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{"cellarURIs": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f65d9a2e-cf0c-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1", "title": "THE COMMUNITY'S SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS (Communication from the Commission to the Council)", "langIdentifier": "ENG", "mtypes": "pdf", "workTypes": "http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#resource_legal,http://publications.europa.eu/ontology/cdm#work", "authors": "European Commission", "date": "1975-02-05", "subjects": "EU situation,energy diversification,exploitation of the sea-bed,international cooperation,mineral resources,mining industry,raw material,security of supply,shortage", "workIds": "celex:51975DC0050,comnat:COM_1975_0050_FIN", "eurovoc_concepts": ["EU situation", "energy diversification", "exploitation of the sea-bed", "international cooperation", "mineral resources", "mining industry", "raw material", "security of supply", "shortage"], "url": "http://publications.europa.eu/resource/cellar/f65d9a2e-cf0c-11ed-a05c-01aa75ed71a1", "lang": "eng", "formats": ["pdf"], "text": "ARCHIVES HISTORIQUES\nDE LA COMMISSION\n\nCOLLECTION RELIEE DES\nDOCUMENTS \"COM\"\n\nCOM (75) 50\n\nVol. 1975/0020\n\n\fDisclaimer\n\nConform\u00e9ment au r\u00e8glement (CEE, Euratom) n\u00b0 354/83 du Conseil du 1er f\u00e9vrier 1983\nconcernant l'ouverture au public des archives historiques de la Communaut\u00e9 \u00e9conomique\neurop\u00e9enne et de la Communaut\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne de l'\u00e9nergie atomique (JO L 43 du 15. 2. 1983,\np. 1), tel que modifi\u00e9 par le r\u00e8glement (CE, Euratom) n\u00b0 1700/2003 du 22 septembre 2003\n(JO L 243 du 27. 9. 2003, p. 1), ce dossier est ouvert au public. Le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, les documents\nclassifi\u00e9s pr\u00e9sents dans ce dossier ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9classifi\u00e9s conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 l'article 5 dudit\nr\u00e8glement. In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 354/83 of 1 February 1983\nconcerning the opening to the public of the historical archives of the European Economic\nCommunity and the European Atomic Energy Community (OJ L 43, 15. 2. 1983, p. 1), as\namended by Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1700/2003 of 22 September 2003 (OJ L 243,\n27. 9. 2003, p. 1), this file is open to the public. Where necessary, classified documents in this\nfile have been declassified in conformity with Article 5 of the aforementioned regulation. die\n\n\u00fcber\n\n1983\n\nIn \u00dcbereinstimmung mit der Verordnung (EWG, Euratom) Nr. 354/83 des Rates vom 1. Februar\nder Europ\u00e4ischen\nWirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europ\u00e4ischen Atomgemeinschaft (ABI. L 43 vom 15. 2. 1983,\nS. 1), ge\u00e4ndert durch die Verordnung (EG, Euratom) Nr. 1700/2003 vom 22. September 2003\n(ABI. L 243 vom 27. 9. 2003, S. 1),\nist diese Datei der \u00d6ffentlichkeit zug\u00e4nglich. Soweit\nerforderlich, wurden die Verschlusssachen in dieser Datei in \u00dcbereinstimmung mit Artikel 5\nder genannten Verordnung freigegeben. historischen Archive\n\nFreigabe\n\nder\n\n\fCOMMISSION OF THE EU&GK3AN COMMUNITIES\n\nCOM ( 75 ) 50\n\nBrussels # 5 february 1975\n\nTHE COMMUNITY 'S SUE PLIES OF RAW MATERIALS\n\n( Communication from the Commission to the Council)\n\nCOM (. 75 ) 50\n\n\fI. TNTROIXTGTTON\n\nThe forging of closer links betvreen \"the countries producing oil and some\n\nother raw materials ,\n\nthe nationalization of extractive industries ,\n\nthe\n\nsharp price rises occurring over the last three years , and the final\n\ndeclaration of the tenth Special Session of the United Fat ions General\n\nAssembly amply justify a serious examination of possible future problems\n\nin the supply of raw materials for Europe. In the short term ,\n\nthe raw materials supper situation seems far less\n\nserious than , although not unconnected with , other current economic\n\nproblems \u2013 inflation ,\n\nthe threat of recession , adverse balances of\n\npayments ,\n\nthe use presently being made of petrodollars , and the danger\n\nof a return to protectionism and the consequent disruption of world trade. Moreover ,\n\nthe risk of an absolute worldwide shortage of most essential\n\nmaterials is , in the view of experts , extremely slight. Nevertheless ,\n\nEurope is facing a real and serious problem. Historically , Europe became the world 's first industrial power because,\n\nshe was the first to extract coal , and iron , copper and zinc ores , etc. ,\n\nfrom her soil. And , when she had erdiausted or had almost exhausted her\n\nthen known mineral resources she had to import the raw materials needed\n\nto supply her industries. Compared with all the other regions of the\n\nworld ,\n\nthe density of Europe 's population and industry , and. the length\n\nof time during which her own natural resources have been exploited , have-\n\nturned her into a region specializing in the processing of ravr materials\n\nfrom other continents which ehe then resells to them as finished products. Only one other power is faced with the same problem , and even more acutely\n\nnamely Japan , which has for long been aware of the risks inherent in such\na situation and has developed a systematic policy ori' raw material supplies\n\n\fThe other non-European industrialized nations (USA, Canada. Australia ,\nSouth Africa, USSR ) are markedly less densely populated than Europe or\nJapan. They also possess considerably greater mineral resources which ,\n\nmoreover ,\n\n\"because they have been more recently developed , have not yet\n\nbeen exhausted. Consequently , some countries have been devoting more\n\nand more attention to the problems raised by the exhaustion of natural\n\nresources and by export restrictions. In recent decades ,\n\nthe risks involved in Europe 's higher level of\n\ndependences on imports than other continents * have continued to multiply. Increasingly , less developed countries are nationalizing foreign\n\ncompanies and , in particular , mining companies which can slow down\n\nprospecting and the working cf new deposits. Producing countries are\n\nattempting ,\n\nthrough concerted action , to obtain steep price rises for\n\ntheir raw materials. Moreover ,\n\nthey wish to pursue their own economic\n\nand social development through processing their own raw materials\n\nthemselves. Instead of being surprised by the UN declaration , we must ,\n\ntherefore ,\n\nattempt to build a future assuring each nation a fair share of tho world 's\n\neconomic and social development. In short ,\n\nthe problem facing Europe\n\nappears to be :\n\n- a constantly developing range of manufacturing activities must ba\n\nmaintained as the cornerstone of Europe 's economic and social\n\nstructure ;\n\n\u2013 although it must not be disregarded ,\n\nthe potential offered by\n\nEurope 's mineral resources , by material recycling and economies\n\nin use cannot guarantee maintenance of the economic development\n\nto which our countries aspire :\n\n,\n\n\u2013 it is therefore essential that Europe maintains access to sources\n\nof supply frail developing countries on conditions offering mutual\n\nlong\u2013term satisfaction. - 3 -\n\nOne must also ask whether the mining industry and distribution companies >\n\ncan alone bear the risks to which they ere exposed and fulfil the economic\n\nand social obligations to the raw material producing countries as well as\n\nto Europe implicit in their role. This document deals neither with foodstuffs , except for protein plants ,\n\nnor with energy sources , which are in any case covered by the agricultural\n\npolicy and by the joint proposals concerning energy policy. When the time comes it would be desirable for the analysis also to cover\n\nbasic foodstuffs. The Commission intends to put forward proposals cn\n\nthis subject ,\n\n11 ,\n\nTHE MAIN PR0Z3L5-Z AFT) POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS\n\nFor the purpose of analysis raw material supply problems may be classified\n\nunder the following headings :\n\n\u2013 insufficient knowledge of the present and future outlook for each\n\nraw material ,\n\n\u2013 the prospect of relative or absolute shortages in the medium and\n\nlong-term. *\n\n\u2013 insufficient diversificatiori of sources of supplyj\n\n\u2013 the trend towards processing raw materials in their country of\n\norigin ;\n\n\u2013 the risk of temporary bottlenecks crid price fluctuations ,,\n\nA ,\n\nInsuffi cient knowledge ,\n\nA long-term Community strategy for the supply of raw materials cannot be\n\nbased solely on the data which the Cconiissioii is able to assemble on its\n\nown account \u201e\n\n\fDifferent raw materials need specific strategies , Analyses , for a fairly\n\nlarge number of products , of supply and demand ,\n\nthe extent and location of\n\nknown reserves , prospective growth in requirements broken down by consumer\n\nsector , problems with regard to pollution and the environment and\n\npotential for recycling and substitution are therefore needed to allow\n\npresent aad future problems to be pinpointed. Only the close and systematic collaboration of experts in the relevant\ntechnological , economic )\nsubjects ( geological ,\n\nfrom the member countries\n\nwill make possible the assembly of all the facts needed for the evolution\n\nof a European raw material policy. B. Prospe cts of relative or absolute rhort ages in the msdiun gnd long-term\n\nFew raw materials give rise to fears of permanent scarcity , although some\nleathers and skin , pulping wood ); and it may\ndo ( e. g. , protein products ,\nlargely for ecological\nprove necessary to avoid x-zasting certain others ,\n\nreasons ;\n\njihus , for most metals , recycling uses much less energy than ore. refining. Mhere there is scarcity the solutions ,\n\nthough easy to conceive , may be\n\ndifficult to put into practice. Apart from regenerable materials , such\n\nas wood , which offer other possibilities ,\n\nthey comprise :\n\n\u2013 optimum recycling of waste ;\n\n\u2013 substitution by other materials and by new manufacturing processes ;\n\n- extension of product life and improved operating economy. This requires research , standardisation end the dissemination of good\n\n\u25a0 practice. 1. Devel omcnt of recycling and of the exploitation of by-products. Recycling raises problems both for the organization of waste recovery , and\n\n\fits profitability. Solutions to these may \"best be sought in the framework\n\nof environment policy. The improvement of technical and economic aspects\n\nof the recovery and use of waste and by-p -roducts ought to be the object\n\nof research and development projects launched by the CREST raw materials\n\nsub\u2013committee. 2. Development of substitution -\n\n\u25a0. Research should also. be done with a view to replacing products for which\n\nthere is a risk of relative or absolute shortage , by others not subject\n\nto the same supply difficulties. '\u20223. Operating economy and extension of product life. Improvements in product quality pave the way for large-scale economies. However , competitive pressures often lead the manufacturers of consumer-\n\ndurables to reduce tho durability of their products or disregard\n\n\u25a0 operating economy if lack of consumer awareness permits. There needs ,\n\ntherefore , to be study of the operation of such products ,\n\nleading to the\n\ndevelopment of technical standards , and to consumers being better informed\n\nabout what they are buying *. Such a programme , which could include ,\n\ninter alia ,\n\ninformation campaigns and the introduction of a \" European\n\nquality mark\", should form part of the policy on consumer. protection. C. Insufficient diversification of sources of supply. For most raw materials the Community 's degree of dependence on imports\nfrora non-member countries varies between \"JOffo and. 100$. These figures\n\nclearly tend to increase in parallel iri. th the growth of industrial\n\nactivity in Europe. 6 -\n\nOwing to the geographical location of known reserves ,\n\nthe Community\n\ndepends , or will soon depend , for a number of raw materials on a very \u25a0\n\nsmall number of supplier countries. This raises two questions :\n\n\u2013 in acme cases these may be political problems ;\n- in others the dominant position occupied by one or more producing\n\ncountries on the trorld or Community market\n\nleaves the Community\n\nopen to the unilateral imposition of unacceptable conditions\n\nregarding quantity or price. Opportunities for spreading these risks should therefore be explored. The possibility of self-sufficiency. \u25a0 -\u25a0\n\nEurope cannot engage in autarchical policies. to a final break between the industrialized countries and the rest ,\n\nSuch a response would lead\n\nwith disastrous political , human and economic consequence^. especially\n\nfor Europe. In sny event , it would be foolish to hope that by better\n\nexploiting her own minerals , and improving her recycling end product\n\nutilization techniques , Europe could achieve a level of s el ' -sufficiency\n\ngreat enough to shelter her from interruptions of external supply. This does not , however , mean that the limited resources which the\nCommunity does have should not be exploited rationally. First, of all ,\n\nit is. possible that the production of regenerable animal or vegetable\n\nmaterials such as pulping wood could be developed in the Community ,\n\nIn\n\nthis instance the machinery of the. common agricultural market and more\n\nparticularly the EAGGP enable such action to be carried through. Secondly , an overall re-examination and updating of the map of the\nCommunity 's mineral reserves could produce useful results. A lasting rise\n\nin raw material prices and improvements in extraction techniques might\n\nmake the working of low\u2013grade ores economic. new prospecting techniques such as remote sensing , and the presence in\n\nThe potential opened up by\n\n\f- 7 -\n\nthe Community of territory not yet fully explored as in Greenland or ,\n\nto a lesser extent , Ireland , suggest that such a re\u2013examination-would\" \"be. worthwhile. Moreover , relatively recent, discoveries of deposits of\n\nhydrocarbons , coal , uranium ,\n\nlead , zinc , copper and fluorine show that\n\nsubstantial mineral resources may still be found beneath European. soil. 2. Exploitation of tlie sea bed. Whether the exploitation of the sea bed will count as own resources , or\n\n- be considered an external source , will depend on the exact geographical\n\nlocation of submarine deposits and developments of the law of the sea. 'Ihichever the case , results already obtained in the IJorth Sea are\n\nsufficient to justify the continuation , if not stepping up , of research\n\nin connection with the exploration and exploitation of the sea bed. Moreover work done for the United Nations indicates that for some metals\n\nproduction from metalliferous nodules to be found on the sea bed could by\nI985 cover a relatively larger proportion of the import requirements of\nindustrialized countries , for example 13$ of manganese or 26?o of nickel. 3 \u00ab\n\n'Diversification of external sources of supply. Although efforts on these lines have not up to. now been very successful ,\n\n\u25a0\n\nit is nevertheless true that , for a number of products ,\n\nthe supplier\n\ncompanies or countries are so few in number and their interests coincide\n\nso closely that they could agree amongst themselves on monoplistic\nIn addition , the political instability of certain supplier\naction. countries threatens the regularity of supplies. For both Community countries and mining companies the problem is , as it\n\nwere , one of insurance and calls for an effort to spread the risks. The limits of this effort will of course depend on the comparative costs\n\nof exploring and exploiting such alternative sources , as may be found. - 8 -\n\n( a) Company oligopolies\n\nThe potential risks inherent in oligopolies or dominent positions. occupied\n\nby mining companies should be dealt with in three ways ,\n\nin addition to the\n\nimplementation of the rules governing competition set out in the Treaties ;\n\nFirst there is the adoption of a series of measures aimed at reducing the\n\npossibility of abuse open to multinational corporations\n\nby means of\n\neffective collaboration among the public authorities. This course\n\nincludes , inter alia , active participation by the Comratur. ty and the Member\n\nStates in the activities , of the 0\u00b1CCD and the United Nations in the same\n\nfield. Secondly there is the possibility of a close co-ordination of competition\n\npolicies between the respohsible authorities in the United States , Japan\n\nand the Community. Such co-ordination could help to avoid the\n\ndistortion of competition which would result from unlawful agreements and\n\nabuses of dominant positions by industry. Thirdly there is the way proposed a long time ago by the Commission in\n\nits memorandum on industrial policy. It consists of supporting the\n\nformation and development of European-based companies capable of taking\n\non their overseas rivals and thus re-establishing that balance of\n\ncompetition which is so often lacking ,\n\n(b ) Recourse to other developed countries. \u2022\n\nAil obvious initial action to reduce risks would be to look for supplies\n\nfrom the greatest possible number of developed countries. This is the\n\npath which mining companies prefer to tread. x see Commission communi Cation to the Council of 8 ITovember 1973\n\nentitled \"Multinational companies and Community regulations \" ( Doc. COM ( 73 ) 1930 ). However , these5 countries are the ones most able , to turn raw materials\n\ninto finished products \"themselves. They would therefore frequently - find\n\nit unattractive to exhaust their own natural resources to sell to\n\nITur ope- products with a 1 ow added' value ; it must be noted that ,\n\nin this\n\ncase ,\n\nthere is a divergence of interest \"between the European consuming\n\nnations and the mining companies , even where they are European\u2013based ,. since the local processing of the raw materials which they extract does\n\nnot conflict with their own interests ,\n\nMoreover such steps ,\n\nlike those in connection with self-sufficiency ,\n\nshould only be taken when they will not maintain or even widen the gulf\n\nseparating the industrial. from the under-developed nations ,\n\n( c ) Prospecting and mining in the loss de\\reloped countries. The narrow geographic limits of the known reserves of many minerals cannot\n\nbe regarded as definitive'. Their concentration in North. America, along\n\nthe Andes' ;Cordillera , in South Africa , Rhodesia, Zambia and Zaire , ih the\n\nUSSR , China, Korea and Australia- probably merely traces the explorations\n\nof the past. It is hard to believe that similar exploration in\n\nneighbouring or. even totally different areas. would not lead ta. im-portant\n\ndiscoveries which could diversify sources of supply and thus spread\n\nthe. political and oligopolistic risks which. face us ,; But. exploration \u25a0\nand. exploitation are linked activities ,. It would 'be absurd to expect\n\nprivate companies to spend money1 on prospecting without a firm expectation\n\nof- ^a- role in the exploitation of their discoveries or a share of the\n\n\"\n\nproducts extracted ,\n\n-. \u25a0\n\n\u2022\n\n\u2022\n\n>\n\nMining companies with the skills and finah. cial res. ources needed to\n\ndiscover and exploit reserves ihat could give us adequate supplies exist\n\nin -\n\n-the Community ,. However ,\n\nthere are many countries in which theywould\n\nbe chary of operating' because of the risk of being nationalized. Such\n\ncountries often do not yet - possess the know-how or financial resources\nthey would need to prospect and work their own 'territory effectively. - 10-\n\nIn consequence the technical and financial potential of the largo mining\ncompanies often remains dormant for lack of adequate guarantees. Action to guarantee and provide a return on nrivate investment in less\n\ndeveloped countries could release a flow of private funds and have\n\nsurprisingly fruitful results for the Under-developed countries as well\n\nas for Europe. >\n\n( d ) Joint ventures. There are two sorts of risk to \"be spread - those relating to the nwnber\nof our sources of supply ( just discussed ) and those relating to investments\n\nin them. ;\n\n,\n\nt,\n\n_\n\n\u25a0;\n\nAny system set up on a Community level ought ,\n\ntherefore , to provide\n\nincentives for mining companies in different member countries to pool\n\ntheir efforts \u2013 possibly in collaboration with others from -non-member\n\nstates - and spread their risks through joint ventures. , D. The processing of raw material s in their country. of origin. The trend towards processing in the country of origin is emerging for a\n\nwhole series of raw materials ,\n\nin particular wood , wood pulp , textile fibres ,\n\ncopper and zinc. It is therefore becoming essential to seek ways of\n\n-\n\nreconciling the interests of the producing with those of the consuming\n\ncountries. 1 , Pror>erty and nrofit sharing. A primary aim must be to enable local interests , public or private , to\nobtain an increasing share in the cqpitai , profits end -management of' niininj\n\noperations carried out on their territory. \" The conditions and pace of thics\n\ngradual partial transfer of property and responsibility could be decided\n\n\fand arranged on mutually satis factors'- terras between the authorities and\n\ncompanies of the producing countries and those in the Community ,\n\nIn this\n\nway ,\n\nthe risk of nationalization , which is curbing companies * activities\n\nand thus both reducing the income of less developed countries and Europe 's\n\nsupplies of raw materials would gradually diminish. If account is taken of the way in which the riskiness and profitability\n\nof mining and of manufacturing differ , it would also seem logical\n\ngradually to extend participation by public or private interests' of raw\n\nmaterial producing countries into the downstream manufacturing activities\n\nperformed in Europe. Such a process should also be covered by framework\n\nagreements between the authorities in the producing countries and in Europe\n\nIn this way , solidarity between the less developed countries and Europe ,\n\nwhich to date has been only too lacking , should take shape , and numerous\n\nsources of tension would be eliminated. However ,\n\nthere must be no illusions about the difficulties to be overcome\n\nto make the use of joint ventures sufficiently widespread to be effective. First , the means available to the Communities' public authorities for\n\ninducing private companies to a. ccept the idea of sharing the ownership of\n\ntheir installations with third country raw material suppliers are extremely\n\nlimited. Secondly ,\n\nthe most simple and straightforward way of implementing such a\n\njoint venture would be to exchange shares for raw materials. But the\n\nmajority of the less developed countries urgently need the funds they\n\nreceive in payment for their raw materials , and can hardly afford the\n\nluxury of foregoing these in order to obtain shares in European companies\n\noperating on their own territory or in Europe. There are possible ways of operating mines which offer opportunities for\n\nprofit sufficient to avoid both of these problems. In other cases it will\n\nperhaps be necessary for the political authorities to take specific action\n\n\f- 12 -\n\nin order to give the less developed countries the opportunity to buy\nshares in the local , or even the European operations of Community companies,\non an instalment basis , and to provide such companies with guarantees\n\nsufficient to stimulate investment by them in these countries. A Community organization specializing in overseas investment\n\ninsurance\n\nand finance could perhaps be made responsible for pursuing these objectives ,\n\n2. Distribution of work throughout th e world ,\n\nDespite its advantages a system of cross shareholdings cannot resolve\n\nall the problems facing Europe and the third world. Those less developed\n\ncountries which possess both raw materials and underemployed populations\n\njustifiably wish to upgrade both on the spot. Fear of this trend leads industrialists in developed countries to demand\n\nprotectionist measures. But such an approach to the problem leads nowhere. The industrialized raw material producing countries already have this\n\ncapacity and the less developed producing countries are bound to acquire\n\nit some day. Europe must be continuously aware of this trend , otherwise\n\nshe will find hevself with an industrial structure starved of raw\n\nmaterials \u00bb\n\nThis solution necessarily involves a rational distribution of industrial\n\nactivity throughout the world , particularly in favour of the less developed\n\ncountries , i. e. , Europe must be willing gradually to give up the exercise\n\nof industrial activities which can often be performed better elsewhere. Such a renunciation would be tempered to the extent that it was\n\naccompanied by European investment in the third world. Reason should\n\ntherefore lead Europe to accept the processing of raw materials in their\n\ncountry of origin where such an operation is economically justified. - 13 -\n\nEurope has already taken some important steps m this direction ,\n\nparticularly within the system of generalized preference^ but accompanying\nmeasures would have to be considered ,\n\n- With the co-operation of industry'\n\nand the representatives of European workers , and in consultation with the\n\nauthorities in the various supplier countries ,\n\nthe public authorities\n\nin the Community countries should organize :\n\n- the gradual run-down of aid to those European production activities\n\nwhich can be carried cut more economically in the countries\n\nsupplying the raw materials ;\n\n\u2013 the provision , as soon as possible , of a legal tax and financial\n\nframework that will encourage Community industrialists to participate\n\nactively in the development of such activities in the less developed\n\ncountries ;\n\n- in suitable cases , the provision by the public authorities of the\n\nnecessary financial resources and technical assistance ;\n\n\u2013 aid schemes to reduce the harmful social and regional consequences\n\nthat may result from these changes. E. The risk of temporary bottlenecks and pri c e fluctuations. Temporary bottlenecks in supply and the rocketing prices accompanying\n\nthou may result from unforeseen increases in demand , insufficient\n\ninvestment the actions of oligopolies of companies or producing countries\n\nor froa speculative operations. The second and third alternatives are dealt with mainly under C and D\n\nIn order to cushion such risks a number of protective measures\n\nabove. can be implemented \"*\":\u2013\n\n1 ,\n\nThe conclusion of long-term contracts \u201e\n\nRecent events affecting a number of raw materials or sources of energy,\n\n1 Export restrictions are not discussed here because thejr can be of little\nuse for the Community , which is a net importer of nost raw materials and\nwould expose itself to more effective retaliation if it adopted such\nmeasures. They should therefore only be used with care and deliberation. - 14 -\n\nand the differences that the existence of long-term contacts has made ,\n\nwhere consuming companies have entered into them , to the impact of\n\nthose events , has demonstrated the stabilizing effect of such\n\ncontracts. In effect ,\n\nthe violent fluctuations in quoted prices\n\nhave mainly affected dealings on the free market , which often account\n\nfor only a fairly small proportion of our supplies. Although long-term contracts can bo broken unilaterally , Community\n\ncompanies should be encouraged to conclude such agreements ; and , if they\n\nare not large enough to do so alone ,\n\nthey must be encouraged to form\n\nconsortia or purchasing co-operatives that would be capable of doing\n\nso. 2. The building up of emergency stocks. It may prove desirable for the Community to build up emergency stocks\n\nin those few cases where the Community is dependent upon a very limited\nnumber of suppliers ( countries or companies ) and where :\n\n\u2013 those countries may , for reasons of domestic or foreign policy ,\n\ncut off supplies if only for limited periods ( tungsten for example );\n\n\u2013 those countries might wish to exploit their oligopoly position in\n\norder to impose unacceptable conditions of sale ;\n\n\u2013 a sharp upturn in demand , clearly outpacing any possible expansion\n\n\u25a0 of - existing capacity , becomes a probability ( as in the case of\nplatinum ). The measures to be implemented in such cases depend on the raw material\n\ninvolved. '\n\n\u2022\n\nFor bulky materials ,\nthe only practicable solution would seem to be to\nrequire companies using them to build up emergency stocks expressed in\n\n\fterms of number of days' consumption either themselves or , particularly\nfor small and medium-sized undertakings , by forming consortia or\npurchasing co-operatives to do so. In the case of materials having a high unit value , this function could\nbe delegated to an agency, acting at a Community level and having a\npublic or mixed status. However , before such decisions are taken it\nwill be necessary to balance carefully the costs against the risks to\n\nbe covered ,\n\n3 ,\n\nInternational listening poets ,. For seme products the activities of private or public international\nstudy groups improve knowledge of world needs and thus encourage\nnecessary expansion of production. It would be useful to know to what\nextent the operation of existing groups ( e. g. , those for rubber , lead\nor zinc ) could or should be improved and with what other materials this\ntype of solution should be sought. information about companies producing and distributing raw materials\nand their importance as Community suppliers. helpful , at an early stage , to seek a dialogue with the larger undertakings\non which the Community depends for supplies. aimed at obtaining a clearer picture of the state of our supplies ,. Such groups should furnish better\n\nThis dialogue should be\n\nIn any event it would be\n\n4. Different types of international agreements. Follovdng the rise in the price of sccie commodities , the hazards of a\nsituation in which export restrictions are not subject to international\nsurveillance have been increasingly acknowledged. effort by the international community to bring about seme co-operative\nsystem that will prevent sudden disruption of trade and enable any\nnecessary changes to be carried through gradually. This calls for an\n\n\fThis subject should be taken up in multilateral trade negotiations. Greater\nclarity and international discipline through the observance of existing\nrules and adoption of any necessary new ones would appear to be essential. The Community should point out emphatically that Article XI of the GATT\n\nprohibits quantitative export restrictions , except in certain clearly\n\ndefined situations , and should try to establish a new notification and\n\nconsultation procedure. At the very least , countries imposing quantitative\n\nexport restrictions should be asked to justify than , as were those\n\nimposing quantitative import restrictions ,\n\nin the context of the GATT\n\njoint working party on quantitative restrictions. The question of\n\nquantitative export restrictions cannot of course be divorced from that\n\nof export taxes which ,\n\nin some circumstances , can be used to achieve the\n\nsame effect. Several other approaches could be considered , possibly in combination :\n\n\u2013 effort to establish a code of conduct for export restrictions ;\n\n\u2013 detailed negotiations , product by product , between exporting and\n\nimporting countries , and where appropriate sectoral agreements , to\n\nobtain better management of supplies and involving joint responsibility\nby supplier and consumer countries\"'' ;\n\n\u2013 carrying the above approach further , international commodity agree\u00ad\n\nments could be concluded , for some essential raw materials ,\n\nto\n\nstabilize markets in the interests both of producing and consuming\n\ncountries. In the form taken hitherto , commodity agreements have not been primarily\nconcerned with supply problems \u2013 their essential aim has been to stabilize\n\nmarkets in the interests of producers. In a new form these agreements - which ,\n\nin the nature of things will\n\nalways be few in number - could guard against supply problems by the\n\n1 In other cases , especially where state trading countries are involved or\nthe number of supplier countries for the product concerned is limited ,\nCommunity could also envisage the conclusion of bilateral agreements on\nindustrial and technological co-operation incorporating in return certain\narrangements to ensure regular supplies of raw materials. the\n\n\fsystematic buildirg-up , where appropriate , of stocks of raw materials or\n\nindeed of semi-processed products. To their traditional function of\n\nregulating markets could be added that of regulating supplies. This would\n\ninvolve the joint management of stocks , by importers as well as exporters ,\nwho would then share the costs involved ,\n\nHI. THE IMP LBIETCTATIOH\" OP 'TEE SOLUTIONS\n\nThe supply of raw materials for the Community is an aim calling for an\n\noverall strategy to be taken into account in the whole range of Community\n\npolicies - that is ,\n\nthe external affairs , co-operation , industrial , regional\n\nsocial , research , environment ar. d consumer protection policies. Thi3 csn\n\nonly be brought about by the adoption of c com on guidelines vrhich provide\n\na spur tc action in addition to serving as an instrument of co-ordination ,. It must be admitted that a number of elements needed for the definition\n\nand imp 1 era ent at i on of such a strategy are currently lacking. These are :\n\n\u2013 an adequate instrument for the analysis of future prospects and the\n\ndefinition of the measures called for ;\n\n\u2013 a prospecting service befitting Europe ;\n\n\u2013 adequate guidance for research activities. ;\n\n\u2013 means of finance and guarantee capable of stimulating the necessary\n\ninvestment ;\n\n,\n\n\u2013 an overall concept for commodity agreements and a methodical seeking\n\nafter multilateral solutions. 1 , Orgnnizaticn of co\u2013op\u00e9ration. It is therefore essential to organize close co-operation and consultation\n\nbetween the national authorities responsible for raw material supplies. - 13 -\n\nThe main purposes of this co-operation , for which support should be sought\n\nfrom the private sector , would be :\n\n\u2013 to collect economic information on raw material supplies ( inventory\n\nof common resources , assessment of needs , possibilities of\nsubstitution , recycling and economies in use , ecological constraints );\n\n\u2013 to compare available resources and future needs and monitor the\n\nmergence and development of factors likely to influence supplies\nto the Community ( risks of breaks in supplies , formation of\nproducer cartels , etc ,);\n\n\u2013 to appraise action taken at national level for ensuring adequate\n\nsupplies , so as to highlight any gaps or duplication and identify\n\nthe areas in which co-ordination would be desirable ;\n\n\u2013 to provide contacts with the large raw material winning and\n\ndistributing companies ;\n\n\u2013 without prejudice to existing responsibilities ,\n\nto obtain an overall\n\nview of present or future activity by way of external negotiations\nin a number of bodies ( OECD , UNCTAD , GATT, etc. ) which might affect\n\nraj'/ material supply ;\n\n\u2013 to finalize and propose , with details of costs ,\n\nthe joint steps\n\nwhich the Community should undertake in order to overcome any\n\ndifficulties pinpointed. Recommendations of this type could , for instance , relate to the encouragement\n\nof long-term contracts ,\n\nthe setting-up of purchasing groups ,\n\nimplementation\n\nof stockpiling formulae , support of programmes for prospecting and use ,\n\nsubstitution , recycling , more economic consumption of materials or the\n\nreconstitution of renewable resources through the granting of aid , tax\n\nconcessions and guarantees or financing facilities ,\n\nThe sub-committee on R&D into Raw Uaterials , which the CREST Committee\n\ndecided , on 30 October 1974 \u00bb\n\n\"to set up would provide a natural forum for\n\n\f- 19 -\n\nco-operation in R 4 D, particularly for guiSing geological and mining\n\nresearch , updating the Community map of metal deposits , providing technical\n\nassistance for prospecting in less developed countries , developing\n\ntechniques for remote sensing , for exploring and exploiting the sea bed ,\n\nand new techniques for vanning and processing oros , for recycling and for\n\neconomies of use. Ways of obtaining Community co-operation in other fields have yet to be\n\nfound or established. In order to define these the Commission intends\n\nto call in the near future a meeting of senior national officials responsible\n\nfor various aspects of raw material supplies. 2 , Financing and tarante es ,\n\nOne of the main problems is to encourage the investments needed for the\nprospecting, exploitation and upgrading of mineral resources. This has\n\nbeen made difficult in several developing countries by the nationalization\n\nof foreign mining companies. As discussed on page 10 above ,\n\nthe\n\ndevelopment of new forms of property shared between local and foreign\n\ninterests can help to avoid the pressures leading to nationalization. However , such forms of property will demand more initial financing of\n\ninvestment projects which are already very expensive. Under the\n\ncircumstances it is necessary to consider setting up a finance and\n\nguardJitee institution. Under agreements between European authorities or companies and their\n\ncounterparts in less developed countries , such an institution could , with\n\nfunds borrowed on the capital market , subscribe some agreed percentage\n\nof new investments in less developed countries in the form of shares in\n\neither the local or parent company which it would then transfer to members\nof the local population ( private or public ) either immediately, ar in step\nwith the distribution of profits which could then be used to repay the\n\noriginal loan. - 20 -\n\nIn addition , if arrangements acceptable to the host country could \"be\nreached in order to ensure fair sharing of the responsibility for the\npotential risks , Community companies accepting such a plan for the\npartial transfer of their assets could, in addition to initial funding,\nbe protected by a guarantee against political risks. Special conditions could perhaps be agreed upon to encourage joint ventures\nby. Community undertakings. The Commission will also examine any concrete suggestions concerning\nthese financing and guarantee problems at a Community level as part of a\ncoherent financial pro. gramme. (\n\n\f- 20a -\n\nIV. PRODUCT-BY-PROUJCT EXAMETATION\n\nA raw materials supply stretegy can obviously not be mapped out or\n\nimplemented without a prior study of the position as regards individual\n\nproducts. \"\n\nFor practical reasons the Commission has initially confined itself to\nexamining twenty or so minerals (aluminium , chromium , oobalt , copper , tin ,\niron , magnesium , manganese , mercury , molybdenum , platinum , lead , titanium ,\ntungsten , vanadium , zinc and phosphates ), a few products of vegetable\norigin (natural rubber , cotton , vegetable oils , wood pulp ), two products\nof animal origin (wool , and skins and leather ) and proteins. This examination will of course have to be taken further with the assistance\n\nof national experts and extended to at least ten or so other raw materials ,\n\n1. Products not giving rise to major problems\n\nThis initial examination has revealed that a number of products do not\n\npresent any major supply problems. (a) Minerais\nThese are cobalt , ma^iesiun , mercury , molybdenum , nickel , lead ,\n\ntitanium and vanadium. Although two-thirds of the world cobalt production is concentrated in\n\nZaire , the fact that', it is to a large extent extracted from copper and\nniokel ores , and the scope for substituting chromium , molybdenum ,\n\nniokel or vanadium make the risk of a shortage very remote. Deposits of magnesium are widely distributed across the world. Reserves\nare practically inexhaustible and Norway alone could provide the\nCommunities' needs. Antipollution measures should lead to a very substantial reduction in\nmercury consumption , the market for which is facing a crisis of over\u00ad\n\n\f- 21-\n\nproduction ; mercury is available in very many. countries ,\n\n\"but in\n\nparticular Spain and the USSR,\n\nthe world 's main producers. Although largely concentrated in the in ori can continent , molybdenum\n\nreserves are adequate * Despite the fact that the main production\n\ncentres belong to a few large firms , price manipulation would be\n\ndifficult- as about half the production cooes from the processing\n\nof copper ores. At the present time there is surplus production of. nickel. , The known\n\nreserves are about 150 tiraos the present annual world consumption , and\n\nare divided between North and South America, Africa , Asia, Australia\n\nand the USSR , The oligopoly exercised by four large companies has been\n\ndissolved and possibilities exist for substitution by other elements\n\nsuch as manganese , cobalt , molybdenum , chromium and aluminium. The problem of lead is somewhat like that of mercury. Pollution\n\ncontrol will prevent anything more than a moderate increase in\n\nconsumption in the future , wliilo considerable deposits have just been\ndiscovered in Ireland , and a large part ( 38^) of the Community 's\n\nsupply is provided by recycling. Titraiun consumption is closely related to developments in the\n\naviation and space fields , \u201e This may perhaps justify participation in\n\nthe exploitation of rutile deposits in Africa and Latin America. Known reserves of vanadium are very high. ' Since this element is also. a by\u2013product of the reduction of many iron ores , of the phosphate\nindustry and of oil refining , there appears to be no risk of a\nshortage. (b ) Vegetbble products -,\n\nThe case. of natural rubber appears to be marginal. Thanks to synthetic\n\n\f- 22 -\n\nrubber ,\n\nthe Comnunity is self-sufficient to the extent of two-thirds\n\nof its supplies , Eighty five percent of the world production of\nnatural rubber canes from four countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand\nand Sri Lanka), However , competition from synthetic rubber ,\n\nthe\n\nconsumption of which is rising twice as rapidly as that of natural\n\nrubber , makes oligopolistic action very improbable. The supply\n\nsituation could possibly be improved by an improvement in the\n\ntechnical qualities of natural rubber , which should be achieved by the\n\nproducing countries , and , if necessary , by the development of\n\nproduction in Africa ,\n\n2 , Products giving cause for concern. Attention will therefore be concentrated on the other products under\n\nconsideration. ( a) Minerais\n\nThe Comnunity is totally dependent on outside sources for its supplies\n\nof other mineral ores , with the exception of tin ,\n\niron and zinc ,\n\n;\n\n80 to\n\nof which comes from outside. Aluminium is required in particular by an affluent society and has\n\ntaken the place of less noble materials such as steel or wood. In\n\nthe event of shortage , a return to the earlier materials would be\n\npossible ,\n\n- Bauxite is available in many places. Thirty countries ,\n\nfew of them possessing refining plant , produce it. Electrolytic\n\ntreatment of bauxite uses so much energy that its development in the\n\nComnunity should be avoided if adequate supplies of the metal can be\n\nsecured. Greater participation by Community firms in the. mining\n\nof bauxite and in electrolytic treatment, operations in producer\n\ncountries thus appears desirable ,. - 23 -\n\nAlthough the known world reserves of chromium cover about 100 tines\n\nthe present annual consumption ,\nRhodesia own JCfi and a Japanese consortium has obtained control of a\nfurther 15$ shows the t;npe of risk to which the Community is exposed. that South Africa and\n\nthe fact\n\nCopper reserves do not lead one to foresee difficulties at least for\n\nthe next 50 years. Problems result essentially from heavy dependence\n\nupon the CIPEC countries , possible lack of steps to open up new\n\nmining sites , and the need for Community industry to fall in with\n\nthe pressure to undertake the initial processing of ore in the\n\nproducing countries ,\n\n?or tin the main problems are the improvement of the working of the\n\nInternational Agreement and buffer stock , and the transfer netal\n\nproduction to the ore producing oountries. Iron reserves present no problem , nevertheless , difficulties may\n\narise from the fact that Community industry plays almost no part in\n\nopening up new :. iining sites and therefore docs not gain sufficient\n\ncontrol over its sources of supply , and that it resists the trend\n\ntowards ore reduction in the source country instead of adapting to it. In the case of mgnganese ,\n\nthe fact that half the known reserves are\n\nin the USSR and a third in South Africa, while substitution of other\n\nproducts for manganese is barely conceivable , provides a natural\n\n'\n\nincentive for prospecting in other countries to diversify sources\n\nof supply. Platinum raises a similar problem ,\n\n9\n\n\"the known reserves are\n\nin South Africa and the USSR , Antipollution standards may lead to\n\nincrease in platinum and palladium consumption. In this particular\n\ncase , attention should be given to the idea of building up suitable\n\nstocks. For tungsten , 80% of the known reserves are in Communist countries ,\n60$ in China. the Community should engage in prospecting in the hope of diversifying\n\nTo avoid remaining almost entirely dependent on China,\n\nits sources of supply and also give consideration to the possible use\n\nof relatively low\u2013grade ores. What is more ,\n\nthe production of the\n\nmain substitute product , molybdenum ,\n\nto some extent linked to copper\n\nproduction , poses pollution problems. The chances of temporary\n\ninterruptions of tungsten deliveries cannot be discounted * Stock\n\npiling could therefore be justified in this case. Zinc ore producing countries are showing a marked tendency to develop\n\nthe production of metal. Known reserves are situated mainly in\n\nindustrialized countries or in stable or accessible regions. order to retain its'role as the main world processor. ,\n\nthe Community\n\nIn\n\nshould promote geological prospecting in Ireland and Greenland. Phosphates represent to seme extent a typical case of a product for\n\nwhich a supply policy is required. On the one hand , phosphate is\n\ndifficult to replace ; on the other , the Community 's soil contains\n\npractically no phosphates. The Community obtains three-quarters of\n\nits supplies from North Africa and the United States. Less developed\n\ncountries which produce phosphates are increasingly tending, to process\n\nthe phosphates themselves into phosphoric acid and fertilizers. Supply , already tight in 1972 , was not able to meet the 1973 demand ,\n\nand this imbalance was further aggravated by the withdrawal of the\nAmerican tonnage from the market\ncontracts signed with the USSR ). Morocco has quadrupled its prices\n\n(more land under cultivation , supply\n\nin 4 years and its example has been followed in varying degrees by\n\nother producers. This product thus raises not only problems of diversification of\n\nsupply sources , but also of participation in mining ventures in non-\n\n\fmember countries , of long-term contracts , and of concentration \"between\n\nproducer and consumer countries. (b ) Vegetable products\n\nQuestions raised bj'- vegetable products differ from those mentioned\n\npreviously in that plants grow again. Cotton ,\n\nlike other natural fibres is subject to considerable cyclical\n\nfluctuations - its price doubled in 1973 only to fall back in the\n\nfollowing year. Some stability might be sought through the\n\nnegotiation of mediun-terra agreements. Supplying the Community with vegetable oils hardly raises any problems\n\nNevertheless , it is expedient to guard against a narrowing of the\n\nmarket by maintaining a certain level of self-sufficiency , by\n\nencouraging a diversification of supply , more especially through\nagricultural and tropical research , by developing cultivation in the\n\ndeveloping countries and by participation in world agreements. The production of paper at an acceptable cost is threatened by a\nrelative shortage of pulping wood in the 1980s. The Community depends\n\nfor its supplies of pulp. or paper mainly on the countries of North\n\nAmerica and Scandinavia , which wish to process their semi-manufactured\n\nproducts themselves. This calls for a policy of reafforestation in the Community , developin\n\nforestry ventures and initial processing in developing countries , and\n\nan improvement in recycling. ( c ) Animal products\nIn the case of products of animal origin , considerable fluctuations\n\nin the price of wool could probably be buffered by seme international\n\nregulating organization. \" On the other hand ,\n\nthe relative but growing\n\n\fmm 26 \u2013\n\nshortage of leather and skins prompts a move to keep a watch on\n\nexports and to encourage recovery and the development of the\n\nunexploited resources of the third world. ( d ) Protein products\n\nLastly ,\n\nthe supply of the Community with proteins , of \"both vegetable\n\nand animal origin , raises great difficulties which will increase in\n\nthe future. The supply policy should aim at developing the production\n\n'of proteins in the Community ( dehydrated fodders , soya \"beans ,\n\nsynthetic proteins ), seeking a long-term agreement with the United\nStates , whose soya \"bean supply covers 40% of the Community 's\n\nprotein consumption , and promoting protein production in the\n\nassociated countries. 3. ' Examples of the applicability of different tyres of agreement \"by -\n\n\u25a0\n\nproduct \u00bb\n\n'\n\n'\n\n1\n\n'\n\n1\n\nAmong the materials examined three metals , chromium , copper , and tungsten ,\n\npose problems which seem to justify closer examination of the relations\n\nbetween the Community and the supplying countries. Chronium\n\nThe developed countries. The only developed countries producing\n\nappreciable amounts of chromium are the Republic of South Africa and the\nUSSR. These are the Community 's biggest suppliers. wishes to increase the dependability of its supplies it must turn to the\n\nIf the Canmunity\n\ndeveloping countries. The less developed countries. Just one or two bilateral agreements with\n\nless developed supplier countries would be quite inadequate in vieiHof the\n\nlow percentage of world supplies provided by each of them. A whole series\n\nof such agreements could be concluded , but the Community 's supply-\nsystem would then be very complicated , and would still be dominated by\n\n\f- 27. -\n\nSouth Africa. It is probable that the best path would be to conclude\n\na multilateral agreement on good conduct , or a world agreement containing\n\nat least the most useful features of existing commodity agreements. As\n\nan additional benefit to the less developed producer countries our imports\n\nof thsir chromium could always bo brought within the scope of one of the\n\nbeneficial agreements already in force such as the GATT or the SGP ,\n\nt he developed countries. Although major producers and holders of reserves ,\n\ntheir own consumption will not permit than appreciably to increase their\n\nexports to the ESC ,\n\nIn addition they are perfectly well aware of the\n\nsituation as regards world reserves , A \"developed country\" approach\n\nalone would not provide a solution even if it were politically acceptable. The less developed countries. This really means the four CIPEC countries ,\n\nsince the others do not possess the same potential. Against this back\u00ad\n\nground ;\n\nAn attempt will have to be made to conclude a world agreement. Although the CIPEC countries and the other less developed copper\n\nproducing countries occupy different points on the political\n\nspectrum ,\n\nthey all need developoent aid, This common factor should\n\nmake\n\nan agreement incorporating our co-operation in their\n\ndevelopment in parallel with certain guarantees with regard to\n\nsupplies very acceptable to them ,. This aid could cover the\n\nsetting-up or expansion of copper-processing facilities in the\n\ncountry or countries in question. The manner and rate of such\n\ndevelopment should be co-ordinated with a slowing down of the\n\nexpansion of capacity in Europe ,\n\nTungsten \u2022\nIn view of the strategic importance ( in the military sense. of the phrase )\nof. tungsten , it would be rather risky to attempt to develop our trade\n\ni\n\n\f- 28 -\n\nwith the three Communist countries ( China, USSR , North Korea), which are\nboth the largest producers and holders of the largest reserves. Considering, furthermore , the diversity of the other producing countries ,\nit would seem desirable to apply the same agreements and to pursue the same\npolicy on tungsten as on chromium , i. e. , a world agreement and/or the\noffer cf specific aid in the development of the resources of those\n\ncountries concerned which have need for it. 4. Example of the application of a supply policy to wood pulp and pat>cr. One material , wood pulp , has already been the subject of a communication \u25a0\nfrom the Commission to the Council^\". document , it is possible to outline by way of example a policy for a\nmaterial that lends itself to almost all types of action. By expanding on the ideas in this\n\nScandinavia, a traditional supplier\n\nIn addition the major producing countries in Scandinavia and North\n\nThe Community meets almost 60}o of its needs by importing paper and\nIn 1972 these\npaperboard , wood pulp , pulping wood and waste paper. imports were worth 2500 million u. a. of pulp and paper to the Community, is already importing wood from the\nUSSR. America rre pursuing the aim of processing their resources themselves\nand are - tending to restrict their sales of raw materials ( wood and pulp )\nin favour of finished products. industry which, with more than 1000 undertakings employing about 230. 000\npeople , occupies second place in the world league behind the United States ,\nis put in jeopardy. Thus , the Community ^ paper-making\n\nIn view of the threat of world shortages in the 'eighties some possible\nsolutions open to the Community are as follows :. \u2013 sn increase in the amount of pulping wood obtained from forests\n\nwithin the Comiiiunity through the more efficient use of existing and\nthe planting of new forests ;\n\n1 Doc. SEC ( 74) 1215 final of 28 March 1974. \\\n\n\f- 29 -\n\n- better recovery of sawmill wastes\n\n- more recycling of waste paper ;\n\n- the elimination of wasteful consumption of paper and board ;\n\n- improved 6o-operation with traditional suppliers ;\n\n\u2022- long-term agreements with state-trading nations ;\n\n- technical assistance to developing countries. In addition , any non-discrimination guarantees obtainable in GATT in\n\nconnection with wood pulp would be particularly beneficial ,. As regards forestry , pulping wood and sawmill waste currently cover 20^\n\nof the Community 's requirement for raw materials for pulp. The nore\n\nefficient use of existing forests and better recovery of sawmill waste\nshould enable available pulping tfood to be increased by 20-30$ over the\n\nnext 5-10 years. In the longer term , it would be possible to double that increase by the\n\nafforestation of marginal or of derelict agricultural land. The proposal for a directive on forestry measures forwarded to the\n\nCouncil by the Commission on 26 February 1974\n\nconcerned mainly the\n\nafforestation of derelict agricultural land. Although useful , this is\n\nno more than the beginning of a solution. Therefore the Council should\n\ninstruct the Community 's forestry authorities to prepare ,\n\nin conjunction\n\nwith the Commission , a programme of reafforestation end forestry\nmanagement and define aid schemes for its implementation , with details' of\n\ntheir approximate cost ,\n\nA number of research projects could help to bring about an appreciable\n\nimprovement in supplies , and in particular the development of new\n\nprocesses for the treatment of waste , recovered fibres and animal plants ,\n\nthe production of pulp from wood drawn from coppice , small wood from\nhigh forest (mostly thinnings ), straw and lower grades of waste paper ,\nand finally the improvements of yields by new methods of mashing. 1 Doc , CCM ( 74 ) 1070 final\n\n\fThere ought to be an immediate Council agreement to the principal of such\n\na programme of research the details of which should \"be worked out \"by the\n\nCommission in collaboration with the \" CREST\" Committee *\n\nIn the matter of recycling waste and economy in the use of raw materials\n\nthe Community should draw inspiration from the measures adopted in the\n\nUnited States , where the Federal Government has already instructed its\n\nadministration to use , for internal purposes , paper made at least to the\nextent of 50$ from waste. This has encouraged the creation of a new\n\ncommercial market for recycled paper , which has extended to all consumers\n\nof writing paper. Finally , with regard to external supplies ,\n\nthe Council and Member States\n\nshould agree to s\n\n' - Encourage cross investment ,\n\nincluding joint ventures , with\n\nindustrialized nations , such as Canada ;\n\n- Seek to conclude with state-trading nations long-term agreements\n\nfor the supply of given quantities of wood pulp and paper products\n\nat firm prices in return for the construction of industrial\n\nfacilities , and in particular pulping plants ;\n\nv\n\n- Encourage the forestry industry ,\n\nthe production of pulp , and of\n\npaper in \"bulk in the developing countries through technical\n\nassistance and incentives to private investment. These measures\n\nshould include support for research aimed at enabling specific\nraw materials from these countries ( e,g \u201e bagasse ) to be exploited\n\neconomically. 5. Conclusion. The problem of Europe 's raw material supplies is a vast but\n\nlong\u2013term\n\none whioh does not\n\nlend itself to spectacular , instant solutions. Consequently the cruestion is whether the Community will be able to take\n\nadvantage of the absence of immediate pressure to set up ,\n\nin an atmosphere\n\nof calm ,\n\nthose information , co-ordination and planning systems needed to\n\nmap out a 1 ong\u2013t orm policy which are currently lacking. 1- 31 -\n\nWe must not allow the complexity and gravity of the problems of the\n\nmoment to cause us to lose sight of the other problems ive shall have to\n\nface in the future. Rather should we let them meke us a*are of how\n\nadequate preparation can at least facilitate the solution of such\n\nproblems if not make it possible to forestall them. In short , it must be recognized that the scale of this problem is too\n\ngreat for individual Member States ; and its importance demands the\n\nestablishment of that point of cohesion , currently lacking, for all the\n\ndifferent projects and initiatives underway here and there throughout\n\nthe Community in this enormous field. The Commission therefore judges it essential to provide a structure that\n\nwill make possible the co-ordination of the activities now being\n\nundertaken at different levels , and if necessary the launching of cannon\n\ninitiatives in this field ; and now asks the \u2022member governments to. provide\nit with all the help 'and support it will need in drafting the specific\n\nproposals which it will lay before the Council"} |
