body: I can't grasp the distinction boldened in the quote below. How does 
  
  
  
  > 
  > A believing ‘B to be not B’, and by implication someone else 
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  differ from 
  
  
  
  > 
  > A believing ‘B to be C, mistakenly believing that C exists’
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  ? Mindy Chen-Wishart. [*Contract Law* (2018 6 edn)](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Contract-Law-Mindy-Chen-Wishart/dp/0198806353/ref=dp_ob_title_bk). p 262.
  
  
  
  > 
  > 6.2.5 Non-existence of the identity assumed
  > -------------------------------------------
  > 
  > 
  > According to this rule, A’s mistake as to B’s identity will only void their contract if
  >  A mistook B for another existing and identifiable party, C. If A merely believes that
  >  B is C who is non-existent or unidentifiable, the contract is only voidable. In *King’s
  >  Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge, Merrett & Co Ltd* (1897), K sent goods in response to an
  >  order from the fictitious ‘Hallam & Co’, written on headed stationery with a picture
  >  of a large factory and a list of overseas depots. The fraudster then sold the goods
  >  to E. Although the contract was in writing, the contract was only voidable for fraud
  >  because K intended to contract with the writer of the letter, being mistaken only as to
  >  his attributes; namely, solvency and respectability. The contract was not void for K’s
  >  mistake that it was contracting with ‘Hallam & Co’ because ‘Hallam & Co’ was nonexistent.
  >  ‘If it could have been shown that there was a separate entity called Hallam &
  >  Co . . . then the case might have come within the decision in *Cundy v Lindsay*.’  
  > 
  >        It is difficult to see why A and D’s rights should depend on whether A mistook B for
  >  another real entity or not. Furthermore, why was it not enough in King’s Norton that K
  >  believed that ‘Hallam & Co’ existed, when it did not?
  >  This supposed rule is subject to two exceptions, which require impossible distinctions
  >  to be drawn:
  > 
  > 
  > (i) A contract may be voided if A makes the additional mistake that **C exists, even
  >  if C does not exist. But is there a meaningful difference between A believing ‘B to be
  >  not B’, and by implication someone else (contract not void); and A believing ‘B to be
  >  C, mistakenly believing that C exists’ (contract is void)?** After all, in *Lake v Simmons*
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  p 263.
  
  
  
  > 
  > (1927), the mistress of a wealthy customer, a widower, purchased some items from L,
  >  and then persuaded L to let her take away valuable pearl necklaces for her ‘husband’s
  >  approval’. L’s loss was only insured if no valid contract was made with the mistress.
  >  The court so found, although she was posing as a non-existent wife.
  > 
  > 
  > (ii) A contract is void when A believes that B who pretends to be C is not B (whether
  >  C exists or not), as long as there is an implied term that B is not B (*Said v Butt* (1920)),
  >  as where:
  > 
  > 
  > • an offer is made only to persons fitting particular descriptions which excludes
  >  B (eg ‘current students of a particular university’, or being ‘over 18 years’ to
  >  buy alcohol); or  
  > 
  >  • B may know from previous dealings that A is unwilling to contract with
  >  them (eg B is barred from a pub or a soccer match).
  > 
  > 
  > If the rationale is merely that B cannot accept an offer known not to be meant for
  >  her, then why did this not apply in *King’s Norton Metal* when the fraudster must have
  >  known that K had no intention of contracting with him?
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  
title: A believing ‘B to be not B’, and by implication someone else (not void) v. A believing ‘B to be C, mistakenly believing that C exists’ (void)