body: 1. How does Innocent Misrepresentation differs from Mistake?
  2. *Scriven Brothers & Co. v Hindley (1913)* (quoted below) illustrates my bewilderment. Defendant made a false statement of fact, acted upon by Plaintiff, pre-contractually that definitely induced the P to contract. So isn't it obvious D made an innocent misrepresentation to P?
  3. Thus why did the first 2 textbooks below discuss it in solely the chapter on mistake, not (again) in misrepresentation? The third textbook discusses it in solely Ch 2 on Offer and Acceptance, and never again, not even Mistake!
  
  
  Poole, Shaw-Mellors. [*Contract Law Concentrate* (4 ed 2019)](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Contract-Law-Concentrate-Jill-Pool/dp/0198840446/ref=dp_ob_title_bk). p 38.
  
  
  
  > 
  > **FACTS:** The Ds mistakenly bid for bales of tow believing they were hemp. At the auction the Ds had
  >  examined a sample, which happened to be hemp, and thought that all the bales were hemp because
  >  they all had the same shipping mark. This was accepted as a reasonable interpretation but so too was
  >  the auctioneer’s belief that the bales being sold were tow.
  > 
  > 
  > **HELD:** There was no contract and the Ds did not have to pay for the tow.
  > 
  > 
  > However, in *Tamplin v James* (1880) the purchaser mistakenly believed the lot of property being
  >  sold included some garden but had failed to check the plan which indicated that no garden was
  >  included. The purchaser was at fault and could not avoid the contract by citing his mistake.
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  [*Anson's Law of Contract* (2016 30 ed)](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Ansons-Law-Contract-Jack-Beatson/dp/0198734786/ref=pd_lpo_sbs_14_t_0?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=ZW82SGPZDB8D0GKSVMV4). p 275. Note the 31st ed will be published in Apr 2020.
  
  
  
  > 
  >         Similarly, if A makes to B an offer which is ambiguous in its terms, or is rendered
  >  ambiguous by the circumstances surrounding it, and B accepts the offer in a different
  >  sense from that in which it is meant, then unless an objective construction requires
  >  otherwise, B may effectively maintain that there is no binding contract. In *Scriven Bros
  >  & Co v Hindley & Co*:37
  > 
  > 
  > 
  > > 
  > > S instructed an auctioneer to sell certain bales of hemp and tow. These bore the same
  > >  shipping mark and were described in the auction catalogue as so many bales in different
  > >  lots with no indication of the difference in their contents. H’s manager examined samples
  > >  of the hemp before the sale intending to bid for the hemp alone. At the auction, the tow was
  > >  put up for sale, and H’s buyer, believing it to be hemp, made a bid which was a reasonable
  > >  one if it had been intended for hemp, but an excessive one for tow. This bid was accepted
  > >  by the auctioneer, who did not realize the buyer’s mistake, but merely thought the bid an
  > >  extravagant one for tow. S sought to enforce the contract by suing for the price.
  > > 
  > > 
  > > 
  > 
  > 
  > It was clear that offer and acceptance did not coincide. S intended to sell tow; H’s buyer,
  >  misled by the auction catalogue, intended to buy hemp. The Court held that there was
  >  nothing in H’s conduct which would estop it from pleading that the parties were not
  >  in agreement as to the subject- matter of the sale— or, to put it in the language of the
  >  objective test set out by Blackburn J in *Smith v Hughes*,38 H had not so conducted itself
  >  that a reasonable man would believe that it was assenting to S’s terms. Accordingly, no
  >  contract had come into existence, and H was not liable.
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  [*O'Sullivan & Hilliard's The Law of Contract*](https://www.amazon.co.uk/OSullivan-Hilliards-Law-Contract-Janet/dp/0198807821/ref=dp_ob_title_bk) (2018 8 ed). p. 16.
  
  
  
  > 
  > 2.17 In *Scriven v Hindley* (1913), the claimant was selling bales of hemp and bales of tow at
  >  auction. However, he did not make clear which lot was the hemp and which lot was the
  >  tow. The defendant, thinking he was bidding for the lot that contained the hemp, actually
  >  bid for the tow. It was held that there was no contract for the sale of the tow, because
  >  the defendant’s apparent intent (to bid for the tow) had been caused by the claimant’s
  >  carelessness in not making it clear which lot was which. Therefore, because the objective
  >  principle did not apply, the court looked at the parties’ actual intention. The defendant’s
  >  intention (to buy the hemp) did not coincide with the claimant’s intention (to sell the
  >  defendant the tow) so there was no contract.
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  
title: Innocent Misrepresentation v. Mistake