body: Why would you "probably be required to enforce the strict legal position so that it would be necessary to initiate
  proceedings", when you can just rely on *Tool Metal*?
  
  
  Poole, Shaw-Mellors. [*Contract Law Concentrate* (4 ed 2019)](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Contract-Law-Concentrate-Jill-Pool/dp/0198840446/ref=dp_ob_title_bk). p 71.
  
  
  
  > 
  > ### How is the promissory estoppel brought to an end? Reasonable notice given and notice period has expired
  > 
  > 
  > This issue is complicated by the facts of *High Trees* since the estoppel in that case was considered
  >  to turn on the bombing in the Second World War and so came to an end automatically
  >  when the conditions under which the estoppel operated ceased to exist. However, the HL in
  >  *Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd* (1955) revived the strict legal
  >  rights only after the promisor had given reasonable notice of an intention to do so and that
  >  notice had elapsed.  
  > 
  >          It seems safest to demonstrate the giving of reasonable notice as a means of showing fairness
  >  and that it is no longer inequitable to go back to the strict contractual rights rather than
  >  assuming that the estoppel conditions have come to an end. **In any event, court action would
  >  probably be required to enforce the strict legal position so that it would be necessary to initiate
  >  proceedings.** This is exactly what happened in *High Trees* [1947].
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  I'll outline *Tool Metal* here. 
  
  
  Paul Davies. [*JC Smith's The Law of Contract* (2018 2 ed)](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Smiths-Law-Contract-Paul-Davies/dp/0198807813/ref=dp_ob_title_bk). p 98. 
  
  
  
  > 
  > It is suggested that the preferable view is that promissory estoppel
  >  can have an extinctive effect as regards existing obligations, but is suspensory as
  >  regards future obligations. Both these points emerge in the *Tool Metal* case.116 *Tool Metal*
  >  had licensed Tungsten to deal in certain metals, for which Tool Metal owned the patents,
  >  in consideration of Tungsten paying a royalty of 10 per cent up to a certain amount
  >  and, thereafter, 30 per cent. During the war, Tool Metal agreed to waive their right to
  >  30 per cent and to accept a flat rate of 10 per cent. After the war a dispute arose. Tool
  >  Metal claimed the waived 20 per cent in respect of material which had been used after
  >  1 June 1945. In these respects, then, it was exactly like the High Trees case, except that
  >  the wartime agreement had not terminated. It was held by the Court of Appeal, following
  > 
  > 
  > 116 *Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd* [1955] 1 WLR 761.
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  p 99.
  
  
  
  > 
  > *Hughes v Metropolitan Railway*,117 that the claim failed. As a result, the existing ‘rights’
  >  under the contract were clearly extinguished—the extra 20 per cent was lost forever. But
  >  the contract to pay 30 per cent was still in existence (though waived) and the House of
  >  Lords held, on the assumption that the waiver was binding (as had been held by the Court
  >  of Appeal), that *Tool Metal* could resume their rights to the 30 per cent for the future, by
  >  giving reasonable notice that the waiver was at an end. Their future rights under the contract
  >  were only suspended until they had given proper notice that they wished to resume
  >  them. It seems to follow from this decision that in *High Trees*, if the landlord had given
  >  notice during the war that, from a reasonable time in the future (say, three months) he
  >  wanted the full rent again, he would have been entitled to it; but that, for the periods in
  >  the past, the balance of the rent was lost for ever. His ‘rights’ for the past rents were extinguished,
  >  whereas his ‘rights’ for the future rents merely suspended.
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  [*O'Sullivan & Hilliard's The Law of Contract*](https://www.amazon.co.uk/OSullivan-Hilliards-Law-Contract-Janet/dp/0198807821/ref=dp_ob_title_bk) (2018 8 ed). p 117.
  
  
  
  > 
  > 5.84 First, does promissory estoppel extinguish the creditor’s rights or merely suspend them
  >  until revived by notice? The most common view in cases and commentary is that promissory
  >  estoppel is merely suspensory. After all, the landlord in *Hughes* was allowed to
  >  reactivate the six months’ repair period by giving the tenant the appropriate notice.
  >  Moreover, the House of Lords took the same view in *Tool Metal Manufacturing Co v
  >  Tungsten Electric Co* (1955), the first case on promissory estoppel to reach the House
  >  of Lords after High Trees. Here, TM granted TECO a licence in 1937 to deal with hard
  >  metal alloys which they had patented. The licence agreement provided for TECO to pay
  >  ‘compensation’ to TM in any month if they sold more than a stated quantity of the alloys.
  >  When the war broke out, TM agreed to forgo the contractual compensation and none
  >  was paid after the end of 1939. In 1944 negotiations for a new agreement broke down
  >  and, in an action brought the following year by TECO for breach of the licence agreement,
  >  TM counterclaimed that compensation was again payable from 1945 onwards (as
  >  in *High Trees*, no claim was made for the war years). The Court of Appeal held that TM
  >  could withdraw the concession not to claim the compensation by giving reasonable notice
  >  to TECO. In a subsequent action, ***the House of Lords confirmed that the serving of
  >  the counterclaim was itself sufficient notice to restart TECO’s obligation to make compensation
  >  payments [Inaki Viggers quoted this in his answer below.]*** (in fact, from 1947 onwards).
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  
title: Why court action would probably be required to enforce the strict legal position so that it would be necessary to initiate proceedings?