body: [*O'Sullivan & Hilliard's The Law of Contract*](https://www.amazon.co.uk/OSullivan-Hilliards-Law-Contract-Janet/dp/0198807821/ref=dp_ob_title_bk) (2018 8 ed). p. 98.
  
  
  
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  The red underlines fit para. 31 of the [judgment](http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2003/22.html):
  
  
  
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  > 31. In the present case the price for which R's promise was bought was the forbearance of the MOD to exercise its power to return him to unit. It could not be a promise that he would not be returned to unit, because, as their Lordships have already observed, the Crown was entitled to move him to another regiment and **could not fetter its discretion by a contract having effect in private law [emboldening mine]**. Whether there were any circumstances in which it could have created a legitimate expectation giving rise to rights against the Crown in public law is a matter which their Lordships need not discuss. But the actual forbearance was in their Lordships' opinion sufficient consideration to support the contract. In *Alliance Bank Ltd v Broom* (1864) 2 Dr & Sm 289, 292 the bank demanded security for its loan in circumstances in which, as Sir Richard Kindersley V-C said, it would otherwise have enforced payment. It made no promise not to demand payment but:
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  > > "the [bank] did in effect give, and the defendant received, the benefit of some degree of forbearance; not, indeed, for any definite time, but, at all events, some extent of forbearance."
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title: Why couldn't the Ministry of Defence fetter its public law powers by promising not to transfer a SAS soldier?