body: Mindy Chen-Wishart. [*Contract Law* (2018 6 edn)](https://www.amazon.co.uk/Contract-Law-Mindy-Chen-Wishart/dp/0198806353/ref=dp_ob_title_bk). [p 557](https://i.stack.imgur.com/orjAy.jpg).
  
  
  ### Counterpoint
  
  
  
  > 
  > 1. The current level of damages awarded is the outcome of balancing the various policies
  >  identified in Chapter 13. If we accept the validity of policies such as the avoidance of waste
  >  and undue harshness to defendants, and the desirability of mitigation of loss by the claimant,
  >  then under-compensation to that extent is inevitable. Such policies should not be
  >  evaded by simply choosing specific performance.
  > 2. On one view, automatic specific enforcement may amount to ‘over-compensation’, because
  >  **[2.1]** it allows the claimant to sell the right to specific performance for **[2.2]** *more than* the *true* value
  >  of the performance to him or her (Lord Hoffmann in *Cooperative Insurance v Argyll Stores*).
  > 
  > 
  > 
  
  
  1. How's 2.1 true? I'm assuming that contracts ordinarily don't allow either party to sell the right to specific performance, if the contract doesn't stipulate such selling.
  2. How's 2.2 true?
  
  
  
title: How does automatic specific enforcement allow claimants 'to sell the right to specific performance for more than the performance's true value to him'?