diff --git "a/input_text_cleaned.txt" "b/input_text_cleaned.txt" --- "a/input_text_cleaned.txt" +++ "b/input_text_cleaned.txt" @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with "almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or" re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org "" "" @@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E. "Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations" "of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards" +"of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards" probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray. "" @@ -66,6 +68,8 @@ Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a "straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the" study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer +study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer +study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer "such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in" "ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring" "all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the" @@ -82,6 +86,7 @@ experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot +is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot "globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's" "rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an" "indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal" @@ -111,10 +116,13 @@ the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected. "" "For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to" the painter they are all-important: the painter has to unlearn the habit +the painter they are all-important: the painter has to unlearn the habit of thinking that things seem to have the colour which common sense says "they 'really' have, and to learn the habit of seeing things as they" appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy--the distinction between +that cause most trouble in philosophy--the distinction between +that cause most trouble in philosophy--the distinction between "'appearance' and 'reality', between what things seem to be and what they" "are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man" and the philosopher want to know what they are; but the philosopher's @@ -123,11 +131,15 @@ troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question. "" "To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that" there is no colour which pre-eminently appears to be _the_ colour of the +there is no colour which pre-eminently appears to be _the_ colour of the +"table, or even of any one particular part of the table--it appears to" +"table, or even of any one particular part of the table--it appears to" "table, or even of any one particular part of the table--it appears to" "be of different colours from different points of view, and there is" no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will "seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a" +"seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a" "man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no colour" "at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. This" "colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something" @@ -190,29 +202,42 @@ same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and clear. Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: +of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: "such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and" so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being "immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour," "we have a sensation _of_ the colour, but the colour itself is a" "sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that _of_ which we are" +"sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that _of_ which we are" "immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is" "plain that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be" "by means of the sense-data--brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness," +"by means of the sense-data--brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness," +"by means of the sense-data--brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness," +"by means of the sense-data--brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness," +"etc.--which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have" +"etc.--which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have" "etc.--which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have" "been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even" +"been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even" +that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem "arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing" +"arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing" there is such a thing. "" "The real table, if it exists, we will call a 'physical object'. Thus" we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects. +we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects. The collection of all physical objects is called 'matter'. Thus our two questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as +questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as "matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?" "" The philosopher who first brought prominently forward the reasons for regarding the immediate objects of our senses as not existing independently of us was Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753). His _Three +independently of us was Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753). His _Three "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and" "Atheists_, undertake to prove that there is no such thing as matter at" "all, and that the world consists of nothing but minds and their ideas." @@ -232,9 +257,11 @@ There are two different questions involved when we ask whether matter of as occupying space and as radically incapable of any sort of thought or consciousness. It is chiefly in this sense that Berkeley denies "matter; that is to say, he does not deny that the sense-data which we" +"matter; that is to say, he does not deny that the sense-data which we" commonly take as signs of the existence of the table are really signs "of the existence of _something_ independent of us, but he does deny" "that this something is non-mental, that it is neither mind nor ideas" +"that this something is non-mental, that it is neither mind nor ideas" entertained by some mind. He admits that there must be something which "continues to exist when we go out of the room or shut our eyes, and that" what we call seeing the table does really give us reason for believing @@ -244,6 +271,10 @@ thinks that this something cannot be radically different in nature from must be independent of _our_ seeing. He is thus led to regard the 'real' table as an idea in the mind of God. Such an idea has the required "permanence and independence of ourselves, without being--as matter would" +"permanence and independence of ourselves, without being--as matter would" +"permanence and independence of ourselves, without being--as matter would" +"otherwise be--something quite unknowable, in the sense that we can only" +"otherwise be--something quite unknowable, in the sense that we can only" "otherwise be--something quite unknowable, in the sense that we can only" "infer it, and can never be directly and immediately aware of it." "" @@ -251,8 +282,12 @@ table as an idea in the mind of God. Such an idea has the required "table does not depend for its existence upon being seen by me, it does" depend upon being seen (or otherwise apprehended in sensation) by "_some_ mind--not necessarily the mind of God, but more often the whole" +"_some_ mind--not necessarily the mind of God, but more often the whole" +"_some_ mind--not necessarily the mind of God, but more often the whole" "collective mind of the universe. This they hold, as Berkeley does," chiefly because they think there can be nothing real--or at any rate +chiefly because they think there can be nothing real--or at any rate +chiefly because they think there can be nothing real--or at any rate nothing known to be real except minds and their thoughts and feelings. We might state the argument by which they support their view in some such way as this: 'Whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of @@ -268,6 +303,7 @@ nothing real except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called "'idealists'. When they come to explaining matter, they either say, like" "Berkeley, that matter is really nothing but a collection of ideas," "or they say, like Leibniz (1646-1716), that what appears as matter is" +"or they say, like Leibniz (1646-1716), that what appears as matter is" really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds. "" "But these philosophers, though they deny matter as opposed to mind," @@ -280,13 +316,24 @@ really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds. views of ordinary mortals in their answer to our second question. In "fact, almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real" "table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data--colour," +"table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data--colour," +"table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data--colour," +"table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data--colour," +"shape, smoothness, etc.--may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is" +"shape, smoothness, etc.--may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is" "shape, smoothness, etc.--may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is" "a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing," "perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as" +"perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as" +causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the real table. "" Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed--the view +Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed--the view +Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed--the view +"that there _is_ a real table, whatever its nature may be--is vitally" +"that there _is_ a real table, whatever its nature may be--is vitally" "that there _is_ a real table, whatever its nature may be--is vitally" "important, and it will be worth while to consider what reasons there are" for accepting this view before we go on to the further question as @@ -299,6 +346,7 @@ Before we go farther it will be well to consider for a moment what it "common object of the sort that is supposed to be known by the senses," what the senses _immediately_ tell us is not the truth about the object "as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data" +"as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data" "which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and" "the object. Thus what we directly see and feel is merely 'appearance'," which we believe to be a sign of some 'reality' behind. But if the @@ -330,6 +378,7 @@ CHAPTER II. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER there is such a thing as matter. Is there a table which has a certain "intrinsic nature, and continues to exist when I am not looking, or is" "the table merely a product of my imagination, a dream-table in a very" +"the table merely a product of my imagination, a dream-table in a very" prolonged dream? This question is of the greatest importance. For if "we cannot be sure of the independent existence of objects, we cannot" "be sure of the independent existence of other people's bodies, and" @@ -337,6 +386,8 @@ prolonged dream? This question is of the greatest importance. For if for believing in their minds except such as are derived from observing their bodies. Thus if we cannot be sure of the independent existence of "objects, we shall be left alone in a desert--it may be that the whole" +"objects, we shall be left alone in a desert--it may be that the whole" +"objects, we shall be left alone in a desert--it may be that the whole" "outer world is nothing but a dream, and that we alone exist. This is an" uncomfortable possibility; but although it cannot be strictly proved to "be false, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that it is true." @@ -346,6 +397,7 @@ In this chapter we have to see why this is the case. or less fixed point from which to start. Although we are doubting the "physical existence of the table, we are not doubting the existence" of the sense-data which made us think there was a table; we are not +of the sense-data which made us think there was a table; we are not "doubting that, while we look, a certain colour and shape appear to us," "and while we press, a certain sensation of hardness is experienced by" "us. All this, which is psychological, we are not calling in question." @@ -353,6 +405,9 @@ of the sense-data which made us think there was a table; we are not experiences seem absolutely certain. "" "Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of modern philosophy, invented a" +"Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of modern philosophy, invented a" +method which may still be used with profit--the method of systematic +method which may still be used with profit--the method of systematic method which may still be used with profit--the method of systematic doubt. He determined that he would believe nothing which he did not see quite clearly and distinctly to be true. Whatever he could bring himself @@ -378,6 +433,7 @@ subject. "But some care is needed in using Descartes' argument. 'I think," therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain. It might seem as though we were quite sure of being the same person to-day as we were +as though we were quite sure of being the same person to-day as we were "yesterday, and this is no doubt true in some sense. But the real Self is" "as hard to arrive at as the real table, and does not seem to have that" "absolute, convincing certainty that belongs to particular experiences." @@ -402,16 +458,24 @@ knowledge. "" The problem we have to consider is this: Granted that we are certain of "our own sense-data, have we any reason for regarding them as signs of" +"our own sense-data, have we any reason for regarding them as signs of" "the existence of something else, which we can call the physical object?" When we have enumerated all the sense-data which we should naturally +When we have enumerated all the sense-data which we should naturally "regard as connected with the table, have we said all there is to say" "about the table, or is there still something else--something not a" +"about the table, or is there still something else--something not a" +"about the table, or is there still something else--something not a" +"sense-datum, something which persists when we go out of the room? Common" "sense-datum, something which persists when we go out of the room? Common" sense unhesitatingly answers that there is. What can be bought and sold "and pushed about and have a cloth laid on it, and so on, cannot be" a _mere_ collection of sense-data. If the cloth completely hides the +a _mere_ collection of sense-data. If the cloth completely hides the +"table, we shall derive no sense-data from the table, and therefore, if" "table, we shall derive no sense-data from the table, and therefore, if" "the table were merely sense-data, it would have ceased to exist, and" +"the table were merely sense-data, it would have ceased to exist, and" "the cloth would be suspended in empty air, resting, by a miracle, in" the place where the table formerly was. This seems plainly absurd; but whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened @@ -419,16 +483,20 @@ by absurdities. "" One great reason why it is felt that we must secure a physical object "in addition to the sense-data, is that we want the same object for" +"in addition to the sense-data, is that we want the same object for" +"different people. When ten people are sitting round a dinner-table," "different people. When ten people are sitting round a dinner-table," it seems preposterous to maintain that they are not seeing the same "tablecloth, the same knives and forks and spoons and glasses. But the" sense-data are private to each separate person; what is immediately +sense-data are private to each separate person; what is immediately present to the sight of one is not immediately present to the sight of "another: they all see things from slightly different points of view, and" "therefore see them slightly differently. Thus, if there are to be public" "neutral objects, which can be in some sense known to many different" "people, there must be something over and above the private and" "particular sense-data which appear to various people. What reason, then," +"particular sense-data which appear to various people. What reason, then," have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects? "" "The first answer that naturally occurs to one is that, although" @@ -437,25 +505,37 @@ have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects? the variations in what they see follow the laws of perspective and "reflection of light, so that it is easy to arrive at a permanent object" underlying all the different people's sense-data. I bought my table from +underlying all the different people's sense-data. I bought my table from +"the former occupant of my room; I could not buy _his_ sense-data," "the former occupant of my room; I could not buy _his_ sense-data," "which died when he went away, but I could and did buy the confident" expectation of more or less similar sense-data. Thus it is the fact that +expectation of more or less similar sense-data. Thus it is the fact that "different people have similar sense-data, and that one person in a given" +"different people have similar sense-data, and that one person in a given" +"place at different times has similar sense-data, which makes us suppose" "place at different times has similar sense-data, which makes us suppose" that over and above the sense-data there is a permanent public object +that over and above the sense-data there is a permanent public object +which underlies or causes the sense-data of various people at various which underlies or causes the sense-data of various people at various times. "" Now in so far as the above considerations depend upon supposing that "there are other people besides ourselves, they beg the very question at" "issue. Other people are represented to me by certain sense-data, such as" +"issue. Other people are represented to me by certain sense-data, such as" "the sight of them or the sound of their voices, and if I had no" reason to believe that there were physical objects independent of my "sense-data, I should have no reason to believe that other people exist" +"sense-data, I should have no reason to believe that other people exist" "except as part of my dream. Thus, when we are trying to show that there" "must be objects independent of our own sense-data, we cannot appeal to" +"must be objects independent of our own sense-data, we cannot appeal to" "the testimony of other people, since this testimony itself consists of" "sense-data, and does not reveal other people's experiences unless our" +"sense-data, and does not reveal other people's experiences unless our" +own sense-data are signs of things existing independently of us. We must own sense-data are signs of things existing independently of us. We must "therefore, if possible, find, in our own purely private experiences," "characteristics which show, or tend to show, that there are in the world" @@ -468,11 +548,16 @@ results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my "fancy. In dreams a very complicated world may seem to be present, and" "yet on waking we find it was a delusion; that is to say, we find that" the sense-data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such +the sense-data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such +physical objects as we should naturally infer from our sense-data. (It physical objects as we should naturally infer from our sense-data. (It "is true that, when the physical world is assumed, it is possible to" "find physical causes for the sense-data in dreams: a door banging, for" +"find physical causes for the sense-data in dreams: a door banging, for" "instance, may cause us to dream of a naval engagement. But although, in" "this case, there is a physical cause for the sense-data, there is not a" +"this case, there is a physical cause for the sense-data, there is not a" +physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an actual naval battle would correspond.) There is no logical impossibility "in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we" @@ -480,6 +565,7 @@ ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this "is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that" "it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a" "means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense" +"means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense" "hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action" on us causes our sensations. "" @@ -489,14 +575,19 @@ are physical objects is easily seen. If the cat appears at one moment in "to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over" a series of intermediate positions. But if it is merely a set of "sense-data, it cannot have ever been in any place where I did not see" +"sense-data, it cannot have ever been in any place where I did not see" it; thus we shall have to suppose that it did not exist at all while I "was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a new place. If" "the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can understand from our own" experience how it gets hungry between one meal and the next; but if "it does not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd that appetite" should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the +should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the +"cat consists only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no hunger" "cat consists only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no hunger" but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the +but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the +"sense-data which represent the cat to me, though it seems quite natural" "sense-data which represent the cat to me, though it seems quite natural" "when regarded as an expression of hunger, becomes utterly inexplicable" "when regarded as mere movements and changes of patches of colour, which" @@ -504,8 +595,12 @@ are as incapable of hunger as a triangle is of playing football. "" But the difficulty in the case of the cat is nothing compared to the difficulty in the case of human beings. When human beings speak--that +difficulty in the case of human beings. When human beings speak--that +difficulty in the case of human beings. When human beings speak--that "is, when we hear certain noises which we associate with ideas, and" simultaneously see certain motions of lips and expressions of face--it +simultaneously see certain motions of lips and expressions of face--it +simultaneously see certain motions of lips and expressions of face--it is very difficult to suppose that what we hear is not the expression "of a thought, as we know it would be if we emitted the same sounds. Of" "course similar things happen in dreams, where we are mistaken as to the" @@ -515,6 +610,7 @@ on scientific principles if we assume that there really is a physical world. Thus every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural "view, that there really are objects other than ourselves and our" sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving +sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving them. "" Of course it is not by argument that we originally come by our belief in @@ -523,14 +619,25 @@ soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an _instinctive_ belief. We should never have been led to question this belief but for "the fact that, at any rate in the case of sight, it seems as if the" sense-datum itself were instinctively believed to be the independent +sense-datum itself were instinctively believed to be the independent "object, whereas argument shows that the object cannot be identical" "with the sense-datum. This discovery, however--which is not at all" +"with the sense-datum. This discovery, however--which is not at all" +"with the sense-datum. This discovery, however--which is not at all" +"with the sense-datum. This discovery, however--which is not at all" "paradoxical in the case of taste and smell and sound, and only slightly" so in the case of touch--leaves undiminished our instinctive belief that +so in the case of touch--leaves undiminished our instinctive belief that +so in the case of touch--leaves undiminished our instinctive belief that +there _are_ objects _corresponding_ to our sense-data. Since this belief there _are_ objects _corresponding_ to our sense-data. Since this belief "does not lead to any difficulties, but on the contrary tends to simplify" "and systematize our account of our experiences, there seems no good" reason for rejecting it. We may therefore admit--though with a slight +reason for rejecting it. We may therefore admit--though with a slight +reason for rejecting it. We may therefore admit--though with a slight +"doubt derived from dreams--that the external world does really exist," +"doubt derived from dreams--that the external world does really exist," "doubt derived from dreams--that the external world does really exist," and is not wholly dependent for its existence upon our continuing to perceive it. @@ -569,6 +676,8 @@ preceded acquiescence. "This function, at least, philosophy can perform. Most philosophers," "rightly or wrongly, believe that philosophy can do much more than" "this--that it can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable," +"this--that it can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable," +"this--that it can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable," "concerning the universe as a whole, and concerning the nature of" "ultimate reality. Whether this be the case or not, the more modest" "function we have spoken of can certainly be performed by philosophy, and" @@ -583,6 +692,11 @@ CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF MATTER "In the preceding chapter we agreed, though without being able to" "find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that our" "sense-data--for example, those which we regard as associated with my" +"sense-data--for example, those which we regard as associated with my" +"sense-data--for example, those which we regard as associated with my" +"sense-data--for example, those which we regard as associated with my" +table--are really signs of the existence of something independent of us +table--are really signs of the existence of something independent of us table--are really signs of the existence of something independent of us "and our perceptions. That is to say, over and above the sensations of" "colour, hardness, noise, and so on, which make up the appearance of" @@ -593,6 +707,7 @@ the sensation of hardness ceases to exist if I remove my arm from table with my knuckles. But I do not believe that when all these things "cease the table ceases. On the contrary, I believe that it is because" the table exists continuously that all these sense-data will reappear +the table exists continuously that all these sense-data will reappear "when I open my eyes, replace my arm, and begin again to rap with my" knuckles. The question we have to consider in this chapter is: What "is the nature of this real table, which persists independently of my" @@ -603,8 +718,10 @@ perception of it? "respect so far as it goes. Physical science, more or less unconsciously," has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced "to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which" +"to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which" travel from the body emitting them to the person who sees light or feels heat or hears sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or +heat or hears sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or "'gross matter', but in either case is what the philosopher would call" matter. The only properties which science assigns to it are position in "space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion. Science" @@ -613,13 +730,19 @@ matter. The only properties which science assigns to it are position in him in explaining the phenomena. "" "It is sometimes said that 'light _is_ a form of wave-motion', but this" +"It is sometimes said that 'light _is_ a form of wave-motion', but this" "is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we know" "directly by means of our senses, is _not_ a form of wave-motion, but" +"directly by means of our senses, is _not_ a form of wave-motion, but" +something quite different--something which we all know if we are not +something quite different--something which we all know if we are not something quite different--something which we all know if we are not "blind, though we cannot describe it so as to convey our knowledge to a" "man who is blind. A wave-motion, on the contrary, could quite well be" +"man who is blind. A wave-motion, on the contrary, could quite well be" "described to a blind man, since he can acquire a knowledge of space by" the sense of touch; and he can experience a wave-motion by a sea voyage +the sense of touch; and he can experience a wave-motion by a sea voyage "almost as well as we can. But this, which a blind man can understand, is" not what we mean by _light_: we mean by _light_ just that which a blind "man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him." @@ -662,10 +785,12 @@ manner of its connexion requires investigation. "" We agreed provisionally that physical objects cannot be quite like "our sense-data, but may be regarded as _causing_ our sensations." +"our sense-data, but may be regarded as _causing_ our sensations." "These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call" "'physical' space. It is important to notice that, if our sensations" "are to be caused by physical objects, there must be a physical space" containing these objects and our sense-organs and nerves and brain. We +containing these objects and our sense-organs and nerves and brain. We get a sensation of touch from an object when we are in contact with it; "that is to say, when some part of our body occupies a place in physical" space quite close to the space occupied by the object. We see an object @@ -680,11 +805,14 @@ mainly the relative positions of the object and our body that determine what sensations we shall derive from the object. "" "Now our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space" +"Now our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space" of sight or the space of touch or such vaguer spaces as other senses "may give us. If, as science and common sense assume, there is one public" "all-embracing physical space in which physical objects are, the relative" +"all-embracing physical space in which physical objects are, the relative" positions of physical objects in physical space must more or less correspond to the relative positions of sense-data in our private +correspond to the relative positions of sense-data in our private spaces. There is no difficulty in supposing this to be the case. If we "see on a road one house nearer to us than another, our other senses will" "bear out the view that it is nearer; for example, it will be reached" @@ -692,9 +820,11 @@ sooner if we walk along the road. Other people will agree that the house which looks nearer to us is nearer; the ordnance map will take the same view; and thus everything points to a spatial relation between the houses corresponding to the relation between the sense-data which we see +houses corresponding to the relation between the sense-data which we see when we look at the houses. Thus we may assume that there is a physical space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It +those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and assumed in physics and astronomy. "" @@ -713,11 +843,13 @@ _relations_ of distances in physical space than about the distances that immediate acquaintance with physical distances that we have with "distances in our private spaces, or with colours or sounds or other" sense-data. We can know all those things about physical space which a +sense-data. We can know all those things about physical space which a man born blind might know through other people about the space of sight; but the kind of things which a man born blind could never know about the space of sight we also cannot know about physical space. We can know the properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence with "sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the" +"sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the" relations hold. "" "With regard to time, our _feeling_ of duration or of the lapse of time" @@ -729,6 +861,8 @@ is notoriously an unsafe guide as to the time that has elapsed by the a public and a private time as there was in the case of space. But in so "far as time consists in an _order_ of before and after, there is no need" "to make such a distinction; the time-order which events seem to have is," +"to make such a distinction; the time-order which events seem to have is," +"so far as we can see, the same as the time-order which they do have. At" "so far as we can see, the same as the time-order which they do have. At" any rate no reason can be given for supposing that the two orders are not the same. The same is usually true of space: if a regiment of men @@ -740,40 +874,55 @@ to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the order. "" In saying that the time-order which events seem to have is the same as +In saying that the time-order which events seem to have is the same as +"the time-order which they really have, it is necessary to guard against" "the time-order which they really have, it is necessary to guard against" a possible misunderstanding. It must not be supposed that the various states of different physical objects have the same time-order as the +states of different physical objects have the same time-order as the +sense-data which constitute the perceptions of those objects. Considered sense-data which constitute the perceptions of those objects. Considered "as physical objects, the thunder and lightning are simultaneous; that is" "to say, the lightning is simultaneous with the disturbance of the air in" "the place where the disturbance begins, namely, where the lightning" is. But the sense-datum which we call hearing the thunder does not take +is. But the sense-datum which we call hearing the thunder does not take place until the disturbance of the air has travelled as far as to where "we are. Similarly, it takes about eight minutes for the sun's light" "to reach us; thus, when we see the sun we are seeing the sun of eight" minutes ago. So far as our sense-data afford evidence as to the physical +minutes ago. So far as our sense-data afford evidence as to the physical sun they afford evidence as to the physical sun of eight minutes ago; if "the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last eight minutes, that" would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing +would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing the sun'. This affords a fresh illustration of the necessity of distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects. +distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects. "" What we have found as regards space is much the same as what we find in relation to the correspondence of the sense-data with their +in relation to the correspondence of the sense-data with their "physical counterparts. If one object looks blue and another red, we may" reasonably presume that there is some corresponding difference between "the physical objects; if two objects both look blue, we may presume a" corresponding similarity. But we cannot hope to be acquainted directly with the quality in the physical object which makes it look blue or red. "Science tells us that this quality is a certain sort of wave-motion, and" +"Science tells us that this quality is a certain sort of wave-motion, and" "this sounds familiar, because we think of wave-motions in the space we" +"this sounds familiar, because we think of wave-motions in the space we" +"see. But the wave-motions must really be in physical space, with which" "see. But the wave-motions must really be in physical space, with which" we have no direct acquaintance; thus the real wave-motions have not that +we have no direct acquaintance; thus the real wave-motions have not that familiarity which we might have supposed them to have. And what holds for colours is closely similar to what holds for other sense-data. Thus +for colours is closely similar to what holds for other sense-data. Thus "we find that, although the _relations_ of physical objects have all" "sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the" "relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown" +"relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown" "in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means" of the senses. The question remains whether there is any other method of discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects. @@ -781,6 +930,8 @@ discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects. "The most natural, though not ultimately the most defensible, hypothesis" "to adopt in the first instance, at any rate as regards visual" "sense-data, would be that, though physical objects cannot, for the" +"sense-data, would be that, though physical objects cannot, for the" +"reasons we have been considering, be _exactly_ like sense-data, yet they" "reasons we have been considering, be _exactly_ like sense-data, yet they" "may be more or less like. According to this view, physical objects will," "for example, really have colours, and we might, by good luck, see an" @@ -794,6 +945,7 @@ view. "Such a theory is perhaps not capable of being definitely refuted, but" "it can be shown to be groundless. To begin with, it is plain that the" colour we see depends only upon the nature of the light-waves that +colour we see depends only upon the nature of the light-waves that "strike the eye, and is therefore modified by the medium intervening" "between us and the object, as well as by the manner in which light is" reflected from the object in the direction of the eye. The intervening @@ -806,6 +958,7 @@ which the waves start has any colour or not. Thus it is quite gratuitous "to suppose that physical objects have colours, and therefore there is no" justification for making such a supposition. Exactly similar arguments will apply to other sense-data. +will apply to other sense-data. "" It remains to ask whether there are any general philosophical arguments "enabling us to say that, if matter is real, it must be of such and such" @@ -818,8 +971,13 @@ Such philosophers are called 'idealists'. Idealists tell us that what "in the minds which, as we should commonly say, 'perceive' the matter." Thus idealists deny the existence of matter as something intrinsically "different from mind, though they do not deny that our sense-data are" +"different from mind, though they do not deny that our sense-data are" signs of something which exists independently of our private sensations. In the following chapter we shall consider briefly the reasons--in my +In the following chapter we shall consider briefly the reasons--in my +In the following chapter we shall consider briefly the reasons--in my +opinion fallacious--which idealists advance in favour of their theory. +opinion fallacious--which idealists advance in favour of their theory. opinion fallacious--which idealists advance in favour of their theory. "" "" @@ -847,6 +1005,8 @@ dismissed as obviously absurd. "" "We have seen that, even if physical objects do have an independent" "existence, they must differ very widely from sense-data, and can only" +"existence, they must differ very widely from sense-data, and can only" +"have a _correspondence_ with sense-data, in the same sort of way in" "have a _correspondence_ with sense-data, in the same sort of way in" which a catalogue has a correspondence with the things catalogued. Hence common sense leaves us completely in the dark as to the true intrinsic @@ -863,11 +1023,13 @@ conditions which things must satisfy in order that we may be able to know them. The first serious attempt to establish idealism on such "grounds was that of Bishop Berkeley. He proved first, by arguments which" "were largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an" +"were largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an" "existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, 'in' the" "mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were" "no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting. So far, his" "contention was almost certainly valid, even if some of his arguments" were not so. But he went on to argue that sense-data were the only +were not so. But he went on to argue that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perceptions could assure us; and that "to be known is to be 'in' a mind, and therefore to be mental. Hence he" "concluded that nothing can ever be known except what is in some mind," @@ -877,8 +1039,10 @@ other mind. "In order to understand his argument, it is necessary to understand his" use of the word 'idea'. He gives the name 'idea' to anything which "is _immediately_ known, as, for example, sense-data are known. Thus a" +"is _immediately_ known, as, for example, sense-data are known. Thus a" "particular colour which we see is an idea; so is a voice which we hear," and so on. But the term is not wholly confined to sense-data. There will +and so on. But the term is not wholly confined to sense-data. There will "also be things remembered or imagined, for with such things also we have" immediate acquaintance at the moment of remembering or imagining. All such immediate data he calls 'ideas'. @@ -928,6 +1092,8 @@ question as to the nature of ideas. "Before taking up the general question of the nature of ideas, we must" disentangle two entirely separate questions which arise concerning "sense-data and physical objects. We saw that, for various reasons of" +"sense-data and physical objects. We saw that, for various reasons of" +"detail, Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute" "detail, Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute" "our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that" "they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the" @@ -935,20 +1101,28 @@ tree were not being perceived. But this is an entirely different point from the one by which Berkeley seeks to prove that whatever can be immediately known must be in a mind. For this purpose arguments of detail as to the dependence of sense-data upon us are useless. It is +detail as to the dependence of sense-data upon us are useless. It is "necessary to prove, generally, that by being known, things are shown to" be mental. This is what Berkeley believes himself to have done. It "is this question, and not our previous question as to the difference" "between sense-data and the physical object, that must now concern us." +"between sense-data and the physical object, that must now concern us." "" "Taking the word 'idea' in Berkeley's sense, there are two quite distinct" things to be considered whenever an idea is before the mind. There is on the one hand the thing of which we are aware--say the colour of my +on the one hand the thing of which we are aware--say the colour of my +on the one hand the thing of which we are aware--say the colour of my +"table--and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act" +"table--and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act" "table--and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act" "of apprehending the thing. The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is" there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental? Our previous arguments concerning the colour did not prove it to be mental; they only proved that its existence depends upon the relation "of our sense organs to the physical object--in our case, the table. That" +"of our sense organs to the physical object--in our case, the table. That" +"of our sense organs to the physical object--in our case, the table. That" "is to say, they proved that a certain colour will exist, in a certain" "light, if a normal eye is placed at a certain point relatively to" the table. They did not prove that the colour is in the mind of the @@ -983,11 +1157,16 @@ or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of "knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well" "as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'ideas'--i.e. the objects" +"as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'ideas'--i.e. the objects" +"as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'ideas'--i.e. the objects" +"apprehended--must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever." +"apprehended--must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever." "apprehended--must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever." Hence his grounds in favour of idealism may be dismissed. It remains to see whether there are any other grounds. "" "It is often said, as though it were a self-evident truism, that we" +"It is often said, as though it were a self-evident truism, that we" cannot know that anything exists which we do not know. It is inferred that whatever can in any way be relevant to our experience must be at least capable of being known by us; whence it follows that if matter @@ -1023,10 +1202,12 @@ word we know _that_ something is the case. This sort of knowledge may be described as knowledge of _truths_. (2) In the second use of the word "'know' above, the word applies to our knowledge of _things_, which we" may call _acquaintance_. This is the sense in which we know sense-data. +may call _acquaintance_. This is the sense in which we know sense-data. (The distinction involved is roughly that between _savoir_ and "_connaitre_ in French, or between _wissen_ and _kennen_ in German.)" "" "Thus the statement which seemed like a truism becomes, when re-stated," +"Thus the statement which seemed like a truism becomes, when re-stated," the following: 'We can never truly judge that something with which we "are not acquainted exists.' This is by no means a truism, but on the" contrary a palpable falsehood. I have not the honour to be acquainted @@ -1075,30 +1256,45 @@ We shall say that we have _acquaintance_ with anything of which we are "directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference" or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of my table I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my +acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my +"table--its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are" +"table--its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are" "table--its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are" things of which I am immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching my table. The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many "things said about it--I may say that it is brown, that it is rather" +"things said about it--I may say that it is brown, that it is rather" +"things said about it--I may say that it is brown, that it is rather" "dark, and so on. But such statements, though they make me know truths" "about the colour, do not make me know the colour itself any better" "than I did before so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as" "opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and" "completely when I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even" theoretically possible. Thus the sense-data which make up the +theoretically possible. Thus the sense-data which make up the "appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, things" immediately known to me just as they are. "" "My knowledge of the table as a physical object, on the contrary, is not" "direct knowledge. Such as it is, it is obtained through acquaintance" with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. We have +with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. We have "seen that it is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whether there is" "a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data. My" +"a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data. My" knowledge of the table is of the kind which we shall call 'knowledge by description'. The table is 'the physical object which causes such-and-such sense-data'. This describes the table by means of the +such-and-such sense-data'. This describes the table by means of the +such-and-such sense-data'. This describes the table by means of the +such-and-such sense-data'. This describes the table by means of the +"sense-data. In order to know anything at all about the table, we must" "sense-data. In order to know anything at all about the table, we must" know truths connecting it with things with which we have acquaintance: we must know that 'such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical +we must know that 'such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical +we must know that 'such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical +we must know that 'such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical object'. There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the "table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and" "the actual thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known" @@ -1112,19 +1308,28 @@ rests upon acquaintance as its foundation. It is therefore important to consider what kinds of things there are with which we have acquaintance. "" "Sense-data, as we have already seen, are among the things with which" +"Sense-data, as we have already seen, are among the things with which" "we are acquainted; in fact, they supply the most obvious and striking" "example of knowledge by acquaintance. But if they were the sole example," our knowledge would be very much more restricted than it is. We should only know what is now present to our senses: we could not know anything about the past--not even that there was a past--nor could we know any +about the past--not even that there was a past--nor could we know any +about the past--not even that there was a past--nor could we know any +about the past--not even that there was a past--nor could we know any +about the past--not even that there was a past--nor could we know any +"truths about our sense-data, for all knowledge of truths, as we shall" "truths about our sense-data, for all knowledge of truths, as we shall" "show, demands acquaintance with things which are of an essentially" "different character from sense-data, the things which are sometimes" +"different character from sense-data, the things which are sometimes" "called 'abstract ideas', but which we shall call 'universals'. We have" therefore to consider acquaintance with other things besides sense-data +therefore to consider acquaintance with other things besides sense-data if we are to obtain any tolerably adequate analysis of our knowledge. "" The first extension beyond sense-data to be considered is acquaintance +The first extension beyond sense-data to be considered is acquaintance by _memory_. It is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or "heard or had otherwise present to our senses, and that in such cases we" "are still immediately aware of what we remember, in spite of the fact" @@ -1142,16 +1347,20 @@ food' is an object with which I am acquainted. Similarly we may be "aware of our feeling pleasure or pain, and generally of the events which" "happen in our minds. This kind of acquaintance, which may be called" "self-consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of mental things." +"self-consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of mental things." It is obvious that it is only what goes on in our own minds that can be thus known immediately. What goes on in the minds of others is known "to us through our perception of their bodies, that is, through the" sense-data in us which are associated with their bodies. But for our +sense-data in us which are associated with their bodies. But for our "acquaintance with the contents of our own minds, we should be unable to" "imagine the minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at" the knowledge that they have minds. It seems natural to suppose that self-consciousness is one of the things that distinguish men from +self-consciousness is one of the things that distinguish men from "animals: animals, we may suppose, though they have acquaintance with" "sense-data, never become aware of this acquaintance. I do not mean" +"sense-data, never become aware of this acquaintance. I do not mean" "that they _doubt_ whether they exist, but that they have never become" "conscious of the fact that they have sensations and feelings, nor" "therefore of the fact that they, the subjects of their sensations and" @@ -1159,6 +1368,7 @@ self-consciousness is one of the things that distinguish men from "" We have spoken of acquaintance with the contents of our minds as "_self_-consciousness, but it is not, of course, consciousness of our" +"_self_-consciousness, but it is not, of course, consciousness of our" _self_: it is consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. The "question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves, as opposed" "to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one, upon which" @@ -1173,23 +1383,34 @@ acquaintance with particular thoughts really involves. "When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun', it seems plain that I am" acquainted with two different things in relation to each other. On the "one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the" +"one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the" +"other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum. All acquaintance," "other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum. All acquaintance," "such as my acquaintance with the sense-datum which represents the sun," +"such as my acquaintance with the sense-datum which represents the sun," seems obviously a relation between the person acquainted and the object with which the person is acquainted. When a case of acquaintance is one with which I can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with my acquaintance "with the sense-datum representing the sun), it is plain that the person" +"with the sense-datum representing the sun), it is plain that the person" "acquainted is myself. Thus, when I am acquainted with my" "seeing the sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is" 'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'. +'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'. +'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'. +'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'. +'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'. "" "Further, we know the truth 'I am acquainted with this sense-datum'. It" +"Further, we know the truth 'I am acquainted with this sense-datum'. It" "is hard to see how we could know this truth, or even understand what is" "meant by it, unless we were acquainted with something which we call 'I'." It does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more "or less permanent person, the same to-day as yesterday, but it does seem" +"or less permanent person, the same to-day as yesterday, but it does seem" "as though we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature," "which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. Thus, in some" +"which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. Thus, in some" sense it would seem we must be acquainted with our Selves as opposed "to our particular experiences. But the question is difficult, and" "complicated arguments can be adduced on either side. Hence, although" @@ -1200,6 +1421,8 @@ We may therefore sum up as follows what has been said concerning acquaintance with things that exist. We have acquaintance in sensation "with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of" "what may be called the inner sense--thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.;" +"what may be called the inner sense--thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.;" +"what may be called the inner sense--thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.;" we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either "of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable," "though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which" @@ -1218,11 +1441,20 @@ aware is called a _concept_. "" It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted "are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other" +"are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other" people's minds. These things are known to us by what I call 'knowledge "by description', which we must now consider." "" By a 'description' I mean any phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' or +By a 'description' I mean any phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' or +By a 'description' I mean any phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' or +'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an 'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an +'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an +'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an +'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an +'ambiguous' description; a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the +'ambiguous' description; a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the 'ambiguous' description; a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the singular) I shall call a 'definite' description. Thus 'a man' is an "ambiguous description, and 'the man with the iron mask' is a definite" @@ -1235,9 +1467,13 @@ any such object. This is a matter which is concerned exclusively with "definite descriptions. I shall therefore, in the sequel, speak simply of" 'descriptions' when I mean 'definite descriptions'. Thus a description will mean any phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' in the singular. +will mean any phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' in the singular. +will mean any phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' in the singular. "" We shall say that an object is 'known by description' when we know that "it is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and" +"it is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and" +"it is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and" "no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied" that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance. We "know that the man with the iron mask existed, and many propositions" @@ -1250,21 +1486,47 @@ candidate who will get most votes; but we do not know which of the the candidate who will get most votes' where A is one of the candidates by name. We shall say that we have 'merely descriptive knowledge' of the "so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although" +"so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although" +"so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although" +"so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although" +"so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although" "we may possibly be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the" "so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so'," +"so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so'," +"so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so'," +"so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so'," +"so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so'," where _a_ is something with which we are acquainted. "" "When we say 'the so-and-so exists', we mean that there is just one" +"When we say 'the so-and-so exists', we mean that there is just one" +"When we say 'the so-and-so exists', we mean that there is just one" +object which is the so-and-so. The proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so' object which is the so-and-so. The proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so' +object which is the so-and-so. The proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so' +object which is the so-and-so. The proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so' +object which is the so-and-so. The proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so' +"means that _a_ has the property so-and-so, and nothing else has. 'Mr." +"means that _a_ has the property so-and-so, and nothing else has. 'Mr." "means that _a_ has the property so-and-so, and nothing else has. 'Mr." A. is the Unionist candidate for this constituency' means 'Mr. A. is "a Unionist candidate for this constituency, and no one else is'. 'The" Unionist candidate for this constituency exists' means 'some one is a "Unionist candidate for this constituency, and no one else is'. Thus," "when we are acquainted with an object which is the so-and-so, we know" +"when we are acquainted with an object which is the so-and-so, we know" +"when we are acquainted with an object which is the so-and-so, we know" +that the so-and-so exists; but we may know that the so-and-so exists +that the so-and-so exists; but we may know that the so-and-so exists +that the so-and-so exists; but we may know that the so-and-so exists +that the so-and-so exists; but we may know that the so-and-so exists that the so-and-so exists; but we may know that the so-and-so exists when we are not acquainted with any object which we know to be the "so-and-so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in" +"so-and-so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in" +"so-and-so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in" +"fact, is the so-and-so." +"fact, is the so-and-so." "fact, is the so-and-so." "" "Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That" @@ -1288,9 +1550,11 @@ constituent of the judgement. Here the proper name has the direct use and not for a description of the object. But if a person who knew "Bismarck made a judgement about him, the case is different. What this" person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected +person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected "(rightly, we will suppose) with Bismarck's body. His body, as a physical" "object, and still more his mind, were only known as the body and the" "mind connected with these sense-data. That is, they were known by" +"mind connected with these sense-data. That is, they were known by" "description. It is, of course, very much a matter af chance which" characteristics of a man's appearance will come into a friend's mind when he thinks of him; thus the description actually in the friend's @@ -1301,6 +1565,8 @@ acquainted with the entity in question. "When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judgement about him, the" description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass "of historical knowledge--far more, in most cases, than is required to" +"of historical knowledge--far more, in most cases, than is required to" +"of historical knowledge--far more, in most cases, than is required to" "identify him. But, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that we" think of him as 'the first Chancellor of the German Empire'. Here all "the words are abstract except 'German'. The word 'German' will, again," @@ -1316,17 +1582,24 @@ particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we "are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing described is not to be" "merely what follows _logically_ from the description. For example, 'the" "most long-lived of men' is a description involving only universals," +"most long-lived of men' is a description involving only universals," "which must apply to some man, but we can make no judgements concerning" this man which involve knowledge about him beyond what the description "gives. If, however, we say, 'The first Chancellor of the German Empire" "was an astute diplomatist', we can only be assured of the truth of our" judgement in virtue of something with which we are acquainted--usually a +judgement in virtue of something with which we are acquainted--usually a +judgement in virtue of something with which we are acquainted--usually a "testimony heard or read. Apart from the information we convey to others," "apart from the fact about the actual Bismarck, which gives importance" "to our judgement, the thought we really have contains the one or more" "particulars involved, and otherwise consists wholly of concepts." "" "All names of places--London, England, Europe, the Earth, the Solar" +"All names of places--London, England, Europe, the Earth, the Solar" +"All names of places--London, England, Europe, the Earth, the Solar" +"System--similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some" +"System--similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some" "System--similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some" one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. I suspect that "even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves such a" @@ -1361,6 +1634,7 @@ It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from acquaintance with particulars: there is Bismarck to people who knew him; Bismarck to those who only know of him through history; the man with the iron mask; the longest-lived of men. These are progressively further +the iron mask; the longest-lived of men. These are progressively further removed from acquaintance with particulars; the first comes as near to "acquaintance as is possible in regard to another person; in the second," "we shall still be said to know 'who Bismarck was'; in the third, we do" @@ -1416,11 +1690,15 @@ the attempt to get clear as to our data in the way of knowledge of existence. What things are there in the universe whose existence is "known to us owing to our being acquainted with them? So far, our answer" "has been that we are acquainted with our sense-data, and, probably," +"has been that we are acquainted with our sense-data, and, probably," +with ourselves. These we know to exist. And past sense-data which with ourselves. These we know to exist. And past sense-data which are remembered are known to have existed in the past. This knowledge supplies our data. "" But if we are to be able to draw inferences from these data--if we are +But if we are to be able to draw inferences from these data--if we are +But if we are to be able to draw inferences from these data--if we are "to know of the existence of matter, of other people, of the past before" "our individual memory begins, or of the future, we must know general" principles of some kind by means of which such inferences can be drawn. @@ -1436,15 +1714,18 @@ exceedingly limited. The question we have now to consider is whether "Let us take as an illustration a matter about which none of us, in fact," feel the slightest doubt. We are all convinced that the sun will rise "to-morrow. Why? Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience," +"to-morrow. Why? Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience," or can it be justified as a reasonable belief? It is not easy to find a test by which to judge whether a belief of this kind is reasonable or "not, but we can at least ascertain what sort of general beliefs would" "suffice, if true, to justify the judgement that the sun will rise" "to-morrow, and the many other similar judgements upon which our actions" +"to-morrow, and the many other similar judgements upon which our actions" are based. "" It is obvious that if we are asked why we believe that the sun will rise "to-morrow, we shall naturally answer 'Because it always has risen every" +"to-morrow, we shall naturally answer 'Because it always has risen every" "day'. We have a firm belief that it will rise in the future, because it" has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why we believe that "it will continue to rise as heretofore, we may appeal to the laws of" @@ -1452,9 +1733,11 @@ has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why we believe that "bodies do not cease to rotate unless something interferes from outside," and there is nothing outside to interfere with the earth between now and to-morrow. Of course it might be doubted whether we are quite certain +to-morrow. Of course it might be doubted whether we are quite certain "that there is nothing outside to interfere, but this is not the" interesting doubt. The interesting doubt is as to whether the laws of motion will remain in operation until to-morrow. If this doubt is +of motion will remain in operation until to-morrow. If this doubt is "raised, we find ourselves in the same position as when the doubt about" the sunrise was first raised. "" @@ -1468,6 +1751,7 @@ particular cases. But the real question is: Do _any_ number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be "fulfilled in the future? If not, it becomes plain that we have no ground" "whatever for expecting the sun to rise to-morrow, or for expecting the" +"whatever for expecting the sun to rise to-morrow, or for expecting the" "bread we shall eat at our next meal not to poison us, or for any of the" other scarcely conscious expectations that control our daily lives. It is to be observed that all such expectations are only _probable_; thus @@ -1486,6 +1770,7 @@ appearance is found to be associated with an unusual taste. Things which "we see become associated, by habit, with certain tactile sensations" which we expect if we touch them; one of the horrors of a ghost (in many ghost-stories) is that it fails to give us any sensations of touch. +many ghost-stories) is that it fails to give us any sensations of touch. Uneducated people who go abroad for the first time are so surprised as to be incredulous when they find their native language not understood. "" @@ -1504,6 +1789,7 @@ nevertheless exist. The mere fact that something has happened a certain number of times causes animals and men to expect that it will happen again. Thus our instincts certainly cause us to believe that the sun "will rise to-morrow, but we may be in no better a position than the" +"will rise to-morrow, but we may be in no better a position than the" chicken which unexpectedly has its neck wrung. We have therefore to distinguish the fact that past uniformities _cause_ expectations as to "the future, from the question whether there is any reasonable ground for" @@ -1526,6 +1812,7 @@ aeroplanes can rise; thus the laws of motion and the law of gravitation are not subject to these exceptions. "" The belief that the sun will rise to-morrow might be falsified if the +The belief that the sun will rise to-morrow might be falsified if the earth came suddenly into contact with a large body which destroyed its rotation; but the laws of motion and the law of gravitation would not be infringed by such an event. The business of science is to find @@ -1551,6 +1838,8 @@ same laws as the past. The reference to the future in this question is not essential. The same question arises when we apply the laws that work in our experience to "past things of which we have no experience--as, for example, in geology," +"past things of which we have no experience--as, for example, in geology," +"past things of which we have no experience--as, for example, in geology," or in theories as to the origin of the Solar System. The question we really have to ask is: 'When two things have been found to be often "associated, and no instance is known of the one occurring without the" @@ -1654,6 +1943,7 @@ question. Thus we must either accept the inductive principle on the "ground of its intrinsic evidence, or forgo all justification of our" "expectations about the future. If the principle is unsound, we have no" "reason to expect the sun to rise to-morrow, to expect bread to be more" +"reason to expect the sun to rise to-morrow, to expect bread to be more" "nourishing than a stone, or to expect that if we throw ourselves off" the roof we shall fall. When we see what looks like our best friend "approaching us, we shall have no reason to suppose that his body is not" @@ -1676,6 +1966,10 @@ unless the inductive principle is assumed. "concrete applications, appears to be as firmly rooted in us as many" of the facts of experience. The existence and justification of such "beliefs--for the inductive principle, as we shall see, is not the only" +"beliefs--for the inductive principle, as we shall see, is not the only" +"beliefs--for the inductive principle, as we shall see, is not the only" +example--raises some of the most difficult and most debated problems of +example--raises some of the most difficult and most debated problems of example--raises some of the most difficult and most debated problems of "philosophy. We will, in the next chapter, consider briefly what may be" "said to account for such knowledge, and what is its scope and its degree" @@ -1697,11 +1991,14 @@ from what is experienced. Some of these principles have even greater evidence than the principle "of induction, and the knowledge of them has the same degree of certainty" as the knowledge of the existence of sense-data. They constitute the +as the knowledge of the existence of sense-data. They constitute the means of drawing inferences from what is given in sensation; and if what "we infer is to be true, it is just as necessary that our principles" of inference should be true as it is that our data should be true. The principles of inference are apt to be overlooked because of their very obviousness--the assumption involved is assented to without our +very obviousness--the assumption involved is assented to without our +very obviousness--the assumption involved is assented to without our realizing that it is an assumption. But it is very important to realize "the use of principles of inference, if a correct theory of knowledge" is to be obtained; for our knowledge of them raises interesting and @@ -1718,10 +2015,12 @@ last it becomes possible to see that it is true of any pair of couples. The same thing happens with logical principles. Suppose two men are "discussing what day of the month it is. One of them says, 'At least you" will admit that _if_ yesterday was the 15th to-day must be the 16th.' +will admit that _if_ yesterday was the 15th to-day must be the 16th.' "'Yes', says the other, 'I admit that.' 'And you know', the first" "continues, 'that yesterday was the 15th, because you dined with Jones," "and your diary will tell you that was on the 15th.' 'Yes', says the" second; 'therefore to-day _is_ the 16th.' +second; 'therefore to-day _is_ the 16th.' "" Now such an argument is not hard to follow; and if it is granted that "its premisses are true in fact, no one will deny that the conclusion" @@ -1736,6 +2035,10 @@ general logical principle. The logical principle is as follows: 'Suppose 'whatever follows from a true proposition is true'. "" "This principle is really involved--at least, concrete instances of it" +"This principle is really involved--at least, concrete instances of it" +"This principle is really involved--at least, concrete instances of it" +are involved--in all demonstrations. Whenever one thing which we believe +are involved--in all demonstrations. Whenever one thing which we believe are involved--in all demonstrations. Whenever one thing which we believe "is used to prove something else, which we consequently believe, this" principle is relevant. If any one asks: 'Why should I accept the results @@ -1747,6 +2050,7 @@ of valid arguments based on true premisses?' we can only answer by which is in no way derived from objects of sense. "" The above principle is merely one of a certain number of self-evident +The above principle is merely one of a certain number of self-evident logical principles. Some at least of these principles must be granted before any argument or proof becomes possible. When some of them have "been granted, others can be proved, though these others, so long as they" @@ -1763,6 +2067,8 @@ They are as follows: (3) _The law of excluded middle_: 'Everything must either be or not be.' "" "These three laws are samples of self-evident logical principles, but" +"These three laws are samples of self-evident logical principles, but" +are not really more fundamental or more self-evident than various other are not really more fundamental or more self-evident than various other "similar principles: for instance, the one we considered just now, which" states that what follows from a true premiss is true. The name 'laws of @@ -1777,15 +2083,25 @@ In addition to the logical principles which enable us to prove from "logical principles which enable us to prove, from a given premiss," that there is a greater or less probability that something is true. An example of such principles--perhaps the most important example is the +example of such principles--perhaps the most important example is the +example of such principles--perhaps the most important example is the "inductive principle, which we considered in the preceding chapter." "" One of the great historic controversies in philosophy is the controversy between the two schools called respectively 'empiricists' and 'rationalists'. The empiricists--who are best represented by the +'rationalists'. The empiricists--who are best represented by the +'rationalists'. The empiricists--who are best represented by the +"British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--maintained that all" +"British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--maintained that all" "British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--maintained that all" our knowledge is derived from experience; the rationalists--who are +our knowledge is derived from experience; the rationalists--who are +our knowledge is derived from experience; the rationalists--who are "represented by the Continental philosophers of the seventeenth century," "especially Descartes and Leibniz--maintained that, in addition to what" +"especially Descartes and Leibniz--maintained that, in addition to what" +"especially Descartes and Leibniz--maintained that, in addition to what" "we know by experience, there are certain 'innate ideas' and 'innate" "principles', which we know independently of experience. It has now" become possible to decide with some confidence as to the truth or @@ -1819,6 +2135,7 @@ must have among our premisses the existence of one or more things of which we have direct experience. Our belief that the Emperor of China "exists, for example, rests upon testimony, and testimony consists," "in the last analysis, of sense-data seen or heard in reading or being" +"in the last analysis, of sense-data seen or heard in reading or being" "spoken to. Rationalists believed that, from general consideration as" "to what must be, they could deduce the existence of this or that in the" actual world. In this belief they seem to have been mistaken. All the @@ -1842,6 +2159,7 @@ wholly or partly upon experience. Thus all knowledge which asserts "" _A priori_ knowledge is not all of the logical kind we have been hitherto considering. Perhaps the most important example of non-logical +hitherto considering. Perhaps the most important example of non-logical _a priori_ knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value. I am not speaking "of judgements as to what is useful or as to what is virtuous, for such" judgements do require empirical premisses; I am speaking of judgements @@ -1904,6 +2222,7 @@ generalizations always remain mere facts: we feel that there might be a everything actual and possible must conform. "" The case may be made clearer by considering a genuinely-empirical +The case may be made clearer by considering a genuinely-empirical "generalization, such as 'All men are mortal.' It is plain that we" "believe this proposition, in the first place, because there is no known" "instance of men living beyond a certain age, and in the second place" @@ -1978,6 +2297,7 @@ next occupy us is this: How is it possible that there should be such "indeed never can examine them all, because their number is infinite?" "These questions, which were first brought prominently forward by" "the German philosopher Kant (1724-1804), are very difficult, and" +"the German philosopher Kant (1724-1804), are very difficult, and" historically very important. "" "" @@ -1996,6 +2316,7 @@ Whether these results were valid may well be doubted. But Kant "undoubtedly deserves credit for two things: first, for having perceived" "that we have _a priori_ knowledge which is not purely 'analytic', i.e." "such that the opposite would be self-contradictory, and secondly," +"such that the opposite would be self-contradictory, and secondly," for having made evident the philosophical importance of the theory of knowledge. "" @@ -2021,11 +2342,16 @@ that could be known _a priori_. 'A bald man is not bald' would assert priori_ knowledge. "" "Hume (1711-76), who preceded Kant, accepting the usual view as to what" +"Hume (1711-76), who preceded Kant, accepting the usual view as to what" "makes knowledge _a priori_, discovered that, in many cases which had" "previously been supposed analytic, and notably in the case of cause and" "effect, the connexion was really synthetic. Before Hume, rationalists at" least had supposed that the effect could be logically deduced from the "cause, if only we had sufficient knowledge. Hume argued--correctly, as" +"cause, if only we had sufficient knowledge. Hume argued--correctly, as" +"cause, if only we had sufficient knowledge. Hume argued--correctly, as" +would now be generally admitted--that this could not be done. Hence he +would now be generally admitted--that this could not be done. Hence he would now be generally admitted--that this could not be done. Hence he inferred the far more doubtful proposition that nothing could be known "_a priori_ about the connexion of cause and effect. Kant, who had been" @@ -2074,14 +2400,22 @@ What Kant maintained was that in all our experience there are two "elements to be distinguished, the one due to the object (i.e. to what we" "have called the 'physical object'), the other due to our own nature. We" "saw, in discussing matter and sense-data, that the physical object is" +"saw, in discussing matter and sense-data, that the physical object is" +"different from the associated sense-data, and that the sense-data are to" +"different from the associated sense-data, and that the sense-data are to" "different from the associated sense-data, and that the sense-data are to" be regarded as resulting from an interaction between the physical "object and ourselves. So far, we are in agreement with Kant. But what" is distinctive of Kant is the way in which he apportions the shares of ourselves and the physical object respectively. He considers that the "crude material given in sensation--the colour, hardness, etc.--is due" +"crude material given in sensation--the colour, hardness, etc.--is due" +"crude material given in sensation--the colour, hardness, etc.--is due" +"crude material given in sensation--the colour, hardness, etc.--is due" +"crude material given in sensation--the colour, hardness, etc.--is due" "to the object, and that what we supply is the arrangement in space" "and time, and all the relations between sense-data which result from" +"and time, and all the relations between sense-data which result from" comparison or from considering one as the cause of the other or in any other way. His chief reason in favour of this view is that we seem to have _a priori_ knowledge as to space and time and causality and @@ -2119,6 +2453,7 @@ logic and arithmetic. To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed by us does not account for this. Our nature is as much a fact of the "existing world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will" "remain constant. It might happen, if Kant is right, that to-morrow" +"remain constant. It might happen, if Kant is right, that to-morrow" our nature would so change as to make two and two become five. This "possibility seems never to have occurred to him, yet it is one which" utterly destroys the certainty and universality which he is anxious @@ -2126,6 +2461,8 @@ to vindicate for arithmetical propositions. It is true that this "possibility, formally, is inconsistent with the Kantian view that time" "itself is a form imposed by the subject upon phenomena, so that our" real Self is not in time and has no to-morrow. But he will still have +real Self is not in time and has no to-morrow. But he will still have +to suppose that the time-order of phenomena is determined by to suppose that the time-order of phenomena is determined by "characteristics of what is behind phenomena, and this suffices for the" substance of our argument. @@ -2188,6 +2525,7 @@ and two are four. And no fact about the constitution of our minds could "if it is not erroneous, is not merely knowledge about the constitution" "of our minds, but is applicable to whatever the world may contain, both" what is mental and what is non-mental. +what is mental and what is non-mental. "" The fact seems to be that all our _a priori_ knowledge is concerned with "entities which do not, properly speaking, _exist_, either in the mental" @@ -2225,6 +2563,7 @@ At the end of the preceding chapter we saw that such entities as relations appear to have a being which is in some way different from "that of physical objects, and also different from that of minds and from" that of sense-data. In the present chapter we have to consider what is +that of sense-data. In the present chapter we have to consider what is "the nature of this kind of being, and also what objects there are that" have this kind of being. We will begin with the latter question. "" @@ -2256,6 +2595,7 @@ Moreover it is not fleeting or changeable like the things of sense: it "is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible." "" "Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common" +"Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common" "world of sense, the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to" the world of sense whatever pale reflection of reality may belong to it. "The truly real world, for Plato, is the world of ideas; for whatever" @@ -2491,6 +2831,7 @@ Let us consider first the knowledge of universals by acquaintance. It is "obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals as" "white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e. with qualities" "which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are" +"which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are" "acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by" "seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness" "which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are" @@ -2502,12 +2843,16 @@ from particulars than other universals are. "" We come next to relations. The easiest relations to apprehend are those which hold between the different parts of a single complex sense-datum. +which hold between the different parts of a single complex sense-datum. "For example, I can see at a glance the whole of the page on which I" am writing; thus the whole page is included in one sense-datum. But I +am writing; thus the whole page is included in one sense-datum. But I "perceive that some parts of the page are to the left of other parts," and some parts are above other parts. The process of abstraction in this case seems to proceed somewhat as follows: I see successively a number "of sense-data in which one part is to the left of another; I perceive," +"of sense-data in which one part is to the left of another; I perceive," +"as in the case of different white patches, that all these sense-data" "as in the case of different white patches, that all these sense-data" "have something in common, and by abstraction I find that what they have" "in common is a certain relation between their parts, namely the relation" @@ -2522,6 +2867,8 @@ perceive that what I am remembering came before the present time. From either of these sources I can abstract the universal relation of before "and after, just as I abstracted the universal relation 'being to the" "left of'. Thus time-relations, like space-relations, are among those" +"left of'. Thus time-relations, like space-relations, are among those" +"left of'. Thus time-relations, like space-relations, are among those" with which we are acquainted. "" Another relation with which we become acquainted in much the same way is @@ -2538,9 +2885,11 @@ resemblance between a shade of red and a shade of green. Here we are "dealing with a relation, namely 'greater than', between two relations." "Our knowledge of such relations, though it requires more power of" "abstraction than is required for perceiving the qualities of sense-data," +"abstraction than is required for perceiving the qualities of sense-data," "appears to be equally immediate, and (at least in some cases) equally" indubitable. Thus there is immediate knowledge concerning universals as well as concerning sense-data. +well as concerning sense-data. "" "Returning now to the problem of _a priori_ knowledge, which we left" "unsolved when we began the consideration of universals, we find" @@ -2568,6 +2917,10 @@ collection of four'. If we can show that such statements as this really "" One way of discovering what a proposition deals with is to ask ourselves "what words we must understand--in other words, what objects we must be" +"what words we must understand--in other words, what objects we must be" +"what words we must understand--in other words, what objects we must be" +acquainted with--in order to see what the proposition means. As soon as +acquainted with--in order to see what the proposition means. As soon as acquainted with--in order to see what the proposition means. As soon as "we see what the proposition means, even if we do not yet know whether" "it is true or false, it is evident that we must have acquaintance with" @@ -2678,12 +3031,14 @@ of the universals in question. Yet the knowledge of such general propositions is quite vital to a great deal of what is generally "admitted to be known. For example, we saw, in our early chapters," "that knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only" +"that knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only" "obtained by an inference, and that they are not things with which we are" acquainted. Hence we can never know any proposition of the form 'this "is a physical object', where 'this' is something immediately known. It" follows that all our knowledge concerning physical objects is such that no actual instance can be given. We can give instances of the associated "sense-data, but we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects." +"sense-data, but we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects." Hence our knowledge as to physical objects depends throughout upon this possibility of general knowledge where no instance can be given. And the "same applies to our knowledge of other people's minds, or of any other" @@ -2696,6 +3051,7 @@ knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. In each there are two "things, which we called _acquaintance_, consists of two sorts, according" "as the things known are particulars or universals. Among particulars, we" have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) with ourselves. Among +have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) with ourselves. Among "universals, there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which" "can be known by acquaintance, but it is clear that among those that" "can be so known are sensible qualities, relations of space and time," @@ -2704,11 +3060,14 @@ have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) with ourselves. Among involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our "immediate knowledge of _truths_ may be called _intuitive_ knowledge," and the truths so known may be called _self-evident_ truths. Among such +and the truths so known may be called _self-evident_ truths. Among such "truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and" "also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though" with less certainty) some ethical propositions. Our _derivative_ knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction. +self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction. +self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction. "" "If the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends" upon our intuitive knowledge. It therefore becomes important to consider @@ -2723,6 +3082,7 @@ knowledge from error. This problem does not arise with regard "acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error" involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can "only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e. the sense-datum," +"only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e. the sense-datum," as the mark of some physical object. Thus the problems connected with knowledge of truths are more difficult than those connected with knowledge of things. As the first of the problems connected @@ -2761,22 +3121,27 @@ of being deduced from anything more evident. In most questions of "regress. The principle itself is constantly used in our reasoning," "sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously; but there is no" "reasoning which, starting from some simpler self-evident principle," +"reasoning which, starting from some simpler self-evident principle," leads us to the principle of induction as its conclusion. And the same "holds for other logical principles. Their truth is evident to us, and we" "employ them in constructing demonstrations; but they themselves, or at" "least some of them, are incapable of demonstration." "" "Self-evidence, however, is not confined to those among general" +"Self-evidence, however, is not confined to those among general" principles which are incapable of proof. When a certain number of "logical principles have been admitted, the rest can be deduced from" them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as +them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as "those that were assumed without proof. All arithmetic, moreover, can" "be deduced from the general principles of logic, yet the simple" "propositions of arithmetic, such as 'two and two are four', are just as" self-evident as the principles of logic. +self-evident as the principles of logic. "" "It would seem, also, though this is more disputable, that there are some" "self-evident ethical principles, such as 'we ought to pursue what is" +"self-evident ethical principles, such as 'we ought to pursue what is" good'. "" "It should be observed that, in all cases of general principles," @@ -2796,11 +3161,14 @@ abstractions can readily grasp a general principle without the help of instances. "" "In addition to general principles, the other kind of self-evident truths" +"In addition to general principles, the other kind of self-evident truths" are those immediately derived from sensation. We will call such truths "'truths of perception', and the judgements expressing them we will" call 'judgements of perception'. But here a certain amount of care is required in getting at the precise nature of the truths that are self-evident. The actual sense-data are neither true nor false. A +self-evident. The actual sense-data are neither true nor false. A +self-evident. The actual sense-data are neither true nor false. A "particular patch of colour which I see, for example, simply exists: it" is not the sort of thing that is true or false. It is true that there is "such a patch, true that it has a certain shape and degree of brightness," @@ -2808,13 +3176,19 @@ true that it is surrounded by certain other colours. But the patch "itself, like everything else in the world of sense, is of a radically" "different kind from the things that are true or false, and therefore" cannot properly be said to be _true_. Thus whatever self-evident truths +cannot properly be said to be _true_. Thus whatever self-evident truths +may be obtained from our senses must be different from the sense-data may be obtained from our senses must be different from the sense-data from which they are obtained. "" It would seem that there are two kinds of self-evident truths of +It would seem that there are two kinds of self-evident truths of "perception, though perhaps in the last analysis the two kinds may" "coalesce. First, there is the kind which simply asserts the _existence_" "of the sense-datum, without in any way analysing it. We see a patch" +"of the sense-datum, without in any way analysing it. We see a patch" +"of red, and we judge 'there is such-and-such a patch of red', or more" +"of red, and we judge 'there is such-and-such a patch of red', or more" "of red, and we judge 'there is such-and-such a patch of red', or more" strictly 'there is that'; this is one kind of intuitive judgement of "perception. The other kind arises when the object of sense is complex," @@ -2822,12 +3196,14 @@ strictly 'there is that'; this is one kind of intuitive judgement of "_round_ patch of red, we may judge 'that patch of red is round'. This is" "again a judgement of perception, but it differs from our previous kind." In our present kind we have a single sense-datum which has both colour +In our present kind we have a single sense-datum which has both colour and shape: the colour is red and the shape is round. Our judgement "analyses the datum into colour and shape, and then recombines them by" stating that the red colour is round in shape. Another example of this "kind of judgement is 'this is to the right of that', where 'this'" and 'that' are seen simultaneously. In this kind of judgement the sense-datum contains constituents which have some relation to each +sense-datum contains constituents which have some relation to each "other, and the judgement asserts that these constituents have this" relation. "" @@ -2870,12 +3246,15 @@ am by no means certain. I am quite certain that I ate my breakfast this "I can recall some of it easily, some with an effort, some only with a" "large element of doubt, and some not at all. Thus there is a continual" "gradation in the degree of self-evidence of what I remember, and a" +"gradation in the degree of self-evidence of what I remember, and a" corresponding gradation in the trustworthiness of my memory. "" Thus the first answer to the difficulty of fallacious memory is to say "that memory has degrees of self-evidence, and that these correspond" +"that memory has degrees of self-evidence, and that these correspond" "to the degrees of its trustworthiness, reaching a limit of perfect" self-evidence and perfect trustworthiness in our memory of events which +self-evidence and perfect trustworthiness in our memory of events which are recent and vivid. "" "It would seem, however, that there are cases of very firm belief in a" @@ -2892,35 +3271,50 @@ therefore not be a genuine case of memory. It would seem that cases of can be shown to be not cases of memory in the strict sense at all. "" One important point about self-evidence is made clear by the case of +One important point about self-evidence is made clear by the case of +"memory, and that is, that self-evidence has degrees: it is not a quality" "memory, and that is, that self-evidence has degrees: it is not a quality" "which is simply present or absent, but a quality which may be more or" "less present, in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an" almost imperceptible faintness. Truths of perception and some of the principles of logic have the very highest degree of self-evidence; +principles of logic have the very highest degree of self-evidence; truths of immediate memory have an almost equally high degree. The inductive principle has less self-evidence than some of the other +inductive principle has less self-evidence than some of the other "principles of logic, such as 'what follows from a true premiss must be" true'. Memories have a diminishing self-evidence as they become remoter +true'. Memories have a diminishing self-evidence as they become remoter and fainter; the truths of logic and mathematics have (broadly speaking) less self-evidence as they become more complicated. Judgements of +less self-evidence as they become more complicated. Judgements of +"intrinsic ethical or aesthetic value are apt to have some self-evidence," "intrinsic ethical or aesthetic value are apt to have some self-evidence," but not much. "" "Degrees of self-evidence are important in the theory of knowledge," +"Degrees of self-evidence are important in the theory of knowledge," "since, if propositions may (as seems likely) have some degree of" "self-evidence without being true, it will not be necessary to abandon" +"self-evidence without being true, it will not be necessary to abandon" "all connexion between self-evidence and truth, but merely to say that," +"all connexion between self-evidence and truth, but merely to say that," +"where there is a conflict, the more self-evident proposition is to be" "where there is a conflict, the more self-evident proposition is to be" retained and the less self-evident rejected. +retained and the less self-evident rejected. "" "It seems, however, highly probable that two different notions are" "combined in 'self-evidence' as above explained; that one of them," +"combined in 'self-evidence' as above explained; that one of them," +"which corresponds to the highest degree of self-evidence, is really an" "which corresponds to the highest degree of self-evidence, is really an" "infallible guarantee of truth, while the other, which corresponds to" "all the other degrees, does not give an infallible guarantee, but only a" "greater or less presumption. This, however, is only a suggestion, which" we cannot as yet develop further. After we have dealt with the nature "of truth, we shall return to the subject of self-evidence, in connexion" +"of truth, we shall return to the subject of self-evidence, in connexion" with the distinction between knowledge and error. "" "" @@ -2992,13 +3386,21 @@ because of an historical event which happened two and a half centuries quality of the beliefs. "" The third of the above requisites leads us to adopt the view--which has +The third of the above requisites leads us to adopt the view--which has +The third of the above requisites leads us to adopt the view--which has +on the whole been commonest among philosophers--that truth consists in +on the whole been commonest among philosophers--that truth consists in on the whole been commonest among philosophers--that truth consists in "some form of correspondence between belief and fact. It is, however, by" no means an easy matter to discover a form of correspondence to which there are no irrefutable objections. By this partly--and partly by the +there are no irrefutable objections. By this partly--and partly by the +there are no irrefutable objections. By this partly--and partly by the "feeling that, if truth consists in a correspondence of thought with" "something outside thought, thought can never know when truth has been" attained--many philosophers have been led to try to find some definition +attained--many philosophers have been led to try to find some definition +attained--many philosophers have been led to try to find some definition of truth which shall not consist in relation to something wholly outside belief. The most important attempt at a definition of this sort is the theory that truth consists in _coherence_. It is said that the mark of @@ -3023,6 +3425,7 @@ is no reason why they should always succeed. that degree of reality that the objects of dreams have; but although "such a view does not seem inconsistent with known facts, there is no" "reason to prefer it to the common-sense view, according to which other" +"reason to prefer it to the common-sense view, according to which other" people and things do really exist. Thus coherence as the definition of truth fails because there is no proof that there can be only one coherent system. @@ -3160,10 +3563,14 @@ from their being united must be complex. Wherever there is a relation "order by the 'sense' of the relation of believing. Among the objects," "as we saw in considering 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio'," "one must be a relation--in this instance, the relation 'loving'. But" +"one must be a relation--in this instance, the relation 'loving'. But" +"one must be a relation--in this instance, the relation 'loving'. But" "this relation, as it occurs in the act of believing, is not the relation" which creates the unity of the complex whole consisting of the subject "and the objects. The relation 'loving', as it occurs in the act of" "believing, is one of the objects--it is a brick in the structure, not" +"believing, is one of the objects--it is a brick in the structure, not" +"believing, is one of the objects--it is a brick in the structure, not" the cement. The cement is the relation 'believing'. When the belief is "_true_, there is another complex unity, in which the relation which was" "one of the objects of the belief relates the other objects. Thus, e.g.," @@ -3202,8 +3609,12 @@ depend on minds for their _truth_. We may restate our theory as follows: If we take such a belief as "'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', we will call Desdemona" "and Cassio the _object-terms_, and loving the _object-relation_. If" +"and Cassio the _object-terms_, and loving the _object-relation_. If" +"and Cassio the _object-terms_, and loving the _object-relation_. If" "there is a complex unity 'Desdemona's love for Cassio', consisting of" the object-terms related by the object-relation in the same order as +the object-terms related by the object-relation in the same order as +the object-terms related by the object-relation in the same order as "they have in the belief, then this complex unity is called the _fact" corresponding to the belief_. Thus a belief is true when there is a "corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact." @@ -3294,14 +3705,17 @@ which would not be made if it were false. And we are quite amply justified in believing that the newspaper asserts that the King is dead. But here the intuitive knowledge upon which our belief is based is knowledge of the existence of sense-data derived from looking at +is knowledge of the existence of sense-data derived from looking at the print which gives the news. This knowledge scarcely rises into "consciousness, except in a person who cannot read easily. A child may be" "aware of the shapes of the letters, and pass gradually and painfully to" a realization of their meaning. But anybody accustomed to reading "passes at once to what the letters mean, and is not aware, except on" "reflection, that he has derived this knowledge from the sense-data" +"reflection, that he has derived this knowledge from the sense-data" called seeing the printed letters. Thus although a valid inference from "the-letters to their meaning is possible, and _could_ be performed" +"the-letters to their meaning is possible, and _could_ be performed" "by the reader, it is not in fact performed, since he does not in fact" perform any operation which can be called logical inference. Yet it would be absurd to say that the reader does not _know_ that the @@ -3338,6 +3752,7 @@ the difficulties of the question. "" "Our theory of truth, to begin with, supplies the possibility of" distinguishing certain truths as _self-evident_ in a sense which ensures +distinguishing certain truths as _self-evident_ in a sense which ensures "infallibility. When a belief is true, we said, there is a corresponding" "fact, in which the several objects of the belief form a single complex." "The belief is said to constitute _knowledge_ of this fact, provided" @@ -3368,21 +3783,29 @@ only the reality of the parts and the relation: the relation may not "" It will be remembered that at the end of Chapter XI we suggested that "there might be two kinds of self-evidence, one giving an absolute" +"there might be two kinds of self-evidence, one giving an absolute" "guarantee of truth, the other only a partial guarantee. These two kinds" can now be distinguished. "" "We may say that a truth is self-evident, in the first and most absolute" +"We may say that a truth is self-evident, in the first and most absolute" "sense, when we have acquaintance with the fact which corresponds to" "the truth. When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, the" "corresponding fact, if his belief were true, would be 'Desdemona's" love for Cassio'. This would be a fact with which no one could have acquaintance except Desdemona; hence in the sense of self-evidence that +acquaintance except Desdemona; hence in the sense of self-evidence that "we are considering, the truth that Desdemona loves Cassio (if it were" "a truth) could only be self-evident to Desdemona. All mental facts, and" +"a truth) could only be self-evident to Desdemona. All mental facts, and" +"all facts concerning sense-data, have this same privacy: there is only" "all facts concerning sense-data, have this same privacy: there is only" "one person to whom they can be self-evident in our present sense, since" +"one person to whom they can be self-evident in our present sense, since" there is only one person who can be acquainted with the mental things or the sense-data concerned. Thus no fact about any particular existing +or the sense-data concerned. Thus no fact about any particular existing +"thing can be self-evident to more than one person. On the other hand," "thing can be self-evident to more than one person. On the other hand," facts about universals do not have this privacy. Many minds may be acquainted with the same universals; hence a relation between universals @@ -3390,10 +3813,13 @@ may be known by acquaintance to many different people. In all cases where we know by acquaintance a complex fact consisting of certain terms "in a certain relation, we say that the truth that these terms are so" "related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these" +"related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these" cases the judgement that the terms are so related _must_ be true. Thus this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of truth. +this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of truth. "" But although this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of +But although this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of "truth, it does not enable us to be _absolutely_ certain, in the case of" "any given judgement, that the judgement in question is true. Suppose" "we first perceive the sun shining, which is a complex fact, and thence" @@ -3403,14 +3829,17 @@ complex fact: we have to separate out 'the sun' and 'shining' as constituents of the fact. In this process it is possible to commit an error; hence even where a _fact_ has the first or absolute kind of "self-evidence, a judgement believed to correspond to the fact is not" +"self-evidence, a judgement believed to correspond to the fact is not" "absolutely infallible, because it may not really correspond to the" fact. But if it does correspond (in the sense explained in the preceding "chapter), then it _must_ be true." "" The second sort of self-evidence will be that which belongs to +The second sort of self-evidence will be that which belongs to "judgements in the first instance, and is not derived from direct" perception of a fact as a single complex whole. This second kind of "self-evidence will have degrees, from the very highest degree down to a" +"self-evidence will have degrees, from the very highest degree down to a" "bare inclination in favour of the belief. Take, for example, the case of" a horse trotting away from us along a hard road. At first our certainty "that we hear the hoofs is complete; gradually, if we listen intently," @@ -3419,6 +3848,8 @@ blind upstairs or our own heartbeats; at last we become doubtful whether "there was any noise at all; then we _think_ we no longer hear anything," "and at last we _know_ we no longer hear anything. In this process, there" "is a continual gradation of self-evidence, from the highest degree to" +"is a continual gradation of self-evidence, from the highest degree to" +"the least, not in the sense-data themselves, but in the judgements based" "the least, not in the sense-data themselves, but in the judgements based" on them. "" @@ -3426,19 +3857,26 @@ on them. one green. We can be quite sure they are different shades of colour; but if the green colour is gradually altered to be more and more like the "blue, becoming first a blue-green, then a greeny-blue, then blue," +"blue, becoming first a blue-green, then a greeny-blue, then blue," +"blue, becoming first a blue-green, then a greeny-blue, then blue," there will come a moment when we are doubtful whether we can see any "difference, and then a moment when we know that we cannot see any" "difference. The same thing happens in tuning a musical instrument, or in" any other case where there is a continuous gradation. Thus self-evidence +any other case where there is a continuous gradation. Thus self-evidence of this sort is a matter of degree; and it seems plain that the higher degrees are more to be trusted than the lower degrees. "" In derivative knowledge our ultimate premisses must have some degree of "self-evidence, and so must their connexion with the conclusions deduced" +"self-evidence, and so must their connexion with the conclusions deduced" from them. Take for example a piece of reasoning in geometry. It is not enough that the axioms from which we start should be self-evident: it +enough that the axioms from which we start should be self-evident: it "is necessary also that, at each step in the reasoning, the connexion of" "premiss and conclusion should be self-evident. In difficult reasoning," +"premiss and conclusion should be self-evident. In difficult reasoning," +this connexion has often only a very small degree of self-evidence; this connexion has often only a very small degree of self-evidence; hence errors of reasoning are not improbable where the difficulty is great. @@ -3447,6 +3885,8 @@ great. "knowledge and as regards derivative knowledge, if we assume that" intuitive knowledge is trustworthy in proportion to the degree of its "self-evidence, there will be a gradation in trustworthiness, from the" +"self-evidence, there will be a gradation in trustworthiness, from the" +existence of noteworthy sense-data and the simpler truths of logic and existence of noteworthy sense-data and the simpler truths of logic and "arithmetic, which may be taken as quite certain, down to judgements" which seem only just more probable than their opposites. What we firmly @@ -3457,6 +3897,7 @@ intuitive or inferred (logically or psychologically) from intuitive "knowledge nor error, and also what we believe hesitatingly, because it" "is, or is derived from, something which has not the highest degree of" "self-evidence, may be called _probable opinion_. Thus the greater" +"self-evidence, may be called _probable opinion_. Thus the greater" part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable opinion. "" @@ -3488,12 +3929,17 @@ CHAPTER XIV. THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE "In all that we have said hitherto concerning philosophy, we have" scarcely touched on many matters that occupy a great space in the "writings of most philosophers. Most philosophers--or, at any rate, very" +"writings of most philosophers. Most philosophers--or, at any rate, very" +"writings of most philosophers. Most philosophers--or, at any rate, very" +"many--profess to be able to prove, by _a priori_ metaphysical reasoning," +"many--profess to be able to prove, by _a priori_ metaphysical reasoning," "many--profess to be able to prove, by _a priori_ metaphysical reasoning," "such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential" "rationality of the universe, the illusoriness of matter, the unreality" "of all evil, and so on. There can be no doubt that the hope of finding" reason to believe such theses as these has been the chief inspiration of "many life-long students of philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It" +"many life-long students of philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It" would seem that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to "be obtained by metaphysics, and that the proposed proofs that, in virtue" of the laws of logic such and such things _must_ exist and such and such @@ -3504,6 +3950,7 @@ that it may be valid. "" "The great representative, in modern times, of the kind of view which" "we wish to examine, was Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel's philosophy is very" +"we wish to examine, was Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel's philosophy is very" "difficult, and commentators differ as to the true interpretation of it." "According to the interpretation I shall adopt, which is that of many, if" "not most, of the commentators and has the merit of giving an interesting" @@ -3514,6 +3961,8 @@ existing without the complement supplied by the rest of the world. Just "the whole must have been, so the metaphysician, according to Hegel," "sees, from any one piece of reality, what the whole of reality must" be--at least in its large outlines. Every apparently separate piece of +be--at least in its large outlines. Every apparently separate piece of +be--at least in its large outlines. Every apparently separate piece of "reality has, as it were, hooks which grapple it to the next piece;" "the next piece, in turn, has fresh hooks, and so on, until the whole" "universe is reconstructed. This essential incompleteness appears," @@ -3537,6 +3986,10 @@ to one who simultaneously surveys the Whole. Thus Hegel reaches the "in space or time, not in any degree evil, wholly rational, and wholly" "spiritual. Any appearance to the contrary, in the world we know, can be" proved logically--so he believes--to be entirely due to our fragmentary +proved logically--so he believes--to be entirely due to our fragmentary +proved logically--so he believes--to be entirely due to our fragmentary +proved logically--so he believes--to be entirely due to our fragmentary +proved logically--so he believes--to be entirely due to our fragmentary "piecemeal view of the universe. If we saw the universe whole, as we may" "suppose God sees it, space and time and matter and evil and all striving" "and struggling would disappear, and we should see instead an eternal" @@ -3548,6 +4001,7 @@ perfect unchanging spiritual unity. confusion and many unwarrantable assumptions. The fundamental tenet upon which the system is built up is that what is incomplete must be not "self-subsistent, but must need the support of other things before it can" +"self-subsistent, but must need the support of other things before it can" exist. It is held that whatever has relations to things outside itself "must contain some reference to those outside things in its own nature," "and could not, therefore, be what it is if those outside things did not" @@ -3556,6 +4010,8 @@ exist. It is held that whatever has relations to things outside itself "but for the objects which he knows or loves or hates, he could not be" what he is. He is essentially and obviously a fragment: taken as the sum-total of reality he would be self-contradictory. +sum-total of reality he would be self-contradictory. +sum-total of reality he would be self-contradictory. "" "This whole point of view, however, turns upon the notion of the 'nature'" "of a thing, which seems to mean 'all the truths about the thing'. It is" @@ -3572,6 +4028,8 @@ relations to all the other things in the universe. But if the word "employed, between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. We may" have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance even if we know very few propositions about it--theoretically we need not know any propositions +propositions about it--theoretically we need not know any propositions +propositions about it--theoretically we need not know any propositions "about it. Thus, acquaintance with a thing does not involve knowledge of" its 'nature' in the above sense. And although acquaintance with a thing "is involved in our knowing any one proposition about a thing, knowledge" @@ -3605,6 +4063,7 @@ chapters. Most of the great ambitious attempts of metaphysicians have proceeded by the attempt to prove that such and such apparent features of the actual "world were self-contradictory, and therefore could not be real. The" +"world were self-contradictory, and therefore could not be real. The" "whole tendency of modern thought, however, is more and more in the" "direction of showing that the supposed contradictions were illusory, and" that very little can be proved _a priori_ from considerations of what @@ -3624,6 +4083,10 @@ must be other points between them however small the distance between "time may elapse between two moments, it seems evident that there will be" other moments between them. Thus space and time appear to be infinitely divisible. But as against these apparent facts--infinite extent and +divisible. But as against these apparent facts--infinite extent and +divisible. But as against these apparent facts--infinite extent and +infinite divisibility--philosophers have advanced arguments tending to +infinite divisibility--philosophers have advanced arguments tending to infinite divisibility--philosophers have advanced arguments tending to "show that there could be no infinite collections of things, and that" "therefore the number of points in space, or of instants in time, must" @@ -3637,6 +4100,7 @@ his time very many philosophers have believed that space and time are "however, owing to the labours of the mathematicians, notably Georg" "Cantor, it has appeared that the impossibility of infinite collections" "was a mistake. They are not in fact self-contradictory, but only" +"was a mistake. They are not in fact self-contradictory, but only" contradictory of certain rather obstinate mental prejudices. Hence the "reasons for regarding space and time as unreal have become inoperative," and one of the great sources of metaphysical constructions is dried up. @@ -3651,6 +4115,10 @@ are now known to derive their appearance of necessity from our mere "foundation. By imagining worlds in which these axioms are false, the" mathematicians have used logic to loosen the prejudices of common "sense, and to show the possibility of spaces differing--some more, some" +"sense, and to show the possibility of spaces differing--some more, some" +"sense, and to show the possibility of spaces differing--some more, some" +less--from that in which we live. And some of these spaces differ so +less--from that in which we live. And some of these spaces differ so less--from that in which we live. And some of these spaces differ so "little from Euclidean space, where distances such as we can measure are" "concerned, that it is impossible to discover by observation whether our" @@ -3675,12 +4143,15 @@ there is so much to know. "the task of deciding, where decision is possible, between the many" worlds which logic offers for our choice. Thus knowledge as to what exists becomes limited to what we can learn from experience--not to +exists becomes limited to what we can learn from experience--not to +exists becomes limited to what we can learn from experience--not to "what we can actually experience, for, as we have seen, there is much" knowledge by description concerning things of which we have no direct "experience. But in all cases of knowledge by description, we need some" "connexion of universals, enabling us, from such and such a datum, to" infer an object of a certain sort as implied by our datum. Thus in "regard to physical objects, for example, the principle that sense-data" +"regard to physical objects, for example, the principle that sense-data" are signs of physical objects is itself a connexion of universals; and it is only in virtue of this principle that experience enables us to acquire knowledge concerning physical objects. The same applies to @@ -3740,9 +4211,15 @@ criticism which we are asserting to be the essence of philosophy. His "on reflection, he could feel certain that he really knew it. This is the" "kind of criticism which constitutes philosophy. Some knowledge, such as" "knowledge of the existence of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable," +"knowledge of the existence of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable," however calmly and thoroughly we reflect upon it. In regard to such "knowledge, philosophical criticism does not require that we should" "abstain from belief. But there are beliefs--such, for example, as the" +"abstain from belief. But there are beliefs--such, for example, as the" +"abstain from belief. But there are beliefs--such, for example, as the" +belief that physical objects exactly resemble our sense-data--which are +belief that physical objects exactly resemble our sense-data--which are +belief that physical objects exactly resemble our sense-data--which are belief that physical objects exactly resemble our sense-data--which are "entertained until we begin to reflect, but are found to melt away" when subjected to a close inquiry. Such beliefs philosophy will bid us @@ -3773,6 +4250,7 @@ what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is "many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are" inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent "but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on" +"but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on" matters concerning which knowledge is impossible. "" "This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong" @@ -3829,6 +4307,10 @@ questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in "" "This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of" philosophy. There are many questions--and among them those that are of +philosophy. There are many questions--and among them those that are of +philosophy. There are many questions--and among them those that are of +"the profoundest interest to our spiritual life--which, so far as we" +"the profoundest interest to our spiritual life--which, so far as we" "the profoundest interest to our spiritual life--which, so far as we" "can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers" become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the @@ -3866,6 +4348,7 @@ uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through "life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the" "habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which" have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his +have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his "deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite," "finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar" possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to @@ -3883,6 +4366,10 @@ familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. "" "Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy" has a value--perhaps its chief value--through the greatness of the +has a value--perhaps its chief value--through the greatness of the +has a value--perhaps its chief value--through the greatness of the +has a value--perhaps its chief value--through the greatness of the +has a value--perhaps its chief value--through the greatness of the "objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal" aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and @@ -3903,6 +4390,10 @@ prison and this strife. One way of escape is by philosophic contemplation. Philosophic "contemplation does not, in its widest survey, divide the universe into" "two hostile camps--friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and" +"two hostile camps--friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and" +"two hostile camps--friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and" +"bad--it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it" +"bad--it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it" "bad--it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it" "is unalloyed, does not aim at proving that the rest of the universe is" "akin to man. All acquisition of knowledge is an enlargement of the Self," @@ -3914,28 +4405,35 @@ which does not wish in advance that its objects should have this or that "as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that" knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what seems alien. "The desire to prove this is a form of self-assertion and, like all" +"The desire to prove this is a form of self-assertion and, like all" "self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it" +"self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it" +"desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion," "desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion," "in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to" "its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, and the" "Self sets bounds to the greatness of its goods. In contemplation, on" "the contrary, we start from the not-Self, and through its greatness the" +"the contrary, we start from the not-Self, and through its greatness the" boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity. "" For this reason greatness of soul is not fostered by those philosophies which assimilate the universe to Man. Knowledge is a form of union "of Self and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and" +"of Self and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and" therefore by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves. There is a widespread philosophical tendency "towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things," "that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals" +"that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals" "are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created" "by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if" "our previous discussions were correct, is untrue; but in addition to" "being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of" "all that gives it value, since it fetters contemplation to Self. What" "it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of" +"it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of" "prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between" us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear @@ -3943,9 +4441,11 @@ his word might not be law. "" "The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its" "satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything" +"satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything" "that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject" "contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or" "private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire," +"private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire," "distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect" "seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such" personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free @@ -3953,11 +4453,14 @@ personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free "without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs" "and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and" "exclusive desire of knowledge--knowledge as impersonal, as purely" +"exclusive desire of knowledge--knowledge as impersonal, as purely" +"exclusive desire of knowledge--knowledge as impersonal, as purely" "contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free" intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into "which the accidents of private history do not enter, than the knowledge" "brought by the senses, and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon" an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs +an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs distort as much as they reveal. "" The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of @@ -3995,6 +4498,7 @@ BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE The student who wishes to acquire an elementary knowledge of philosophy will find it both easier and more profitable to read some of the works of the great philosophers than to attempt to derive an all-round view +of the great philosophers than to attempt to derive an all-round view from handbooks. 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