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+""
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+"almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or"
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+""
+""
+Title: The Problems of Philosophy
+""
+Author: Bertrand Russell
+""
+"Release Date: June, 2004  [EBook #5827]"
+"Posting Date: May 2, 2009"
+""
+Language: English
+""
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+""
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY ***
+""
+""
+""
+""
+Produced by Gordon Keener
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
+""
+""
+By Bertrand Russell
+""
+""
+""
+""
+PREFACE
+""
+In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those
+problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say
+"something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism"
+"seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a"
+"larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics"
+"much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all."
+""
+I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E.
+"Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations"
+"of sense-data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards"
+probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the
+criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.
+""
+1912
+""
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER I. APPEARANCE AND REALITY
+""
+Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no
+"reasonable man could doubt it? This question, which at first sight might"
+"not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can"
+be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a
+"straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the"
+study of philosophy--for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer
+"such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in"
+"ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring"
+"all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the"
+vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.
+""
+"In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer"
+"scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent contradictions that only a"
+great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may
+"believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our"
+"present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be"
+derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate
+experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that
+"I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I"
+see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out
+of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun
+is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot
+"globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's"
+"rotation, it rises every morning, and will continue to do so for an"
+"indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal"
+"person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and"
+"books and papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as"
+the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be
+"so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who"
+"doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted,"
+and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure
+that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.
+""
+"To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the"
+"table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is"
+"smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound."
+Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this
+"description, so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise;"
+but as soon as we try to be more precise our troubles begin. Although
+"I believe that the table is 'really' of the same colour all over, the"
+"parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts,"
+"and some parts look white because of reflected light. I know that, if"
+"I move, the parts that reflect the light will be different, so that the"
+apparent distribution of colours on the table will change. It follows
+"that if several people are looking at the table at the same moment, no"
+"two of them will see exactly the same distribution of colours, because"
+"no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in"
+the point of view makes some change in the way the light is reflected.
+""
+"For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to"
+the painter they are all-important: the painter has to unlearn the habit
+of thinking that things seem to have the colour which common sense says
+"they 'really' have, and to learn the habit of seeing things as they"
+appear. Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions
+that cause most trouble in philosophy--the distinction between
+"'appearance' and 'reality', between what things seem to be and what they"
+"are. The painter wants to know what things seem to be, the practical man"
+and the philosopher want to know what they are; but the philosopher's
+"wish to know this is stronger than the practical man's, and is more"
+troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question.
+""
+"To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that"
+there is no colour which pre-eminently appears to be _the_ colour of the
+"table, or even of any one particular part of the table--it appears to"
+"be of different colours from different points of view, and there is"
+no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than
+others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will
+"seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind man, or to a"
+"man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be no colour"
+"at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. This"
+"colour is not something which is inherent in the table, but something"
+depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light falls
+"on the table. When, in ordinary life, we speak of _the_ colour of the"
+"table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a"
+normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions
+of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions
+"have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid"
+"favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any"
+one particular colour.
+""
+The same thing applies to the texture. With the naked eye one can see
+"the grain, but otherwise the table looks smooth and even. If we looked"
+"at it through a microscope, we should see roughnesses and hills and"
+"valleys, and all sorts of differences that are imperceptible to the"
+naked eye. Which of these is the 'real' table? We are naturally tempted
+"to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but that in"
+"turn would be changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we"
+"cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why should we trust what we"
+"see through a microscope? Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with"
+which we began deserts us.
+""
+The shape of the table is no better. We are all in the habit of judging
+"as to the 'real' shapes of things, and we do this so unreflectingly that"
+"we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we"
+"all have to learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different"
+in shape from every different point of view. If our table is 'really'
+"rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had"
+"two acute angles and two obtuse angles. If opposite sides are parallel,"
+they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator;
+"if they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were"
+"longer. All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table,"
+because experience has taught us to construct the 'real' shape from the
+"apparent shape, and the 'real' shape is what interests us as practical"
+men. But the 'real' shape is not what we see; it is something inferred
+from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we
+move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us
+"the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the"
+table.
+""
+Similar difficulties arise when we consider the sense of touch. It is
+"true that the table always gives us a sensation of hardness, and we feel"
+that it resists pressure. But the sensation we obtain depends upon how
+hard we press the table and also upon what part of the body we press
+with; thus the various sensations due to various pressures or various
+parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal _directly_ any definite
+"property of the table, but at most to be _signs_ of some property which"
+"perhaps _causes_ all the sensations, but is not actually apparent in any"
+of them. And the same applies still more obviously to the sounds which
+can be elicited by rapping the table.
+""
+"Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the"
+same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing. The
+"real table, if there is one, is not _immediately_ known to us at all,"
+"but must be an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very"
+"difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1) Is there a real table at"
+"all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?"
+""
+It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple
+terms of which the meaning is definite and clear. Let us give the name
+of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation:
+"such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and"
+so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the experience of being
+"immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour,"
+"we have a sensation _of_ the colour, but the colour itself is a"
+"sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that _of_ which we are"
+"immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is"
+"plain that if we are to know anything about the table, it must be"
+"by means of the sense-data--brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness,"
+"etc.--which we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have"
+"been given, we cannot say that the table is the sense-data, or even"
+that the sense-data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem
+"arises as to the relation of the sense-data to the real table, supposing"
+there is such a thing.
+""
+"The real table, if it exists, we will call a 'physical object'. Thus"
+we have to consider the relation of sense-data to physical objects.
+The collection of all physical objects is called 'matter'. Thus our two
+questions may be re-stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as
+"matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?"
+""
+The philosopher who first brought prominently forward the reasons
+for regarding the immediate objects of our senses as not existing
+independently of us was Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753). His _Three
+"Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in Opposition to Sceptics and"
+"Atheists_, undertake to prove that there is no such thing as matter at"
+"all, and that the world consists of nothing but minds and their ideas."
+"Hylas has hitherto believed in matter, but he is no match for Philonous,"
+"who mercilessly drives him into contradictions and paradoxes, and makes"
+"his own denial of matter seem, in the end, as if it were almost common"
+sense. The arguments employed are of very different value: some are
+"important and sound, others are confused or quibbling. But Berkeley"
+retains the merit of having shown that the existence of matter is
+"capable of being denied without absurdity, and that if there are any"
+things that exist independently of us they cannot be the immediate
+objects of our sensations.
+""
+There are two different questions involved when we ask whether matter
+"exists, and it is important to keep them clear. We commonly mean by"
+"'matter' something which is opposed to 'mind', something which we think"
+of as occupying space and as radically incapable of any sort of thought
+or consciousness. It is chiefly in this sense that Berkeley denies
+"matter; that is to say, he does not deny that the sense-data which we"
+commonly take as signs of the existence of the table are really signs
+"of the existence of _something_ independent of us, but he does deny"
+"that this something is non-mental, that it is neither mind nor ideas"
+entertained by some mind. He admits that there must be something which
+"continues to exist when we go out of the room or shut our eyes, and that"
+what we call seeing the table does really give us reason for believing
+in something which persists even when we are not seeing it. But he
+thinks that this something cannot be radically different in nature from
+"what we see, and cannot be independent of seeing altogether, though it"
+must be independent of _our_ seeing. He is thus led to regard the 'real'
+table as an idea in the mind of God. Such an idea has the required
+"permanence and independence of ourselves, without being--as matter would"
+"otherwise be--something quite unknowable, in the sense that we can only"
+"infer it, and can never be directly and immediately aware of it."
+""
+"Other philosophers since Berkeley have also held that, although the"
+"table does not depend for its existence upon being seen by me, it does"
+depend upon being seen (or otherwise apprehended in sensation) by
+"_some_ mind--not necessarily the mind of God, but more often the whole"
+"collective mind of the universe. This they hold, as Berkeley does,"
+chiefly because they think there can be nothing real--or at any rate
+nothing known to be real except minds and their thoughts and feelings.
+We might state the argument by which they support their view in some
+such way as this: 'Whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of
+the person thinking of it; therefore nothing can be thought of except
+"ideas in minds; therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is"
+inconceivable cannot exist.'
+""
+"Such an argument, in my opinion, is fallacious; and of course those who"
+advance it do not put it so shortly or so crudely. But whether valid or
+"not, the argument has been very widely advanced in one form or another;"
+"and very many philosophers, perhaps a majority, have held that there is"
+nothing real except minds and their ideas. Such philosophers are called
+"'idealists'. When they come to explaining matter, they either say, like"
+"Berkeley, that matter is really nothing but a collection of ideas,"
+"or they say, like Leibniz (1646-1716), that what appears as matter is"
+really a collection of more or less rudimentary minds.
+""
+"But these philosophers, though they deny matter as opposed to mind,"
+"nevertheless, in another sense, admit matter. It will be remembered that"
+"we asked two questions; namely, (1) Is there a real table at all? (2) If"
+"so, what sort of object can it be? Now both Berkeley and Leibniz admit"
+"that there is a real table, but Berkeley says it is certain ideas in the"
+"mind of God, and Leibniz says it is a colony of souls. Thus both of them"
+"answer our first question in the affirmative, and only diverge from the"
+views of ordinary mortals in their answer to our second question. In
+"fact, almost all philosophers seem to be agreed that there is a real"
+"table: they almost all agree that, however much our sense-data--colour,"
+"shape, smoothness, etc.--may depend upon us, yet their occurrence is"
+"a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing,"
+"perhaps, completely from our sense-data, and yet to be regarded as"
+causing those sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the
+real table.
+""
+Now obviously this point in which the philosophers are agreed--the view
+"that there _is_ a real table, whatever its nature may be--is vitally"
+"important, and it will be worth while to consider what reasons there are"
+for accepting this view before we go on to the further question as
+"to the nature of the real table. Our next chapter, therefore, will be"
+concerned with the reasons for supposing that there is a real table at
+all.
+""
+Before we go farther it will be well to consider for a moment what it
+"is that we have discovered so far. It has appeared that, if we take any"
+"common object of the sort that is supposed to be known by the senses,"
+what the senses _immediately_ tell us is not the truth about the object
+"as it is apart from us, but only the truth about certain sense-data"
+"which, so far as we can see, depend upon the relations between us and"
+"the object. Thus what we directly see and feel is merely 'appearance',"
+which we believe to be a sign of some 'reality' behind. But if the
+"reality is not what appears, have we any means of knowing whether there"
+"is any reality at all? And if so, have we any means of finding out what"
+it is like?
+""
+"Such questions are bewildering, and it is difficult to know that even"
+"the strangest hypotheses may not be true. Thus our familiar table,"
+"which has roused but the slightest thoughts in us hitherto, has become a"
+problem full of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it
+"is that it is not what it seems. Beyond this modest result, so far, we"
+have the most complete liberty of conjecture. Leibniz tells us it is a
+community of souls: Berkeley tells us it is an idea in the mind of God;
+"sober science, scarcely less wonderful, tells us it is a vast collection"
+of electric charges in violent motion.
+""
+"Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there"
+"is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot _answer_ so many questions"
+"as we could wish, has at least the power of _asking_ questions which"
+"increase the interest of the world, and show the strangeness and wonder"
+lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER II. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER
+""
+"In this chapter we have to ask ourselves whether, in any sense at all,"
+there is such a thing as matter. Is there a table which has a certain
+"intrinsic nature, and continues to exist when I am not looking, or is"
+"the table merely a product of my imagination, a dream-table in a very"
+prolonged dream? This question is of the greatest importance. For if
+"we cannot be sure of the independent existence of objects, we cannot"
+"be sure of the independent existence of other people's bodies, and"
+"therefore still less of other people's minds, since we have no grounds"
+for believing in their minds except such as are derived from observing
+their bodies. Thus if we cannot be sure of the independent existence of
+"objects, we shall be left alone in a desert--it may be that the whole"
+"outer world is nothing but a dream, and that we alone exist. This is an"
+uncomfortable possibility; but although it cannot be strictly proved to
+"be false, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that it is true."
+In this chapter we have to see why this is the case.
+""
+"Before we embark upon doubtful matters, let us try to find some more"
+or less fixed point from which to start. Although we are doubting the
+"physical existence of the table, we are not doubting the existence"
+of the sense-data which made us think there was a table; we are not
+"doubting that, while we look, a certain colour and shape appear to us,"
+"and while we press, a certain sensation of hardness is experienced by"
+"us. All this, which is psychological, we are not calling in question."
+"In fact, whatever else may be doubtful, some at least of our immediate"
+experiences seem absolutely certain.
+""
+"Descartes (1596-1650), the founder of modern philosophy, invented a"
+method which may still be used with profit--the method of systematic
+doubt. He determined that he would believe nothing which he did not see
+quite clearly and distinctly to be true. Whatever he could bring himself
+"to doubt, he would doubt, until he saw reason for not doubting it."
+By applying this method he gradually became convinced that the only
+existence of which he could be _quite_ certain was his own. He imagined
+"a deceitful demon, who presented unreal things to his senses in a"
+perpetual phantasmagoria; it might be very improbable that such a demon
+"existed, but still it was possible, and therefore doubt concerning"
+things perceived by the senses was possible.
+""
+"But doubt concerning his own existence was not possible, for if he did"
+"not exist, no demon could deceive him. If he doubted, he must exist; if"
+"he had any experiences whatever, he must exist. Thus his own existence"
+"was an absolute certainty to him. 'I think, therefore I am,' he said"
+"(_Cogito, ergo sum_); and on the basis of this certainty he set to work"
+to build up again the world of knowledge which his doubt had laid in
+"ruins. By inventing the method of doubt, and by showing that subjective"
+"things are the most certain, Descartes performed a great service to"
+"philosophy, and one which makes him still useful to all students of the"
+subject.
+""
+"But some care is needed in using Descartes' argument. 'I think,"
+therefore I am' says rather more than is strictly certain. It might seem
+as though we were quite sure of being the same person to-day as we were
+"yesterday, and this is no doubt true in some sense. But the real Self is"
+"as hard to arrive at as the real table, and does not seem to have that"
+"absolute, convincing certainty that belongs to particular experiences."
+"When I look at my table and see a certain brown colour, what is quite"
+"certain at once is not '_I_ am seeing a brown colour', but rather,"
+'a brown colour is being seen'. This of course involves something (or
+somebody) which (or who) sees the brown colour; but it does not of
+itself involve that more or less permanent person whom we call 'I'. So
+"far as immediate certainty goes, it might be that the something which"
+"sees the brown colour is quite momentary, and not the same as the"
+something which has some different experience the next moment.
+""
+Thus it is our particular thoughts and feelings that have primitive
+certainty. And this applies to dreams and hallucinations as well as to
+"normal perceptions: when we dream or see a ghost, we certainly do have"
+"the sensations we think we have, but for various reasons it is held that"
+no physical object corresponds to these sensations. Thus the certainty
+of our knowledge of our own experiences does not have to be limited in
+"any way to allow for exceptional cases. Here, therefore, we have, for"
+"what it is worth, a solid basis from which to begin our pursuit of"
+knowledge.
+""
+The problem we have to consider is this: Granted that we are certain of
+"our own sense-data, have we any reason for regarding them as signs of"
+"the existence of something else, which we can call the physical object?"
+When we have enumerated all the sense-data which we should naturally
+"regard as connected with the table, have we said all there is to say"
+"about the table, or is there still something else--something not a"
+"sense-datum, something which persists when we go out of the room? Common"
+sense unhesitatingly answers that there is. What can be bought and sold
+"and pushed about and have a cloth laid on it, and so on, cannot be"
+a _mere_ collection of sense-data. If the cloth completely hides the
+"table, we shall derive no sense-data from the table, and therefore, if"
+"the table were merely sense-data, it would have ceased to exist, and"
+"the cloth would be suspended in empty air, resting, by a miracle, in"
+the place where the table formerly was. This seems plainly absurd; but
+whoever wishes to become a philosopher must learn not to be frightened
+by absurdities.
+""
+One great reason why it is felt that we must secure a physical object
+"in addition to the sense-data, is that we want the same object for"
+"different people. When ten people are sitting round a dinner-table,"
+it seems preposterous to maintain that they are not seeing the same
+"tablecloth, the same knives and forks and spoons and glasses. But the"
+sense-data are private to each separate person; what is immediately
+present to the sight of one is not immediately present to the sight of
+"another: they all see things from slightly different points of view, and"
+"therefore see them slightly differently. Thus, if there are to be public"
+"neutral objects, which can be in some sense known to many different"
+"people, there must be something over and above the private and"
+"particular sense-data which appear to various people. What reason, then,"
+have we for believing that there are such public neutral objects?
+""
+"The first answer that naturally occurs to one is that, although"
+"different people may see the table slightly differently, still they all"
+"see more or less similar things when they look at the table, and"
+the variations in what they see follow the laws of perspective and
+"reflection of light, so that it is easy to arrive at a permanent object"
+underlying all the different people's sense-data. I bought my table from
+"the former occupant of my room; I could not buy _his_ sense-data,"
+"which died when he went away, but I could and did buy the confident"
+expectation of more or less similar sense-data. Thus it is the fact that
+"different people have similar sense-data, and that one person in a given"
+"place at different times has similar sense-data, which makes us suppose"
+that over and above the sense-data there is a permanent public object
+which underlies or causes the sense-data of various people at various
+times.
+""
+Now in so far as the above considerations depend upon supposing that
+"there are other people besides ourselves, they beg the very question at"
+"issue. Other people are represented to me by certain sense-data, such as"
+"the sight of them or the sound of their voices, and if I had no"
+reason to believe that there were physical objects independent of my
+"sense-data, I should have no reason to believe that other people exist"
+"except as part of my dream. Thus, when we are trying to show that there"
+"must be objects independent of our own sense-data, we cannot appeal to"
+"the testimony of other people, since this testimony itself consists of"
+"sense-data, and does not reveal other people's experiences unless our"
+own sense-data are signs of things existing independently of us. We must
+"therefore, if possible, find, in our own purely private experiences,"
+"characteristics which show, or tend to show, that there are in the world"
+things other than ourselves and our private experiences.
+""
+In one sense it must be admitted that we can never prove the existence
+of things other than ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity
+results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my
+"thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere"
+"fancy. In dreams a very complicated world may seem to be present, and"
+"yet on waking we find it was a delusion; that is to say, we find that"
+the sense-data in the dream do not appear to have corresponded with such
+physical objects as we should naturally infer from our sense-data. (It
+"is true that, when the physical world is assumed, it is possible to"
+"find physical causes for the sense-data in dreams: a door banging, for"
+"instance, may cause us to dream of a naval engagement. But although, in"
+"this case, there is a physical cause for the sense-data, there is not a"
+physical object corresponding to the sense-data in the way in which an
+actual naval battle would correspond.) There is no logical impossibility
+"in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we"
+ourselves create all the objects that come before us. But although this
+"is not logically impossible, there is no reason whatever to suppose that"
+"it is true; and it is, in fact, a less simple hypothesis, viewed as a"
+"means of accounting for the facts of our own life, than the common-sense"
+"hypothesis that there really are objects independent of us, whose action"
+on us causes our sensations.
+""
+The way in which simplicity comes in from supposing that there really
+are physical objects is easily seen. If the cat appears at one moment in
+"one part of the room, and at another in another part, it is natural"
+"to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over"
+a series of intermediate positions. But if it is merely a set of
+"sense-data, it cannot have ever been in any place where I did not see"
+it; thus we shall have to suppose that it did not exist at all while I
+"was not looking, but suddenly sprang into being in a new place. If"
+"the cat exists whether I see it or not, we can understand from our own"
+experience how it gets hungry between one meal and the next; but if
+"it does not exist when I am not seeing it, it seems odd that appetite"
+should grow during non-existence as fast as during existence. And if the
+"cat consists only of sense-data, it cannot be hungry, since no hunger"
+but my own can be a sense-datum to me. Thus the behaviour of the
+"sense-data which represent the cat to me, though it seems quite natural"
+"when regarded as an expression of hunger, becomes utterly inexplicable"
+"when regarded as mere movements and changes of patches of colour, which"
+are as incapable of hunger as a triangle is of playing football.
+""
+But the difficulty in the case of the cat is nothing compared to the
+difficulty in the case of human beings. When human beings speak--that
+"is, when we hear certain noises which we associate with ideas, and"
+simultaneously see certain motions of lips and expressions of face--it
+is very difficult to suppose that what we hear is not the expression
+"of a thought, as we know it would be if we emitted the same sounds. Of"
+"course similar things happen in dreams, where we are mistaken as to the"
+existence of other people. But dreams are more or less suggested by what
+"we call waking life, and are capable of being more or less accounted for"
+on scientific principles if we assume that there really is a physical
+world. Thus every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natural
+"view, that there really are objects other than ourselves and our"
+sense-data which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving
+them.
+""
+Of course it is not by argument that we originally come by our belief in
+an independent external world. We find this belief ready in ourselves as
+soon as we begin to reflect: it is what may be called an _instinctive_
+belief. We should never have been led to question this belief but for
+"the fact that, at any rate in the case of sight, it seems as if the"
+sense-datum itself were instinctively believed to be the independent
+"object, whereas argument shows that the object cannot be identical"
+"with the sense-datum. This discovery, however--which is not at all"
+"paradoxical in the case of taste and smell and sound, and only slightly"
+so in the case of touch--leaves undiminished our instinctive belief that
+there _are_ objects _corresponding_ to our sense-data. Since this belief
+"does not lead to any difficulties, but on the contrary tends to simplify"
+"and systematize our account of our experiences, there seems no good"
+reason for rejecting it. We may therefore admit--though with a slight
+"doubt derived from dreams--that the external world does really exist,"
+and is not wholly dependent for its existence upon our continuing to
+perceive it.
+""
+The argument which has led us to this conclusion is doubtless less
+"strong than we could wish, but it is typical of many philosophical"
+"arguments, and it is therefore worth while to consider briefly its"
+"general character and validity. All knowledge, we find, must be built"
+"up upon our instinctive beliefs, and if these are rejected, nothing"
+is left. But among our instinctive beliefs some are much stronger than
+"others, while many have, by habit and association, become entangled with"
+"other beliefs, not really instinctive, but falsely supposed to be part"
+of what is believed instinctively.
+""
+"Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs,"
+"beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much"
+isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. It should
+"take care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth,"
+"our instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system."
+There can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief
+"except that it clashes with others; thus, if they are found to"
+"harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of acceptance."
+""
+It is of course _possible_ that all or any of our beliefs may be
+"mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight"
+element of doubt. But we cannot have _reason_ to reject a belief except
+"on the ground of some other belief. Hence, by organizing our instinctive"
+"beliefs and their consequences, by considering which among them is most"
+"possible, if necessary, to modify or abandon, we can arrive, on the"
+"basis of accepting as our sole data what we instinctively believe, at an"
+"orderly systematic organization of our knowledge, in which, though the"
+"_possibility_ of error remains, its likelihood is diminished by the"
+interrelation of the parts and by the critical scrutiny which has
+preceded acquiescence.
+""
+"This function, at least, philosophy can perform. Most philosophers,"
+"rightly or wrongly, believe that philosophy can do much more than"
+"this--that it can give us knowledge, not otherwise attainable,"
+"concerning the universe as a whole, and concerning the nature of"
+"ultimate reality. Whether this be the case or not, the more modest"
+"function we have spoken of can certainly be performed by philosophy, and"
+"certainly suffices, for those who have once begun to doubt the adequacy"
+"of common sense, to justify the arduous and difficult labours that"
+philosophical problems involve.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF MATTER
+""
+"In the preceding chapter we agreed, though without being able to"
+"find demonstrative reasons, that it is rational to believe that our"
+"sense-data--for example, those which we regard as associated with my"
+table--are really signs of the existence of something independent of us
+"and our perceptions. That is to say, over and above the sensations of"
+"colour, hardness, noise, and so on, which make up the appearance of"
+"the table to me, I assume that there is something else, of which these"
+"things are appearances. The colour ceases to exist if I shut my eyes,"
+the sensation of hardness ceases to exist if I remove my arm from
+"contact with the table, the sound ceases to exist if I cease to rap the"
+table with my knuckles. But I do not believe that when all these things
+"cease the table ceases. On the contrary, I believe that it is because"
+the table exists continuously that all these sense-data will reappear
+"when I open my eyes, replace my arm, and begin again to rap with my"
+knuckles. The question we have to consider in this chapter is: What
+"is the nature of this real table, which persists independently of my"
+perception of it?
+""
+"To this question physical science gives an answer, somewhat incomplete"
+"it is true, and in part still very hypothetical, but yet deserving of"
+"respect so far as it goes. Physical science, more or less unconsciously,"
+has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced
+"to motions. Light and heat and sound are all due to wave-motions, which"
+travel from the body emitting them to the person who sees light or feels
+heat or hears sound. That which has the wave-motion is either aether or
+"'gross matter', but in either case is what the philosopher would call"
+matter. The only properties which science assigns to it are position in
+"space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion. Science"
+"does not deny that it _may_ have other properties; but if so, such other"
+"properties are not useful to the man of science, and in no way assist"
+him in explaining the phenomena.
+""
+"It is sometimes said that 'light _is_ a form of wave-motion', but this"
+"is misleading, for the light which we immediately see, which we know"
+"directly by means of our senses, is _not_ a form of wave-motion, but"
+something quite different--something which we all know if we are not
+"blind, though we cannot describe it so as to convey our knowledge to a"
+"man who is blind. A wave-motion, on the contrary, could quite well be"
+"described to a blind man, since he can acquire a knowledge of space by"
+the sense of touch; and he can experience a wave-motion by a sea voyage
+"almost as well as we can. But this, which a blind man can understand, is"
+not what we mean by _light_: we mean by _light_ just that which a blind
+"man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him."
+""
+"Now this something, which all of us who are not blind know, is not,"
+"according to science, really to be found in the outer world: it is"
+something caused by the action of certain waves upon the eyes and nerves
+and brain of the person who sees the light. When it is said that light
+"_is_ waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of"
+"our sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people"
+"experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form"
+any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses. And very
+similar remarks would apply to other kinds of sensations.
+""
+It is not only colours and sounds and so on that are absent from the
+"scientific world of matter, but also _space_ as we get it through sight"
+or touch. It is essential to science that its matter should be in _a_
+"space, but the space in which it is cannot be exactly the space we see"
+"or feel. To begin with, space as we see it is not the same as space as"
+we get it by the sense of touch; it is only by experience in infancy
+"that we learn how to touch things we see, or how to get a sight of"
+things which we feel touching us. But the space of science is neutral as
+between touch and sight; thus it cannot be either the space of touch or
+the space of sight.
+""
+"Again, different people see the same object as of different shapes,"
+"according to their point of view. A circular coin, for example, though"
+"we should always _judge_ it to be circular, will _look_ oval unless we"
+"are straight in front of it. When we judge that it _is_ circular, we are"
+"judging that it has a real shape which is not its apparent shape, but"
+belongs to it intrinsically apart from its appearance. But this real
+"shape, which is what concerns science, must be in a real space, not"
+"the same as anybody's _apparent_ space. The real space is public, the"
+apparent space is private to the percipient. In different people's
+_private_ spaces the same object seems to have different shapes; thus
+"the real space, in which it has its real shape, must be different from"
+"the private spaces. The space of science, therefore, though _connected_"
+"with the spaces we see and feel, is not identical with them, and the"
+manner of its connexion requires investigation.
+""
+We agreed provisionally that physical objects cannot be quite like
+"our sense-data, but may be regarded as _causing_ our sensations."
+"These physical objects are in the space of science, which we may call"
+"'physical' space. It is important to notice that, if our sensations"
+"are to be caused by physical objects, there must be a physical space"
+containing these objects and our sense-organs and nerves and brain. We
+get a sensation of touch from an object when we are in contact with it;
+"that is to say, when some part of our body occupies a place in physical"
+space quite close to the space occupied by the object. We see an object
+(roughly speaking) when no opaque body is between the object and our
+"eyes in physical space. Similarly, we only hear or smell or taste an"
+"object when we are sufficiently near to it, or when it touches the"
+"tongue, or has some suitable position in physical space relatively to"
+our body. We cannot begin to state what different sensations we shall
+derive from a given object under different circumstances unless we
+"regard the object and our body as both in one physical space, for it is"
+mainly the relative positions of the object and our body that determine
+what sensations we shall derive from the object.
+""
+"Now our sense-data are situated in our private spaces, either the space"
+of sight or the space of touch or such vaguer spaces as other senses
+"may give us. If, as science and common sense assume, there is one public"
+"all-embracing physical space in which physical objects are, the relative"
+positions of physical objects in physical space must more or less
+correspond to the relative positions of sense-data in our private
+spaces. There is no difficulty in supposing this to be the case. If we
+"see on a road one house nearer to us than another, our other senses will"
+"bear out the view that it is nearer; for example, it will be reached"
+sooner if we walk along the road. Other people will agree that the house
+which looks nearer to us is nearer; the ordnance map will take the
+same view; and thus everything points to a spatial relation between the
+houses corresponding to the relation between the sense-data which we see
+when we look at the houses. Thus we may assume that there is a physical
+space in which physical objects have spatial relations corresponding to
+those which the corresponding sense-data have in our private spaces. It
+is this physical space which is dealt with in geometry and assumed in
+physics and astronomy.
+""
+"Assuming that there is physical space, and that it does thus correspond"
+"to private spaces, what can we know about it? We can know _only_ what is"
+"required in order to secure the correspondence. That is to say, we can"
+"know nothing of what it is like in itself, but we can know the sort"
+of arrangement of physical objects which results from their spatial
+"relations. We can know, for example, that the earth and moon and sun"
+"are in one straight line during an eclipse, though we cannot know what"
+"a physical straight line is in itself, as we know the look of a straight"
+line in our visual space. Thus we come to know much more about the
+_relations_ of distances in physical space than about the distances
+"themselves; we may know that one distance is greater than another, or"
+"that it is along the same straight line as the other, but we cannot have"
+that immediate acquaintance with physical distances that we have with
+"distances in our private spaces, or with colours or sounds or other"
+sense-data. We can know all those things about physical space which a
+man born blind might know through other people about the space of sight;
+but the kind of things which a man born blind could never know about the
+space of sight we also cannot know about physical space. We can know the
+properties of the relations required to preserve the correspondence with
+"sense-data, but we cannot know the nature of the terms between which the"
+relations hold.
+""
+"With regard to time, our _feeling_ of duration or of the lapse of time"
+is notoriously an unsafe guide as to the time that has elapsed by the
+"clock. Times when we are bored or suffering pain pass slowly, times when"
+"we are agreeably occupied pass quickly, and times when we are sleeping"
+"pass almost as if they did not exist. Thus, in so far as time is"
+"constituted by duration, there is the same necessity for distinguishing"
+a public and a private time as there was in the case of space. But in so
+"far as time consists in an _order_ of before and after, there is no need"
+"to make such a distinction; the time-order which events seem to have is,"
+"so far as we can see, the same as the time-order which they do have. At"
+any rate no reason can be given for supposing that the two orders are
+not the same. The same is usually true of space: if a regiment of men
+"are marching along a road, the shape of the regiment will look different"
+"from different points of view, but the men will appear arranged in the"
+same order from all points of view. Hence we regard the order as true
+"also in physical space, whereas the shape is only supposed to correspond"
+to the physical space so far as is required for the preservation of the
+order.
+""
+In saying that the time-order which events seem to have is the same as
+"the time-order which they really have, it is necessary to guard against"
+a possible misunderstanding. It must not be supposed that the various
+states of different physical objects have the same time-order as the
+sense-data which constitute the perceptions of those objects. Considered
+"as physical objects, the thunder and lightning are simultaneous; that is"
+"to say, the lightning is simultaneous with the disturbance of the air in"
+"the place where the disturbance begins, namely, where the lightning"
+is. But the sense-datum which we call hearing the thunder does not take
+place until the disturbance of the air has travelled as far as to where
+"we are. Similarly, it takes about eight minutes for the sun's light"
+"to reach us; thus, when we see the sun we are seeing the sun of eight"
+minutes ago. So far as our sense-data afford evidence as to the physical
+sun they afford evidence as to the physical sun of eight minutes ago; if
+"the physical sun had ceased to exist within the last eight minutes, that"
+would make no difference to the sense-data which we call 'seeing
+the sun'. This affords a fresh illustration of the necessity of
+distinguishing between sense-data and physical objects.
+""
+What we have found as regards space is much the same as what we find
+in relation to the correspondence of the sense-data with their
+"physical counterparts. If one object looks blue and another red, we may"
+reasonably presume that there is some corresponding difference between
+"the physical objects; if two objects both look blue, we may presume a"
+corresponding similarity. But we cannot hope to be acquainted directly
+with the quality in the physical object which makes it look blue or red.
+"Science tells us that this quality is a certain sort of wave-motion, and"
+"this sounds familiar, because we think of wave-motions in the space we"
+"see. But the wave-motions must really be in physical space, with which"
+we have no direct acquaintance; thus the real wave-motions have not that
+familiarity which we might have supposed them to have. And what holds
+for colours is closely similar to what holds for other sense-data. Thus
+"we find that, although the _relations_ of physical objects have all"
+"sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the"
+"relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown"
+"in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means"
+of the senses. The question remains whether there is any other method of
+discovering the intrinsic nature of physical objects.
+""
+"The most natural, though not ultimately the most defensible, hypothesis"
+"to adopt in the first instance, at any rate as regards visual"
+"sense-data, would be that, though physical objects cannot, for the"
+"reasons we have been considering, be _exactly_ like sense-data, yet they"
+"may be more or less like. According to this view, physical objects will,"
+"for example, really have colours, and we might, by good luck, see an"
+object as of the colour it really is. The colour which an object seems
+"to have at any given moment will in general be very similar, though"
+"not quite the same, from many different points of view; we might thus"
+"suppose the 'real' colour to be a sort of medium colour, intermediate"
+between the various shades which appear from the different points of
+view.
+""
+"Such a theory is perhaps not capable of being definitely refuted, but"
+"it can be shown to be groundless. To begin with, it is plain that the"
+colour we see depends only upon the nature of the light-waves that
+"strike the eye, and is therefore modified by the medium intervening"
+"between us and the object, as well as by the manner in which light is"
+reflected from the object in the direction of the eye. The intervening
+"air alters colours unless it is perfectly clear, and any strong"
+reflection will alter them completely. Thus the colour we see is a
+"result of the ray as it reaches the eye, and not simply a property of"
+"the object from which the ray comes. Hence, also, provided certain waves"
+"reach the eye, we shall see a certain colour, whether the object from"
+which the waves start has any colour or not. Thus it is quite gratuitous
+"to suppose that physical objects have colours, and therefore there is no"
+justification for making such a supposition. Exactly similar arguments
+will apply to other sense-data.
+""
+It remains to ask whether there are any general philosophical arguments
+"enabling us to say that, if matter is real, it must be of such and such"
+"a nature. As explained above, very many philosophers, perhaps most, have"
+"held that whatever is real must be in some sense mental, or at any rate"
+that whatever we can know anything about must be in some sense mental.
+Such philosophers are called 'idealists'. Idealists tell us that what
+"appears as matter is really something mental; namely, either (as Leibniz"
+"held) more or less rudimentary minds, or (as Berkeley contended) ideas"
+"in the minds which, as we should commonly say, 'perceive' the matter."
+Thus idealists deny the existence of matter as something intrinsically
+"different from mind, though they do not deny that our sense-data are"
+signs of something which exists independently of our private sensations.
+In the following chapter we shall consider briefly the reasons--in my
+opinion fallacious--which idealists advance in favour of their theory.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER IV. IDEALISM
+""
+The word 'idealism' is used by different philosophers in somewhat
+different senses. We shall understand by it the doctrine that whatever
+"exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in"
+"some sense mental. This doctrine, which is very widely held among"
+"philosophers, has several forms, and is advocated on several different"
+"grounds. The doctrine is so widely held, and so interesting in itself,"
+that even the briefest survey of philosophy must give some account of
+it.
+""
+Those who are unaccustomed to philosophical speculation may be inclined
+to dismiss such a doctrine as obviously absurd. There is no doubt that
+common sense regards tables and chairs and the sun and moon and material
+objects generally as something radically different from minds and the
+"contents of minds, and as having an existence which might continue if"
+minds ceased. We think of matter as having existed long before there
+"were any minds, and it is hard to think of it as a mere product of"
+"mental activity. But whether true or false, idealism is not to be"
+dismissed as obviously absurd.
+""
+"We have seen that, even if physical objects do have an independent"
+"existence, they must differ very widely from sense-data, and can only"
+"have a _correspondence_ with sense-data, in the same sort of way in"
+which a catalogue has a correspondence with the things catalogued. Hence
+common sense leaves us completely in the dark as to the true intrinsic
+"nature of physical objects, and if there were good reason to regard them"
+"as mental, we could not legitimately reject this opinion merely because"
+it strikes us as strange. The truth about physical objects _must_ be
+"strange. It may be unattainable, but if any philosopher believes that"
+"he has attained it, the fact that what he offers as the truth is strange"
+ought not to be made a ground of objection to his opinion.
+""
+The grounds on which idealism is advocated are generally grounds derived
+"from the theory of knowledge, that is to say, from a discussion of the"
+conditions which things must satisfy in order that we may be able to
+know them. The first serious attempt to establish idealism on such
+"grounds was that of Bishop Berkeley. He proved first, by arguments which"
+"were largely valid, that our sense-data cannot be supposed to have an"
+"existence independent of us, but must be, in part at least, 'in' the"
+"mind, in the sense that their existence would not continue if there were"
+"no seeing or hearing or touching or smelling or tasting. So far, his"
+"contention was almost certainly valid, even if some of his arguments"
+were not so. But he went on to argue that sense-data were the only
+things of whose existence our perceptions could assure us; and that
+"to be known is to be 'in' a mind, and therefore to be mental. Hence he"
+"concluded that nothing can ever be known except what is in some mind,"
+and that whatever is known without being in my mind must be in some
+other mind.
+""
+"In order to understand his argument, it is necessary to understand his"
+use of the word 'idea'. He gives the name 'idea' to anything which
+"is _immediately_ known, as, for example, sense-data are known. Thus a"
+"particular colour which we see is an idea; so is a voice which we hear,"
+and so on. But the term is not wholly confined to sense-data. There will
+"also be things remembered or imagined, for with such things also we have"
+immediate acquaintance at the moment of remembering or imagining. All
+such immediate data he calls 'ideas'.
+""
+"He then proceeds to consider common objects, such as a tree, for"
+instance. He shows that all we know immediately when we 'perceive' the
+"tree consists of ideas in his sense of the word, and he argues that"
+there is not the slightest ground for supposing that there is anything
+"real about the tree except what is perceived. Its being, he says,"
+consists in being perceived: in the Latin of the schoolmen its '_esse_'
+is '_percipi_'. He fully admits that the tree must continue to exist
+even when we shut our eyes or when no human being is near it. But this
+"continued existence, he says, is due to the fact that God continues to"
+"perceive it; the 'real' tree, which corresponds to what we called the"
+"physical object, consists of ideas in the mind of God, ideas more or"
+"less like those we have when we see the tree, but differing in the fact"
+that they are permanent in God's mind so long as the tree continues
+"to exist. All our perceptions, according to him, consist in a"
+"partial participation in God's perceptions, and it is because of this"
+participation that different people see more or less the same tree. Thus
+"apart from minds and their ideas there is nothing in the world, nor is"
+"it possible that anything else should ever be known, since whatever is"
+known is necessarily an idea.
+""
+There are in this argument a good many fallacies which have been
+"important in the history of philosophy, and which it will be as well to"
+"bring to light. In the first place, there is a confusion engendered by"
+the use of the word 'idea'. We think of an idea as essentially something
+"in somebody's mind, and thus when we are told that a tree consists"
+"entirely of ideas, it is natural to suppose that, if so, the tree"
+must be entirely in minds. But the notion of being 'in' the mind is
+"ambiguous. We speak of bearing a person in mind, not meaning that the"
+"person is in our minds, but that a thought of him is in our minds. When"
+a man says that some business he had to arrange went clean out of his
+"mind, he does not mean to imply that the business itself was ever in his"
+"mind, but only that a thought of the business was formerly in his mind,"
+but afterwards ceased to be in his mind. And so when Berkeley says that
+"the tree must be in our minds if we can know it, all that he really has"
+a right to say is that a thought of the tree must be in our minds. To
+argue that the tree itself must be in our minds is like arguing that a
+person whom we bear in mind is himself in our minds. This confusion
+may seem too gross to have been really committed by any competent
+"philosopher, but various attendant circumstances rendered it possible."
+"In order to see how it was possible, we must go more deeply into the"
+question as to the nature of ideas.
+""
+"Before taking up the general question of the nature of ideas, we must"
+disentangle two entirely separate questions which arise concerning
+"sense-data and physical objects. We saw that, for various reasons of"
+"detail, Berkeley was right in treating the sense-data which constitute"
+"our perception of the tree as more or less subjective, in the sense that"
+"they depend upon us as much as upon the tree, and would not exist if the"
+tree were not being perceived. But this is an entirely different point
+from the one by which Berkeley seeks to prove that whatever can be
+immediately known must be in a mind. For this purpose arguments of
+detail as to the dependence of sense-data upon us are useless. It is
+"necessary to prove, generally, that by being known, things are shown to"
+be mental. This is what Berkeley believes himself to have done. It
+"is this question, and not our previous question as to the difference"
+"between sense-data and the physical object, that must now concern us."
+""
+"Taking the word 'idea' in Berkeley's sense, there are two quite distinct"
+things to be considered whenever an idea is before the mind. There is
+on the one hand the thing of which we are aware--say the colour of my
+"table--and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act"
+"of apprehending the thing. The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is"
+there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense
+mental? Our previous arguments concerning the colour did not prove it to
+be mental; they only proved that its existence depends upon the relation
+"of our sense organs to the physical object--in our case, the table. That"
+"is to say, they proved that a certain colour will exist, in a certain"
+"light, if a normal eye is placed at a certain point relatively to"
+the table. They did not prove that the colour is in the mind of the
+percipient.
+""
+"Berkeley's view, that obviously the colour must be in the mind, seems"
+to depend for its plausibility upon confusing the thing apprehended
+with the act of apprehension. Either of these might be called an 'idea';
+probably either would have been called an idea by Berkeley. The act
+"is undoubtedly in the mind; hence, when we are thinking of the act,"
+"we readily assent to the view that ideas must be in the mind. Then,"
+forgetting that this was only true when ideas were taken as acts of
+"apprehension, we transfer the proposition that 'ideas are in the mind'"
+"to ideas in the other sense, i.e. to the things apprehended by our acts"
+"of apprehension. Thus, by an unconscious equivocation, we arrive at the"
+conclusion that whatever we can apprehend must be in our minds. This
+"seems to be the true analysis of Berkeley's argument, and the ultimate"
+fallacy upon which it rests.
+""
+This question of the distinction between act and object in our
+"apprehending of things is vitally important, since our whole power of"
+acquiring knowledge is bound up with it. The faculty of being acquainted
+with things other than itself is the main characteristic of a mind.
+Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the
+mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the
+mind's power of knowing things. If we say that the things known must be
+"in the mind, we are either unduly limiting the mind's power of knowing,"
+or we are uttering a mere tautology. We are uttering a mere tautology if
+"we mean by '_in_ the mind' the same as by '_before_ the mind', i.e. if"
+"we mean merely being apprehended by the mind. But if we mean this, we"
+"shall have to admit that what, _in this sense_, is in the mind,"
+may nevertheless be not mental. Thus when we realize the nature of
+"knowledge, Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well"
+"as in form, and his grounds for supposing that 'ideas'--i.e. the objects"
+"apprehended--must be mental, are found to have no validity whatever."
+Hence his grounds in favour of idealism may be dismissed. It remains to
+see whether there are any other grounds.
+""
+"It is often said, as though it were a self-evident truism, that we"
+cannot know that anything exists which we do not know. It is inferred
+that whatever can in any way be relevant to our experience must be at
+least capable of being known by us; whence it follows that if matter
+"were essentially something with which we could not become acquainted,"
+"matter would be something which we could not know to exist, and which"
+"could have for us no importance whatever. It is generally also implied,"
+"for reasons which remain obscure, that what can have no importance for"
+"us cannot be real, and that therefore matter, if it is not composed of"
+"minds or of mental ideas, is impossible and a mere chimaera."
+""
+"To go into this argument fully at our present stage would be impossible,"
+since it raises points requiring a considerable preliminary discussion;
+but certain reasons for rejecting the argument may be noticed at
+once. To begin at the end: there is no reason why what cannot have any
+"_practical_ importance for us should not be real. It is true that,"
+"if _theoretical_ importance is included, everything real is of _some_"
+"importance to us, since, as persons desirous of knowing the truth about"
+"the universe, we have some interest in everything that the universe"
+"contains. But if this sort of interest is included, it is not the case"
+"that matter has no importance for us, provided it exists even if we"
+"cannot know that it exists. We can, obviously, suspect that it may"
+"exist, and wonder whether it does; hence it is connected with our desire"
+"for knowledge, and has the importance of either satisfying or thwarting"
+this desire.
+""
+"Again, it is by no means a truism, and is in fact false, that we cannot"
+know that anything exists which we do not know. The word 'know' is here
+used in two different senses. (1) In its first use it is applicable to
+"the sort of knowledge which is opposed to error, the sense in which"
+"what we know is _true_, the sense which applies to our beliefs and"
+"convictions, i.e. to what are called _judgements_. In this sense of the"
+word we know _that_ something is the case. This sort of knowledge may
+be described as knowledge of _truths_. (2) In the second use of the word
+"'know' above, the word applies to our knowledge of _things_, which we"
+may call _acquaintance_. This is the sense in which we know sense-data.
+(The distinction involved is roughly that between _savoir_ and
+"_connaitre_ in French, or between _wissen_ and _kennen_ in German.)"
+""
+"Thus the statement which seemed like a truism becomes, when re-stated,"
+the following: 'We can never truly judge that something with which we
+"are not acquainted exists.' This is by no means a truism, but on the"
+contrary a palpable falsehood. I have not the honour to be acquainted
+"with the Emperor of China, but I truly judge that he exists. It may"
+"be said, of course, that I judge this because of other people's"
+"acquaintance with him. This, however, would be an irrelevant retort,"
+"since, if the principle were true, I could not know that any one else"
+is acquainted with him. But further: there is no reason why I should not
+know of the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted. This
+"point is important, and demands elucidation."
+""
+"If I am acquainted with a thing which exists, my acquaintance gives"
+"me the knowledge that it exists. But it is not true that, conversely,"
+"whenever I can know that a thing of a certain sort exists, I or some one"
+"else must be acquainted with the thing. What happens, in cases where I"
+"have true judgement without acquaintance, is that the thing is known to"
+"me by _description_, and that, in virtue of some general principle, the"
+existence of a thing answering to this description can be inferred
+from the existence of something with which I am acquainted. In order
+"to understand this point fully, it will be well first to deal with"
+the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
+"description, and then to consider what knowledge of general principles,"
+"if any, has the same kind of certainty as our knowledge of the existence"
+of our own experiences. These subjects will be dealt with in the
+following chapters.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER V. KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION
+""
+In the preceding chapter we saw that there are two sorts of knowledge:
+"knowledge of things, and knowledge of truths. In this chapter we shall"
+"be concerned exclusively with knowledge of things, of which in turn we"
+"shall have to distinguish two kinds. Knowledge of things, when it is"
+"of the kind we call knowledge by _acquaintance_, is essentially simpler"
+"than any knowledge of truths, and logically independent of knowledge"
+"of truths, though it would be rash to assume that human beings ever,"
+"in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time knowing"
+"some truth about them. Knowledge of things by _description_, on the"
+"contrary, always involves, as we shall find in the course of the present"
+"chapter, some knowledge of truths as its source and ground. But first of"
+all we must make clear what we mean by 'acquaintance' and what we mean
+by 'description'.
+""
+We shall say that we have _acquaintance_ with anything of which we are
+"directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference"
+or any knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of my table I am
+acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my
+"table--its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.; all these are"
+things of which I am immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching
+my table. The particular shade of colour that I am seeing may have many
+"things said about it--I may say that it is brown, that it is rather"
+"dark, and so on. But such statements, though they make me know truths"
+"about the colour, do not make me know the colour itself any better"
+"than I did before so far as concerns knowledge of the colour itself, as"
+"opposed to knowledge of truths about it, I know the colour perfectly and"
+"completely when I see it, and no further knowledge of it itself is even"
+theoretically possible. Thus the sense-data which make up the
+"appearance of my table are things with which I have acquaintance, things"
+immediately known to me just as they are.
+""
+"My knowledge of the table as a physical object, on the contrary, is not"
+"direct knowledge. Such as it is, it is obtained through acquaintance"
+with the sense-data that make up the appearance of the table. We have
+"seen that it is possible, without absurdity, to doubt whether there is"
+"a table at all, whereas it is not possible to doubt the sense-data. My"
+knowledge of the table is of the kind which we shall call 'knowledge
+by description'. The table is 'the physical object which causes
+such-and-such sense-data'. This describes the table by means of the
+"sense-data. In order to know anything at all about the table, we must"
+know truths connecting it with things with which we have acquaintance:
+we must know that 'such-and-such sense-data are caused by a physical
+object'. There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the
+"table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and"
+"the actual thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known"
+"to us at all. We know a description, and we know that there is just one"
+"object to which this description applies, though the object itself is"
+"not directly known to us. In such a case, we say that our knowledge of"
+the object is knowledge by description.
+""
+"All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths,"
+rests upon acquaintance as its foundation. It is therefore important to
+consider what kinds of things there are with which we have acquaintance.
+""
+"Sense-data, as we have already seen, are among the things with which"
+"we are acquainted; in fact, they supply the most obvious and striking"
+"example of knowledge by acquaintance. But if they were the sole example,"
+our knowledge would be very much more restricted than it is. We should
+only know what is now present to our senses: we could not know anything
+about the past--not even that there was a past--nor could we know any
+"truths about our sense-data, for all knowledge of truths, as we shall"
+"show, demands acquaintance with things which are of an essentially"
+"different character from sense-data, the things which are sometimes"
+"called 'abstract ideas', but which we shall call 'universals'. We have"
+therefore to consider acquaintance with other things besides sense-data
+if we are to obtain any tolerably adequate analysis of our knowledge.
+""
+The first extension beyond sense-data to be considered is acquaintance
+by _memory_. It is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or
+"heard or had otherwise present to our senses, and that in such cases we"
+"are still immediately aware of what we remember, in spite of the fact"
+that it appears as past and not as present. This immediate knowledge by
+memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past: without
+"it, there could be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we"
+should never know that there was anything past to be inferred.
+""
+The next extension to be considered is acquaintance by _introspection_.
+"We are not only aware of things, but we are often aware of being aware"
+"of them. When I see the sun, I am often aware of my seeing the sun; thus"
+'my seeing the sun' is an object with which I have acquaintance. When
+"I desire food, I may be aware of my desire for food; thus 'my desiring"
+food' is an object with which I am acquainted. Similarly we may be
+"aware of our feeling pleasure or pain, and generally of the events which"
+"happen in our minds. This kind of acquaintance, which may be called"
+"self-consciousness, is the source of all our knowledge of mental things."
+It is obvious that it is only what goes on in our own minds that can be
+thus known immediately. What goes on in the minds of others is known
+"to us through our perception of their bodies, that is, through the"
+sense-data in us which are associated with their bodies. But for our
+"acquaintance with the contents of our own minds, we should be unable to"
+"imagine the minds of others, and therefore we could never arrive at"
+the knowledge that they have minds. It seems natural to suppose that
+self-consciousness is one of the things that distinguish men from
+"animals: animals, we may suppose, though they have acquaintance with"
+"sense-data, never become aware of this acquaintance. I do not mean"
+"that they _doubt_ whether they exist, but that they have never become"
+"conscious of the fact that they have sensations and feelings, nor"
+"therefore of the fact that they, the subjects of their sensations and"
+"feelings, exist."
+""
+We have spoken of acquaintance with the contents of our minds as
+"_self_-consciousness, but it is not, of course, consciousness of our"
+_self_: it is consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. The
+"question whether we are also acquainted with our bare selves, as opposed"
+"to particular thoughts and feelings, is a very difficult one, upon which"
+it would be rash to speak positively. When we try to look into ourselves
+"we always seem to come upon some particular thought or feeling, and not"
+upon the 'I' which has the thought or feeling. Nevertheless there are
+"some reasons for thinking that we are acquainted with the 'I', though"
+the acquaintance is hard to disentangle from other things. To make clear
+"what sort of reason there is, let us consider for a moment what our"
+acquaintance with particular thoughts really involves.
+""
+"When I am acquainted with 'my seeing the sun', it seems plain that I am"
+acquainted with two different things in relation to each other. On the
+"one hand there is the sense-datum which represents the sun to me, on the"
+"other hand there is that which sees this sense-datum. All acquaintance,"
+"such as my acquaintance with the sense-datum which represents the sun,"
+seems obviously a relation between the person acquainted and the object
+with which the person is acquainted. When a case of acquaintance is one
+with which I can be acquainted (as I am acquainted with my acquaintance
+"with the sense-datum representing the sun), it is plain that the person"
+"acquainted is myself. Thus, when I am acquainted with my"
+"seeing the sun, the whole fact with which I am acquainted is"
+'Self-acquainted-with-sense-datum'.
+""
+"Further, we know the truth 'I am acquainted with this sense-datum'. It"
+"is hard to see how we could know this truth, or even understand what is"
+"meant by it, unless we were acquainted with something which we call 'I'."
+It does not seem necessary to suppose that we are acquainted with a more
+"or less permanent person, the same to-day as yesterday, but it does seem"
+"as though we must be acquainted with that thing, whatever its nature,"
+"which sees the sun and has acquaintance with sense-data. Thus, in some"
+sense it would seem we must be acquainted with our Selves as opposed
+"to our particular experiences. But the question is difficult, and"
+"complicated arguments can be adduced on either side. Hence, although"
+"acquaintance with ourselves seems _probably_ to occur, it is not wise to"
+assert that it undoubtedly does occur.
+""
+We may therefore sum up as follows what has been said concerning
+acquaintance with things that exist. We have acquaintance in sensation
+"with the data of the outer senses, and in introspection with the data of"
+"what may be called the inner sense--thoughts, feelings, desires, etc.;"
+we have acquaintance in memory with things which have been data either
+"of the outer senses or of the inner sense. Further, it is probable,"
+"though not certain, that we have acquaintance with Self, as that which"
+is aware of things or has desires towards things.
+""
+"In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also"
+"have acquaintance with what we shall call _universals_, that is to say,"
+"general ideas, such as _whiteness_, _diversity_, _brotherhood_, and so"
+on. Every complete sentence must contain at least one word which stands
+"for a universal, since all verbs have a meaning which is universal. We"
+"shall return to universals later on, in Chapter IX; for the present, it"
+is only necessary to guard against the supposition that whatever we can
+be acquainted with must be something particular and existent. Awareness
+"of universals is called _conceiving_, and a universal of which we are"
+aware is called a _concept_.
+""
+It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted
+"are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other"
+people's minds. These things are known to us by what I call 'knowledge
+"by description', which we must now consider."
+""
+By a 'description' I mean any phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' or
+'the so-and-so'. A phrase of the form 'a so-and-so' I shall call an
+'ambiguous' description; a phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' (in the
+singular) I shall call a 'definite' description. Thus 'a man' is an
+"ambiguous description, and 'the man with the iron mask' is a definite"
+description. There are various problems connected with ambiguous
+"descriptions, but I pass them by, since they do not directly concern"
+"the matter we are discussing, which is the nature of our knowledge"
+concerning objects in cases where we know that there is an object
+"answering to a definite description, though we are not acquainted with"
+any such object. This is a matter which is concerned exclusively with
+"definite descriptions. I shall therefore, in the sequel, speak simply of"
+'descriptions' when I mean 'definite descriptions'. Thus a description
+will mean any phrase of the form 'the so-and-so' in the singular.
+""
+We shall say that an object is 'known by description' when we know that
+"it is 'the so-and-so', i.e. when we know that there is one object, and"
+"no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied"
+that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance. We
+"know that the man with the iron mask existed, and many propositions"
+are known about him; but we do not know who he was. We know that the
+"candidate who gets the most votes will be elected, and in this case we"
+are very likely also acquainted (in the only sense in which one can
+"be acquainted with some one else) with the man who is, in fact, the"
+candidate who will get most votes; but we do not know which of the
+"candidates he is, i.e. we do not know any proposition of the form 'A is"
+the candidate who will get most votes' where A is one of the candidates
+by name. We shall say that we have 'merely descriptive knowledge' of the
+"so-and-so when, although we know that the so-and-so exists, and although"
+"we may possibly be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the"
+"so-and-so, yet we do not know any proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so',"
+where _a_ is something with which we are acquainted.
+""
+"When we say 'the so-and-so exists', we mean that there is just one"
+object which is the so-and-so. The proposition '_a_ is the so-and-so'
+"means that _a_ has the property so-and-so, and nothing else has. 'Mr."
+A. is the Unionist candidate for this constituency' means 'Mr. A. is
+"a Unionist candidate for this constituency, and no one else is'. 'The"
+Unionist candidate for this constituency exists' means 'some one is a
+"Unionist candidate for this constituency, and no one else is'. Thus,"
+"when we are acquainted with an object which is the so-and-so, we know"
+that the so-and-so exists; but we may know that the so-and-so exists
+when we are not acquainted with any object which we know to be the
+"so-and-so, and even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in"
+"fact, is the so-and-so."
+""
+"Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That"
+"is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name"
+correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the
+"proper name by a description. Moreover, the description required to"
+"express the thought will vary for different people, or for the same"
+person at different times. The only thing constant (so long as the name
+is rightly used) is the object to which the name applies. But so long as
+"this remains constant, the particular description involved usually makes"
+no difference to the truth or falsehood of the proposition in which the
+name appears.
+""
+Let us take some illustrations. Suppose some statement made about
+Bismarck. Assuming that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance
+"with oneself, Bismarck himself might have used his name directly to"
+designate the particular person with whom he was acquainted. In this
+"case, if he made a judgement about himself, he himself might be a"
+constituent of the judgement. Here the proper name has the direct use
+"which it always wishes to have, as simply standing for a certain object,"
+and not for a description of the object. But if a person who knew
+"Bismarck made a judgement about him, the case is different. What this"
+person was acquainted with were certain sense-data which he connected
+"(rightly, we will suppose) with Bismarck's body. His body, as a physical"
+"object, and still more his mind, were only known as the body and the"
+"mind connected with these sense-data. That is, they were known by"
+"description. It is, of course, very much a matter af chance which"
+characteristics of a man's appearance will come into a friend's mind
+when he thinks of him; thus the description actually in the friend's
+mind is accidental. The essential point is that he knows that the
+"various descriptions all apply to the same entity, in spite of not being"
+acquainted with the entity in question.
+""
+"When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judgement about him, the"
+description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague mass
+"of historical knowledge--far more, in most cases, than is required to"
+"identify him. But, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that we"
+think of him as 'the first Chancellor of the German Empire'. Here all
+"the words are abstract except 'German'. The word 'German' will, again,"
+have different meanings for different people. To some it will recall
+"travels in Germany, to some the look of Germany on the map, and so on."
+"But if we are to obtain a description which we know to be applicable,"
+"we shall be compelled, at some point, to bring in a reference to a"
+particular with which we are acquainted. Such reference is involved in
+"any mention of past, present, and future (as opposed to definite dates),"
+"or of here and there, or of what others have told us. Thus it would seem"
+"that, in some way or other, a description known to be applicable to a"
+particular must involve some reference to a particular with which we
+"are acquainted, if our knowledge about the thing described is not to be"
+"merely what follows _logically_ from the description. For example, 'the"
+"most long-lived of men' is a description involving only universals,"
+"which must apply to some man, but we can make no judgements concerning"
+this man which involve knowledge about him beyond what the description
+"gives. If, however, we say, 'The first Chancellor of the German Empire"
+"was an astute diplomatist', we can only be assured of the truth of our"
+judgement in virtue of something with which we are acquainted--usually a
+"testimony heard or read. Apart from the information we convey to others,"
+"apart from the fact about the actual Bismarck, which gives importance"
+"to our judgement, the thought we really have contains the one or more"
+"particulars involved, and otherwise consists wholly of concepts."
+""
+"All names of places--London, England, Europe, the Earth, the Solar"
+"System--similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some"
+one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. I suspect that
+"even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves such a"
+"connexion with particulars. In logic, on the contrary, where we are"
+"concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or"
+"could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved."
+""
+"It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known"
+"by description, we often _intend_ to make our statement, not in the form"
+"involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That"
+"is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we"
+"could, to make the judgement which Bismarck alone can make, namely,"
+the judgement of which he himself is a constituent. In this we are
+"necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us. But"
+"we know that there is an object B, called Bismarck, and that B was an"
+astute diplomatist. We can thus _describe_ the proposition we should
+"like to affirm, namely, 'B was an astute diplomatist', where B is the"
+object which was Bismarck. If we are describing Bismarck as 'the first
+"Chancellor of the German Empire', the proposition we should like to"
+"affirm may be described as 'the proposition asserting, concerning the"
+"actual object which was the first Chancellor of the German Empire, that"
+this object was an astute diplomatist'. What enables us to communicate
+in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is
+"a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck, and that however we"
+may vary the description (so long as the description is correct) the
+"proposition described is still the same. This proposition, which is"
+"described and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not"
+"acquainted with the proposition itself, and do not know it, though we"
+know it is true.
+""
+It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from
+acquaintance with particulars: there is Bismarck to people who knew him;
+Bismarck to those who only know of him through history; the man with
+the iron mask; the longest-lived of men. These are progressively further
+removed from acquaintance with particulars; the first comes as near to
+"acquaintance as is possible in regard to another person; in the second,"
+"we shall still be said to know 'who Bismarck was'; in the third, we do"
+"not know who was the man with the iron mask, though we can know many"
+propositions about him which are not logically deducible from the fact
+"that he wore an iron mask; in the fourth, finally, we know nothing"
+beyond what is logically deducible from the definition of the man. There
+"is a similar hierarchy in the region of universals. Many universals,"
+"like many particulars, are only known to us by description. But here,"
+"as in the case of particulars, knowledge concerning what is known by"
+description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is
+known by acquaintance.
+""
+The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing
+descriptions is this: _Every proposition which we can understand must be
+composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted_.
+""
+We shall not at this stage attempt to answer all the objections which
+"may be urged against this fundamental principle. For the present, we"
+"shall merely point out that, in some way or other, it must be possible"
+"to meet these objections, for it is scarcely conceivable that we can"
+make a judgement or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is
+that we are judging or supposing about. We must attach _some_ meaning
+"to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere"
+noise; and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with
+"which we are acquainted. Thus when, for example, we make a statement"
+"about Julius Caesar, it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not"
+"before our minds, since we are not acquainted with him. We have in mind"
+some description of Julius Caesar: 'the man who was assassinated on the
+"Ides of March', 'the founder of the Roman Empire', or, perhaps, merely"
+"'the man whose name was _Julius Caesar_'. (In this last description,"
+_Julius Caesar_ is a noise or shape with which we are acquainted.)
+"Thus our statement does not mean quite what it seems to mean, but means"
+"something involving, instead of Julius Caesar, some description of him"
+which is composed wholly of particulars and universals with which we are
+acquainted.
+""
+The chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us
+to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the
+fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms
+"which we have experienced in acquaintance, we can yet have knowledge by"
+description of things which we have never experienced. In view of the
+"very narrow range of our immediate experience, this result is vital, and"
+"until it is understood, much of our knowledge must remain mysterious and"
+therefore doubtful.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER VI. ON INDUCTION
+""
+In almost all our previous discussions we have been concerned in
+the attempt to get clear as to our data in the way of knowledge of
+existence. What things are there in the universe whose existence is
+"known to us owing to our being acquainted with them? So far, our answer"
+"has been that we are acquainted with our sense-data, and, probably,"
+with ourselves. These we know to exist. And past sense-data which
+are remembered are known to have existed in the past. This knowledge
+supplies our data.
+""
+But if we are to be able to draw inferences from these data--if we are
+"to know of the existence of matter, of other people, of the past before"
+"our individual memory begins, or of the future, we must know general"
+principles of some kind by means of which such inferences can be drawn.
+"It must be known to us that the existence of some one sort of thing, A,"
+"is a sign of the existence of some other sort of thing, B, either at"
+"the same time as A or at some earlier or later time, as, for example,"
+thunder is a sign of the earlier existence of lightning. If this were
+"not known to us, we could never extend our knowledge beyond the"
+"sphere of our private experience; and this sphere, as we have seen, is"
+exceedingly limited. The question we have now to consider is whether
+"such an extension is possible, and if so, how it is effected."
+""
+"Let us take as an illustration a matter about which none of us, in fact,"
+feel the slightest doubt. We are all convinced that the sun will rise
+"to-morrow. Why? Is this belief a mere blind outcome of past experience,"
+or can it be justified as a reasonable belief? It is not easy to find
+a test by which to judge whether a belief of this kind is reasonable or
+"not, but we can at least ascertain what sort of general beliefs would"
+"suffice, if true, to justify the judgement that the sun will rise"
+"to-morrow, and the many other similar judgements upon which our actions"
+are based.
+""
+It is obvious that if we are asked why we believe that the sun will rise
+"to-morrow, we shall naturally answer 'Because it always has risen every"
+"day'. We have a firm belief that it will rise in the future, because it"
+has risen in the past. If we are challenged as to why we believe that
+"it will continue to rise as heretofore, we may appeal to the laws of"
+"motion: the earth, we shall say, is a freely rotating body, and such"
+"bodies do not cease to rotate unless something interferes from outside,"
+and there is nothing outside to interfere with the earth between now and
+to-morrow. Of course it might be doubted whether we are quite certain
+"that there is nothing outside to interfere, but this is not the"
+interesting doubt. The interesting doubt is as to whether the laws
+of motion will remain in operation until to-morrow. If this doubt is
+"raised, we find ourselves in the same position as when the doubt about"
+the sunrise was first raised.
+""
+The _only_ reason for believing that the laws of motion will remain in
+"operation is that they have operated hitherto, so far as our knowledge"
+of the past enables us to judge. It is true that we have a greater body
+of evidence from the past in favour of the laws of motion than we have
+"in favour of the sunrise, because the sunrise is merely a particular"
+"case of fulfilment of the laws of motion, and there are countless other"
+particular cases. But the real question is: Do _any_ number of cases
+of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be
+"fulfilled in the future? If not, it becomes plain that we have no ground"
+"whatever for expecting the sun to rise to-morrow, or for expecting the"
+"bread we shall eat at our next meal not to poison us, or for any of the"
+other scarcely conscious expectations that control our daily lives. It
+is to be observed that all such expectations are only _probable_; thus
+"we have not to seek for a proof that they _must_ be fulfilled, but"
+only for some reason in favour of the view that they are _likely_ to be
+fulfilled.
+""
+"Now in dealing with this question we must, to begin with, make an"
+"important distinction, without which we should soon become involved"
+"in hopeless confusions. Experience has shown us that, hitherto, the"
+frequent repetition of some uniform succession or coexistence has been a
+_cause_ of our expecting the same succession or coexistence on the next
+occasion. Food that has a certain appearance generally has a certain
+"taste, and it is a severe shock to our expectations when the familiar"
+appearance is found to be associated with an unusual taste. Things which
+"we see become associated, by habit, with certain tactile sensations"
+which we expect if we touch them; one of the horrors of a ghost (in
+many ghost-stories) is that it fails to give us any sensations of touch.
+Uneducated people who go abroad for the first time are so surprised as
+to be incredulous when they find their native language not understood.
+""
+And this kind of association is not confined to men; in animals also it
+is very strong. A horse which has been often driven along a certain
+road resists the attempt to drive him in a different direction. Domestic
+animals expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them. We
+know that all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable
+to be misleading. The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout
+"its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined"
+views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the
+chicken.
+""
+"But in spite of the misleadingness of such expectations, they"
+nevertheless exist. The mere fact that something has happened a certain
+number of times causes animals and men to expect that it will happen
+again. Thus our instincts certainly cause us to believe that the sun
+"will rise to-morrow, but we may be in no better a position than the"
+chicken which unexpectedly has its neck wrung. We have therefore to
+distinguish the fact that past uniformities _cause_ expectations as to
+"the future, from the question whether there is any reasonable ground for"
+giving weight to such expectations after the question of their validity
+has been raised.
+""
+The problem we have to discuss is whether there is any reason for
+believing in what is called 'the uniformity of nature'. The belief in
+the uniformity of nature is the belief that everything that has happened
+or will happen is an instance of some general law to which there are no
+exceptions. The crude expectations which we have been considering are
+"all subject to exceptions, and therefore liable to disappoint those who"
+"entertain them. But science habitually assumes, at least as a working"
+"hypothesis, that general rules which have exceptions can be replaced by"
+general rules which have no exceptions. 'Unsupported bodies in air fall'
+is a general rule to which balloons and aeroplanes are exceptions. But
+"the laws of motion and the law of gravitation, which account for the"
+"fact that most bodies fall, also account for the fact that balloons and"
+aeroplanes can rise; thus the laws of motion and the law of gravitation
+are not subject to these exceptions.
+""
+The belief that the sun will rise to-morrow might be falsified if the
+earth came suddenly into contact with a large body which destroyed its
+rotation; but the laws of motion and the law of gravitation would not
+be infringed by such an event. The business of science is to find
+"uniformities, such as the laws of motion and the law of gravitation,"
+"to which, so far as our experience extends, there are no exceptions."
+"In this search science has been remarkably successful, and it may be"
+conceded that such uniformities have held hitherto. This brings us back
+"to the question: Have we any reason, assuming that they have always held"
+"in the past, to suppose that they will hold in the future?"
+""
+It has been argued that we have reason to know that the future will
+"resemble the past, because what was the future has constantly become the"
+"past, and has always been found to resemble the past, so that we really"
+"have experience of the future, namely of times which were formerly"
+"future, which we may call past futures. But such an argument really begs"
+"the very question at issue. We have experience of past futures, but not"
+"of future futures, and the question is: Will future futures resemble"
+past futures? This question is not to be answered by an argument which
+starts from past futures alone. We have therefore still to seek for some
+principle which shall enable us to know that the future will follow the
+same laws as the past.
+""
+The reference to the future in this question is not essential. The same
+question arises when we apply the laws that work in our experience to
+"past things of which we have no experience--as, for example, in geology,"
+or in theories as to the origin of the Solar System. The question we
+really have to ask is: 'When two things have been found to be often
+"associated, and no instance is known of the one occurring without the"
+"other, does the occurrence of one of the two, in a fresh instance, give"
+any good ground for expecting the other?' On our answer to this question
+must depend the validity of the whole of our expectations as to the
+"future, the whole of the results obtained by induction, and in fact"
+practically all the beliefs upon which our daily life is based.
+""
+"It must be conceded, to begin with, that the fact that two things have"
+"been found often together and never apart does not, by itself, suffice"
+to _prove_ demonstratively that they will be found together in the next
+case we examine. The most we can hope is that the oftener things are
+"found together, the more probable it becomes that they will be found"
+"together another time, and that, if they have been found together often"
+"enough, the probability will amount _almost_ to certainty. It can"
+"never quite reach certainty, because we know that in spite of frequent"
+"repetitions there sometimes is a failure at the last, as in the case"
+of the chicken whose neck is wrung. Thus probability is all we ought to
+seek.
+""
+"It might be urged, as against the view we are advocating, that we"
+"know all natural phenomena to be subject to the reign of law, and that"
+"sometimes, on the basis of observation, we can see that only one law"
+can possibly fit the facts of the case. Now to this view there are two
+"answers. The first is that, even if _some_ law which has no exceptions"
+"applies to our case, we can never, in practice, be sure that we have"
+discovered that law and not one to which there are exceptions. The
+"second is that the reign of law would seem to be itself only probable,"
+"and that our belief that it will hold in the future, or in unexamined"
+"cases in the past, is itself based upon the very principle we are"
+examining.
+""
+The principle we are examining may be called the _principle of
+"induction_, and its two parts may be stated as follows:"
+""
+(a) When a thing of a certain sort A has been found to be associated
+"with a thing of a certain other sort B, and has never been found"
+"dissociated from a thing of the sort B, the greater the number of cases"
+"in which A and B have been associated, the greater is the probability"
+that they will be associated in a fresh case in which one of them is
+known to be present;
+""
+"(b) Under the same circumstances, a sufficient number of cases of"
+association will make the probability of a fresh association nearly a
+"certainty, and will make it approach certainty without limit."
+""
+"As just stated, the principle applies only to the verification of our"
+expectation in a single fresh instance. But we want also to know that
+there is a probability in favour of the general law that things of the
+"sort A are _always_ associated with things of the sort B, provided a"
+"sufficient number of cases of association are known, and no cases of"
+failure of association are known. The probability of the general law is
+"obviously less than the probability of the particular case, since if the"
+"general law is true, the particular case must also be true, whereas"
+the particular case may be true without the general law being true.
+Nevertheless the probability of the general law is increased by
+"repetitions, just as the probability of the particular case is. We may"
+therefore repeat the two parts of our principle as regards the general
+"law, thus:"
+""
+(a) The greater the number of cases in which a thing of the sort A has
+"been found associated with a thing of the sort B, the more probable it"
+is (if no cases of failure of association are known) that A is always
+associated with B;
+""
+"b) Under the same circumstances, a sufficient number of cases of the"
+association of A with B will make it nearly certain that A is always
+"associated with B, and will make this general law approach certainty"
+without limit.
+""
+It should be noted that probability is always relative to certain data.
+"In our case, the data are merely the known cases of coexistence of A and"
+"B. There may be other data, which _might_ be taken into account, which"
+"would gravely alter the probability. For example, a man who had seen a"
+"great many white swans might argue, by our principle, that on the"
+"data it was _probable_ that all swans were white, and this might be a"
+perfectly sound argument. The argument is not disproved by the fact that
+"some swans are black, because a thing may very well happen in spite of"
+"the fact that some data render it improbable. In the case of the swans,"
+a man might know that colour is a very variable characteristic in many
+"species of animals, and that, therefore, an induction as to colour is"
+"peculiarly liable to error. But this knowledge would be a fresh datum,"
+by no means proving that the probability relatively to our previous data
+"had been wrongly estimated. The fact, therefore, that things often fail"
+to fulfil our expectations is no evidence that our expectations will not
+_probably_ be fulfilled in a given case or a given class of cases. Thus
+our inductive principle is at any rate not capable of being _disproved_
+by an appeal to experience.
+""
+"The inductive principle, however, is equally incapable of being _proved_"
+by an appeal to experience. Experience might conceivably confirm
+the inductive principle as regards the cases that have been already
+"examined; but as regards unexamined cases, it is the inductive principle"
+alone that can justify any inference from what has been examined to what
+"has not been examined. All arguments which, on the basis of experience,"
+argue as to the future or the unexperienced parts of the past or
+"present, assume the inductive principle; hence we can never use"
+experience to prove the inductive principle without begging the
+question. Thus we must either accept the inductive principle on the
+"ground of its intrinsic evidence, or forgo all justification of our"
+"expectations about the future. If the principle is unsound, we have no"
+"reason to expect the sun to rise to-morrow, to expect bread to be more"
+"nourishing than a stone, or to expect that if we throw ourselves off"
+the roof we shall fall. When we see what looks like our best friend
+"approaching us, we shall have no reason to suppose that his body is not"
+inhabited by the mind of our worst enemy or of some total stranger. All
+"our conduct is based upon associations which have worked in the past,"
+and which we therefore regard as likely to work in the future; and this
+likelihood is dependent for its validity upon the inductive principle.
+""
+"The general principles of science, such as the belief in the reign"
+"of law, and the belief that every event must have a cause, are as"
+completely dependent upon the inductive principle as are the beliefs of
+daily life All such general principles are believed because mankind have
+found innumerable instances of their truth and no instances of their
+"falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future,"
+unless the inductive principle is assumed.
+""
+"Thus all knowledge which, on a basis of experience tells us something"
+"about what is not experienced, is based upon a belief which experience"
+"can neither confirm nor confute, yet which, at least in its more"
+"concrete applications, appears to be as firmly rooted in us as many"
+of the facts of experience. The existence and justification of such
+"beliefs--for the inductive principle, as we shall see, is not the only"
+example--raises some of the most difficult and most debated problems of
+"philosophy. We will, in the next chapter, consider briefly what may be"
+"said to account for such knowledge, and what is its scope and its degree"
+of certainty.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER VII. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
+""
+"We saw in the preceding chapter that the principle of induction, while"
+"necessary to the validity of all arguments based on experience,"
+"is itself not capable of being proved by experience, and yet is"
+"unhesitatingly believed by every one, at least in all its concrete"
+applications. In these characteristics the principle of induction does
+not stand alone. There are a number of other principles which cannot be
+"proved or disproved by experience, but are used in arguments which start"
+from what is experienced.
+""
+Some of these principles have even greater evidence than the principle
+"of induction, and the knowledge of them has the same degree of certainty"
+as the knowledge of the existence of sense-data. They constitute the
+means of drawing inferences from what is given in sensation; and if what
+"we infer is to be true, it is just as necessary that our principles"
+of inference should be true as it is that our data should be true. The
+principles of inference are apt to be overlooked because of their
+very obviousness--the assumption involved is assented to without our
+realizing that it is an assumption. But it is very important to realize
+"the use of principles of inference, if a correct theory of knowledge"
+is to be obtained; for our knowledge of them raises interesting and
+difficult questions.
+""
+"In all our knowledge of general principles, what actually happens"
+is that first of all we realize some particular application of the
+"principle, and then we realize that the particularity is irrelevant, and"
+that there is a generality which may equally truly be affirmed. This is
+of course familiar in such matters as teaching arithmetic: 'two and
+two are four' is first learnt in the case of some particular pair of
+"couples, and then in some other particular case, and so on, until at"
+last it becomes possible to see that it is true of any pair of couples.
+The same thing happens with logical principles. Suppose two men are
+"discussing what day of the month it is. One of them says, 'At least you"
+will admit that _if_ yesterday was the 15th to-day must be the 16th.'
+"'Yes', says the other, 'I admit that.' 'And you know', the first"
+"continues, 'that yesterday was the 15th, because you dined with Jones,"
+"and your diary will tell you that was on the 15th.' 'Yes', says the"
+second; 'therefore to-day _is_ the 16th.'
+""
+Now such an argument is not hard to follow; and if it is granted that
+"its premisses are true in fact, no one will deny that the conclusion"
+must also be true. But it depends for its truth upon an instance of a
+general logical principle. The logical principle is as follows: 'Suppose
+"it known that _if_ this is true, then that is true. Suppose it also"
+"known that this _is_ true, then it follows that that is true.' When it"
+"is the case that if this is true, that is true, we shall say that this"
+"'implies' that, and that that 'follows from' this. Thus our principle"
+"states that if this implies that, and this is true, then that is true."
+"In other words, 'anything implied by a true proposition is true', or"
+'whatever follows from a true proposition is true'.
+""
+"This principle is really involved--at least, concrete instances of it"
+are involved--in all demonstrations. Whenever one thing which we believe
+"is used to prove something else, which we consequently believe, this"
+principle is relevant. If any one asks: 'Why should I accept the results
+of valid arguments based on true premisses?' we can only answer by
+"appealing to our principle. In fact, the truth of the principle is"
+"impossible to doubt, and its obviousness is so great that at first sight"
+"it seems almost trivial. Such principles, however, are not trivial to"
+"the philosopher, for they show that we may have indubitable knowledge"
+which is in no way derived from objects of sense.
+""
+The above principle is merely one of a certain number of self-evident
+logical principles. Some at least of these principles must be granted
+before any argument or proof becomes possible. When some of them have
+"been granted, others can be proved, though these others, so long as they"
+"are simple, are just as obvious as the principles taken for granted. For"
+"no very good reason, three of these principles have been singled out by"
+tradition under the name of 'Laws of Thought'.
+""
+They are as follows:
+""
+"(1) _The law of identity_: 'Whatever is, is.'"
+""
+(2) _The law of contradiction_: 'Nothing can both be and not be.'
+""
+(3) _The law of excluded middle_: 'Everything must either be or not be.'
+""
+"These three laws are samples of self-evident logical principles, but"
+are not really more fundamental or more self-evident than various other
+"similar principles: for instance, the one we considered just now, which"
+states that what follows from a true premiss is true. The name 'laws of
+"thought' is also misleading, for what is important is not the fact that"
+"we think in accordance with these laws, but the fact that things behave"
+"in accordance with them; in other words, the fact that when we think in"
+"accordance with them we think _truly_. But this is a large question, to"
+which we must return at a later stage.
+""
+In addition to the logical principles which enable us to prove from
+"a given premiss that something is _certainly_ true, there are other"
+"logical principles which enable us to prove, from a given premiss,"
+that there is a greater or less probability that something is true. An
+example of such principles--perhaps the most important example is the
+"inductive principle, which we considered in the preceding chapter."
+""
+One of the great historic controversies in philosophy is the controversy
+between the two schools called respectively 'empiricists' and
+'rationalists'. The empiricists--who are best represented by the
+"British philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume--maintained that all"
+our knowledge is derived from experience; the rationalists--who are
+"represented by the Continental philosophers of the seventeenth century,"
+"especially Descartes and Leibniz--maintained that, in addition to what"
+"we know by experience, there are certain 'innate ideas' and 'innate"
+"principles', which we know independently of experience. It has now"
+become possible to decide with some confidence as to the truth or
+"falsehood of these opposing schools. It must be admitted, for the"
+"reasons already stated, that logical principles are known to us, and"
+"cannot be themselves proved by experience, since all proof presupposes"
+"them. In this, therefore, which was the most important point of the"
+"controversy, the rationalists were in the right."
+""
+"On the other hand, even that part of our knowledge which is _logically_"
+independent of experience (in the sense that experience cannot prove
+it) is yet elicited and caused by experience. It is on occasion of
+particular experiences that we become aware of the general laws which
+their connexions exemplify. It would certainly be absurd to suppose that
+there are innate principles in the sense that babies are born with a
+knowledge of everything which men know and which cannot be deduced from
+"what is experienced. For this reason, the word 'innate' would not now be"
+employed to describe our knowledge of logical principles. The phrase
+"'_a priori_' is less objectionable, and is more usual in modern writers."
+"Thus, while admitting that all knowledge is elicited and caused by"
+"experience, we shall nevertheless hold that some knowledge is _a"
+"priori_, in the sense that the experience which makes us think of it"
+"does not suffice to prove it, but merely so directs our attention that"
+we see its truth without requiring any proof from experience.
+""
+"There is another point of great importance, in which the empiricists"
+were in the right as against the rationalists. Nothing can be known to
+"_exist_ except by the help of experience. That is to say, if we wish to"
+"prove that something of which we have no direct experience exists, we"
+must have among our premisses the existence of one or more things of
+which we have direct experience. Our belief that the Emperor of China
+"exists, for example, rests upon testimony, and testimony consists,"
+"in the last analysis, of sense-data seen or heard in reading or being"
+"spoken to. Rationalists believed that, from general consideration as"
+"to what must be, they could deduce the existence of this or that in the"
+actual world. In this belief they seem to have been mistaken. All the
+knowledge that we can acquire _a priori_ concerning existence seems
+"to be hypothetical: it tells us that if one thing exists, another must"
+"exist, or, more generally, that if one proposition is true, another must"
+be true. This is exemplified by the principles we have already dealt
+"with, such as '_if_ this is true, and this implies that, then that is"
+"true', or '_if_ this and that have been repeatedly found connected, they"
+will probably be connected in the next instance in which one of them is
+found'. Thus the scope and power of _a priori_ principles is strictly
+limited. All knowledge that something exists must be in part dependent
+"on experience. When anything is known immediately, its existence is"
+"known by experience alone; when anything is proved to exist, without"
+"being known immediately, both experience and _a priori_ principles must"
+be required in the proof. Knowledge is called _empirical_ when it rests
+wholly or partly upon experience. Thus all knowledge which asserts
+"existence is empirical, and the only _a priori_ knowledge concerning"
+"existence is hypothetical, giving connexions among things that exist or"
+"may exist, but not giving actual existence."
+""
+_A priori_ knowledge is not all of the logical kind we have been
+hitherto considering. Perhaps the most important example of non-logical
+_a priori_ knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value. I am not speaking
+"of judgements as to what is useful or as to what is virtuous, for such"
+judgements do require empirical premisses; I am speaking of judgements
+"as to the intrinsic desirability of things. If something is useful, it"
+"must be useful because it secures some end; the end must, if we have"
+"gone far enough, be valuable on its own account, and not merely because"
+it is useful for some further end. Thus all judgements as to what is
+useful depend upon judgements as to what has value on its own account.
+""
+"We judge, for example, that happiness is more desirable than misery,"
+"knowledge than ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on. Such"
+"judgements must, in part at least, be immediate and _a priori_. Like our"
+"previous _a priori_ judgements, they may be elicited by experience, and"
+indeed they must be; for it seems not possible to judge whether anything
+is intrinsically valuable unless we have experienced something of
+the same kind. But it is fairly obvious that they cannot be proved by
+experience; for the fact that a thing exists or does not exist cannot
+prove either that it is good that it should exist or that it is bad. The
+"pursuit of this subject belongs to ethics, where the impossibility of"
+deducing what ought to be from what is has to be established. In the
+"present connexion, it is only important to realize that knowledge as to"
+what is intrinsically of value is _a priori_ in the same sense in
+"which logic is _a priori_, namely in the sense that the truth of such"
+knowledge can be neither proved nor disproved by experience.
+""
+"All pure mathematics is _a priori_, like logic. This was strenuously"
+"denied by the empirical philosophers, who maintained that experience was"
+as much the source of our knowledge of arithmetic as of our knowledge of
+geography. They maintained that by the repeated experience of seeing two
+"things and two other things, and finding that altogether they made four"
+"things, we were led by induction to the conclusion that two things"
+"and two other things would _always_ make four things altogether. If,"
+"however, this were the source of our knowledge that two and two are"
+"four, we should proceed differently, in persuading ourselves of its"
+"truth, from the way in which we do actually proceed. In fact, a certain"
+"number of instances are needed to make us think of two abstractly,"
+"rather than of two coins or two books or two people, or two of any other"
+specified kind. But as soon as we are able to divest our thoughts of
+"irrelevant particularity, we become able to see the general principle"
+"that two and two are four; any one instance is seen to be _typical_, and"
+the examination of other instances becomes unnecessary.(1)
+""
+"(1) Cf. A. N. Whitehead, _Introduction to Mathematics_ (Home University"
+Library).
+""
+The same thing is exemplified in geometry. If we want to prove some
+"property of _all_ triangles, we draw some one triangle and reason about"
+it; but we can avoid making use of any property which it does not share
+"with all other triangles, and thus, from our particular case, we obtain"
+"a general result. We do not, in fact, feel our certainty that two and"
+"two are four increased by fresh instances, because, as soon as we have"
+"seen the truth of this proposition, our certainty becomes so great as"
+"to be incapable of growing greater. Moreover, we feel some quality of"
+"necessity about the proposition 'two and two are four', which is"
+absent from even the best attested empirical generalizations. Such
+generalizations always remain mere facts: we feel that there might be a
+"world in which they were false, though in the actual world they happen"
+"to be true. In any possible world, on the contrary, we feel that two"
+"and two would be four: this is not a mere fact, but a necessity to which"
+everything actual and possible must conform.
+""
+The case may be made clearer by considering a genuinely-empirical
+"generalization, such as 'All men are mortal.' It is plain that we"
+"believe this proposition, in the first place, because there is no known"
+"instance of men living beyond a certain age, and in the second place"
+because there seem to be physiological grounds for thinking that an
+organism such as a man's body must sooner or later wear out. Neglecting
+"the second ground, and considering merely our experience of men's"
+"mortality, it is plain that we should not be content with one quite"
+"clearly understood instance of a man dying, whereas, in the case of 'two"
+"and two are four', one instance does suffice, when carefully considered,"
+to persuade us that the same must happen in any other instance. Also
+"we can be forced to admit, on reflection, that there may be some doubt,"
+"however slight, as to whether _all_ men are mortal. This may be made"
+"plain by the attempt to imagine two different worlds, in one of which"
+"there are men who are not mortal, while in the other two and two make"
+five. When Swift invites us to consider the race of Struldbugs who never
+"die, we are able to acquiesce in imagination. But a world where two"
+and two make five seems quite on a different level. We feel that such a
+"world, if there were one, would upset the whole fabric of our knowledge"
+and reduce us to utter doubt.
+""
+"The fact is that, in simple mathematical judgements such as 'two and two"
+"are four', and also in many judgements of logic, we can know the general"
+"proposition without inferring it from instances, although some instance"
+is usually necessary to make clear to us what the general proposition
+"means. This is why there is real utility in the process of _deduction_,"
+"which goes from the general to the general, or from the general to the"
+"particular, as well as in the process of _induction_, which goes from"
+"the particular to the particular, or from the particular to the general."
+It is an old debate among philosophers whether deduction ever gives
+"_new_ knowledge. We can now see that in certain cases, at least, it does"
+"do so. If we already know that two and two always make four, and we"
+"know that Brown and Jones are two, and so are Robinson and Smith, we can"
+deduce that Brown and Jones and Robinson and Smith are four. This is
+"new knowledge, not contained in our premisses, because the general"
+"proposition, 'two and two are four', never told us there were such"
+"people as Brown and Jones and Robinson and Smith, and the particular"
+"premisses do not tell us that there were four of them, whereas the"
+particular proposition deduced does tell us both these things.
+""
+But the newness of the knowledge is much less certain if we take the
+"stock instance of deduction that is always given in books on logic,"
+"namely, 'All men are mortal; Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is"
+"mortal.' In this case, what we really know beyond reasonable doubt is"
+"that certain men, A, B, C, were mortal, since, in fact, they have died."
+"If Socrates is one of these men, it is foolish to go the roundabout way"
+through 'all men are mortal' to arrive at the conclusion that _probably_
+Socrates is mortal. If Socrates is not one of the men on whom our
+"induction is based, we shall still do better to argue straight from our"
+"A, B, C, to Socrates, than to go round by the general proposition, 'all"
+"men are mortal'. For the probability that Socrates is mortal is greater,"
+"on our data, than the probability that all men are mortal. (This is"
+"obvious, because if all men are mortal, so is Socrates; but if Socrates"
+"is mortal, it does not follow that all men are mortal.) Hence we shall"
+reach the conclusion that Socrates is mortal with a greater approach to
+certainty if we make our argument purely inductive than if we go by way
+of 'all men are mortal' and then use deduction.
+""
+This illustrates the difference between general propositions known _a
+"priori_ such as 'two and two are four', and empirical generalizations"
+"such as 'all men are mortal'. In regard to the former, deduction is the"
+"right mode of argument, whereas in regard to the latter, induction is"
+"always theoretically preferable, and warrants a greater confidence in"
+"the truth of our conclusion, because all empirical generalizations are"
+more uncertain than the instances of them.
+""
+"We have now seen that there are propositions known _a priori_, and that"
+"among them are the propositions of logic and pure mathematics, as well"
+as the fundamental propositions of ethics. The question which must
+next occupy us is this: How is it possible that there should be such
+"knowledge? And more particularly, how can there be knowledge of general"
+"propositions in cases where we have not examined all the instances, and"
+"indeed never can examine them all, because their number is infinite?"
+"These questions, which were first brought prominently forward by"
+"the German philosopher Kant (1724-1804), are very difficult, and"
+historically very important.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER VIII. HOW _A PRIORI_ KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE
+""
+Immanuel Kant is generally regarded as the greatest of the modern
+philosophers. Though he lived through the Seven Years War and the
+"French Revolution, he never interrupted his teaching of philosophy at"
+Koenigsberg in East Prussia. His most distinctive contribution was the
+"invention of what he called the 'critical' philosophy, which, assuming"
+"as a datum that there is knowledge of various kinds, inquired how such"
+"knowledge comes to be possible, and deduced, from the answer to this"
+"inquiry, many metaphysical results as to the nature of the world."
+Whether these results were valid may well be doubted. But Kant
+"undoubtedly deserves credit for two things: first, for having perceived"
+"that we have _a priori_ knowledge which is not purely 'analytic', i.e."
+"such that the opposite would be self-contradictory, and secondly,"
+for having made evident the philosophical importance of the theory of
+knowledge.
+""
+"Before the time of Kant, it was generally held that whatever knowledge"
+was _a priori_ must be 'analytic'. What this word means will be best
+"illustrated by examples. If I say, 'A bald man is a man', 'A plane"
+"figure is a figure', 'A bad poet is a poet', I make a purely analytic"
+judgement: the subject spoken about is given as having at least two
+"properties, of which one is singled out to be asserted of it. Such"
+"propositions as the above are trivial, and would never be enunciated"
+in real life except by an orator preparing the way for a piece of
+sophistry. They are called 'analytic' because the predicate is obtained
+by merely analysing the subject. Before the time of Kant it was thought
+that all judgements of which we could be certain _a priori_ were of this
+kind: that in all of them there was a predicate which was only part
+"of the subject of which it was asserted. If this were so, we should be"
+involved in a definite contradiction if we attempted to deny anything
+that could be known _a priori_. 'A bald man is not bald' would assert
+"and deny baldness of the same man, and would therefore contradict"
+"itself. Thus according to the philosophers before Kant, the law of"
+"contradiction, which asserts that nothing can at the same time have and"
+"not have a certain property, sufficed to establish the truth of all _a"
+priori_ knowledge.
+""
+"Hume (1711-76), who preceded Kant, accepting the usual view as to what"
+"makes knowledge _a priori_, discovered that, in many cases which had"
+"previously been supposed analytic, and notably in the case of cause and"
+"effect, the connexion was really synthetic. Before Hume, rationalists at"
+least had supposed that the effect could be logically deduced from the
+"cause, if only we had sufficient knowledge. Hume argued--correctly, as"
+would now be generally admitted--that this could not be done. Hence he
+inferred the far more doubtful proposition that nothing could be known
+"_a priori_ about the connexion of cause and effect. Kant, who had been"
+"educated in the rationalist tradition, was much perturbed by Hume's"
+"scepticism, and endeavoured to find an answer to it. He perceived that"
+"not only the connexion of cause and effect, but all the propositions"
+"of arithmetic and geometry, are 'synthetic', i.e. not analytic: in"
+"all these propositions, no analysis of the subject will reveal the"
+predicate. His stock instance was the proposition 7 + 5 = 12. He pointed
+"out, quite truly, that 7 and 5 have to be put together to give 12: the"
+"idea of 12 is not contained in them, nor even in the idea of adding them"
+"together. Thus he was led to the conclusion that all pure mathematics,"
+"though _a priori_, is synthetic; and this conclusion raised a new"
+problem of which he endeavoured to find the solution.
+""
+"The question which Kant put at the beginning of his philosophy, namely"
+"'How is pure mathematics possible?' is an interesting and difficult one,"
+to which every philosophy which is not purely sceptical must find
+"some answer. The answer of the pure empiricists, that our mathematical"
+"knowledge is derived by induction from particular instances, we have"
+"already seen to be inadequate, for two reasons: first, that the validity"
+of the inductive principle itself cannot be proved by induction;
+"secondly, that the general propositions of mathematics, such as 'two"
+"and two always make four', can obviously be known with certainty by"
+"consideration of a single instance, and gain nothing by enumeration of"
+other cases in which they have been found to be true. Thus our knowledge
+of the general propositions of mathematics (and the same applies to
+logic) must be accounted for otherwise than our (merely probable)
+knowledge of empirical generalizations such as 'all men are mortal'.
+""
+"The problem arises through the fact that such knowledge is general,"
+whereas all experience is particular. It seems strange that we should
+apparently be able to know some truths in advance about particular
+things of which we have as yet no experience; but it cannot easily be
+doubted that logic and arithmetic will apply to such things. We do not
+know who will be the inhabitants of London a hundred years hence; but
+we know that any two of them and any other two of them will make four of
+them. This apparent power of anticipating facts about things of which
+we have no experience is certainly surprising. Kant's solution of the
+"problem, though not valid in my opinion, is interesting. It is, however,"
+"very difficult, and is differently understood by different philosophers."
+"We can, therefore, only give the merest outline of it, and even that"
+will be thought misleading by many exponents of Kant's system.
+""
+What Kant maintained was that in all our experience there are two
+"elements to be distinguished, the one due to the object (i.e. to what we"
+"have called the 'physical object'), the other due to our own nature. We"
+"saw, in discussing matter and sense-data, that the physical object is"
+"different from the associated sense-data, and that the sense-data are to"
+be regarded as resulting from an interaction between the physical
+"object and ourselves. So far, we are in agreement with Kant. But what"
+is distinctive of Kant is the way in which he apportions the shares of
+ourselves and the physical object respectively. He considers that the
+"crude material given in sensation--the colour, hardness, etc.--is due"
+"to the object, and that what we supply is the arrangement in space"
+"and time, and all the relations between sense-data which result from"
+comparison or from considering one as the cause of the other or in any
+other way. His chief reason in favour of this view is that we seem
+to have _a priori_ knowledge as to space and time and causality and
+"comparison, but not as to the actual crude material of sensation. We can"
+"be sure, he says, that anything we shall ever experience must show the"
+"characteristics affirmed of it in our _a priori_ knowledge, because"
+"these characteristics are due to our own nature, and therefore"
+nothing can ever come into our experience without acquiring these
+characteristics.
+""
+"The physical object, which he calls the 'thing in itself',(1) he regards"
+as essentially unknowable; what can be known is the object as we have it
+"in experience, which he calls the 'phenomenon'. The phenomenon, being"
+"a joint product of us and the thing in itself, is sure to have those"
+"characteristics which are due to us, and is therefore sure to conform"
+"to our _a priori_ knowledge. Hence this knowledge, though true of all"
+"actual and possible experience, must not be supposed to apply outside"
+"experience. Thus in spite of the existence of _a priori_ knowledge, we"
+cannot know anything about the thing in itself or about what is not
+an actual or possible object of experience. In this way he tries to
+reconcile and harmonize the contentions of the rationalists with the
+arguments of the empiricists.
+""
+(1) Kant's 'thing in itself' is identical in _definition_ with
+"the physical object, namely, it is the cause of sensations. In the"
+"properties deduced from the definition it is not identical, since Kant"
+held (in spite of some inconsistency as regards cause) that we can know
+that none of the categories are applicable to the 'thing in itself'.
+""
+"Apart from minor grounds on which Kant's philosophy may be criticized,"
+there is one main objection which seems fatal to any attempt to deal
+with the problem of _a priori_ knowledge by his method. The thing to
+be accounted for is our certainty that the facts must always conform to
+logic and arithmetic. To say that logic and arithmetic are contributed
+by us does not account for this. Our nature is as much a fact of the
+"existing world as anything, and there can be no certainty that it will"
+"remain constant. It might happen, if Kant is right, that to-morrow"
+our nature would so change as to make two and two become five. This
+"possibility seems never to have occurred to him, yet it is one which"
+utterly destroys the certainty and universality which he is anxious
+to vindicate for arithmetical propositions. It is true that this
+"possibility, formally, is inconsistent with the Kantian view that time"
+"itself is a form imposed by the subject upon phenomena, so that our"
+real Self is not in time and has no to-morrow. But he will still have
+to suppose that the time-order of phenomena is determined by
+"characteristics of what is behind phenomena, and this suffices for the"
+substance of our argument.
+""
+"Reflection, moreover, seems to make it clear that, if there is any truth"
+"in our arithmetical beliefs, they must apply to things equally whether"
+we think of them or not. Two physical objects and two other physical
+"objects must make four physical objects, even if physical objects cannot"
+be experienced. To assert this is certainly within the scope of what
+we mean when we state that two and two are four. Its truth is just as
+indubitable as the truth of the assertion that two phenomena and two
+other phenomena make four phenomena. Thus Kant's solution unduly limits
+"the scope of _a priori_ propositions, in addition to failing in the"
+attempt at explaining their certainty.
+""
+"Apart from the special doctrines advocated by Kant, it is very common"
+"among philosophers to regard what is _a priori_ as in some sense mental,"
+as concerned rather with the way we must think than with any fact of
+the outer world. We noted in the preceding chapter the three principles
+commonly called 'laws of thought'. The view which led to their being so
+"named is a natural one, but there are strong reasons for thinking"
+that it is erroneous. Let us take as an illustration the law of
+contradiction. This is commonly stated in the form 'Nothing can both be
+"and not be', which is intended to express the fact that nothing can at"
+"once have and not have a given quality. Thus, for example, if a tree"
+is a beech it cannot also be not a beech; if my table is rectangular it
+"cannot also be not rectangular, and so on."
+""
+Now what makes it natural to call this principle a law of _thought_
+is that it is by thought rather than by outward observation that we
+persuade ourselves of its necessary truth. When we have seen that a tree
+"is a beech, we do not need to look again in order to ascertain whether"
+it is also not a beech; thought alone makes us know that this is
+impossible. But the conclusion that the law of contradiction is a law
+"of _thought_ is nevertheless erroneous. What we believe, when we believe"
+"the law of contradiction, is not that the mind is so made that it must"
+believe the law of contradiction. _This_ belief is a subsequent result
+"of psychological reflection, which presupposes the belief in the law of"
+contradiction. The belief in the law of contradiction is a belief about
+"things, not only about thoughts. It is not, e.g., the belief that if we"
+"_think_ a certain tree is a beech, we cannot at the same time _think_"
+that it is not a beech; it is the belief that if the tree _is_ a
+"beech, it cannot at the same time _be_ not a beech. Thus the law of"
+"contradiction is about things, and not merely about thoughts; and"
+"although belief in the law of contradiction is a thought, the law of"
+"contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning the things"
+"in the world. If this, which we believe when we believe the law of"
+"contradiction, were not true of the things in the world, the fact"
+that we were compelled to _think_ it true would not save the law of
+contradiction from being false; and this shows that the law is not a law
+of _thought_.
+""
+A similar argument applies to any other _a priori_ judgement. When we
+"judge that two and two are four, we are not making a judgement about our"
+"thoughts, but about all actual or possible couples. The fact that our"
+"minds are so constituted as to believe that two and two are four, though"
+"it is true, is emphatically not what we assert when we assert that two"
+and two are four. And no fact about the constitution of our minds could
+"make it _true_ that two and two are four. Thus our _a priori_ knowledge,"
+"if it is not erroneous, is not merely knowledge about the constitution"
+"of our minds, but is applicable to whatever the world may contain, both"
+what is mental and what is non-mental.
+""
+The fact seems to be that all our _a priori_ knowledge is concerned with
+"entities which do not, properly speaking, _exist_, either in the mental"
+or in the physical world. These entities are such as can be named by
+parts of speech which are not substantives; they are such entities as
+"qualities and relations. Suppose, for instance, that I am in my room. I"
+"exist, and my room exists; but does 'in' exist? Yet obviously the word"
+'in' has a meaning; it denotes a relation which holds between me and my
+"room. This relation is something, although we cannot say that it exists"
+_in the same sense_ in which I and my room exist. The relation 'in' is
+"something which we can think about and understand, for, if we could not"
+"understand it, we could not understand the sentence 'I am in my room'."
+"Many philosophers, following Kant, have maintained that relations are"
+"the work of the mind, that things in themselves have no relations,"
+but that the mind brings them together in one act of thought and thus
+produces the relations which it judges them to have.
+""
+"This view, however, seems open to objections similar to those which we"
+urged before against Kant. It seems plain that it is not thought which
+produces the truth of the proposition 'I am in my room'. It may be true
+"that an earwig is in my room, even if neither I nor the earwig nor any"
+one else is aware of this truth; for this truth concerns only the earwig
+"and the room, and does not depend upon anything else. Thus relations, as"
+"we shall see more fully in the next chapter, must be placed in a world"
+which is neither mental nor physical. This world is of great importance
+"to philosophy, and in particular to the problems of _a priori_"
+knowledge. In the next chapter we shall proceed to develop its nature
+and its bearing upon the questions with which we have been dealing.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER IX. THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS
+""
+At the end of the preceding chapter we saw that such entities as
+relations appear to have a being which is in some way different from
+"that of physical objects, and also different from that of minds and from"
+that of sense-data. In the present chapter we have to consider what is
+"the nature of this kind of being, and also what objects there are that"
+have this kind of being. We will begin with the latter question.
+""
+"The problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one, since it"
+was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato's 'theory of ideas' is an
+"attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the"
+most successful attempts hitherto made. The theory to be advocated in
+"what follows is largely Plato's, with merely such modifications as time"
+has shown to be necessary.
+""
+The way the problem arose for Plato was more or less as follows. Let
+"us consider, say, such a notion as _justice_. If we ask ourselves what"
+"justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and the"
+"other just act, with a view to discovering what they have in common."
+"They must all, in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be"
+"found in whatever is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in"
+"virtue of which they are all just, will be justice itself, the pure"
+essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the
+multiplicity of just acts. Similarly with any other word which may be
+"applicable to common facts, such as 'whiteness' for example. The word"
+will be applicable to a number of particular things because they all
+participate in a common nature or essence. This pure essence is what
+"Plato calls an 'idea' or 'form'. (It must not be supposed that 'ideas',"
+"in his sense, exist in minds, though they may be apprehended by minds.)"
+The 'idea' _justice_ is not identical with anything that is just: it is
+"something other than particular things, which particular things partake"
+"of. Not being particular, it cannot itself exist in the world of sense."
+Moreover it is not fleeting or changeable like the things of sense: it
+"is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible."
+""
+"Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common"
+"world of sense, the unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to"
+the world of sense whatever pale reflection of reality may belong to it.
+"The truly real world, for Plato, is the world of ideas; for whatever"
+"we may attempt to say about things in the world of sense, we can only"
+"succeed in saying that they participate in such and such ideas, which,"
+"therefore, constitute all their character. Hence it is easy to pass"
+"on into a mysticism. We may hope, in a mystic illumination, to see the"
+ideas as we see objects of sense; and we may imagine that the ideas
+"exist in heaven. These mystical developments are very natural, but the"
+"basis of the theory is in logic, and it is as based in logic that we"
+have to consider it.
+""
+"The word 'idea' has acquired, in the course of time, many associations"
+which are quite misleading when applied to Plato's 'ideas'. We shall
+"therefore use the word 'universal' instead of the word 'idea', to"
+describe what Plato meant. The essence of the sort of entity that Plato
+meant is that it is opposed to the particular things that are given in
+"sensation. We speak of whatever is given in sensation, or is of the same"
+"nature as things given in sensation, as a _particular_; by opposition"
+"to this, a _universal_ will be anything which may be shared by many"
+"particulars, and has those characteristics which, as we saw, distinguish"
+justice and whiteness from just acts and white things.
+""
+"When we examine common words, we find that, broadly speaking, proper"
+"names stand for particulars, while other substantives, adjectives,"
+"prepositions, and verbs stand for universals. Pronouns stand for"
+"particulars, but are ambiguous: it is only by the context or the"
+circumstances that we know what particulars they stand for. The word
+"'now' stands for a particular, namely the present moment; but like"
+"pronouns, it stands for an ambiguous particular, because the present is"
+always changing.
+""
+It will be seen that no sentence can be made up without at least one
+word which denotes a universal. The nearest approach would be some such
+statement as 'I like this'. But even here the word 'like' denotes
+"a universal, for I may like other things, and other people may like"
+"things. Thus all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths"
+involves acquaintance with universals.
+""
+Seeing that nearly all the words to be found in the dictionary stand
+"for universals, it is strange that hardly anybody except students of"
+philosophy ever realizes that there are such entities as universals. We
+do not naturally dwell upon those words in a sentence which do not stand
+for particulars; and if we are forced to dwell upon a word which stands
+"for a universal, we naturally think of it as standing for some one of"
+"the particulars that come under the universal. When, for example, we"
+"hear the sentence, 'Charles I's head was cut off', we may naturally"
+"enough think of Charles I, of Charles I's head, and of the operation"
+"of cutting off _his_ head, which are all particulars; but we do not"
+naturally dwell upon what is meant by the word 'head' or the word
+"'cut', which is a universal: We feel such words to be incomplete and"
+insubstantial; they seem to demand a context before anything can be
+done with them. Hence we succeed in avoiding all notice of universals as
+"such, until the study of philosophy forces them upon our attention."
+""
+"Even among philosophers, we may say, broadly, that only those universals"
+which are named by adjectives or substantives have been much or often
+"recognized, while those named by verbs and prepositions have been"
+usually overlooked. This omission has had a very great effect upon
+"philosophy; it is hardly too much to say that most metaphysics, since"
+"Spinoza, has been largely determined by it. The way this has occurred"
+"is, in outline, as follows: Speaking generally, adjectives and common"
+"nouns express qualities or properties of single things, whereas"
+prepositions and verbs tend to express relations between two or more
+things. Thus the neglect of prepositions and verbs led to the belief
+that every proposition can be regarded as attributing a property to a
+"single thing, rather than as expressing a relation between two or more"
+"things. Hence it was supposed that, ultimately, there can be no such"
+entities as relations between things. Hence either there can be only
+"one thing in the universe, or, if there are many things, they cannot"
+"possibly interact in any way, since any interaction would be a relation,"
+and relations are impossible.
+""
+"The first of these views, advocated by Spinoza and held in our own day"
+"by Bradley and many other philosophers, is called _monism_; the second,"
+"advocated by Leibniz but not very common nowadays, is called _monadism_,"
+because each of the isolated things is called a _monad_. Both these
+"opposing philosophies, interesting as they are, result, in my opinion,"
+"from an undue attention to one sort of universals, namely the sort"
+represented by adjectives and substantives rather than by verbs and
+prepositions.
+""
+"As a matter of fact, if any one were anxious to deny altogether that"
+"there are such things as universals, we should find that we cannot"
+"strictly prove that there are such entities as _qualities_, i.e. the"
+"universals represented by adjectives and substantives, whereas we"
+"can prove that there must be _relations_, i.e. the sort of universals"
+generally represented by verbs and prepositions. Let us take in
+illustration the universal _whiteness_. If we believe that there is such
+"a universal, we shall say that things are white because they have the"
+"quality of whiteness. This view, however, was strenuously denied by"
+"Berkeley and Hume, who have been followed in this by later empiricists."
+The form which their denial took was to deny that there are such things
+"as 'abstract ideas '. When we want to think of whiteness, they said, we"
+"form an image of some particular white thing, and reason concerning this"
+"particular, taking care not to deduce anything concerning it which we"
+cannot see to be equally true of any other white thing. As an account of
+"our actual mental processes, this is no doubt largely true. In geometry,"
+"for example, when we wish to prove something about all triangles, we"
+"draw a particular triangle and reason about it, taking care not to use"
+any characteristic which it does not share with other triangles. The
+"beginner, in order to avoid error, often finds it useful to draw several"
+"triangles, as unlike each other as possible, in order to make sure that"
+his reasoning is equally applicable to all of them. But a difficulty
+emerges as soon as we ask ourselves how we know that a thing is white
+or a triangle. If we wish to avoid the universals _whiteness_ and
+"_triangularity_, we shall choose some particular patch of white or some"
+"particular triangle, and say that anything is white or a triangle if it"
+has the right sort of resemblance to our chosen particular. But then the
+resemblance required will have to be a universal. Since there are many
+"white things, the resemblance must hold between many pairs of particular"
+white things; and this is the characteristic of a universal. It will be
+"useless to say that there is a different resemblance for each pair, for"
+"then we shall have to say that these resemblances resemble each other,"
+and thus at last we shall be forced to admit resemblance as a universal.
+"The relation of resemblance, therefore, must be a true universal. And"
+"having been forced to admit this universal, we find that it is no longer"
+worth while to invent difficult and unplausible theories to avoid the
+admission of such universals as whiteness and triangularity.
+""
+Berkeley and Hume failed to perceive this refutation of their rejection
+"of 'abstract ideas', because, like their adversaries, they only thought"
+"of _qualities_, and altogether ignored _relations_ as universals. We"
+have therefore here another respect in which the rationalists appear to
+"have been in the right as against the empiricists, although, owing to"
+"the neglect or denial of relations, the deductions made by rationalists"
+"were, if anything, more apt to be mistaken than those made by"
+empiricists.
+""
+"Having now seen that there must be such entities as universals, the next"
+point to be proved is that their being is not merely mental. By this is
+meant that whatever being belongs to them is independent of their being
+thought of or in any way apprehended by minds. We have already touched
+"on this subject at the end of the preceding chapter, but we must now"
+consider more fully what sort of being it is that belongs to universals.
+""
+Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we
+"have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation"
+subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that
+"Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to"
+do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the
+"proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a"
+fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface
+"where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands,"
+"even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and"
+"even if there were no minds at all in the universe. This is, of course,"
+"denied by many philosophers, either for Berkeley's reasons or for"
+"Kant's. But we have already considered these reasons, and decided that"
+they are inadequate. We may therefore now assume it to be true that
+nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of
+"London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a"
+universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve
+"nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part"
+"of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the"
+"relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but"
+belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not
+create.
+""
+"This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation"
+'north of' does not seem to _exist_ in the same sense in which Edinburgh
+and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?'
+the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where
+we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any
+"more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between"
+them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now
+everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection
+exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is
+radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in
+"time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something."
+""
+It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals
+which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We
+"can think _of_ a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly"
+"ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that"
+we are thinking of whiteness. Then _in one sense_ it may be said that
+whiteness is 'in our mind'. We have here the same ambiguity as we noted
+"in discussing Berkeley in Chapter IV. In the strict sense, it is not"
+"whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The"
+"connected ambiguity in the word 'idea', which we noted at the same time,"
+"also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense"
+"in which it denotes the _object_ of an act of thought, whiteness is an"
+"'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to"
+"think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of"
+thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so
+"thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's"
+act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one
+man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from
+"the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were"
+"the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think"
+"of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different"
+"thoughts of whiteness have in common is their _object_, and this object"
+"is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though"
+when known they are the objects of thoughts.
+""
+We shall find it convenient only to speak of things _existing_ when they
+"are in time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which"
+they exist (not excluding the possibility of their existing at all
+"times). Thus thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist."
+But universals do not exist in this sense; we shall say that they
+"_subsist_ or _have being_, where 'being' is opposed to 'existence'"
+"as being timeless. The world of universals, therefore, may also be"
+"described as the world of being. The world of being is unchangeable,"
+"rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder"
+"of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life. The"
+"world of existence is fleeting, vague, without sharp boundaries,"
+"without any clear plan or arrangement, but it contains all thoughts and"
+"feelings, all the data of sense, and all physical objects, everything"
+"that can do either good or harm, everything that makes any difference to"
+"the value of life and the world. According to our temperaments, we shall"
+prefer the contemplation of the one or of the other. The one we do not
+"prefer will probably seem to us a pale shadow of the one we prefer, and"
+hardly worthy to be regarded as in any sense real. But the truth is that
+"both have the same claim on our impartial attention, both are real,"
+and both are important to the metaphysician. Indeed no sooner have we
+distinguished the two worlds than it becomes necessary to consider their
+relations.
+""
+But first of all we must examine our knowledge of universals. This
+"consideration will occupy us in the following chapter, where we shall"
+"find that it solves the problem of _a priori_ knowledge, from which we"
+were first led to consider universals.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER X. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS
+""
+"In regard to one man's knowledge at a given time, universals, like"
+"particulars, may be divided into those known by acquaintance, those"
+"known only by description, and those not known either by acquaintance or"
+by description.
+""
+Let us consider first the knowledge of universals by acquaintance. It is
+"obvious, to begin with, that we are acquainted with such universals as"
+"white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc., i.e. with qualities"
+"which are exemplified in sense-data. When we see a white patch, we are"
+"acquainted, in the first instance, with the particular patch; but by"
+"seeing many white patches, we easily learn to abstract the whiteness"
+"which they all have in common, and in learning to do this we are"
+learning to be acquainted with whiteness. A similar process will make us
+acquainted with any other universal of the same sort. Universals of this
+sort may be called 'sensible qualities'. They can be apprehended with
+"less effort of abstraction than any others, and they seem less removed"
+from particulars than other universals are.
+""
+We come next to relations. The easiest relations to apprehend are those
+which hold between the different parts of a single complex sense-datum.
+"For example, I can see at a glance the whole of the page on which I"
+am writing; thus the whole page is included in one sense-datum. But I
+"perceive that some parts of the page are to the left of other parts,"
+and some parts are above other parts. The process of abstraction in this
+case seems to proceed somewhat as follows: I see successively a number
+"of sense-data in which one part is to the left of another; I perceive,"
+"as in the case of different white patches, that all these sense-data"
+"have something in common, and by abstraction I find that what they have"
+"in common is a certain relation between their parts, namely the relation"
+which I call 'being to the left of'. In this way I become acquainted
+with the universal relation.
+""
+In like manner I become aware of the relation of before and after in
+time. Suppose I hear a chime of bells: when the last bell of the chime
+"sounds, I can retain the whole chime before my mind, and I can perceive"
+that the earlier bells came before the later ones. Also in memory I
+perceive that what I am remembering came before the present time. From
+either of these sources I can abstract the universal relation of before
+"and after, just as I abstracted the universal relation 'being to the"
+"left of'. Thus time-relations, like space-relations, are among those"
+with which we are acquainted.
+""
+Another relation with which we become acquainted in much the same way is
+"resemblance. If I see simultaneously two shades of green, I can see"
+that they resemble each other; if I also see a shade of red: at the same
+"time, I can see that the two greens have more resemblance to each other"
+than either has to the red. In this way I become acquainted with the
+universal _resemblance_ or _similarity_.
+""
+"Between universals, as between particulars, there are relations of which"
+we may be immediately aware. We have just seen that we can perceive
+that the resemblance between two shades of green is greater than the
+resemblance between a shade of red and a shade of green. Here we are
+"dealing with a relation, namely 'greater than', between two relations."
+"Our knowledge of such relations, though it requires more power of"
+"abstraction than is required for perceiving the qualities of sense-data,"
+"appears to be equally immediate, and (at least in some cases) equally"
+indubitable. Thus there is immediate knowledge concerning universals as
+well as concerning sense-data.
+""
+"Returning now to the problem of _a priori_ knowledge, which we left"
+"unsolved when we began the consideration of universals, we find"
+ourselves in a position to deal with it in a much more satisfactory
+manner than was possible before. Let us revert to the proposition 'two
+"and two are four'. It is fairly obvious, in view of what has been said,"
+that this proposition states a relation between the universal 'two' and
+the universal 'four'. This suggests a proposition which we shall
+"now endeavour to establish: namely, _All _a priori_ knowledge deals"
+exclusively with the relations of universals_. This proposition is
+"of great importance, and goes a long way towards solving our previous"
+difficulties concerning _a priori_ knowledge.
+""
+"The only case in which it might seem, at first sight, as if our"
+"proposition were untrue, is the case in which an _a priori_ proposition"
+states that _all_ of one class of particulars belong to some other
+"class, or (what comes to the same thing) that _all_ particulars having"
+some one property also have some other. In this case it might seem
+as though we were dealing with the particulars that have the property
+rather than with the property. The proposition 'two and two are four' is
+"really a case in point, for this may be stated in the form 'any two"
+"and any other two are four', or 'any collection formed of two twos is a"
+collection of four'. If we can show that such statements as this really
+"deal only with universals, our proposition may be regarded as proved."
+""
+One way of discovering what a proposition deals with is to ask ourselves
+"what words we must understand--in other words, what objects we must be"
+acquainted with--in order to see what the proposition means. As soon as
+"we see what the proposition means, even if we do not yet know whether"
+"it is true or false, it is evident that we must have acquaintance with"
+"whatever is really dealt with by the proposition. By applying this test,"
+it appears that many propositions which might seem to be concerned with
+particulars are really concerned only with universals. In the special
+"case of 'two and two are four', even when we interpret it as meaning"
+"'any collection formed of two twos is a collection of four', it is plain"
+"that we can understand the proposition, i.e. we can see what it is that"
+"it asserts, as soon as we know what is meant by 'collection' and 'two'"
+and 'four'. It is quite unnecessary to know all the couples in the
+"world: if it were necessary, obviously we could never understand the"
+"proposition, since the couples are infinitely numerous and therefore"
+cannot all be known to us. Thus although our general statement _implies_
+"statements about particular couples, _as soon as we know that there are"
+"such particular couples_, yet it does not itself assert or imply that"
+"there are such particular couples, and thus fails to make any statement"
+whatever about any actual particular couple. The statement made is about
+"'couple', the universal, and not about this or that couple."
+""
+Thus the statement 'two and two are four' deals exclusively with
+"universals, and therefore may be known by anybody who is acquainted"
+with the universals concerned and can perceive the relation between them
+"which the statement asserts. It must be taken as a fact, discovered"
+"by reflecting upon our knowledge, that we have the power of sometimes"
+"perceiving such relations between universals, and therefore of sometimes"
+knowing general _a priori_ propositions such as those of arithmetic and
+"logic. The thing that seemed mysterious, when we formerly considered"
+"such knowledge, was that it seemed to anticipate and control experience."
+"This, however, we can now see to have been an error. _No_ fact"
+concerning anything capable of being experienced can be known
+independently of experience. We know _a priori_ that two things and two
+"other things together make four things, but we do _not_ know _a priori_"
+"that if Brown and Jones are two, and Robinson and Smith are two, then"
+Brown and Jones and Robinson and Smith are four. The reason is that this
+proposition cannot be understood at all unless we know that there are
+"such people as Brown and Jones and Robinson and Smith, and this we can"
+"only know by experience. Hence, although our general proposition is _a"
+"priori_, all its applications to actual particulars involve experience"
+and therefore contain an empirical element. In this way what seemed
+mysterious in our _a priori_ knowledge is seen to have been based upon
+an error.
+""
+It will serve to make the point clearer if we contrast our genuine _a
+"priori_ judgement with an empirical generalization, such as 'all men are"
+"mortals'. Here as before, we can _understand_ what the proposition"
+"means as soon as we understand the universals involved, namely _man_ and"
+_mortal_. It is obviously unnecessary to have an individual acquaintance
+with the whole human race in order to understand what our proposition
+means. Thus the difference between an _a priori_ general proposition
+and an empirical generalization does not come in the _meaning_ of the
+proposition; it comes in the nature of the _evidence_ for it. In the
+"empirical case, the evidence consists in the particular instances."
+We believe that all men are mortal because we know that there are
+"innumerable instances of men dying, and no instances of their living"
+beyond a certain age. We do not believe it because we see a connexion
+between the universal _man_ and the universal _mortal_. It is true that
+"if physiology can prove, assuming the general laws that govern living"
+"bodies, that no living organism can last for ever, that gives a"
+connexion between _man_ and _mortality_ which would enable us to assert
+our proposition without appealing to the special evidence of _men_
+dying. But that only means that our generalization has been subsumed
+"under a wider generalization, for which the evidence is still of the"
+"same kind, though more extensive. The progress of science is constantly"
+"producing such subsumptions, and therefore giving a constantly wider"
+inductive basis for scientific generalizations. But although this gives
+"a greater _degree_ of certainty, it does not give a different _kind_:"
+"the ultimate ground remains inductive, i.e. derived from instances, and"
+not an _a priori_ connexion of universals such as we have in logic and
+arithmetic.
+""
+Two opposite points are to be observed concerning _a priori_ general
+"propositions. The first is that, if many particular instances are known,"
+our general proposition may be arrived at in the first instance by
+"induction, and the connexion of universals may be only subsequently"
+"perceived. For example, it is known that if we draw perpendiculars"
+"to the sides of a triangle from the opposite angles, all three"
+perpendiculars meet in a point. It would be quite possible to be first
+led to this proposition by actually drawing perpendiculars in many
+"cases, and finding that they always met in a point; this experience"
+might lead us to look for the general proof and find it. Such cases are
+common in the experience of every mathematician.
+""
+"The other point is more interesting, and of more philosophical"
+"importance. It is, that we may sometimes know a general proposition in"
+cases where we do not know a single instance of it. Take such a case as
+"the following: We know that any two numbers can be multiplied together,"
+and will give a third called their _product_. We know that all pairs
+of integers the product of which is less than 100 have been actually
+"multiplied together, and the value of the product recorded in the"
+multiplication table. But we also know that the number of integers is
+"infinite, and that only a finite number of pairs of integers ever have"
+been or ever will be thought of by human beings. Hence it follows that
+there are pairs of integers which never have been and never will be
+"thought of by human beings, and that all of them deal with integers the"
+product of which is over 100. Hence we arrive at the proposition:
+"'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will"
+"be thought of by any human being, are over 100.' Here is a general"
+"proposition of which the truth is undeniable, and yet, from the very"
+"nature of the case, we can never give an instance; because any two"
+numbers we may think of are excluded by the terms of the proposition.
+""
+"This possibility, of knowledge of general propositions of which no"
+"instance can be given, is often denied, because it is not perceived"
+that the knowledge of such propositions only requires a knowledge of the
+"relations of universals, and does not require any knowledge of instances"
+of the universals in question. Yet the knowledge of such general
+propositions is quite vital to a great deal of what is generally
+"admitted to be known. For example, we saw, in our early chapters,"
+"that knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only"
+"obtained by an inference, and that they are not things with which we are"
+acquainted. Hence we can never know any proposition of the form 'this
+"is a physical object', where 'this' is something immediately known. It"
+follows that all our knowledge concerning physical objects is such that
+no actual instance can be given. We can give instances of the associated
+"sense-data, but we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects."
+Hence our knowledge as to physical objects depends throughout upon this
+possibility of general knowledge where no instance can be given. And the
+"same applies to our knowledge of other people's minds, or of any other"
+class of things of which no instance is known to us by acquaintance.
+""
+"We may now take a survey of the sources of our knowledge, as they have"
+appeared in the course of our analysis. We have first to distinguish
+knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. In each there are two
+"kinds, one immediate and one derivative. Our immediate knowledge of"
+"things, which we called _acquaintance_, consists of two sorts, according"
+"as the things known are particulars or universals. Among particulars, we"
+have acquaintance with sense-data and (probably) with ourselves. Among
+"universals, there seems to be no principle by which we can decide which"
+"can be known by acquaintance, but it is clear that among those that"
+"can be so known are sensible qualities, relations of space and time,"
+"similarity, and certain abstract logical universals. Our derivative"
+"knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by _description_, always"
+involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our
+"immediate knowledge of _truths_ may be called _intuitive_ knowledge,"
+and the truths so known may be called _self-evident_ truths. Among such
+"truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and"
+"also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though"
+with less certainty) some ethical propositions. Our _derivative_
+knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from
+self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction.
+""
+"If the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends"
+upon our intuitive knowledge. It therefore becomes important to consider
+"the nature and scope of intuitive knowledge, in much the same way as,"
+"at an earlier stage, we considered the nature and scope of knowledge by"
+"acquaintance. But knowledge of truths raises a further problem, which"
+"does not arise in regard to knowledge of things, namely the problem of"
+"_error_. Some of our beliefs turn out to be erroneous, and therefore"
+"it becomes necessary to consider how, if at all, we can distinguish"
+knowledge from error. This problem does not arise with regard
+"to knowledge by acquaintance, for, whatever may be the object of"
+"acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error"
+involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can
+"only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e. the sense-datum,"
+as the mark of some physical object. Thus the problems connected
+with knowledge of truths are more difficult than those connected
+with knowledge of things. As the first of the problems connected
+"with knowledge of truths, let us examine the nature and scope of our"
+intuitive judgements.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER XI. ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE
+""
+There is a common impression that everything that we believe ought to be
+"capable of proof, or at least of being shown to be highly probable. It"
+is felt by many that a belief for which no reason can be given is an
+"unreasonable belief. In the main, this view is just. Almost all our"
+"common beliefs are either inferred, or capable of being inferred, from"
+other beliefs which may be regarded as giving the reason for them. As a
+"rule, the reason has been forgotten, or has even never been consciously"
+"present to our minds. Few of us ever ask ourselves, for example, what"
+reason there is to suppose the food we are just going to eat will not
+"turn out to be poison. Yet we feel, when challenged, that a perfectly"
+"good reason could be found, even if we are not ready with it at the"
+moment. And in this belief we are usually justified.
+""
+"But let us imagine some insistent Socrates, who, whatever reason we"
+"give him, continues to demand a reason for the reason. We must sooner"
+"or later, and probably before very long, be driven to a point where we"
+"cannot find any further reason, and where it becomes almost certain that"
+no further reason is even theoretically discoverable. Starting with the
+"common beliefs of daily life, we can be driven back from point to point,"
+"until we come to some general principle, or some instance of a general"
+"principle, which seems luminously evident, and is not itself capable"
+of being deduced from anything more evident. In most questions of
+"daily life, such as whether our food is likely to be nourishing and not"
+"poisonous, we shall be driven back to the inductive principle, which we"
+"discussed in Chapter VI. But beyond that, there seems to be no further"
+"regress. The principle itself is constantly used in our reasoning,"
+"sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously; but there is no"
+"reasoning which, starting from some simpler self-evident principle,"
+leads us to the principle of induction as its conclusion. And the same
+"holds for other logical principles. Their truth is evident to us, and we"
+"employ them in constructing demonstrations; but they themselves, or at"
+"least some of them, are incapable of demonstration."
+""
+"Self-evidence, however, is not confined to those among general"
+principles which are incapable of proof. When a certain number of
+"logical principles have been admitted, the rest can be deduced from"
+them; but the propositions deduced are often just as self-evident as
+"those that were assumed without proof. All arithmetic, moreover, can"
+"be deduced from the general principles of logic, yet the simple"
+"propositions of arithmetic, such as 'two and two are four', are just as"
+self-evident as the principles of logic.
+""
+"It would seem, also, though this is more disputable, that there are some"
+"self-evident ethical principles, such as 'we ought to pursue what is"
+good'.
+""
+"It should be observed that, in all cases of general principles,"
+"particular instances, dealing with familiar things, are more evident"
+"than the general principle. For example, the law of contradiction states"
+that nothing can both have a certain property and not have it. This is
+"evident as soon as it is understood, but it is not so evident as that a"
+particular rose which we see cannot be both red and not red. (It is of
+"course possible that parts of the rose may be red and parts not red, or"
+that the rose may be of a shade of pink which we hardly know whether to
+call red or not; but in the former case it is plain that the rose as a
+"whole is not red, while in the latter case the answer is theoretically"
+definite as soon as we have decided on a precise definition of 'red'.)
+It is usually through particular instances that we come to be able to
+see the general principle. Only those who are practised in dealing with
+abstractions can readily grasp a general principle without the help of
+instances.
+""
+"In addition to general principles, the other kind of self-evident truths"
+are those immediately derived from sensation. We will call such truths
+"'truths of perception', and the judgements expressing them we will"
+call 'judgements of perception'. But here a certain amount of care
+is required in getting at the precise nature of the truths that are
+self-evident. The actual sense-data are neither true nor false. A
+"particular patch of colour which I see, for example, simply exists: it"
+is not the sort of thing that is true or false. It is true that there is
+"such a patch, true that it has a certain shape and degree of brightness,"
+true that it is surrounded by certain other colours. But the patch
+"itself, like everything else in the world of sense, is of a radically"
+"different kind from the things that are true or false, and therefore"
+cannot properly be said to be _true_. Thus whatever self-evident truths
+may be obtained from our senses must be different from the sense-data
+from which they are obtained.
+""
+It would seem that there are two kinds of self-evident truths of
+"perception, though perhaps in the last analysis the two kinds may"
+"coalesce. First, there is the kind which simply asserts the _existence_"
+"of the sense-datum, without in any way analysing it. We see a patch"
+"of red, and we judge 'there is such-and-such a patch of red', or more"
+strictly 'there is that'; this is one kind of intuitive judgement of
+"perception. The other kind arises when the object of sense is complex,"
+"and we subject it to some degree of analysis. If, for instance, we see a"
+"_round_ patch of red, we may judge 'that patch of red is round'. This is"
+"again a judgement of perception, but it differs from our previous kind."
+In our present kind we have a single sense-datum which has both colour
+and shape: the colour is red and the shape is round. Our judgement
+"analyses the datum into colour and shape, and then recombines them by"
+stating that the red colour is round in shape. Another example of this
+"kind of judgement is 'this is to the right of that', where 'this'"
+and 'that' are seen simultaneously. In this kind of judgement the
+sense-datum contains constituents which have some relation to each
+"other, and the judgement asserts that these constituents have this"
+relation.
+""
+"Another class of intuitive judgements, analogous to those of sense and"
+"yet quite distinct from them, are judgements of _memory_. There is some"
+"danger of confusion as to the nature of memory, owing to the fact that"
+"memory of an object is apt to be accompanied by an image of the object,"
+and yet the image cannot be what constitutes memory. This is easily seen
+"by merely noticing that the image is in the present, whereas what is"
+"remembered is known to be in the past. Moreover, we are certainly able"
+"to some extent to compare our image with the object remembered, so"
+"that we often know, within somewhat wide limits, how far our image is"
+"accurate; but this would be impossible, unless the object, as opposed to"
+"the image, were in some way before the mind. Thus the essence of memory"
+"is not constituted by the image, but by having immediately before the"
+mind an object which is recognized as past. But for the fact of memory
+"in this sense, we should not know that there ever was a past at all,"
+"nor should we be able to understand the word 'past', any more than a man"
+born blind can understand the word 'light'. Thus there must be intuitive
+"judgements of memory, and it is upon them, ultimately, that all our"
+knowledge of the past depends.
+""
+"The case of memory, however, raises a difficulty, for it is notoriously"
+"fallacious, and thus throws doubt on the trustworthiness of intuitive"
+judgements in general. This difficulty is no light one. But let us
+"first narrow its scope as far as possible. Broadly speaking, memory is"
+trustworthy in proportion to the vividness of the experience and to its
+nearness in time. If the house next door was struck by lightning half a
+"minute ago, my memory of what I saw and heard will be so reliable that"
+it would be preposterous to doubt whether there had been a flash at
+"all. And the same applies to less vivid experiences, so long as they are"
+recent. I am absolutely certain that half a minute ago I was sitting in
+"the same chair in which I am sitting now. Going backward over the day,"
+"I find things of which I am quite certain, other things of which I am"
+"almost certain, other things of which I can become certain by thought"
+"and by calling up attendant circumstances, and some things of which I"
+am by no means certain. I am quite certain that I ate my breakfast this
+"morning, but if I were as indifferent to my breakfast as a philosopher"
+"should be, I should be doubtful. As to the conversation at breakfast,"
+"I can recall some of it easily, some with an effort, some only with a"
+"large element of doubt, and some not at all. Thus there is a continual"
+"gradation in the degree of self-evidence of what I remember, and a"
+corresponding gradation in the trustworthiness of my memory.
+""
+Thus the first answer to the difficulty of fallacious memory is to say
+"that memory has degrees of self-evidence, and that these correspond"
+"to the degrees of its trustworthiness, reaching a limit of perfect"
+self-evidence and perfect trustworthiness in our memory of events which
+are recent and vivid.
+""
+"It would seem, however, that there are cases of very firm belief in a"
+"memory which is wholly false. It is probable that, in these cases, what"
+"is really remembered, in the sense of being immediately before the mind,"
+"is something other than what is falsely believed in, though something"
+generally associated with it. George IV is said to have at last believed
+"that he was at the battle of Waterloo, because he had so often said that"
+"he was. In this case, what was immediately remembered was his repeated"
+assertion; the belief in what he was asserting (if it existed) would
+"be produced by association with the remembered assertion, and would"
+therefore not be a genuine case of memory. It would seem that cases of
+"fallacious memory can probably all be dealt with in this way, i.e. they"
+can be shown to be not cases of memory in the strict sense at all.
+""
+One important point about self-evidence is made clear by the case of
+"memory, and that is, that self-evidence has degrees: it is not a quality"
+"which is simply present or absent, but a quality which may be more or"
+"less present, in gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an"
+almost imperceptible faintness. Truths of perception and some of the
+principles of logic have the very highest degree of self-evidence;
+truths of immediate memory have an almost equally high degree. The
+inductive principle has less self-evidence than some of the other
+"principles of logic, such as 'what follows from a true premiss must be"
+true'. Memories have a diminishing self-evidence as they become remoter
+and fainter; the truths of logic and mathematics have (broadly speaking)
+less self-evidence as they become more complicated. Judgements of
+"intrinsic ethical or aesthetic value are apt to have some self-evidence,"
+but not much.
+""
+"Degrees of self-evidence are important in the theory of knowledge,"
+"since, if propositions may (as seems likely) have some degree of"
+"self-evidence without being true, it will not be necessary to abandon"
+"all connexion between self-evidence and truth, but merely to say that,"
+"where there is a conflict, the more self-evident proposition is to be"
+retained and the less self-evident rejected.
+""
+"It seems, however, highly probable that two different notions are"
+"combined in 'self-evidence' as above explained; that one of them,"
+"which corresponds to the highest degree of self-evidence, is really an"
+"infallible guarantee of truth, while the other, which corresponds to"
+"all the other degrees, does not give an infallible guarantee, but only a"
+"greater or less presumption. This, however, is only a suggestion, which"
+we cannot as yet develop further. After we have dealt with the nature
+"of truth, we shall return to the subject of self-evidence, in connexion"
+with the distinction between knowledge and error.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER XII. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD
+""
+"Our knowledge of truths, unlike our knowledge of things, has an"
+"opposite, namely _error_. So far as things are concerned, we may know"
+"them or not know them, but there is no positive state of mind which can"
+"be described as erroneous knowledge of things, so long, at any rate,"
+as we confine ourselves to knowledge by acquaintance. Whatever we are
+acquainted with must be something; we may draw wrong inferences from
+"our acquaintance, but the acquaintance itself cannot be deceptive. Thus"
+there is no dualism as regards acquaintance. But as regards knowledge of
+"truths, there is a dualism. We may believe what is false as well as"
+what is true. We know that on very many subjects different people
+hold different and incompatible opinions: hence some beliefs must be
+erroneous. Since erroneous beliefs are often held just as strongly
+"as true beliefs, it becomes a difficult question how they are to be"
+"distinguished from true beliefs. How are we to know, in a given case,"
+that our belief is not erroneous? This is a question of the very
+"greatest difficulty, to which no completely satisfactory answer is"
+"possible. There is, however, a preliminary question which is rather less"
+"difficult, and that is: What do we _mean_ by truth and falsehood? It is"
+this preliminary question which is to be considered in this chapter. In
+this chapter we are not asking how we can know whether a belief is true
+or false: we are asking what is meant by the question whether a belief
+is true or false. It is to be hoped that a clear answer to this question
+may help us to obtain an answer to the question what beliefs are
+"true, but for the present we ask only 'What is truth?' and 'What is"
+falsehood?' not 'What beliefs are true?' and 'What beliefs are false?'
+It is very important to keep these different questions entirely
+"separate, since any confusion between them is sure to produce an answer"
+which is not really applicable to either.
+""
+There are three points to observe in the attempt to discover the nature
+"of truth, three requisites which any theory must fulfil."
+""
+"(1) Our theory of truth must be such as to admit of its opposite,"
+falsehood. A good many philosophers have failed adequately to satisfy
+this condition: they have constructed theories according to which all
+"our thinking ought to have been true, and have then had the greatest"
+difficulty in finding a place for falsehood. In this respect our theory
+"of belief must differ from our theory of acquaintance, since in the case"
+of acquaintance it was not necessary to take account of any opposite.
+""
+(2) It seems fairly evident that if there were no beliefs there could
+"be no falsehood, and no truth either, in the sense in which truth is"
+"correlative to falsehood. If we imagine a world of mere matter, there"
+"would be no room for falsehood in such a world, and although it would"
+"contain what may be called 'facts', it would not contain any truths, in"
+the sense in which truths are things of the same kind as falsehoods.
+"In fact, truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements:"
+"hence a world of mere matter, since it would contain no beliefs or"
+"statements, would also contain no truth or falsehood."
+""
+"(3) But, as against what we have just said, it is to be observed that"
+the truth or falsehood of a belief always depends upon something which
+lies outside the belief itself. If I believe that Charles I died on the
+"scaffold, I believe truly, not because of any intrinsic quality of my"
+"belief, which could be discovered by merely examining the belief, but"
+because of an historical event which happened two and a half centuries
+"ago. If I believe that Charles I died in his bed, I believe falsely: no"
+"degree of vividness in my belief, or of care in arriving at it, prevents"
+"it from being false, again because of what happened long ago, and not"
+"because of any intrinsic property of my belief. Hence, although truth"
+"and falsehood are properties of beliefs, they are properties dependent"
+"upon the relations of the beliefs to other things, not upon any internal"
+quality of the beliefs.
+""
+The third of the above requisites leads us to adopt the view--which has
+on the whole been commonest among philosophers--that truth consists in
+"some form of correspondence between belief and fact. It is, however, by"
+no means an easy matter to discover a form of correspondence to which
+there are no irrefutable objections. By this partly--and partly by the
+"feeling that, if truth consists in a correspondence of thought with"
+"something outside thought, thought can never know when truth has been"
+attained--many philosophers have been led to try to find some definition
+of truth which shall not consist in relation to something wholly outside
+belief. The most important attempt at a definition of this sort is the
+theory that truth consists in _coherence_. It is said that the mark of
+"falsehood is failure to cohere in the body of our beliefs, and that it"
+is the essence of a truth to form part of the completely rounded system
+which is The Truth.
+""
+"There is, however, a great difficulty in this view, or rather two great"
+difficulties. The first is that there is no reason to suppose that
+"only _one_ coherent body of beliefs is possible. It may be that, with"
+"sufficient imagination, a novelist might invent a past for the world"
+"that would perfectly fit on to what we know, and yet be quite different"
+"from the real past. In more scientific matters, it is certain that there"
+are often two or more hypotheses which account for all the known facts
+"on some subject, and although, in such cases, men of science endeavour"
+"to find facts which will rule out all the hypotheses except one, there"
+is no reason why they should always succeed.
+""
+"In philosophy, again, it seems not uncommon for two rival hypotheses"
+"to be both able to account for all the facts. Thus, for example, it is"
+"possible that life is one long dream, and that the outer world has only"
+that degree of reality that the objects of dreams have; but although
+"such a view does not seem inconsistent with known facts, there is no"
+"reason to prefer it to the common-sense view, according to which other"
+people and things do really exist. Thus coherence as the definition
+of truth fails because there is no proof that there can be only one
+coherent system.
+""
+The other objection to this definition of truth is that it assumes the
+"meaning of 'coherence' known, whereas, in fact, 'coherence' presupposes"
+the truth of the laws of logic. Two propositions are coherent when both
+"may be true, and are incoherent when one at least must be false. Now in"
+"order to know whether two propositions can both be true, we must"
+"know such truths as the law of contradiction. For example, the two"
+"propositions, 'this tree is a beech' and 'this tree is not a beech',"
+"are not coherent, because of the law of contradiction. But if the law of"
+"contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should"
+"find that, if we choose to suppose it false, nothing will any longer"
+be incoherent with anything else. Thus the laws of logic supply the
+"skeleton or framework within which the test of coherence applies, and"
+they themselves cannot be established by this test.
+""
+"For the above two reasons, coherence cannot be accepted as giving the"
+"_meaning_ of truth, though it is often a most important _test_ of truth"
+after a certain amount of truth has become known.
+""
+Hence we are driven back to _correspondence with fact_ as constituting
+the nature of truth. It remains to define precisely what we mean by
+"'fact', and what is the nature of the correspondence which must subsist"
+"between belief and fact, in order that belief may be true."
+""
+"In accordance with our three requisites, we have to seek a theory of"
+"truth which (1) allows truth to have an opposite, namely falsehood, (2)"
+"makes truth a property of beliefs, but (3) makes it a property wholly"
+dependent upon the relation of the beliefs to outside things.
+""
+The necessity of allowing for falsehood makes it impossible to regard
+"belief as a relation of the mind to a single object, which could be said"
+"to be what is believed. If belief were so regarded, we should find that,"
+"like acquaintance, it would not admit of the opposition of truth and"
+"falsehood, but would have to be always true. This may be made clear"
+by examples. Othello believes falsely that Desdemona loves Cassio. We
+"cannot say that this belief consists in a relation to a single object,"
+"'Desdemona's love for Cassio', for if there were such an object, the"
+"belief would be true. There is in fact no such object, and therefore"
+Othello cannot have any relation to such an object. Hence his belief
+cannot possibly consist in a relation to this object.
+""
+"It might be said that his belief is a relation to a different object,"
+namely 'that Desdemona loves Cassio'; but it is almost as difficult to
+"suppose that there is such an object as this, when Desdemona does not"
+"love Cassio, as it was to suppose that there is 'Desdemona's love for"
+Cassio'. Hence it will be better to seek for a theory of belief which
+does not make it consist in a relation of the mind to a single object.
+""
+It is common to think of relations as though they always held between
+"two terms, but in fact this is not always the case. Some relations"
+"demand three terms, some four, and so on. Take, for instance, the"
+"relation 'between'. So long as only two terms come in, the relation"
+'between' is impossible: three terms are the smallest number that render
+it possible. York is between London and Edinburgh; but if London and
+"Edinburgh were the only places in the world, there could be nothing"
+which was between one place and another. Similarly _jealousy_ requires
+three people: there can be no such relation that does not involve three
+at least. Such a proposition as 'A wishes B to promote C's marriage with
+"D' involves a relation of four terms; that is to say, A and B and C and"
+"D all come in, and the relation involved cannot be expressed otherwise"
+than in a form involving all four. Instances might be multiplied
+"indefinitely, but enough has been said to show that there are relations"
+which require more than two terms before they can occur.
+""
+"The relation involved in _judging_ or _believing_ must, if falsehood is"
+"to be duly allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms,"
+"not between two. When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he"
+"must not have before his mind a single object, 'Desdemona's love for"
+"Cassio', or 'that Desdemona loves Cassio ', for that would require that"
+"there should be objective falsehoods, which subsist independently of"
+"any minds; and this, though not logically refutable, is a theory to be"
+avoided if possible. Thus it is easier to account for falsehood if
+we take judgement to be a relation in which the mind and the various
+"objects concerned all occur severally; that is to say, Desdemona and"
+loving and Cassio must all be terms in the relation which subsists when
+"Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. This relation, therefore,"
+"is a relation of four terms, since Othello also is one of the terms of"
+"the relation. When we say that it is a relation of four terms, we do not"
+"mean that Othello has a certain relation to Desdemona, and has the same"
+relation to loving and also to Cassio. This may be true of some other
+"relation than believing; but believing, plainly, is not a relation which"
+"Othello has to _each_ of the three terms concerned, but to _all_ of"
+them together: there is only one example of the relation of believing
+"involved, but this one example knits together four terms. Thus the"
+"actual occurrence, at the moment when Othello is entertaining his"
+"belief, is that the relation called 'believing' is knitting together"
+"into one complex whole the four terms Othello, Desdemona, loving, and"
+Cassio. What is called belief or judgement is nothing but this relation
+"of believing or judging, which relates a mind to several things other"
+than itself. An _act_ of belief or of judgement is the occurrence
+"between certain terms at some particular time, of the relation of"
+believing or judging.
+""
+We are now in a position to understand what it is that distinguishes a
+true judgement from a false one. For this purpose we will adopt certain
+"definitions. In every act of judgement there is a mind which judges, and"
+there are terms concerning which it judges. We will call the mind the
+"_subject_ in the judgement, and the remaining terms the _objects_. Thus,"
+"when Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio, Othello is the subject,"
+while the objects are Desdemona and loving and Cassio. The subject and
+the objects together are called the _constituents_ of the judgement.
+It will be observed that the relation of judging has what is called a
+"'sense' or 'direction'. We may say, metaphorically, that it puts its"
+"objects in a certain _order_, which we may indicate by means of the"
+"order of the words in the sentence. (In an inflected language, the same"
+"thing will be indicated by inflections, e.g. by the difference between"
+nominative and accusative.) Othello's judgement that Cassio loves
+"Desdemona differs from his judgement that Desdemona loves Cassio, in"
+"spite of the fact that it consists of the same constituents, because the"
+relation of judging places the constituents in a different order in the
+"two cases. Similarly, if Cassio judges that Desdemona loves Othello,"
+"the constituents of the judgement are still the same, but their order is"
+different. This property of having a 'sense' or 'direction' is one which
+the relation of judging shares with all other relations. The 'sense'
+of relations is the ultimate source of order and series and a host of
+mathematical concepts; but we need not concern ourselves further with
+this aspect.
+""
+We spoke of the relation called 'judging' or 'believing' as knitting
+together into one complex whole the subject and the objects. In this
+"respect, judging is exactly like every other relation. Whenever a"
+"relation holds between two or more terms, it unites the terms into a"
+"complex whole. If Othello loves Desdemona, there is such a complex whole"
+as 'Othello's love for Desdemona'. The terms united by the relation may
+"be themselves complex, or may be simple, but the whole which results"
+from their being united must be complex. Wherever there is a relation
+"which relates certain terms, there is a complex object formed of the"
+"union of those terms; and conversely, wherever there is a complex"
+"object, there is a relation which relates its constituents. When an act"
+"of believing occurs, there is a complex, in which 'believing' is the"
+"uniting relation, and subject and objects are arranged in a certain"
+"order by the 'sense' of the relation of believing. Among the objects,"
+"as we saw in considering 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio',"
+"one must be a relation--in this instance, the relation 'loving'. But"
+"this relation, as it occurs in the act of believing, is not the relation"
+which creates the unity of the complex whole consisting of the subject
+"and the objects. The relation 'loving', as it occurs in the act of"
+"believing, is one of the objects--it is a brick in the structure, not"
+the cement. The cement is the relation 'believing'. When the belief is
+"_true_, there is another complex unity, in which the relation which was"
+"one of the objects of the belief relates the other objects. Thus, e.g.,"
+"if Othello believes _truly_ that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there is"
+"a complex unity, 'Desdemona's love for Cassio', which is composed"
+"exclusively of the _objects_ of the belief, in the same order as they"
+"had in the belief, with the relation which was one of the objects"
+occurring now as the cement that binds together the other objects of the
+"belief. On the other hand, when a belief is _false_, there is no such"
+complex unity composed only of the objects of the belief. If Othello
+"believes _falsely_ that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there is no such"
+complex unity as 'Desdemona's love for Cassio'.
+""
+Thus a belief is _true_ when it _corresponds_ to a certain associated
+"complex, and _false_ when it does not. Assuming, for the sake of"
+"definiteness, that the objects of the belief are two terms and a"
+"relation, the terms being put in a certain order by the 'sense' of"
+"the believing, then if the two terms in that order are united by the"
+"relation into a complex, the belief is true; if not, it is false. This"
+constitutes the definition of truth and falsehood that we were in search
+of. Judging or believing is a certain complex unity of which a mind is
+"a constituent; if the remaining constituents, taken in the order which"
+"they have in the belief, form a complex unity, then the belief is true;"
+"if not, it is false."
+""
+"Thus although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs, yet they"
+"are in a sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the truth of"
+"a belief is something not involving beliefs, or (in general) any mind"
+"at all, but only the _objects_ of the belief. A mind, which believes,"
+believes truly when there is a _corresponding_ complex not involving the
+"mind, but only its objects. This correspondence ensures truth, and its"
+absence entails falsehood. Hence we account simultaneously for the two
+"facts that beliefs (a) depend on minds for their _existence_, (b) do not"
+depend on minds for their _truth_.
+""
+We may restate our theory as follows: If we take such a belief as
+"'Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', we will call Desdemona"
+"and Cassio the _object-terms_, and loving the _object-relation_. If"
+"there is a complex unity 'Desdemona's love for Cassio', consisting of"
+the object-terms related by the object-relation in the same order as
+"they have in the belief, then this complex unity is called the _fact"
+corresponding to the belief_. Thus a belief is true when there is a
+"corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact."
+""
+It will be seen that minds do not _create_ truth or falsehood. They
+"create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot"
+"make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern"
+"future things which are within the power of the person believing, such"
+"as catching trains. What makes a belief true is a _fact_, and this fact"
+does not (except in exceptional cases) in any way involve the mind of
+the person who has the belief.
+""
+"Having now decided what we _mean_ by truth and falsehood, we have next"
+to consider what ways there are of knowing whether this or that belief
+is true or false. This consideration will occupy the next chapter.
+""
+""
+""
+"CHAPTER XIII. KNOWLEDGE, ERROR, AND PROBABLE OPINION"
+""
+"The question as to what we mean by truth and falsehood, which we"
+"considered in the preceding chapter, is of much less interest than the"
+question as to how we can know what is true and what is false. This
+question will occupy us in the present chapter. There can be no doubt
+that _some_ of our beliefs are erroneous; thus we are led to inquire
+what certainty we can ever have that such and such a belief is not
+"erroneous. In other words, can we ever _know_ anything at all, or do we"
+merely sometimes by good luck believe what is true? Before we can attack
+"this question, we must, however, first decide what we mean by 'knowing',"
+and this question is not so easy as might be supposed.
+""
+At first sight we might imagine that knowledge could be defined as 'true
+"belief'. When what we believe is true, it might be supposed that we had"
+achieved a knowledge of what we believe. But this would not accord
+with the way in which the word is commonly used. To take a very trivial
+instance: If a man believes that the late Prime Minister's last name
+"began with a B, he believes what is true, since the late Prime Minister"
+was Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. But if he believes that Mr. Balfour
+"was the late Prime Minister, he will still believe that the late Prime"
+"Minister's last name began with a B, yet this belief, though true,"
+"would not be thought to constitute knowledge. If a newspaper, by an"
+"intelligent anticipation, announces the result of a battle before any"
+"telegram giving the result has been received, it may by good fortune"
+"announce what afterwards turns out to be the right result, and it may"
+produce belief in some of its less experienced readers. But in spite of
+"the truth of their belief, they cannot be said to have knowledge. Thus"
+it is clear that a true belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from
+a false belief.
+""
+"In like manner, a true belief cannot be called knowledge when it is"
+"deduced by a fallacious process of reasoning, even if the premisses from"
+which it is deduced are true. If I know that all Greeks are men and that
+"Socrates was a man, and I infer that Socrates was a Greek, I cannot be"
+"said to _know_ that Socrates was a Greek, because, although my premisses"
+"and my conclusion are true, the conclusion does not follow from the"
+premisses.
+""
+But are we to say that nothing is knowledge except what is validly
+deduced from true premisses? Obviously we cannot say this. Such a
+"definition is at once too wide and too narrow. In the first place, it is"
+"too wide, because it is not enough that our premisses should be _true_,"
+they must also be _known_. The man who believes that Mr. Balfour was the
+late Prime Minister may proceed to draw valid deductions from the true
+"premiss that the late Prime Minister's name began with a B, but he"
+cannot be said to _know_ the conclusions reached by these deductions.
+Thus we shall have to amend our definition by saying that knowledge
+"is what is validly deduced from _known_ premisses. This, however, is a"
+circular definition: it assumes that we already know what is meant
+"by 'known premisses'. It can, therefore, at best define one sort"
+"of knowledge, the sort we call derivative, as opposed to intuitive"
+knowledge. We may say: '_Derivative_ knowledge is what is validly
+deduced from premisses known intuitively'. In this statement there is
+"no formal defect, but it leaves the definition of _intuitive_ knowledge"
+still to seek.
+""
+"Leaving on one side, for the moment, the question of intuitive"
+"knowledge, let us consider the above suggested definition of derivative"
+knowledge. The chief objection to it is that it unduly limits knowledge.
+"It constantly happens that people entertain a true belief, which has"
+grown up in them because of some piece of intuitive knowledge from which
+"it is capable of being validly inferred, but from which it has not, as a"
+"matter of fact, been inferred by any logical process."
+""
+"Take, for example, the beliefs produced by reading. If the newspapers"
+"announce the death of the King, we are fairly well justified in"
+"believing that the King is dead, since this is the sort of announcement"
+which would not be made if it were false. And we are quite amply
+justified in believing that the newspaper asserts that the King is
+dead. But here the intuitive knowledge upon which our belief is based
+is knowledge of the existence of sense-data derived from looking at
+the print which gives the news. This knowledge scarcely rises into
+"consciousness, except in a person who cannot read easily. A child may be"
+"aware of the shapes of the letters, and pass gradually and painfully to"
+a realization of their meaning. But anybody accustomed to reading
+"passes at once to what the letters mean, and is not aware, except on"
+"reflection, that he has derived this knowledge from the sense-data"
+called seeing the printed letters. Thus although a valid inference from
+"the-letters to their meaning is possible, and _could_ be performed"
+"by the reader, it is not in fact performed, since he does not in fact"
+perform any operation which can be called logical inference. Yet
+it would be absurd to say that the reader does not _know_ that the
+newspaper announces the King's death.
+""
+"We must, therefore, admit as derivative knowledge whatever is the result"
+"of intuitive knowledge even if by mere association, provided there _is_"
+"a valid logical connexion, and the person in question could become aware"
+"of this connexion by reflection. There are in fact many ways, besides"
+"logical inference, by which we pass from one belief to another: the"
+passage from the print to its meaning illustrates these ways. These
+"ways may be called 'psychological inference'. We shall, then, admit such"
+"psychological inference as a means of obtaining derivative knowledge,"
+provided there is a discoverable logical inference which runs parallel
+to the psychological inference. This renders our definition of
+"derivative knowledge less precise than we could wish, since the word"
+'discoverable' is vague: it does not tell us how much reflection may be
+needed in order to make the discovery. But in fact 'knowledge' is not a
+"precise conception: it merges into 'probable opinion', as we shall"
+see more fully in the course of the present chapter. A very precise
+"definition, therefore, should not be sought, since any such definition"
+must be more or less misleading.
+""
+"The chief difficulty in regard to knowledge, however, does not arise"
+"over derivative knowledge, but over intuitive knowledge. So long as we"
+"are dealing with derivative knowledge, we have the test of intuitive"
+"knowledge to fall back upon. But in regard to intuitive beliefs, it is"
+by no means easy to discover any criterion by which to distinguish
+some as true and others as erroneous. In this question it is scarcely
+possible to reach any very precise result: all our knowledge of truths
+"is infected with some degree of doubt, and a theory which ignored this"
+"fact would be plainly wrong. Something may be done, however, to mitigate"
+the difficulties of the question.
+""
+"Our theory of truth, to begin with, supplies the possibility of"
+distinguishing certain truths as _self-evident_ in a sense which ensures
+"infallibility. When a belief is true, we said, there is a corresponding"
+"fact, in which the several objects of the belief form a single complex."
+"The belief is said to constitute _knowledge_ of this fact, provided"
+it fulfils those further somewhat vague conditions which we have been
+"considering in the present chapter. But in regard to any fact, besides"
+"the knowledge constituted by belief, we may also have the kind of"
+knowledge constituted by _perception_ (taking this word in its widest
+"possible sense). For example, if you know the hour of the sunset,"
+you can at that hour know the fact that the sun is setting: this is
+"knowledge of the fact by way of knowledge of _truths_; but you can also,"
+"if the weather is fine, look to the west and actually see the setting"
+sun: you then know the same fact by the way of knowledge of _things_.
+""
+"Thus in regard to any complex fact, there are, theoretically, two ways"
+"in which it may be known: (1) by means of a judgement, in which its"
+several parts are judged to be related as they are in fact related; (2)
+"by means of _acquaintance_ with the complex fact itself, which may (in a"
+"large sense) be called perception, though it is by no means confined to"
+objects of the senses. Now it will be observed that the second way of
+"knowing a complex fact, the way of acquaintance, is only possible when"
+"there really is such a fact, while the first way, like all judgement,"
+"is liable to error. The second way gives us the complex whole, and is"
+therefore only possible when its parts do actually have that relation
+"which makes them combine to form such a complex. The first way, on the"
+"contrary, gives us the parts and the relation severally, and demands"
+only the reality of the parts and the relation: the relation may not
+"relate those parts in that way, and yet the judgement may occur."
+""
+It will be remembered that at the end of Chapter XI we suggested that
+"there might be two kinds of self-evidence, one giving an absolute"
+"guarantee of truth, the other only a partial guarantee. These two kinds"
+can now be distinguished.
+""
+"We may say that a truth is self-evident, in the first and most absolute"
+"sense, when we have acquaintance with the fact which corresponds to"
+"the truth. When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, the"
+"corresponding fact, if his belief were true, would be 'Desdemona's"
+love for Cassio'. This would be a fact with which no one could have
+acquaintance except Desdemona; hence in the sense of self-evidence that
+"we are considering, the truth that Desdemona loves Cassio (if it were"
+"a truth) could only be self-evident to Desdemona. All mental facts, and"
+"all facts concerning sense-data, have this same privacy: there is only"
+"one person to whom they can be self-evident in our present sense, since"
+there is only one person who can be acquainted with the mental things
+or the sense-data concerned. Thus no fact about any particular existing
+"thing can be self-evident to more than one person. On the other hand,"
+facts about universals do not have this privacy. Many minds may be
+acquainted with the same universals; hence a relation between universals
+may be known by acquaintance to many different people. In all cases
+where we know by acquaintance a complex fact consisting of certain terms
+"in a certain relation, we say that the truth that these terms are so"
+"related has the first or absolute kind of self-evidence, and in these"
+cases the judgement that the terms are so related _must_ be true. Thus
+this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of truth.
+""
+But although this sort of self-evidence is an absolute guarantee of
+"truth, it does not enable us to be _absolutely_ certain, in the case of"
+"any given judgement, that the judgement in question is true. Suppose"
+"we first perceive the sun shining, which is a complex fact, and thence"
+proceed to make the judgement 'the sun is shining'. In passing from
+"the perception to the judgement, it is necessary to analyse the given"
+complex fact: we have to separate out 'the sun' and 'shining' as
+constituents of the fact. In this process it is possible to commit
+an error; hence even where a _fact_ has the first or absolute kind of
+"self-evidence, a judgement believed to correspond to the fact is not"
+"absolutely infallible, because it may not really correspond to the"
+fact. But if it does correspond (in the sense explained in the preceding
+"chapter), then it _must_ be true."
+""
+The second sort of self-evidence will be that which belongs to
+"judgements in the first instance, and is not derived from direct"
+perception of a fact as a single complex whole. This second kind of
+"self-evidence will have degrees, from the very highest degree down to a"
+"bare inclination in favour of the belief. Take, for example, the case of"
+a horse trotting away from us along a hard road. At first our certainty
+"that we hear the hoofs is complete; gradually, if we listen intently,"
+there comes a moment when we think perhaps it was imagination or the
+blind upstairs or our own heartbeats; at last we become doubtful whether
+"there was any noise at all; then we _think_ we no longer hear anything,"
+"and at last we _know_ we no longer hear anything. In this process, there"
+"is a continual gradation of self-evidence, from the highest degree to"
+"the least, not in the sense-data themselves, but in the judgements based"
+on them.
+""
+"Or again: Suppose we are comparing two shades of colour, one blue and"
+one green. We can be quite sure they are different shades of colour; but
+if the green colour is gradually altered to be more and more like the
+"blue, becoming first a blue-green, then a greeny-blue, then blue,"
+there will come a moment when we are doubtful whether we can see any
+"difference, and then a moment when we know that we cannot see any"
+"difference. The same thing happens in tuning a musical instrument, or in"
+any other case where there is a continuous gradation. Thus self-evidence
+of this sort is a matter of degree; and it seems plain that the higher
+degrees are more to be trusted than the lower degrees.
+""
+In derivative knowledge our ultimate premisses must have some degree of
+"self-evidence, and so must their connexion with the conclusions deduced"
+from them. Take for example a piece of reasoning in geometry. It is not
+enough that the axioms from which we start should be self-evident: it
+"is necessary also that, at each step in the reasoning, the connexion of"
+"premiss and conclusion should be self-evident. In difficult reasoning,"
+this connexion has often only a very small degree of self-evidence;
+hence errors of reasoning are not improbable where the difficulty is
+great.
+""
+"From what has been said it is evident that, both as regards intuitive"
+"knowledge and as regards derivative knowledge, if we assume that"
+intuitive knowledge is trustworthy in proportion to the degree of its
+"self-evidence, there will be a gradation in trustworthiness, from the"
+existence of noteworthy sense-data and the simpler truths of logic and
+"arithmetic, which may be taken as quite certain, down to judgements"
+which seem only just more probable than their opposites. What we firmly
+"believe, if it is true, is called _knowledge_, provided it is either"
+intuitive or inferred (logically or psychologically) from intuitive
+"knowledge from which it follows logically. What we firmly believe, if it"
+"is not true, is called _error_. What we firmly believe, if it is neither"
+"knowledge nor error, and also what we believe hesitatingly, because it"
+"is, or is derived from, something which has not the highest degree of"
+"self-evidence, may be called _probable opinion_. Thus the greater"
+part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more or less probable
+opinion.
+""
+"In regard to probable opinion, we can derive great assistance from"
+"_coherence_, which we rejected as the _definition_ of truth, but may"
+"often use as a _criterion_. A body of individually probable opinions,"
+"if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them"
+would be individually. It is in this way that many scientific hypotheses
+acquire their probability. They fit into a coherent system of probable
+"opinions, and thus become more probable than they would be in isolation."
+The same thing applies to general philosophical hypotheses. Often in a
+"single case such hypotheses may seem highly doubtful, while yet, when"
+we consider the order and coherence which they introduce into a mass of
+"probable opinion, they become pretty nearly certain. This applies, in"
+"particular, to such matters as the distinction between dreams and"
+"waking life. If our dreams, night after night, were as coherent one with"
+"another as our days, we should hardly know whether to believe the dreams"
+"or the waking life. As it is, the test of coherence condemns the"
+"dreams and confirms the waking life. But this test, though it increases"
+"probability where it is successful, never gives absolute certainty,"
+unless there is certainty already at some point in the coherent system.
+"Thus the mere organization of probable opinion will never, by itself,"
+transform it into indubitable knowledge.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER XIV. THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE
+""
+"In all that we have said hitherto concerning philosophy, we have"
+scarcely touched on many matters that occupy a great space in the
+"writings of most philosophers. Most philosophers--or, at any rate, very"
+"many--profess to be able to prove, by _a priori_ metaphysical reasoning,"
+"such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential"
+"rationality of the universe, the illusoriness of matter, the unreality"
+"of all evil, and so on. There can be no doubt that the hope of finding"
+reason to believe such theses as these has been the chief inspiration of
+"many life-long students of philosophy. This hope, I believe, is vain. It"
+would seem that knowledge concerning the universe as a whole is not to
+"be obtained by metaphysics, and that the proposed proofs that, in virtue"
+of the laws of logic such and such things _must_ exist and such and such
+"others cannot, are not capable of surviving a critical scrutiny. In"
+this chapter we shall briefly consider the kind of way in which such
+"reasoning is attempted, with a view to discovering whether we can hope"
+that it may be valid.
+""
+"The great representative, in modern times, of the kind of view which"
+"we wish to examine, was Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel's philosophy is very"
+"difficult, and commentators differ as to the true interpretation of it."
+"According to the interpretation I shall adopt, which is that of many, if"
+"not most, of the commentators and has the merit of giving an interesting"
+"and important type of philosophy, his main thesis is that everything"
+"short of the Whole is obviously fragmentary, and obviously incapable of"
+existing without the complement supplied by the rest of the world. Just
+"as a comparative anatomist, from a single bone, sees what kind of animal"
+"the whole must have been, so the metaphysician, according to Hegel,"
+"sees, from any one piece of reality, what the whole of reality must"
+be--at least in its large outlines. Every apparently separate piece of
+"reality has, as it were, hooks which grapple it to the next piece;"
+"the next piece, in turn, has fresh hooks, and so on, until the whole"
+"universe is reconstructed. This essential incompleteness appears,"
+"according to Hegel, equally in the world of thought and in the world of"
+"things. In the world of thought, if we take any idea which is"
+"abstract or incomplete, we find, on examination, that if we forget"
+"its incompleteness, we become involved in contradictions; these"
+"contradictions turn the idea in question into its opposite, or"
+"antithesis; and in order to escape, we have to find a new, less"
+"incomplete idea, which is the synthesis of our original idea and its"
+"antithesis. This new idea, though less incomplete than the idea we"
+"started with, will be found, nevertheless, to be still not wholly"
+"complete, but to pass into its antithesis, with which it must be"
+combined in a new synthesis. In this way Hegel advances until he reaches
+"the 'Absolute Idea', which, according to him, has no incompleteness,"
+"no opposite, and no need of further development. The Absolute Idea,"
+"therefore, is adequate to describe Absolute Reality; but all lower ideas"
+"only describe reality as it appears to a partial view, not as it is"
+to one who simultaneously surveys the Whole. Thus Hegel reaches the
+"conclusion that Absolute Reality forms one single harmonious system, not"
+"in space or time, not in any degree evil, wholly rational, and wholly"
+"spiritual. Any appearance to the contrary, in the world we know, can be"
+proved logically--so he believes--to be entirely due to our fragmentary
+"piecemeal view of the universe. If we saw the universe whole, as we may"
+"suppose God sees it, space and time and matter and evil and all striving"
+"and struggling would disappear, and we should see instead an eternal"
+perfect unchanging spiritual unity.
+""
+"In this conception, there is undeniably something sublime, something to"
+"which we could wish to yield assent. Nevertheless, when the arguments"
+"in support of it are carefully examined, they appear to involve much"
+confusion and many unwarrantable assumptions. The fundamental tenet
+upon which the system is built up is that what is incomplete must be not
+"self-subsistent, but must need the support of other things before it can"
+exist. It is held that whatever has relations to things outside itself
+"must contain some reference to those outside things in its own nature,"
+"and could not, therefore, be what it is if those outside things did not"
+"exist. A man's nature, for example, is constituted by his memories and"
+"the rest of his knowledge, by his loves and hatreds, and so on; thus,"
+"but for the objects which he knows or loves or hates, he could not be"
+what he is. He is essentially and obviously a fragment: taken as the
+sum-total of reality he would be self-contradictory.
+""
+"This whole point of view, however, turns upon the notion of the 'nature'"
+"of a thing, which seems to mean 'all the truths about the thing'. It is"
+of course the case that a truth which connects one thing with another
+thing could not subsist if the other thing did not subsist. But a
+"truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it must,"
+"according to the above usage, be part of the 'nature' of the thing."
+"If we mean by a thing's 'nature' all the truths about the thing, then"
+plainly we cannot know a thing's 'nature' unless we know all the thing's
+relations to all the other things in the universe. But if the word
+"'nature' is used in this sense, we shall have to hold that the thing"
+"may be known when its 'nature' is not known, or at any rate is not known"
+"completely. There is a confusion, when this use of the word 'nature' is"
+"employed, between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths. We may"
+have knowledge of a thing by acquaintance even if we know very few
+propositions about it--theoretically we need not know any propositions
+"about it. Thus, acquaintance with a thing does not involve knowledge of"
+its 'nature' in the above sense. And although acquaintance with a thing
+"is involved in our knowing any one proposition about a thing, knowledge"
+"of its 'nature', in the above sense, is not involved. Hence, (1)"
+acquaintance with a thing does not logically involve a knowledge of its
+"relations, and (2) a knowledge of some of its relations does not involve"
+a knowledge of all of its relations nor a knowledge of its 'nature' in
+"the above sense. I may be acquainted, for example, with my toothache,"
+and this knowledge may be as complete as knowledge by acquaintance ever
+"can be, without knowing all that the dentist (who is not acquainted"
+"with it) can tell me about its cause, and without therefore knowing its"
+'nature' in the above sense. Thus the fact that a thing has relations
+does not prove that its relations are logically necessary. That is to
+"say, from the mere fact that it is the thing it is we cannot deduce"
+that it must have the various relations which in fact it has. This only
+_seems_ to follow because we know it already.
+""
+It follows that we cannot prove that the universe as a whole forms a
+single harmonious system such as Hegel believes that it forms. And if we
+"cannot prove this, we also cannot prove the unreality of space and time"
+"and matter and evil, for this is deduced by Hegel from the fragmentary"
+and relational character of these things. Thus we are left to the
+"piecemeal investigation of the world, and are unable to know the"
+characters of those parts of the universe that are remote from our
+"experience. This result, disappointing as it is to those whose hopes"
+"have been raised by the systems of philosophers, is in harmony with"
+"the inductive and scientific temper of our age, and is borne out by the"
+whole examination of human knowledge which has occupied our previous
+chapters.
+""
+Most of the great ambitious attempts of metaphysicians have proceeded by
+the attempt to prove that such and such apparent features of the actual
+"world were self-contradictory, and therefore could not be real. The"
+"whole tendency of modern thought, however, is more and more in the"
+"direction of showing that the supposed contradictions were illusory, and"
+that very little can be proved _a priori_ from considerations of what
+_must_ be. A good illustration of this is afforded by space and
+"time. Space and time appear to be infinite in extent, and infinitely"
+"divisible. If we travel along a straight line in either direction, it"
+"is difficult to believe that we shall finally reach a last point,"
+"beyond which there is nothing, not even empty space. Similarly, if in"
+"imagination we travel backwards or forwards in time, it is difficult to"
+"believe that we shall reach a first or last time, with not even empty"
+time beyond it. Thus space and time appear to be infinite in extent.
+""
+"Again, if we take any two points on a line, it seems evident that there"
+must be other points between them however small the distance between
+"them may be: every distance can be halved, and the halves can be halved"
+"again, and so on _ad infinitum_. In time, similarly, however little"
+"time may elapse between two moments, it seems evident that there will be"
+other moments between them. Thus space and time appear to be infinitely
+divisible. But as against these apparent facts--infinite extent and
+infinite divisibility--philosophers have advanced arguments tending to
+"show that there could be no infinite collections of things, and that"
+"therefore the number of points in space, or of instants in time, must"
+be finite. Thus a contradiction emerged between the apparent nature of
+space and time and the supposed impossibility of infinite collections.
+""
+"Kant, who first emphasized this contradiction, deduced the impossibility"
+"of space and time, which he declared to be merely subjective; and since"
+his time very many philosophers have believed that space and time are
+"mere appearance, not characteristic of the world as it really is. Now,"
+"however, owing to the labours of the mathematicians, notably Georg"
+"Cantor, it has appeared that the impossibility of infinite collections"
+"was a mistake. They are not in fact self-contradictory, but only"
+contradictory of certain rather obstinate mental prejudices. Hence the
+"reasons for regarding space and time as unreal have become inoperative,"
+and one of the great sources of metaphysical constructions is dried up.
+""
+"The mathematicians, however, have not been content with showing that"
+space as it is commonly supposed to be is possible; they have shown also
+"that many other forms of space are equally possible, so far as logic"
+"can show. Some of Euclid's axioms, which appear to common sense to be"
+"necessary, and were formerly supposed to be necessary by philosophers,"
+are now known to derive their appearance of necessity from our mere
+"familiarity with actual space, and not from any _a priori_ logical"
+"foundation. By imagining worlds in which these axioms are false, the"
+mathematicians have used logic to loosen the prejudices of common
+"sense, and to show the possibility of spaces differing--some more, some"
+less--from that in which we live. And some of these spaces differ so
+"little from Euclidean space, where distances such as we can measure are"
+"concerned, that it is impossible to discover by observation whether our"
+actual space is strictly Euclidean or of one of these other kinds.
+Thus the position is completely reversed. Formerly it appeared that
+"experience left only one kind of space to logic, and logic showed this"
+"one kind to be impossible. Now, logic presents many kinds of space as"
+"possible apart from experience, and experience only partially decides"
+"between them. Thus, while our knowledge of what is has become less"
+"than it was formerly supposed to be, our knowledge of what may be is"
+"enormously increased. Instead of being shut in within narrow walls, of"
+"which every nook and cranny could be explored, we find ourselves in an"
+"open world of free possibilities, where much remains unknown because"
+there is so much to know.
+""
+"What has happened in the case of space and time has happened, to some"
+"extent, in other directions as well. The attempt to prescribe to the"
+"universe by means of _a priori_ principles has broken down; logic,"
+"instead of being, as formerly, the bar to possibilities, has become the"
+"great liberator of the imagination, presenting innumerable alternatives"
+"which are closed to unreflective common sense, and leaving to experience"
+"the task of deciding, where decision is possible, between the many"
+worlds which logic offers for our choice. Thus knowledge as to what
+exists becomes limited to what we can learn from experience--not to
+"what we can actually experience, for, as we have seen, there is much"
+knowledge by description concerning things of which we have no direct
+"experience. But in all cases of knowledge by description, we need some"
+"connexion of universals, enabling us, from such and such a datum, to"
+infer an object of a certain sort as implied by our datum. Thus in
+"regard to physical objects, for example, the principle that sense-data"
+are signs of physical objects is itself a connexion of universals; and
+it is only in virtue of this principle that experience enables us to
+acquire knowledge concerning physical objects. The same applies to
+"the law of causality, or, to descend to what is less general, to such"
+principles as the law of gravitation.
+""
+"Principles such as the law of gravitation are proved, or rather are"
+"rendered highly probable, by a combination of experience with some"
+"wholly _a priori_ principle, such as the principle of induction. Thus"
+"our intuitive knowledge, which is the source of all our other knowledge"
+"of truths, is of two sorts: pure empirical knowledge, which tells us of"
+the existence and some of the properties of particular things with
+"which we are acquainted, and pure _a priori_ knowledge, which gives us"
+"connexions between universals, and enables us to draw inferences from"
+the particular facts given in empirical knowledge. Our derivative
+knowledge always depends upon some pure _a priori_ knowledge and usually
+also depends upon some pure empirical knowledge.
+""
+"Philosophical knowledge, if what has been said above is true, does not"
+differ essentially from scientific knowledge; there is no special
+"source of wisdom which is open to philosophy but not to science, and the"
+results obtained by philosophy are not radically different from those
+"obtained from science. The essential characteristic of philosophy,"
+"which makes it a study distinct from science, is criticism. It examines"
+critically the principles employed in science and in daily life; it
+"searches out any inconsistencies there may be in these principles,"
+"and it only accepts them when, as the result of a critical inquiry, no"
+"reason for rejecting them has appeared. If, as many philosophers have"
+"believed, the principles underlying the sciences were capable, when"
+"disengaged from irrelevant detail, of giving us knowledge concerning"
+"the universe as a whole, such knowledge would have the same claim on our"
+belief as scientific knowledge has; but our inquiry has not revealed any
+"such knowledge, and therefore, as regards the special doctrines of the"
+"bolder metaphysicians, has had a mainly negative result. But as regards"
+"what would be commonly accepted as knowledge, our result is in the main"
+positive: we have seldom found reason to reject such knowledge as the
+"result of our criticism, and we have seen no reason to suppose man"
+incapable of the kind of knowledge which he is generally believed to
+possess.
+""
+"When, however, we speak of philosophy as a _criticism_ of knowledge, it"
+is necessary to impose a certain limitation. If we adopt the attitude
+"of the complete sceptic, placing ourselves wholly outside all knowledge,"
+"and asking, from this outside position, to be compelled to return within"
+"the circle of knowledge, we are demanding what is impossible, and our"
+scepticism can never be refuted. For all refutation must begin with
+"some piece of knowledge which the disputants share; from blank doubt,"
+no argument can begin. Hence the criticism of knowledge which philosophy
+"employs must not be of this destructive kind, if any result is to be"
+"achieved. Against this absolute scepticism, no _logical_ argument can be"
+advanced. But it is not difficult to see that scepticism of this kind
+"is unreasonable. Descartes' 'methodical doubt', with which modern"
+"philosophy began, is not of this kind, but is rather the kind of"
+criticism which we are asserting to be the essence of philosophy. His
+'methodical doubt' consisted in doubting whatever seemed doubtful; in
+"pausing, with each apparent piece of knowledge, to ask himself whether,"
+"on reflection, he could feel certain that he really knew it. This is the"
+"kind of criticism which constitutes philosophy. Some knowledge, such as"
+"knowledge of the existence of our sense-data, appears quite indubitable,"
+however calmly and thoroughly we reflect upon it. In regard to such
+"knowledge, philosophical criticism does not require that we should"
+"abstain from belief. But there are beliefs--such, for example, as the"
+belief that physical objects exactly resemble our sense-data--which are
+"entertained until we begin to reflect, but are found to melt away"
+when subjected to a close inquiry. Such beliefs philosophy will bid us
+"reject, unless some new line of argument is found to support them."
+"But to reject the beliefs which do not appear open to any objections,"
+"however closely we examine them, is not reasonable, and is not what"
+philosophy advocates.
+""
+"The criticism aimed at, in a word, is not that which, without reason,"
+"determines to reject, but that which considers each piece of apparent"
+"knowledge on its merits, and retains whatever still appears to be"
+knowledge when this consideration is completed. That some risk of error
+"remains must be admitted, since human beings are fallible. Philosophy"
+"may claim justly that it diminishes the risk of error, and that in some"
+cases it renders the risk so small as to be practically negligible. To
+do more than this is not possible in a world where mistakes must occur;
+and more than this no prudent advocate of philosophy would claim to have
+performed.
+""
+""
+""
+CHAPTER XV. THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY
+""
+Having now come to the end of our brief and very incomplete review of
+"the problems of philosophy, it will be well to consider, in conclusion,"
+what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is
+"the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that"
+"many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are"
+inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent
+"but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on"
+matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.
+""
+"This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong"
+"conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the"
+"kind of goods which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science,"
+"through the medium of inventions, is useful to innumerable people who"
+are wholly ignorant of it; thus the study of physical science is to
+"be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the"
+"student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. Thus"
+utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has
+"any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only"
+"indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it."
+"It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of"
+philosophy must be primarily sought.
+""
+"But further, if we are not to fail in our endeavour to determine the"
+"value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudices"
+"of what are wrongly called 'practical' men. The 'practical' man, as"
+"this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who"
+"realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the"
+"necessity of providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if"
+"poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point,"
+there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society;
+and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as
+important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of
+the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who
+are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of
+philosophy is not a waste of time.
+""
+"Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The"
+knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and
+"system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a"
+"critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and"
+beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very
+great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to
+"its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian,"
+"or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been"
+"ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are"
+"willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he"
+"will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved"
+positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is
+"true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as"
+"definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject"
+"ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The"
+"whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once"
+included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical
+"principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human"
+"mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from"
+"philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great"
+"extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those"
+questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in
+"the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer"
+"can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy."
+""
+"This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of"
+philosophy. There are many questions--and among them those that are of
+"the profoundest interest to our spiritual life--which, so far as we"
+"can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers"
+become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the
+"universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse"
+"of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving"
+"hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on"
+a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good
+and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions
+"are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers."
+"But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or"
+"not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably"
+"true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it"
+is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of
+"such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the"
+"approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the"
+universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely
+ascertainable knowledge.
+""
+"Many philosophers, it is true, have held that philosophy could establish"
+the truth of certain answers to such fundamental questions. They have
+supposed that what is of most importance in religious beliefs could be
+proved by strict demonstration to be true. In order to judge of such
+"attempts, it is necessary to take a survey of human knowledge, and to"
+form an opinion as to its methods and its limitations. On such a subject
+it would be unwise to pronounce dogmatically; but if the investigations
+"of our previous chapters have not led us astray, we shall be compelled"
+to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious
+"beliefs. We cannot, therefore, include as part of the value of"
+"philosophy any definite set of answers to such questions. Hence, once"
+"more, the value of philosophy must not depend upon any supposed body of"
+definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it.
+""
+"The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very"
+uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through
+"life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the"
+"habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which"
+have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his
+"deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite,"
+"finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar"
+possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to
+"philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening"
+"chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which"
+"only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to"
+tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it
+"raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts"
+"and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our"
+"feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our"
+knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant
+dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of
+"liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing"
+familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.
+""
+"Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy"
+has a value--perhaps its chief value--through the greatness of the
+"objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal"
+aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive
+man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and
+"friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except"
+as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive
+"wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in"
+comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private
+"world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a"
+"great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private"
+world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the
+"whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleagured fortress,"
+knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is
+"inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife"
+between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one
+"way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this"
+prison and this strife.
+""
+One way of escape is by philosophic contemplation. Philosophic
+"contemplation does not, in its widest survey, divide the universe into"
+"two hostile camps--friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and"
+"bad--it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it"
+"is unalloyed, does not aim at proving that the rest of the universe is"
+"akin to man. All acquisition of knowledge is an enlargement of the Self,"
+but this enlargement is best attained when it is not directly sought. It
+"is obtained when the desire for knowledge is alone operative, by a study"
+which does not wish in advance that its objects should have this or that
+"character, but adapts the Self to the characters which it finds in its"
+"objects. This enlargement of Self is not obtained when, taking the Self"
+"as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that"
+knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what seems alien.
+"The desire to prove this is a form of self-assertion and, like all"
+"self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it"
+"desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion,"
+"in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to"
+"its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, and the"
+"Self sets bounds to the greatness of its goods. In contemplation, on"
+"the contrary, we start from the not-Self, and through its greatness the"
+boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe
+the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity.
+""
+For this reason greatness of soul is not fostered by those philosophies
+which assimilate the universe to Man. Knowledge is a form of union
+"of Self and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and"
+therefore by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with
+what we find in ourselves. There is a widespread philosophical tendency
+"towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things,"
+"that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals"
+"are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created"
+"by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if"
+"our previous discussions were correct, is untrue; but in addition to"
+"being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of"
+"all that gives it value, since it fetters contemplation to Self. What"
+"it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of"
+"prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between"
+us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of
+knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear
+his word might not be law.
+""
+"The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its"
+"satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything"
+"that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject"
+"contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or"
+"private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire,"
+"distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect"
+"seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such"
+personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free
+"intellect will see as God might see, without a _here_ and _now_,"
+"without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs"
+"and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and"
+"exclusive desire of knowledge--knowledge as impersonal, as purely"
+"contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free"
+intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into
+"which the accidents of private history do not enter, than the knowledge"
+"brought by the senses, and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon"
+an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs
+distort as much as they reveal.
+""
+The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of
+philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom
+and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. It will view
+"its purposes and desires as parts of the whole, with the absence of"
+insistence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments in
+a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man's deeds. The
+"impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth,"
+"is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in"
+"emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only"
+to those who are judged useful or admirable. Thus contemplation enlarges
+"not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our"
+"actions and our affections: it makes us citizens of the universe, not"
+only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship
+"of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the"
+thraldom of narrow hopes and fears.
+""
+"Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy"
+"is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its"
+"questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be"
+"true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because"
+"these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich"
+our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which
+"closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the"
+"greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also"
+"is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe"
+which constitutes its highest good.
+""
+""
+""
+""
+BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
+""
+The student who wishes to acquire an elementary knowledge of philosophy
+will find it both easier and more profitable to read some of the works
+of the great philosophers than to attempt to derive an all-round view
+from handbooks. The following are specially recommended:
+""
+"Plato: _Republic_, especially Books VI and VII."
+Descartes: _Meditations_.
+Spinoza: _Ethics_.
+Leibniz: _The Monadology_.
+Berkeley: _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_.
+Hume: _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_.
+Kant: _Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic_.
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+""
+"End of Project Gutenberg's The Problems of Philosophy, by Bertrand Russell"
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