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1 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST MAJOR
CHALLENGE: THE
REVOLT OF 1857
It was the morning of 11 May 1 857. The city of De1h had
not yet woken up when a band of Sepoys from Meerut, who had
defied and killed the European officers the previous day, crossed
the Jamuna, set the toll house on fire and marched to the Red
Fort. They entered the Red Fort through the Raj Gha t gate,
followed by an excited crowd, to appeal to Bahadur Shah II, the
Moghul Emperor — a pensioner of the British East India
Company, who possessed nothing but the name of the mighty
Mughals — to become their leader, thus, give legitimacy to their
cause. Bahadur Shah vacillated as he was neither sure of the
intentions of the sepoys nor of his own ability to play an effective
role. He was however persuaded, if not coerced, to give in and
was proclaimed the Shahenshah -e-Hindustan. The sepoys, then,
set out t o capture and control the imperial city of Delhi. Si mon
Fraser, the Political Agent and several other Englishmen were
killed; the public offices were either occupied or destroyed. The
Revolt of an unsuccessful but heroic effort to eliminate foreign
rule, h ad begun. The capture of Delhi and the proclamation of
Bahadur Shah as the Empero r of Hindustan gave a positive
political meaning to the revolt and provided a rallying point for
the rebels b y recalling the past glory of the imperial city.
The Revolt at Mee rut and the capture of Delhi was the
precursor to a widespread mutiny by the sepoys and rebellion
almost all over North India, as well as Central and Western India.
South India remained quiet and Punjab and Bengal were only
marginally affected. Almost half the Company’s sepoy strength of
2,32,224 opted out of their loyalty to their regimental colors and
overcame the ideology of the army, meticulously constructed over
a period of time through training and discipline. | <s>[INST]1 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
CHAPTER 1. THE FIRST MAJOR
CHALLENGE: THE
REVOLT OF 1857
It was the morning of 11 May 1 857. The city of De1h had
not yet woken up when a band of Sepoys from Meerut, who had
defied and killed the European officers the previous day, crossed
the Jamuna, set the toll house on fire and marched to the Red
Fort. They entered the Red Fort through the Raj Gha t gate,
followed by an excited crowd, to appeal to Bahadur Shah II, the
Moghul Emperor — a pensioner of the British East India
Company, who possessed nothing but the name of the mighty
Mughals — to become their leader, thus, give legitimacy to their
cause. Bahadur Shah vacillated as he was neither sure of the
intentions of the sepoys nor of his own ability to play an effective
role. He was however persuaded, if not coerced, to give in and
was proclaimed the Shahenshah -e-Hindustan. The sepoys, then,
set out t o capture and control the imperial city of Delhi. Si mon
Fraser, the Political Agent and several other Englishmen were
killed; the public offices were either occupied or destroyed. The
Revolt of an unsuccessful but heroic effort to eliminate foreign
rule, h ad begun. The capture of Delhi and the proclamation of
Bahadur Shah as the Empero r of Hindustan gave a positive
political meaning to the revolt and provided a rallying point for
the rebels b y recalling the past glory of the imperial city.
The Revolt at Mee rut and the capture of Delhi was the
precursor to a widespread mutiny by the sepoys and rebellion
almost all over North India, as well as Central and Western India.
South India remained quiet and Punjab and Bengal were only
marginally affected. Almost half the Company’s sepoy strength of
2,32,224 opted out of their loyalty to their regimental colors and
overcame the ideology of the army, meticulously constructed over
a period of time through training and discipline.[/INST] |
a period of time through training and discipline.
Even before the Meerut incident, there w ere rumblings of
resentment in various cantonments. The 19th Native Infantry at | <s>[INST]a period of time through training and discipline.
Even before the Meerut incident, there w ere rumblings of
resentment in various cantonments. The 19th Native Infantry at[/INST] |
2 | India’s S truggle for Independence
Berhampur which refused to use the newly introduced Enfield
Rifle, was disbanded in March 1857. A young sepoy of the 34th
Native Infantry, Mangal Pande, went a step further an d fired at
the Sergeant Major of his regiment. He was overpowered and
executed and his regiment too, was disbanded. The 7th Oudh
regiment which defied its officers met with a similar fate .
Within a month of capture of Delhi , the Revolt spread to
different parts of the country: Kanpur, Lucknow, Benares,
Allahabad, Bareilly, Jagdishp ur and Jhansi. The rebel activity
was marked by intense anti -British feelings and the
administ ration was invariably toppled. In the absence of any
leaders from their own ranks, th e insurgents turned to the
traditional leaders of Indian society — the territorial aristocrats
and feudal chiefs who had suffered at the hands of the British.
At Kanpur, the natural choice was Nana Saheb, the adopted
son of the last Peshw a,Baji Rao II . He had ref used the family title
and, banished fro m Poona, was living near Kanpur . Begum
Hazrat Mahal took over the reigns where popular sympathy was
overwhelmingly in favour of the deposed Nawab. Her son, Birjis
Qadir, was proclaimed the Nawab and a regular administration
was organized with important offices shared equally by Muslims
and Hindus.
At Barielly, Khan Bahadur, a descendant of the former ruler
of Rohilkhand was placed in command. Living on a pension
granted by the British , he was not too enthusia stic about this
and had in fact, warned the Commissioner of the impending
mutiny. Yet, once the Revolt broke out, he assumed the
administration, organized an army of 40,000 soldiers and offered
stiff resistance to the British.
*
In Bihar the Revolt was le d by Kunwar Singh, the zamindar
of Jagdishpur, a 70 year -old man on the brink of bankruptcy. He
nursed a grudge against the British. He had been deprived of his
estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with | <s>[INST]2 | India’s S truggle for Independence
Berhampur which refused to use the newly introduced Enfield
Rifle, was disbanded in March 1857. A young sepoy of the 34th
Native Infantry, Mangal Pande, went a step further an d fired at
the Sergeant Major of his regiment. He was overpowered and
executed and his regiment too, was disbanded. The 7th Oudh
regiment which defied its officers met with a similar fate .
Within a month of capture of Delhi , the Revolt spread to
different parts of the country: Kanpur, Lucknow, Benares,
Allahabad, Bareilly, Jagdishp ur and Jhansi. The rebel activity
was marked by intense anti -British feelings and the
administ ration was invariably toppled. In the absence of any
leaders from their own ranks, th e insurgents turned to the
traditional leaders of Indian society — the territorial aristocrats
and feudal chiefs who had suffered at the hands of the British.
At Kanpur, the natural choice was Nana Saheb, the adopted
son of the last Peshw a,Baji Rao II . He had ref used the family title
and, banished fro m Poona, was living near Kanpur . Begum
Hazrat Mahal took over the reigns where popular sympathy was
overwhelmingly in favour of the deposed Nawab. Her son, Birjis
Qadir, was proclaimed the Nawab and a regular administration
was organized with important offices shared equally by Muslims
and Hindus.
At Barielly, Khan Bahadur, a descendant of the former ruler
of Rohilkhand was placed in command. Living on a pension
granted by the British , he was not too enthusia stic about this
and had in fact, warned the Commissioner of the impending
mutiny. Yet, once the Revolt broke out, he assumed the
administration, organized an army of 40,000 soldiers and offered
stiff resistance to the British.
*
In Bihar the Revolt was le d by Kunwar Singh, the zamindar
of Jagdishpur, a 70 year -old man on the brink of bankruptcy. He
nursed a grudge against the British. He had been deprived of his
estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with[/INST] |
estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with
their management again fell on dea f ears. Even though he had
not planned an uprising, he unhesitatingly joined the sepoys
when they reached Arrah from Dinapore. | <s>[INST]estates by them and his repeated appeals to be entrusted with
their management again fell on dea f ears. Even though he had
not planned an uprising, he unhesitatingly joined the sepoys
when they reached Arrah from Dinapore.[/INST] |
3 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
The most outstanding leader of the Revolt was Rani
Lakshmib ai, who assumed the leadership of the sepoys at
Jhansi. Lord Dalhousi e, the Governor -General, had refused to
allow her adopted son to succeed to the throne after her husband
died and had annexed the state by the application of the Doctrine
of Lapse. The Rani had tried everything to reverse the deci sion.
She even offered to keep J hansi ‘safe’ for the British if they would
grant her wishes. When it was clear nothing was working she
joined the sepoys and, in time, became one of the most
formidable enemies the British had to contend with.
The Revolt was not confined to these ma jor centres. It had
embraced almost every cantonment in the Bengal and a few in
Bombay. Only the Madras army remained totally loyal. Why did
the sepoys revolt? It was considered prestigious to be in the
service of the Company; it provided economic stabilit y. Why,
then, did the sepoys choose to forego these advantages for the
sake of an uncertain future? A proclamation issued at Delhi
indicates the immediate cause: ‘it is well known that in these
days all the English have entertained these evil designs — first, to
destroy the religion of the whole Hindustani Army, and then to
make the people by compulsion Christians. Therefore, we, solely
on accou nt of our religion, have combined with the people, and
have not spared alive one infidel, and have re -established the
Delhi dynasty on these terms’.
It is certainly true that the conditions of service in the
Company’s army and cantonments increasingly came in to
conflict with the religious beliefs and prejudices of the sepoys,
who were predominantly drawn from the upp er caste Hindus of
the North Western Provinces and Oudh. Initially, the
administration sought to accommodate the sepoys’ demands:
facilities were provided to them to live according to the dictates of
their caste and religion. But, with the extension of the Army’s | <s>[INST]3 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
The most outstanding leader of the Revolt was Rani
Lakshmib ai, who assumed the leadership of the sepoys at
Jhansi. Lord Dalhousi e, the Governor -General, had refused to
allow her adopted son to succeed to the throne after her husband
died and had annexed the state by the application of the Doctrine
of Lapse. The Rani had tried everything to reverse the deci sion.
She even offered to keep J hansi ‘safe’ for the British if they would
grant her wishes. When it was clear nothing was working she
joined the sepoys and, in time, became one of the most
formidable enemies the British had to contend with.
The Revolt was not confined to these ma jor centres. It had
embraced almost every cantonment in the Bengal and a few in
Bombay. Only the Madras army remained totally loyal. Why did
the sepoys revolt? It was considered prestigious to be in the
service of the Company; it provided economic stabilit y. Why,
then, did the sepoys choose to forego these advantages for the
sake of an uncertain future? A proclamation issued at Delhi
indicates the immediate cause: ‘it is well known that in these
days all the English have entertained these evil designs — first, to
destroy the religion of the whole Hindustani Army, and then to
make the people by compulsion Christians. Therefore, we, solely
on accou nt of our religion, have combined with the people, and
have not spared alive one infidel, and have re -established the
Delhi dynasty on these terms’.
It is certainly true that the conditions of service in the
Company’s army and cantonments increasingly came in to
conflict with the religious beliefs and prejudices of the sepoys,
who were predominantly drawn from the upp er caste Hindus of
the North Western Provinces and Oudh. Initially, the
administration sought to accommodate the sepoys’ demands:
facilities were provided to them to live according to the dictates of
their caste and religion. But, with the extension of the Army’s[/INST] |
operation not only to various parts of India, but also to countries
outside, it was not possible to do so any more. Moreover, caste
distinctions and segregation within a regiment were not
conducive to the cohesiveness of a fighting unit. To begin w ith,
the administration thought of an easy way out: discourage the
recruitment of Brahmins; this apparently did not succeed and, by | <s>[INST]operation not only to various parts of India, but also to countries
outside, it was not possible to do so any more. Moreover, caste
distinctions and segregation within a regiment were not
conducive to the cohesiveness of a fighting unit. To begin w ith,
the administration thought of an easy way out: discourage the
recruitment of Brahmins; this apparently did not succeed and, by[/INST] |
4 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the middle of the nineteenth century, the upper castes
predominated in the Bengal Army, for instance.
The unhappiness of th e sepoys first surfaced in 1824 when
the 47th Regiment at Barrackpur was ordered to go to Burma. To
the religious Hindu, crossing the sea meant loss of caste. The
sepoys, therefore, refused to comply. The regiment was disbanded
and those who led the opposi tion were hanged. The religious
sensibilities of the sepoys who participated in the Afghan War
were more seriously affected. During the arduous and disastrous
campaigns, the fleeing sepoys were forc ed to eat and drink
whatever cam e their way. When they ret urned to India, those at
home correctly sensed that they could not have observed caste
stipulations and therefore, were hesitant to welcome them back
into the b iradiri (caste fraternity). Sitaram who had gone to
Afghanistan found himself outcaste not only in his village, but
even in his own barracks. The Prestige of being in the pay of the
Company was not enough to hold his Position in society; religion
and caste proved to be more powerful.
*
The rumours about the Government’s secret designs to
promote conv ersions to Christianity further exasperated the
sepoys. The official -missionary nexus gave credence to the
rumour. In some cantonments missionaries were permitted to
preach openly and their diatribe against other religions angered
the sepoys. The reports a bout the mixing of bone dust in atta and
the introduction of the Enfield rifle enhanced the sepoys’ growing
disaffection with the Government. The cartridges of the new rifle
had to be bitten off before loading and the grease was reportedly
made of beef and pig fat. The army administration did nothing to
allay these fears, and the sepoys felt their religion was in real
danger.
The sepoys’ discontent was not limited to religion alone.
They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in | <s>[INST]4 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the middle of the nineteenth century, the upper castes
predominated in the Bengal Army, for instance.
The unhappiness of th e sepoys first surfaced in 1824 when
the 47th Regiment at Barrackpur was ordered to go to Burma. To
the religious Hindu, crossing the sea meant loss of caste. The
sepoys, therefore, refused to comply. The regiment was disbanded
and those who led the opposi tion were hanged. The religious
sensibilities of the sepoys who participated in the Afghan War
were more seriously affected. During the arduous and disastrous
campaigns, the fleeing sepoys were forc ed to eat and drink
whatever cam e their way. When they ret urned to India, those at
home correctly sensed that they could not have observed caste
stipulations and therefore, were hesitant to welcome them back
into the b iradiri (caste fraternity). Sitaram who had gone to
Afghanistan found himself outcaste not only in his village, but
even in his own barracks. The Prestige of being in the pay of the
Company was not enough to hold his Position in society; religion
and caste proved to be more powerful.
*
The rumours about the Government’s secret designs to
promote conv ersions to Christianity further exasperated the
sepoys. The official -missionary nexus gave credence to the
rumour. In some cantonments missionaries were permitted to
preach openly and their diatribe against other religions angered
the sepoys. The reports a bout the mixing of bone dust in atta and
the introduction of the Enfield rifle enhanced the sepoys’ growing
disaffection with the Government. The cartridges of the new rifle
had to be bitten off before loading and the grease was reportedly
made of beef and pig fat. The army administration did nothing to
allay these fears, and the sepoys felt their religion was in real
danger.
The sepoys’ discontent was not limited to religion alone.
They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in[/INST] |
They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in
the infantry g ot seven rupees a month. A sawar in the cavalry
was paid Rs. 27, out of which he had to pay for his own uniform,
food and the upkeep of his mount, and he was ultimately left
with only a rupee or two. What was more galling was the sense of
deprivation compa red to his British counterparts. He was made | <s>[INST]They were equally unhappy with their emoluments. A sepoy in
the infantry g ot seven rupees a month. A sawar in the cavalry
was paid Rs. 27, out of which he had to pay for his own uniform,
food and the upkeep of his mount, and he was ultimately left
with only a rupee or two. What was more galling was the sense of
deprivation compa red to his British counterparts. He was made[/INST] |
5 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
to feel a subordinate at every step and was discriminated against
racially and in matters of promotion and privileges. ‘Though he
might give the signs of a military genius of Hyder,’ wrote T.R.
Holmes, ‘he knew that he could never attain the pay of an
English subaltern and that the rank to which he might attain,
after 30 years of faithful service, would not protect him from the
insolent dictation of an ensign fresh from England.” The
discontent of the sepoys was not limited to matters military; they
felt the general disenchantment with and opposition to British
rule. The sepoy, in fact, was a peasant in uniform,’ whose
consciousness was not divorced from that of the rural population.
A military officer had warned Dalhousie about the possible
consequences of his policies: ‘Your army is derived from the
peasantry of the country who have rights and if those rights are
infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity
of the army . . . If you infringe the institutions of the people of
India, that army will sympathize with them; for they are part of
the population, and in every infringement you may make upon
the rights of the individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men
who are either themselves in th e army or upon their sons, their
fathers or their relations.’
*
Almost every agricultural family in Oudh had a
representative in the army; there were 75,000 men from Oudh.
Whatever happened there was of immediate concern to the sepoy.
The new land revenue system introduced after the annexation
and the confiscation of lands attached to charitable institutions
affected his well -being. That accounted for the 14,000 petitions
received from the sepoys about the hardships of the revenue
system. A proclamation iss ued by the Delhi rebels clearly
reflected the sepoy’s awareness of the misery brought about by
British rule. The mutiny in itself, therefore, was a revolt against | <s>[INST]5 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
to feel a subordinate at every step and was discriminated against
racially and in matters of promotion and privileges. ‘Though he
might give the signs of a military genius of Hyder,’ wrote T.R.
Holmes, ‘he knew that he could never attain the pay of an
English subaltern and that the rank to which he might attain,
after 30 years of faithful service, would not protect him from the
insolent dictation of an ensign fresh from England.” The
discontent of the sepoys was not limited to matters military; they
felt the general disenchantment with and opposition to British
rule. The sepoy, in fact, was a peasant in uniform,’ whose
consciousness was not divorced from that of the rural population.
A military officer had warned Dalhousie about the possible
consequences of his policies: ‘Your army is derived from the
peasantry of the country who have rights and if those rights are
infringed upon, you will no longer have to depend on the fidelity
of the army . . . If you infringe the institutions of the people of
India, that army will sympathize with them; for they are part of
the population, and in every infringement you may make upon
the rights of the individuals, you infringe upon the rights of men
who are either themselves in th e army or upon their sons, their
fathers or their relations.’
*
Almost every agricultural family in Oudh had a
representative in the army; there were 75,000 men from Oudh.
Whatever happened there was of immediate concern to the sepoy.
The new land revenue system introduced after the annexation
and the confiscation of lands attached to charitable institutions
affected his well -being. That accounted for the 14,000 petitions
received from the sepoys about the hardships of the revenue
system. A proclamation iss ued by the Delhi rebels clearly
reflected the sepoy’s awareness of the misery brought about by
British rule. The mutiny in itself, therefore, was a revolt against[/INST] |
the British and, thus, a political act. What imparted this
character to the mutiny was the se poy’s identity of interests with
the general population.
The Revolt of the sepoys was accompanied by a rebellion of
the civil population, particularly in the North Western Provinces | <s>[INST]the British and, thus, a political act. What imparted this
character to the mutiny was the se poy’s identity of interests with
the general population.
The Revolt of the sepoys was accompanied by a rebellion of
the civil population, particularly in the North Western Provinces[/INST] |
6 | India’s S truggle for Independence
and Oudh, the two areas from which the sepoys of the Bengal
army were rec ruited. Except in Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur,
civil rebellion followed the Revolt of the sepoys. The action of the
sepoys released the rural population from fear of the state and
the control exercised by the administration. Their accumulated
grievances f ound immediate expression and they rose en masse
to give vent to their opposition to British rule. Government
buildings were destroyed, the “treasury was plundered, the
magazine was sacked, barracks and court houses were burnt and
prison gates were flung o pen.” The civil rebellion had a broad
social base, embracing all sections of society — the territorial
magnates, peasants, artisans, religious mendicants and priests,
civil servants, shopkeepers and boatmen. The Revolt of the
sepoys, thus, resulted in a po pular uprising.
*
The reason for this mass upsurge has to be sought in the
nature of British rule which adversely affected the interests of
almost all sections of s ociety Under the burden of excessive taxes
the peasantry became progressively indebted and impoverished.
The only interest of the Company was the realization of maximum
revenue with minimum effort.
Consequently settlements were hurriedly undertaken, often
without any regard for the resources of the land. For instance, in
the district of Bareill y in 1812, the settlement was completed in
the record time often months with a dramatic increase of Rs.
14.73,188 over the earlier settlement. Delighted by this increase,
the Government congratulated the officers for their ‘zeal, ability
and indefatigable labour.’ It did not occur to the authorities that
such a sharp and sudden increase would have disastrous
consequences on the cultivators. Naturally, the revenue could not
be collected without coercion and torture: in Rohilkhand there
were as many as 2 ,37,3 88 coercive collections during 1848 -56. | <s>[INST]6 | India’s S truggle for Independence
and Oudh, the two areas from which the sepoys of the Bengal
army were rec ruited. Except in Muzzafarnagar and Saharanpur,
civil rebellion followed the Revolt of the sepoys. The action of the
sepoys released the rural population from fear of the state and
the control exercised by the administration. Their accumulated
grievances f ound immediate expression and they rose en masse
to give vent to their opposition to British rule. Government
buildings were destroyed, the “treasury was plundered, the
magazine was sacked, barracks and court houses were burnt and
prison gates were flung o pen.” The civil rebellion had a broad
social base, embracing all sections of society — the territorial
magnates, peasants, artisans, religious mendicants and priests,
civil servants, shopkeepers and boatmen. The Revolt of the
sepoys, thus, resulted in a po pular uprising.
*
The reason for this mass upsurge has to be sought in the
nature of British rule which adversely affected the interests of
almost all sections of s ociety Under the burden of excessive taxes
the peasantry became progressively indebted and impoverished.
The only interest of the Company was the realization of maximum
revenue with minimum effort.
Consequently settlements were hurriedly undertaken, often
without any regard for the resources of the land. For instance, in
the district of Bareill y in 1812, the settlement was completed in
the record time often months with a dramatic increase of Rs.
14.73,188 over the earlier settlement. Delighted by this increase,
the Government congratulated the officers for their ‘zeal, ability
and indefatigable labour.’ It did not occur to the authorities that
such a sharp and sudden increase would have disastrous
consequences on the cultivators. Naturally, the revenue could not
be collected without coercion and torture: in Rohilkhand there
were as many as 2 ,37,3 88 coercive collections during 1848 -56.[/INST] |
Whatever the conditions, the Government was keen on collecting
revenue. Even in very adverse circumstances, remissions were
rarely granted. A collector, who repeatedly reported his inability
to realize revenue from a n estate, as only grass was grown there,
was told that grass was a very good produce and it should be sold
for collecting revenue! | <s>[INST]Whatever the conditions, the Government was keen on collecting
revenue. Even in very adverse circumstances, remissions were
rarely granted. A collector, who repeatedly reported his inability
to realize revenue from a n estate, as only grass was grown there,
was told that grass was a very good produce and it should be sold
for collecting revenue![/INST] |
7 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
The traditional landed aristocracy suffered no less. In Oudh,
which was a storm centre of the Revolt, the taluqdars lost all
their power and privileges. About 21,000 taluqdars whose estates
were confiscated suddenly found themselves without a source of
income, ‘unable to work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury.’
These dispossessed taluqdars smarting under the humiliation
heaped on them, seized the opportunity presented by the Sepoy
Revolt to oppose the British and regain what they had lost.
*
British rule also meant misery to the artisans and
handicraftsmen. The annexation of Indian states by the Company
cut off their major s ource of patronage. Added to this, British
policy discouraged Indian handicrafts and promoted British
goods. The highly skilled Indian craftsmen were deprived of their
source of income and were forced to look for alternate sources of
employment that hardly existed, as the destruction of Indian
handicrafts was not accompanied by the development of modem
industries.
The reforming zeal of British officials under the influence of
utilitarianism had aroused considerable suspicion, resentment,
and opposition. Th e orthodox Hindus and Muslims feared that
through social legislation the British were trying to destroy their
religion and culture. Moreover, they believed that legislation was
undertaken to aid the missionaries in their quest for
evangelization. The ortho dox and the religious, therefore, arrayed
against the British. Several proclamations of the rebels expressed
this cultural concern in no uncertain terms.
The coalition of the Revolt of the sepoys and that of the civil
population made the 1857 movement an unprecedented popular
upsurge. Was it an organized and methodically planned Revolt or
a spontaneous insurrection? In the absence of any reliable
account left behind by the rebels it is difficult to be certain. The
attitude and activities of the leaders har dly suggest any planning | <s>[INST]7 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
The traditional landed aristocracy suffered no less. In Oudh,
which was a storm centre of the Revolt, the taluqdars lost all
their power and privileges. About 21,000 taluqdars whose estates
were confiscated suddenly found themselves without a source of
income, ‘unable to work, ashamed to beg, condemned to penury.’
These dispossessed taluqdars smarting under the humiliation
heaped on them, seized the opportunity presented by the Sepoy
Revolt to oppose the British and regain what they had lost.
*
British rule also meant misery to the artisans and
handicraftsmen. The annexation of Indian states by the Company
cut off their major s ource of patronage. Added to this, British
policy discouraged Indian handicrafts and promoted British
goods. The highly skilled Indian craftsmen were deprived of their
source of income and were forced to look for alternate sources of
employment that hardly existed, as the destruction of Indian
handicrafts was not accompanied by the development of modem
industries.
The reforming zeal of British officials under the influence of
utilitarianism had aroused considerable suspicion, resentment,
and opposition. Th e orthodox Hindus and Muslims feared that
through social legislation the British were trying to destroy their
religion and culture. Moreover, they believed that legislation was
undertaken to aid the missionaries in their quest for
evangelization. The ortho dox and the religious, therefore, arrayed
against the British. Several proclamations of the rebels expressed
this cultural concern in no uncertain terms.
The coalition of the Revolt of the sepoys and that of the civil
population made the 1857 movement an unprecedented popular
upsurge. Was it an organized and methodically planned Revolt or
a spontaneous insurrection? In the absence of any reliable
account left behind by the rebels it is difficult to be certain. The
attitude and activities of the leaders har dly suggest any planning[/INST] |
or conspiracy on their part and if at all it existed it was at an
embryonic stage. | <s>[INST]or conspiracy on their part and if at all it existed it was at an
embryonic stage.[/INST] |
8 | India’s S truggle for Independence
When the sepoys arrived from Meerut, Bahadur Shah seems
to have been taken by surprise and promptly conveyed the news
to the Lt. Governor at Agra. So did Rani Lakshmibhai of Jhansi
who took quite some time before openly joining the rebels.
Whether Nana Saheb and Maulvi Ahmad Shah of Faizabad had
established links with various cantonments and were
instrumental in instigating Revolt is yet to be prove d beyond
doubt. Similarly, the message conveyed by the circulation of
chappatis and lotus flowers is also uncertain. The only positive
factor is that within a month of the Meerut incident the Revolt
became quite widespread.
*
Even if there was no planning and organization before the
revolt, it was important that it was done, once it started.
Immediately after the capture of Delhi a letter was addressed to
the rulers of all the neighboring states and of Rajasthan soliciting
their support and inviting them t o participate. In Delhi, a court of
administrators was established which was responsible for all
matters of state. The court consisted of ten members, six from
the army and four from the civilian departments. All decisions
were taken by a majority vote. Th e court conducted the affairs of
the state in the name of the Emperor. ‘The Government at Delhi,’
wrote a British official, ‘seems to have been a sort of
constitutional Milocracy. The king was king and honoured as
such, like a constitutional monarch; but i nstead of a Parliament ,
he had a council of soldiers, in whom power rested, and of whom
he was no degree a military commander.’ In other centres, also
attempts were made to bring about an organization.
Bahadur Shah was recognized as the Emperor by all reb el
leaders Coins were struck and orders were issued in his name. At
Bareilly, Khan Bahadur Khan conducted the administration in
the name of the Mughal Emperor. It is also significant that the
first impulse of the rebels was always to proceed to Delhi wheth er | <s>[INST]8 | India’s S truggle for Independence
When the sepoys arrived from Meerut, Bahadur Shah seems
to have been taken by surprise and promptly conveyed the news
to the Lt. Governor at Agra. So did Rani Lakshmibhai of Jhansi
who took quite some time before openly joining the rebels.
Whether Nana Saheb and Maulvi Ahmad Shah of Faizabad had
established links with various cantonments and were
instrumental in instigating Revolt is yet to be prove d beyond
doubt. Similarly, the message conveyed by the circulation of
chappatis and lotus flowers is also uncertain. The only positive
factor is that within a month of the Meerut incident the Revolt
became quite widespread.
*
Even if there was no planning and organization before the
revolt, it was important that it was done, once it started.
Immediately after the capture of Delhi a letter was addressed to
the rulers of all the neighboring states and of Rajasthan soliciting
their support and inviting them t o participate. In Delhi, a court of
administrators was established which was responsible for all
matters of state. The court consisted of ten members, six from
the army and four from the civilian departments. All decisions
were taken by a majority vote. Th e court conducted the affairs of
the state in the name of the Emperor. ‘The Government at Delhi,’
wrote a British official, ‘seems to have been a sort of
constitutional Milocracy. The king was king and honoured as
such, like a constitutional monarch; but i nstead of a Parliament ,
he had a council of soldiers, in whom power rested, and of whom
he was no degree a military commander.’ In other centres, also
attempts were made to bring about an organization.
Bahadur Shah was recognized as the Emperor by all reb el
leaders Coins were struck and orders were issued in his name. At
Bareilly, Khan Bahadur Khan conducted the administration in
the name of the Mughal Emperor. It is also significant that the
first impulse of the rebels was always to proceed to Delhi wheth er[/INST] |
they were at Meerut, Kanpur or Jhansi. The need to create an
organization and a political institution to preserve the gains was
certainly felt. But in the face of the British counter -offensive,
there was no chance to build on these early nebulous ideas. | <s>[INST]they were at Meerut, Kanpur or Jhansi. The need to create an
organization and a political institution to preserve the gains was
certainly felt. But in the face of the British counter -offensive,
there was no chance to build on these early nebulous ideas.[/INST] |
9 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
For more than a year, the rebels carried on their struggle
against heavy odds. They had no source of arms and
ammunition; what they had captured from the British arsenals
could not carry them far. They ‘were often forced to fight with
swords and pikes ag ainst an enemy supplied with the most
modern weapons. They had no quick system of communication at
their command and, hence, no coordination was possible.
Consequently, they were unaware of the strength and
weaknesses of their compatriots and as a result c ould not come
to each other’s rescue in times of distress. Every one was left to
play a lonely hand.
*
Although the rebels received the sympathy of the people, the
country as a whole was not behind them. The merchants,
intelligentsia and Indian rulers n ot only kept aloof, but actively
supported the British. Meetings were organized in Calcutta and
Bombay by them to pray for the success of the British. Despite
the Doctrine of Lapse, the Indian rulers who expected their future
to be safer with the British l iberally provided them with men and
materials. Indeed, the sepoys might have made a better fight of it
if they had received their support.
Almost half the Indian soldiers not only did not Revolt but
fought against their own countrymen. The recapture of De lhi was
effected by five columns consisting of 1700 British troops and
3200 Indians. The blowing up of Kashmere Gate was conducted
by six British officers and NCOs and twenty -four Indians, of
whom ten were Punjabis and fourteen were from Agra and Oudh.
Apart from some honourable exceptions like the Rani of
Thansi, Kunwa r Singh and Maulv i Ahmadullah, the rebels were
poorly served by their leaders. Most of them failed to realize the
significance of the Revolt and simply did not do enough. Bahadur
Shah and Ze enat Mahal had no faith in the sepoys and
negotiated with the British to secure their safety. Most of the | <s>[INST]9 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
For more than a year, the rebels carried on their struggle
against heavy odds. They had no source of arms and
ammunition; what they had captured from the British arsenals
could not carry them far. They ‘were often forced to fight with
swords and pikes ag ainst an enemy supplied with the most
modern weapons. They had no quick system of communication at
their command and, hence, no coordination was possible.
Consequently, they were unaware of the strength and
weaknesses of their compatriots and as a result c ould not come
to each other’s rescue in times of distress. Every one was left to
play a lonely hand.
*
Although the rebels received the sympathy of the people, the
country as a whole was not behind them. The merchants,
intelligentsia and Indian rulers n ot only kept aloof, but actively
supported the British. Meetings were organized in Calcutta and
Bombay by them to pray for the success of the British. Despite
the Doctrine of Lapse, the Indian rulers who expected their future
to be safer with the British l iberally provided them with men and
materials. Indeed, the sepoys might have made a better fight of it
if they had received their support.
Almost half the Indian soldiers not only did not Revolt but
fought against their own countrymen. The recapture of De lhi was
effected by five columns consisting of 1700 British troops and
3200 Indians. The blowing up of Kashmere Gate was conducted
by six British officers and NCOs and twenty -four Indians, of
whom ten were Punjabis and fourteen were from Agra and Oudh.
Apart from some honourable exceptions like the Rani of
Thansi, Kunwa r Singh and Maulv i Ahmadullah, the rebels were
poorly served by their leaders. Most of them failed to realize the
significance of the Revolt and simply did not do enough. Bahadur
Shah and Ze enat Mahal had no faith in the sepoys and
negotiated with the British to secure their safety. Most of the[/INST] |
taluqd ars tried only to protect their own interests. Some of them, | <s>[INST]taluqd ars tried only to protect their own interests. Some of them,[/INST] |
10 | India’s S truggle for Independence
like Man Singh, changed sides several times depending on which
side had the upper h and.
Apart from a commonly shared hatred for alien rule, the
rebels had no political perspective or a definite vision of the
future. They were all prisoners of their own past, fighting
primarily to regain their lost privileges. Unsurprisingly, they
proved incapable of ushering in a new political order. John
Lawrence rightly remarked that had a single leader of ability
arisen among them (the rebels) we must have been lost beyond
redemption.’
That was not to be, yet the rebels showed exemplary
courage , dedication and commitment. Thousands of men courted
death, fighting for a cause they held dear. Their heroism alone,
however, could not stem the onslaught of a much superior
British army. The first to fall was Delhi on 20 September 1857
after a prolonged battl e. Bahadur Shah, who took refuge in
Humayun’s tomb, was captured, tried and deported to Burma.
With that the back of the Revolt was broken, since Delhi was the
only possible rallying point. The British military then dealt with
the rebels in one centre afte r another. The Rani of Jhansi died
fighting on 17 June 1858. General Hugh Rose, who defeated her,
paid high tribute to his enemy when he said that ‘here lay the
woman who was the only man among the rebels.’ Nana Saheb
refused to give in and finally escaped to Nepal in the beginning of
1859, hoping to renew the struggle. Kunwar Singh, despite his
old age, was too quick for the British troops and constantly kept
them guessing till his death on 9 May 1858. Tantia Tope, who
successfully carried on guerrilla war fare against the British until
April 1859, was betrayed by a zamindar, captured and put to
‘death by the British.
Thus, came to an end the most formidable challenge the
British Empire had to face in India. It is a matter of speculation
as to what the cour se of history would have been had the rebels | <s>[INST]10 | India’s S truggle for Independence
like Man Singh, changed sides several times depending on which
side had the upper h and.
Apart from a commonly shared hatred for alien rule, the
rebels had no political perspective or a definite vision of the
future. They were all prisoners of their own past, fighting
primarily to regain their lost privileges. Unsurprisingly, they
proved incapable of ushering in a new political order. John
Lawrence rightly remarked that had a single leader of ability
arisen among them (the rebels) we must have been lost beyond
redemption.’
That was not to be, yet the rebels showed exemplary
courage , dedication and commitment. Thousands of men courted
death, fighting for a cause they held dear. Their heroism alone,
however, could not stem the onslaught of a much superior
British army. The first to fall was Delhi on 20 September 1857
after a prolonged battl e. Bahadur Shah, who took refuge in
Humayun’s tomb, was captured, tried and deported to Burma.
With that the back of the Revolt was broken, since Delhi was the
only possible rallying point. The British military then dealt with
the rebels in one centre afte r another. The Rani of Jhansi died
fighting on 17 June 1858. General Hugh Rose, who defeated her,
paid high tribute to his enemy when he said that ‘here lay the
woman who was the only man among the rebels.’ Nana Saheb
refused to give in and finally escaped to Nepal in the beginning of
1859, hoping to renew the struggle. Kunwar Singh, despite his
old age, was too quick for the British troops and constantly kept
them guessing till his death on 9 May 1858. Tantia Tope, who
successfully carried on guerrilla war fare against the British until
April 1859, was betrayed by a zamindar, captured and put to
‘death by the British.
Thus, came to an end the most formidable challenge the
British Empire had to face in India. It is a matter of speculation
as to what the cour se of history would have been had the rebels[/INST] |
succeeded. Whether they would have put the clock back’ and
resurrected and reinforced a feudal order need not detain us
here; although that w as not necessarily the only option. Despite
the sepoys’ limitations an d weaknesses, their effort to emancipate
the country from foreign rule was a patriotic act and a
Progressive step. If the importance of a historical event is not | <s>[INST]succeeded. Whether they would have put the clock back’ and
resurrected and reinforced a feudal order need not detain us
here; although that w as not necessarily the only option. Despite
the sepoys’ limitations an d weaknesses, their effort to emancipate
the country from foreign rule was a patriotic act and a
Progressive step. If the importance of a historical event is not[/INST] |
11 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
limited to its immediate achievements the Revolt of 1857 was not
a pure historical tragedy. Ev en in failure it served a grand
purpose: a source of inspiration for the national liberation
movement which later achieved what the Revolt could not. | <s>[INST]11 | The First Major Challenge: The Revolt of 1857
limited to its immediate achievements the Revolt of 1857 was not
a pure historical tragedy. Ev en in failure it served a grand
purpose: a source of inspiration for the national liberation
movement which later achieved what the Revolt could not.[/INST] |
12 | India’s S truggle for Independence
CHAPTER 2. CIVIL REBELLIONS AND
TRIBAL UPRISINGS
The Revolt of 1857 was the most dramatic instance of traditional
India’s struggle against foreign rule. But it was no sudden
occurrence. It was the culmination of a century long tradition of
fierce popular resistance to British domination.
The establishment of British power in India was a prolonged
process of piecemeal conquest and consolidation and the
colonialization of the economy and society. This process produced
discontent, resentment and resistance at every stage. This
popular resistance took three broad forms: civil rebellions, tribal
uprisings and peasant movements. We will discuss the first two
in this chapter.
*
The series of civil rebellions, which run like a thread
through the first 100 years of British rule, were often led by
deposed rajas and nawabs or their descendants, uprooted and
impoverished zamindars, landlords and poligars (landed military
magnates in South India), and ex-retainers and officials of the
conquered Indian states. The backbone of the rebellions, their
mass base and striking power came from the rack -rented
peasants, ruined artisans and demobilized soldiers.
These sudden, localized revolts often took place because of
local grievances although for short periods they acquired a broad
sweep, involving armed bands of a few hundreds to several
thousands. The major cause of all these civil rebellions taken as a
whole was the rapid changes the British introduced in the
economy, administration and land revenue system. These
changes led to the disruption of the agrarian society, causing
prolonged and widespread su ffering among its constituents Above
all, the colonial policy of intensifying demands for land revenue | <s>[INST]12 | India’s S truggle for Independence
CHAPTER 2. CIVIL REBELLIONS AND
TRIBAL UPRISINGS
The Revolt of 1857 was the most dramatic instance of traditional
India’s struggle against foreign rule. But it was no sudden
occurrence. It was the culmination of a century long tradition of
fierce popular resistance to British domination.
The establishment of British power in India was a prolonged
process of piecemeal conquest and consolidation and the
colonialization of the economy and society. This process produced
discontent, resentment and resistance at every stage. This
popular resistance took three broad forms: civil rebellions, tribal
uprisings and peasant movements. We will discuss the first two
in this chapter.
*
The series of civil rebellions, which run like a thread
through the first 100 years of British rule, were often led by
deposed rajas and nawabs or their descendants, uprooted and
impoverished zamindars, landlords and poligars (landed military
magnates in South India), and ex-retainers and officials of the
conquered Indian states. The backbone of the rebellions, their
mass base and striking power came from the rack -rented
peasants, ruined artisans and demobilized soldiers.
These sudden, localized revolts often took place because of
local grievances although for short periods they acquired a broad
sweep, involving armed bands of a few hundreds to several
thousands. The major cause of all these civil rebellions taken as a
whole was the rapid changes the British introduced in the
economy, administration and land revenue system. These
changes led to the disruption of the agrarian society, causing
prolonged and widespread su ffering among its constituents Above
all, the colonial policy of intensifying demands for land revenue[/INST] |
13 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
and extracting as large an amount as possible produced a
veritable upheaval in Indian villages. In Bengal, for example, in
less than thirty years land re venue collection was raised to nearly
double the amount collected under the Mughals. The pattern was
repeated in other us of the country as British rule spread. And
aggravating the unhappiness of the farmers was the fact that not
even a part of the enhance d revenue was spent on the
development of agriculture or the welfare of the cultivator.
Thousands of zamindars and poligars lost control over their
land and its revenues either due to the extinction of their rights
by the colonial state or by the forced s ale of their rights over land
because of their inability to meet the exorbitant land revenue
demanded. The proud zamindars and poligars resented this loss
even more when they were displaced by rank outsiders —
government officials and the new men of money — merchants
and moneylenders. Thus they, as also the old chiefs, who had
lost their principalities, had personal scores to settle with the
new rulers.
Peasants and artisans, as we have seen earlier, had their
own reasons to rise up in arms and side with t he traditional elite.
Increasing demands for land revenue were forcing large numbers
of peasants into growing indebtedness or into selling their lands.
The new landlords, bereft of any traditional paternalism towards
their tenants, pushed up rents to ruino us heights and evicted
them in the case of non -payment. The economic decline of the
peasantry was reflected in twelve major and numerous minor
famines from 1770 to 1857.
The new courts and legal system gave a further fillip to the
dispossessors of land an d encouraged the rich to oppress the
poor. Flogging, torture and jailing of the cultivators for arrears of
rent or land revenue or interest on debt were quite common. The
ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of | <s>[INST]13 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
and extracting as large an amount as possible produced a
veritable upheaval in Indian villages. In Bengal, for example, in
less than thirty years land re venue collection was raised to nearly
double the amount collected under the Mughals. The pattern was
repeated in other us of the country as British rule spread. And
aggravating the unhappiness of the farmers was the fact that not
even a part of the enhance d revenue was spent on the
development of agriculture or the welfare of the cultivator.
Thousands of zamindars and poligars lost control over their
land and its revenues either due to the extinction of their rights
by the colonial state or by the forced s ale of their rights over land
because of their inability to meet the exorbitant land revenue
demanded. The proud zamindars and poligars resented this loss
even more when they were displaced by rank outsiders —
government officials and the new men of money — merchants
and moneylenders. Thus they, as also the old chiefs, who had
lost their principalities, had personal scores to settle with the
new rulers.
Peasants and artisans, as we have seen earlier, had their
own reasons to rise up in arms and side with t he traditional elite.
Increasing demands for land revenue were forcing large numbers
of peasants into growing indebtedness or into selling their lands.
The new landlords, bereft of any traditional paternalism towards
their tenants, pushed up rents to ruino us heights and evicted
them in the case of non -payment. The economic decline of the
peasantry was reflected in twelve major and numerous minor
famines from 1770 to 1857.
The new courts and legal system gave a further fillip to the
dispossessors of land an d encouraged the rich to oppress the
poor. Flogging, torture and jailing of the cultivators for arrears of
rent or land revenue or interest on debt were quite common. The
ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of[/INST] |
ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of
corruption at the lower level s of the police, judiciary and general
administration. The petty officials enriched themselves freely at
the cost of the poor. The police looted, oppressed and tortured
the common people at will. William Edwards, a British official,
wrote in 1859 that the police were ‘a scourge to the people’ and | <s>[INST]ordinary people were also hard hit by the prevalence of
corruption at the lower level s of the police, judiciary and general
administration. The petty officials enriched themselves freely at
the cost of the poor. The police looted, oppressed and tortured
the common people at will. William Edwards, a British official,
wrote in 1859 that the police were ‘a scourge to the people’ and[/INST] |
14 | India’s S truggle for Independence
that ‘their oppression and exactions form one of the chief
grounds of dissatisfaction with our government.’
The ruin of Indian handicraft industries, as a result of the
imposition of free trade in India and levy o f discriminatory tariffs
against Indian goods in Britain, pauperized millions of artisans.
The misery of the artisans was further compounded by the
disappearance of their traditional patrons and buyers, the
princes, chieftains, and zamindars.
The scholarl y and priestly classes were also active in
inciting hatred and rebellion against foreign rule. The traditional
rulers and ruling elite had financially supported scholars,
religious preachers, priests, pandits and maulvis and men of arts
and literature. Wit h the coming of the British and the ruin of the
traditional landed and bureaucratic elite, this patronage came to
an end, and all those who had depended on it were impoverished.
Another major cause of the rebellions was the very foreign
character of Briti sh rule. Like any other people, the Indian people
too felt humiliated at being under a foreigner’s heel. This feeling
of hurt pride inspired efforts to expel the foreigner from their
lands.
The civil rebellions began as British rule was established in
Bengal and Bihar, arid they occurred in area after area as it was
incorporated into colonial rule. There was hardly a year without
armed opposition or a decade without a major armed rebellion in
one part of the country or the other. From 1763 to 1856, there
were more than forty major rebellions apart from hundreds of
minor ones.
Displaced peasants and demobilized soldiers of Bengal led
by religious monks and dispossessed zamindars were the first to
rise up in the Sanyasi rebellion, made famous by Bankim
Chandr a Chatterjee in his novel Anand Math, that lasted from
1763 to 1800. It was followed by the Chuar uprising which
covered five districts of Bengal and Bihar from 1766 to 1772 and | <s>[INST]14 | India’s S truggle for Independence
that ‘their oppression and exactions form one of the chief
grounds of dissatisfaction with our government.’
The ruin of Indian handicraft industries, as a result of the
imposition of free trade in India and levy o f discriminatory tariffs
against Indian goods in Britain, pauperized millions of artisans.
The misery of the artisans was further compounded by the
disappearance of their traditional patrons and buyers, the
princes, chieftains, and zamindars.
The scholarl y and priestly classes were also active in
inciting hatred and rebellion against foreign rule. The traditional
rulers and ruling elite had financially supported scholars,
religious preachers, priests, pandits and maulvis and men of arts
and literature. Wit h the coming of the British and the ruin of the
traditional landed and bureaucratic elite, this patronage came to
an end, and all those who had depended on it were impoverished.
Another major cause of the rebellions was the very foreign
character of Briti sh rule. Like any other people, the Indian people
too felt humiliated at being under a foreigner’s heel. This feeling
of hurt pride inspired efforts to expel the foreigner from their
lands.
The civil rebellions began as British rule was established in
Bengal and Bihar, arid they occurred in area after area as it was
incorporated into colonial rule. There was hardly a year without
armed opposition or a decade without a major armed rebellion in
one part of the country or the other. From 1763 to 1856, there
were more than forty major rebellions apart from hundreds of
minor ones.
Displaced peasants and demobilized soldiers of Bengal led
by religious monks and dispossessed zamindars were the first to
rise up in the Sanyasi rebellion, made famous by Bankim
Chandr a Chatterjee in his novel Anand Math, that lasted from
1763 to 1800. It was followed by the Chuar uprising which
covered five districts of Bengal and Bihar from 1766 to 1772 and[/INST] |
then, again, from 1795 to 1816. Other major rebellions in
Eastern India were t hose of Rangpur and Dinajpur, 1783;
Bishnupur and Birbhum, 1799; Orissa zamindars, 1804 -17; and
Sambalpur, 1827 -40. | <s>[INST]then, again, from 1795 to 1816. Other major rebellions in
Eastern India were t hose of Rangpur and Dinajpur, 1783;
Bishnupur and Birbhum, 1799; Orissa zamindars, 1804 -17; and
Sambalpur, 1827 -40.[/INST] |
15 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
In South India, the Raja of Vizianagram revolted in 1794,
the poligars of Tamil Nadu during the 1790’s, of Malabar and
coastal Andhra durin g the first decade of the 19th century, of
Parlekamedi during 1813 - 14. Dewan Velu Thampi of Travancore
organized a heroic revolt in 1805. The Mysore peasants too
revolted in 1830 -31. There were major uprisings in
Visakhapatnam from 1830 -34, Ganjam in 1835 and Ku rnool in
1846 -47.
In Western India, the chiefs of Saurashtra rebelled
repeatedly from 1816 to 1832. The Kolis of Gujarat did the same
during 1824 -28, 1839 and 1849. Maharashtra was in a perpetual
state of revolt after the final defeat of the Peshwa . Prominent were
the Bhil uprisings, 1818 -31; the Kittur uprising, led by Chinnava,
1824; the Satara uprising, 1841; and the revolt of the Gadkaris.
1844.
Northern India was no less turbulent. The present states of
Western U.P. and Haryana rose up in arms in 1824. Other major
rebellions were those of Bilaspur, 1805; the taluqdars of Aligarh,
18 14 -17; the Bundelas of Jabalpur, 1842; and Khandesh, 1852.
The second Punjab War in 1848 - 49 was also in the nature of a
popular revolt by the people and the army.
These almost continuous rebellions were massive in their
totality, but were wholly local in their spread and isolated from
each other. They were the result of local causes and grievances,
and were also localized in their effects. They often bore the same
character not because they represented national or common
efforts but because they represented common conditions though
separated in time and space.
Socially, economically and politically, the semi -feudal
leaders of these rebellions were backward looking and traditional
in outlook. They still lived in the old world, blissfully unaware
and oblivious of the modern world which had knocked down the
defences of their society. Their resistance represented no societal
alternative. It was centuries -old in form and ideological and | <s>[INST]15 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
In South India, the Raja of Vizianagram revolted in 1794,
the poligars of Tamil Nadu during the 1790’s, of Malabar and
coastal Andhra durin g the first decade of the 19th century, of
Parlekamedi during 1813 - 14. Dewan Velu Thampi of Travancore
organized a heroic revolt in 1805. The Mysore peasants too
revolted in 1830 -31. There were major uprisings in
Visakhapatnam from 1830 -34, Ganjam in 1835 and Ku rnool in
1846 -47.
In Western India, the chiefs of Saurashtra rebelled
repeatedly from 1816 to 1832. The Kolis of Gujarat did the same
during 1824 -28, 1839 and 1849. Maharashtra was in a perpetual
state of revolt after the final defeat of the Peshwa . Prominent were
the Bhil uprisings, 1818 -31; the Kittur uprising, led by Chinnava,
1824; the Satara uprising, 1841; and the revolt of the Gadkaris.
1844.
Northern India was no less turbulent. The present states of
Western U.P. and Haryana rose up in arms in 1824. Other major
rebellions were those of Bilaspur, 1805; the taluqdars of Aligarh,
18 14 -17; the Bundelas of Jabalpur, 1842; and Khandesh, 1852.
The second Punjab War in 1848 - 49 was also in the nature of a
popular revolt by the people and the army.
These almost continuous rebellions were massive in their
totality, but were wholly local in their spread and isolated from
each other. They were the result of local causes and grievances,
and were also localized in their effects. They often bore the same
character not because they represented national or common
efforts but because they represented common conditions though
separated in time and space.
Socially, economically and politically, the semi -feudal
leaders of these rebellions were backward looking and traditional
in outlook. They still lived in the old world, blissfully unaware
and oblivious of the modern world which had knocked down the
defences of their society. Their resistance represented no societal
alternative. It was centuries -old in form and ideological and[/INST] |
cultural content. Its basic objective was to restore earlier forms of
rule and social relations. Such backward looking and scattered,
sporadic and disunited uprisings were incapable of fending off or | <s>[INST]cultural content. Its basic objective was to restore earlier forms of
rule and social relations. Such backward looking and scattered,
sporadic and disunited uprisings were incapable of fending off or[/INST] |
16 | India’s S truggle for Independence
overthrowing foreign rule. The British succeeded in pacifying the
rebel areas one by one. They also gave concessions to the less
fiery rebel chiefs and zamindars in the form of reinstatement, the
restoration of their estates and reduction in revenue assessments
so long as they agreed to live pe acefully under alien authority.
The more recalcitrant ones were physically wiped out. Velu
Thampi was, for example, publicly hanged even after he was
dead.
The suppression of the civil rebellions was a major reason
why the Revolt of 1857 did not spread to South India and most of
Eastern and Western India. The historical significance of these
civil uprisings lies in that they established strong and valuable
local traditions of resistance to British rule. The Indian people
were to draw inspiration from these traditions in the later
nationalist struggle for freedom.
The tribal people, spread over a large part of India,
organized hundreds of militant outbreaks and insurrections
during the 19th century. These uprisings were marked by
immense courage and sacrifi ce on their part and brutal
suppression and veritable butchery on the part of the rulers. The
tribals had cause to be upset for a variety of reasons. The colonial
administration ended their relative isolation and brought them
fully within the ambit of colo nialism. It recognized the tribal
chiefs as zamindars and introduced a new system of land
revenue and taxation of tribal products. It encouraged the influx
of Christian missionaries into the tribal areas. Above all, it
introduced a large number of moneylen ders, traders arid revenue
farmers as middlemen among the tribals. These middlemen were
the chief instruments for bringing the tribal people within the
vortex of the colonial economy and exploitation. The middlemen
were outsiders who increasingly took poss ession of tribal lands
and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal | <s>[INST]16 | India’s S truggle for Independence
overthrowing foreign rule. The British succeeded in pacifying the
rebel areas one by one. They also gave concessions to the less
fiery rebel chiefs and zamindars in the form of reinstatement, the
restoration of their estates and reduction in revenue assessments
so long as they agreed to live pe acefully under alien authority.
The more recalcitrant ones were physically wiped out. Velu
Thampi was, for example, publicly hanged even after he was
dead.
The suppression of the civil rebellions was a major reason
why the Revolt of 1857 did not spread to South India and most of
Eastern and Western India. The historical significance of these
civil uprisings lies in that they established strong and valuable
local traditions of resistance to British rule. The Indian people
were to draw inspiration from these traditions in the later
nationalist struggle for freedom.
The tribal people, spread over a large part of India,
organized hundreds of militant outbreaks and insurrections
during the 19th century. These uprisings were marked by
immense courage and sacrifi ce on their part and brutal
suppression and veritable butchery on the part of the rulers. The
tribals had cause to be upset for a variety of reasons. The colonial
administration ended their relative isolation and brought them
fully within the ambit of colo nialism. It recognized the tribal
chiefs as zamindars and introduced a new system of land
revenue and taxation of tribal products. It encouraged the influx
of Christian missionaries into the tribal areas. Above all, it
introduced a large number of moneylen ders, traders arid revenue
farmers as middlemen among the tribals. These middlemen were
the chief instruments for bringing the tribal people within the
vortex of the colonial economy and exploitation. The middlemen
were outsiders who increasingly took poss ession of tribal lands
and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal[/INST] |
and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal
people increasingly lost their lands and were redu ced to the
position of agricultural labourers, share -croppers and rack -
rented tenants on the land they had earlier broug ht under
cultivation and held on a communal basis.
Colonialism also transformed their relationship with the
forest. They had depended on the forest for food, fuel and cattle -
feed. They practiced shifting cultivation (jhum, podu, etc.), taking | <s>[INST]and ensnared the tribals in a web of debt. hi time, the tribal
people increasingly lost their lands and were redu ced to the
position of agricultural labourers, share -croppers and rack -
rented tenants on the land they had earlier broug ht under
cultivation and held on a communal basis.
Colonialism also transformed their relationship with the
forest. They had depended on the forest for food, fuel and cattle -
feed. They practiced shifting cultivation (jhum, podu, etc.), taking[/INST] |
17 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
recourse to fresh forest lands when their existing lands showed
signs of exhaustion. The colonial government changed all this. It
usurped the forest lands and placed restrictions on access to
forest products, forest lands and village common lands. It refused
to let cu ltivation shift to new areas.
Oppression and extortion by policemen and other petty
officials further aggravated distress among the tribals. The
revenue farmers and government agents also intensified and
expanded the system of begar — making the tribals p erform
unpaid labour.
All this differed in intensity from region to region, but the
complete disruption of the old agrarian order of the tribal
communities provided the common factor for all the tribal
uprisings. These uprisings were broad -based, involvin g
thousands of tribals, often the entire population of a region.
The colonial intrusion and the triumvirate of trader,
moneylender and revenue farmer in sum disrupted the tribal
identity to a lesser or greater degree. In fact, ethnic ties were a
basic fea ture of the tribal rebellions. The rebels saw themselves
not as a discreet class but as having a tribal identity.
At this level the solidarity shown was of a very high order.
Fellow tribals were never attacked unless they had collaborated
with the enemy.
At the same time, not all outsiders were attacked as
enemies. Often there was no violence against the non -tribal poor,
who worked in tribal villages in supportive economic roles, or
who had social relations with the tribals such as telis, gwalas,
lohars, carpenters, potters, weavers, washermen, barbers,
drummers, and bonded labourers and domestic servants of the
outsiders. They were not only spared, but were seen as allies. In
many cases, the rural poor formed a part of the rebellious tribal
bands.
The reb ellions normally began at the point where the tribals
felt so oppressed that they felt they had no alternative but to | <s>[INST]17 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
recourse to fresh forest lands when their existing lands showed
signs of exhaustion. The colonial government changed all this. It
usurped the forest lands and placed restrictions on access to
forest products, forest lands and village common lands. It refused
to let cu ltivation shift to new areas.
Oppression and extortion by policemen and other petty
officials further aggravated distress among the tribals. The
revenue farmers and government agents also intensified and
expanded the system of begar — making the tribals p erform
unpaid labour.
All this differed in intensity from region to region, but the
complete disruption of the old agrarian order of the tribal
communities provided the common factor for all the tribal
uprisings. These uprisings were broad -based, involvin g
thousands of tribals, often the entire population of a region.
The colonial intrusion and the triumvirate of trader,
moneylender and revenue farmer in sum disrupted the tribal
identity to a lesser or greater degree. In fact, ethnic ties were a
basic fea ture of the tribal rebellions. The rebels saw themselves
not as a discreet class but as having a tribal identity.
At this level the solidarity shown was of a very high order.
Fellow tribals were never attacked unless they had collaborated
with the enemy.
At the same time, not all outsiders were attacked as
enemies. Often there was no violence against the non -tribal poor,
who worked in tribal villages in supportive economic roles, or
who had social relations with the tribals such as telis, gwalas,
lohars, carpenters, potters, weavers, washermen, barbers,
drummers, and bonded labourers and domestic servants of the
outsiders. They were not only spared, but were seen as allies. In
many cases, the rural poor formed a part of the rebellious tribal
bands.
The reb ellions normally began at the point where the tribals
felt so oppressed that they felt they had no alternative but to[/INST] |
fight. This often took the form of spontaneous attacks on
outsiders, looting their property and expelling them from their | <s>[INST]fight. This often took the form of spontaneous attacks on
outsiders, looting their property and expelling them from their[/INST] |
18 | India’s S truggle for Independence
villages. This l ed to clashes with the colonial authorities. When
this happened, the tribals began to move towards armed
resistance and elementary organization.
Often, religious and charismatic leaders — messiahs
emerged at this stage and promised divine intervention and an
end to their suffering at the hands of the outsiders, and asked
their fellow tribals to rise and rebel against foreign authority.
Most of these leaders claimed to derive their authority from God.
They also often claimed that they possessed magical powe rs, for
example, the power to make the enemies’ bullets ineffective.
Filled with hope and confidence, the tribal masses tended to
follow these leaders to the very end.
The warfare between the tribal rebels and the British armed
forces was totally unequal. On one side were drilled regiments
armed with the latest weapons and on the other were men and
women fighting in roving bands armed with primitive weapons
such as stones, axes, spears and bows and arrows, believing in
the magical powers of their commander s. The tribals died in
lakhs in this unequal warfare.
*
Among the numerous tribal revolts, the Santhal hool or
uprising was the most massive. The Santhals, who live in the
area between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal, known as Daman -i-koh,
rose in revolt; made a d etermined attempt to expel the outsiders
— the dikus — and proclaimed the complete ‘annihilation’ of the
alien regime. The social conditions which drove them
to insurrection were described by a contemporary in the
Calcutta Review as follows: ‘Zamindars, the police, the revenue
and court alas have exercised a combined system of extortions,
oppressive exactions, forcible dispossession of property, abuse
and personal violence and a variety of petty tyrannies upon the
timid and yielding Santhals. Usurious inte rest on loans of money
ranging from 50 to 500 per cent; false measures at the haul and
the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by | <s>[INST]18 | India’s S truggle for Independence
villages. This l ed to clashes with the colonial authorities. When
this happened, the tribals began to move towards armed
resistance and elementary organization.
Often, religious and charismatic leaders — messiahs
emerged at this stage and promised divine intervention and an
end to their suffering at the hands of the outsiders, and asked
their fellow tribals to rise and rebel against foreign authority.
Most of these leaders claimed to derive their authority from God.
They also often claimed that they possessed magical powe rs, for
example, the power to make the enemies’ bullets ineffective.
Filled with hope and confidence, the tribal masses tended to
follow these leaders to the very end.
The warfare between the tribal rebels and the British armed
forces was totally unequal. On one side were drilled regiments
armed with the latest weapons and on the other were men and
women fighting in roving bands armed with primitive weapons
such as stones, axes, spears and bows and arrows, believing in
the magical powers of their commander s. The tribals died in
lakhs in this unequal warfare.
*
Among the numerous tribal revolts, the Santhal hool or
uprising was the most massive. The Santhals, who live in the
area between Bhagalpur and Rajmahal, known as Daman -i-koh,
rose in revolt; made a d etermined attempt to expel the outsiders
— the dikus — and proclaimed the complete ‘annihilation’ of the
alien regime. The social conditions which drove them
to insurrection were described by a contemporary in the
Calcutta Review as follows: ‘Zamindars, the police, the revenue
and court alas have exercised a combined system of extortions,
oppressive exactions, forcible dispossession of property, abuse
and personal violence and a variety of petty tyrannies upon the
timid and yielding Santhals. Usurious inte rest on loans of money
ranging from 50 to 500 per cent; false measures at the haul and
the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by[/INST] |
the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by
means of their untethered cattle, tattoos, ponies and even
elephants, on the growing crops of the poorer race ; and, such like
illegalities have been prevalent.’ | <s>[INST]the market; wilful and uncharitable trespass by the rich by
means of their untethered cattle, tattoos, ponies and even
elephants, on the growing crops of the poorer race ; and, such like
illegalities have been prevalent.’[/INST] |
19 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
The Santhals considered the dikus and government servants
morally corrupt being given to beggary, stealing, lying and
drunkenness.
By 1854, the tribal heads, the majhis and parganites, had
begun to meet and discuss the possibility of revolting. Stray
cases of the robbing of zamindars and moneylenders began to
occur. The tribal leaders called an assembly of nearly 6000
Santhals, representing 400 villages, at Bhaganidihi on 30 June
1855. It was decided to r aise the banner of revolt, get rid of the
outsiders and their colonial masters once and for all, the usher in
Salyug, ‘The Reign of Truth,’ and ‘True Justice.’
The Santhals believed that their actions had the blessings of
God. Sido and Kanhu, the principa l rebel leaders, claimed that
Thakur (God) had communicated with them and told them to
take up arms and fight for independence. Sido told the
authorities in a proclamation: ‘The Thacoor has ordered me
saying that the country is not Sahibs . . . The Thacoor himself
will fight. Therefore, you Sahibs and Soldiers (will) fight the
Thacoor himself.’
The leaders mobilized the Santhal men and women by
organizing huge processions through the villages accompanied by
drummers and other musicians. The leaders rode at the “d on
horses and elephants and in palkis. Soon nearly 60,000 S anthals
had been mobilized. Forming bands of 1,500 to 2,000, but
rallying in many thousands at the call of drums on particular
occasions, they attacked the mahajans and zamindars and their
houses, police stations, railway construction sites, the dak (post)
carriers — in fact all the symbols of dila4 exploitation and
colonial power.
The Santhal insurrection was helped by a large number of
non-tribal and poor dikus. Gwalas (milkmen) and others helped
the rebels with provisions and services; lohars (blacksmiths)
accompanied the rebel bands, keeping their weapons in good
shape.
Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it | <s>[INST]19 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
The Santhals considered the dikus and government servants
morally corrupt being given to beggary, stealing, lying and
drunkenness.
By 1854, the tribal heads, the majhis and parganites, had
begun to meet and discuss the possibility of revolting. Stray
cases of the robbing of zamindars and moneylenders began to
occur. The tribal leaders called an assembly of nearly 6000
Santhals, representing 400 villages, at Bhaganidihi on 30 June
1855. It was decided to r aise the banner of revolt, get rid of the
outsiders and their colonial masters once and for all, the usher in
Salyug, ‘The Reign of Truth,’ and ‘True Justice.’
The Santhals believed that their actions had the blessings of
God. Sido and Kanhu, the principa l rebel leaders, claimed that
Thakur (God) had communicated with them and told them to
take up arms and fight for independence. Sido told the
authorities in a proclamation: ‘The Thacoor has ordered me
saying that the country is not Sahibs . . . The Thacoor himself
will fight. Therefore, you Sahibs and Soldiers (will) fight the
Thacoor himself.’
The leaders mobilized the Santhal men and women by
organizing huge processions through the villages accompanied by
drummers and other musicians. The leaders rode at the “d on
horses and elephants and in palkis. Soon nearly 60,000 S anthals
had been mobilized. Forming bands of 1,500 to 2,000, but
rallying in many thousands at the call of drums on particular
occasions, they attacked the mahajans and zamindars and their
houses, police stations, railway construction sites, the dak (post)
carriers — in fact all the symbols of dila4 exploitation and
colonial power.
The Santhal insurrection was helped by a large number of
non-tribal and poor dikus. Gwalas (milkmen) and others helped
the rebels with provisions and services; lohars (blacksmiths)
accompanied the rebel bands, keeping their weapons in good
shape.
Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it[/INST] |
Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it
organized a major military campaign against the rebels. It
mobilized tens of regiments under the command of a major - | <s>[INST]Once the Government realized the scale of the rebellion, it
organized a major military campaign against the rebels. It
mobilized tens of regiments under the command of a major -[/INST] |
20 | India’s S truggle for Independence
general, declared Martial Law in the affected areas and offered
rewards of upto Rs. 10,000 for the capture of various leaders.
The rebellion was crushed ruthlessly. More than 15,000
Santhals were ki lled while tens of villages were destroyed . Sido
was betrayed and captured and killed in August 1855 while
Kanhu was arrested by accident at the tail -end of the rebellion in
February 1866. And ‘the Rajmahal Hills were drenched with the
blood of the fightin g Santhal peasantry.’ One typical instance of
the heroism of Santhal rebels has been narrated by L.S.S.
O’Malley: ‘They showed the most reckless courage never knowing
when they were beaten and refusing to surrender. On one
occasion, forty - five Santhals to ok refuge in a mud hut which
they held against the Sepoy’s . Volley after volley was fired into
it… Each time the Santhals replied with a discharge of arrows. At
last, when their fire ceased, the Sepoys entered the hut and
found only one old man was left al ive. A Sepoy called on him to
surrender, whereupon the old man rushed upon him and cut him
down with his battle axe.”
*
I shall describe briefly three other major tribal rebellions.
The Kols of Chhotanagpur rebelled from 1820 to 1837.
Thousands of them were massacred before British authority
could be re -imposed. The hill tribesmen of Rampa in coastal
Andhra revolted in March 1879 against the depredations of the
government -supported mansabdar and the new restrictive forest
regulations. The authorities had to mobilize regiments of infantry,
a squadron of cavalry and two companies of sappers and miners
before the rebels, numbering several thousands, could be
defeated by the end of 1880.
The rebellion (ulgulan) of the Munda tribesmen, led by Birsa
Munda, occurr ed during 1899 -19. For over thirty years the
Munda sardars had been struggling against the destruction of
their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of | <s>[INST]20 | India’s S truggle for Independence
general, declared Martial Law in the affected areas and offered
rewards of upto Rs. 10,000 for the capture of various leaders.
The rebellion was crushed ruthlessly. More than 15,000
Santhals were ki lled while tens of villages were destroyed . Sido
was betrayed and captured and killed in August 1855 while
Kanhu was arrested by accident at the tail -end of the rebellion in
February 1866. And ‘the Rajmahal Hills were drenched with the
blood of the fightin g Santhal peasantry.’ One typical instance of
the heroism of Santhal rebels has been narrated by L.S.S.
O’Malley: ‘They showed the most reckless courage never knowing
when they were beaten and refusing to surrender. On one
occasion, forty - five Santhals to ok refuge in a mud hut which
they held against the Sepoy’s . Volley after volley was fired into
it… Each time the Santhals replied with a discharge of arrows. At
last, when their fire ceased, the Sepoys entered the hut and
found only one old man was left al ive. A Sepoy called on him to
surrender, whereupon the old man rushed upon him and cut him
down with his battle axe.”
*
I shall describe briefly three other major tribal rebellions.
The Kols of Chhotanagpur rebelled from 1820 to 1837.
Thousands of them were massacred before British authority
could be re -imposed. The hill tribesmen of Rampa in coastal
Andhra revolted in March 1879 against the depredations of the
government -supported mansabdar and the new restrictive forest
regulations. The authorities had to mobilize regiments of infantry,
a squadron of cavalry and two companies of sappers and miners
before the rebels, numbering several thousands, could be
defeated by the end of 1880.
The rebellion (ulgulan) of the Munda tribesmen, led by Birsa
Munda, occurr ed during 1899 -19. For over thirty years the
Munda sardars had been struggling against the destruction of
their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of[/INST] |
their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of
jagirdar, thikadar (revenue farmers) and merchant moneylenders.
Birsa, born in a poor share -cropper household in 1874, had
a vision of God in 1895. He declared himself to be a divine
messenger, possessing miraculous healing powers. Thousands | <s>[INST]their system of common land holdings by the intrusion of
jagirdar, thikadar (revenue farmers) and merchant moneylenders.
Birsa, born in a poor share -cropper household in 1874, had
a vision of God in 1895. He declared himself to be a divine
messenger, possessing miraculous healing powers. Thousands[/INST] |
21 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
gathered around him seeing in him a Messiah with a new
religious message. Under the influence of the religi ous movement
soon acquired an agrarian and political Birsa began to move from
village to village, organizing rallies and m obilizing his followers on
religious and political grounds. On Christmas Eve, 1899, Birsa
proclaimed a rebellion to establish Munda ru le in the land and
encouraged ‘the killing of thikadars and jagirdars and Rajas and
Hakims (rulers) and Christians.’ Saiyug would be established in
place of the present -day Kalyug. He declared that ‘there was
going to be a fight with the dikus, the ground would be as red as
the red flag with their blood.’ The non-tribal poor were not to be
attacked.
To bring about liberation, Birsa gathered a force of 6,000
Mundas armed with swords, spears, battle -axes, and bows and
arrows. He w, however, captured in the beginning of February
1900 and he died in jail in June. The rebellion had failed. But
Birsa entered the realms of legend. | <s>[INST]21 |Civil Rebellions and Tribal Uprisings
gathered around him seeing in him a Messiah with a new
religious message. Under the influence of the religi ous movement
soon acquired an agrarian and political Birsa began to move from
village to village, organizing rallies and m obilizing his followers on
religious and political grounds. On Christmas Eve, 1899, Birsa
proclaimed a rebellion to establish Munda ru le in the land and
encouraged ‘the killing of thikadars and jagirdars and Rajas and
Hakims (rulers) and Christians.’ Saiyug would be established in
place of the present -day Kalyug. He declared that ‘there was
going to be a fight with the dikus, the ground would be as red as
the red flag with their blood.’ The non-tribal poor were not to be
attacked.
To bring about liberation, Birsa gathered a force of 6,000
Mundas armed with swords, spears, battle -axes, and bows and
arrows. He w, however, captured in the beginning of February
1900 and he died in jail in June. The rebellion had failed. But
Birsa entered the realms of legend.[/INST] |
22 | India’s S truggle for Independence
CHAPTER 3. PEASANT MOVEMENTS
AND UPRISINGS
AFTER 1857
It is worth taking a look at the effects of colonial exp loitation
of the Indian peasants. Colonial economic policies, the new land
revenue system, the colonial administrative and judicial systems,
and the ruin of handi craft leading to the over -crowding of land,
transformed the agrarian structure and impoverishe d the
peasan try. In the vast zamindari areas, the peasants were left to
the tender mercies of the zamindars who rack -rented them and
compelled them to pay the illegal dues and perform begar. In
Ryotwari areas, the Government itself levied heavy land revenu e.
This forced the peasants to borrow money from the
moneylenders. Gradually, over large areas, the actual cultivators
were reduced to the status of tenants -at-will, share -croppers and
landless labourers, while their lands, crops and cattle passed into
the hands of landlords, trader -moneylenders and rich peasants.
When the peasants could take it no longer, they resisted
against the oppression and exploitation; and, they found whether
their target was the indigenous exploiter or the colonial
administration, that their real enemy, after the barriers were
down, was the colonial state.
One form of elemental protest, especially when individuals
and small groups found that collective action was not possible
though their social condition was becoming intolerable, was to
take to crime. Many dispossessed peasants took to robbery,
dacoity and what has been called social banditry, preferring these
to starvation and social degradation.
*
The most militant and widespread of the peasant
movements was the Indigo Revolt o f 1859 -60. The indigo planters,
nearly all Europeans, compelled the tenants to grow indigo which
they processed in factories set up in rural (mofussil) areas. From | <s>[INST]22 | India’s S truggle for Independence
CHAPTER 3. PEASANT MOVEMENTS
AND UPRISINGS
AFTER 1857
It is worth taking a look at the effects of colonial exp loitation
of the Indian peasants. Colonial economic policies, the new land
revenue system, the colonial administrative and judicial systems,
and the ruin of handi craft leading to the over -crowding of land,
transformed the agrarian structure and impoverishe d the
peasan try. In the vast zamindari areas, the peasants were left to
the tender mercies of the zamindars who rack -rented them and
compelled them to pay the illegal dues and perform begar. In
Ryotwari areas, the Government itself levied heavy land revenu e.
This forced the peasants to borrow money from the
moneylenders. Gradually, over large areas, the actual cultivators
were reduced to the status of tenants -at-will, share -croppers and
landless labourers, while their lands, crops and cattle passed into
the hands of landlords, trader -moneylenders and rich peasants.
When the peasants could take it no longer, they resisted
against the oppression and exploitation; and, they found whether
their target was the indigenous exploiter or the colonial
administration, that their real enemy, after the barriers were
down, was the colonial state.
One form of elemental protest, especially when individuals
and small groups found that collective action was not possible
though their social condition was becoming intolerable, was to
take to crime. Many dispossessed peasants took to robbery,
dacoity and what has been called social banditry, preferring these
to starvation and social degradation.
*
The most militant and widespread of the peasant
movements was the Indigo Revolt o f 1859 -60. The indigo planters,
nearly all Europeans, compelled the tenants to grow indigo which
they processed in factories set up in rural (mofussil) areas. From[/INST] |
23 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
the beginning, indigo was grown under an extremely oppressive
system which involved great lo ss to the cultivators. The planters
forced the peasants to take a meager amount as advance and
enter into fraudulent contracts. The price paid for the indigo
plants was far below the market price. The comment of the
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, J.B. Gran t, was that ‘the root of
the whole question is the struggle to make the raiyats grow
indigo plant, witho ut paying them the price of it.’ The peasant
was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whether or not
he wanted to devote his land and labour to more paying crops
like rice. At the time of delivery, he was cheated even of the due
low price. He also had to pay regular bribes to the planter’s
officials. He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in
a position to repay it, but even if he co uld he was not allowed to
do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go
on cultivating indigo.
Since the enforcement of forced and fraudulent contracts
through the courts was a difficult and prolonged process, the
planters resorted to a reign of terror to coerce the peasants.
Kidnapping, illegal confinement in factory godowns, flogging,
attacks on women and children, carrying off cattle, looting,
burning and demolition of houses and destruction of crops and
fruit trees were some of the me thods used by the planters. They
hired or maintained bands of lathya ls (armed retainers) for the
purpose.
In practice, the planters were also above the law. With a few
exceptions, the magistrates, mostly European, favoured the
planters with whom they dine d and hunted regularly. Those few
who tried to be fair were soon transferred. Twenty -nine planters
and a solitary Indian zamindar were appointed as Honorary
Magistrates in 1857, which gave birth to the popular saying ‘je
rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer). | <s>[INST]23 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
the beginning, indigo was grown under an extremely oppressive
system which involved great lo ss to the cultivators. The planters
forced the peasants to take a meager amount as advance and
enter into fraudulent contracts. The price paid for the indigo
plants was far below the market price. The comment of the
Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, J.B. Gran t, was that ‘the root of
the whole question is the struggle to make the raiyats grow
indigo plant, witho ut paying them the price of it.’ The peasant
was forced to grow indigo on the best land he had whether or not
he wanted to devote his land and labour to more paying crops
like rice. At the time of delivery, he was cheated even of the due
low price. He also had to pay regular bribes to the planter’s
officials. He was forced to accept an advance. Often he was not in
a position to repay it, but even if he co uld he was not allowed to
do so. The advance was used by the planters to compel him to go
on cultivating indigo.
Since the enforcement of forced and fraudulent contracts
through the courts was a difficult and prolonged process, the
planters resorted to a reign of terror to coerce the peasants.
Kidnapping, illegal confinement in factory godowns, flogging,
attacks on women and children, carrying off cattle, looting,
burning and demolition of houses and destruction of crops and
fruit trees were some of the me thods used by the planters. They
hired or maintained bands of lathya ls (armed retainers) for the
purpose.
In practice, the planters were also above the law. With a few
exceptions, the magistrates, mostly European, favoured the
planters with whom they dine d and hunted regularly. Those few
who tried to be fair were soon transferred. Twenty -nine planters
and a solitary Indian zamindar were appointed as Honorary
Magistrates in 1857, which gave birth to the popular saying ‘je
rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer).[/INST] |
rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer).
The discontent of indigo growers in Bengal boiled over in the
autumn of 1859 when their case seemed to get Government
support. Misreading an official letter and exceeding his authority,
Hem Chandra Kar, Deputy Magistrate of Kalaroa, published on
17 August a proclamation to policemen that ‘in case of disputes
relating to Indigo Ryots, they (ryots) shall retain possession of | <s>[INST]rakhak se bhakak’ (Our protector is also our devourer).
The discontent of indigo growers in Bengal boiled over in the
autumn of 1859 when their case seemed to get Government
support. Misreading an official letter and exceeding his authority,
Hem Chandra Kar, Deputy Magistrate of Kalaroa, published on
17 August a proclamation to policemen that ‘in case of disputes
relating to Indigo Ryots, they (ryots) shall retain possession of[/INST] |
24 | India’s S truggle for Independence
their own lands, and shall sow on them what crops they please,
and the Police will be careful that no Indigo Plant er nor anyone
else be able to interface in the matter.
The news of Kar’s proclamation spre ad all over Bengal, and
peasant felt that the time for overthrowing the hated system had
come. Initially, the peasants made an attempt to get redressal
through peacef ul means. They sent numerous petitions to the
authorities and organized peaceful demonstrations. Their anger
exploded in September 1859 when they asserted their right not to
grow indigo under duress and resisted the physical pressure of
the planters and th eir lathiyals backed by the police and the
courts.
The beginning was made by the ryots of Govindpur village in
Nadia district when, under the leadership of Digambar Biswas
and Bishnu Biswas, ex -employees of a planter, they gave up
indigo cultivation. And when, on 13 September, the planter sent
a band of 100 lathya ls to attack their village, they organized a
counter force armed with lathis and spears and fought back.
The peasant disturbances and indigo strikes spread rapidly
to other areas. The peasants re fused to take advances and enter
into contracts, pledged not to sow indigo, and defended
themselves from the planters’ attacks with whatever weapons
came to hand — spears, slings, lathis, bows and arrows, bricks,
bhel-fruit, and earthen -pots (thrown by wom en).
The indigo strikes and disturbances flared up again in the
spring of 1860 and encompassed all the indigo districts of
Bengal. Factory after factory was attacked by hundreds of
peasants and village after village bravely defended itself. In many
cases, the efforts of the police to intervene and arrest peasant
leaders were met with an attack on policemen and police posts.
The planters then attacked with another weapon, their
zamindari powers. They threatened the rebellious ryots with
eviction or enhance ment of rent. The ryots replied by going on a | <s>[INST]24 | India’s S truggle for Independence
their own lands, and shall sow on them what crops they please,
and the Police will be careful that no Indigo Plant er nor anyone
else be able to interface in the matter.
The news of Kar’s proclamation spre ad all over Bengal, and
peasant felt that the time for overthrowing the hated system had
come. Initially, the peasants made an attempt to get redressal
through peacef ul means. They sent numerous petitions to the
authorities and organized peaceful demonstrations. Their anger
exploded in September 1859 when they asserted their right not to
grow indigo under duress and resisted the physical pressure of
the planters and th eir lathiyals backed by the police and the
courts.
The beginning was made by the ryots of Govindpur village in
Nadia district when, under the leadership of Digambar Biswas
and Bishnu Biswas, ex -employees of a planter, they gave up
indigo cultivation. And when, on 13 September, the planter sent
a band of 100 lathya ls to attack their village, they organized a
counter force armed with lathis and spears and fought back.
The peasant disturbances and indigo strikes spread rapidly
to other areas. The peasants re fused to take advances and enter
into contracts, pledged not to sow indigo, and defended
themselves from the planters’ attacks with whatever weapons
came to hand — spears, slings, lathis, bows and arrows, bricks,
bhel-fruit, and earthen -pots (thrown by wom en).
The indigo strikes and disturbances flared up again in the
spring of 1860 and encompassed all the indigo districts of
Bengal. Factory after factory was attacked by hundreds of
peasants and village after village bravely defended itself. In many
cases, the efforts of the police to intervene and arrest peasant
leaders were met with an attack on policemen and police posts.
The planters then attacked with another weapon, their
zamindari powers. They threatened the rebellious ryots with
eviction or enhance ment of rent. The ryots replied by going on a[/INST] |
rent strike. They refused to pay the enhanced rents; and they
physically resisted attempts to evict them. They also gradually
learnt to use the legal machinery to enforce their rights. They
joined together and raised funds to fight court cases filed against
them, and they initiated legal action on their own against the | <s>[INST]rent strike. They refused to pay the enhanced rents; and they
physically resisted attempts to evict them. They also gradually
learnt to use the legal machinery to enforce their rights. They
joined together and raised funds to fight court cases filed against
them, and they initiated legal action on their own against the[/INST] |
25 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
planters. They also used the weapon of social boycott to force a
planter’s servants to leave him.
Ultimately, the planters could not withstand th e united
resistance of the ryots, and they gradually began to close their
factories. The cultivation of indigo was virtually wiped out from
the districts of Bengal by the end of 1860.
A major reason for the success of the Indigo Revolt was the
tremendous initiative, cooperation, organization and discipline of
the r yots. Another was the complete unity among Hindu and
Muslim peasants. Leadership for the movement was provided by
the more well -off ryots and in some cases by petty zamindars,
moneylenders and ex -employees of the planters.
A significant feature of the Indigo Revolt was the role of the
intelligentsia of Bengal which organized a powerful campaign in
support of the rebellious peasantry. It carried on newspaper
campaigns, organized mass meetings, pre pared memoranda on
peasants’ grievances and supported them in their legal battles.
Outstanding in this respect was the role of Harish Chandra
Mukherji, editor of the Hindoo Patriot. He published regular
reports from his correspondents in the rural areas on planters’
oppression, officials’ partisanship and peasant resistance. He
himself wrote with passion, anger and deep knowledge of the
problem which, he raised to a high political plane. Revealing an
insight into the historical and political significance of the Indigo
Revolt, he wrote in May 1860: Bengal might well be proud of its
peasantry. . Wanting power, wealth, political knowledge and even
leadership, the peasantry of Bengal have brought about a
revolution inferior in magnitude and importance to none th at has
happened in the social history of any other country . . . With the
Government against them, the law against them, the tribunals
against them, the Press against them, they have achieved a
success of which the benefits will reach all orders and the mo st | <s>[INST]25 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
planters. They also used the weapon of social boycott to force a
planter’s servants to leave him.
Ultimately, the planters could not withstand th e united
resistance of the ryots, and they gradually began to close their
factories. The cultivation of indigo was virtually wiped out from
the districts of Bengal by the end of 1860.
A major reason for the success of the Indigo Revolt was the
tremendous initiative, cooperation, organization and discipline of
the r yots. Another was the complete unity among Hindu and
Muslim peasants. Leadership for the movement was provided by
the more well -off ryots and in some cases by petty zamindars,
moneylenders and ex -employees of the planters.
A significant feature of the Indigo Revolt was the role of the
intelligentsia of Bengal which organized a powerful campaign in
support of the rebellious peasantry. It carried on newspaper
campaigns, organized mass meetings, pre pared memoranda on
peasants’ grievances and supported them in their legal battles.
Outstanding in this respect was the role of Harish Chandra
Mukherji, editor of the Hindoo Patriot. He published regular
reports from his correspondents in the rural areas on planters’
oppression, officials’ partisanship and peasant resistance. He
himself wrote with passion, anger and deep knowledge of the
problem which, he raised to a high political plane. Revealing an
insight into the historical and political significance of the Indigo
Revolt, he wrote in May 1860: Bengal might well be proud of its
peasantry. . Wanting power, wealth, political knowledge and even
leadership, the peasantry of Bengal have brought about a
revolution inferior in magnitude and importance to none th at has
happened in the social history of any other country . . . With the
Government against them, the law against them, the tribunals
against them, the Press against them, they have achieved a
success of which the benefits will reach all orders and the mo st[/INST] |
distant generations of our countrymen.’
Din Bandhu Mitra’s play, Neel Darpan, was to gain great
fame for vividly portraying the oppression by the planters.
The intelligentsia’s role in the Indigo Revolt was to have an
abiding impact on the emerging nat ionalist intellectuals. In their | <s>[INST]distant generations of our countrymen.’
Din Bandhu Mitra’s play, Neel Darpan, was to gain great
fame for vividly portraying the oppression by the planters.
The intelligentsia’s role in the Indigo Revolt was to have an
abiding impact on the emerging nat ionalist intellectuals. In their[/INST] |
26 | India’s S truggle for Independence
very political childhood they had given support to a popular
peasant movement against the foreign planters. This was to
establish a tradition with long run implications for the national
movement.
Missionaries were another group which extended active
support to the indigo ryots in their struggle.
The Government’s response to the Revolt was rather
restrained and not as harsh as in the case of civil rebellions a nd
tribal uprisings. It had just undergone the harrowing experien ce
of the Santhal uprising and the Revolt of 1857. It was also able to
see, in time, the changed temper of the peasantry and was
influenced by the support extended to the Revolt by the
intelligentsia and the missionaries. It appointed a commission to
inqui re into the problem of indigo cultivation. Evidence brought
before the Indigo Commission and its final report exposed the
coercion and corruptio0 underlying the entire system of indigo
cultivation. The result was the mitigation of the worst abuses of
the s ystem. The Government issued a notification in November
1860 that ryots could not be compelled to sow indigo and that it
would ensure that all disputes were settled by legal means. But
the planters were already closing down the factories they felt that
they could not make their enterprises pay without the use of
force and fraud.
*
Large parts of East Bengal were engulfed by agrarian unrest
during the 1870s and early 1880s. The unrest was caused by the
efforts of the zamindars to enhance rent beyond legal l imits and
to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights under Act
X of 1859. This they tried to achieve through illegal coercive
methods such as forced eviction and seizure of crops and cattle
as well as by dragging the tenants into costly litigat ion in the
courts.
The peasants were no longer in a mood to tolerate such
oppression. In May 1873, an agrarian league or combination was
formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the | <s>[INST]26 | India’s S truggle for Independence
very political childhood they had given support to a popular
peasant movement against the foreign planters. This was to
establish a tradition with long run implications for the national
movement.
Missionaries were another group which extended active
support to the indigo ryots in their struggle.
The Government’s response to the Revolt was rather
restrained and not as harsh as in the case of civil rebellions a nd
tribal uprisings. It had just undergone the harrowing experien ce
of the Santhal uprising and the Revolt of 1857. It was also able to
see, in time, the changed temper of the peasantry and was
influenced by the support extended to the Revolt by the
intelligentsia and the missionaries. It appointed a commission to
inqui re into the problem of indigo cultivation. Evidence brought
before the Indigo Commission and its final report exposed the
coercion and corruptio0 underlying the entire system of indigo
cultivation. The result was the mitigation of the worst abuses of
the s ystem. The Government issued a notification in November
1860 that ryots could not be compelled to sow indigo and that it
would ensure that all disputes were settled by legal means. But
the planters were already closing down the factories they felt that
they could not make their enterprises pay without the use of
force and fraud.
*
Large parts of East Bengal were engulfed by agrarian unrest
during the 1870s and early 1880s. The unrest was caused by the
efforts of the zamindars to enhance rent beyond legal l imits and
to prevent the tenants from acquiring occupancy rights under Act
X of 1859. This they tried to achieve through illegal coercive
methods such as forced eviction and seizure of crops and cattle
as well as by dragging the tenants into costly litigat ion in the
courts.
The peasants were no longer in a mood to tolerate such
oppression. In May 1873, an agrarian league or combination was
formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the[/INST] |
formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the
demands of the zamindars. The league organized mass meet ings | <s>[INST]formed in Yusufshahi Parganah in Pabna district to resist the
demands of the zamindars. The league organized mass meet ings[/INST] |
27 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
of peasants. Large crowds of peasants would gather and march
through villages frightening the zamindars and appealing to other
peasants to join them. The league organized a rent - strike — the
ryots were to refuse to pay the enhanced rents — and challe nged
the zamindars in the courts. Funds were raised from the ryots to
meet the costs. The struggle gradually spread throughout Pabna
and then to the other districts of East Bengal. Everywhere
agrarian leagues were organized, rents were withheld and
zaminda rs fought in the courts. The main form of struggle was
that of legal resistance. There was very little violence — it only
occurred when the zamindars tried to compel the ryots to submit
to their terms by force. There were only a few cases of looting of
the houses of the zamindars. A few attacks on police stations
took place and the peasants also resisted attempts to execute
court decrees. But such cases were rather rare. Hardly any
zamindar or zamindar‘s agent was killed or seriously injured. In
the course of the movement, the ryots developed a strong
awareness of the law and their legal rights and the ability to
combine and form associations for peaceful agitation.
Though peasant discontent smouldered till 1885, many of
the disputes were settled partially under official pressure and
persuasion and partially out of the zamindar‘s fear that the
united peasantry would drag them into prolonged and costly
litigation. Many peasants were able to acquire occupancy rights
and resist enhanced rents.
The Government r ose to the defence of the zamindars
wherever violence took place. Peasants were then arrested on a
large sale. But it assumed a position of neutrality as far as legal
battles or peaceful agitations were concerned. The Government
also promised to undertake legislation to protect the tenants from
the worst aspects of zamindari oppression, a promise it fulfilled
however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was | <s>[INST]27 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
of peasants. Large crowds of peasants would gather and march
through villages frightening the zamindars and appealing to other
peasants to join them. The league organized a rent - strike — the
ryots were to refuse to pay the enhanced rents — and challe nged
the zamindars in the courts. Funds were raised from the ryots to
meet the costs. The struggle gradually spread throughout Pabna
and then to the other districts of East Bengal. Everywhere
agrarian leagues were organized, rents were withheld and
zaminda rs fought in the courts. The main form of struggle was
that of legal resistance. There was very little violence — it only
occurred when the zamindars tried to compel the ryots to submit
to their terms by force. There were only a few cases of looting of
the houses of the zamindars. A few attacks on police stations
took place and the peasants also resisted attempts to execute
court decrees. But such cases were rather rare. Hardly any
zamindar or zamindar‘s agent was killed or seriously injured. In
the course of the movement, the ryots developed a strong
awareness of the law and their legal rights and the ability to
combine and form associations for peaceful agitation.
Though peasant discontent smouldered till 1885, many of
the disputes were settled partially under official pressure and
persuasion and partially out of the zamindar‘s fear that the
united peasantry would drag them into prolonged and costly
litigation. Many peasants were able to acquire occupancy rights
and resist enhanced rents.
The Government r ose to the defence of the zamindars
wherever violence took place. Peasants were then arrested on a
large sale. But it assumed a position of neutrality as far as legal
battles or peaceful agitations were concerned. The Government
also promised to undertake legislation to protect the tenants from
the worst aspects of zamindari oppression, a promise it fulfilled
however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was[/INST] |
however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was
passed.
What persuaded the zamindars and the colonial regime to
reconcile themselves to t he movement was the fact that its aims
were limited to the redressal of the immediate grievances of the
peasants and the enforcement of the existing legal rights and
norms. It was not aimed at the zamindari system. It also did not | <s>[INST]however imperfectly in 1885 when the Bengal Tenancy Act was
passed.
What persuaded the zamindars and the colonial regime to
reconcile themselves to t he movement was the fact that its aims
were limited to the redressal of the immediate grievances of the
peasants and the enforcement of the existing legal rights and
norms. It was not aimed at the zamindari system. It also did not[/INST] |
28 | India’s S truggle for Independence
have at any stage an anti-colonial political edge. The agrarian
leagues kept within the bounds of law, used the legal machinery
to fight the zamindars, and raised no anti-British demands. The
leaders often argued that they were against zamindars and not
the British. In fact, the l eaders raised the slogan that the
peasants want ‘to be the ryots of Her Majesty the Queen and of
Her only.’ For this reason, official action was based on the
enforcement of the Indian Penal Code and it did not take the form
of armed repression as in the ca se of the Santhal and Munda
uprisings.
Once again the Bengal peasants showed complete Hindu -
Muslim solidarity, even though the majority of the ryots were
Muslim and the majority of zamindars Hindu. There was also no
effort to create peasant solidarity on the grounds of religion or
caste.
In this case, too, a number of young Indian intellectuals
supported the peasants’ cause. These included Bankim Chandra
Chatterjea and R.C. Dutt . Later, in the early I 880s, during the
discussion of the Bengal Tenancy Bill , the Indian Association, led
by Surendranath Banerjee, Anand Mohan Bose and Dwarkanath
Ganguli, campaigned for the rights of tenants, helped form r yot’
unions, and organized huge meetings of upto 20,000 peasants in
the districts in support of the Rent Bil l. The Indian Association
and many of the nationalist newspapers went further than the
Bill. They asked for permanent fixation of the tenant’s rent. They
warned that since the Bill would confer occupancy rights even on
non-cultivators, it would lead to the growth of middlemen — the
jotedars — who would be as oppressive as the zamindars so far
as the actual cultivators were concerned. They, therefore,
demanded that the right of occupancy should go with actual
cultivation of the soil, that is, in most cases t o the under ryots
and the tenants -at-will.
*
A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and | <s>[INST]28 | India’s S truggle for Independence
have at any stage an anti-colonial political edge. The agrarian
leagues kept within the bounds of law, used the legal machinery
to fight the zamindars, and raised no anti-British demands. The
leaders often argued that they were against zamindars and not
the British. In fact, the l eaders raised the slogan that the
peasants want ‘to be the ryots of Her Majesty the Queen and of
Her only.’ For this reason, official action was based on the
enforcement of the Indian Penal Code and it did not take the form
of armed repression as in the ca se of the Santhal and Munda
uprisings.
Once again the Bengal peasants showed complete Hindu -
Muslim solidarity, even though the majority of the ryots were
Muslim and the majority of zamindars Hindu. There was also no
effort to create peasant solidarity on the grounds of religion or
caste.
In this case, too, a number of young Indian intellectuals
supported the peasants’ cause. These included Bankim Chandra
Chatterjea and R.C. Dutt . Later, in the early I 880s, during the
discussion of the Bengal Tenancy Bill , the Indian Association, led
by Surendranath Banerjee, Anand Mohan Bose and Dwarkanath
Ganguli, campaigned for the rights of tenants, helped form r yot’
unions, and organized huge meetings of upto 20,000 peasants in
the districts in support of the Rent Bil l. The Indian Association
and many of the nationalist newspapers went further than the
Bill. They asked for permanent fixation of the tenant’s rent. They
warned that since the Bill would confer occupancy rights even on
non-cultivators, it would lead to the growth of middlemen — the
jotedars — who would be as oppressive as the zamindars so far
as the actual cultivators were concerned. They, therefore,
demanded that the right of occupancy should go with actual
cultivation of the soil, that is, in most cases t o the under ryots
and the tenants -at-will.
*
A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and[/INST] |
*
A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and
Ahmednagar districts of Maharashtra in 1875. Here, as part of
the Ryotwari system, land revenue was settled directly with the
peasant who was also recognized as the owner of his land. Like
the peasants in other Ryotwari areas, the Deccan peasant also | <s>[INST]*
A major agrarian outbreak occurred in the Poona and
Ahmednagar districts of Maharashtra in 1875. Here, as part of
the Ryotwari system, land revenue was settled directly with the
peasant who was also recognized as the owner of his land. Like
the peasants in other Ryotwari areas, the Deccan peasant also[/INST] |
29 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
found it difficult to pay land revenue without getting into the
clutches of the moneylender and increasingly losing his land.
This led to growing tension between the peasants and the
moneylenders most of whom were outsiders — Marwaris or
Gujaratis.
Three other developments occurred at this time. During the
early I 860s, the American Civil War had led to a rise in cotton
exports which had pushed up prices. The end o f the Civil War in
1864 brought about an acute depression in cotton exports and a
crash in prices. The ground slipped from under the peasants’
feet. Simultaneously, in 1867, ‘the Government raised land
revenue by nearly 50 per cent. The situation was worse ned by a
succession of bad harvests.
To pay the land revenue under these conditions, the
peasants had to go to the moneylender who took the opportunity
to further tighten his grip on the peasant and his land. The
peasant began to turn against the perceived cause of his misery,
the moneylender. Only a spark was needed to kindle the fire.
A spontaneous protest movement began in December 1874
in Kardab village in Sirur taluq. When the peasants of the village
failed to convince the local moneylender, Kalooram, that he
should not act on a court decree and pull down a peasant’s
house, they organized a complete social boycott of the ‘outsider’
moneylenders to compel them to accept their demands a peaceful
manner. They refused to buy from their shops. No pe asant would
cultivate their fields. The bullotedars (village servants) — barbers,
washermen, carpenters, ironsmiths, shoemakers and others
would not serve them. No domestic servant would work in their
houses and when the socially isolated moneylenders decided to
run away to the taluq headquarters, nobody would agree to drive
their carts. The peasants also imposed social sanctions against
those peasants and bullotedars who would not join the boycott of | <s>[INST]29 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
found it difficult to pay land revenue without getting into the
clutches of the moneylender and increasingly losing his land.
This led to growing tension between the peasants and the
moneylenders most of whom were outsiders — Marwaris or
Gujaratis.
Three other developments occurred at this time. During the
early I 860s, the American Civil War had led to a rise in cotton
exports which had pushed up prices. The end o f the Civil War in
1864 brought about an acute depression in cotton exports and a
crash in prices. The ground slipped from under the peasants’
feet. Simultaneously, in 1867, ‘the Government raised land
revenue by nearly 50 per cent. The situation was worse ned by a
succession of bad harvests.
To pay the land revenue under these conditions, the
peasants had to go to the moneylender who took the opportunity
to further tighten his grip on the peasant and his land. The
peasant began to turn against the perceived cause of his misery,
the moneylender. Only a spark was needed to kindle the fire.
A spontaneous protest movement began in December 1874
in Kardab village in Sirur taluq. When the peasants of the village
failed to convince the local moneylender, Kalooram, that he
should not act on a court decree and pull down a peasant’s
house, they organized a complete social boycott of the ‘outsider’
moneylenders to compel them to accept their demands a peaceful
manner. They refused to buy from their shops. No pe asant would
cultivate their fields. The bullotedars (village servants) — barbers,
washermen, carpenters, ironsmiths, shoemakers and others
would not serve them. No domestic servant would work in their
houses and when the socially isolated moneylenders decided to
run away to the taluq headquarters, nobody would agree to drive
their carts. The peasants also imposed social sanctions against
those peasants and bullotedars who would not join the boycott of[/INST] |
moneylenders. This social boycott spread rapidly to the villages of
Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara districts.
The social boycott was soon transformed into agrarian riots
when it did not pro ve very effective. On 12 May, peasants
gathered in Supa, in Bhimthari taluq, on the bazar day and | <s>[INST]moneylenders. This social boycott spread rapidly to the villages of
Poona, Ahmednagar, Sholapur and Satara districts.
The social boycott was soon transformed into agrarian riots
when it did not pro ve very effective. On 12 May, peasants
gathered in Supa, in Bhimthari taluq, on the bazar day and[/INST] |
30 | India’s S truggle for Independence
began a systematic attac k on the moneylenders’ houses and
shops. They seized and publicly burnt debt bonds and deeds —
signed under pressure, in ignorance, or through fraud — decrees,
and other documents dealing with their debts. Within days the
disturbances spread to other villa ges of the Poona and
Ahmednagar districts.
There was very little violence in this settling of accounts.
Once the moneylenders’ instruments of oppression — debt bonds
— were surrendered, no need for further violence was felt. In
most places, the ‘riots’ we re demonstrations of popular feeling
and of the peasants’ newly acquired unity and strength. Though
moneylenders’ houses and shops were looted and burnt in Supa,
this did not occur in other places.
The Government acted with speed and soon succeeded in
repressing the movement. The active phase of the movement
lasted about three weeks, though stray incidents occurred for
another month or two. As in the case of the Pabna Revolt, the
Deccan disturbances had very limited objectives. There was once
again an abse nce of anti -colonial consciousness. It was,
therefore, possible for the colonial regime to extend them a
certain protection against the moneylenders through the Deccan
Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879.
Once again, the modern nationalist intelligentsia o f
Maharashtra supported the peasants’ cause. Already, in 1873 -
74, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, led by Justice Ranade, had
organized a successful campaign among the peasants, as well as
at Poona and Bombay against the land revenue settlement of
1867. Under its impact, a large number of peasants had refused
to pay the enhanced revenue. This agitation had generated a
mentality of resistance among the peasants which contributed to
the rise of peasant protest in 1875. The Sabha as well as many of
the nationalist newspapers also supported the D.A.R. Bill.
Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the | <s>[INST]30 | India’s S truggle for Independence
began a systematic attac k on the moneylenders’ houses and
shops. They seized and publicly burnt debt bonds and deeds —
signed under pressure, in ignorance, or through fraud — decrees,
and other documents dealing with their debts. Within days the
disturbances spread to other villa ges of the Poona and
Ahmednagar districts.
There was very little violence in this settling of accounts.
Once the moneylenders’ instruments of oppression — debt bonds
— were surrendered, no need for further violence was felt. In
most places, the ‘riots’ we re demonstrations of popular feeling
and of the peasants’ newly acquired unity and strength. Though
moneylenders’ houses and shops were looted and burnt in Supa,
this did not occur in other places.
The Government acted with speed and soon succeeded in
repressing the movement. The active phase of the movement
lasted about three weeks, though stray incidents occurred for
another month or two. As in the case of the Pabna Revolt, the
Deccan disturbances had very limited objectives. There was once
again an abse nce of anti -colonial consciousness. It was,
therefore, possible for the colonial regime to extend them a
certain protection against the moneylenders through the Deccan
Agriculturists’ Relief Act of 1879.
Once again, the modern nationalist intelligentsia o f
Maharashtra supported the peasants’ cause. Already, in 1873 -
74, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, led by Justice Ranade, had
organized a successful campaign among the peasants, as well as
at Poona and Bombay against the land revenue settlement of
1867. Under its impact, a large number of peasants had refused
to pay the enhanced revenue. This agitation had generated a
mentality of resistance among the peasants which contributed to
the rise of peasant protest in 1875. The Sabha as well as many of
the nationalist newspapers also supported the D.A.R. Bill.
Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the[/INST] |
Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the
country . Mappila outbreaks were endemic in Malabar. Vasudev
Balwant Phadke, an educated clerk, raised a Ramosi peasant
force of about 50 in Maharashtra duri ng 1879, and organized
social banditry on a significant scale. The Kuka Revolt in Punjab
was led by Baba Ram Singh and had elements of a messianic
movement. It was crushed when 49 of the rebels were blown up | <s>[INST]Peasant resistance also developed in other parts of the
country . Mappila outbreaks were endemic in Malabar. Vasudev
Balwant Phadke, an educated clerk, raised a Ramosi peasant
force of about 50 in Maharashtra duri ng 1879, and organized
social banditry on a significant scale. The Kuka Revolt in Punjab
was led by Baba Ram Singh and had elements of a messianic
movement. It was crushed when 49 of the rebels were blown up[/INST] |
31 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
by a cannon in 1872. High land revenue assessmen t led to a
series of peasant riots in the plains of Assam during 1893 -94.
Scores were killed in brutal firings and bayonet charges.
*
There was a certain shift in the nature of peasant
movements after 1857. Princes, chiefs and landlords having been
crushe d or co -opted, peasants emerged as the main force in
agrarian movements. They now fought directly for their own
demands, centered almost wholly on economic issues, and
against their immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous
zamindaris and moneylen ders. Their struggles were directed
towards specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular
grievances. They did not make colonialism their target. Nor was
their objective the ending of the system of their subordination
and exploitation. They d id not aim at turning the world upside
down.’
The territorial reach of these movements was also limited.
They were confined to particular localities with no mutual
communication or linkages. They also lacked continuity of
struggle or long -term organizatio n. Once the specific objectives of
a movement were achieved, its organization, as also peasant
solidarity built around it, dissolved and disappeared. Thus, the
Indigo strike, the Pabna agrarian leagues and the social -boycott
movement of the Deccan ryots left behind no successors.
Consequently, at no stage did these movements threaten British
supremacy or even undermine it.
Peasant protest after 1857 often represented an instinctive
and spontaneous response of the peasantry to its social
condition. It was t he result of excessive and unbearable
oppression, undue and unusual deprivation and exploitation,
and a threat to the peasant’s existing, established position. The
peasant often rebelled only when he felt that it was not possible
to carry on in the existin g manner.
He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what | <s>[INST]31 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
by a cannon in 1872. High land revenue assessmen t led to a
series of peasant riots in the plains of Assam during 1893 -94.
Scores were killed in brutal firings and bayonet charges.
*
There was a certain shift in the nature of peasant
movements after 1857. Princes, chiefs and landlords having been
crushe d or co -opted, peasants emerged as the main force in
agrarian movements. They now fought directly for their own
demands, centered almost wholly on economic issues, and
against their immediate enemies, foreign planters and indigenous
zamindaris and moneylen ders. Their struggles were directed
towards specific and limited objectives and redressal of particular
grievances. They did not make colonialism their target. Nor was
their objective the ending of the system of their subordination
and exploitation. They d id not aim at turning the world upside
down.’
The territorial reach of these movements was also limited.
They were confined to particular localities with no mutual
communication or linkages. They also lacked continuity of
struggle or long -term organizatio n. Once the specific objectives of
a movement were achieved, its organization, as also peasant
solidarity built around it, dissolved and disappeared. Thus, the
Indigo strike, the Pabna agrarian leagues and the social -boycott
movement of the Deccan ryots left behind no successors.
Consequently, at no stage did these movements threaten British
supremacy or even undermine it.
Peasant protest after 1857 often represented an instinctive
and spontaneous response of the peasantry to its social
condition. It was t he result of excessive and unbearable
oppression, undue and unusual deprivation and exploitation,
and a threat to the peasant’s existing, established position. The
peasant often rebelled only when he felt that it was not possible
to carry on in the existin g manner.
He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what[/INST] |
He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what
was justifiable and what was not. That is why he did not fight for
land ownership or against landlordism but against eviction and | <s>[INST]He was also moved by strong notions of legitimacy, of what
was justifiable and what was not. That is why he did not fight for
land ownership or against landlordism but against eviction and[/INST] |
32 | India’s S truggle for Independence
undue enhancement of rent. He did not object to paying i nterest
on the sums he had borrowed; he hit back against fraud and
chicanery by the moneylender and when the latter went against
tradition in depriving him of his land. He did not deny the state’s
right to collect a tax on land but objected when the level of
taxation overstepped all traditional bounds. He did not object to
the foreign planter becoming his zamindar but resisted the
planter when he took away his freedom to decide what crops to
grow and refused to pay him a proper price for his crop.
The peas ant also developed a strong awareness of his legal
rights and asserted them in and outside the courts. And if an
effort was made to deprive him of his legal rights by extra -legal
means or by manipulation of the law and law courts, he
countered with extra -legal means of his own. Quite often, he
believed that the legally -constituted authority approved his
actions or at least supported his claims and cause. In all the
three movements discussed here, he acted in the name of this
authority, the sarkar.
In these movements, the Indian peasants showed great
courage and a spirit of sacrifice, remarkable organizational
abilities, and a solidarity that cut across religious and caste lines.
They were also able to wring considerable concessions from the
colonial state. The latter, too, not being directly challenged, was
willing to compromise and mitigate the harshness of the agrarian
system though within the broad limits of the colonial economic
and political structure. In this respect, the colonial regime’s
treatment of the post -1857 peasant rebels was qualitatively
different from its treatment of the participants in the civil
rebellions, the Revolt of 1857 and the tribal uprisings which
directly challenged colonial political power.
A major weakness of the 19th century peasant movements
was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of | <s>[INST]32 | India’s S truggle for Independence
undue enhancement of rent. He did not object to paying i nterest
on the sums he had borrowed; he hit back against fraud and
chicanery by the moneylender and when the latter went against
tradition in depriving him of his land. He did not deny the state’s
right to collect a tax on land but objected when the level of
taxation overstepped all traditional bounds. He did not object to
the foreign planter becoming his zamindar but resisted the
planter when he took away his freedom to decide what crops to
grow and refused to pay him a proper price for his crop.
The peas ant also developed a strong awareness of his legal
rights and asserted them in and outside the courts. And if an
effort was made to deprive him of his legal rights by extra -legal
means or by manipulation of the law and law courts, he
countered with extra -legal means of his own. Quite often, he
believed that the legally -constituted authority approved his
actions or at least supported his claims and cause. In all the
three movements discussed here, he acted in the name of this
authority, the sarkar.
In these movements, the Indian peasants showed great
courage and a spirit of sacrifice, remarkable organizational
abilities, and a solidarity that cut across religious and caste lines.
They were also able to wring considerable concessions from the
colonial state. The latter, too, not being directly challenged, was
willing to compromise and mitigate the harshness of the agrarian
system though within the broad limits of the colonial economic
and political structure. In this respect, the colonial regime’s
treatment of the post -1857 peasant rebels was qualitatively
different from its treatment of the participants in the civil
rebellions, the Revolt of 1857 and the tribal uprisings which
directly challenged colonial political power.
A major weakness of the 19th century peasant movements
was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of[/INST] |
was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of
colonial economic structure and the colonial state — and of the
social framework of the movements themselves. Nor did the 19th
century peasants possess a new ideology and a new social,
economic and political programme based on an analysis of the
newly constituted colonial society. Their struggles, however
militant, occurred within the framework of the old societal order. | <s>[INST]was the lack of an adequate understanding of colonialism — of
colonial economic structure and the colonial state — and of the
social framework of the movements themselves. Nor did the 19th
century peasants possess a new ideology and a new social,
economic and political programme based on an analysis of the
newly constituted colonial society. Their struggles, however
militant, occurred within the framework of the old societal order.[/INST] |
33 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
They lacked a positive conception of an alternative socie ty —
a conception which would unite the people in a common struggle
on a wide regional and all-India plane and help develop long -term
political movements. An all-India leadership capable of evolving a
strategy of struggle that would unify and mobilize peasants and
other sections of society for nation -wide political activity could be
formed only on the basis of such a new conception, such a fresh
vision of society. In the absence of such a flew ideology,
programme, leadership and strategy of struggle, it was not to
difficult for the colonial state, on the one hand, to reach a
Conciliation and calm down the rebellious peasants by the grant
of some concessions arid on the other hand, to suppress them
with the full use of its force. This weakness was, of course, not a
blemish on the character of the peasantry which was perhaps
incapable of grasping on its own the new and complex
phenomenon of colonialism. That needed the efforts of a modem
intelligentsia which was itself just coming into existence.
Most of these weaknesses were overcome in the 20th
century when peasant discontent was merged with the general
anti-imperialist discontent and their political activity became a
part of the wider anti-imperialist movement. And, of course, the
peasants’ participation in t he larger national movement not only
strengthened the fight against the foreigner it also,
simultaneously, enabled them to organize powerful struggles
around their class demands and to create modem peasant
organization. | <s>[INST]33 |Peasant Movements and Uprisings After 1857
They lacked a positive conception of an alternative socie ty —
a conception which would unite the people in a common struggle
on a wide regional and all-India plane and help develop long -term
political movements. An all-India leadership capable of evolving a
strategy of struggle that would unify and mobilize peasants and
other sections of society for nation -wide political activity could be
formed only on the basis of such a new conception, such a fresh
vision of society. In the absence of such a flew ideology,
programme, leadership and strategy of struggle, it was not to
difficult for the colonial state, on the one hand, to reach a
Conciliation and calm down the rebellious peasants by the grant
of some concessions arid on the other hand, to suppress them
with the full use of its force. This weakness was, of course, not a
blemish on the character of the peasantry which was perhaps
incapable of grasping on its own the new and complex
phenomenon of colonialism. That needed the efforts of a modem
intelligentsia which was itself just coming into existence.
Most of these weaknesses were overcome in the 20th
century when peasant discontent was merged with the general
anti-imperialist discontent and their political activity became a
part of the wider anti-imperialist movement. And, of course, the
peasants’ participation in t he larger national movement not only
strengthened the fight against the foreigner it also,
simultaneously, enabled them to organize powerful struggles
around their class demands and to create modem peasant
organization.[/INST] |
34 | India’s S truggle for Independence
CHAPTER 4. FOUNDATION OF TH E
CONGRESS: THE MYTH
Indian National Congress was founded in December 1885 by
seventy -two political workers. It was the first organized
expression of Indian nationalism on an all -India scale. A.O.
Hume, a retired English ICS officer, played an important role in
its formation. But why was it founded by these seventy - two men
and why at that time?
A powerful and long-lasting myth, the myth of ‘the safety
valve,’ has arisen around this question. Generations of students
and political act ivists have been fed on this myth. But despite
widespread popular belief, this myth has little basis in historical
fact. The myth is that the Indian National Congress was started
by A.O. Hume and others under the official direction, guidance
and advice of no less a person than Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, to
provide a safe, mild, peaceful, and constitutional outlet or safety
valve for the rising discontent among the masses, which was
inevitably leading towards a popular and violent revolution.
Consequently, the revolutionary potential was nipped in the bud.
The core of the myth, that a violent revolution was on the cards
at the time and was avoided only by the foundations of the
Congress, is accepted by most writers; the liberaIs welcome it,
the radicals use it to prove that the Congress has always been
compromising if not loyalist vis -a-vis imperialism, the extreme
right use it to show that the Congress has been anti -national
from the beginning. All of them agree that the manner of its birth
affected the bas ic character and future work of the Congress in a
crucial manner.
In his Young India published in 1916, the Extremist leader
Lala Lajpat Ra i used the safety -valve theory to attack the
Moderates in the Congress. Having discussed the theory at length
and su ggested that the Congress ‘was a product of Lord
Dufferin’s brain,’ he argued that ‘the Congress was started more | <s>[INST]34 | India’s S truggle for Independence
CHAPTER 4. FOUNDATION OF TH E
CONGRESS: THE MYTH
Indian National Congress was founded in December 1885 by
seventy -two political workers. It was the first organized
expression of Indian nationalism on an all -India scale. A.O.
Hume, a retired English ICS officer, played an important role in
its formation. But why was it founded by these seventy - two men
and why at that time?
A powerful and long-lasting myth, the myth of ‘the safety
valve,’ has arisen around this question. Generations of students
and political act ivists have been fed on this myth. But despite
widespread popular belief, this myth has little basis in historical
fact. The myth is that the Indian National Congress was started
by A.O. Hume and others under the official direction, guidance
and advice of no less a person than Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy, to
provide a safe, mild, peaceful, and constitutional outlet or safety
valve for the rising discontent among the masses, which was
inevitably leading towards a popular and violent revolution.
Consequently, the revolutionary potential was nipped in the bud.
The core of the myth, that a violent revolution was on the cards
at the time and was avoided only by the foundations of the
Congress, is accepted by most writers; the liberaIs welcome it,
the radicals use it to prove that the Congress has always been
compromising if not loyalist vis -a-vis imperialism, the extreme
right use it to show that the Congress has been anti -national
from the beginning. All of them agree that the manner of its birth
affected the bas ic character and future work of the Congress in a
crucial manner.
In his Young India published in 1916, the Extremist leader
Lala Lajpat Ra i used the safety -valve theory to attack the
Moderates in the Congress. Having discussed the theory at length
and su ggested that the Congress ‘was a product of Lord
Dufferin’s brain,’ he argued that ‘the Congress was started more[/INST] |
with the object of saving the British Empire from danger than
with that of winning political liberty for India. The interests of the
British E mpire were primary and those of India only secondary.’ | <s>[INST]with the object of saving the British Empire from danger than
with that of winning political liberty for India. The interests of the
British E mpire were primary and those of India only secondary.’[/INST] |
35 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
And he added: ‘No one can say that the Congress has not been
true to that ideal.’ His conclusion was: ‘So this is the genesis of
the Congress, and this is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of
the ad vanced Nationalists.”
More than a quarter century later, R. Palme Dutt’s
authoritative work India Today made the myth of the safety -valve
a staple of left -wing opinion. Emphasizing the myth, Dutt wrote
that the Congress was brought into existence through direct
Governmental initiative and guidance and through ‘a plan
secretly pre -arranged with the Viceroy’ so that it (the
Government) could use it ‘as an intended weapon for
safeguarding British rule against the rising forces of popular
unrest and anti -British feeling.’ It was ‘an attempt to defeat, or
rather forestall, an impending revolution.’ The Congress did, of
course, in time become a nationalist body; ‘the national character
began to overshadow the loyalist character.’ It also became the
vehicle of mas s movements. But the ‘original sin’ of the manner
of its birth left a permanent mark on its politics. Its ‘two -fold
character’ as an institution which was created by the
Government and yet became the organizer of the anti -imperialist
movement ‘ran right th rough its history.’ It both fought and
collaborated with imperialism. It led the mass movements and
when the masses moved towards the revolutionary path, it
betrayed the movement to imperialism. The Congress, thus, had
two strands: ‘On the one hand, the st rand of cooperation with
imperialism against the “menace” of the mass movement; on the
other hand, the strand of leadership of the masses in the national
struggle.’ This duality of the Congress leadership from Gokhale to
Gandhi, said Dutt, in fact reflecte d the two -fold and vacillating
character of the Indian bourgeoisie itself; ‘at once in conflict with
the British bourgeoisie and desiring to lead the Indian people, yet | <s>[INST]35 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
And he added: ‘No one can say that the Congress has not been
true to that ideal.’ His conclusion was: ‘So this is the genesis of
the Congress, and this is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of
the ad vanced Nationalists.”
More than a quarter century later, R. Palme Dutt’s
authoritative work India Today made the myth of the safety -valve
a staple of left -wing opinion. Emphasizing the myth, Dutt wrote
that the Congress was brought into existence through direct
Governmental initiative and guidance and through ‘a plan
secretly pre -arranged with the Viceroy’ so that it (the
Government) could use it ‘as an intended weapon for
safeguarding British rule against the rising forces of popular
unrest and anti -British feeling.’ It was ‘an attempt to defeat, or
rather forestall, an impending revolution.’ The Congress did, of
course, in time become a nationalist body; ‘the national character
began to overshadow the loyalist character.’ It also became the
vehicle of mas s movements. But the ‘original sin’ of the manner
of its birth left a permanent mark on its politics. Its ‘two -fold
character’ as an institution which was created by the
Government and yet became the organizer of the anti -imperialist
movement ‘ran right th rough its history.’ It both fought and
collaborated with imperialism. It led the mass movements and
when the masses moved towards the revolutionary path, it
betrayed the movement to imperialism. The Congress, thus, had
two strands: ‘On the one hand, the st rand of cooperation with
imperialism against the “menace” of the mass movement; on the
other hand, the strand of leadership of the masses in the national
struggle.’ This duality of the Congress leadership from Gokhale to
Gandhi, said Dutt, in fact reflecte d the two -fold and vacillating
character of the Indian bourgeoisie itself; ‘at once in conflict with
the British bourgeoisie and desiring to lead the Indian people, yet[/INST] |
feeling that “too rapid” advance may end in destroying its
privileges along with those of the imperialists.’ The Congress had,
thus, become an organ of opposition to real revolution, that is, a
violent revolution. But this role did not date from Gandhiji; ‘this
principle was implanted in it by imperialism at the outset as its
intended offici al role.’ The culmination of this dual role was its
‘final capitulation with the Mountbatten Settlement.’
Earlier, in 1939, M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS chief, had also
found the safety -valve theory handy in attacking the Congress for | <s>[INST]feeling that “too rapid” advance may end in destroying its
privileges along with those of the imperialists.’ The Congress had,
thus, become an organ of opposition to real revolution, that is, a
violent revolution. But this role did not date from Gandhiji; ‘this
principle was implanted in it by imperialism at the outset as its
intended offici al role.’ The culmination of this dual role was its
‘final capitulation with the Mountbatten Settlement.’
Earlier, in 1939, M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS chief, had also
found the safety -valve theory handy in attacking the Congress for[/INST] |
36 | India’s S truggle for Independence
its secularism and, theref ore, anti -nationalism. In his pamphlet
We Golwalkar complained that Hindu national consciousness
had been destroyed by those claiming to be ‘nationalists’ who had
pushed the ‘notions of democracy’ and the perverse notion that
‘our old invaders and foes’, t he Muslims, had something in
common with Hindus. Consequently, ‘we have allowed our foes to
be our friends and with our hands are undermining true
nationality.’ In fact, the tight in India was not between Indians
and the British only. It was ‘a triangular fight.’ Hindus were at
war with Muslims on the one hand and with the British on the
other. What had led Hindus to enter the path of
‘denationalization,’ said Golwalkar, were the aims and policy laid
down by flume, Cotton, and Wedderburn in 1885; ‘the Congr ess
they founded as a “safety valve” to “seething nationalism,” as a
toy which would lull the awakening giant into slumber, an
instrument to destroy National consciousness, has been, as far
as they are concerned, a success.’
The liberal C.F. Andrews and Gi rija Mukherji fully accepted
the safety -valve theory in their work, The Rise and Growth of the
Congress in India published in 1938. They were happy with it
because it had helped avoid ‘useless bloodshed.’ Before as well as
after 1947, tens of scholars and hundreds of popular writers have
repeated some version of these points of view.
*
Historical proof of the safety -valve theory was provided by
the seven volumes of secret reports which flume claimed to have
read at Simla in the summer of 1878 and which con vinced him of
the existence of ‘seething discontent’ and a vast conspiracy
among the lower classes to violently overthrow British rule.
Before we unravel the mystery of the seven volumes, let us
briefly trace the history of its rise and growth. It was firs t
mentioned in William Wedderburn’s biography of A.O. flume
published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated | <s>[INST]36 | India’s S truggle for Independence
its secularism and, theref ore, anti -nationalism. In his pamphlet
We Golwalkar complained that Hindu national consciousness
had been destroyed by those claiming to be ‘nationalists’ who had
pushed the ‘notions of democracy’ and the perverse notion that
‘our old invaders and foes’, t he Muslims, had something in
common with Hindus. Consequently, ‘we have allowed our foes to
be our friends and with our hands are undermining true
nationality.’ In fact, the tight in India was not between Indians
and the British only. It was ‘a triangular fight.’ Hindus were at
war with Muslims on the one hand and with the British on the
other. What had led Hindus to enter the path of
‘denationalization,’ said Golwalkar, were the aims and policy laid
down by flume, Cotton, and Wedderburn in 1885; ‘the Congr ess
they founded as a “safety valve” to “seething nationalism,” as a
toy which would lull the awakening giant into slumber, an
instrument to destroy National consciousness, has been, as far
as they are concerned, a success.’
The liberal C.F. Andrews and Gi rija Mukherji fully accepted
the safety -valve theory in their work, The Rise and Growth of the
Congress in India published in 1938. They were happy with it
because it had helped avoid ‘useless bloodshed.’ Before as well as
after 1947, tens of scholars and hundreds of popular writers have
repeated some version of these points of view.
*
Historical proof of the safety -valve theory was provided by
the seven volumes of secret reports which flume claimed to have
read at Simla in the summer of 1878 and which con vinced him of
the existence of ‘seething discontent’ and a vast conspiracy
among the lower classes to violently overthrow British rule.
Before we unravel the mystery of the seven volumes, let us
briefly trace the history of its rise and growth. It was firs t
mentioned in William Wedderburn’s biography of A.O. flume
published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated[/INST] |
published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated
memorandum in Hume’s papers which dealt with the foundation
of the Congress. He quoted at length from this document. To keep
the mystery alive so that the reader may go along with the writer
step by step towards its solution, I will withhold an account of
Wedderburn’s writing, initially giving only those paragraphs | <s>[INST]published in 1913. Wedderburn (ICS) found an undated
memorandum in Hume’s papers which dealt with the foundation
of the Congress. He quoted at length from this document. To keep
the mystery alive so that the reader may go along with the writer
step by step towards its solution, I will withhold an account of
Wedderburn’s writing, initially giving only those paragraphs[/INST] |
37 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
which were quoted by the subsequent writers. According to
Lajpat Rai, despite the fact that Hume was ‘a lover of liberty and
wanted political liberty for India under the aegis of the British
crown,’ he was above all ‘an English patriot.’ Once he saw that
British rule was threatened with ‘an impending calamity’ he
decided to create a saf ety valve for the discontent.
As decisive proof of this Lajpat Ra i provided a long quotation
from Hume’s memorandum that Wedderburn had mentioned
along with his own comments in his book. Since this passage is
quoted or cited by all subsequent authors, it is necessary to
reproduce it here at length.
“I was shown,” wrote Hume, “several large volumes
containing a vast number of entries; English abstracts or
translations longer or shorter — of vernacular reports or
communications of one kind or another, all ar ranged according to
districts (not identical with ours) The number of these entries was
enormous; there were said, at the time to be communications
from over 30,000 different reporters.” He (Hume) mentions that
he had the volumes in his possession only for a week... Many of
the entries reported conversations between men of the lowest
classes, “all going to show that these poor men were pervaded
with a sense of the hopelessness of the existing state of affairs;
that they were convinced that they would starve and die, and that
they wanted to do something, and stand by each other, and that
something meant violence. a certain small number of the educated
classes, at the time desperately, perhaps unreasonably, biller
against the Government, would join the movemen t assume here
and there the lead, give the outbreak cohesion, and direct it as a
national revolt.”’
Very soon, the seven volumes, whose character, origin, etc.,
were left undefined in Lajpat Rai’s quotation, started undergoing
a metamorphosis. In 1933, in Gurmukh Nihal Singh’s hands,
they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji | <s>[INST]37 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
which were quoted by the subsequent writers. According to
Lajpat Rai, despite the fact that Hume was ‘a lover of liberty and
wanted political liberty for India under the aegis of the British
crown,’ he was above all ‘an English patriot.’ Once he saw that
British rule was threatened with ‘an impending calamity’ he
decided to create a saf ety valve for the discontent.
As decisive proof of this Lajpat Ra i provided a long quotation
from Hume’s memorandum that Wedderburn had mentioned
along with his own comments in his book. Since this passage is
quoted or cited by all subsequent authors, it is necessary to
reproduce it here at length.
“I was shown,” wrote Hume, “several large volumes
containing a vast number of entries; English abstracts or
translations longer or shorter — of vernacular reports or
communications of one kind or another, all ar ranged according to
districts (not identical with ours) The number of these entries was
enormous; there were said, at the time to be communications
from over 30,000 different reporters.” He (Hume) mentions that
he had the volumes in his possession only for a week... Many of
the entries reported conversations between men of the lowest
classes, “all going to show that these poor men were pervaded
with a sense of the hopelessness of the existing state of affairs;
that they were convinced that they would starve and die, and that
they wanted to do something, and stand by each other, and that
something meant violence. a certain small number of the educated
classes, at the time desperately, perhaps unreasonably, biller
against the Government, would join the movemen t assume here
and there the lead, give the outbreak cohesion, and direct it as a
national revolt.”’
Very soon, the seven volumes, whose character, origin, etc.,
were left undefined in Lajpat Rai’s quotation, started undergoing
a metamorphosis. In 1933, in Gurmukh Nihal Singh’s hands,
they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji[/INST] |
they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji
transformed them into ‘several volumes of secret reports from the
CID’ which came into Hume’s possession ‘in his official capacity.’
The classical and most influential sta tement came from R. Pa lme
Dutt. After quoting the passage quoted by Lajpat Rai from
Wedderb urn, Du tt wrote: ‘Hume in his official capacity had
received possession of the voluminous secret police reports.” | <s>[INST]they became ‘government reports.’ Andrews and Mukherji
transformed them into ‘several volumes of secret reports from the
CID’ which came into Hume’s possession ‘in his official capacity.’
The classical and most influential sta tement came from R. Pa lme
Dutt. After quoting the passage quoted by Lajpat Rai from
Wedderb urn, Du tt wrote: ‘Hume in his official capacity had
received possession of the voluminous secret police reports.”[/INST] |
38 | India’s S truggle for Independence
Numerous other historians of the national movement including
recent ones such as R.C. Maju mdar and Tara Chand, were to
accept this product of the creative imagination of these writers as
historical fact.
So deeply rooted had become the belief in Hume’s volumes
as official documents that in the 1950s a lar ge number of
historians and would -be historians, including the present writer,
devoted a great deal of time and energy searching for them in the
National Archives. And when their search proved futile, they
consoled themselves with the thought that the Brit ish had
destroyed them before their departure in 1947. Yet only if the
historians had applied a minimum of their historiographic sense
to the question and looked at the professed evidence a bit more
carefully, they would not have been taken for a ride. Thr ee levels
of historical evidence and logic were available to them even before
the private papers of Ripon and Dufferin became available.
The first level pertains to the system under which the
Government of India functioned in the 1870s. In 1878, Flume
was Secretary to the Department of Revenue, Agriculture and
Commerce. How could the Secretary of these departments get
access to Home Department files or CID reports? Also he was
then in Simla while Home Department files were kept in Delhi;
they were not sent to Simla. And from where would 30,000
reporters come? The intelligence departments could not have
employed more than a few hundred persons at the time! And, as
Lajpat Rai noted, if Congress was founded out of the fear of an
outbreak, why did Flume and Bri tish officialdom wait for seven
long years?
If these volumes were not government documents, what
were they? The clue was there in Wedderburn’s book and it was
easily available if a writer would go to the book itself and not rely
on extracts from it reprod uced by previous authors as nearly all
the later writers seem to have done. This brings us to the second | <s>[INST]38 | India’s S truggle for Independence
Numerous other historians of the national movement including
recent ones such as R.C. Maju mdar and Tara Chand, were to
accept this product of the creative imagination of these writers as
historical fact.
So deeply rooted had become the belief in Hume’s volumes
as official documents that in the 1950s a lar ge number of
historians and would -be historians, including the present writer,
devoted a great deal of time and energy searching for them in the
National Archives. And when their search proved futile, they
consoled themselves with the thought that the Brit ish had
destroyed them before their departure in 1947. Yet only if the
historians had applied a minimum of their historiographic sense
to the question and looked at the professed evidence a bit more
carefully, they would not have been taken for a ride. Thr ee levels
of historical evidence and logic were available to them even before
the private papers of Ripon and Dufferin became available.
The first level pertains to the system under which the
Government of India functioned in the 1870s. In 1878, Flume
was Secretary to the Department of Revenue, Agriculture and
Commerce. How could the Secretary of these departments get
access to Home Department files or CID reports? Also he was
then in Simla while Home Department files were kept in Delhi;
they were not sent to Simla. And from where would 30,000
reporters come? The intelligence departments could not have
employed more than a few hundred persons at the time! And, as
Lajpat Rai noted, if Congress was founded out of the fear of an
outbreak, why did Flume and Bri tish officialdom wait for seven
long years?
If these volumes were not government documents, what
were they? The clue was there in Wedderburn’s book and it was
easily available if a writer would go to the book itself and not rely
on extracts from it reprod uced by previous authors as nearly all
the later writers seem to have done. This brings us to the second[/INST] |
level of historical evidence already available in Wedderburn.
The passages quoted by Lajpat Rai, R. Palme Du tt and
others are on pages 80 -81 of Wedder burn’s book. Two pages
earlier, pages 78 -80, and one page later, 82 -83, Wedderburn tells
the reader what these volumes were and who provided them to
Hume. The heading of the section where the quoted passages | <s>[INST]level of historical evidence already available in Wedderburn.
The passages quoted by Lajpat Rai, R. Palme Du tt and
others are on pages 80 -81 of Wedder burn’s book. Two pages
earlier, pages 78 -80, and one page later, 82 -83, Wedderburn tells
the reader what these volumes were and who provided them to
Hume. The heading of the section where the quoted passages[/INST] |
39 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
occur is ‘ Indian religious leaders.’ In the very beginning of the
section, Wedderbu rn writes that a warning of the threatened
danger came to Flume ‘from a very special source that is, from
the leaders among those devoted, in all parts of India , to a
religious life.’ Hume referred in his memorandum to th e legions of
secret quasi -religious orders, with literally their millions of
members, which form so important a factor in the Indian
problem.” These religious sects and orders were headed by Gurus,
“men of the highest quality who . . have purged themselves from
earthly desires, and fixed their desires on the highest good.” And
“these religious leaders, through their Chelas or disciples, are
hilly informed of all that goes on under the surface, and their
influence is great in forming public opinion.” It was with these
Gurus, writes Wedderburn, ‘that Mr. Hume came in touch,
towards the end of Lord Lytton’s Viceroyalty.’ These Gurus
approached Hume because Hume was a keen student of Eastern
religions, but also because they “feared that the ominous ‘ unrest’
throughout the country… would lead to terrible outbreak” and it
was only men like Hume who had access to the Government who
could help ‘avert a catastrophe.’ “This,” wrote Hume, “is how the
case was put to me.” With this background the passages on
pages 80 -81 become clearer.
In other words, the evidence of the seven volumes was
shown to Hume by the Gurus who had been sent reports by
thousands of Chelas. But why should Hume believe that these
reports ‘must necessarily be true?’ Because Chelas were persons
of a special breed who did not belong to any particular sect or
religion or rather belonged to all religions. Moreover they were
‘bound by vows and conditions, over and above those of ordinary
initiates of low grade.’ They were ‘all initiates in some of the man y
branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows, | <s>[INST]39 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
occur is ‘ Indian religious leaders.’ In the very beginning of the
section, Wedderbu rn writes that a warning of the threatened
danger came to Flume ‘from a very special source that is, from
the leaders among those devoted, in all parts of India , to a
religious life.’ Hume referred in his memorandum to th e legions of
secret quasi -religious orders, with literally their millions of
members, which form so important a factor in the Indian
problem.” These religious sects and orders were headed by Gurus,
“men of the highest quality who . . have purged themselves from
earthly desires, and fixed their desires on the highest good.” And
“these religious leaders, through their Chelas or disciples, are
hilly informed of all that goes on under the surface, and their
influence is great in forming public opinion.” It was with these
Gurus, writes Wedderburn, ‘that Mr. Hume came in touch,
towards the end of Lord Lytton’s Viceroyalty.’ These Gurus
approached Hume because Hume was a keen student of Eastern
religions, but also because they “feared that the ominous ‘ unrest’
throughout the country… would lead to terrible outbreak” and it
was only men like Hume who had access to the Government who
could help ‘avert a catastrophe.’ “This,” wrote Hume, “is how the
case was put to me.” With this background the passages on
pages 80 -81 become clearer.
In other words, the evidence of the seven volumes was
shown to Hume by the Gurus who had been sent reports by
thousands of Chelas. But why should Hume believe that these
reports ‘must necessarily be true?’ Because Chelas were persons
of a special breed who did not belong to any particular sect or
religion or rather belonged to all religions. Moreover they were
‘bound by vows and conditions, over and above those of ordinary
initiates of low grade.’ They were ‘all initiates in some of the man y
branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows,[/INST] |
branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows,
they cannot practically break, to some farther advanced seeker
than themselves.’ The leaders were of ‘no sect and no religion, but
of all sects and all religions.’ But why did hardly anyone i n India
know of the existence of these myriads of Gurus and Chelas?
Because, explained Hume, absolute secrecy was an essential
feature in their lives. They had communicated with Hume only
because they were anxious to avert calamity.
And, finally, we come to the third level of historiography, the
level of profound belief and absolute fantasy. The full character of | <s>[INST]branches of the secret knowledge’ and were ‘all bound by vows,
they cannot practically break, to some farther advanced seeker
than themselves.’ The leaders were of ‘no sect and no religion, but
of all sects and all religions.’ But why did hardly anyone i n India
know of the existence of these myriads of Gurus and Chelas?
Because, explained Hume, absolute secrecy was an essential
feature in their lives. They had communicated with Hume only
because they were anxious to avert calamity.
And, finally, we come to the third level of historiography, the
level of profound belief and absolute fantasy. The full character of[/INST] |
40 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the Gurus and Chelas was still not revealed by Wedderburn, for
he was sheltering the reputation of his old friend, as friendly
biographers usuall y do. The impression given by him was that
these Gurus and Chelas were ordinary mortal men. This was,
however, not the case. Reconstructing the facts on the basis of
some books of Theosophy and Madame Blavatsky and the private
papers of the Viceroys Ripon and Dufferin, we discover that these
Gurus were persons who, because of their practice of ‘peculiar
Eastern religious thought,’ were supposed to possess
supernatural occult powers; they could communicate and direct
from thousands of mites, enter any place go anywhere, sit
anywhere unseen, and direct men’s thoughts and opinions
without their being aware of it.
*
In 1881, Hume came under the spell of Madame Blavatsky
who claimed be in touch with these Gurus who were described by
her as mahatmas. These mahatm as lived as part of a secret
brotherhood in Tibet, but they could contact or ‘correspond’ with
persons anywhere in the world because of their occult powers.
Blavatsky enabled Hume to get in touch with one of these
mahatmas named ‘Koot Hoomi Lal Singh.’ It is this invisible
brotherhood that gathered secret information on Indian affairs
through their Chelas. In a book published in 1880, A.P. Sinnet,
editor of the Pioneer and another follower of Blavatsky, had
quoted a letter from Koot Hoomi that these mahatma s had used
their power in 1857 to control the Indian masses and saved the
British Empire and that they would do the same in future.
Hume believed all this. He was keen to acquire these occult
powers by which the Chelas could know all about the present
and the future. He started a ‘correspondence’ with the mahatmas
in Tibet. By 1883 Hume had quarreled with Blavatsky, but his
faith in the Gurus or mahatmas continued unabated. He also
began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote | <s>[INST]40 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the Gurus and Chelas was still not revealed by Wedderburn, for
he was sheltering the reputation of his old friend, as friendly
biographers usuall y do. The impression given by him was that
these Gurus and Chelas were ordinary mortal men. This was,
however, not the case. Reconstructing the facts on the basis of
some books of Theosophy and Madame Blavatsky and the private
papers of the Viceroys Ripon and Dufferin, we discover that these
Gurus were persons who, because of their practice of ‘peculiar
Eastern religious thought,’ were supposed to possess
supernatural occult powers; they could communicate and direct
from thousands of mites, enter any place go anywhere, sit
anywhere unseen, and direct men’s thoughts and opinions
without their being aware of it.
*
In 1881, Hume came under the spell of Madame Blavatsky
who claimed be in touch with these Gurus who were described by
her as mahatmas. These mahatm as lived as part of a secret
brotherhood in Tibet, but they could contact or ‘correspond’ with
persons anywhere in the world because of their occult powers.
Blavatsky enabled Hume to get in touch with one of these
mahatmas named ‘Koot Hoomi Lal Singh.’ It is this invisible
brotherhood that gathered secret information on Indian affairs
through their Chelas. In a book published in 1880, A.P. Sinnet,
editor of the Pioneer and another follower of Blavatsky, had
quoted a letter from Koot Hoomi that these mahatma s had used
their power in 1857 to control the Indian masses and saved the
British Empire and that they would do the same in future.
Hume believed all this. He was keen to acquire these occult
powers by which the Chelas could know all about the present
and the future. He started a ‘correspondence’ with the mahatmas
in Tibet. By 1883 Hume had quarreled with Blavatsky, but his
faith in the Gurus or mahatmas continued unabated. He also
began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote[/INST] |
began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote
political objectiv es dear to his heart — attempting to reform
Indian administration and make it more responsive to Indian
opinion.
In December 1883, he wrote to Ripon: ‘I am associated with
men, who though never seen by the masses . . . are yet | <s>[INST]began to use his connection with the mahatmas to promote
political objectiv es dear to his heart — attempting to reform
Indian administration and make it more responsive to Indian
opinion.
In December 1883, he wrote to Ripon: ‘I am associated with
men, who though never seen by the masses . . . are yet[/INST] |
41 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
reverenced by them as Gods . . . and who feel every pulse of
public feeling.’ He claimed a Superior knowledge ‘of the native
mind’ because ‘a body of men, mostly of Asiatic origin . . . who
possess facilities which no other man or body of men living do,
for gauging the feelings of th e natives. . . have seen fit. . . to give
me their confidence to a certain limited extent.’ In January 1884,
he informed Ripon that even earlier, in 1848, he had been in
contact with the brotherhood or association of his mystical
advisers and that it was t heir intervention which had defeated
the revolutions of 1848 in Europe and the ‘mutiny’ of 1857. From
distant Tibet they were now acting through him and others like
him to help Ripon introduce reforms and avoid ‘the possibility of
such a cataclysm recurrin g.’ This association of mahatmas was
also helping him, he told Ripon, to persuade the Queen to give a
second term as Viceroy to Ripon and to ‘tranquilize the native
press.
Hume tried to play a similar role with Dufferin, but more
hesitatingly, not sharing with him the information that his
advisers were astral, occult figures so that even many historians
have assumed that these advisers were his fellow Congress
leaders! Only once did he lift the veil before Dufferin when the
latter during 1887 angrily presse d him to reveal the source
through which he claimed to have gained access to the Viceroy’s
secret letter to the Secretary of State. Pressed to the wall, Hume
told him copies of the letter had been obtained by his friends
through occult methods or ‘through the medium of supernatural
photography.’ And when Dufferin showed him the original letter,
proving that the copy w as false, Hume had no answer.’
Once earlier, too, Hume had indirectly tried to tell Dufferin
that his advisers were not ordinary political lea ders but
‘advanced initiates’ and mahatmas ; but he had done so in a
guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he | <s>[INST]41 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
reverenced by them as Gods . . . and who feel every pulse of
public feeling.’ He claimed a Superior knowledge ‘of the native
mind’ because ‘a body of men, mostly of Asiatic origin . . . who
possess facilities which no other man or body of men living do,
for gauging the feelings of th e natives. . . have seen fit. . . to give
me their confidence to a certain limited extent.’ In January 1884,
he informed Ripon that even earlier, in 1848, he had been in
contact with the brotherhood or association of his mystical
advisers and that it was t heir intervention which had defeated
the revolutions of 1848 in Europe and the ‘mutiny’ of 1857. From
distant Tibet they were now acting through him and others like
him to help Ripon introduce reforms and avoid ‘the possibility of
such a cataclysm recurrin g.’ This association of mahatmas was
also helping him, he told Ripon, to persuade the Queen to give a
second term as Viceroy to Ripon and to ‘tranquilize the native
press.
Hume tried to play a similar role with Dufferin, but more
hesitatingly, not sharing with him the information that his
advisers were astral, occult figures so that even many historians
have assumed that these advisers were his fellow Congress
leaders! Only once did he lift the veil before Dufferin when the
latter during 1887 angrily presse d him to reveal the source
through which he claimed to have gained access to the Viceroy’s
secret letter to the Secretary of State. Pressed to the wall, Hume
told him copies of the letter had been obtained by his friends
through occult methods or ‘through the medium of supernatural
photography.’ And when Dufferin showed him the original letter,
proving that the copy w as false, Hume had no answer.’
Once earlier, too, Hume had indirectly tried to tell Dufferin
that his advisers were not ordinary political lea ders but
‘advanced initiates’ and mahatmas ; but he had done so in a
guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he[/INST] |
guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he
said that he had been trying to persuade those who had shown
him the volumes in Simla to also show them to Dufferin so that
the Viceroy could get their veracity checked by his own sources.
But, at present they say that this is impossible.’ Nor would they
agree to communicate with the Viceroy directly. ‘Most of them, I
believe , could not. You have not done, and would not do, what is
required to enable them to communicate with you directly after
their fashion.’ But there was hope. ‘My own special friend’ who | <s>[INST]guarded fashion. In a letter to Dufferin in November 1886, he
said that he had been trying to persuade those who had shown
him the volumes in Simla to also show them to Dufferin so that
the Viceroy could get their veracity checked by his own sources.
But, at present they say that this is impossible.’ Nor would they
agree to communicate with the Viceroy directly. ‘Most of them, I
believe , could not. You have not done, and would not do, what is
required to enable them to communicate with you directly after
their fashion.’ But there was hope. ‘My own special friend’ who[/INST] |
42 | India’s S truggle for Independence
spent more than a month with Hume in Simla (in 1878), and who
was often in India might agree to see the Viceroy. Hume
suggeste d: ‘if ever a native gentleman comes to the Private
Secretary and says that Mr. Hume said the Viceroy would like to
see him, see him at once. You will not talk to him ten minutes
without finding out that he is no ordinary man. You may never
get the chance — goodness knows — they move in a mysterious
way their wonders to
But Hume was worried that he could offer no visible or
direct proof of his knowledge or connections. He told the Viceroy
that he was ‘getting gradually very angry and disgusted’ because
he was not able to get ‘this vouching for directly.’ None of the
‘advanced initiates’ under whose advice and guidance’ he was
working would ‘publicly stand by me,’ so that most Europeans in
India ‘look upon me either as a lunatic or a liar.’ And hence, he
informed the Viceroy, while he had decided to continue the
political work, he had decided to ‘drop all references to my
friends.”
Thus, it turns out that the seven volumes which Hume saw
were prepared by mahatmas and Gurus, and his friends and
advisers were these occult figures and not Congressmen!
*
Further proof offered for the safety -valve theory was based
on W.C. B annerjee’ s statement in 1898 in Indian Politics that the
Congress, ‘as it was originally started and as it has since been
carried on, is in re ality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and
Ava.’ He stated that Flume had, in 1884, thought of bringing
together leading political Indians once a year “to discuss social
matters” and did not “desire that politics should form part of
their discussion.” B ut Dufferin asked flume to do the opposite
and start a body to discuss politics so that the Government could
keep itself informed of Indian opinion. Such a body could also
perform ‘the functions which Her Majest y’s Opposition did in
England.” | <s>[INST]42 | India’s S truggle for Independence
spent more than a month with Hume in Simla (in 1878), and who
was often in India might agree to see the Viceroy. Hume
suggeste d: ‘if ever a native gentleman comes to the Private
Secretary and says that Mr. Hume said the Viceroy would like to
see him, see him at once. You will not talk to him ten minutes
without finding out that he is no ordinary man. You may never
get the chance — goodness knows — they move in a mysterious
way their wonders to
But Hume was worried that he could offer no visible or
direct proof of his knowledge or connections. He told the Viceroy
that he was ‘getting gradually very angry and disgusted’ because
he was not able to get ‘this vouching for directly.’ None of the
‘advanced initiates’ under whose advice and guidance’ he was
working would ‘publicly stand by me,’ so that most Europeans in
India ‘look upon me either as a lunatic or a liar.’ And hence, he
informed the Viceroy, while he had decided to continue the
political work, he had decided to ‘drop all references to my
friends.”
Thus, it turns out that the seven volumes which Hume saw
were prepared by mahatmas and Gurus, and his friends and
advisers were these occult figures and not Congressmen!
*
Further proof offered for the safety -valve theory was based
on W.C. B annerjee’ s statement in 1898 in Indian Politics that the
Congress, ‘as it was originally started and as it has since been
carried on, is in re ality the work of the Marquis of Dufferin and
Ava.’ He stated that Flume had, in 1884, thought of bringing
together leading political Indians once a year “to discuss social
matters” and did not “desire that politics should form part of
their discussion.” B ut Dufferin asked flume to do the opposite
and start a body to discuss politics so that the Government could
keep itself informed of Indian opinion. Such a body could also
perform ‘the functions which Her Majest y’s Opposition did in
England.”[/INST] |
England.”
Clearly, eith er W.C. B annerjee’s memory was failing or he
was trying to protect the National Congress from the wrath of the
late 19th century imperialist reaction, for contemporary evidence | <s>[INST]England.”
Clearly, eith er W.C. B annerjee’s memory was failing or he
was trying to protect the National Congress from the wrath of the
late 19th century imperialist reaction, for contemporary evidence[/INST] |
43 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
clearly indicated the opposite. All the discussions Hume had with
Indian leader s regarding the holding of an annual conference
referred to a political gathering. Almost the entire work of earlier
associations like the Bombay Presidency Association, Poona
Sarvajanik Sabha, Madras Mahajan Sabha and Indian
Association was political. Sin ce his retirement from the Indian
Civil Service in 1882, Hume had been publicly urging Indians to
take to politics. He had also been asking his Indian friends not to
get divided on social questions.
When, in January 1885, his friend B.M. Malabari wrote
some editorials in the Indian Spectator urging educated Indians to
inaugurate a movement for social reform, Hume wrote a letter to
the Indian Spectator criticizing Malabari’s proposals, warning
against the dangerous potential of such a move, and arguing that
political reforms should take precedence over social reform.’
Dufferin, on his part, in his St. Andrews’ Day dinner speech in
1888, publicly criticized the Congress for pursuing politics to
serve narrow interests rather than take to social reform which
would benefit millions.’5 Earlier he had expressed the same
sentiment in a private letter to the Secretary of State.
A perusal of Dufferin’s private papers, thrown open to
scholars in the late 1950s, should have put an end to the myth of
Dufferin’s sponsor of or support to the Congress. It was only after
Hume had sent him a Copy of the letter to the Indian Spectator
with a covering note deprecating Malabari’s views on social
reform that Dufferin expressed agreement with Hume and asked
him to meet him. Defini te confirmation of the fact that Hume
never proposed a social gathering but rather a political one comes
in Dufferin’s letter to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay, after his f
meeting with Hume in May 1885: “At his last interview he told me
that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political | <s>[INST]43 |Founda tions of the Congress: The Myth
clearly indicated the opposite. All the discussions Hume had with
Indian leader s regarding the holding of an annual conference
referred to a political gathering. Almost the entire work of earlier
associations like the Bombay Presidency Association, Poona
Sarvajanik Sabha, Madras Mahajan Sabha and Indian
Association was political. Sin ce his retirement from the Indian
Civil Service in 1882, Hume had been publicly urging Indians to
take to politics. He had also been asking his Indian friends not to
get divided on social questions.
When, in January 1885, his friend B.M. Malabari wrote
some editorials in the Indian Spectator urging educated Indians to
inaugurate a movement for social reform, Hume wrote a letter to
the Indian Spectator criticizing Malabari’s proposals, warning
against the dangerous potential of such a move, and arguing that
political reforms should take precedence over social reform.’
Dufferin, on his part, in his St. Andrews’ Day dinner speech in
1888, publicly criticized the Congress for pursuing politics to
serve narrow interests rather than take to social reform which
would benefit millions.’5 Earlier he had expressed the same
sentiment in a private letter to the Secretary of State.
A perusal of Dufferin’s private papers, thrown open to
scholars in the late 1950s, should have put an end to the myth of
Dufferin’s sponsor of or support to the Congress. It was only after
Hume had sent him a Copy of the letter to the Indian Spectator
with a covering note deprecating Malabari’s views on social
reform that Dufferin expressed agreement with Hume and asked
him to meet him. Defini te confirmation of the fact that Hume
never proposed a social gathering but rather a political one comes
in Dufferin’s letter to Lord Reay, Governor of Bombay, after his f
meeting with Hume in May 1885: “At his last interview he told me
that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political[/INST] |
that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political
convention of delegates, as far as I understood, on the lines
adopted by O’Connell previous to Catholic emancipation.”
Neither Dufferin and his fellow -liberal Governors of Bombay
and Madras nor his conservative offic ials like Alfred and J.B.
Lyall, D.M Wallace, A. Colvin and S.C. Bayley were sympathetic
to the Congress . It was not only in 1888 that Dufferin attacked
the Congress in a vicious manner by writing that he would
consider ‘in what way the happy despatch may be best applied to | <s>[INST]that he and his fri ends were going to assemble a political
convention of delegates, as far as I understood, on the lines
adopted by O’Connell previous to Catholic emancipation.”
Neither Dufferin and his fellow -liberal Governors of Bombay
and Madras nor his conservative offic ials like Alfred and J.B.
Lyall, D.M Wallace, A. Colvin and S.C. Bayley were sympathetic
to the Congress . It was not only in 1888 that Dufferin attacked
the Congress in a vicious manner by writing that he would
consider ‘in what way the happy despatch may be best applied to[/INST] |
44 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the Congress,’ for ‘we cannot allow the Congress to continue to
exist.” In May 1885 itself, he had written to Reay asking him to
be careful about Hume’s Congress, telling him that it would be
unwise to identify with either the reformers or the reactionaries.
Reay in turn, in a letter in June 1885, referred with apprehension
to the new political activists as ‘the National Party of India’ and
warned against Indian delegates, like Irish delegates, making
their appearance on the British polit ical scene. Earlier, in May,
Reay had cautioned Dufferin that Hume was ‘the head -centre of
an organization . . . (which) has for its object to bring native
opinion into a focus.’
In fact, from the end of May 1885, Dufferin had grown cool
to Hume and began to keep him at an arm’s length. From 1886
onwards he also began to attack the ‘Bengali Baboos and
Mahratta Brahmins’ for being ‘inspired by questionable motives’
and for wanting to start Irish -type revolutionary agitations in
India.20 And, during May -June 1886. he was describing Hume
as ‘cleverish, a little cracked, excessively vain, and absolutely
indifferent to truth,’ his main fault being that he was ‘one of the
chief stimulants of the Indian Home Rule movement. To
conclude, it is high time that the saf ety-valve theory of the
genesis of the Congress was confined to the care of the mahatmas
from whom perhaps it originated! | <s>[INST]44 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the Congress,’ for ‘we cannot allow the Congress to continue to
exist.” In May 1885 itself, he had written to Reay asking him to
be careful about Hume’s Congress, telling him that it would be
unwise to identify with either the reformers or the reactionaries.
Reay in turn, in a letter in June 1885, referred with apprehension
to the new political activists as ‘the National Party of India’ and
warned against Indian delegates, like Irish delegates, making
their appearance on the British polit ical scene. Earlier, in May,
Reay had cautioned Dufferin that Hume was ‘the head -centre of
an organization . . . (which) has for its object to bring native
opinion into a focus.’
In fact, from the end of May 1885, Dufferin had grown cool
to Hume and began to keep him at an arm’s length. From 1886
onwards he also began to attack the ‘Bengali Baboos and
Mahratta Brahmins’ for being ‘inspired by questionable motives’
and for wanting to start Irish -type revolutionary agitations in
India.20 And, during May -June 1886. he was describing Hume
as ‘cleverish, a little cracked, excessively vain, and absolutely
indifferent to truth,’ his main fault being that he was ‘one of the
chief stimulants of the Indian Home Rule movement. To
conclude, it is high time that the saf ety-valve theory of the
genesis of the Congress was confined to the care of the mahatmas
from whom perhaps it originated![/INST] |
45 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
CHAPTER 5. FOUNDATION OF THE
INDIAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS :THE REALITY
In the last chapter we began the story of the foundation of
the Indian National Congress. We could not, however, make
much headway because the cobwebs had to be cleared, the myth
of the safety -valve had to be laid to rest, the mystery of the
‘missing volumes’ had to be solve d, and Hume’s mahatmas had to
be sent back to their resting place in Tibet. In this chapter we
resume the more serious part of the story of the emergence of the
Indian National Congress as the apex nationalist organization
that was to guide the destiny of the Indian national movement till
the attainment of independence.
The foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was
not a sudden event, or a historical accident. It was the
culmination of a process of political awakening that had its
beginnings i n the 1860s and 1870s and took a major leap
forward in the late 1870s and early 1880s. The year 1885 marked
a turning point in this process, for that was the year the political
Indians, the modem intellectuals interested in politics, who no
longer saw them selves as spokesmen of narrow group interests,
but as representatives of national interest vis -a-vis foreign rule,
as a ‘national party,’ saw their efforts bear fruit. The all -India
nationalist body that they brought into being was to be the
platform, the organizer, the headquarters, the symbol of the new
national spirit and politics.
British officialdom, too, was not slow in reading the new
messages that were being conveyed through the nati onalist
political activity leadin g to the founding of the Congress, and
watched them with suspicion, and a sense of foreboding. As this
political activity gathered force, the prospect of disloyalty,
sedition and Irish -type agitations began to haunt the
Government. | <s>[INST]45 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
CHAPTER 5. FOUNDATION OF THE
INDIAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS :THE REALITY
In the last chapter we began the story of the foundation of
the Indian National Congress. We could not, however, make
much headway because the cobwebs had to be cleared, the myth
of the safety -valve had to be laid to rest, the mystery of the
‘missing volumes’ had to be solve d, and Hume’s mahatmas had to
be sent back to their resting place in Tibet. In this chapter we
resume the more serious part of the story of the emergence of the
Indian National Congress as the apex nationalist organization
that was to guide the destiny of the Indian national movement till
the attainment of independence.
The foundation of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was
not a sudden event, or a historical accident. It was the
culmination of a process of political awakening that had its
beginnings i n the 1860s and 1870s and took a major leap
forward in the late 1870s and early 1880s. The year 1885 marked
a turning point in this process, for that was the year the political
Indians, the modem intellectuals interested in politics, who no
longer saw them selves as spokesmen of narrow group interests,
but as representatives of national interest vis -a-vis foreign rule,
as a ‘national party,’ saw their efforts bear fruit. The all -India
nationalist body that they brought into being was to be the
platform, the organizer, the headquarters, the symbol of the new
national spirit and politics.
British officialdom, too, was not slow in reading the new
messages that were being conveyed through the nati onalist
political activity leadin g to the founding of the Congress, and
watched them with suspicion, and a sense of foreboding. As this
political activity gathered force, the prospect of disloyalty,
sedition and Irish -type agitations began to haunt the
Government.[/INST] |
46 | India’s S truggle for Independence
The official suspicion was not merely the over -anxious
response of an administration that had not yet recovered from
the mutiny complex, but was in fact, well -founded. On the
surface, the nationalist Indian demands of those years — no
reduction of import duties on textile import no expansion in
Afghanistan or Bu rma, the right to bear arms, freedom of the
Press, reduction of military expenditure, higher expenditure on
famine relief, Indianization of the civil services, the right of
Indians to join the semi -military volunteer corps, the right of
Indian judges to tr y Europeans in criminal cases, the appeal to
British voters to vote for a party which would listen to Indians —
look rather mild, especially when considered separately. But
these were demands which a colonial regime could not easily
concede, for that would undermine its hegemony over the colonial
people. It is true that any criticism or demand no matter how
innocuous its appearance but which cannot be accommodated by
a system is in the long -run subversive of the system.
The new political thrust in the year s between 1875 and
1885 was the creation of the younger, more radical nationalist
intellectuals most of whom entered politics during this period.
They established new associations, having found that the older
associations were too narrowly conceived in ter ms of their
programmes and political activity as well as social bases. For
example, the British Indian Association of Bengal had
increasingly identified itself with the interests of the zamindars
and, thus, gradually lost its anti -British edge. The Bombay
Association and Madras Native Association had become
reactionary and moribund. And so the younger nationalists of
Bengal, led by Surendranath Banerjea and Anand Mohan Bose,
founded the Indian Association in 1876. Younger men of Madras
— M. Viraraghavachari ar, G. Subramaniya Iyer, P. Ananda
Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in | <s>[INST]46 | India’s S truggle for Independence
The official suspicion was not merely the over -anxious
response of an administration that had not yet recovered from
the mutiny complex, but was in fact, well -founded. On the
surface, the nationalist Indian demands of those years — no
reduction of import duties on textile import no expansion in
Afghanistan or Bu rma, the right to bear arms, freedom of the
Press, reduction of military expenditure, higher expenditure on
famine relief, Indianization of the civil services, the right of
Indians to join the semi -military volunteer corps, the right of
Indian judges to tr y Europeans in criminal cases, the appeal to
British voters to vote for a party which would listen to Indians —
look rather mild, especially when considered separately. But
these were demands which a colonial regime could not easily
concede, for that would undermine its hegemony over the colonial
people. It is true that any criticism or demand no matter how
innocuous its appearance but which cannot be accommodated by
a system is in the long -run subversive of the system.
The new political thrust in the year s between 1875 and
1885 was the creation of the younger, more radical nationalist
intellectuals most of whom entered politics during this period.
They established new associations, having found that the older
associations were too narrowly conceived in ter ms of their
programmes and political activity as well as social bases. For
example, the British Indian Association of Bengal had
increasingly identified itself with the interests of the zamindars
and, thus, gradually lost its anti -British edge. The Bombay
Association and Madras Native Association had become
reactionary and moribund. And so the younger nationalists of
Bengal, led by Surendranath Banerjea and Anand Mohan Bose,
founded the Indian Association in 1876. Younger men of Madras
— M. Viraraghavachari ar, G. Subramaniya Iyer, P. Ananda
Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in[/INST] |
Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in
1884. In Bombay, the more militant intellectuals like K.T. Telang
and Pherozeshah Mehta broke away from older leaders like
Dadabhai Framji and Dinshaw Petit on politi cal grounds and
formed the Bombay Presidency Association in 1885. Among the
older associations only the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha carried on as
before. But, then, it was already in the hands of nationalist
intellectuals. | <s>[INST]Charlu and others — formed the Madras Mahajan Sabha in
1884. In Bombay, the more militant intellectuals like K.T. Telang
and Pherozeshah Mehta broke away from older leaders like
Dadabhai Framji and Dinshaw Petit on politi cal grounds and
formed the Bombay Presidency Association in 1885. Among the
older associations only the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha carried on as
before. But, then, it was already in the hands of nationalist
intellectuals.[/INST] |
47 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
A sign of new political life in the c ountry was the coming
into existence during these years of nearly all the major
nationalist newspapers which were to dominate the Indian scene
till 1918 — The Hindu, Tribune, Bengalee, Mahraua and Kesari.
The one exception was the Amrita Bazar Patrika which was
already edited by new and younger men. It became an English
language newspaper only in 1878.
By 1885, the formation of an all -India political organization
had become an objective necessity, and the necessity was being
recognized by nationalists all over the country. Many recent
scholars have furnished detailed information on the many moves
that were made in that direction from 1877. These moves
acquired a greater sense of urgency especially from 1883 and
there was intense political activity. The Indian Mirror of Calcutta
was carrying on a continuous campaign on the question. The
Indian Association had already in December 1883 organized an
All-India National Conference and given a call for another one in
December 1885. Surendranath Banerjea , who was in volved in the
All-India National Conference, could not for that reason attend
the founding session of the National Congress in 1885).
Meanwhile, the Indians had gained experience, as well as
confidence, from the large number of agitations they had
organiz ed in the preceding ten years. Since 1875, there had been
a continuous campaign around cotton import duties which
Indians wanted to stay in the interests of the Indian textile
industry. A massive campaign had been organized during 1877 -
88 around the demand for the lndianization of Government
services. The Indians had opposed the Afghan adventure of Lord
Lytton and then compelled the British Government to contribute
towards the cost of the Second Afghan War. The Indian Press had
waged a major campaign agains t the efforts of the Government to
control it through the Vernacular Press Act. The Indians had also | <s>[INST]47 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
A sign of new political life in the c ountry was the coming
into existence during these years of nearly all the major
nationalist newspapers which were to dominate the Indian scene
till 1918 — The Hindu, Tribune, Bengalee, Mahraua and Kesari.
The one exception was the Amrita Bazar Patrika which was
already edited by new and younger men. It became an English
language newspaper only in 1878.
By 1885, the formation of an all -India political organization
had become an objective necessity, and the necessity was being
recognized by nationalists all over the country. Many recent
scholars have furnished detailed information on the many moves
that were made in that direction from 1877. These moves
acquired a greater sense of urgency especially from 1883 and
there was intense political activity. The Indian Mirror of Calcutta
was carrying on a continuous campaign on the question. The
Indian Association had already in December 1883 organized an
All-India National Conference and given a call for another one in
December 1885. Surendranath Banerjea , who was in volved in the
All-India National Conference, could not for that reason attend
the founding session of the National Congress in 1885).
Meanwhile, the Indians had gained experience, as well as
confidence, from the large number of agitations they had
organiz ed in the preceding ten years. Since 1875, there had been
a continuous campaign around cotton import duties which
Indians wanted to stay in the interests of the Indian textile
industry. A massive campaign had been organized during 1877 -
88 around the demand for the lndianization of Government
services. The Indians had opposed the Afghan adventure of Lord
Lytton and then compelled the British Government to contribute
towards the cost of the Second Afghan War. The Indian Press had
waged a major campaign agains t the efforts of the Government to
control it through the Vernacular Press Act. The Indians had also[/INST] |
opposed the effort to disarm them through the Arms Act. In
1881 -82 they had organized a protest against the Plantation
Labour and the Inland Emigration Act which condemned
plantation labourers to serfdom. A major agitation was organized
during 1883 in favour of the Ilbert Bill which would enable Indian
magistrates to try Europeans. This Bill was successfully thwarted
by the Europeans. The Indians had been qu ick to draw the
political lesson. Their efforts had failed because they had not | <s>[INST]opposed the effort to disarm them through the Arms Act. In
1881 -82 they had organized a protest against the Plantation
Labour and the Inland Emigration Act which condemned
plantation labourers to serfdom. A major agitation was organized
during 1883 in favour of the Ilbert Bill which would enable Indian
magistrates to try Europeans. This Bill was successfully thwarted
by the Europeans. The Indians had been qu ick to draw the
political lesson. Their efforts had failed because they had not[/INST] |
48 | India’s S truggle for Independence
been coordinated on an all -India basis. On the other hand, the
Europeans had acted in a concerted manner. Again in July 1883
a massive all -India effort was made to raise a Nati onal Fund
which would be used to promote political agitation in India as
well as England. In 1885, Indians fought for the right to join the
volunteer corps restricted to Europeans, and then organized an
appeal to British voters to vote for those candidates who were
friendly towards India. Several Indians were sent to Britain to put
the Indian case before British voters through public speeches,
and other means.
*
It thus, becomes clear that the foundation of the Congress
was the natural culmination of the p olitical work of the previous
years: By 1885, a stage had been reached in the political
development of India when certain basic tasks or objectives had
to be laid down and struggled for. Moreover these objectives were
correlated and could only be fulfilled by the coming together of
political workers in a single organization formed on an all - India
basis. The men who met in Bombay on 28 December 1885 were
inspired by these objectives and hoped to initiate the process of
achieving them. The success or failure and the future character
of the Congress would be determined not by who founded it but
by the extent to which these objectives were achieved in the
initial years.
*
India had just entered the process of becoming a nation or a
people. The first major obje ctive of the founders of the Indian
national movement was to promote this process, to weld Indians
into a nation, to create an Indian people. It was common for
colonial administrators and ideologues to assert that Indians
could not be united or freed becau se they were not a nation or a
people but a geographical expression, a mere congeries of
hundreds of diverse races and creeds. The Indians did not deny
this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India | <s>[INST]48 | India’s S truggle for Independence
been coordinated on an all -India basis. On the other hand, the
Europeans had acted in a concerted manner. Again in July 1883
a massive all -India effort was made to raise a Nati onal Fund
which would be used to promote political agitation in India as
well as England. In 1885, Indians fought for the right to join the
volunteer corps restricted to Europeans, and then organized an
appeal to British voters to vote for those candidates who were
friendly towards India. Several Indians were sent to Britain to put
the Indian case before British voters through public speeches,
and other means.
*
It thus, becomes clear that the foundation of the Congress
was the natural culmination of the p olitical work of the previous
years: By 1885, a stage had been reached in the political
development of India when certain basic tasks or objectives had
to be laid down and struggled for. Moreover these objectives were
correlated and could only be fulfilled by the coming together of
political workers in a single organization formed on an all - India
basis. The men who met in Bombay on 28 December 1885 were
inspired by these objectives and hoped to initiate the process of
achieving them. The success or failure and the future character
of the Congress would be determined not by who founded it but
by the extent to which these objectives were achieved in the
initial years.
*
India had just entered the process of becoming a nation or a
people. The first major obje ctive of the founders of the Indian
national movement was to promote this process, to weld Indians
into a nation, to create an Indian people. It was common for
colonial administrators and ideologues to assert that Indians
could not be united or freed becau se they were not a nation or a
people but a geographical expression, a mere congeries of
hundreds of diverse races and creeds. The Indians did not deny
this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India[/INST] |
this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India
was as Tilak, Surendranath Banerjea and ma ny others were fond
of saying — a nation -in-the-making . The Congress leaders
recognized that objective historical forces were bringing the | <s>[INST]this but asserted that t hey were now becoming a nation. India
was as Tilak, Surendranath Banerjea and ma ny others were fond
of saying — a nation -in-the-making . The Congress leaders
recognized that objective historical forces were bringing the[/INST] |
49 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
Indian people together. But they also realized that the people had
to become subjectively aware of the objective proc ess and that for
this it was necessarily to promote the feeling of national unity
and nationalism among them.
Above all, India being a nation -in-the-making its nationhood
could not be taken for granted. It had to be constantly developed
and consolidated. The promotion of national unity was a major
objective of the Congress and later its major achievement For
example, P. Ananda Charlu in his presidential address to the
Congress in 1891 described it ‘as a mighty nat ionalizer’ and said
that this was its most ‘glorious’ role.’ Among the three basic aims
and objectives of the Congress laid down by its first President,
W.C. Bannerji, was that of ‘the fuller development and
Foundation of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
consolidation of those sentiments of national unity.’ The Russian
traveller, I.P. Minaye ff wrote in his d iary that, when travelling
with Bonnerji, he asked, ‘what practical results did the Congress
leaders expect from the Con gress,’ Bonnerji replied: ‘Growth of
national feeling and unity o f Indians.’ Similai.ly commenting on
the first Congress session, the Indu Prakash of Bombay wrote: ‘It
was the beginning of a new life . . . it will greatly help in creating
a national feeling and binding together distant people by common
sympathy and comm on ends.’
The making of India into a nation was to be a prolonged
historical process. Moreover, the Congress leaders realized that
the diversity of India was such that special efforts unknown to
other parts of the world would have to be made and national
unity caref ully nurtured. In an effort to reach all regions, it was
decided to rotate the Congress session among different parts of
the country. The President was to belong to a region other than
where the Congress session was being held. | <s>[INST]49 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
Indian people together. But they also realized that the people had
to become subjectively aware of the objective proc ess and that for
this it was necessarily to promote the feeling of national unity
and nationalism among them.
Above all, India being a nation -in-the-making its nationhood
could not be taken for granted. It had to be constantly developed
and consolidated. The promotion of national unity was a major
objective of the Congress and later its major achievement For
example, P. Ananda Charlu in his presidential address to the
Congress in 1891 described it ‘as a mighty nat ionalizer’ and said
that this was its most ‘glorious’ role.’ Among the three basic aims
and objectives of the Congress laid down by its first President,
W.C. Bannerji, was that of ‘the fuller development and
Foundation of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
consolidation of those sentiments of national unity.’ The Russian
traveller, I.P. Minaye ff wrote in his d iary that, when travelling
with Bonnerji, he asked, ‘what practical results did the Congress
leaders expect from the Con gress,’ Bonnerji replied: ‘Growth of
national feeling and unity o f Indians.’ Similai.ly commenting on
the first Congress session, the Indu Prakash of Bombay wrote: ‘It
was the beginning of a new life . . . it will greatly help in creating
a national feeling and binding together distant people by common
sympathy and comm on ends.’
The making of India into a nation was to be a prolonged
historical process. Moreover, the Congress leaders realized that
the diversity of India was such that special efforts unknown to
other parts of the world would have to be made and national
unity caref ully nurtured. In an effort to reach all regions, it was
decided to rotate the Congress session among different parts of
the country. The President was to belong to a region other than
where the Congress session was being held.[/INST] |
where the Congress session was being held.
To reach out to t he followers of all religions and to remove
the fears of the minorities a rule was made at the 1888 session
that no resolution was to be passed to which an overwhelming
majority of Hindu or Muslim delegates objected. In 1889, a
minority clause was adopted in the resolution demanding refo rm
of legislative councils. According to the clause, wherever Parsis,
Christians , Muslims or Hindus were a minority their nu mber
elected to the Councils would not be less than the ir proportion in | <s>[INST]where the Congress session was being held.
To reach out to t he followers of all religions and to remove
the fears of the minorities a rule was made at the 1888 session
that no resolution was to be passed to which an overwhelming
majority of Hindu or Muslim delegates objected. In 1889, a
minority clause was adopted in the resolution demanding refo rm
of legislative councils. According to the clause, wherever Parsis,
Christians , Muslims or Hindus were a minority their nu mber
elected to the Councils would not be less than the ir proportion in[/INST] |
50 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the Population. The reason g iven by the mover of the resolution
was that India was not yet a homogenous country and political
methods here had, therefore, to differ from those in Europe.
The early national leaders were also determined to build a
secular nation, the Congress itself b eing intensely secular.
*
The second major objective of the early Congress was to
create a common political platform or programme around which
political workers in different parts of the country could gather
and Conduct their political activities, educati ng and mobilizing
people on an all -India basis. This was to be accomplished by
taking up those grievances and fighting for those rights which
Indians had in common in relation to the rulers.
For the same reason the Congress was not to take up
questions of social reform . At its second session, the President of
the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji, laid down this rule and said that
‘A National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the
entire nation has a direct participation.’ Congress was, therefore,
not the right place to discuss social reforms. ‘We are met
together,’ he said, ‘as a political body to represent to our rulers
our political aspirations.’
Modern politics — the politics of popular participation,
agitation mobilization — was new to India. The notion that
politics was not the preserve of the few but the domain of
everyone was not yet familiar to the people. No modern political
movement was possible till people realized this. And, then, on the
basis of this realization, an informed and determ ined political
opinion had to be created. The arousal, training, organization and
consolidation of public opinion was seen as a major task by the
Congress leaders. All initial activity of the early nationalism was
geared towards this end.
The first step w as seen to be the politicization and
unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other | <s>[INST]50 | India’s S truggle for Independence
the Population. The reason g iven by the mover of the resolution
was that India was not yet a homogenous country and political
methods here had, therefore, to differ from those in Europe.
The early national leaders were also determined to build a
secular nation, the Congress itself b eing intensely secular.
*
The second major objective of the early Congress was to
create a common political platform or programme around which
political workers in different parts of the country could gather
and Conduct their political activities, educati ng and mobilizing
people on an all -India basis. This was to be accomplished by
taking up those grievances and fighting for those rights which
Indians had in common in relation to the rulers.
For the same reason the Congress was not to take up
questions of social reform . At its second session, the President of
the Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji, laid down this rule and said that
‘A National Congress must confine itself to questions in which the
entire nation has a direct participation.’ Congress was, therefore,
not the right place to discuss social reforms. ‘We are met
together,’ he said, ‘as a political body to represent to our rulers
our political aspirations.’
Modern politics — the politics of popular participation,
agitation mobilization — was new to India. The notion that
politics was not the preserve of the few but the domain of
everyone was not yet familiar to the people. No modern political
movement was possible till people realized this. And, then, on the
basis of this realization, an informed and determ ined political
opinion had to be created. The arousal, training, organization and
consolidation of public opinion was seen as a major task by the
Congress leaders. All initial activity of the early nationalism was
geared towards this end.
The first step w as seen to be the politicization and
unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other[/INST] |
unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other
sections. The primary objective was to go beyond the redressal of
immediate grievances and organize sustained political activity
along the lines of the Anti-Corn Law League (formed in Britain by | <s>[INST]unification of the opinion of the educated, and then of other
sections. The primary objective was to go beyond the redressal of
immediate grievances and organize sustained political activity
along the lines of the Anti-Corn Law League (formed in Britain by[/INST] |
51 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
Cobden and Bright in 1838 to secure reform of Corn Laws). The
leaders as well as the people also had to gain confidence in their
own capacity to organize political opposition to the most powerful
state of the day.
All this was no easy task. A prolonged period of
politicization would be needed. Many later writers and critics
have concentrated on the methods of political struggle of the
early nationalist leaders, on their petitions, prayers and
memorials. It is, of cours e, true that they did not organize mass
movements and mass struggles. But the critics have missed out
the most important part of their activity — that all of it led to
politics, to the politicization of the people. Justice Ranade, who
was known as a politi cal sage, had, in his usual perceptive
manner, seen this as early as 1891 When the young and
impatient twenty -six-year-old Gokhale expressed disappointment
when the Government sent a two line reply to a carefully and
laboriously prepared memorial by the Po ona Sarvajanik Sabha,
Ranade reassured him: ‘You don’t realize our place in the history
of our country. These memorials are nominally addressed to
Government, in reality they are addressed to the people, so that
they may learn how to think in these matters . This work must be
done for many years, without expecting any other result, because
politics of this kind is altogether new in this land.”
*
As part of the basic objective of giving birth to a national
movement, it was necessary to create a common all -India
national -political leadership, that is, to construct what Antonio
Gramsci, the famous Italian Marxist, calls the headquarters of a
movement. Nations and people become capable of meaningful
and effective political action only when they are organized. They
become a people or ‘historical subjects’ only when they are
organized as such. The first step in a national movement is taken | <s>[INST]51 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
Cobden and Bright in 1838 to secure reform of Corn Laws). The
leaders as well as the people also had to gain confidence in their
own capacity to organize political opposition to the most powerful
state of the day.
All this was no easy task. A prolonged period of
politicization would be needed. Many later writers and critics
have concentrated on the methods of political struggle of the
early nationalist leaders, on their petitions, prayers and
memorials. It is, of cours e, true that they did not organize mass
movements and mass struggles. But the critics have missed out
the most important part of their activity — that all of it led to
politics, to the politicization of the people. Justice Ranade, who
was known as a politi cal sage, had, in his usual perceptive
manner, seen this as early as 1891 When the young and
impatient twenty -six-year-old Gokhale expressed disappointment
when the Government sent a two line reply to a carefully and
laboriously prepared memorial by the Po ona Sarvajanik Sabha,
Ranade reassured him: ‘You don’t realize our place in the history
of our country. These memorials are nominally addressed to
Government, in reality they are addressed to the people, so that
they may learn how to think in these matters . This work must be
done for many years, without expecting any other result, because
politics of this kind is altogether new in this land.”
*
As part of the basic objective of giving birth to a national
movement, it was necessary to create a common all -India
national -political leadership, that is, to construct what Antonio
Gramsci, the famous Italian Marxist, calls the headquarters of a
movement. Nations and people become capable of meaningful
and effective political action only when they are organized. They
become a people or ‘historical subjects’ only when they are
organized as such. The first step in a national movement is taken[/INST] |
when the ‘carriers’ of national feeling or national identity begin to
organize the people. But to be able to do so successfully , these
‘carriers’ or leaders must themselves be unified; they must share
a collective identification, that is, they must come to know each
other and share and evolve a common outlook, perspective, sense
of purpose, as also common feelings. According to th e circular | <s>[INST]when the ‘carriers’ of national feeling or national identity begin to
organize the people. But to be able to do so successfully , these
‘carriers’ or leaders must themselves be unified; they must share
a collective identification, that is, they must come to know each
other and share and evolve a common outlook, perspective, sense
of purpose, as also common feelings. According to th e circular[/INST] |
52 | India’s S truggle for Independence
which, in March 1885, informed political workers of the coming
Congress session, the Congress was intended ‘to enable all the
most earnest labourers in the cause of national progress to
become personally known to each other.’9 W.C. Bonnerji, as the
first Congress President, reiterated that one of the Congress
objectives was the ‘eradication, by direct friendly personal
intercourse, of all possible race, creed, or provincial prejudices
amongst all lovers of our country,’ and ‘the promotion of pers onal
intimacy and friendship amongst all the more earnest workers in
our country’s cause in (all) parts of the Empire.”
In other words, the founders of the Congress understood
that the first requirement of a national movement was a national
leadership. The social - ideological complexion that this leadership
would acquire was a question that was different from the main
objective of the creation of a national movement. This complexion
would depend on a host of factors: the role of different social
classes, id eological influences, outcomes of ideological struggles,
and so on.
The early nationalist leaders saw the internalization and
indigenization of political democracy as one of their main
objectives. They based their politics on the doctrine of the
sovereign ty of the people, or, as Dadabhai Naoroji put it, on ‘the
new lesson that Kings are made for the people, not peoples for
their Kings.’
From the beginning, the Congress was organized in the form
of a Parliament. In fact, the word Congress was borrowed from
North American history to connote an assembly of the’ people.
The proceedings of the Congress sessions were conducted
democratically, issues being decided through debate and
discussion and occasionally through voting. It was, in fact, the
Congress, and no t the bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial
state, as some writers wrongly argue, which indigenized,
popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India. | <s>[INST]52 | India’s S truggle for Independence
which, in March 1885, informed political workers of the coming
Congress session, the Congress was intended ‘to enable all the
most earnest labourers in the cause of national progress to
become personally known to each other.’9 W.C. Bonnerji, as the
first Congress President, reiterated that one of the Congress
objectives was the ‘eradication, by direct friendly personal
intercourse, of all possible race, creed, or provincial prejudices
amongst all lovers of our country,’ and ‘the promotion of pers onal
intimacy and friendship amongst all the more earnest workers in
our country’s cause in (all) parts of the Empire.”
In other words, the founders of the Congress understood
that the first requirement of a national movement was a national
leadership. The social - ideological complexion that this leadership
would acquire was a question that was different from the main
objective of the creation of a national movement. This complexion
would depend on a host of factors: the role of different social
classes, id eological influences, outcomes of ideological struggles,
and so on.
The early nationalist leaders saw the internalization and
indigenization of political democracy as one of their main
objectives. They based their politics on the doctrine of the
sovereign ty of the people, or, as Dadabhai Naoroji put it, on ‘the
new lesson that Kings are made for the people, not peoples for
their Kings.’
From the beginning, the Congress was organized in the form
of a Parliament. In fact, the word Congress was borrowed from
North American history to connote an assembly of the’ people.
The proceedings of the Congress sessions were conducted
democratically, issues being decided through debate and
discussion and occasionally through voting. It was, in fact, the
Congress, and no t the bureaucratic and authoritarian colonial
state, as some writers wrongly argue, which indigenized,
popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India.[/INST] |
popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India.
Similarly, the early national leaders made maintenance of
civil liberties and their extension a n integral part of the national
movement. They fought against every infringement of the freedom
of the Press and speech and opposed every attempt to curtail
them. They struggled for separation of the judicial and executive
powers and fought against racial discrimination. | <s>[INST]popularized and rooted parliamentary democracy in India.
Similarly, the early national leaders made maintenance of
civil liberties and their extension a n integral part of the national
movement. They fought against every infringement of the freedom
of the Press and speech and opposed every attempt to curtail
them. They struggled for separation of the judicial and executive
powers and fought against racial discrimination.[/INST] |
53 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
*
It was necessary to evolve an understanding of colonialism
and then a nationalist ideology based on this understanding. In
this respect, the early nationalist leaders were simultaneously
learners and teachers. No ready - made anti -colonia l
understanding or ideology was available to them in the 1870s
and 1880s. They had to develop their own anti -colonial ideology
on the basis of a concrete study of the reality and of their own
practice.
There could have been no national struggle without an
ideological struggle clarifying the concept of we as a nation
against colonialism as an enemy They had to find answers to
many questions. For example, is Britain ruling India for India’s
benefit? Are the interests of the rulers and the ruled in harmony,
or does a basic contradiction exist between the two? Is the
contradiction of the Indian people with British bureaucrats in
India, or with the British Government, or with the system of
colonialism as such? Are the Indian people capable of fighting the
mighty British empire? And how is the fight to be waged?
In finding answers to these and other questions many
mistakes were made. For example, the early nationalists failed to
understand, at least till the beginning of the 20th century, the
character of the col onial state. But, then, some mistakes are an
inevitable part of any serious effort to grapple with reality. In a
way, despite mistakes and setbacks, it was perhaps no
misfortune that no ready -made, cut and dried, symmetrical
formulae were available to them . Such formulae are often lifeless
and, therefore, poor guides to action.
True, the early national leaders did not organize mass
movements against the British. But they did carry out an
ideological struggle against them. It should not be forgotten that
nationalist or anti -imperialist struggle is a struggle about
colonialism before it becomes a struggle against colonialism. And | <s>[INST]53 |Foundations of the Indian National Congress: The Reality
*
It was necessary to evolve an understanding of colonialism
and then a nationalist ideology based on this understanding. In
this respect, the early nationalist leaders were simultaneously
learners and teachers. No ready - made anti -colonia l
understanding or ideology was available to them in the 1870s
and 1880s. They had to develop their own anti -colonial ideology
on the basis of a concrete study of the reality and of their own
practice.
There could have been no national struggle without an
ideological struggle clarifying the concept of we as a nation
against colonialism as an enemy They had to find answers to
many questions. For example, is Britain ruling India for India’s
benefit? Are the interests of the rulers and the ruled in harmony,
or does a basic contradiction exist between the two? Is the
contradiction of the Indian people with British bureaucrats in
India, or with the British Government, or with the system of
colonialism as such? Are the Indian people capable of fighting the
mighty British empire? And how is the fight to be waged?
In finding answers to these and other questions many
mistakes were made. For example, the early nationalists failed to
understand, at least till the beginning of the 20th century, the
character of the col onial state. But, then, some mistakes are an
inevitable part of any serious effort to grapple with reality. In a
way, despite mistakes and setbacks, it was perhaps no
misfortune that no ready -made, cut and dried, symmetrical
formulae were available to them . Such formulae are often lifeless
and, therefore, poor guides to action.
True, the early national leaders did not organize mass
movements against the British. But they did carry out an
ideological struggle against them. It should not be forgotten that
nationalist or anti -imperialist struggle is a struggle about
colonialism before it becomes a struggle against colonialism. And[/INST] |
the founding fathers of the Congress carried out this ‘struggle
about colonialism’ in a brilliant fashion.
* | <s>[INST]the founding fathers of the Congress carried out this ‘struggle
about colonialism’ in a brilliant fashion.
*[/INST] |
54 | India’s S truggle for Independence
From the beginning, t he Congress was conceived not as a
party but as a movement. Except for agreement on the very broad
objectives discussed earlier, it did not require any particular
political or ideological commitment from its activists. It also did
not try to limit its following to any social class or group. As a
movement, it incorporated different political trends, ideologies
and social classes and groups so long as the commitment to
democratic and secular nationalism was there. From the outset,
the Congress included in the ranks of its leadership persons with
diverse political thinking, widely disparate levels of political
militancy and varying economic approaches.
To sum up: The basic objectives of the early nationalist
leaders were to lay the foundations of a secular and democratic
national movement, to politicize and politically educate the
people, to form the headquarters of the movement, that is, to
form an all-India leadership group, and to develop and propagate
an anti-colonial nationalist ideology.
History will jud ge the extent of the success or failure of the
early national movement not by an abstract, ahistorical standard
but by the extent to which it was able to attain the basic
objectives it had laid down for itself. By this standard, its
achievements were quite substantial and that is why it grew from
humble beginnings in the 1880s into the most spectacular of
popular mass movements in the 20th century. Historians are
not likely to disagree with the assessment of its work in the early
phase by two of its major leaders. Referring to the preparatory
nature of the Congress work from 1885 to 1905, Dadabhai
Naoroji wrote to D.E. Wacha in January 1905: ‘The very
discontent and impatience it (the Congress) has evoked against
itself as slow and non -progressive among the rising generation
are among its best results or fruit. It is its own evolution and
progress ….(the task is) to evolve the required revolution | <s>[INST]54 | India’s S truggle for Independence
From the beginning, t he Congress was conceived not as a
party but as a movement. Except for agreement on the very broad
objectives discussed earlier, it did not require any particular
political or ideological commitment from its activists. It also did
not try to limit its following to any social class or group. As a
movement, it incorporated different political trends, ideologies
and social classes and groups so long as the commitment to
democratic and secular nationalism was there. From the outset,
the Congress included in the ranks of its leadership persons with
diverse political thinking, widely disparate levels of political
militancy and varying economic approaches.
To sum up: The basic objectives of the early nationalist
leaders were to lay the foundations of a secular and democratic
national movement, to politicize and politically educate the
people, to form the headquarters of the movement, that is, to
form an all-India leadership group, and to develop and propagate
an anti-colonial nationalist ideology.
History will jud ge the extent of the success or failure of the
early national movement not by an abstract, ahistorical standard
but by the extent to which it was able to attain the basic
objectives it had laid down for itself. By this standard, its
achievements were quite substantial and that is why it grew from
humble beginnings in the 1880s into the most spectacular of
popular mass movements in the 20th century. Historians are
not likely to disagree with the assessment of its work in the early
phase by two of its major leaders. Referring to the preparatory
nature of the Congress work from 1885 to 1905, Dadabhai
Naoroji wrote to D.E. Wacha in January 1905: ‘The very
discontent and impatience it (the Congress) has evoked against
itself as slow and non -progressive among the rising generation
are among its best results or fruit. It is its own evolution and
progress ….(the task is) to evolve the required revolution[/INST] |