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{
"creator": "Swindell Blumenthal-Barby, J. S.",
"date": "2010",
"datestamp": 1567953700000,
"description": "The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence",
"identifier": "oai:philarchive.org/rec/A",
"language": "en",
"subject": "Philosophy",
"title": "Ambivalence",
"type": "info:eu-repo/semantics/article"
} | PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE This article was downloaded by: [Ph.D, J.S. Swindell] On: 10 March 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 919787708] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 3741 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Philosophical Explorations Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: Ambivalence J. S. Swindell a a Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, USA Online publication date: 10 March 2010 To cite this Article Swindell, J. S.(2010) 'Ambivalence', Philosophical Explorations, 13: 1, 23 - 34 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13869790903318516 URL: Full terms and conditions of use: This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Ambivalence J.S. Swindell Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, USA The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it, only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon full treatment in the context of action theory - providing an analysis of how it relates to the structure and freedom of the will. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's account, all revolving around the charge that his account contains a serious ambiguity between willing and identifying. With such objections in place, I then develop an analysis that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities that Frankfurt's analysis is prey to. I briefly distinguish ambivalence from other types of internal conflict. This paper aims to offer conceptual clarification on the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the normative merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence. Keywords: ambivalence; autonomy; Frankfurt; will; identification 1. Introduction The phenomenon of ambivalence is an important one for any philosophy of action. Despite this importance, there is a lack of a fully satisfactory analysis of the phenomenon. Although many contemporary philosophers recognize the phenomenon, and address topics related to it,1 only Harry Frankfurt has given the phenomenon a full treatment in the context of action theory - examining how it relates to the structure of the will, freedom of the will, and freedom of action. In this paper, I develop objections to Frankfurt's analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence. I argue that his account contains an ambiguity between identification and willing. I treat this ambiguity as a distinction, and then use it to develop an analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities to which Frankfurt's analysis is prey. Throughout, I consider and rebut some preliminary objections to this new analysis. 2. Frankfurt on ambivalence Frankfurt has argued that the objects, people, courses of action etc., that we desire are objects of first-order desires. We, as humans, have the ability to reflect on these desires ISSN 1386-9795 print/ISSN 1741-5918 online # 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13869790903318516 Email: Philosophical Explorations Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2010, 23-34 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 and either want to have them or not want to have them - these desires about our first-order desires are second-order desires. If, upon reflecting on a desire, we want to have it and we want it to be effective in moving us to action, then it is our will (also referred to by Frankfurt as a second-order volition), and acting freely consists in acting in accordance with our will (Frankfurt 1988a, 14-6). According to Frankfurt, ambivalence occurs when there is a conflict during will formation. An ambivalent agent experiences conflict during the process of reflecting on a desire that she has, and the conflict prevents her from forming a will, i.e. from taking a position on whether it is a desire that she wants to have and to be effective in action. Frankfurt's exact words: Ambivalence is constituted by conflicting volitional movements or tendencies. . . (Frankfurt 1999b, 99) If there is an unresolved conflict among someone's second-order desires, then he is in danger of having no second-order volition; for unless this conflict is resolved, he has no preference concerning which of his first-order desires is to be his will. (Frankfurt 1988a, 21) He is inclined in one direction, and he is inclined in the contrary direction as well; and his attitude toward these inclinations is unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of his alternatives, nor that he prefers the other, nor that he likes them equally. (Frankfurt 1999b, 100) Frankfurt differentiates ambivalence from other types of conflict that an agent may experience. One common type of conflict that an agent may experience is temptation. In the case of temptation, the agent has taken a side about what desires she wants to have and to move her to act (she has formed a will); and so the conflict is between her and the outlaw desires. In ambivalence, however, the conflict is in the agent; for she has not taken a side; the agent herself is torn. Frankfurt says, '. . .the person is not merely in conflict with forces "outside" him; rather, he himself is divided' (Frankfurt 1988b, 165). Another common type of conflict that an agent may experience is a conflict of first-order desires. An agent may experience a conflict at the first-order level (e.g. eating steak or a vegetarian meal for dinner), but to qualify as a case of ambivalence, there would have to be a conflict at the second-order level as well (e.g. the agent is conflicted about whether she wants her desire for pleasure or her desire for health to be effective in action). Frankfurt argues that the opposite of ambivalence is wholeheartedness. He says, 'If ambivalence is a disease of the will, the health of the will is to be unified and in this sense wholehearted' (Frankfurt 1999b, 100). And that wholeheartedness '. . . requires that with respect to any such conflict, he himself be fully resolved. This means that he must be resolutely on the side of one of the forces struggling within him and not on the side of any other. Concerning the opposition of these forces, he has to know where he himself stands. In other words, he must know what he wants' (Frankfurt 1999b, 100). Once a person is wholehearted, Frankfurt describes it as being '. . . tantamount to the enjoyment of a kind of self-satisfaction . . . a state of satisfaction with the condition of the self . . .' (Frankfurt 1999b, 102). The satisfaction that Frankfurt has in mind is not narcissistic or enthusiastic, it is just '. . . an absence of restlessness or resistance . . .' (Frankfurt 1999b, 103-4). 3. Why Frankfurt's analysis is flawed Although Frankfurt's work has the merits of taking on the phenomenon of ambivalence directly, his analysis contains a serious ambiguity between identifying and willing. This 24 J.S. Swindell D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 ambiguity needs to be sorted out in order to accurately locate the phenomenon of ambivalence and in order to differentiate it from other conflicts of the will. The ambiguity To begin, consider Frankfurt's analysis of freedom of the will. In his 1971 seminal paper, 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Frankfurt argued that what makes us persons is the ability to reflect on our desires; to form 'second-order desires'. For example, a smoker may desire a cigarette, but she does not want to want to smoke the cigarette because she is trying to quit. The smoker has a 'first-order desire' to smoke, but does not have a 'second-order desire' to smoke. Frankfurt argues that the smoker's will is not free, because a person's will is free only when her first order desires are in accord with her second order desires. The smoker who is trying to quit does not identify with her first order desire to smoke the cigarette; she views it as outlaw (Frankfurt 1988a, 14-6). On this account, freedom of the will requires an agent somehow to identify with, as opposed to outlaw, the desires that she has. Frankfurt describes the range of ways that an agent can identify with a desire: to identify with a desire is to 'acknowledge that satisfying it is to be assigned some position in my preferences'; it may be that the desire doesn't please me or make me proud, but I am 'willing to have it represent me'; I 'accept it'; I make 'no determined effort to dissociate myself from it'; in 'weary resignation' I 'consent' to having it and to being influenced by it (Frankfurt 2006, 8).2 Or, I could identify more strongly with the desire and regard it with 'welcoming approval', or even feel like not having that desire would be 'unthinkable' (Frankfurt 1988c, 177-90; Frankfurt 1998, 26-7). On the other hand, to view a desire as outlaw is described by Frankfurt in the following range of ways: I feel like I am a 'bystander' to it; it 'disturbs' me; it makes 'no sense' to me; I'd 'never think of acting on it'; it has 'no recognizable warrant'; it 'happens to me/enters my mind'; it feels 'oddly disconnected' from me or even 'dangerously antithetical'; it is an 'unacceptable intruder'; I feel an 'anxious disposition to resist it'; it is 'outlawed and disenfranchised'; 'I refuse to recognize it as grounds for what I think and do'; I treat it as 'categorically unacceptable' and try to 'suppress it or rid myself of it entirely'; regardless of how insistent it may or how powerfully moved by it I am I 'give it no rational claim'; I am 'determined to give it no position at all' in the order of my preferences (Frankfurt 2006, 9-10).3 If the outlawed desire succeeds in defeating our attempts to resist it, then '. . . the outlaw imposes itself upon us without authority, and against our own will. This suggests a useful way of understanding what it is for a person's will to be free' (Frankfurt 2006, 14). So far, it seems that, for Frankfurt, a person is acting with free will so long as she is acting on one of the desires that she identifies with (and not acting on one that she views as outlaw). But, in other places in Frankfurt's work, it seems as if something more specific is required for freedom of the will: in order for a person to enjoy freedom of the will, she must choose a particular desire, out of the set that she identifies with, to be effective in action. That desire is then said to be the one that she 'wills'. For example, Frankfurt says: 'It is not merely that he wants the desire to X to be among the desires by which, to one degree or another, he is moved or inclined to act. He wants this desire to be effective - that is, to provide the motive in what he actually does . . . want the desire to X not merely to be one of his desires but, more decisively, to be his will' (Frankfurt 1988a, 15). So then, the picture is something like this: On this reading of Frankfurt, freedom of the will consists not merely in having and acting on desires that an agent identifies with, but in having and acting on the desire that Ambivalence 25 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 the agent (more narrowly) wills (wants to be effective in guiding action). Freedom of the will consists in an orderly arrangement. Passages in Frankfurt's most recent essay, 'Taking Ourselves Seriously', lend support to this reading that freedom of the will consists in an orderly arrangement of first-order desires (i.e. structure and harmony). Frankfurt says: 'The volitional unity in which the freedom of the will consists is purely structural' (Frankfurt 2006); 'When we are acquiescent to ourselves, or willing freely, there is no conflict within the structure of our motivations and desires' (Frankfurt 2006); 'Willing freely means that the self is at that time harmoniously integrated' (Frankfurt 2006); and 'This would amount to an inner harmony that comes to much the same thing as having a free will' (Frankfurt 2006, 17-9). The ambiguity in Frankfurt's account of freedom of the will leads to a similar ambiguity in his analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence. At times, Frankfurt writes as if ambivalence occurs at the level of identification, and at other times he writes as if it occurs at the level of identification plus willing (at the level of ordering the desires that the person identifies with). In support of the former reading of Frankfurt's analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence, consider the following passage: 'A person is ambivalent, then, only if he is indecisive concerning whether to be for or against a certain psychic position' (Frankfurt 1999b, 99). It is not that the agent has decided that she identifies with the desire and approves of it being among her motivations, but just cannot decide whether she wants it or other desires that she identifies with to move her to action right now. The agent cannot even decide whether she identifies with the desire in question at all. Similarly, about the ambivalent agent, Frankfurt says: 'He is inclined in one direction, and he is inclined in the contrary direction as well; and his attitude toward these inclinations is unsettled. Thus, it is true of him neither that he prefers one of his alternatives, nor that he prefers the other, nor that he likes them both equally' (Frankfurt 1999b, 100). At other times, however, Frankfurt writes as if ambivalence occurs at the level of willing; that it is a failure of the agent to order her desires and decide which of them she wants to be effective in action at a particular time. In other words, he writes as if ambivalence occurs when an agent likes or dislikes both alternatives equally (contra the above quote), and cannot decide which to prioritize, or which to be effective in action at a particular time. Frankfurt writes, to overcome ambivalence, an agent should '. . . give up trying to have things both ways and find some coherent order . . .' (Frankfurt 1999b, 107). The ambivalent agent has a conflict among the desires that she identifies with and has trouble ordering them, i.e., deciding which of the conflicting desires she wants to be effective in action at a particular time. Now that the ambiguity in Frankfurt's account is exposed, the ambiguity can be turned into a distinction (between willing and identifying), that can allow us not only to understand the phenomenon of ambivalence better, but also to understand its relationship to other conflicts of the will. For example, if ambivalence is understood as a failure or a trouble at the level of deciding which desire the agent wants to be effective in action at a particular time (i.e. of willing), then one way that weakness of will might be understood is that an agent has decided which desire she wants to be effective in action but acts not on that desire, but on another desire that she identifies with (but does not more narrowly will). If, on the other hand, ambivalence is understood as a failure to decide whether a desire is one that the agent identifies with or views as outlaw, then one way that weakness of the will might be understood is that an agent has decided which desires she in some sense identifies with and which she views as outlaw, but has acted on a desire that she has outlawed. Moreover, understanding ambivalence in will versus identification will be an important distinction to keep in mind when theorizing about how to resolve it. Suggested methods of 26 J.S. Swindell D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 resolution may vary greatly if the problem is one of forming a psychic attitude towards a desire or one of ordering desires. 4. New analysis Locating ambivalence The above discussion of the ambiguity in Frankfurt's analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence is not purely negative, for we can sort out the ambiguities and develop an alternative analysis of the phenomenon. Referring to Figure 1, ambivalence can occur during the first decision process (of whether or not to identify with or reject a particular first order desire). Ambivalence can also occur during the second decision process, i.e. when an agent is deciding which desire (of the desires she identifies with) she wants to be effective in action at a particular time. Hence, ambivalence can be either a failure/trouble to form a psychic position towards one's desires (to identify or outlaw) or a failure/trouble to order one's desires (to form a will). Indeed, there are many cases where an agent identifies with desires where the satisfaction of one negatively affects the satisfaction of another, and as a result has trouble ordering those preferences.4 Consider the literary example of Agamemnon. In Aeschylus's play Agamemnon, Agamemnon is faced with the conflict of whether or not to kill his daughter Iphigenia in order to spare the lives of his cavalry. The anguish of his mental conflict can be felt in his words (Aeschylus 2008): A heavy doom, sure, if God's will were broken; But to slay mine own child, who my house delighteth, Is that not heavy? That her blood should flow On her father's hand, hard beside an altar? My path is sorrow wheresoe'er I go. Shall Agamemnon fail his ships and people, And the hosts of Hellas melt as melts the snow? They cry, they thirst, for a death that shall break the spell, Figure 1. Identifying and willing. Ambivalence 27 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 For a Virgin's blood: 'tis a rite of old, men tell. And they burn with longing.- O God may the end be well! Agamemnon has two desires, to spare the life of his daughter and to spare the lives of his cavalry. It is not as if Agamemnon is having a problem forming a psychic attitude towards those desires; he is not having a problem deciding whether he identifies with both desires or views them as outlaw. He does identify with both. The problem that Agamemnon is having is one of ordering his desires; of deciding which desire he wills to be effective in action at this particular time. Consider another example of an agent experiencing ambivalence: an agent is ambivalent about having children. The agent has a desire to raise children (and raise them well) and is not having a problem deciding whether he identifies with that desire or views it as outlaw; he identifies with it (he wants to assign it some position among the motivations and causes of his behavior). But the agent also has a desire to devote himself intensely to his career. He also identifies with that desire, but knows that the satisfaction of it conflicts with the satisfaction of his desire to raise children well, and so is having a problem deciding which of the two desires he wants to move him to action. His ambivalence is a case of a failure to order desires (a failure of willing) and not a failure to form a psychic position about a desire (a failure of identifying). Ambivalence as a structure of the will Thus far, I have clarified an ambiguity in Frankfurt's account about the location of ambivalence, and have argued that cases of ambivalence can be located not just in the realm of identifying, but also in the realm of willing. Another important conceptual issue that must be addressed is whether ambivalence is to be construed as a feeling that an agent has or as a structure of an agent's will. Frankfurt defines ambivalence as a structure of the will, as I explained in the section on Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence. I essentially agree with Frankfurt's analysis on this point, but an important objection needs to be addressed. Some might object that ambivalence is fundamentally a feeling, the feeling of being torn and conflicted, just as love and anger are fundamentally feelings. It would seem odd for love or anger to be defined as anything but a feeling; it would be as if we as outsiders could insist that someone was not really angry or in love because they did not behave a certain way. It would be similarly odd to define ambivalence as anything but a feeling. In response, this objection has some merit, for there is an affective component to ambivalence just as there is to love and anger. But there is a danger in making the affective component the, or part of the, necessary and sufficient conditions for ambivalence for two reasons: (1) we then face a conceptual difficulty of counterexamples where an agent (e.g. a zombie, or an anthropologist from Mars) has the structure of the will for ambivalence, looks like she is ambivalent, but lacks the affective component; (2) it becomes difficult to differentiate ambivalence from other conflicts, such as temptation and regret, that might feel very similar to the agent experiencing them. So, in order to accommodate the objection that there is some affective component tied to the phenomenon of ambivalence, but avoid the difficulties involved in making an affective element the, or part of the, necessary and sufficient conditions for ambivalence, I suggest that ambivalence is fundamentally a certain structure of the will (conflict of second order desires) that is 'necessarily-typically' accompanied by a certain affective element (the feeling of being torn). That is, the affective component is necessarily part of it, but it does not have to occur in all genuine cases; it merely has to 28 J.S. Swindell D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 typically occur. I borrow the term 'necessarily-typically' from Berys Gaut in his article, 'The Paradox of Horror' (Gaut 1993). Gaut argued that although it may seem paradoxical that some of us enjoy horror (i.e. enjoy unpleasant emotions such as fear and disgust), it is not a paradox at all because emotions are essentially evaluations (in the case of horror, negative) which can feel either pleasant or unpleasant (in the case of horror, pleasant). He recognizes that negative emotions (evaluations) are usually tied to unpleasant feelings and so he argues for a conceptual connection between the evaluation and the feeling that he calls 'necessarily-typically'. Negative emotions 'necessarily-typically' produce unpleasant feelings, in the same way that pain 'necessarily-typically' produces avoidance behavior. Two degrees of ambivalence Thus far, I have characterized ambivalence as a structure of the will in which there is either a difficulty in forming of second order positions (identifying or outlawing) or a difficulty ordering second order desires (willing), that necessarily typically causes the agent to feel torn. Ambivalence of both types comes in degrees. The most severe degree, I call paralyzing ambivalence. The difficulty of a decision is so paralyzing that the agent does not form a will at all; she does not decide which of her desires she wants to be effective in action at a particular time (think of Agamemnon in the phase of paralysis). A less severe degree of ambivalence I call residual ambivalence. The agent does form a will but is still drawn towards the other desires that conflict with the desire that she wills. I will discuss each degree of ambivalence in turn. As an example of a case of paralyzing ambivalence, consider the following: Mr. X, a youthful 70 year old man, was involved in a head on motor vehicle accident. As a result, he lay in a hospital bed, on a ventilator, and paralyzed from the neck down. Mr. X had to decide whether to have the ventilator withdrawn and die, or remain on the ventilator, living a life on a ventilator and paralyzed from the neck down. Mr. X's family, physicians, and an ethicist all talked with Mr. X to try to ascertain what he really wanted. These conversations spanned over weeks, but Mr. X did not know what he really wanted. He could not decide which of his desires (his desire to live or his desire to avoid living a life paralyzed and on a ventilator) he wanted to be effective in action; he could not form a will; he was paralyzingly ambivalent. The severity of ambivalence found in paralyzing ambivalence is usually the result of having to decide between making a full commitment to one thing or another, and a compromise is not obvious or available because one commitment excludes acting on the other. When an agent, such as Mr. X, is paralyzingly ambivalent (referring once again to the diagram below), he experiences a conflict among the desires that he identifies with and does not settle on which of those desires he wants to be at the top of the order; to be effective in action at a particular time. In the case of Mr. X, he has a desire to live that he identifies with, and a desire to live a certain quality of life that he identifies with, and the satisfaction of those two desires conflict in this particular instance. Mr. X does not decide on the ordering of those desires; his ambivalence is paralyzing in that he fails to form a will. While paralyzing ambivalence is a structure of the will in which there is a difficulty in forming second order positions (identifying or outlawing), or a difficulty in ordering second order desires that (1) necessarily typically causes the agent to feel torn and (2) results in the agent failing to form a will, there is another degree of ambivalence that I call residual. Residual ambivalence is a structure of the will in which there is a difficulty in forming second order positions (identifying or outlawing), or a difficulty in ordering second order desires that (1) necessarily typically causes the agent to feel torn or uneasy, but (2) does Ambivalence 29 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 not result in the agent failing to form a will. The agent does form a will but is still drawn towards the other second order desires that conflict with the desire that she wills. Imagine the following example: Chris and John are engaged to be married and have a young child together. John was raised Catholic, but has not seriously practiced his religion since his teens. Lately however, John has been rekindling his relationship with the Church and over the past few months he has begun to experience a deep feeling that he is being called to become a priest. John has a desire to marry Chris and share a life with Chris and their daughter, but he also has a desire to become a priest. Both desires are ones that he identifies with in that he in some sense endorses them as being among the influences on his behavior. After some time and inner turmoil, John makes a decision and forms a will. He commits to his desire for a life with Chris and their daughter being the one that is effective in action. One question that may arise is that it is not clear what it means to simultaneously form a will (decide which desire is to be effective in action at t1) yet still be strongly drawn towards conflicting alternatives (that one also identifies with). This question arises from the differentiation between types of ambivalence that I have provided, and from the distinction between willing and identifying that I have drawn. It is an important and interesting question about the particular phenomenon of residual ambivalence, and although addressing it fully would require a separate paper on residual ambivalence alone, I will provide a preliminary response. To form a will in cases of residual ambivalence is to resign oneself to a certain ordering of one's desires, and to take steps towards making the desire that has been ordered primary effective in action. Now, taking steps towards making the primary desire effective in action can mean small and gradual steps. For example, whenever John feels like looking at the webpage for priests he redirects his thoughts to something else. Whenever he begins to miss his deep involvement with the Church, he reminds himself of what he would be losing in pursuing that option. John begins therapy with Chris to make their relationship even better and more attractive. John is, however, residually ambivalent. He is still drawn towards (and at times strongly drawn towards) his desire to become a priest, especially when he drives by a church or sees a book on Catholicism while he is browsing at his local bookstore. Ambivalence vs. regret Analysis of ambivalence sheds light on a related phenomenon: regret. Ambivalence, of the residual degree in particular, bears some relation to regret. There are, however, two different sorts of regret to be discussed: (1) an agent regrets how she ordered her desires, or (2) an agent regrets that she had to order her desires; that the satisfaction of some conflicted with the satisfaction of others. The former type of regret is directed towards the agent herself, the latter type of regret can be directed towards oneself or towards the world. The type of regret that is most likely to be associated with the phenomenon of residual ambivalence is the latter. Referring back to the case of John the would-be priest, it is not that he regrets that he decided that he wanted his desire for a relationship with Chris to be effective in action instead of his desire to become a priest. The regret that John may experience is directed towards the world, it is regret that he could not have both desires satisfied. To complicate matters, there is a way in which regret may be directed towards the self, but not be regret about how the agent ordered her desires. If the decision that the agent made about the ordering of her desires involved other persons, then the agent may regret that she did harm to those persons (even though she does not regret her ordering). For example, if ambivalent Agamemnon finally chose (as he did) his army over his daughter, then it is too 30 J.S. Swindell D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 simple to describe his regret as towards the world, as regret that he could not save both Iphigenia and his army. Agamemnon may regret doing wrong to Iphigenia. It may be more accurate to describe his regret as directed towards her and not towards the world or the circumstances. All of this is just to point out, however, that the phenomenon of ambivalence has some relation to the phenomenon of regret, but that they are not the same thing. Ambivalence vs. weakness of will and temptation Another common type of conflict of the will is temptation, which if succumbed to becomes weakness of will. Recall that Frankfurt differentiates ambivalence from temptation in the following way: in the case of temptation, the conflict is between the agent/the desires that she identifies with and the desires that she views as outlaw. In ambivalence, however, the conflict is in the agent. Frankfurt is partly correct in his distinction between ambivalence and temptation. Temptation can be a conflict between the desires that the agent identifies with and the ones that she views as outlaw, but temptation can also be a conflict between the desire that the agent wills (the one that she wants to be effective in action at t1) and the other desires that she identifies with. Hence, an agent is weak of will when she acts on a desire other than the one that she wills. This other desire can either be one that she views as outlaw or one that she identifies with. For example, I may decide that I do not identify with my first order desire to eat ice cream for dinner, but the desire to eat ice cream for dinner continues to influence me; it tempts me. I succumb to it and eat ice cream for dinner; I am weak of will. Or, I may decide that I do identify with my desire to eat ice cream for dinner, but on this particular evening I do not will it. I have another desire that I identify with that conflicts with it (e.g. I am on a health kick right now and have a desire to be healthy, and I ate ice cream for dinner last night). The desire to be healthy is the one that I will; it is the one that I want to be effective in action this evening. The desire to eat ice cream for dinner tempts me and if I succumb to it I am weak of will, even though it is a desire that I identify with. These cases of temptation/ weakness of will are different from a case of ambivalence, where I am not able to decide whether I identify at all with my first order desire to eat ice cream for dinner (whether I assign it some position), or (more likely) where I am not able to decide what I will this evening (whether I want my second order desire for health or my second order desire for ice cream to move me to action this evening). One objection is that on my analysis, temptation/weakness of will cannot be distinguished from residual ambivalence. I have said that if a desire other than the one that I will influences me (even if it is a desire I identify with), then that is a case of temptation. Yet, cases of residual ambivalence just are cases where desires that I identify with continue to influence me. So, it is true that on my analysis all cases of residual ambivalence are cases temptation. The difference between the two phenomena, however, is that not all cases of temptation are cases of residual ambivalence (since I have argued that temptation also occurs when an agent is influenced by desires that she views as outlaw). On my analysis it is also true that cases of residual ambivalence are also cases of temptation and may very easily turn into cases of weakness of will. For if the agent acts on a desire other than the one that she wills (even if it is a desire that she identifies with), then she is weak of will. Return to the case of the man who wills to remain with his fiancée and their daughter, but is residually ambivalent in that he is still strongly influenced by his conflicting second order desire to become a priest. He is tempted by his desire to become a priest, and if he abandons his fiancée and runs off to become a priest then he is weak of will, even though his desire to become a priest is one that he identifies with. Ambivalence 31 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 Ambivalence vs. indifference Ambivalence is not to be confused with indifference. Here, Frankfurt is entirely correct. Consider the following quote by the character Meursault in Albert Camus's The Stranger (Camus 1989, Part 1, Chapter 4): She was wearing a pair of my pajamas with the sleeves rolled up. When she laughed I wanted her again. A minute later she asked me if I loved her. I told her it didn't mean anything but that I didn't think so. She looked sad. But as we were fixing lunch, and for no apparent reason, she laughed in such a way that I kissed her. Meursault does not reject his desire for Marie, nor does he endorse it. He is not ambivalent, for he is not experiencing strong feelings drawing him in conflicting directions. He is what we might call, indifferent. To be indifferent to one's own motives is to, as Frankfurt says, '. . .take no evaluative attitude toward the desires that incline him to act. If there is a conflict between those desires, he does not care which of them proves to be the more effective. In other words, the individual does not participate in the conflict' (Frankfurt 1988b, 164). This type of indifference we might call, borrowing from Frankfurt, 'wanton indifference' (Frankfurt 1988a, 18). Another type of indifference (one that Frankfurt does not discuss) is someone who does not even have first order desires that incline him to act one way or the other. There is no conflict between the desires that incline him to act (first order desires) because he does not even have inclinations one way or the other. Imagine that an agent has to decide whether to spend the day at the beach or the park - those are his only two options. The agent is indifferent about where he spends the day in the sense that he does not have a first order desire inclining him to spend the day at the beach, nor does he have a first order desire inclining him to spend the day at the park. This type of indifference we might call 'first order indifference', or more colloquially depression or lack of motivation. Both wanton indifference and first order indifference are distinguished from ambivalence by the fact that in cases of indifference, there is no conflict of the will at all. 5. Conclusion In conclusion, internal conflict comes in various forms. In this paper, I have provided an analysis of one of the more neglected forms of internal conflicts: ambivalence. I have argued that Frankfurt's account of ambivalence contains an ambiguity between identification and willing. I turn this ambiguity into a distinction, and use it to develop an analysis of the phenomenon of ambivalence that avoids the difficulties and ambiguities to which Frankfurt's analysis is prey. I argue that ambivalence is a structure of the will in which there is either a difficulty in forming second order positions (identifying or outlawing) or a difficulty ordering second order desires (willing), that necessarily typically causes the agent to feel torn. I hope that the conceptual clarifications that I have made contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of ambivalence, which will then allow for discussions about the merits and demerits of ambivalence, the effects of ambivalence on autonomous action, and methods of resolution of ambivalence in cases where ambivalence has significant negative consequences for an agent. Notes 1. See, for example, Bratman (1999); Bratman (2002); Bratman (2003); Calhoun (1995); Christman (1991); Christman (1993); Ekstrom (1993); Ekstrom (2005); Velleman (2002); Greenspan (1980); Harrist (2006) and Koch (1987). 32 J.S. Swindell D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 2. See Frankfurt (2006, 8). The exact quote is as follows (emphasis original): 'When we consider the psychic raw materials with which nature and circumstance have provided us, we are sometimes more or less content. They may not exactly please us, or make us proud. Nevertheless, we are willing for them to represent us. We accept them as conveying what we really feel, what we truly desire, what we do indeed think and so on. They do not arouse in us any determined effort to dissociate ourselves from them. Whether with welcoming approval, or in weary resignation, we consent to having them and to being influenced by them. This willing acceptance of attitudes, thoughts, and feelings transforms their status. They are no longer merely items that happen to appear in a certain psychic history. We have taken responsibility for them as authentic expressions of ourselves'. 3. See Frankfurt (2006, 9-10). The exact quotes are as follows: 'Sometimes we do not participate actively in what goes on in us. It takes place, somehow, but we are just bystanders to it. There are obsessional thoughts, for instance, that disturb us but that we cannot get out of our heads; there are peculiar reckless impulses that make no sense to us, and upon which we would never think of acting; there are hot surges of anarchic emotion that assault us from out of nowhere and that have no recognizable warrant from the circumstances in which they erupt'. And 'By a kind of psychic immune response . . . we dissociate ourselves from them, and seek to prevent them from being at all effective . . . this means that we deny them any entitlement to supply us with motives or reasons. . ..Regardless of how insistent they may be, we assign their claims no place whatever in the order of preferences and priorities that we establish for our deliberate choices and acts'. 4. An agent may be unambivalent about the first decision (whether or not the desire is one that she identifies with), she may even be unambivalent about the second decision in that she wants either desire 1 or 2 to move her to action at t1 but not desire 3 or 4. What she is ambivalent about is whether she wants desire 1 or desire 2 to move her to action at t1. For example, imagine that a person is unambivalent that she identifies with her desire to go to the beach, her desire to go the park, her desire to go to the bookstore, and her desire to have sex. She is even unambivalent that she wants either the desire to go to the beach or the park this afternoon. What she is ambivalent about is whether she wants her desire to go to the beach or her desire to go to the park to be the one that is effective in action this afternoon. This footnote arises from Geoffrey-Sayre McCord encouraging me to reflect on the way that dividing up desires affects the classification of ambivalence during an informal conversation upon his visit to Michigan State University in June 2007. Notes on contributor J.S. Swindell is an Assistant Professor at the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine. In 2008, she received her PhD in philosophy from Michigan State University. She has several articles on autonomy published or in press, and her research interests focus on decision making and the philosophy of action. References Aeschylus. 2008. Agamemnon of Aeschylus. Translated into English rhyming verse with explanatory notes. Trans. Gilbert Murray. London: George Allen. Bratman, M. 1999. Identification, decision, and treating as a reason. In Faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and agency, ed. M. Bratman, 185-206. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bratman, M. 2002. Hierarchy, circularity, and double reduction. In Contours of agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. S. Buss and L. Overton, 65-90. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. Bratman, M. 2003. Autonomy and hierarchy. Social Philosophy and Policy 2: 156-76. Calhoun, C. 1995. Standing for something. The Journal of Philosophy 92: 235-60. Camus, A. 1989. The stranger. New York: Vintage International. Christman, J. 1991. Autonomy and personal history. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21: 1-24. Christman, J. 1993. Defending historical autonomy: A reply to Professor Mele. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2: 281-89. Ambivalence 33 D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 0 Ekstrom, L.W. 1993. A coherence theory of autonomy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 599-616. Ekstrom, L.W. 2005. Autonomy and personal integration. In Personal autonomy: New essays on personal autonomy and its role in contemporary moral philosophy, ed. J.S. Taylor, 143-61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. 1988a. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. In The importance of what we care about: Philosophical essays, ed. H. Frankfurt, 11-25. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. 1988b. Identification and wholeheartedness. In The importance of what we care about: Philosophical essays, ed. H. Frankfurt, 159-77. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. 1988c. Rationality and the unthinkable. In The importance of what we care about: Philosophical essays, ed. H. Frankfurt, 177-90. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. 1998. Discussion with Harry Frankfurt. Ethical Perspectives 5: 30-5. Frankfurt, H. 1999a. Autonomy, necessity, and love. In Necessity, volition, and love, ed. H. Frankfurt, 129-42. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. 1999b. The faintest passion. In Necessity, volition, and love, ed. H. Frankfurt, 95-108. New York: Cambridge University Press. Frankfurt, H. 2006. Taking ourselves seriously. In Taking ourselves seriously and getting it right, ed. H. Frankfurt, 1-27. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Gaut, B. 1993. The paradox of horror. The British Journal of Aesthetics 33: 333-45. Greenspan, P. 1980. A case of mixed feelings: Ambivalence and the logic of emotion. In Explaining emotions, ed. A.O. Rorty, 223-50. Berkeley: University of California Press. Harrist, S. 2006. A phenomenological investigation of the experience of ambivalence. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 37: 85-114. Koch, P. 1987. Emotional ambivalence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48: 257-79. Velleman, D. 2002. Identification and identity. In Contours of agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. S. Buss and L. Overton, 92-123. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. 34 J.S. Swindell D o w n l o a d e d B y : [ P h . D , J . S . S w i n d e l l ] A t : 1 8 : 2 9 1 0 M a r c h 2 0 1 | {
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"creator": ", Lucas",
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"description": "Averiguando la esboza de Filolao, tomando cuenta del recurso acesorio que hizo verodImilmente a datos observacionales",
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} | Ninguna entre las previas rendiciones, ya había recobrado validez astronómica. Como si los quienes hicieron ricercas desde Crotona hubieran sido modelistas. Desde ahora, no pienso mi granito de arena apuntàndolo en astronomía desconviniese a Mattei con tal de cautela filológica2. Presupuesto : Filolao ciertamente no detuve su marco sin consideraciones observacionales3. Aunque S fue obfuscado por el <foco central>, medidas pienden a T. a) yo comprobo, mediante calibraje -c-... b) ...2 porciones del càlculo, resp. a los siguientes 'an'! : T[ierra] ; S[ol] ; l[una]... c) , para lo que suele restaurar la longueza inicial ; puès 2*<r>≞ 'a!'c . Por misma ocasión, περιοδοσ≝ " circuito anual ". Este procedimiento c) hace sentido, desde que 'a7'! 'a4'! o 54 meses lunares ≡ !° !í!" 'a4'! , mientras n° ciclo plurianual r! ≎1 més lunar. Postulado resp. a los <rayo[s]> de Filolao, r : ∀r ∈ t (totientes perfectos, desde Euler) : r1 r! r3 r4 r! r! r7 1 3 9 27 81 243 729 Puès la validez calendaria (n. 3) rinde lícito no reducir el atajo de Filolao [S ≞< cuadrado_cubo>] al sólo uso mnemotécnico : màs allà de la suerte ocultada de S, vale fuera de Filolao en < 2!. 3! >4 medida comùn -por lo menos (¿mero azar o coincidencia significativa?) para la pareja retro-inluminada (vide infra, n. 4). Esos convencionales < 22.33 > se averan idóneos para poner Filolao en perspectiva de datos contemporàneos. Surge ahora el problema conexo (estudiado a lo largo del desarrollo de totientes5) en torno a la potencia unaria i.e. {1 siendo (o no) un p[rimo]}, en que posibilidad elegimos < 1!"#$. 2!. 3! >. Expediente (ésta cuantidad limitante6 108, equiparando ambos 'l ≬ T'! y 'S ≬ T' ! ) : al hacer recurso acesorio a los ''totientes'' correspondientes, c) (es decir : doblamiento del <rayo>) quedarà evidente con 'a3'c (i.e. 2*'9'), ya que : (i) φ 9 = φ 18 , mientras... (ii)...los divisores φ 9 observen los 3 primeros étapas de Filolao : {r!; r!; r!} . 1 En forma de su progresión, cuya razón es ! , PLUTARCO,De anima procreatione in Tim. , ch. XXX. 2 El llorado MATTEI († 2014) en Platon & le miroir du mythe, p. 17, liminaire, Puf, re-ed : FILOLAO, fr. B-7. 3 El calendario de Filolao (364,5 días) està representado por un 1⁄4 del περιοδοσ S-ofuscante. Se consigue al entroncar los 54 meses lunares pendientes a las duraciones reconstituidas : ′S T′ 'T/l'!! !! . 4 Calibraje, merced al n° de diàmetros requeridos para trascurrir unas distancias marcadas por el signo '≬' S. 108!"#$ = S≬T[ierra] :: l[una]≬T = l!"#$ .108 5 Daniel VELLEMAN, How to prove it, Cambridge, 2006. 6 A pesar de no ser ≝diàmetros (n. 4 hacia arriba), vale nuestro postulado : !"#. 'l≬T'! l≬T ≡ !"#. 'S≬T'! S≬T . Cuàn mañoso puede ser Filolao resp. a la pareja En suma : aclaro la ordenanza propuesta por el mismo. Durante siglos, la universidad se quedó al interés paradigmàtico, mientras su marco eliocéntrico tiene relativa validez estadística. Entallada, la esboza1 de Filolao aparece asombrosamente correcta, aùn si resuelta parcial ; se consigue bajo ipotésis de predominio (bajo el informe lumbrifero), aplicado ùnicamente a la pareja retro-inluminada (S∨l)← "foco central" - mientras los valores de los demàs objetos celestes quedan misterio o mero tràmite, segùn y conforme. Ahora, a32∗<rayo> ⇋ 'T'! . Sàlvo el observador terrestre merced a (ii), otros totientes tendràn valor facultativa. Entonces el observador en T sierve como punto de partida ; y los totientes permiterén manejar ambas partes. No es menester los otros totientes (≢! {S l }T!pendiendo a valores [efectivas] -veàse abajo, (1)) ser màs que ''totativas'', puesto que { 'a!'c 'a!'c }⋃φ 18 -siguiendo con órbitas eliocéntricas en ambas ordenanzas. Todavía hace falta subrayar cuàn formal acaba éso apellido revisado 'S'2c , representando la " virtud de los nùmeros sesudos " [Pic] bajo un informe temporal, no un recorrido -ni siquiera los lapsos efectivos tales como los 1.392.000km separando S[, rectificado] y T. En seguida de n. 3 y del desfase debido al Sol reflejado, es recevable referir el desfase (resp. al 'sol' periférico ofuscado) al intervalo ; la duración anual (echando atràs el ajuste inter-calendario inicial) Al reenfocar al intervalo provisional (no obstante la convuelta desalineación resp. al <foco central>) (1) entre ambos astros y el centro segùn Filolao, llegamos un ratio7 igual a φ(100) : (1.1) 'l ≬ T'! ⊐ 54-18, 12.3 (1.2) 'S ≬ T' ! ⊐ 1458-18, 12 2.10 Logrando ésto, recobramos longuezas discretas 8, i.e. poliédricas. Sabemos el marco de Filolao reponer sobre <rayo[s]> por la sencilla razón que en vida tanto iba desconocido. Por eso, Filolao se quedó a coniecturas bi-dimensionales, siempre buscando solucionar lo que quedaba αμαθην (¬calculable) -el pentadecàgono, por ejemplo, para explicar la [anticipada] obliquidad del eclíptico. Logicamente, el paràmetro quedante sino incidente, resp. a la occultación de S, es volumétrico. Y, siguiendo los preceptos pitagóricos, se puede reconducirlo9 al brazo opuesto a la progresión {a!;a!; a!}!!"#$! : (2) luego por la tasa (!! !!) (!! !!) ≈10 se adivina cuàn fàctico rinde a! la τετρακτυσ , tanto como {a! ≬ a! } encubren al mismo factor 10. Entonces halló solución, tan parcial sembrara : (3) a1 + a3 1.2 , reenfocando a minima el marco de Filolao. Para conseguirlo, el ajuste constarà de ser el ratio (1), frente a datos hoy día ciertos : (4) !"#$%&'"% {!! !} !"#$%&'"% {!!!} , permitiendo ahora contestar la pregunta quantum ? (5) 389,18 veces 'l ≬ T'!! , lo que [devuelto a (3) y de acuerdo con (2.v) en n. 7], trae : (6) 389, 18. 'l ≬ T'2c ≲122.102 Así rendido a la pareja de Filolao, se averigua a los ∽ 97,3%10 el intervalo ∎ DS 7 2.i) por formalismo, φ(1440) = φ(111), 2.ii) ...y 37, d[ivisor de φ(111)], aparezcando igualmente d[ivisor de[ 'S ≬ T' ! φ 100 . 2.iii) la pareja permanece, al considerarla dentro de t, si φ 100 = !(!"##) !(!"#)∗ !(!") 2.iv) (3) volverà dable en t : φ 3700 ∗ φ 11 ≎ φ 401 − φ 11 2.v) φ(109) !(!) ! !"" ∗! !! T(S) ≎ T(l) , idest 384000 !"##$$ . 8 ... a los cuales corresponden, segùn PLATÔN, Timeo, tantos cùbos 9 FICINO, Scolios sobre el Timeo, λ , x!!!!!!! ≎ φ(100) -descartando toda regañina de anàcronismo. 10 (2) recoge !"# !"" !!! !"# !"" = 389,18. 12.3 = 14010,4 ≽ 14400. | {
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"creator": "Williams, J. Robert G.",
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"description": "If one believes vagueness to be an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many: in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many 'mountain-candidates', all, apparently, with more or less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all these billions of mountain-candidates are mountains. I argue that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis's proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites paradox.",
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"title": "An Argument for the Many",
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} | An Argument for the Many Penultimate Draft.∗ by J.R.G. Williams (September 29, 2005) Abstract If one believes that vagueness is an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many. In the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many many 'mountain candidates' all, apparently, with more-or-less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all the billions of mountain candidates are mountains. This paper argues that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis' proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites. Before me, there is a mountain. But is there, in front of me, something which is definitely a mountain? A popular approach to the philosophy of vagueness is in danger of implying that the answer is 'no'. But we can independently argue that the answer should be 'yes'. There is a reconciliation in view: but it says strange things about the number of mountains I'm about to climb. I Many philosophers want to construe vagueness as a product of linguistic or representational indeterminacy. My focus here is on the most popular way of cashing this out: the 'standard' form of supervaluationism that is developed in Fine (1975) and recently defended by Keefe (2000). A standard supervaluationist approach to vague language envisages a range of ways of making our vague language precise. A sentence will count as true simpliciter (or ∗Forthcoming in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. References should be to the published version. Some text may differ. 1 'supertrue') if it is true on every such precisification. (The metalinguistic notion of supertruth is reflected, in the object-language, by a 'Definitely' operator. We can characterize this, initially, in the following way: 'Definitely S' is true at a precisification p if and only if 'S' is true on all precisifications.)1 One of the main selling points of the standard form of supervaluationism is that we can retain the simple, familiar and powerful classical logic in the context of vagueness. We need not worry that the tautologies that we learn in first year logic courses will be rendered invalid when we move to consider a vague language.2 But just this commitment to classical logic is the source of a range of objections to supervaluationism. We can illustrate the problems by running through a version of the notorious sorites reasoning. Suppose we are contemplating a range of emanations: mounds, hills, mountains, and the like. Suppose this range of emanations includes some which are clearly mountains (Kilimanjaro), and also contains emanations of intermediate heights, decreasing at small intervals, until ultimately we reach something which is clearly not a mountain (say, Glastonbury Tor). We shall suppose that, for any emanation in the series, there is a smaller one whose height is within 10 metres of it. For the sake of exposition, we imagine we are in a possible world where these emanations are arranged in order of decreasing height. Now restrict the domain of quantification to this (finite) range, and let x′ be a way of referring to the tallest emanation that is shorter than x, i.e. the next emanation in the range. Under relatively uncontroversial assumptions, classical logic will deliver: (1) ∃x(x is a mountain ∧¬x′ is a mountain) This, however, sounds like we are asserting the existence of a sharp cut-off between those emanations that are mountains and those which are not mountains. But surely there is no sharp cut-off between mountains and non-mountains: a difference in height of only 10 metres cannot make the difference between mountainhood and non-mountainhood.3 Since the supervaluationist buys into classical logic, she is committed to endorsing (1). This leads to the following puzzle: why do our intuitions repel us from (1), given that (according to the supervaluationist) it is both supertrue and a clear consequence of the uncontroversial premisses such as 'Glastonbury Tor is not a mountain' and 'Kilimanjaro is a mountain'? What explains the repugnance of the existential claim (1)? Correlatively, what explains the seductiveness of the negation of (1), assent to which will generate the sorites paradox? Here is how one supervaluationist responds: 1The definition can be generalized to allow 'definitely' to be applied to an open sentence. This is discussed below. 2The situation is actually more subtle than this might make it seem. See Williamson (1994, ch.5.). 3Perhaps government agencies might impose some precise conditions on what height of emananation should count as a mountain. But I suppose such facts to be incidental to the point at issue here-we can easily imagine a situation where no such stipulative definitions have been put forward. 2 Our belief that there is no true instance of the quantification gets confused with a belief that the quantified statement is not true. The more theoretical description of the lack of a true instance needs to be expressed using either the [Definitely] operator or the truth predicate. . . (Keefe, 2000, p.185) The confusion hypothesis which Keefe here endorses contends that our intuitions against statements such as (1) are rooted in a confusion between two related claims (here stated in the material mode): (2) Definitely[∃x(x is a mountain ∧ x′ is not mountain)] (3) ∃x(Definitely[x is mountain∧ x′ is not mountain]) Keefe continues: The confusion . . . is a confusion of scope, according to whether the truth predicate [or 'Definitely'-operator] appears inside or outside the existential quantifier. It is thus like a confusion between saying that it is true that someone ought to do X and saying that it is true of someone that they ought to do X: that latter may be false while the former is true. (ibid) The suggestion is that, generally, we are apt to confuse an utterance of "There is something which is F" with "There is something which is definitely F": our intuitions about the former track the truth-values of the latter. But the two can come apart in truth-value, as is the case in the crucial sorites premiss. Accordingly, Keefe's suggestion is that an assertion of "there is a mountain next to a non-mountain" is heard as committing one to (3), rather than (2). If so, no wonder that we reject it out of hand. Proposals of this kind can be presented in a theory-neutral way, and can be motivated independently of the point at issue. The need to explain the seductiveness of the sorites is incumbent on all non-logically revisionary treatments of vague language; and the confusion hypothesis requires only that one's favoured treatment allows the construction of the notion 'Definitely'. So, for example, Greenough (2003) defends an epistemic version of the confusion hypothesis;4 and Edgington (1997) appeals to the same moves in the context of a degree theoretic account. So when supervaluationists such as Fine (1975) and Keefe (2000) postulate confusion to explain the sorites, it is 4Indeed, the term 'confusion hypothesis' is due to Greenough. 3 no idiosyncratic idea. As regards independent motivation, one would hope that the alleged confusion involved in the case of sorites can be accounted for within systematic pragmatics for vague language. Weatherson (2002) argues persuasively that such an extension gives a range of powerful, surprising and accurate predications of intuitions about the acceptability of statements involving vague vocabulary. I do not claim that appealing to confusion hypotheses of this kind is the only possible way for a supervaluationist to account for the seductiveness of the sorites. But it is something that prominent supervaluationists do endorse, and I am happy to think that of the extant options, it is the one they should endorse. II Mountains, we think, do not have precise boundaries-there isn't any convention over where precisely the base of Kilimanjaro finishes and the surrounding plains begin; or over which clods of earth at its base are part of the mountain. For one who thinks that vagueness is an exclusively linguistic phenomenon, there are no 'vague objects' in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, and no vagueness in what parts a given object has. Rather, what exists is an array of mountainy agglomorations of land and rock: the 'Kilimanjaro candidates'. There is Kilimanjaro-generously-construed, which includes all the pieces of land that one might count as part of Kilimanjaro under the most generous interpretation; there is Kilimanjaro-meanly-construed, where the only stretches of land counted as parts of Kilimanjaro are those that are clearly part of the main body of the peak itself. Two questions present themselves, either of which might deserve the name 'the problem of the many'.5 The first asks which of the mountain candidates is Kilimanjaro: which is the referent of 'Kilimanjaro'? The second asks which mountain candidates (if any) are mountains: which fall under the predicate 'is a mountain'? We here focus on the second question. There are two salient ways that a supervaluationist might handle this 'problem of the many', if they want to remain true to the idea of vagueness as an exclusively linguistic phenomena.6 The first, sane, option, is to hold that on every way of making the language precise, exactly one of the mountain-candidates will count as a mountain-different candidates on different precisifications. Overall, then, it will be supertrue that there is a mountain; but it will be indeterminate which object is a mountain. The second, 5See Unger (1980) for an early presentation of this problem. Weatherson (2004) surveys various approaches. 6I count among the 'ontological' options being discounted here, the view that there is a 'mountain' existing over and above the various mountain-candidates, in the manner that the statue is said to be a distinct object, though co-located with, the clay. The reason for this is that it looks like the relation of constitution supposedly holding between the mountain candidates and the floating mountain will be a vague one. Appeal to this solution therefore seems unavailable to one who believes that vagueness is an exclusively linguistic matter. Thanks to Carrie Jenkins for pressing me on this point. 4 insane, option, is to hold that on every way of making the language precise, all of the mountain-candidates will count as mountains. Overall, then, it will be supertrue that there is a mountain standing in front of me; further, strictly speaking it will be supertrue that there are many mountains in front of me, even when (as we would usually describe it) there is only Kilimanjaro around. For on this proposal each one of the mountain candidates will be a numerically distinct mountain. The 'insane' option is commended by Lewis (1993) in "Many, but almost one". He does much there to rehabilitate the option, to show how it can give an account of why we say the things that we do. For example, to the objection that his theory amounts to a massive error theory of ordinary practice of counting and discriminating between mountains, Lewis replies by distinguishing 'almost identity' from identity proper. Objects x and y are almost-identical if they share almost all their parts. So, though the many mountain candidates are not identical in the strictest sense, they are 'almost identical'. Suppose we say that there are just two mountains in a range. We can take this to express the following: there are x and y which are mountains, and every mountain in the range is such that it is almost-identical to either x or to y. If 'identity' as used by English speakers, typically expresses almost-identity, then truisms such as "there are less than a million mountains in Scotland" will come out true, where on the strict reading of they come out false. By systematically reinterpreting the apparatus of individuation for natural languages in this way, Lewis makes tenable the initially incredible thesis that strictly speaking, there are billions of mountains in Scotland.7 III Whether or not we continue to regard the 'many' thesis endorsed by Lewis as insane, if we want to maintain the confusion hypothesis discussed above, we need to buy into it. For on the rival view, on each precisification, only one of the Kilimanjaro candidates falls within the predicate "is a mountain". Hence there is no object in the relevant range which falls under the predicate "is a mountain" on every precisification. But, on the natural treatment of 'Definitely', this means that the following will be false:8 7Note that the semantic hypothesis about the meanings of English words that Lewis explores does not require any objectionable metaphysical thesis about the nature of identity itself. Nor does it mean that we cannot create contexts-such as that of the philosophy classroom-where 'identity' will unambiguously express strict identity. 8What I refer to as the 'standard' treatment of 'Definitely' takes it that for an object to satisfy 'Definitely φ' is for those objects to satisfy φ on each admissible precisification. This is the natural generalization of 'Definitely' as requiring truth on every precisification, as described, for example, in McGee (1997). If one handles 'Definitely' analogously to a modal operator (with 'precisifications' replacing 'worlds' on the model of Lewis (1970)), then the above is simply the extension of the standard semantic treatment of quantification into modal contexts. 5 (4) ∃x Definitely[x is a mountain] This result, if sustained, completely undermines the confusion hypothesis outlined earlier. An immediate problem is that a range of false predictions flowing from the generalized form of the confusion hypothesis: our intuitions about the acceptability of asserting "there are mountains" are supposed to track the truth value of "there are definite mountains". The latter, on this view, is false-but obviously the former is perfectly assertible, contrary to the predictions of the confusion hypothesis. An even more serious consequence of the 'sane' view is that the ability of the confusion hypothesis to explain intuitions about the sorites premiss is undermined. To illustrate this, let us put the explanatory challenge in the following contrastive form. In the original case presented above, where we have a range of emanations from Kilimanjaro to Glastonbury Tor, decreasing in height by millimetres from one to the next, we have strong 'no cut off' intuitions. Consider a new range, consisting only of Kilimanjaro next to Glastonbury Tor. With respect to this scenario, we have strong intuitions that there is a cut-off, a mountain standing next to a non-mountain. We have, that is, contrasting intuitions in the two cases. But the status of (3) is the same in the two cases, for its falsity rests on the non-existence of any definite mountains. The problem, of course, is that the status of (3) is now totally insensitive to the heights of the mountains and hills we have in our range, for its falsity is secured purely by the presence of many mountain-candidates, given the 'sane' resolution of the problem of the many. It remains to be shown that adopting Lewis' 'many mountains' resolution of the problem of the many avoids these problems. Recall that on this view, on every precisification of the language, all the Kilimanjaro candidates will fall under the predicate "mountain". It follows that every Kilimanjaro candidate will be a definite mountain; a fortiori "there is something which is definitely a mountain", will be true; and no false predications about our intuitions concerning "there are mountains" arise. And similarly, whether or not (3) is true or false will depend, as it should, on the height and distribution of the emanations in the range that we are considering. The tension between supervaluationism and the confusion hypothesis can be removed, therefore, by adopting Lewis' proposals. The confusion hypothesis plays a vital theoretical role within supervaluationism: without it we have no good way to explain the seductiveness of the sorites. So we have a strong reason to look favourably on the 'many mountains' proposal. By contrast, what reason have we for rejecting it? At first glance such a view looks ontologically excessive-billions of mountains where ordinary folk say there is just one. But there is no distinguishing the Lewis 'many' resolution and its rival on these grounds. They agree about what there is: billions of mountainy agglomorations of rock. The disagreement is simply about how these entities should be labelled in order to explain our language use. The intuitions of ordinary speakers do speak against the Lewisian resolution. But there is a familiar tactic available: explain away such recalcitrant data pragmatically. 6 The discussion in Lewis (1993), briefly described above, can be taken in this spirit. Given the strong theoretical grounds in favour, and the fragility of the case against, supervaluationists should adopt Lewis' 'many mountains' resolution of the problem of the many. The thing I am climbing is definitely a mountain. So, there are many, many mountains beneath my feet.9 School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, UK. and Arché AHRC Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind. School of Philosophical and Anthropological Studies. University of St Andrews. References Edgington, D. (1997). 'Vagueness by degrees'. In R. Keefe and P. Smith, editors, Vagueness: A reader. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Fine, K. (1975). 'Vagueness, truth and logic'. Synthese, 30, 265-300. Reprinted with corrections in Keefe and Smith (eds) Vagueness: A reader (MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 1997) pp.119-150. Greenough, P. (2003). 'Vagueness: A minimal theory'. Mind, 112(446). Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lewis, D. K. (1970). 'General semantics'. Synthese, 22, 18-67. Reprinted with postscript in Lewis, Philosophical Papers I (Oxford University Press, 1983) 189- 229. Lewis, D. K. (1993). 'Many, but almost one'. In K. Campbell, J. Bacon, and L. Reinhardt, editors, Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted in Lewis, Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 164-82. 9Versions of this paper were presented to the Arché AHRC Research Centre, to the School of Philosophy at the University of Leeds, and in the Graduate Sessions at the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society. I also benefitted from discussions in two electronic forums: the Arché Discussion Boards; and Brian Weatherson's weblog Thoughts, Arguments and Rants () I am grateful to everyone who has discussed this material with me in these and other contexts, for much useful criticism and advice. In preparing this work I have benefitted from an AHRC studentship (doctoral award), and from support by the departments of philosophy at the University of St Andrews. 7 McGee, V. (1997). "Kilimanjaro". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume: 'Meaning and Reference', 3, 141-196. McGee, V. and McLaughlin, B. (1994). 'Distinctions without a difference'. Southern Journal of Philosophy, supp XXXII, 203-251. Unger, P. (1980). 'The problem of the many'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 411-67. Weatherson, B. (2004). 'The problem of the many'. Fall 2004 edition edition. http: //. Weatherson, B. (Draft 2002). 'Vagueness and pragmatics'. Available at . . Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. Routledge, London. | {
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"description": "Organizational learning can be described as a transfer of individuals’ cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Employees, seeking the same colleagues for advice, are structurally equivalent, and the aim of the paper is to study if the concept can act as a conduit for organizational learning. It is argued that the mimicking of colleagues’ advice seeking structures will induce structural equivalence and transfer the accuracy of individuals’ cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Taking a dyadic level of analysis authors revisit a classical case and present novel data analyses.The empirical results indicate that the mimicking of advice seeking structures can alter cognitive accuracy. It is discussed the findings’ implications for organization learning theory and practice, addressed the study’s limitations, and suggested avenues for future research.",
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"title": "Advice seeking network structures and the learning organization",
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} | Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 44 SECTION 3. General issues in management Jarle Aarstad (Norway), Marcus Selart (Norway), Sigurd Troye (Norway) Advice seeking network structures and the learning organization Abstract Organizational learning can be described as a transfer of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Employees, seeking the same colleagues for advice, are structurally equivalent, and the aim of the paper is to study if the concept can act as a conduit for organizational learning. It is argued that the mimicking of colleagues' advice seeking structures will induce structural equivalence and transfer the accuracy of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models. Taking a dyadic level of analysis authors revisit a classical case and present novel data analyses. The empirical results indicate that the mimicking of advice seeking structures can alter cognitive accuracy. It is discussed the findings' implications for organization learning theory and practice, addressed the study's limitations, and suggested avenues for future research. Keywords: accuracy of cognitive models, advice seeking networks, cognitive congruence, imitation, mediating variable, organizational learning, structural equivalence, QAP-regression. JEL Classifications: C12, D85, M10. Introduction© Organizational learning can be described as a transfer of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models (Kim, 1993; March and Olsen, 1975). But what are the carriers of learning in organizations? The question has been addressed by numerous scholars (e.g., Haunschild, 2009; Nagano et al., 2010; Vera and Crossan, 2004), and it has been suggested that social network structures act as important catalysts (e.g., Borgatti and Cross, 2003; Hannah and Lester, 2009). The focus in this paper is to gain further knowldegde about social network structures' role on organizational learning, and in paticular we study if structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns can act as a vehicle for the transferring of cognitive models. Structural equivalence indicates similar network positions or structures (Lorrain and White, 1971), which implies that employees seeking the same colleagues for advice are structurally equivalent. Structural equivalence can explain the diffusion of innovations and business practices (Burt, 1987; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991). Despite of the concept appears to explain crucial organizational phenomena, its explicit role in the transferring of cognitive models is not well understood. Granted, Kang and Kim (2010) find that structural equivalence is related to knowledge transfer, but they measure knowledge transfer retrospectively as a subjective construct, which can have implications for their study's validity (cf., March and Sutton, 1997). © Jarle Aarstad, Marcus Selart, Sigurd Troye, 2011. In this paper we study organizational learning and cognitive mental models as objective and not as a subjective constructs. More specifically, we study the accuracy of cognitive models, which we define as the correspondence between the real advice structure at the workplace (i.e., an objective benchmark) and an employee's perception of the same structure (Krackhardt, 1990). The definition is in line with Senge (1990), who describes a person's mental model as a cognitive or internal image of the workings of the world. Argyris and Schön (1978: 16) argue that "each member of the organization constructs his or her own representation, or image, of the theory-in-use of the whole. That picture is always incomplete." And they continue: "Inquiry into organizational learning must concern itself not with static entities called organizations, but with an active process of organizing which is, at root, a cognitive enterprise". In a similar vein Kim (1993: 39) states that "mental models not only help us make sense of the world we see, they can also restrict our understandings to that which makes sense within the mental model." It thus appears that Kim describes inaccurate mental models of the "real" world as a liability whereas high degree of accuracy is an asset. Studies likewise find that cognitive accuracy is associated with power, effectiveness, status, social knowledge, and social rank (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2005; Choi and Kim, 2007; Johnson and Orbach, 2002; Krackhardt, 1990). Cognitive accuracy accordingly appears to be an advantage, and in particular we will argue that the mimicking of colleagues' advice seeking patterns can be related to the concept. Aarstad et al. (2010) state that structurally equivalent actors mimic the networking patterns of successful colleagues and Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 45 develop a pool of intangible resources. Studying entrepreneurs, they find that similarity in advice structures is related to higher joint performance. Taking a dyadic level of analysis, we elaborate further in this paper how the mimicking of colleagues' advice seeking networks will induce structural equivalence and transfer the accuracy of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models. We develop three hypotheses which we test on a dataset from an entrepreneurial firm. Next, we discuss the findings, assess theoretical and practical implications for organizational learning, address the study's limitations, and suggest avenues for future research. 1. Theory and hypotheses In Figure 1 we observe that employee i seeks k, l, and m for advice. If we also assume that j seeks k, l, and m for advice, we can say that i and j are structurally equivalent in advice seeking patterns (Lorrain and White, 1971). Said differently, the information i and j receive through their advice ties comes from similar or equivalent sources. l m k i j Fig. 1. It is reasonable to assume that information passing through similar or equivalent network sources induce similarities in cognitive models. Heald et al. (1998) find that similarity in networking patterns is associated with shared cognitions in employees' interpretation of the social structure at the workplace. Studies also find that structural equivalence is related to similarity in behavior, e.g. studying entrepreneurs (Aarstad, Haugland and Greve, 2010; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991). Aarstad et al. (2010) report that entrepreneurs, who seek the same actors for advice, are more similar in performance than actors who seek advice from different sources. Taken together, these studies can indicate that structural equivalence is instrumental for shared cognitions and similarity in behavior. If we relate the findings to cognitive accuracy, it is reasonable to assume that similarity in advice seeking patterns will induce i and j to have a more similar or shared cognitive accuracy of the advice structure than colleagues who are dissimilar in advice seeking patterns. This motivates the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: Structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns is related to similarity in cognitive accuracy for pairs of employees. So far, we have merely argued that structural equivalence is related to similarity in cognitive accuracy. In the following we elaborate how structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns can transfer the accuracy of cognitive models and act as a vehicle for learning in organizations. A premise for our arguing is that advice seeking patterns are related to imitation or mimetic behavior. Seminal works by organizational scholars state that the effects of mimetic behavior can be advantageous (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; March and Olsen, 1976). Other scholars likewise argue that imitation is inherently creative, innovative and crucial for organizational learning (see Tsui-Auch, 2003). Let us now assume that i at the outset seeks k, l, and m for advice, whereas this is not the case for j (e.g., j may either seek other colleagues for advice or seek no colleagues for advice at all). We furthermore assume that by seeking k, l, and m for advice, i has developed a high degree of cognitive accuracy (e.g., by seeking these colleagues for advice, i has learned what "really" is going on in the firm beyond any formal organizational chart). On the other hand, j, is at the outset relatively inferior in accuracy of cognitive accuracy. In order to increase her/his cognitive accuracy, j may feel inclined to imitate or mimic i's advice seeking pattern1. By mimicking i's advice seeking pattern, j may in turn gain access to equivalent or similar network resources. As a consequence, we can expect that j will improve her/his cognitive accuracy. According to our arguing above, this will result in that i and j will be more similar in cognitive accuracy than they were at the outset, but it will also result in that the pair of actors' cumulative or joint cognitive accuracy will be improved. Studying entrepreneurs, Aarstad et al. (2010) report that similarity in network structures is related to higher joint performance for pairs of actors, which is in line with our reasoning. 1Granted, i's high degree of cognitive accuracy is not necessarily explicitly visible, but we have referred to studies that relate the concept to power and influence (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2005; Choi and Kim, 2007; Johnson and Orbach, 2002; Krackhardt, 1990). Krackhardt (1990) also shows that employees are very consistent in whom they refer to as powerful. Thus, perhaps without explicitly being aware of i's cognitive accuracy, j may feel prone to mimic i's advice seeking pattern, due to i's possible success at the workplace (e.g., by perceiving i as a powerful or influential colleague). Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 46 To generalize our way of thinking beyond i and j, we argue that employees with relatively low degrees of cognitive accuracy at the outset will have a general tendency to mimic the advice seeking patterns of one or more successful colleagues. This can act as a carrier of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models. To paraphrase Argyris and Schön (1978: 17): "Organizational maps are the shared descriptions of organization which individuals jointly construct and use to guide their own inquiry... Whatever their form, maps have a dual function. They describe actual patterns of activity, and they are guides to future action. As musicians perform their scores, members of an organization perform their maps." Thus, numerous employees may pursue parallel strategies as j in mimicking i or other successful colleagues' advice seeking patterns, which can have additive effects on the cognitive accuracy. Taken together, we sum up our discussion and advance the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2: Structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns is related to higher joint cognitive accuracy for pairs of employees. We have assumed that j can improve her/his cognitive accuracy by mimicking i's advice seeking pattern. A premise for this reasoning is that j imprints a cognitive map of the advice structure that is congruent with i's cognitive map. Cognitive congruence deals with to what extent employees are similar in cognitive interpretation social network structures, independent of whether they have accurate cognitive perceptions or not (Heald, Contractor, Koehly and Wasserman, 1998). Accordingly, j, improves her/his cognitive accuracy by being more congruent with i in cognitive interpretation of the advice network than she/he was at the outset. Mediation explains why the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable occurs (Baron and Kenny, 1986). We consequently argue that cognitive congruence mediates the proposed relationships between similarity in advice seeking patterns and joint cognitive accuracy. This motivates the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3: Cognitive congruence mediates the proposed relationship between structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns and higher joint cognitive accuracy for pairs of employees. The concepts of cognitive congruence and cognitive accuracy are closely related, but they nevertheless deviate slightly - but importantly - in connotation1. We argue that applying cognitive congruence as mediating variable can partake in assessing the internal validity of the findings from this study, and we return to this issue when we discuss the results from the empirical analyses. 2. Method 2.1. Research context and data instrument. In this paper we revisit a classical case and present novel data analyses. The raw data was gathered by David Krackhardt from an entrepreneurial firm. At the time of the data collection, the firm had 36 employees (Krackhardt, 1990). This classical case has been applied in other studies (e.g., Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1999), which adds validity to our contribution. The firm's business "involved the sales, installation, and maintenance of the state-of-the-art information systems... and was wholly owned by the three top managers..." (Krackhardt, 1990, p. 347). A questionnaire was used to gather the data on real and cognitive advice structures. Directions about advice and help for work-related problems "were followed by 36 questions (e.g., "Who would Cindy Stalwart help or advice at work?"), each asking the same question about a different employee. Each of these 36 questions was followed by a list of 35 names, any of which the respondent could check off in response to the question" (Krackhardt, 1990, p. 349). 33 of 36 employees participated in the study. 2.2. Modeling the real advice network. A real or actual advice tie from one employee to another exists if both of them agree on both the relation and its direction. This is analogous with the term locally aggregated structure (Krackhardt, 1987), which has been applied in numerous other studies (e.g., Casciaro et al., 1999; Kilduff et al., 2008; Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; Krackhardt, 1990, 1992). In Figure 2 we graphically display the advice seeking network (names are reported with pseudonyms). For further details about the modeling of the real advice network, see Krackhardt (1990). 1 I.e., whereas cognitive accuracy is the correspondence between the real advice structure and an employee's cognitive perception of the same structure, cognitive congruence deals with to what extent employees are similar in cognitive interpretation social network structures, independent of whether they have accurate cognitive knowledge or not. Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 47 Fig. 2. A graphical display of the advice network 2.3. Structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns as independent variable. Studying the concept of similarity or structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns implies that we take a dyadic level of analysis on pairs of actors. Dyads are rarely perfect in structural equivalence, and a widely used measure to model the concept is to correlate each pair of actors' networking pattern (see Wasserman and Faust, 1994, pp. 368-375). In our context, this implies that we generate at matrix in which we assess the correlation coefficient in advice seeking patterns for each dyad, and the coefficient can theoretically take any value between -1 and +1. As noted, 3 out of 36 employees did not participate in the study. In addition, 2 out the 33 respondents did not seek advice at all and were consequently deleted from the sample. We therefore remain with a sample size of 31, which implies that we have 465 dyadic observations ([312-31]/2=465). 2.4. Dependent variables. The cognitive advice network for each employee was taken from the responses selected on the questionnaire. Each employee's cognitive map or matrix of the advice network was next correlated with the matrix of the real advice network (i.e., the locally aggregated structure), thus a high correlation coefficient implies a high degree of cognitive accuracy and vice versa. Following Krackhardt's (1990) suggestion, we deleted ego and her/his perceived and real relations from the respective matrices before correlating them. 2.4.1. Similarity in cognitive accuracy. To model similarity in cognitive accuracy between pairs of actors, we created a matrix in which we applied the absolute value in difference for each dyad. If i's cognitive accuracy is .50 and j's is .20, the i-j dyad's similarity in cognitive accuracy is .30 (|.50-.20|). 2.4.2. Joint cognitive accuracy. Joint cognitive accuracy was modeled by creating a matrix in which we summarized each pair of actors' cognitive accuracy. E.g., if i's accuracy is .50 and j's is .20, the i-j dyad's joint accuracy is .70 (.20+.50). 2.5. Cognitive congruence as mediating variable. To model cognitive congruence between pairs of actors, we correlated i's cognitive network matrix of advice ties on j's, repeating this procedure on all dyads in the sample. Next, we aggregated these correlates into a new data matrix. As with the concept of structural equivalence, the concept of cognitive congruence can theoretically take any value between -1 and +1. Burt (1982) argues that structural equivalence can have a strong explanatory effect on organizational phenomena. We argue in this paper that structural equivalence is also a major carrier for the dependent variables, but due to limited space we do not elaborate in detail why we do not include other control variables than cognitive congruence (as a mediating variable) for this study. Upon request, however, the first author can provide a detailed note about this issue. Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 48 3. Results Table 1 reports dyadic QAP (quadratic assignment procedure) correlations for 31 employees (i.e., 465 dyads). All the analyses are calculated in Ucinet 6.135 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The significance level is calculated by randomly permuting rows and columns for one matrix (by default) 5000 times (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002). Below we present the results of the hypothesized effects (due to limited space we do not discuss the descriptive statistics here, but upon request the first author can provide a detailed discussion). Table 1. QAP correlations Min Max Mean SD SCA JCA CC Similarity in cognitive accuracy (SCA) 0 .302 .071 .056 Joint cognitive accuracy (JCA) .513 1.01 .810 .088 -.346* Cognitive congruence (CC) .151 .715 .433 .101 -.345** .716*** Structural equivalence in advice seeking -.169 1.00 .196 .266 -.204* .174* .178* Notes: Number of dyads = 465; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two tailed tests). We hypothesized that structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns is related to similarity in cognitive accuracy (SCA) for pairs of employees, and we observe in Table 1 that the correlation between the concepts is negative and significant. This finding gives empirical support to hypothesis 1. Next we hypothesized that structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns is related to higher joint cognitive accuracy (JCA) for pairs of employees, and Table 1 shows a positive and significant relationship between the concepts. Thus, also hypothesis 2 gains empirical support. We furthermore hypothesized that cognitive congruence would mediate the relationships between structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns and higher joint accuracy of cognitive knowledge (hypothesis 3). To test this hypothesis we applied a multi regression technique developed by Dekker et al. (2007). By default, we applied 2000 random permutations, and the results are reported in Table 2. We observe that when controlling for cognitive congruence, the relationship between structural equivalence in advice seeking and joint cognitive accuracy is practically zero. Thus, hypothesis 3 gains empirical support in that cognitive congruence in practical terms fully mediates the relationship between structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns and joint cognitive accuracy (from a significant standardized coefficient of .174 to an insignificant coefficient of .048). Table 2. QAP regression Dependent variable Joint cognitive accuracy Cognitive congruence .708*** Structural equivalence in advice seeking .048 R-square .515*** Adjusted R-square .515 Notes: Number of dyads = 465. Standardized coefficients. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two tailed tests). Discussion and conclusions Organizational learning can be described as a transfer of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models (Kim, 1993; March and Olsen, 1975). In this paper we have argued that employees with relatively inaccurate cognitive mental models may tend to mimic the advice seeking patterns of more successful colleagues. This can act as a transferring mechanism of learning and improve cognitive accuracy by the sharing of mental models. Thus, if an employee improves her/his cognitive accuracy by mimicking the advice seeking pattern of a colleague, this will increase the joint cognitive accuracy for the dyad members. The mimicking of advice seeking patterns will furthermore induce structural equivalence or similarity in network structures, and we find that similarity (or structural equivalence) in advice seeking patterns is associated with higher joint cognitive accuracy (Table 1). Our result is in line with Aarstad et al. (2010), who report that similarity in advice structures is related to higher joint performance. They also argue that structurally equivalent actors mimic the networking patterns of successful colleagues and develop a pool of intangible resource. We also find that structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns is related to similarity in cognitive accuracy (Table 1). Having argued that j improves her/his accuracy by mimicking i's advice seeking pattern, this in fact cannot be possible unless the dyad members also become more similar in accuracy. To generalize our findings, we can infer from the empirical analyses that numerous employees pursue parallel strategies in mimicking other successful colleagues' advice seeking patterns, which leverages learning by the sharing of mental models. In a similar vein Argyris and Schön (1978: 19) argue that "in order for organizational learning to occur, learning agents' discoveries, inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organizational memory. They must be encoded in the individual images and the shared maps..." Our analyses, moreover, show that cognitive congruence mediates the relationship between structural Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 49 equivalence in advice seeking patterns and joint cognitive accuracy (Table 2). Assuming that i and j's joint cognitive accuracy is a function of j mimicking i's advice seeking pattern (which in turn improves j's accuracy and induces her/him to be more similar with i), this process cannot take place unless j imprints i's cognitive map of the advice structure. In our opinion, the mediating effect of cognitive congruence indicates that such a process takes place, and adds validity to our line of reasoning§. The explained variance of the empirical findings does not seem to be particularly strong. For instance, a correlation coefficient of .174 in Table 1 tells that similarity in advice seeking patters explains a little more than 3% of the variance in joint cognitive accuracy (.1742 = .0303). We must bear in mind, however, that the coefficient explains the variance in joint cognitive accuracy for each dyad in the sample. This implies that imitating the advice seeking pattern of not only one, but perhaps numerous colleagues can have an additive effect on joint cognitive accuracy. If we in addition assume that numerous colleagues pursue parallel mimicking strategies, the total impact on the sharing cognitive mental model can be substantial. Implications for theory and practice We have referred to studies that relate individuals' cognitive accuracy to power and influence at the workplace (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2005; Choi and Kim, 2007; Johnson and Orbach, 2002; Krackhardt, 1990). Thus, having accurate cognitive mental models appears to be beneficial for each individual, and in this paper we have assessed how structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns can leverage this ability. Research nevertheless indicates that cognitive accuracy can be beneficial beyond an individual level of analysis (e.g., at group level, organization level, or even at an inter-organizational level), and below we elaborate this issue. Kim (1993: 43) states that organizational learning increases "an organization's capacity to take effective action", and Krackhardt (1992) argues that cognitive misinterpretations of strong informal friendship ties prevented an attempt to unionize the firm he was currently studying. It thus seems that cognitive inaccuracy in the labor union constrained effective action on their part. Said differently, cognitive § Theoretically, we can also assume that i instead imprints j's cognitive map. But since the similarity in advice seeking patters is positively associated with joint cognitive accuracy, this is a likely result of j improving his/her cognitive accuracy, and not i deteriorating his/her cognitive accuracy (by imprinting j's cognitive map of the advice structure). In the latter case, similarity in advice seeking patterns for i and j would have resulted in lower joint accuracy, which is contrary to what we find. accuracy seems to be beneficial beyond an individual level of analysis in that it appears to leverage an organizational capacity to take effective action. Close-knit network structures can increase performance (Lazer and Friedman, 2007), but Killworth et al. (2006) find that cognitive mistakes in predicting the shortest path length between actors are prevalent. In other words, despite that close-knit network ties can be beneficial; many employees appear to miss out the benefits of such structures due to cognitive misinterpretations. In another study, Greve (2009: 1) argues that "valuable innovations [in the shipping industry] remain rare because they are not adopted by distant firms in geographical and network space." A plausible hypothesis related to this statement is that valuable innovations would be more frequent if relevant actors had more accurate perceptions of the "actual" path-length between themselves and other network members. This paper has assessed how the sharing of mental models can facilitate cognitive accuracy of "actual" social network structures, which, as s consequence, also increases the awareness of the de facto path-length between network members. Research has shown that the concept of structural equivalence can have crucial explanatory effect on organizational phenomena, such as innovation, the spreading of business practices and performance (Aarstad, Haugland and Greve, 2010; Burt, 1987; Galaskiewicz and Burt, 1991). In this paper we have emphasized that structural equivalence can transfer the accuracy of individuals' cognitive mental models to shared mental models. We argue that managers should be aware of how they can apply this insight. For instance, a first practical step (which is often done) can be identified and classified skilled employees along several dimensions (including cognitive accuracy, but also practical knowledge, intellectual knowledge, tacit knowledge, etc.). Subsequently, managers should aim to identify from which sources these skills have been acquired (e.g., advice seeking patters, but also other sources such as coursework, certain experience, use of manuals, etc.) and make this information explicitly available for relevant employees, who are in need of similar knowledge. The mimicking successful colleagues' sources will induce structural equivalence, and the major implication from our study is that this may act as a carrier for the transfer of learning between employees. Nevertheless, it might be intuitive to assume that learning is also transferred through cohesive direct ties between employees, and the research literature gives some support to this argument (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). Other studies point to that both structural equivalence and cohesion play complemenProblems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2011 50 tary roles in explaining the diffusion of innovation, learning, and performance (Aarstad, Haugland and Greve, 2010; Harkola and Greve, 1995; Kang and Kim, 2010). A practical insight from these scholarly works accordingly is the complementary roles which cohesive ties might play along with structural equivalence as carriers of learning in organizations, and managers should be aware of these issues. Argyris and Schön (1978) make a distinction between what they label as single-loop learning and double-loop learning in organizations. In brief, single-loop learning involves the detection and correction of error without further substantial changes in organizational practices or policies. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, "occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that [also] involve the modification of an organization's underlying norms, policies, and objectives" (Argyris and Schön, 1978, p. 3). In this paper we have implicitly studied knowledge transfer as single-loop learning in that we have merely examined how structural equivalence can induce the detection and correction of employees' inaccurate cognitive maps of the advice seeking structure. We nevertheless emphasize that our contribution can have implications for the fostering of double-loop learning. A prerequisite for a successful and smooth modification of an organization's underlying norms, policies, and objectives, is that the employees share an accurate cognitive interpretation of the challenges at hand. In this paper we have illustrated that the concept of structural equivalence can act as an important carrier for the sharing of accurate cognitive mental models. Limitations and future research Applying the concept of cognitive congruence as a mediating variable has indicated causal direction between structural equivalence in advice seeking patterns and joint cognitive accuracy, but the study's cross sectional design nevertheless limits a robust assessment of the internal validity. Future research should therefore deal with this issue, either by the use of instrumental variables, a longitudinal design or an experimental design. We have argued that cognitive accuracy can be beneficial beyond an individual level of analysis, but it is a matter of fact that some employees have more accurate cognitive perceptions of social network structures than others. Future research should accordingly study in what ways the concept of cognitive accuracy is related to individual or collective benefits at the workplace. Questions may be: Is homogeneity in cognitive accuracy more beneficial for a collective of organizational members, whereas heterogeneity in accuracy will benefit a minority of members at the cost of a collective group? It is also likely to assume that contextual issues in terms of stable and simple versus unstable and complex environments can moderate the relationships between employees' cognitive accuracy and individual or collective benefits, and future studies should examine these issues. References 1. Aarstad, J., S.A. Haugland and A. Greve (2010). Performance Spillover Effects in Entrepreneurial Networks: Assessing a Dyadic Theory of Social Capital, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(5), pp. 1003-1020. 2. Argyris, C. and D. Schön (1978). 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Krackhardt, D. (1990). Assessing the Political Landscape: Structure, Cognition, and Power in Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, pp. 342-369. 26. Krackhardt, D. (1987). Cognitive Social Structures, Social Networks, 9, pp. 109-134. 27. Krackhardt, D. (1992). The Strength of Strong Ties: the Importance of Philos in Organizations, in Networks and Organization, ed. N. Nohria and R.G. Eccles, 216-39, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 28. Krackhardt, D. and M. Kilduff (1999). Whether Close or Far: Social Distance Effects on Perceived Balance in Friendship Networks, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(5), pp. 770-782. 29. Lazer, D. and A. Friedman (2007). The Network Strucrure of Exploration and Exploitation, Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, pp. 667-694. 30. Lorrain, F. and H.C. White (1971). Structural Equivalence of Individuals in Social Networks, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1, pp. 49-80. 31. March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1976). Ambiguity and Choice in Oranizations, Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget. 32. March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1975). The Uncertainty of the Past: Organizational Learning under Ambiguity, European Journal of Political Research, 3, pp. 147-171. 33. March, J.G. and R.I. Sutton (1997). Organizational Performance as a Dependent Variable, Organization Science, 8(6), pp. 698-706. 34. Nagano, M.S., A. Iacono and E. Escrivao (2010). Cooperation, Interaction and Learning in Local Production Systems: Evidence in Brazilian Firms, African Journal of Business Management, 4(12), pp. 2459-2479. 35. Reagans, R. and B. McEvily (2003). Network Structure and Knowledge Transfer: the Effects of Cohesion and Range, Administrative Science Quarterly, 48(2), pp. 240-267. 36. Senge, P.M. (1990). The Fifth Discipline, New York: Doubleday. 37. Tsui-Auch, L.S. (2003). Learning Strategies of Small and Medium-Sized Chinese Family Firms a Comparative Study of Two Suppliers in Singapore, Management Learning, 34(2), pp. 201-220. 38. Vera, D. and M. Crossan (2004). Strategic Leadership and Organizational Learning, Academy of Management Review, 29(2), pp. 222-240. 39. Wasserman, S.S. and K. Faust (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press. | {
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"creator": "Maltais, Aaron",
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"description": "Investments in mitigating climate change have their greatest environmental impact over the long term. As a consequence the incentives to invest in cutting greenhouse gas emissions today appear to be weak. In response to this challenge, there has been increasing attention given to the idea that current generations can be motivated to start financing mitigation at much higher levels today by shifting these costs to the future through national debt. Shifting costs to the future in this way benefits future generations by break- ing existing patterns of delaying large-scale investment in low-carbon energy and efficiency. As we will see in this chapter, it does appear to be technically feasible to transfer the costs of investments made today to the future in such a way that people alive today do not incur any net cost. the aim of this chapter is to take seriously the possibility that climate change has produced an extremely intractable political problem and that we must now consider strong measures that can break existing patterns of delaying mitigation. I defend the claim that if climate change involves a stark conflict of interests between current and future generations, then borrowing from the future would be both strategically and normatively much better than the status quo. Nevertheless, I challenge the borrowing from the future proposal on the grounds that it is not in fact the powerful tool for motivating existing agents that its proponents imagine it to be. The purpose of developing this critical argument is not, however, simply to throw doubt onto the idea of borrowing from the future. If we really do find ourselves in a political context where the prospects for effective action are very poor then strategic forms of buck-passing may make an important positive contribution to avoiding dangerous global cli- mate change. Consequently, if debt financing is not as powerful of a motivational tool as imagined we still have strong reasons, I will argue, to identify other strategies that will change agents’ incentive structures. To this end, I propose an alternative form of passing on the costs of mitigation to the future that warrants consideration.",
"identifier": "oai:philarchive.org/rec/AARMOC",
"language": "en",
"subject": "Philosophy",
"title": "Making our children pay for mitigation",
"type": "info:eu-repo/semantics/article"
} | MAKING OUR CHILDREN PAY FOR MITIGATION AARON MALTAIS1 This author produced PDF is the accepted but pre-copy-editing version of a chapter that appears in A. Maltais & C. McKinnon (eds) The Ethics of Climate Governance, published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc in July of 2015. INTRODUCTION Investments in mitigating climate change have their greatest environmental impact over the long--‐term. As a consequence the incentives to invest in cutting greenhouse gas emissions today appear to be weak. In response to this challenge there has been increasing attention given to the idea that current generations can be motivated to start financing mitigation at much higher levels today by shifting these costs to the future through national debt. Shifting costs to the future in this way benefits future generations by breaking existing patterns of delaying large--‐scale investment in low--‐carbon energy and efficiency. As we will see in this chapter, it does appear to be technically feasible to transfer the costs of investments made today to the future in such a way that people alive today do not incur any net cost (e.g. Foley, 2009; Rendall, 2011; Broome, 2012; Rezai et al., 2012; Rozenberg et al., 2013). The basic idea then is that governments can break current patterns of delaying mitigation investments by ensuring that their existing constituents do not need to make significant sacrifices. The normative argument that we should finance mitigation by 'borrowing from the future' can be advanced in two general ways. The first is based on the empirical prediction that we will continue to see a pattern of very weak motivation among current generations to accept short--‐term mitigation costs. Thus, unless it becomes economically beneficial over the short--‐term to markedly increase investments in low--‐carbon energy and efficiency we should not expect to see sufficient investment to avoid dangerous levels of global warming. On this view finding a way to pass on the costs of mitigation to future generations is an imperfect solution to the problem of weak moral motivation today but much better than the status--‐quo (Broome, 2012, 37--‐48). On the second view, because we have good reason to expect that people in the future will be wealthier than 2 people today (at least over the next century or so) and because the benefits of mitigation largely benefit people in the future, passing on most of the costs of mitigation to the future is actually a fair way to distribute these costs (Rendall, 2011). Notice that the second view is not dependent on the empirical premise that people today will not be motivated to make sufficient short--‐term sacrifices, although the problem of motivating the present will give additional support to the argument for redistributing costs to the future. In this chapter I focus on the implications of the first approach. Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to take seriously the possibility that climate change has produced an extremely intractable political problem and that we must now consider strong measures that can break existing patterns of delaying mitigation. I defend the claim that if climate change involves a stark conflict of interests between current and future generations, then borrowing from the future would be both strategically and normatively much better than the status quo.2 However, I nevertheless challenge the borrowing from the future proposal on the grounds that it is not in fact the powerful tool for motivating existing agents that its proponents imagine it to be. The purpose of developing this critical argument is not, however, simply to throw doubt onto the idea of borrowing from the future. Debt financing climate mitigation is a form of intergenerational buck--‐passing. In the climate ethics literature this type of buck--‐passing is usually viewed as deeply objectionable. As a consequence, normative theorising about climate governance tends to focus on institutional reforms that better represent the interests of future generations and inhibit buck--‐passing. My ultimate concern in this chapter is to argue that we cannot limit prescriptive normative theorising about climate governance to these types of reforms. If we really do find ourselves in a political context where the prospects for effective action are very poor then strategic forms of buck--‐passing may also make an important positive contribution to avoiding dangerous global climate change. Consequently, if debt financing is not as powerful of a motivational tool as imagined we still have strong reasons, I will argue, to identify other strategies that will change agents' incentive structures. To this end I propose an alternative form of passing on the costs of mitigation to the future that warrants consideration. 3 The chapter is organised into five sections. Section I accounts for why motivating existing agents to invest in climate mitigation is taken to be such a difficult challenge. Section II defends the view that borrowing from the future can be normatively justifiable. Section III explains how it is thought to be possible to dedicate significantly more resources to mitigation today without current agents experiencing this as a cost. Section IV challenges the idea that borrowing from the future is a powerful tool for motivating the present to invest in mitigation. Section V proposes that we consider the development of an alternative form of explicitly pre--‐committing the future to mitigation costs. I defend this type of governance instrument at a normative level, specifically against the objections that it is 1) a form of tyranny of the present over the future and 2) morally corrupt. I --‐ THE WICKEDNESS OF TIME IN THE ANTHROPOCENE The capacity of the atmosphere, the oceans, and other natural sinks to safely carry GHG emissions is a global common pool resource. The mitigation of climate change is a global public good. We currently find ourselves in familiar conditions of unsustainable use of common resources and under provision of public goods. However, these cooperative challenges appear to be unusually difficult in the case of global warming. This is in part because of the large number and variety of actors that need to be coordinated and because of the scale and influence of special interests in the fossil fuel sector. In addition, there is some divergence between where the impacts of climate change will be most severe and which countries must bear the greatest mitigation costs. We are also currently lacking a leading state with strong incentives to act unilaterally and to coordinate other states. The high cost, complexity, and technological uncertainty involved in reforming our economies is another commonly highlighted obstacle. Yet, of all these impeding factors it is the role of time that appears to be the most toxic feature of this political problem. In a recent paper Hansen et al. (2011) estimate that it takes 100 years to see 60--‐90 per cent of the warming response associated with GHG emissions. Long time lags in the climate system between emissions and temperature responses, between temperature stresses and damaging environmental consequences, and between effective mitigation 4 policies and substantial infrastructure reform create a situation where investments in mitigation make little difference to the climate damages agents will experience over their lifetimes. It is past and probable on--‐going emissions that will have the greatest effects on current generations. From a game theoretic perspective this means that the relevant agents do not share in a preference for the collectively cooperative outcome compared to the collectively non--‐cooperative outcome. The consumption interests of people alive today are best promoted by not mitigating climate change.3 In a more typical commons problem it is the agents' preferences for the collectively cooperative outcome that can be leveraged to establish norms and institutions that allow individuals to escape prisoner's dilemma dynamics (e.g. Ostrom, 1990). In the climate case there is no prisoner's dilemma between generations. Rather the central problem is to motivate existing agents to invest in protecting the commons for future agents (Gardiner, 2001). As time moves forward and irrespective of the climate conditions each generation is born into the same problem of weak incentives will be present (Gardiner, 2001). Overcoming the intergenerational structure of the problem requires that agents be motivated by the interests of others (i.e. future agents) to a much greater degree than is true for agents in typical collective action problems. Norms of fair reciprocity may simply not be enough. Importantly, if we can redress the intergenerational motivational obstacle we can still face a typical global public goods problem between states. Even more importantly, as time passes the costs of mitigation increase, environmental damages increase, and the amount that has to be invested into adapting to climate change increases (Vaughan et al., 2009; Luderer et al., 2012; Rogelj et al., 2013). This means that the passing of time has the real potential to create a positive feedback where delay breeds stronger and stronger incentives for further delay (Shue 2010, Gardiner, 2011, pp. 185-209). The assessment above is not, of course, an attempt to give a full account of individuals' or political communities' motivations or to depict how individuals and groups have actually responded to climate change. The account above aims only to describe key obstacles to effective climate politics that can help us understand why the world's states have yet to invest in mitigation in a way that responds to the seriousness of the threat and why the politics of climate change appear so intractable. 5 II --‐ GIVING THE FUTURE A CHANCE TO PAY If the incentives for passing on the costs of climate change to future generations are very strong, one response is to try to identify ways of passing on these costs in a way that best serves the interests of future generations. This is the core idea behind debt financing of climate change mitigation. Let us assume for now that we can pass on the costs of mitigation to the future in a way that does produce an improvement for these future agents compared to business as usual. Our terms of negotiation with the future are only possible because we are in a position of domination over them. We are free to ignore the fact that continuing to pollute the atmosphere will undermine the climatic conditions for human wellbeing far into the future. Thus, it appears to be disingenuous to claim that we are somehow helping the future by letting them pay for mitigation when it is our actions that are putting them in danger in the first place. This assessment has strong normative force, but there are also strong strategic and normative arguments for borrowing from the future. To the extent that we expect political inertia to continue or worsen, identifying a no--‐cost option that could bring about immediate and significant mitigation investment while at the same time improving conditions for all the relevant agents leads to a very good outcome compared to perpetual delay (Broome, 2012, 43--‐48). However, this improvement on the status quo is hardly a second--‐best option. Finding ways to bring the interests of present people and future people into better alignment or finding ways to better mobilise the concern for future people current generations already have appear to be much more normatively attractive options. Thus we have good reason to be critical of failures to engage seriously in efforts to spread more climate friendly preferences or to make the long--‐term consequences of public policy more salient in political discourse. At the same time, if climate change is the most difficult cooperative challenge humanity has ever faced this difficulty must make some difference to our moral assessments of current failures to act and of strategies to address these failures. The development of highly productive economies driven by the exploitation of cheap and abundant energy has been one of the main drivers of the amazing improvements in human welfare over the past two centuries. Individuals, companies, and governments both have had and continue to have good reasons for using fossil fuels. At the same time, 6 finding ways to transition to low--‐carbon economies is straining the capacity of our economic and political institutions. Investing in the interests of the present has traditionally and continues to pass on enormous benefits to future people. At the same time, when it becomes clear that investing in shared goods today can undermine human welfare far off into the future it also becomes clear that we are straining the ability of our systems of morality to continually improve on the human condition. The point is not to deny that it is deeply problematic that we are failing to dedicate a small fraction of current wealth to protecting the conditions for human welfare for generations to come. However, we must also acknowledge that climate change is a system level problem similar to other system level problems in capitalist economies that are not intended and for which it is difficult to assign moral responsibility. From this perspective, taking on long--‐term debt to finance low--‐carbon infrastructure for the future is in part a moral failure but also in part a system level response to a system level problem, similar to the way in which deficit spending to redress the effects of boom--‐bust cycles is a system level response to the vulnerabilities capitalist economies generate. We really do find ourselves in conditions of political delay with no sense of how or when these patterns might be broken. As a result, there is a strategic and normative case for at least some significant borrowing from the future. In fact the proposal raises the following question, if we can solve the largest environmental threat to human welfare without anybody having to give up anything then why don't we? Is it plausible to think that it is because we have simply failed to notice the options available to us? In the following section I explain how borrowing from the future to finance climate mitigation is technically possible. However, in section IV I argue that it is not surprising that we have not yet used debt financing to pay for mitigation. This is because the borrowing from the future proposal does not adequately address how costly it would be to compensate the current generation to the no--‐sacrifice level. III --‐ WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HAVE TO BARGAIN WITH? If we only have access to resources in the present how can we direct these resources towards mitigation without this being perceived as a cost today? To achieve this the basic idea is that we can 1) change the composition of the savings we make for the future 7 and 2) change the composition of the consumption bundles we will enjoy over our lifetimes (Broome, 2012, 37--‐48). These changes in how we save and what we consume can, it is argued, free up resources for mitigation investments but at the same time involve no net cost. To see how this is expected to work we can first look at changes in the way we save. Each generation passes on savings to the next generation by leaving natural resources and by investing in things like infrastructure, technology, and knowledge that pass on productive capacity to future generations. However, because the true social costs of GHG intensive consumption and investment choices are not internalised it is argued that the current generation is actually saving for future generations in a very inefficient way. We could save for the future in a much more efficient way by shifting some current investment away from conventional capital and into mitigation capital, i.e. low--‐carbon energy, low--‐carbon infrastructures, and efficiency. By investing the resources necessary to avoid dangerous levels of global warming much more welfare is 'passed on' to future generations in the form of avoided climate damages than would be passed on to them in the form of conventional productive capacity. The idea is that a shift in the composition of the current generation's future oriented investments can leave consumption levels constant. This brings us to the second issue, changes in the composition of our consumption. The aim is to bring about an intergenerationally optimal level of investment in mitigation capital and an intergenerationally optimal shift away from GHG intensive consumption without affecting (too much) the value of lifetime consumption bundles for present people. In economic theory this is ideally achieved by the imposition of an optimal cost for GHG emissions. Compensating the present for making the consumption of GHG intensive goods more expensive can be achieved, it is argued, by consuming more goods that are not GHG intensive. Eating meat and other animal based foods can be compensated with eating less expensive and higher quality vegetable based foods. Travel by car can be compensated with increased investment in public transportation. Buying less carbon intensive consumer products and going on few overseas vacations can be compensated by consuming more services and working less. 8 Of course the substitutions noted above are all already available to us and are not currently chosen to nearly a sufficient extent. The mitigation without sacrifice proposal cannot simply be that current agents should change their preferences. This is not because there are necessarily few opportunities for existing agents to change their preferences. Instead the borrowing from the future proposal aims to show that even if we depart from the pessimistic premises that i) existing agents are only willing to make modest sacrifices for the future and ii) that we can only expect existing agents to alter their preferences marginally, it is still possible to compensate these agents for investing in avoiding future climate damage. As a consequence, the argument has to be that there is some increase in alternative consumption patterns that the current generation prefers more than or at least as strongly as its current emissions intensive economy. If we impose an intergenerationally optimal carbon tax the costs of consuming emissions intensive goods are increased and the returns on emissions intensive investments are decreased. The results are reductions in lifetime consumption as a direct response to cost increases and reductions in consumption as consequence of reductions in the rate of economic growth over existing agents' lifetimes compared to a business as usual (BAU) investment scenario. We can in part compensate for these losses by redistributing emissions taxes back to citizens and in part by taking on national debt (Foley, 2009). The aim of this borrowing is to give the current generation enough of an alternative lifetime consumption bundle to make it worth its while to accept the effects of the carbon tax. To illustrate how this debt financing is expected to amount to borrowing from the future we can set up this borrowing via a pay--‐as--‐you go pension system. Let us say that in the current pension system workers pay for retirees' pensions by transferring 5% of their earnings (i.e. productivity) into the scheme. Workers are motivated to make such transfers because they expect their children to pay for their pensions when they themselves retire. This allows workers to spread out their consumption between their productive and non--‐productive years and to save in a way that gives them access to some of the gains of economic growth in the economy. This same reasoning will hold for the worker's children and so on. This system of saving is a form of indirect reciprocity where the working generation confers a benefit on the 9 retired generation in exchange for a future benefit from the young generation. This system of reciprocity does not rely on altruism, does not have a determinate endpoint, and users expect it to reach far out into the future (Heath, 2013). To borrow from the future workers are asked to dedicate an additional 1% of their productivity to investment in mitigation capital. As compensation the workers' children will increase the size of the transfers they make to retirees when they themselves become workers. Our children will in turn be compensated when they retire by their children. When the benefits of avoided climate change begin to arrive workers can begin to reduce the amount of compensation they give to retirees. Retirees are now being compensated for their payments into the pension system both in the form of transfers from workers and in the form of avoided climate damages. Subsequent cohorts of workers should also expect to receive less than they paid into the pension system. These decreases in the size of the transfers made from workers to retirees can continue until the point at which a cohort of workers secures a net benefit over its lifetime from any investments they make in mitigation capital. This is the point in time when there is no longer a problem of motivating these types of investments. In theory, there can be a stopping point for transferring the costs of mitigation to future generations despite the fact that the benefits of mitigation can be expected to extend very far into the future.4 This looks like a clear method for taking on debt to finance investment in mitigation and effectively transferring the costs into the future. IV --‐ THE DIFFICULTIES OF COMPENSATING THE PRESENT Changing the way we save for future generations only appears to be able to solve the problem of motivating the current generation in the straightforward way described above if current savings actually aim at passing on wealth to future generations. However, to a large extent the intergenerational savings effect of investments in the conventional capital stock appears to be a by--‐product rather than the aim of these investments. Savers save to distribute their consumption over both the productive and unproductive years of their lives, to secure some of the gains of economic growth, and to pass on some wealth to their immediate descendants. Borrowers borrow to make productive investments that will bring them returns that are more valuable than the cost of borrowing. When the government borrows to invest in things like infrastructure, 10 education, and healthcare the timeframes for returns are longer than for private investors. Still, if the government borrows to build a hospital, a university, or new roads the main aims are to use these goods now and to produce economic growth that will be beneficial in some way to taxpayers and their children. The claim is not of course that the present's investments are in no way aimed towards the interests of future people. Those who engage in basic research may in part do so because it represents a good career for them. Individuals and society may invest in such research because it is valued for its own sake. However, if there were no prospect of this research doing some good in the future we would surely invest much less. This is especially true for areas such as cancer research, but also appears to be a general feature of our interests in the future (Scheffler, 2013, p. 24). A real concern for the future must play some part in explaining why we sometimes invest in infrastructure designed to last for many generations. Taking resources away from things like cancer research or designing hundred year bridges and re--‐directing them towards mitigation may in fact be a more effective way of investing in the future. However, the large majority of investments in capital aim at benefiting the present even though they also often benefit the future as a bi--‐product. Thus, asking the current generation to shift its investments in conventional capital towards mitigation capital is for the most part not a cost--‐free way for the present to produce better returns far off into the future. Rather, a motivationally challenged present needs to be compensated for not making the investments they currently make for more self--‐interested reasons. If we go back to our pension scheme, it should now be clear that if current workers dedicate and extra 1% of their productivity to mitigation receiving an extra 1% of our children's productivity is not enough to compensate us in a sacrifice free way. From the perspective of current workers and their children the value of their lifetime consumption bundles is greater in the BAU scenario compared to a scenario in which investments are shifted from conventional capital to mitigation capital. Resources are directed away from the types of consumption and investments that produce the best economic outcomes over the period that is relevant for current workers. When current workers become pensioners they need to be compensated for the effect this decrease in the rate of growth will have on the size of transfers into the pension system compared to 11 BAU. This means that our children will have to dedicate a larger percentage of their productivity into to the pay--‐as--‐you--‐go pension system than we did. This is only the first way in which reaching the no--‐sacrifice level is more difficult than it may at first seem. Think of an economy that consists of a smoker and a room filled with asthmatics. The smoker internalises the benefits of smoking and externalises the costs. The asthmatics' lives are made almost unbearable by the suffering the second--‐hand smoke causes them. These social costs of smoking are much greater than the personal benefits the smoker enjoys. Let us suppose that the smoker is not moved by the plight of the asthmatics and that the only available option to eliminate the negative externality in this economy is for the asthmatics to compensate the smoker for quitting. He must be compensated to an extent that at least matches the benefits he enjoys from smoking. If the smoker quits smoking the asthmatics will become amazingly 'welfare rich' compared to current conditions. However, this does not free up resources that can be used to compensate the smoker. The asthmatics become rich in the form of avoided asthma attacks. By assumption the value of this form of wealth is extremely low from the perspective of the smoker. If the asthmatics are poor in other types of goods while the smoker has a very strong preference for smoking, a transfer to compensate the smoker for quitting will not be possible. For a social planner trying to maximize welfare it is clear that that permitting smoking in this economy is very inefficient. However, this is not how economists conceive of the way a negative externality can create inefficiency in a market that can be eliminated by a transfer that leaves no party worse off. Instead we have to see the value of smoking in terms of the smoker's willingness to be compensated for not smoking. In other words, the social benefit of smoking a cigarette is determined by how much we would have to pay the smoker so that he would be at least indifferent between the options of smoking the cigarette or taking the payment. The social cost of smoking is a function of the asthmatics willingness to pay to prevent smoking. When some agents' willingness to pay to avoid a negative externality is greater than the amount necessary to pay some other agents to refrain from creating this externality there is inefficiency in the market. A transfer from the negative externality takers to the externality producers generates a more efficient market outcome (Kelleher 2015, 71--‐73). In the smoking case I have 12 described we can assume that the asthmatics' willingness to pay is greater than the smoker's willingness to be compensated. However, the point to notice is that even if we have a large negative externality that is massively inefficient with respect to welfare outcomes it can also be true that there is no possible transfer between agents that could diminish the externality while each agent remains, at the very least, on their Pareto indifference curve. The extent to which an externality reducing transfer will be possible is dependent on the pollutees having access to goods that are candidates for transfer because they satisfy the polluters' willingness to be compensated. Once we focus on the question of what the present appears to be willing to be compensated with to stop consuming GHG intensive goods it becomes clearer how large this alternative bundle of resources may have to be. What is at issue is the core of the current generation's consumption preferences and productive capacity. For example, effective climate mitigation may require moving largely to a vegetarian diet. The resources necessary to make such a transition are negative. Production of plant--‐based foods requires fewer resources than the production of meat. Small reductions in meat consumption are surely easy to compensate, but if we are aiming to compensate without having to wait for people to change their preferences (which is what the borrowing from the future proposal aims for) at some point the marginal willingness to be compensated for not being able to eat meat will become very low. Likewise, it may only take an annual investment of 1% of gross world product to mitigate climate change. However, getting to the no--‐sacrifice level may require a very large bundle of alternative resources to compensate the current generation for not being able to exploit emission intensive goods they have strong demonstrated preferences for. The upshot is that in addition to compensating for differences in economic growth compared to BAU our children will also have to dedicate even more of their productive capacity to the pay--‐as--‐you--‐go pension scheme to make it worth the present's while to change the composition of its consumption bundles. Also note that the system calls for us to shift more of our consumption from our productive years to our non--‐productive years than we would normally choose to do. This is an opportunity cost and has to be compensated by more consumption in our non--‐productive years than we forwent in our productive years. This is a third additional cost that results in still greater shares of our 13 children's productivity going into the pension system. Our children's children will in their turn have to dedicate even larger portions of their productivity to their parents than they did for us. The point is not to suggest that it is more expensive than we think to mitigate climate change. Nor is the concern that there must necessarily be a very low elasticity of demand for GHG intensive goods that will make GHG emissions prices less effective than expected. The point is that even if emissions taxes effectively bring about desired shifts in consumption and investments it looks like it is more expensive than we think to compensate the current generation to the extent that they do not view these taxes as generating important sacrifices. It looks more difficult than expected to solve the problem of motivating agents to adopt effective carbon taxes in the first place. This is important because of limits to the amount of debt financing countries can engage in. The typical story about limits to deficit spending is that the more debt a country has the more tax revenue they have to dedicate to servicing the debt, which raises the risk of default, which raises the interests rates at which governments can borrow, which in turn increases the revenue necessary to service the debt, which eventually makes further borrowing too costly. Given limits to how much debt governments can take on, whatever the mechanisms, it seems to follow that a generation that is unwilling to take on significant sacrifices to mitigate climate change is also going to have a strong preference for using debt financing for the sake of more present oriented goods rather than more future oriented goods. In other words, there is an opportunity cost here that looks like it is very difficult to compensate. Given that the present needs to be compensated for shifting its investment patterns, changing its consumption bundles, changing its consumption timing, and for the opportunity cost of dedicating scarce access to debt financing to future oriented investments it should no longer be surprising that the current generation does not use debt financing to a substantial extent to invest in climate change mitigation. This is especially true given the magnitude of mitigation investments needed in comparison to existing deficit levels. Net government deficits for the OECD countries in 2013 were 2.1 trillion US $.5 In order to get onto a 2°C trajectory the International Energy Agency is calling for investment in 14 addition to those needed simply to meet future energy demand of on average 1 trillion US $ per year to 2035 (International Energy Agency, 2014: 44). Rogelj et al. (2013) estimate that an immediate global price on GHG emissions of US$40 tCO2e, rising there after, would give us a 66% chance of keeping warming to 2°C. Global GHG emissions in 2011 were over 43 000 MtCO2e.6 This gives us over 1.7 trillion US$ in new costs. The co--‐ benefits from such mitigation investments may be very large over the longer--‐term, while cost estimates may also be overly optimistic due to assumptions of full global cooperation and perfect policy implementation. There is obviously a lot of uncertainty about costs, but what is clear is that meeting these costs through debt financing involves extremely large shifts in how resources are being used compared to current patterns. V --‐ EXPLOITING TYRANNY OVER THE FUTURE FOR THE GOOD The combination of limits to the ability of governments to take on debt, incentives to use debt for present oriented goods, preferences for GHG intensive goods over alternative packages of goods, and a system of investment in capital that largely aims at producing returns over the nearer term should make us question how big of a role borrowing from the future can play in addressing motivational obstacles to investing in mitigation capital. If this assessment is plausible we are back where we started. We see strong incentives for delaying mitigation investments and as a result it may be strategically important to identify ways of shifting the costs of mitigation to avoid dangerous levels of global warming. In one sense 'passing the buck' to the future has been a key strategy in climate politics for several decades. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol is regularly derided as having had far too weak commitments, covering far too little of global emissions, and as having been ineffective in brining about emissions reductions that would not have occurred for other reasons. However, it is also widely understood that the protocol was weakly demanding in order to secure broad international participation and to make it possible to set up the institutional mechanisms for carbon trading and other flexibility mechanisms. The aim was to extend the regime in subsequent commitment periods with deeper reduction targets and more effective institutional mechanisms. This did not occur as envisioned, but the push within the UNFCCC process for more ambitious emissions commitments and expanded coverage continues. In the EU Emissions Trading System's (ETS) initial 15 trading period between 2005--‐2007 the market was characterised by weak emissions targets, an over--‐allocation of free emissions allowances, and significant national flexibility in meeting targets (Parker, 2011). Increased ambition and harmonisation of rules across EU member states, especially for the third trading period 2013--‐2020, has followed. However "temporary exemptions, compensations and procrastination of decisions" still create delays between decisions and the arrival of costs with these delays designed to help secure agreement (Muller & Slominski, 2013: 1437). For example, the full shift in the third trading period to auctioning of emission credits will not be in place until 2027, while sectors deemed to be exposed to significant carbon leakage will have access to free allowances and the possibility of compensation.7 Creating temporal space between when policy makers adopt at decision and when the costs arrive, working with shorter--‐term flexibility and longer--‐term pre--‐commitments, and setting in motion path dependencies are all highlighted in the political science literature as important strategies for dealing with so--‐called 'super wicked' cooperation problems (e.g. Lazurus, 2009, Ismer & Neuhoff, 2009, Levin et al., 2012, Urpelainen, 2012, Brunner et al., 2012, Jordan & Matt, 2014). To the extent that these types of policies involve weak initial demands they do not respond to the urgency of the environmental threat. This is regularly and rightly criticised, but it should also be clear that such policies are often genuine strategic responses to real political obstacles. The borrowing from the future proposal aims to offer a better strategy than incrementalism by shifting costs to the future while at the same time eliminating procrastination. I have raised doubts that this approach is a powerful tool for mediating the politics of delay. The structure of the problem suggests that we need to identify ways to set in motion serious mitigation efforts but at the same time not require large changes in behaviour right now. For example, those in political power now could commit the young to significant investments in mitigation. Designing these commitments so that they create a future financial liability for failures to make promised investments would exploit future decision makers' commitments to property rights regimes and the global financial system. Potential financial liabilities for failing to invest in mitigation would be a means to entrench mitigation commitments imposed by present governments onto future 16 governments.8 The only proposal along these lines I have been able to identify is the idea of governments issuing index--‐linked policy performance bonds where interest payments on the bonds are linked to GHG emission targets or financing targets for low--‐ carbon energy. If the government fails to meet its mitigation targets there is a penalty in the form of higher interest rates to be paid to bond holders (Ekins et al., 2014, 168--‐170). However, governments have to already be committed to increasing the resources dedicated to cutting GHG emissions to pre--‐commit themselves in this way. What I am imagining is a policy that largely pre--‐commits future governments and thus places some temporal space between when the pre--‐commitment is made and when governments have to start making the mitigation investments. I have not been able to identify thinking in the economics literature that would specifically meet the criteria outlined above. As a result I am only able to briefly suggest a type of proposal that attempts to enforce commitments made today on future governments by creating a financial liability today that will materialise tomorrow if governments fail to mitigate. The aim of the pre--‐commitment proposal suggested above is to reduce the level of bootstrapping involved in the more incrementalist approaches we currently have while at the same time taking seriously the possibility that governments will continue to be very wary about binding themselves to strong financial commitments over the short--‐ term. The type of proposal under consideration is clearly flawed in that it does not respond quickly enough to the environmental threat. Thus, it should be understood chiefly as an insurance policy against the risk of an intergenerational pattern of perpetual delay.9 Because I cannot provide a design for the strategy proposed above, this chapter is limited to assessing the normative case for this more explicit form of pre--‐ committing the future. The purpose of such an assessment is to give some normative permission to think about new creative ways of pre--‐committing future publics that can better mediate the wickedness of time in the Anthropocene. If our parents had committed us to financial liabilities for failing to invest in mitigation could we plausibly argue that we did not deserve this type of treatment? The more unjustifiable it appears to be for us to simply fail to mitigate climate change and the longer we delay serious action, the less plausible it is to question that it would have been justifiable for past generations to bind us to mitigation investments. If we deserve 17 paternalistic treatment for our unwillingness and political incapacity to make meaningful investments in mitigation then so may our children. We have good reason to expect the next generation to do better than us from a moral perspective in various respects, but it is far from obvious that we should expect so much change that they will not also have very strong incentives to discount the interests of the future. Thus, the claim is not that the ways and extent to which people are motivated by moral considerations cannot change, but only that the incentives to discount the far future look particularly hard to change and that we should have some insurance against this problem. When current publics try to pre--‐commit future publics the most common normative objection is that this is a form of political domination over the future by the present. This concern is usually raised against the constitutional entrenchment of some substantive public policy by the current majority with the aim of limiting the ability of future majorities to make public policy in this same area. If the present is able to democratically determine what the right substantive policy is without such obstacles why should the future be denied this same democratic power? Given reasonable disagreement about politics it is problematic for the current public to paternalistically safeguard future publics from following their own majoritarian will. On what grounds do current majorities think they have better access to answers about the policies that ought to be adopted than future majorities (Waldron, 1999, 255--‐282)? However the type of pre--‐commitment I am proposing is not an effort to protect the future against itself. Instead, pre--‐committing our children to mitigation investments is an effort to protect the further future from the near future. What we do is not to democratically adopt some measure for ourselves that we then think should be maintained in perpetuity. Rather we fail to adopt some measure that we think ought to be put into practice for the sake of future generations and instead pass on that commitment to the publics that will follow us. Surprisingly then, the combination of an unwillingness and inability to adopt just legislation with respect to the interests of future generations that we are currently witnessing appears to significantly improve the justifiability of present majorities paternalistically pre--‐committing future majorities. 18 The most serious objection to the idea that we should bind our children to mitigation costs is that it is a form of moral corruption. As Stephen Gardiner puts it, if the current generation favors buck--‐passing, but does not want to face up to what it is doing, it is likely to welcome any rationale that appears to justify its behavior. Hence, it may be attracted to weak or deceptive arguments that appear to license buck--‐passing, and so give them less scrutiny than it ought. It is the claim that the obstacles to political action are particularly severe in the case of climate change that makes buck--‐passing in a safer way seem reasonable. How this claim is deployed in our moral evaluations is what warrants more scrutiny. Given the enormous amount of wealth and technological capability we currently enjoy it is not plausible to be sceptical about the prospects for action due to a sheer lack of capacity. Rather, it is a lack of the right kinds of motivations that prevents us from bringing the climate threat under effective political control. Binding our children to the costs of mitigation is presented as a way for us to live up to our obligations to protect the interests of future generations, albeit a very imperfect response. However, to make this move the present's moral failure to act is actually conceived of as an external condition that existing agents must take into account as we decide how to protect the interests of the future. It looks like I have perverted our blatant discounting of future interests into a moral justification for passing on the costs of mitigation! What can be said in response to this charge? It is clearly moral suspicious to appeal to current political obstacles to justify cost shifting to the future. There is an incentive to exaggerate the obstacles one is complicit in creating because this provides moral cover for doing little now to address the problem. At the same time, it is also problematic to conceive of the present as a singular agent that can simply decide not to exploit some other agent, the future. Prohibitions on exploiting others agents are a basic feature of our normative theories and social institutions, and the message is that we need simply not to do what we normally expect agents not to do to each other. Yet, a generation is not a singular agent or any agent at all. Instead, what is required is to coordinate the actions of individuals, companies, communities, and governments all over the world. What we need to coordinate around is not some ubiquitous feature of common sense morality but something new. Agents must let the effects of their present actions on conditions far into the future outweigh 19 their interests in securing goods here and now. We may have always depended on the idea of future generations to give meaning to our projects (Scheffler, 2013), but we have not had to face the prospect of stark conflicts between many of our own unextraordinary projects and welfare in the distant future. If we look at the conditions in which agents have tended to be successful in protecting common pool resources it is clear that in the case of climate change these conditions are not satisfied (see Dietz et al., 2003). Climate change is the most difficult cooperative challenge humanity has faced to date and as a result it is reasonable to think in terms of second and third best options without being accused of blatant moral corruption. In response to long--‐term threats like climate change political theorists often argue for institutional reforms that will eliminate the tyranny of the present over the future. The most common proposals are to have the interests of the future represented in some way in the democratic process or to constitutionally entrench respect for the interests of future generations. Instead of trying to address symptoms of the tyranny of the present over the future it would be better, it is argued, to address the institutional sources of this injustice. However, it remains highly uncertain if institutional reforms of this type will go far enough fast enough to bring about effective mitigation policies. The argument of this section is that because we may have a limited window of opportunity to deal with the problem of weak incentives to invest in mitigation we should also consider strategies that attempt to exploit the present's tyranny over the future for the good. The argument above has defended the paternalism of binding the future to mitigation costs. However, once a case for paternalism is made it is appropriate to ask if other forms of paternalism are preferable. For example, one could imagine more or less paternalistic government policies that attempt to change present people's preferences so that they are more in line with the interests of future generations. The argument advanced here clearly does not demonstrate which policy responses are all things considered the best ones. Much depends on how pessimistic we think we should be about current political conditions. The type of proposal I have advanced is thought of as an insurance strategy against the risk of perpetual political inertia. 20 CONCLUSION There is already some debt financing of mitigation investments and debt financing would surely be a large part of extensive government efforts to mitigate climate change. There is also a good strategic and normative case for passing on the costs of mitigation investments to the future. If the present has strong incentives to pass on the costs of climate change to the future we should at least try to identify ways of passing on those costs in ways that best protect the interests of future generations. However, I have argued that the option to debt finance mitigation does not really resolve the basic problem of motivating agents to change their consumption and investment behaviours. This raises the question of whether or not there are other ways to pass on the costs of climate change in a 'safer' way. Strategic buck--‐passing and efforts to pre--‐commit future publics to increasingly demanding mitigation efforts are also already a key part of climate governance. I have suggested that we should consider more explicit pre--‐ commitment strategies that bind the young today to large investments in mitigation over their productive lifetimes. If we are failing to overcome the tyranny of the present over the future then we should consider how we might exploit that tyranny for the good. My argument is not a moral endorsement of the present's domination over the future and it is not in conflict with the typical institutional reforms political theorists advance to reduce the present's discounting of future interests. Yet, given the severity of the political challenges we currently face and the severity of the consequences of global warming we should also be open to the possibility that we may need stronger measures to prevent a scenario in which we perpetually put off investing in climate security for the future. BIBLIOGRAPHY Anadon, L. D. and Holdren, J. P. H. (2009) 'Policy for Energy Technology Innovation.' in Acting in Time on Energy Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Andreou, Chrisoula. "Environmental Preservation and Second‐Order Procrastination." Philosophy & Public Affairs 35.3 (2007): 233--‐248. Asheim, G. B. (2013). 'Competitive intergenerational altruism'. Accessed March 2014 at: . Broome, J. (2012) Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Brunner, S., Flachsland, C., & Marschinski, R. (2012). Credible commitment in carbon policy. Climate Policy, 12(2), 255--‐271. 21 Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. C. (2003). 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International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics,13(2), 107--‐125. 1 I would like to thank Catriona McKinnon for in--‐depth comments that helped me greatly improve this chapter. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented during 2014 at the ECPR Joint Sessions, the Nordic Political Science Association Conference, The Academy of Finland's Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and at the Global and Regional Governance and Political Theory research seminars at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University. I would like to thank participants at these events for their comments, in particular Matthew Rendall, Dominic Roser, Blake Francis, John Broome, Robert Huseby, Jonas Tallberg, Magnus Reitberg, Säde Hormio, Kian Mintz--‐Woo, Simo Kyllönen, Jonathan Kuyper, Ludvig Beckman, and Göran Duus--‐Otterström. I would also like to thank Alan Mehlenbacher, David von Below, and Nick Rowe for answering some basic questions about the notion of borrowing from the future. 2 I remain agnostic on the question of what a fair distribution of mitigation costs between generations would be. 3 This conclusion appears to be true even where agents are narrowly altruistic in the sense of having strong preferences for securing high consumption levels for their children (Asheim, 2013). 4 There is a question of whether or not the one could plan to reduce pay--‐outs to retirees without undermining the pension scheme. Workers facing the prospect that they will put more into the pension system that they get out cannot be excluded from the avoided climate damages that are supposed to make up for this difference. As such they have an incentive to decrease their inputs into the system to what they can expect to get out of it. This in turn gives cohorts prior to them incentives to pre--‐emptively decrease their inputs into the system. This dynamic could undermine the credibility of the scheme. Perpetually rolling over the debt could be a better way to ensure the credibility of the scheme. Normatively assessing such a strategy would be dependent on a theory of distributive justice between generations. 5 By country GDP figures were taken from OECD (2014), "Gross domestic product in US dollars", Economics: Key Tables from OECD, No. 5. DOI: 10.1787/gdp--‐cusd--‐table--‐2014--‐5--‐ en. By country deficit figures were taken from OECD (2014), "Government deficit / surplus as a percentage of GDP", Economics: Key Tables from OECD, No. 20. DOI: 10.1787/gov--‐dfct--‐table--‐2014--‐1--‐en. The calculation excludes Chile, Mexico and Turkey. 6 WRI, CAIT 2.0. 2014. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool: WRI's Climate Data Explorer. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available at: . Accessed October 1, 2014. 7 See . 23 8 Ideally, the future holders of the corresponding financial entitlements would be those in poorer countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. These entitlements could thus serve as some level of compensation for failures to mitigate. However, one would also want agents holding rights to payment for 'failure to perform' to be in a strong position to defend these entitlements. 9 Rendall (2011) also argues that borrowing from the future should be seen as an insurance policy against a pattern of political inertia. | {
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{"creator":"Feeney, Aaron M.","date":"2014","datestamp":1587507802000,"description":"{June 2018 UPDA(...TRUNCATED) | "Understanding Future-Viewing Machines and Time Travel∗ Aaron M. Feeney 1 Introduction The concept(...TRUNCATED) | {"alnum_ratio":0.8025885694,"avg_line_length":121148.0,"char_rep_ratio":0.0733289857,"flagged_words_(...TRUNCATED) | 577,131,367,252,509,800 |
{"creator":"Abao, Antonia Sasap","date":"2020","datestamp":1575018037000,"description":"The World Ec(...TRUNCATED) | "African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure, Volume 9 (1) - (2020) ISSN: 2223-814X Copyrigh(...TRUNCATED) | {"alnum_ratio":0.8131961208,"avg_line_length":23613.0,"char_rep_ratio":0.0734621251,"flagged_words_r(...TRUNCATED) | 16,319,703,398,181,415,000 |
{"creator":"Abath, André J.","date":"2008","datestamp":1426784178000,"description":"John McDowell a(...TRUNCATED) | "Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons ∗ This is a preprint version of an article (...TRUNCATED) | {"alnum_ratio":0.8011220142,"avg_line_length":51871.0,"char_rep_ratio":0.1424549767,"flagged_words_r(...TRUNCATED) | 7,520,256,921,094,345,000 |
{"creator":"Abad Espinoza, Luis Gregorio","date":"2019","datestamp":1579942839000,"description":"Cul(...TRUNCATED) | "© PASOS. Revista de Turismo y Patrimonio Cultural. ISSN 1695-7121 Vol. 17 N.o 4. Págs. 671‐693.(...TRUNCATED) | {"alnum_ratio":0.8145356365,"avg_line_length":99631.0,"char_rep_ratio":0.083214551,"flagged_words_ra(...TRUNCATED) | 4,728,978,874,712,900,000 |
{"creator":"Abbott, Russ","date":"manuscript","datestamp":1587672863000,"description":"Fundamental t(...TRUNCATED) | "/62 Abstractions and implementations: a computer science perspective on emergence, causality, and m(...TRUNCATED) | {"alnum_ratio":0.7984083095,"avg_line_length":207955.0,"char_rep_ratio":0.0729035423,"flagged_words_(...TRUNCATED) | 7,211,775,244,297,247,000 |
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The Pile -- PhilPaper (refined by Data-Juicer)
A refined version of PhilPaper dataset in The Pile by Data-Juicer. Removing some "bad" samples from the original dataset to make it higher-quality.
This dataset is usually used to pretrain a Large Language Model.
Notice: Here is a small subset for previewing. The whole dataset is available here (About 1.7GB).
Dataset Information
- Number of samples: 29,117 (Keep ~88.82% from the original dataset)
Refining Recipe
# global parameters
project_name: 'our-recipes-Philpaper'
dataset_path: '/path/to/the/original/dataset/' # path to your dataset directory or file
export_path: 'Philpaper-refine-result.jsonl' # path to your dataset result file
np: 50 # number of subprocess to process your dataset
ds_cache_dir: /cache # path to your dataset cache file
open_tracer: true
# process schedule
# a list of several process operators with their arguments
process:
- clean_email_mapper:
- clean_links_mapper:
- fix_unicode_mapper:
- punctuation_normalization_mapper:
- whitespace_normalization_mapper:
- alphanumeric_filter:
tokenization: false
min_ratio: 0.7 # <3sigma (0.72)
- average_line_length_filter:
max_len: 5e5 # >3sigma (406006)
- character_repetition_filter:
rep_len: 10
max_ratio: 0.2 # >3sigma (0.145)
- flagged_words_filter:
lang: en
tokenization: true
max_ratio: 0.0007 # 3sigma
- language_id_score_filter:
min_score: 0.6
- maximum_line_length_filter:
max_len: 1e6 # 3sigma
- perplexity_filter:
lang: en
max_ppl: 5000
- special_characters_filter:
max_ratio: 0.4 # > 3sigma (0.302)
- words_num_filter:
lang: en
tokenization: true
min_num: 1000
max_num: 2e5 # 3sigma
- word_repetition_filter:
lang: en
tokenization: true
rep_len: 10
max_ratio: 0.3 # > 3sigma (0.249)
- document_simhash_deduplicator:
tokenization: space
window_size: 6
lowercase: true
ignore_pattern: '\p{P}'
num_blocks: 6
hamming_distance: 4
- Downloads last month
- 46
Size of downloaded dataset files:
4.12 MB
Size of the auto-converted Parquet files:
2.09 MB
Number of rows:
100