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PA-24C-11-08/2023

PEMOHON Land Success Engineering Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN Amindo Packaging Industries Sdn Bhd

CIPAA – Setting aside, stay and enforcement of adjudication decision – Whether denial of natural justice – Whether the adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially – Whether the adjudicator has acted in excess of her jurisdiction.

30/01/2024

YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=95614a06-78f5-4cf4-9cfe-04bb4bb2e967&Inline=true

30/01/2024 15:53:42 PA-24C-11-08/2023 Kand. 25 S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N BkphlfV49Eyc/gS7S7LpZw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m\—2ac-11»os/2n23 Kand. 25 an/amuza 13:52:42 m the High Com 0! Malaya m Panang In me State 0! Pena;-g, Mahysxa ongmaung Summons No P c as/zozs Dalam perkara mengena: Kepulusan Aquaukaeu benankh ca Ogos 2023 dengan nombur nqukan Ame/D/Am—45sa—2o2a o\eh Adjudikamr Ehuvzneswan Krishnamurlhy anlava Land Success Engineenng Sdn Ehd dan Ammdo Packagmg lndusmes Sdn Bhd dan Daram perkara mengenai Seksyen 2a dan pemnlukan undang — undang di bawah Ana Pemhayzran dan Adwdwkasx lndusm Pembmaan 2012 darn Da\em perkava mengenau Aluran 7‘ 22;‘ 69A den perunmkan kaedah — kaedah da\am Kaedah — Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Between Land Success Engineering Sdn Bhd . Plamllfl And Amindo Packagmg Industries Sdn Ehd Deferldam Heam together wmn In ma Hugh ceun uf Ma\aya m Penang In the Sva|e or Penang, Malay a Summ n No P so /2 23 0n n Dalam pemaxa Seksyen 12. 15 dan we Ana Pembayaran darn Afljudlkasl Vndusln Pemmnaan 2012‘ dan « am s~amNaEyrJDS7s1Luzw «we. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e U... a may a. mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum am Dalam perkars Kepulusan Adwmkasx berlankh we 05 mm dengan Adwdxkasx Rujukan Nu AIACIDIADJ-45ss—2o2a yang di puluskan aleh Bhuvaneswan Knshnamurmy‘ dan Da\am perkara Aluran sen Kaedah - Kaedah Mankaman zmz. dan Dawn perkara Amran 7 dan 293 dan muran 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah — Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Between Ammdo Packagmg Vndusmes sun Bhd . Appncam And Land Success Engineering Sdn and ., Respundent Grounds L71 Be on Immducnon 1. There are [we vewaueu acflons belore me Namew my Orlgmallng Summom Na FAr24C—11«05I2D23 man by Land Sums“ Engmaenng Sdn am runa Succui‘}un an a ma ms ‘s an appirahon m eurmce ‘nniomnmlnl ap uliazn“) Ihe Admdlcatmv Declimn new 13 a 2fl23(‘id]|l¢IcIflon .1. - nvaewerea ny lha Adluduzilur Ehuvaneswan Knihnamunhy (‘.m1ju-ilumor‘) m an Amudxtzmmn No NACJD/ADJAEBBJUZSPidjunluflan plncoodlllfj me enrnmemsfll .ppw»ca«.m was made under suclmn 23 at me canwucuon lndushy Paymem and Mjudlcalwon AcA2D12(‘C|PAA')‘ and my Dngmnllnn Summons No FA—24C-13-‘Ufi/2021! Ned by Anundu Paumgmg tndusmes Sdn am: (‘Amado’) on 22 9 ma me ‘e an apmmm m ya asme me adludwcation domuun 4'-mun asldl .wnIe.nmr‘) me semrv] aside anmmmn was made under b9won15oVC\PAA sm smumN4vEydps7s7u:zw 2 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! defence raised by Ammdu, Vs nm a gvound to set aeme me amudlcallon decwswon 41. The admdlcalor ::nm:\uded ms: the urns to complete me pmjen had been set at Verge. As Land Success was permllled to eennnue |o remain ac lhe pmjact sme and carry out as works. And Ihere was no subsequent oenificale ol nun — complelion wssued aner the rewsea commeuan date 01 so 11 2020 42. The deience rawsed by Ammdo wmn regard \ulI1e cemflcale at nun — compleuon at 29.5 2020 had been Iaken Into accoum by the adiudwcator ms appears at Fart P paraglaphs 10 and 11 oilhe adjudicalmn deusuon. wmcn reads. we The Reswllflerfl subrmls Ihmme am case wanna be msnnamsnea as .n we um case me PAM Conlracl 2006 was avvhcable and Clause 22 pm»: sam PAM eonlranl reqmres me so to wssue a Cemficals a! Non comm-an bevere up can be warm ‘H The Respondnm a um mm as me Cmumcl .n queslmn .s nol a PAM wlI|r-I<:| and (her: a no reqmremen| up Vssue a CNC helare LAD can be Vewed me xhererme me case ewunp Km not appucabqs In any men: we Responaem claws lha| cNc had been Immd an 2v a 2020 * The ad udwcato lmdmg on road and dra §_q§ Qawm by Land Success 4:. Ammdo alleges than the adjudxcalor had umlalerafly vpund |ha| Ammdo had accepled Land Success‘ claim nn road and drainage work Tne aueganen Vs umenable. Tne aapmueacor consxdered Amlndds Rejuinder, where Ammdu rawsed that me man and eramage work wmen was In vanalmn order rm 2 had been De ed m me mlenm paymenc clam: no 7. Noiwilhslanding me cenmcauon, Amlndu delved ma« me mad and dramage work was commeled by Land Success 44 In any event, eppanunny was aeeemea to Amlndo lo pu| toward as case Tne delenoe and eymenee ravssd by Amman were cnnswdered by the Adjudwcawv ms appears at Pan 5 paragraph 1: el me adjudication dectswcn, wmen veads w Road a. Dva\nana- Vntsmal Road K0ng\na|WoIk!Y a The Respondent m me Aepmmen Response claws man nem an my Vmemnl am was nol my name by me Cmxmam The Responasm smas max by way own 2 me mnslmcmn ov me ln|erna\ Road (Mam a 1 under Road a manage) was vanad m Hum mats and hencslha D\aIman\$hou\d am swmN4nEydDS7s1l-nzw “ “Nab: s.nn lunhnrwm be e... a mm s. snpnu-y mm: dnuamnl VI mum em um be wlmed \a mam mow. lar m|ema\ mad and Ihsmlnm mas Ihe Chlminl had been ovemam lar Item an h The Claumanl m mew Repiy slam: max vo 2 was leraddlhonal s\ab works and had nssn duly anpvvved bylhe so u The Rexmnflenl m mew ns.o.mer snanss Ihat ma asnmaauan Vor man s. Draulanze m we 1 mm to be sustamud The Rssponasm howevavstales lhe|\|\sw\lhuulp1a]uuu>s on ma aamsmau lhal addulm-131 floor slab was run sxssmaa The Reswnflem reflers to me Whakkpp wrwelsalmn M 15 3 2021 m Schedme 25 (wm»g\y marked as Swodule 32) 7: nssusmn That: \s no dispute mm regavd to hem a 1, as ascapma by um R¢spnnwen| The wnamaa mrwersanon does ml ‘and any anmance In ma delenmnalmn M0-us Issue The -ssus suns Addmnnal F\ncrS\ab has naan asan mm under voz havmnabove The cnamanra slam under Hem s < Is mervlom anawsa as Inna C\aImam's whole aaxm undev Ham a - Thea ud nzlofs nd g cgn ra on the Issue 0! me v >1 av me lermmauon ol 45 Land Sucoess dawms man the contract WES nc\ lelminaled. Whereas Armndc contends that the oantract was lerrmnmed, when me prqem swle was handled back «a Ammdu The disagreement an whether the connect had been lerminaled was raised by hull’! pames, and ¢el\ squarely under me adjudlcalofs junsmcnon 45. The adjudicator found that lhe oonlracl was no! pmpany (errmnmed by Ammdo The answer reached in rfipem uflhe |emuneman 0' contract. which differs fmm the names‘ subrnisswons, dues nu| render M an excess oflhe ad;udvcamfs;unsd\ct\an Nor can (he adjudicahnr be blamed Io have acled pafllafly. 47. The adjudicator then pmoseded In news on anomsr issue of whether Am do us emmau to claim from Land Success lo! ma sxpansas mowed In ng a Ihwd pafly to carry out the purportedly incomplete works The adjudicator and not gram ma sum claimed by Amindo The amudlcalar cannot be said |o have ac1ed m breach of na(ura\ ju ce or acted pamaHy nr ac1ed In excess 0! her junsmcuon, when she applied he! fmdmgs m raspesx ol the wmpmper Ie alien to same Am-nuns claim lor such expenses. 4.5 ms appears at Pan 5 paraglaph l3(e) av Ihe adjumcaman deuswen. wmch leads am asam/4az,,a.svsnaza " «am. am.‘ nmhnrwm a. med w mm s. saw-y mm: dnuumnl VII nF\uNG v-ma! -e Declslon l Vlrld (hal M none: was wlverl |o lhe clarmarrl prlol lhe appalvllmam am. 3'” pally Io do me wens l have found aamav men are lenrrrharreh was ml cane aoaurdlnq In the eerrrlrselrral pmvlllunl rh clarrse 33 av lhe General carralllorn an Conllad ll rs under Ihls I:lause|h.n|1he Respondent would be enhliad la emplny an panyio cmvlplele walks allegedly ml eohe by me clarmanl The plumes plovlded by lhe Reipundsnl aa he: prove lrrsl lh. salfl wurks were deiedrvely done by lhe aeswlaehl ue omen wix glven la lhe clalmerrlanhwghlh. Raspolvflavll had by cnndudlsmlniled me eerrlrael ln seplamesrzuzr Furlhemwle lhe charges rrrerrrrea are In zuza whlch ls mom lharr a year aha a hall aherslre pessessrorr was taken nylhe Rewnndvnl I lherelere alsallew lhrs uounlutlalm bylhe nesperruem- The recllllcauon cosl lln cm A an alarm cl Rmwa 411 lor the as Thrs rs again anolner sllualron where Amindo rs purely unhappy wllh lhe findlng el lhe aalrldrealnr There ls no challenge as to lhe quesllan asked erwhelher Amlndo ls ehlllled to elslrn lor lrle ones to demolish and redo lhe purpnrled undone or delsctwe works ll ls rncarreel lor Arnlhdo |n allege lhal lhe aalrrrjrrsalur had acted ln breach el nalurel lusllce or panrally or in excess of her lrrrrsalcllen, when she aeclaea lhal lhe quolalicn (endeved were lnsumcrenl Io suppurl A dds clalrn. so The aalualealer leunu lhal only a lhlm — pany quolaflun claleu 13.5 202311 year and a mohlhs aller lhe pmjecl slle was handed back re Amlndn) was |erldered by Amlndol nul hol ah lhyolee nor recelpl The ‘quulaliuw would merely be an anlrelpalron and evaluallon lor lulure losses whlch does run lrrsllly actual loss suflsred al lhe malerlal llrrle when lhe claim was made sl. Tms appears a| l=sn s paragraph 10(9) or the adludicalvon declslon, whlch reads -wrlh regard no me eerrnrerelalrrr rhe Responderll has urlly amylase e quomlnn lrem a an puny || ls orrlslee lhe purvlaw ol lhls Mlrralcallerr lo Inllclpaie and eyalrrale lrmrre losses om-e Relpondarl| lalsallew lhe Rarrperraehrs wunher alarm aha llrld \h.n| rlre clarmahl ls ehllllea la mu armrrrms as clalmed rh Revlsed Flawless clarm s rrhaer llerrr 51 mm sm EAuNN4iEyrJfi7S7LaZw " “Nana Smul luvlhnrwm rs. UIQG In my rs. arlrlmllry MIMI dnuavlml vn nFluNfl WVM Ihm rm msuum nas been valsod wrrn regnm la rne amer wems under nsnr 5 and unererora auowme rema- The allegeg tenure at the ad uarcaror to con der Am gg s defence 52. II us no\ true that lhe adrudraator (arled |D consider Armrvdds defense‘ as alleged by Ammdo The aaruarcamr ma aoneraer Arninaosaerenpe arm lhe evrdencs, mcludmg the photographic evidence submilled by A tin rn consrdsnng Amlndds uerenee, ma aanmrcaror round rehance and suppmt (mm the cemficaliun by the Supermlendenl cmcer in ma uerlflicale M prograaa crarrn no, 7 53 Trris appears at Pan s paragraph 711:) unhe aaruarcanon aecrsrorr. wmcrr reads ‘In new pun. I.ur1mn|me so nas uumflad me work: m we 1 V 3 rn rerar as having paen mm mnrprerea m CanIfica1so¢Fmgre:: Payment Na 7‘ I sea In) reason to quesuon the same rn. Raxpnndcnfs |:\nm\ mar ma Floursbab Work: were nor cumpleled m apearaanae m specwrcarrans rs unsupsrannarea mm urrsuppaneu by any ewdenee we Ualmanls cuarrnerprvo «-3 an aflewed Mm no daduclmm “ ‘1es| re rt‘ mdueed p A 'ndn m these raoesdln s were n egg ga m the ad udncahnn prooee g 54 In Alnmdtfs allwdai/1| VI rep\y immled on 30 102023 (Enclosure 2|) and filed in the sellmg aside Ongrnalmg Summons, a \esl vepcfl Issued by we sort A Cuncvele Lab Sdn am: daled 410202: was exhumed. ‘rrna IBDOR was issued puvpunedly pursuem to an mspeclxon carried out on 27 9 2023. TN5 repon was drsragarded by me 707 the IGHOMVVQ reasons. 55. rrrsuy, Ihls repon was any prepared aner me adjudlcalinn pruaaearng had been compleled And aner |he adjumcahon decrsrprr had been handed down 01118 5.2023 Obviously‘ me report :5 not a documenl that was waned helore the adjudxcawr for mnsiderafion. II \s a document prepared afier the mug M the sewing aswde Ongmahng Summons on 22 92023 VI was not made as a grow suppurl ol the asrtlmg aswde Originating Summons m Amlndds afhdav in support aflvrned on 22.9.2023 (Endasure 2;. But on\y dlsdosed rarer m Amindds alfldavu In rep\y. 55 Secondly, there was no Iorrnan arm proper applrcanon made by Amman to adduce such “lresh evidence“ In these proceedings Neither was any explanalmn provened «or rrra de\ay m omarrurrg and producing rn aranrrwrreyapsrsnpzy. “ “Nana s.n.r nmhnrwm be LAIQ4 w my r... rmmnauly mm: dnuumrrl y.. .nuye war lnis rspon Peninenlly, Amlndo was represenled by Ilie same sclicilcrs in me adiudicaiian pmcsedlng and in these proceedings. 57 In any eueni, Ilie selling aside appliealion is subiecl to the Iiniiled grounds sel oul in seclion 15 ol CIPAA Even fllhe repon is considered il will nol aid Aniindo lo iuslily Inal Irie adiudicalion decision should be set aside because Iris adiudiealol nas acled H1 breach ol nalural Iuslicei pafllallyi or in excess cl her jurisdiction. Simply put me repon has no deleiniining erlecl over me selling aside appliealion. More so wlien Ine repon was uhlalrled niaie lnan 2 years aller me pmject sile was nanded back lo Amirldo The slay aoplicaliori 5a. Fremlssd on me above I lino Inal Amlndo has Iailed Io subslanliale any silualien which walianls Ilie adiudioalion deal on lo be sel aside pursuant Io seciian 15(b| [denial of naluial }usIlos]‘ seelion Isle) Illie adiudicalor has nol acled independeiilly or inipaniallyj or secllun lsldl [lne adiudicalor has acled in excess oi nis jurisdiclion] oi CIPAA I lnerelare dlsinissed Irie selling aside application 59. Tile slay applicalicn Vlfle Enclosure 9 ocnlalned Iwo prayersi i.e Ia) an Inielini slay M ins adludicaiisn decision oendinw me lull and final dlsposal ollne seling aside aPD|lca|lorI and Enclosure Ia: (D7 an oiderlorslay bl Ina adindieaiion duclxlon so Recall lnal on 279 2023, I lied granled an ad inlerirn slay ol the adiudicalion declsbon, pending llie disposal o1 lne selling aside application Prayer (a) above became redundanl since I nad disposed of me selling aside abpI‘icaIion.AI Ine heanrigi Arnindo irisisled on prayer (b) above I e lo: a slay onne adiudiealion decision Bu| I was conlused as Io wlial slay is Arnindo seeking » slay pending what‘) 51 The pre—reoui es Ior a losing pany lo seek a slay at an adiudicalion dec ion under seaion 16 at CIPAA are (al lnere is an ongoing selling aside apnlicalion [secliori 16(1)(a)], or (b) lnere is an ongoing civil suil uv albiiralion [seclion leIl)lb)], Herei Ineie is no civil suil or arbitration ooniinenoed by eiinei Amlrlda or Land success al Inis iunciure Hence, lne pie — reduisile in seclion I€(1j(bj ol CIPAA is riol lullilled A slay lnerelare carvIu| be souglil nor granied under seclian 16(1)(h)a1 CIPAA As rnenlioned eavlleri a slay under seclion 16(1)|a)aVClPAA liad beoonie academic. given lrial lne selling aside has been disposed ol sru EwIilN4hEyrJN7s1l-nzw ‘5 “Nair s.n.i luvlhnrwlll as UIQG a may i... bflmruflly MIMI dnuavlml VI nFluNa Wm! 62 In wew Esteem Sdn and y Ema Puri Holdings Esn1sd[20|B] 2 MLJ 22, tne Federal cdun adopted a hberal apprdacn Io saouon 15 of CIPAA An approach that wouk! anow some degree of nexrmmy to say an admdvcatuon decrsron where lhere Vs dsar ermrr or ID meet me ‘uslma ov me inmvwdual ease Nevennexess, M was made dear that a soay 0! an adjudroauon decrsron ougm not be gwen readny. and caulmn must os exercised when domg so es The Federal Coun said (al page 4:3 — 49; “[521 We are m Agreement mm ma mlllnnhun dune aoos»/am mat a mom hbuml ruumrIgo(:16a?lh5 cum wuuld aflow me degree afflcxmamy In Iha mails to my mo award mm mm um um mars. or rnmul flu/‘uxllcn ollne mdmduor em 1: I: accepted that a say n! In: award nugm not bu aim mdny Ind s. ian rnusl be ucmud Mun doing Sn fiowvvsv la nurrm ma upplrcahan ors 15 or ma cum In the manner pmpused by the mgr. Court, and me CourIalAppuL wauld oe In mp vl olany um/Iy’ en The burden lies on Annndo In snow Mal there have been dearerrots. drcna¢ the Justice 01 me case warrants a stay dune adjudrcazion decxsxan Ammdn has (exiled to do so Ammdo has not shown the exis|ence a! any special crrcomsaances |hat wumd render such a slay necessary 65 The adjudwcalion decision must be respected and honoured al this ]unc1ure,Iegard|ess Many cw suucrarmrauon |hal may be med Beavmg m mmd tha\ CIPAA atuudlcallon proceedmgs are mended |o be ior qmck and umely paynrams. Tna enloreemem agghcanon as Pursuant 10 secucn 23 0| CIPAA. Land success apphed [or an order In enfaroe the adyudicauon decnsmn as w u re a judgmenl dune Hvgh Cam I aucwed ma cmcreernenc application. I sxercrsod my dlscveliun in do so srnce me relevant reqmlemems are met. Namely, (a) me adyudmacron dacman nu been made wn «aydur av and Success. me my apvVY'V‘fi ccr um. an Arnrndo, me oany agamsl wnorn the ad;udII:i|n7n deusmn was made, his tamed In oay nne admmcatad sum oy me shnmaled date, and my mere rs no pmmbllmn on me mun‘: dlscvemnaly power In gram leave (0 onrcrca the -Idguducauon dedsson sm smuMN4vEydps7s7u:zw ‘S «no. Snr1n\nmhnrw\HI>e med w my r... nrW\nnU|:I mm: dnuumnl y.. mum om sm s~amNaEydDS7s1I-uzw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 57 I !ollow the Court a! Apnea! decisxon in /nal Krara Sun and v Puten Nusanlsra sun and [2019] 2 MLJ 362, [2019] 2 CLJ 229 al 235 Much sam 125] my Iha! ma awlrtantneods :9 do ya to samy lhe mm Court that mm It an ldludlcnlon decision mama-1 been ruudued In ms a;‘IPllI:anl'r favour. ma! mere hadbeerr non-payment ollhe Iqiadfcalodtum by m. dais spaaired m ma ad)uL1»calroII fiscrston and Ina! mu: rs no prvhibirion in m. gunk ofkhn man that was sought 125; By nus, we mean ms! the admrlmatuon seam has not been 59! am or srayed. ma! mere I: no wnllsn samsmsnl or me sumac! manor bclwun m. games, 9! Ina! man? /5 no final decmon rendered on me paynlcrvl dorm, whsmsr mm m mmam or by =3 cum ollaw um um. nuflirx ... .sm:.m.: as nunsrs or «m, the Urdu In onlizrw mm to n. ,....m: - nln as For the reasons above, \ dwsmissed Ammdrfs apphcallun m set asxde and may the amumcmion dec sxon Vaflowed Lend Success’ appl enloree me amudlcalwon declswn. as I ordered Ammdo to pay costs «a Land Success In me iollowing sums — ta) RM5,0fl0 m mspem ol the enooreemem apphoalwon‘ (b) RM5,000 In respea onne selling aside appncauon, am (:2) RMSDDO m respea oi me slay application Dated 12 December 2023 X Quay Chew Soon Judge Hwgh Cour! nl Malaya‘ Penang cm: nwism NCVC 1 oounsexs Llm Wum Vmq am Les Hue: mg (The Chamoelsol Vu snm Gag] (nr um success us K:1Jun(Mcuvs Waynu Slang, Km .4. ca; !arAmmda n sw suwN4wEyrJbS7s1Lnzw «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 2 in me setting aside originating summons. Aniindo nad iiied a notice at appllualian t1a|ed 24 9 man vide Enclosure 9 la seek tor a stay oi tne ad]udicaIion declslun (‘stay app: I(ion'). on 27.9 202:, I granted an ad interim stay or the adiudication decision‘ pending rne disposal oi me Sefllrlg aside application. 3 Both |he sriian:emeri| annltcalton and the setting aside application‘ as weii as me s|ay apphcslion, were neard rogerner on 1.12.2023 I decided as follows. tai I diarriiaaao mo ialilrvg unis ivnhcznmn uv Amindn (bi ldisniissed ms siay apntmanen av Arirrnde. and (ch 1 aimed Via amoioemam appi-cation ny Land Succus 4 Here are me grounds oi my decision Background (acts 5. Pursuant la a letter at award dated 13.11 2019, Arninda app ' ed Land success as tne main corilraclor in relation to a proJec1 lor reiniorceo concrete work, steel slrucmrat wnrk and In1ra—s|mc1ura| work at a canlracl sum o1 RM2 34 million 5. Land success nad rnade seven previous interim progressive claims And Amindo nad paid an cemiiec sums ior tne seven interim ce ales to Land success Progress claim No ts was subrriilled by Land success to Ammdn var work done as at 29.1 2uz1 in the sum RM437.477.19. This was not cenined by me Supennlendenl Offioer nor paid by Amindo 7. Notwithstanding, Land success conunued to carry am the works urim near completion around September 2021. Al the request 01 Amvldflt the proieci site was handed back to Arriindo around 17 9 2021 8 Land Suooess then re — assessed and valued its work done UD wilt‘ the handing ever at me preiect in Amman Arid submitled a revised progress claim no 510 Amlndu an 2 9 2022, (DI the sum nYRM652,§72 1D as ar 29.3 2022 Th kewise was not ceruired by the Sup sndent oiiicer nor paid by Arnindo. 9. Thus a paymsnl dIspu|e arose eeiweeri Land success and Aniindo. Land suocess carnmerioed tiie adiudreanen proceeding and ciainied tor SIN s~ariiNaEyrJi)S7s1l-nzur 3 “Nana a.ii.i luvihnrwm be u... a may i... amimiirv MVMI dnuaviml vn .riuue v-mat me arspmea sum ol RM652,572 10 agams\ Arnrnoo based on me revised progress daim no a 10 on 18 a 2023 the admdlcalar rssuea me adwdwcahun deorsron. Tne adrudrcaxor delemuned mar Armnao re [0 pay Lena success me sum of RM425,622 so wrmrn 14 days, toge|hsr mm rnteresr and cosls The eeumg asrde app ca n 11. The Ihree limbs oi semen 15 of CIFAA rehed on by Amlndo In lhe selling aerpe applrcanon are: 151 demal or narurar ruenroa by live aorupreerpr [hmb (err my me adjudlcatm has nnla:1edvndeper\deM\y oc rnrpanrauy nrrnn Lcjl, and 1:) me epruprparor has sued rn excess or rrer junsdlwon {rune (4)) 12 It appears in me lhal the selling asrde aponearron 45 premised on Annnpee grouse: about the vrnamgs made by me aojuorcaror. Armndo Is anegrng |ha| me aoruprcarer has reached ervuneous ounemsrone Vn orner words Ammdn re merely unhanny with me menrs pr rne adpmrcaupn deusmn 13 However, an aarourcarprs orrrorng 04 «acre re nor revrewaoxe in a eemng esrae apphcauon Ammdds commaunls on me errors purpunedly oonrrnmed by me aorudroaror rs In essence en apnea! agarnsr the meme 0! me apruaroarron oe on Such canned be enrenarned by |he caurl m a ssllmg aerpe eppucarrorr An appurcarron ro set aerpe an adyudicallon oeorsron enounp nor be treated as a mu 7 bluwn appeal pr rehsanng or marfls by me gudge 14 me Cmmof Appeal m AOFM Engineering .9. Consmlclran San and V Esslar Vrsrtm Sdlv Bhd & another appeal [2016] I LNS 1522 hem. -[2v] rn the context oreeorrpn 15 p/crpm 24712 rr cannot b: m. llmcflon ul rm cam rp look me or nvllw rm mlnu or me can pr to oaama ma rem orrrre paae Tm rears Ira torn». eanrpmaror In men and dsads an Tm Com‘: rurrerron in simply to rm .1 me munner In won me eqruoamor conduriud mo hunting arm wbutnor ne Mdcommmed In lrrvralllwdmmg matprubasx Sum error pr/aw males 10 wnomorhc hadacronfndpmctdunl him!!! to ma Appouanr rn ma eprmm or (ms me, me eornprarnra pr rrre Apps!/an! were rrpmrrrq but epmptainre nfllrlunl llndlnfls oltne Idludlcalor which In our Vlcw clnmzk bu onronarnerr or us em smpmN4vEydps7s7Lpzw ‘ “Nana s.n.r ...n.rwrr be p... m my r... nflmrraflly mm: dnuumrrl vu murm WM 424; me law as n exlxls /"law mnzclly limit: the Own‘: nmcuons wmcn ..p....w do 7191 Includt to rivhw ms curncmess n! the mudlcslon dtclslon Awon-lledby the )earrlad)I1Dl?sl me some lrltslvwlllon ls unlym very exoepnona! wcumslanms wmcll on far and law II! ouwecn rna prlma (acre wsw 0/1/19 Com must as to a/rnn (ha Id/ufllcatofs dacuvon uness me Iosmg new can show ma: ll had eon-nnsd wan thi mmsllalds llslsd n sacrum vs a! cum 2:712 - 15 u IS not me task of the com lo conslder whether lne adjudlcalnr had answered me lssues ccnecuy am lnslead, wnslner me adludlcalor had duly consldered me velevan ues Any error by an adludlca|or can only be remedled H1 an arbllrallorl or gallon No dsn/a/ ofnamIa/ us!/cs 16 Mere verblage mm a flndlng as ‘breach ol natural lustlee‘ cannol be pevmilled For Anundc lo succeed on denial ol natural lusuee, ll musl prove that male was a lundanlenlal procedural unvanness golng lo lne roeloilne decislon, such as where one party was heard and lne omer not 17 ‘Backdoor anemple‘ lo use allegalions ol nalural iusllce lo sel aslde an adludlcanon oeclslon snould nol be allowed. so long as lne pames were aooordsd an opponunny lo present men easel lnere eannol oe a complaln: o1 denlal ol natural lustloe lsee lne coon ol Appeal case of /reka Engrneenng and Carlstruchan son Bhd v PWC Corp sdn Bhd 3. anal apnea! [2019] MLJU 35) 18 Here, Amlndo had been accorded wnn lne ophurmnily In nla lls Adjudlcallon Response. wmcn ll dld Amlndo was also accorded wiln me opponumly lo me me Paymsnl Response. oul eleeled nol to do so In any event, me nun — nung cl lne Payment Response cesrs no ellecl. as I! ls deemed lhal lne enllre claim oy Land success ls belng dlspuled. 19. cll=AA provides lor lne fllllng ol lne Adyudlcallun clalnl oy lne unpam psny, lollewed by me Adludlcalion Response by the non — paylng carry, and laelly me Adludlcallorl Reply by me unpaid parly Here, Armndo nad subsequently reouesled lo We a Relolnder. ms was allowed and Ammdo Indeed med a Relulnder There was no procedural unlalmess suflered oy Amlndo W lne ad]udica|iun pmceedlng‘ as ample nppeflunlly was accorded lo Amlndo to present NS case 20. Amlnda alleges lnal ll was denled nalural wsluce oy lne arblhatuv Hawevsr, Amlrldo and no: snow lnal II was prevenled lrom lendenng evidence or maklng suhmlsslon on the lssues ralsed In lne adludlcalion 5 sm s~ahlNaEydN7s1|-nzw “None a.n.l nuvlhnrwlll s. o... a may s. snnnnn sun. dnuuvlml Vfl .nuno Wm! proceeding it seems in ins |hal what Aniinu oonipiaining oi Is purely ins iindings reached by iris aaiuaicaioi. and how sne weighed ine evidence neioia nei niai is nu| an issue ol proceauisi a ess. 21. There niusi be no wniu fl bemesn an appiiaaiion to sel aside an adiudicalmn decision ioi denial of naiuiai iusiiaa, which ni ges un prouedural unfairness And appeahng againsllhe decision, wnien involves a veview oflhe msms onne decls n Amindu ougiii not in be pemiiuieu In rely on ma principle oi naiwai justice In set aside ina aaiuaissuon decision, piainisaa on is cnaiisnge against me miuings M ins aaiuaicaior The idudlc has not soled In excess of I nsdiciion 22 WW?! regard to the mmplainl that the adiudicalor has aded in excess cMer1unsdicliori,Am do is velying an uis siniiiai grounds as Ihuse ieiiaa on in rsspeci oi VIS oonipiainis legardmg asniai or natural iusiioe Which is naming more irian niere dissaiislaciion WI|h iris oonciusions reached by me adiiiaicaior. 23 i am salisfied that uis adjudlcalor did not aai uulside the scope oi ner appointment and the dispulss raised belore riai The Issues mined by the adiudicaluv were well wllhln the disputes ralsed by (he pames In the saiuaicsiiun proceeding The ad ud»ca!arII§§ acled inasgsnuenily or impgrialgy 24. Neiiner had Ainindo snown how the auiimicaior nad acled paniaiiy. Am do aiinpiy raised its eompiainis aver ins findings made by iris adjudicator on a 'ana / or basis And swept aii aiiniiar conipiainis to be a purpcrled meacn oi naiurai iusiice and / DI the adjudicator acted pariiaiiy and I or me aaiiiiiicami acted in excess oi her iuiisiiiicuan i consider inai Amindu is raising these auegea breaches as a backdoor way |o set aside the auiudicaiiun decision, wnicn was noi in its lavcur Ainind Cu; 25. i move on to deal wiiri me cnaiiengas raised by Aminuu AI me slart ol me aaiuaieaiiori decision, me aiiiuaicaici had sei out me issues for deieimiriaiion 1; issues IN EAuNNA)‘lEydfi7S7LaZw “Nair s.ii.i nuvihnrwm be LAIQ4 M van; i... nflginnflly MVMI dnuumnl VII nF\uNG puns! Based on me Admdlcnlmn Clam: Aflpudnzamn Rzspanse, Reoly In Aammaanon Respnnse. Relmnaer and reply in Reminder, I ma mal Ina vouowma Vssues anse\n\h\sMA\x1Aca(Inn 1 Does the new-caxor havu junsdurllan «o decide «ms Adgudmahmw cram Has me mmract been vmoefly |emumsled7 Has urne oeen sex ar Iaraew Does mu 7 oanrmuon rarae a presurnmrorr Ina! work was nm ¢ona7 rs me malmam emmed re D5 van Vulwolk acme" Has one crarrnan: arm-argue rt: ouraen or WW4 and Wnvnd rne Quanmm ul II: r..rn and naa 01: moanaann Dmvud Ilx defence and counrererarrnr 25. Ammdo am not onanenge men mese oueauorrs posed by me aorumcacor are wrong. Rather‘ Amman ra purely onauengrng me cunclusians reaoned by me Adjudicalur. wma. not |he|es|ln hsappllsd oeororng whether or nu| an adjudlcauun de un augm to be set aame. 27. I am saflisfied Ihal the adJud\ca|nr had up oonsldered me uevences rarsea by Arnrnae by Iakmg Into earrsrderauerr me documenls presented more rrerr runrung rmo over 15 pages or me aaruaroauon aecrsren under Fan S4 or; acted wlmm henurxsmclxon by aeorarng on me rasues raised by both pamea prenuseo an the raons and me documents presented. and (In) acled rrnaamany (awards oom sides 25. Here is my exnmnatrorr nrsrruaaal of Arrundo‘s ceumemlarrrr for redmcallon coils ol sloien rterns (or rnecnarw;a< and meclncal works 29. Ammdds munlelclawm fur recvfinatwan oasis 01 stolen Items hr meorrarncal and e\ec1rica| works was my cunsideved by me aorumoator The Adiudxcatcr do not wIHy mlly rmo ou\ ner runsdraron m uenernuning defence. u was only aner vakrng rmo consroe n the argumems raised. man the aaruoroacer decided lhat mas Issue rs beyond me scope or me aaruareanon. an Trns appears at Pan 5 paragrapn 1a 11! me adjudica|mn dam on, men reads we Rsipoluderns counnercnarrn vonasses due la man a we Resvurvdlm cram. m an Adgudrcatmn Respunae mm due In mans ma: eccurved on Ihe me we we Cmmam was rn amupmmn M Ihe sue, me Respondent has smverea rosses as n has nan in may ror remmeauon works srn s~nMNaEyrJDS7s1l-uzw ’ “None s.r1a\n.nmrwmne U... a may r... nrW\n|U|y -mm: dnuamnl VI murm war In ine ernouni ol lwllea.nao.uo and RM3fl.5D0 on me Respundeni has Iflducad lnlvolces lar reeimcaison work done in Schedule 19 a. 2n. n The RespoiIderl| has pivduced police reporls by me clurnrunrs Repmierllallve issnedule 17 RBOD7 end phmogizpm In suvnml ns claim iscnedule is s. scneeule 27; c we cluimenr nes siaied in men Reply la rne Auludnzuon Raupnnse Iliai lhls aelnr ls loo wmanmus in be delernuned under llm Aflludlcailan and mac M s. 2 works were ourslde lne sodoe nhlswurk: e ins Neeoamenl claims lnel ii nr lndlsvmable rner lne Claimant had iull l:nn|m|M|V1e srle wnen in. (MN: lmk plane and me cuuneni md luiled lo nmnerly seeursine ene WHICH caused me losses Irlwrvsd i, in me Cllim-ill‘: Reply |a ins Relomdu are C\alman|sIaies|ha1lIvmu V! e lapu oi lime nerween lne dares SHDNH in pichues In Saladule 27 iii 3 mi 5 H QJD21) and me duleo lne rnelis look pleoe 122 5 mi A s 6 20217 e Dsclslorl me ioeue cl wnelner ins cl. am VS Ilahle ior lne wsii lncwrad by lne Respondem ior Iachficallm c asses caused by ineiie an me slle srems irorn a dalm in negligence men is oulilds in. scope ul lnie adjudbcahuil ins neepondenl nus lo pursue me eleun elsewhere ' 31 Amlrldu did nm cnallenge lnel ine adpudlaaioi nad asked me wmng quesllon The adjudleelor had asked me ngniqueelmn oiwnelnermrndo is enililed to ils oounierclelrn ior losses due In lneii wnei ls onellenged by Arnindo is purely ine answer giyen oy ine adludlcslar The adludlcerdr neld ihal on we issue oi lneii and negligence, Amlndo would seek lls recourse In ine civil mime. lneiead oi via a caunierdlenrn in ine adludlcallorl proceeding 32. secilcn 2 oi CVFAA siaies that CIPAA only applies In oorlslmellon work as defined in secllon 4 oi CIPAA. Section 2 oi CIPAA reeds: ‘Thu An anwes lo every oonllmcimn eonrraa rnede ur willing releuno lo Callslmchorl work umed aux wholly or only wllhlrl lne Iemlmy cl Malayxla including a wnltmnnn mn|Iac|evll.eIadIn1l7 oylne Government.‘ 33 seciion 4 a1 CIPAA read 'oons|mc1lon walk“ nreuns me wnsiiummn. exienslnn, lnslellailon. vsvalr mslnlennnce. renewal. reimuvill renwemn ellerelron, dlulnarmlrlq, or dernnllrlon Dis srn sumlNaEydps7s7l.;-lzw ‘ “Nun: s.n.l nurlhnrwm r. u... e may r... unrn.l-r mini: dnuuvlml Vfl erluria Wm! la) rm La» (9) any bufldmg, arsmn, samss, stmmuve‘ wafl. «ma or chimney, whelher wnunma whnfly ur plmy azma ar kmhw gmurvd met any man, hamourwmks. rarmay. cableways canar or aaraarmna. my dmrnnge rmgauan nrmeronmrcl work any areannaar, nracnanrsax, walerr gas, on nenmsnarruaar lelecommunlcauon work, av any brI¢g9,vIadu:1rdamrvuelvmvraanmmrks,plpshrvesiswarsaqueflucl. wlvsr\,dnvn,sha1|‘ lunnsi urmchmahun wurk. or and mchmes . on any wurk wmch Vorms an rnneuraw pan or, u! are pupa-awry In ov nemvorary tor Iha walk: dascnbad m varaamvhs (at k: may rnaua g slla clearance, son mvnshgatuzn and Impmvumenl, cam:-moving «cannon, rayrng nflmmdilmn. mu rexlamlmn and landsclvmflr ana ta» orocurernanr al mnslmawn nraranals, equ-prnenn or worksa, at nsaesarfly reumraa «or any works described m parauvapns (aHv1s7.' 34. The adrudrcaxor held mail me rssue cl smlen Kems lorlhe mechamcal and elemncax works was not within me oumram, nor me defi n or sonsuuclmn work under secucn 4 or CIPAA srnce me scope 0! works 01 Land Sumsss am not rncmae macnamcal and atecmcal works, which was assrgnad |a one KPH Erecnnaal Engmaenng sun Ehd The adwdlcalor dacrasa mat Amindds counterclaim on the stulen electnca\ work was a mane! omslde henunsd>c1ron 35. Tnus, me adjuurcawr retused Io adwdicate on re, and aannnaa her junsmduon tome cansnrucnon work wi in me contract pursuam |a CVPAA Ammdds chauange on ms gmund rs a mere dlssauslacfinn wrcn me adpz ‘camr's nnaxng, which us. not a ground to set aside |he adrudrcanun The ad uu 3011 2020 and non - ennuernem m LAD as. Ammdc clanna unax me oampxamn dale remained at 25 32020, and the oerlificale of non » commeuon raauea on 29. .2021: remarna vahd. Tns aajuaraacur huwever denuded max Arnrnau was not enhllsd to LAD because me ungmal comple n dale was rewsed in aun.2u2u. AmIndo's cnanenge on m s agam a mere drssacrsvacnran with the ad;udrca1or‘s answer to me queshon 0! whether me nnne nas been set at Vargs. srn s~nmN4nEydDS7s1l-nzw “ “Nana s.n.r mnmrwm a. U... a may r... anmnauly -mm: dnunmnl VI mum war 37 In answsrmg nms auwien, me adjudmalcr had eonsraere-1 the argunrene and me aeeurnenrs presemed lu her Amongst erhers, at Pan P av me aanmicahen daclswon lrom paragraphs 1 to 12, and Pan 5 paragraph 22 of «he ad;udu:aIIon dec n Aller dmng so‘ me adjudwcalm concmdea Ihanhe lime Inrcnmplenon enne project had been set at large The adjudxcator lound Iha| a csmficale 0! non - cumplelinn is reqwed co enhne Ammdo to rarse non — cnmmellon and rrnpose LAD agamsl Land sueeeaa. 35 Thus appears al Pan P paragraph 12 a! me adwdwcalwon demsmn, which reads: ~: Vsswe 37 Hasllme been sem large’) 12. Decmun Clause an m me General Cowman: at Cunlmcl1ExhIh\H caom slates mar hrhe connramervsrua tn camrdele me mm: by «he dale In me Form or Tender orwnmn any extended lame Imdev Clause 3\ and me so eenrnes m wmmg - Smca we extended mrnpueoen date was an 11 mo. rhe Conlvaclnaqmves mar me so cemflas In wvmng aher 3a<12n2n mal mu wnmd be chenzsama rm Rsspomenfs epnrenhon mat nu cm: was ml reemrea Is a\sa ml aucemable as me so has prewauxy as-rep a one on 29 a mu wmch his pm reheu on rmrre Rnpondwl Amzr me 3011 mm. me (Nalmznl had mu nm wmpueree ms mas and was afluwad \a vemam on sneuu 11 9 2021 ' 39 The aanmrearor laund supporl m me supennnenaenr othoers own Indlcahon «n me eenmeane ol pmgras payrnem rm 7 that the cprnplehen dale lorlha project had been lunher re ' d m 30.11.2020 Tnrs appears at Pan P paragraph 5 M Ihe adrumcahon decisrenr wmch reads: -5 nu so lhen proceeded co exrer-a me oempnahan Dare to 30.11 me me me Is apparem vrorh cemhcsu L11 Fmgress Payment No. 7 name an 2m Deeemnar me me so has then pmmedad up aeuma me LAD er Rwaesoo up our 91 days In cenmcare m Pvugwss Fiymem up 7, Much ra pam<:u\lnzed as bemu LAD up to me data no me cenmcare or Prcgmn Faymem No 7 - A0 C\aar\y, mess were rssues vaised m the aaruarcaricn pmce pre ed on the documents presented lherem. There us no ad 0! Junsdwcmon by «he adwdxcawr How me auruurearer anmysed the am shph\N4vEydps7s7Lpzw ‘“ “Nana a.n.r mmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... nrwhrnflly mm: dnuumnl vu aF\uNG war

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

W-01(A)-255-05/2023

PERAYU LOH SIEW HONG RESPONDEN 1. ) PENDAFTAR MUALAF NEGERI PERLIS 2. ) MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT ISTIADAT MELAYU PERLIS 3. ) DATO' ARIF PERKASA DR. MOHD ASRI BIN ZAINUL ABIDIN (DISAMAN SEBAGAI MUFTI NEGERI PERLIS) 4. ) Kerajaan Negeri Perlis

Civil Appeal - A case of a father who had consented to convert his three minor children (a twin girls aged 11 and a boy aged 9) from the Hindu religion to the religion of Islam without the knowledge and consent of the childrens’ mother, the appellant herein - unilateral conversion - The appellant challenged the legality of the conversion – judicial review – High Court : Dismissed the appellant’s judicial review application with no order as to costs - The main complaints of the appellant against the decision of the High Court is the learned High Court Judge did not address the two pertinent issues in the judicial review proceedings. The two issues are: (i) Whether the unilateral conversion is lawful; (ii) Whether section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null and void; and (iii) Whether the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text – Court of Appeal held : (i) The respondents’ argument that the Malay translation of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text is a non-starter because the prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language has not been approved by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Until such prescription is approved, the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. Therefore, it is wrong for the respondents to say the decision of the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi on this issue is made per incuriam. It matters not whether there is a Malay version of the Federal Constitution but rather whether there is a prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language as the authoritative text. Since there is no prescription, the learned High Court Judge is correct in his decision to follow Indira Gandhi; (ii) We chose to follow Indira Gandhi because that is the latest case decided by the Federal Court. We also agree and adopt the reasonings advanced by the Court of Appeal in Pendaftar Mualaf’s in that the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi had analysed the various provisions of the law and the previous decided cases including Subashini in coming to its decision; that by the principle of stare decisis, the High Court and Court of Appeal are bound by Indira Gandhi’s case. Pursuant to Indira Gandhi, the law is settled in that consent of both parents are required for conversion of a minor children; (iii) Based on Article 4 of the Constitution, we held that section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with art.12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void; and (iv) The appeal is allowed. The decision of the High Court is set aside. The appellant’s judicial review application in prayer (a) to (i) is allowed with no order as to costs.

30/01/2024

YA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Hashim Bin HamzahYA Datuk Azhahari Kamal bin Ramli

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=33eae898-87ef-438a-820f-43e3a6473ac2&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO.W-01(A)-255-05/2023 BETWEEN LOH SIEW HONG - APPELLANT AND 1. PENDAFTAR MUALAF PERLIS 2. MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT ISTIADAT MELAYU PERLIS 3. DATO’ ARIF PERKASA DR. MOHD ASRI BIN ZAINUL ABIDIN (DISAMAN SEBAGAI MUFTI NEGERI PERLIS) 4. KERAJAAN NEGERI PERLIS - RESPONDENTS [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Bahagian Rayuan Dan Kuasa-Kuasa Khas Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No.WA-25-169-03/2022 Dalam perkara status agama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran (Sijil Kelahiran No:CB 34247), Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran (Sijil Kelahiran No:CB34248) dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran (Sijil Kelahiran No:CN44327); 30/01/2024 10:01:06 W-01(A)-255-05/2023 Kand. 44 S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai permohonan semakan kehakiman untuk mendapatkan perintah-perintah bersifat deklarasi, certiorari, larangan dan mandamus; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 25(2), dibaca bersama perenggan 1 dalam Jadual, Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah 1 (1), Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 15 Kaedah 16, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen-seksyen 41, 42 dan 44(1) Akta Relif Spesifik 1950; S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Dan Dalam Perkara 3 Fasal (1), Perkara 4 Fasal (1), Perkara 11 Fasal (1) dan Perkara 12 Fasal (3) dan Fasal (4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 117(b) Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam 2006; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 7 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam (Pindaan) 2016. Antara Loh Siew Hong - Pemohon Dan 1. Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis 2. Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Perlis 3. Dato’ Arif Perkasa Dr. Mohd Asri bin Zainul Abidin (Disaman sebagai Mufti Negeri Perlis) S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 4. Kerajaan Negeri Perlis - Responden- Responden] CORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, JCA HASHIM BIN HAMZAH, JCA AZHAHARI KAMAL BIN RAMLI, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] This is a case of a father who had consented to convert his three minor children (a twin girls aged 11 and a boy aged 9) from the Hindu religion to the religion of Islam without the knowledge and consent of the childrens’ mother, namely Loh Siew Hong, the appellant herein. The unilateral conversion is not disputed by the respondents. [2] The appellant challenged the legality of the conversion. She contended that without her consent, her childrens’ conversion to Islam is null and void. She also contended that without her consent as the sole guardian of the children, the first respondent cannot issue certificates of conversion to her children; that the certificates are null and void and her children remain as Hindus. [3] The appellant then applied by way of Judicial Review Application at the Kuala Lumpur High Court, seeking for the following reliefs: S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (a) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran adalah penganut- penganut agama Hindu; (b) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa Nagahswaran a/l Muniandy tidak mempunyai keupayaan dari segi undang-undang untuk membenarkan responden pertama mendaftarkan Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran sebagai mualaf, tanpa keizinan pemohon; (c) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, sebagai kanak-kanak, tidak mempunyai keupayaan dari segi undang-undang untuk memeluk agama Islam, tanpa keizinan pemohon; (d) perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan Akuan-Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam bertarikh 7 Julai 2020 yang dikeluarkan oleh responden pertama atas nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran (Daftar No.JAIPs DAK.02 Fol 17/2020), Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran (Daftar No.JAIPs. DAK 02 Fol 18/2020) dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran (Daftar No.JAIPs DAK.02 Fol 16/2020); (e) perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan Kad-Kad Rasmi Memeluk Agama Islam atas nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, jika ia telah dikeluarkan oleh responden pertama atau mana-mana pihak lain, atau perintah larangan untuk menghalang responden pertama atau mana-mana pihak lain mengeluarkan Kad-Kad Rasmi Memeluk Agama Islam atas nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, jika ia masih belum dikeluarkan lagi; (f) perintah mandamus untuk mengarahkan responden pertama memadamkan atau membatalkan dalam Daftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, dan juga nama-nama Islam mereka iaitu Nur Sulochana binti Nagahswaran, Nur Sulochini binti Nagahswaran dan Muhammad Thatchina Moorthi bin Nagahswaran; (g) perintah larangan untuk menghalang responden ketiga, sama ada secara sendiri atau melalui mana-mana pegawai, pekerja atau agen Jabatan Mufti Negeri Perlis, membuat apa-apa kenyataan yang secara nyata atau tersirat boleh membawa maksud bahawa Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi ialah kanak-kanak mualaf atau kanak-kanak beragama Islam; (h) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa seksyen 117(b) Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam 2006, dalam versi Bahasa Malaysia dan Bahasa Inggeris, sepertimana yang dipinda oleh seksyen 7 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Islam (Pindaan) 2016, setakat mana memberi kuasa kepada responden pertama untuk mendaftarkan seorang kanak-kanak sebagai mualaf hanya dengan keizinan daripada ibu atau bapa kanak-kanak tersebut, walaupun kedua-dua mereka masih hidup adalah tidak berpelembagaan dan, oleh itu, adalah tidak sah dan batal, setakat itu; dan (i) perintah yang patut supaya responden ke-empat memberi kesan kepada semua perintah-perintah di atas. [4] On 11 May 2023, the learned High Court Judge dismissed the appellant’s judicial review application with no order as to costs. [5] Aggrieved with the decision of the High Court, the appellant appealed to this court. Facts of the case [6] The appellant and her former husband, Nagahswaran a/l Muniandy (Nagahswaran) were married under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 on 25.5.2008. The appellant was a Buddhist. Nagahswaran was a Hindu. [7] There were three children from the said marriage, as follows: (i) Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, born on 7.11.2008; (ii) Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran, born on 7.11.2008; and (iii) Tatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, born on 26.5.2011. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [8] The appellant was separated from her three children from 3.3.2019 until 21.2.2022 after she was beaten up and chased out of their matrimonial home by Nagahswaran. [9] On 13.12.2019, the appellant filed a divorce petition at the Kuala Lumpur High Court vide Divorce Petition No.WA-33-734-12/2019.In the divorce proceedings, each party was represented by a legal counsel. [10] On 7.1.2020, the appellant obtained an ad interim order from the Kuala Lumpur High Court for the sole guardianship, care and control of her three children. Despite having the full knowledge of the custody order issued by the High Court, Nagahswaran refused to hand over the children to the appellant. Her attempts to get back her children was unsuccessful. [11] A certificate of Decree Nisi made Absolute was issued on 22.9.2021. Vide a High Court Order dated 31.3.2021, the appellant was granted sole custody, care and control of all the three children. [12] Prior to the fact stated in para 11 above, on 7.7.2020, one Abdul Khadir, alleged to be an old friend of Nagahswaran brought Nagahswaran together with the three children to the office of Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam Negeri Perlis (JAIPS) because Nagahswaran wanted to convert to Islam along with the three children. When asked about the childrens’ mother, Nagahswaran told the second respondent that the appellant had left him 2 years prior to 7.7.2020 and he does not know where she is. This is a blatant lie by Nagahswaran because at the material time, the divorce proceedings was ongoing and he knew the whereabout of the appellant. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [13] Since section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 allows either the father or the mother of the minor’s to consent to the conversion, the second respondent was satisfied that the consent of Nagahswaran as the father fulfills the legal requirement for the second respondent to proceed with the conversion of the three children. [14] Thereafter, the second respondent alleged that Nagahswaran, along with the three children had, one after another, uttered the Islamic affirmation of faith in Arabic, followed by its meaning in Malay,” Aku menjadi saksi bahawa tiada Tuhan melainkan Allah dan aku menjadi saksi bahawa Nabi Muhammad SAW ialah Pesuruh Allah”. [15] Satisfied that Nagahswaran and the three children had fulfilled the Islamic principles for conversion into Islam, the Registrar of Mualafs (the first respondent) register their conversion to the Islamic faith in the prescribed Register of Mualafs, and thereafter issued their respective Certificate of Conversion into Islam (Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam as follows: (i) Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, No. Kad Pengenalan: 081107-02-0616, No.Daftar: JAIPs. DAK. 02 Fol. 17/2020 bertarikh 7.7.2020; (ii) Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran, No. Kad Pengenalan: 081107-02-0616, No. Daftar: JAIPs. DAK 02 Fol .18/2020 bertarikh 7.7.2020; and S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iii) Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam Tatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, No. Kad Pengenalan:110526-01-1239, No.Daftar: JAIPs. DAK.02 Fol.16/2020 bertarikh 7.7.2020. [16] When Nagahswaran was sentenced to imprisonment for a drug related offence from 13.11.2020 to 11.11.2022, the three children were placed in Islamic hostels by a Muslim preacher, one Nazirah Nanthakumari binti Abdullah, who at the material time acted as the de facto guardian of the three children. [17] To get back her children, the appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus at the Kuala Lumpur High Court vide Criminal Application No.WA-44-28-02/2022. Only when the High Court had issued a writ of habeas corpus on 21.2.2022, that the appellant was able to get the physical custody of her three children. At The High Court [18] The issues to be determined by the High Court are as follows: (i) Whether the unilateral conversion of the three children is lawful or constitutional. (ii) Whether the Bahasa Malaysia version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. (iii) Whether section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 which require S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 the consent of either the father or the mother is inconsistent with Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. [19] The learned High Court Judge held the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. Nevertheless, His Lordship dismissed the appellant’s application based on the following reasons: (i) The Certificates of Conversion issued by the first respondent to the three children are conclusive proof they were Muslim and the conversion to Islam is valid. In coming to that decision, His Lordship rely on the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah & Anor Appeal [2023] 2 CL J513. (ii) The three children continued professing the religion of Islam when they were in the appellant’s custody. His Lordship rely on the Federal Court decision in the case of Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 3 CL J 301. The Appeal [20] The main complaints of the appellant against the decision of the High Court is the learned High Court Judge did not address the two pertinent issues in the judicial review proceedings. The two issues are: (i) Whether the unilateral conversion is lawful; and S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (ii) Whether section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null and void. [21] We noted that the respondents, in their written submission had submitted that the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text. To put matters at rest, we add the third issue as follow: (iii) Whether the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text. [22] We proposed to deal with the third issue first. Authoritative text [23] Before us, the respondents still maintain their position that the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text. [24] The English version of Article 12(3) and (4) of the Federal Constitution read as follows: “12. Right in respect of education (3) No person shall be required to receive instruction in or take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own. (4) For the purposes of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [25] The Bahasa Malaysia translation of Article 12 (4) in the national language reads as follows: “(4) Bagi maksud Fasal (3) agama seseorang yang di bawah umur lapan belas tahun hendaklah ditetapkan oleh ibu atau bapanya atau penjaganya.” [26] Article 160B of the English version of the Federal Constitution states: 160B. Authoritative text Where this Constitution has been translated into the national language, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may precribe such national language text to be authoritative, and thereafter if there is any conflict of disagreeing between such national language text and the English language text of this Constitution, the national language text shall prevail over the English language text. [27] In dealing with Article 160B, the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 3 CL J 145, Her Ladyship Zainun Ali (FCJ) said: “[147] In the present appeals, despite the learned State Legal Adviser’s reliance on art.160B, no evidence of the necessary prescription was adduced by either of the respondents. In the circumstances, we will proceed on the basis that the English version to be the authoritative text.” [28] Coming back to the present case. At the High Court, all the respondents argued that: S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “The Yang di-Pertuan Agong has launched the Malay version of the Federal Constitution on 29 September 2003, which according to Article 160B should be the authoritative text. According to Article 12 Clause (4) of the said Malay version, a minor’s religion shall be determined by his mother or father (ibu atau bapa). As such, the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Indira Gandhi Mutho invalidating the unilateral conversion of the minors to Islam, on the basis that there is no evidence of the existence of the said Malay version, is made per incuriam.” [29] In simple language, the respondents contended that the Malay version which require the consent of either the father or mother to convert a minor shall prevail over the English version. [30] The learned High Court Judge rightly reject the respondents’ argument and held the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text on the basis the prescription referred to in Art 160B of the Federal Constitution could not mean a mere physical presence of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in an official function and the translation is not an authoritative text of the national language. [31] We took note that the Malay translation had put a caveat in the following words: Teks ini HANYALAH TERJEMAHAN oleh Jabatan Peguam Negara bagi Federal Constitution. Melainkan jika dan sehingga ditetapkan sahih di bawah Perkara 160B Perlembagaan Persekutuan, teks ini bukan perundangan. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [32] We also took note of the speech of the former Attorney General of Malaysia at the Opening of the Legal Year 2023, wherein it was stated: “The Federal Constitution acts as our cornerstone in implementing the separation of powers. Therefore, for the year 2023, pursuant to Article 160A of the Federal Constitution, the AGC plans to reprint the Federal Constitution to incorporate the latest historic constitutional amendments. The AGC also plans to propose to the Government that the prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language to be the authoritative text in line with Article 160B of the Federal Constitution. These two plans are subject to the approval of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.” [33] Therefore, as day follow night, the respondents’ argument that the Malay translation of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text is a non starter because the prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language has not been approved by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Until such prescription is approved, the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. Therefore, it is wrong for the respondents to say the decision of the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi on this issue is made per incuriam. It matters not whether there is a Malay version of the Federal Constitution but rather whether there is a prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language as the authoritative text. Since there is no prescription, the learned High Court Judge is correct in his decision to follow Indira Gandhi. Unilateral Conversion [34] In Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and Other Appeals [2018] 3 CL J 151, the appellant’s former husband S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 had converted their three minor children to the religion of Islam without the consent of the appellant. One of the issue for determination by the Federal Court is whether the mother and the father (if both are still surviving) of a child of a civil marriage must consent before a certificate of conversion to Islam could be issued in respect of that child. [35] In delivering the judgment of the court, Zainun Ali FCJ held: “[157] Conversion to another religion is a momentous decision affecting the life of a child, imposing on him a new and different set of personal laws. Where a decision of such significance as the conversion of a child is made, it is undoubtedly in the best interests of the child that the consent of both parents must be sought. The contrary approach of allowing the child to be converted on the consent of only one parent would give rise to practical conundrums. A purposive reading of art.12 (4) of the Federal Constitution that promotes the welfare of the child and is consistent with good sense would require the consent of both parents (if both are living) for the conversion of a minor. [161] Since custody of the children had been granted to the appellant, it was the appellant who exercised the dominant influence in their lives. To allow the other spouse to unilaterally convert the children without the appellant’s consent would amount to a serious interference with the lifestyle of the family. [175] Based on a purposive interpretation of art.12 (4) read with the Eleventh Schedule of the Federal Constitution, and on application of sections 5 and 11 of the GIA, it is concluded that the consent of both the appellant and her husband are required before a Certificate of Conversion to Islam can be issued in respect of the children.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [36] A recent case of unilateral conversion is Pendaftar Muallaf Wilayah Persekutuan v LCY & Ors And Another Appeal [2022] 2 MLRA 167. In that case, the mother had converted her two minor children to Islam without the consent of her husband. The custody, care and control of the two children was given to the husband. The husband applied for an Order of Certiorari to quash the conversion of religion of the children and the decision of the appellant in issuing the Certificate of Conversion to Islam. The High Court granted the husband’s application. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. At the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued that Indira Gandhi’s case does not apply to all unilateral conversion cases and that the said case was decided per incuriam. [37] In dismissing the appellant’s appeal, His Lordship Nordin Hassan JCA (now FC J) said: “[28] The Federal Court in Indira Gandhi in answering a specific question of law, had considered the relevant facts and applied the law as can be seen from paras 142 until 181 of the grounds of judgment. All relevant statutory provisions and previous Federal Court decisions on the same issue including Subashini has been analysed and considered before the decision on the issue was decided. As such, the decision in Indira Gandhi that consent of both parents are required before the Certificate of Conversion to Islam can be issued, is in our view, the ratio decidendi of the case. [33] In the circumstances and based on the principles of stare decisis, the High Court and this Court are bound by the decision in Indira Gandhi.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [38] Relying on Indira Gandhi and Pendaftar Mualaf, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned High Court Judge had erred in law and in fact in not following these two cases when the facts in the present case is similar to those cases and the cases are binding on the High Court. [39] On the other hand, counsels for the respondents submitted that Indira Gandhi does not apply to every case of unilateral conversion; that Indira Gandhi was decided per incuriam; that this Court should follow Subashini’s case (which held consent from either father or mother is sufficient). In particular, the respondents’ stressed the point that the three children had uttered the Affirmation of Faith (dua kalimah syahadah) in Arabic before the first respondent. [40] We are not persuaded by the respondents’ argument. We chose to follow Indira Gandhi because that is the latest case decided by the Federal Court. We also agree and adopt the reasonings advanced by the Court of Appeal in Pendaftar Mualaf’s in that the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi had analysed the various provisions of the law and the previous decided cases including Subashini in coming to its decision; that by the principle of stare decisis, the High Court and Court of Appeal are bound by Indira Gandhi’s case. [41] We also took note that pursuant to Indira Gandhi, the law is settled in that consent of both parents are required for conversion of a minor children. In Rosliza binti Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 ML J 181, at p.184 para 4, Her Ladyship Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat (Chief Justice) held that based on the authority of Federal Court decision in Indira Gandhi, Ibrahim (father) had no right in law to unilaterally S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 convert Rosliza to the religion of Islam when she was a minor without Yap’s (the mother) consent. [42] In Chang Ah Mee v Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam, Majlis Ugama Islam Sabah & Ors [2003] 5 ML J 106, a two year old girl was converted to Islam by her father without the consent of the mother. The mother challenged the legality of the conversion. She sought for a declaration that her daughter’s conversion to Islam to be declared null and void. In interpreting Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution, the High Court Judge held: “The Constitution does not discriminate against the sexes and since the father and the mother have equal right over the person and property of an infant, the term ‘’parent” in art 12 (4) must necessary mean both the father and mother if both are living. To construe otherwise would mean depriving, for example, a mother of her right as a parent to choose the religion of the infant under art 12 (4), if the father alone decides on the religion to be followed by the infant. To allow just the father or the mother to choose the religion would invariably mean depriving the other of the constitutional right under art 12 (4).” [43] We entirely agree with the High Court in Chang Ah Mee in the interpretation of art 12 (4). [44] Apart from its binding effect on the lower courts, Indira Gandhi has established that: (a) Both the father and mother had equal right to decide on the religion of a minor child. This is the constitutional right of each S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 spouse under art.12 (4). So, consent must be obtained from both parents. (b) When custody, care and control of the children is given to the mother or father, the person who is entitled to the custodian has the right to decide all questions relating to the upbringing and education of the child including what religion the child should have. (c) Consent should have been obtained from the person who is entitled to the custodian of the child before a child is converted. If consent is not obtained, her constitutional right is violated and the conversion is null and void. [45] Coming back to the present case. We agree with the appellant’s submission that the facts of this case is similar to that of Indira Gandhi. Therefore, it is reasonable for the appellant to expect that the High Court would follow Indira Gandhi and allowed her application. [46] Unfortunately, the learned High Court Judge had disregarded Indira Gandhi. Instead, His Lordship rely on the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah & Anor Appeal [2023] 2 CL J 513. Briefly, the facts in that case is as follows. The respondent was born in 1986 to non-Muslim parents. Her father was a Hindu. Her mother was a Buddhist. Following her parents’ separation in 1991, the respondent lived with her mother. The respondent’s mother visited Jabatan Agama Islam Malaysia (JAIS)/Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) to convert to Islam to marry a Muslim man. After the conversion, both mother and daughter, who was five years old S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 at the material time, were issued with conversion cards by JAIS. Based on the cards issued by JAIS on 28.8.1993, the respondent had been converted on 17.5.1991. This was done without the consent of the respondent’s father. [47] In 2013, the respondent, by then aged 27,filed a summons at the Syariah High Court against Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (MAIWP Summons) for a declaration that she was no longer a Muslim.She contends that she never professed the religion of Islam.The Syariah High Court dismissed the MAIWP summons. The respondent’s appeal to the Syariah Court of Appeal was also dismissed. [48] The respondent then commenced originating summons (OS) at the High Court against the appellants, seeking for a declaration that she was not a person professing the religion of Islam. The High Court allowed the OS and granted the declaration sought by the respondent on the ground inter alia that the conversion of the respondent, when she was a minor, was in contravention of s 147 of the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952. [49] Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, in majority decision, allowed the appeal and held: (i) The Syariah High Court and Syariah Court of Appeal have already decided that the respondent is a Muslim. The OS is es judicata. The High Court was wrong in holding the respondent had never been a Muslim; and S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (ii) That a certificate of conversion to Islam is conclusive proof of the facts stated therein. [50] Based on the case of Dahlia Dhaima, the learned High Court Judge held that the certificate of conversions issued by the first respondent to the three children are conclusive proof they were Muslim and the conversion was valid. [51] Before us, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is wrong for the learned High Court Judge to refer and rely on Dahlia Dhaima’s on two grounds. First, that case does not deal with unilateral conversion. Second, a specific issue of whether consent from both parents are required before a certificate of conversion can be issued for conversion of a minor was not an issue in that case. We agree with the appellant’s submission on both grounds. The truth is the facts and issues in Dahlia Dhaima and the present case is totally different. Having relied on a wrong case, the learned High Court Judge had reached an erroneous decision in that the certificate of conversion is conclusive proof the children are Muslim when the act of issuing the certificates is challenged by the appellant. [52] The learned High Court Judge also relied on the case of Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 3 CL J 301. The issue in that case is whether Rosliza professes the religion of Islam. The Federal Court found Rosliza was raised in the Buddhist faith. [53] Applying Rosliza’s case, the learned High Court Judge held the three children continued professing the religion of Islam when they were in the appellant’s custody. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [54] Our first response is the facts and issue in Rosliza’s case is totally different from the present case. Thus, Rosliza case is not applicable. Again, we find the learned High Court Judge had failed to address his mind to the crucial issue on the consent of both parents. Whether the children continue professing the religion of Islam is not an issue the parties had asked the court to decide. [55] To conclude, we find there were four error of law and fact committed by the learned High Court Judge which warrant appellate’s intervention. First, he had failed to abide the principle of stare decisis when he failed to follow Indira Gandhi. Secondly, he relied on cases which had totally different facts and issues from the case before him. Third, he had not answered the issue raised by the parties i.e whether the unilateral conversion is lawful. Fourth, he made a wrong decision. Had he followed Indira Gandhi, he would have decided that without the consent of the appellant, Nagahswaran had no right to convert the three children to Islam and thus the unilateral conversion is unlawful. Unconstitutional Law [56] The second issue that the learned High Court Judge failed to answer is whether section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void. [57] The original section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam 2006 provides as follows: S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Keupayaan untuk memeluk agama Islam 117. Bagi maksud Bahagian ini, seseorang yang tidak beragama Islam boleh memeluk agama Islam jika dia sempurna akal: (a) sudah mencapai umur lapan belas tahun; atau (b) jika dia belum mencapai umur lapan belas tahun, ibu dan bapa atau penjaganya mengizinkan pemelukan agama Islam olehnya. [58] Following Subashini’s case which held that consent from either father or mother is sufficient to convert a minor, section 117(b) was amended by virtue of section 7 of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016. The new amended section 117(b) reads: Pindaan seksyen 117 7. Subseksyen 117(b) Enakmen ibu dipinda dalam teks Bahasa Malaysia dengan menggantikan perkataan “ibu dan bapa” dengan perkataan “ibu atau bapa”. [59] Since we have decided that the English version of the Federal Constitution to be the authoritative text, it is instructive to follow the Federal Court decision in Indira Gandhi which interpret Article 12 (4) as follows: “Since a literal construction of art.12 (4) would give rise to consequences which the legislative could not possibly have intended, the article should not be construed literally. A purposive reading of art.12 (4) that promotes the welfare of the child and is consistent with good sense would require the consent of both parents (if both are living) for the conversion of a minor child.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [60] Based on Indira Gandhi, the word “parent” in Article 12 (4) means both parent. Therefore, section 117(b) which used the singular word of “mother or father” is inconsistent with Article 12(4). [61] Article 4 of the Federal Constitution provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency. [62] Again, the learned High Court Judge failed to address his mind to this issue. This is an error of law that justify appellate intervention. Based on Article 4 of the Constitution, we held that section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with art.12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void. Our Decision [63] Based on the reasons mentioned above, we find there is merit in the appeal. The appeal is allowed. The decision of the High Court is set aside. Consequentially, we allow the appellant’s judicial review application in prayer (a) to (i) with no order as to costs. Dated: 22nd January 2024 - SGD - Hadhariah binti Syed Ismail Judge Court of Appeal S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 For the Appellant: Srimurugan Alagan, Gunamalar Joorindanjn, Dr. Shamsher Singh, Thind & Thian Yee Chin; Messrs Srimurugan & Co. For the 1st,3rd and 4th Respondents: Mohd Radhi bin Abas & Ainul Wardah binti Shahidan; State Legal Adviser Office, Perlis and Attorney General Chambers, Putrajaya. For the 2nd Respondent: Mohamed Haniff bin Khatri Abdulla, Aidil bin Khalid, Hariz bin Yusoff & Danial Farhan bin Zainul Rijal; Chambers of Zainul Rijal. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

PA-45A-11-06/2020

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH You Yong

Pengakuan salah-Seksyen 39B Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952-Akta 846 mengahapuskan hukuman mati mandatori, hukuman dibawah budibicara hakim bicara-pengakuan bersalah menjimatkan masa mahkamah-walaupun peruntukan seksyen 39B (2A) telah dimansuhkan melalui seksyen 54 Akta 846, ia tidak menghalang tertuduh untuk bergantung kepada kesemua atau mana-mana faktor yang disenaraikan dalam seksyen 39B (2A) tersebut sebagai faktor mitigasi-faktor-faktor mitigasi dalam kes ini adalah jauh mengatasi faktor pemberatan.

30/01/2024

YA Puan Rofiah Binti Mohamad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=62bc1679-f9ea-4a94-8c9e-fe012b667000&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI GEORGETOWN DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG, MALAYSIA PERBICARAAN JENAYAH: PA-45A-11-06/2020 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN YOU YONG [ Passport No.: G55871458 ] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Penghakiman ini disediakan berikutan dari Notis Rayuan kepada Mahkamah Rayuan yang difailkan oleh Tertuduh melalui pihak penjara bertarikh pada 27.10.2023 memohon agar hukuman yang dijatuhkan ke atasnya oleh Mahkamah ini dikurangkan. Latar Belakang Kes [2] Tertuduh adalah seorang warganegara China yang telah dituduh di Mahkamah ini dengan pertuduhan yang ditandakan sebagai eksibit P1 seperti berikut: 30/01/2024 10:03:37 PA-45A-11-06/2020 Kand. 85 S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 “Bahawa kamu pada 30 November 2019 jam lebih kurang 10.11 pagi bertempat di Bahagian Pengimbas Terminal Berlepas Antarabangsa Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Bayan Lepas Pulau Pinang, di dalam Daerah Barat Daya, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah didapati mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis, Heroin seberat 1381 gram, dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B (2) Akta yang sama.” [3] Fakta kes menunjukkan pada 30 November 2019 jam lebih kurang 10.11 pagi di Bahagian Pengimbas Terminal Berlepas Antarabangsa Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Bayan Lepas Pulau Pinang, tertuduh yang dalam perjalanan pulang ke Negara China telah dikesan membawa 1381 gram dadah jenis Heroin yang disembunyikan di dalam bengkong (girdle) yang ketika itu dipakai oleh tertuduh di pinggangnya. Kronologi Kes [4] Tertuduh dihadapkan ke Mahkamah ini di hadapan Hakim-Hakim terdahulu buat pertama kalinya pada 21.7.2020. Tertuduh tidak mengaku salah dan memohon masa bagi melantik peguambelanya sendiri. Kes telah ditangguhkan beberapa kali atas alasan yang sama. Kemudiannya kes ini telah tertangguh buat sekian lamanya pula kerana Mahkamah tidak bersidang ketika Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan Bersyarat berkuat kuasa berikutan penukaran wabak Covid-19. [5] Setelah Mahkamah kembali bersidang dan setelah beberapa kali lagi peluang diberikan atas permohonan Tertuduh untuk melantik peguam pilihannya sendiri, akhirnya pada 21.4.2021, Tertuduh mengakui bahawa beliau dan keluarganya tidak mampu melantik peguam dan memohon peguam lantikan Mahkamah disediakan untuk membelanya. [6] Peguam lantikan Mahkamah, Dato’ Baldev Bhar telah hadir bagi mewakili tertuduh buat pertama kalinya pada 27.10.2021 di mana S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 dokumen-dokumen bawah seksyen 51 A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah telah diserahkan oleh Pendakwa Raya kepada beliau selaku peguam Tertuduh. [7] Ketika kehadiran keduanya di Mahkamah, peguam tertuduh memaklumkan bahawa beliau akan memasukkan reprentasi kepada Jabatan Peguam Negara. Setelah itu, perbicaraan kes ini telah ditangguhkan beberapa kali kerana Mahkamah memberikan keutamaan bagi menjalan perbicaraan kes-kes yang lebih lama dan juga sementara menunggu maklum balas terhadap representasi berkenaan. [8] Akhirnya pada 23 Oktober 2023, kes ini telah ditetapkan di hadapan saya untuk perbicaraan penuh. Walau bagaimana pun, sebaik kes dipanggil dan setelah Puan Timbalan Pendakwaraya memaklumkan bahawa representasi tertuduh telah diterima oleh Jabatan Peguam Negara, Tertuduh yang Ketika itu diwakili oleh peguam yang sama, telah memaklumkan hasratnya untuk menukar pengakuannya kepada bersalah. [9] Justeru pertuduhan yang ditandakan sebagai P1 telah dibacakan dan diterangkan oleh jurubahasa Cina dalam dialek Mandarin sekali lagi kepada Tertuduh. Ketika pertuduhan dibacakan, Tertuduh kelihatan menganguk-ngangukkan kepalanya sambil mengatakan sesuatu dalam Mandarin. Berdasarkan makluman jurubahasa bahawa pertuduhan telah dibacakan dan Tertuduh telah faham pertuduhan tersebut dan Tertuduh mengaku bersalah. Tertuduh juga telah diterangkan dan beliau faham akan sifat dan akibat dari pengakuan salahnya. [10] Dari pengamatan mahkamah sendiri kepada riak wajahnya, mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa sebelum membuat pengakuan bersalah tersebut, tertuduh telah faham akan pertuduhan yang dikenakan terhadapnya dan tertuduh juga telah dijelaskan akan akibat dari S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 pengakuan bersalahnya iaitu beliau akan dihukum dengan hukuman- hukuman sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta Dadah Merbahaya 1952 setelah Mahkamah mensabitkannya dengan kesalahan tersebut. [11] Setelah saya berpuas hati bahawa pengakuan bersalah tertuduh adalah tanpa sebarang syarat dan dibuatnya dalam keadaan sedar dan dengan sukarela tanpa sebarang paksaan dari mana-mana pihak serta setelah tertuduh memahami pertuduhan serta tahu akan sifat dan akibat dari pengakuannya, maka saya telah menerima dan merekodkan pengakuan bersalah tertuduh. [12] Setelah fakta kes yang intipatinya adalah sebagaimana yang dihuraikan di atas diakui sepenuhnya oleh Tertuduh dan kesemua eksibit- eksibit serta gambar-gambar barang kes dan tempat kejadian yang dikemukakan dicam dan diakui oleh tertuduh, saya telah mensabitkan tertuduh atas pertuduhan sebagaimana di eksibit P1. [13] Sejurus itu, peguam tertuduh dan Puan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya masing-masing telah mengemukan hujahan dalam mitigasi dan pemberatan yang untuk kemudahan rujukan diperturunkan semula seperti berikut: Mitigasi OKT is now 48 years of age. Before being arrested he was a taxi driver in China earning about RM 2000-RM 3000 per month. He is a divorcee and has one child age 19 years old, a male. OKT is from China, Shenzhen District. He went to school for 11 years, but never went to a college or university. His health is good except for his right leg got problem in walking. By his pleading, guilty it had saved the time of the court, of the learned DPP and of all the witness that would have been called for this trial. He is sorry for the offence that he had committed. He was tempted by the money given to him to transport the drug S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 from Penang to China. His only role in this offence is that he was a courier or a mule as some call them. He cooperated with the authority by providing the name of the person who ask him to do the transportation. He did not bring any drug into this country but instead taking the drug out from this country. He prays for a minimum sentence from the date of his arrest that is 30.11.2019 and a minimum number of strokes. That all. Hujahan Pemberatan Sebagaimana Yang Arif maklumi dengan adanya Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 yang berkuat kuasa pada 4.7.2023, di mana death penalty tidak lagi menjadi kewajipan di dalam kes ini dan jika tidak dikenakan mandatory death, hukuman yang digariskan adalah life imprisonment sebagaimana definisi yang diberi di bawah Criminal Justice Amendment Act 2007 yang berkuatkuasa pada 7.9.2007 yang menggariskan bahawa life imprisonment adalah sebanyak 30 tahun penjara. Dan di dalam hukuman 39 B (2) juga jika tidak dikenakan hukuman mati, bersama-sama dengan hukuman penjara 30 tahun adalah hukuman sebatan minimum 12 sebatan. Faktor-faktor mitigasi adalah bersifat peribadi. Sewajarnya OKT sebagai seorang bukan warganegara hormat dengan undang-undang kita yang melarang dengan sekeras-kerasnya berkenaan dengan kesalahan dadah. Itu sahaja. Saya sahkan tarikh tangkapan adalah pada 30.11.2019. Hukuman [14] Sebagaimana yang dibentangkan oleh Puan TPR yang bijaksana, Akta 846 hanya menghapuskan hukuman mati yang bersifat mandatori. Namun hukuman mati masih kekal menjadi antara dua pilihan hukuman yang boleh dijatuhkan di bawah seksyen 39B (2) atas sabitan di bawah seksyen 39B (1). Pemilihan hukuman adalah di bawah kuasa budibicara Mahkamah yang semestinya dilaksanakan secara judiciously dengan mengambil kira kesemua faktor-faktor mitigasi dan juga pemberatan (aggravating). Kes Mahkamah Rayuan PP v. Morah Chekwube Chukwudi [2017] 1 LNS 864; [2017] CLJU 864 telah dirujuk dan dijadikan panduan S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 berkaitan dengan senarai contoh-contoh hal keadaan yang terjumlah kepada faktor mitigasi. [15] Setelah menimbangkan faktor-faktor mitigasi seperti pengakuan salah tertuduh yang dibuat sebelum perbicaraan kes ini dimulakan yang mana tidak boleh dinafikan telah menjimatkan masa dan kos kesemua pihak jika kes ini dibicarakan. Pada masa yang sama, ia telah memberikan ruang kepada Mahkamah untuk menggunakan masa kehakiman (judicial time) dengan memberikan tumpuan untuk melupuskan kes-kes lain. [16] Selain itu satu fakta yang menarik perhatian dan telah diberikan pertimbangan oleh Mahkamah ini adalah fakta bahawa ketika ditangkap, Tertuduh sedang membawa keluar dadah berbahaya jenis heroin seberat 1381 gram tersebut dari Malaysia melalui Lapangan Terbang Antarabangsa Bayan Lepas, Pulau Pinang. Walau pun tidak bermaksud untuk memberikan nilaian yang berbeza-beza kepada kemaslahatan dan nyawa antara warganegara dan bukan warganegara, namun, pada hemat Mahkamah ini, fakta ini sewajarnya diberikan pengiktirafan di dalam menjalankan kuasa budi bicara di dalam menjatuhkan hukuman ke atas Tertuduh. Ini kerana pada hakikatnya kesan dan kemudaratan yang besar sudah tentu akan diakibatkan kepada warga Malaysia dan negara ini akan terbeban untuk mengatasi dan menangani segala masalah dan gejala sosial yang akan timbul sekiranya dadah heroin seberat 1381 gram tersebut berjaya diseludup masuk dan diedarkan di pasaran gelap dalam Malaysia berbanding dengan jika ianya dibawa keluar dari negara ini sebagaimana yang sedang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh ketika tertangkap. [17] Fakta seterusnya yang diberi penekanan dan diambil kira ialah fakta bahawa setelah tertangkap tertuduh telah memberikan kerjasama kepada pihak berkuasa dengan mendedahkan indentiti dalang yang bertanggung S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 jawab di sebalik aktiviti haram pengedaran dadah ini. Mereka ini lah yang telah mengupan dan mengupah Tertuduh untuk menjadi keldai dadah dengan sejumlah wang yang mampu mengelabui mata Tertuduh. [18] Mahkamah ini juga bersetuju dengan pandangan YA Hakim Mahkamah tinggi di dalam kes PP v. Umapathi Ganesan [2023] 9 CLJ 625 bahawa walaupun peruntukan seksyen 39B (2A) telah dimansuhkan melalui seksyen 54 Akta 846, ia tidak menghalang tertuduh untuk bergantung kepada kesemua atau mana-mana faktor yang disenaraikan dalam seksyen 39B (2A) tersebut sebagai faktor mitigasi. [19] Berdasarkan fakta kes ini, saya mendapati kesemua situasi-situasi yang Mahkamah boleh mempertimbangkan dalam menjatuhkan hukuman alternatif kepada hukuman mati iaitu tiada bukti jual beli dadah berbahaya di masa Tertuduh ditangkap, kedua, tiada penglibatan ejen provokator, ketiga, penglibatan Tertuduh adalah terhad kepada mengangkut, membawa, menghantar atau menghantar dadah berbahaya, keempat, bahawa Tertuduh telah membantu agensi penguatkuasaan dalam membanteras aktiviti pengedaran dadah di dalam atau di luar Malaysia. [20] Puan TPR yang terpelajar selain dari menegaskan bahawa Tertuduh seharusnya menghormati undang-undang negara ini yang sangat ketat terhadap kesalahan melibatkan dadah, tidak mengemukakan apa-apa faktor pemberatan lain yang menonjol untuk dipertimbangkan. [21] Justeru saya mendapati bahawa faktor-faktor mitigasi dalam kes ini adalah jauh mengatasi faktor pemberatan. Oleh yang demikian, saya telah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 30 tahun dari tangkap dan 12 sebatan rotan ke atas Tertuduh. S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [22] Sebagaimana yang telah dinyatakan sebelum ini, Mahkamah tidak mempunyai pilihan hukuman lain di bawah seksyen 39B (2) Akta Dadah Merbahaya 1952 selain dari hukuman mati dan pemenjaraan seumur hidup iaitu selama 30 tahun dan 12 sebatan rotan. Sehubungan itu, permintaan Tertuduh agar dijatuhkan hukuman lain yang lebih ringan adalah di luar bidang kuasa Mahkamah ini. Rofiah binti Mohamad Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Georgetown, Pulau Pinang. 29 Januari 2024. S/N eRa8Yur5lEqMnv4BK2ZwAA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24IP-10-07/2023

PEMOHON DELUXE CATERERS PRIVATE LIMITED RESPONDEN FOOD STACK CONCEPTS PTE LTD

Plaintiff applying; (i) under s. 46(1)(a) and (b) of the Trademarks Act, 2019 (“Act”) to revoke the registration of the Defendant’s Mark from the Register of Trademarks, Malaysia (“Register”); (ii) further and/or in the alternative, to invalidate the Defendant’s Mark under several provisions of the Act, namely sections 47(1), (3) and (6) and/or sections 76(3) and (4).

30/01/2024

YA Tuan Azlan bin Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c1f523be-ca5f-4aaa-87b3-b1e1e576669a&Inline=true

30/01/2024 09:13:18 WA-24IP-10-07/2023 Kand. 25 S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N viP1wV/KqkqHs7Hh5XZmmg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the 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AT KUALA LUMPUR oRI6INA‘rmG §ywaoNs No WA.-ZAIF D-\77I‘2013 BETWEEN DELUXE CAYERERS PRIVAYE |.lMl1ED PLAINTIFF AND FOOD STACK CONCEPTS PTE LYD DEFENDANT JU DGMENT A. lnlroducllan 1 On a balmy mghl In wem Bombay (as Mumbm was man known] In I972‘ |ha excllemenl In Me aw was pa\pab\e Legendary new, nu-p Kumar, whodomlnaled the mum mm mausny In me Vale AU. scs and sea. was JK Kapurs honoured guesI al the grand npening I11 ma Va((er‘s Inaugurm and flagship res|auranl rzafled Copper cmmney 2 FasI lorward so years Mound lwenly Copper Chmmey IesIauranIs have smce opened In Vnma, MI?! 3 lurther Me In DubaI. UAE and ans each In Inc UK and Kuwau. The P\amIIfl has luflher reglslelud trademarks comalnvng ms word ‘Coupe! CmrnrIey' In Ihose Put 1 at -1 am .I=wv»<qxa>«smsxzmma -was saw ...m.mm as flied m mm a. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .num wrm countrtes and in Australia However, wrnte exptortng the tdea at npentrtg ‘Copper cnrrnrrey‘ restaurants rn Malaysta, the Ptarrttrtt dtsoovered that the Detendartt nad atready regts1ered tn Mataysra Trademark No 2014007985, a stytrzed Word Mark in case 4310! ‘Services /dr pros/tdmg food and drmk: temporary morrrrrrodarrorr: all rrrc/uded rrr class 43"rnetendant's Mark’) that looks trke trns: COPPER CHIMNEY 3 Nevertnetess, tne P|atrtm1‘s tunner rnaurrres suggested mat, desprte tegts|ertng me oatarrdarrt‘s Mark. «rte netendant had netlher opened nor operated any restaurant under me name copper Chtmttey‘ tn Mataysra 4 natarrrrrned lo proceed wttn tts man to gar snare me rays 01 tls dehcmus eurstne wrtrt Mataysrarts and as a gateway tn the res|u1 ASEAN, by |ms Ovlgtnaltng Summuns cos‘), tne P\atn|iN ts applylr-9 (1) under s. 46(1j(a) and ta) M the Trademarks Act, 2U19(“Ac|‘) lo revoke me regrstratrort at me Detendanra Mark trorn the Regts|er at Trademarks, Malaysia (‘RegtsIev“), tn; turtnerartd/or tn tna atternatrve, Io rrwattdate trte Detertdanrs Mark under sevarat ptovtstorts 0! the Ad, narnety seanona 47(1), ta) and ts; and/or aactrorta 75(3) and t4) Pay 2 M 47 IN vtP1vItIIK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ “Nana s.n.r tuvthnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... aflmrraflly mm: dun-mm VII mum v-mat 25 Thus, m awepllhe Defervdanfs conlenlmn that use omre Plammrs‘ Marks tor «nose services rm2l\y by me marnrrrr rs a pre—wndIlrun Io me Prairmrr being regarded as an aggneved person‘ lhal would place me Plimlflf In a classwc Ca|ch-22 situation It would mean |hal me Premxrrr worm rmt be an aggrieved person (or nor rlavmg used ma mammrs Marks Iocauy, and ar are same hrne n wnuld also nor be an aggrieved person rr rt ma Nanaggneved if you did, non- aggneved rryou marn Dru mac basrs. no onewoura be an aggnsved person, and me reqmlemerlt under secluon 46 or me Act lor an applicant In be an aqgrreved person could never pe made em As a opnsequerrce, eecopn as rrselr wculfl pe rendered reaunaam and urrenroroeeme. Thar oourd never have been me LegIs\a|ure‘s rrnennorr, Io nave Iegrsrarea m varn 25 Secondly, lhe Federal Court Irv Lrwayway did no| say thal an apphcsnl lor revocalwon pr a trademark wrll only be an aggnaved person W rt has afimally used the trademark It wanls to revoke V1 Malaysia H anry agreed wllrr the proposition lhal an apphcanl applyrng to revoke a registered trademark mus| Show that it has or rs usmg an idermcal or summer mark (not rueoessanly In Maraysiap ar who has a genume and preeem Inlernlon to use :1 m Meraysra 27. I accordingly repec1 mese Delerrdanfs oprecuons, and find that me Framhff IS indeed an aggrieved person under S 45{1jnl|I1e AC1 That finding men opens the way to mnsldenng whether there has been non-use or me Defendant‘: Mam rn Malaysia v... 11 vi .1 IN vrP1v/VrK~1kA:Hs‘rMr«5xzmm9 «me smm ...m.mur be used m mm r.. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII nFruNG v-mm her the Flam N has estamr n 25. As I sara earner. under semen 45(1) 1a) and (b). me marnnm wumd nave |a esoaunsn prima (acfe non-use by me Detenuanrs Marks for muse sennoes underclass 43 fora period was 201510 27 9.2013 and 0131 weast 25.7 2020 in 25 7 2023 The Vaw Iogreany requrrss an apphcanl unaersemrun as 07 the Act to aslabhsh only pnrna raere norH1se cflhe trademark |hal It seeks to revpke Tn: s because an apphcarvf cannot be expected «p ooncmswexy know 01 or prove nan- use since he wpma be speaking of the actwmy In reiahon to a Imdemark ol somenne else 29. The P\aumf1ve\i2s on me lollowmg evmence up eslahlvsh pnrna /acre nomuse \11|he Delendanfs Mark (or those periods‘ m A Search on me Googls pvaccpnn usmg me keywords -cepper cnrrrrney Ma/sy::a' that up not reveal any resmxs ol the use 0! the oerenaanrs Mark er any such resvaurant named ‘Coppe< Chimney’ operaling in Matayswaz and (:1) A Search pn me Delendanfs company wrm me cpmpanies opmnussrun 0'1 Mamysxa (‘COM’) wmcn revealed that a pornpany caned copper crnrnney Sdn Bhd had been incorporated on 25 6 2019. buuhants status Is “Drssoh/so‘ rug: :1 M47 rn wP1v/vrK~1kA:Hs7><n5xzrnnw§ “Nana s.n.r n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m my r... nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm vu .nunc v-mm an ln my vtew. these two evtdenoes es|ab|ish trrat, prima facie, |he Defendant had not out the Defendant's Mam to use in good latttt tn Malaysta tor the pertod ol tnree years tram 28 9 2015 to 27 9 2g‘84 and also that use onne Defendants Mark rtad been suspended tor a penod otlttree years lrorn at least 26.7 2020 to 25 7 2023 Fortwo reasons 31. Firstly‘ as I satd earlier‘ lhe Delendsnts Malk ta regtstered in class 43 tor “Services /or proyrdrng food and drlrlk, temporary accornrnodatton, all rncluded rn class 43' tn provtdtng trtose klrtds at sen/lees, a restaurant or notet naturally oorne to rntnd Had trte Delendant actually used ttte Delendants Mark tttrougn oneratlrtg ettner a reslauranl or ttotel. trren surely tn tltrs day and age sucn oustness would nave appeared tn a Google searcrt A nuwresull searcn on me Google plattonn using tlte keywords -copper Chimney MaIsysls"would mean tnat, prrrne tacrel Cooper crrtrnney has not been used and is currently not being used hyany restaurant or hotel tn Malaysia despite the reglslrallon ortne Defendant‘: Mark 32 secondly nad tne Derendent actually used ttte Delervdarws Mark tn a restaurant or hotel. trren in all likeltttood surely a company would be running and managlng tt Evert tl the Defendant‘: Mark was owned by a loretgn entrty (ltlie ltere). tlten tn all llkallhood trte owner would incorporate a company or suosldtary locally to do so trte Detendant dtd tn tact do tnat However‘ trte CCM search revealed trtat coppercrttntney Sdn Bhd tonal tlte Detendant incorporated tn Maleystal was only incorporated on 26.6 zt7t9. wntcn ts alter tne exnlry ot tnatnrst ttrree-year oenod and esters tne oontntenoernent ottne seoond tnreeyeer penod. And tnat tt l5 now dissolved st... 11 at .1 rn ytPtvIlIIK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzntnt§ “None Snrtnl n-vlhnrwlll be u... M my r... oflnlnallly Mthln don-vlnrrt wa nFlt.lNG Wrul \/Vhelher the Defgndant has used Ihe Delegdanls Marg my sgmg In Class 43 I1urI'ng gny uflhnse Enods 33 The PIairI|4fl havmg eslahhshed pnma lacie nan-use ol the DeIenI1arII‘s Malk during 25.92015 10 27.9.2016 and (mm an I935! 26 7 2020 In 25 7 2023. the burden men smfled to me DeIendanI Iu establish use or proper reasons Inr nun—use of the Defendanfs Mark var Ihose sennoes In Class A3 in Malaysia 34 In Ma|aysIa. one sIngIe an ar use [5 suflimenl in defeat an appllcallorl In revoke a trademark Im nnn—u5e In E-Toyo Global Slalionnry Sdn Bhd v. Toyu Ink 5:171 and 5 Anal (2004) 1 Cu 365, Ramln AII J sent '0" ma quesnorv ulhaw much mrIs1m1Ies use fur ms purpose 0' s 4511; a! me Ac! me mm mm: the decmorv m wmoz fade Mam [I952-[RFC I, men (he Mgr: Cam! auusme . Clmncary DIVIIIDII mm In. single an arena v/5: wandered sulfimervl 35. on me Delendanfs own ewaence, I am max me navanaann could only show use uflhe Dulendanfs Mark In sIngapaIe and na| : smgle use in MaIaysIe In I-cI, In paragnapn II 01019 nucandanrs Alfidavit In Reply |o the os, Ina Dslandanfs dvaclnf (whn had um appomled III. Malaysla Ccumry Manager In January 2023; aaInIIIea mm, In Smgaporu, the Duenaann II. “cI.nvenlIy opanazing two Iamurnnzs andtwo school canmns: and In an: no: dspose (0 any sum amle|s In MaIaysIa Hm Irma been an auflel In MaIaysIa, he would nave mentioned II, and those eslabllshmenls In Singapore would have been irrabvanl and InInIaIeIIaI. so... II M n IN .II=I.nzII<II>II:>ImIIIaxznnIg mu. Snr1nI:uvIhnrwHII>e II... M my I... nrWIrI.H|y MIMI dun-mm wa nFIuNG WM! 35 nesprte ttrs absence of any restaurant rn Malaysta operatrnq under 37 33. the name ‘Copper Chtmney‘ the Deiendants atteqes tnat rt nas nevertheless eslabitshed use ottne Deiertdanfs Mark In Mataysra by (rt rts restaurants In Stngapme, w * ttre Detendant contends are axceearngty popular amongst Mataystan crtrzens. as many frequently Hack to tnerrr: out by the Datanaanrs srgrrmcant amount ot markeltng and aarrartrsrrrg oi rts restauranls and servtces antrne and tnrougrr soctal mama, and (Mt) by me fact ttrat tls restaurants rn Strtgapure have reserved nruttrpte awards, racognrtron and good ravraws However‘ I reject tnese oantanntans, as secliurt 46(1) at tne Act dearly stipulates trrat the trademark rn tssue nrust be put to actuat use in Mataysra In Comic Enlnrprisas Ltd V Twlnllflh Cnnlury Fox Film Ccrpor1Iton(Nn. 2) [201-1] EWNC as ten), Amt Flc V AnsulI's Hinlllhaus KGBOHIIIH [I014] Lexis Citation 2522. Troian Recording: Ltd V ARCO I.ld mu] Loxs citation 3375. Thu Walt Disney Company v Rosull Fantasy Wurks [zoos] Lox I Cilitiull 3133‘ and SINIDO Point Solution: SA V DHL Illtumztionil Gmhflr the vanaus Ceuns have held that use M a trademark is dentartstraleti by oerlatn cmerinrt These rnctude r... 15 at u srn rrPtv/vtt<~1>u:Hs7>ttt5xzrrrrvt§ -nna s.n.r ruvthnrwm be .n.. M mm r.. nrtmrrattly mrnr. dun-vtnrrt wa nrtuttc wnxt tr) actual use and not just token use t.e sotety |c preserve the nghls ocnfemad by regtstrattort: (41) use that Is consistent wt|h the ESSeI'|1Ia"U7IC1\0fl of the mark, whtch Is to guaranlee the raerrttty otthe ongtrt at the goods or ltly at oorriusiurr, to oisttrrgutsh the goods or sewtoes from others servtees lo the mnsumer or end-user‘ wtthoul any po wmch have annther ortgtn. tun the use must he by way oteorrrrrrererat exptortatrorr or the mark an the market tar those goods er servtoes. armed at matnlzlrwtg or creaurrg an outtet fmm therrr or a share of the market. (Iv) the use must be puptrcty and outwardly. (u) trrternat use by the pruprtetor and the dtslnbtflton ol prorrtotrorrat tterna to enccturage sale and as a reward tor the purchase ol other gaods is not use 39 toeatty, VI paragraphs [19] and [20]o1ms Jurtgrnerrt In Just cranes GmbflI-COKGvJoItClInosSdnBltd[20l0]lMLJ191.Azahar Mohamed J (as Hts Lorushtp than was) relerred lo mtrrrt-r AG v Surly Group Co Ltd mas] All ER tn) 12a and the prrnerptes therern |o derwe the meaning olgertutne use He said var serrutrre use re a quumanvi arm rm! a quartttlaltve cmenon vuvliatn ru utP1vItI!K~1kA:Hs7>th5xzmm§ -use s.r.r tuvthnrwm be used M vewtw ms nflmrraflly MW: dun-mm r.. arturtc v-mat (:7) 15/ (17) {6} (0 The use has to be msmm mm the cswnlmliunmon aims Irsdermlrk, wmm rs to guamniee me mm, am: Lmgm nftlw goodsavsemaexlumewstumerorendt/sets 7». and has m be an the math! by Ina pmpuamr or an aumannd mm: my and no! my mllmn/ us: by tho unourtnkmycanwmvd The use has m be In mamtam or waste a mare m the marks! f-wlhegoodsorsen/mespmlectedbymenwk The noun has m me we cor-mdsnlran an M5 ram and cwcumllanxxs mm." lo lxlnblrxlhng wnum tn: eommsmal upronanon or Ms mark has am N91, and m partrculel whalncv such us: wowd be vrewed as warmnrad m In: Inadu sector concerned to mam!-am nvcruls a sham m ms marketlor in: relevant goads or semees pmreaed Dy me mark And finally. ‘rm nllura of m goods m rmn such .3 ma c»ma.m.u ar the rnarkatmnarnld and me scan and frequency own use ems mark have to be tukan mm accourvl - 40 Further, section 3(1) M mo Act nrmndes me fellcwmg definmon or ‘Arademark" 'Trademsri<“ means any sign myable M bemg represarvred gmpmcalry wmm I5 mpaoue aldtsungmsmrlg guods or services 17/ one undedakmg hum moss o/anomev umnaung V1]/A .1 M u sm wFmvIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 41 Black‘s Law Drcuanary defines ‘trademark a a want phrase /ago or prner graprrrc symbol used by a manulscmrev 9! saw! ra fllsbngmsh N: pmduct avpmdums imm those orpmers ma mam purwse are tradsmark is to guarantee a product‘: genumerless In eknx. me Iradcmuk rs me oommemal sumlmne lar me‘: pgnarure ' 42 Tne word ‘trade’ is mere car a reason too. E\ack's Law Dmronery aennee man as “lhs busmus ol ouyrng and se/ling or Darlsnng gooda or sslwcea," u only sums to reason |haI a Ilzdemalk Mme i|s underlying purpose wnerr mere Is actual acmmeluifl aclwlty usmg the creuemerk In mner words, oommerual axp\oIla|\on. Thil necessnnly meene mar me use has m be pupncxy anu ou|wsM\y. 43 In conclusmnr 1 find |ha| me Dclzndanl has no| used me oerenaenre Marx Vn Maleysra ar aH during me panods M enhar 2a 9.2u15 to 27.9 201: or at leasl tram 25 7.2020 re 25 1 2023 44 severe rnpvrng on |o whelhar me Derenaam has pmnered any proper reesarrs var non-use. [here re one rnauer which Ms Cuurl caNIu| uvaflook wrmour cemmenlmg on It, and mews wan urrnpsr concern. Vn paragraph 2o 04 the Delendanfs Amuamr. me Detenaanrs Dirsclor said (empnasrs ms) 1 am. mat II It crucvel 10 mm mm (he ran. and remgnrzron ruvnvvd by ma Dnfundlnt rs not only /rrnaea rn Smgspove but has area spared over to Malaysm pm. 41 am wF1wVIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xznrm§ “Nana s.n.r mmhnrwm r. med w my r... nflmnaflly mm: dnuumrrl VII muNG war me Defendant has mam mum in Me mam: anu me Mslsyauan consumers are /armlral wrm me nereneanr mrere an amt:/e by Jane. Kala shows mar me Maraysran pub!/0 has knowledge or “COPPERCMMMEW The Dedendinl aaauoea lhal emote by Jnhur Kakt as Exhibit ‘K’. 45. The reason why lhts Conn vtaws mus wrtrr uunott concern is tnat, 47! response, lhe Plalnml auaueea mat very same article, amy met me vane Ihe Ptarntrfl etmueea centemea |he lnlluwing words which were wneuy aaaent from Exmhll ‘K“ at the Delertdanfs Amaaurt -orsmrrur Plan not: met me was en Invltld lullng ' 46 ll true, Ihal mat the Defendant has cremed presence m the market and that clatmsr undennmes Ihe Delendanrs bold contermon Mateyaran eansurners ere tarrrmar wrtr. trre Deteuaant. H rneana that the wnler 0| Exnrtut K was ncluafly Invflad in do a testing, and had nol gene to We neveneanrs Copoer cnuuney restaurant on ma own volition or out of ms having hearts out, and rarees the possmrtity and suspicton that ne may not have wntten me amde tndepenrsenuy ur votuntanty. 47 The crustal pmnl is tms. rt ts tmperalwe mat partrea adduce wmfler unedrted documents. ll Indeed the author or met anicla want In the Deteneanra restaurant an an invtled tesung, men the statement that wvaraysran coneurnere are /enulier wrrn (he uelendanr where an article by.loIvor Kala shows that me Maraya/an pub/)c has knowrsuge or “COPPER CHIMNEY‘ Is sumzly not true a... 19 M41 sru wF1wVIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm9 «mt. a.n.t mmhnrwm r. u... w my r... urumuu mm: dnuumrrl n. mum Wm! Whelherlhg Detendaiit has Qmflered any proper gagiis lg[ ngu 5; 43. In its Amdaviis, me Dereriaani has proffered several reasons lor non-use or the Detendaiirs Mark in Malaysia and me lnlerlllorl In use me l:elendani's Maik in Malaysia, wliicn can he Summarlled as lpllims ii) in August 2017 iwnicn was over imee years aaei H19 Defendant had applled to register lhe Defendanfs Mark and iwuyeaisanenneceiiifieaiepmegisiiaiianroriiwasissuedl. irie Delenaani was approached by a business owner prwaslng Ia operate ine Copper Chimney lraneiiise In Malaysia. Haweyan iriai proposal did nai come to iniiiien as lhal buslrless owner wanted to sews alwhol In those Malaysian milieu, vmlch was ml in tandem WIH1 Ihe Delendams vlslon for lfs proposed oullels lo caler predaminarltly to Muslim cllsmele: (ii; on 18 12 2013‘ me Delenuanl anpolnled one Raiiiii Jaoub as iis cunsiiliani for Malaysia, whose mandate iiicliideil regisieiing a company in Malaysia and opening a flagship aullel iii Malaysla Hwwever, even irioiigh Copper cliininey Sdn slid was incorporated on 27 5.2019. vial iiileniien in open a iesiaiinini in Malaysia aid nol maieiializediiexoiiie COVlD- ie pandemic, wriicri also caused iris dissoluhorl oi Copper cniiniiey Sdn and. and Pan iii M ii IN iipiwixsxsmnnsxzmns “Nair s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll be ii... M may i... nflnlnnllly MIMI dnunvlnnl y.. nFluNG Wml 5 In Part B unms Judgment I wm deal wnn me Plamurrs ravocahan applicamm and wn Part C its applicancn to Invahdale me Delenaanrs Mark under all oflhose provlsxons In Pan D I van set out the relief sought and Ihe orders made. 3. Revocation of ma norendanrs Mark undnr s. 46 of the Act e. Sectmn as ofme Act is me vmvlsvan fur revnking the regisxrauon of a trademark on lhe ground Ihax n has not been used, ie. (or non- use The avphcsuon Is made 10 Conn and, .1 n Is allowed. me nrder for mvocauon Is made by the COUI1. wmch the Rsgxshar of Trademarks, Malaysia cnegusnrar) than cames am 7 Saclmn 46 av the Acl pmwaes: ~11; The regtstnatmn era trademark may be revoked by com Court on M appncauon by an aggneved person on anyalme gmumis as follow: (a) when WIYMIV . Wm ar Imus yd-rs followmg me can ol Issuance own nahflcslmn Ifragumshon m. Indvmark has not bocn ml! 1.: use w good «sun m Malaysia. by the regnslered pmpvmlvr or wrm ms consent m re/almn to me goods 0! servrces rm mm the magma /s rsgrstemd and mm arunapropeusasons lurnan-use, m um» um um am. good: or nrweu under paragraph (5; has been mpenm rm an unmlvrwpred pomzd of was years, and name an nu nvumr masons foi rvorwsv. M. a cu: sm wFwvIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Vn January 2023. the Delendanl appomled one MHHDJ Bavadekar as Ma\aysIa Country Manager ro exmore and spearhead s|arlmg a cnarn or copper cnnnney reslauranls m Maraysra Tms resuneo in me Delendam recewmg a Letter or lnlenl dated 7421723 and a Partnersmp Proposal dated 2 5.2023 «ran. a Maraysran husmessman Vooklng Io sxpkxe warkmg rogemar wnn me Defendant lo open Copper Chimney resrauranrs In Manaysra. A9 However‘ m my mew, mesa reasons do not consmule proper reasons for non-use undzr holh hmbs (a) and (b) of secuon 4611) oi (heAcl so Firstly‘ as emcxdaled earner, me purpose of regrararrng a rraaarnark rs «or the trademark in be aclwew usaa and sxpkmed The lad mac 5. 4su)(a) onne Acl provides (or revocabcm cor non—use Mlhm three years of regrscerrng a kadamark rnaans mar Ma\ays\a rs senpus about prompt anus! use of trademarks upun ragasxranon, By mmparison, m lhe UK and srngapore, me perroo 01 non-use lor revocation purposes rs me years 51 Secondly, Ihe natendarrrs own narrauon Mevenls shows a Vanse of around two years vrorn ma ragrsuarrorr at me Devenoanrs Trademark m 2015 lo we Daaendann s nrsr expressrorr ovwanurrg to use rt H1 Maraysra rrr 2017 Even men. r: was no\ on the Defendant‘: own vollhon but rn led by a proposal cram a business owner to operate me copper cmrnney iranernss m Malaysva p... 1. mn rn vrP1wrKnkA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ “Nuns Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used m mm ms n«rn.un mm: dun-mm wa muNG vwm 52 Thtrdlyt wnen that am not rrraterrattze. rt was over a year tater on 1512 2015 » thus aver four years aner tne Delertdanl had apnlted In ragrstertne De1endanl‘s Trademark and overtnree years artarme Cemficale of Reqtstmtton tor tl was Issued — trtat tne oetendant appotrtled a cansutrant tor Malaysia In register a company tn Mataysra and explore Dperwlg a ttagsntp store tn Malaysta. tt took anomer Stx months to regtster the Mataystan oomparry. wttn stttt no evidence of any defirtmvs prans to open a res|aurant tn Mataysta 53 Fourlhtyt tne ettects at me COVID-19 pandemic |mly struck tn earty Mamh N20‘ whtclt was over six years after tne ueterraarrt rrao aaptrea to register the DeVertdartl’s Trademark and nverftve years attertne Cerlificale at Regtslralton for it was Issued In an that ttrne, mere was no use at at at the Delendartfs Mark tn Mataysta_ and no servraes orverea by the Dafendanl tor any r11 trre serytaes tar which tne taeverrdanrs Mark was regrsterea 54 Frfiffly, in my vtew, the COVtD—19 pandemtc (10% not (met the uetenoant any rssptle. It might have had the Detenaant been rn aayanoea, final stages 01 preparaltun tor acluatty opening a Copper Chtmney restaurant in Mataysta. but |he netanaanrs own evidence dtd nut Show mat to be the case at all 55 tn the Untted Ktngdom case onrado Mark Irrtor Pam: Dcctaton 0/350/22‘ trre UK Trademark Regrstry had eanstdersd COVIDW as a reason for nun-use Tnrs ts what was said rn trrat case -rne cwra 19 Palmsrrttc started amulalrrtg in me UK In January 2020 MM me rrrsr narronsr /aawowrr orxurnng Vt Marm mo r=.;.uaur IN vtPtv.IVtK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ “Nana s.n.t ruvthnrwttt re used m mm the nflmnattly enn. dun-mm y.. .nune Wrut m rslatron lo pmwdmg reasons brnan-use m Amrm Hauplv my Stvmmg .4 Co KG Des: 9245/175‘ My Own uuusnoe 0/the Euvapean Llmon he/11 vumm mu only ueltsclu nawnga aullrcoarvl/y am mmlrunsh/D WWI . mu. m making 1!: we Amposslbls 9. urvralsannma and Wm ansa mdnpvnvnntly aims my arms propnemr olmut mark may be desmhed as vmnerrissons (oi nolbusfolthat mark ’ A pmmg ralsrancs Io msse events m rsnfianarv, mm: (mmer madlicahan, as m Ivuw mu: ewnls rmpaded upun me Pmonelars nus!»-mass: resasmal/y aw. ms! u 1: nu! ma wnu rm Pvvonuovs‘ nusu-Jane: an). arc mmcmn m III-muivu mam rnnhsr uplannnorv ta demolvsrralu no/'v~u3s or 0.. marks an m. goods and semen in amm > 55 Here, aparl (mm Incomeratmg Cnpper Chimney Sdn Bhd on 27.6 2019, the De¢enaant dud nm adduce any ewdence ov even being near to opemng a restaurant usmg me Deieneams Mark up to the tune the Plamlflf man this 05. ordetaxls or how the pandenm: had slowed m In ms tracks 57 smnny, me Defendant has not disclosed any mnnemevempmencs afler the Leller or lnlenl dated 7 4 2-123 and the Parlnersmp Pmposax dated 1 5 2023 The lallerwas ahnostlhree months belore the OS was Med, and was expressed in be valxd urml 2 ‘H 2023. Surely N we mamurv were senous about openmg a Copper cmmney .esoauran« Vocavy there would have been some developments 53 I aooerdmgry find mat the Defendant has no| made out any vmper reasons tor narwseanne Delendanls Mark m serwoes m mass 43 Page 1; M11 sm wP1v/\/IK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ mm. smm ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 w may he .mmn.u-y mm: m.n.n VII mum pm.‘ Conclusion 59, In conclusion, Ifind that me Plenum \s an aggrieved person, and has eslabhshed pnma Iacie Ihal me Defendant mo nm use me Derenaanvs Mark for services In Class 43 durmg me penoas of emner 23.9.2015 to 27 9.2015 or 26 7.2020 to 257 2023 I further find that me ne4enoanx lafled to snow any use or me Defendant‘: Mark smce nwas regwstered. or provvde any groper reasons Iorsuen non—use Thus, we Plairum us enlvllsd la revake (he Defendant's Mark under s as 01 me Act C. Invaudanion of me Dam-danrs Mark 60 For Invalldahcn anne Defendants Mark,1ne.nmuIemenno|ne OS mennons sections 41(1), (3) and (6), and secuens 75(3) and 14; or the Act 51. Seaman 47(1) uhhe Acl expressly provides‘ -me regrstranon ul trademark may be declared rnvshd by me Conn upon me appllcalvon by an agwrevsd person on me gmund ms! the lmdemark was registered In bveadv oisecuon 2: 52 Sechon 23 01th: Ac| man Vs mennonea m seenon 47(1) eoneems ansoluxe grounds [or Ihe Rsgxshar u: reluse to register a uaaemark. In us Wn|Ian Submissions me Mamlm honed -n on sub-yschon (5)(a) or s, 23, wmcn prowdes man a Rsgwslnar shall muse In register a (rademark so... 1. ml .1 m wP1v.IVrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ mm. s.nn n-nhnrwm .. med m mm s. nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm VII mum pm -ms use arme lrademark rs fivhely lo meme arcausu mnlllson m M: Dllbln: ur wnmvy ta any wmm. law‘ es. Sec1mn 4713) ov me Acl expressly pmwaes -ms rnglslrubalv 5/ lrudumvk Inly bu dodarvd mv:/rd Dy In Court upon me appmuon by M spgrrand plrsun an we gmund mm A (al Inem rs an aamarlvadsmsrk unaarsummm em, (2; mm 9. /11! mm Is an same! right ummrsunsectnm um 64 01 lbs four subsemlons or s. 24 0! the Act that mesa pmvlslans menhon. In ns Wrmen Sublmssrons the P\amUfl honed in on s 2413) vfme Act wmon provmes. -ma Rlyrlhrnr mm mm 10 register a trademark yr. u m mm: mm .. mm. m . mm...m. a..1..m. ma Is not rugrsfnrad W Maraysra and ,1 .5 :9 he reaisleved for me ..1...mr mm .1 semen of the Plwnuvuv ultha wslumawn mmm ~ 65. Secnon 47(6)o1Ihe Act expressly pmvxdes ‘The ragrmalron cl trademark may be m/ma mud Dy me am upon me nppmlm by an agar-ma Dfirsnn or me Rsgmm on the ground aliraurt m m Miran-anon or ma! ma mgvalmlrarv was ublumsd by mlrlpunnlflnm run as .v :1 sm wF1wvIK~1h:Hs7Hn5xzmm§ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 65 searon 76(3) 0! the Act exnressly pruvrdes: ~,a pmulfctuv at at we/Hmwm trademark may auwy re me cam fur . declzmnon orrnvslrdalravv alarugmsmd kadsrnark an the gmanfls that me rugrstsred trademark r. mm: with or um!/Ir ya . mrrrnown lndumark In Mnraysva and ms mgrnzrert Rama .5 regtslemd (or any am; or surwaas warm DIE not mrmr at not slmrtar In M. In ...,,.cr arm. r..rr.r...m trsdcmurk — {5} Ilme use aflhe mgvstsled Imdsrmrk m rulatron ra mm goods or Jurwocs mm rndrcale a mnnemon bemwvv those goods or gamma and In: pruwretal ar rrrs we/Hmnwn trademark,‘ rnr mare most; .5 rrrsrrrooa of mnmsrm an the par! ur the gum Dummy nlsucll um‘ ma 1:) the Interest: a/ ma prvmclor ulmc wuflknown Irwdemerk are lrkely to be damaged by such an 57. sectron 76(4) nflhe Am expressly provides: ‘A pr-opnelnr ola wel/-kvrown Iradomark may apo/y to ma Court Ivar a ammrron ulmvalrdatron are reavsleved namm an ma gtnurvfls ul ma rn m. regrslmtlon or ma: Ins ragrsrrahan was crammed by m«srDVaaorvIaIrarv » es. Lrke section may of me Acl, under subsechons 11). (3) and (6) of section 47 n! ma Au rm apphcanl -mm be an aggrieved person The mncepl or aggnaved person urmer bath sacxiuns as and 41 at "19 Act Is ma same. Consequenlly, as I had already earlier laund meal we Prarnm vs an aggrieved person lot us revecahcn applrcahon under suction 45(1) oi the MI, :1 would ukmsa be an aggneven person var W5 mvalxdzllen appnoauon under secuon 47 nllhe Am So r .2; .4 .1 sm wF1wVrK~1|A:Hs7Mr«5xzmm§ «mm. smm mmhnrwm .. U... w my r... mrmu-y mm: dnuumrrl vn murm v-max I need not go into ttiat issue again 69 in respect or an application under section 47(3) read wirti section 24(3t or ttie Act. and under seaions 7613) and 14) or ttie Act an appticant woutd have to snow itiat ts trademark is a welt-known trademark in tact, trorii ttie Ptaintttrs written suprnissicns, this notion ot weH—knt:wn trademark was ttie mainstay or its case tcr iriiiatidatidri ct ttie Deteridarits Mark. 7:: In prreprepn 5: Mine iztairititrs Wrillen sutnriissiens, ttie Ptaintirt subminsd mat the DefErIdan|'s Mark shautd be irwaltdated under Secnun 47(1). (3) arid ts) cri tne lotlowtrtg grounds. ti) Iha| it is identical and I or eiinitar to a we||—known trademark wtiieti is not registered in Mataysia and registered tar tdenticat goods cr services. pursuant to s 47(3) read mgelhev witti s. 2413) ollhl Act (ii) that use M ttie Defendant‘: is iikely tc deceive or cause contusion to the pubtii: pursuant to s. 41(1) read together mtri s. 2a(5)(a) crttie Act and lhal the Detenoanrs registration was obtained by traud or misrepresentation pursuant tc s 47(6) ct the Act. 71 Ttien, in paragraphs 55-56 oi the Plaintiffs written SMDIIIVSSWHS‘ ttie Ptairititv attuded to ttie ability at the pmpnetor ola wettkncwn mark being able to apply under st9c1ions 76(3) and (4) ct ttie Acl tor a declaration M invalidation cta regrstered trademark p... 17 at A1 rn viP1vItI/K~1kI:Hs7Mrt5xZmm§ “Nair s.ii.i In-vthnrwm be u... M may i... nflntrinflly MIMI flnulvtlnl VII nFtt.ING pmui 72. As me Plaimwrs mvalidahan appncanon prednmlnanfly mvolves me notion and concept of “we||—known trademarks“, it wuu!d be apprupnale and Dppaflune ax lhls junclurelo clarify wfvalthatmenns and en|an\s. 73. section 4 of lhe Act prowdes a defimlmn av 'w9IH<n0wn trademark“ 11; ‘Welt-Jmawrv l'radsmar)<'mezns any kademarir that .s welt-hvmwrv m Malaysoa and malbelarvgs to a person wrm— 4.: »s a nahoualala Convention coumty, m (a; u domnzhd, or has n real And mam mdullrml a. commernal asrablahrmrvl ». a common cow-rvy whether or not that yavsun cams on mmess, or nas any gnaw:/L In Malaysia (2; In ammmmg whallvsrnlrndumnvkns wnl/Jmawn In Mallysra ma Rngrwsl or Me com am am mgm: to ma mm .5 prusmhld‘ 74 The 'crr‘IeIra as presarbsd"lhaI smd seclion 4(2) speaks 0! are set out m Regulafinn 5 01 (he Trademarks Regulations 2019 Regu|a\iuns'). but they are by no means exhausflve s Regmatxm 5 prowdes‘ ‘Criteria ovwewmawn ma-mm m demmmmg wnamcra hudnnlam /5 known /71 Malaysia me Regrskar arlhc Com sha/rhave rngam 1.. the /ulluwmg mtam, u... 2: our sm wFmvIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! (3) me extent of knawisdgv ov rswgmtvon oi the trademark m the mlevirvt seam olme public: 4») ms mam and mm. and googmpmcu ml olarvy use aun- hr-domanr, re» Ms flumtvovv and extent olany pmmulran allha gums ovwrwoes wher: ms trademark appnss andme geoovapmcal area when m pmmahm rs named on! ya) me amuon and Made or negmauon a. dumbon am 177512 at nnpbcalmn Iorreglam1von,o(lhslraaamsnv. m mm mm that may rI/490.1 u. or mcogmnon DNA: mmnem 1:; momvomofsuccessful enlnmenrenlufrfgmsm ma mmmm, m Pamculav the extent to wmm m. trade/nalk was /scoamzed as ws!H<nown by mmnemu aunmmes, and m the value asaocraiad mm m. :r.a.m.u. - 75. A5 ma memuu Is eonu-nu-ng met me Flaimifis Marks are well— known nraaamam. m Malaysia‘ man it heals the burden ul eslnhhsmng so vn re: Spurn 5:17: am: v Bullrnn span (M|l:yu.I) [2021] 1 ms 37¢, Quay Chew Soon J sand on paragraphs [an] and 1351 00 his Judgment. ~ Seoandm Mull kmzwrv' m law 71:: . wry mfluunl murvlng and aims! P I: not snmled m am. am mlhoul lulfiflma an mu rvqmremsrlts under me ma zmanams Trademarks Regulations 20:: “ o...u.m1 sm wFmvIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! A person an-gm a partlnu/ar fan! that ms llademarlr 75 well- known In mm Colmlry. has me egslounven undsrssmorl ms onne Ewosrlw 21211960 mumve gm. alm- 76. Funnel. V7 Ihls caselhe Plalnlm musl prove ulalme Plalnllffs Marks were well-known Hademarks ln Malaysla by M 7 21114. being me dale lnal lhe Delenflam had applleu lo reglsler lne Defendant‘: Mark II cenainly cannol rely on any evlaence beyond me: date because, if lnal were 50, men every trademark reglsured In Malaysia woula be susoephbla In belng challenged lor lnvalldauon by a slmllar or ldsnllcal nadelnark reglslered anywtleve In the world lnal mlghl only nave became weIl—known long arler me Veglskallon 0! mal Malayslan trademark. 17. mal lne Plalnm must prove «real me Plalnllfrs Marks were well— known llaaeunams by M 7 2014 IS also evlaenl «om secllon 76(5) 0! me AC1, which pnwldes: -me pmunalor ufl mlmlawn mark me»: no! u mm/ed lo me my ruler-led lo M subsacrlan rzl n m. us: or me Imdvmark began below me pwpmlovs Iradcmark became wewmown m Malaysia lmlass me vademsrk has been usod ln nan ralm * 73. In support at me os, me Plelnlm filed lwo affldavlls wlln mulllple documentary exhlblls WV three volumes runnlng |o well over 1,000 fullas (uulleulvely, “Plalnuffs Alnaavlrl pmflemlg sevelal gruunds for ecntendlng that me Plalnulrs Marks are wellrknawn, On muse grounds and domlments, l make several observallons and findlngs win so an) sm lnP1v/lIrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ “Nair Smnl ...n.mll be HIGH M may he nflmnnllly mm: dun-mm VII nrlum mm s Sermon 46(1) make: u clear that oruy an aggneved person an mvoke I| However, ‘us! before discussing whether U19 P\amM'1|s an aggnevea person and gmng In|o «he menls of me revocanprr eppuceuorr, i\ may be expeurerrr In examme me nuances and dfllerenoes belween an apprrceuorr under nrrrbs la) and (I7) 01 secuerr 46. After all, m Mcurerr International Ltd v. Lmr v.1 mm mm) 4 cu 149‘ Ahdm Aziz Mohamad FCJ sad: ‘The grounds in paras 1.; and rm are mdependen! a/(emalwe grounds M37519 not related to one another “ Lvmb a 9 Under mu (3), me mreeyear perm av norvuse of the trademark m rssue rs peggeu to me “npmrcerrorr uf registration”, which under seam 36(2) of me Ad me Regrsrmr rssues to me successful app1IcarI|/ propnelor. Under secuurr 1l6(3)ulthe Ac1.a oeruficale oi regrsuauon rs eqmvalenua a rrmmcauon of regrsurauon rssuea under semen 36(2) 10. In «ms case. we Defendant had apphed lo regrslerme Detenuerrrs Mark on 14 7.2014 and me Oamficaxe er Regrsnrauun for me Derenuanrs Mark I5 daled 23 92015. consequermy, tor me purpose L71 hmb (a), me Pxarnurr would have us show mal the De!endanl had not pm me Deienaanrs Mark to use m good term rrr Meleysra lov a period ohhree years «mm 25 9 20151:: 27.9.2018, and mamrere are no prcper reesuns for non-use omre Deiendanrs Mark dunng that perm run‘ 4 .r n W urP1v/vrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm9 Nuns Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used m mm r.. nr1mn.HIy mm: dun-mm VI] .nuNG Wm 79. Firstly. Exhibit u to the Plaintnrs Amdavit shows that. even though he Platrttttv alleges that It had used the nerne ‘Copper cltrrnnel/' t-rorrt the cdrnnrenoerrtent or operations when tt opened tts hrst restaurant in Bntrnbay tn tgvz, as at 147 mu the Platrmfl was operating only that solttary restaurant. which the documents refer to as ‘Copper Chimney WORLI‘ All of its other 24 restaurants operating under the copper chtnrney nante tn lrtdta Kzm‘ UAE (2). UK (I) and Kuwait tt), all at whteh use the Platntirrs Marks. were opened onwards trorrt 5 t2 me That date was when the Platntnvs seccnd restaurant opened‘ in Pune. In a The Platnttlrsrtrst copper Chimney outlets beyond the shores ol lndta opened only rn 2020 tn London. Dubat, and Kuwait That the Ftatntrft had only ventured outside ol India In 2020 wrtn ns copper chimney restaurant ts evidenced by the date tn Ekhtott :3 to the P|alnIlWs Amdaytt that trrternattorrel sales only started generating in 2o2o—2u2t so. secondly, Exhlbll u lo the vtatrtttlvs Amdayrt shows that, despite opening tts ltrst restaurant in 1972, the Ptatntrrt only began regrstenng the Platntttrs Mark tn 1987, with the ttrst regtstered in 631957. Even though lrorrt 1967 up to new the Plaintm has registered an trademarks in Indra that contatn the word “Conner Chimnefy as at 147.2014, only ts ol these had been registered. Even then, none or those trademarks were regtstered in class 43. not even the ones regtstered in 1957 The l=la n registered Mo ot the Plarntttrs Marks in class 4: tor the rtrst trrne only on ts.9 2ol7, which was over three years arflerlhe date the Delendanrs Mark was regtstered tn Melaysra tn class 43. and A5 years alter the Plaintlfl opened rts nrst restaurant’ laorrtoay in 1972 hp 11 ol .1 IN vtP1vIIIIK~1kA:Hs7Mh5xzntm§ «mt. s.rt.t n-nhnrwm be tr... M my r... oflmnetlly MVMI dnunvlnnl y.. eFluNG Wml an. Trwony, Exh n u1o1ne Pnainms Amdavrn anso snows nnan, eunsrae o1 lndna, as an 14 7 2014. 1ne Pnarnm had regnsnered me Pnarn1r11's Marks in UAE (2010), Kuwaln 12011), Ausnrana 12013) and one UK (2013). However‘ Exmbnl E no nne Pnarn1rn1°s Aflidavnl shuws 1rra1 |he firstohnslhrae resnanrams nn UAE1une olwnrcn dosed in.nuny 2022) and rns sone resnaurann in Kuwann opened onny nrl Augusn 2020‘ ns sane resnauram nn lhe UK opened rrn Ocmbsr 20201 and mere was no evndence on any Copper cnrrnney resnaurann naving eve( been opened rn Ausnranra unn1l naw Thns means 1ne1, desprne regrsrenng nnosa llademarks rn those oounnries. nnere was non-use on nna Pnarnnrrrs Marks in UAE Kuwarn and 1ne UK for an leasn a decade belore me Pnarnnm aanuanny opened nnosa res1auran1s and pm me Plannl s Marks no aenuan use And asthe Pnarnnmnas neweraamanny opened a copper Chnmney resnaurann nn Aushaliar nnera has been no acnuan use an an! of me Pnainmrs Marks dawn under Evnuenuy. muse sanre argumenns on nonarse rn Malaysia which one Pnainnm argues agarnsn nne Defendant wnuld appny no one Pnainnm in an 0! muse counnrres nn addmon. nne Plannlnfl also dnd non adduce any evndenca nnan me Plainlifis Marks had become wenn-known nraoernarks in those oounlrnes einner or even nn Indna 1or nna1 manner by me (nme the Devenoanrs Mark was regrs1erea rn Manaysna 52 Fonmhlyr nrn respecn of ma P|annmTs evndence on 11s anneged exoerrarnure rncurred nn pmmonmgr rnarkeung and advennsnng Ils copper Chimney rersrauranns nncludnng onlnne and nnrougn socran medna, aworerng no my cancunanrons, nna Pnainm spenn usseoesas 00 nor me years 20072023 However, only around 3% o1 man was spenn between 20074015 Thus, 91'-/. o1 nnar p... :2 M n rn urP1v/nIrK~1kA:>1s7>1n5xznrnw9 “None s.n.r nnvnhnrwm .. u... m my r... mn.u-1 mm: dun-mm vu .nune 0-man exnendlluve was ac|uaHy Incurred aner the DeIendan1‘s Mark was regrsIered 83 Fmhlyr In respeen at saIes generated, ExhIbII G lo we I=IaInmrs Affidaw/II sndws IhaL bemeen 2007-2015, we IoIaI generated sales was uss2a,9o2_349. wme me unaI generated saIes Ior 2007-2023 was uss7a,229,5o9 This means that aI Ieasl lwc—IhIrds of Its sales were generated aflar lhe Detendanrs Mark was rEgIsIered Even men, Exh4bI| u In one PIaIn|iff‘s Amdavn shows that In all‘ me I2Ia.nm nas regmered me I>IainIIIrs Marks in 14 o|hsrCIasses apan fmm crass 43(Ie.C|asses12,16,18,|9‘Z1,24.29‘30,3|,32. 33, 34, 39 and A2) and by 2014 me Plamlm had opened my one resIauranI In Bombay. There IS nu ewdenoe man those amrna were generaIed Iron: Ine PIaInhff‘s Bombay reslauranl aIone 34 As for bennq lealured In Ina mess and In magazines‘ me PIaInIIf1 adduced Iusl E fewarlmles in India (ram before 14 7 2014 and none (mm abmad 55. In respecx or awards, \he only award mat the PIaIrrmI adduced ewdence or from bevere 147.2014 was ‘Best Indran Cmsms Restaurant chem — NaIronaI for 2013" by FRANCHISE INDIA we can be seen from Exmbm F to me Plalnhifs Alfidavm There were no awards shown Ivorn between 1972 to 2013 Just as one swauow does nal a summer make, one award does not alone make a lrademalk weII-known »dgu1bu1 rn .rerwr»<qxa~;ra.sxzmme “Nair s.n.I In-vIhnrw\H .. LAIQ4 M my r... WWI-y mm: dun-mm VII aFIuNG perm 97 89. so The Mavmflaisodxd noladduoeany evidence Manhne review: (mm beicre 14.7 2014 The ms: was on 412 zmaa posled on Tnpadvrsor [mm someone In Mumbau lndxa The firs! review cf lhe Copper cmmnay restauram m Landon was m Ha/amwdguy, or a msm on 3.122020 Even then‘ In the latter, none 0' the (cod (hat was sampled was gwen a mung at over 7/10, and one was rated omy mo Further. mmngemam 0! \he Pxainms Marks was m the Bombay Hugh Coon [Commercial Dmsuonu, m 2015 me nniy suwessml prosecution L71 an action tor I also no|eIhal ms Plamlrff only secured me use nmwa dcmam name regwstrahon for “Copper cmmney in July 2022. Lasfly. the Plamuff did not adduue any ewdence 01 a survey having been carried out to Show that Ils Copper Chimney resnau-am or brand was weH—km:wn m Malaysia, In Aspucl Synuuy Sdn Bhd v Banyan rm Moldings Lm [mm 8 CLJ 97, me de!em1anl alleged lhal Ils mark was a we\|—known trademark In Malaysxa Aparl (mm fmdmg that the deiervdanl had «auaa |a es|abhsh «na« :15 mark fumed the crllena vorm well-known (mdemarks set om m regulatIcn13BaHhs Trade Marks Regulations 1997(1ha\vr.~s.nfome at me um). Ramvy An J sand ‘arm nas not pmauasa any ewdsnw orsurwy reports to show me extent anemgnman the BTHL‘s mark has In Malayan vagescavn IN wP1m/rxqknwsvnnsxzmmq «ma saw ...m.mm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VII mum v-vrm Them rs no recnrd a/ suwosdul wnlovwrwrvl omgnrs pmdmwd at and NHL provrds any mfnrmahon as In Me value asmaaled wrlh the am x mm am» than pvoalmmg some brochures and agvesmenls’ 91. Based on the Pnannws awn documenns and evidence, I find than me Pnannuw has failed \o auuuce any sumcnenn evndence (or nms Court In hold man any onrne Pnannms Marks were weI|—Known trademarks as an 14 7.2014. 92 Ccmsequernllyr as Ihe Pnammrs appnncannon no nnvahdale me nanarnaann s Mark under secnnen 47(3) raau wnm seclnon 24(3) ohhe Act and secnnons 76(3) and 7614) a! ma Act rnran requnra |he Pnanrnnm |a esnablnsh man one P|ain|iWs Marks were welldmawn Irademarks as an 14 7.2014 and me Plannlnll has faded Ia dn an, n find Iha| ma Pnannnnws auampn lo nrwahdale lhe nenenaarnrs Mark under «nae pmvnsnons oi the Acn nann 93 n ansa mane man, despnle bclh sacnnans 75(3) arm 75(4) an me Act snannng lhat the propnetov an a weH»Krnowr\ trademark ‘may apply to me com fol a dedaratnorn ol nnn/alndalnan of a rsgrstsrsd 1Jan1smark"n me Plannlnfl and non even apply lor man aacnarannan in me 05 Since nnosa provnsnans exprassny provide for such a aecnaraniun, 4 wound Lhnnk man specnfically appnymg for man has to be par (or one course nn order for the Courl no so order nllhe case had been made cm. 94. That new leaves the Court rnavmg no consider me Pnannmrs apphcalmn lo invahdale me nelendanrs Mark under secuons 4711) and 47(6) unne Am r... as av n m vnP1v/nIrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm9 “Nana sman n-vnhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my r... ar1mn.uIy mm: flan-mm VII .rnma v-man I v Hdalmn under seam 471 re w n n 95. semen 47(1) of me Act explessw provxdes: ‘The rwgrstmhon of kademavk may be declamd mvalrd by me Calm‘ upon In: nppbcalroll by an aggneved person on me gmund that the nademark was Isgrstwvdm bvuam olsemxwv 23 " 96 Sub-section (snap at s 23 lhal me Plamun vocused on m W5 Wnuen Sublmsswons provides that a Regwslrar shall reluse |o rag|s|er a Hademark: ‘um: use of m. Irsdnmuk rs like/yto aocsws Dr cause conlusoon m me pubm: or mnlmry In any wmlan law 97 The purpose and rauonale 0! ms pmvvsmn \s to pmnem me public The use ov a lmdemark Is likely to dsoewe or cause curvfusmn to the pm: M :1 \s xdenhcal mm or sv '|ar In a lvademark already used by analherlradsr,regan1\ess afwhemer or nollhe trademark ws used m Malay ' ea In Yong mm Hing (trading as Hong Kong Tmdlng Co.) A Anor u Wallon lnhurnational Ltd [2o121 5 ML! soc. zmm‘ c4 (Malaya) said As regards ms IVS! alconillsmn and Deoepban n .5 new wen served The deasran nlllre Nous: 0/ Lord: m we base uIBal¢ Trade Mark /1969] RPC :72 m mmpmnng 511 an m. ux ma. MuksAc! wmcn rs Bqmvamnl to our 5 units; of me As! is mg!-vy Irulmcuva Lam upprm ht/rim ma: can up 496 on the rest of/rhvlmnodaluunfilyon and .1.»-mum as mow: mama sm wPwvrK~1kA:Ms7Mn5xzmm§ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm wvmmnn mm 1917 Mrs rm: neceslsnlybe 5 queumarrm anddzgvze mevnrycasu /rvsnolneoo.ssrymm1e¢1o imdmax 5 max allends non-m..u.a.. 11m Drnva Ina! mm .5 an actual pmmmy or dlupkron /nmmg In pasmg M or u .44 u. mmnglmdnl aamn n .s wmcm vi 4». resulv cl In: regrlvihwv a! nu mm wut be that a numue. 0/perwn: ml be cam u mm wllamurtmoghl nor be the use that me Ma prmucts came Iran: the sum: samm - 99 m ‘ELEA" SpA v Fl-mmn sdn am: [20115] 3 MLJ 71:, Rsmn An J sad “The clomtnl clean/Imon anvymmu m mm was Dulangmg to Ma ummnr pvapnetwt mm srmvlar mark: are mmwrng in ms mm! market m we mum: of am. ‘mom wowd not as any mnrusmn bccause me applrcant has never um the mm mm m me wars: of bade m Ma/ayua - mo Given that. an me me me Defendant apphed kn mglsler me nevenaams Mark, |he Flamufl was orfly uperalmg vane Ieslauram nullel m Indu and had not opened any nufleis uu|sIde ol Vndla, and had not IcluaHy put |o use me Lrademarks u had regIs|en:d m UAE, Kuwait or Australia, I and that, even fllhe wendanc had used ma trademark In Malaysia upon wt bemg registered, lhal use would not likely deserve Of cause contusion to ma puhhc or mnlrary In any wnllen waw. wuc. oonsaquenuy, me Flalnmrs appucauon Ia mvahdale me Delendanfs Mark under sashon 41(nreamogemerwun s 2.‘l(5)(a) av me A51 vans. »...xmn sm wP1wvrK~1|A:Ms7Mn5xzmm§ mu. sum nmhnrwm .. u... m my u. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! In a! me Ad 102. Section 47(6) onne Am expressly provides ‘The revlxrralran of naemam may be aedamd mm: by the Court upon me applmalron by an aggneved usrson a Mo Regan on the ground ammm me mgrshatlon 0! that we mgvslranon was nhtumzd Dy rmareprusenlulym ~ 103 To suc4:essluHy mvoke W5 provwsvon‘ me Ma-nun womd have In ssvabfish man, an me me me navenaam apphed |o reg\s|er ma Da1endan|’s Mark m Malaysia, « przcllced a fraud or msrepreaemauon upon me Regislrar 104. In rm-o Enmprlu am: v Nauung chm [Inez] 4 on was‘ Mahadev Snankar said may Am: bl:-an ma ma that .: hen rsfsrmd :9 ya nolmsl me mm on Me for-vrvn manummmw ms M ma M ms Rvglslrpv and lhrwfih Me Ragrstvar on other mar; and Ma Malaysmn puma * 105. m nga Gajah Cho Hlnu Sdn Ehd V Maluperak npung Burns sun Bhd (199714 MLJ 5414. Kamalanalhan Ratnam JC expounded W! What ‘hand’ entailed He said ‘Coming to me rssue or ma mom ma: «mm as dated in s 37 5/ M: 7m 197:: must and ought to mflen ma mmary meamng asmbed .-a ,1 and merelove show comluct mvowmg dvshulvssty oi deception. by walk! .2. am at ormswon by word or need "gum: sm wPwvrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmma «ma saw ...m.mm a. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: flan-mm VII mum v-vrm me msmwwstymus: nu! be axswmed sa)e)yhyreas~nn a1 knwoeage of an umegrsieredmleresi I! rs ngnlm my mew lo we examms as to what may mnsmuts fraud by way a! I/Vusiranva hypctllctuxl condmons bocausa each an mm dspond 1/pomll own spectfic selollncts lam (nmfiod m m. waw Ina! Mold by mlymg o(Famy [Anal] Piy ua V ./R Alixundsrlu Sam‘ :0; Ply mums; 75 cm 491 when m M!/ram: 4 saw a: p as: Puma ma. ma wards al a yam: showd be gm mew nmvwr ynmmllrut mumng ma avvmary mommy at me mvoivu kirshmaflyaryuve mom culpability (aw Ru Avuryx mam; ma: msvafureemevyes Wm Uvexecasests me Lvyauflrsabannflhvza e/emuvts to mwosl wv uwabtnsmng ma mlesaecl an 32 aims ma mm For mm to samsu, mm mm be u; an bcluamucaptran Md mew. m dean/D. m In .uu.«mmy at pa-sac. my by m us a« down, It I3) ama: kmm/mtg: that run ad was cawlalld to mm on‘: ne:gvvhaur' ms. In “ELBA"SpA, supra, Ramlu AI: J adcpled Ihese same uuee critena for de|em\inIng whether tram has: been made am in lhalcase 107. Gwen man, at me lune me Defendam apphed to register me De(em1anI‘s Mark, me Marnufi was only opelalmg one restaurant nulls! VI India and had not opened any mmels ouvsxde D1|nd1a,and had um pm to actual use the Inademarks n nan regxsteted m me me. Kuwau and Ausuana, and was that me Plaunufls Marks were nol well—knawn uauemams, \ rm than mere was nn hand by me Defendant m the regwslrauon ol the Deiendanfs Mark In Malaysia, . ..saam am wF1wvrK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ «mm. sm.‘ nmhnrwm s. LAIQ4 w my a. mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! and lhal me regishalnon at me Defendanfs Mark in Malaysia ms not ubtained by mxsrepresenlalxun‘ an eimenhe Regvslmr or on the general public. Ccncms on 105 In conclusion. as the Pramms apphcauon lo mvaIIda|e me Delendanfs Mark lails on an nve pravnsxans of me Aci max n seeks In Invoke, |he Waxnliffs apphcauon lo Inva|Ida|e me Delendanrs Mark 15 dusnussed wv|h casts C4 Rolitf I order: sauna: and mad- 109 In prayer 1 name 05‘ me Plamtm saugm me rollowmg. ‘A Dedamlton ma! Ins P/arrmll rs me /aw mm and common Law owner ofme Irarlenlark ‘COPPER cmmusr and vts man: Iheveaf wnerz u .5 used m rs/alum to vts reslauranx basmess ' no. The Plawnlifl cannot be me Vega! owner 0! me “Copper Chimney“ trademark m Malaysxa because u was regxs|ersd by me Deiendant, and the provnsuons Ior revocalmn 0! me Defendants Mark do not have Dmvnsmns empowenng me Cour! to order n uansvenaa to the Plammf 111 As for common raw awnensmp ov a trademark, | us usuany dependent on much 01 me oompelmg pames was the nrst to use me d-spunea mark wllhln Malaysia. »....nau1 aw wP1v/vrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ «ma sm.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Lmlb h 11 Under hmb (D), the Plalnlrflwould have Ioshow thanhe use olgoods and services under the Devenaanrs Mark m Ma\aysxa had been suspended for an uninterrupted period of three years from at xeasc 26.7 2020 m 25 7 2023 and Ihal there are no wuper veasuns lor m:n—use or the neianaanrs Mark The wane: data or 25 7 2023 Is taken because me as was filed on 25.7 2023 12 Oomlng back to “aggrieved persan’ m samon am) of me Act dearly provides mm the some may nvdev revocation Ma regszerea trademark ”on the application 0/an aggrreved person", even before oonsudenng whether there has been non-use 94 the Delsndanrs Mark m Malaysia under erlher hmbs (a) or (b), me P|amhff as appIII:an| ws firs! and foremost required to eslabhsh that VI Is an aggrieved person M lhe P\am1ifffiii\slo do so, then me Issue at now use of |he De7erIdanI‘s Mark under ellherhmh forawlher period need not been conswdered. and the US would be dwsmxssed 13 Thus.|hethree1ssues(a be eansmerpd Inr lhe Mammrs applucanon to revoke the regusu-anon nllhe Defendants Mark a (1) wnemerme Plamm us an aggneved psrsun m relahun to me Defendant s Mark‘ (2) H so, whemerlhe P\am|ifl has esxabnsnad mms lame manna umenuam did not use the Dslendanfs Mark M Malaysia for goods In Class 43 for bom whose psneus umme prescnbed by both hmbs (a)and (D): and v... 5 av n m wP1mIrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ «ma Snr1n\nnnhnrw\HI>e LAIQ4 w may he nrW\nnH|:I mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 112. In Fszan/ddm brn Ibrahim, supra Abdw Malik lshak Jsaxdz ‘The new common law prmcvpb 75 Mrs ms nu: psrson Mm uses a numm 5/an appmpnale rype mmm a country become: the pmprretor ol the mark (R: Raymund Trado Mark Yanx’ ex 9 Amafigamalsd Tobacco carp Ltd 1:952; 52 cu: m .1 p 203, Thu:-dcmard Pvoducli Corp v Thnmdovbud Mann: Product: Pry Lid am; 131 cm 522 a: .2 son. Moovyars Tobacco Co uu ./mm Mam: uu (No 21119541 59 ALJR 77;: ;1 23) n rs sardmal a Demon who became: nmmeluvafa Irsdumarlr m Mrs way 5 emu/9:1 at wmrmwv law to restrain a person who my mmmer-mes to use the maaennarlr ~ 113. In Sy um zamaul H) ‘lamln Sdn Bhd 5. Ana: v Yong su Fun & Anal [2006] 5 Mu 232, Ramn AI: J said 1: ya mm law ma: Inc m: to us: a mark m Mnlnysm wank! pmvavl omemse u would 1334:)! m an armmaly in ma 1.», m ma ans: mu: m. first and orlgmal user rs warmed by a subsequenl user - 114. In Lim vaw sing v Humme nlernaliorlal spans 7 Leisure NS [1996] 3 Mu 7,Mana-12v Shankar sand: -mm mm /aw rs vary Ismtma/m many awed: So, u m/Vbe useful to keep m m: lwalronl ulowmmds may, however msiasiefu/n may be re: a nanny m one country In sfipmpvlalz the mark an. lutungrv um.’ who vs usmg mu mark m . Iovsngn munuy, mum is mmmg umuwnu undsllha mm mm Au ma /m . Muuyuun mu.’ :9 D-mnu (ha rvgmvrani nrwlratw of 5 Iarergn mark mu Ihr mm (Dvmgrv guarlspmvrdsd that me fvmyn mam has nu! been used at B//In Ma/awe - u... 4: M11 sm wP1wvrK~1|A:Ms7Mn5xzmm§ mu. sum nmhnrwm .. u... m mm u. mmnnuly mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 115, In Mesuma Spods‘ anarreterringm Fazarudd//7, SysrikelZsmanfH/ Tamm and Lrm Yaw Sing Azahar Mohamed FCJ said m paragraphs (4s]am1[47| onne Judgment: ‘mus. me weN—se!(Ied legal requisites nawssary luv the aeqmsmon of mmnnn law tvadsnrark rvghls over an mdrcatar and rdenhfie! rm I/we mmmervaemenl of My pasmg arr muse or aclmn has always been premised on a Iaclual reautrermmt mm. dtslmntvve use aime mdrcamr or rduvwm m a trademark sense m the cams: unm- 85 m wwld r-om mil he mo /51: run: a Inmumurk awn: m. lard trademark under common law and ma: sum mmmon raw av/nsrshrp would In mm enlrlle mm in II): by rraamm appocabon as a bone me apnlniam, purwanllv s25{1IoIAhe Tm V 116. As the Plarnm has not used a mark wrm “Conner ommney“ In Malaysxar It lherelme cannot be the common raw owner at n. Thrs rebel rs reduseu 117. In prayer 2 or me 05, lhe Plammi saugm the louowrrrg: ‘An Order ma! me Delsndanrs Ma/ayyan Yraflemark Rcgrsflslmn as slslcdbmaw mm bun onrsrad mm ma Regratsr or Trademarks wlumul salmnnlnnsm and/or wrongly Iomsmld .n ma Ragvstsb la) Trademark Regtnmlvovv No 2014007995 for “COPPER cmmvsv m Class 43 Wed on M or am (Imsrnsflar refined Iv as ms 'Deiendim’s Malaysian RegIsInIian')“ vzgeu .1 sm vrF1wVIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ “Nana smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mm-y mm: dnuumrrl VII .mm v-max 113 The wmds ‘snlsrsd mla [he Register 0:‘ Trademarks wnhaul sulfcfenl mason and/ov wmngly remained in me Reg/star’ are acwally a lhrvMzad< to me Trade Marks An. ms pnswoussy in lame and naw vepealed. taken «mm secuon aw Ks) onne pnnnous Tmde Marks Act, 1976, much provides “saclian 45. Rcctificatron oi Me nsgrmn m summ to me prawsrons 9/Ims Act- (a) the cam! may on ma nppflalllon m mu pl-ucnbsd marmar or any pnuun lggndvad by my nnnmufiron In or onnssmn fmm My Pogvstsl alsny my or by any enlry mnda m the Rsmster wrlhoul sulficnml cause or Dy any army wvongmfly ramarmw In me Wegrsver, or by any error or demo! rn any enzmn ms Regmer make wm Urdu farmakmg, emungmg or wlymg sum envy as yr mms nr‘ 119 Nevennuess, mesa wards are assouaued wnn the wrungvul mguslrahon or a hademark and an apphcalmn to invalidate man reguslralmn 129 As I had found that me Plannhffs apphcahon in Inva ate Ihe Devenaanrs Mark raneu‘ Lms rehei ws alsu refused. 121. In prayer 3 «:4 me Os, ma Plamm suugm me lullowlng ‘An Onier undcv sum 45(1}1aI & (on Seaman mu, (3) a pa; and / at Sacnon ma; A 14; findnmnnvs Act 2019 that m. Dslandcvvl‘: Ml/ayitan Remslmlrun DI ravokid, mvn/rdulcd and/on mnma born :9. ma. Mums mgysw‘ pm as .1 .1 sm wF1wvIK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ mm. s.nn nmhnrwm s. LAIQ4 w my me nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 122. As I had found meme P arrnm ma succeeded enry In Ms apphcalxon xa revoke me Deverruarrrs Mark under seeuerre as (1){a)&(b]aHne AI,1.nn\‘{lhs|Darl av prayer 3 of me os relating In reveeecron ofthe Delendanfs Mam Is aH0wefl 123. In prayer 4 It the 05. the P\ainlIW sough| me lollowmq ‘An Ovder for me Regrsver e/ Ymds Marks hum My/PO10 record ma revorznon I rnverrnenarr or the Defendant‘: Malaysian Rcgnslrahan vr me Regrstu at Trade Marks ' 124. As Ihe Flaxnlifl had succeeded in us appureenorr |o revoke lhe oevenaerrrs Mark undevsectlons 46 (1 pm a 1b)a1lhe Act, omy man pan 0! prayer 4 av lhe 05 In reueuorr In recording me revocevon or me Delendanfs Mark In the Register rs aHowed. 125 In pvzyer 4 0! me 05, me F\aInM sought an erdsv (or me Delendanl m pay n were. Under order 59 Ms 3 ol me Rules 01 Court, 2012‘ costs will usually follow me evenl (Le me successful parly Is awemea costs) except wnere 1: appears to me com me: rrr me mumsrances ol me case some oznev ads! shouldbe made as (0 me whole orenypan a/me costs." 125 In my vrevv. auneugh the Plamlwfl succeeded In making a use [or revoking me Defendant‘: Mark, mrs Is e case m vmrerr costs slmmd not lnllaw me even| The P\aInnWs Amdavrz and exmmcs (man ran to mree volumes) and as Wnllen sunmrsuons were devmed subslzrmafly H) vs caselcr anemplmg lo estabhsh that me Puemnre Marks are well-known lrademarks and «er Invahdalmg me vanuamn rrv vrP1v/\IrK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ “Nair s.n.r nnnhnrwm .. v... w my r... nflmnnflly em. dun-mm wn mum vwm uererruanrs Mark under «nose five provrsrons or the Act mar I mentioned samer. ll rarred rn that endeavor As such‘ m my vrew. |he Defendarn should run he ordered to pay me Flamlvff any cesrs 127 Acwldmgly. I made Ihe Iouowrng Orders 11) An Order under secuorr 46 (1 ua) A lb) olthe Trademarks AM, 21119 man the Deiendarrrs Trademark Regrsnrauurr Nu' 2014007985 lor- COPPER CI-IIl\’l1‘IEY be revoked lrom me Regrsner of Yrademarks kepl and mamlamed by the Regrsrrar or Traderrrams under me Trademarks Ad‘ 2019. 12) Thar upon service of |ms Order on me Regnslrar or Trademarks In accuaarree wrm Rsgulanarr 52 0! ma Trademarks Regulahuns, ma Registrar or Trademarks srrau reoara me revocauorr or ma Deverraanrs Trademark Regrsrrauarr No 2uuoo19a5 and mereafler cause such «act 0! ravocalrcn To be published rrr the Journal, (3) ‘Hum me P\amW‘s applncauon to |nvaIIda|e Iha Darenaanrs Trademark Regrsuauorr No 2n1Am79a5 underlhe prcvrsrms ol me Trademarks Acc, 2019 be dnsrrflssed, and (4; Tha| mere he no order as In oasis or this aclmn Page .5 ..r n ra vrP1v/vrK~1kA:Hs7Mr«5xzmm§ «ma sarm nnuhnrwm .. used m mm r.. mrmrr-y mm: dun-rurrl VII mum v-mar Dated me ml" day of January, 2024 Ian Sulaiman icial comfnlulomr K II Lumpur Hlgh Cour! counnn; Steven Check logelhev wim S00 An 0. (Messrs cnnstopner .4 Les Ong) for me F\aIn||W Falhma Ra] A/L Ramasamy (Messrs Famms Ra; Rsmasamy & Co.) «or me Daiandanl Llgl llnnz Trademarks MI, 2D19.ss:mons 311 p, 36(2).36(3)‘45(1|(a)arm1b),47[1|‘ (3). and (sy, and 7E13|and (4) Trade Marks Act 1976 secliun 45(1)(a) c 1 mama: Aspen Synergy Sdn Bhd v Banyan Tree Hmdmgs Lm [2009] 5 cu 97 has Pk: v Ansuns Herrenhaus KGBer1mev [2014] Lexis cnamun 2522 Cumin: Enlarpnses Lm v Twentieth Cenlury Fax Film Curparauun (Na 2) [2014] EWHC was (Ch) Dmmler AG v Sany Group Ca nu {zoos} All ER (D) 125 man‘ spA V Flamma Sdn Bhfl [2008] 3 MLJ 713 E—Tuyn G\oba\ scan-onery sun Ehd V Tcyn Vnk Sdn Ehd 5. Armor 12004) 7 cm 363 Fazaruamn mn uaramm v Pamson Corp sun am [1997] 4 MLJ JED mus .1. u m wP1mIrK~1kA:Ms7Mn5xzmm§ mm. snnnw n-nhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my n. nrW\nnU|Y mm: dun-mm wa mum pm Haw-O Emerpnse Bhd v Nguang Chan (19921 4 cm 1955 Just cranes GmbH a. Co KG v Josl cranes Sdn and [2910] 4 ML! 191 Lwn vew Sing v Humme\ Inzemauonax Spcrls 7 Leisure A15 [1995] 3 MLJ 7 Lxwayway markeung Corporallon v Osxm Group Public Co Lld [mm 5 cu 133 LB (Lian see) canrecuanery sun am: V om: us: [2012] 3 cm 661 MI:Laren Inxemamunal Ltd v. Lim Vat Mean [2009] 4 cu 749 Mesuma Spurls Sdn Bhd v Majhs Sukan Negars Malaysxa (201516 MLJ 435 Re Arnold D Pahusr In me Matter avnaae Mark Regxstralxon Na 3249 [1987] 2 MLJ 551 semee Pmnl Solutions SA v DHL lnlemallnnal GmbH syanxax Zamani H. Tamin Sdn End 9 Anovv Yong sze Fun 5. Anor [zone] 5 MLJ 262 we GaJah cno Hang Sdn Bhd v Majupevak Tepung Eeras sun and [1997] 4 MLJ 504 TCE Spons Sdn and v BuHzen span (Mzflaysxal [2923] 1 LNS 379 Trojan Recnrmngs Ltd v ARGO Ltd [2014] Lexus cmamon 3375 The Walt Disney company v Rasseu Fanuasy woms [zoos] Laxns c-«anon 3333 Yong Tang Hung (trading as Hang Knng Trading Co ; a. Anur v waunn lnlemalmnal Ltd [2012] 6 MLJ 609 me .1 m -1 m wP1mIIK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xznam§ mm. Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe 9... w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 13) It so‘ wnemer the Delendanl can Show that n did use the Defendanfs Mark m Malaysia «or bath oflhose penods onune forguods 4n Class 43, or pmvude proper reasons Var non-use. wngnhsr the Hamhff ws aggngm gy me Delsndan s Mark 14. In Fazaruddin bin Ibrahim u Parksun Corp Sdn B?-d[1W7| 4 MLJ aso, Abdul Mallk Ishak 4 expvessed the new [7151 any person whnse appllcalrcn |O rwwsier a trademark has been thwarled by the trademark n wishes to challenge would be aggneveu He sad: ‘The phmse ‘person aggnarwd‘ m s 45{1}(a7 or the Au Mould bu Donshved Ivboral/y In myjildqmenl, yr Includes nny pqrwn wnose awn appmnan rm Iegmrairon IS onsmmea by me opocsmg pany m the sail 15 rn an A-nola n Filmer In nu. mnnu u1Tv|do um Rnglnrnlnan In an [M7] 2 ML! sat the smgapona Hugh Conn held |ha( ms mare filmg cl an appucamn In rsg\s|er a trademark would no: make maunerwn an aggnmd person, and man [here musthe more cnan Sek Keong JC sal rn. ngrslraborv al a have mam n ma nnml of a pmpmlor, once eflecxed ought not m o. drsiurbed by person: who nm no nnang neeren In me good: concsmed n an applvcanl my recnfimlmvv nns no such nnmsz 10 mm mm, and merelnve cannot surfer any damage at an by me zxrsnmae or a mn/hctmg made mark an the rvgnslsl, n cannot bu r/QIII, In pvmaw: that In: me!-a Ming elm: apnrlcauon can mu/Irm- mnsmry hmu: mnm an Ina lppflcant /or lho purpose of mmnnq mzccsdmys u... 5 .1 sm mwrxqxnmnnsxznng “Nana s.nn n-nhnrwm n. LAIQ4 w my n. nnmnmy mm: mmn wa mnnc Wm! Omslwvse the Iss1 nfgnevance VvpoanUCL1rnPawv/75 TMl1S94) 11 RFC 7, IVBWIAC a wow be oompmely rm//med by Ieaomng to ma stmpie expedrency a/applymg to 7997519! me my mark the apphcalvl sucks to upunge 16 In mum. Int nllonll Ltd v. Llm van M u [zoov] 4 cu nu, Abdul Am Mahamnd FCJ reierved lo Fazsruddin bin nuamm and sad 1 person wlmsa epplncllron lav mgrsrrulrorv of ma rrndlmnrlx 1.: pooumrsud by 5 mm cannot, wvlhuul mom, quulrly aa . gonna aggneved because he muldbs a mom Dusyoady ’ 17. Relemng men to me passage m Re Amold D Pa/mar. Abdul Aznz Mohamed FCJ sad. ‘we understand malpassage as Vzyvngaown mepnncwe ma mam. aggnsvsd rs a persnn me has used his mark at a trade mark — or who has . garmme and pmssnl mtsrmun m use ms mark as . Irnds mam m ma couul ml: Lrndl Wm.» /5 ma same A: or amulnr la the Irma d! the mm, ollm rvgrsluud ma ma». that we ysrwn wants m haw rvmovsd rmm me name: ' 15. Then‘ m Momma spans Sdn and v. Mum sukan Ncgau Malay [2015] 6 uIL.I 465, Azahar Mohamed FCJ Hater CM (Ma\aya) concurred wnn and summed wha| Abdul Am Moharnad FCJ had said in McLeren Imemanonar, and men added. ‘ms persun muslbe soured»: who nussolm element 17/fiegal mletesl, rlglll at Mmlvnals wmaw. m us and mark mm a hung subxlnnllnlfy mama by ma presence of the mgvstsmd tmda mark rm mm: and mm must 1» legal at aw ‘ u... 1 M11 am wPwvIK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ mm. Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: flan-mm VII mum pm 19 Thus‘ an aggrieved person ‘s sumecne who has used his mark as a lrademark, or who has a genuine and plesem mlermon 10 use I115 mark as El trademark‘ in the course 0' a trade whvch vs the same as or swmllar lo the trade 01 the owner ol the registered (lademark that he wants to remove lwm |hs Regvsler. The person must also have a |ega\ and |ega\ mlerash nghl er Iegwlimale expeclalron H1 H5 vwn mark and that I! 15 subslarmally aflecled by the presence of the regxslered mark The next (ask Is In see whelherlhe P\a\nIiW its me brll. 20 The Fhaxnllff adduced evndenoe om-e trademarks n has used and regnslered m India, UK. Kuwait and UAE (eowacuvely, 'P|zmlr|T‘s Marks“), lhal it wants |u use lot the resLauranLslhahIwxsI1es In upen hers.WhaHI1ey cam look We us 59! ou| bebw, COPPER CHIMNEY’ COPPER . CH |.\INE\ (Zl)I‘l’|‘.R (1IlL\IXl'\' ‘#4 _ COPPER m CHIMNEY DC COPPER cIII.\IKn' mu... .1 IN wP1m/rK~1kA:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ "Nab! smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm SC COPPER CHlMN_Y 2n The Pnornun says men, because on the nenenoanns Mark nnen ns ragnslered nere, rn rs unepne no do so on presenn as man may conennnune nnlnngarmnl on me Delendarnrs Mark eno expose the Flannlnfl no hademark rnnnngemenn pmoeednngs. 22 rue neneno-nn eorrnenes nnen me pnernnnu ns non an aggrneveu person oeceuse n| has nor ecnnnenny useo nne Planrnlnffs Mlrks wnmn Malaysna For nms, me uenenaann renres on Lnweywey Mark 9 corpor ion v o-nnn Group Public co. up [2017] 5 cn..n 13:. 23. I oo npn agree wnnn nne Delsrndenrs oonnennion. Fnrsfly, rune vnerrmrn had enready opensd rns resneurenn In Malaysna usmg me Pnennnnre Marks, |hern nl would have exposed nlssll no Defendant‘: anneganrons on nreaerrum nnmngemenn Than rn rrsenn wound have deprived |hs Pnenrmn at me opporlumly no regard nnsenn as an aggrieved person Ind eoneeqnnerrnny me ahnh|y no even resonne s.45 onnne AM no eppry no revoke me uenenaonrs Mark. Tnen was men happened nn LB [Llnn an) confmnonery Sdn Blvd v QAF LId[2012]3 cu m r»... g M47 rn wP1v/n/rK~1kn:Hs7Mn5xzmm§ «me senen n-vnhnrwm re used m mm ms nrwnnnflly mm. dun-mm VII mn.nNG v-mxn 24 In that case. QAF was regrsrered as me pwpnelor 0! me trademark 'Sqmggles“um1er mass 30 However‘ Lran aea had been usmg mar rrrarx rrr Ma\aysia and had appwea lo expunge QAF's Mark, unders. 46(I}(b)o1\he Trade Marks AC1. 1976|hatwas men in force, OAF apposed Lian Bee‘s appncarrprr anegrng lhat. because Lran see was arready rrrrrrrrprng us trademark, n was not an aggrieved person and |haI. as an trvfringer nl m\eHecmal properly nghls. me Oourl shumd not assrsr il. Trre Federal Oourl heki mar, on me prrrreipxe of oons|ruc1Aon rrr bonam partem an rrrmrrger M a trademark could not be regarded as an aggrieved person hecauselhat would be contrary to me umemnpured princrple mar a person cannm berrem from their very own wrong pr urrrawmx aci ln paragraph [1 s] or me ruagrrrern. zulkenr CJ Malaya sara: ‘In accordance mu. the pnnuu/5 af cans1vuc1Iarv rn bonam pattern ms rmled mar the reamed rrarmge had round that the apperlant had been m/rmgmg me regrslered trademark ‘sqmggI9s' since 2907 me mgrxlzlafl trsdamark ‘squ/gglss‘ was mgulemd an 20 Augusi 2004 Umrl rls slnwladrvlanh mu mgrslorur! nmcmark rarrrarns . ragrsmud trademark /n me can mm mm In: app/rcltvun /or .xaar.ganer.r, rr» appsuanr had muawiu//y been usmg m. mlvrngmg mark kqww/H‘ winch rs can/usmgly srrmrar to the regrsremd lradamavk Ayptytrlg me prmupre M omvslmdron m borram parrsm me appeuarrr cannot be n:gLImtx1 as bemg a bona We ‘person aggrrewd‘ at a persm who Ix Iawiurvy aggrrma rar ms purpose: ol s 4A(1;(n; or the rm Furmalmaru, rm. lppuflanl rs to as regarded as . ‘person agglrzvad‘ fur mo pmpasls pr s 45mm 07 mo ma, :1 waard moan mu an rrrrrrrraer. may nmfly In cxpunge me vary memarr. may hum pm mmrrgmg and Mrs would be mnmsry lo the rrmempurea aware or not a/Iuwvng mm tuber-rem from merrvelyawn wronguun/av/fu7i:t' Pan re :4 -7 sm wFwvrK~1|A:Hs7Mn5xzmm9 “Nana sarm mmhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my r... mmrrnflly mm: dnuumnl y.. nF\uNG war

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

W-01(A)-255-05/2023

PERAYU LOH SIEW HONG RESPONDEN 1. ) PENDAFTAR MUALAF NEGERI PERLIS 2. ) MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT ISTIADAT MELAYU PERLIS 3. ) DATO' ARIF PERKASA DR. MOHD ASRI BIN ZAINUL ABIDIN (DISAMAN SEBAGAI MUFTI NEGERI PERLIS) 4. ) Kerajaan Negeri Perlis

Civil Appeal - A case of a father who had consented to convert his three minor children (a twin girls aged 11 and a boy aged 9) from the Hindu religion to the religion of Islam without the knowledge and consent of the childrens’ mother, the appellant herein - unilateral conversion - The appellant challenged the legality of the conversion – judicial review – High Court : Dismissed the appellant’s judicial review application with no order as to costs - The main complaints of the appellant against the decision of the High Court is the learned High Court Judge did not address the two pertinent issues in the judicial review proceedings. The two issues are: (i) Whether the unilateral conversion is lawful; (ii) Whether section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null and void; and (iii) Whether the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text – Court of Appeal held : (i) The respondents’ argument that the Malay translation of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text is a non-starter because the prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language has not been approved by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Until such prescription is approved, the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. Therefore, it is wrong for the respondents to say the decision of the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi on this issue is made per incuriam. It matters not whether there is a Malay version of the Federal Constitution but rather whether there is a prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language as the authoritative text. Since there is no prescription, the learned High Court Judge is correct in his decision to follow Indira Gandhi; (ii) We chose to follow Indira Gandhi because that is the latest case decided by the Federal Court. We also agree and adopt the reasonings advanced by the Court of Appeal in Pendaftar Mualaf’s in that the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi had analysed the various provisions of the law and the previous decided cases including Subashini in coming to its decision; that by the principle of stare decisis, the High Court and Court of Appeal are bound by Indira Gandhi’s case. Pursuant to Indira Gandhi, the law is settled in that consent of both parents are required for conversion of a minor children; (iii) Based on Article 4 of the Constitution, we held that section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with art.12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void; and (iv) The appeal is allowed. The decision of the High Court is set aside. The appellant’s judicial review application in prayer (a) to (i) is allowed with no order as to costs.

30/01/2024

YA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Hashim Bin HamzahYA Datuk Azhahari Kamal bin Ramli

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=33eae898-87ef-438a-820f-43e3a6473ac2&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CIVIL APPEAL NO.W-01(A)-255-05/2023 BETWEEN LOH SIEW HONG - APPELLANT AND 1. PENDAFTAR MUALAF PERLIS 2. MAJLIS AGAMA ISLAM DAN ADAT ISTIADAT MELAYU PERLIS 3. DATO’ ARIF PERKASA DR. MOHD ASRI BIN ZAINUL ABIDIN (DISAMAN SEBAGAI MUFTI NEGERI PERLIS) 4. KERAJAAN NEGERI PERLIS - RESPONDENTS [Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Bahagian Rayuan Dan Kuasa-Kuasa Khas Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman No.WA-25-169-03/2022 Dalam perkara status agama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran (Sijil Kelahiran No:CB 34247), Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran (Sijil Kelahiran No:CB34248) dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran (Sijil Kelahiran No:CN44327); 30/01/2024 10:01:06 W-01(A)-255-05/2023 Kand. 44 S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai permohonan semakan kehakiman untuk mendapatkan perintah-perintah bersifat deklarasi, certiorari, larangan dan mandamus; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 25(2), dibaca bersama perenggan 1 dalam Jadual, Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah 1 (1), Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 15 Kaedah 16, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen-seksyen 41, 42 dan 44(1) Akta Relif Spesifik 1950; S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Dan Dalam Perkara 3 Fasal (1), Perkara 4 Fasal (1), Perkara 11 Fasal (1) dan Perkara 12 Fasal (3) dan Fasal (4) Perlembagaan Persekutuan; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 117(b) Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam 2006; Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 7 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam (Pindaan) 2016. Antara Loh Siew Hong - Pemohon Dan 1. Pendaftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis 2. Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Perlis 3. Dato’ Arif Perkasa Dr. Mohd Asri bin Zainul Abidin (Disaman sebagai Mufti Negeri Perlis) S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 4. Kerajaan Negeri Perlis - Responden- Responden] CORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, JCA HASHIM BIN HAMZAH, JCA AZHAHARI KAMAL BIN RAMLI, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] This is a case of a father who had consented to convert his three minor children (a twin girls aged 11 and a boy aged 9) from the Hindu religion to the religion of Islam without the knowledge and consent of the childrens’ mother, namely Loh Siew Hong, the appellant herein. The unilateral conversion is not disputed by the respondents. [2] The appellant challenged the legality of the conversion. She contended that without her consent, her childrens’ conversion to Islam is null and void. She also contended that without her consent as the sole guardian of the children, the first respondent cannot issue certificates of conversion to her children; that the certificates are null and void and her children remain as Hindus. [3] The appellant then applied by way of Judicial Review Application at the Kuala Lumpur High Court, seeking for the following reliefs: S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (a) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran adalah penganut- penganut agama Hindu; (b) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa Nagahswaran a/l Muniandy tidak mempunyai keupayaan dari segi undang-undang untuk membenarkan responden pertama mendaftarkan Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran sebagai mualaf, tanpa keizinan pemohon; (c) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, sebagai kanak-kanak, tidak mempunyai keupayaan dari segi undang-undang untuk memeluk agama Islam, tanpa keizinan pemohon; (d) perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan Akuan-Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam bertarikh 7 Julai 2020 yang dikeluarkan oleh responden pertama atas nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran (Daftar No.JAIPs DAK.02 Fol 17/2020), Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran (Daftar No.JAIPs. DAK 02 Fol 18/2020) dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran (Daftar No.JAIPs DAK.02 Fol 16/2020); (e) perintah certiorari untuk membatalkan Kad-Kad Rasmi Memeluk Agama Islam atas nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, jika ia telah dikeluarkan oleh responden pertama atau mana-mana pihak lain, atau perintah larangan untuk menghalang responden pertama atau mana-mana pihak lain mengeluarkan Kad-Kad Rasmi Memeluk Agama Islam atas nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, jika ia masih belum dikeluarkan lagi; (f) perintah mandamus untuk mengarahkan responden pertama memadamkan atau membatalkan dalam Daftar Mualaf Negeri Perlis nama-nama Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, dan juga nama-nama Islam mereka iaitu Nur Sulochana binti Nagahswaran, Nur Sulochini binti Nagahswaran dan Muhammad Thatchina Moorthi bin Nagahswaran; (g) perintah larangan untuk menghalang responden ketiga, sama ada secara sendiri atau melalui mana-mana pegawai, pekerja atau agen Jabatan Mufti Negeri Perlis, membuat apa-apa kenyataan yang secara nyata atau tersirat boleh membawa maksud bahawa Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran dan Thatchina Moorthi ialah kanak-kanak mualaf atau kanak-kanak beragama Islam; (h) perintah deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa seksyen 117(b) Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam 2006, dalam versi Bahasa Malaysia dan Bahasa Inggeris, sepertimana yang dipinda oleh seksyen 7 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Islam (Pindaan) 2016, setakat mana memberi kuasa kepada responden pertama untuk mendaftarkan seorang kanak-kanak sebagai mualaf hanya dengan keizinan daripada ibu atau bapa kanak-kanak tersebut, walaupun kedua-dua mereka masih hidup adalah tidak berpelembagaan dan, oleh itu, adalah tidak sah dan batal, setakat itu; dan (i) perintah yang patut supaya responden ke-empat memberi kesan kepada semua perintah-perintah di atas. [4] On 11 May 2023, the learned High Court Judge dismissed the appellant’s judicial review application with no order as to costs. [5] Aggrieved with the decision of the High Court, the appellant appealed to this court. Facts of the case [6] The appellant and her former husband, Nagahswaran a/l Muniandy (Nagahswaran) were married under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 on 25.5.2008. The appellant was a Buddhist. Nagahswaran was a Hindu. [7] There were three children from the said marriage, as follows: (i) Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, born on 7.11.2008; (ii) Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran, born on 7.11.2008; and (iii) Tatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, born on 26.5.2011. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [8] The appellant was separated from her three children from 3.3.2019 until 21.2.2022 after she was beaten up and chased out of their matrimonial home by Nagahswaran. [9] On 13.12.2019, the appellant filed a divorce petition at the Kuala Lumpur High Court vide Divorce Petition No.WA-33-734-12/2019.In the divorce proceedings, each party was represented by a legal counsel. [10] On 7.1.2020, the appellant obtained an ad interim order from the Kuala Lumpur High Court for the sole guardianship, care and control of her three children. Despite having the full knowledge of the custody order issued by the High Court, Nagahswaran refused to hand over the children to the appellant. Her attempts to get back her children was unsuccessful. [11] A certificate of Decree Nisi made Absolute was issued on 22.9.2021. Vide a High Court Order dated 31.3.2021, the appellant was granted sole custody, care and control of all the three children. [12] Prior to the fact stated in para 11 above, on 7.7.2020, one Abdul Khadir, alleged to be an old friend of Nagahswaran brought Nagahswaran together with the three children to the office of Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam Negeri Perlis (JAIPS) because Nagahswaran wanted to convert to Islam along with the three children. When asked about the childrens’ mother, Nagahswaran told the second respondent that the appellant had left him 2 years prior to 7.7.2020 and he does not know where she is. This is a blatant lie by Nagahswaran because at the material time, the divorce proceedings was ongoing and he knew the whereabout of the appellant. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [13] Since section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 allows either the father or the mother of the minor’s to consent to the conversion, the second respondent was satisfied that the consent of Nagahswaran as the father fulfills the legal requirement for the second respondent to proceed with the conversion of the three children. [14] Thereafter, the second respondent alleged that Nagahswaran, along with the three children had, one after another, uttered the Islamic affirmation of faith in Arabic, followed by its meaning in Malay,” Aku menjadi saksi bahawa tiada Tuhan melainkan Allah dan aku menjadi saksi bahawa Nabi Muhammad SAW ialah Pesuruh Allah”. [15] Satisfied that Nagahswaran and the three children had fulfilled the Islamic principles for conversion into Islam, the Registrar of Mualafs (the first respondent) register their conversion to the Islamic faith in the prescribed Register of Mualafs, and thereafter issued their respective Certificate of Conversion into Islam (Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam as follows: (i) Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam Sulochana a/p Nagahswaran, No. Kad Pengenalan: 081107-02-0616, No.Daftar: JAIPs. DAK. 02 Fol. 17/2020 bertarikh 7.7.2020; (ii) Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam Sulochini a/p Nagahswaran, No. Kad Pengenalan: 081107-02-0616, No. Daftar: JAIPs. DAK 02 Fol .18/2020 bertarikh 7.7.2020; and S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (iii) Akuan Memeluk Agama Islam Tatchina Moorthi a/l Nagahswaran, No. Kad Pengenalan:110526-01-1239, No.Daftar: JAIPs. DAK.02 Fol.16/2020 bertarikh 7.7.2020. [16] When Nagahswaran was sentenced to imprisonment for a drug related offence from 13.11.2020 to 11.11.2022, the three children were placed in Islamic hostels by a Muslim preacher, one Nazirah Nanthakumari binti Abdullah, who at the material time acted as the de facto guardian of the three children. [17] To get back her children, the appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus at the Kuala Lumpur High Court vide Criminal Application No.WA-44-28-02/2022. Only when the High Court had issued a writ of habeas corpus on 21.2.2022, that the appellant was able to get the physical custody of her three children. At The High Court [18] The issues to be determined by the High Court are as follows: (i) Whether the unilateral conversion of the three children is lawful or constitutional. (ii) Whether the Bahasa Malaysia version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. (iii) Whether section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 which require S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 the consent of either the father or the mother is inconsistent with Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. [19] The learned High Court Judge held the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. Nevertheless, His Lordship dismissed the appellant’s application based on the following reasons: (i) The Certificates of Conversion issued by the first respondent to the three children are conclusive proof they were Muslim and the conversion to Islam is valid. In coming to that decision, His Lordship rely on the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah & Anor Appeal [2023] 2 CL J513. (ii) The three children continued professing the religion of Islam when they were in the appellant’s custody. His Lordship rely on the Federal Court decision in the case of Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 3 CL J 301. The Appeal [20] The main complaints of the appellant against the decision of the High Court is the learned High Court Judge did not address the two pertinent issues in the judicial review proceedings. The two issues are: (i) Whether the unilateral conversion is lawful; and S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 (ii) Whether section 117(b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional, null and void. [21] We noted that the respondents, in their written submission had submitted that the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text. To put matters at rest, we add the third issue as follow: (iii) Whether the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text. [22] We proposed to deal with the third issue first. Authoritative text [23] Before us, the respondents still maintain their position that the Federal Constitution in the national language is the authoritative text. [24] The English version of Article 12(3) and (4) of the Federal Constitution read as follows: “12. Right in respect of education (3) No person shall be required to receive instruction in or take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own. (4) For the purposes of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [25] The Bahasa Malaysia translation of Article 12 (4) in the national language reads as follows: “(4) Bagi maksud Fasal (3) agama seseorang yang di bawah umur lapan belas tahun hendaklah ditetapkan oleh ibu atau bapanya atau penjaganya.” [26] Article 160B of the English version of the Federal Constitution states: 160B. Authoritative text Where this Constitution has been translated into the national language, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may precribe such national language text to be authoritative, and thereafter if there is any conflict of disagreeing between such national language text and the English language text of this Constitution, the national language text shall prevail over the English language text. [27] In dealing with Article 160B, the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 3 CL J 145, Her Ladyship Zainun Ali (FCJ) said: “[147] In the present appeals, despite the learned State Legal Adviser’s reliance on art.160B, no evidence of the necessary prescription was adduced by either of the respondents. In the circumstances, we will proceed on the basis that the English version to be the authoritative text.” [28] Coming back to the present case. At the High Court, all the respondents argued that: S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “The Yang di-Pertuan Agong has launched the Malay version of the Federal Constitution on 29 September 2003, which according to Article 160B should be the authoritative text. According to Article 12 Clause (4) of the said Malay version, a minor’s religion shall be determined by his mother or father (ibu atau bapa). As such, the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Indira Gandhi Mutho invalidating the unilateral conversion of the minors to Islam, on the basis that there is no evidence of the existence of the said Malay version, is made per incuriam.” [29] In simple language, the respondents contended that the Malay version which require the consent of either the father or mother to convert a minor shall prevail over the English version. [30] The learned High Court Judge rightly reject the respondents’ argument and held the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text on the basis the prescription referred to in Art 160B of the Federal Constitution could not mean a mere physical presence of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in an official function and the translation is not an authoritative text of the national language. [31] We took note that the Malay translation had put a caveat in the following words: Teks ini HANYALAH TERJEMAHAN oleh Jabatan Peguam Negara bagi Federal Constitution. Melainkan jika dan sehingga ditetapkan sahih di bawah Perkara 160B Perlembagaan Persekutuan, teks ini bukan perundangan. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [32] We also took note of the speech of the former Attorney General of Malaysia at the Opening of the Legal Year 2023, wherein it was stated: “The Federal Constitution acts as our cornerstone in implementing the separation of powers. Therefore, for the year 2023, pursuant to Article 160A of the Federal Constitution, the AGC plans to reprint the Federal Constitution to incorporate the latest historic constitutional amendments. The AGC also plans to propose to the Government that the prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language to be the authoritative text in line with Article 160B of the Federal Constitution. These two plans are subject to the approval of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.” [33] Therefore, as day follow night, the respondents’ argument that the Malay translation of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text is a non starter because the prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language has not been approved by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. Until such prescription is approved, the English version of the Federal Constitution is the authoritative text. Therefore, it is wrong for the respondents to say the decision of the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi on this issue is made per incuriam. It matters not whether there is a Malay version of the Federal Constitution but rather whether there is a prescription of the Federal Constitution in the national language as the authoritative text. Since there is no prescription, the learned High Court Judge is correct in his decision to follow Indira Gandhi. Unilateral Conversion [34] In Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and Other Appeals [2018] 3 CL J 151, the appellant’s former husband S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 had converted their three minor children to the religion of Islam without the consent of the appellant. One of the issue for determination by the Federal Court is whether the mother and the father (if both are still surviving) of a child of a civil marriage must consent before a certificate of conversion to Islam could be issued in respect of that child. [35] In delivering the judgment of the court, Zainun Ali FCJ held: “[157] Conversion to another religion is a momentous decision affecting the life of a child, imposing on him a new and different set of personal laws. Where a decision of such significance as the conversion of a child is made, it is undoubtedly in the best interests of the child that the consent of both parents must be sought. The contrary approach of allowing the child to be converted on the consent of only one parent would give rise to practical conundrums. A purposive reading of art.12 (4) of the Federal Constitution that promotes the welfare of the child and is consistent with good sense would require the consent of both parents (if both are living) for the conversion of a minor. [161] Since custody of the children had been granted to the appellant, it was the appellant who exercised the dominant influence in their lives. To allow the other spouse to unilaterally convert the children without the appellant’s consent would amount to a serious interference with the lifestyle of the family. [175] Based on a purposive interpretation of art.12 (4) read with the Eleventh Schedule of the Federal Constitution, and on application of sections 5 and 11 of the GIA, it is concluded that the consent of both the appellant and her husband are required before a Certificate of Conversion to Islam can be issued in respect of the children.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [36] A recent case of unilateral conversion is Pendaftar Muallaf Wilayah Persekutuan v LCY & Ors And Another Appeal [2022] 2 MLRA 167. In that case, the mother had converted her two minor children to Islam without the consent of her husband. The custody, care and control of the two children was given to the husband. The husband applied for an Order of Certiorari to quash the conversion of religion of the children and the decision of the appellant in issuing the Certificate of Conversion to Islam. The High Court granted the husband’s application. The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. At the Court of Appeal, the appellant argued that Indira Gandhi’s case does not apply to all unilateral conversion cases and that the said case was decided per incuriam. [37] In dismissing the appellant’s appeal, His Lordship Nordin Hassan JCA (now FC J) said: “[28] The Federal Court in Indira Gandhi in answering a specific question of law, had considered the relevant facts and applied the law as can be seen from paras 142 until 181 of the grounds of judgment. All relevant statutory provisions and previous Federal Court decisions on the same issue including Subashini has been analysed and considered before the decision on the issue was decided. As such, the decision in Indira Gandhi that consent of both parents are required before the Certificate of Conversion to Islam can be issued, is in our view, the ratio decidendi of the case. [33] In the circumstances and based on the principles of stare decisis, the High Court and this Court are bound by the decision in Indira Gandhi.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [38] Relying on Indira Gandhi and Pendaftar Mualaf, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned High Court Judge had erred in law and in fact in not following these two cases when the facts in the present case is similar to those cases and the cases are binding on the High Court. [39] On the other hand, counsels for the respondents submitted that Indira Gandhi does not apply to every case of unilateral conversion; that Indira Gandhi was decided per incuriam; that this Court should follow Subashini’s case (which held consent from either father or mother is sufficient). In particular, the respondents’ stressed the point that the three children had uttered the Affirmation of Faith (dua kalimah syahadah) in Arabic before the first respondent. [40] We are not persuaded by the respondents’ argument. We chose to follow Indira Gandhi because that is the latest case decided by the Federal Court. We also agree and adopt the reasonings advanced by the Court of Appeal in Pendaftar Mualaf’s in that the Federal Court in Indira Gandhi had analysed the various provisions of the law and the previous decided cases including Subashini in coming to its decision; that by the principle of stare decisis, the High Court and Court of Appeal are bound by Indira Gandhi’s case. [41] We also took note that pursuant to Indira Gandhi, the law is settled in that consent of both parents are required for conversion of a minor children. In Rosliza binti Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 ML J 181, at p.184 para 4, Her Ladyship Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat (Chief Justice) held that based on the authority of Federal Court decision in Indira Gandhi, Ibrahim (father) had no right in law to unilaterally S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 convert Rosliza to the religion of Islam when she was a minor without Yap’s (the mother) consent. [42] In Chang Ah Mee v Jabatan Hal Ehwal Agama Islam, Majlis Ugama Islam Sabah & Ors [2003] 5 ML J 106, a two year old girl was converted to Islam by her father without the consent of the mother. The mother challenged the legality of the conversion. She sought for a declaration that her daughter’s conversion to Islam to be declared null and void. In interpreting Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution, the High Court Judge held: “The Constitution does not discriminate against the sexes and since the father and the mother have equal right over the person and property of an infant, the term ‘’parent” in art 12 (4) must necessary mean both the father and mother if both are living. To construe otherwise would mean depriving, for example, a mother of her right as a parent to choose the religion of the infant under art 12 (4), if the father alone decides on the religion to be followed by the infant. To allow just the father or the mother to choose the religion would invariably mean depriving the other of the constitutional right under art 12 (4).” [43] We entirely agree with the High Court in Chang Ah Mee in the interpretation of art 12 (4). [44] Apart from its binding effect on the lower courts, Indira Gandhi has established that: (a) Both the father and mother had equal right to decide on the religion of a minor child. This is the constitutional right of each S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 spouse under art.12 (4). So, consent must be obtained from both parents. (b) When custody, care and control of the children is given to the mother or father, the person who is entitled to the custodian has the right to decide all questions relating to the upbringing and education of the child including what religion the child should have. (c) Consent should have been obtained from the person who is entitled to the custodian of the child before a child is converted. If consent is not obtained, her constitutional right is violated and the conversion is null and void. [45] Coming back to the present case. We agree with the appellant’s submission that the facts of this case is similar to that of Indira Gandhi. Therefore, it is reasonable for the appellant to expect that the High Court would follow Indira Gandhi and allowed her application. [46] Unfortunately, the learned High Court Judge had disregarded Indira Gandhi. Instead, His Lordship rely on the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v Dahlia Dhaima Abdullah & Anor Appeal [2023] 2 CL J 513. Briefly, the facts in that case is as follows. The respondent was born in 1986 to non-Muslim parents. Her father was a Hindu. Her mother was a Buddhist. Following her parents’ separation in 1991, the respondent lived with her mother. The respondent’s mother visited Jabatan Agama Islam Malaysia (JAIS)/Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) to convert to Islam to marry a Muslim man. After the conversion, both mother and daughter, who was five years old S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 at the material time, were issued with conversion cards by JAIS. Based on the cards issued by JAIS on 28.8.1993, the respondent had been converted on 17.5.1991. This was done without the consent of the respondent’s father. [47] In 2013, the respondent, by then aged 27,filed a summons at the Syariah High Court against Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (MAIWP Summons) for a declaration that she was no longer a Muslim.She contends that she never professed the religion of Islam.The Syariah High Court dismissed the MAIWP summons. The respondent’s appeal to the Syariah Court of Appeal was also dismissed. [48] The respondent then commenced originating summons (OS) at the High Court against the appellants, seeking for a declaration that she was not a person professing the religion of Islam. The High Court allowed the OS and granted the declaration sought by the respondent on the ground inter alia that the conversion of the respondent, when she was a minor, was in contravention of s 147 of the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952. [49] Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal, in majority decision, allowed the appeal and held: (i) The Syariah High Court and Syariah Court of Appeal have already decided that the respondent is a Muslim. The OS is es judicata. The High Court was wrong in holding the respondent had never been a Muslim; and S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (ii) That a certificate of conversion to Islam is conclusive proof of the facts stated therein. [50] Based on the case of Dahlia Dhaima, the learned High Court Judge held that the certificate of conversions issued by the first respondent to the three children are conclusive proof they were Muslim and the conversion was valid. [51] Before us, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is wrong for the learned High Court Judge to refer and rely on Dahlia Dhaima’s on two grounds. First, that case does not deal with unilateral conversion. Second, a specific issue of whether consent from both parents are required before a certificate of conversion can be issued for conversion of a minor was not an issue in that case. We agree with the appellant’s submission on both grounds. The truth is the facts and issues in Dahlia Dhaima and the present case is totally different. Having relied on a wrong case, the learned High Court Judge had reached an erroneous decision in that the certificate of conversion is conclusive proof the children are Muslim when the act of issuing the certificates is challenged by the appellant. [52] The learned High Court Judge also relied on the case of Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 3 CL J 301. The issue in that case is whether Rosliza professes the religion of Islam. The Federal Court found Rosliza was raised in the Buddhist faith. [53] Applying Rosliza’s case, the learned High Court Judge held the three children continued professing the religion of Islam when they were in the appellant’s custody. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [54] Our first response is the facts and issue in Rosliza’s case is totally different from the present case. Thus, Rosliza case is not applicable. Again, we find the learned High Court Judge had failed to address his mind to the crucial issue on the consent of both parents. Whether the children continue professing the religion of Islam is not an issue the parties had asked the court to decide. [55] To conclude, we find there were four error of law and fact committed by the learned High Court Judge which warrant appellate’s intervention. First, he had failed to abide the principle of stare decisis when he failed to follow Indira Gandhi. Secondly, he relied on cases which had totally different facts and issues from the case before him. Third, he had not answered the issue raised by the parties i.e whether the unilateral conversion is lawful. Fourth, he made a wrong decision. Had he followed Indira Gandhi, he would have decided that without the consent of the appellant, Nagahswaran had no right to convert the three children to Islam and thus the unilateral conversion is unlawful. Unconstitutional Law [56] The second issue that the learned High Court Judge failed to answer is whether section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with Article 12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void. [57] The original section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam 2006 provides as follows: S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Keupayaan untuk memeluk agama Islam 117. Bagi maksud Bahagian ini, seseorang yang tidak beragama Islam boleh memeluk agama Islam jika dia sempurna akal: (a) sudah mencapai umur lapan belas tahun; atau (b) jika dia belum mencapai umur lapan belas tahun, ibu dan bapa atau penjaganya mengizinkan pemelukan agama Islam olehnya. [58] Following Subashini’s case which held that consent from either father or mother is sufficient to convert a minor, section 117(b) was amended by virtue of section 7 of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016. The new amended section 117(b) reads: Pindaan seksyen 117 7. Subseksyen 117(b) Enakmen ibu dipinda dalam teks Bahasa Malaysia dengan menggantikan perkataan “ibu dan bapa” dengan perkataan “ibu atau bapa”. [59] Since we have decided that the English version of the Federal Constitution to be the authoritative text, it is instructive to follow the Federal Court decision in Indira Gandhi which interpret Article 12 (4) as follows: “Since a literal construction of art.12 (4) would give rise to consequences which the legislative could not possibly have intended, the article should not be construed literally. A purposive reading of art.12 (4) that promotes the welfare of the child and is consistent with good sense would require the consent of both parents (if both are living) for the conversion of a minor child.” S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [60] Based on Indira Gandhi, the word “parent” in Article 12 (4) means both parent. Therefore, section 117(b) which used the singular word of “mother or father” is inconsistent with Article 12(4). [61] Article 4 of the Federal Constitution provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is void to the extent of the inconsistency. [62] Again, the learned High Court Judge failed to address his mind to this issue. This is an error of law that justify appellate intervention. Based on Article 4 of the Constitution, we held that section 117 (b) of the Perlis Administration of the Religion of Islam (Amendment) Enactment 2016 is inconsistent with art.12 (4) of the Federal Constitution and is therefore null and void. Our Decision [63] Based on the reasons mentioned above, we find there is merit in the appeal. The appeal is allowed. The decision of the High Court is set aside. Consequentially, we allow the appellant’s judicial review application in prayer (a) to (i) with no order as to costs. Dated: 22nd January 2024 - SGD - Hadhariah binti Syed Ismail Judge Court of Appeal S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 For the Appellant: Srimurugan Alagan, Gunamalar Joorindanjn, Dr. Shamsher Singh, Thind & Thian Yee Chin; Messrs Srimurugan & Co. For the 1st,3rd and 4th Respondents: Mohd Radhi bin Abas & Ainul Wardah binti Shahidan; State Legal Adviser Office, Perlis and Attorney General Chambers, Putrajaya. For the 2nd Respondent: Mohamed Haniff bin Khatri Abdulla, Aidil bin Khalid, Hariz bin Yusoff & Danial Farhan bin Zainul Rijal; Chambers of Zainul Rijal. S/N mOjqMHikOCD0Pjpkc6wg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22IP-53-09/2021

PLAINTIF 1. ) E & F ESSENTIAL SDN BHD 2. ) GREAT FEET BY FOOT EFX SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) HARMONY NETWORK PLT 2. ) KENT GOH KOOI CHONG 3. ) Chew Kwan Chuen 4. ) Lee Seok Ting 5. ) Chamcare Capital International Pte Ltd

Claim against Breach of contract and/or fiduciary duties; Tort of inducement to breach of contract; Breach of confidence; Defamation, Passing off; Copyright infringement - claim dismissed with costs.

30/01/2024

YA Tuan Azlan bin Sulaiman

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30/01/2024 09:04:45 WA-22IP-53-09/2021 Kand. 224 S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RJLdv5HpfEiroK5DcnQMtQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the 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Tika 2.6.0

JA-63ES-12-03/2019

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa RayaORANG KENA SAMANP TECH RESOURCES SDN BHD

Pengakuan Salah bagi kesalahan dibawah peraturan peraturan kualiti alam sekeliling (udara bersih)- rayuan mitigasi dan hujahan pemberatan - tafsir tujuan akta digubal merupakan faktor kepentingan awam

29/01/2024

Dato' Che Wan Zaidi Bin Che Wan Ibrahim

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=48a26508-ebe8-4760-964c-965464f7d154&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA KES NO: JA-63ES-12-03/2019, JA-63ES-13-03/2019, JA-63ES-14-03/2019, JA-63ES-15-03/2019, JA-63ES-16-03/2019, JA-63ES-17-03/2019, JA-63ES-18-03/2019 DAN JA-63ES-19-03/2019 PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN P TECH RESOURCES SDN BHD [NO SYARIKAT: 1241183-X] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN [1] Ini adalah rayuan silang oleh Pihak Pendakwaan dan juga Pihak Pembelaan terhadap keputusan yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah pada 30.11.2023. Pihak Pendakwaan telah memfailkan Notis Rayuan bertarikh 04.12.2023 dan Pihak Pembelaan pula telah memfailkan notis rayuan bertarikh 11.12.2023. Kedua – dua rayuan tersebut adalah terhadap keputusan hukuman sahaja. 29/01/2024 16:00:51 JA-63ES-12-03/2019 Kand. 125 S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 PERTUDUHAN [2] Orang Kena Saman (OKS) dan 3 orang Pengarah Syarikat OKS pada awalnya telah dituduh dengan 60 pertuduhan di dalam kes JA- 63ES-12 hingga 71-03/2019. Namun, Pihak Pendakwaan telah menarik balik 52 pertuduhan di dalam kes JA-63ES-20 hingga 71- 03/2019 ke atas OKS dan juga 3 orang Pengarah Syarikat OKS dan hanya meneruskan 8 pertuduhan pindaan di dalam 8 kes yang berasingan iaitu JA-63ES-12 hingga 19-03/2019 ke atas OKS sahaja. Pertuduhan-pertuduhan pindaan tersebut adalah seperti lampiran B1 iaitu di bawah Peraturan 7(3), 7(4), 9(a), 9(b), 10(1), 16(1) dan Peraturan 29 Peraturan – Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014 Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 (Akta 127) dibaca bersama Peraturan 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c), Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, di bawah Peraturan yang sama dan pertuduhan adalah seperti berikut: i) Kes JA-63ES-12-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat di, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113, Jalan Nibong 2Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal mengemukakan pemberitahuan bertulis kepada Ketua Pengarah tidak kurang daripada tiga puluh (30) hari sebelum kerja di premis yang terletak di PLO 113, Jalan Nibong 2, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat dimulakan yang S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 boleh mewujudkan satu punca pengeluaran. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29 Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014 Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 [Akta 127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 5(1)(b), Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama." Hukuman: Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua-duanya. ii) Kes JA-63ES-13-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat diP Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113, Jalan Nibong 2 Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah membina premis yang mewujudkan satu punca pengeluaran yang baru tanpa memberi pemberitahuan bertulis kepada Ketua Pengarah tidak kurang daripada tiga puluh hari (30) hari sebelum pembinaan premis itu. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29. Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersin) 2014 Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 [Akta 127] dibaca S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 bersama Peraturan 5(1)(c) Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama. Hukuman: Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua-duanya. iii) Kes JA-63ES-14-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat di, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113, Jalan Nibong 2, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal mengendalikan dan menyelenggarakan sistem kawalan pencemaran udara mengikut amalan kejuruteraan yang menyeluruh dan memastikan bahawa semua komponen sistem kawalan pencemaran udara berfungsi dengan baik. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 (Akta 127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 7(3) Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama. S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Hukuman: Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua – duanya. iv) Kes JA-63ES-15-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, PTech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2018 jam lah kurang 12.18 tengahari bertempat di P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113, Jalan Nibong 2 Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, d Daerah Johor Bahru, dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal memastikan sistem kawalan pencemaran udara diselia oleh orang yang berwibawa yang bertugas sepanjang masa sistem kawalan pencemaran udara beroperasi. Oleh itu, kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29 Peraturan - Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih 2014 Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 Akta [127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 7(4), Peraturan yang sama” Hukuman “Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua – duanya. S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 v) Kes JA-63ES-16-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat di P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113 Jalan Nibong 2, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal melengkapkan premis dengan kelengkapan atau peralatan yang berkaitan bagi menjalankan pemantauan prestasi sistem kawalan pencemaran udara. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29 Peraturan- Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 [Akta 127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 9(a) Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama. Hukuman “Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua – duanya. vi) Kes JA-63ES-17-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat di P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113 Jalan Nibong 2, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal menjalankan pemantauan prestasi bagi komponen sistem kawalan pencemaran udara sebagaimana yamg ditentukan oleh Ketua Pengarah. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29 Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 [Akta 127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 9(b) Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama. Hukuman “Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua – duanya. vii) Kes JA-63ES-18-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat di P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113 Jalan Nibong 2, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal menyenggarakan rekod bagi proses pengilangan, dan bagi penyengaraan dan pemantauan prestasi bagi sistem kawalan pencemaran udara sebagaimana yamg ditentukan oleh S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Ketua Pengarah. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29 Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 [Akta 127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 10(1) Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama. Hukuman “Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua – duanya. viii) Kes JA-63ES-19-03/2019 “Bahawa kamu, P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd (1241183-X) pada 11 Mac 2019, jam lebih kurang 12.15 tengahari, bertempat di P Tech Resources Sdn Bhd terletak di PLO 113 Jalan Nibong 2, Kawasan Perindustrian Tanjung Langsat, 81700 Pasir Gudang, Johor, di dalam Daerah Johor Bahru, di dalam Negeri Johor Darul Takzim didapati telah gagal menjalankan pemantauan berkala yang dikehendaki di bawah Jadual (l)1, bagi bahanapi jenis cecair. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah Peraturan 29 Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 [Akta 127] dibaca bersama Peraturan 16(1) Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, Peraturan yang sama. S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Hukuman “Boleh didenda tidak melebihi RM 100,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Ribu) atau dipenjarakan selama tempoh tidak lebih daripada 2 tahun atau kedua – duanya. [3] Pada 24.3.2019, kesemua kes telah dipanggil secara bersama dan Pihak Pendakwaan telah mengemukakan izin untuk mendakwa dan surat kuasa seperti dilampiran A-C, A1 dan B dan kesemua pertuduhan dan hukuman di dalam 60 kes tersebut telah dibacakan dan diterangkan kepada OKS dalam Bahasa Malaysia dan juga Bahasa Inggeris. Kesemua OKS memahami pertuduhan dan faham sifat dan akibat pengakuan dan memilih untuk minta bicara pada tarikh tersebut dan kes seterusnya ditetapkan untuk beberapa tarikh sebutan dan juga perbicaraan penuh. Setiap OKS juga telah diberi jaminan sebanyak RM141,000 dengan 1 penjamin warganegara Malaysia dan OKS dikehendaki melapor diri di balai polis terdekat sekali sebulan. [4] Setelah perbicaraan penuh berlangsung sehingga saksi pendakwaan yang ke 37, pada tarikh pengurusan kes 30.11.2023, Pihak Pendakwaan telah memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa ada perkembangan terkini dalam kes ini. Berdasarkan keputusan representasi, Pihak Pendakwaan ingin menarik balik 52 pertuduhan di dalam kes JA-63ES-20 hingga 71-03/2019 ke atas OKS dan juga 3 orang pengarah syarikat OKS dan hanya meneruskan 8 pertuduhan pindaan di dalam 8 kes yang berasingan iaitu JA-63ES- 12 hingga 19-03/2019 ke atas OKS sahaja. S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [5] Kesemua pertuduhan dan hukuman di dalam 8 kes tersebut telah dibacakan dan diterangkan sekali lagi kepada pengarah syarikat yang mewakili OKS iaitu Yap Yoke Liang (No. KP: 770812-01-6261) dalam Bahasa Malaysia. OKS memahami pertuduhan dan faham sifat dan akibat pengakuan serta hukuman dan memilih untuk mengaku salah ke atas kesemua pertuduhan tersebut. [6] Pada mulanya, OKS telah memfailkan borang 28A iaitu permohonan akuan rundingan di bawah seksyen 172C Kanun Tatacara Jenayah namun, permohonan tersebut telah ditarik balik kerana masalah teknikal di dalam permohonan yang dimasukkan. Mahkamah telah membatalkan permohonan tersebut dan meneruskan dengan prosiding pengakuan salah di bawah seksyen 173(b) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [7] Seterusnya, Pihak Pendakwaan mengemukakan eksibit-eksibit seperti berikut : (i) fakta kes pindaan yang ditanda sebagai eksibit P57, (ii) semua eksibit yang dikemukan sebelum ini dalam perbicaraan yang ditanda sebagai eksibit P1 hingga P155 [8] OKS memahami fakta kes tersebut serta mengakuinya tanpa syarat. OKS juga mengakui kesemua eksibit-eksibit P1 hingga P155 tersebut. S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [9] Mahkamah telah berpuas hati bahawa tertuduh faham akan sifat, akibat dan kesan pengakuannya serta hukuman ke atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan tersebut dan kemudiannya menerima pengakuan salah OKS. Mahkamah seterusnya mendapati OKS bersalah dan disabitkan dengan setiap pertuduhan di dalam kes JA- 63ES-12 hingga 19-03/2019. [10] Di dalam rayuan mitigasi untuk meringankan hukuman, peguambela OKS secara ringkasnya telah memaklumkan bahawa OKS telah mengaku salah sebaik sahaja pertuduhan pindaan dikemukakan kepada OKS. Pohon Mahkamah mengambil kira pengakuan salah tersebut. [11] OKS juga telah membuat rundingan dengan Jabatan Alam Sekitar (JAS) sejak 2018 dan berdasarkan eksibit P98 dimana JAS telah mengakui teknik yang diamalkan oleh OKS adalah “best available technic” dalam industri pemprosesan tayar. OKS juga memaklumkan bahawa 8 pertuduhan ini bukan melibatkan kesalahan pencemaran tapi hanyalah kesalahan melibatkan “administrative offence”. Selepas kes ini bermula, OKS telah mengambil tindakan untuk mematuhi setiap arahan dan SOP yang ditetapkan oleh JAS seperti surat di eksibit P133 dan juga surat - surat lain yang disertakan. Laporan EIA yang dihantar juga menunjukkan ianya diluluskan. [12] OKS juga memaklumkan bahawa semenjak tindakan ini diambil, pihak JAS telah menyita semua reaktor mulai dari tarikh tersebut S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 sehingga September 2022 dan hanya selepas itu, perintah sitaan dibuka. Akibat daripada sitaan tersebut, OKS tidak dapat beroperasi untuk tempoh 3 tahun setengah dan juga pandemic covid-19 telah menyebabkan OKS mengalami kerugian dan juga OKS telah terpaksa untuk membayar kos sewa premis kilang dalam tempoh tersebut. [13] Dalam mengambil kira hukuman denda yang ingin dikenakan oleh Mahkamah, OKS telah merujuk kepada kes lain yang dilaporkan di dalam Utusan Malaysia dan Berita Harian Online bertarikh 2 April 2021 yang bertajuk “Kilang proses premix bitumen didenda RM100,000” dan “Kilang di denda RM100,000 keluar habuk tanpa kawalan”. OKS menghujahkan bahawa kes tersebut menunjukkan bahawa Mahkamah Sesyen Klang hanya menjatuhkan hukuman denda RM100,000.00 untuk kesemua 4 pertuduhan yang sama seperti dalam kes OKS hari ini. Dalam kontek yang sama, OKS juga merujuk Mahkamah kepada kes Abdullah Ang v PP, dimana Mahkamah telah menetapkan prinsip undang-undang yang diterima bahawa diskaun 1/3 daripada jumlah hukuman perlu diberikan sekiranya OKS mengaku salah kepada pertuduhan yang dikenakan. Akhirnya, OKS memohon agar hukuman denda yang dikenakan ke atas OKS adalah seperti yang dihujahkan. [14] Seterusnya, Pihak Pendakwaan dalam hujahan pemberatan pula secara ringkasnya telah mengemukakan beberapa otoriti kes untuk rujukan Mahkamah sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman ke atas OKS. Pihak pendakwaan memohon agar hukuman denda maksimum dan berbentuk deteren dikenakan ke atas OKS. OKS telah mendapat S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 penjimatan yang banyak iaitu sebanyak RM70,000 dari denda maksimum yang boleh dikenakan disebabkan beberapa pertuduhan telah ditarik balik selepas representasi dibenarkan. [15] Pihak pembelaan juga memohon untuk suatu hukuman yang mencerminkan kepentingan awam dijaga berbanding kepentingan OKS berdasarkan kes R v Ball dan kes -kes yang lain. Pihak Pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa isu alam sekitar adalah suatu perkara yang tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa ianya adalah suatu perkara yang melibatkan kepentingan awam. [16] Dalam hal ini, Pihak Pembelaan telah merujuk kepada kes PP lwn NCK Aluminium Extrusion Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 MLJ 96 yang telah menimbangkan kepentingan awam dalam menjatuhkan hukuman denda di dalam kes yang melibatkan pencemaran alam sekitar. Pihak pembelaan menghujahkan bahawa Mahkamah hendaklah memberi hukuman yang memberikan pengajaran kepada OKS dan juga bagi mengelakkan orang lain untuk melakukan kesalahan yang sama. Pencemaran yang berlaku akan menyebabkan “liberty of life” terjejas seperti yang dinyatakan didalam kes tersebut. [17] Seterusnya, berdasarkan kes yang sama telah memutuskan bahawa tujuan Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 ini digubal adalah bertujuan untuk mencegah dan mengawal pencemaran. Oleh itu, kesalahan yang melibatkan isu alam sekitar adalah suatu kesalahan yang dianggap serius. Hukuman ke atas kesalahan alam sekitar juga telah dipinda dan dinaikkan kepada hukuman yang lebih tinggi S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 dari denda RM5,000.00 ke RM10,000.00 dan penjara dari 1 tahun ke 2 tahun untuk menunjukkan kesalahan ini adalah kesalahan serius. [18] Bagi memastikan dasar alam sekitar negara disokong, Mahkamah perlu memainkan peranan untuk memberikan hukuman yang tinggi. Kes ini adalah suatu kes perbicaraan penuh dan banyak kos telah dibelanjakan dalam menjalankan kes ini. Pihak pendakwaan memohon agar Mahkamah mengambil kira insiden pencemaran Sungai Kim-Kim pada tahun 2019 yang telah memberi kesan kepada orang awam setempat dan memohon untuk Mahkamah juga mengambil kira kesan pencemaran udara yang berlaku. Akhirnya, Pihak pembelaan memohon agar satu hukuman denda maksimum dikenakan ke atas OKS. PENEMUAN DAN KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH [19] Dalam menentukan apakah bentuk hukuman bersesuaian terhadap OKS, Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kepada suatu prinsip yang dinyatakan secara jelas dalam kes PP v Jafa bin Daud (1981) 1 MLJ 315 seperti berikut: “…. sentence according to law, means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section but it also be assessed and passed accordance with established judicial priciples….” S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [20] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada kes R V BALL [1951] 35 CR. APP. R 164 yang mengariskan prinsip asas untuk menjatuhkan sesuatu hukuman iaitu: “In deciding the appropriate sentence a Court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is public enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deters others who might be tempted to try crime and seeming to offer easy money on the supposition that, if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leave it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe.” S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [21] Hukuman yang hendak dikenakan terhadap OKS mestilah setimpal dengan kesalahan dilakukan, “seriousness” kesalahan dan tahap penglibatan pesalah – pesalah itu sendiri. Prinsip ini telah digariskan di dalam kes R V. Ipeelee (2012) 1SCR433: “…. proportionality… is not just a sanction. First, the principles ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence… it promotes justice for the victim and ensures public confidence in the system of justice. Secondly, the principles of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriates, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender….” [22] Justeru itu, dalam menentukan suatu hukuman yang setimpal adalah menjadi tugas Mahkamah ini untuk memberikan pertimbangan yang sewajarnya kepada faktor – faktor “aggravating” dan “mitigating” sebelum sesuatu hukuman tersebut diputuskan. Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes Yusmarin Samsuddin v PP (1999) CLJ 391, Mahkamah menegaskan seperti berikut: “…the principles of sentencing have long been entranched and well settle in our criminal law jurisprudence and the court seized with such jurisdiction is empowered to take into account the following consideration : a. the extend and seriousness of the offence committed; S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 b. the guilty person’s antecendents and c. the public interest [23] Hukuman yang diperuntukkan bagi pertuduhan yang dikenakan ke atas OKS adalah di bawah Peraturan 7(3), 7(4), 9(a), 9(b), 10(1), 16(1) dan Peraturan 29 Peraturan – Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014 Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 (Akta 127) dibaca bersama Peraturan 5(1)(b), 5(1)(c), Peraturan yang sama dan boleh dihukum di bawah Peraturan 29, di bawah Peraturan yang sama iaitu denda sehingga RM100,000 atau penjara sehingga 2 tahun atau kedua-duanya. [24] Mahkamah telah menimbangkan prinsip undang – undang di atas dan fakta kes dan eksibit-eksibit yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dan rayuan mitigasi tertuduh serta hujahan pemberatan yang diberikan oleh Pihak Pendakwaan dan mendapati bahawa hukuman yang diberikan adalah bersesuaian dan adil di dalam lingkungan hukuman yang diperuntukkan dikenakan ke atas OKS di atas faktor-faktor berikut: (a) Kepentingan Awam. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pertuduhan yang dikenakan ke atas OKS adalah suatu pertuduhan yang melibatkan kesalahan pentadbiran dibawah Peraturan – Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974. Pada hemah Mahkamah, walaupun peruntukkan kesalahan ini adalah S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 suatu kesalahan pentadbiran tetapi ianya adalah suatu peruntukkan penting untuk memastikan tujuan akta tersebut iaitu untuk mencegah, menghapus, mengawal pencemaran dan membaiki alam sekeliling dan bagi maksud-maksud yang berkaitan dengannya. Peruntukkan kesalahan ini adalah untuk mencegah sesuatu pencemaran dari berlaku di masa hadapan dan isu alam sekitar ini adalah suatu isu yang melibatkan kepentingan awam. Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes PP lwn NCK Aluminium Extrusion Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 MLJ 96, YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “Saya menyimpulkan apa yang perlu diberi pertimbangan sewajarnya dalam kesalahan seperti ini ialah kepentingan awam. Dalam kes Joiginder Sing v PP [1984] 2 MLJ 133, Ajaib Singh H berkata (di ms140): On the question of sentence, the courts invariably take certain factors into consideration, the first and foremost being the public interest. Then, the age of the offender, his health, his character and background, the nature of the offence and the circumstances and the manner in which the offence is committed. The courts are duty bound to consider all these matters before deciding upon a suitable sentence. On an appeal on sentence from the subordinate courts therefore the High Court wull not interfere with the sentence imposed unless it can be shown to its satisfaction that in the circumstances of the particular case, the sentence was manisfestly excessive or inadequate, or that in fixing the sentence, the subordinate court had failed to adequately consider all relevant factors either for or against the offender.” S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 (b) Fakta Kes dan Jenis Kesalahan Selain daripada faktor kepentingan awam yang perlu diutamakan, Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan faktor-faktor lain yang ada termasuk faktor mitigasi dan juga faktor pemberatan. Berdasarkan fakta kes pindaan seperti eksibit P157, OKS telah menjalankan aktiviti pirolisis tayar terpakai melibatkan proses-proses utama iaitu pembakaran bahan api (combustion), pyrolysis, pemeluwapan (condensation) dan pemisahan minyak (oil separator) bagi menghasilkan “pyrolysis oil, carbon ash dan steel wire”. Proses- proses ini akan menghasilkan pencemaran udara sekiranya tidak dijaga mengikut sop yang ditetapkan oleh pihak JAS dan kilang perlu mempunyai alat kawalan pencemaran udara yang dibenarkan oleh Ketua Pengarah JAS. Semasa pemeriksaan dibuat dipremis, OKS telah didapati telah mengoperasikan alat pembakaran bahan api iaitu 8 pyrolisis reactor dan OKS juga mempunyai alat kawalan pencemaran udara iaitu 4 unit scrubber, 2 unit cyclone dan 1 unit cerobong tanpa mengemukakan pemberitahuan bertulis kepada Ketua Pengarah JAS terlebih dahulu sebelum memulakan operasi. OKS juga didapati telah gagal menyelenggara dan mengendalikan sistem kawalan udara tersebut dengan baik dan gagal menempatkan orang yang berwibawa untuk memastikan sistem kawalan pencemaran udara tersebut befungsi dengan baik. Selain itu, OKS juga telah gagal melengkapkan peralatan yang berkaitan bagi menjalankan pemantauan prestasi kepada alat-alat kawalan pencemaran udara S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 tersebut dan gagal mengemukakan rekod pemantauan prestasi alat kawalan pencemaran udara dan kualiti bahan api jenis cecair yang digunakan apabila diminta. Mahkamah telah melihat kepada fakta kes dan mendapati bahawa 8 pertuduhan yang dikenakan ke atas OKS adalah suatu kesalahan yang berbentuk kesalahan pentadbiran. Pada takat ini, tiada kes pencemaran alam sekitar melibatkan udara telah dibuktikan dan telah dilakukan oleh OKS hasil daripada pengoperasian kilang OKS dalam industri pyrolisis tayar. Fakta kes juga menunjukkan bahawa OKS telah mempunyai sistem alat kawalan pencemaran udara di premis OKS. Namun, Mahkamah mengakui bahawa peraturan- peraturan yang ditetapkan dibawah Peraturan-Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara Bersih) 2014, Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974 ini adalah penting untuk dilaksanakan bagi menjaga kepentingan awam dan mengelakkan insiden pencemaran alam sekitar berlaku di masa hadapan. Mahkamah berpendapat satu hukuman yang seimbang dan sewajarnya perlu dikenakan untuk memenuhi tujuan AKAS 1974 digubal iaitu untuk mencegah dan mengawal pencemaran alam sekitar. (c) Latarbelakang dan Perlakuan OKS : Sebelum menjatuhkan sesuatu hukuman, adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah ini mempunyai pengetahuan dan menimbangkan tentang latarbelakang dan perlakuan OKS “to strike a balance between the interest of the public and interest of the OKT” sepertimana yang diputuskan di dalam kes PP V MOHD FUAD S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [2001] 5 MLJ 549. Terdapat beberapa faktor untuk menetapkan sesuatu hukuman. Semestinya Mahkamah ini mesti mengimbangkan antara faktor mitigasi dan juga faktor pemberatan. Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes PP V LOH OI LIN [1949] MLJ 120, yang telah menyatakan; “that there are factors such as prevalence, difficulty of detection and injury to public revenue which operate in the direction of severity and others such as leniency to first offenders which operate in the other direction and where as frequently happens a number of these factors applied in one case. The court must balance them as best as it can. Among the factors more commonly advanced are age, antecedence, family hardship, conduct subsequent to the offence, impact of conviction, health, and delay in disposal of cases.” Secara am, antecedent OKS adalah satu faktor mitigasi tetapi Mahkamah harus mengimbangi dengan the nature of the crime committed by the OKT where it required the dare, the dash and the defiance of the OKT in its commission seperti yang digariskan di dalam kes PP V TEH AH CHENG [1976] 2 MLJ 186. Di dalam kes ini, OKS adalah sebuah syarikat sdn bhd yang menjalankan perniagaan dan aktiviti pirolisis tayar terpakai. Hasil S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 proses tersebut akan menghasilkan “pyrolisis oil, carbon ash dan steel wire” dan bahan-bahan tersebut akan dijual kepada pasaran dalam dan luar negara. Mahkamah telah menimbangkan rayuan mitigasi OKS dan juga menilai perlakuan OKS sebelum dan selepas pertuduhan dikenakan. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa OKS telah membuat rundingan dengan JAS mengenai perniagaan yang dijalankan sejak tahun 2018. Bahkan, Pihak JAS juga telah memperakui bahawa perniagaan dan teknik pemprosesan tayar yang dijalankan oleh OKS adalah “best available technic” seperti yang dinyatakan dalam surat JAS di eksibit P98. Mahkamah juga telah mendapati bahawa setelah pertuduhan dikenakan, OKS telah memberi kerjasama dan mengambil tindakan untuk mematuhi arahan dan SOP JAS seperti disurat eksibit P133 dan surat-surat lain yang berkaitan. Ini jelas dapat dilihat daripada laporan EIA yang dihantar oleh OKS juga telah diluluskan. Mahkamah mendapati OKS juga telah menerima pengajaran akibat kesalahan ini dan terpaksa menanggung kerugian yang besar kerana tidak dapat menjalankan perniagaan untuk tempoh yang panjang akibat akibat peralatan yang telah disita oleh JAS dan tempoh pandemik covid 19. OKS pada awalnya juga telah dituduh bersama 4 orang yang lain untuk kesalahan pencemaran Sungai Kim Kim dibawah seksyen 34B(4) Akta Kualiti Alam Sekeliling 1974. Walaubagaimanapun, pertuduhan ke atas OKS dan juga 3 pengarah Syarikat OKS tersebut telah ditarik balik dan OKS telah dilepaskan dan dibebaskan dari pertuduhan tersebut. Dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa OKS tidak lagi dapat dikaitkan S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 dengan mana-mana kesalahan kes pencemaran Sungai Kim Kim tersebut dan hujahan bahawa OKS adalah pelaku pencemaran Sungai Kim Kim adalah tidak lagi relevan dan terpakai. Sesuatu keputusan keadilan tidak boleh dilaksanakan berdasarkan “virality” dan pada hemah Mahkamah, sekiranya sesuatu keadilan itu ditetapkan atas dasar “virality”, maka ianya adalah suatu keadilan yang tersasar. Maksud keadilan yang sebenar adalah untuk meletakkan sesuatu perkara itu pada tempatnya. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ingin menegaskan bahawa adalah menjadi tugas Mahkamah sebagai penjaga dan benteng terakhir keadilan untuk menetapkan keadilan dan hukuman yang bersesuaian berdasarkan fakta dan merit sesuatu kes tersebut. Namun begitu, Mahkamah juga perlu lebih menimbangkan kepentingan awam berbanding kepentingan OKS. Walaupun OKS telah memiliki sistem alat kawalan pencemaran udara sendiri tetapi OKS telah gagal memaklumkan, menyenggarakan dan menempatkan orang yang berwibawa untuk memantau prestasi alatan dan kualiti bahan api yang digunakan dalam pengoperasian kilang OKS. Perbuatan OKS yang tidak mematuhi peraturan- peraturan yang ditetapkan dibawah JAS boleh menyebabkan berlakunya pencemaran udara di masa hadapan sekiranya alat-alat kawalan pencemaran udara yang dimiliki oleh OKS gagal berfungsi dan diselia dengan baik. Mahkamah percaya, satu hukuman yang tinggi dan sewajarnya perlu diberikan bertujuan melindungi kepentingan awam daripada ancaman pencemaran alam sekitar yang mungkin berlaku akibat perbuatan OKS dan pemain industri yang lain di masa hadapan. S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 (d) Pengakuan Salah OKS : Kes telah berlangsung untuk perbicaraan penuh sehingga saksi pendakwaan yang ke 37. Walaubagaimanapun, OKS telah mengaku salah sebaik sahaja pertuduhan pindaan dikemukakan kepada OKS selepas keputusan representasi diperolehi. Pengakuan salah tersebut sedikit sebanyak telah menjimatkan masa dan kos Mahkamah serta Pendakwaan. Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes PP V JESICCA LIM LU PING & ANOR [2004] 2 CLJ 763 dimana Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “It is customary for the court to give the convict a reduced sentence for pleading guilty. The court recognizes that a plea of guilty disposes of a criminal case with lightning speed; it eases the backlog of undisposed criminal cases and unclogs the courts and prison of remand-prisoners. A reduced sentence for pleading guilty encourages the accused to be honest in admitting to the offence he has committed. A discount of between one quarter and one third of the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed is usually given.” Namun, Mahkamah perlu memberi pertimbangan yang sewajarnya bagi faktor mitigasi ini setelah mengimbangkan dengan jenis kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh OKS dan mendapati bahawa kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh OKS adalah suatu kesalahan yang S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 melibatkan kepentingan awam dan bertujuan untuk mencegah dan mengawal pencemaran alam sekitar. Dalam keadaan ini, OKS tidak seharusnya diberikan pengurangan hukuman yang terlalu ringan dan sewajarnya dikenakan hukuman berbentuk deteren untuk memberi pengajaran kepada OKS dan pemain industri yang lain agar tidak mengulangi kesalahan yang sama. (e)Kuantum dan Tren Hukuman : Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada kes MOHAMED ABDULLAH ANG SWEE KANG V PP [1988] 167. Mahkamah telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: "In assessing the length of custodial sentence, the court must look at the overall picture in perspective by considering, firstly the gravity of the type of offense committed. Secondly, the facts in the commission of the offense, thirdly the presence or absence of mitigating factors, and, fourthly, the sentences that have been imposed in the past for similar offenses to determine the trend of sentencing policy, if any. The fact that a sentence of imprisonment is imposed as a deterrent does not justify the sentence in passing a sentence of greater length than what the facts of the offense warrant. The gravity of the type of offense involved must be considered in the light of the particular facts of the offense." S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada hukuman yang diperuntukkan sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman tersebut terhadap OKS. Mahkamah percaya hukuman tersebut adalah ‘proportionate and reasonable, within the Court’s jurisdiction and the financial positon of the OKS was also considered’ sepertimana yang digariskan di dalam kes CHAN SIT HOONG V PP [1975]1MLJ 261. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah telah mengambil kira faktor hukuman mengikut peruntukan undang-undang, keseriusan dan jenis kesalahan, imbangan kepentingan awam dan kepentingan OKS, pengakuan salah OKS, latarbelakang OKS, mitigasi OKS dan rayuan balas pihak Pendakwaan sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman tersebut. Mahkamah telah merujuk kepada tren hukuman semasa bagi kes-kes alam sekitar yang melibatkan kesalahan pencemaran dan pelepasan effluen perindustrian dan mengaku salah adalah antara RM30,000 hingga RM90,000.00 bagi setiap pertuduhan. Manakala, bagi pengakuan salah dalam kesalahan melibatkan “administrative offence” dibawah Peraturan Kualiti Alam Sekeliling (Udara bersih) 2014 pula antara RM10,000.00 hingga RM25,000.00 bagi setiap pertuduhan. Tren hukuman tersebut boleh dilihat di jadual yang disertakan dibawah seperti berikut: TREN DENDA BAGI KESALAHAN DI BAWAH PERATURAN 11 &12, PERATURAN-PERATURAN KUALITI ALAM SEKELILING (EFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN) 2009 BIL NAMA PREMIS NO KES TARIKH HUKUMAN SEKSYEN / PERATURAN MAHKAMAH SESYEN JUMLAH DENDA(RM) 1 GUAN CHONG COCOA SDN BHD JA-63ES- 60- 07/2022 28.8.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 80,000.00 S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 2 EVYAP SABUN MALAYSIA SDN BHD JA-63ES- 53- 07/2022 29.8.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 50,000.00 3 THIAM HOCK FOOD INDUSTRIES SDN BHD JB-63ES- 1-04/2022 6.9.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN MUAR 30,000.00 4 5E RESOURCES SDN BHD JA-63ES- 15- 04/2022 7.9.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 80,000.00 5 IFFCO (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD JA-63ES- 69- 09/2022 4.10.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 40,000.00 6 EG REFINERY SDN BHD JA-63ES- 67- 09/2022 4.10.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 80,000.00 7 URC SNACK FOOD SDN BHD JA-63ES- 83- 10/2022 4.10.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 60,000.00 8 PACIFIC OILS & FATS INDUSTRIES SDN BHD JA-63ES- 79- 09/2022 13.10.2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 45,000.00 9 FOOD EXCELLENCE SPECIALIST SDN BHD JA-63ES- 87- 11/2022 12/12/2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 90,000.00 10 KISWIRE CORD SDN BHD JA-63ES- 35- 06/2022 19/12/2022 PER 11 & 12, EFFLUEN PERINDUSTRIAN JOHOR BAHRU 90,000.00 TREN DENDA BAGI KESALAHAN DI BAWAH PERATURAN-PERATURAN KUALITI ALAM SEKELILING (UDARA BERSIH) 2014 BIL NAMA PREMIS NO KES TARIKH HUKUMAN SEKSYEN / PERATURAN MAHKAMAH SESYEN JUMLAH DENDA(RM) 1 QUAN CHENG ENVIRONMENT INITIATIVES SDN BHD JA-63ES- 10- 07/2020, JA-63ES- 11- 07/2020 & JA- 63ES-17- 07/2020 18.10.2022 PER. 5(1) PPKAS (UB) 2014 JOHOR BAHRU 12,000.00 PER. 7(3) PPKAS (UB) 2014 12,000.00 PER. 7(4) PPKAS (UB) 2014 12,000.00 PER. 9(a) PPKAS (UB) 2014 12,000.00 PER. 9(b) PPKAS (UB) 2014 12,000.00 PER. 10(1) PPKAS (UB) 2014 10,000.00 PER. 16(1) PPKAS (UB) 2014 10,000.00 PER. 18(1) PPKAS (UB) 2014 10,000.00 S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 2 GMY RUBBER TYRE RECYCLE SDN BHD JA-63ES- 41- 07/2022 & JA- 63ES-42- 07/2022 28.8.2023 PER. 7(3) PPKAS (UB) 2014 JOHOR BAHRU 20,000.00 PER. 7(4) PPKAS (UB) 2014 20,000.00 PER. 9(a) PPKAS (UB) 2014 20,000.00 PER. 9(b) PPKAS (UB) 2014 15,000.00 PER. 10(1) PPKAS (UB) 2014 15,000.00 PER. 16(1) PPKAS (UB) 2014 15,000.00 3 MODERN TIMBER PRODUCTS SDN BHD JC-63ES- 5- 02/2023 5.9.2023 PER. 5(1)(b) PPKAS (UB) 2014 BATU PAHAT 20,000.00 4 WAH CENS HARDWARE SDN BHD JD-63ES- 8- 01/2023 10.12.2023 PER. 5(1)(c) PPKAS (UB) 2014 SEGAMAT 25,000.00 5 SRITAMA INDUSTRIES SDN BHD BK- 63ES-12- 9/2021 15.4.2022 PER. 5(1) PPKAS (UB) 2015 SEPANG 10,000.00 Pada hemah Mahkamah, jumlah denda yang dikenakan ke atas OKS bagi setiap pertuduhan tersebut adalah memadai, adil dan munasabah setelah mengambil kira kesemua faktor yang ada termasuk faktor mitigasi OKS, hujahan pemberatan pihak pendakwaan, imbangan kepentingan awam dan OKS, fakta kes serta jenis kesalahan yang dilakukan serta tren hukuman semasa bagi jenis kesalahan yang sama. [25] Oleh itu berpandukan kepada kesemua prinsip-prinsip hukuman yang telah dinyatakan, Mahkamah mendapati OKS bersalah dan disabitkan dengan pertuduhan yang telah dihadapkan terhadapnya dan menjatuhkan hukuman ke atas OKS dengan hukuman denda S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 RM40,000.00 bagi setiap pertuduhan dan jumlah keseluruhan denda ialah RM320,000.00 bagi 8 pertuduhan. Bertarikh : 23 Januari 2024 -------------chewanzaidi--------- [DATO’ CHE WAN ZAIDI BIN CHE WAN IBRAHIM] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah (4) Johor Bahru, Johor. Pihak Pendakwaan diwakili Abdul Ghafar bin Ab Latif, Nurul Syafiqah binti Sha’ari, Sharifah Natasha binti Syed Ahmad dan Siti Hasyimah binti Sahari Pihak Pembelaan diwakili Subramaniam a/l Govindan Nair dan Selvanteran V. segaran S/N CGWiSOjrYEeWTJZUZPfRVA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24-12-02/2023

PEMOHON 1. ) RICHARD YEOH 2. ) RAYMAOND YEOH 3. ) ALEX YEOH RESPONDEN 1. ) Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara, Malaysia 2. ) Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Dalam Negeri 3. ) Kerajaan Malaysia

Originating Summons (OS) - A Declaration that the Plaintiffs are Malaysian citizens by operation of law under Article 14(1)(b) Sections 1(a) and 1(e) Part II of the 2nd Schedule of the Federal Constitution.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=77ea237b-46cd-4304-ad02-711e38c869f4&Inline=true

29/01/2024 17:08:46 WA-24-12-02/2023 Kand. 23 S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eyPqd81GBEOtAnEeOMhp9A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—24—12—o2/2023 Kand. 23 29/01/2n2L rvzaa-as mum mnxmm nuscu MALAVA on xunxu LUIAPUR mum wnuvm nznszxumm KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA xaunmuu KUASA-KIJISA may smm psuuu ND yggc ozmza Da\am Femam Amkel-Amke\ 1mm Jamal Knsdua Penemnaqaan Persekmuan Mahyswa‘ Dan Dmam Penna Akla Pandaflaran Neqars ma nan Paraturan smqap Penman- Pemlman Pendzflaran Negara1990. Dun ma Rehl5pesWvk 1950 Dan Dmam ream Alumn-Mnvan 1. 1: dan 76 Kaedah~Kaedah Mimcamah 2012 Auum momma vEa1-1 (sun Kuvanlran Nu. mm. AL mm 2 RAVMADND vzan {sun K mm. Mn. many as am) : ALEX vsun (sun xmmm. No. Dallzrfllwsl XA) mm"; budlk mlndukwl m um. mm.-n van», wakll lmgasmyn] PLAlNTIF»PLAINYlF p... 2 m .- sm -yfiumneazotnnznomnpia mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! mu 1. KEWA rzmmuu wzunzurunau uzcuu. vnuwsun 2. KETUA szmusnu KEMENTERIAN mxwa NEGERI :. xsnunm nuuwsu ...n:rsunm-nzrsunm Judgment Introduction 1. The F\a1nlIf1s med an apnhcanon by way of Onginalmg Summons ms) dated 10 2 21:23 (Enclosure 1) seeking mler alla the following Ordars — 1.1. A dsclaralmn met me 1-‘, 2"“ and 3” P\ain|Ifls are Malaysuan 'izens1r1 accordance wnn Amcle I4(1)(b)read(ogs1her wun secnon 1(a| Pan In. Second Schedme, Federa\Cons|1luucn of Malaysia (FC): 1 2 A dedarallon man we 15‘ 2*’ and 3'“ P\ain|xfls are Ma|ays1an cmzens In accardanoe with Amcxe 141I)(b| read rogamer wrm secnan Hal Pan H. Second Schedme, Fe, 1 3 An order that the De4em1an|s Issueme 1", 2"“ and 3"‘ P\amufls amn Oemficales Iha| states man we 1>', 2"-1 and 3* Plarnms are Malaysian ciuzens within fourteen (14; days lmm the date av me coun Ordel. 1 4 An order Ihal |he Devenaanxs Issue to the 1*‘ 2"’ and 3"’ marnmos an menmcauan card (MyKid) slaflng man me 1% 2"’ and 3” Wannhfls are Mamyman cmzens wuhvn 1our1eer1 (14) days (mm me dale anne coun Orden 1 5 An oraarman me 1- Delandanl regulars and updales ms 11*, 2""ar1d 3'“ Plaintiffs’ namaslolhe Reglslry as smpmated under Sechon A at the Nations! Regusuahan Act 1959 and inn 1 gr :4 sm -yPuna1GaEu1AnEuoMnpIA .~.» “Nana 5.11.1 nmhnrwm .. med m W10} 1... nr1g\n|HIy .1111. dnuumnl VI mum p-ma! 33 2 VI >5 sulficnenl (or the Plannlrfis Io pmve matlheydnd not acqunre cnlnzernshlp of any country wnnnnn 1 year 01 men nnnn pursuant (D Sechon 2(3) 0! the Samnd Schedule 57 me FC :54 on me facts on nna case the Pnannnms submnl man the Pnannnms have never aaqunrsd any nurangn cnuzsnshnp snnee nnnn By ragnslenng ma Pnannnrvs as a -nun-cm’zen“ an nne P\anrnN‘fs' snnn cernmeane, lhe Ddendants have Iherelore depnved me Pnannnms oflhenv Manaysnan cmzernshnp Tney nave enecnweny caused me Pnannurns no he snaneness. wnncn vs contrary no me imermon and nne sum! of me FC. 35 I am on me mew nnan rn mlerpneung secnnon 1(e) on Fan In an nna saddnd Schedule of the Fc, nne Pnannnnvs misnrnlerpreted and ngrnored nne requnremernl of ‘not born a cmzen on any country“ nn Seclnan 1(a) wnnan reqmres Ihe evndence nl nnneage as esnannnsnad by decided case law. as In ns my vnew nr-an nne Planmnfls are an nnnegnnunane person an me Inme o1 bmn and snnse me Pnannms bnonogncal manner ns an Indenesna nannonamy, nne Plannlnfls hneage could only be nnaoaanle to me amnognean mother who vs an lndunesnarn cmxen. 37 In is he be nonea man aeqmsnnan an cnizenshnp by operauon on law under Annc1eI4|1j(b)o!nhe FC read mgelherwnlh S:cH0r\1(e), Pan In, Second Schedule of me FC ns anenorad on both eonoepns at nus sch and jus sangmnns Thns 15 based on me coun an Appea\‘s decnsnons Llm Jon Hllan 5 Mar y. Konuu Pnnglrlln Jlblnn Pandaruran Megan a. Or; [2017] 3 CL! 412;mn71 e unnnuuzs: 12013) 6 ML! 54:. Anzvn Amcla urnxon Mme Fedeal Ccnllxlumn ammpmlatulha rsflulmrmmt ul cmzenshnn mus sun 1 e by me pnaee or Dunn, whlle par: He) ofnn nn. Soconfi Sch-duln Mun mm: Cmnlmulimn [not how: . nlllnn of any eaumryy entzpsullln ma nvumnmenl 01 clllxnenshlp by nus nngulnll n.- by nnood nr nnnug. nun mm‘ n wanna apvell man Ina secornfl appennann wnulfl rnnd in 5:11:91 am on. mqulnmums 01 nus tall and jun nnwuinii in wduvwtulfll Km leualrements of an money and 5 He) an pan nn. Sccmnni smduna ohm Fldlul nernpnasns added) me 1: am sm -yfiqdaneazotnnznsmnvn .~.» “Nana sanan ...n..mn a. med w my .. annn.ny MIN: dnmmmn VI .nu~a v-man 35 Based on Amme 1A(1)(b| onne FC read «ogemen-nun Section 1(2). Pan II, Second Schedule onne Fe, m Is clear max (ora person to be a Mimyixan cmzen by uperauen ollaw pursusnuo mesa prowsions. ms reqmsme quahficalions to be Mfifled are‘ . The person was born on or aner Mamyswa day‘ » The person was born wmmn me Fedemuon, and m The person was nul burn a cmxen af any murury 39 ms com 45 at me mew mat the xmru quahficauon ‘.8. ms perm was not mm a cmzen olany councry encapsmales me requirement 01 ]us sangmms, It refers to ma delermmatmn or me pevson's nnaaga, lhal ws, me relahanshvp 0! ma person In ms blmoglcal parents at me nn-e olhls bnrlh ms us based on me Cour!olAppeal's decwsxons In the Iouowmg cases r Than sum sang a Anur V4 Kulua Punnlnh Jalnun Pendaluran mgara u. on [2011] 5 MLJ 662: [2017] 9 CLJ 1s:[zu17)a MLRA 35¢ “[27; me mnlenhuus Issue Is m respea or me requnemem of 5... man n u otlhu sncond Snmduu nun. mera: consmunan, :4 uxnrnud by me phrase. ‘win: Is no! born . emun 01 any counlry‘ Fur - purnncl nl ml: mum an. manna: mm m umrrnan. are sum: allu- [351 04 para 1(2) ‘was ml born a cilinn nl Iny cnunln/n1 n to cm nllltunlhlp an Inn ucnnd appvllanlm M5 him ma mom paunls at mo urn. of his birth Yhe nmy avauame aocumemary ewaence me sswnu anpeflanls mun ccmficale texh rsa . ay cumimod nu miurnulmn psflmnmg as me b\o\o§Ina\ Dfirenls and me |e\ev.nn| pamwlars were endunad Mm Makhnmm flask Dwpsmlehw [351 Smce ma ndenmy at me am 3 lawful and b\o\ug\ca1par~enls are unknown. in in not pouiblu to dukmnlm (M llnum M an menu appellanl Ihnlvmuld Innbll nu. uwnd appnllalll In bu so-mrna clllznnl u try um. cum uvnguwnrl (emphasis added) »..,.m.r u sm uyvumaweazoinnzuomnpia .~.» “Nam em mmhnrwm .. HIGH m M», .. mn.u.y mum: m.r.n VI mum pm 40. In the presenl case. the parents were naver mamed after me bmh at me P\amMs. In me apphcamon oi secnon 11 of Pan III 0! me Second scneauls, paranxs man ruegmnraxe mm 1; to be construed as manner The evidence snows (hat ma Piammvs are born c at mheroounlry that rs Indonesra. 41. The biological momer. Enggauna Nabul Is a cilizen of Vndcnesia The Vaw 07 Indonesia regards an illegI\Ima|e child born I0 an snaenssran molher as a cmzen ol nnaonasra Fasal 4(9) Undang- Undang Repuhlik Vndorlesia Nombor I2 Tahun 2006 prwvndesz -warga Nagnra rnanmxa adulan (g)anik yang samr a. Iuar pelkaiwnnan yang uh nan mung mu Wang: Nugara lnoonesm - 42 Based an Ihe above, n rs Ihe consmereu vwew 0! me Court man ramsal in register \he Plarnws mnn mm me Indonesian Government does ncl disbdge me «am max me Plarnnfls were born a C: an at Vndaneswa as lhe Inaonesran law has me corresponding pmvislun aflowing an ruegmrnnna chvld bom m an Indonaslan molhar to acquire cmzenship oflndonesla. 43 Therefore, band on me «am: presented before this case, "we Plarnms lauled to discharge me humen at prool In show mat they were na| [mm a when M any omer counlry Hence, me Plamlms not sansfy me mquvamen| or Aniaxa 14mm) and secuon I(e) Pan ll 01 Second Schedme to be conferred mm the slams of uuzenshlp by operauen av Law conclusion 44 Fremised on me avoresara reasons, I find war we Plamlms‘ os (Enc\osur~a1)has no mam In ‘aw »...u.r :- srn -ywqasweazomnznomnvn .~.» “Nam s.n.r nmhnrwm n. met! a M, .. .nnn.u., mm: dnunmnl VI mum p-max 45. As such. the Prammis‘ os rs drsmwssed war: no order as in costs. Dalw Q1 January 2024 Ahmad Kamal n Md. 5715 .1 Judge Hwgh Coun Kua\a Lumpur Counsoll Forms F\am1rWs. Cwk LEHSSH Ann Louis Teluan Lee Swee Seng 3. Ca Peguambela 5 Feguamcsra unn 2m, Lave! 2. Bmck A. Fusal Dagangan Phlleo Damansara 2‘ Jalan 16lI1, ON Jalan Damansara. 46350 Pslahng Jaya, Selangor Darul Ehsan. (Ru. Tuan — ALSS/LAI4437/22) cm Nuv mayu mm Amlr Senior Fedem co-msax Jabalan Peguam Negana, Bahagnan Guaman. No 45. Persiaran Perdana Fresum A. azwnu Fultalaya p... u at 1. sm ryfiunmeazotnnznsmnvn .~_» «mm. Snr1l\nmhnrw\HI>e HIGH m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Regulations 4, 11 and 14 al ll-is Nallnnal Regislrallon Regulatiuns 1990: 16 An award for damages Including general damages (0 be assessed for conslllullnnal rlgms violalions; 1 7 Cosl: and 1 13 Orders and/crdlrectlnns lnal lnls Honourable coun Ihlnks Ill and fair 2 The greurms in suppan oi unis appllcallnn aniongsl elneis are as lollaws ~ e. The hlnloglcal lailier cl Inc I", 2'4 and 3'“ Flairiliils is a Malaysian cilizen, n nie 1-‘ 2* and 3'“ Plamtifls was born in Malaysia, 1: The 1*, 2"’ and 3'“ Plairilms nas no naliorialiny in any olner country: and o The 1*. 2t and an P|ainliWs' binli cemfica|e states ‘Bukarl Warganegars“. 3 In essencei lnis applioauon concerns lne cilizensnip o1 me 1“. 2"‘ and 3" Plainiiiis unoer me provisions ol in: F0. 4 After me nearing, I dismissed lhe PIainln1s' as (Enclosure 1). The reasons lor lne decision are set dawn below Background Facls 5 The background lams oi lnis 05 are galnered iruni lne cause papers and ins submissions aflhe panias I respecliully aaopl lnerri suoiecl to some rriodincaliens s. The biological lainer oi me Flzlnhfls‘ IS Yeah Phee Henng, a Malaysian Cllizen (b aqical ffllllfil) and llie biological riiolner oi me Plainllfls is Enggellrla Nabul. 2: Gillian o1 Indonesia (bioluglonl mother) mes Nu SIN -yfieasleazolnnz-omnvn .~_» "Nair s.ii.i nuvlhnrwm .. .1... a may i... nflmnniily MIMI dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNfl Wm! 7 Although tnere was no record at a vatta -narnage. aecomrng to the Plaintiffs, the btologtcat lalherand btolugtcat mother had atradtttonal rnarnaga In 1985 and um nntregts|21lhstr mamaga omcratty 5. The 1-‘ Platnltfl was Dom on 27 A 1999 at Kttntk Bersatm dsn Saktl Puan Bandur Surtway. Attrraugn tnare was no tsoord at a Vahd mamaget trre narne at the atotegreat tatrrer was trtcluded in the Birth CerItltca|e based on the consent at the parents tsee. Paragraph 5 (I) Do ndlnl'l Mfldlvll In Ropty (Enetesur. 5)] 9. The 2"= Platnttlf was Dom on 16 1 2002 at Tamart Jttnah Jaye Fan Dtckson, and me 3"! Flatnltfl was burn on 2 11.2007 at Haspttal Fotl Dtckson. nunrtg the regtstrat-on ot blrlh nf me 2"“ and am Platnlifis, only the motogteat tatner was present and no record at a valtd mamage was pmduced durtng me regrstrauon Hence, tne rntonrtatmn of the btctogtcal mother is Enggelina Natrut and |he rntornratran attne tatrrer was stated as Makturnat max Dtpemtem“ tsee. Plmgruph 5 (II) 5 mt), neterutarrrs Aflldavll In Reply tsnctosuru 5)]. to As tnere was no vattd rnarnage between lhe btult3gical1a|her and rnotner. tne Ptatnntts status was regtsteree as ‘Butcart warganegara", lssun tt. Hawtg perused the cause papers and me retets sougnt by me Ptatnlifls, I am 171 the vtzw that the tssues |u be detemwted are as fnllows: - a wnetner the Plamhfls are citrzens at Mataysra urmer Atttcle 14l|)(b) and Part II Section 1(5) at the Secand Schedulo 0' the FC by virlue :11 tne r:t|tzenshtp status or tne tnotogtcat father, and h Whether the Ptetnmts are ctttzens at Mataysta under Amcte Mmtbt and Part II Sechon 1(e)aHhe Second scneaute ot the F0. Put 1 at ll sru uywqaateazotnnz-DMAVSA .~.» «ma s.nn nutthnrwm a. med m vum r... ntwtruflly mm: dnuuvtml VI .nuua v-mat Whether lh Plalnnlfa are cinx-us o1 Mnlay:|.I unacr Amcla 14(1)(b) ma Part II suction ua) of me sacond scmdulo own PC by vlnua cum clunmhlp tutu: of mu blologlul f-mu 12. Amde14m Part III enne FC mas as follows ~ "cltizmlshlp by operalian of I... um Suhpea lo we pmvlssans of mu Pan. me lmhwmg persons are mums byovenflnn m \:w, mac V5 to say. (3) evsry person Dom name Mahuyswa my was It a unzen mme Fad-lawn by wlun nl me pmvmnns cnmmnnd m PM 1 0! ma s-mm Sohe<1u\e‘and (ow wary person bum an 01 aflnr Mahysna Day‘ m: havm any cl ms qualmcahons speufied m Fan in mm Second Schsnme ' 13 secmnx Fan ll. Second Schedule cf the FC pruvides as «allows- Pan u smna Schlflulo cmzsusnuw av orssnnnn or LAW or reasons son» an on AFYER muvsux nu < Sumecl to me nmvmani av Pan m ul ms Consumlnn, me vanmmg psrsans Dam on ur lnar Malaysia Day in c-Inxaru by opemlmn av lnw‘ mat Is to say is) everv Dslwn born mmn me Fedemlmn Mvmnw vlrsnlsurw at \eas| ‘s at the mm m the win enher a cmzen or permanmuy rasmnm m m. Fad-vsbun, Ind 1h} every perwn born oulsne me Federalmn whose (3111:! ‘s at me «me 0! 171: mm a mum mm mm Wu bum m we Fldarinon or us an In: Mme m we mm m Ihe serwce ol the Federahon or of a sum and (c; every nelson bum oulsnu um ssamuan muse came: .5 atlhe I-ma mm rmn . ullzlnarvd when om - mm on: y-my ms occurrence or mm. such langsr period as me Federal Gm/umm51\| may m pammlar mac anew, vaglilarod at a wnwlale unm Federamn or, mucous m Brunet orma Iamlnry pvesmbsc luv |ms purpose by Mia cl me Vang dw-Penuan Agony ngm-ma walh the rum Gnvemmenl mm a... 5 at :4 sm -ywqnswaazoinnz-omnvn .~.» “Nam smuw nmhnrwm .. HIGH m M, .. mm.m, mm: dnuamnl VI mum pm my everypelsnn bum VII Singapore Mwhcse parem one ai iaasi VS al In: nnia oi the bran n cmzan and Min .3 not Dom a cinzen mhemiselhan by man cum paragrapn an: (e) Mn, permn bum Wllhm me Fednvamn me .a rim Dom n man in any flmmlry nlherwlse man by Vlflue at INS paragliph‘ 14 Eased on Anlcie I4(I Kb) Mme FC read lugalhef with Sacuon 115), Part in, Second scneauie ofthe Fc, ii is dearmal iora person to be a Malaysian citizen by cperaiion oi iaw pursuant Iolhese Brovisimls, he requisites qualification lo be Fulfilled are (a) The person was burn an or alter Maiaysia Day. (:7) The person was born within the Faaaiauon: and [(2) Al the time 01 me person‘: mnn, one 0! ms psrenls VS a Malaysian citizen ur permanenlly remani in (he Federation 15. Hawever, i am unne Vlew that «me persnn was born out oiwediocki he is an iliegmmaie peison at me time a! his win and me reierence la 'pamni“ in secuon 1(a), Pan ii, Second scneauie oi me FC V! In be construed as “moinert This is based nri section 17, Pan ‘H, Seound Schedule of me FC whicn provides as loiiows: 17 For the anions: ul Pan Ill 01 Ihli Oumvilufion vlllrlncu In . pencil‘: mm er In ms parent. or In on of 5 FIRMS. are in raianonio a 9850!! wm i. m..mni n In bu non-Im-d n nhnncu In his mum, and accoramqky seclinn 19 uf this saiauuia snail nui am, In sum a pawn‘ (emphasis added) 16 I lmd suppon «oi my View based on me com omppaai case :2! Llm Jon Hsian 5. Anal v. Kama Pangzrah Jnbalan Pmdafulln Megan 1. 07: mm 5 MLRA 42 . [2011] 8 cm 412; [min] a IILJ 54: where n was held: - ‘[36] the slmnd lppolllnfs llneage would only bl zumim In hli Illllyulzn Nnlmbul hllur pvuvlflnfl um ml plum: wan in a IIMIAI min 90. in In: can ofnn llngililrllb child, mo ward ‘pawn!’ II construed in velermhis a logical mom-i. varfioiu am -yPi:m!1GEED4AnEn3MnpIA .~.» “Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm .. HIGH m mm .. nflginlflly MIMI dnuuvinnl VI .riuNG mi secrrprr 17 an Pan In onrre Federal cdnsumdrr males as fulkzws For nun purpose or PM In M lhls Cunshlmmv rvhrvncn to e porporrs hlher orla ms per-m. me one onus parents, In In r mm to . hum who 1. meemrrm. In p. mnllluuu -- revererrees In hi! rrromer, arrd aowrdm§\Y seclmn 15 or «ms Scbedme shau not apuly up such a perm (errrprrasrs added) 17 Further‘ W: Chen Tai Em a-rm Ila (aeorarrg di biwall umur din merrmawa ndakarr ini m- In] bapa yang sah suna sahabat wakunya Plalnm Kadun) 3. Anor v. Kelua Pengamh Pnndnnaran Nogara. M 1y: I On [2020] MLRAU 51; man] 4 cu 597: [mm] 1 MAR 421; [2020] 3 MLJ 534. the cm of Apnea! held lhal — 131 Renmrvg nu above med pmvvsmn! we fivvd mm will run M my pvoblum u a child ls barn Inullmlltzl up a reurer who Is a Manaysurr cilinn mu n For up perrr pumda tin raderanerr. am In ms mum lypoal me cmlfl was ham all m wudlnck. N: was lllegmmnm .4 mm mm ems mm. se mm cums rm Bmbiema. Sccllun :1 0! Pin m oltm Socond Schuduh lpnclllcally lllpullul um ’1IlIItv" in vvlalboll up a person and ix mnprurrraze rem re h mam. ~ (emphasvs added) 15 Commg hack to me vans in me presem case. n rs not mspuned at me nrrre onhe Flavnhfls‘ binhs, the bxmogvcm father and rrmmer were rrm vaudly rnamed.Tnere1ere, s clear |ha| me Plamms were Imm am nlwedlock and me P\am(\Ws were rnegmruaxe perwnsa: me Mme of lhav bmh 19 Based on me above, 1 am 11! me censrdered mew me: me Plamuffs were Hlegrlimale persons at the true unneir mm, by vmue ofsechon 17, Part IH, Second Schsdme nfihe FC, me word ‘parent’ rn secuen Ha), Fan II, second Schedme 111 me P!) shall be conslmed as 'mo|her" 20 wmh regards to me Mfiflmenl a! me reqmsue quamcauerr for emzerrsmp as alluded to earlxev. I am onne werw that me P\am|l|V!r fumed lha firs! and me second -zualmcanen where they were born after me Malaysia day on 27.4 1999, 15 1 20012 M 2007 and they vau1ouA sm uywedaweazutnnzuomnpla “Nana a.r.r nmhnrwm r. d... m my r... pflmrraflly am. dnuumnl vu aF\uNG WM were Dom wllhln the Federallort. tn Selangorartd Negen Sembllart However‘ the Platnlllts dld not lulitll the mint qttallflcallort because metrrnotner rs not a Malayslan cllllen or pennanenlly resldem tn the Federaltnrt but a pmzen ol lrtdonesia 2t. Tnerelere, applylng tne law to me facts ot the present case, ll ls clear that me Ftairttlffs are rtnl a Metaystan Ctllzen by dperatipn oi law under ArllcleI4(I)(b)readIogelherwl1h Sec1lort1(a)F':n lt Mlhe second Schedule at lne FC and semen t7 Pan lll ol the second scnedule at tne FC. 22 The above vtew taken wnuld not be complete wlmout relemng tome recent Federal coun case at (3723 & Anor v. Kenna Pengaralt Pcndllflnrln Nogaru. mleynln A On [2021] A MLRA en: [2021] 6 CL] 411; [1021] 5 AMR 661: (201114 ML] 235. 23 ‘me lssues In We present case ate subslanhally Slmllar tp tne lssues In CTEE (supra) where both cases concern me sue el eitlzensmp under Amcle ‘lA{1)1|>) ot the FC lead tpgetnerw section 1th), Part II. Second schedule at the FC as well as me lssue pl lllegmrnete cntld and the appllcallorl of sscllort 17‘ Pan lll_ second Schedule at me FC 24. In cTEs(supral. the Chlld t.e me Flrsl Appellant was born outstae Malaysta, k: a Malayslan tamer t.e the second Appellant and e Flllnlrta matner and at the lime at ms blrlh, ms parents were not legally married Hence the Flvst Appellant ls lllegmrnate at the tune el ms blflh 25 The Appellanls had med an ortgtnetlng surnmens at the Hlgh court to seek fleclalallcn that the Flrsl Appellant ls a Malayslalt clllzefl by eperatron at law pursuant to Anlcle l4(l)(h) ol the FC The Appellanrs nrlglnatlrtg summons was dismlssed by the Hlgh court 26. The Appellants men appealed to me ceun pl Appeal The Court of Appeal dlsmlssod lha Appellants‘ appeal and affirmed the dectstan dune High ceun. The judgment of the coun ohiopsal ls reppned In Chan Yul Em Bemtlllts (seerang dl bawnrt umur den mumluw: llll I|l| DID! ylng uh ru Ihlbll Kudua) 5 Artur v. Kym: Pengiralt Putdaflantn -III, Malaysla E Ors (supra). w Nag Pt]! I at u SIN ryPt:datGEEDtAnEflMhpiA .~.» “Nair s.n.t mmhnrwlll .. u... e mm .. nflglnnllly MIN: dnuuvtnnl VII mum vtmxl 27 subsequently, the Appellanls were gmnted leave to appeal to the Feoeral court agalnsllhe Calm omppeals declslcrl on 28 5 2021, the Federal court by a maronty dismissed the Appellants‘ appeal The orders olthe Hrgrr Conn as amrrned by the Cowl of Aapsal are malnlalned. 25 upon perusal otthe marorlty oeuslorl olthe Federal court VI cm: lsupra), l find that the sahem legal principles can be ttisrrlleo which are Is lollows. zal Firstly, the aeqnrsrrron ot orlizenshrp by opemhorl oi law under Artlcls 14 07 [he FC Is based on me fulflllmanl ol quallficallons set out W the FC and such qualrflcallans mus| be met at the Ilme of blfl 28.2 seeonoty, slrlce citizenship by operatlorr or law ls determined at blrlh, other laws wnlch relrospectlvelyquahfy a person such as Legrtirnacy Aci orAdopllun Acl oannot be used to construe the ouallnra n at that person: 2a 3 Thlrdly. sectlon 17‘ Fan in, seoorro Schedule 0! the FC applies to Sefllcn 1. Pan ll, second schedule of the PC by wine at the qualllyrng woros VI section 1. Pan II. Second Schedule olthe so and by wrlue el Amcle 31 of the Fe; 28 4 Founhly.sectlon17, Part III, Second Schedule of Ihe FC IS clear and unambiguous mat the relerence to ‘Daren! or ‘1alher“ln relation \u an illeymmaie child ls la be construed as -rnmnar Thereflclre, an illeglltmale child‘: or erlsmp {allows the clllzenshlp DV his molher. and 25.5. Flflhlyt based on the legislative tnslory, ll is also the Iruanllurl and positron ol the lramers ol the FC tnal an rlleg mate chrlds mizenship is to follow the Cllllerlshlp at the mother and not me lather 29 In the instant case, it ls not disputed that me Plarntms were born In Malaysla on 27 4.1999, ta 1.2002 and 2 11 2007 to a Malaysian biological latherand Ihe lrldovleslsn blologica! rnomer Hwvever, Ihe Plalntrrts were not born In a lawml marnage as at the lime of the Plalrrulfs were born, both the blclngical father and mother are riot rnarrreo Theielore. rt ls rny oorrsroereo View that the Plalnlrlls are Pnulovn sm -yfieasleazotnnz-omhpia .~.» “Nair s.n.l nuvlhnrwm rs. med II: vuny r... .nrn.u., sun. dnuuvlml VI nrlutta ml megmrnate at the «me or brrm This was dearly stated In CTEB [supra] when we Federal Conn new as 1nl\aws* — 11571 Frum the express msuncmn fuv parent: arranrrerurarr Mleqmmzle mm m 5 w. n n. abvloxumnl lhn word ‘plums’ In an sanhxl m plfl Ill cl or. re rrum bu covlslmnd Io mm In mm: plums In : mogmsea rrmmg. In um fuunnllun This country never Iegnlly ..m..«.¢ p y In mum amp-r aisnncllons have may: um. ma. . our leglslaflon In And: 0 ammr-um human or. nuns: .4 plums‘ In a mom a marrilul or alherwusn. Even under s 13 ac ma Ems arra Dsalns Regrsllamn Act 1957 me Veglslaflnn makes a clenrdnslmnmn belweon 3 «mar av mulhw M an fllegxumaie cnrra rm. mnwlus um Darwr\i' rerers always m regauy wedded parents‘ nol Dm\og|ca\ lslher and mcmer‘ (emphasis added) 30 Based on me above‘ It Is clearlhal |he Flamufls are rm 3 Mmaysran cmzen by aperauon at law under amue MHMD) or me F0 read (ogemar wrm sschun Ma), Pan In, Second Schedule ohhe FC and secuon 17‘ Pan IH, semnd Schedule 0! the FC. Wh-thur um Plai in: are ciliuns of Malaysia under An cle 1A(1)(b) and Fun II sacnon 1(0) of the Second schedule of mo F: 3‘. rue P\a|n||ifs suarnrx thal me Plarrrnms who were mm m Ma\ays|a and vamains sta|e\ess (or a year anar (haw bmh are 5 Malaysian cmzens by eperauon nllaw underAmc|e M(1)(b)and Part II secuon 11s) and sewer: my 0! me Second Scheduie at me FC 32 Accordmg lo the Plamhfls, the phrase ‘not born a clhzen at any country“ m Secnon 1(a) of me Second scneame 0! the FC must be mad together wr|h Sectmn 213) 0' In Second Schedule 0! the FC in delermmlng the cm‘; cmzsnsmp by operation of Vaw :3 The Plarrmus iunner suhmll that. as 1, me words ‘not born a cmzen or any country" in secnon 1(2) oi the Second Scnedme av Ihe FC do not require me Plamhffs lo prove me raenmy of their mulogrcal parents and man they are not iorergn cmzsns, and Fnge In M u srn uywmaweazomnznamnpia .~.» “Nam smnx mmhnrwm .. HIGH m vuflj r... nnmrrnuly mm: dnuumrrl VI mum p-max

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-309-10/2023

PEMOHON UNITARA RESOURCES (M) SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) MENTERI PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN 2. ) PENGAWAL PERUMAHAN KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN 3. ) IMPIAN EKSPRESI SDN BHD

Administrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Leave — Approach of court — Whether a scrutiny of the merits warranted — Circumstances where a scrutiny of the merits warranted – Issues of law of some significanceAdministrative Law — Judicial review — Application for — Leave – Whether application is frivolous or vexatious — Whether there is some substance in the grounds supporting the application

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f7e3b3b0-bd2f-4e9d-ab90-502a392ba171&Inline=true

29/01/2024 16:01:21 WA-25-309-10/2023 Kand. 24 S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N sLPj9y9nU6rkFAqOSuhcQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—25—309—1D/2023 Kand. 24 29/ouznu 15:01-21 DALAM MAHKAIIIAH YINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI MLAVAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR PERMOMONAN sEMAxAu KENAK MAN no WA 25-:09 1012023 Delnm pencam Peuanflsn 4...: Bah benmkh 4512 2017 m anlnm F-mutton dzn neapumen K245 mengenal nemmmu nansnh a. mum Ia‘ Kawasanau kwra-kIraV57me|erpelsegv a. mam Menzm xarxmm 3 denqzn anamanposmxmmc Curporilufiwwer 3. Plvlhon Damansars Heoghts. No. 3‘ Jilin Dimanhm sum Kuah Lumwh wnayan Parukuluan Kuzla Lumpuv an tab:-ah Dembnngunnn parumahan yang mxem sebagax 'Pav1l1on Dzmansara He\gM5, Kuala Lumour om Dalam Denkam m ngsnal Seksyen um All: mum Sp-es: 1950 mm Deflam perxm pererggan 1 Jadual xapmn ma Mahkamuh Kuruklmzn I964 mm Dllam pemare An. Psmawan Pemmamn (kawatan den Pebserun) was um Damn: venuva Peramran~pe¢a|uvIrI Pamnluan Psvumahan (Knwihn dun Fe\esenan)1989 mu Dalam perkara menuunar Almin 53 Kaedzm- Kaaflah Mzhkamah 2m2 dan bdrm: kulu mun an. Mnhkimlh mm sm sLPmvnumrAuDsmcG mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y éw. dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Dnlam Dlnrari manganavSeksyau 3:. 35 35A den sac Am lzlvgkarv Langkah Semenlar: any Munwrllvgkan Kasan Penyam Komnavwus zma (C0vu>¢9> mu om Da\am perkara mengeuaw Surarsural Kvmsrxmnan Fnrumah-n um Kmapaan Yemvalan benankh nsnzuzu nan 15032022, can suml Manlun Femmahan dan Kerxuaan Ylmpaiarl bedankh aaaazuza msngenau penwecunlxan I-mwh Penman Kawnlan Psvgerakan hag: pcnglraan mass urahin lmhkan knmnu dzn/alau human masa unluk serahan mmkan wsong ANTARA UMITARA RESOURCES (M) sun EHD (No. SVARIKAT: 342170»U) ..,PEMoNou DAN I. MENTERI PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN 2. PENGAWAL PERUMANAN KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN om KERAJAAN TEMPAYAN 3. mm» EKSPRESI sun. sun. ...RE5PONDEN (No. sumxm-: 513545-w) -RESPONDEM JUDGM§_N !NiLF|‘Jyh1Um\<FAflUSmcG ,w._ W nu Factual Background [1] Tms rs an appficanan for leave to commence judicral revrew aga<ns1 ma putamve respondents [21 The appncann emered into a sa\e and purchase agreement (‘SPA’) dated 1812 2017 wan me puranve 3"’ respondent, lmpian Ekspresr Sam and lo purchase a game! 07 property known as Level 10 au Area wim a postal address idenlmed as 03—10~01,CorDorale Tower 3‘ Pavilion Darnansara Heigms Na. 3, Jalan Damanlma. 50490 Kama Lumpur (“the Pmpeny ). The Properly rs Vacated rn a deveropnrenr known as “Pavlhan Damansar-a Hergms" (31 The Property rs not a housing aeeennmaerron hu| an uffioe uml. Hanna‘ one SPA Is not In |he prescnbed srauumry Form G‘ H or I of me Housmg Development (Comm! and Llcensmg) Reguranans 19a9(“19a9 Regu\aIions') [4] C1 5 2 rflme SPA provides as lollows my Vaunl possessmn 01 me Pmpeny. mm me cm: aurynruaa, snau be reudytu he dslrvumd re lbs Purchastr nu mu man my ergnr may months hum me anus no mu Agroemum (‘ma Ounlrlclafl vp now‘) 4:21 IV we Vzrvdurlmls no hand nvav vicanl poisessaon 07 me Pruoeny by me connacnea w me, In Vmdor man no name In pay me Pumhaner nquraanea dnmngas nu ma delmry m D: csk:u\a|sd on a day to day bans anne rat: 0! eenr pemenl (3%) per annum at me Pumhnse wnen «nun lhe exmrymma Camvaded vv Dlls «mu vacanl Donenmn alma vnw-ny e mid)/lo be aenuerea to me Purchaser the cause cl scum hy ma Pumnnser agnmfl me Vendar for naymenl at me Vuquldaled damages rm Inks dalmry nu any) snau onw Qwus mm 5012:: «mm me cm. or Ins Purchase: ram aauax wssessmn 01 me vmpeny as owmud (0 me aeennna nravmon an we vakmg L71 vacant sm are r vnumrmosmcn ; “Nana Mn ...n.mn rs HIGH m vufit .. anmnauly mm: m.n.n VI muNG Wm! Do§eslIfilV ei me Pmpeny by the Purchaser. [5] Aeeeiding lo the applicant. the Pmpeny was only delivered on i9.5.2o2a. There was a delay at 545 days in the delivery at vacant possession ol the Piupeny. [6] By a letter dated 7.7.2a23. the applicant demanded a sum oi RM1 139,275 20 h g agreed liquidated damages lur late delivery iaithe Pmperiy According to the letter, the 543 dayswereceleulaled lmm1Q.12 2021 In 16.6. 2023 [7] The putative 3'“ respaiident replied to the applicant by its letter dated 10.7 2023. citing lorce rnaieuie in cl 10.15 at the SPA as the ground tor the delay The letuir iriteraiie states as follows‘ me In the Covndri 9 pandemic, me Gmemmlnl uf Meiayua iriipienieiiied Vlflfilll fluuvul M lockdmwns xnd riiovemeiit eeiiiiei nvev pipioiiaee pemdl whim xigiiinmitiy aimed ma pioeress eiaiiieensinictien wens these .ie Fm» Melodie evarils ieniiig wllllln Clnual io ispiii-ii mwsdwe sea As yet. are Ewlm. Fivlllfill nanianeaia neients. xiiaia Lllmvw is a niiiednmegreied deviluymnvll mnipniiria eeipeiai. sullflli reiaii and residential bower: the Ministry 0! Heiaing in me axarusa in its s1aluTcl‘{ pemeie under Ihe ienipemy Msamms ipi immune the Inland in oomiiavinis Disease 2D|91C<1vltH9MLl202fl glanled us a tmnl uxlnnlton pi HIM ul 565 days in deiiveiy ol vacant possess-en [9] The subject of dispute in this application lor leave (or ]udK:laI review are the three letters. which aie as (allows lat Deled 5.112o2a, issued by the putative 2'-1 iespendeni, the Housing controller. ltii Dated 30.3 2021 issued by the pulalive 1' respondent, the Minister or Housing and Local Gdvemrnerit: and (c) Dauid 15 a 2022 issued by the tieueing cenlmller rn sLFflYVliUnrtFAflDSmt:G 3 “Nair s.ii.i nuvlhnrwlll be i... m M», i... nflglnlllly . dnuuvlml VI eFluNa Wm! It is tne edmenlion oline putative aw respcndentlhal all ttrree letters (“|hB impugned lallers‘) addressed ro ltte pulatrve 3"‘ respondent nad purpunediy extended lne lime ot deltvery ol vacation possession cutie Pmperty Th loavc appllealrorr [9] By way main application in Enel 1, made under 0 53 r 3 otltie Rules ol Cnurl 2012 (“Room In commence proceedings leriudrcral review inter elie, tor an order at oempnari la queen ttre decisions ol lhe pulattve 1" and 2"“ respondents in ltte larrn of ttre impugned tellers (‘the impugned dacislons“). [in] The applicant also seeks tor a declaratory order trial the impugned letters are ullra was the coind—1s Am [11] ms application Ior leave is supponed by Lim Klan Loong in End 2 (-M52’) Enclk UN! is the dlreclnr nl tne applicant oompany The grounds 01 me ipnlicalinri can be summarised irrlar eiia as tdllows- la) The extension at lrrne lor vacant posscsslari under ss :5 and also puns covtma Act is only enplrceple tor rtie sms «net are based on me slalulory Farms (3, H, I and J of me 1989 Regulaucns. (pi The puiaiive 2" respondent was acting ulna vines s ascial ol the CWld~19 Ac! Smce {he SPA belweeri the appllcanl company and [he putative 3*’ respondent was npl made oursuentte the Housing Developmem (control and Licensing) Act |9661“HDA“) nre Properly is an omoe will that does nal tau under iris HOA (C) in any event, rne power to extend me time tor delivery [or VBC3r|| possession under the HDA and the CDWD-19 Act has In the pu|a|lve1' respondent and cannot, ln law, bedelegaled (D a lhlrd party (dj Even ttttre putative 2"" and 3'" resppndenls tiad such power to extend ltre Ilme tor dellvery ol vacant possession, suett IN sLPl‘JyDIiLmr|FAuDSmcG 5 “Nair Smnl mmhnrwlll rs. LAIQ4 m M, i... nnglrrnllly . dnuuvintrl VII nFluNG mi Bxalcise of power was in bvezch 0' the pnnclplae 01 natural lusllce and, lherelote, bad .n law. [12] me leave awllcallnn was heard expafle on 22 ll 2023 As ls lne lequlrernent under 0 53 v 3(3) dune Roc, me cause papers were served on lne Allamey Gerleral‘s Chambers so even ll lne matter ls neard ex pane, lne A6 or me representative nas lne rlghl lo be presenl at me leave stage In wing to me court‘: allsnuon any leelmes slmourldlrlg lrlel panlculsr camplalm lnal need lo be |akerl ln|a eonslderalion by me eoun belore lne leave applled lor was granled or relused. nns rule ls explalned by me vargnse George vamgnese .lcA ln dellvenng nls ludgmenl an we coun of Appeal ln my aunt Hang v Publdlmn Taburly P-ndtdlkan Tingql Masloml [2015] MLJU 2255 CA Acoordlng la ms Loldsmp. lne role or me AGO an we slage ls lo applalse the court or any parllcular Veatuves o1 lhe ease lnal wmlld lsduelliy any leave belng granted: As sum the lrlvulvamarll M me AG .n we anpllcallon was planer at we presence wu lo new the noun ln delennlnmg :1 male was any uplcl 0! me use ml mwld Vandal . dsnnssel all me applleanon [13] Al me hearing‘ me AG was reoresenled by me Senior Federal counsel, wnd had no oblecilon to me appllcallon for leave [14] l have considered lhe appllcallon and granled leave for me same [15] The grounds or my deelslon are as lollows‘ (3) ln ralslllg me applnzmlny ol lne COVID-l9Ac1arld me HDA lo me rmmhuuslng development‘ which lncludes lne Properly [winch 45 an olnee IANIL lne appllcarll has urged lne Own lo declde on me lssues 01 law cl some slgnlflcanoe (bl Al lnls leave slage, me Hbgh coun snduld nol go unto me menls onne case The quesllon olwhemerlhe col/lD—l9 Act and the HDA are appllcable snould only be vennlelea at me sulzslanllve slage Likewlse, the issue el wnelner me COVID» 19 pandemic IS legorlsed as loroe maleure wllnln lhe mearlmg ol cl 10.15 ollne SPA IS also a queshon ul menls. It would be amlss to go ln|o me men|s or me applucallon at lnis stage. IN sLPlvyDnumrAuDsm:G “None Smnl nuvlhnrwlll .. u... m mm .. nflnlnnllly Sm. dnuuvlnnl y.. .nuue ml (c) in Tiny Kwar l-lam A Ors. v Pongurualn lzaiianma lllasicnal and .1 Ors[2D0€] 1 cu 927 ca, me ccurl cl Appeal neld lnai KM role cl inc High cuurl is only ic see ir lrie applicahon lar leave is lr lous ll, lcr aiiainple, liie applieani is a liusyccdy, or iiie applicalion is inade oiiial "me or againsl a person or body inal Is irnrnunlsea lroni being irnpleaded in legal proceedings lnen me High courl would be iuelrneo in relusing leave in linilne. la) The law can also oe irsced in lne iuogrneni cl ina supreme courl in Anocillion or semi Officnrs, Pnnlrlsullr Malaysla v Malayan commercial sanlrs Assccloucn (19901 3 MLJ 223 so. Aialo singn sou, in delivering lne iudgrnenl cllne coun, neld man. in rile grounds cl lnilonieni lne llsamad Judicial Commissioner nad gone MIME! man iris leave slage and ¢mharkm1 on Suhslamlnl ssuu on nierii we did iiol Ihlnk inal Ihl: WI: I giii acpioapri when lrie applialion lor leave in firmly lur an olvnr M aeniaian I! made in. giidlno pmlclralas wan: to be moi me applicanm HIMSI snow nnni. l as man ins apnlicamn is no: Yllvnlnus or malious and lrial mere ls lama mbflallca ln ine glmlrlds suppening lne aimliulion (al l will nol, lnerelcre. address on siioslanlial issues ol menus lhai involve the inlerpraiaiions at liie SPA, iris covlme Act and me HDA. [ls] Based on AIS-3 and me slalenienl liled under 0 53 r 3(2) ol lrie ROC, I am salisfieo lnal lhe applioanl riad a prime lacie arguable case lcr lrie granilng ol lrie reliels lriel ilie appllcanl company is seeking I am convinced me: lrie applicant‘: applicellcn is nai lnvoious or vexallaus The issues al law oi some significance can only be neard and delenriineo al the 5ubsIan|lve siege. [17] In irie ciicunisiances. lrie applicant company has crossed lne low Ihreshold expeoled al him ai this preliminary siege in View cl me issues ol law involved, cerlainly nol lnvclous nr vexalicus. [la] In shun, inere are sufficlenl grounds In consider me ssserlinne made by me applicant I| lne suhs|arlIilIe iiaanng at liie iiidicial review IN sLF|‘1yhlUnr|FAflDSml:G "Nah! s.n.i In-vlhnrwlll be i... m min i... nflnlnnllly Ziiii. dnuuvlnrll n. nFluNG WVM Findings [19] For these reasons, 1 am oflhe ocnsmered wewmauhe appncam be given weave lo commence manual review agamsx me pmanve respondents and I so hold, Tankh: 29 Januari znu L4 (WAN AHMAD FARID am WAN SALLEH) Hakmn Mahkamah Tmggx Kuala Lumpur. Plhak-pmak Bag: Pmak Pemohan Luke wex Lun Tetuan E E Ten Bag! Flhak Raspnrvden: Muhammad maayac bun Wahah SFC Jabalan Peguam Negara. Fultajaya m up vymmmnuosmca mm. in» ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y 5» . dun-mm VII .mm mm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-358-12/2020

PEMOHON PUNCAK NIAGA MANAGEMENT SERVICES SDN BHD RESPONDEN MENTERI KEWANGAN MALAYSIA PENCELAH Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri

Judicial Review- Mandamus - Seeking for order for Minister of Finance to give direction to DGIR to set aside or exempt Notice of Additional Assessment deemed served on the Applicant - Non reply or non- response of Minister to Applicant's letter - Whether section 135 of ITA impose legal duty on Minister to make decision - Whether Applicant circumvented and failed to exhaust domestic remedy i.e SCIT under ITA.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a5f3146c-0742-4cab-95c5-3a55e80a3a2b&Inline=true

29/01/2024 12:29:02 WA-25-358-12/2020 Kand. 80 S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N bBTzpUIHq0yVxTpV6Ao6Kw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25—35s—12/2n2n Kand. 50 29/01/2132: 12:29-n2 mum umumm nuusl mun nu KUALA LUIAPUR mun wuuvm FERSEKUYUAN KLIALA LLIIAI-‘UR. muwsu IBAHAGIAN KUASLKUASA nous) PERMDHONAN am: mafia xznmum N aim mmg Dalam Balkan suatu Penrmnonan yang mun mm: kspada Responder: menunn sexsyen 135 dam Sekiyen waxy ma Cukiv Pendapnlnn may ylng z..n.m 2411 202:: Dan Damm gem. mm 53 K-Id: .xm.r. Mahkamah 2u12 Amara Puucnx mus: MANAGEMEN1 sznv-cs: sun nun Pnmahcn Din MENYERI xswmsm muvsu Respnnden Dan xsvua wsucnmm mam mum NEGERI Pencmah Judgmum lnlroducfion 1 The Appncam on 3122020. filed an appllcalion fov weave to commence judlaal vewew proceedmg (Enclosure 1) under Order 53 or the Runes at com 21:12 (aoc) sacking mter aha, me faHawmg- me 1 sun sm nah: Mnflwxwvuanxw mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! I 1 An order ler irie Respondent lo exercise its power under section 135 and/er section 12713A) ol the lriconie ‘lax Act 1957 (rm) to set aside or exempt lnlend Revenue Baavd‘s (IRE) decrsion in trielorrn ol Notices emdditienal lusessmenl (Form: J) lor me years olassessnieni tun) 2017 and 2015 tor irie teial sum el RMdi2au,555.ea on me grounds that irie said Form J were illegal void. urilavwul and/or in exoess oi auinomy, riad been inaiienal andloi unreasonable and resulled in a denial oltne Applicants legitimate expecletione: l.2 A Declarallon mat lrie Applicant is eriiilled In etaim me losses in us 2017 and 2015 amounting lo RM2,292,la2s4 and RMi,9a8,472 96 respectively surrendered by Puncak Niaga Cons|ructlon sdn and (PNC) according lo the Group Reliei sdieme provided underseciien «Am oHhelTA. t 3 Trial all luntier proceedings including trie enlcioenient and efieoi of the slid Form J be siayed until the lull and final delerrninatien of ttie application to quash the said Farm J; 1 4 Trial all neoessery and consequential directions and orders tie given: 1.5 Tha| |he costs oltnis applicauen he costs in the cause, and 1.5 All otherand tunnel reliel wnicti ttiis Honourable courl deems at and proper 2. In essence lne Applicant, Ftmcak Nlaga Management Services sdn and med an appllcahon lei leave in ooninienoe iuoisiel review against the Honouretile ' 'sier 0! Finance (Respondent) seeking various reliefs eineng otriers an drderloi the Honeuietile MIVIISIEI of Finance to exercise his powers under section 135 and/or Seclmn 11‘/|3A)oHhe WA to set aside ei exernpt ine No|ices ol Addiiionnl Assessment (Form J) loi VA: 2017 and 2013 raised by me lnieruener 3 Alieririe heanrig.|t1ISmls$ed\he Applicants application tor leave to wrnnienoe iudleial levlew (Enclosure 1) I will now set out me grounds for my decision. zenn IN hEYlvUIHfl“WxTDVMalKw «mu. s.n.i nuvlhnrwm be UIQG e may i... iniin.ii-i uni. dnulvllnl Vfl nFluNfl Wm! argue onanapnlwczmnfaqudicwalvevwew Au ,Icammxagm. o. 5: .. 2(4) mull nalbc mm In Iaananm. n munbc ma eammuuly, booilmrwilh o 5: 7. am which vmvwdes [an Inn nub-ml: rlrudlnqnnnundin llulrpranlrconuxl Ilcln he so that mm ma m: away: he an azmal at on by ion! ~ [emphasis added) 19. I nausea lha| ma High Court has adopted a swmflar pasman m aHowmg ;ud\c\a\ review against deemed decuswons made by public auUmri|Ie5 In um regald‘ ma High Court has daaunaa to rely on older decisions that were premised upan Order 53 Rule 214) or me Rmes av mgn Conn 1950, where the amt al ramewabxe decwslons Is hmned 20 I can provma no betler nevevenoa man me case oi Immun soloka Sdn Bhd v. M-marl Kawaugan MI ylln [2022] MLJU 3479; [2022] AMEJ 2020 wherein my learned bromer, wan Ahmad Fand J held as vouaws — 1211 the lsamsd Semor raaaan Counsel anrzclefl my allenlmn \a ma nmpugned mm Ind rvalervea me na me puflgmom -3! ma Com av Apr-ea: Abdu1Rahmin bm Ab<1uHah Mmnrfln Orsv Datuk Sander Kual: Lumvur 5: Ma! [2006] a MLJ nu ca "1: lumen src mm auhmima man an. Mmlikl nan-Iilpcnu za um lmnugmd mm um um cansuma . dnculon wunm me melnmg 00 o 53 : 2:» In short the waamaa src crmlarudsd man any auamm lo wrwnn a deemnd doclsfnn" would give us. In an Artificial nwanlny to an wmd - nclxlon." [25] Wm resuecl um uumld Ippmalzhlhl dncnlon on «ms spaunc me m mm Rihman hm Ahduflah Mumr mu. cluflon My reason ‘a nu; rm declslun or Inn coun of Avneal is vnmiud on o 53 u an al on lumnr Ruln a4 Nlgh cam 1I£D.IIsmes as renew; . Any porson ma Vs adverswy aflnclad by me name"; at Iny numlc ammnly shun he anlmvd Iv make Ihe apnnmamn Nowuvlr nu now a 5: am cl um Roc pruvndas as rauawa . Any plum who 1- Iflvustly llhclnd by (M duclilen. man at omiuiun m rv\am>n in ma uxmsnca 0! ma pubhc duty or vumm shaH be enlmad to make me apnheamn u... 11 al In am am» Hnflwxwvuanxw «ma. saw nmhnrwm a. med w my a. nrW\ruH|Y am. dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [29] The new a 5: . 2(4) 5:! an we has afldnd Iha pm... "oucision. Icllon or omlnlnn In nlntlon In ma anmm am. ubllc duly o. luncllon.‘ xn my ‘new ma word omission 5 simply a hnlnn m mnkn . daclnlon. n In a non-dnclslnn. wm. ma Introduction en». wovd “ominion” In Ibo ncw a s: r 1(1), (in quullon or an “anlllclal dslslnn" um um um» um [30] TM omlsslun ora non-dncisinn, tomy mm, is amevuhhlojnd an n aw. m lama! hm rm: Nimmddm vYha Regnluarai Soaauasflmzl Muu 1523 the apnlxcanl apuhed vdr mgmuauon at PAKAR under me Souelxes An 1365 ms dedsxon m regnslev or nvvelwlse us wlmn me mscrwan £71012 Rawnsvav Imdenhd Souvllu Au wse The Registrar \5 enjoined M01: Somahes Am «a mnsuder me apphcalnon and maku a dmm. ndwmv. we mgmm had hnlsd -.7 nuke a fllcmun . one way onhe olher Ravmmran Paramagum .15 (now JCA) hem Ihal m my opumdu me mdmmm. and oormnumg delay wnhom good reason In me msvsnl can u squwalenl Lo ve¢usa\ m make a decmon As we appncam has sumcxanl |ega\ Vnlevesl m we may mm. Rsgmvano make a meclsaon on me appncamn m vegsm PAKAR. I held (hat Ihe :elusa\ In make a decrsmn u mama: and «ma mum Somalxes Act was (emphasis added) a) (See: Syarikzl Kapasl sdn Bhd v. Mneteri Kewangan Mnlaysla and ulllu cans [z\113] AMEJ 0471; [2023] MLJU 52 up an Agvluullun (Malayua) sun and v. Munlnrl Kuwangin Malaysia (202314 AMR nos; [mm] MLJU 4 cj cum lnvuslmanl Ltd v. mnml Kawangan Malaysia [2022] MLJU 360) 21 Based on the above. m Is euaem Iha| me Respondents deemed demsicn of 24.11 2020 Insmg hum I15 non-reply |o me Applvcanfs lener can be amename m wdicxal review under Order 53 we 2(4) a! me R00. 22. Thevefare, «ms ooun does not agree mm me can|enImn 0! Ike learned src and SRO an rm omemnun Dare :2 at za sm bah: Hfl9WxTDVMalKw «mm. am ...m.mm .. d... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Thu Nottoe of Assessment niisud by the DGIR who was not named as u partyterms neuon 2: The teamed SFC argued tner by not nernrng me new In tne present stnt Is tndeed tnvotods and vexattous because tne sub|ec| matter reIa|es to the assessment raised by the DGIR Henoe, tne assessment by me DGIR Is the decrsron tnst tne Appltzanl is drssetistted wrtn 24 However. pursuam to an order at tnts court dated te.2.2a23 rne DG\R his been atlawad In intervene as in Inlervaner In tnis id cial revtew auphnalran under order 53 Rate 8 ottne ROC Thereluvet I mew rnat tne teamed srcs objeclton ts e nomssue and has become academic rare Applicant ru Hn meet : mlndlmul. Howovu. Ihu App: mt r ad to estataltsn legal duty 25 The teamed src omected tttat tne Appttcant ts not entrtted to a relret to onrnpet |he Respondent to set asrde tne Nottce cl Addthonal Assessment resued by DG\R as the Respondent nss no teget duty to do so 26 Tne Federal court in Minllur of Flnsn -, Government at Slbxh v. Petrojese sdn Bhd [2005] 4 MLJ s4I;[1ntu}5 cu :21; [zonal t MLRA 705. netd that an order of mandamus can be granted eitner. (a) under sectton 44 of the specmr; Rettet Act 1950 (SRA): or (12) me eddttronat powers at the Hugh court provtdefl by paragraph 1 tn! the scnedute to me courts ot Judicature Ax.11964|CJA). 21. tr ts also In be noted tnat Order 53 Rule 1(2) of me ROG prnvmes that Ims Order to. 5:; VS subjazfl |o the provtstans at Chaplet vm of Fan 2 ottne SRA, but rs M m rn t2aYwL1IMu9WxTv\IManKw “Nate s.n.t mmhnrwm r. .r.... m my r... nflmnnflly sun. dnuuvtnnl Vfl .nnne vtmxt 28. Triereiore, any application for an cider at mandamus made by way cl judlclfll review proceedings niusi coinpiy wiin me lequiremenl al Seclion 44 oflhe SKA. 29. seaion 44 mine SRA reads as loilows “EMFORCEMENY cir PLIBIJC nunes Pamr wordlf public sm-nu and minis In an cumin soccilk: was 44 in A mg: may make in mfler requiring any spam: acl In be dun: or lomomei uy any peisan naming a public amen. whefllev oi is perinansni UV .3 iunipoisiy nalum Hf by My uorporabon oi any eoun subardm . la in. uign Coun Pnwldsd |hal— (n) in lnp\II:a\ioH Iur inch in order ha ma. by mi. pawn WNIEB propefly inancnise or peisonsi ngni wauu be iniuiea by me lomnring aiuaing sin. use mly he. at me snia so-civic In in) such dmng nrlomeaflng in underany isw min. lime wng in [ONE cieuny Incumbent on me person or mun in niwi lb gum»: cnamun won me ooipmmn in iis Dulpovala cnamiei. (c) in me opinion oi ins Judge [he dfimg nrfurbsarvig is umsoviam io ngni ms lllllflfii mi in. lpphcanl has no olharspeuflc ...i adnquals Inga! mnuiy, and La) me remedy given oi the im1erappl>ed 1urwiH 5. mmphle 42) Nolhing in INS section shall he deemsa to sums aJi>d9% iai In make any man! binding on [he Vang di-Famlari Agolvui (Dim make my mien anyservani olam/Gavammuril in Malaysia as sucn, memly la eniiome Ins iatiflachon M a claim upon llual sovinnnieni, or ici In mike any wear nniai is Mhemrnl Ixpanly axdudsd by any in lnr the fims being in Force" 30. in Kenn Moi Chow v. Pniarn Sinuh [1072] I MLJ IIDE; [W12]1 MLRH 497. shamia J (as he men was) had nuuinea (our pierequisiies essenusi in me issue or an order urine: seaian 44 of lhe SRA or a mandamus- but It ma SIN nan: uinrrvmivuium. “Nun: Smli navihnrwm be UIQG u may i... nrwinnflly MIMI m.i.n. VI nFi|.INfl Wm! 31. 32 33. 35 no wnenner nne Ap icann has a dear and spacnfic negan ngnn no one rehei sougnt; nu) Whether more is a duty imposed by iaw on ntre Respondents; (Inn) Whemer such dmy is of In imperative mnnis|en1sI character nnvoh/mg no judgment or dnsorenion on tna pan on nna Respondents; and (iv) wnetner me Auplncant has any remedy, onner nnan by way oi mandamus, la! nne enloroement on tne right which has been denied no rnrn Based on nne case, in order to issue nrve order on mandamus. me App|ir:Bn| must show not only nnat no nos a negan right no have me an periomreo out tnan nne righ(mus1 oa so cnearn specific‘ and we" denned as no he nree fmm any reasonable controversy The order cannon be issued wnen nne right is douoniun, or is a ouan ed one or where in depends upon an issue on ran to pa dene ed by nne Resoondenn. Tne ianiure no snow tne existence on any iegan rignn no aornoen nne penonnande on a negan duly cast upun nne Respondenn will deny tne order 0! mandamus Anomer rmpornann nordne man needs |o oe crossed oy tne Appnroann nor an orderor mandamus VS no shuwthal nhere is a duty rmooaed oy now on me Respondenn. In the absence o1 sucn Iegai duty, nne mandamus shaH non lie against me Respondenn Coming back no me «acts in the present case‘ Hind nnan nne Appnnoant seeks an order no oompen nn Responden(1MinIs|er oi Finance) to eeneside tne Notices on Ad nan Assessment The ouesnon is whelhera negai duty exists fort s courn to grant a mandamus n find nnan the rennet snughl by nhe Appnnoant is like mandamus n e no compei nne Respondent no exercise its power under Section 135 and/or Sec(ian127(3A)oHhe|TA. itmuen oe borne in mind nnan lms power is discrelnoniry and tne Respondent nas the niperty to exercise nns pcwe( wnthout oemo lowed no do so. Moreover. one exerrnmion oi tax sought try tne Anplnuant cannot be gnven wilhcul oonsidering all nine reievann facts and documents on the case The approach taken by me Applicant is as ni the no 15 on In ru haiwulflnfl/n/xTv\IManKw “None semi luvnhnrwm be o... a may r... onnn.n-r mm: dnuaviml VI mono v-man Respondem nas no oplion other than to agree and arms by me Aupltcanrs tequest 35 Tneretote, {K is the respectiul vtew DHNS court tnat «nets 15 no tegat duly |u be tmpcseu on me Respondent under any taw hence tne Applicilnl ts not enmtea (a camper ms Respondent to set aside a Names of Addtltonal Assessment Issued by DGIR reason bevlg Responaent has no legal duly to sel astde the Names aiAddmDnal Assessment under the ITA Sncllulu 135 Ind 1Z7(3A) ol the IYA do um nay. nnxul to set a the Notice uf Assessment Issued by an DGIR 37. Tne DGIR ts empowered by me tn to VEVSB the assessments and me Apphcanl IS (lying to quash me said assessment by enlorctng me Respcndanl to axeruse tts dtscmllonsry powers under Sectton I35 and Sewer! 12713/UOHHB IT/-\ whtdl pmvvdes as (allows — -135 psnuerutnuurto ulve dilecllons Lo mnctm Gnnuul The Mlmslef may guts to ms Dtlcauv Geneml dtreatans cl a geneat charmer (no! Inounstsmnl mm (ms Act; as In tn. mm... M tn. mnutons of ma Dlrenor sensrat unset mus Am and me Dwenlcr senemt snsu give 3413:! In any atrecwons sn given‘ as Secuun I27(3Ato1 the ITA reaas as rouaws — Exemnlion mun ux: qlnufll ‘(3A) me Mtrus1er may tn any panmutarcm mmm any rnvwn «mm an ar any 07 me pmvluon at ‘N5 N1, etlhei genetetty or VII lespen at any tnmmu or s pamnulav tune or any can of tnmme nl e plrlntmir mm‘ 39 Upon readmg Secuon135 and sectmn 127(3A) anne ITA, lflnd mat both provtstons carry the word ‘may’ wntcn clearly shows mat the Respandent has a dlscreltnn an wnemer to exercise as nowerernal under tnase satd seaions and therefore, tne Apphcanl cannot mmpet me Respondent tt me Respondent chooses not In do so. 40 The word 'may‘ eonnote a nnnntanaatery nature as tenectea V7 me ms: 01 Lock w o Kacl v. Manta Hal Ehwal nalant Nngofl & Ann! [1993] A CLJ 211: [1993] 3 MLJ 691: [1993] 1 MLRA 463; 1199312 AMR use where the men supreme court held that - Fan la n! 2:: IN hEYwLIIHn“WxTD\IManKw “Nair s.n.t nmhnrwm s. U... M my s. snnnnt-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum vtmxt 151 the significance otsech e ptohston in the ihtetptetenan Au wili remain the ieeet drallmnn In aiways oontme the us: at the word’ II to II: mandatory sense 3. contmt lo the use et Kin ward my which denotes - p-nntuten udisnetion" [emphasis added) 41 Going by the plain ruadirig otsecttons t27t:tA)or 135 Mine ITA, i am at the view that no nght was given to the Appitcent ettherto ask at dneci the Respondent to exempi the assessment raised by the DGIR. but instead. I5 putoiy the dllttleltan puwar at the Respondent to exercise or hot 42 TTNS court Is at the view that it Pariiamerd thienda to do $04 Parttameht will state that the Applicant may make the appitcattah to the Respondent ot the Respondent may issue thstructions to the DGIR on the Applicanfs appitcahen Theretore, the section musl be read piathiy ea iegtsiated by the Fatitameht. 43. in interpreting such provisions, which are clear and unambiguous in meaning‘ this Honourable Cnurl has eonsuieniiy held that such provisions shouid begivsn tttetrpiem. rtaturalarid ordinary meaning 44 Further, eurSupsriorCourIs have held thettn irIlerpre|tng statutory provisions, the courts shouid meteiygtye effect to the iaws enacted by Parttameht and should not usurp the legislative tuncttoh by exlarldirig a statute to meet a case tor which provision has cieatiy and undoubiedly not been made 45 Based on the above. this court agrees with the submission at the teamed SFC and sac that Secllnns 135 and I27(3At at the ITA do not have nexus to set aside the Notices oi Addniohai Assessment issued by the DGIR. The Applicant clrcumvent and tuned to exhaust the domestic remedy provided under the l'lA As it is a tact no| spuled that the Appttceni chaitehged in the term at Nottoea ofmid phat Assessment (Form J) on the Appitoaht tor us 2017 and znta sed hythe DGIR v... 11 at so m batwuiwnwvxwvuanxw «we. sent naviherwiii a. ii... a may t... btwiheiily em. dnuaviml VI eriutifl vtmxi 47. The Applicant being dissatisfied aria aggrleved by an assessrnenl in me Sald nolipes srioula make an appeal lo lrie special commissioners at Income Tax (scrr) lor uelerniinalion. The riglil lo appeal is Dmvlded linuer seclion 99 oi lrie ITA 4a irie Applicanl had lnslead shun Cllcml and lakerl a ‘sribncul lb deal‘ willi lne additional assessrnenl ralsed by me DGIR llirougri lrie iudiaal review applicalien againsl me Respondent. 49 since we Appiicanl had already med Farm 0 lo appeal in lhe sclT, lrre application lnr ilmieial review by me Applicanl is lnvolous. vexalmus and an abuse oi lrie probess pl me Courl Relerring ID ine case M1: Wu Ruliy sun and v. Dlreeler Gnnlral of Inlnnd Rnvnnuo [2004] 1 MLRH 154; [2004] 6 EU :98: [2005] 4 MAR 521; [mm] 6 ML] 53, me cairn relused lne application for leave lor iuaiciel mvlew and held lnal. 1301 Flmtver. 1 arn awe or me view (he! ine cenumerll Nlllg no ine lrlsV:n| appriumn and abpiieanis appeai beipre lne Spaclnl corrirnnsimrs eenainiy wnsarlne a duplrclly or proceedings and VS Indeed inyaiairs. veullous and an abuse bl lne prams no me calm ‘ 50. Triere are numerous cases on lhis queslmn mwnelner an Applicanl should exnailsl me damesllc remedy available belare making an appliealion (or iuaieial review cases have decided thal lne Aophcanl is nbl enlilled lb iniliale a iuaieial review prooesding agalnsl lrie Resporiaenl as me Applicant had varied to exnausl lne sialulary appeal procedure available (see Kama Pangaren Hull Dalarn Nnqul v. Alum Lucenl Malzysia sari Bhd & Anor [2017] 1 MLRA 251, [2017] 2 CLJ 1; [21117] 1 ML! 55:; orienral Aaaernbler Sdn Eric! V. MOIIMH Kewengan a. Aner [2o1a} umuu 793; 1201311 LNS B75: 1- Wu Ruzlly Sdn Bhd V. Knu- Penqavzh Hasil Dalam Negnrl a Anar [Inna] 2 MLRA151; [2009] 1 ILR 1; [21194] 4AMR 52 , [2003] a CLJ 235; [2009] 1 MLJ 555 (cairn M App: ); Robin Yuri Pong Neng y. Km. Plngnnh Kasanran s-koria Mlllylln & Anny [2n1o11 MELR 51; [2010] 2 MLRA 511; (101015 cm 505; 1201112 ML! 451). 51 Based an lrie abeye inls cam is at me VIEW lnal ina Appllcarvfs applicalian var ilmicial review is prernalure Tlie law pmvldes tor an avenue lo appeal |o be exhausted iirsl belee lne son’ pursuani I0 seeiibri as urine in r... .1 and IN l:EYwUIMn9WxTD\IManKw “Nair Sam mmhnrwm .. ll... M may i... nflnlriaflly MVMI dnuuvlnrrl n. nFll.ING Wm! Conclusion 52 Premised on the amrsara reasons, r am :71 me View man ma Apphcanrs appllcalmn for leave ru commence Judlcxal review rs mvoucus and vexauous and an abuse pmcess av me Court 53. As such, I drsrmssed me Applicanfs apphcauon lo! Weave to commence ;ud1c4a\ revrew (Encmsure I) wror costs 0! RM2,5ao.oo «a me Honourabha Allnmey General and Irwarvanar wuhaux me am: mrvee Dated Jfi January2D24 Ahmad Kamal hm Md Shahld Judge Hugh ceun Kuala Lumpur o... 15 .r In m natzvununwvxwvuanxw “Nana smm nmhnrwm .. U... m may r... mruu-r -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max counsels For (he Appllunli For me Honuuralfle Allorney Genera! Fol lhe Vnlervener En. s Saravana Kumar (Cik Yap Wen Hm mm mm; Teluan Rosll Daman Saravana Parlnership, Pegunmnaxa den Fsguamcara. Lswex 15‘ Menara 1 Dulamas. Solans Duxamas. No. 1, Jalan Duxamas 1. 50430 Kuala Lumpur (Ru; Tuarr RDS/SKS/NH/2021/D441) Tuan Muhammad Hn1aya\ Em Wahab Senna: Federal counsex Jabacan Peguam Negara. Eahagxan Guaman, 45. Persxavan Ferdana. Prasml A‘ 62100 Pulrajaya. En. Mohammad Hafldz Mn Ahmad. Senior Revenue counsel. (En Muhammad Asyral Bm Zakaria, Revenue Counsel mm mm}, Lembags Hasu Dalam Negen Maflaysls‘ Jabalan Rayuan Khas‘ Na: 15‘ Menava Hasfl. Fersiaran Rtmba Permm. Cybev 3. same Cybeuaya, Selangur me zn cl :0 m natzaununi?/vxTv\IManKw «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! aackqmunds Facts A The backgmund TacTs of True case are exTrac1ed fmm The sTaTemenT wTlh suname modTficaTTon and are as Toudws. » 4.1 The Aup|Tcam IS a whoTTy mvhed suTzsidTary oi Puhcak Mega T-ToTdTngs Eerhad (FNH) The pnhcTpaT acTTvTTy 01 The AppTTT:anT Ts lo prowde menagemem sennoes Ta PNH Ind oTher subsTdTenes of PNH which Thcludes PNC: 42 Th The course aT carrylng out he pmjecl. lsas ol PNC were sunendered la The AppTTT:anT, but The TRE dTseTTdwed The same on The premuse ThaT losses arose burn The uncompTeTed proTecTs. T im advised by The Applxcanfs soIToT(ors and venly T:eTTeve TheT The TRE has no basis In law To do so as The ITA does run make any resIrTclTon T71 |his name; As The uhdTspuTed chrurToTL)gy M Key eveme leadmg In This appTicaTTon Ts es Tduaws 7 Dale Even: 14.2.2020 IRE has dxsallvwed The gmup reTTeT‘ Tm T/As 2nT7 and 2013 survendered by PNC |o The Applicem 23.2.2020 we a Teuer. The AppITT:anT Thvormed IRE Than The losses elaumed by The Apphcanl Tn Tespecl cl VAs 2017 and 2013 ave leg|uma|e Tn aceardanoe wTTh Seclicn MA at The TTA 2. mm IRB Infarmed its TTnaT audTT Tmd-ngs by disallowing The Tosses claimed by The Applucalicun Th relahoh To group reTTeT sunenaered by The PNC Ta The Anphcanl an The Tea ThaT The project was not eompTeTed and acwal loss had yeT To be ascenamed Due 3 all!) IN eeneuhaewmpmem. «we. SnT1|TnavThnrwHTI>e T... It: may T... nTWTruH|y em. dnuamnl VI nFTuNa WVM F T _ 1 15.3.1020 1n rep\y 1c me IRE’: prewcus ccrmspcrmances, the Applicant dusagreed wnn the |RB's disauwances 01 me group1 rewrev tor ma vouuwmg basis a) pus as a surrarmermg company would sill‘ be m an adjusted Vcss position after deductmg (ha ersfimaled V055 and have aumcrcm adjusted \ass to surrender la‘ the Apphcanlr l b) Havmg disregarded me es4irua1cd 105: «ram me D44 prcyecn and BALE proren, PNC would sIil\ vemam m an admslsd loss nnsman pursuam to secnon 40 of me HA By having a sumc1emad;us1sa I055, ma 1>Nc1s angmls for group renew arm was able |o surrender such loss In me Appncam In acccrdance wan Secuun MA of ma \TA: :1 Accon1mgIy.mere womd be no xssue o1 undercharged |ax by Appncam as a claimanloompan . nd a; 4n me avanl man than us any amaum 04 tax underchargsd much we Apphcanl demesl, 1: should be wmposed cn either ma nlatmam ccmpany or ma surrendermg company and not on mm companies. 2n.1I.zo2n The IRE subscquanuy rawsed Form (3 for VA: 2017 and 2015 agamsl [he PNC and Form J lor VA: 2017 and 2018 aga-nsx lhe Applucarn 24.11.2020 The Aunncanc submmec a request In me Resnnnaem to give me Dveclor General or lmand Revenue mrecuons under secnon 1:5 afme ITAandloranagQI11;alion pursuam m} n...‘ ar In m natwulurfl/vxTvvManKw «mm. 5.1.1 nmhnrwm .. .1... 1: my 1... mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max Sechon 127(3A) oi the ITA lo exempt me lax rawsed arbmamy under we saw Form J s 4 4 As ms Respondent had failed to respond to me Applicanrs reques| |o wssue a dwecllnn under seauan 135 ol me ITA and/or exempl under saunmn 1271:» of me ITA, ma |axes arbm-snly rawsed ma lhe sard Form J. ma Appncam Vs makmg ma present appll n |o presewe ns legal ngms The Respondent‘: dam on m ms lafluve to respond .s Irsalsd as rqecuung me Appncanrs apphcahon for requesl undar sacnun 135 of the ITA and/or apphcallcn var lax sxemplran under sacuon l27(3A) oi ma ITA nu uw 5 "19 Federal com m wnp ma Paclfln: Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nlllorlll Bhd [2017] 4 CL‘ 47!: R012] 4 MLRA 257; [2011] 4 ML] 293 at 303, speakmg through Sunyadi Hallm Omar FCJ [as he men was) held ~ Leave may be granted a me leave .Iup\u:a|\on I5 mnmugm Mas Vmolous and n Weave I5 granrza. In arguama mass m lavor M grarmng mu mus» sougm at me subslanlwe naanng may be Iha Iesullam amaum. A mm mm be manned In the appncamn though rs unless the matter Var gudmlal remew .3 Imeruma la ,m.c.a: mvmw ahsmmary no menu my be enwaag-.1 6 The «as: land down for leave |o commence a mtiwcwal yamaw m WRP ma Pacific Sdn and (man) are as vouuws- 5.1 whelher the sumac: mane: Is amanabre to zumual review‘ and w so 6 2 (mm Ihe malenals avaxlame, wnelhar ma applltallon Is (nvmous and we not thought as lnvnlous, lo consider max Ina App cam has an arguable case to obvam me renet sougm an «he subsuannve neanng. vale 5 sun m aanaumwmpmam. «mm. saw ...m.mm .. U... a may he mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-max 7. Tne prlnclples govemlng appllcallanslorleave lo oonlmenoeludlclal reulew praceedlngs rrsve also been sel oul ln rang Kwor burn a. 01: v. Punnumnn Dnnlhlnl Na-lonal Ehd 5. on [zoos] 1 MLRH 507: [mas] l cu 917; [2006] 5 ML] an at as where Gopal sn Ram JCA las he men was) neld: lmr me mgn Conn rnuulu rm gn mm are rnenle 01 lne case al me leave nag. lls rule ll only In we llms appllcalmrl Vol leave ll Mvuluus Soloo wlll lne man be e«|l|led lo relune leave ll ll s .u use Mum lrle sumac: rnaller ol me mtlaw ls one Mulch by selllea law lelmerwmlerl law urlne mmmon lawy rs »on—lua.e.anle' 8 ll ls lnle that lne Appllcanl have In salrsry lne lesls ptopolmded ln lhe abavarvlenllorlsd cases |o secure me leave (0 unmmenoe llle ludlclal revlew prooeearngs. Al lrus slagel lne caurl need nulgo lnlo lne msrlls or me use, bul only lo see ll lna subject rnaller ls amenable to lualclal revlew or wlrelnerlne appllcallorl lor leave rs lrrvolous In any evenh e judlclal revlew ls me alscrellan ol me courl, lrre spphcatlcn for leave lo oumrnenee ludiclal revlew may be allowed rn exoepllonal clrcumslanees as exolalned by lhe lnen supreme Court Govanlmont al lllalayela 5. Anorv. .l-gale slngn man 2 ML] 1: , 185611 MLRA zln; [1937] cu REP 110 wnlen held Wald allunlrru lneaupeal lmne aleaellan ls s(lH wvlh ln. mun: In act hy way cl lualenl Ievlsw nul mere lnere rs an appeal prlwlsmrl avallzble lo Ihe rnulrcanl, aerlruran snuula Mn nonnalry lnul wlleli lnera ls shown a char lick lunsdnilan or a blalanl «allure lo perronrl sarne slellmry duty ur ln apwuprlzle am a urleus bleach all». pnnaples or nanrral 1uS|lce ‘ nu ground: «or an luulelal uvlvw 10 The grounds ol rellel eougnl are based on me eonlenlron (ha| lne Raswrldenfs declsion was lllegal, vale, unlawful, in excess ol authanly‘ lrralronal, unreasonable and made ln breach ol the Appllcanrs leglllrnala expeclallon. These mnlenuons are supparled by several reasons among whlch lnelude lne lollawlng — la 1 rrre sala Form J rs lllegah volu, unlawlul andler in exoess cl aulhonty lerlne following grounds - r... 5 cl rr srn sane Hnflwxwvmanxw “Nana s.n.l mrvlhnrwm .. UIQG a may r... nflnlnallly MIMI dnuuvlml Vfl aFluNa Wrul (i) Fm. (here 15 no basis m law and (ad in musing auamaner waxes on amn me Applicant and PNC as Semian came; or me VTA cleariy pmyuues that (he Dwecror Genera! oomd eflher mvoke secncn 44A(9)(a) onne WA on me dawmanx cumpany ovsecuon 44A(9)1b) oi me ITA on me sunendenng company; (II) Second‘ the men Supreme Court In National Land Finlllcl Cu-DPOIMIVO Socinty Lld V. Dluclor General at Inland Ravanue 1199:] 1 MLRA 512; [1994] 1 ML] 99; mm] 2 AMR 3531: [1993] 4 cu an has held lha| Iaxmg Vegwsmwon musl ae mleruvsmd s1r1cl\y, “nolhvng Is to be read H1, nothing Is to he wmphed one can only look fatriy 5| me language used " This posmnn 15 M50 adopcea by me Federar cum m Palm on Research and Lmenopmem Board Malaysia I Anorv. premium ve nubll one Seth and A Anolhur Agplll (20041 1 MLRA «:1; [mu] 2 cu 255: [2004] I AMR 202; [2005] 3 MLJ 97; ‘H the present mitten II is clear (ha| there VS no basrs I0 Impose such taxes on the Applicant as the I:|avman( scmpany or PNC as me surrendering company, (Hi) The was lafled (ogwe effecl to seem 44A{9)o1lhe urn by arbllmmy ransmg Form e and Form J wuhnul rugardmg the facis 07 the plcsem mailer: (Iv) The ‘RB lafled to ask the quesnons winch ll ougm to have askad whether he Said Farm J wal wssued on the base of any Vega! and conslvlunnnm aulhnmy and n Ihe akemalwe or addmonally, whether the IRB may disregard |he decvsmns of out supener nmmsy u is Inle Vaw that a pubhc deusion maker entrusted with slamwry powers vs s|nc||y mnfined wnmn me name at mew wnsdlctlun A decvsvon made by a public dec maker that exceeds 105 aulhomy 13 sumecl to scrutiny and rewsw by me H1gh com on me ground at ‘megamy. 102 Tne Respondent‘: decision had been xrrauonal and/or unreasnname for me mllewmg grounds ma 7 cl :0 m haYwL1|MnflWxT>\IManKw «we. saw nmhnrwm e. .1... m my 1... mm-y mm: dnuumnl y. mune v-max iii The Respondents decision I5 liable to D9 quasned on Ihe ground that ll ts an unreasonable that no reasonable person could have oonie to that decision This is especially Irue when tne Respondent nad tailed to give any valid iusuiicauon, reason or oasis lot as decision. (H) There is also a gdoo oasis ior tne Applicant to believe mat the Respondent nad exercised its antnonty aroilranly endioi rneonanically wllhoul aoolytng its intnd to tile iacts and circumstances oi the Aoplitznt as nothing in tile Respondents decision suggests tnat tne Respondent had given even the loneieitt oi tnougnt to me explanation contained in the Applicants letter daled 24.ll 2020: The Applicant at all matenai tirnes acted in good iaitn, gave iull co-cpevallon, rnaoe toll and tank disclosure Ind oblalnad oiolessional advice in managing I|S nnance and lax aiiairs. (ivy The decisions ottna supariuroourls and tnis Honourable Calm in relation to tne interoietation and construction 01 legtslatien and case law are pan ottne laws or Malaysia ano are bindtng on me Respondent The Respnridenl nao ctearlyiailed to take cogrlixarlce oi trrose decisions ano (V) Tne tenure to applectale andglve eiieet to tie true eiieot end appltcalton oi the ITA amounts to a clear corurave n oi Article 95 ot tne Federal Oonshlutlon (FC) Ar\lcle96oi(hs FC clearty states that “No lsxor rate shall be levied by or for me purpose o/ the Federation except by or under the authority of Iederei /aw" was The Respondent‘: decision was inade without having any regard to tne legitimate expectations oi the Auplicant as the Respondent tailed to wrlsldel the decisions of our supenoi oonns and ttns t-tonottraole coun in relation to the interpretation and oonstrtmion ot legislation and‘ nenee, tins eonslitutes a dental oi the leglllmale expeclafinns or me Aoplteant and tnat me Respondsru will take cognizance oline seine. run u out: IN oatzvulilui?/vxwvmanxw «wot. s.nn navlhnrwm be tn... e may i... onnnntn mini: dnuavlnnl VI .nuno Wm! Case lor Ins Honourabll Attorney General and Inlervener 11 The learned Senior Federal Counse\ (srcy for me Honourame Anamey General and learned Samar Revenue Counsel (sac) «or he lnlervener raised a simwlar prahmmary Objafllon (P0). The P0 was premised on lhe vouowmg gruunas: ~ (i) No Decision. Act or Ormsilon was made by the Respondenl tmmster oi Fmanoe) um1erOn1er 53 onne Rec. 4... Tna Nullua av Assessmern raised by DGIR who was no| named as a party to |hrs aclno . my The Aopficam ralref m efieci a mandamus huwsver lhs Appucann fawled Io eslahhsh Vega! duly: (W) SecImns135 and 12'/(SA) ol the ITA do not have nexus to sa| aswde the Notice olAsssssmenl xssued by usnz, M Appncam mrcumvenxaa and (sued to exhaust me aamasmc remedy pruwded under me ITA Yhe decision onno Conn 12 I wul now deal wmn the P05 raised bythe Veamed SFC and SRO Mn necmon, Act or onussron was mad. bylhe Ruspondnnl (Mlmlhr ol Flnnncl) under Order 5: .71 inc R06 13 Order 53 Rule 2(4) or me Roe expressly allows persons who are ‘adversely allecled“ by me aecusmn made by a pubh: amhnnly In imliale mama: review appficalvons For ease of reverence, subrule 4 is reproduced as [allows 14) Any panon who ws advesrely aifened by me duclsuzm amen or mmsunn m malmn In the mm“ ur me pumrc may or Vuncmn shafl he enmaa m mnka ms avnlmauon ‘ .>..¢saun r~ hatzpulunflwxwvuanxw «mm. Snr1|\nuuhnrwH\I>e U... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max 14 The leouiremenls oi Order 53 oi lrie ROG ale marldiwry and mlisl be oonipliea wiln, railing wnicn me applioeiion wouio not be erilenaineo by lne com 15. The learned SFC and sac sueniii mail me Resporioenl has made no decision liial is amenable lo iudicial review and that lhe Applicanrs application is prenialiule. It is to say than me Responaenrs non-reply lo lne Applicanrs lellei does riol amounl lo : eecision amenable lo judicial review under Order 53 oillie R00 is ii is lnie law |I‘laI iailuie oi iaiiisal by a public aiiinoiily lo make a decision is also amenable lo iuoieial review 17 In amigo R-dorm Am v. Km: Poiigomi Hull Dal-m NIgor| [2015] MLRHU las; [zine] 1 LNS :84: [2018] IIILJII 213. Azllih Naviiawi J iiiaw JCA) had allowed lrie leave application and had slaleo mar - 1i A] on me some day, llll aeiilleaiil also imne lo the new slziiiio lis loool nnlillnn inel eiimiiinlie Amda ix aims MI|ayl4I—DenmIfk on and me case iews Daymerlls lficelved by we aopiioaiil iioni wiia swe aie nei Sllbpd lo wllhboldlrlg ieii riinnennoie, me applicant ieiieieiee (him Amdu ix 471 me Ma|aySlasDerlm:ark on prevails DVEI 5 AA iiiil oi lna WA ism m aoolluiii Illa Ixpullly mine In in» Ilflnr mu ll lhc new lo mpeiio lavourlbly la (Ill aiiollc-nu i-pi-uiiulien Illfl appeal, men lhe anp|icani1wil| III-ll ll! lppniul .iiii llplll iimloii ii. ouiio ujochd oyllio now. [15] won me new ieiis io respond lo me iippiiuiiis latlev dllad 29 :2 2016mm Bpplltarll lakes lne posioiin lzial lhn new s lalivl valid 29 i2 2016 II the decision ol me new aiio oeemeo la be have oeeii SEIVBH on in. apoiieeni on 29 i 2oi1 Nllltli (M Ippllunl filnd nil. apnllcatianhrjudl I IIV wIClinII." (emphasis added) is II is iniponanl lo nole inal oioei 53 oline ROC allows lei e oioeaei soope oi ievieweole declslorls as compared lo llie pieinoiis provisions iiiioer Ihe Rules oi me iligri coun ieso A decision oeemad made by me Responoenl ii eiiinoieni lo iniieie an epplioalion for judicial review. In rang Kwoi Ham 5. ois (supra) me coun oi Appeal lielo: - ~lsol The nine palm iaiioo by learned counsel helnre iis Wllh la? less €UHrlflEV\OSi1SlhB|lhB1BwBl7V=r:fl0 oeeiiiimi nyaiiyone Anosinoe o. 53 i may seem iii a -oaoiion in aiiiiiicenls have no cause lo mi in in IE! sin sane niinwiiemeiio. «nii. s.n.i nmlhnrvim be iii... a may i... iiiiniiiii MIMI iie.n.ni Vfl miino vtmxl

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-366-12/2020

PEMOHON DUNIA KUKUH SDN BHD RESPONDEN MENTERI KEWANGAN MALAYSIA PENCELAH Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri

Judicial Review- Mandamus - Seeking for order for Minister of Finance to give direction to DGIR to set aside or exempt Notice of Additional Assessment deemed served on the Applicant - Non reply or non- response of Minister to Applicant's letter - Whether section 135 of ITA impose legal duty on Minister to make decision - Whether Applicant circumvented and failed to exhaust domestic remedy i.e SCIT under ITA.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=66397936-0553-4bed-a6dc-5198f2df8675&Inline=true

29/01/2024 14:39:26 WA-25-366-12/2020 Kand. 77 S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGY8tGdQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25—3s6—12/2n2n Kand. 77 29/01/2132: 1:1 :39-25 mum MAHKAMAH mace: mun nu KUALA LUMPUR mum wuuwm psnssxumm KUALA LUIPUR. MALAYSIA usammm KUASA-KIJASA must psszmouoggu anon ssummu ggugxmnu ND wpzszmuygggg Dalam nemam suam pavmolwnan yarva lelah mam kavadx Ruuowuun memmn Saksyen 135 dan Setsyen xzmm Aida cm Pendapalan 1957 ynng mnmn 3011 mu Dan n. m perkzru Aluran 53 x...m..m.1.n Ma kimah 2512 Amara numn Kuxun sou END Pamahan Dan mzursm KEWANGAN muvsu Responder: Dan KEYUAPENGARAM sum mun nzczru Fencnmh Juagmam lnlmduclloll 1 The Apphcanl on 912.2020, med an appncauon for leave tn commence iudxcwal review pmoeedmg (Enclomro 1) under Omar v... I V! n sm Nnk5zlMF7uum3rGva\Gnu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 53 at me Rules or com 2012 (Ron) seeking, mler aha the 1aHewmg— 1 1 An order Inr me Resporraem 1a exercise as pmver under secuarr 1:15 and/or seerrorr 121(3A) o1 me Income Tax Act 199 (ITA) to se1 esrae or exenrpn me Nance M Assessmenl dated 24.11.2020 for me yeav oi assessmenl (VA) 2009 (or me sum e1 RM 27.6111, 234.30 on me gmunds that me serd Nouoe oreseeeerrrem rs rnegau, Vera. unlawful andlarm excess o1 eumonny, had been m1l1onal and/or unreasonatfle, and resumed m a demal o1 me AppJ1can|‘s|egmma1e expecrauerrs. 1.2. A Decraralwon Mal the gains ansing (ram the disposal of ‘and by [he Apphcanl In Greenslone Developmem Sdn Ehd W the VA zone Ire subied |n real properly gems (ax under the Rue! Property Gams Tax AcI1976(RFGYA). 1 3. mar all lurlher proceedings mrzludmg me envoreemem and sweet of me deueron be sveyed until (he run and final aerermrrranorr oi me apphcatwon 1o quash me decision, 1 4 That an necessary and con3equen|1:\ drreenrons and orders be gwen. 1 5. Tha||I1e ws1s oflms epnlrcanon he were m me cause. and 1 6. All omer and lunhar relrevwmcn mus Honourable cmm deems m and proper 2. 1n essence, me Aapllcam, Duma Kukuh 5:111 and men an applrcemrr lor leave 11: commence Audmal review agamsl me Honourable Mlmsler on Finance (Reeporraem) seekvng varmus relreis, among omere, en order for me Honourable Mrrus1er e1 Funance m exercise his powers under secrrarr 1:15 and/or sec1ren 127(3A) ul |he rm 1o se1 asrde or exempt me Nance o1 Assessment daled 24.11 21720 for me VA 2009 rereen by me wervener for me sum or RM 27, 601. 234.80 on me grounds mm the sera Nome o1Assessmenl 3. Aner me hear1r1g.Id|sm1ssed me Applicanfs spphcalum for Veavelo commence judxcnal rlvmw (Enclosure H I wfll new set out Ihe grounds 107 my aecrsrerr »...mu m Nnxszlwvuumzrevalfinu “Nana Snr1|\nuv1hnrwH\I>e H... e may r... mruurr mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum WM la. It ls Inte law lnal iallure or relusal by a publlc aulhonly In make a aeclslon IS also amenable lo judrclfil review. l7 In Oranno Rodnrlel Aps v. Kslun Punqlrlh Hasil Dalam Nouuri mm] MLRMU 135; [Zml] 1 LNS 334; lzlmu ull..lu 213. Azlzah Nawawl J (now JCA) had alloweu lna leave app|lca||un and had stated mac — my On ln. um. day, (In Ippllnlnl Illa Itwlc lo In: new mung lu leg: pou Ion lnal nulsuanl |a Anna. lx mm; Malayslzrmnmam on and me case law! plymanlx mcalved by me nppzlscarllfmm Wlfa Swlre are nmsublncl la wnvmoldmg lax Furlhammva ti»? awllcanl rellemled lnax Amcle lx ohhe Ma\ayIla—Denmanl on prevalls my 5 ul lull ac ma ma 1967 ms -pnllanl allo -xpmavy mud in iron mm Ihll iv an new fills In nspand tavonrahlv to the Jppllcanfl mpnllnllllon Ind nppnl. nun lhl pplsum will Inn lu -pm: and mm:-nunon as nelnq mm-n by an DGIR. [15] when me new «all. to respond Io Ihe appllcanlx lullsv amen 29 12 2015‘ me appllmnl lakes In: vfiilmn lnal me DGlR‘s lellzrdaled 29 :2 2016 I! the deasmn av on. new and damned (D be may boen sewed on me apvhcanl an 29! 2017 l<-nc-, Ihn Ippllcim mm mus -pplluuen Iarjudlal-I nvlcw -cllon.’ (emphasxs added) 13, ms lmpananflo nulelhal Order53 ollhe ROC allows lora broader scope or ruvlewable aeclslons as compared to me previous Drovlslons under the Rules at me Hlgh own 1950. A aeclslan deemed made by lne Respondent ls sumclenl la lnmala an npph::s|ion la: Jualalal revlew. In Tang Kwor mm A 0:: (supra) me com o1Appea¥ held . 1w] Yhe amer pfllnl mm m laamed counsel balms -u. mn can lass oonfldence. VS lhzlmers ms here no declslun“ byanyurla And 5lIIca 0 53 r 7L4) Speaks cl . ’deoIIlan' ne appllcanus have m muse lo ugw on an applnnllun lmluaml re aw Au-ln.lunnmgr-. o. 53 u. 244) must no: be an III IIDIIIIDVI. n nmsl be new comenun (again will 0. 5: 1. my whnih pmvldss [51] mm sum-llu an rud Iogulhlrand In ml: pruplf mum. Ilcall u. an mm mm mm! um mm b. .n aclual doclllon by Iomcane." (emphasls added) u»... n M :1 sm Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGVBIEnD “Nair s.n.l ...n.mn .. UIQG M my me mln.l-y mm. mmn Vfl .nuna Wm! 19 I named that me Hxgh Court has adopted a slmflar pnsman in anowmg ;udIcIa\ rewew against deemed decrslons made by public aulhormes. In nms regard‘ the High court has declined to raly an older dectsions that were premised upon Order 53 Rule 214)oHhe Rules cl Hlgh Court 1980, where the ambit of revwewabb deasxons .s lmuled. 20. I can pmwse no beller Ielerenee man me case av lmplln Seloka Sun and v. Mumn Knwlngln M-llyslu [2922] un..:u 3479: [2022] AME! zoza wherem my learned brother, Wan Ahmad Fand J held asvouaws — -[271 The leamsd Samar Federal comm altvadsd my anennm (0 me mupuuned bllernnd Manna me to line ,uagmem u! on Cam ac Anpea\ Abdul mmm hm Abduflah Mvmr& Orsv mm Bender Kua\a Lurmw :. my [2006] s MLJ 704 ca nu numen src mm suhmiltnd nm on minim: nun-nlnnn to flu lmpuamd I-nu don nu] conslimu Idnclslun wnmn he nuanmg oil) 53 r2(4) m shun Ihe Vaamea src wnlandad that any anemia in semen a deemed onld gin nu to in armlciil muninq to an vmrd [28] m mm Rahmun hm Ammn MW wnh clumn My mlwn 1 ms nu dmmu ohhe court at Appull Is premised on o 53 r 2(4) nl ch: Iomnr mu Mfllgh Conn ma. u mu; an lulluwi 7 My pevsm ma .. adversely afleclsa by Ina decxsmns ul my pubhc amhonly mu bu mmled to make me npw-cmm nmmm am now 0 5: r 244) aims Rec prvwdes as1oHows ~ Any pannn who Is ldwrsely -«mm by nu duchlnn. Icllon ion m relanun to me axlshlvca av ma pmmc duty or iuncnon she“ be enlnlsd to make me anbhmhon [29] Tina nut o 5: r zmomu. noc ms mm lhn Dhvu ‘doc mu, mm. avomkubon In nlnllon tn IM mmm nhhc Dnhllc my or funcfiun, In myvnew ma ward omlulon II simnly a I-Hun lo mm a declswn. n In . nun-dlclslon. wm. um inuodncnon m the mud n ..- I: not lww o s: 1 214). an quullon 01 In mm: m dlclslon" does not Ionglr arise. [am] Thu nmlsslon or a non-doc n, In my mum, is imnuhlt Loiudicval mm. m Zmnal hm nan Nasnmddm v The Rnglslrir ovsomenes [201 21 MLJU 1323 ms Iunlxcanlavnlmd so: mililmnn u1PAKAR mums Suuenes M11966 Th: aecwsmn Ia regwslerur ems-we 45 wmln me mmmn Mme nagmm under lhe Socmlms An was Thu Ragnlrir v... u nV 1: sm Nnk5ZlMF7uum3FGVaIEnD «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! ts untamed by me someues An In mnsner me annhtmmn and makz a daemon Kawavavr me R-gtur-r nae varteu re make : aeetston — one wayorlhe mner Ravmthran Pavamzgum JC [now JCA7 hem mat tn my Damion rne tnamtnaha and wnlmutnw may wtmoul wad veawu In use mslam case ts eqw m |a remsan to make a demstan As me npnltunl nu lumdanl legal vmeresl vn ma duty of IM Ragtslmr In make a aecisnn an lhe appltcahuvv |u vegIs1er PAKAR I hold met me newest Ia mm n aecrsmt Vs uvvlymm ma ultra Wu rne $ocs9'(\asA.41 tees temptrasts added) a) (see. s kat Kapasi Sdn Bhd v. Mn-mi Kawangan Mllaysl um other cases [zo231AMEJ 0471: [2023] MLJU 52 tat an Agrlcullun (Mnluyala) stir: and v. Monml Knwangan M uynla [20:31 4 AMR us; [2023] uuu 43 ct cum lnvnsmlonl Lta v. mmert Kewangan Malaysia [m2] MLJU sea) 21 Based on the above, it Is evment that the Respondents deemed dectstorv 01712 2:220 anslng from us non-repty to me Apphoanm lellev can be amenable to Juductal revrew under Order 53 Rule 2m) oi tne R00 22. Therebrer true court does rum agree wi\h me cunlenlton o1 |he teamed SFC and SRC on this amecnmn ‘nu Notlco afA.ssessmen1 raised by the DGIR who was not namnd as a party lo ml: nation 2: The teamea ssc argued lha| by not namtng the nan: V7 me present sml re mused tnvnlous and vexalious because the subject mailer relates tn the assssmem reset: by the DGIR Hence, the asssssmanl by me DGIR Is the aectsron tnet Ins Anpncant rs drssattsned wun 24 However, pursuant to an order at [ms Cmm dazed 1s 22oz: me DGIR nas been snowed In intervene as an Intervener Vn this tudtczat review apphnalton under Order 53 Rule 8 a1 tne Roc. Therefore, I memrn IN Nnkszlwvuumzrevalfinu “Nate smut mmhnrwm .. tn... w my r... nflmnnflly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum vmm vvew that Ihe learned sI=<:s umecnon Is a non-Issue and has became acadermc rne Appllum n Hn ofrecl a mandamus. I-Iowmr, Ihu Appllcnnl fllllfl ID Ofilblllll log: duly 25 The Ieamed SFC obIsc|sd Inanha Ag lIcarIt Is not enlmed no a raIIaI Io cornpeI Ina Respondent In set aside Ihe Mouse or Assessmem Issued by DGIR daIed 24.11.2020 as me Respondent has no IagaI my lo du su 25 The FedevaI coun rn Mlnlmr oi Fmance. Govemmenl of sabah v. Pmrofiul Sdn Bhd (200514 ML! 541; [2005] 5 cm :21; [zonal I MLRA7o5. held Ihat an omemvnnandarnus can be granted either Ia) under Seclmn 44 or me Speclfic Rem Ad 1950 (Sm! or my me addihonal powers av Ina I-ugh cam prowded by paragraph 1 of me saneaule to me couns o1JudIca(ure Act I964 (c.IAI 27 l| IS aIsa Is he nmed (ha| Order 53 Me 112) ofthe ROC prayraas mat mIs Omar I0 53; IS subyecl lo we prm/IsIons oI cnaprer VIII or Pan 2 of ma sru 2a Tnerevore, any appllcallon {M an order ol mandamus made by way at Iudrcial review pmceedmgs nrusx u:mpIy wI|h Ina raquuramanx uI Sec1IorI 44 M Ihe SRA. 29 secuon 44 ov me SRA reads as IuIIaws- "snroxcsmsur or PUBUC nuns: Puwerm nnlu public urvlms anu olhecs Ia Isa cenun specific arts as (1) A Judge may mnka an Lmlar raqmnng any sperm zcl Ia he done or iurbomey by any person nmarng a pubhc Mflct. whether in a pemIan51I| or a ttmpovary namra. or by any r:nrpcm|Inn ar Iny own more-nans In In: High man Pmwded Khm- up I! M xx rn Nnkszlwvuumzrevalfinu “Nana s.naI nmhnrwm s. .I..a w my r... nr1nIruHIy mm: dnuumnl Vfl .rIuNa v-m:I (a) an appucam «or sum an order be made by same psrson wmsa properly, «manna, av perstum «gm wuuhl he Irumed hy me farbeirmg mdomg. anne case may be‘ mine mm xpaulxc am. m such damn m rmmnnq n. undev any Vaw lot um me being m Imus clslny mcumbenl on me person or mun .n ms or us vubkc cnan-nan m an m. ourpouuan II: wrpoula anamm us) n the anmmn al ma Judge ma doing or lumsanng .s mnsonanl to nm and mm. my me appnaam Ms no alhuv mama and aaaauaua Veqal mnauy, Ind uns mmady gwsn by (M order Inphofi lorwxll In mmpma (2; Now»! Vn ws senunn am bu deemed to animals a Judfie— (5)10 make any order hmdmg an In: mg at-Penuun Agony‘ my to nuke any Lwuavun any sewanmany Govemmem an Maliyswa. as men. may «a autumn the sausvacmn at a swan. upon Inai Govemmenuzr «cw to maxa any older mm ws alhervnsa axamsry axcnuuac by any law lorme [me bemg in «me 30. In Koan Mal Chow v. Pmam singh [1912] I MLJ IIHB; [1972] I IALRH W1, Sharma J [as he men was) had oullmea tour premq les essenlm to ma vssue M an order under sacmm 44 or me SRA or a mandamus an wnamar the Appncann has a clear and specific Vega! rIgh| to me rehev sougm (n) Whether mare Is a duty imposed hy Vaw on ma Raspanusnva. (m) Whether such duty IS 01 an mupeuauye rvunIs(er\a\ charader Irwalvvng no wdgmenl or dvacrenon on ma pan of ma Respondents: and (M whether the An M has any remedy‘ olhur man by way of mandamus, for the enforcement oi ma ngm which has been demad Io mm but as am am Nnkszmrvuumzravalfinn «mm. Snr1I\nauhnrwH\I>e U... a my me mn.u-y mum: flnuamnl VI mum am 3|. 32 33 34 35 36 Based on the case, WI order to issue the order ot mandamus, the Appltcartt must show not onty that he has a tegat rtgh| |o have the act pertormed out that the nghl must oe so clean specific‘ and well denned as to oetree from any reesonebte pontroversy The order cannot be tssued when the rtght ts douottut, or Is a ouatrned one or where rt depends upon an tssue at test to he detennrned by the Respondent. The tarture to show the exrstenoe ot any tegat nght to compet the pertonnanoe ot a legal duty cast upon the Respondent wrtt deny the order ot mandamus Another rrnpdnanr hurdte that needs to be ctussed by the Apphcart! tor en order at mandamus ts to show that there rs a duly rmpoeed by taw on the Respondent. tn the absenoe of such tegat duty, the mandamus shett not he agatrtst the Respondent conrtng hack to the facts In the present Case, I ttnd that the Appltcznt seeks an order to eompet the Respondent (N|ints1ev or Frnanoe) to set-astde the Mouse ot Assessment dated 241! 2020 the ouestron ts wnether a tegat duty extsts tor this court to gram a mandamus. t rrnd that the rehef sought by the Applicant Is hke mandamus t e to compel the Respondent to exerctse rts power under section 135 and/or section 127(3A) at the tn ttmust oe oome In mrnd that thrs power rs drsoretronary and the Respondent has the llberly to exeretse as power wrthout betng toroed to do so. Moreover, the exempttort 01 tax Saught by the Aaphcartl cannot be gtven wnhout oonsrdenng all the reteyant tests and documents ot the case The approach taken by the Appltcant We as It the Reiwfldent has no 091107! other than to agvee and abide by the Apptrcanrs request. Theretore, rt rs the respectnrt urew ottnts court that there Is no teont duty to be imposed on the Respondent under any law nenoe the Appltcam rs not entrtted to oompet the Respondent to set esrde a Notioe ot Assessment resued by DGIR dated 2411 2020 reasun belng Respondent has no tegat duty to set aside the Notroe of Assessment under the VTA. rs... ts or n ru Nnh5zlMF7uum3FGvatEnu «we. s.n.r nuvthnrwm e. u... e may r... mrn.t-r snn. dnuuvtmt y. .nune vtmxt soctions 135 and 1z7(3A) of the ITA do not have mxus to sit aside ma Notlca omssassmom Iuued by lho DGIR 37 The DGIR IS empowered by the ‘TA In rawse the assessmenls and he Applicant is (rying in quash [he Sam assessment by anion: q me Respundem to sxennse ns msc-euonary powers under secuon 135 and Sechon 12713A)oHhelTA wmm pnames as inflows . “135Fov4ernf lurk) uwe dlreaians to Diruclov sums: Yha Munster may we la nu Dweclor Genera! dlraclmns M a genera! character mm mcanswslenl mm (ms Am as In me axumse on me Iunnnons M ms nnaaor ssnmx under (N5 Ann, and In: Dwaclor Gcnernl mu awn Wad la my dvreamns so gwen‘ as Se¢:n'un12713A)ofme ITA reads asmnows — ex-mpunn cm In; an crll um Th: M. stermay. Ill any Dnrlwcmavcase exemmany nemnnmn all or .my 57? ms wuvlsmn av Mrs AC1. ermer aenerafly er wn mspecl av any moome at a Dsr\Icu\a1kmd or any class u1Inoom:OVa vanwcmarknnd’ 39 Upon readmg Sanlu:n135 and Seclron127(3A)o|lhe1TAJfind\ha( bom prmnsions carry the word ‘may whvch dearly Shaw: that the Respondent has a dtscrelvon on whelherlo Exemse Ms powercr not under mass smd sections and lherelore. me App|u:an| cannot survive! the Respondent n‘ the Respondent chooses not In do so. 40. The word may‘ connots a non-mandabry nalure as tsfloclea m the case :2! Lock wu Keck V4 Mouton Mal Ehwal Dzlam Mogori 5 Am)! [1993] 4 cu 211; (159313 MLJ 691; [1393] 1 MLRA 463; men] 2 AM}? 32511 where me man Supreme Cmm held max - 151 The swgmflcanca alsuaa a umvmon m was mcerprenamn Act wm temam the legal drnlmun lo mwnyi cmflnn ma me o« In ward‘ nuII'ln1u mandltnry sense, In commn to an us. of me wnni ‘mly‘ which «noun a pmnmmn ordlluutlon“ |emphas\s added) n... 17 u! 1: sm Nnkszlwvuumzrevalfinu «mm. Snr1|\nuuhnrwH\I>e U... w my n. nnnnnn mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max 41 42. 43 A5 Golng by lhe plalrl reaolng ol Secllorls |27(3A) nr 135 ullhe ITA. l am ol the Vlew than no nghl was given to the Aoplloanl ellherlo ask or dived lhe Responuenl to exernpl lhe assassmenl ralsefl hy lha DGIR. bul lnsleao. ll is purely lhe dlscrelion power of lhe Responaenl lo exemlse or not. ms coun IS ol the new that W Panlamenl lnlends In do so, Parllamenl WIH $1319 Ihal the Appllcant may make the appllcatlon to |7Ie Relvvorldarll or the Respondenl may Issue lnsltI.lc1lons la the DGIR on IheAppllcanl s applicallon Tnerelere, lhe seclinn musl be read plalnly as leglslaleo by me panlarnenl ln lnlerpreling such pruvlslonsl wnlch are clear and unambiguous in meamng. INS Honourable Cowl has ocrlslslerllly helo lhal such provlslons shoulo heglverl lhelrplaln, nalural and omlnary meanlng Funnel‘ our Superlor couns have helo that W lrllerprla|Irlg elalulory provlsluns, zhe couns should mehelyglvs ellemlo the laws enecleu by Farhament ano should no: usurp lhe laglslallve luncuon by extendlng a slalule lo meal a case lor whlch pmvlslurl has clearly and undoubtedly nol been made Baseo on me above lhls coun Igvess wlch the submlsslon ohhe learned SFC and SRClhat5ac1lans 135 and 127(3A) ol lhe ITA oo no| have nexus lo sel asme me Name olAssessmerll l$S\lEd by me DGlR The Appllaxnn olremnvehuno hllcd lo exh-umln domnllc rnmsdy pmvldld lmdor me ITA 45. 47 ll IS a facl nel dlspuled lhal me Appllcanl challenged V1 lhe lorm of Nolloe of Assessment dated 24.11.2020 on the Aupllcant lor VA 2009 reused by the DGlR. The Applicanl being dlssallsfied eno aggneved by an assessmenl ln the said nolloes sheulo make an appeal lo lhe Speclal connnn. ners ol Income Tax (SCIT) for eelernnnenon. The rlghl lo appeal IS provided under Salmon 99 ollhe ITA nuenolu m Nnk5ZlMF7uum3FGVaIEnD «wn. s.n.l ...n.mn n. UIQG o my n. nflfllnnllly unn. dnumlml Vfl .nunn pnnl 45 49 50. 51 The Appllcarll had Instead shun clrcul| and taken a ‘shoncuf lo deal‘ wllh lne addlhonal assessnuem ralsea by me DGlR Ilvuugh ma judlclal ruvlew appllaallon agalnsl me Rzspondenl slnoe me Apphcarll had already filed Form 1: lo appeal to the sour, We appllcalmn fur yudlclal revlew by lhe Applicant ls mvolaus, vexahous and an anus: of me pvooess cl lha coun Refervlng to me case of Ta Wu Rulty Sun Bhd v. nlmlor Glnaral o1 Inland Ravonun punt] 1 MLRH 154; [mu] 5 cu ass; 1200414 AMR 521: [2004] G MLJ 53. (he Courl rdused the ilppllcallon (or leave (or ludlclal review and held lhal 1301 Further l mu am 5! Inc vlaw mm M: cnrwurrmll mung :21 me lnslanl applmamn and =v|7llcan|s appeal helm: nu speclal Commlssloners cenamly cnnslllula a dupllclly cl nmcmmgs am Is lnflsed lrwolous, vaxallous and nn shun ollhe pmaeu ann. mun’ There are numerous cases on INS queshon ol whemev an Applltzru should exnausl 1ne domestlc remeay avallable before malnng an appllcallon lur judlclal ravlew cases have aeclueu lnal me Appllcanx I5 not enllued lo lI'| s|e a yudlclal Vevlew pruoeedlng agamsl me Rasponderll as the Appllcanl nan lsllaa |o axheusl me statutory appeal prosedure avallanle (See Kama Pungaruh Hull nalam Negui v. Alcml Lucenl lvlalaysla sun arm 5. Anal [N17] 1 MLRA 251; mm: 2 CLJ 1; mm 1 ML! 55:; Orlonl-I Assemblur sun all-1 v. Munluri Kowanqan 5 Anor [ZEUS] MLRNU 193; [Zola] 1 LNS 975; Ta Wu Rnlry sdn Bhd v. Kenna Pang Ih Hnll nnlam N: on 5 Anal [zonal 2 MLRA 151; [zoos] 1 ILR mm] 4 MAR 521; [zoos] 5 11.1 235: lzoulu 1 ML] 555 (cuun of Appeal): Robin Tan Pang Hang v. Kuua Fannarulv Klsaluall Snknrja ulalaysla 5 Ann: [ma] 1 MELR 151; 12010) 2 MLRA 51111201019 CLJ sus;[2o1ll2 ML! 457). Based on me above, lnls com ls ol the vlew lna1 me Appl-canrs appllcslmn (or .u.1lcial ruvlewls premallna. The law pruvldes loran avenue lo appeal In he exhauslsa ml befave lhe sclT pursuanl la Secllon 99 v1thelTA so... 1! all) sm Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGVB\GnD “Nair Smnl ...n.mm n. .1... m mm 1... nflnlnnllly mm: dnuuvlnnl wa nFluNG Wm! conclusion 52 Premlsed on me avoresaid reasons, I am ov me view that the Apphcanfs appncauon tor weave to commence Jummaw veview Is Involous and vexahous and an abuse process of me com 53. As such‘ I msmnssea me Apphcanrs apphcalmn to: leave to commence wdlclal rewew (Enclosure 1) wmn costs 0! RM2,5no.co lo me Honourable Mmmay Genera! -nu lnlervsner wuhnul me auocatovree. Dated: ifl January2024 Ahmad Kamal bin Md Shamd Judge Hugh com Kuah! Lumpur »...m:n m Nnk5ZlMF7uum3FGVaIEnD «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Background Fact: 4 The background facts UHh<s case are exlraned from me Slalsmem wnn suhable modiircaucn and are as fofluwsi - 4 1 The Appncant rs a company inwruarated rn Ma\ays\a and rs pnncrpauy engaged in me busmess o1 Vnveslmenl properly navdrng 42. On 1110.200?‘ me Apphcanl acqmred a parcel at land measurmg appraximamy 23 I7 heclsres known as H.S(D) 25235. F’! 32223 m we Muklm nl smawan, D\s1ric\ av Maruung, Perak(L1nd) 43 vrde a Jew! vanrure Agreement da|ed 26.8 2009 (Joinl vonune Agmnnm) between me Appncanc and Greenslone Dsvekapmenl sen Ehd (Gnnnltonc). me Aapncanr agreed to drspuse 0! ma sand and w Gnsanscane for me Iamar m undenake ncusmg t1eve\apmempm;eds,T7Ie sahent |erms 01 me Agmemem are, inlar all: a The Applmam agreed In aflow Greenstone to develop and Greensmne nas agreed to devemp the said land we a housing esxa|e: 5. The names hereby agree and expressly declare war we Apphcant shau be enmled to enner ene(1)oHhs1oH0wxng aphnns (Land Owner En ernenc) r Aner the corwarsnon and subdivisron at me said land mm separate building lets me Apphcanl snail be summed to 25°/.. merecv xogelner wrm me burldrngs Ia be erected Inereon tree lmm an encurnmnoes, or u. A casn payment hy way of 5313 of no wuss «nan RM 75. ooo.oon.oo omy Dunng aH mitsrim urnes, ma Apphcant I: the regruared nwnar ofme land whereas Greensnone Is the henafiural owner. v... 1 n! 2: m Nnkszlmvuumzrevalfinu “Nana Snr1|\n-nhnrwmbe 5.... w my r... anmnauly mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max coans-Is For me Avwhcanr For me Honourame Allomey Genemt For me Incervener En s Samvani Khmer (cm Tan Jass Key wvlh mm) Texuan Rash Daman Saravana Farlnersmp‘ Feguambeh flan Paguamcara, Level 15, Menara 1 Dutamas. Salans Dulamas‘ No 1, Jalan Dulama: 1. 50450 Kua\a Lumnur. (Ru; Tuan RDSISKS/NH/2021/0441) Tuan Luew Homg Seniuv Fedeva\ C0unse\ (Fuan Noomuqan Bmh Zamal Awm, Federal Cmmse\ mm mm) Jabatan Peguarn Negara‘ Bahagran Guzman, A5. Persiaran Peraana, Presml A. azmo Puuqaya. Cik Ashnna Ramlan Ah. semm Revenue Counse\. Lembaga Hm Da\am Negen Mmaysxa, Jabalan Rayuan Khas‘ Aras (6, Menara Hasn, Pelswaran Rlmba pennau. Cyber 5‘ 53000 cybecjaya, Se\angor nun n at n m Nnk5ZlMF7uum3FGVaIEnD «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 4.4. The Applicant opted hr the second opmon vflhe Land Owner Emmemenl 1m a cash payment of no Vess man RM 1s.oaa.nnooo, m accordance mm ma piymanl Iarms s||puYaIed by Greensnone 45 The chronology o1 key avams, wma. are run in dxspule, leading la «ms applvcalrcn is as follows — um Event The Appncanu had subnuued us re|ums var Real Property Gains Tax (mac?) 1n me 10mm :11 Form CKHT 1A in respect oflhe disposal unne sam lam: The Vnland Revenue Board (IRE) mfarmed the Apphcanl that me dxsposm of wand falls wmmn } ma scape a1 Sermon 7 of ma RPGTA. However, 171 view that the disposal occurred on 4.11.2015 25.3 2009. me gains ansmg from the dIsposa\ ‘ wave uempled (tom RPGT aomrdmg in Ihe Rea! Propetty Gains Tax (Exemplmn) Order 2007 (PU. (A) 14512007) and the Anglican! was no! Iequvred lo me 115 Form CKHT IA V 25 .2u11. Subsequently, we IRE raxsed Nouees a1 1 n.9.2o11. Assessmenl «or Ms mm 2012, 2013 and }15.n.2m , 2014 5!! dated 2572017 «or mooms lax m L respeclaflhe sale oi housmg un-1s erected an 11.1 1.21117 me send land by Gveenskme The Apphcnnt, vlde ils |ax agam (Excluswe 7.x.2aI7, Tax Sen/mes Sdn Bhd), prowded delafled 17. 2011. explanauons along wnn suppomng 22.5.2011. aocumamsm Ihe IRS The Annlicam had aw.) 2s.11.2o17,.suhnu1ted Nuuees -:1 Appeav (Forms 0) In 1.2.2n1a. appeanng agamsl me sad Nomoes ul 1: .2111: Assessmem The Apphcanfs posmon was 5 Inter aha. as fcmwws: - 1.3.2111: : a. M an mauanan nrnss, me Awllcam was the rgpscered age: of me sad land mm 11 m Nnkszlwvuumzrevalfinu «mm. 5.11.1 ...n.mm .. .1... 1. may 1... mm-1 -mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-max whereas Greenstene was the beneirerat owner. I) As the benencrat awner. Greensrone was enlmed to lhegams ans g «mm me sale of the erected nmrsrng units‘ and rrreretore, such garns snould be sumemea rp Greenslone rnstead ol the r Apptrr-ant I The IRB naa accepted me Apptrcanrs r expranatipns and euewee rrs appears aparnsr r me said Notces or Assessment lor us 2011 ta.1n.2ota ‘re 2014 Subsequently‘ tne ma rssuea \ Notmcamarrs 0! Reduced Asxessmsnt (Farms JR) for the VAS 2011 in 2014 all dates! ts,to.2ms. AI tnrs juncture, tne IRE re revrsrtrng tne tssue rev rarsmg rneome lax upon tne game artsrng 2.11.2029 {from the drsposar ofland by me Anplicanl ta 1 tereensrane by way of me eard Joint Venture : Agreement. The IRS rssued a Narroe at Assessment for V VA 2009 dated 24 11.2020 pensequerrt In W; conduct rn suhreering tne gains arisrng fmm , tne drspasat at tend to rncarrre vex r 24.1 1.2020 rrre Anpltcanl suhmnted a request to tne r Respondent to grve m the Dtreclur General 0! 10.11.2020 Inland Revenue drrectruns under sectron 135 of the IYA and/orto exempt the taxes ratsed under sec n I27(3A) onne ITA. 4 s As me Respondent had rerled to respond to me App|manl‘s request In reerre e drractrdn under sectren 135 of the ITA and/crexempl Ihe taxes arbrtrarily rarsed via tne said Names at Assessments undev sectron 127t3N at me tn, tne Anphcanl ts making znrs present apptrcaoon re preserve rte tegal rights The Respondents decrsron rn nrs rarlure to respond rs treated as meclmg me Appttcenrs apprrearren lot page 5 pm r~ Nnkszlwvuumzrevatfinu “Nana s.t.r luvthnrwm r. r... p may r... pflmruflly MW: dnuavtml VI mum vmut requesl under Sachon 135 of the ITA and/o« aunllcalmn lor lax exemption unuer section 127(5A) ol the ITA. nu Law 5, The Federal Ccurl In WRF Asia Pacific Sdn and v. ‘ronaga Nu onll Bhd lzolzl 4 CL! 41:; [2012] A MLRA :57: [2012] A MLJ 296 at 303. speaking lhvough suriyadi Halirn Omar FCJ [as he men was) held ' Laws may be gmrlled lime leave appllcalwn is hath-ought olaa flwulmzsl and n leave I5 gmm, en arguable case in «am at gvamlng me Valle! scughl ac me subxlamlve hearing may be me rexurulfl uulcnms A ndnr mun be lllaalad to the apalmamn lmugh la unless me mailer «oi ludlaal review 4! Inlenabls bu JIMVGVBI lavlaw abmhnely no Iuwesi may he anmm - 6 Tha lasi laid down (of leave lo commence a lumcial review in war ALI: Pacific Sdn and (sum) are as «anew: 5.1 wheiher ihe sublet! maller is amenable In ]|AdICIaI review, anu ll so 6.2. him the ma|erlals available, whether the application is frivolous and ll not lhnughl as irivolous. lo consider that Ihe Applicant has an arguable case to obtain one relief sought al the suhsxanhve hearing 7 The principles governingappllcancnslorleavelo commence iuuicial review preeeeuings have also been sel out 10 1'-ng Kwor run. 5 Dr: V. Penqurusan Dnnahlru Nalional mud n Ovs [zone] 1 MLRN 5n1: puns] I CL! 927; [2005] 5 ML: no at as where Gupal sn Rum JCA (as he then was) held: [ID]' ma High Calm should nai go lntu ma mans oi me case at lne leave mg. MI role lsorlly Io see .1 xha ippllcfllnfl var lam Ii Vllvolous So we will ihe Dhtlll bo anmlau lo heluse leave W n is u we wnaie lhe sumeci inane: ml in. VEVIEWII cm which by itmad lawlelinerwmian law arm: nommorl lawns nun-ludlclable ' ll la lune man «he Applicant have |a salisry the teens pmpmmded In lhe abnvemenuoned cases to secure the leave to commence lhe judicial review proceedlrlgs.AHl1ls slage, Ihe mun need nol go no Fneialn IN Nnk5ZlMF7Uum3FGVBIEnD “Nair s.nn mmhnrwul .. U... a may he nflnlnnllly mm. dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna Wm! me rnerlls of me case‘ but only to see if the sublec1 rnaner ls erneneble |o ludlclal revrew or wneurer me appllcahon for leave ls Ivlvulnus 9 In any event‘ E judlclal lewew Is the dlscrehon 0! the com, me appllcallorl {or leave (:1 oomrnencs Judicial review mly be illowed ln exoepllonal crrcumsvances as exalalnsd by me men Supreme Cnurl ln Govommont of Malaysia a Anorv. Jlgdls Slngh[1i!7] 2 ML! Il5;[1DI6]1 MLRR 207: [1987] CLJ REP 1I|'l whlch held‘ Mela alluwlng me anneal tn the areaeuun ls sllll mm we own: In an by my or rumsrsl revltw hul when: mu. ls an appeal Drovlslon mrrebre lo me appllcaml cenmsn snoula ml normally lssue unless mere 45 slluwn a clear lack ;unsfllc|lull on bluunl hllun Ia percerrr. mm: xlammry duly M In sppmpnals cases a senws brsaar mine Drmcllales 41 nalural nrsuu “ ‘nu grounds tar lne jud lal rev:-w 10 The gmunus of we re soughl are based on me ounlentlun met me Respenaenrs declslon was lllegal, vom, unlaw1uL exeess al sumnrny. rrraubnslr unreasonable end made rn breach 0! leglllmale axpecla ons These conlenlmrls ere supporled by several reasons among whlcrl lrlcludelhelullowlng — 10 1 The said Nmioes ol Aadrlranal Assessment were ultra vlres, lllegal, vold. unlawlul and/or In excess ol aulhorlly lor me lallcwrng gmunds. ~ Frrslly, me IRE had aaed erbnrarrly ann exceeded us aulhnrlly by comrevenrng e well-eslabllshed legal pnnuple lard down by mrs Honourable coun ln NVF Rnalty Sdn and v. Comptroller at Inllnd Rwenue [1974] 1 MLRH 39: [was] 1 MTC 234; mas] 1 BLJ 234; [um] I MLJ 132 where the RB Is bound to lock er me clvcumslances surmunfllng me fllsposal as a whole ln escabllshmg whslhar an asset rs held «or me purposes ol rnveslrnenl orlradmg In the presem mlfiel. Ihe R5 was merely alleging that the gems anslng lrurn me disposal by the Appllcanl acnslltuled bu SS lnwme and killed to cansluer Ihe clrcumsfannes surroundlng the a'sp°SaL van 2 cl 2: sru Nnkszlufiuumzrevalfinu «wee s.n.r mmhnrwlll e. med e my r... bflnlrullly mm: m.r.n Vfl .rluNa vmul b. Secondly the iRa rial: aaed arbiharilyand exceeded ils aulrrorily by disregarding a walleslaeirsned legal principle laid down by rrielneri supreme oourl iri Lowor Porak cooperative Housing Society and v. Kolua Pang: n llaell nalani Negarl [1994] 1 MLRA 202; mu] :4 cu 5A1: [WM] 2 AM! 1135; mm 2 ML] 71:. where rl was rield max llie inlenuon lo lrade rnusl be Show up nave exlsled at lrie rirne oi me aoeursiuori ollrie Draverly in me preserrr manner, the Appiiearil acquired and kept me sad land lor invoslrnenl purposes. as agricullural land. and lriere were no inrerilions on me pan of «lie Applicant (0 Imde in land, c. Fuflhefi me IRE iarled lo consider its dulies to provide suliiaenl evidenoe |o eslahlish lrade or an advenlure or earroe ri Ilka rrade as neld in VMF v. Kurtul Povlglilh Hasl Dalarn Negeri mall IIISTC 3257. As no evidenoe was provided lo supporl lire IRB‘s allegalions, me Appircanls drspdsal lalls squarely wilriin lire scope of «tie RPGTA .1. There Is no basis lor lrra IRE lo allege lraoirig on me purl at rrre Applicanl as lrre disposal 04 land via a Jornl venlure Agreemen| belween a urxpayer and developers does ricl prinra lacio arnourrl lo lradirig, as eslaplisried in we case olVMF(supra);am1 e IrI1aCl,|he|RE riad inirially ackrimviedgefl |ha( lne galns arising irnrn lrie dlsposal at |he said land laii under me scope olsecucn 7 ollrie RPGTA Nevenrreiess, under me Real Frcperly Gains Tax (Exemption) order zoav (P.U. (A) 14$/2007)‘ sucri gains were exerripled lrorn RPGT Al rnis iunclure, lliere is no basis lorlne IRE lo revisir lriir issue agalri, 102 The Resporiderirs decision had been irrational andipr unreasonable lor lne lollowirrg grounds — a Trre Respondenrs decision is liable lo be quashed on llie ground llial I! Is so unreesoriaole lrlal no reasonable persnri could have come |o lhal decision. Triis is v... r of xx SIN Nrik5zlMF7l.lurn:lrGvalEdu “None s.n.i nurihnrwiii be u.... m an i... nrwirrnilly MIMI dnuuvinrrl Vfl nFiuNG WVM especeuy true when me Respnndem had failed to grve any vafid jusuficaucn, reasan or bests fonts GECVSIOH not to exempt the irmlranly raised taxes p me Appncant at an matenel limes was In good 'i\Ul, gave tun co-cpera|ion. made mu and frank msclasure, and aptamed professronal advvce W managmg us nnanoe and lax awatrs. c The deusuons at the Superior oauns VI retanon tp Ihe mlerprelahon and oanslruclton ol Iegtslatton and case the Respondent The Respondent nad clearvy is ad to lake cogmzanoe oi those decrsmns d. Thelaflure tp apprectale and we effect lolhetme effecl and appltcahorl ol the HA amounts In a ctear conlravemmn M Amde 96 at me Feaemt Conslt|u|mn (re) Amc\e as at the FC dearly s|aIes lhal ‘No tax or rate snan be levied by or lor the purposes er the Federauon except by ev undar me autnomy 0! team! law" 103 Tne Respundenrs decvslan was made wttneut havmg any regard lo the dactsrcns at our Superior Courts tn retahan ta the .nterpreveuun and ounskucllun of Vegtsmton and tins consmulas a dental of ma Veglhmale expeclmlons DI Ihe Applicant that the Responderfl WI" take cognizance uf the same case ior Iho Hnnourahle Attorney General and Innervensr 11. The Ieamed senmr Federal Counse\ (src) lor the Hcnaurame Allomay General and teamed Same! Revenue counsel (sac) rm me lntervener ravsed e strmlar pnshmlnary otnecuon (P0) The P0 was nrelmssd on me following grounds — to No Deciston‘ Act or Omtssian was made by the Respondent (Munster at Ftnanoe) under Order 53 ohm Roc, me s 0121 m Nnk5ZlMF7uum3FGVaIEnD «nu. s.n.t ...n.mn .. n... u may .. nrW\ruH|y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum vmm air) The Name of Assessment raised by DGiR whn was not named as a party rd |his neuron. (in) The Appiicant relrei In eaieex a mandamus however me Appireani varied in esiapiisn Iegai duly‘ IN) sections 135 and 12‘/(BA) of me in do not have nexus |a set asme me Noliae oi Assessmenl issued by DGIR; M Applicant circumvented and lanled to exneusr the domestic remedy pmvmed undenne ITA The duclslon ol the Conn 12 I win new deai with me P05 raised by me iearned SFC and SRO No Decision. Au or emission was made by are Respandenx (Minisur ol Flnnncn) under order 5: Mun ROC 13 order 53 RM: 2(4) or me ROC expressiy aiiows persens who are ’adversaiy aiiecred" by me decision made by a pubiie authority in inILia|e iudiual review apphcations For ease at re1ererice.subn.IVe 4 15 repreduced as Voilows -up Any person who n adverseiy aueered bylhs uededn, aerien or mI\i$oari m rennen ha in Ixarcau m (M puhiun duly er mncliun man he enmrae |0 make me aw btfihun‘ 14 The reeurrerrrerws 0! order 53 of me R00 are mandatory and rmrsi be complied wixn iaiirrig which are application would not be enterlained by the cam. 15 The iearrred SFC and sRc submit that the Respondent has made no aecrsron man is amenabis |o judicial renew and max me Appiicarrrs appireanon rs premature. II is to say Iha\ me Respondenfs rron-repiy lo the Appiicanrs Ienerdees ROI arndunuo e deasidn amename re judlaal review under order 5: ol me ROG me In at n r~ Nnkszlwvuumzrevalfinu “Nair Semi mmhnrwiii r. n... w my r... nflmruflly mi. dnuuviml Vfl eFiuNfl Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

K-06B-72-12/2022

PERAYU MOHD RAZIN BIN RAZALI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Criminal Appeal – Application for bail under section 13(3) of the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 [Act 747] (“SOSMA”) – Whether the ruling or decision by the High Court Judge in refusing bail to the appellants is appealable? – The ruling made by the learned High Court Judge in refusing bail to the Appellant did not finally dispose of the rights of the Appellant. Therefore, it was not a decision within the meaning of section 3 of the CJA and as such not appealable under section 50(2) of the same Act.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahKorumYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' S.M. Komathy A/P Suppiah

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29/01/2024 16:04:52 K-06B-72-12/2022 Kand. 47 S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N r8TEITl9qky1arnUQUmQgw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal x—nsa—72—12/2022 Kand. 47 29/ax/mm ,5 A :1 IN THE COURT or APPEAL MALAVSIA AT PUTRAJAVA (APPELLAYE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APP BETWEEN MOHD RAZIN am RAIALI [NRIC No.: D|l|l7231Afi921] APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTDR RESFONDEN1 [In the matter of High Court of Malaya al Alor Sutar In an sun of Kuaah Daml Aman. Malaysla Criminal gggncauon No KA u A) 112022 amp-n Mohd Ruin bln Rauli And Public Pnmcucar 2 5w rnzmvqmamunumaqw mm Sum M... M“ be used m M, M nugvuhly mm; nnmmnnl VII muua Wm Qi AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IERAHIM. JCA AZMAN BIN AEDULLAH. JCA s.M. KOMATHV A/P SUPPIAH, JCA GROUNDS or JUDGMENY INTRODUCTION [1] N «ha Sessions Court ma Appeflant was charged wnh two auendss. The rm charge was under seclmn zaa c1 lhe Arm-Tramcklng In Persons and Anmsmuggnmg cl Mxgrants Act 2do7 [/191670] and the second undev sectmn 130V(1) of the Pena! Code For (he firs! charge, the AppeHarI|'S apphcahon Io be Iekeased on ball was aHowat1 by me mgr. ooun via Cnmmal Appncsuon ND. KA-44(A|»5-In/2022. [2] However, the Appellants apphcaliun for baxl under sermon 13(3|n1 me secumy Offenses (spsual Measures) A01 2012 [Act 7471 rsosuw) In respect at me secnnd charge was dismvsssd by me Hugh Cuurl Hence this Appeal, [3] omectiun in Encl. 26 on me ground mat the dsdsmn of me High Cour! Judge on the issue of bad is not appeaxame and me appellanrs appeal ws mus mcompetam as mass nm tau wnmn me denmuon v1‘dec|sIon” under secuen 3 at me Cnurl of.|udiI:aIure Au|1964(“1ho cJA”j The respondent, me Public Prosecuwr. filed a name at prehrmnary 1 sw rtrzwliqmamuuumuvw -ms Sum IHIVVDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm [4] oralw and perusrng me reearrss o1apoeaI,we unammous\y struck our «ms Aner reaamg lhs wrmen eummssrons filed, heanng oom genres aDpeiL We now g\ve our reasons mus APPEAL [5] We noted that the Apoenam, m his apphcation lar barn at me on Cam relied on me grounds mar he was suwerrng Irom nypenensron, diabetes, hyperlnglycendemia, fully liver and hypermioemre (gout), The learned Hrgn coun Judge disrmssed ms appucarrnn on me ground «he: me Aopeusnr Vafled In pmve mar his memos: oonumon was we threatening. The learned Hugh couruudgeoamero this ::onc\usmn based on memcax repcn preparer: by Dr. Moor Hndeya nrmnr a medical omoer ar the Nor serar prison. [5] In ram, me learned High Courl Judge had oonsraerea various aummmes such as new Sari Anwar Ibrahim v. PP (199911 ML! 32:, FF v. Da|o‘ Emwanl Slngh [2ou214 cm 155, Rama" Shunmugham v pp [2020] 2 CLJ era, eoomem all srnneya v more Prosecumr and other appeals [2022] MLJU 2723, Mohamed FEVSEV Mohamed Sharif V. PP [2UZ2]1 LNS122,Ravmdran Anemslsw V FP[2D22]1 LNS125,Ganesan Muniandy Ywn Fendakwa Raya [2013] MLRU um and Jimmy Ssah man Heng A Dr; v. PP [2019] 7 MLJ ans before he amvad al the decision. 17] we now rum to dea\ first with the Respondenfs prslnrmnary oorecuon u was suhmmed by me Responuem mar nus appea\ was meumpslenl as n does not fall wrmin me defimllnn a! 'de ' ' :1" under section 3 of me CJA. It was argued Ihal therehre, Ims coun has no : sw rtrzwliqhywamunumuvw ‘Nata sum ...m.. WW be used m mm o. nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm VI] muNG wrm jurisdiv:|iun m curvsxderlhis appeal The Respondent rened on me uemsion allms Cour] m we case o!Dsto'senAnwar/zaramm v PH1999] 1 cu 537 which new as loHow:: 1 Mann made pending me man Mme crmgss :ga¥ns| me nppsflanl Is not. In our mrmdecvd opmwrl, .3 dscwslan mm) mat had Ina aflscl av finafly delenmmnw |he fights av III: anpI\|En| u Vs omy ma outcome ul ma ml mm wonhl have me emu oH\naI\y disposmg av ms r1nhIs.A docuinn on bau {by me mun mm: umanoe), whemsr the gram or refusal 01 u. wnl no|fln.Il\y datalmmu me IIQNA Mme appelhm m ma omoome of his man That bemg 59.01: mduv ul Inn mgr. Com m Iehmng m ndmllma appaflarma man u ml appuxam. In Ihe Cour! 00199621 ~ [a1 Counsel lor the appsuam subrmllsd umerma. He submm/ed that this Court has Jurisdiction hear [ms appeal and relerved |u me case at Syarikilll gan Lumber Sdn and v. Takang Timber Sdn BM (200312 cu 117 wmch ham as laflaws wm we mu. mrwever, mus| be empruma. mm equal «me man scmlumsmg x 3 on as amended‘ u mm Im an rulmg mum ha mnda m the muvse ov a mal, m hefiling Much emphasis‘ we «saw, .3 {Hand on Ins mm mm of ma sum:-xme vamv-2‘ .does no| finafly dlspase av me um: 01 the gamer, mus oveuwxmg me last (Ml me mung mun be made m we course L71 ; max nr mung of my cauia ov malmr. Cnunse! we mm appeamd m be wecccuprqd mm the aemmmmn ovwmo-enm rulmsi mspaa-as em rlgmi ur me partied‘ um paid icanl mgam In me mm as In at vmanunduva lhe xmd ruhng was made Equal wawgm would be anamea In ma zmlrs ssmenoe :1! s 3 on an amenasmorvmau mus: be aakoa, Is nulorfly vmelhera mlmg does noldlspose me «man nuns Mme names um aha ma qussflnn whemer was a nlhng made m I11: course no a ma! or healing‘ cl any came av mallet w u M: nm a man; made ln lhe amuse Ma max av matter. mgnmlau of mu fact um u dld rum flliposa M Ihu mm M n.. pinks. n mly um bu oxcludcd by the . N maummamuqumuw um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm dnflnlllon of “dnci1ion" u puma-a In I4 s oflhl can as amamsa, and 1: memlare avD9aIeh\e' [91 The Appellant furlher submmed that the ban ap nun filed by me Appeuam an Nor se4ar High Court was an appnaamn mat s1ocd on us own and not relaled In me AppsHanl's max for charge nnderSeI:l\an13DV of me panax Code. u was argued that me decision by me Ieamed High Court Judge was not an Inlerlucmory older. or ruling made mmng lhe max. because we Inal for me avranca charged had no| nommenced and m «am We case was ye| we be lranslerred «mm ms Sesswans Cmm \o me Hwgh com when me Appeflanfs sppHcauon was disrmssed OUR DECISION [10] Theiunsdncuon onhis com is derived [mm the slalmury pmwsions. Aocurdmg NH Chan JCA in me case of Dam’ Sari Anwar Vbrahim v PP [1999] 1 cu 537‘ “the nghl lo apnea! imm one oourl |o anumer must be conlerred by some s|a(u|s, mhe nnax " 9,012 decision vfevery cnun of Vaw we. [11] semen so o1|he c.uA, prescnbss me mnsdvcfion cl this Courl. we prowaes man ma coun of Appeal shaH have junsamn to hear and determine any appeal against any dec on made by me man Court [12] The Ie\e\mnt Issue here Is mu: wnemer the ruhng ardecision by me Hugh coun Judge m rarusmg ban «a me appeflanls Is appea\able"' 5 am maunamamuauauaw -ma Sum ...as.. M“ be used m mm a. nflmnnflly MW; flan-mm wa anurm Wm! [131 Tms same issue was mnsmerea In lhe case at Gnhinalh all Slnnaya v Public Pros-culound olhnr Ippoal:[1|l22] IIILJU 2123 by Nomm Hassan JCA where his Lordsmp held as Inflows. my 1-»: qnesnun ovwnemenne dedslon on nan .5 awa.IInbVa ma abo been enema by nn-n com -n Data $en Arvwar mraMm's case (sum) where Lnmm Mam! Yunus Pm and W: ‘Th mm mm us us whulhnr an mum of mu II lppu on com o1AnpuL Thu com no Judmallma Ar:l1E64 snefls out me areas cl jmlsdxcflon for Ihe Conn ol Anna! on». cnrmnal and cnm us cnmmaHur1sflIm>un Vs canna Mlhin Ina helm: ol 5 so aflha Am Sacbon so amwnyi mu mm 'dec4sIun Mm nsdennmun Dmv-dedlorm s 3 A: n nu been Iugganad (ha dafinmun nl ms word 'dec4a\un' would exclude any mum on any mnner axlraneaus m we Issues In be dalelmmod n ma mam case ThIs‘as\umers12nfl\|,wauld mun any uecinon Uflha Hugh Cum! on Iny maltlv wou\d be appeahbda m Ins Ooml ampnem rum mnnm be me mnnen cl Pamnmem nu mum M ball mly my w M uxlrmoous come Issun he be ninunvnmd In IN mnln can. sauna: It now». um Whlun -pm tale, A: la lnlnndud mun cumnl man an of mu wn1I1"flncIxlon"Inthn|e aoclslons ann- Nlgh com um um ms «nu afllnaliy dlxpoxlnu oflllu nnnu 01 name 1n gel bill In not Is 01 «gm. aau under: 333 M I11: Cflmmav Pmcldun Coda -n granm anna wmv\e|e dnscreuon Mme mun Ila I'M my nnun of mu posunu no Ilumull al nnnnty. n It wmnhlnfl M n nnpn .n II n mnchanlsm ramnmamy Iilwffrom wnllunmumn Oncl 4: Wu n in cavahln n: mung wllhdnwn. Llpnn niuu n an be mpg: .wnn mn grvalan 01 respect x am unable In mam ma lnlarpmlmlnn as suhmmad by lhu hamud counsel forms appellam I am lmvflnn nun. ulnar In my awn nnnn: um .n lppual on an rnaummuu vi Incumpwlmtu bu ma bofonmis count nna n rtrzwliqhywamuuumuvw Nuns s.nn In-nhnv M“ be used m mm n. nnmnnuly mm; dun-mm wa munc pm munfovv il rwmly drimllud wnn mm. the nmesedina: av flu: morning would and “ (emphasis added) [191 \n me same case NH mm JCA owned 1: lollowl “A daemon made psndmg lha ma: av lha marge: agemst me nppeunnl ‘s not‘ m aur consxdered opminn, 3 uscmn (mungy mat um me eflect al finafly flelemumml me fights ov rm anbeflam n I. only an mun. o1 um (rm um would rm. the client a)‘ llrully dlspculng of M. n.m.. A d-clulon on lull (by nu oourl ofllrullnllanoal‘ wmmm». gum or nluul M I; will no! finally ammln. cm. mam: «NM Ippnlllnl m cm nwtcomn o1hIslrI:l.ThIlb¢lnn In, m min ac nu Nlwh Court In Munlmz to mm mm aw-Ham to an n: ma non nu. In an Caml Appull - ksmphaw added7 my Malunven than 5 rm mmy \n in appncauuu for ban as a vssn apphoahon can be made u now davelapmenl awe: A: sum ma daemon on nan, as nu ma prasem case‘ does no: mm aim“ A7101: mm at am appuu.m nus Iuuu war aaumssu m Data‘ sen Ammr \hmNm'scasaAsupI'H} ' [141 m a similar vem, m Data‘ Ssrl Anwar Ibramm v PF [1999] 1 ML! 321 the court made VI dear lhal "the very nature D? hafl possessu no elemem M finality It Is snmeilwlg Of a respite. H Vs a mechanism {OF (empovary renev from wnfinemenl. Once given m \s capable av oemg wilhdrawn. Uncn refusal, N can be reapplied“ N maunqmamuqumuyw um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [15] ll ls clearlmm me cased dlswssed in me preceding paragraph lhal me mllng made by me learned Hlgh calm Judge in refuslng ball lo lne Appellenl did not llnally dlspose nl me ngms cl lhe Appellanl ‘rherelore, ll was not a declslorl wllmn lhe meamng M seclion 3 04 me CJA and as such not appealable under secflnn 5012) olme same Act CONCLUSION [15] ln me upsnm, we uphuld lne premnmary cbjecllon by lhe Respondent We lnerelore slluck out me Appellanvs appeal ,5gd, (AZMAN am ABDIILLAM) Judge Cour! al Aunsal Melayela Putralaya Duo ollhdslon : 21 Sopl=mber2023 Grmlndl luuod :3'|January 2024 3 SW rtrzlvliqmamunumuvw -we Sum mm. M“ be used m mm we pllnlrullly MIN; dun-mm vn erlum Wflxl Legal Represenmion For mo Anpoll-m » G Ravrshankar uogemerwflh Mohd Nizam Azhar) [Messrs. R Shankar ssndm a. Assoumes] For Ihl ROIDBIIHOM : Aliqah hlnl} Abdul Kanm@Husa\ni [Altumey General’: Chambers] 9 sw maunqmamuaumugw -um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-121-05/2023

PEMOHON MAXIS BROADBAND SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN MENTERI KEWANGAN MALAYSIA

Judicial Review- Mandamus - Seeking for order for Minister of Finance to give direction to DGIR to set aside or exempt Notice of Additional Assessment deemed served on the Applicant - Non reply or non- response of Minister to Applicant's letter - Whether section 135 of ITA impose legal duty on Minister to make decision - Whether Applicant circumvented and failed to exhaust domestic remedy i.e SCIT under ITA.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a1da8c52-4356-484d-b6d5-f1ab7289adfd&Inline=true

29/01/2024 15:00:21 WA-25-121-05/2023 Kand. 40 S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UozaoVZDTUi21fGrcomt/Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25—121—o5/2n23 Kand. 40 29/01/2132: Jszan-2) mum PIAHKAIIAH mam: MALAYA m KLIALA LIJMPIAR nAuM wuuvm vznssxumua KUALA LLIMPLIR, uuuvsu (EAHNGIAN KUASA-KUASA mus) wsgmouoruw ans: ssmuuw ggzgmumu no wA«2s~12w5/2:221 Da\am pemam sumu pevmmvorun yang «em dumm mm Runonden msnunn Seksyen 135 can Seksyen uzmw Akla Cukal Fendayilan um yang lnnnnlm 27:20:: aan Ksoulusan Responflen yang flmnggap ummz pad: 5 5 2:221 Din Dalam wxava S:ksyen 3301(2) dzn Ssksyen mom Akm Cukm Pandspzun 1967* Dan Dawam pelkam wnln pumohcnln unmk amara ‘am. sum: Pmman cemom Dan mum penara Aluran 5: xaeaamaeaan Mnhklmah zw wrung uums anmnamn sun sun Pemomn mm msmsm KEWANGAN uALAvaIA Relpnnaen »...:.,us sm uuzzavzmuaufirmmua «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Judgment Introduction 1 Tne Appiicani on 952023 med en apphcalion tor ieave in eoirirnenoe iudioiai Isview proceeding (Euclomn 1) under order 53 ot the was 0! 0mm (Rec) seeking inter aiia ine iottowing . 1.1. An order tor tne Respondent to exercise its power under section 135 and/or Suction 127(3A) oi the Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA) to give directions to the Director General or tniand Revenue (DGIR) io set aside or exempt the Nuhce e1 Adaiiionei Assessment (Fovm JA) «or tne year or assessment (VA) 2021 dated 19.4.2023 on the grounds met me said Form JA was iiiegat, void, untew1ui and/at in excess o1autnoriiy,ned been irrationei end/or unreesonaoie, and resulted in e aeniei ottne Appricenrs legitimate expectations. 1 2 A Deoiaration tnai the Respondent is oound by and sheii give effect to tne decision ofthe Fedeiei court in Dirlctor-Glnuul ol I and Revertuo v. Rakynit aerjaya Sdn and [1993] I MLRA 231; mu] 1 CLJ [Rap] me; [19:41 1 MLJ zu tnei a iaxpayeris entrited to organize its afiairs in such a way as to minimize tax: 1 3 A oeeiereiion that the Respondent rs bound by and snail give etveot to tire decision onne ooun cl Appeal in Sabah aeiiaya Sdn Bhd ir. Keiiie Plllg ii Mnll D: iii Nlgurl man] 3 MLJ 145 and nus Honourable coun in Ense rudi (M) sdii Bhd e. Keiiie Pungiluh Ila ' uatani Negeri (No: 25- 101.05/2012) Ihal Seclinn I4D(1)nHr1e in is not applicable where a tax advantage IS derived lrom an actual ouiiay or expenditure which ieduoes ine lax llabllfly in oiroumsiarioes in which ine taxing siaiuie affnrds a reduction in lax Iiahlhlyi and 1 4 A Deciaretion tnai me Respondeni is bound by and shalt give enect |o Ihe decision at mis Honourable court in Port Dickson Power Ehd v. Kllul Pengsiuh Ha I Deiani uegeri [2012] MSTC 30-045 and Knlua Pongei-an Hasil DI ninogonv. OKACancmulndu1lr| sun Bhd[2015] MSTC JD-W1 that me DGWR has no autnonty ln diaaie how a v... 1 er )5 ru Uuz:uV1DTUflHGrmmIlD “Nair s.n.i mmhnrwm be ii... m may i... nflninnflly MW: dnuuvinril vu nFiuNG p-mxi and il IS ml the provlnce M the Delk In dlclale how me Apphcam IS 10 eenduel us nuslnese lv Fcurlh. |he |rlIe pnnclple Ihal m a taxing acl. one can only look falrly at We language used and what 45 cleariy sin and lnsl m1lh' g ls to be read ln nor nnplred (See: National land Finanu co-operallvo Socmy Ltd v. Dlramor General of Inland lznvonuo [ma] 4 CLJ 119) v Flhh, me prlnclple mat a pruvrsrdn ln a laxlng slalule musl In read smelly Is In be applled agalnsl me revenue and nm In lls lavor. ll there ls any dnubl, ll musl be resolved lnthelaxpayer‘s1avour. ma The Respondent nad larled lo ask me quesliens wh it ougm la neve asked Le whether lne Respondenls Declslnn nes any legal and oonsmulinnel amhurlly and ln me allemawe or addlhorlallyl wlrelner lne Respcndenl may dlsnegard the declslnrls ol me supendr cams and «ms Hunuurahle com um The Respcndenl ls nol en Pxcepllun to me lurlsprudence wnereuy every exerclse of s|a(uIcry power rnusl ndl only he lrl canronmly wlth lne express words ollhe slime bul above all rnusl also comply wllh cenaln lmpl ed legal requlremenls Our supenor Calms ln lndlrl Glndhl -/ls Mumo V4 Pnngarah Jabatzn Aqama Islam Punk 5 on and ofllor nppule [me] I Mu 545 and Pomhlnunn Batu Jay: sdn Bhd v. Pony: n Tmlh dun Gillan. sslnngor a. Anor [ms] 2 Mu 495 nave naoenlly remlnded lne Government urel rr ls well-sellled law that every exerclse ol sralulory power cannu| be arbllrarlly sxerclsad Tne Calms nave always viewed suen an exemlse es en abuse and merelare heal u as lilegal where Ihe exalclse Is done lor an madmlssibls purpose or on rnelevanl grounds or vnlnuul regard la relevant eonsmeralans or vnln gross unreasunablerless. 10.5. The Respondenrs ueclslon had been lrrallorlal and/or unreasonable lor lne lalluwlng grounds — so... 11 u! 15 m uemvzurumenenva “Nair s.n.l nuvlhnrwm r. med m my r... uflmnnllly sun. m.n.n vn mum Wm! i The Respondents Decision is liable to be quasned on me gmurtd tnat it is so unreasonable tliat no reasanabla person could nave come to trial dec Tnis is especially tnie Mien ttie Respondent nad veiled to give any valid iustincation, reason or oasis lor tne Respondents Decision not to issue tne direction and/clrexempl tne arprtranly raised Form JA. There is also a good oasis tor tne Applicant to lielieire trial tne Respondent nad exerdsed its auttiorily aroitrenly andlor iiiecrianically witnoui applying its mind to ine (acts and circunistnnces cl tne Applicant. iii. The Applicant at all material times acted in good laitn, gaue lull moperatlon, niede lull and lranlt disclosure and obtained prolessional advice in managing its nnance and tax atlairs. iii Trie decisions cf tne superior courts in relation to tne interpretation and construction or legislation and case law are pan oline laws or Malaysia and are oindino on tne Respondent The Respondent nad clearly tailed to me oognizanoe oltnose de ' ' ns v The (allure to appreciate Ind give effect to the true erlect and application oi trie WA amounts to a clear conlvaverltlal-l 0! Article 95 at the Federal Constitution (FC) Amcle % 0' the FC clearly states that ‘No lax or rate snail pe levied by or lor trie purposes ol tne Federauurt except by or under trie authority ol lederal lav/, in a, The Respondents Decision was made iuitriout naviiig any regard to me leprtirnate expectations of trie Applicant as me Respondent tailed to consider tne decrsions or our superior courts and one Honourable court in relation to tne interpretation and construction ollsgislalion arldi herlcei tnis oonslttutes a denial of trie legitimate expemallons ol tne Applicant and that trio Respondent will lake cognizance ol the same me xx sr 15 rri Uuz:uVZDTUfl1VErmmllO «nu. s.n.i navlhnrwlll be iii... In may i... pflfllnlllly MVMI dnunvlmt VI nFlt.lNfl vtmxl can (or me Nonourahl: Annrnuy Gnnoral 11 The Veamed Federal Counsel (F0) for the Honourame Anorney General raised a preunrunary omecnen (so) The P0 was prermsed an me Idwovnng grounds. - qr) No Deersrnn, Act or ornrssron was made by me Respondent (M-msxer av Finance) under order 53 oi me Roc, (H) The News cl Assessment ransed by DGIR who was no| named as a any to (ms acuund (In) The Apphcanl rehel m even a mandamus however me Appncann varied to es(ah\ish Vagal duty, (w) SectIons135 end I27(3A) of me ITA do ncl nave nexus to set as-de me Nance o1A5sessmen| xssued by DGIR: M Apphcanl cxrcumvenled and faded lo exhaus| the domesuc remedy prcvmed under me ITA nu decision 0! Km Conn 12 Iwm new deal wuh me PO raised bylheleamed Fc. No Dncmon. Am oroml--Ion wu nude bylho Rnpondann [unnlmr nf Finincn) unduv order 53 oi tho Rec 13 order 53 Rude 2(4) of the ROC explessw aHows persdns who are edversery afiec1ed' by me decision made by a public aulhanly to mmale judvclal mrew apphca|mns. For ease ol reverence. sunme 4 .s reuroduced es rovdms 14; Any psrwn whu .5 adversew alaclm by me de<;\sAon,ac1>on or enumn M menan be me exerese M une pnnne duly av iulvmon sneu be emmed to make me enpucauw so... 1: ans rn Uuzzavznfllmfifirmmllo “Nana s.n.r mmhnrwm .. med e may r... nrW\ruH|Y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum we 14 15 15 11. la. The requlremems ol Omer 53 of lne Roc are rnandalory and mu5\ be camplled wlln, lalllng wlucn me appllcallan would not be arllerlalned by me Court The learned FC subml|s lnaune Responaenl has made no aeclsmn Ihal amenable lo lualael revlew and met me Applleanrs appllcal n rs premature. ll ls |o say lnal me Respondenrs non- reply to me Appllcanrs leller does nu! amwnl ll: a ueclslon amenable lo jufllclal review under Order 53 ol lhe ROG ll IS lnle lew lha| lallure or relusal by a puhllc authority |o make a ueelslan ls also amenable lo Judicial vsvlew ln Orlngl Red-rlea AM u. Kemn Pongnnh msll Damn llegerl [2013] MLRHU I65: [2015] 1 ms :34; [2018] MLJU Z18. Azlzen Nawawl J (now JCAj had allowed lne leave appllcalion and had sraled lnal: - my on me same day, in nyplicznl also men to the new slaunn lls lml pnllllnn mu wmnl la Amue lx cl lm M lay Denmark um and me cau laws paymenls recelved by lhe nppl-cam hum Wlra ewe are ml MNAEG la wvmlloldlrlg (ax Furlnermore‘ me apollcanl relleraled lhal Amcle lx anne M=LIysla—Denmal1< an prevalls over 5 AA (nu M me HA 1957 The appllczm also exnnslly stand in nu mm nu: ll me DGIK um to n-pend hvnunhly In nu -unllml-x mplesenufian Ind ppual, mun me applicanlwill Item snupnl mm mm. ml on n being npeua by IM nnln. [:51 wnen me DGlR lens lo respond (D we awllcams leflar dnlgd 2912 ms. mu annlrcanl lakes lhe vosman lnel me new . lelm men 29 12.2915 IS Ihe aeclslan 0! me new and aeenlea la be have been sewsfl an me apnlluam an 291 2011 H-new on apulicanl fikd we nppllennen Iur jlmlchl nvlnw Action." (emphasis added) l| ls lmpanarll to note Iha| Order 53 of me ROG allows (or a broader scope 01 re»/iewable declslorls as compared in me previous pmvlsions undar the Rules cl‘ |ha H h Cnurl I980 A daclslon deemed made by me Respondenl IS sufficlerll lo Inmate en appllcallon lor Judlaal review ln Tang Kwol Ham 5 Or: (supra) ma coun afApDeal held . 160} me olber palm ralled by le.-men counsel eelme Ill, mm lay me: cunfidurloe lilhillhaflvfls?1Ef9V\fl‘flb1:lslflV1“‘1y-llVyBVVI ma sme- van [1 M 25 em uemvzmumlanmua “Nair s.n.l mmhnrwul a. UIQG a may he nflmnnllly -mm: dnuunml Vfl nFluNa Wm! o 53 r 244) speaks 0! a ‘dEGS\lm‘i me apvphnanls rim no cans: In irgus DII an BPDIVCADQH Yov IUGICVM rsrisw Jqlln. lclnllnl lgru .. o. 53 r. zmrriiisi riiim iuii iii iwlxuon. nrriiimn man cunitllllllly, lagelhtvwllil o, 5: r. sisiwnrcn Dim/‘dc: [sq um supsruies are llld loqnhlrlnfl ii. flelrpvlvplrconmxv. ilcln bu u mi mm III .4 mi. ray: p. In IGIIIII dcclllon ny (empnasis aimed; W. i HOIICSG Iha| me mgr. coiin nas adop|ed a similar posmon In aupwing iuaiciai review agairis. deemed decisions rriaas by public aumoriiies. In «ms regard, irie Higr. Conn has declined |o rely on aiaer decisions mm were preniissu upon Omar 53 Ruie 2(4) Mme Rules oi High Court 1930, wriere me anmii in rsviewabie decisions is Iiniiiea. 20 I can pmvide nu bener relerenoe man me case at Irriplm Sololu Sdn aria V. Merimri Knwangan Malaysia [2022] ML.Iu 3419; [zo221AuIE.i zozu wnerein my learned brother, Wan Anrriau Farid J held as lul|cws' - 1271 We issnpa Samar rsaeiai Coimsei IIIIIEIEU my aiisriiian ID the impugned ismiir aria Mensa me in nip iudglvlinl mine cairn onxppeai rxmui Rahmfifl bll Abdmlah Muriir LCISV Damk EanflarKua\a Lumpuv 5. Ann? iauuei 6 MLJ ma ca rm lllmlfl src Ihlll piinriiimii: .2... oi. Minis.-rs non-response in mi inipwruu Ielkl does in. cnrimin. a-smori wiinin (Iva manning ai o 5: r my in than. me iezinpa SP9 mmended ma. any Ellzfllm In wrwsn a ‘deemed dlcillou ma glvu nu to In nrmicui mllnlnfl an Inn ward “dlbiilull [29] win. resoecl. onlihmllfl approach "II minor. 0!! W5 svecmc issue in Aimiii sunrnari DUI Azraiiiiar. mmiir wmi uulion My rsmri Ii mis. vii: Sec pi. of mu coiin cf Appeal is pnrriis-a or. o 53 r 2(4)o'1 uiupriri niiin «mgr. Cour! 1IID.IIs(alns as mow. . Any DGISOII mm is udvevsely alluded by (he decisions av any piimic aiiimniy xhal he enlmud up make me apniimpn Nuwavar iv.» rm. a 5: r 21:) pi in. wc prwiau as ioiiim ~ Any pmpii who is ndnnlly -mm: by Ina duclllon, Iclton pr 0 ii .ri rsiaziori to me EXVSCEHOS iii in. pubhc duty or iuricinn shall be erimiea in make me zpniicaiinri v-uxsaus srn Uuz:aV1DTUflHErmmllO “Nair s.ii.i nuvihnrwm p. ....i ll! mm i... .ii.ii.ii.r MVMI flnulfllfll Vfl nFiuNfl piii.i :29} his rm 0 5: r mm M me ROE nu «ma 1M pram “decision, ncllon aromlulun In nlnuon up um um": ohm publltduly at lum:(ion." In my mm mm wan: nmlssuon is lvmply : Vlilurl m link: a music" I: Is a nu.-mum" wnn mu lntnaducllon av Km wnm “omll on" In an mu 0 :2 7 am tin quullon of m “Irllficinl due on” doc: rum longer arise.” pay the onus: on non-declslon, m myminmlslmuuhlnlojudlual :- ow m Zamal Mn Hap Nuwuddm v we Regnslravo!SomeI\es[2n12l MLJU ms the apmmam appnea var regsstranon ac was underlhe Sousltss An 1966 The aemsmn to vegwslsv or umamse .5 wmwv me dmcrsban ovme Regrslmrundar hm $outIws An was The Regblrar ‘s erumnsd Iry me Sumehes An In mnsnderme appnuuun and make a daemon HmN!VlV,l71e Regmrar had «mm m mm 1 mum. . mm way nrlhe elhsr Ravmmran Paramagum JC {new guy new that \n my owmnn me Iwlvmata and wnlnnuvng delay wvllmm ma reason m Ine mslam case Is eqmvmenl \a yelusm m make a aacumn As me nnpham ha: mrmem mum Imurafllnllvl dmy ullha Rugmrarto max- 2 aemsm an Ihe appncamn in register PAKAR. n mm mm lhe mm: la man a daemon u ummm ma mu; was me Sm:|auesAcl was [emphasis added) a) (See Syarikat Klpasl sun and v. Mnezeri Kewangan Mlllysla -mi omer casu[2013]AME.l 0411; [mm uuu 524. D) an Agllcullurv mmym) Sdn Bhd v. Menlzrl Kawangan M-Iaym [2023] 4 AMR us; [2023] MLJU 430. c) CMMT Invesunnm Ltd v. Planter Kewangan Malaysia [2021] MLJU sea) 21 Based on the above‘ u \s ewuent mat |he Respondenfs deemed decwswon e! 5 5 2023 ansmg rrom ms non-reply Io ms Apphcsnrs \ene< can be amenable In judxcxal revwew under oraer 53 Rule 2(A) a! me R00 22 Therefore, «ms coun does not agree mm the comenuon 0! me learned FC on «ms omecnon v... 15 ms sm uuzzavzmuaufirmmuo «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! ‘rite Nomi e at Assessment raised by the DGIR who was not named as a party to this action 23 24 25. 26 27 25. The teamed Fc argued that by not rtammg the DGIR tn the present sutt ts indeed tnvbtous and vexatinus because the subyect rnatter relates to the assessment tatsed by the DGIR. Hence. the assessment by the Dem ts the deotsion that the Appttcant ts dissatisfied wtth tt ts my view that any order at tudgrnent whtoh tater made by ans court, will dtreotty tnrpaot and attest the new as the rettet sought are against an the assessments tatsed by the DGIR. This can be seen horn the tettets sought by the Appttcant tn thetr Nottce oi Appttoattbn tsnctosnre 1). whereby the Apptreant sought an avder to exerrtpt the tax assessed agarnst the Applicant and an ordertot a stay at proeeeotrtg agatnet the DGtR‘s decision tn tbttn ot the Nottoes it IS to be noted that the bore ts-we and dtssattstactton ol the Apphcartl retrotyes around the Npttoes desptte the Appttcantsdentat and ctatnred that the tudtoiat review ccrtcems on the tatttne of the Respondent to reven the App toants ietter. Theretbre. it ts cteat that the new wttt be ditectty aflecled wtth the buteentetdeetstbn 0! (mi court because the exernpttort sought by the Applicant is based truth the assessments and these assessments are the crux tssue and dtssattstactron ol the Appttcant In thts appttcatton it the court alluwed the Avnttcant s tudtctat teyten and stay appttcatton. the DstR‘s tnterast will be ahaoted as such aeotston wttt tnottr tosses on pan oi the DGtR and the Gcvemmertt where the DGIR wttt not be able to botteot the taxes trbrn the taxpayer tn the tnstant Base, the Applicant is seeking tor an exetnptton hunt the Respondent on the nottoes raised by the DGIR Thus, wttheut the houses mised by the DGIR. there wttt be no exetnptton apptteetton made by the Apphcart| to the Respondent. ms Court ts ot the new that t! ts urttatrtor the Applimnt tn make an applies 7! agathst the Respondent todtrect the DGIR to exempt |he assessments raised by the DGIR agaFns1 lhe Applicant. but at the same ttrne, oenytng the DGIR's nght to detence tts assssntents. val: n at 1. IN uamvzaruottahehtta «mt. Smut mrrthhrwm be tn... In may t... bttmruitly MIMI dnuuvthrtt Vfl ariuttfl WVM 29. Fremlsed on me aloresald reasons, I am ollne yrewlnal me new nas a dlrsc| mleresl M lnls ludlclal revlerw appllcalban and wrll as subsnanllally aflecled by the courts delislon Tnerelore. lne l:GlR should be named as a pany lo lnrs omoeedrng. Tn. Applleanr rellal in enact a mandamus. However. ma Applicant l led to maallsn legal duty 30 Inc learned FC abladed max lna Apolloanl ll nol annlled to e rellel lo oornpel lne Responderll lu sel aslde me Name of Additional Assessmam lssued by DGIR dated 19.4.2023 as me Respondenl nas no legal duly to do so 31. The Federal courl In Mlnlmr M Flnanoo, Govemmenl of Sabah y. Pnlmllu sun and [zoos] A ulL.l u1;[2nos]5 CLJ 321; laooal I MLRA 105‘ held lnal an order o1 mandamus can be granted ellner (an) under seclron 44 ullha Speclfi: Rellaf Aer 1950 (SRM: or (bl lna addrnonal puwers ol the Hugh coun oroyrded by paragraph 1 or me schedule la lne corms ouudraamre Acl19o4(c.lAl 32 II ls also to be rmled lnal order 53 Rule 1(2) of me R00 pmvldes mat lrns order (0 53) ls sublacl to me proyrsrons ol cnaplar vlll o1 Perl 2 ol me SEA :3 Tnerelore, any appllcallon lor an order or mandamus made by way cl ludlclal revlew proceedlngs rnusl comply wllh xne requrrernenl or secllon 44 al the SRA an Sedlon an arms SKA reads as lollows. --suroncsmsm or vusuc nunss Pow-r In nrdurpuhllc uvvlma and mum to do mun. Ipa:ll|c am 54 l1lAJud§I may Nuke nrl mum reqmvlng any sp-ecml: 3:! no he done or loroorne, hy any person hnldlng a puulll: vffiue wnelnerol a oennanenl ma rernporary nslure, or oy any aorpuralmn or any aonn more-nave lo ma non Calm van in .r as rn uuzzavzmumlfirmnma “None s.nn nuvlhnrwm a. med w my r... nflfllnnllly mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna war Fnmdm (hat- (a) an apauunon Var sum an order he mm by some person v-moss pvopeny frnncmu, or personal mm wont} be myurea by me ranmmg urdmnq um. car: may Du. on»: sand suacm: an: (nu ma com; ntiorbennng u unamnynamarma ma mmg m ram maafly Incumbent an me Dersnn nr mun in msar us pubis: characier or an We corporlbon In Rs celpotale character, (c) m we nmmen at me Judg: am doing av lomearma Is umsonam to nah! am mum my me npphunl Hit N: amarspacma and mequme mm mmedyy am (e) we remedy given by mu order appfled fovwm he wmplme 12)NolnmaIn Ims semnn shaH be deemsu \o mom. a Juage— mm make any ordev mnmng an the Vang d>~Pemzan Agang. my to make My alflerun any wvvam M any Goyemmam m Mawyswa as such, merely to enma Inc sauavmm at a emu upon mm euynmmem, or (:1 In miku my mum wmch .. omunmn exuleuw excluded by any law my me ma new m lame’ :45 In Koon MolChowv.PrtIam ' yh[1972]1MLJ1BOB: (197211 MLRM 491‘ snarma J (as he men was) had oumned 1am prensqu -«es esasnuax to me xssus M an urdar undev sechnn 44 ac Ihe SRA or a mandamus’ (uy wnemar me Appncam has a dear and specific Vega! mgm (0 me rahef sought: Whalhar mare us a duly Vmpasad by Vaw on me Respnndems; Whether such duty us at an imperalwe ministenal charader Invclvmg no wdgmenl ov mscremon on ma pan a! he Respondenls, and (M Whemer the Applicant has any vemedy, other man by way of manuamus, (or me enforuement ohhe ngm which has been denied to m. PI]! 19 n! 25 am uuznavzmurzwfimumuo «mm. sm-1 nmhnrwm a. U... a my a. mm-y mum: flnuamnl VI muya Wm! 36 37 as :59 40. 41 Based on the case in order to issue the order ol mandamus, the Applicant must show not only that he has a legal right to have the act performed but that the noht must be so clear, specific, end well denned as to be tree lrorri any reasonable controversy The order cannot be issued when the right is doubttul, or is a qualmed one or where it depends upon an issue or tact to be detennined by the Respondent The failure to show the existence at any legal right to oompel the perlormence ol a legal duty rasl upon the Respondent will deny the order cl mandamus Artolnsr important hurdle that needs to be crossed by the Applicant loren order ol mandamus is to show tnattheie is a duty imposed by law on the Respondent. in the absence in such legal duty, the mandamus shall not he against the Respondent coming back to the facts in the present case, I ltnd that the Applicant seeks an order to compel the Respondent (Minister 0! Finance) to setaside the Notice oi Additional Assessment dated 19.4.2023. The question is whether a legal duty exists lot this court to grant a mandarrius. I find that the renal sought by the App|lcarl| IS like mandamus i e. to compel the Respondent to exercise its power under section 135 and/er section 12713» ol the ITA it must be borne in mind that this power is discretionary and the Respondent has the liberty to exercise its power without being lorced to do so Moreover. the exemption ottax sought by the Applicant cannot be given w out considering all the relevant facts and documents ot the case The approach Iaken by the Applicant is as it the Respondent has no option other than to agree and abide by the Applicant's request. Therelore, it is the respecttul view ol this court that there is no legal duty to be imposed on the Respondent under any law hence Ihe Appllcam is not entitled to compel the Respondent to set aside a Notice oi Additional Assessment issued by DGIR dated 19 A 2023 reason being Rspondent has no legal duty to set aside the Notice ol Assessment undet the in. Panlaolxs IN Uuz:uVZDTUfl1!ErmmllO «wet. s.n.i luvlhnrwm be UIQG a may i... oflnlnuflly MVMI dnuavlml VI .riuito perei raxnayer shomd conduct ms business and a taxpayer rs at rrs own hbeny re conduct Ils busrness wnn an avarlaole means re make good prom and re mrugaur nrs rncroence or |:x. 1.5. Tha| consequent to me ptayev Vn paragrapn 1 1 above, all lurlher proooedrngs mcmdlng me anfnrceman| and eflecl ol the sand Form M be s1ayed unril the fun and final de|ermIna|Ion onne rumcral review application 1 6 That all neoessary and consequenlval dlrecixans and orders be grvsn: 1 1 That are costs of we appncariun be costs In the cause; and I 5 All other and lunhev rehei Much rnrs r-ranourame ooun deems m and mper 2 In essence, the Appllzzarn filed an applrcarron vor leave to commence ruarual review for an nrder hr me Respondenl lo exercise its power under Sectmn 135 and/or Sec1\on127(3A)r71me\TA(o set aside or exenrpr me Names 0! Andnlonm Assessment lo! rrre YA 2a2I daled 19.4.2023 3 Aner rne heanng. \ drsnrrseea me Applncanfs apphcalran lo! weave lo oonrrnence ruororal revrew (Endusure r), I wru new sex eur rho grounds lor my deozsron Background Facts 4, ‘me backgmund lasts 01 «ms case are extracted fvom me Slavemenl wrm smlable modrnca on and are as foflaws — A1. The Applicant rs a prrrare company limited by shares moorporaled M12 2 1992. where \he pnn::|palaI:lMIreso1|ne Applicant are to pvvvlda 5 NH suvle 01 oovaraga lelemmmunlcauonsr mgnax and mated servrces and soluhons‘ and oorporare ena sennees lunclrcrns to rrs norarng cumpanies and !elIww subsruranes and related names wrrnrrr me Maxis Gruuv nlxieus m uuzzuvzmumvfirmnrua “None s.n.r nmhnrwm r. med e may r... nflmnnflly mm: m.r.n VI mum p-ms! Sections 135 and 1:74:11» 01‘ the ITA do not havn nuxnl to in um: um Mono: cuss-ssrnunt luuod by me DGIR 42, me DGIR Is empowered bylhe ITA to ransstne asssssrnerns and me Appllcanl Vs Irymg (0 quash ms sard assrsumenl by anlorclng the Respondent to exemse As dacrenonary powers under secnon 135 and secuon 12713/K) of ma ITA mm promdes as lollows - was flower M M mno uivu dnoenons Lo |ZIlre:.1or¢‘-Imrnl ma Mmnsler rnay awe Ia Ihu Du-clurfinnaval drrosnons ova general enaranar mm wvmrvsmenl wnn |ms Am as re ma exevcrse or me mncnons or me Dlrsnor sanarar nndlr ma Au and ma Dvucmv Guam! -H mm aflacl Io any mrermans so given" A3 secmon 127(3A)aHhe ITA reads aslowdmvs - Exnmmion Imm uxv aanmn -rm Yhe MmIsle< rnay m any pamonar mse exempl any verwn «rpm an or any or me pmv on or lhn Ac!‘ anher aanarauy or m rasoan or my monme or a oanrunar kmd or any mass M Income (:12 pamcmar kind‘ 44. upon reading secnon was and seenon 12713» dune NA, \ nnd \ha\ pom prmnsmns carry me word may wrncn dearly snows that me neapondarn nas a mscrelwon on whelhsr |o axerose II: power or no| under those sard sacnrdns and hwersfnrey me Aaphcanl cannol mmpe\ the Respondent n (he Respondent chooses not to do so. 45 Tne word ‘may‘ oerIrIo|a a non-mandalary na|ure as reuecned in \he mse of Lock Woe Kock v. Menteri Hal Enwal Dalam Nagari & Arm [1993] 4 CLJ 111; [1991] 3 ML! :91; [1993] 1 MLRA 463; [1093] 2 MAR new wnera \he then supreme Court held max. - 15} me slgmflcance on sun: a prowslnn .n ma lnlemrmamn An wfll remam |he\egaH1ranm3n Ia arways cunlmv me we or In were «now In In rnandamry unit, in comnsl to me use or me ward -my which Gonnkl - pmnmuon ordnoaranon" (ernpnasns added) 46 sound by me mam reading orsecnons 127(3A) or «:5 arms HA, I arn 01 me view man no ngm was given xo me Appnoanz anner to ask or dvacl ma Raspdndenn Io exsrnpx ma assessment rarsad oy the vuozxons srn Uuz:aV1DTUflHErmmll0 “None snn nunhnrwm a. d... w my r... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl vn murm Wm‘ DGIR, but mslead. It is puuety the drscrehnn power cf the Responaent Io exemtse or not 47 ms Court IS 01 the view (hat W Pamamsnl Intends to do so, Pamament wm state met tne Apphcanl may make me appncsnon (0 me Responden|o1me Respondent may tssue InS|Nc(I0nS to tne DGIR on me Apphcanfs application, Thereiore, tne ltectwan must be read p\aH'I\y as tegtslatea by tne Parnament. 4B In mtervrelmg sud: pmvvsvonst vmmh are dear and unambiguous tn meamngt thvs Hannuralfle Court has wnststenfly held that such prmnswuns should begtven thew glam namraland oldlnary meamng. 49 Further. our Superior Couns have held thal WI mterpteling statutory pmvtstons, |he Oourls should merely gwe effecl tn the Vaws enacted by Parhamaru and snouvo not usurp me Vegtslaltve Iunaton by exlending a statute (0 meal a case for whmh pIvV\s\0n has clearly and undoubtedly ncI| been made 50 Based on the above. lhis Coun agrees wun the suonnsxnon of the learned FC tnat secnons 135 and 12713A)v1Ihe WA do not have nexus to set astde me Name a1AddxItonal Assessment tssued by tne DGIR Tho Appliclnl GIWMMVIHK Ind {Iliad Io lxhlull (III dam III: rnmldy provided under Ihn IVA 51. n VS a fact nal msputed Ihal me App:-cent chauenged In one «arm of Name of Addmana\ Assessment (Form JA) flaked t9 42023 on the Apphcanl (or VA 2o2t ratsea by me DGIR 52 The Apphcanl bemg mssatisned and aggrieved by an assessment In me sad noltoes should make an appeal In the Special Commtssxoners 01 Income Tax (SCIT) (or delermmalxon. The fight to appeal VS pmvmea under Section 99 onne ms. 53. we Applmant had Instead short cmnt‘ and Iaken a ‘shom:uI‘ is ‘deaf WW1 the additional assessment ratsed by the now? through me judiual revxew apphnauon agemst the Respondent. »...m«xs m uuzzuvzmumvfirmmua “Nair s.nn lunhnrwm .. t... e may he nflmnnflly mm: dnuamnl VI mtma Wm! 54. Slrlse lhe Appllcam had already filed Form a la appeal lo we SCIT, me Eippllcahon ior luulclal revlew by me Appllcant >5 involaus, vexenaus and an abuse oi ine process cl me Court Relemng le |he case MT: Wu Rualty Sdn Bhd v. lreaor Guiinrzl cf inland Revenuo [2004] 1 MLRH 754; [20114] 6 CL: 395; [2004] 4 AMR 521; [2004] 9 MLJ 55, me coun relused |he appueallen lm leave lor iudlclal mlew and held mai- my Fuivllal I am also cl me view me: me oenounem mmg cl me lrlslanl appllcaborl and annlicanis appeal were me Sbeclal Commlssloneii cerizlrlly ouiisuluhe e dUDVu:l|Y cl vruceedlrlgs and .s lndeed irwnlous. vuuhuus and an abuse m we moans: ullhacmm’ 55. Thais are numerous cases on UIIS quesilun 0' whether an Appllcanl should i=.xhaus| the domestic remedy avallabla balnre making an applicaimn fur ludicial revlew. Cases have decided mal me Appllcanl IS noi emlea Io lrllllaie a Judi al revlew primeedlng agairlsl ihe Respondent as his Applicant had [alled lo exhaust the statutory appeal nmceduie available, (599: mu. Poiignraii Hlsil naiam Neg-rl v. Aleeiei Liicenl Malaysia sun Bhd 5 [mar min 1 MLRA 251; [2017] 2 cm 1; mm 1 MLJ sea; Orlnnlal Axumhlnr sun and v. mm. K.w...g... 5 Anal [znia] MLRHLI 79:; [man LNS 91 T: Wu Rnlly $dn Bhd V4 Kama Fenglrlh Hull Dallm Nageri 5 Anor [2003] 2 MLRA 151; [2|'l09] 1 ILR 1F [2004] I AMR 521: [2008] B CLJ 235: [H109] I MLJ 555 (ceun oi Appeal); R0 Tan Ping Hung v. Kolua Fenqarah Kesatuan Soknrin Malays a. Anor [2910] 1 MELR 51; [2010] 2 MLRA 571; [1010] 3 CL] 505: [2011] 2 ML! 457). 56. Based en me above. lhis Court ls of me VIEW that the Appllcanfs appllnallan [oi judlclal review ls piemaluie. The law provides (or an avenue in appeal to he exneueled ml oeime me sclr pursuam Io seeuon as a1(he|TA Conclusion 57 Premlsed on me eloresem reasons, I am oi the vlew mat the Appllcarifs appllcallcri tor leave lo mmmenoe judlclal revlew IS lnvolous and vexailous and an abuse process M (he Court. Pueualli m uezzevzmumisrmmun “Nair Smnl nmlhnrwlll be u... m my 1... mm-y mm: dnuuvlnni v.. mum Wm! sa As such, I drsmxssed the Apnlncanfs apphrztmrl luv leave |a eommenoe pmuaaw rewew (Enclosure 1) with costs of RM2,5nn on In me Hanourame Allomey General wnnam me aHo::a(ar (ea. Counul: Fnvthe Appncanr For me Honameme Allomey Genera!‘ m uuzzuvzmumvfirmmua “Nana sew ...m.mm e. H... e may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum v-ms! Da\ed: 1*] January E024 Ahmad Kama‘ hm Mu Sharud Judge wan Conn Kua\a Lumpur Eu 3. Saravana Kumar (cm Lvm cmnn Wm(PDK)w|1h mm) Teluan Rasli Dahlan Saravana Partnership. Peguambexa flan Peguamcara. Level 16, Msnara I Dulamas, Salans Dmamas‘ No 1, Jalan Dulamas 1. 50480 Kuala Lumpur (Ru; Tuan RDS/SKS/NH/2021/0441) Cwk Krishna Pnya A/F Venugupal, Fedeuex Counseh Jabahan Feguam Negara, Eahagwan Guaman, A5, Persiaran Perdana. Fresum 4, 62100 Puuamya nxeunun 4 2 On 2.12 2015, the Applicant entered VHO Business Sale and Purchase Agreements wnn tour oi its ieitow subsidiaries. Maxis Mobiie Services Sdn Bhdi Maxis Mobile Sdn Bhd. Maxis international Sdn one and Maxis coiieutions son Brio (setting C:-mpanles) to acquire me husinesss ano uniteriaxings at the saiiing Companies 4 3 The resIruI:|I.tring under Prujecl salu oonsotiaatea five at me Maxls Grouu‘i businesses into one existing operarng entity i.e the Appiicant The rationale (or Freieel sarii is to improve tne Maxis Gmup's compellllve aavantage. provide greater uperaliarl aglllfy and niixioiiity in tne euoiuing ane las| paced teteoornniunicalien ineuslry, and allow tne Maxis Group to be more cusiorner-eentne including through tne provision at seamless Iniegvaled sarvim axpenenoe to iii. customers 4.4 Project satu was neeesseryestne Maxis Groups eonipetitars in Malaysia. tor example nigi (l| tiie material time) and u Mehiie operated their businesses under one entity, which proiiitteo uieni with a competitive advamage in me market inauoing aitowirig tneni to mooitize and mad taster to tne demands or the market place. 4.5. To nnanoa the restructuring unuer Preiect satu. lhe Applicant undertook loans ardebl transactions 4.6. The Applicant incurred interest expenses on the teens or dept transactions tnal were duly paid by the Applicant. Tne interest expenses tncurrea are tax deductible under semion 33(l K5) 0! me VTA Ind irtis nas not been disputed by tne DGIR. 4.7. The ioans or dept Iransaclions unttenaken oy tne Applicant inipaeiett ine Applicants holding eempany, Maxis Bertieds (MBHD) eriitity to henew irorn nnanoiel institutions as me Maxis Group's leverage profiie, wnien is eaieulalee by the Groups Net Debt to EBITDA iearnings oetore interest expense, taxes. deprecrallan em: nrnortizelion) retro is tested py tne financial institutions on a eonsoiittated basis. 4.5 This slipulnlion onlie Maxis Group s not Dab! lo EBITDA rilto oovenant is retlectea in various other loan laoili s between MBHD ann otrier financial institutions. wnicii stale tnat -the ripiar 15 ni Lluz:uV1DTLlflWErmmll0 “None s.n.i navihnrwiii be UIQG a may in. aniin.iiii MVMI dnuaviml VI nFit.INfl vtmxi ra of Net Dem |o EBNDA shaH not exceed 4 o1".Tms svmlar slipmahun rs iouna Vn me agreements relalmg |u me Applrcanvs Voans or debt mnsacninns «or Project Sam. 4 9 The loans or debt lmnsacllons unuenaken by me Appucanr led me Ma 5 Groups Ne| Debt (0 EBITDA ralie lo approach or surpassing the 4 0:1 thrashald above Consequenfly. MBHD had |o make lhe necessary repaymenrs m senre ms other kmmawlngs to prevent me Msxrs Group‘: Net Debl In EEVTDA mic sxcsedmg 4 «nresnord. 4 r0 Pnwrousxy. me new had mso urumsruy invoked sacuon Mum af Ihe ITA w arsregera me Appnsanvs Voans av debt u-ansamic-us for Pmjeu sam In me ‘(As 2010 to 2020 The DGIR srnurany auegea lha| ms mlsrasl expenses manned by me Apphcanl on me loans ardehtlransacmns «or Pmectsalu are not deducuble as Pmject Sam Is purpunedly a debt pusn- damn scnerne wmn me sole mow: af uenvlng a Lax benefit by clamnng aeauarons on me mleresl expenses -ncunea by me Apphcanl 411 For the VA: 201a m 2020, (he Applrcanl (hraugh us lax agenl exmaxned In me DGIR mar lhe inleres1 expenses Incurred by me Appueann on ma loans or sea: uansacnonsvor Fmrecn Sam were Indeed paid by the Apphcanl Funner, In mamlam one Maxrs Gmup‘s Ne| Debt to EEITDA ram helaw me A01 Ihreshmd, n was necessary lo: MEHD ro same 115 omer bormwlngs 4.12. Nolwmhslandmgr rne DGIR pmcesded |0 rarse Forms JA fur me was 2016 to 2020. A 13 Aggneved by me Forms JA rarsed for me vAs 2016 to 2020‘ me Anvlicanl had sirnnsny filed applicarmns fot waava lo commence ;udicIa\ revvsw. 4.14 on 19 4 2023, me DGYR raised Form JA1orlha VA 2021. ‘rne cmonnbgy 01 key events, which s not m dispuxe rs as rouows.— vxnsmzs rn uuzzuvzmumvfirmrnua «mm. s.n.r lunhnrwm s. 0.... a may r... nflmnnuly -mm: dnuamnl VI muNa we Do Evan: 30.3.2022 2Y)£|:1App|\can| med us vax return lor the YA Hue DGIR mvocmea the Appllcanl mat me ‘DGIR mamlains ils pesuien and allsged Iha| me mterast expenses mourred bylhe Applicant on me Voans av debt transactions lar Prqecl Sam are not aeducume as Prmecl Sslu ‘e purponetfly e debt pusmmm scheme beiween remed mmpames mum Mans Graup WIIVI the sale mauve of deflvlng a lax benefit by dalming aeducnuns on me imeresc expenses manned by me Appllcam. As such. the DGIR proposed (0 rarse iddIlvor\a\ ‘ ‘ 1 essessmems var me YA 2021 21 .1202: gs , The Applucannhmugh i\s sencners exwaxnod no me DGIR thallhere ave ongo1ngjudiz;4a\ vevwew ‘Hp canons at me Kuala Lumpur Hwgh coun egemc ms Names of Addmonnl Assessmem raxsed m respea av me purported debt push- down seneme xssue and requested me DGIR nut to raise 5 Names av Addmoner Auessmem \ for me VA 2021. 1.4.2023 The DG{R mamllmsd wk pasxhan and 19.4.1\723 ymoeedw to rawse me impugned Form JA1or uhe VA 2021 amuunhng ID RM 7|,707,2Dd.Q0. The Applicant subrmllsd an apphcanon via ils Ieuer dated 27 4.2023 In me Resparmem en exemse us power under Sermon 135 andlar Secuan 127(3A) ev me ITA lo set aside or i 2.. mm exemnnhe Form JA dated 19.4.2023. The Aaphcanl also mgrmgmea be me Respondent that an mlsnm slay of aH furlher proceedings InL:lud\ng the enlomemenl of me Names af Addmonsl Assassmenl for the was 201610 2020 on the same issue was granted mums m Uuz:uVZDTUfl1!ErunmllO «we. Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e H... e may he mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ‘ by me Kuaxa Lumpuv mgr. Courl .r. the . vouomng ungmng j..a.c.nx mew applvcalmns (.| Jud: al Rewew Appr.canor. No WA- 25-354-12/2020. \ (... Judmal Rewew App..ca:.o.. Nu. WA- ‘ 25-121474/202.; and . 4...) ....u.c.au Review Apphcaucn Na wA— 25-I38-U3/2022 The Appnca... |hrough its s.uI.c..o.s suhmmed ‘an appea\ Iellerdated 5 5 2023 la me DGIR on 5.5.2021 the a.ssg.ee...e... win. the xssuanoe of me ‘ . Form JA on me same day upon me rssuanoe‘ ‘ ‘ nflhe sum. settlement wens. ‘ I The Respondenl am no! respond lo me ‘ Auplicanrs Vener dated 27 A 2023 and in dumg } 5.5.2023 so. deemed no. to issue one a..ec1.en andlor‘ axemm me armxranly rzflsed Farm JA (tho Rcsnondunvn uocmon). ‘ The Law 5. The Fedsra\ Court 1!! WRP Asia Faclfll: Sdn and v. Tenaga Nulon and mu] 4 CU 475; [2011] 4 MLRA 251; [2012] 4 mu 2:: at 303. spaakmg mmugr. suriyad. Hallm Omar FCJ1as he men was) held’ “ Lem may be gnimud .v Ins Inve apphcemn .5 ml lmugm mu fvmfloui. and n Weave .s uranled, an mguabls use ... (aver ul grzmmg Ihe .e..e« songm n the sumllmwa ma/mg my u. I»: .u..r..... ouleome A Mar must he sumac to me apchcahon Ihough . 2 unless he mane. vo. moan mew .s amenzhle In ...a..:.xn ravaw zblohnaly no success may be =.....s..._;.a- v... 1 ul .5 m uuzzuvzmumvfimamua «w... 5.... .......w... .. ...... m may .. .n........ mm: dnuamnl VI .:.....a pm... 6 Ti-ie lesl iaiu aewri lcr leave to eoiriiiierioe a mi al review in WRP Aslu l=-cm: sari Elia (supra) are as iollowsz 5 1 wriellierlhe subjecl nialleris amenable lo iudiciel review, and ii so 5.2. «mm lhe maierials available. vmelher ine apnhcallon is irivuious and II rial Ihm.Igh| as frivolous. la wnsldsr that me Applicant has an arguable case ta Db n the raiief sought at ine simslaniive nearing. 7 The principles gnvemlng anplicahuns lurieave |D commencsmdl al review proceedings nave also been ser out in Tang Kwor Ham a. Dr: v. Fungnmnn Danallarla Naslnnal Bhd & are [zno6| i MLRH 507: [2006] 1 CLI 937: [1005] 5 NILI ED e169 wheve Gnnal sri Ram JCA1as ne men was) held: H0!’ in. nign com ahouid nei fin lulu in. marili Mlha can ai lhu iezva siege lis ieie il anlylo 559 iiine appiiceiien forleave ie inimioiie So loo will ine own he sfllfliod In muse iunva ii ii is a 525: Mare lhe simian maiiei er me 1eVi9'wI5 one mien Ivy semen law ieilr-er wimen law or ine common iawi is nuri~l\u1iciAbi:' 5. ii is inie met vie Applicerii have re saiisly the less pmpaunded in me enovenieriiionei: cases is secure me leave lo Oammenoa me judiflial review proceedings. Al iliie siege, ine eoim need rio| go iri|u lne menls ei me case, but only in see il me siilaieci nianer is amenable to iunioial review or wneiner ine epplieaiion lei leave is fnvulnus 9 In any event, a judicial review is (fie dlscralion (:7 Die couni the applieaiieri lei leave In commence judicial review may be allowed in exceiaiionel eireumsianees as explained by me lhen Supreme cam in GOV/lrflrllllll oi Mlllysla :. Anar v. Jagdls Slngr-[1987] 2 ML! 185:[1DlG]1 MLRA 207: [1987] CL] REP I10 which held: ’Nelfl zliinwirlg ine appeal iiiine aiseieiian is snli wiin lbs owns 10 ea by way ei iimiciei ieinew mil vmeie [here i! an aplzlai nvovlskm available lo me zppiitAnL cellimari sneiiia ml rioniiaiiy issue unless ineie IS $N)Wl| . dual lack iiinseicaen or I biahni isiiuie in peflclmi some llilmnry aria, W in spwupnsie uses a serious breach eiine principles oinaiuiai luslioe" >....eiz; SIN Lluz:aV1DTLlflifiErmmllO “Nana s.n.i mmhnrwiii rs. UIQG e may i... nflniruiily Mihil dnuuviml Vfl nFiuNfl mi The grounds lprmo judicre rwlnw lo. Tne grounds ol rellel sought are based on me conlenllan ltlel lne Raspondenls declsron was rllegal, vald, unlawlul. ln exness el aulhonly, lnaclbnel, unreasonable and made ln breach bl me Applicants legmmale expeclallon. These conlenlrans are supparled by several reasons among wmbn lrlclud: lhe lallawmg — ml The Respondenrs Dacls n aughl to be revlewed by lhls Honourable com oansldering lhal ~ Frewausly, me DGIR had also arbllranly lnvnked Seclmn mum of me WA ln dlsregard lne Applrcanrs loans or debl lransablruns ler Propel salu lrl me ‘(As 2016 to 2020 The new slmllarly alleged lnal me lnIeres| expenses lncurred by me Appllcant on me loans or debl lrenseclrana lor Pmlacl sum are no| deduclrble as Prelecl Sam is purpprledly a debl push- down scheme wllh rne sale motive o1 deriving a lax benenl by Clalmlng daduaupns on ma lnlsrasl expenses manned by me Appllcanl H Farlhe VA: 2016102020, ma Apphcam lnrbugh we lax agenl explalned lo we DGIR lhallne lrlleresl expenses lncurred by the Applicant on me loans or debt transacllons lor Pmrecl selu were rndeed perd by me Appllcant Furlner, w rnalnlaln lhe ulaxrs Group's Mal Debl lo EBITDA vallu below me 4.D:1 mresnold. 4! was necessary lar Mal-lu |n sellle rls other borrawlngs. The Appllcant also nlghnghled me expected benefits and cornmerclal Jusllflcsllorls at Prqecl Sam nu. Nolwllhslarvdlng. me DGIR proceeded in VEISS Farms M (or me ‘(As 2016 lo 2020 w Aggrieved by lhe Farms JA ralsed lor me YAS 2016 |0 2020, me Aapllcanl nad slmllaliy filed appllbaupns lor leave In commence judlcial revlew. 102. The Raspondenrs Declslorl was ultra vlres. lllegal, vmd‘ unlewlul and/or ln excess M aulneruy lpr me lollowrng gl\:um1s— u... g M 15 rn uuzzuvzmumvfirmnulla “Nana Smnl navlhnrwlll .. med a may r... nflnlnnllly mm: dnuavlml VI .nuna ml 4 Frrsxr me Feaerai coumn Rairyar sarjaya (supra) has decided lhala iaxpayens entitled to organize Ms aflairs in aucn a way as to MITIIIYHZS lax. wanes, mars VS nolhing wrong ai an wllh the Applicanl organize as commercial iransacrrons in sucn a way as ro m mize lax H Second. «he coun o1AppeaJ rn Sabah Herlawi (supra) and this Honourable coun In Enuzo Gurudl (sums) nave decided that Section mam oi ma ITA is not applicable wnere a tax advamage is derived tram an aciuai ounay or expenditure which reauoas ma lax Iiabriiiy in cirounrsianoes in whrcn me taxing siaiuie ariords a reduction In lax liabmy subsequeriiiy, ibis rionourabia couns daorsmn In Enlco Gurudl uurzra) was upheld by me Coun oi Apveai in ma bresani rnaiier, ma rnieraai expenses incurred by me Appiicani on ma loans or debl |ransac||uns in acquire ins buslnessa and undertakings from me Selling Companies are tax deductible under Section 33(1)(z| onne ITA and unis nas nctl bean dispmed by me DGIR It IS undemabie that me aoquisiuon of businesses and unaanaxings were aciuai lransaciiuns and the iniarasi expenses incurred were indeed paid out by lhe Apphcanl. Theredore, Pmrem saiu is not a nmious arrangemam and cannoi be saan as a lax avoidance acneme HI Third, Chis Honourable Court n Pm‘! Dickson FOWIV (supra) and on conmu iniiunriu (supra) new that the DGIR has no authority In dictate how a «axpayer should conuuu as business and a taxpayer is at its own irbany In canauoi its business wnn an avariabie means to make good prom and lo nriirgaie his inciflenee 0! tax in ma preseni rrianer, Project Salu was implemented ior nnancrai, mmrneroiai and business raalilies and obrnrnerorai and business raaimas arm rusiriioaiions It must be noise: that Propel saru is capable ol axpianauob by rersranoe Io ovdinary businsss ueaiings p... 10 M 25 rn uazaavzmuaufirmniua «war. s.n.r mmhnrwm .. u... u may r... bnrrn.i-y mini: dnumiml Vfl briurm war

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-45B-32-10/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) ANGELA DEWI A/P GANAI SANNACY 2. ) VIJAYA A/L GANAI SANNACY

Perbicaraan jenayah - Pertuduhan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan;Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie. Walaupun tiada saksi mata (eye witness), tapi keterangan-keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) dan inferens yang munasabah dibuat menjadikan kes pendakwaan yang kukuh dan menyakinkan;Di akhir perbicaraan, Tertuduh-tertuduh hanya sekadar membuat penafian semata-mata. Namun Tertuduh-Tertuduh langsung tidak menafikan keberadaan mereka pada masa dan tempat yang material. Mahkamah menerima "last seen person theory" untuk membuat suatu inferens yang cukup menyakin.Pihak pembelaan telah gagal menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Justeru, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes yang melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah disabitkan dengan kesalahan membunuh.Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, Mahkamah tidak mendapati apa-apa keadaan yang mewajarkan pelaksanaan budi bicara untuk mengenakan hukuman pemenjaraan dan sebatan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah telah memerintahkan supaya Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 dikenakan hukuman gantung di leher sampai mati menurut seksyen 277 Kanun Keseksaan.

29/01/2024

YA Tuan Hasbullah bin Adam

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=cfc1e245-a2a9-42a6-8393-9a48770b30cc&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO. BA-45B-32-10/2021 PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN 1. ANGELA DEWI A/P GANAI SANNACY [NO. KP: 750816-08-6154] 2. VIJAYA A/L GANAI SANNACY [NO. KP: 780509-08-6485] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Angela Dewi a/p Ganai Sannacy (“Tertuduh 1”) dan Vijaya a/l Ganai Sannacy (“Tertuduh 2”) (secara kolektif dirujuk sebagai “Tertuduh-Tertuduh”) telah dituduh dengan satu pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. 29/01/2024 12:17:30 BA-45B-32-10/2021 Kand. 146 S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh-Tertuduh [ekshibit P2] adalah seperti berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada 1.10.2020 di antara jam 12.00 tengahari hingga jam 1.00 petang bertempat di rumah beralamat No. 10, Lorong Jati 1, Rumah Murah PKNS Blok A, Kg Baru Sungai Chua, 43000 Kajang, dalam Daerah Hulu Langat di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan bagi mencapai niat bersama kamu telah melakukan bunuh ke atas Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (No. KP: 610817-08-5415) dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” [3] Pada 25.5.2023, Mahkamah ini telah merumuskan di akhir kes pendakwaan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh (murder) yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan terhadap Tertuduh-Tertuduh seperti mana dalam pertuduhan [ekshibit P2]. Oleh yang demikian, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah dipanggil untuk membela diri ke atas pertuduhan tersebut. [4] Seterusnya di akhir perbicaraan (at the conclusion of the trial) pula, Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan pada 21.9.2023 bahawa Tertuduh- Tertuduh disabitkan dengan kesalahan membunuh dan seterusnya dikenakan hukuman gantung di leher sampai mati menurut seksyen 277 S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [5] Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah memfailkan rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah melalui notis rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia bertarikh 22.9.2023. Ringkasan Kes Pendakwaan [6] Perbicaraan kes ini di peringkat kes pendakwaan telah bermula pada 27.2.2023 dan pihak pendakwaan telah menutup kes pendakwaan pada 17.3.2023 setelah memanggil seramai 16 orang saksi pendakwaan seperti berikut: SP1 : Kpl Syarizwan bin Md Saad (Jurufoto) SP2 : Dr Nour Izaquan bin Baharuddin (Pegawai Perubatan) SP3 : Mohd Nasharuddin bin Mahat (Jiran mangsa) SP4 : Kpl Mohd Ariff bin Hazmi (Jurufoto bedah siasat) SP5 : Kpl Mohammad Na’im bin Ideres (Jurufoto tempat kejadian dan barang kes) SP6 : ASP Boby bin Tamat (Pegawai forensik PDRM) SP7 : Dr Muhammad Firdaus bin Yusman (Peg Perubatan) SP8 : Dr Khairul Anuar bin Zainun (Pakar Patologi Forensik) SP9 : Sjn Ilham bin Hitam (Jurustor) SP10 : Insp. Mohamad Faeez bin Norzah (Pegawai penyiasat kes samun) S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 SP11 : Janaky a/p Supurmany (Isteri kedua mangsa) SP12 : Sangitha a/p Devarajoo (Cucu mangsa) SP13 : Navaneethan a/l Devarajoo (Anak mangsa) SP14 : Insp. Mohd Hazrani bin Hashim (Pegawai tangkapan) SP15 : ASP S.Vekram a/l S.Sinnaiah (Pegawai Penyiasat) SP16 : Muniandy a/l Sivalingam (Pemandu peribadi mangsa). [7] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di peringkat kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah merumuskan fakta kes pendakwaan secara ringkasnya seperti berikut: (a) Pada 1.10.2020 jam lebih kurang 12 tengahari, Janaky a/p Supurmany (SP11) yang merupakan isteri kedua yang dikahwini secara adat oleh Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (“Mangsa”), telah keluar dari rumah di No. 10, Lorong Jati 1, Rumah Murah PKNS Blok A, Kg Baru Sungai Chua, Kajang (“Rumah tempat kejadian”) untuk menghantar 2 orang cucu Mangsa ke sekolah iaitu Sangitha a/p Devarajoo (SP12) dan seorang lagi bernama Mohanas Sree (Moganeswari), dengan menaiki motorsikal; (b) Sebelum bergerak ke sekolah, SP11 dan SP12 telah melihat Tertuduh 1 (yang memakai night dress) dan Tertuduh 2 (yang memakai t-shirt dan seluar pendek) sedang berbual di kawasan garaj depan rumah; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (c) Lebih kurang baru 5 minit meninggalkan Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut, SP11 telah berpatah balik kerana secara tiba-tiba dimaklumkan bahawa Mohanas Sree (Moganeswari) berasa tidak sihat. Setelah sampai di rumah, SP12 telah mendekati mangsa yang masih di atas sofa di kawasan beranda rumah itu dan melihat mangsa dalam keadaan berlumuran darah. SP12 menjerit dan SP11 turut datang serta melihat mangsa yang berlumuran darah itu; (d) Mohd Nasharuddin bin Mahat (SP3) yang merupakan seorang jiran, telah datang ke rumah Mangsa apabila mendengar kekecohan dan jeritan. SP3 telah membuat panggilan kecemasan untuk memanggil ambulan; (e) Dalam keadaan kelam kabut itu, SP11 dan SP12 boleh melihat Tertuduh 1 berdiri berdekatan dengan kereta di porch/garaj dan telah bertukar pakaian kepada tshirt dan seluar. Manakala Tertuduh 2 tidak kelihatan di rumah itu; (f) Setelah ambulan sampai, Mangsa telah di bawa ke Hospital Kajang. Manakala Tertuduh 1 telah membuat satu laporan polis iaitu Kajang Report No. 29818/20 bertarikh 1.10.2020 [ekshibit P24] iaitu pada petang hari yang sama menyatakan ia adalah kejadian samun kerana rantai leher emas yang dipakai oleh Mangsa telah tiada. Siasatan awal kejadian tersebut di bawah seksyen 394 Kanun Keseksaan diambil oleh Insp. Mohamad Faeez bin Norzah (SP10); S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (g) Mangsa telah disahkan meninggal dunia pada 10.10.2020. Siasatan pihak polis telah diklasifikasikan semula kepada seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan diambil alih siasatan oleh ASP S. Vekram a/l S. Sinnaiah (SP15); (h) SP15 telah membuat siasatan lanjut dan telah melawat ke tempat kejadian. Hasil siasatan lanjut tersebut, SP15 telah mengarahkan penangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 1. Tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 1 telah dijalankan oleh Insp. Mohd Hazrani bin Hashim (SP14) dan beliau telah membuat laporan polis penangkapan tersebut seperti mana dalam Kajang Report No. 30880/20 [ekshibit P28] bertarikh 10.10.2020; (i) SP14 juga telah membuat tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 2 pada 17.10.2020 seperti mana dalam laporan polis Kajang Report No. 31682/20 [ekshibit P29]; (j) Hasil siasatan lanjut ke atas Tertuduh 2, Tertuduh 2 telah memandu arah SP14 dan pasukan polis ke sebuah stor di Bukit Angkat, Kajang dan telah membawa kepada penemuan 1 penukul besi [ekshibit P15(1)(A)] di kawasan stor dan seutas rantai leher emas [ekshibit P15(2)(B)] yang diletakkan dalam sarung tangan getah hitam [ekshibit P15(4)(A1)] di pangkal pokok pisang berhampiran dengan kawasan stor tersebut, seperti mana dilaporkan oleh SP14 dalam Kajang Report No.31683/20 [ekshibit P32–dengan mengambil kira S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 beberapa frasa ayat yang diputuskan supaya dipotong/expunged]; (k) Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun, Pakar Patologi Forensik (SP8) yang telah menjalankan bedah siasat ke atas mayat Mangsa menjelaskan tentang punca kematian Mangsa (cause of death) iaitu akibat komplikasi pendarahan selaput otak, kesan dari trauma tumpul setempat yang dialami oleh Mangsa pada bahagian kepala (blunt-force trauma to the head). Rujuk laporan bedah siasat bertarikh 15.10.2020 [ekshibit P18]. Tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan [8] Tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan adalah seperti mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 180(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Prinsip-prinsip tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan telah diputuskan di dalam beberapa kes tersohor termasuklah PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan: “[15] For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of the prosecution’s case: (i) the close of the prosecution’s case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 credibility of each of the prosecution’s witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused; (ii) ask yourself the question: If I now call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is “Yes”, then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is “No” then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted;” [9] Elemen kesalahan membunuh terkandung dalam peruntukan seksyen 299 dan seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 299 mendefinisikan secara umum ‘culpable homicide’ seperti berikut: “Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death commits the offence of culpable homicide.” [10] Seterusnya seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan tentang ‘culpable homicide amounting to murder’ seperti yang berikut: S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 “Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder: (a) If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; (b) If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; (c) If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or (d) If the person committing the act knows that it is imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid.” (Penekanan ditambah) [11] Oleh yang demikian, dengan berpandukan peruntukan seksyen 299 dan seksyen 300 tersebut, pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini yang melibatkan pertuduhan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Keseksaan adalah bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan elemen- elemen pertuduhan seperti berikut: (a) berlakunya kematian seorang yang bernama Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (“Mangsa”); (b) kematian Mangsa disebabkan kecederaan yang dialaminya (bodily injury); (c) kecederaan ke atas Mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh; (d) perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh yang menyebabkan bencana tubuh atau kecederaan ke atas Mangsa telah dilakukan pada masa, tarikh dan tempat seperti mana dalam pertuduhan; (e) bahawa dalam mengakibatkan kecederaan ke atas Mangsa, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah, sama ada - (i) dengan niat menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; (ii) dengan niat menyebabkan bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang diketahui oleh Tertuduh-Tertuduh boleh menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iii) dengan niat menyebabkan bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang pada kebiasaannya boleh menyebabkan kematian; atau (iv) dengan pengetahuan bahawa perbuatan itu sangat merbahaya dan semestinya dalam apa jua kebarangkalian akan menyebabkan kematian atau kecederaan badan yang boleh menyebabkan kematian; dan (f) bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh mempunyai niat bersama untuk membunuh atau menyebabkan kematian Mangsa. Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan Kematian Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (mangsa) [12] Adalah merupakan fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan oleh mana-mana pihak dalam kes ini bahawa Mangsa telah mati pada 10.10.2020 seperti mana dalam keterangan dokumentar Daftar Kematian [ekshibit P21]. [13] Adalah dapatan (finding) Mahkamah ini bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen pertama bahawa Mangsa telah pun mati melalui keterangan Dr. Muhammad Firdaus bin Yusman, Pegawai Perubatan (SP7) dan keterangan dokumentar iaitu Laporan Bedah Siasat bertarikh 15.10.2020 [ekshibit P18] oleh Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun, Pakar Patologi Forensik (SP8). S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Kematian Mangsa disebabkan kecederaan yang dialaminya [14] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa kematian Mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh kecederaan yang dialaminya. Keterangan Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun, Pakar Patologi Forensik (SP8) yang telah menjalankan bedah siasat ke atas mayat Mangsa menjelaskan tentang punca kematian Mangsa akibat komplikasi pendarahan selaput otak, kesan dari trauma tumpul setempat yang dialami oleh Mangsa pada bahagian kepala (blunt-force trauma to the head). [15] SP8 semasa memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah ini telah menjelaskan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Mangsa pada bahagian kepala tersebut adalah sangat serius dan walaupun rawatan diberikan ia hanyalah sekadar untuk memanjangkan hayat Mangsa. Namun kecederaan yang dialami oleh Mangsa akan menyebabkan kematian juga kepada Mangsa. Manakala jangkitan paru-paru (pneumonia) yang turut dijumpai ketika bedah siasat juga boleh menyumbang dalam mempercepatkan kematian Mangsa pada waktu tersebut tetapi bukanlah penyebab kepada sebab kematian. [16] Mahkamah ini menerima keterangan SP8 tersebut dan berpuas hati bahawa elemen kedua pertuduhan kesalahan telah berjaya dibuktikan. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Kecederaan ke atas Mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh [17] Pihak pendakwaan telah bergantung kepada keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) bagi membuktikan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Mangsa tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh. [18] Walaupun tiada saksi mata (eye witness) yang melihat bagaimana Mangsa menghadapi peristiwa yang menyebabkan kecederaan hingga membawa kepada kematiannya, namun Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan menerima keterangan-keterangan mengikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) yang cukup menyakinkan (strong and convincing) bagi membuat suatu kesimpulan tentang perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh yang telah menyebabkan kecederaan dan kematian Mangsa. [19] Mangsa dalam kes ini adalah seorang lelaki india yang mempunyai masalah penglihatan/buta yang sudah lama dialaminya akibat daripada kemalangan. Pada hari-hari biasa, terdapat 9 orang lain lagi (selain Mangsa) yang tinggal bersama-sama Mangsa di Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut yang terdiri daripada 3 orang dewasa dan 6 orang kanak-kanak, seperti berikut: (a) Tertuduh 1 (isteri pertama Mangsa); (b) Tertuduh 2 (adik lelaki Tertuduh 1); (c) Janaky a/p Supurmany (SP11/ isteri kedua Mangsa); (d) Navaneethan a/l Devarajoo (SP13/ anak dengan Tertuduh 1); S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (e) Sangitha a/p Devarajoo (SP12/ cucu yang dijadikan anak angkat); (f) Kishok Kumar a/l Devarajoo (anak dengan Tertuduh 1; (g) Vaishnavi a/l Devarajoo (cucu/ anak angkat); (h) Varunavi a/l Devarajoo (cucu/ anak angkat); dan (i) Mohana Sree a/p Devarajoo (cucu/ anak angkat). [20] Walaupun mempunyai masalah penglihatan/buta, Mangsa masih bekerja dengan bergantung kepada pemandu peribadinya iaitu Muniandy a/l Sivalingam (SP16) untuk membawa beliau ke mana-mana atas urusan kerja. Pada hari kejadian iaitu pada 1.10.2020, SP16 tidak hadir bekerja kerana telah meminta cuti selama 3 hari dan pada hari kejadian tersebut beliau hanya duduk di rumah sahaja dan hanya datang ke rumah Mangsa setelah menerima panggilan telefon memaklumkan mengenai kejadian yang berlaku ke atas Mangsa. [21] Menurut keterangan SP11 dan SP12, pada hari kejadian tersebut sebelum bergerak menuju ke sekolah, mereka telah nampak Mangsa yang sedang duduk di atas sofa di bahagian beranda Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut dengan memakai seluar pendek tanpa baju dan memakai rantai emas di leher yang biasa dan telah lama dipakai oleh Mangsa. Malahan SP12 dan Mohana Sree telah menghampiri dan memeluk serta mencium Mangsa untuk memaklumkan mereka akan ke sekolah. Sebelum bergerak ke sekolah, SP11 dan SP12 turut nampak Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 yang sedang berbual di garaj di hadapan rumah seperti mana ditandakan dalam gambar rajah kasar [ekshibit P27]. Pada masa itu, Tertuduh 1 dikatakan memakai gaun baju tidur malam S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (night dress) dan Tertuduh 2 memakai seluar pendek dan t-shirt. Manakala 4 orang lagi kanak-kanak yang tinggal bersama di rumah tersebut tiada di rumah kerana mereka bersekolah sesi pagi. [22] SP11 kemudiannya telah membawa kedua-dua cucu/anak angkat Mangsa iaitu SP12 dan Mohana Sree menaiki motorsikal menuju ke sekolah. Walau bagaimanapun, lebih kurang 5 minit daripada rumah, Mohana Sree telah memaklumkan bahawa beliau tidak sihat. Oleh yang demikian, SP11 telah berpatah balik ke rumah. Sampai sahaja di hadapan rumah, SP12 terus menuju ke arah Mangsa yang masih berada atas sofa yang sama. SP12 melihat badan Mangsa yang berlumuran darah termasuk bahagian kepala Mangsa. SP12 telah menjerit dan SP11 terus masuk dan melihat keadaan Mangsa. Pada masa kekecohan itu, SP11 dan SP12 tidak melihat Tertuduh 1 atau Tertuduh 2 di situ. Namun Tertuduh 1 hanya datang kemudian dan berdiri di tepi kereta yang diletakkan berdekatan dengan sofa tempat Mangsa duduk. Pada ketika itu, SP11 dan SP12 dalam keterangannya memaklumkan bahawa Tertuduh 1 tidak lagi memakai night dress tetapi telah menukar pakaian kepada t-shirt dan seluar pendek. Manakala Tertuduh 2 tidak kelihatan. [23] SP11 kemudiannya telah meminta bantuan daripada jiran untuk menghubungi ambulan. SP3 dalam keterangannya mengesahkan bahawa beliau merupakan jiran yang telah memanggil ambulan. SP11 telah menaiki ambulan tersebut mengiringi Mangsa dalam ambulan tersebut menuju ke hospital. Manakala Tertuduh 1 telah menaiki kereta bersama pemandu kepada Mangsa (SP16) yang tiba kemudian di Rumah kejadian tersebut menuju ke hospital. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [24] Pada petang hari yang sama kejadian tersebut juga, Tertuduh 1 telah membuat laporan polis [ekshibit P24] menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh 1 telah mendengar jeritan kakaknya dan kemudiannya mendapati Mangsa dalam keadaan cedera di kepala dan rantai emas yang dipakai Mangsa juga turut hilang. [25] Insp. Mohamad Faeez bin Norzah (SP10) merupakan pegawai penyiasat awal bagi kes yang pada mulanya diklasifikasi sebagai kes samun di bawah seksyen 394 Kanun Keseksaan. SP10 telah merakam percakapan Tertuduh 1 dan isteri kedua Mangsa (SP11). SP10 turut merakam percakapan pemandu peribadi Mangsa iaitu Muniandy a/l Sivalingam (SP16) dan juga anak lelaki Mangsa. [26] Selepas Mangsa disahkan meninggal dunia pada 10.10.2019, kes telah dklasifikasikan semula untuk siasatan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Siasatan telah dijalankan seterusnya oleh Pegawai Penyiasat, ASP S. Vekram a/l S. Sinnaiah (SP15). Dalam menjalankan siasatan, SP15 telah mendapati sofa tempat kejadian di mana Mangsa duduk kali terakhir sebelum kematiannya, telah tiada atau dibuang oleh keluarga Mangsa. SP15 juga telah masuk ke dalam stor menyimpan barangan katering yang mana menurut Tertuduh 1 beliau berada dalam stor tersebut pada tengahari hari kejadian untuk mengemas barangan katering. Hasil siasatan dan pemerhatian SP15 mendapati stor tersebut hanyalah merupakan sebuah bilik kecil yang diletakkan barangan katering. Namun menurut SP15 keadaan dalam stor tersebut adalah sangat berhabuk, sempit, panas dan barang-barang dalam keadaan berselerak. Hasil siasatan tidak menunjukkan perbuatan mengemas dan S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 tidak munasabah untuk berada di dalamnya waktu tengahari yang sangat panas. [27] SP15 juga telah mengarahkan mayat Mangsa dihantar untuk tujuan bedah siasat yang telah dijalankan oleh Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun (SP8). Dalam bedah siasat yang dijalankan ke atas mayat Mangsa, SP8 menemui adanya kesan luka mempertahankan diri atau pergelutan iaitu luka di bahagian tangan kiri dan kanan Mangsa. SP8 turut menjelaskan bahawa corak kecederaan yang dialami Mangsa adalah akibat ketukan atau pukulan dengan objek atau senjata tumpul yang menyebabkan kepatahan tulang tempurung kepala, pendarahan selaput otak dan pembengkakan otak yang menyebabkan kematian Mangsa. Menurut SP8 lagi bahawa berdasarkan corak kecederaan tersebut, ia boleh diakibatkan oleh ketukan atau pukulan dengan objek atau senjata tumpul yang mempunyai bahagian yang berbentuk bulat. [28] Seterusnya Tertuduh 2 pula telah ditangkap oleh Insp. Mohd Hazrani bin Hashim (SP14). Hasil siasatan ke atas Tertuduh 2 pula telah membawa kepada pandu arah oleh Tertuduh 2 ke sebuah stor kitar semula di Bukit Angkat, Sg Chua, Kajang berhadapan kuil Sri Maha Kali Matha Illam hingga membawa kepada penemuan sebuah penukul besi [ekshibit P15(1A)] yang diletakkan di atas tanah berdekatan stor tersebut dan seterusnya membawa pasukan polis ke rimbunan pokok pisang di mana ditemui satu sarung tangan hitam [ekshibit P15(4)(A1)] yang mengandungi seutas rantai leher emas berbentuk bulat-bulat [ekshibit P15(2B)]. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [29] ASP Boby bin Tamat (SP6) merupakan pegawai forensik PDRM yang telah dipanggil ke lokasi tersebut bagi menjalankan ‘swabbing’ dan cap jari ke atas barang-barang kes yang ditemui serta membuat ukuran pada penukul besi berkenaan. SP6 telah menyerahkan semua barang kes yang ditemui kepada SP15 seperti mana dalam Borang Serah Menyerah Barang-Barang Kes [ekshibit P14]. [30] Keterangan saksi-saksi iaitu SP11, SP12, SP13 dan SP16 telah mengecam rantai emas tersebut yang dikemukakan dalam Mahkamah yang merupakan rantai emas yang dipakai oleh Mangsa semasa hidupnya. Sifat unik rantai emas itu juga membantu dalam proses pengecaman iaitu bentuk rantai leher bulat-bulat kecil. Malahan isu pengecaman rantai leher emas ini juga tidak pernah dibantah atau diragui semasa keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan oleh pihak pembelaan. [31] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan walaupun tiada saksi mata yang dapat dikemukakan, namun keterangan- keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) yang ada cukup kuat dan menyakinkan bahawa Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 merupakan orang yang terakhir (last seen person) bersama Mangsa di Rumah tempat kejadian. Malahan perbezaan masa SP11, SP12 dan Mohana Sree mula meninggalkan rumah untuk ke sekolah dan berpatah balik ke rumah hanyalah lebih kurang 10 minit dan kedudukan Mangsa yang masih kekal di atas sofa di halaman rumah itu. Hanya orang yang berada di rumah tersebut sahaja mengetahui Mangsa berada di rumah ketika itu. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [32] Dalam kes Kagatree a/p Pechi v. Public Prosecutor & Another appeal [2023] MLJU 275, rujukan telah dibuat kepada Sarkar Law of Evidence: “[56] Sarkar Law of Evidence, 18th Edition, Volume 1 page 140, states this: ‘The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crimes becomes impossible.’….” [33] Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, keterangan SP11 dan SP12 mengatakan bahawa semasa mereka hendak bergerak ke sekolah, Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 dilihat berada di garaj di hadapan Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut. Malahan Tertuduh 1 dilihat sedang memakai night dress. Apabila SP11 dan SP12 sampai semula ke rumah setelah berpatah balik kerana Mohana Sree yang tidak sihat, Mangsa masih pada kedudukan di atas sofa dan Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 sudah tidak lagi kelihatan di hadapan rumah. Jarak masa lebih kurang 10 minit daripada mula SP11 dan SP12 meninggalkan rumah hingga balik semula ke rumah adalah suatu masa yang singkat. Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 merupakan orang yang terakhir berada di rumah dan tiada orang lain lagi yang berada di rumah ketika itu. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [34] Tertuduh 1 hanya muncul kemudian dengan memakai seluar dan tshirt. Pembelaan cuba menyatakan pembelaan Tertuduh 1 di peringkat kes pendakwaan lagi bahawa Tertuduh 1 berada di dalam stor barangan katering di hadapan rumah dan cuba menyatakan bahawa Mangsa telah disamun disebabkan rantai leher emas yang dipakai Mangsa telah tiada. Namun siasatan SP15 mendapati keadaan dalam stor barangan katering di garaj hadapan rumah adalah sangat berhabuk, sempit, panas dan barang-barang dalam keadaan berselerak yang tidak mungkin Tertuduh 1 berada dalam stor tersebut pada waktu tengahari untuk mengemas barang-barang katering. Versi pembelaan untuk mengatakan Mangsa telah disamun berdasarkan kehilangan rantai leher emas Mangsa sedangkan cincin yang dipakai oleh Mangsa masih ada adalah juga tidak menyakinkan Mahkamah ini. [35] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan penilaian secara keseluruhan keterangan-keterangan ikut keadaan dan ‘last seen person theory’, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan membuat dapatan yang menyakinkan bahawa perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh tersebut yang telah menyebabkan kecederaan atau bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa hingga mengakibatkan kematian Mangsa. Elemen mens rea bagi kesalahan membunuh [36] Bagi membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi kesalahan membunuh, salah satu elemen penting lagi yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan adalah elemen mens rea seperti mana dijelaskan S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 dalam seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan. Pihak pendakwaan hendaklah juga membuktikan bahawa dalam mengakibatkan kecederaan ke atas Mangsa, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah, sama ada - (a) dengan niat menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; (b) dengan niat menyebabkan kecederaan tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang diketahui oleh Tertuduh-Tertuduh boleh menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; (c) dengan niat menyebabkan kecederaan tubuh Mangsa yang pada kebiasaannya boleh menyebabkan kematian; atau (d) dengan pengetahuan bahawa perbuatan itu sangat merbahaya dan semestinya dalam apa jua kebarangkalian akan menyebabkan kematian atau kecederaan badan yang boleh menyebabkan kematian. [37] Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan dan mengguna pakai cabang (c) di bawah seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh mempunyai niat untuk menyebabkan kecederaan seperti yang dialami oleh Mangsa yang mana secara lazimnya akan menyebabkan kematian (sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death). [38] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa seksyen 300(c) Kanun Keseksaan tersebut menghendaki pihak pendakwaan membuktikan bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh mempunyai niat (intention) untuk S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 menyebabkan kecederaan atau bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang mana kecederaan atau bencana tubuh yang dilakukan itu secara lazimnya akan menyebabkan kematian: “(c) If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;” (Penekanan ditambah) [39] Adalah merupakan suatu yang agak mustahil bagi membuktikan niat atau pengetahuan seseorang pelaku melalui keterangan secara langsung (direct evidence). Walau bagaimanapun, ia masih boleh ditentukan melalui inferens yang dapat dibuat dengan bersandarkan kepada segala fakta dan keadaan (facts and circumstances). [40] Dalam kes Sainal Abidin v. PP [1999] 4 MLJ 497 telah diputuskan bahawa niat adalah merupakan suatu perkara inferens yang boleh dibuat dan sifat kecederaan yang dialami oleh mangsa termasuk bilangan luka serta jenis senjata yang digunakan adalah dianggap sebagai petunjuk (indicator) kepada niat pelaku dalam menyebabkan sesuatu kecederaan: “Intention is a matter of inference. In the instant case, the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence of the doctor (medical evidence), the evidence of eye-witness and the appellant on the issue of intention. After considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 deceased, the number of wounds and the weapon used. The trial judge had correctly regarded the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as an indicator of intention. The trial judge was correct in concluding that the appellant possessed the intention of causing bodily injuries to the deceased and that such injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” [41] Manakala dalam kes Juraimi Husin v. PP [1998] 2 CLJ 383, adalah diputuskan bahawa inferens niat dapat dibuat berdasarkan perbuatan dan kelakuan (conduct) atau lain-lain keadaan. [42] Berdasarkan segala keterangan yang ada, Mahkamah ini dapat membuat apa-apa inferens yang sewajarnya bagi menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah dengan niat (intention) menyebabkan kecederaan tubuh Mangsa yang mana kecederaan tubuh yang dilakukan itu secara lazimnya akan menyebabkan kematian, berdasarkan alasan- alasan berikut: (a) SP11, SP12, SP13 dan SP16 mengesahkan bahawa Tertuduh 1 selalu bergaduh dengan Mangsa dan sudah lama tidak bercakap. Mereka hanya bercakap apabila pergaduhan berlaku. Apabila ditanya punca pergaduhan, semuanya mengatakan ia akibat duit yang dipinjam oleh Mangsa daripada Tertuduh1 dan belum dibayar. Malahan SP13 juga mengatakan bahawa Tertuduh 1 marah apabila Mangsa S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 membawa masuk SP11 (isteri kedua Mangsa) tinggal bersama-sama dalam Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut; (b) Malahan dalam keterangan SP13 (iaitu anak kandung lelaki Tertuduh 1 dan Mangsa) ada menjelaskan bahawa Tertuduh 1 pernah menceritakan masalah antara Mangsa dengan Tertuduh 1. Tertuduh 1 juga pernah mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak berpuas hati dengan Mangsa dan meminta SP13 memasukkan suatu serbuk ke dalam makanan Mangsa. Namun SP13 enggan untuk berbuat demikian tapi sekadar mengiyakan sahaja arahan Tertuduh 1. Hal ini berlaku dalam 2 bulan sebelum kejadian Mangsa dibunuh; (c) SP16 yang merupakan pemandu peribadi Mangsa juga ada memberi keterangan bahawa Mangsa dan Tertuduh 1 kerap bergaduh berpunca daripada duit. Malahan SP16 juga pernah disuruh oleh Tertuduh 1 untuk memasukkan racun dalam kopi Mangsa tetapi SP16 tidak melakukannya. Sebaliknya SP16 memberitahu kepada SP13 dan seterusnya diambil botol berisi racun tersebut oleh SP13 dan dibuang ke dalam parit. Tambahan menurut SP16 lagi bahawa Tertuduh 1 pernah bertanya kepada beliau jika mengetahui mana-mana orang yang sanggup untuk membunuh Mangsa dan akan diberikan upah RM20 ribu; (d) Manakala Tertuduh 2 pula sememangnya merupakan adik lelaki kepada Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 yang telah S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 membawa dan memandu arah pihak polis hingga menemui penukul besi serta rantai leher emas milik Mangsa; (e) SP8 dalam keterangannya menjelaskan tentang kecederaan yang dialami Mangsa adalah sangat teruk. Tempurung kepala adalah suatu bahagian yang sangat keras dan untuk kecederaan yang dialami Mangsa, ia menunjukkan satu daya yang sangat kuat telah digunakan oleh pelaku untuk mencederakan Mangsa. Kecederaan itu sendiri sudah jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia mencukupi untuk menyebabkan kematian kerana pelakunya memilih bahagian kepala dan bukannya anggota badan yang lain. Oleh yang demikian, ia mewajarkan inferens tentang niat pelakunya untuk melakukan tindakan untuk mencederakan Mangsa yang boleh menyebabkan kematian. [43] Seterusnya, walaupun motif bukanlah merupakan salah satu intipati (ingredient) kepada pertuduhan membunuh, namun Mahkamah ini mendapati keterangan-keterangan tentang kewujudan motif dalam kes ini. Tertuduh 1 sememangnya telah beberapa kali membuat percubaan melalui SP13 dan SP16 untuk memasukkan ubat atau racun ke dalam makanan Mangsa tetapi tidak berjaya apabila kedua-dua saksi tersebut tidak melaksanakan arahan yang diberikan. Malahan Tertuduh 1 sampai pernah meminta SP16 mencari pembunuh upahan dengan bayaran upah RM20 ribu untuk membunuh Mangsa. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [44] Dalam kes Priytharen Sundaramurthy v. PP & 1 lagi rayuan [2019] 1 LNS 47, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menjelaskan tentang penerimaan motis sebagai keterangan sokongan seperti berikut: “[33] …. Kami mengambil maklum bahawa motif bukanlah salah satu inti pati pertuduhan namun hakim bicara telah membuat pertimbangan berdasarkan kepada fakta bahawa wujud motif di pihak Perayu Pertama untuk membunuh si mati. Dapatan ini hanya satu keterangan sokongan sahaja….” [45] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen mens rea menurut seksyen 300(c) Kanun Keseksaan iaitu niat (intention) Tertuduh-Tertuduh dengan perbuatan mengetuk dengan penukul besi pada bahagian kepala Mangsa untuk menyebabkan kecederaan yang lazimnya boleh mengakibatkan kematian (sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death). Niat bersama oleh Tertuduh-Tertuduh [46] Dalam kes ini, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah dituduh secara bersama- sama menurut seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan bagi kesalahan membunuh Mangsa. [47] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa berdasarkan keterangan- keterangan ikut keadaan sebelum dan selepas kejadian pembunuhan S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 tersebut telah mencukupi untuk menunjukkan ‘common design’ antara keduanya. Dalam kes Aung Thun & Anor. [2013] 1 LNS 985 ada menyatakan seperti berikut: “It is now well established that to invoke section 34 it is not a sine qua non for the prosecution to prove pre- concert or pre-planning in the true sense. It will be sufficient of the prosecution can establish that the appellants were in the place and took part in the crime and/or had nexus to the crime. Section 34 is not substantive law but it is procedural in nature favouring the prosecution such as that of presumption. The effect of the application of section 34 is that once it is invoked in the charge itself and evidence is led to show that the appellants were involved in the crime, the appellants will be required to speak of their innocence or non involvement in the crime or that at the material time of the crime they have disassociated from the crime. Nothing more.” [48] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati kepada ‘last seen person theory” tentang keberadaan Tertuduh-Tertuduh sebagai orang terakhir berada di Rumah tempat kejadian sebelum SP11, SP12 dan Mohanas Sree meninggal rumah tersebut untuk ke sekolah. Mahkamah ini juga telah menerima keterangan SP14 tentang tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 2 yang seterusnya telah memandu arah pihak polis membawa kepada penemuan penukul besi dan rantai leher emas milik Mangsa. Perihal S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 2 dan perihal pandu arah tersebut telah dinyatakan dalam laporan polis yang dibuat oleh SP14 [ekshibit P32 dan ekshibit P33]. Tanpa pandu arah oleh Tertuduh 2 kepada pihak polis, sudah pasti barang-barang yang dirampas tersebut tidak akan ditemui. Melihat kepada kedudukan barang-barang tersebut ditemui di mana rantai leher emas milik Mangsa diletakkan dalam sarung tangan hitam yang diletakkan dalam surat khabar dan plastik serta disorokkan pada pangkal rumpun pokok pisang berdekatan Kawasan stor di Bukit Angkat, Kajang itu pastilah agak mustahil untuk ditemui oleh pihak polis tanpa dipandu arah oleh sesiapa atau Tertuduh 2. [49] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan niat bersama (common intention) Tertuduh-Tertuduh bagi perbuatan kesalahan membunuh seperti mana maksud peruntukan seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan, ‘in furtherance of the common intention which presupposes permutation or pre-concept of mind’. Keputusan Di Akhir Kes Pendakwaan [50] Justeru, setelah meneliti secara keseluruhan dan membuat penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan-keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di peringkat kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan pada 25.5.2023 di akhir kes pendakwaan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [51] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini telah memerintahkan supaya Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 dipanggil untuk membela diri bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Ringkasan Kes Pembelaan [52] Mahkamah ini telah menerangkan 3 pilihan kepada Tertuduh- Tertuduh sama ada untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah (sworn statement) dalam kandang saksi (witness box), memberi keterangan tidak bersumpah (unsworn statement) daripada kandang tertuduh atau berdiam diri. Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 kemudiannya telah memilih untuk memberi pengataan tanpa bersumpah secara bertulis dari dalam kandang tertuduh [ditandakan sebagai WSD 1 dan WSD 2 masing- masing]. Seterus pihak pembelaan telah menutup kes pembelaan tanpa memanggil mana-mana saksi lain lagi. [53] Secara ringkasnya, rumusan daripada pernyataan Tertuduh- Tertuduh, mereka mengakui pada sebelah tengahari (tanpa menyatakan masa yang spesifik) berada bersama-sama di hadapan rumah seperti dalam pertuduhan sambil berbincang berkenaan perniagaan katering dan apakah barang-barang yang perlu diambil dari stor katering di hadapan rumah tersebut. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [54] Menurut Tertuduh 2, selepas menerima barang-barang katering yang diberikan oleh Tertuduh 1, Tertuduh 2 telah bertolak pula ke kedai katering (yang dipercayai berada di Bukit Angkat, Kajang) bagi menyerahkan barang-barang katering tersebut kepada pekerja di kedai katering. Namun tiada mana-mana saksi lain atau pekerja di kedai katering dipanggil bagi mengesahkan perkara tersebut. [55] Manakala menurut Tertuduh 1 pula, beliau kemudiannya telah pergi ke stor katering tersebut yang juga terdapat tempat sembahyang. Menurutnya lagi, semasa berada di dalam stor katering itulah maka terdengar jeritan yang kuat oleh Janaki a/p Supurmany (SP11). Tertuduh 1 telah berlari untuk melihat apa yang berlaku dan mendapati mangsa dalam keadaan cedera di bahagian kepala serta rantai emas yang dipakai oleh Mangsa telah hilang. Ini berbeza dengan keterangan SP11 dan SP12 sebelum ini bahawa Tertuduh 1 dilihat berada berdekatan dengan kereta di garaj. Tertuduh 1 menyangkakan kejadian itu merupakan suatu rompakan. Semasa Mangsa dimasukkan ke hospital, Tertuduh 1 telah membuat laporan polis iaitu Kajang Report No. 29818/20 bertarikh 1.10.2020 [ekshibit P24] iaitu pada petang hari kejadian yang sama. Adalah amat tidak munasabah untuk Tertuduh 1 menyangkakan kejadian itu sebagai samun hanya kerana kehilangan rantai leher emas Mangsa sedangkan cincin emas di jari Mangsa tidak pula diambil oleh pelaku. [56] Tertuduh 1 juga menyatakan dalam pernyataan bertulisnya bahawa serbuk putih yang dikatakan sebagai racun oleh SP13 dan SP16 adalah sebenarnya serbuk yang digunakan bagi upacara keagamaan yang S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 dipanggil sebagai “tinuru”. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah ini mendapati itu merupakan perkara baru dibangkitkan oleh Tertuduh1 yang tidak pernah dicadangkan semasa peringkat kes pendakwaan. Tugas Mahkamah Di Akhir Perbicaraan [57] Tugas Mahkamah di akhir perbicaraan (at the conclusion of the trial) adalah untuk mempertimbangkan segala keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah dan memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (beyond reasonable doubt) seperti mana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 182A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah: “(1) At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty and he may be convicted on it. (3) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.” S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [58] Dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Tan Chai Hing [2018] 6 CLJ 436 CA, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyentuh tentang tanggungjawab mahkamah di akhir kes pembelaan seperti berikut: “[20] Under. S. 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is clearly the duty of the court to consider all the evidence before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This is a mandatory requirement as evident by the use of the word ‘shall’ in that section. What it entails is that, at the end of the defence, it is incumbent on the court to evaluate the entire evidence placed before it including the prosecution evidence. This was exactly what the learned judge had undertaken at the end of the defence case having considered the case of Jaafar Ali v. PP [1999] 1 CLJ 410...” (Penekanan ditambah) [59] Mahkamah ini juga berpandukan kepada kes Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 29 MLJ 263 yang telah menggariskan sebagai panduan tugas Mahkamah di akhir perbicaraan: “If the court accepts the explanation given by or on behalf of the accused, it must acquit. But this does not entitle the court to convict if it does not believe that explanation, for he is still entitled to an acquittal if the explanation raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 his guilt lies throughout on the prosecution. If upon the whole evidence the court is left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it.” [60] Walau bagaimanapun, Tertuduh-Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah memilih untuk memberikan pernyataan tanpa sumpah dari kandang tertuduh (unsworn statement from the dock). Dalam kes Rewang bin Tempe v. PP [2016] 3 MLJ 586, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan dalam penghakimannya seperti berikut: “[20] In our view when the defence is called, it is the appellant’s right to give an unsworn statement from the dock. If he elects to give unsworn statement, it cannot be the subject of cross-examination and its weight is not the same as the evidence given on oath in the witness box. The trial court is free to give the dock statement the weight it deserves or not at all, having regard to the whole evidence before the court.” (Penekanan ditambah) [61] Dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP & Another Appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan dalam penghakimannya seperti yang berikut: “In law, a trial judge will not give much weight to what an accused has said in his unsworn statement as he S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 is not subject to cross examination by the prosecution nor can he be questioned by the trial judge.” (Penekanan ditambah) Penilaian Keterangan dan Dapatan Di Akhir Perbicaraan [62] Di akhir perbicaraan (at the conclusion of the trial) adalah menjadi tugas Mahkamah ini untuk mempertimbangkan segala keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah dan memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (beyond reasonable doubt) seperti mana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 182A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [63] Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab mahkamah di peringkat kes pembelaan ini untuk mempertimbangkan sama ada keterangan- keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pembelaan itu telah mewujudkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Tugas pihak pembelaan hanyalah untuk menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. [64] Walau apapun pembelaan yang dikemukakan dan walaupun pembelaan yang dikemukakan itu adalah lemah, mahkamah masih bertanggungjawab untuk memberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya ke atas keterangan pembelaan tersebut bagi menentukan sama ada pembelaan sedemikian mampu menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [65] Dalam kes Ganapathy Rengasamy v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membuat pemerhatian berikut: “It needs to be remembered that however weak a defence may be, trial judges being judges of both fact and law should not just brush aside the defence on the basis that the prosecution witnesses are to be believed and not the defence. Where the law casts the onus of giving an explanation upon an accused person, and the explanation is given, which if consistent with innocence, the court is duty bound to consider whether it might reasonably be true, although not convinced of its truth.” (Penekanan ditambah) [66] Mahkamah ini mendapati pembelaan Tertuduh-Tertuduh tersebut adalah merupakan penafian semata-mata (mere denial) dan bukanlah suatu pembelaan. Mahkamah ini juga berpandukan kepada kes PP v. Ku Lip See [1981] 1 MLJ 258 menyatakan yang berikut: “A mere denial without other proof to reasonably dislodge the prosecution’s evidence is not sufficient.” [67] Mahkamah ini juga telah merujuk kepada kes D A Duncan v PP [1980] 1 LNS 12 yang memutuskan bahawa penafian semata-mata bukanlah suatu pembelaan: S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 “The defence was, in effect, a simple denial of the evidence connecting the appellant with four boxes. We cannot see any plausible ground for saying that the four boxes were not his. In the circumstances of the prosecution evidence, the High Court came, in our view, to the correct conclusion that this denial did not cast a doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant.” (Penekanan ditambah) Keputusan Di Akhir Perbicaraan [68] Setelah meneliti segala keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini secara keseluruhannya di peringkat kes pendakwaan dan juga di peringkat kes pembelaan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak pembelaan atau Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 telah gagal untuk menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. Adalah dapatan (finding) Mahkamah ini bahawa keterangan-keterangan saksi pendakwaan adalah tetap utuh dan tiada keraguan munasabah yang telah dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan ke atas kebenaran kes pendakwaan tersebut. [69] Justeru, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes yang melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (beyond reasonable doubt) menurut seksyen 182A (2) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 [70] Oleh yang demikian, di akhir perbicaraan setelah mempertimbangkan segala keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah diputuskan bahawa Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 adalah disabitkan dengan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [71] Bagi hukuman kesalahan membunuh (murder), peruntukan hukuman (sentencing provision) yang berkuat kuasa adalah seksyen 302 setelah mengambil kira pindaan yang dibuat dengan berkuat kuasa nya Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 [Akta 846] pada 4 Julai 2023 [P.U.(B) 229/23], yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years but not exceeding forty years and if not sentenced to death, shall also be punished with whipping of not less than twelve strokes.” (Penekanan ditambah) Hujahan Mitigasi dan Pemberatan Hukuman [72] Pihak pembelaan dalam mitigasi memohon hukuman pemenjaraan yang minimum dengan mengambil kira faktor-faktor berikut: (a) Tertuduh 1 berumur 48 tahun dan Tertuduh 2 yang berumur 45 tahun; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 (b) Kesalahan pertama Tertuduh-Tertuduh; (c) Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 merupakan adik beradik; (d) Masalah kesihatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh; (e) Anak-anak mangsa yang telah kehilangan ayah akan kehilangan ibu pula jika Tertuduh 1 dikenakan hukuman gantung; (f) Supaya Tertuduh-Tertuduh diberi peluang untuk menghabiskan sisa kehidupan dalam penjara; (g) Tertuduh 1 merupakan pesalah wanita yang dikecualikan daripada hukuman sebatan; dan (h) Pohon hukuman sebatan ke atas Tertuduh 2 ditangguhkan (stay) sehingga selesai proses rayuan. [73] Pihak pendakwaan pula telah mengemukakan hujah pemberatan ke atas hukuman seperti berikut: (a) hukuman mati masih lagi relevan; (b) dokumen perubatan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan bukanlah merupakan laporan perubatan terkini Tertuduh-Tertuduh; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 (c) kejadian pembunuhan tersebut merupakan suatu pengkhianatan kepada kepercayaan di kalangan anggota keluarga yang tinggal bersama dalam sebuah rumah; dan (d) Mangsa merupakan seorang yang buta sepenuhnya yang tidak berdaya untuk melawan atau melindungi diri sendiri. [74] Pihak pendakwaan juga telah mengemukakan ‘victim’s impact statement’ oleh anak lelaki Mangsa iaitu SP13 yang dikemukakan melalui Pegawai Penyiasat ASP S. Vekram a/l S. Sinnaiah (SP15) yang telah diterima masuk oleh Mahkamah ini menurut seksyen 183A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan ditandakan sebagai ekshibit P46. Antara lain SP13 dalam ekshibit P46 menyatakan tentang perasaan yang teramat trauma, takut dan sedih beliau hinggakan tidak sanggup untuk hadir ke Mahkamah ini bagi mengetahui keputusan kes mendiang bapanya. Hukuman [75] Setelah mendengar, meneliti dan mengambil kira hujah mitigasi oleh peguambela dan hujah pemberatan oleh pihak pendakwaan serta mengambil kira ‘victim’s impact statement’ (ekshibit P46) oleh anak Mangsa yang bernama Navaneethan a/l Devarajoo (SP13), Mahkamah ini tidak mendapati apa-apa keadaan yang mewajarkan pelaksanaan budi bicara untuk mengenakan hukuman pemenjaraan dan sebatan menurut peruntukan hukuman terkini seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan selepas pindaan menurut Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 [Akta 846]. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-45B-32-10/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH 1. ) ANGELA DEWI A/P GANAI SANNACY 2. ) VIJAYA A/L GANAI SANNACY

Perbicaraan jenayah - Pertuduhan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan;Di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie. Walaupun tiada saksi mata (eye witness), tapi keterangan-keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) dan inferens yang munasabah dibuat menjadikan kes pendakwaan yang kukuh dan menyakinkan;Di akhir perbicaraan, Tertuduh-tertuduh hanya sekadar membuat penafian semata-mata. Namun Tertuduh-Tertuduh langsung tidak menafikan keberadaan mereka pada masa dan tempat yang material. Mahkamah menerima "last seen person theory" untuk membuat suatu inferens yang cukup menyakin.Pihak pembelaan telah gagal menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Justeru, Mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes yang melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah disabitkan dengan kesalahan membunuh.Setelah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, Mahkamah tidak mendapati apa-apa keadaan yang mewajarkan pelaksanaan budi bicara untuk mengenakan hukuman pemenjaraan dan sebatan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah telah memerintahkan supaya Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 dikenakan hukuman gantung di leher sampai mati menurut seksyen 277 Kanun Keseksaan.

29/01/2024

YA Tuan Hasbullah bin Adam

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=cfc1e245-a2a9-42a6-8393-9a48770b30cc&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN PERBICARAAN JENAYAH NO. BA-45B-32-10/2021 PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN 1. ANGELA DEWI A/P GANAI SANNACY [NO. KP: 750816-08-6154] 2. VIJAYA A/L GANAI SANNACY [NO. KP: 780509-08-6485] ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Angela Dewi a/p Ganai Sannacy (“Tertuduh 1”) dan Vijaya a/l Ganai Sannacy (“Tertuduh 2”) (secara kolektif dirujuk sebagai “Tertuduh-Tertuduh”) telah dituduh dengan satu pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. 29/01/2024 12:17:30 BA-45B-32-10/2021 Kand. 146 S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh-Tertuduh [ekshibit P2] adalah seperti berikut: “Bahawa kamu pada 1.10.2020 di antara jam 12.00 tengahari hingga jam 1.00 petang bertempat di rumah beralamat No. 10, Lorong Jati 1, Rumah Murah PKNS Blok A, Kg Baru Sungai Chua, 43000 Kajang, dalam Daerah Hulu Langat di dalam Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan bagi mencapai niat bersama kamu telah melakukan bunuh ke atas Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (No. KP: 610817-08-5415) dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan.” [3] Pada 25.5.2023, Mahkamah ini telah merumuskan di akhir kes pendakwaan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh (murder) yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan terhadap Tertuduh-Tertuduh seperti mana dalam pertuduhan [ekshibit P2]. Oleh yang demikian, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah dipanggil untuk membela diri ke atas pertuduhan tersebut. [4] Seterusnya di akhir perbicaraan (at the conclusion of the trial) pula, Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan pada 21.9.2023 bahawa Tertuduh- Tertuduh disabitkan dengan kesalahan membunuh dan seterusnya dikenakan hukuman gantung di leher sampai mati menurut seksyen 277 S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [5] Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah memfailkan rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah melalui notis rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia bertarikh 22.9.2023. Ringkasan Kes Pendakwaan [6] Perbicaraan kes ini di peringkat kes pendakwaan telah bermula pada 27.2.2023 dan pihak pendakwaan telah menutup kes pendakwaan pada 17.3.2023 setelah memanggil seramai 16 orang saksi pendakwaan seperti berikut: SP1 : Kpl Syarizwan bin Md Saad (Jurufoto) SP2 : Dr Nour Izaquan bin Baharuddin (Pegawai Perubatan) SP3 : Mohd Nasharuddin bin Mahat (Jiran mangsa) SP4 : Kpl Mohd Ariff bin Hazmi (Jurufoto bedah siasat) SP5 : Kpl Mohammad Na’im bin Ideres (Jurufoto tempat kejadian dan barang kes) SP6 : ASP Boby bin Tamat (Pegawai forensik PDRM) SP7 : Dr Muhammad Firdaus bin Yusman (Peg Perubatan) SP8 : Dr Khairul Anuar bin Zainun (Pakar Patologi Forensik) SP9 : Sjn Ilham bin Hitam (Jurustor) SP10 : Insp. Mohamad Faeez bin Norzah (Pegawai penyiasat kes samun) S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 SP11 : Janaky a/p Supurmany (Isteri kedua mangsa) SP12 : Sangitha a/p Devarajoo (Cucu mangsa) SP13 : Navaneethan a/l Devarajoo (Anak mangsa) SP14 : Insp. Mohd Hazrani bin Hashim (Pegawai tangkapan) SP15 : ASP S.Vekram a/l S.Sinnaiah (Pegawai Penyiasat) SP16 : Muniandy a/l Sivalingam (Pemandu peribadi mangsa). [7] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di peringkat kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah merumuskan fakta kes pendakwaan secara ringkasnya seperti berikut: (a) Pada 1.10.2020 jam lebih kurang 12 tengahari, Janaky a/p Supurmany (SP11) yang merupakan isteri kedua yang dikahwini secara adat oleh Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (“Mangsa”), telah keluar dari rumah di No. 10, Lorong Jati 1, Rumah Murah PKNS Blok A, Kg Baru Sungai Chua, Kajang (“Rumah tempat kejadian”) untuk menghantar 2 orang cucu Mangsa ke sekolah iaitu Sangitha a/p Devarajoo (SP12) dan seorang lagi bernama Mohanas Sree (Moganeswari), dengan menaiki motorsikal; (b) Sebelum bergerak ke sekolah, SP11 dan SP12 telah melihat Tertuduh 1 (yang memakai night dress) dan Tertuduh 2 (yang memakai t-shirt dan seluar pendek) sedang berbual di kawasan garaj depan rumah; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (c) Lebih kurang baru 5 minit meninggalkan Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut, SP11 telah berpatah balik kerana secara tiba-tiba dimaklumkan bahawa Mohanas Sree (Moganeswari) berasa tidak sihat. Setelah sampai di rumah, SP12 telah mendekati mangsa yang masih di atas sofa di kawasan beranda rumah itu dan melihat mangsa dalam keadaan berlumuran darah. SP12 menjerit dan SP11 turut datang serta melihat mangsa yang berlumuran darah itu; (d) Mohd Nasharuddin bin Mahat (SP3) yang merupakan seorang jiran, telah datang ke rumah Mangsa apabila mendengar kekecohan dan jeritan. SP3 telah membuat panggilan kecemasan untuk memanggil ambulan; (e) Dalam keadaan kelam kabut itu, SP11 dan SP12 boleh melihat Tertuduh 1 berdiri berdekatan dengan kereta di porch/garaj dan telah bertukar pakaian kepada tshirt dan seluar. Manakala Tertuduh 2 tidak kelihatan di rumah itu; (f) Setelah ambulan sampai, Mangsa telah di bawa ke Hospital Kajang. Manakala Tertuduh 1 telah membuat satu laporan polis iaitu Kajang Report No. 29818/20 bertarikh 1.10.2020 [ekshibit P24] iaitu pada petang hari yang sama menyatakan ia adalah kejadian samun kerana rantai leher emas yang dipakai oleh Mangsa telah tiada. Siasatan awal kejadian tersebut di bawah seksyen 394 Kanun Keseksaan diambil oleh Insp. Mohamad Faeez bin Norzah (SP10); S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (g) Mangsa telah disahkan meninggal dunia pada 10.10.2020. Siasatan pihak polis telah diklasifikasikan semula kepada seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan diambil alih siasatan oleh ASP S. Vekram a/l S. Sinnaiah (SP15); (h) SP15 telah membuat siasatan lanjut dan telah melawat ke tempat kejadian. Hasil siasatan lanjut tersebut, SP15 telah mengarahkan penangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 1. Tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 1 telah dijalankan oleh Insp. Mohd Hazrani bin Hashim (SP14) dan beliau telah membuat laporan polis penangkapan tersebut seperti mana dalam Kajang Report No. 30880/20 [ekshibit P28] bertarikh 10.10.2020; (i) SP14 juga telah membuat tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 2 pada 17.10.2020 seperti mana dalam laporan polis Kajang Report No. 31682/20 [ekshibit P29]; (j) Hasil siasatan lanjut ke atas Tertuduh 2, Tertuduh 2 telah memandu arah SP14 dan pasukan polis ke sebuah stor di Bukit Angkat, Kajang dan telah membawa kepada penemuan 1 penukul besi [ekshibit P15(1)(A)] di kawasan stor dan seutas rantai leher emas [ekshibit P15(2)(B)] yang diletakkan dalam sarung tangan getah hitam [ekshibit P15(4)(A1)] di pangkal pokok pisang berhampiran dengan kawasan stor tersebut, seperti mana dilaporkan oleh SP14 dalam Kajang Report No.31683/20 [ekshibit P32–dengan mengambil kira S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 beberapa frasa ayat yang diputuskan supaya dipotong/expunged]; (k) Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun, Pakar Patologi Forensik (SP8) yang telah menjalankan bedah siasat ke atas mayat Mangsa menjelaskan tentang punca kematian Mangsa (cause of death) iaitu akibat komplikasi pendarahan selaput otak, kesan dari trauma tumpul setempat yang dialami oleh Mangsa pada bahagian kepala (blunt-force trauma to the head). Rujuk laporan bedah siasat bertarikh 15.10.2020 [ekshibit P18]. Tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan [8] Tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan adalah seperti mana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 180(1) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Prinsip-prinsip tugas Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan telah diputuskan di dalam beberapa kes tersohor termasuklah PP v. Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan: “[15] For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of the prosecution’s case: (i) the close of the prosecution’s case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 credibility of each of the prosecution’s witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused; (ii) ask yourself the question: If I now call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is “Yes”, then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is “No” then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted;” [9] Elemen kesalahan membunuh terkandung dalam peruntukan seksyen 299 dan seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 299 mendefinisikan secara umum ‘culpable homicide’ seperti berikut: “Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death commits the offence of culpable homicide.” [10] Seterusnya seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan tentang ‘culpable homicide amounting to murder’ seperti yang berikut: S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 “Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder: (a) If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; (b) If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; (c) If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or (d) If the person committing the act knows that it is imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury as aforesaid.” (Penekanan ditambah) [11] Oleh yang demikian, dengan berpandukan peruntukan seksyen 299 dan seksyen 300 tersebut, pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini yang melibatkan pertuduhan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Keseksaan adalah bertanggungjawab untuk membuktikan elemen- elemen pertuduhan seperti berikut: (a) berlakunya kematian seorang yang bernama Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (“Mangsa”); (b) kematian Mangsa disebabkan kecederaan yang dialaminya (bodily injury); (c) kecederaan ke atas Mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh; (d) perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh yang menyebabkan bencana tubuh atau kecederaan ke atas Mangsa telah dilakukan pada masa, tarikh dan tempat seperti mana dalam pertuduhan; (e) bahawa dalam mengakibatkan kecederaan ke atas Mangsa, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah, sama ada - (i) dengan niat menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; (ii) dengan niat menyebabkan bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang diketahui oleh Tertuduh-Tertuduh boleh menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (iii) dengan niat menyebabkan bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang pada kebiasaannya boleh menyebabkan kematian; atau (iv) dengan pengetahuan bahawa perbuatan itu sangat merbahaya dan semestinya dalam apa jua kebarangkalian akan menyebabkan kematian atau kecederaan badan yang boleh menyebabkan kematian; dan (f) bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh mempunyai niat bersama untuk membunuh atau menyebabkan kematian Mangsa. Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah di akhir kes pendakwaan Kematian Devarajoo a/l Rengasamy (mangsa) [12] Adalah merupakan fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan oleh mana-mana pihak dalam kes ini bahawa Mangsa telah mati pada 10.10.2020 seperti mana dalam keterangan dokumentar Daftar Kematian [ekshibit P21]. [13] Adalah dapatan (finding) Mahkamah ini bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen pertama bahawa Mangsa telah pun mati melalui keterangan Dr. Muhammad Firdaus bin Yusman, Pegawai Perubatan (SP7) dan keterangan dokumentar iaitu Laporan Bedah Siasat bertarikh 15.10.2020 [ekshibit P18] oleh Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun, Pakar Patologi Forensik (SP8). S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Kematian Mangsa disebabkan kecederaan yang dialaminya [14] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa kematian Mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh kecederaan yang dialaminya. Keterangan Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun, Pakar Patologi Forensik (SP8) yang telah menjalankan bedah siasat ke atas mayat Mangsa menjelaskan tentang punca kematian Mangsa akibat komplikasi pendarahan selaput otak, kesan dari trauma tumpul setempat yang dialami oleh Mangsa pada bahagian kepala (blunt-force trauma to the head). [15] SP8 semasa memberi keterangan dalam Mahkamah ini telah menjelaskan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Mangsa pada bahagian kepala tersebut adalah sangat serius dan walaupun rawatan diberikan ia hanyalah sekadar untuk memanjangkan hayat Mangsa. Namun kecederaan yang dialami oleh Mangsa akan menyebabkan kematian juga kepada Mangsa. Manakala jangkitan paru-paru (pneumonia) yang turut dijumpai ketika bedah siasat juga boleh menyumbang dalam mempercepatkan kematian Mangsa pada waktu tersebut tetapi bukanlah penyebab kepada sebab kematian. [16] Mahkamah ini menerima keterangan SP8 tersebut dan berpuas hati bahawa elemen kedua pertuduhan kesalahan telah berjaya dibuktikan. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Kecederaan ke atas Mangsa adalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh [17] Pihak pendakwaan telah bergantung kepada keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) bagi membuktikan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Mangsa tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh. [18] Walaupun tiada saksi mata (eye witness) yang melihat bagaimana Mangsa menghadapi peristiwa yang menyebabkan kecederaan hingga membawa kepada kematiannya, namun Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan menerima keterangan-keterangan mengikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) yang cukup menyakinkan (strong and convincing) bagi membuat suatu kesimpulan tentang perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh yang telah menyebabkan kecederaan dan kematian Mangsa. [19] Mangsa dalam kes ini adalah seorang lelaki india yang mempunyai masalah penglihatan/buta yang sudah lama dialaminya akibat daripada kemalangan. Pada hari-hari biasa, terdapat 9 orang lain lagi (selain Mangsa) yang tinggal bersama-sama Mangsa di Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut yang terdiri daripada 3 orang dewasa dan 6 orang kanak-kanak, seperti berikut: (a) Tertuduh 1 (isteri pertama Mangsa); (b) Tertuduh 2 (adik lelaki Tertuduh 1); (c) Janaky a/p Supurmany (SP11/ isteri kedua Mangsa); (d) Navaneethan a/l Devarajoo (SP13/ anak dengan Tertuduh 1); S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (e) Sangitha a/p Devarajoo (SP12/ cucu yang dijadikan anak angkat); (f) Kishok Kumar a/l Devarajoo (anak dengan Tertuduh 1; (g) Vaishnavi a/l Devarajoo (cucu/ anak angkat); (h) Varunavi a/l Devarajoo (cucu/ anak angkat); dan (i) Mohana Sree a/p Devarajoo (cucu/ anak angkat). [20] Walaupun mempunyai masalah penglihatan/buta, Mangsa masih bekerja dengan bergantung kepada pemandu peribadinya iaitu Muniandy a/l Sivalingam (SP16) untuk membawa beliau ke mana-mana atas urusan kerja. Pada hari kejadian iaitu pada 1.10.2020, SP16 tidak hadir bekerja kerana telah meminta cuti selama 3 hari dan pada hari kejadian tersebut beliau hanya duduk di rumah sahaja dan hanya datang ke rumah Mangsa setelah menerima panggilan telefon memaklumkan mengenai kejadian yang berlaku ke atas Mangsa. [21] Menurut keterangan SP11 dan SP12, pada hari kejadian tersebut sebelum bergerak menuju ke sekolah, mereka telah nampak Mangsa yang sedang duduk di atas sofa di bahagian beranda Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut dengan memakai seluar pendek tanpa baju dan memakai rantai emas di leher yang biasa dan telah lama dipakai oleh Mangsa. Malahan SP12 dan Mohana Sree telah menghampiri dan memeluk serta mencium Mangsa untuk memaklumkan mereka akan ke sekolah. Sebelum bergerak ke sekolah, SP11 dan SP12 turut nampak Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 yang sedang berbual di garaj di hadapan rumah seperti mana ditandakan dalam gambar rajah kasar [ekshibit P27]. Pada masa itu, Tertuduh 1 dikatakan memakai gaun baju tidur malam S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (night dress) dan Tertuduh 2 memakai seluar pendek dan t-shirt. Manakala 4 orang lagi kanak-kanak yang tinggal bersama di rumah tersebut tiada di rumah kerana mereka bersekolah sesi pagi. [22] SP11 kemudiannya telah membawa kedua-dua cucu/anak angkat Mangsa iaitu SP12 dan Mohana Sree menaiki motorsikal menuju ke sekolah. Walau bagaimanapun, lebih kurang 5 minit daripada rumah, Mohana Sree telah memaklumkan bahawa beliau tidak sihat. Oleh yang demikian, SP11 telah berpatah balik ke rumah. Sampai sahaja di hadapan rumah, SP12 terus menuju ke arah Mangsa yang masih berada atas sofa yang sama. SP12 melihat badan Mangsa yang berlumuran darah termasuk bahagian kepala Mangsa. SP12 telah menjerit dan SP11 terus masuk dan melihat keadaan Mangsa. Pada masa kekecohan itu, SP11 dan SP12 tidak melihat Tertuduh 1 atau Tertuduh 2 di situ. Namun Tertuduh 1 hanya datang kemudian dan berdiri di tepi kereta yang diletakkan berdekatan dengan sofa tempat Mangsa duduk. Pada ketika itu, SP11 dan SP12 dalam keterangannya memaklumkan bahawa Tertuduh 1 tidak lagi memakai night dress tetapi telah menukar pakaian kepada t-shirt dan seluar pendek. Manakala Tertuduh 2 tidak kelihatan. [23] SP11 kemudiannya telah meminta bantuan daripada jiran untuk menghubungi ambulan. SP3 dalam keterangannya mengesahkan bahawa beliau merupakan jiran yang telah memanggil ambulan. SP11 telah menaiki ambulan tersebut mengiringi Mangsa dalam ambulan tersebut menuju ke hospital. Manakala Tertuduh 1 telah menaiki kereta bersama pemandu kepada Mangsa (SP16) yang tiba kemudian di Rumah kejadian tersebut menuju ke hospital. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [24] Pada petang hari yang sama kejadian tersebut juga, Tertuduh 1 telah membuat laporan polis [ekshibit P24] menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh 1 telah mendengar jeritan kakaknya dan kemudiannya mendapati Mangsa dalam keadaan cedera di kepala dan rantai emas yang dipakai Mangsa juga turut hilang. [25] Insp. Mohamad Faeez bin Norzah (SP10) merupakan pegawai penyiasat awal bagi kes yang pada mulanya diklasifikasi sebagai kes samun di bawah seksyen 394 Kanun Keseksaan. SP10 telah merakam percakapan Tertuduh 1 dan isteri kedua Mangsa (SP11). SP10 turut merakam percakapan pemandu peribadi Mangsa iaitu Muniandy a/l Sivalingam (SP16) dan juga anak lelaki Mangsa. [26] Selepas Mangsa disahkan meninggal dunia pada 10.10.2019, kes telah dklasifikasikan semula untuk siasatan di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan. Siasatan telah dijalankan seterusnya oleh Pegawai Penyiasat, ASP S. Vekram a/l S. Sinnaiah (SP15). Dalam menjalankan siasatan, SP15 telah mendapati sofa tempat kejadian di mana Mangsa duduk kali terakhir sebelum kematiannya, telah tiada atau dibuang oleh keluarga Mangsa. SP15 juga telah masuk ke dalam stor menyimpan barangan katering yang mana menurut Tertuduh 1 beliau berada dalam stor tersebut pada tengahari hari kejadian untuk mengemas barangan katering. Hasil siasatan dan pemerhatian SP15 mendapati stor tersebut hanyalah merupakan sebuah bilik kecil yang diletakkan barangan katering. Namun menurut SP15 keadaan dalam stor tersebut adalah sangat berhabuk, sempit, panas dan barang-barang dalam keadaan berselerak. Hasil siasatan tidak menunjukkan perbuatan mengemas dan S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 tidak munasabah untuk berada di dalamnya waktu tengahari yang sangat panas. [27] SP15 juga telah mengarahkan mayat Mangsa dihantar untuk tujuan bedah siasat yang telah dijalankan oleh Dr. Khairul Anuar bin Zainun (SP8). Dalam bedah siasat yang dijalankan ke atas mayat Mangsa, SP8 menemui adanya kesan luka mempertahankan diri atau pergelutan iaitu luka di bahagian tangan kiri dan kanan Mangsa. SP8 turut menjelaskan bahawa corak kecederaan yang dialami Mangsa adalah akibat ketukan atau pukulan dengan objek atau senjata tumpul yang menyebabkan kepatahan tulang tempurung kepala, pendarahan selaput otak dan pembengkakan otak yang menyebabkan kematian Mangsa. Menurut SP8 lagi bahawa berdasarkan corak kecederaan tersebut, ia boleh diakibatkan oleh ketukan atau pukulan dengan objek atau senjata tumpul yang mempunyai bahagian yang berbentuk bulat. [28] Seterusnya Tertuduh 2 pula telah ditangkap oleh Insp. Mohd Hazrani bin Hashim (SP14). Hasil siasatan ke atas Tertuduh 2 pula telah membawa kepada pandu arah oleh Tertuduh 2 ke sebuah stor kitar semula di Bukit Angkat, Sg Chua, Kajang berhadapan kuil Sri Maha Kali Matha Illam hingga membawa kepada penemuan sebuah penukul besi [ekshibit P15(1A)] yang diletakkan di atas tanah berdekatan stor tersebut dan seterusnya membawa pasukan polis ke rimbunan pokok pisang di mana ditemui satu sarung tangan hitam [ekshibit P15(4)(A1)] yang mengandungi seutas rantai leher emas berbentuk bulat-bulat [ekshibit P15(2B)]. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [29] ASP Boby bin Tamat (SP6) merupakan pegawai forensik PDRM yang telah dipanggil ke lokasi tersebut bagi menjalankan ‘swabbing’ dan cap jari ke atas barang-barang kes yang ditemui serta membuat ukuran pada penukul besi berkenaan. SP6 telah menyerahkan semua barang kes yang ditemui kepada SP15 seperti mana dalam Borang Serah Menyerah Barang-Barang Kes [ekshibit P14]. [30] Keterangan saksi-saksi iaitu SP11, SP12, SP13 dan SP16 telah mengecam rantai emas tersebut yang dikemukakan dalam Mahkamah yang merupakan rantai emas yang dipakai oleh Mangsa semasa hidupnya. Sifat unik rantai emas itu juga membantu dalam proses pengecaman iaitu bentuk rantai leher bulat-bulat kecil. Malahan isu pengecaman rantai leher emas ini juga tidak pernah dibantah atau diragui semasa keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan oleh pihak pembelaan. [31] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan walaupun tiada saksi mata yang dapat dikemukakan, namun keterangan- keterangan ikut keadaan (circumstantial evidence) yang ada cukup kuat dan menyakinkan bahawa Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 merupakan orang yang terakhir (last seen person) bersama Mangsa di Rumah tempat kejadian. Malahan perbezaan masa SP11, SP12 dan Mohana Sree mula meninggalkan rumah untuk ke sekolah dan berpatah balik ke rumah hanyalah lebih kurang 10 minit dan kedudukan Mangsa yang masih kekal di atas sofa di halaman rumah itu. Hanya orang yang berada di rumah tersebut sahaja mengetahui Mangsa berada di rumah ketika itu. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [32] Dalam kes Kagatree a/p Pechi v. Public Prosecutor & Another appeal [2023] MLJU 275, rujukan telah dibuat kepada Sarkar Law of Evidence: “[56] Sarkar Law of Evidence, 18th Edition, Volume 1 page 140, states this: ‘The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crimes becomes impossible.’….” [33] Dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, keterangan SP11 dan SP12 mengatakan bahawa semasa mereka hendak bergerak ke sekolah, Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 dilihat berada di garaj di hadapan Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut. Malahan Tertuduh 1 dilihat sedang memakai night dress. Apabila SP11 dan SP12 sampai semula ke rumah setelah berpatah balik kerana Mohana Sree yang tidak sihat, Mangsa masih pada kedudukan di atas sofa dan Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 sudah tidak lagi kelihatan di hadapan rumah. Jarak masa lebih kurang 10 minit daripada mula SP11 dan SP12 meninggalkan rumah hingga balik semula ke rumah adalah suatu masa yang singkat. Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 merupakan orang yang terakhir berada di rumah dan tiada orang lain lagi yang berada di rumah ketika itu. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [34] Tertuduh 1 hanya muncul kemudian dengan memakai seluar dan tshirt. Pembelaan cuba menyatakan pembelaan Tertuduh 1 di peringkat kes pendakwaan lagi bahawa Tertuduh 1 berada di dalam stor barangan katering di hadapan rumah dan cuba menyatakan bahawa Mangsa telah disamun disebabkan rantai leher emas yang dipakai Mangsa telah tiada. Namun siasatan SP15 mendapati keadaan dalam stor barangan katering di garaj hadapan rumah adalah sangat berhabuk, sempit, panas dan barang-barang dalam keadaan berselerak yang tidak mungkin Tertuduh 1 berada dalam stor tersebut pada waktu tengahari untuk mengemas barang-barang katering. Versi pembelaan untuk mengatakan Mangsa telah disamun berdasarkan kehilangan rantai leher emas Mangsa sedangkan cincin yang dipakai oleh Mangsa masih ada adalah juga tidak menyakinkan Mahkamah ini. [35] Oleh yang demikian, berdasarkan penilaian secara keseluruhan keterangan-keterangan ikut keadaan dan ‘last seen person theory’, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan membuat dapatan yang menyakinkan bahawa perbuatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh tersebut yang telah menyebabkan kecederaan atau bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa hingga mengakibatkan kematian Mangsa. Elemen mens rea bagi kesalahan membunuh [36] Bagi membuktikan suatu kes prima facie bagi kesalahan membunuh, salah satu elemen penting lagi yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan adalah elemen mens rea seperti mana dijelaskan S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 dalam seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan. Pihak pendakwaan hendaklah juga membuktikan bahawa dalam mengakibatkan kecederaan ke atas Mangsa, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah, sama ada - (a) dengan niat menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; (b) dengan niat menyebabkan kecederaan tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang diketahui oleh Tertuduh-Tertuduh boleh menyebabkan kematian Mangsa; (c) dengan niat menyebabkan kecederaan tubuh Mangsa yang pada kebiasaannya boleh menyebabkan kematian; atau (d) dengan pengetahuan bahawa perbuatan itu sangat merbahaya dan semestinya dalam apa jua kebarangkalian akan menyebabkan kematian atau kecederaan badan yang boleh menyebabkan kematian. [37] Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan dan mengguna pakai cabang (c) di bawah seksyen 300 Kanun Keseksaan bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh mempunyai niat untuk menyebabkan kecederaan seperti yang dialami oleh Mangsa yang mana secara lazimnya akan menyebabkan kematian (sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death). [38] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa seksyen 300(c) Kanun Keseksaan tersebut menghendaki pihak pendakwaan membuktikan bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh mempunyai niat (intention) untuk S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 menyebabkan kecederaan atau bencana tubuh ke atas Mangsa yang mana kecederaan atau bencana tubuh yang dilakukan itu secara lazimnya akan menyebabkan kematian: “(c) If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;” (Penekanan ditambah) [39] Adalah merupakan suatu yang agak mustahil bagi membuktikan niat atau pengetahuan seseorang pelaku melalui keterangan secara langsung (direct evidence). Walau bagaimanapun, ia masih boleh ditentukan melalui inferens yang dapat dibuat dengan bersandarkan kepada segala fakta dan keadaan (facts and circumstances). [40] Dalam kes Sainal Abidin v. PP [1999] 4 MLJ 497 telah diputuskan bahawa niat adalah merupakan suatu perkara inferens yang boleh dibuat dan sifat kecederaan yang dialami oleh mangsa termasuk bilangan luka serta jenis senjata yang digunakan adalah dianggap sebagai petunjuk (indicator) kepada niat pelaku dalam menyebabkan sesuatu kecederaan: “Intention is a matter of inference. In the instant case, the trial judge had carefully considered the evidence of the doctor (medical evidence), the evidence of eye-witness and the appellant on the issue of intention. After considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 deceased, the number of wounds and the weapon used. The trial judge had correctly regarded the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as an indicator of intention. The trial judge was correct in concluding that the appellant possessed the intention of causing bodily injuries to the deceased and that such injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” [41] Manakala dalam kes Juraimi Husin v. PP [1998] 2 CLJ 383, adalah diputuskan bahawa inferens niat dapat dibuat berdasarkan perbuatan dan kelakuan (conduct) atau lain-lain keadaan. [42] Berdasarkan segala keterangan yang ada, Mahkamah ini dapat membuat apa-apa inferens yang sewajarnya bagi menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah dengan niat (intention) menyebabkan kecederaan tubuh Mangsa yang mana kecederaan tubuh yang dilakukan itu secara lazimnya akan menyebabkan kematian, berdasarkan alasan- alasan berikut: (a) SP11, SP12, SP13 dan SP16 mengesahkan bahawa Tertuduh 1 selalu bergaduh dengan Mangsa dan sudah lama tidak bercakap. Mereka hanya bercakap apabila pergaduhan berlaku. Apabila ditanya punca pergaduhan, semuanya mengatakan ia akibat duit yang dipinjam oleh Mangsa daripada Tertuduh1 dan belum dibayar. Malahan SP13 juga mengatakan bahawa Tertuduh 1 marah apabila Mangsa S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 membawa masuk SP11 (isteri kedua Mangsa) tinggal bersama-sama dalam Rumah tempat kejadian tersebut; (b) Malahan dalam keterangan SP13 (iaitu anak kandung lelaki Tertuduh 1 dan Mangsa) ada menjelaskan bahawa Tertuduh 1 pernah menceritakan masalah antara Mangsa dengan Tertuduh 1. Tertuduh 1 juga pernah mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak berpuas hati dengan Mangsa dan meminta SP13 memasukkan suatu serbuk ke dalam makanan Mangsa. Namun SP13 enggan untuk berbuat demikian tapi sekadar mengiyakan sahaja arahan Tertuduh 1. Hal ini berlaku dalam 2 bulan sebelum kejadian Mangsa dibunuh; (c) SP16 yang merupakan pemandu peribadi Mangsa juga ada memberi keterangan bahawa Mangsa dan Tertuduh 1 kerap bergaduh berpunca daripada duit. Malahan SP16 juga pernah disuruh oleh Tertuduh 1 untuk memasukkan racun dalam kopi Mangsa tetapi SP16 tidak melakukannya. Sebaliknya SP16 memberitahu kepada SP13 dan seterusnya diambil botol berisi racun tersebut oleh SP13 dan dibuang ke dalam parit. Tambahan menurut SP16 lagi bahawa Tertuduh 1 pernah bertanya kepada beliau jika mengetahui mana-mana orang yang sanggup untuk membunuh Mangsa dan akan diberikan upah RM20 ribu; (d) Manakala Tertuduh 2 pula sememangnya merupakan adik lelaki kepada Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 yang telah S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 membawa dan memandu arah pihak polis hingga menemui penukul besi serta rantai leher emas milik Mangsa; (e) SP8 dalam keterangannya menjelaskan tentang kecederaan yang dialami Mangsa adalah sangat teruk. Tempurung kepala adalah suatu bahagian yang sangat keras dan untuk kecederaan yang dialami Mangsa, ia menunjukkan satu daya yang sangat kuat telah digunakan oleh pelaku untuk mencederakan Mangsa. Kecederaan itu sendiri sudah jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia mencukupi untuk menyebabkan kematian kerana pelakunya memilih bahagian kepala dan bukannya anggota badan yang lain. Oleh yang demikian, ia mewajarkan inferens tentang niat pelakunya untuk melakukan tindakan untuk mencederakan Mangsa yang boleh menyebabkan kematian. [43] Seterusnya, walaupun motif bukanlah merupakan salah satu intipati (ingredient) kepada pertuduhan membunuh, namun Mahkamah ini mendapati keterangan-keterangan tentang kewujudan motif dalam kes ini. Tertuduh 1 sememangnya telah beberapa kali membuat percubaan melalui SP13 dan SP16 untuk memasukkan ubat atau racun ke dalam makanan Mangsa tetapi tidak berjaya apabila kedua-dua saksi tersebut tidak melaksanakan arahan yang diberikan. Malahan Tertuduh 1 sampai pernah meminta SP16 mencari pembunuh upahan dengan bayaran upah RM20 ribu untuk membunuh Mangsa. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [44] Dalam kes Priytharen Sundaramurthy v. PP & 1 lagi rayuan [2019] 1 LNS 47, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menjelaskan tentang penerimaan motis sebagai keterangan sokongan seperti berikut: “[33] …. Kami mengambil maklum bahawa motif bukanlah salah satu inti pati pertuduhan namun hakim bicara telah membuat pertimbangan berdasarkan kepada fakta bahawa wujud motif di pihak Perayu Pertama untuk membunuh si mati. Dapatan ini hanya satu keterangan sokongan sahaja….” [45] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan elemen mens rea menurut seksyen 300(c) Kanun Keseksaan iaitu niat (intention) Tertuduh-Tertuduh dengan perbuatan mengetuk dengan penukul besi pada bahagian kepala Mangsa untuk menyebabkan kecederaan yang lazimnya boleh mengakibatkan kematian (sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death). Niat bersama oleh Tertuduh-Tertuduh [46] Dalam kes ini, Tertuduh-Tertuduh telah dituduh secara bersama- sama menurut seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan bagi kesalahan membunuh Mangsa. [47] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa berdasarkan keterangan- keterangan ikut keadaan sebelum dan selepas kejadian pembunuhan S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 tersebut telah mencukupi untuk menunjukkan ‘common design’ antara keduanya. Dalam kes Aung Thun & Anor. [2013] 1 LNS 985 ada menyatakan seperti berikut: “It is now well established that to invoke section 34 it is not a sine qua non for the prosecution to prove pre- concert or pre-planning in the true sense. It will be sufficient of the prosecution can establish that the appellants were in the place and took part in the crime and/or had nexus to the crime. Section 34 is not substantive law but it is procedural in nature favouring the prosecution such as that of presumption. The effect of the application of section 34 is that once it is invoked in the charge itself and evidence is led to show that the appellants were involved in the crime, the appellants will be required to speak of their innocence or non involvement in the crime or that at the material time of the crime they have disassociated from the crime. Nothing more.” [48] Mahkamah ini berpuas hati kepada ‘last seen person theory” tentang keberadaan Tertuduh-Tertuduh sebagai orang terakhir berada di Rumah tempat kejadian sebelum SP11, SP12 dan Mohanas Sree meninggal rumah tersebut untuk ke sekolah. Mahkamah ini juga telah menerima keterangan SP14 tentang tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 2 yang seterusnya telah memandu arah pihak polis membawa kepada penemuan penukul besi dan rantai leher emas milik Mangsa. Perihal S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh 2 dan perihal pandu arah tersebut telah dinyatakan dalam laporan polis yang dibuat oleh SP14 [ekshibit P32 dan ekshibit P33]. Tanpa pandu arah oleh Tertuduh 2 kepada pihak polis, sudah pasti barang-barang yang dirampas tersebut tidak akan ditemui. Melihat kepada kedudukan barang-barang tersebut ditemui di mana rantai leher emas milik Mangsa diletakkan dalam sarung tangan hitam yang diletakkan dalam surat khabar dan plastik serta disorokkan pada pangkal rumpun pokok pisang berdekatan Kawasan stor di Bukit Angkat, Kajang itu pastilah agak mustahil untuk ditemui oleh pihak polis tanpa dipandu arah oleh sesiapa atau Tertuduh 2. [49] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan mendapati mendapati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan niat bersama (common intention) Tertuduh-Tertuduh bagi perbuatan kesalahan membunuh seperti mana maksud peruntukan seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan, ‘in furtherance of the common intention which presupposes permutation or pre-concept of mind’. Keputusan Di Akhir Kes Pendakwaan [50] Justeru, setelah meneliti secara keseluruhan dan membuat penilaian maksimum ke atas keterangan-keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di peringkat kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan pada 25.5.2023 di akhir kes pendakwaan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [51] Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini telah memerintahkan supaya Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 dipanggil untuk membela diri bagi pertuduhan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Ringkasan Kes Pembelaan [52] Mahkamah ini telah menerangkan 3 pilihan kepada Tertuduh- Tertuduh sama ada untuk memberi keterangan secara bersumpah (sworn statement) dalam kandang saksi (witness box), memberi keterangan tidak bersumpah (unsworn statement) daripada kandang tertuduh atau berdiam diri. Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 kemudiannya telah memilih untuk memberi pengataan tanpa bersumpah secara bertulis dari dalam kandang tertuduh [ditandakan sebagai WSD 1 dan WSD 2 masing- masing]. Seterus pihak pembelaan telah menutup kes pembelaan tanpa memanggil mana-mana saksi lain lagi. [53] Secara ringkasnya, rumusan daripada pernyataan Tertuduh- Tertuduh, mereka mengakui pada sebelah tengahari (tanpa menyatakan masa yang spesifik) berada bersama-sama di hadapan rumah seperti dalam pertuduhan sambil berbincang berkenaan perniagaan katering dan apakah barang-barang yang perlu diambil dari stor katering di hadapan rumah tersebut. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [54] Menurut Tertuduh 2, selepas menerima barang-barang katering yang diberikan oleh Tertuduh 1, Tertuduh 2 telah bertolak pula ke kedai katering (yang dipercayai berada di Bukit Angkat, Kajang) bagi menyerahkan barang-barang katering tersebut kepada pekerja di kedai katering. Namun tiada mana-mana saksi lain atau pekerja di kedai katering dipanggil bagi mengesahkan perkara tersebut. [55] Manakala menurut Tertuduh 1 pula, beliau kemudiannya telah pergi ke stor katering tersebut yang juga terdapat tempat sembahyang. Menurutnya lagi, semasa berada di dalam stor katering itulah maka terdengar jeritan yang kuat oleh Janaki a/p Supurmany (SP11). Tertuduh 1 telah berlari untuk melihat apa yang berlaku dan mendapati mangsa dalam keadaan cedera di bahagian kepala serta rantai emas yang dipakai oleh Mangsa telah hilang. Ini berbeza dengan keterangan SP11 dan SP12 sebelum ini bahawa Tertuduh 1 dilihat berada berdekatan dengan kereta di garaj. Tertuduh 1 menyangkakan kejadian itu merupakan suatu rompakan. Semasa Mangsa dimasukkan ke hospital, Tertuduh 1 telah membuat laporan polis iaitu Kajang Report No. 29818/20 bertarikh 1.10.2020 [ekshibit P24] iaitu pada petang hari kejadian yang sama. Adalah amat tidak munasabah untuk Tertuduh 1 menyangkakan kejadian itu sebagai samun hanya kerana kehilangan rantai leher emas Mangsa sedangkan cincin emas di jari Mangsa tidak pula diambil oleh pelaku. [56] Tertuduh 1 juga menyatakan dalam pernyataan bertulisnya bahawa serbuk putih yang dikatakan sebagai racun oleh SP13 dan SP16 adalah sebenarnya serbuk yang digunakan bagi upacara keagamaan yang S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 dipanggil sebagai “tinuru”. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah ini mendapati itu merupakan perkara baru dibangkitkan oleh Tertuduh1 yang tidak pernah dicadangkan semasa peringkat kes pendakwaan. Tugas Mahkamah Di Akhir Perbicaraan [57] Tugas Mahkamah di akhir perbicaraan (at the conclusion of the trial) adalah untuk mempertimbangkan segala keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah dan memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (beyond reasonable doubt) seperti mana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 182A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah: “(1) At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty and he may be convicted on it. (3) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order of acquittal.” S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [58] Dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Tan Chai Hing [2018] 6 CLJ 436 CA, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyentuh tentang tanggungjawab mahkamah di akhir kes pembelaan seperti berikut: “[20] Under. S. 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is clearly the duty of the court to consider all the evidence before it and shall decide whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. This is a mandatory requirement as evident by the use of the word ‘shall’ in that section. What it entails is that, at the end of the defence, it is incumbent on the court to evaluate the entire evidence placed before it including the prosecution evidence. This was exactly what the learned judge had undertaken at the end of the defence case having considered the case of Jaafar Ali v. PP [1999] 1 CLJ 410...” (Penekanan ditambah) [59] Mahkamah ini juga berpandukan kepada kes Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] 29 MLJ 263 yang telah menggariskan sebagai panduan tugas Mahkamah di akhir perbicaraan: “If the court accepts the explanation given by or on behalf of the accused, it must acquit. But this does not entitle the court to convict if it does not believe that explanation, for he is still entitled to an acquittal if the explanation raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, as the onus of proving S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 his guilt lies throughout on the prosecution. If upon the whole evidence the court is left in a real state of doubt, the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon it.” [60] Walau bagaimanapun, Tertuduh-Tertuduh dalam kes ini telah memilih untuk memberikan pernyataan tanpa sumpah dari kandang tertuduh (unsworn statement from the dock). Dalam kes Rewang bin Tempe v. PP [2016] 3 MLJ 586, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan dalam penghakimannya seperti berikut: “[20] In our view when the defence is called, it is the appellant’s right to give an unsworn statement from the dock. If he elects to give unsworn statement, it cannot be the subject of cross-examination and its weight is not the same as the evidence given on oath in the witness box. The trial court is free to give the dock statement the weight it deserves or not at all, having regard to the whole evidence before the court.” (Penekanan ditambah) [61] Dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. PP & Another Appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 145, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan dalam penghakimannya seperti yang berikut: “In law, a trial judge will not give much weight to what an accused has said in his unsworn statement as he S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 is not subject to cross examination by the prosecution nor can he be questioned by the trial judge.” (Penekanan ditambah) Penilaian Keterangan dan Dapatan Di Akhir Perbicaraan [62] Di akhir perbicaraan (at the conclusion of the trial) adalah menjadi tugas Mahkamah ini untuk mempertimbangkan segala keterangan yang telah dikemukakan di hadapan mahkamah dan memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan kes melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (beyond reasonable doubt) seperti mana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 182A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. [63] Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab mahkamah di peringkat kes pembelaan ini untuk mempertimbangkan sama ada keterangan- keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pembelaan itu telah mewujudkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. Tugas pihak pembelaan hanyalah untuk menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. [64] Walau apapun pembelaan yang dikemukakan dan walaupun pembelaan yang dikemukakan itu adalah lemah, mahkamah masih bertanggungjawab untuk memberikan pertimbangan sewajarnya ke atas keterangan pembelaan tersebut bagi menentukan sama ada pembelaan sedemikian mampu menimbulkan keraguan munasabah terhadap kes pendakwaan. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [65] Dalam kes Ganapathy Rengasamy v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah membuat pemerhatian berikut: “It needs to be remembered that however weak a defence may be, trial judges being judges of both fact and law should not just brush aside the defence on the basis that the prosecution witnesses are to be believed and not the defence. Where the law casts the onus of giving an explanation upon an accused person, and the explanation is given, which if consistent with innocence, the court is duty bound to consider whether it might reasonably be true, although not convinced of its truth.” (Penekanan ditambah) [66] Mahkamah ini mendapati pembelaan Tertuduh-Tertuduh tersebut adalah merupakan penafian semata-mata (mere denial) dan bukanlah suatu pembelaan. Mahkamah ini juga berpandukan kepada kes PP v. Ku Lip See [1981] 1 MLJ 258 menyatakan yang berikut: “A mere denial without other proof to reasonably dislodge the prosecution’s evidence is not sufficient.” [67] Mahkamah ini juga telah merujuk kepada kes D A Duncan v PP [1980] 1 LNS 12 yang memutuskan bahawa penafian semata-mata bukanlah suatu pembelaan: S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 “The defence was, in effect, a simple denial of the evidence connecting the appellant with four boxes. We cannot see any plausible ground for saying that the four boxes were not his. In the circumstances of the prosecution evidence, the High Court came, in our view, to the correct conclusion that this denial did not cast a doubt on the prosecution case against the appellant.” (Penekanan ditambah) Keputusan Di Akhir Perbicaraan [68] Setelah meneliti segala keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini secara keseluruhannya di peringkat kes pendakwaan dan juga di peringkat kes pembelaan, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak pembelaan atau Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 telah gagal untuk menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. Adalah dapatan (finding) Mahkamah ini bahawa keterangan-keterangan saksi pendakwaan adalah tetap utuh dan tiada keraguan munasabah yang telah dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan ke atas kebenaran kes pendakwaan tersebut. [69] Justeru, Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan suatu kes yang melampaui keraguan yang munasabah (beyond reasonable doubt) menurut seksyen 182A (2) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 [70] Oleh yang demikian, di akhir perbicaraan setelah mempertimbangkan segala keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah diputuskan bahawa Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 adalah disabitkan dengan kesalahan membunuh di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. [71] Bagi hukuman kesalahan membunuh (murder), peruntukan hukuman (sentencing provision) yang berkuat kuasa adalah seksyen 302 setelah mengambil kira pindaan yang dibuat dengan berkuat kuasa nya Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 [Akta 846] pada 4 Julai 2023 [P.U.(B) 229/23], yang memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment for a term of not less than thirty years but not exceeding forty years and if not sentenced to death, shall also be punished with whipping of not less than twelve strokes.” (Penekanan ditambah) Hujahan Mitigasi dan Pemberatan Hukuman [72] Pihak pembelaan dalam mitigasi memohon hukuman pemenjaraan yang minimum dengan mengambil kira faktor-faktor berikut: (a) Tertuduh 1 berumur 48 tahun dan Tertuduh 2 yang berumur 45 tahun; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 (b) Kesalahan pertama Tertuduh-Tertuduh; (c) Tertuduh 1 dan Tertuduh 2 merupakan adik beradik; (d) Masalah kesihatan Tertuduh-Tertuduh; (e) Anak-anak mangsa yang telah kehilangan ayah akan kehilangan ibu pula jika Tertuduh 1 dikenakan hukuman gantung; (f) Supaya Tertuduh-Tertuduh diberi peluang untuk menghabiskan sisa kehidupan dalam penjara; (g) Tertuduh 1 merupakan pesalah wanita yang dikecualikan daripada hukuman sebatan; dan (h) Pohon hukuman sebatan ke atas Tertuduh 2 ditangguhkan (stay) sehingga selesai proses rayuan. [73] Pihak pendakwaan pula telah mengemukakan hujah pemberatan ke atas hukuman seperti berikut: (a) hukuman mati masih lagi relevan; (b) dokumen perubatan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan bukanlah merupakan laporan perubatan terkini Tertuduh-Tertuduh; S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 (c) kejadian pembunuhan tersebut merupakan suatu pengkhianatan kepada kepercayaan di kalangan anggota keluarga yang tinggal bersama dalam sebuah rumah; dan (d) Mangsa merupakan seorang yang buta sepenuhnya yang tidak berdaya untuk melawan atau melindungi diri sendiri. [74] Pihak pendakwaan juga telah mengemukakan ‘victim’s impact statement’ oleh anak lelaki Mangsa iaitu SP13 yang dikemukakan melalui Pegawai Penyiasat ASP S. Vekram a/l S. Sinnaiah (SP15) yang telah diterima masuk oleh Mahkamah ini menurut seksyen 183A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan ditandakan sebagai ekshibit P46. Antara lain SP13 dalam ekshibit P46 menyatakan tentang perasaan yang teramat trauma, takut dan sedih beliau hinggakan tidak sanggup untuk hadir ke Mahkamah ini bagi mengetahui keputusan kes mendiang bapanya. Hukuman [75] Setelah mendengar, meneliti dan mengambil kira hujah mitigasi oleh peguambela dan hujah pemberatan oleh pihak pendakwaan serta mengambil kira ‘victim’s impact statement’ (ekshibit P46) oleh anak Mangsa yang bernama Navaneethan a/l Devarajoo (SP13), Mahkamah ini tidak mendapati apa-apa keadaan yang mewajarkan pelaksanaan budi bicara untuk mengenakan hukuman pemenjaraan dan sebatan menurut peruntukan hukuman terkini seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan selepas pindaan menurut Akta Pemansuhan Hukuman Mati Mandatori 2023 [Akta 846]. S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ReLBz6mipkKDk5pIdwswzA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

CB-82D-1-01/2022

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara] TERTUDUH MOHD JAMEL BIN AWANG @ ZAKARIA

Majistret bicara diikat dengan keputusan mahkamah yang lebih agong yang terkini - faktor pemulihan untuk kes 15 (1) (a) ADB - sama ada penjawat awam yang disabitkan atas kesalahan 15 (1) (a) ADB wajar dipenjarakan - sama ada satu hukuman yang diberikan sebagai obiter boleh diambil kira sebagai satu faktor trend hukuman - Garis panduan KKM dan Perintah tetap Ketua Polis Negara mempunyai kuasa undang-undang - kesalahan lampau di dalam mahkamah yang sama - pengiktirafan penghakiman berkenaan sabitan Tertuduh - keputusan saringan awal test strip berbeza dengan Laporan Patologi - individu yang paling kompeten untuk memberikan penjelasan berkenaan perbezaan keputusan saringan awal dan keputusan analisa makmal - proses metabolisma dalam badan semasa mengambil dadah - metabolite - test strip kaedah saringan awal yang kurang sensitif dan kurang spesifik

29/01/2024

Tuan Tan Chiew King

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1338be93-799e-4607-a4ab-447fbe588e95&Inline=true

CB-82D-1-01-2022 Mohd Jamel bin Awang Final.pdf 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR [KES NO: CB-82D-1-01/2022] PENDAKWA RAYA LAWAN MOHD JAMEL BIN AWANG @ ZAKARIA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN [1] Tertuduh dalam kes ini merupakan seorang anggota polis yang telah dituduh di bawah perenggan 15 (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 ( ADB ) kerana air kencing Tertuduh didapati mengandungi dadah jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine. Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh adalah seperti yang berikut: - BAHAWA KAMU, PADA 23/01/2022, JAM LEBIH KURANG 1315 HRS BERTEMPAT DI PEJABAT BSJND TEMERLOH, DI DALAM DAERAH TEMERLOH, DI DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, TELAH DIDAPATI MENGGUNAKAN DADAH JENIS 29/01/2024 13:06:36 CB-82D-1-01/2022 Kand. 71 S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 AMPHETAMINE DAN METHAMPHETAMINE KE DALAM TUBUH BADAN KAMU DENGAN CARA MENYALAHI UNDANG-UNDANG. OLEH YANG DEMIKIAN KAMU TELAH MELAKUKAN SATU KESALAHAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 15(1)(a) AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA 1952 DAN BOLEH DIHUKUM DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 15(1) AKTA YANG SAMA DAN DIBACA BERSAMA SEKSYEN 38B AKTA YANG SAMA. [2] Tertuduh tidak mengaku salah dan telah mohon untuk dibicarakan. BEBAN PEMBUKTIAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN [3] Berdasarkan perenggan 173 (h) (i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah , mahkamah seharusnya memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh. Perenggan 173 (h) (i) KTJ juga memperuntukkan bahawa beban pembuktian pihak pendakwaan di akhir kes pendakwaan adalah suatu kes prima facie. Perenggan 173 (h) (iii) KTJ selanjutnya menjelaskan bahawa satu kes prima facie wujud apabila bukti yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan mewajarkan satu sabitan kes atas tertuduh sekiranya tidak disangkal oleh Tertuduh. Sekiranya kes prima facie dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan, maka Tertuduh akan dipanggil untuk membela diri. [4] Di dalam kes Looi Kow Chai v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734, Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa: S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 "the correct test to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case has been made out under s. 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code (and this would apply to a trial under s. 173 of the Code ) is that as encapsulated in the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (as he then was) in Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 CLJ 138...It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s. 180 of the Code has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and ask himself the question: If I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal". [5] Dalam kes Balachandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85, Yang Arif Augustine Paul JCA telah mengikut autoriti yang telah diketengahkan di dalam kes Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. PP [2003] 1 CLJ 734 dan telah selanjutnya menyatakan bahawa: - "A prima facie case is therefore one that is sufficient for the accused to be called upon to answer. This in turn means that the evidence adduced must be such that it can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal... S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The result is that the force of the evidence adduced must be such that, if unrebutted, it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts stated in the charge or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts exist or did happen. On the other hand if a prima facie case has not been made out it means that there is no material evidence which can be believed in the sense as described earlier. In order to make a finding either way the court must, at the close of the case for the prosecution, undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliability of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established... The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out". [6] Langkah-langkah yang harus diambil oleh mahkamah pada akhir kes pendakwaan juga telah disimpulkan di dalam kes PP v. Mohd Radzi Bin Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457, yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "For the guidance of the courts below, we summarise as follows the steps that should be taken by a trial court at the close of the prosecution's case: S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (i) the close of the prosecution's case, subject the evidence led by the prosecution in its totality to a maximum evaluation. Carefully scrutinise the credibility of each of the prosecution's witnesses. Take into account all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. If the evidence admits of two or more inferences, then draw the inference that is most favourable to the accused; (ii) ask yourself the question: If I now call upon the accused to make his defence and he elects to remain silent am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? If the answer to that question is "Yes", then a prima facie case has been made out and the defence should be called. If the answer is "No" then, a prima facie case has not been made out and the accused should be acquitted; (iii) after the defence is called, the accused elects to remain silent, then convict; (iv) after defence is called, the accused elects to give evidence, then go through the steps set out in Mat v. Public Prosecutor [1963] MLJ 263." [7] Oleh itu, berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip di atas, pada tahap ini, Mahkamah ini akan menimbangkan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh atau tidak. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 FAKTA KES [8] Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil sebanyak 4 orang saksi dalam kes ini iaitu: - SP1: ASP G17374 Hisham bin Abdul Hamid - Pengadu SP2: SI 123208 Rasli bin Ismail Juruiring SP3: Puan Syuhaidah binti Sahabudin Pegawai Sains SP4: Insp G26944 Nik Helmi bin Nik Hassan Pegawai Penyiasat Kes [9] SP1 di dalam keterangannya telah menyatakan bahawa pada 23 Januari 2022 jam lebih kurang 1.15pm, beliau bersama SP2 dan seorang anggota polis telah mengarahkan Tertuduh untuk membuat ujian saringan awal air kencing di Pejabat Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Nakrotik IPD Temerloh. [10] SP1 telah menyediakan lima (5) botol urin yang dibungkus plastik yang dibekalkan oleh Polis Diraja Malaysia (PDRM). SP1 telah mengarahkan Tertuduh untuk memilih satu (1) botol daripada lima (5) botol tersebut. Tertuduh mematuhi arahan tersebut dan memilih satu (1) bungkusan botol urin yang bernombor siri SNB119999. [11] Bungkusan botol urin tersebut telah dibuka oleh SP1 di hadapan Tertuduh dan botol di dalam bungkusan SNB119999 tersebut telah diserahkan kepada Tertuduh. [12] SP2 kemudiannya telah mengiring Tertuduh ke tandas dalam bilik urin di Pejabat Nakrotik IPD Temerloh dan beliau melihat sendiri S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Tertuduh memberikan sampel air kencing Tertuduh ke dalam botol urin SNB119999. [13] Setelah itu, Tertuduh membawa botol yang berisi air kencing dalam keadaan botol tertutup kepada SP1 dan SP1 telah menjalankan ujian saringan awal air kencing dengan menggunakan enam (6) test strip iaitu METH, OPIATE, AMP, BENZO, KET dan THC dengan meletakkan test strip tersebut ke dalam botol urin SNB119999 yang berisi air kencing Tertuduh. Hasil saringan awal mendapati air kencing Tertuduh dalam botol urin SNB119999 adalah positif dadah Methamphetamine. [14] Tindakan selanjutnya oleh SP1 adalah untuk mencatit butiran Tertuduh dan butiran spesimen serta menurunkan tandatangannya di bahagian Pegawai Pemungut dan mengarahkan Tertuduh menurunkan tandatangannya di bahagian Orang Yang Diperiksa pada pelekat dan kemudiannya telah melekatkan pelekat tersebut pada botol urin tersebut. Botol tersebut dimeteraikan. [15] SP1 kemudiannya telah mengisi satu (1) Borang Permintaan Ujian Pengesahan Dadah di Dalam Air Kencing (Borang UPD) untuk botol urin SNB119999. [16] Laporan Polis Temerloh Repot: 1398/22 [P1] dibuat bagi bacaan positif saringan awal pada botol urin SNB119999. [17] Kesemua barang kes termasuk satu Borang Permintaan Ujian Pengesahan Dadah di Dalam Air Kencing (Borang UPD) dan botol urin SNB119999 (dalam keadaan tertutup) serta Tertuduh kemudiannya telah diserahkan kepada SP4 sebagai pegawai S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Penyiasat di mana sesalinan Borang Serah Terima telah ditandatangani antara SP1 dan SP4. [18] SP4 hari yang sama jam lebih kurang 6.05pm, SP4 telah menyimpan semula botol urin SNB119999 di dalam peti sejuk berkunci sementara menunggu botol tersebut dihantar kepada Pegawai Sains untuk ujian pengesanan dadah dalam air kencing Tertuduh. [19] Pada 25 Januari 2022, SP4 telah mengeluarkan botol urin SNB119999 daripada peti sejuk berkunci dan menghantar botol urin tersebut ke Hospital Kuala Lumpur. SP4 menyatakan bahawa semasa botol urin SNB119999 dikeluarkan daripada peti sejuk berkunci, keadaan botol tersebut adalah dalam keadaan baik serta tiada kacau ganggu pada seal botol tersebut. [20] Botol urin SNB119999 telah diterima oleh Pegawai Sains SP3 yang menjalankan analisa ke atas botol urin B119999 dengan kaedah Immunoassay dan Chromatography Mass Spectrometry / telah mendapati air kencing Tertuduh mengandungi dadah berbahaya jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine. Satu laporan patologi [P10] telah disediakan oleh SP3. KES DI PIHAK PENDAKWAAN [21] Pihak pendakwaan berhujah bahawa kesinambungan rantaian barang kes di dalam kes ini adalah tidak terputus berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan SP1 sehingga SP4. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [22] Pendakwaan juga berhujah bahawa elemen-elemen dibawah perenggan 15 (1) (a) ADB telah berjaya dibuktikan yang mana: - (a) Tertuduh telah mengambil atau memasukkan sendiri dadah ke dalam tubuhnya dengan sengaja [23] Pendakwaan berhujah bahawa keterangan saksi-saksi dan dapatan fakta mengesahkan bahawa prosedur di bawah seksyen 31A ADB telah dipatuhi yang mana pengambilan sampel air kencing Tertuduh oleh SP1 tanpa mendapatkan mahupun membuktikan usaha mendapatkan Pegawai Perubatan adalah masih dalam ruang lingkup seksyen 31A ADB berdasarkan kes PP v Samsul Arifin Bakar [2020] 7 CLJ yang menyatakan seperti berikut: - [9] Section 31A(1A) which was added as a sub-section in 2002 appears to target drug addicts specifically. As pointed out by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, the Parliamentary Secretary who tabled the Bill in Parliament said in his speech that the main aim of s. 31A(1A) provision is to preserve evidence as it may not be practicable for a medical officer to procure a urine sample from an arrested suspect. The aim of s. 31A(1A) is also stated in the opening words of the provision, ie, "for the purpose of preservation of evidence..." To our mind, these words are the key to interpreting this provision. Otherwise, the intention of Parliament in enacting the provision to preserve evidence in the face of the exigencies faced by enforcement authorities while carrying out operations against drug addicts would be defeated. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [10] The learned High Court Judge opined that several pre-conditions must be satisfied before a urine sample can be taken by a police officer not below the rank of sergeant. His Lordship said that the police must prove in court that it was not practicable for a medical officer to obtain the urine sample from the arrested person. His Lordship also said that the determination whether the procurement of the urine sample by a medical officer is practicable must be made by the medical officer himself. In our view, such a reading of the provision is not warranted by the words of s. 31A(1A). If the police are obligated to wait for the determination of the medical officer, precious time would be wasted and it is possible that traces of drugs in the body of a suspect would have disappeared by the time the urine sample is obtained. [11] In respect of the argument that the police have to "prove" that it was not practicable to send the suspect to the hospital for the medical officer to obtain the urine sample, we note that s. 31A(1A) does not impose that duty. It is a provision designed to preserve evidence depending on constraints of the situation faced by the enforcement authorities. Therefore, the test result from a urine sample is not rendered inadmissible merely because the police could not prove that sending the suspect to see a medical officer to take a urine sample is not practicable. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [12] We find analogical support for this view in the judgment of this court in PP lwn. Mohd Safwan Husain [2017] 7 CLJ 685; [2017] 5 MLJ 255 which was cited by the learned DPP. In that case which also involved the collection of urine sample under s. 31A(1A) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, the respondent was acquitted on the ground that prosecution failed to prove that he was an "arrested person" which appears to be a pre-condition of s. 31A(1). The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the High Court and the Magistrate's Court and said as follows: Harus juga dicatat lanjut bahawa s. 31A ADB 1952 tidak menyebut di mana-mana bahawa kegagalan untuk mematuhi kehendak di situ boleh membuatkan apa jua bukti yang diperoleh hasil daripada pemeriksaan yang dilakukan akan menjadi tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan (inadmissible). Ini berbeza dengan peruntukan s. 113 KPJ atau pun s. 37A ADB 1952 yang memperuntukkan dengan jelas bahawa percakapan tertuduh selepas ditangkap dan tanpa diberikan kata-kata amaran tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan (inadmissible). Seperti mana yang dinyatakan di atas berkenaan dengan objektif s. 31A, seksyen ini memberikan keabsahan undang-undang (lawfulness) ke atas tindakan yang dilakukan oleh pegawai-pegawai atau orang yang disenaraikan dalam mengambil sampel dan S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 membuat pemeriksaan ke atas orang yang ditangkap. Pada pandangan kami itulah dasar utama peruntukan s. 31A ini. Pada pengamatan kami lagi, skema peruntukan tersebut jelas membezakan antara pemberian kebenaran vis a vis kesahan dengan kerelevanan sesuatu bahan bukti yang diperoleh daripada tindakan tersebut. Ini dapat dilihat daripada perkataan dan ungkapan yang digunakan dalam s. 31A(1A) itu sendiri iaitu 'For the purpose of preservation of evidence...'. [13] Similarly, in the instant case, even if there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that it was not practicable to send the respondent to see a medical officer for the purpose of obtaining the urine sample, we shall respectfully follow the principle enunciated in the above-mentioned case and hold that the test result in question is admissible. [14] It is also our view that the determination whether it is practicable to send a suspect to see a medical officer must be made by the police officers on the ground who must have regard to relevant circumstances with the overarching aim of preserving the evidence. We have reviewed two High Court cases that discussed the issue at hand, namely PP v. Mohamad Rasid Jusoh [2009] 9 CLJ 557 and Choo Kah Chong lwn. PP [2019] 1 LNS 13. In both cases, it was held that the distance from the hospital and the point of arrest or the police station alone S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 is not the determinative factor in deciding whether it is "practicable" for the suspect to be brought to see a medical officer. In the latter case, the High Court said as follows: Perayu kes semasa, ketika ujian saringan awal hendak dibuat, dia tidak berada di hospital. Dia berada di Balai Polis Sungai Siput Utara. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan TPR, demi mengambil segera sampel air kencing Perayu bagi tujuan dianalisa oleh pegawai sains sebelum kesan dadah hilang daripada air kencing Perayu, adalah tidak praktikal untuk SP2 membawa Perayu ke fasiliti perubatan kerajaan bagi tujuan diambil sampel air kencing. Meskipun jarak perjalanan ke fasiliti perubatan kerajaan itu hanya mengambil masa 10 minit sahaja, faktor lain perlu diambil kira seperti keutamaan mendapat sampel seberapa segera bagi menjaga keutuhan sampel yang diberikan, pengangkutan, eskot, dan aspek keselamatan yang lain. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini, pihak polis sebagai agensi yang melakukan penyiasatan lebih berupayaan (knows best) untuk menentukan sama ada praktikal atau tidak untuk menghantar suspek yang disyaki memasukkan atau menggunakan dadah ke dalam badan ke hospital bagi tujuan pengambilan air kencing. Sementelah pula, pengambilan sampel air kencing tidak memerlukan sebarang kepakaran khusus. Yang penting ialah pelabelan yang sempurna pada S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 botol sampel yang berisi air kencing suspek supaya tidak bertukar dengan sampel air kencing suspek yang lain dan memastikan tiada kacau ganggu ke atas sampel tersebut bermula daripada masa sampel diambil sehingga selesai dianalisa oleh pegawai sains. [24] Seterusnya pihak pendakwaan juga berhujah bahawa andaian subseksyen 37(k) ADB adalah terpakai yang mana terdapat andaian bahawa Tertuduh mengambil atau memasukkan sendiri dadah berbahaya ke dalam badannya dengan sengaja tanpa kebenaran yang sah. (b) Dadah Tersebut Adalah Jenis Yang Disenaraikan Dalam Bahagian III Jadual Pertama ADB [25] Pendakwaan merujuk kepada keterangan oleh SP3 dan Laporan Makmal [P10] bagi membuktikan elemen kedua dan bahawa Tertuduh telah menggunakan dadah berbahaya jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine sepertimana disenaraikan di Bahagian III Jadual Pertama ADB. ISU-ISU YANG DIBANGKITKAN OLEH PEMBELAAN [26] Mahkamah ini mendapati terdapat 2 isu utama yang telah dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (a) [27] Hujahan pembelaan di akhir kes pendakwaan telah mengetengahkan isu sama ada Inspector General's Standing Order F103 ("IGSO F103") dan Garis Panduan Bagi Ujian Pengesanan Penyalahgunaan Dadah Dalam Air Kencing Bil. 6/2002 oleh mempunyai kuasa undang- force of law diambil kira oleh Mahkamah ini. [28] Isu ini telah banyak dibahaskan dan mengetengahkan dua keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu kes Noor Shariful Rizal Noor Zawawi v. PP [2017] 4 CLJ 434 yang diputuskan pada 22 Februari 2017 dan PP v. Rosman Saprey & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2019] 4 CLJ 767 yang diputuskan pada 23 April 2018. [29] Dalam kes Noor Shariful Rizal Noor Zawawi, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa IGSO F103 dan Garis Panduan KKM mempunyai kuasa undang-undang. Oleh sebab itu, kegagalan pihak polis menggunakan dua (2) botol untuk mendapatkan sampel air kencing Tertuduh dalam kes tersebut telah mematahkan kes pendakwaan. [30] Selanjutnya, dalam kes PP v. Rosman Saprey & Satu Lagi Rayuan [2019] 4 CLJ 767 pula, Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa IGSO F103 dan Garis Panduan KKM hanyalah garis panduan pentadbiran dan tiada kuasa undang-undang. Oleh itu kegagalan pihak polis menggunakan dua (2) botol untuk mendapatkan air kencing Tertuduh dalam kes tersebut tidak S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 mematahkan kes pendakwaan. Kes ini diikuti dalam kes Mahkamah Tinggi Mustadzimaludin Bin Musimin v. PP [2022] 1 LNS 2289 dan kes Mahkamah Rayuan PP v. Samsul Arifin Bakar [2020] 7 CLJ 503. [31] Dalam keadaan yang mana terdapat dua keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang berbeza, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes PP v. Ahmad Saiful Islam Mohamad [2023] 2 CLJ 714 yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan panduan yang jelas kepada mahkamah-mahkamah rendah berkenaan kes mana yang mengikat Mahkamah ini. Dalam kes tersebut, Majistret yang bijaksana telah memutuskan bahawa dalam situasi yang mana mahkamah yang setanding mengeluarkan keputusan yang berbeza, beliau diikat dengan keputusan terkini Mahkamah Rayuan. Namun di peringkat rayuan di Mahkamah Tinggi, Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa mahkamah mempunyai opsyen untuk memilih keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan. [32] Berhubung dengan perkara ini, Yang Arif Hashim Hamzah JCA telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: Appeal conflict on a point of law, the later decision prevails over the earlier decision. If the subordinate courts can choose either decision of the Court of Appeal, there will be no finality to the issue and no certainty in the law. This would defeat the purpose of judicial precedent and stare decisis. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [44] Judicial hierarchy must be observed for the orderly development of legal rules and for the courts and lawyers to regulate their affairs, and to avoid chaos and misapprehensions in the judicial system. [47] Based on the reasons above, we agree with the learned DPP that the learned Magistrate was correct when he followed the decision in Rosman Saprey as he was bound by it. [48] On our part, we see no reason to depart from [33] Berdasarkan keputusan kes Ahmad Saiful Islam di atas, Mahkamah ini juga tidak mempunyai pilihan lain selain mengikuti keputusan kes Rosman Saprey. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa IGSO F103 and the Garis Panduan KKM tidak mempunyai kuasa undang-undang. [34] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa tiada keperluan untuk mempertimbangkan isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh pihak pembelaan berkenaan dengan ketidakpatuhan IGSO F103 and the Garis Panduan KKM. (b) Sama ada terputusnya rangkaian keterangan mengenai sampel air kencing yang diambil untuk dianalisiskan. [35] Isu kedua yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan adalah berkenaan dengan keputusan saringan awal botol urin SNB119999 yang positif Methamphetamine menggunakan test strip. Ini adalah S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 kerana terdapat perbezaan antara bacaan saringan awal test strip dan hasil analisa SP3 di [P10]. Bacaan saringan awal test strip mengesan Methamphetamine sahaja manakala hasil analisa SP3 di [P10] mengesan 2 jenis dadah iaitu Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine. [36] Bagi isu ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada satu kes Mahkamah Tinggi yang inter alia telah membincangkan isu yang sama. Dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v. Azahari bin Abdul Wahab [2009] MLJU 898, Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Zamani A Rahim (pada ketika itu) telah menyatakan seperti berikut: - Another disturbing feature or evidence is this. When SP1 carried out preliminary screening, the accused urine was positive for Methamphetamine, whilst P4 stated that it was positive for Amphetamine. The difference between Amphetamine and Methamphetamine was not satisfactorily explained. The competent person to explain most probably the IMR (Institute For Medical Research) officer who carried out the examination and analysis of the accused urine sample [37] Kes Azahari bin Abdul Wahab telah memberi bimbingan kepada Mahkamah ini berkenaan dengan individu yang paling kompeten untuk memberikan penjelasan berkenaan perbezaan keputusan saringan awal dan keputusan analisa makmal adalah individu atau S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 pegawai yang menjalankan analisa terhadap sampel air kencing Tertuduh di makmal. [38] Adalah dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa penjelasan yang memuaskan telah diberikan oleh SP3 selaku Pegawai Sains yang menjalankan analisa air kencing Tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan utama dan pemeriksaan semula. [39] Semasa pemeriksaan utama, SP3 telah menjelaskan bahawa jika seseorang mengambil dadah, dadah tersebut akan melalui satu proses di dalam badan yang dipanggil metabolisma. Proses ini akan menukarkan sebahagian bentuk asal dadah kepada bentuk yang lain. Amphethamine adalah metabolite kepada Methamphetamine. Oleh itu, seandainya seseorang mengambil dadah Methamphetamine, Amphetamine juga akan dikesan dalam analisa makmal memandangkan Methamphetamine akan menjalani proses metabolisma di dalam badan sejurus menghasilkan Amphetamine yang merupakan metabolite kepada Methamphetamine. [40] Pada pemeriksaan semula pula, SP3 telah menjelaskan bahawa ujian mengesan dadah menggunakan test strip adalah satu kaedah saringan awal yang kurang sensitif dan kurang spesifik manakala kaedah menggunakan GC/MS iaitu ujian pengesahan yang dijalankan di makmal adalah sangat sensitif dan spesifik. Beliau menjelaskan bahawa ada kemungkinan test strip tidak dapat mengesan dadah tertentu kerana ujian test strip adalah kurang sensitif jika dibandingkan dengan kaedah GC/MS. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [41] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa perbezaan hasil saringan antara ujian saringan awal menggunakan test strip dan analisa makmal yang menggunakan analisa kaedah GC/MS telah dijelaskan dengan memuaskan (satisfactorily explained) oleh SP3 sebagai Pegawai Sains yang menjalankan analisa terhadap botol urin SNB119999. [42] Keputusan berbeza saringan awal menggunakan test strip yang mengesan Methamphetamine sahaja dengan hasil analisa SP3 di [P10] yang mengesan Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine tidak menyebabkan terputusnya apa-apa rangkaian keterangan mengenai sampel air kencing. [43] Hakikatnya, mahkamah ini menerima keterangan SP3 dan [P10] yang jelas menyatakan bahawa dadah jenis Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine yang disenaraikan dalam Bahagian III Jadual Pertama ADB dapat dikesan di dalam air kencing Tertuduh sebagai keterangan yang membuktikan intipati pertuduhan dadah yang terkandung dalam air kencing Tertuduh. KES PRIMA FACIE [44] Setelah mendengar pemeriksaan saksi-saksi yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan serta mempertimbangkan kredibiliti mereka, mendengar dan mempertimbangkan hujahan-hujahan kedua-dua pihak pendakwaan dan pembelaan, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan pihak pendakwaan dan mendapati kesinambungan rantaian barang kes di dalam kes ini adalah tidak terputus berdasarkan keterangan- keterangan SP1 sehingga SP4 yang kredibel. Oleh itu, Mahkamah S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 ini berpuas hati bahawa elemen-elemen di bawah perenggan 15 (1) (a) ADB telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan setelah membuat penilaian secara maksima terhadap keterangan- keterangan yang dikemukakan. [45] Dengan itu, Mahkamah ini mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh dan memanggil Tertuduh untuk membela diri. SABITAN APABILA TERTUDUH MEMILIH UNTUK BERDIAM DIRI [46] Setelah Mahkamah ini memberikan keputusan di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah membaca dan menerangkan kepada Tertuduh berkenaan 3 pilihan yang boleh dibuat oleh Tertuduh sepertimana yang terkandung dalam subseksyen 173 (ha) KTJ iaitu: - i. memberikan keterangan bersumpah dari kandang saksi; ii. memberikan keterangan tidak bersumpah dari kandang tertuduh; atau iii. berdiam diri. [47] Tertuduh dalam kes ini faham pilihan-pilihan yang diterangkan oleh mahkamah dan telah memilih untuk berdiam diri. Tertuduh tidak mengemukakan apa-apa keterangan mahupun memanggil mana- mana saksi sama ada saksi sendiri atau saksi yang ditawarkan oleh pihak pendakwaan. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [48] Kes Balachandran sekali lagi dirujuk yang mana Yang Arif Augustine Paul JCA menyatakan: - said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt only at the conclusion of the trial upon a consideration of all the evidence adduced as provided by s. 182A(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That would normally be the position where the accused has given evidence. However, where the accused remains silent there will be no necessity to re-evaluate the evidence in order to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt in the absence of any further evidence for such a consideration. The prima facie evidence which was capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt will constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. [49] Berdepan dengan situasi ini, Mahkamah ini berpendapat pada tahap ini, Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa keterangan-keterangan prima facie yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan semasa kes pihak pendakwaan yang berupaya menyokong satu sabitan melampaui keraguan munasabah telah membentuk bukti melampaui keraguan munasabah (The prima facie evidence adduced by the prosecution which was capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasonable doubt has constituted to be proof beyond reasonable doubt). Tertuduh didapati bersalah dan disabitkan seperti pertuduhan di bawah perenggan 15 (1) (a) ADB. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 MITIGASI, PEMBERATAN DAN HUKUMAN [50] Peruntukan hukuman di bawah seksyen 15 ADB adalah denda tidak melebihi lima ribu Ringgit (RM5,000.00) atau penjara boleh sampai dua (2) tahun. Seksyen 38B ADB menetapkan Tertuduh yang didapati bersalah di bawah seksyen 15 ADB dikenakan perintah pengawasan selama tempoh tidak kurang dua (2) tahun dan tidak melebihi tiga (3) tahun. [51] Bagi rayuan hukuman, peguambela menyatakan bahawa Tertuduh berumur 34 tahun, mempunyai 2 anak kecil yang berumur 6 dan 7 tahun, mempunyai tanggungan ibu bapa di Kelantan, setakat ini tidak mempunyai rekod lampau dan ingin merakamkan rasa insaf beliau. Tertuduh melalui peguambela juga mohon satu hukuman denda sahaja berdasarkan kepada kes Azhar Ibrahim v. PP [2022] 1 LNS 2607. [52] Pihak pendakwaan memohon hukuman berat dan pemenjaraan yang maksima di bawah seksyen 15 ADB serta pengawasan di bawah seksyen 38B ADB atas dasar melindungi kepentingan awam yang mana kepentingan awam hendaklah diutamakan melebihi kepentingan Tertuduh. Pihak pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa mahkamah juga perlu mengambil kira kesiriusan kesalahan dan kekerapan penyalahgunaan dadah di kalangan masyarakat dan mempertimbangkan bahawa Tertuduh merupakan anggota polis yang bertugas di Balai Polis Temerloh ketika kesalahan dilakukan serta penelanan kos dan masa mahkamah. Pihak pendakwaan juga menghujahkan bahawa Tertuduh mempunyai rekod lampau sabitan di bawah seksyen dan akta yang sama di mahkamah ini di mana S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 satu hukuman denda dan perintah pengawasan selama 2 tahun telah diberikan kepada Tertuduh. [53] Sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman, Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kes Lim Guan Eng v. PP & Other Appeals [1998] 3 CLJ 769; [1998] 3 MLJ 14, yang mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperi berikut: The principles governing sentencing have been stated on numerous occasions and we think no assistance is to be had by going through all the authorities on the subject. Suffice to say that a court should, when sentencing an accused, take into account all considerations relevant to the case, including the gravity of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, the antecedents of the accused, the deterrent effect that punishment is to have, any factor that warrants special attention either in favour or against the accused and above all the public interest [54] Oleh itu, dalam kes ini Mahkamah telah mengambil kira faktor hukuman mengikut peruntukan undang-undang, kepentingan awam, keseriusan kesalahan, mitigasi oleh peguam, hujahan pemberatan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, latar belakang Tertuduh dan faktor pencegahan sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman. [55] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah ini juga mengambil kira dan ingin menekankan faktor pemulihan untuk kesalahan di bawah seksyen 15 ADB yang mana hasrat penggubalan undang-undang seksyen 15 S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 ADB dan Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) 1983 telah diterangkan dengan komprehensif oleh Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Roslan Mat Nor (pada ketika itu) dalam kes Azhar Ibrahim v. PP [2022] 1 LNS 2607. Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman menyatakan seperti berikut ketika mengulas berkenaan hubungkait perenggan 15 (1) (a) ADB dan Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) 1983: - Di samping itu Mahkamah juga harus memahami jenis kesalahan yang melibatkan penyalahgunaan dadah dan juga kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya agar dapat memahami jenis-jenis kesalahan dan hukuman yang diperuntukkan. Apa yang jelas daripada peruntukan di bawah s. 15 ADB 1952 tersebut ialah ia memberikan hukuman denda sehingga RM5,000.00 dan pemenjaraan sehingga tidak melebihi dua tahun penjara dan memperuntukkan peruntukan di bawah s. 38B ADB 1952 iaitu perintah pengawasan. Ini bermakna kesalahan di bawah s. 15 ADB 1952 ini mempunyai serampang dua mata iaitu hukuman kesalahan memasukkan dadah ke dalam badan di samping memberi peluang kepada pesalah tersebut untuk dimasukkan ke dalam skim pemulihan ketagihan dadah di bawah s. 38B ADB 1952 tersebut. Ia adalah peruntukan undang-undang yang memperkuatkan peruntukan- peruntukan di bawah Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) 1983 yang mewujudkan skim rawatan dan pemulihan di bawah s. 6, 8, dan 9 Akta tersebut. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Pemahaman kepada peruntukan s. 15 (1) (a) ADB 1952 dan Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) 1983 serta keupayaan untuk menghubungkaitkan kedua- dua undang-undang tersebut dapat membantu mahkamah memahami peruntukan undang-undang yang berkaitan dengan penyalahgunaan dan rawatan kepada penagih dadah. Ia tidak boleh ditafsirkan secara berasingan dalam menentukan hukuman yang diberikan. Jika itu dilakukan seseorang yang dituduh di bawah s. 15 (1) (a) ADB 1952 akan dianggap sebagai penjenayah tegar seperti kesalahan-kesalahan jenayah yang serius yang lain sehingga tidak memberikan peluang untuk pesalah tersebut melalui proses pemulihan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam undang-undang. Kegagalan memahami peruntukan-peruntukan tersebut akan menyebabkan hukuman yang dijatuhkan akan tersasar dan tidak membolehkan matlamat untuk memulihkan pesalah di bawah s. 15 (1) (a) ADB 1952 dilaksanakan seperti yang diharapkan oleh undang-undang. [40] Selain daripada itu peruntukan-peruntukan di bawah s. 39C ADB 1952 adalah suatu gambaran bahawa sekiranya pesalah yang melakukan kesalahan di bawah s. 15 (1) (a) ADB 1952 telah diberikan peluang pengawasan di bawah s. 38B ADB 1952 dan masih melakukan kesalahan yang sama seperti yang dinyatakan di bawah s. 39C (a) hingga (e) ADB 1952 maka ketika itu mahkamah boleh menjatuhkan S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 hukuman pemenjaraan minima tidak kurang daripada lima tahun. Ia mencadangkan bawah setelah peluang diberikan kepada pesalah di bawah s. 15 (1) (a) ADB 1952 di atas kesalahan pertama tetapi masih juga terlibat di dalam penyalahgunaaan dadah di bawah s. 15 (1) (a) ADB 1952 maka ketika itu mahkamah boleh menjatuhkan hukuman yang wajarnya disebabkan pesalah tersebut tidak menggunakan kesempatan untuk memulihkan dirinya daripada ketagihan dadah seperti yang di bawah s. 38B ADB 1952. Ia menyebabkan beliau wajar diberikan hukuman pemenjaraan di bawah s. 39C (i) ADB 1952. [56] Keadaan Tertuduh yang dinyatakan dalam kes Azhar Ibrahim adalah lebih kurang sama dengan kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini yang mana Tertuduh dalam kes tersebut juga merupakan penjawat awam yang merupakan anggota polis serta kes telah dibicarakan secara penuh. Majistret yang bijaksana dalam kes tersebut telah mengutamakan fakta bahawa Tertuduh dalam kes itu adalah seorang penjawat awam dan telah mencemarkan nama balik perkhidmatan awam. Selanjutnya, Tertuduh dalam kes itu telah dijatuhkan hukuman dua tahun penjara dari tarikh sabitan dan perintah pengawasan selama dua tahun. [57] Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman setelah merungkai hasrat penggubalan undang-undang perenggan 15 (1) (a) ADB telah menggantikan hukuman Majistret kepada hukuman denda RM4,000.00 gagal bayar enam bulan penjara dan diletakkan untuk pengawasan selama dua tahun di bawah seksyen 38B ADB. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [58] Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini juga dipandu oleh penghakiman Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman berkenaan dengan jenis hukuman yang sesuai bagi kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Tertuduh dalam kes ini haruslah diberi kesempatan dan peluang untuk memulihkan dirinya daripada ketagihan dadah. [59] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes Mohamad Fadhilah Bantut v PP [2022] 1 LNS 2879. Dalam kes tersebut, YA Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Soo Tiang Joo telah mendapati bahawa sabitan di Mahkamah Majistret setelah perbicaraan penuh untuk satu pertuduhan di bawah perenggan 15 (1) (a) ADB adalah tidak selamat dan seterusnya melepaskan dan membebaskan tertuduh dalam kes tersebut. Namun begitu, Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman seterusnya telah menyatakan bahawa sekiranya beliau khilaf dan sabitan tersebut sebenarnya adalah selamat, Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman akan menambah hukuman denda RM3,500 gagal bayar 8 bulan penjara kepada hukuman penjara 7 bulan dari tarikh tangkap bersama dengan dua (2) tahun pengawasan yang dijatuhkan oleh Majistret. [60] Walaubagaimanapun, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pandangan Yang Arif Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman tersebut berhubung dengan hukuman hanyalah suatu dapatan obiter sahaja memandangkan sabitan dalam kes tersebut telah diketepikan dan oleh itu isu berhubung dengan hukuman tidak sepatutnya lagi berbangkit. [61] Kes tersebut juga menyenaraikan kes-kes yang serupa dengan kes di Mahkamah ini yang mana akan diulangi oleh Mahkamah ini: - S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 ough the law reports yielded a disturbing number of cases involving self-administration of drugs by those entrusted with law enforcement. I set out hereunder a list of the cases involving policemen convicted of drug abuse or self-administration of [dangerous] drugs pursuant to section 15 (1) (a) DDA and the sentences imposed: i) Fakhrurrazi Ismail v. PP [2021] 1 LNS 1221 (HC) the accused, a policeman, was found guilty after a full trial of a single charge under section 15(1)(a) DDA and sentenced to a fine of RM3,500 in default of payment 8 months imprisonment and upon appeal an added 2 years of supervision; ii) Pendakwaraya lwn. Raof Aziz [2016] 5 LNS 24 (Magistrates' Court) the accused, a policeman with 11 years of service, was found guilty after a full trial of three charges under section 15(1)(a) DDA and sentenced to a fine of RM2,500 in default of payment 12 months imprisonment plus 2 years of supervision for each of the three offences; iii) PP lwn. Abd Halil Hamzah [2016] 2 SMC 45 (Magistrates' Court) the accused, a policeman with the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police, with 30 years of service was found guilty after a full trial of a single charge under section 15(1)(a) DDA and S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 sentenced to a fine of RM5,000 in default of payment 12 months imprisonment plus 2 years of supervision; iv) PP lwn. Mohd Fadir Che Kob [2013] 1 SMC 85 (Magistrates' Court) - the accused, a policeman, was found guilty after a full trial of a single charge under section 15(1)(a) DDA and sentenced to a fine of RM3,700 in default of payment 10 months imprisonment plus 2 years of supervision [62] Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini mendapati trend hukuman masih tidak berubah kerana kes-kes yang mana Tertuduh yang merupakan penjawat awam yang merupakan anggota atau pegawai polis benar- benar (dan bukan sekadar perbincangan akademik) dijatuhkan dengan hukuman dikenakan denda antara RM2,500 sehingga RM5,000 bersama perintah pengawasan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan demi keadilan dan ketekalan, layanan yang sama patut diberikan kepada Tertuduh. [63] Apa yang menariknya untuk kes ini adalah Tertuduh ini pernah disabitkan setelah bicara penuh untuk kesalahan di bawah seksyen dan akta yang sama yang dilakukan pada tahun 2021 di Mahkamah ini dalam no. kes CB-82D-2-05/2021. Berhubungan perkara ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Tan Shy Wen v. Public Prosecutor [2021] MLJU 1849 yang telah menyatakan seperti berikut: - S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 a magistrate may use his judicial knowledge from matters that are made known to him from inside his own courtroom. If a matter has reached the court, he may take judicial notice of it, what more if it reached his own court. A Magistrate is also allowed to use his knowledge of the facts proved in a previous action that had been tried before him previously and previous conviction is a fact [64] Oleh itu, berdasarkan kepada kes di atas, kesalahan lampau Tertuduh dalam kes ini sepatutnya diambil kira oleh Mahkamah ini. [65] Namun begitu, pada tarikh jatuh hukum di mana kes ini telah ditetapkan untuk hujahan mitigasi dan pemberatan, rayuan Tertuduh terhadap sabitan untuk kes CB-82D-2-05/2021 dalam kes CB- 41S(A)-1-04/2023 telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Temerloh. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini memberi pengiktirafan penghakiman bahawa sabitan Tertuduh di Mahkamah ini telah diakaskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Temerloh dan menganggap Tertuduh ini sebagai seorang yang tidak mempunyai apa-apa sabitan lampau setakat tarikh jatuh hukum. S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 [66] Mengambil kira semua faktor-faktor di atas dan juga pemerhatian trend-trend hukuman, Mahkamah ini telah menjatuhkan hukuman denda RM3,500 gagal bayar 8 bulan penjara dan Tertuduh juga diletakkan di bawah pengawasan Agensi Antidadah Kebangsaan Daerah Kubang Kerian selama dua tahun seperti mana peruntukan seksyen 38B ADB. TAN CHIEW KING Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Temerloh 22 Januari 2024 Pihak-pihak: Khairunnisa binti Zaffar dan Faizah Khalilah binti Zaberi (Timbalan Pendakwa Raya) untuk Pihak Pendakwaan Richard Bong Chong Fook dan Ivan Bong Hongjie (Bong & Co.) untuk Tertuduh S/N k744E555B0akq0R/vliOlQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-83-230-01/2022

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MOHD EFFENDY BIN A. JAMIL

Rayuan hukuman-kesalahan seksyen 323 dibaca bersama 326A Kanun Keseksaan-Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-Pesalah 1954- hukuman pemulihan

29/01/2024

Puan Wong Chai Sia

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-230-01/2022 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN MOHD EFFENDY BIN A. JAMIL ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Tertuduh telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan bagi kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan. Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan pertuduhan seperti berikut:- Pertuduhan Bahawa kamu pada 13.02.2021, jam lebih kurang 06:00 pagi, di alamat Aras 2 Pintu 7 Pangsapuri Bunga Raya PULAPOL Kuala Lumpur, di dalam daerah Wangsa Maju, dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, didapati dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan kepada penama Roslinah binti Abu No KP: 750422-04-5042. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca di bawah seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan. 29/01/2024 15:23:59 WA-83-230-01/2022 Kand. 44 S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Hukuman Jika disabitkan dengan kesalahan ini, kamu boleh dikenakan penjara selama dua tahun [2] Tertuduh tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap pertuduhan dan mohon perbicaraan. Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 saksi di peringkat pendakwaan bagi membuktikan kes prima facie. Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat kes prima facie dan tertuduh diarahkan membela diri. Di peringkat pembelaan, tertuduh telah memberikan keterangan bersumpah dan telah memanggil telah 2 saksi pembelaan dan memanggil semula SP2. Ketiga-tiga saksi pembelaan merupakan anak kepada pengadu dan tertuduh. [3] Mahkamah telah menilai kesemua keterangan dan memutuskan tertuduh bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. Setelah Mahkamah telah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberat, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa hukuman yang sesuai dikenakan adalah perintah kehadiran wajib 2 jam setiap hari bagi tempoh 4 bulan di bawah Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-Pesalah 1954. [4] Pihak pendakwaan tidak berpuas hati dengan hukuman yang dikenakan oleh Mahkamah ini dan memfailkan rayuan terhadap hukuman manakala tiada rayuan difailkan oleh pihak tertuduh ke atas sabitan dan hukuman. Oleh itu, Mahkamah hanya akan membincangkan prinsip kehakiman ke atas rayuan hukuman. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 B. FAKTA RINGKAS [5] Tertuduh dan pengadu (SP1) merupakan suami isteri dan mereka telah bernikah sejak 11.2.1998 seperti mana dalam sijil nikah, ekhibit P2. Dalam tempoh perkahwinan, SP1 dan tertuduh mempunyai 3 anak iaitu SP2, SD2 dan SD3. Pada 13.2.2021, apabila tertuduh dan SP1 sedang tidur di dalam bilik tidur mereka, tertuduh telah bangun dan bertengkar dengan SP1 mengenai mesej dalam telefon bimbit SP1. SP1 menyatakan tertuduh marah dan telah memukul SP1 lalu SP1 telah pengsan. SP2 yang merupakan anak sulung telah dikejutkan oleh tertuduh dan diminta untuk melihat ibunya. SP2 nampak SP1 meracau dan mengetuk-ketuk kepalanya di tepi bucu katil. SP2 ada bertanyakan sebab SP1 pengsan kepada SP1 dan tertuduh. SP1 menyatakan tertuduh telah lempang kepalanya dan tertuduh turut menyatakan perkara yang sama. Tertuduh menghubungi SP3 untuk meminta bantuan SP3 untuk membawa SP1 ke hospital kerana SP1 telah jatuh. Apabila ditanya oleh SP3 sama ada SP1 jatuh atau dipukul oleh tertuduh, tertuduh telah memberitahu SP3 bahawa dia telah memukul SP1 kerana SP1 mempunyai lelaki lain. Ketika itu, SP1 dikatakan dalam keadaan tidak sedar dan tidak boleh mengecam ahli keluarganya. SP1 telah dibawa ke hospital Kuala Lumpur untuk mendapatkan rawatan. SP1 dimaklumkan oleh anaknya bahawa tertuduh telah membawa SP1 ke hospital. Selepas SP1 telah menerima rawatan di bahagian kecemasan, SP1 telah dirujuk kepada bahagian psikriatik. SP1 tidak membuat laporan polis dan hanya membuat laporan polis pada 12.9.2021 apabila setelah berbincang dengan ahli keluarga. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [6] Berkenaan dengan kecederaan yang dialami oleh SP1, SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa dia telah dipukul dibbahagian mata dan belakang kepala. Keterangan SP2 di peringkat pendakwaan adalah terdapat kesan lebam sekitar mata SP1. Saksi pendakwaan SP6 tidak boleh mengesahkan kecederaan SP1 memandangkan kejadian telah berlaku pada bulan Februari 2021 tetapi SP1 dirujuk semula ke hospital bulan September 2021. Namun laporan P8 telah mengesahkan rekod sejarah bahawa SP1 pernah menerima rawatan pada 13.2.2021 dan menyatakan SP1 memaklumkan bahawa dia telah dipukul dan telah pengsan. [7] Mahkamah telah mendapati kesemua elemen pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan berjaya dibuktikan. Semasa peringkat pembelaan, tertuduh telah menafikan ada memukul SP1. SP2 dipanggil semula di peringkat pembelaan dan SP2 telah menukar keterangannya mengenai lebam pada mata SP1. Semasa pemeriksaan balas, SP2 menyatakan tidak pasti bahawa itu adalah kesan lebam atau kesan parut akibat kemalangan yang dialami oleh SP1 pada 24.3.2020. Pihak pendakwaan memohon mencabar kredibiliti SP2 dan pohon keterangan SP2 tidak dipertimbangkan secara keseluruhan. [8] Ketiga-tiga saksi, SD2, SD3 dan SP2 tidak melihat kejadian dalam bilik tidur dan hanya diminta oleh tertuduh untuk melihat ibu mereka setelah tertuduh keluar dari bilik. Tertuduh turut mengemukakan tangkapan skrin perbualan Whatsapp antara SP1 dengan lelaki lain dan menyatakan SP1 telah curang. Setelah menilai kesemua keterangan, Mahkamah mendapati kesemua saksi pembelaan berada di rumah namun kronologi kejadian diberikan oleh kesemua saksi adalah S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 berbeza. Adalah mustahil bahawa SD2 dan SD3 yang bersama-sama masuk ke bilik boleh melihat perkara yang berbeza terutama keadaan SP1. SD2 menyatakan ibu terbaring di atas katil manakala SD3 menyatakan terbaring atas lantai. Selain itu, saksi pembelaan memberikan keterangan yang berbeza tentang kehadiran mereka di hospital. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan saksi pembelaan adalah tidak konsisten dan bercanggah antara satu sama. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan bahawa kecederaan di bahagian mata adalah parut akibat kemalangan pada tahun 2020 adalah tidak disokong. [9] Pihak pembelaan dan pendakwaan telah bergantung kepada laporan perubatan P9 namun perlu ditekankan di sini, kedua-dua pihak telah tersalah arah untuk bergantung kepada P9. Nilai keterangan P9 adalah amat rendah kerana pemeriksaan kecederaan dilakukan pada bulan September 2021 di mana tiada lagi kesan kecederaan dapat dikenal pasti. Mahkamah ingin menekankan bahawa sepanjang perbicaraan di peringkat pendakwaan, keterangan SP1 adalah "Saya dipukul bahagian mata dan bahagaian belakang kepala saya" dan kemudian SP1 pengsan. Laporan P9 menyatakan kejadian 11.6.2021 dan bukan kejadian dalam pertuduhan. Dalam laporan polis, P3 turut menyatakan dua insiden pada tarikh yang berbeza maka laporan P9 adalah tidak relevan dengan pertuduhan. [10] Mahkamah mendapati keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten dan kredibel berkenaan dengan insiden SP1 dipukul dengan berbanding tertuduh dan saksi pembelaan. Adalah fakta yang tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa SP1 telah jatuh pengsan akibat dipukul dan dibawa ke hospital untuk rawatan. Walapun tiada gambar kecederaan atau laporan kecederaan, keterangan SP1 adalah kredibel dan kukuh S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 bahawa beliau telah mengalami kesakitan. Namun begitu, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan kecurangan SP1 adalah konsisten oleh saksi pembelaan berbanding keterangan SP1 yang menafikan kecurangannya. Namun begitu, ianya tidak menjejaskan kredibiliti SP1 berkenaan dengan kejadian SP1 dipukul. Kecurangan SP1 mengukuhkan punca pertengkaran antara SP1 dan tertuduh sehingga tertuduh memukul SP1 apabila mengetahui SP1 masih curang dengan lelaki lain. Setelah menilai kesemua keterangan saksi mengikut prinsip undang-undang, Mahkamah mendapati tertuduh bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. C. HUKUMAN [11] Prinsip undang-undang bagi mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan hukuman untuk dijelaskan di dalam kes PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 seperti berikut: The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed on the record or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not after a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [12] Dalam memutuskan hukuman yang bersesuaian, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Mohammad Zulhiznie bin Zaini [2021] 12 MLJ 780 di Mahkamah Tinggi menjelaskan tujuan hukuman dikenakan seperti berikut: “…On the other hand, purposes of sentencing are the aims or the outcomes wished to be achieved and realised by the courts in line with the law. A sentence may have a sole or multiple purpose it wishes to achieve based on the circumstances of each case in particular. A magistrate when determining this must ask oneself: ‘by imposing this sentence, what will the punishment achieve (within the ambits of the law)?’. [26] As it is well known the four classical purposes to be applied when considering the appropriate sentence are retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. Some heinous offences such as murder, culpable homicide, rape, robbery and those which involve violence retribution, deterrence and prevention would be the main focus of the punishment and not rehabilitation. [27] As for rehabilitation, which is often seen solely as a way to aid an accused in becoming an efficacious member of society but it is also aimed benefiting society. By rehabilitating offenders, it is hoped that offenders will be equipped with the right mind set and skills to live a life by making choices that are well reasoned and grounded. Thus, by achieving this, the criminal tendency of that person will be suppressed and society will be safeguarded against crimes as the said person would no longer be bent on committing crimes. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [28] In addition, reparation which is a form of restorative justice is also a purpose of sentencing which has shown much emergence recently particularly in the criminal justice systems of western nations. Reparation is based on the notion demanding that a criminal make amends to victims by countervailing the wrong that they have committed in order to correct their crimes. [13] Mahkamah turut mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi dan pemberat dalam memutuskan hukuman yang bersesuaian dengan tujuan hukuman diberikan. [14] Untuk faktor mitigasti, peguam bela berhujah bahawa tertuduh merupakan duda dan menanggung anak bongsu yang masih bersekolah. Tertuduh kini tinggal bersama-sama ketiga-tiga anaknya memandangkan bekas isteri, SP1 telah berkahwin baru dan menetap di Ipoh dengan suami. Tertuduh berasa tertekan dengan prosiding di Mahkamah ini dan juga Mahkamah Syariah. Kini, anak bongsu hanya boleh bergantung kepada tertuduh memandangkan ibunya telah berkahwin dengan lelaki lain. [15] Tertuduh mempunyai latar belakang yang baik dan mempunyai kerjaya di sektor pembankan. Peguam bela menyatakan bahawa pengadu dan tertuduh telah bercerai dan pengadu telah kahwin semula dengan lelaki lain dan berpindah ke Ipoh maka tiada kemungkinan kejadian boleh berulang. Peguam bela memohon hukuman yang ringan dikenakan memandangkan tertuduh merupakan pesalah pertama. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [16] Timbalan pendakwa raya yang terpelajar telah memohon suatu hukuman yang deteran dikenakan ke atas tertuduh atas dasar kepentingan pengadu. Di samping itu, timbalan pendakwa raya juga menegaskan 326A, hanzard pengubalan undang-undang adalah untuk mengelakkan pergaduhan antara suami isteri maka graviti kesalahan dan kekerasan perlu dipertimbangkan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan kes yang melibatkan keganasan rumah tangga wajar diberikan hukuman tinggi sebagai peringatan kepada orang awam bahawa kesalahan sebegini adalah satu kesalahan yang serius dan wajar dikenakan hukuman yang setimpal. Akhirnya pihak pendakwaan juga memohon Mahkamah untuk mengambil kira status pengadu selaku seorang polis juga tidak terlepas daripada kes keganasan rumahtangga. [17] Mahkamah kurang bersetuju dengan pihak pendakwaan bahawa kesalahan dilakukan adalah kesalahan serius. Tafsiran kesalahan serius telah diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 52B Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 323 dibaca bersama seksyen 326A merupakan kesalahan tidak serius sepertimana dalam seksyen 52A Kanun Kesesakan Penggubalan undang-undang seksyen 326A yang membawa hukuman lebih tinggi untuk menampilkan usaha pihak kerajaan dalam mengurangkan keganasan rumah tangga yang melibatkan hubungan kekeluargaan dan bukan terhad kepada suami dan isteri. [18] Walapun hukuman merupakan budi bicara mahkamah, Mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan kesemua faktor dan kepentingan awam untuk mencapai kesimbangan dalam kepentingan awam dan kepentingan tertuduh. Kes dirujuk adalah seperti PP v Loo Choon Fatt S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [1976] 2 MLJ 256, Mohamed Jusoh bin Abdullah and another v Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 MLJ 130. [19] Mahkamah ini telah mempertimbangkan latar belakang tertuduh yang kini merupakan duda dan masih menanggung anak bongsu yang masih bersekolah. Tertuduh tidak mempunyai rekod lampau atau merupakan yang penjenayah tegar. Tertuduh mempunyai pekerjaan yang baik dan sekiranya hukuman penjara dikenakan, tertuduh akan kehilangan sumber pendapatan dan peluang pekerjaan yang baik untuk meneruskan kehidupan. Anak-anak tertuduh akan terkesan memandangkan pengadu tidak lagi menjaga mereka. Hal ini dapat lihat daripada keterangan SP2 yang tidak lagi menetap bersama dengan pengadu semasa peringkat pembelaan dan telah berpindah semula dengan tertuduh. [20] Dalam mencapai keseimbangan, Mahkamah turut mengambil kira tahap kecederaan dialami oleh SP1. SP1 mengalami kecederaan yang tidak dapat dikenal pasti tahap keseriusan memandangkan SP1 tidak membuat laporan polis sejurus kejadian dan hanya melaporkan setelah pengadu pulih dan kesan kecederaan tidak lagi dapat dikenal pasti. Laporan perubatan P2 adalah merujuk kepada insiden kedua dan bukan insiden dalam pertuduhan. Merujuk Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes: A Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Bharat Law House, 27th Ed, 2013) at page 2088, di mana hukuman wajar dikenakan berdasarkan keseriusan kecederaan. Pihak pendakwaan gagal menunjukkan bahawa hukuman penjara wajar dikenakan atas faktor kecederaan yang dialami. Pihak pendakwaan telah memohon keterangan SP2 tidak diterima maka keterangan SP1 mengenai kecederaan lebam di mata kini tidak disokong oleh mana-mana S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 keterangan dan keterangan oleh SP2. Dengan itu, selain keterangan SP1, tiada keterangan sokongan berkenaan dengan kesan lebam di mata. Gambar kecederaan dikemukakan oleh SP1 juga mempunyai nilai keterangan rendah memandangkan kerana tidak menunjukkan tarikh dan masa gambar tersebut diambil. Gambar asal telah hilang kerana telefon bimbit telah rosak dan SP1 hanya mengambil semua salinan daripada ‘messenger’. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak dapat mempertimbangkan hukuman berdasarkan kecederaan yang dialami sebagai faktor pemberat. [21] Mahkamah menyatakan tujuan hukuman pengajaran atau pencegahan adalah tidak bersesuaian kerana pihak-pihak telah bercerai dan pengadu tidak lagi mempunyai apa-apa ancaman di masa hadapan. Berdasarkan fakta kes, pengadu telah curang sekian lama dan menyebabkan tertuduh sering bertengkar dengan SP1 sehingga tertuduh telah bertindak memukul SP1. Keterangan SP1 mengenai kecurangan adalah tidak konsisten dengan bukti-bukti serta keterangan saksi pembelaan. Seperti mana dihujahkan oleh pihak pendakwaan, SP1 merupakan anggota polis wajar mengetahui bahawa laporan polis dan pemeriksaan kecederaan wajar dilakukan secepat mungkin dan bukan mengambil masa yang lama. SP1 gagal memberikan keterangan tentang tahap kecederaan dialami dan laporan perubatan P9 adalah tidak relevan dan mempunyai nilai keterangan yang amat rendah. [22] Setelah Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan lisan dan dokumen, Mahkamah tidak dapat mencapai kesimpulan bahawa terdapat kecederaan tetapi hanya boleh mencapai kesimpulan terdapat kesakitan dirasai oleh SP1. Oleh itu, adalah tidak wajar satu hukuman S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 berbentuk pemenjaraan dikenakan bagi tahap kecederaan yang tidak dapat dikenal pasti. Hukuman berbentuk pemulihan wajar diberikan supaya tertuduh boleh berubah di kalangan masyarakat dan bukan di dalam penjara. Tertuduh mempunyai pekerjaan yang stabil selaku pegawai bank dan perlu menanggung anak yang masih belajar. Selain mempertimbangkan keadaan mental pengadu yang dihujahkan oleh pihak pendakwaan seperti mana dalam laporan P8, Mahkamah juga perlu memberi pertimbangan sewajarnya kepada tertuduh juga menghadapi kesan daripada kecurangan oleh SP1. SP1 bukan sahaja mendatangkan tekanan kepada tertuduh tetapi juga anak-anak SP1 yang telah mengetahui kelakuan SP1 yang tidak bermoral. [23] Berdasarkan prinsip kehakiman di atas, Mahkamah menukarkan hukuman penjara kepada perintah kehadiran wajib. Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-pesalah 1954 telah dipinda agar pihak Mahkamah dapat mempertimbangkan hukuman alternatif sebagai langkah pemulihan kepada pesalah-pesalah yang wajar diberikan peluang kedua. [24] Hukuman penjara hanya akan memudaratkan keluarga tertuduh dan tertuduh serta tidak mendatangkan kesan baik kepada masyarakat. Hukuman penjara hanya menyebabkan lebih ramai banduan dan kesesakkan dalam penjara. Hukuman penjara tidak membantu pemulihan bagi pesalah kesalahan tidak serius malah akan menyebabkan tertuduh yang mempunyai latar belakang baik untuk bergaul dengan penjenayah lain di dalam penjara serta boleh memusnahkan kehidupan tertuduh. Apabila tertuduh kehilangan kerjaya dan mempunyai rekod penjara, kemungkinan tertuduh akan kesukaran mendapatkan kerja yang baik dan menanggung keluarga S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 tertuduh. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan permintaan dengan pihak pendakwaan bagi hukuman penjara berdasarkan fakta kes dan faktor-faktor di atas. [25] Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat hukuman yang sesuai adalah hukuman berbentuk pemulihan dalam masyarakat di mana tertuduh boleh berubah, bekerja dan menjaga anak-anaknya. Mahkamah merujuk kepada Seksyen 5 Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah- pesalah 1954. 5. Compulsory Attendance Order (1) Where a person who resides within the prescribed distance from a Centre— (a) has been convicted of an offence for which he is liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years; or (b) is liable to be committed to prison for failure to pay a fine or debt, the Court may, instead of such sentence or committal, make a Compulsory Attendance Order requiring such person to attend daily at a Centre to be specified in such Order and to undertake compulsory work for a period not exceeding twelve months and for such number of hours each day not exceeding four as may be specified in such Order, and may, for further ensuring due compliance with such Order, require the offender to enter into a bond with or without sureties.”; dan (1A) The Court, when making the Compulsory Attendance Order under subsection (1), shall consider the character of such person, the nature and seriousness of the offence or the circumstances of S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 such person’s failure to pay, as the case may be, and all the other circumstances of the case. (2) Where the Court has reason to doubt whether any such person is physically capable for employment on compulsory work the Court— (a)may cause him to be medically examined; (b)shall not make a Compulsory Attendance Order unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that he is so capable; and (c)shall specify in the Compulsory Attendance Order, if such an order is made, any compulsory work for which the Court is satisfied he is not physically capable. (3) The number of hours each day during which the offender shall be required to be employed under subsection (2) shall not exceed four exclusive of any intervals prescribed for meals, refreshment or rest and shall, if the offender is gainfully occupied in employment, occupy only that part of the offender's time which would represent leisure hours. (4) The Court shall, before making a Compulsory Attendance Order, explain to the person concerned in ordinary language the effect of such Order and the consequence of failure to comply therewith and shall not make the order unless such person expresses his willingness to comply with the requirements thereof. [26] Kesalahan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan membawa hukuman penjara paling tinggi adalah dua tahun dan masih boleh dipertimbangkan kehadiran wajib di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-pesalah 1954. Sepertimana yang S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 5(4) Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah- pesalah 1954, sebelum Mahkamah memberikan perintah kehadiran wajib, Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan kemampuan tertuduh untuk melaksanakan kerja wajib dan jumlah masa tertuduh yang boleh bekerja. Mahkamah juga menerangkan kepada tertuduh tentang perlanggaran perintah kehadiran wajib dan kerja wajib yang perlu dilakukan. Tertuduh telah faham dan bersetuju menerima hukuman di bawah Akta Perintah Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-Pesalah 1954. Mahkamah memerintahkan tertuduh melakukan kerja-kerja wajib selama 2 jam sehari untuk tempoh 4 bulan dengan wang cagaran sebanyak RM2000 dengan seorang penjamin setelah mengambil kira waktu bekerja tertuduh dan komitmen tertuduh. Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret Mahkamah Kuala Lumpur S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2024-01-29T15:25:25+0800

Tika 2.6.0

WA-83-230-01/2022

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MOHD EFFENDY BIN A. JAMIL

Rayuan hukuman-kesalahan seksyen 323 dibaca bersama 326A Kanun Keseksaan-Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-Pesalah 1954- hukuman pemulihan

29/01/2024

Puan Wong Chai Sia

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=27967e9a-9ac3-4ee9-a3af-c0a5c4d74262&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI KUALA LUMPUR (BIDANG KUASA JENAYAH) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (DALAM KES JENAYAH NO: WA-83-230-01/2022 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA DAN MOHD EFFENDY BIN A. JAMIL ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN A. LATAR BELAKANG [1] Tertuduh telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan bagi kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca bersama seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan. Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan pertuduhan seperti berikut:- Pertuduhan Bahawa kamu pada 13.02.2021, jam lebih kurang 06:00 pagi, di alamat Aras 2 Pintu 7 Pangsapuri Bunga Raya PULAPOL Kuala Lumpur, di dalam daerah Wangsa Maju, dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, didapati dengan sengaja menyebabkan kecederaan kepada penama Roslinah binti Abu No KP: 750422-04-5042. Oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dan dibaca di bawah seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan. 29/01/2024 15:23:59 WA-83-230-01/2022 Kand. 44 S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 Hukuman Jika disabitkan dengan kesalahan ini, kamu boleh dikenakan penjara selama dua tahun [2] Tertuduh tidak mengaku bersalah terhadap pertuduhan dan mohon perbicaraan. Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil 7 saksi di peringkat pendakwaan bagi membuktikan kes prima facie. Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa terdapat kes prima facie dan tertuduh diarahkan membela diri. Di peringkat pembelaan, tertuduh telah memberikan keterangan bersumpah dan telah memanggil telah 2 saksi pembelaan dan memanggil semula SP2. Ketiga-tiga saksi pembelaan merupakan anak kepada pengadu dan tertuduh. [3] Mahkamah telah menilai kesemua keterangan dan memutuskan tertuduh bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. Setelah Mahkamah telah mendengar hujahan mitigasi dan pemberat, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa hukuman yang sesuai dikenakan adalah perintah kehadiran wajib 2 jam setiap hari bagi tempoh 4 bulan di bawah Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-Pesalah 1954. [4] Pihak pendakwaan tidak berpuas hati dengan hukuman yang dikenakan oleh Mahkamah ini dan memfailkan rayuan terhadap hukuman manakala tiada rayuan difailkan oleh pihak tertuduh ke atas sabitan dan hukuman. Oleh itu, Mahkamah hanya akan membincangkan prinsip kehakiman ke atas rayuan hukuman. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 B. FAKTA RINGKAS [5] Tertuduh dan pengadu (SP1) merupakan suami isteri dan mereka telah bernikah sejak 11.2.1998 seperti mana dalam sijil nikah, ekhibit P2. Dalam tempoh perkahwinan, SP1 dan tertuduh mempunyai 3 anak iaitu SP2, SD2 dan SD3. Pada 13.2.2021, apabila tertuduh dan SP1 sedang tidur di dalam bilik tidur mereka, tertuduh telah bangun dan bertengkar dengan SP1 mengenai mesej dalam telefon bimbit SP1. SP1 menyatakan tertuduh marah dan telah memukul SP1 lalu SP1 telah pengsan. SP2 yang merupakan anak sulung telah dikejutkan oleh tertuduh dan diminta untuk melihat ibunya. SP2 nampak SP1 meracau dan mengetuk-ketuk kepalanya di tepi bucu katil. SP2 ada bertanyakan sebab SP1 pengsan kepada SP1 dan tertuduh. SP1 menyatakan tertuduh telah lempang kepalanya dan tertuduh turut menyatakan perkara yang sama. Tertuduh menghubungi SP3 untuk meminta bantuan SP3 untuk membawa SP1 ke hospital kerana SP1 telah jatuh. Apabila ditanya oleh SP3 sama ada SP1 jatuh atau dipukul oleh tertuduh, tertuduh telah memberitahu SP3 bahawa dia telah memukul SP1 kerana SP1 mempunyai lelaki lain. Ketika itu, SP1 dikatakan dalam keadaan tidak sedar dan tidak boleh mengecam ahli keluarganya. SP1 telah dibawa ke hospital Kuala Lumpur untuk mendapatkan rawatan. SP1 dimaklumkan oleh anaknya bahawa tertuduh telah membawa SP1 ke hospital. Selepas SP1 telah menerima rawatan di bahagian kecemasan, SP1 telah dirujuk kepada bahagian psikriatik. SP1 tidak membuat laporan polis dan hanya membuat laporan polis pada 12.9.2021 apabila setelah berbincang dengan ahli keluarga. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [6] Berkenaan dengan kecederaan yang dialami oleh SP1, SP1 telah menyatakan bahawa dia telah dipukul dibbahagian mata dan belakang kepala. Keterangan SP2 di peringkat pendakwaan adalah terdapat kesan lebam sekitar mata SP1. Saksi pendakwaan SP6 tidak boleh mengesahkan kecederaan SP1 memandangkan kejadian telah berlaku pada bulan Februari 2021 tetapi SP1 dirujuk semula ke hospital bulan September 2021. Namun laporan P8 telah mengesahkan rekod sejarah bahawa SP1 pernah menerima rawatan pada 13.2.2021 dan menyatakan SP1 memaklumkan bahawa dia telah dipukul dan telah pengsan. [7] Mahkamah telah mendapati kesemua elemen pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan berjaya dibuktikan. Semasa peringkat pembelaan, tertuduh telah menafikan ada memukul SP1. SP2 dipanggil semula di peringkat pembelaan dan SP2 telah menukar keterangannya mengenai lebam pada mata SP1. Semasa pemeriksaan balas, SP2 menyatakan tidak pasti bahawa itu adalah kesan lebam atau kesan parut akibat kemalangan yang dialami oleh SP1 pada 24.3.2020. Pihak pendakwaan memohon mencabar kredibiliti SP2 dan pohon keterangan SP2 tidak dipertimbangkan secara keseluruhan. [8] Ketiga-tiga saksi, SD2, SD3 dan SP2 tidak melihat kejadian dalam bilik tidur dan hanya diminta oleh tertuduh untuk melihat ibu mereka setelah tertuduh keluar dari bilik. Tertuduh turut mengemukakan tangkapan skrin perbualan Whatsapp antara SP1 dengan lelaki lain dan menyatakan SP1 telah curang. Setelah menilai kesemua keterangan, Mahkamah mendapati kesemua saksi pembelaan berada di rumah namun kronologi kejadian diberikan oleh kesemua saksi adalah S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 berbeza. Adalah mustahil bahawa SD2 dan SD3 yang bersama-sama masuk ke bilik boleh melihat perkara yang berbeza terutama keadaan SP1. SD2 menyatakan ibu terbaring di atas katil manakala SD3 menyatakan terbaring atas lantai. Selain itu, saksi pembelaan memberikan keterangan yang berbeza tentang kehadiran mereka di hospital. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan saksi pembelaan adalah tidak konsisten dan bercanggah antara satu sama. Mahkamah mendapati keterangan bahawa kecederaan di bahagian mata adalah parut akibat kemalangan pada tahun 2020 adalah tidak disokong. [9] Pihak pembelaan dan pendakwaan telah bergantung kepada laporan perubatan P9 namun perlu ditekankan di sini, kedua-dua pihak telah tersalah arah untuk bergantung kepada P9. Nilai keterangan P9 adalah amat rendah kerana pemeriksaan kecederaan dilakukan pada bulan September 2021 di mana tiada lagi kesan kecederaan dapat dikenal pasti. Mahkamah ingin menekankan bahawa sepanjang perbicaraan di peringkat pendakwaan, keterangan SP1 adalah "Saya dipukul bahagian mata dan bahagaian belakang kepala saya" dan kemudian SP1 pengsan. Laporan P9 menyatakan kejadian 11.6.2021 dan bukan kejadian dalam pertuduhan. Dalam laporan polis, P3 turut menyatakan dua insiden pada tarikh yang berbeza maka laporan P9 adalah tidak relevan dengan pertuduhan. [10] Mahkamah mendapati keterangan SP1 adalah konsisten dan kredibel berkenaan dengan insiden SP1 dipukul dengan berbanding tertuduh dan saksi pembelaan. Adalah fakta yang tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa SP1 telah jatuh pengsan akibat dipukul dan dibawa ke hospital untuk rawatan. Walapun tiada gambar kecederaan atau laporan kecederaan, keterangan SP1 adalah kredibel dan kukuh S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 bahawa beliau telah mengalami kesakitan. Namun begitu, Mahkamah mendapati keterangan kecurangan SP1 adalah konsisten oleh saksi pembelaan berbanding keterangan SP1 yang menafikan kecurangannya. Namun begitu, ianya tidak menjejaskan kredibiliti SP1 berkenaan dengan kejadian SP1 dipukul. Kecurangan SP1 mengukuhkan punca pertengkaran antara SP1 dan tertuduh sehingga tertuduh memukul SP1 apabila mengetahui SP1 masih curang dengan lelaki lain. Setelah menilai kesemua keterangan saksi mengikut prinsip undang-undang, Mahkamah mendapati tertuduh bersalah dan disabitkan ke atas pertuduhan. C. HUKUMAN [11] Prinsip undang-undang bagi mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan hukuman untuk dijelaskan di dalam kes PP v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 2 MLJ 256 seperti berikut: The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed on the record or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not after a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [12] Dalam memutuskan hukuman yang bersesuaian, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Mohammad Zulhiznie bin Zaini [2021] 12 MLJ 780 di Mahkamah Tinggi menjelaskan tujuan hukuman dikenakan seperti berikut: “…On the other hand, purposes of sentencing are the aims or the outcomes wished to be achieved and realised by the courts in line with the law. A sentence may have a sole or multiple purpose it wishes to achieve based on the circumstances of each case in particular. A magistrate when determining this must ask oneself: ‘by imposing this sentence, what will the punishment achieve (within the ambits of the law)?’. [26] As it is well known the four classical purposes to be applied when considering the appropriate sentence are retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation. Some heinous offences such as murder, culpable homicide, rape, robbery and those which involve violence retribution, deterrence and prevention would be the main focus of the punishment and not rehabilitation. [27] As for rehabilitation, which is often seen solely as a way to aid an accused in becoming an efficacious member of society but it is also aimed benefiting society. By rehabilitating offenders, it is hoped that offenders will be equipped with the right mind set and skills to live a life by making choices that are well reasoned and grounded. Thus, by achieving this, the criminal tendency of that person will be suppressed and society will be safeguarded against crimes as the said person would no longer be bent on committing crimes. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [28] In addition, reparation which is a form of restorative justice is also a purpose of sentencing which has shown much emergence recently particularly in the criminal justice systems of western nations. Reparation is based on the notion demanding that a criminal make amends to victims by countervailing the wrong that they have committed in order to correct their crimes. [13] Mahkamah turut mempertimbangkan faktor mitigasi dan pemberat dalam memutuskan hukuman yang bersesuaian dengan tujuan hukuman diberikan. [14] Untuk faktor mitigasti, peguam bela berhujah bahawa tertuduh merupakan duda dan menanggung anak bongsu yang masih bersekolah. Tertuduh kini tinggal bersama-sama ketiga-tiga anaknya memandangkan bekas isteri, SP1 telah berkahwin baru dan menetap di Ipoh dengan suami. Tertuduh berasa tertekan dengan prosiding di Mahkamah ini dan juga Mahkamah Syariah. Kini, anak bongsu hanya boleh bergantung kepada tertuduh memandangkan ibunya telah berkahwin dengan lelaki lain. [15] Tertuduh mempunyai latar belakang yang baik dan mempunyai kerjaya di sektor pembankan. Peguam bela menyatakan bahawa pengadu dan tertuduh telah bercerai dan pengadu telah kahwin semula dengan lelaki lain dan berpindah ke Ipoh maka tiada kemungkinan kejadian boleh berulang. Peguam bela memohon hukuman yang ringan dikenakan memandangkan tertuduh merupakan pesalah pertama. S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [16] Timbalan pendakwa raya yang terpelajar telah memohon suatu hukuman yang deteran dikenakan ke atas tertuduh atas dasar kepentingan pengadu. Di samping itu, timbalan pendakwa raya juga menegaskan 326A, hanzard pengubalan undang-undang adalah untuk mengelakkan pergaduhan antara suami isteri maka graviti kesalahan dan kekerasan perlu dipertimbangkan. Pihak pendakwaan menyatakan kes yang melibatkan keganasan rumah tangga wajar diberikan hukuman tinggi sebagai peringatan kepada orang awam bahawa kesalahan sebegini adalah satu kesalahan yang serius dan wajar dikenakan hukuman yang setimpal. Akhirnya pihak pendakwaan juga memohon Mahkamah untuk mengambil kira status pengadu selaku seorang polis juga tidak terlepas daripada kes keganasan rumahtangga. [17] Mahkamah kurang bersetuju dengan pihak pendakwaan bahawa kesalahan dilakukan adalah kesalahan serius. Tafsiran kesalahan serius telah diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 52B Kanun Keseksaan. Seksyen 323 dibaca bersama seksyen 326A merupakan kesalahan tidak serius sepertimana dalam seksyen 52A Kanun Kesesakan Penggubalan undang-undang seksyen 326A yang membawa hukuman lebih tinggi untuk menampilkan usaha pihak kerajaan dalam mengurangkan keganasan rumah tangga yang melibatkan hubungan kekeluargaan dan bukan terhad kepada suami dan isteri. [18] Walapun hukuman merupakan budi bicara mahkamah, Mahkamah perlu mempertimbangkan kesemua faktor dan kepentingan awam untuk mencapai kesimbangan dalam kepentingan awam dan kepentingan tertuduh. Kes dirujuk adalah seperti PP v Loo Choon Fatt S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [1976] 2 MLJ 256, Mohamed Jusoh bin Abdullah and another v Public Prosecutor [1947] 1 MLJ 130. [19] Mahkamah ini telah mempertimbangkan latar belakang tertuduh yang kini merupakan duda dan masih menanggung anak bongsu yang masih bersekolah. Tertuduh tidak mempunyai rekod lampau atau merupakan yang penjenayah tegar. Tertuduh mempunyai pekerjaan yang baik dan sekiranya hukuman penjara dikenakan, tertuduh akan kehilangan sumber pendapatan dan peluang pekerjaan yang baik untuk meneruskan kehidupan. Anak-anak tertuduh akan terkesan memandangkan pengadu tidak lagi menjaga mereka. Hal ini dapat lihat daripada keterangan SP2 yang tidak lagi menetap bersama dengan pengadu semasa peringkat pembelaan dan telah berpindah semula dengan tertuduh. [20] Dalam mencapai keseimbangan, Mahkamah turut mengambil kira tahap kecederaan dialami oleh SP1. SP1 mengalami kecederaan yang tidak dapat dikenal pasti tahap keseriusan memandangkan SP1 tidak membuat laporan polis sejurus kejadian dan hanya melaporkan setelah pengadu pulih dan kesan kecederaan tidak lagi dapat dikenal pasti. Laporan perubatan P2 adalah merujuk kepada insiden kedua dan bukan insiden dalam pertuduhan. Merujuk Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes: A Commentary on the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Bharat Law House, 27th Ed, 2013) at page 2088, di mana hukuman wajar dikenakan berdasarkan keseriusan kecederaan. Pihak pendakwaan gagal menunjukkan bahawa hukuman penjara wajar dikenakan atas faktor kecederaan yang dialami. Pihak pendakwaan telah memohon keterangan SP2 tidak diterima maka keterangan SP1 mengenai kecederaan lebam di mata kini tidak disokong oleh mana-mana S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 keterangan dan keterangan oleh SP2. Dengan itu, selain keterangan SP1, tiada keterangan sokongan berkenaan dengan kesan lebam di mata. Gambar kecederaan dikemukakan oleh SP1 juga mempunyai nilai keterangan rendah memandangkan kerana tidak menunjukkan tarikh dan masa gambar tersebut diambil. Gambar asal telah hilang kerana telefon bimbit telah rosak dan SP1 hanya mengambil semua salinan daripada ‘messenger’. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak dapat mempertimbangkan hukuman berdasarkan kecederaan yang dialami sebagai faktor pemberat. [21] Mahkamah menyatakan tujuan hukuman pengajaran atau pencegahan adalah tidak bersesuaian kerana pihak-pihak telah bercerai dan pengadu tidak lagi mempunyai apa-apa ancaman di masa hadapan. Berdasarkan fakta kes, pengadu telah curang sekian lama dan menyebabkan tertuduh sering bertengkar dengan SP1 sehingga tertuduh telah bertindak memukul SP1. Keterangan SP1 mengenai kecurangan adalah tidak konsisten dengan bukti-bukti serta keterangan saksi pembelaan. Seperti mana dihujahkan oleh pihak pendakwaan, SP1 merupakan anggota polis wajar mengetahui bahawa laporan polis dan pemeriksaan kecederaan wajar dilakukan secepat mungkin dan bukan mengambil masa yang lama. SP1 gagal memberikan keterangan tentang tahap kecederaan dialami dan laporan perubatan P9 adalah tidak relevan dan mempunyai nilai keterangan yang amat rendah. [22] Setelah Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan lisan dan dokumen, Mahkamah tidak dapat mencapai kesimpulan bahawa terdapat kecederaan tetapi hanya boleh mencapai kesimpulan terdapat kesakitan dirasai oleh SP1. Oleh itu, adalah tidak wajar satu hukuman S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 berbentuk pemenjaraan dikenakan bagi tahap kecederaan yang tidak dapat dikenal pasti. Hukuman berbentuk pemulihan wajar diberikan supaya tertuduh boleh berubah di kalangan masyarakat dan bukan di dalam penjara. Tertuduh mempunyai pekerjaan yang stabil selaku pegawai bank dan perlu menanggung anak yang masih belajar. Selain mempertimbangkan keadaan mental pengadu yang dihujahkan oleh pihak pendakwaan seperti mana dalam laporan P8, Mahkamah juga perlu memberi pertimbangan sewajarnya kepada tertuduh juga menghadapi kesan daripada kecurangan oleh SP1. SP1 bukan sahaja mendatangkan tekanan kepada tertuduh tetapi juga anak-anak SP1 yang telah mengetahui kelakuan SP1 yang tidak bermoral. [23] Berdasarkan prinsip kehakiman di atas, Mahkamah menukarkan hukuman penjara kepada perintah kehadiran wajib. Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-pesalah 1954 telah dipinda agar pihak Mahkamah dapat mempertimbangkan hukuman alternatif sebagai langkah pemulihan kepada pesalah-pesalah yang wajar diberikan peluang kedua. [24] Hukuman penjara hanya akan memudaratkan keluarga tertuduh dan tertuduh serta tidak mendatangkan kesan baik kepada masyarakat. Hukuman penjara hanya menyebabkan lebih ramai banduan dan kesesakkan dalam penjara. Hukuman penjara tidak membantu pemulihan bagi pesalah kesalahan tidak serius malah akan menyebabkan tertuduh yang mempunyai latar belakang baik untuk bergaul dengan penjenayah lain di dalam penjara serta boleh memusnahkan kehidupan tertuduh. Apabila tertuduh kehilangan kerjaya dan mempunyai rekod penjara, kemungkinan tertuduh akan kesukaran mendapatkan kerja yang baik dan menanggung keluarga S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 tertuduh. Oleh itu, Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan permintaan dengan pihak pendakwaan bagi hukuman penjara berdasarkan fakta kes dan faktor-faktor di atas. [25] Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah berpendapat hukuman yang sesuai adalah hukuman berbentuk pemulihan dalam masyarakat di mana tertuduh boleh berubah, bekerja dan menjaga anak-anaknya. Mahkamah merujuk kepada Seksyen 5 Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah- pesalah 1954. 5. Compulsory Attendance Order (1) Where a person who resides within the prescribed distance from a Centre— (a) has been convicted of an offence for which he is liable to be sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years; or (b) is liable to be committed to prison for failure to pay a fine or debt, the Court may, instead of such sentence or committal, make a Compulsory Attendance Order requiring such person to attend daily at a Centre to be specified in such Order and to undertake compulsory work for a period not exceeding twelve months and for such number of hours each day not exceeding four as may be specified in such Order, and may, for further ensuring due compliance with such Order, require the offender to enter into a bond with or without sureties.”; dan (1A) The Court, when making the Compulsory Attendance Order under subsection (1), shall consider the character of such person, the nature and seriousness of the offence or the circumstances of S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 such person’s failure to pay, as the case may be, and all the other circumstances of the case. (2) Where the Court has reason to doubt whether any such person is physically capable for employment on compulsory work the Court— (a)may cause him to be medically examined; (b)shall not make a Compulsory Attendance Order unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that he is so capable; and (c)shall specify in the Compulsory Attendance Order, if such an order is made, any compulsory work for which the Court is satisfied he is not physically capable. (3) The number of hours each day during which the offender shall be required to be employed under subsection (2) shall not exceed four exclusive of any intervals prescribed for meals, refreshment or rest and shall, if the offender is gainfully occupied in employment, occupy only that part of the offender's time which would represent leisure hours. (4) The Court shall, before making a Compulsory Attendance Order, explain to the person concerned in ordinary language the effect of such Order and the consequence of failure to comply therewith and shall not make the order unless such person expresses his willingness to comply with the requirements thereof. [26] Kesalahan di bawah seksyen 323 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama seksyen 326A Kanun Keseksaan membawa hukuman penjara paling tinggi adalah dua tahun dan masih boleh dipertimbangkan kehadiran wajib di bawah seksyen 5(1)(a) Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-pesalah 1954. Sepertimana yang S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 5(4) Akta Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah- pesalah 1954, sebelum Mahkamah memberikan perintah kehadiran wajib, Mahkamah telah mempertimbangkan kemampuan tertuduh untuk melaksanakan kerja wajib dan jumlah masa tertuduh yang boleh bekerja. Mahkamah juga menerangkan kepada tertuduh tentang perlanggaran perintah kehadiran wajib dan kerja wajib yang perlu dilakukan. Tertuduh telah faham dan bersetuju menerima hukuman di bawah Akta Perintah Kehadiran Wajib Pesalah-Pesalah 1954. Mahkamah memerintahkan tertuduh melakukan kerja-kerja wajib selama 2 jam sehari untuk tempoh 4 bulan dengan wang cagaran sebanyak RM2000 dengan seorang penjamin setelah mengambil kira waktu bekerja tertuduh dan komitmen tertuduh. Disediakan oleh: Wong Chai Sia Majistret Mahkamah Kuala Lumpur S/N mn6WJ8Oa6U6jr8ClxNdCYg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2024-01-29T15:25:25+0800

Tika 2.6.0

W-01(NCvC)(W)-82-02/2022

PERAYU 1. ) FITTERS Diversified Berhad 2. ) Fitters Marketing Sdn Bhd 3. ) Pyro-Tech Systems Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN 1. ) Mohd Roslan Mahayudin 2. ) Saifuddin Nasution Bin Ismail 3. ) Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri dan Hal Ehwal Pengguna 4. ) Kerajaan Malaysia

Defamation - elements of tort of defamation - malicious falsehood - statements issued by authorities at a press conference - liability for continued publication - defence of justification and qualified privilege

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Mohd Nazlan Bin Mohd GhazaliKorumYA Datuk S. Nantha Balan A/L E.S. MoorthyYA Dato' Mohd Nazlan Bin Mohd GhazaliDato' Dr. Choo Kah Sing

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=023232a6-a3ef-459e-8894-6d3ef471c15e&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - FITTERS DIVERSIFIED BERHAD & 2 LAGI V MOHD ROSLAND MAHAYUDIN & 3 LAGI Grounds Page 1 of 53 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: W-01(NCvC)(W)-82-02/2022 ANTARA 1. FITTERS Diversified Berhad (No. Syarikat: 149735-M) 2. Fitters Marketing Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 401415-D) 3. Pyro-Tech Systems Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 411757-X) …PERAYU-PERAYU DAN 1. Mohd Roslan Mahayudin (Disaman sebagai Pengarah, Bahagian Penguatkuasa) 2. Saifuddin Nasution bin Ismail (Disaman sebagai Menteri) 3. Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, dan Hal Ehwal Pengguna (Dahulunya dikenali sebagai Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, Koperasi dan Kepenggunaan) 4. Kerajaan Malaysia …RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN [DI DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL: WA-21NCvC-100-12/2018 DI ANTARA 1. FITTERS Diversified Berhad (No. Syarikat: 149735-M) 29/01/2024 11:28:17 W-01(NCvC)(W)-82-02/2022 Kand. 42 S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 53 2. Fitters Marketing Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 401415-D) 3. Pyro-Tech Systems Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 411757-X) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. Mohd Roslan Mahayudin (Disaman sebagai Pengarah, Bahagian Penguatkuasa) 2. Saifuddin Nasution bin Ismail (Disaman sebagai Menteri) 3. Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, dan Hal Ehwal Pengguna (Dahulunya dikenali sebagai Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, Koperasi dan Kepenggunaan) 4. Kerajaan Malaysia …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] CORAM S NANTHA BALAN, JCA MOHD NAZLAN MOHD GHAZALI, JCA CHOO KAH SING, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction [1] This appeal arises from the dismissal of the appellants’ claim for defamation and malicious falsehood against the respondents for the published statements issued by the third respondent at a press S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 53 conference held in respect of its seizure of alleged counterfeit goods which the appellants claimed belonged to them. [2] Having heard the appeal - which was conducted via Zoom video technology, examined the appeal records and considered the submissions by parties, we unanimously decided to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the High Court. [3] These grounds of judgment contain the full reasons for our decision. Key Background Facts The Parties [4] The appellants are a group of companies that are primarily involved in the business of manufacturing and trading of fire-resistant door sets, safety, firefighting equipment, and other industrial products. The first respondent was at the material time the Director of the Enforcement Division of the former Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs - the third respondent. The Impugned Statements [5] The third respondent’s Enforcement Division, on the basis of a complaint against the second appellant made on 3 June 2015 by Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd (“Doretti”), carried out a raid of a factory operated by the second appellant a day after, on 4 June 2015 which resulted in the seizure of many items of product bearing the “PYRO” trademark. At that point, relevant documents showed that Doretti was the registered owner of these PYRO goods. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 53 [6] On 15 June 2015, the first respondent led a press conference on the raid, and on the seizure of the PYRO goods. The third respondent had also issued its own press statement on the matter, which was disseminated to the reporters from the media institutions who were present. [7] The title of the said press statement is “Barang Tiruan PYRO”. News coverage was from that day of 15 June 2015 not only published on the third respondent’s Twitter account, but also on the online versions of Utusan Malaysia and Harian Metro as well as a blog website. [8] For better appreciation of the facts, it is imperative that the statements the appellants complained about in their pleadings (“the impugned statements”) be set out hereunder: (a) Twitter Account of the third defendant “Rampasan terbesar barang tiruan kelengkapan pintu jenama PYRO dengan anggaran nilai rampasan RM 2.46 juta”. (b) Utusan Malaysia - as it appeared on the website www.utusan.com.my 1. “Bahagian Penguat Kuasa Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, Koperasi dan Kepenggunaan (KPDNKK) merampas 80,000.00 unit barang perkakasan pintu tiruan berjenama PYRO bernilai RM 2.46 juta selepas menyerbu Gudang di Sungai Buloh Selangor...”. 2. “Pengarah Penguat Kuasa Kementerian, Mohd Roslan Mahayudin berkata, serbuan dilakukan selepas pihaknya menerima maklumat daripada Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 53 berkaitan penggunaan cap dagang berdaftar milik syarikat berkenaan iaitu PYRO yang berdaftar di Perbadanan Harta Intelek Malaysia (MYIPO)”. 3. “Siasatan juga mendapati barang tiruan tersebut hampir sama barangan asli milik Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd, kes ini disiasat di bawah seksyen 8 (2) (b) Akta Perihal Dagangan 2011 iaitu membekalkan atau menawarkan barangan dagangan palsu.” 4. “Jika sabit kesalahan, pemilik barangan tiruan terbabit boleh di denda di bawah seksyen yang sama iaitu bagi suatu pertubuhan perbadanan denda tidak lebih RM 15,000 bagi setiap barangan yang diletakkan perihal dagangan palsu.” (c) Harian Metro - as it appeared on the website www.hmetro.com.my 1. “Sebanyak 80,000 unit barang berkelengkapan pintu berjenama tiruan dianggarkan bernilai RM 2.46 juta dalam operasi oleh sepasukan penguatkuasa Kementerian Dalam Negeri, Koperasi dan Kepenggunaan (KPDNKK) di sebuah Gudang di Sungai Buloh, Selangor...”. 2. “Barang kelengkapan pintu yang menggunakan cap dagang PYRO itu bukan sahaja menggunakan pek pembungkusan hampir sama, sebaliknya turut memasarkan rangkaian produk sama yang dipasarkan produk jenama asli.” 3. “Pengarah Bahagian Penguatkuasa KPDNKK Mohd Roslan Mahayudin berkata, antara barangan tiruan dirampas termasuk pintu rintangan api dan engsel.” S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 53 4. “Beliau berkata, pihaknya melakukan serbuan berkenaan selepas menerima aduan daripada Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd pemilik cap dagang PYRO mengenai penjualan produk tiruan berkenaan”. 5. “Menerusi aduan dibuat, pengadu mendakwa pihak berkenaan mengimport barang tiruan itu dari luar negara sebelum memasarkanya di negara ini.” 6. “Hasil pemantauan mendapati, barang tiruan itu dijual bersama-sama barangan asli kerana fizikal, bentuk dan pembungkusannya yang hampir sama selain dijual pada harga yang menyamai produk asli,” katanya pada sidang media di sini, semalam.” 6. “...kes berkenaan disiasat mengikut seksyen 8 (2)(b) Akta Perihal Dagangan 2011 dan jika sabit kesalahan boleh didenda RM 10,000 bagi setiap barang atau penjara tiga tahun manakala syarikat pula boleh di denda RM 15,000 bagi setiap barang yang dirampas, katanya”. (d) On a blog with the name known as http:/diabuatdah.blogspot.com 1. “Bahagian Penguat Kuasa Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri, Koperasi dan Kepenggunaan (KPDNKK) merampas 80,000 unit barangan perkakasan pintu tiruan berjenama PYRO bernilai RM 2.46 juta selepas menyerbu Gudang di Sungai Buloh Selangor.” 2. “Pengarah Penguatkuasa Kementerian, Mohd Roslan Mahayudin berkata, serbuan dilakukan selepas pihaknya menerima maklumat daripada Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd berkaitan penggunaan cap dagang berdaftar milik syarikat S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 53 berkenaan iaitu PYRO yang berdaftar di Perbadanan Harta Intelek Malaysia (MYIPO)”. 3. “Dorretti Resources Sdn Bhd membuat laporan kerana cap dagang berdaftar milik mereka iaitu PYRO yang berdaftar dengan MYIPO telah diciplak untuk digunakan pada barangan tiruan yang diimport dari luar negara, barangan yang dirampas dipercayai untuk pasaran tempatan.” 4. “Siasatan juga mendapati barang tiruan tersebut hampir sama dengan barangan asli milik Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd, kes ini disiasat di bawah seksyen 8(2)(b) Akta Perihal Dagangan 2011 iaitu membekalkan atau menawarkan barangan dagangan palsu.” [9] For completeness it should be stated that the appellants also submitted that the aforesaid statements were further aggravated by the description under the picture on Harian Metro's website, stating “Mohd Roslan melihat barang tiruan kelengkapan pintu jenama PYRO di KPNDKK”, and on the said blog stating “Mohd Roslan Mahayudin menunjukkan barang kelengkapan pintu tiruan yang dirampas di Sungai Buloh, Selangor, semalam.” The Court Verdict on the Trademark Ownership of PYRO [10] Following the raid and seizure, criminal charges were in fact brought against the directors of the second appellant company for offences under Section 8(2) of the Trade Description Act 2011 (“the TDA”) . At the same time the appellants and Doretti were also embroiled in a separate legal dispute on the trademark ownership of the PYRO products. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 53 [11] Significantly, on 24 March 2017, the High Court ruled that the second appellant was the bona fide first user and common law owner of the trademark PYRO, such that Doretti’s name was ordered to be expunged from the Register of Trademarks. On 4 May 2017 charges against the directors of the second appellant were withdrawn by the third respondent. This decision of the High Court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 5 April 2018. The Case of the Appellants [12] The appellants sued the respondents for defamation and malicious falsehood. They pleaded that the impugned statements were directed at them and had therefore damaged their reputation and business. The appellants’ position was that since they believed that they have been using the word “PYRO” for a substantial period of time, the reference to the word “PYRO” would indicate that the statements especially the words “barang tiruan” were directed at them. They asserted that the use of the word “PYRO” would mean that a reasonable person would have understood the raid to be referring to their warehouse and items seized to be their goods. [13] It was also pleaded that by their ordinary and natural meaning and / or by way of innuendo, the defamatory publication meant or were understood to mean amongst others as follows. [14] First, pursuant to the third respondent’s raid following the complaint lodged by Doretti, the appellants had committed a criminal offence under Section 8(2) (b) of the TDA which carried a sentence upon conviction of a fine not exceeding RM 15,000.00 for each good with the false description, and for a second or subsequent offence, to a fine not S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 53 exceeding RM 30,000 for each good bearing the false trade description or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or both prison and fine for the appellants’ directors. [15] Secondly, pursuant to the raid, and after allegedly having investigated the complaint, the third respondent made a finding that the appellants’ “PYRO” products were goods bearing false trade description by virtue of first respondent describing it as “barang tiruan”. [16] Thirdly, in light of the third respondent’s raid and the discovery of the “barang tiruan” in the appellants’ warehouse, the appellants had conducted their trade and business by wrongful means; in a dishonest, improper and reprehensible manner and lacked integrity - by employing “barang tiruan”. [17] Given the raid and seizure of the “barang tiruan” in the appellants’ warehouse, the appellants were not the lawful and registered owners of the trademark "PYRO" and had thus defrauded the business and public communities of Malaysia and abroad by representing as such all this while. [18] More significantly, the appellants alleged that they were aggrieved in that the impugned statements were continuously published even after the civil suit on the issue of ownership of the trademark “PYRO” had been resolved in favour of the appellant. Publication on the third respondent’s Twitter was from 15 June 2015 until 20 September 2018. Whilst the republication of the first respondent’s statements on Utusan Malaysia, Harian Metro and the said blog website was all from 15 June 2015 to 22 February 2021. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 53 [19] The appellant therefore contended that the continued publication of the said statement constituted malice and was evidence of bad faith on the part of the respondents. The defence of the Respondents [20] The crux of the defence of the respondents was their position that the impugned statements were not defamatory of the appellants, principally by asserting that the said statements were not directed at the appellants to begin with since no reference was made to the appellants at all. It was also pleaded that the statements were made to the public as part of the third respondent’s statutory duties under the TDA. In any event, even if the impugned statements were defamatory, the respondents were entitled to rely on the defences of justification and qualified privilege. [21] The respondents further claimed that the statements they made were as contained in the third respondent’s press statement distributed on that 15 June 2015 at the press conference, but that the impugned statements by the media and the blog were not in accordance with the contents of the press statement. The respondents had no control over the statements made by the media and the blog, more so as no confirmation was sought from the respondents in respect of the publication by the media and the blog. The Essence of the Decision of the High Court [22] The High Court dismissed the appellants’ suit for defamation and malicious falsehood. For present purposes it ought to be highlighted that the Court principally ruled that the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” did not refer to the appellants. Further it was also first held that the use of the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” in the impugned statements attributed to S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 53 the first and third respondents did not bear any defamatory meaning when published as at the date of the press conference on 15 June 2015. [23] It therefore followed that since the impugned statements were not defamatory, despite the continued publication of the impugned statements, the respondents cannot be held liable due to an alleged change of circumstances which resulted from the decision of the High Court on the trademark ownership of PYRO on 24 March 2017. Primary Grounds of Appeal [24] The grounds of appeal of the appellants vis-à-vis the dismissal of their suit by the High Court may be fairly grouped in terms of four principal arguments. The first is that the High Court was wrong in its finding that the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” in the impugned statements were not defamatory or maliciously false. In other words, the High Court was in error when it held that the statements did not bear any of the above- stated defamatory imputations as pleaded by the appellants. [25] Secondly, the appellants maintained that it was erroneous for the High Court not to have found defamation in respect of the continued publication on the third respondent’s own Twitter, on Utusan Malaysia, Harian Metro and the earlier mentioned blog, of the impugned statements, particularly the reference to “Barang Tiruan PYRO” despite and after the High Court decision on 24 March 2017 which had determined that the trademark ownership of the PYRO products validly vested in the second appellant. The appellants contended that the continued publication without retraction or correction each day after the said decision constituted a fresh accrual of the cause of action for defamation and malicious falsehood against the respondents. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 53 [26] Thirdly, the appellants submitted that even though the impugned statements and the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” did not expressly mention the name of the appellants, evidence at trial did establish that on a balance of probabilities such defamatory imputations concerning “Barang Tiruan PYRO” referred to the appellants. [27] Fourthly, the appellants contended that the High Court erred in law in concluding that the respondents were entitled to the defence of qualified privilege and of justification. [28] Other issues raised by the appellants in their memorandum of appeal and their written and oral submissions are largely related to any one of more of the aforesaid four principal areas of appeal. These four will be examined next. But before that, it would be helpful to refer briefly to the principles governing appellate intervention. Principles on appellate intervention [29] The law is well-established in that an appellate court will not interfere unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong. The Federal Court in Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 MLJ 441, in the judgment written by Azahar Mohamed FCJ (later CJM) reaffirmed the principle to be followed by an appellate court when reversing findings of fact by a trial court: “[60] It is now established that the principle on which an appellate court could interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is 'the plainly wrong test' principle; see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 (at p 10) per Steve Shim CJ (Sabah & Sarawak). More recently, this principle of appellate intervention was affirmed by S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 53 the Federal Court in UEM Group Bhd v Genisys Intergrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 785 where it was held at p 800: It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence (see Chow Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978] 1 LNS 32; Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484; and Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309)”. [30] The Court of Appeal in Nor Azlina Abdul Aziz v Expert Project Management Sdn Bhd [2017] 5 CLJ 58 in the judgment of the Court delivered by Harmindar Singh JCA (now FCJ) held thus: “[20] Nevertheless there are occasions when appellate interference is warranted and these occasions have been well set out in numerous cases. Some of these occasions are: (a) where the trial judge took into account irrelevant considerations and failed to give due weight to relevant considerations (see Director of Forestry, Sabah & Anor v. Mau Kam Tong & Ors And Another Appeal [2010] 3 CLJ 377; [2010] 3 MLJ 509); (b) where there was no proper evaluation of the evidence by the trial judge (see Lee Nyan Hon & Brothers Sdn Bhd v. Metro Charm Sdn Bhd [2009] 6 CLJ 626; [2009] 6 MLJ 1); (c) where the decision arrived at by the trial court was without judicial appreciation of the evidence (see Gan S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 53 Yook Chin & Anor v. Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2005] 2 MLJ 1); (d) where a trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions, would have arrived at the same conclusion (see Raja Lob Sharuddin Raja Ahmad Terzali & Ors v. Sri Seltra Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 CLJ 284; [2008] 2 MLJ 87); (e) where the trial judge was plainly wrong in arriving at his decision (see Lee Ing Chin & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19; [2003] 2 MLJ 97); (f) where a trial judge had so manifestly failed to derive proper benefit from the undoubted advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses at the trial, and in reaching his conclusion, has not properly analysed the entirety of the evidence which was given before him (see First Count Sdn Bhd v. Wang Yew Logging & Plantation Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 625; [2013] 4 MLJ 693 which followed the Privy Council case of Choo Kok Beng v. Choo Kok Hoe & Ors [1984] 1 LNS 40; [1984] 2 MLJ 165); and (g) where the judgment is based upon a wrong premise of fact or of law (see Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v. Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 1 LNS 1416; [2012] 4 MLJ 149)”. [31] In a more recent Federal Court pronouncement on the principles surrounding appellate intervention in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Pen, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 which cited the decision of the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin (P) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 53 @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 it was reaffirmed that the position has always been that a decision which is arrived at due to a lack of judicial appreciation of evidence is plainly wrong. Evaluation & Findings of this Court Elements of the Tort of Defamation [32] For proper context, before we analyse whether the cause of action of defamation is made out we should in summary fashion state the key elements of the tort of defamation that must be proven by the appellants. The key elements of defamation are well-established. In order to prove a claim of libel in defamation, it is essential that the offending words not only bear defamatory imputation, but also that they identify the plaintiff as the person defamed and are published to a third party. It is for the plaintiff as the claimant, to prove these three elements in order to succeed in his defamation action. [33] All these were made abundantly plain in Ayob Saud v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 MLJ 315; [1989] 1 CLJ 152, where Mohamed Dzaiddin J (later Chief Justice) held that: “In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the words are defamatory; (2) the words refer to the plaintiff; and (3) the words were published.” [34] In this case before us however, the fact that there were publications of the impugned statements - specifically the mention of “Barang Tiruan PYRO” - in the third respondent’s Twitter account, on the online news of Utusan, of Harian Metro and on the said blog are not S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 53 disputed. This fact was also one of the agreed facts confirmed prior to the start of the trial. And given the said medium of communication and the purpose of the coverage, it is equally not in dispute that these publications were plainly and obviously made to third parties, being the readers. As such this element of the tort of defamation was not an issue raised by any of the parties. The opposite however is true for the other two elements, as reflected in the key ground of appeals raised by the appellants. Whether the impugned statements and references to “Barang Tiruan PYRO” bear a defamatory meaning or imputation [35] The leading text on defamation - Gatley on Libel and Slander 10th Ed (2004) at para 1.5 page 8 states as follows: “What is defamatory? There is no wholly satisfactory definition of a defamatory imputation. Three formulae have been particularly influential: (1) Would the imputation tend to ‘lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally’? (2) Would the imputation tend to cause others to shun or avoid the plaintiff? And (3) Would the words tend to expose the plaintiff to ‘hatred, contempt or ridicule’? The quotation “what is defamatory?” relates to the nature of the statement made by the defendant: words may be defamatory even if they are believed by no one and even if they are true, though in the latter case they are not, of course, actionable…”. [36] As mentioned, the test of whether a statement published or spoken is defamatory is well-established. In Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Pencetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Another [1973] 2 MLJ 56, Mohd Azmi J (as he then was) formulated the test as follows: S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 53 “Thus, the test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true. Another test is: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally? The typical type of defamation is an attack upon the moral character of the plaintiff attributing crime, dishonesty, untruthfulness, ingratitude or cruelty”. [37] As for the concept of ordinary and natural meaning, Duncan & Neill on Defamation, 4th edition, explained as follows at paragraphs 5.25 to 5.28: “In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements of which the claimant complains it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication... It follows from the principles set out above that a claimant cannot select an isolated passage in an article and complain of that alone if other parts of the article throw a different light on that passage.” [38] In order to ascertain whether this important element is established Courts have followed a two-stage test. Essentially the first is whether the impugned words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning and secondly whether they in fact bear the meaning alleged. The first stage is a question of law, and the second is one of fact. Further elucidation on the application of the relevant principles in this respect may be found in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371; [1999] 1 AMR 753; [1999] 1 CLJ 461 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) stated thus: “It cannot, I think, be doubted that the first task of a court in an action for defamation is to determine whether the words S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 53 complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. And it is beyond argument that this is in essence a question of law that turns upon the construction of the words published. As Lord Morris put it in Jones v Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 at p 958: The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words (see Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151). The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader, guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction, would draw from the words. The test of reasonableness guides and directs the court in its function of deciding whether it is open to a jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable persons would understand the words complained of in a defamatory sense. In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory. (See JB Jeyaretnam v Goh Chok Tong [1985] 1 MLJ 334.) Richard Malanjum J, in an admirable judgment in Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 393, collected and reviewed the relevant authorities upon this branch of the subject and I would, with respect, expressly approve the approach adopted by him. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 53 ………………………………………………. Having decided whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, the next step in the inquiry is for a court to ascertain whether the words complained of are in fact defamatory. This is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case……”. [39] And in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 MLJ 720 the Federal Court emphasised: “[38] The test involved in determining whether or not the words complained of are defamatory is a two-stage process. Firstly, it must be considered what meaning the words would convey to an ordinary person; and secondly, it must be considered whether under the circumstances in which the words were published, a reasonable man would be likely to understand that in a defamatory way (see: Wong Yoke Kong & Ors v Azmi M Anshar & Ors [2003] 4 MLJ 96; [2003] 6 CLJ 559)”. [40] In light of the authorities, the words complained of are defamatory if the said words, as published, in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on its part. An imputation would therefore be defamatory if its effect is to expose the plaintiff, in the eyes of the community, to hatred, ridicule or contempt or to lower him in their estimation or to cause him to be shunned and avoided by them. To be clear, the natural and ordinary meaning of the impugned words includes not only their literal meaning but also any inferences which the ordinary reasonable person would take from the words due to his general knowledge and common sense - in other words, not extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge. The words plainly cannot be read in isolation S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 53 and must instead be read in the proper context they were used, and the meaning must be gathered from the whole publication. [41] Words can also be defamatory in their innuendo sense where whilst they may not be defamatory to the ordinary reasonable person, are instead defamatory to persons with knowledge of extrinsic facts. Here, it bears repetition that in this case, as set out above (in paragraphs [12] to [15]) the appellants had pleaded what they said the ordinary and natural meaning of the impugned words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” are, and what imputation they carried, as well as their innuendo meaning. [42] Essentially the appellants alleged, as they pleaded, that the words meant that the appellants had committed a criminal offence under Section 8(2) (b) of the TDA, that the appellants' "PYRO" products were goods bearing false trade description, that the appellants had conducted their trade and business by wrongful means, and in a dishonest, improper, reprehensible manner as well as lacked integrity, and that the appellants were not the lawful and registered owners of the trademark "PYRO" and had thus defrauded the business and public communities of Malaysia and abroad by representing as such all this while. [43] The High Court disagreed. This is how the learned JC explained his findings on this issue, which we think useful to reproduce: “[42] When I consider the statements made in the said Twitter account and the websites of the newspapers as well as on the blog, I am of the opinion, that a reasonable reader would have understood that: - (i) A raid was undertaken by the Defendants on 5-6-2015 pursuant to a complaint by the then registered proprietor of the trademark "PYRO", Doretti Sdn Bhd, that counterfeit S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 53 products bearing the same brand name were confiscated at a warehouse in Sungai Buloh. (ii) The counterfeit product confiscated included fire- resistant doors and door accessories bearing the trademark PYRO and bearing a similar physical appearance and packaging utilised under the PYRO trademark. (iii) An investigation is underway in accordance with section 8(2)(b) of the Trade Descriptions Act and if found liable the guilty party may be made liable for the sum of RM 10,000.00 for each item found, imprisonment and the corporation may be liable for the sum of RM 15,000.00. The statements clearly state "Jika disabit kesalahan", this would indicate that the issues are still pending investigation and such persons may be found liable if they were found guilty by a court of law. [43] Therefore, I find that the natural and ordinary meaning of the articles are not defamatory as suggested by the Plaintiffs. I believe a reasonable reader would not impute the meaning as suggested by the Plaintiffs. This would even extend to a reasonable reader who knew that the Plaintiffs and the group of companies in the FITTERS group had been undertaking its trade utilising the "PYRO" trademark or related trademark (hereinafter referred collectively as "PYRO") as suggested by the Plaintiffs. [44] The fact that the statements refer to the trademark "PYRO" will not automatically lead a reasonable reader to assume or understand that it was the Plaintiffs' warehouse that was raided and that it was the Plaintiffs that were being investigated by the Defendants at the material time. As seen earlier, the reasonable reader is assumed not to be susceptible of suspicion and not an avid fan [sic] of scandal. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 53 [45] I am also of the view that the reasonable reader would have understood that the statements indicate that the Defendants, in particular, the 1st and 3rd Defendants had only at the time of the publication had raided an unidentified premise on the allegation made by the then owner of the trademark, Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd. A reasonable person reading the newspaper report, the blog and the press release, would understand the articles to mean that the Defendants had undertaken an investigation based on the complaint of the registered trademark owner and raided a warehouse that they suspect contains pirated goods. As of 18-6- 2015, the Defendants only stated that they were undertaking an investigation and no finding of guilt could be attributed to any party at that time. The Defendants also did not make any disparaging remarks to any party, to any product or any brand or trademark. They had only stated what they had undertaken as of 18-6-2015 as part of their duties”. [44] We are inclined to agree with the High Court. To a certain extent. We understand from the above that the High Court did not consider the impugned statements defamatory primarily because first, the raid of the warehouse and the confiscation of the stated “Barang Tiruan PYRO” was clearly being undertaken as part of the third respondent’s investigation and secondly, that no mention was therein made of the appellants at all. [45] Whilst we agree that the impugned statements made no mention of the appellants (which we find to be especially crucial, as discussed below) we do not share the finding of the High Court that words stating matters such as counterfeit goods or “Barang Tiruan PYRO”, raid on warehouse, and an on-going investigation, if published in reference to a plaintiff, did not bear any defamatory imputation. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 53 [46] We should briefly say that in the case of Ng Koo Kay Benedict and another v Zim Integrated Shipping Services Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 860 reference was made to the English case of Chase v News Group Newspapers [2002] ECWA Civ 1772 which categorised three levels of meanings which could be stated as - first, the imputation of the commission of an offence, secondly the existence of reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of the offence and thirdly, the presence of grounds to investigate into the same. However, Ng Koo Kay Benedict observed that “All three [Chase] levels are generally regarded as being defamatory, though in varying degrees”. [47] In other words, in our view, words such as the raid by an enforcement agency of a warehouse as part of an investigation where counterfeit goods were confiscated would be defamatory of the person who is being investigated, whose factory is raided, and whose products have been seized. [48] Cases where the impugned words concerning some accusation or allegation of criminal conduct have been held to be defamatory include DP Vijandran v Karpal Singh & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 22 where the words referred to the allegation of cheating under Section 420 of the Penal Code; and perhaps more similar to the instant case before us, Sin Heak Hin Pte Ltd and another v Yuasa Battery Singapore Co Pte Ltd [1995] 3 SLR (R) 123 where the allegation was on the sale of counterfeit car batteries; DHKW Marketing and another v Nature’s Farm Pte Ltd [1998] 3 SLR (R) 774 where the allegation was on the sale of counterfeit health product; and Microsoft Corp and others v SM Summit Holdings Ltd and another and other appeals [1999] 3 SLR (R) 465 where the allegation was on the sale of counterfeit software. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 53 [49] We reiterate that in our judgment, the impugned statements which contained the words raid, seizure, and investigation vis-à-vis the expression “Barang Tiruan PYRO” - the very words complained of by the appellants, even if described instead as “disyaki Barang Tiruan PYRO” when examined in the context of the entirety of all of the impugned statements in a reasonable and objective manner, if they were in reference to the appellants herein, would certainly carry the imputation, if not the direct meaning, which would tend to “lower the appellants in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally” (Gatley on Libel and Slander 10th Ed (2004) at para 1.5 page 8), have the tendency “to excite against the appellants the adverse opinion of others” (Syed Husin Ali (supra)), and “impute to the appellants any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part” (Chok Foo Choo (supra). [50] It bears emphasis that after all, as stated in Chok Foo Choo (supra), the ordinary and natural meaning of the impugned words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: in the sense that it is a meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge. We therefore find that the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” are certainly capable of a defamatory meaning in the context of the first in a two-stage test to ascertain whether the relevant impugned statements are defamatory of the appellant. We emphasise that the first stage is a question of law as to whether the impugned words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning in terms of what would the words convey to an ordinary person. We have just answered this in the affirmative, somewhat departing from the answer given by the High Court. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 53 [51] In respect of the second stage where it must be asked whether under the circumstances in which the words were published, a reasonable man would likely to understand that in a defamatory way. This concerns a question of fact, as to whether the words in fact bear the meaning alleged. Again, we find it compelling to hold that the said words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” in the circumstances of the case, considering the background facts, the raid, seizure and investigation, which are all published in the impugned statements as appeared on the third respondent’s Twitter, in Utusan, Harian Metro and the blog, did in fact carry the defamatory meaning. [52] As such, the first element of the tort of defamation had been made out since the impugned statements made and published in this case are defamatory, either by way of their ordinary meaning or by innuendo. [53] Before discussing the other element of defamation, we wish to state that the appellants herein in our view gave too much emphasis on their grievance that the impugned statements all mentioned “Barang Tiruan PYRO” despite the appellants then were merely suspected of selling or supplying the said “Barang Tiruan PYRO”. As such, the appellants insisted that without qualifying the statements by employing the word “suspected” or “disyaki”, the respondents had defamed the appellants. [54] It bears repetition that at the time of the press conference on 15 June 2015, the investigations into the status of the PYRO products which had been confiscated - whether fake or genuine - was still on-going. In their submissions the appellants stressed that the third respondent’s S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 53 own officers when testifying agreed that the third respondent was merely (in this context) an investigative body, and the question whether a particular product was a counterfeit or otherwise would be a matter for the Court to decide, not the third respondent. [55] When an enforcement agency like the third respondent or for that matter the Police calls for a press conference or issues statements to the media to announce to the public certain discoveries or arrests undertaken pursuant to investigations under their respective remits, we do not for a moment think that the status of these seizures and arrests are in any manner conveyed or intended to be understood by any reasonable reader to be definitive. In all likelihood investigations are still in progress, just like in the instant case when the press conference was held on 15 June 2015. [56] And we would certainly like to think that it would by now generally be understood by the ordinary and reasonable reader if not the general public that the determination on the status of any items seized or persons arrested - whether counterfeit or illegal or otherwise, and whether guilty or not - will only be conclusively made by the Courts (if brought before the Courts) pursuant to the justice system in this country. [57] In other words, whether the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” ought to have been qualified by the word “disyaki” as argued by the appellants is in our view immaterial as any such announcement or statement by enforcement agencies must in any event be taken as non- definitive as to the legal status of the underlying matter being investigated. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 53 [58] In our view therefore, “Barang Tiruan PYRO” even if qualified with “disyaki” and despite its legal status in any event being non- conclusive as yet, would objectively still be viewed by a reasonable reader to be a negative term which would have the effect of lowering the reputation of the person associated with the said expression. This, in comparison, would be no less defamatory of a person who is announced by authorities to have been arrested for suspicion of committing a criminal offence. Whether the Impugned Words Refer to the Appellants [59] Now, given that it has been established that the impugned statements bear defamatory meanings and imputations, the appellants must show that the defamatory words in question were published of and concerning the appellants. The words must be capable of referring to them or of identifying them. [60] However we must point out that whilst we found the impugned words to be defamatory, it is not at all the case that the appellants had succeeded in showing that the ordinary and natural meaning of the impugned statements and the imputation they bore was in the manner how the appellant had set out in their pleadings as stated in paragraphs [12] to [19] above. This is because whilst we say the impugned statements bear defamatory imputation under the first element of the tort of defamation, the meaning of the impugned statements as ascribed to and pleaded by the appellants, had already combined or married the two key elements of defamation in this case – namely that the words must bear a defamatory imputation and that they refer to the appellants. We reiterate that we find the impugned statements in the publication to be defamatory. But we disagree they refer to the appellants. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 53 [61] In other words, whilst words such as the raid, the seizure of “Barang Tiruan PYRO” and the investigation are defamatory, as mentioned earlier, in order to make out a case in a tort of defamation, these words must also be published (which is not in dispute) and refer to the person who alleges to have been defamed vis-à-vis the publication of these words. [62] However in this case, what the appellants had pleaded (as stated in paragraphs [12] to [19] above) as to how these words had defamed them presupposed that the impugned statements as made by the first and third respondents actually are in reference to the appellants. We stress that unless it is proved that the subject matter of the action was published of and concerning the plaintiff, the action is bound to fail (see Chew Sew Khian @ Chew Hua Seng v Saniboey Mohd lsmail [2003] 5 MLJ 91). [63] Based on the totality of the evidence we are unable to conclude that the words referred to the appellants. We should also say that the High Court too did not find the impugned statements defamatory of the appellants. We need only state that for all intents and purposes, whilst we did not share the same conclusion with the High Court on the issue of whether the impugned words bore any defamatory imputation, we are nevertheless in full agreement with the High Court that they do not refer to the appellants. [64] This as touched on earlier is also one main reason why the High Court determined the words were not defamatory, since in its analysis of the issue of whether the words did bear any defamatory imputation (the first element in the tort of defamation), much emphasis had already been placed on the finding that the impugned statements had S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 53 nothing to do with the appellants, which under the law is concerning the second element in the tort of defamation. [65] This comes out clearly in the grounds of judgment of the High Court where under the discussion topic of “Whether the impugned statements refer to the Plaintiffs” in paragraph 71 it is stated that the “second part of this two-stage test concerns whether the words or statements are defamatory of the Plaintiffs”. This is not entirely erroneous. But it is trite that the two-stage test is the test to determine the first of three elements to found a cause of action in defamation - which is whether the impugned statements bear a defamatory imputation. The second is whether they refer to the appellants as the plaintiffs and the third is whether they are published to a third party. In our analysis, the High Court had already considered the second element in the first, thus unnecessarily conflating the issues somewhat. [66] We therefore repeat the following passage from the judgment of the Federal Court in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (supra) on the two-stage test vis-à-vis the first element on the determination whether the impugned words bear defamatory imputations, as follows: “[38] The test involved in determining whether or not the words complained of are defamatory is a two-stage process. Firstly, it must be considered what meaning the words would convey to an ordinary person; and secondly, it must be considered whether under the circumstances in which the words were published, a reasonable man would be likely to understand that in a defamatory way (see: Wong Yoke Kong & Ors v. Azmi M Anshar & Ors [2003] 6 CLJ 559)”. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 30 of 53 [67] In our view, as is clear from the above, judicial determination on whether the impugned statements refer to or identify the plaintiff should rightfully be made in the analysis of the second element, and less so in the first, which focusses on whether in the first place, the words in question bear defamatory meaning or imputations. In any event, in the instant case before us, whilst we, unlike the High Court, find the impugned statements did bear defamatory imputations, we nevertheless agreed with the High Court that the action in defamation cannot be sustained because it has not been proven that the impugned statements refer to or identify the appellants. [68] In our view, the impugned statements, as published, do not refer to the appellants. Our reasons for saying so are as follows. [69] In the first place, there was without any doubt no mention of the appellants at all in any of the impugned statements attributed to the respondents, Utusan, Harian Metro or the blog. [70] It is true that it is not necessary that a plaintiff must be mentioned by name in the publication in question - but to succeed in the action in defamation he must show that there are matters in the defamatory publication that describe or identify him. A careful reading of the entire press statement in the impugned statements in this case discloses absolutely no mention of the appellants. And it cannot be emphasised enough that nowhere in the statements is it stated that the warehouse had anything to do with the appellants. [71] Therefore it bears repetition that the essence of the impugned statements, as attributed to the first and third respondents was merely that S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 31 of 53 based on the complaint by Doretti (then evidenced to be the registered owner of the PYRO trademark), in respect of the use and sale of counterfeit products using the said PYRO trademark, the raid was conducted by the enforcement team of the third respondent at a warehouse in Sungai Buloh. There and then, various counterfeit PYRO items (which included fire-resistant doors and door accessories bearing the trademark PYRO and bearing a similar physical appearance and packaging utilised under the PYRO trademark) were confiscated as a result. The investigation was being carried out under Section 8 (2) (b) of the TDA which provided for the punishment of fine and imprisonment if found guilty. [72] We are mindful that the appellants contended that the statements referred to them and pleaded that the second appellant had started providing fire services using the trademark PYRO since 1986, and other related products in combination with other words such as PYRODOR, PYROSUIT and PYROLINE. In 2001, the third appellant started the use of PYRO for products such as locks and ironmongeries, with the first appellant being engaged to manufacture and supply the same. Thus, the appellants had over the years recorded substantial sales, and undergone certification and examination of their PYRO products, resulting in their having acquired substantial reputation and goodwill. [73] As such, it was specifically pleaded that relevant trade and business organisations, as well as the public have come to associate PYRO trademark and PYRO products with the appellants. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 32 of 53 [74] We are mindful that on the requirement that the impugned words must be capable of referring to the appellants or of identifying them, the Privy Council in a leading case on the subject - Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Limited [1944] AC 116, had this to say: “It is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published "of the plaintiff", where he is not named the test of this is whether the words would reasonably lead people acquainted with him to the conclusion that he was the person referred to. The question whether they did so in fact does not arise if they cannot in law be regarded as capable of referring to him”. [75] We are of the view that the fact that the impugned statements refer to the trademark "PYRO" would not without more lead a reasonable reader to understand that it was the second appellant’s warehouse that had been raided or that it was the appellants which were being investigated by the third respondent at the material time. This would be the case to a reasonable reader who was even aware that the appellants and their group of companies had been undertaking their trade using the "PYRO" trademark as claimed by the appellants. [76] The appellants called two witnesses. Their senior sales manager Lai Fook Eng (PW1) and one Liew Kok Foo (PW2), who was a supplier of the parts employed by the appellants. Their evidence was intended by the appellants to support their position, as pleaded, on the meaning to be attributed to impugned statements complained of, and how this would translate into the defamatory meaning complained by the appellants. Their evidence was relevant for the purposes of the knowledge concerning the word "PYRO" and the ownership of the intellectual S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 33 of 53 property relating to the said word that should be imputed of a reasonable reader. [77] After all, the law in this respect says that the reasonable reader is taken not to be susceptible of suspicion; nor is he avid for scandal. To begin with, the overall tone of the language in the impugned statements is distinctly neutral without suggesting blame to any party vis- à-vis the subject matter of the “Barang Tiruan PYRO”. We cannot but agree with the observation made by the High Court that the reasonable reader will not necessarily assume that it was the appellants’ warehouse or factory that was raided since Sungai Buloh is a very large industrial area containing several factories and warehouses out of which many companies operate from. [78] The reasonable reader would merely have understood that the various impugned statements simply affirmed that the first and third respondents were carrying out their investigative duties following a complaint without identifying the warehouse, what more the identities of the suspects. Not only was there no finding of guilt, but also that none could be attributed to any party at that time. [79] The respondents, as correctly pointed out by the High Court, did not make any disparaging remarks directed at any party, any product or any brand or trademark (other than stating the fact about the confiscation of the counterfeit PYRO products). We should add that neither did evidence show that the third respondent had made any announcement of the subsequent prosecution of the directors of the appellants under the TDA, or linking the same to the earlier raid. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 34 of 53 [80] Even if it was true that the appellants were known in the industry to be associated with the “PYRO” products, news of the authorities seizing fake “PYRO” products would not necessarily without more lead a reasonable reader to assume and conclude that the culprit was the appellants. [81] It could equally be argued that since the appellants were known for such “PYRO” products, the counterfeit versions of “PYRO” must have been or could have been produced by other irresponsible parties. The counterfeit PYRO products could thus have been nefariously produced or sold by a different entity altogether, especially if what was claimed by the appellants that they had substantial goodwill and long- standing business in the PYRO products is true. [82] The High Court stated the law correctly in that when the Court considers the evidence of a witness produced to explain their pleaded ordinary natural meaning of the words, or their imputation, the Court must still consider the testimony objectively for, in the final analysis, it is the meaning which reasonable and fair-minded people, relying on their common sense, would understand the words to have (see the High Court decision in Kumarasamy a/l Naciappan v The News Straits Times Press (M) Bhd [2013] 7 MLJ 361). [83] The following self-explanatory passages as quoted in Chew Sew Khian @ Chew Hua Seng v Saniboey Mohd lsmail [2003] 5 MLJ 91 are especially instructive. The first passage we will refer to is from David Syme v Canavan [1918] 25 CLR 234 which stated thus: "The test of whether the words that do not specifically name the plaintiff refer to him or not in this: Are they such as reasonably in S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 35 of 53 the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to? That does not assume that those persons who read the words know all the circumstances or all the relevant facts. But although the Plaintiff is not named in words, he may, nevertheless, be described so as to be recognized; and whether the description takes the form of a word-picture of an individual or the form of a reference to a class of persons of which he is or believed to be a member or any other form, if in the circumstances the description is such that a person hearing or reading the allege libel would reasonably believe that the plaintiff was referred to, that is sufficient reference to him." [84] The second passage is from Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1239 which emphasised that the test in determining the question of identity is an objective one, as follows: "In my view, a somewhat more exacting test should be predicated where the question is one of identity. It is not sufficient for the reader to say "I wonder if the article refers to Johnny Morgan" nor is pure speculation sufficient. Nor is it sufficient that a reasonable person believes that the words refer to the Plaintiff. The test is an objective one. The ordinary reader must be fair minded and not avid for scandal. He must not be unduly suspicious. The ordinary reader must have rational grounds for his belief that the words refer to the plaintiff." [85] It is so trite that he who alleges must prove and the onus is on the person making the allegation - the plaintiff - to do so. This is also enshrined in Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. And as case law authorities have so amply stated, the burden in on the appellants as the plaintiffs in a defamation action to prove the words in question are defamatory, refer to them and are published to a third party. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 36 of 53 [86] We are cognisant of the fact that the said witnesses of the appellants in the case now before us were called to support the appellants’ pleaded case on how the impugned words were understood by the witnesses, which the appellants claimed were defamatory, more for the understanding the innuendo pleaded by the appellants concerning the usage of the word “PYRO” and all related “PYRO” words, and especially also whether the statement could be understood to be referring to the appellants. The appellants contended that the ordinary reader would have understood that the word “PYRO” and all such related words is a trademark developed by the group of companies within the Fitters Group and as a result any reference to the said trademark would have attributed the said statements or allegations to them. And further the appellants must comply with Order 78 rule 3(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, which provides that where the plaintiff alleges the words complained of were used in a defamatory sense other than their ordinary meaning, he must give particulars of the facts and matters on which he relies in respect of such sense. [87] However, as stated above, only two witnesses were summoned. One - PW1 - purportedly to show the implications encountered by the appellants following the publication and the other - PW2 - on how a third party viewed the same. In essence, the appellants asserted that based on the testimony of these two witnesses, when the word “PYRO” is used, a reasonable reader would have understood this to refer to any of the appellants or the companies within the Fitter Group. [88] Evidence in any trial is of course to be weighed, not counted. But we find that the High Court was not wrong to disbelieve that PW2 had called the appellants' representative and chastised them after allegedly S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 37 of 53 reading the impugned statements, considering that he was not a customer but a supplier of products to the appellants and thus must have relied on the business of the appellants. In any event, when cross-examined, and questioned by the Court, PW2 actually agreed that the impugned statements did not necessarily mean that it was the appellants’ products that had been confiscated, for there was a chance or possibility that someone else could also be producing the said PYRO products, thus for all intents and purposes almost wholly negating any utility of his evidence towards supporting the case of the appellants. [89] As for PW1, his evidence was that after the publication, he was inundated with calls and enquiries from many of the appellants’ trade or business partners and clients who had seen and read the publication (and republication) on the internet; and who immediately believed that the appellants were selling or marketing or distributing or owned fake “PYRO” products. [90] We however note from the record of appeal that in cross- examination PW1 agreed that he was working with the second appellant company Fitters Marketing Sdn Bhd only. As such he clearly had no locus to give evidence on behalf of the first appellant Fitters Diversified Berhad and the third appellant Pyro-Tech Systems Sdn Bhd. In fact, neither did the appellants - specifically the second appellant, produce any authorisation for PW1 to even testify for his own employer, the second appellant. [91] At the same time, interestingly, and somewhat curiously, none of the directors of the board of directors of any of the three appellant companies, not a single one, were called to give evidence for the S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 38 of 53 appellants at trial. The submission of the respondents that the absence of the directors had also prevented the respondents to cross examine the directors of the appellants is also not without merit. And it bears emphasis that all these are despite the obvious fact that the decision to initiate this defamation action must have been made by the boards of the appellants in the first place. This is also not to mention the absence of evidence of losses claimed to have been suffered by the appellants due to the alleged defamation. [92] Furthermore, the appellants only sued the respondents despite their complaint being also directed against articles published by news articles Utusan Malaysia, Harian Metro and the said blog website http:/diabuatdah.blogspot.com. Neither did the appellants who bear the onus of proving their case against the respondents at trial call any witnesses from amongst the journalists or the blogger who were actually responsible for writing their respective pieces which are claimed by the appellants to be defamatory, vis-à-vis the media statement of the third respondent. The appellants also did not offer any explanation for this omission. [93] We therefore find the High Court was correct when concluding on this point as follows: “[55] To reiterate, the meaning of the words complained has to be ascertained by this Court objectively. The evidence of SP-1 and SP-2 is of assistance only to understand the alleged imputation of facts that are relied on by the Plaintiffs. Therefore, I am of the view that SP-1 and SP-2’s personal interpretation is of no help to the Plaintiffs to prove the objective meaning of the said words. This issue must be interpreted by this Court in accordance with the legal position as I have stated earlier.” S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 39 of 53 [94] In any event, as we have discussed earlier, whilst we disagree with the High Court in its finding that the impugned statements did not bear any defamatory meaning, we are however in agreement with its conclusion that the same did not refer to the appellants. This therefore must mean that the appellants’ action in defamation against the respondents fails, and the High Court was entirely correct in dismissing the defamation suit. Liability for continued publication [95] Although we have dealt with the two principal questions in this appeal, we will also address other related issues of significance raised by the appellants in their memorandum of appeal and submissions before us. It is trite that a cause of action in defamation arises at the point when the words in question are published to third parties. The facts at the point of publication are key (see Grappelli v Derek Block (Holdings) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 822). We have determined that the words “Barang Tiruan PYRO” and the impugned statements attributed to the first and third respondents did not bear any defamatory meaning when published as at the date of the press conference on 15 June 2015 because reference to the appellants could not be proven. [96] It therefore follows that despite the alleged continued publication of the impugned statements, the respondents cannot be held liable in light of the decision of the High Court on the trademark ownership of PYRO on 24 March 2017 which adjudged the second appellant as the owner of the PYRO trademark. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 40 of 53 [97] The crucial point is since the initial publication did not in the first place identify the appellants, the “continued publication” of the same, exact statement, despite the supervening High Court decision, still did not subsequently change anything about the impugned statements as first published. There was still no reference to the appellants in the same impugned publication. And, neither did, for example, the said High Court decision (or any statement published concerning the decision, none of which was tendered, if any) make any cross-reference to the earlier impugned publication. [98] The decision of the High Court on the true ownership of “PYRO” on 24 March 2017 and the fact that the criminal charges against the appellants were unsuccessful as they were subsequently granted a discharge not amounting to an acquittal on 4 May 2017, did not in any manner mean that the various actions of the first and third respondents in respect of the investigation, the raid, the seizure and the making of statements to the media, all of which had taken place almost two years prior, become unsustainable. We emphasise that the impugned statements were not defamatory when they were published and they continued to be so even after the said decision of the High Court. [99] We accordingly agree with the following observation by the High Court: “[64] As the statements were not originally defamatory, even their continued existence after the outcome of the Civil Suit would change its character. As I have said earlier, the reader of these statements is assumed to be a reasonable person and is neither naive nor suspicious. Such a person would be expected to know and appreciate that the statements were of the situation at the time they were made. The original statements remain concerning S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 41 of 53 the facts that existed on 15.6.2015. A reasonable reader would appreciate that subsequent events may have overtaken the facts of the case especially in circumstances where an investigation is being undertaken by the authorities”. Evidence of picture of product linked to appellants [100] As stated earlier on, the appellants did try raise a specific point to show that the impugned statements appeared to refer to the appellants. This occurred when the appellants tried, at the stage of the cross examination of one of the respondents’ witnesses, to introduce pictures which appeared in the press statements - specifically in the Harian Metro and the blog articles - of the first respondent who allegedly showed door lever handles claimed to be associated with the appellants. This was objected to by the respondents as it was not pleaded. This objection was upheld by the High Court. [101] This was not even included in the list of issues to be tried. In our judgment, the High Court was correct. We must state that the un- pleaded matter cannot be considered for it has been emphasised many a times that it is a cardinal rule in civil litigation that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded (see the Federal Court decisions in, to name a couple, Giga Engineering & Constructions Sdn Bhd v Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 9 CLJ 537, and Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 944). [102] In particular, in lftikar Ahmed Khan (as the executor of the estate for Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan, deceased) v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd) [2018] 2 S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 42 of 53 MLJ 292, the Federal Court - on the same issue - made the point that a decision based on an un-pleaded issue is liable to be set aside, as follows: “[27] It is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded: Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1, State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490, Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v Maxisegar Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 141; [2009] 6 CLJ 232. In Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 428; [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 239 it was held that where a vital issue was not raised in the pleadings, it could not be allowed to be granted and to succeed on appeal. A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings is liable to be set aside: Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152. In The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 the Federal Court set aside the judgment of the trial judge as it was decided on an issue not raised on the pleadings. In that case the trial judge erred in concluding that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract as well as a claim for libel”. Defence of Justification [103] As the impugned statements have been affirmed not to be defamatory, the need for the respondents to prove their defence becomes irrelevant since only if the elements of defamation have been satisfied by the plaintiff, would the burden then shift to the defendant to prove that the words authored by the latter, alleged to be defamatory, are not defamatory (see Lim Guan Eng v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd [2012] 2 CLJ 619). [104] However for completeness, since the matter was addressed by the High Court, we shall also deal with the defences raised by the respondents, albeit in summary fashion. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 43 of 53 [105] The respondents relied on the defences of justification and qualified privilege. It is trite that the burden of proving these defences rests entirely on the respondents as the defendants. [106] In this regard, for the defence of justification, reference ought to be made to Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 which reads: Justification 8. In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges. [107] It is trite that it is unnecessary to prove the truth of every defamatory allegation if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation. The defendants need only to show substantial justification of the whole defamation, not the truth of every word of the defamation. And the defendant must prove it on the balance of probabilities. [108] We agree with the finding of the High Court that the respondents were entitled to rely on the defence of justification. This is because the impugned statements were factually substantially, if not entirely true when made at the press conference on 15 June 2015, as published. [109] This is especially so considering the indisputable fact that on the date of the publication of the impugned statements, Doretti was the registered proprietor of the relevant trademark under the Trade Mark Act 1976, and further that there was in fact a raid based on the complaint by the then registered proprietor, in pursuance of the investigation carried out S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 44 of 53 by the third respondent into trademark infringement and whether counterfeit products were being produced unlawfully, as well as criminal charges having been filed as a result thereof. The Defence of Qualified Privilege [110] The respondents also relied on the defence of qualified privilege. Two key elements must be shown before one can succeed in relying on the defence of qualified privilege. The first is there is a legal, moral or social duty to make the statement on the one part, and secondly, there is a corresponding interest to receive it on the other part. [111] The British Columbia Supreme Court in PB v RVE [2007] B.C.J. No. 2305 identified four main areas where qualified privileged has been recognised. These are first, the protection of one's own interest; secondly, common interest or mutual concern; thirdly, moral or legal duty to protect another's interest; and fourthly the public interest. The item on 'moral or legal duty to protect another's interest' is relevant here. The Court held that the assessment is that of an objective test, in the following terms: “[344]…..the issue is not whether the defendant had a right to make the communication or thought that he or she had a duty to make it, but rather whether a reasonable person would feel compelled by a duty to make the communication." [112] This in our view accords well with the pronouncement of the Federal Court in the case of Dato’ Dr Low Bin Tick v Datuk Chong Tho Chin & Other Appeals [2017] 8 CLJ 369, as per the following: “[46] Qualified privilege depends on the occasion upon which the communication is made, and not the communication itself. A S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 45 of 53 qualified privilege occasion is an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social or moral to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. If the communication were made in pursuance of a duty or on a matter in which there was a common interest in the party making and the party receiving it, the occasion is said to be one of qualified privilege. Whether an occasion is a privileged occasion depends on the circumstances of each case, the nature of the information and the relation of speaker and recipient. It is for the judge alone to determine as a matter of law whether the occasion is privileged (Adam v. Ward [1917] AC 309; [1916-17] All ER Rep. 157).” [113] It must be emphasised that qualified privilege concerns an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. The privilege attaches to the occasion and not the statement. Further, the element of reciprocity is significant (see also the leading authorities of Abdul Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 1 MLJ 142 and Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd and Others [2001] 2 AC 127). [114] We do not find any flaws in the assertion that in this case, given its facts and cicumstances, the impugned statements were made to fulfil especially the third respondent’s responsibility and to promote and protect the interests of the public. This, we accept, is found in the testimony given by the first respondent, as follows: “Dalam persidangan akhbar yang diadakan, bukan sahaja persidangan akhbar pada 15 Jun itu, malah di lain-lain S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 46 of 53 persidangan akhbar sekalipun yang saya buat, tujuannya adalah untuk memaklumkan tentang tindakan yang kami ambil dan tujuannya adalah untuk memaklumkan bahawa sesuatu perbuatan itu salah dan dalam situ mesejnya adalah untuk mengingati orang ramai supaya sentiasa berhati-hati, jangan mudah tertipu dan kepada pemilik-pemilik harta intelek seperti pemilik-pemilik cap dagang, kami menyatakan bahawa kami bersedia untuk melindungi harta intelek mereka lah. Jadi, itulah peranan kami. Kita nak mewar-warkan kepada orang ramai tentang peranan kami, apa yang kami buat untuk kepentingan pengguna. Kita tak mahulah kalau ada peniaga-peniaga yang tidak bertanggungjawab menjual barang-barang contohnya menggunakan jenama yang terkemuka padahal ia dianggap tiruan dan dijual pada harga yang sama dengan yang, yang asli. Jadi, kita nak ingatkanlah supaya pengguna sentiasa berhati-hati dan juga kepada pemilik-pemilik cap dagangan itu, kita nak memberi mesej bahawa adulah kepada kami dan kami bersedia untuk melindungi harta intelek mereka. Itu gist nya lah.”. [115] In similar vein, in Tan Sri Dato’ Tan Kok Ping, JP lwn. The New Straits Times Press (Malaysia) Bhd & Yang Lain [2010] 3 CLJ 614 the Court held as follows: "[50] Saya bersetuju dengan hujah peguamcara defendan bahawa tujuan pengedaran, penyiaran dan penerbitan berita itu adalah bagi menunjukkan bahawa di negara ini tiada sesiapa yang bebas daripada undang-undang sedia ada, maka ia penting dilaporkan jauh sekali bertujuan untuk mendapatkan sensasi terbit daripada penyiaran berita tersebut, lagi pun saya berpuas hati bahawa laporan itu merupakan laporan kepada perkara yang benar- benar terjadi di mana siasatan polis telah pun mengambil tempat, siasatan sahaja tidak bermakna plaintif dimaksudkan bersalah, ini S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 47 of 53 jelas kerana selepas itu tiada pertuduhan dibuat terhadap plaintif di mana-mana mahkamah”. [116] Now, under the law, once qualified privilege is established, the burden is shifted to the plaintiff to show actual or express malice on the part of the defendant in making the impugned publication, which if proven, defeats the defence of qualified privileged (see Ayob bin Saud v TS Sambanthnamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ(Rep) 321). [117] In the leading case of Raub Australia Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (supra) the Federal Court further clarified the meaning of malice in the following terms: [40] “Malice” has been judicially interpreted by the courts as being reckless, unreasonable, prejudice or unfair belief in the truth of the statement. “Malice” may be established by showing that the defendant did not believe in the truth of what he uttered (see: Horrocks v. Lowe [1974] 1 All ER 662 and Watt v. Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130 at 154, [1929] All ER 284 at 294). [41] As defined in the Osborn’s Concise Dictionary (7th edn.), the word “malice” means: Ill-will or evil motive: personal spite or ill-will sometimes called actual malice, express malice or malice in fact. In law an act is malicious if done intentionally without just cause or excuse. So long as a person believes in the truth of what he says and is not reckless, malice cannot be inferred from the fact that his belief is unreasonable, prejudiced or unfair (Horrocks v. Lowe [1972] 1 WLR 1625). S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 48 of 53 [42] In law, an act is malicious if done intentionally without just cause or excuse. So long as a person believes in the truth of what he says and is not reckless, “malice” cannot be inferred from the fact that his belief is unreasonable, prejudiced or unfair (see: Anne Lim Keng See v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Anor And Other Appeals [2008] 6 CLJ 697; [2008] 3 MLJ 492, Horrocks v. Lowe (supra).”. [118] It is of interest to refer to the case Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Tan Sri Norian Mai & Ors [2013] 3 MLJ 110 where the first defendant, who was then the Inspector General of Police was sued, among others, for defamation for the press statement he had issued at a press conference on the arrest of the defendants who were said in the statement to have been involved in violent or aggressive militant activities capable of overthrowing the government. [119] The High Court in that case ruled that (not unlike the present case) the first defendant had the legal duty to issue the press statement to inform the public about matters affecting public interest. The Court in addressing the defence of qualified privilege stated thus: “[93] The first defendant as the IGP, the highest- ranking officer in the police force is endowed with the powers under the Police Act 1967, amongst others, to enforce the laws, crime prevention and be responsible for the security of the country. Seen in this context, in my view, it is not only the first defendant's privilege but also, he has a legal duty to make the press statement to members of the press at the press conference to inform the general public/community at large in Malaysia on matters affecting public interest and concern in the country”. S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 49 of 53 [120] However, the defence of qualified privilege failed (unlike in this case before us) because of the finding by the High Court of the presence of malice on the part of the first defendant. The Court in that case held as follows: “[100] Bearing in mind the matters stated, it has been shown none of the allegations hurled at the plaintiffs by the first defendant as contained in the press statement and which the first defendant caused to be published as per the 'berita' in the respective newspaper were true; this implies malice on the part of the first defendant. In the circumstances I find there is proof of malice which vitiates the defence of qualified privilege”. [121] Now, in the instant case before us, we find no error in the finding of no malice by the High Court given that the contents of the impugned statements are essentially neutral in its choice of words and did not contain unnecessary language or aspersions. There was no mention of the appellants nor was it followed up with news on the prosecution of the appellants. The overarching theme was plainly that the matter concerning whether the seized PYRO items were counterfeit was still under investigation. The statements were made professionally by the third respondent in its capacity as the enforcement agency responsible for the matter in a neutral and not partial manner, by demonstrating the work they had undertaken and in order to protect the public. [122] We thus find the High Court was not in error when it concluded that there was no malice, in the following manner: “[107] I also do not find any form of malice on the part of the Defendants to negate the right to rely on the defence of S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 50 of 53 qualified privilege. I do not find any evidence of malice either expressly or due to recklessness that could be attributed to the Defendants. The statements were made by the Defendants and their officers as part of their duties to the public”. Claim of Malicious Falsehood [123] We should also address albeit in summary fashion the appeal against the decision of the High Court which had dismissed the appellants’ claim for malicious falsehood against the respondents. [124] It is of interest to appreciate that both defamation and malicious falsehood claims are mentioned in the Defamation Act 1957, in particular in its long title which states to be an Act relating to the law of libel and slander and other malicious falsehoods. Both claims essentially concern the publication of false statements. A key distinction between the two however is that in a malicious falsehood claim the statement in question does not have to bear a defamatory meaning. Another is non- necessity of proving damage to reputation. It is essential that the statements in question are published with improper motive or malice, and also that it has caused actual financial loss. [125] As Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) explained in SV Beverages Holdings Sdn Bhd & Ors v Kickapoo (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2008] 4 CLJ 20 malicious falsehood and libel are distinct torts. In the former, the burden of proof that the words are false, malicious and calculated to damage the plaintiff is on the plaintiff. In the latter however, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the statement is false, because the law presumes that in his favour, that it is false and malicious. It is for S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 51 of 53 the defendant writer to prove that the statement is true or the comment fair, in order to succeed in his defence. [126] Other than clarifying the meaning of “malice” as set out earlier, the Federal Court in Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd (supra) also usefully and concisely explained the elements of malicious falsehood in the following terms: “The Law on Malicious Falsehood [39] In order to establish a claim under malicious falsehood, it is trite law that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the following elements: (i) that the defendant published about the plaintiff words which are false; (ii) that the words were published maliciously; and (iii) that special damage followed as the direct and natural result of the publication. (see: Tan Chong & Son Motor Co Sdn Bhd v. Borneo Motors (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 296; [2001] 3 MLJ 140; Ratus Mesra Sdn Bhd v. Shaikh Osman Majid & Ors [1999] 8 CLJ 499; [1999] 3 MLJ 529; Kaye v. Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (EWCA))”. [127] We agree with the finding of the High Court that the appellants had failed to discharge the burden that the statements were false. The appellants failed to show that the impugned statements are false or that the respondents had maliciously made such statements against the appellants, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, especially given the reason for the first and third respondents to have S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 52 of 53 made the press conference as authorities responsible for the subject matter of counterfeit consumer goods. [128] Furthermore, it certainly cannot be said that the respondents had recklessly made the impugned statements and there is no evidence to even suggest that they did not believe in the truth of the statements. [129] As the claim for malicious falsehood was not made out, it was as such correctly dismissed by the High Court. Conclusion & Decision [130] In conclusion, in light of the foregoing analysis and reasons, we are of the view that there are no appealable errors in the judgment of the High Court to warrant our intervention. We are satisfied that the learned trial judge certainly cannot be said to be plainly wrong in dismissing the appellants’ claims of defamation and malicious falsehood against the respondents. We accordingly affirm the Order of the High Court and dismiss this appeal, with costs of RM30,000.00 to the respondents. 17 January 2024 -signed- MOHD NAZLAN MOHD GHAZALI Judge Court of Appeal Putrajaya, Malaysia S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 53 of 53 For the Appellants Damian Kiethan & Nurul Hanani Azamuddin (Messrs Raj, Ong & Yudistra, Kuala Lumpur) For the Respondents Zetty Zurina Kamarudin SFC & Safiyyah Omar FC (Attorney General’s Chambers, Putrajaya) S/N pjIyAujnkWIlG09HHBXg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-25-354-12/2020

PEMOHON MAXIS BROADBAND SDN BHD RESPONDEN MENTERI KEWANGAN MALAYSIA PENCELAH Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri

Judicial Review- Mandamus - Seeking for order for Minister of Finance to give direction to DGIR to set aside or exempt Notice of Additional Assessment deemed served on the Applicant - Non reply or non- response of Minister to Applicant's letter - Whether section 135 of ITA impose legal duty on Minister to make decision - Whether Applicant circumvented and failed to exhaust domestic remedy i.e SCIT under ITA.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

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E1 29/on/202: 15:aa-51 mum mmxnranx TINEGI MALAVA nu xuau LUIAPUR mum wuuvm PERSEKUYUAN KLIALA mm-un, muvsu (anuauau KUASLKUASA musy Pggmonoruu am: sgn_m<Au KEHAKIMAN 39 flA»25~35l-IZIZIIZD Damn psmava suam pemmm mg lalah amuax kepada Respenflan manuml Seksyen 135 an Seksyen mm) Am Cukm Pemtaulun ms? yang benankh 23:: mo Dan mm mm. Aluun 5: Kzndzhrkaedah Mahkamah 2012 Amara ruxna aaomamn snN sun Pemomn Dan MEIHERI KEWANGAN MALAVSIA Rssponasn Dan KEYLIA wzusuun rusn. mum nzrssm Funcshh Jndlmont Imroducnnn 1 The Apphcanl an M22020 med an apnllcauon «or leave to commence Judicial review pmceedmg {Enclosure 1) under Order 53 01 ms Rmes av cmm 2:112 (ROC) snaking mxer aha, me voIIawmg— »...m :2 sm vpluavnxunannzcxwxwvn mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 1 1 An order lor tne Respondent to exemlss tts power under Secllon 135 and/or searton 12713A) ol tne Income Tax Act 191:7 (ITA) to set aslde oraxerrrot ttte tnlenu Revenue Eoard‘s (ma) dsclslon In trre torrn ot Notroes olmidtllnnal Assessment tor the years oiassessmenl (us) 2016 and 21:17 tor me total sum or RM 140,054,144 as all dated t7112o2o on the gruunds lhal ttre satd Notrees o1 Additlonal Assessment were tllegat, Void, unlawtul and/or m excess ot almtorlly. had been rrrational and/or unreasonable. and resulted ln a dame: ot tne Applicants Ieglltmale expectallartst 1 2 A neclaralron tnat Ihe Respondent ls bound by and shall glve effed |o tne dectsion etttre Federal court tn Dlnclol-Gcnurnl ot lnland Revenue \1. Raltyat taerlaya sdn Bhd [1 sea] 1 MLRA zal; [IBM] 1 CLJ(RIp)10B;[19lA] 1 ML! 24: tttat a taxpayer IS entttled to organlze rts atlatrs H1 stlen a way as to mtnlmlze tax. 1 3 A Deetaratton 1tta1 tne Respondsrtl ls bound by and snarl gtve ettect to tne dectston cllhe court ofAppeal V7 Sahall Berjaya son and y Kama Parrgarstt ua I nalam Nlgori [1999] 1 MLRA :25, (199913 CLJ 531: [N99] 3 MAR 3264- [199913 MLJ 145 and tttts l-lonoumole Courl tn Ensm Gem M) sdn and y. Katua F-ngnuh ltasll nalam Nlgurl (No. 25101- nslzalzlt that sectton 14011 t of tne ITA ts nutappllcable wnere a tax advantage ts denved lmm an actual outlay or exoendrlure wtnon reduces the tax hablmy tn ctlcumslances ln wnrcn me taxtng statute alwords a reduclton tn tax ltaartrty, and I 4 A Deolaratron tnat ttre Rasponderu ls bound by and snall give eflecl lo lhe declslorl at true Honourable court in Pun ntcttscat Power Bhd v. Ketua Pengaratt Haall nalam Nagarl (2|‘lI2) Msrc 30-1145 and Katua Plngarah Null nalarn Noueri v. OKA Concrulo lnduslrlu sdn End [2015] Marc 30-091 tltat me was ttas no autttonty to dtotate now a taxpayer sttoulu conduct tls buslrtess and a Iaxnayer ls at lts own llberly to mnduct tts busrness wlltt all available means to make good pmfll and to mvllga|e nrs lncldence oltax. 1 5 that all lurttter proceedings tneludtng the enloroernerrt and effect ol the salt! N s ol Addittonal Assessmertl he stayed unltl tne lull and lrnal deterrrttnatton oltne aopllcatlon In quasn the salt‘! Nallces omddtttonal Assessmanlt me 2 9111 rrl lpILla'maDn:AnEGxlxsKvn «not. s.n.r taamharwlll be u... ta mm r... nflmnallly am. dnuuvlartl n. aFlt.lNG war Can for the Honourable Atwmey General and Intervener n The teamed Fedemt Counsel (FC) to: the Honourable Allamey Generat and learned Revsnue ceunset (RC) (or the tntervener raisad a stnuter preltmtnary obtecliun (P0) The P0 was premtwed on the fonowtng grounds . to No Dectsten, Ant at Omission was made by the Respondent (Mtntsler of Ftnannet under Order 53 or the ROC: tn) The Names of Assessment mused hy DGIR who was not named as a party to s ectton; (m) The Appltcam rettet In eviecx a menaemus however the Apattcant fatten In establish Ieget duty; (W) secuons 1:5 and I27|3A) of the ITA do not have nexus to set aside the Name a1Assessment tssuea by DG\Rt (vj Aaphcartl ctrcunwentea and «em to exhaust the domsshc remedy crowded urtde1lhelTA The aectatnn of the Conn 12 twttt new deal with the P05 reused by the teamed FC and RC No Decisiun. Actor anti:-ton was made bylho Respondent (Mtntmr nf rtnence) under order 53 of the ROC 13 one: 53 Rure 2(4) at the ROC expressly allows persons who are *at1versety aflacled“ by the aectston made by e pubttc euthonty to Inmiite Judictal review appltcahons FD? eaee 0' reference. subrute 4 ts reproduced as vouows 14) Any persurt who I5 advuvuiy enema by the demon‘ ncltort Or amtssrun VII rstahon to the axe/use al the pump uuty tr vunettun shan be entmed lo mskl the lbmtcalton‘ v... tt 1:! 12 m vpeuemuuemeeuxswe “Nun: s.n.t ...n.mm .. med u may t... mh.u-y mm. dnuavtnnl VI .nuua Wm! 1A L5 15. 17 15 The requwremenws at Order 53 oflhe ROG are manaalmy and must be cumplwed wwlh, wawwwng whwoh me appwwcaoan would now be enlenawned by me com we learned FC and RC submwl lhal me Responaenn has made nu den: n lhal ws amenable to wudwcwaw vevwew and that (he App:-cam s app|Ica| rw ws premature wx ws In say mat lhe Responaenrs non» Iepwy to me Appwwcanrs letter does nu| amount in a decision amanable to wudlcwal vevwew under Order 53 cf me R00 u us We waw max failure or retusaw by e pubwwc aulhorwly |u make a decwsworw ws nwso amanabwe to wdwcial revwew In Onngu iadurlo\AnI v. Kenn Fengarah Nasll Dalarn Nagcri [2o1a] MLRHU 155: [ms] 1 Lus 334: [2013] IIILJII 215. Azlzah Nawaww J (now JCA) ned awwuwed the weave appllcalwon and nad slated mat: - '[w 41 on me same day, nu lppllcanl also wmte to me new sming as up: pumon mt pwsunnl m Arlwcla wx ul um M:layua—Denm:wK an anu the me waws, pay-nems received by my apvwlcam «nun Wwra Swwre are no! sumecl m wlmrwoldwng vzx mnennme, me appwnmrwl reiterated thaw Amcle IX Mme Mawaysnarbanmark on prevails over 5 4A (m) at lhewTA1957 me applicant also -xprixlly mm m on mm mat at my new run: to amend «muuawy lo mu nppucunn repnsemltinn um Ippul. Ihen me app: m will mm . s appull and nmunuuon .. bclug n]Ic1od by Inn DGIR. us} wmn me new Vawls Io mspom to In: awwwennw. leucv dmzd 2912 zme |heappwIcan|1akes me pasmon um me rxsuz ; waliu amen 29 wz zma 5 me decmun 0! me new and deemed m be have been served on me Bpvlwcnnl an 2912917 no-nu, tn. Ivhllunt lllnd mu .ppncauon fouufllclal mm. nation.” (emphasws added) It Is Important |u nula (ha! Order 53 cl [ha ROC alwaws (ova broader scope or revwawabwe use ions as compared lo the prevwaus pvovwsions under me Ruwes at the Hwgn Own 1930 A decwswen deemed mnde by {he Respnndenl ws sulficuanl In wrIwIwI|8 an applwcaharw for wdwcwal rev" w In Ting Km. Him a. On (supra) the Conn 07Appeaw held‘ - 1301 me one! polrn raised by waamad cuurwwi nevme us‘ mn var wess mnfrflerwce nsmauhera was here r\o‘dec|srnn“ byanyone Ana Since 0 5: v 2<nw ipcaki ow a -eeamn mu npplwcinlx nm nu um ho but n ma sm wpmavvxunannzaxwxswn «we. sm-w mnmrwwww .. H... e may he mwnnwwuy -mnwn mmn VI nrwuwwa vtmxw argue on an appucauon vnquamax rsvxsw Nwm, I ciunut agree 0. 5: : 2(4) mun not could ma-onmn n muslbc mu eamm..::y, Iugolhnrwim o 5: 7. ans; whsch pmwdes 151) mm Iuh-mln n ma lagulhuvanfl In Mr proporconlnxl, um bu nun um Inn: need nu alntys bu In lulu! docixioll by mum. (amphasxs added) 19. I named that me High com nas adopted a smxar pnsmon m anowmg judicial review against deemed aecumns made by pubhc aumnrmes Vn «ms regard‘ the High Court has dechneu to rely on older decwsions me! were premised upon order 53 Rule 214) onne Rmes of Hugh cam case, where me arm or re»/Iewab\e declsxans Is hunted. 20 I can pmwde no beusr reference lhan me case of lmpl-In salon Sdn Bhd v. M-m-ri Kvwlngun MI y [znzz] MLJU 3479 [2022] my zoza wherein my learned bmmen Wan Ahmad Farid J held as loHows — 1211 The Veamed Semuv Fedevm Course! attracted my allsrmon «a ma wmvug/and mar and relarmd an to ma mgmema: me Court ov Auneav Abdm Rahman hm Abdmlah Munwa Gnu Dam Ezndzrkumz Lumcur a Alvm [man] 5 ML! 704 CA rm lelmnd src cm. unmnua mu m. Mmun noumspom in mi mpuqmd I-um dun um msmuu a umsim. mm the meamng ov a 53 r 244; In sum. me Veamed src nmtendad m my Inemnl In canvsn a deemod u C! on" would ulve an in nu artificial munmu In the wow daemon." pa; wun respect one should Ippvoichlhl umsnon on mus soecmc Vssue m Ancm Rihman hm Abduuah Mumv wan caution My reasnn .5 ml: nu ducvllnn ul me Count of Apnlll is pmmua on o 53 7 21:) of IV: urmlr Rulu MNIDVI Coun1lID.\umu .muow. . Any person MI: rs gammy awncxed by me aemsms av any publw: 1ulhomysha|\ be sawed m make me appmm. However, on nlw a 5: r 2(4) 0! lm RDC pruvvflas as Imlmn . Any pom... mm Advil:-Iy .n-ma um. duc|Ilon.Ic|lon or omission vn relalmn to ma musnca or me pubhc my or lunohun shall 5: anmlsd to make me appflmlmn p... 1: n! n sm Vpluavwxunannzaxwxswn «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [291 my new 0 5: r any of nnn non: ha mnaa me puns. "dociiinn. mnon or nmlulon nn 1 nnunn ma xlxhncl uilhu publlc dnny or lunclion -- M myvnew in: mm: nmnximn Ilxlmplya n-annnm In links a mnannn. II n n namucnanau. wmn me lnlroducllon ohm ward “omll on” in mu m o 5: 7 am. an qnmnnon a! In --an ul dscluon" anus nan lungernilt.“ [30] Thu omnulon on nnn—6:r:lsicn,nu my mind‘ 1: amovuhle bopmlcnal :. In. nn zamn hm Ha;nNas<run1flnn V The Regnslmv an Sncneuas [201 21 MLJU new we :pD\n:aN amahea (or regnsualran an nuxna wndevlvva souannes AL1 was The flecwun to Iagnster or an-nenwnse ns mnnm me dnscrslsorn Mme Rsgnslrxr undarnhe Sooelnes M11956 Yhe Regnurnr ns truamed by me Soaelnes Ad in wrmdev ms apnnncauon and make a daemon Hawmr, Ins Rewnslmr um um na maka a ducnsnon — one way nrlhe other Ravmmrarn Paramagum no {now Join) nena man nn my onnnnon. nu. nnordnnale am oarnlnnunna delay wvlmul quad vealon nu ma nnslarnl case ns eqwanam In navnuan no make a decnsnnn As me apphcanl has iuM:nenHegI!nmurI11nMm duty olnhe Rsgnslrarlo make a flennsnon an 015 aupucamrn w regslev PAKAR. n hold Wm 01: nsfusan na make a docmcm .. nn\aMu\ and nuns was the Saclzhax Act was nempnasns added) an (See Syarikat nopasn Sdn Bhd v. Mu. orl Kowangan Mllaysla and other can: [2021] AMEJ D471: [2023] MLJU 525: on an Agllcullun (mnnym) Still and v. M-nmn Klwlngln Mullylln mm] A AMR as , 2013) MLJU 4: . c) cum nnmnmom Lm v. unemarn Kownngun Mllaysln [20:21 MLJU Mo) 21 Based on me above, .1 Is evident man Ihe Resnondenfs deemed aacnsnun 0! 30.11 zozu aris g «mm nls rIon»reD\y Io me Apphcarnfs nenner can be amenable no jumcnan revnew under Order 53 Rule 214) onnne R00 22 Therefuve, this Court does non agnee with me ccn|srnlnan of lime learned so and RC on nms abjeclnon. v... u an :2 am Vv'UE‘mxDn:AnE5xnxsKvn “Nana smnn nuvnhnrwm a. U... a may n... anwn-y am. dnuuvnml Vfl nrnunna v-man The Nation of Assassmonn raised by nu DGIR who was non named an a party to Ihls action 23 The learned FC argued nnan by nol namnng nne Dena In nne presenn sun ns nndeed vrwalnus and vexanaue because nne subnecl mallar renanes no nne assessmenn ranaeu by the DGIR Hence. nne assessmem by nne Dom Is «he decnsnon nnan nne Apphcann ns dnssatnsfled wnlh 24 However‘ pursuant m an order 01 nms Courl dated 152 mm me DGIR nas been auuwau no mnervane as an nnnervenar nn |hn5 nudncnan revnew applncanmn under Order 53 Rule 5 07 me ROC Therefore‘ I vnew man the neamed FC s obnecnorn ns a ncumssue and has became academnc Th Anpllcnnl hn mm - mind-mul. Howe nnnno Appllclnl 1 ed In astablnsh Inga: auny 25 The neamed FC umecled man we Applncanl 5 non enmneu to a renier to compel me Respondent nu sen asnde me Name 01 Addnlronal Assessmann nssued by Dena aanau nmn 2020 as me Respondent has no nagan du|y to do so 25 The Feuaran coun in Minnmr av Fnnnnco, Gomnnn-nn ol Saball v. Potrajasa sdn Bhd[20031 4 MLJ 541; [zoos] 5 cu 121:[2ooa1 1MLRA 105‘ new man an order o1 mandamus can be granned euner: (a) under secnnan 44 ofnhe speufic Re\ieVAL':I1950(SRA): or my me auumanan powers 0! (he Hngh Courl pmvnded by paragraph 1 Mme scnedune no nne cauns auudncanure Acn 1964 (CM) 27 In Is also no be noned than Order 53 Rune 112) ornne RDC pmvmes man |hIs Order (0. 53; ns subpem no me pmvnsnons o!Chap(erVlllo1 Pan 2 of nne SRA me as m: ru rpruemeuameenxswe «mu sane! nuvnhnrwm be u... m my .. anmnannly mm: dnuumnl Vfl arnum v-man 25. Therefore, any appnaaman var an order or manaamus mane by way no ;ud1cIa\ renew proceedings must comply wnn me requirement of Sechon 4.: ol une SRA. 29. seamen 44 0! the SRA mads as Iouows ‘ENFORCEMENT or ruauc nuns: Fowur boamnv public urvanls am on»... us. do cumin Ipuclllc am 44 m A Judge may mnku an my nqumng any spaafin an In bu noun 0! mama, by any person hmdmg a pubhc umoe. wnemer cl a permanent nr a Itmpoviry rurun. m by any znnpovamn av any mun wboudmalu In Inc Hwgh Conn Pmwded lhnl-— 1:] an appncanon Var such in man In madv by scum penal: whasa property. Vvancmse‘ or personal ngm would be wruurked by me vomaanng m dumg 3| the case may as. or me an»: lpacmc :51. (11) mm domg ouomeanng Vs. Imdev any Vawmvme me bemg m lame. cllanylncumbenlon me Darwmzvuoun m m or :15 nubhc anarauan own the cnrporzmon m ns oorpnrale chamnler. (c) m the opvmon U! the Judge nna Gama arlomeanng Vs mnsnnam Ia mam Ind Mm. (aw M5 applxam has no amer Ipemfic and aasquaxe Vega! remedy. and (3; me remedy gwen by me ameranplrm ramu be 500191919 427 Nonnmg m W5 seclm sh.nH {redeemed m amhanze a Judge- mm make any order hmdmg on on ‘(any uwenuan Agxma‘ my in nuke any urdavon any servanl at any Govlmmsnl m Mahywa. as such. meve\y In enema me sa||s1ac1mn ov a emu upon «nu Govemmnnt, m (c; In mlka any alder wmcn us mum... axpmary excluded by any law corms wrla bemg .n lame‘ an. In Koon Hal Chow v. Fmam smgn [1012] I MLJ nus; mm I MLRH 491, snanna .I [as ne then was) had oullmed fnur prerequisites essenlm la the Issue at an order under semen 44 of ms SRA or a mandamus D259 xi at u an varuamuu.nnzanxswu «mm. san-1 lunhnrwm a. U... a my me nrW\n|U|y mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm‘ 31. 32. 33 35 (t) whether the Apohcartt has a dear and specific Iegat right to the rettet sought, tn) whether there ts a duty trnposed bylaw on the Respondents: (my whether such duty a at an tmperalwa nnntstenet ehereater rrwalvmg no judgment or dtscreltort on the pan ot the Respondents, and (tv) whether the Appltcant has any remedy. other than by way at mandamus, tor the enforcement otthe right whtch has been dented to htm Based on the ease, V1 order to Issue the order ot mandamus. the Apptteent must show nu| onty that he hes a tegat rrght to have the act oertornted out that the nght ntust oe so dear, specmc, and weH denrted as to he tree trorn any reesonahte controversy The order csrvtnl he issued when the nghl rs douhttut or is a qualified one or where i| depends upon an tssue oi fad to he detemwled by the Respondent The tarture to Shaw the extslence ot any tegat nght to oernper the pertorrnenoe ot a tegat duty cast upon the Respondent ‘MU deny the order or mandamus Another rrnponent hurdte lhI| needs to be crossed hy the Appltcaru for an order of mandamus V5 to show that there ts a duty trnoosed by law on the Respondent. tn the aosenoe ot such tegat duty, the mandamus shat: not he agamsl the Respondent Oamtng hackle the tests In the present case, I find that the Appttcant seeks an order to cantoet the Respondent (MWsIer ot Ftnance) to set-astde the Name or Addthonat Assessment dated t7 tt.2u2o. The ouestton ts whether a tegal duty extsts tor thts Courl to grant a mandamus. I find that the retiet sought by the Apphcant ts Ilke mandamus LE to oornpet the Respondent to exerctse tts power under sectton 135 and/or seetton t27(3A) Mme ITA H must he home In rnrnd that the power is dtscrettonary and the Respondent has the hbeny to exercise tls power wtthout oetng tdroed to do so Moreover, the eterrt n ottex sought by the Aophcanl cannot be gtyen wtthout constdermg an the reteyent teots and documents ot the case The approach |aken by the Apphcant to as rt the »...n mu rn vpmavvxrmannzaxtxswn «mu. s.n.t luvthnrwm be u... a may r... unnnnu MW: dnunvtmt VI erturta p-mat Respondent nas nu uplron other than to agree and abide by me Appln:anrs raques| 36 Tnerelore l| 45 tne respectlul vlew ettnls calm that lhere is no legal duty la b rrnpused on me Respondent under any law hence lne Applicant ls nol enlrttee to compel lne Respondem lo set uses a Notice M Addltlonal Assessment lssued by DGVR dated 17 I1 2u2o reason belrlg Respondent nas no legal duty to sel aslde me Name 0! Assessment under me me Stctionl 135 Ind 1Z1(3A] ed the In use nul tun noxus to t uluu the Notice of Assoasmunt Issued by Ina DGIR 37 Tne DGIR ls empowered byme ITAIo rarse tne assessments and me Applrcant ls lrylng to quash lne sera assessment by enlorclng tne Respondent lo axerclse rxs dlscrellonary powers under sealer. 135 and Secilan 12713A)oi|he VTA wnrcn pmvldes as lullows - was wmr la! Mlnlnu to pin flincllcm In Dinner emrsl rns Mmlsler may we lo tne Dlrccluv ssnersl uulsclnonsal a general enaraerer lnanneensrstent wnn lhss mlasm ln. sxsvclse ovtne Iumnms ollhe urreemr General undev tnu An and tne Dlreclar Geneml snsll glvs aflecl lo any dlreamns an glx/an’ as Secllnn 127(3A)uHhe [TA reads as Iollnws ~ Exlmptlnn lmm lax: general ‘ml The Mrnrster may ln any parllculzr ease exempl any person trmn all ol any nl Ina pmvtnarl at me An, arlnsr generally er ln rupncl no .ny lnwme Ma panlcularklnd or any class or lnmme of a Dalllcularkl 39 Upon readlng Secllon 135 and Secliurl 127(3A)0HheITA. I find tnat trotn provlslorls carry me ward ‘may wnlcn clearly shwws that me Respondent hasa screuen on wnetner lo exerolsa as power or not under those said sectlorls and therefore, the Applicant cannot compel the Respondent rl tne Respondent cnooses not In do so. AD. The word ‘may’ connate a namnrandalery nature as rellected ln tne ease of Lock Wu Kock y. ulerrteri Hal Etrwal Dalam Nsgeri & Anar [1993] 4 cu 21:; [I993] 3 Mu M11; HD9311 MLRA 463; [1 59:] 2 AMR 3289 where the man supreme Oman held ltnet, - n... 1: D4 n rn lpluavwxnnannzfixlxwvn «me s.nn nuvlhnrwm be UIQG a may r... nflnlnsllly unn. dnuuvlml Vfl .nenn v-mxl -tst me stgntfrcance at mm a provtstort tn the tnterpretaton an wrtt mmam the lsgnt dvnlnun I always oarrttne me use at tn. wore -r II’ to II: rrraneatory un rt covthntn to e It“ :4 mo won‘! -my which dmolu a plmusllnn er discretion" tempnasts added) 41. Gulng by the ptern raadlng M Sacltons 127(3A| or 135 orthe ITA, t am at the vtew that no nght was gtven to the Aopttoant etther to ask av (West the Resaonoent to exempt the assessment rarseo try me new out tnlrleadt rt ts purely the dtmreltnn power at the Respondent |a exerctse or not 42 Yhis Cmm ts ot the Vlew tnat tr Pafltamenl tntenos to on so‘ Parttarnent wiH state mat the Appltcant may make the appttoatton to the Respnndertl or the Respcrtdanl may issue tnstructipns to the DGIR on the Appttcanrs apptteatton Theretore, the secltun must be read otatnty as tegtslated by the Fartrament 43 tn tnterprettng such plovtstons, which are ptear and tmambtguous tn meaning lhts Honourabte court has ponsrstenuy here that such pmvlstons should be grven tnerrp naturatand Drdtnary meanrng. 44 Further, our superior Cams hava hate that tn rntarprettng sta|u\nry provtstons, the courts should merety gtve attest lo the laws enacled by Parttarnent aha snouto not usurp the leglslilrve tunctron by extentttng a statute In meal a case lat whtch provtsron has otearty and unaoutrtedty no| been made 45 Based on the above, ttus court agrees wttn the suhmtsston otthe tearneo FC and RC that seottons 1:5 and t27(3A) ml the ITA do not have nexus to set astde the Nouoe at Assessment tsslled by the DGIR. ‘nu Aapllclnl otrcurrmnt amt tuned to exhaust the dorrrutte romody pro d undo! (hr mt 46 It ts a tact not dtsputett tha| the Appttcant chaltengett tn the term at Noltoe olAddi\Icna\ Assessment dated 17 1t 2020 on the Apnttcant tor ‘(As 2016 and 2017 ratseo by the DGIR Dal: I! M 12 ru n.ruarr.uuartnzaxtxsxve «rue s.r.t luvthnrwm be mad a may r... utrn.nr MIMI dnunvtmt VI .nuue vtmxt 47 Tns Applleanl belng dlssatlsfied and aggrieved hy an assessmenl In me sald nohoes snellm make an appeal lo the speclal COMHIISSVOVVSIS ol Income Tax (SCIT) in! delermlnahon The 1157!! to appeal ls crowded undev Secllorl 99 mne rm AB. The Appllcanl had vls|ead shon Ollcull and1akerl a shoncul lp deal wlm me addlhanal asysssmenl valsad by me DGIR lhrcugh me judlaal revlew applleallon against me Respandenl 4a SWO! me Anphcam had iiraady med Form cl lo appeal |o me saw, me appllcallon lor lualclal review by me Appllpanl is fnvoluus. vexauaus and an abuse pl ms process 0! the calm Relemng le lne case M1: wu Rualty sun Bhd v. Dlroctor Gonorll o1 Inllnd Rwvtnun [2004] 1 MLRM 154: 121104] 5 cu alla: [29114] 4 MAR 521; [zonal s MLJ 5:, me cpun refused lne appllcallon cm leave lor lualclal revlew and held lnal 1:0] Flmher 1 am also at me vlsrw ma! me concurrent ilima M lne mslanl apphcahorw nun lpplllzanls appeal Debra lne Soeclal Commlsslenevs cenalnly Oflnslllulz a duvllclly pr proceadmgs and ls mesa irwolous vexahmls and an abuse pllne pmoess pnne calm ‘ so There are numerous cases an lms quesllon olwnelrler an Appllcanl slmulu exnausl me aomesllc remedy avallaple belore maklng an appllcallun lar lualclal nevlew cases have decldsd lhal lna Appllcanl is nol enllllea lo lmhale a lualelal VEVWEW pmceedlng agalnsl me Responaenl as me Appllcanl naa lallea In exhaust the slaluloryappaal procedure avallaple. (See Kolul Fongulh Hull Dallm Nag v. Alcal-I Luconl Maluyxll sdn Bhd 3. Anor [2017] 1 MLRA 251, [2011] 2 CLJ 1; R017] 1 MLJ 553: Oriental Assembler Sdn am: V. Melllen Kewangan A Anal [2015] MLRHU nu; [2013] 1 ms 115; 1- Wu Rally sun arm 1/. Kulun Pellgar-ll Hull nalam Negeri a. Anur [2003] 2 MLRA151: [2009] 1 ILR1:[2D04]4AMR 521; [zoos] 5 cu z35:|2noe]1 MLJ 555 (com :4 Appeal); Robln Tln Pnng mug v. Knlua Puugnuh Kusauun sum}. Malaysia .1. Anor [2010] 1 MELR 61; [2010] 2 MLRA 511; [2010] 9 CL! 5115; [N11] 2 MLJ 457). 51 Based on the abeve, (NS Court 15 6101: Vlew |ha( the Appllcarlfs applisalmn for luuielal revlsw ls pnenlamle The law provlds furan avenue la appeal \o be exnauslea ml before me sen pursuam In Sacllan 99 M me ‘TA 1»... 19 M x: m VpIL1E7‘1xDn:AnEExlXSKVG “Nair s.n.l nuvlhnrwm be .1... M my 1... nflnlrlnfllli MW: dnuuvlnnl VII nFluNG Wm! 1 a That all necessary and oonsequenttat dlrecllons and orders be gwen. I 7 That ttre costs at this appllcallan be costs VII the cause: and 1.5 All other and runner relrel whlch trus Honourable ceun deems rlt and nroper 2. In essence, the Appltcanl filed the appllcauun for leave ID commence Judlclal renew agalrlst the Honourable Menlarl Kewangan Malaysre (Respondent) seeklng vannus relleds, among others, on order tor me Respondent to exerclse ms powers under Sec1lonl35 and/or Sectlon 12713A)o1thelTAto exempt the Notlces 0! Addltlcnal Assessment tor vm ms and 2017 all dated I7.H 2020 (lhl NDHGBI] ralsed by the Dlrbclov General 57 Inland Revenue (lnlnrvonlr). 3 Allev the hearlng, \ dlsmtssed the App|lCan|‘s appllcallon for leave to oummence Iudlclal ravlew (Enclosure H I wlll rlmv set out the grounds lor my ueorsron Background Facts 4 The background lacls nfthls case are extracted from lne statement wltn sultable moamcetlon and are as lollows. » 4 1 The Anpllmnt a pnvate eornoeny lrrnned by snares Incorporated on 12.2 I992‘ where one OI me prlnclpal actlvllles onne Aypllcanl lsta pmvide a lull sulta ulcanverged teleoornrnunicatlons, drgnel and related semoes end solutlunsr and corporate and servings funworls to Its haldlng comparttes and fellow subsldlalles wllhln me Maxls Group 4 2 on 2.12.2015, me Appllcanl entered lnlo Euslness sale and Purcnase Agreements wrlh tour or as lellow sutaslalanes. Ma Moblle Senllces sun land, Mexls Mohlle Sdn Bhd, Mexrs lntematronsl son and and Mzxts collectlens Sdn EM tsulllnu Camplnin) to acqutnr the bustnesses and urlderlaktngs oltne selling cornpanles. me a om rn rpruerr.eosnnzenxswe “Nair s.n.l luvlhnrwm s. UIQG e may r... mn.u-y mm: dnuavlnnl VI nFlt.lNa vtmxl conclusion 52 Fremxsed on me aroresam reasons, 1 am of me mew mat me Appncanrs appucamun lcr leave to commence ]ud\c|a| revxew us mvolous ena vexalmus and an arms: process 0! me cam, 53. As such‘ 1 dismissed the Apphcenrs appncauon for leave to commence judicial rewew (Enclusure 1) mm cos|s ov RM2.50D.O0 |e me Hannurabla Anarney Genera! and Imervener wnhoux me anocacorlee Dated: 941 January 2024 Ahmad Kama) um Md Shamd Judge Hwgh Cnurl Kuara Lumpur p... x: n! u m vymzvvxunannzaxwxswa «mm. smuw ...m.mm .. U... m may he mn.u-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Counsul: Far the Apphcanl For the Honourable Attorney General Put me Vnxsrvenev m vvmavvxrmannzaxwxswn «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! En s Saravana Kumar [OAK Llm Chvnn Wev (PDK) with my Teluan Rash Daman Saravana Pannersnip, Peguambaxa dam Paguammra, Law 15, Menara 1 Dulamas‘ Solans mamas, Nu 1,JaIan Dulamas 1. 50430 Kuala Lumpur (Rm. ruan: RDS/SKSINH/2021/0441) cm Krishna Pnya A/P venugupax, Fedem Counsel‘ Jaba|an Peguam Negara. Bahaglan euaman, 45‘ Perslaran Peruana. Fvesinl 4, 52100 Punrqaya cm Suram Bum: Che Ismau, Revenue Counse\ (En Alhan Fans Ammerry Bin Hussein, Revanue Counse\ wnn her), Lembaga Hasu Dalam Megan Malaysia‘ Janaean Rayuan Khas‘ Ara: 15, Menara Hasrl, Fersuaran Rumba Farmal, Cyber a 63000 Omerjaya, Selangor. puennnz 4 3 Trie restructuring iinuei Project Sam ennsolldaled «ire oflhe Maxis Groups taiisiriesses Inlo uiie exlsllng operahng aniiiy i a iris Applicant the rationale lei Froiect satu isle lmpmvu trie Maxis Gmiips Dumpelfllve aauaiiiage. provide greater operahon agility and llexiuility in the aimtviiig and last paced telecommunication riiaiisiry. and straw trie Maxis Gmup to be more cuswrrier-oeiiliic including lriruugn the provision al seaniliss iiitegnitea service experlerlue to its cuslnmers A 4. Froieat Sam was necessary as me Maxis Group's Dcmpelltors In Malaysia, for example nigi and u Mobile operated their businesses under one eiiiiiy, wriicii pimiitau irierii witri a cumpemlve advantage In me market including alluwlng men. to mobilize and ream taster Ia tne ueriiaiias at the markel place 4 5 To liriance the iesuuctuniig iiniter Protect Sam. the Applicant iinitertimk loans or debt lransamlons A e Trie Aupli.-ant iiicuiied interest exizenses on the loans or item transactions duly paid by trie Appllcanl. 4.7 The lnans or deb| transactions undertaken by the Appllcanl lmpacled me Applicarits mining company, Maxis laeiriairs (MBHD) anilrty lo barrow from financial institutions as Ihe Maxis Gmup‘s leverage profile, wliicn is calculated by the Group‘: Net Debt |o EEITDA (earnings belore interest expense, taxes, depreciation and arriortizatiaiil ratio is tested by the financial institutions on a consolidated basis 4 8 This lillpulallon oflha Maxis Group‘: Net Debt to EBITDA ram: covenant is lefiemed In various other loan laclhllfi between MBHD and other financlal lnsmuflflns which s|a|e that “me nalin ul Ne| Debt to EEVTDA shall not exceed If D 1', This similar stipulation is iauriit in me agreements relating lo the Applii;ant‘s loans or dam zransaninris lor Protect saiu. 4.9 The loans or debt Iransacmans undenakeii by tne Applicant led itie Maxis Group's Mal Dem |u EBITDA ratio to approach or surpassing the 4.0.1 lriiesnalit above. consequently. MBHD had to make are necessary repayments to settle lls Pal: I .i n ru VWUEWXDMADEEXVXSKVG “Nair s.i.i luvlhnrwm be UIQG a may i... nflnlruflly mi. dnuavlnnl VI .riiiiia Wm! other borruwmgs to prevent the Maxts Group‘: Net Debt to EBWDA rifle alosedlng the 49:1 threshold. 4.10 on 25 5 2019. the IRB conducted a tax audit on the Apultcam. Tue emonotogy at key events, which IS not VI dtsflute VS as lolluws . nan Evnm me IRE tssued tts audit tmumg letter (or me VA: 2016 and zow etregtng. Imnng others, that the mterest expenses incurred by the ‘ Appltcam on the loans or debt hansazzuuns tor ‘ m.v.2otv Protect setu are not oeouctmte es Protect setu ‘ VS ourooneoty a debt push—dawn scheme wttn ‘the sole molwe ol dertvlng a tax tzenent by V lctaumng deduchans on the tntetost expenses inctmed by the Applicant t Th: Applicant mruugh tls |aK agent requested 2a.9.2n19 Mot an exlenston ofhme to moono to the IRB s ‘audttimdtn letter The {RB agreed to the Apphcanfs request for 27 -3°" enextenstonontme 1 The Applicam through as |ax agent responded mm detailed explanaltons In lite IRE. Among others, the Apphcanl explained Iha| the mterest expenses Incurred by the Aooncent on the reans or debt Iransacttons lor Project setu 22 “mm 1 were mdeed paid bylhe Applicant. Further, m - - ‘matntaln the Maxis Group’: Net Debt to V EBITDA ratto uetow the 4 o t threshold‘ n was neoessary tor MBHD to settte :15 other bermwtngs. The no nl also htghltghled the expected benefits and oommerctat tusltftcauons at Project Salu. {to mesem m vptuavvxunannzfixtxwvn “Nair amt ...m.mm be t... e may he mm-y -mm: mm. VI mum vtmxt ,7 }Among mhers. lhe ma mamlaunsd us posmon ; 2a.11.2o19;1na1 Pm;ec1 Sam 15 purponemy a debt push— aawn scheme. ‘ The Apphcanl requested (nrume to reply 10 mi ""“-2°" \RB‘sIeIIeruated 2311,2019 . ‘me was agreed 1a the Apphcanls request fur‘ 29.11.1019 lame (I: reply (0 [he IRES Wetter daled 23.11 2019 an me Project Salu -ssua. 1“2_2a" The Applicant mamlsmed us pnsilmn on me Prwect sam Issue nun” ‘During Inns period, me was had on mumple ' '_ ‘occaslons requested furlunher documents 1o ‘wmch ms Agphcanl nr 115 lax agem had duly I 21.9.2021) Wm“ . me IRE ma|r1Ia1ned||s posman and proceeded no 11159 lhe impugned Names o1 Aaamanal ‘Assessmem. dezaus or Much are as louows - 11.11.2020‘ VA 2015 RM 44,456.12? 30 VA 2017 RM 95.595015 53 Total: RM 14a.o54,1u.s3 The Anplucam suhmmed an application dated 23.11 zuzo in me Respnndenn to exeruse us 23 11 2°20 powar under secmn 135 and/or Sechon ' ‘ IZ7(3A) at the lTA1o set aside or exempt the ma‘; asmsmn 171 me (arm 51 the sam Nauces o1 Add1IIana\ Asszvssment dalod 17.11 2020. he Respundem am no: respond |o me‘ Apphcanfs letter da|ed 23112o2o and m; an H am doing 50. decwded not to issue we dvemon ' ' and/ot exempt me amllrarfly reused Nolxces oi Admnunal ksussmem (lho Ruponumn De sion v... 1 ma rNvpMz7vxun:AnE5x1xsKvn «mm. s.n.1...11.mm... 1.... 1: may 1... 11111.1-y -mm: dnuamnl VI .m1a v-max The Law 5 The Federal Court ln WRP Asia Pacific sun Bhd v. Ynnaua Naslollal all-1 [znu] 4 CU An; znlz] A MLRA 257; [2012] 4 MLJ 29¢ 31303. spaaklng lmougn sunyaal Hallm Omar FCJ (as ne men was) held Leave malf be elaniaa ll in. law Inpllcallon is no: lrlmm M an (nvolaus. and a leave Vi gramed. an arguable sass ll fave! or grammg ille lellei sought al me subsl-mlva hsalmg may a lna Imultlrll nulwme A nusl musl be zllaniled lo lhc apnllcamrl Ihouqh le nnlm ma menel vol ludlaal levlev. IS amenable la nmlclal revlew nbwluialy no slmss nlav be envisaged‘ e Tlle lesi laid down lor leave [0 commence a judicial VBVISW ln WRP Am Pnnlllc san aim (Iupn) ala as lallows 5.1. wnelner me sunlecl mane! IS amenable lo lualclal review‘ and li so 62. irom me maienals available. whelher me appllcauun ls lnvolous and ii rln| Ihoughl es lrlvolous, to consider inai me Applicant has an arguable case In ublain me relief sought at me sunsianilve hearing. 7 The pnnaples govemlng appllcailans luvleave \u commence iualclal ievlew pmeeedlngs have also been sel out in Tang Kwor Ham 5. On v. P-ngum-an Dlnlnaru Na lanai Bhd a. 07: [zone] 1 IILRH 507: [2006] I cu n21:[2aac1 5 IALJ an al so where Gopal sn Ram JCA1as he men was) held [m]' we Hlfih Cfilm smuld not 90 me me menls cl ma ms: :1 lm luau gage Ms mle ls only lo see «me appllcamrl vol leave ls lrwolnus so me lvlll ill. mun bv snmled la Muse la-vs ll II n a can where Ihe svbpci matter M the review IS one wnlch by senlea law lennal wmlerl law anlle common lawl IS nan-ludlclnbla * a II is irlle lllai lne Appllcam nave Io sausiy the tests pmpounded in the ahovumerfliorlad cases la snows me leave |a commence me llmiaal review pmoeedlngs M llns stage. me coun need not 90 mm me merits 01 me case. but only to see ll me subleci matter ls amenable lo lvalclal ievlew or wflamer me appllcallon lat leave it lnvolaus. mum: am Vv'UB7vxDn:AnEExlXSKVG "Nana s.n.l luvlhnrwlll .. UIQG e vuny l... nflnlrullly ml. mm. vn muva Wm! 9 In any event. a mdncial rewsw vs me dlscrelvon M me mun, me npphcauon lor leave to commence juducxal review may be auowed m exoenlinnal cvcumslanees as explained by me man Supreme Coun .n Governmcnl of Malaysua a. Anorv. Jagdls Slngh [1957] 2 MLJ lI5;[1IH6]1 MLRA 207; mm CLJ REP no wrncn new -Hem sumng me appeal. (mnemsaeuen n sunwnn ms wnnsmam byway M ‘mama! vewew nu! wnm than n an amen pravmon av: ms to me appvunx oermrznshnuvd nutnonnawylssne umesslher: ws shown e cbavlack wnsmclwon av s hlavanx vaume la penunn some stahnorydmy or .n avnmnnate cans: a wnous hmach nnhe pnnclplu ol nalural wsuee ‘ ‘rm grounds for ma iudiclal nviuw 10 The grounds of relvels souqm are based on me canleminn mm the Responaenrs demsvon was megaly vmd, .n excess or aulhonly. unreasoname, vvauonal and made m meacn ov Iegmmate expecxenon These oomennens are supponea by severfl reasons among wmch Include me Ionowmg: - wt The Respondents Daemon was mlra vnres. megeu. yo-u, unuamux andlor H1 excess of aumunly for me followlng wounds- 1:) Furs!‘ the Fedexa\ mm m Rakya: Berjaya lsupm) has decwded me: a laxpaysr Is an|i\led mcrganlxe us arms In sucn a way as (0 rmrnnnxo (ax. Hence, there Vs nothing wrong at al\ W117! the Applicant orgamze Ks cornmercuel xransacnons m such a way as to nnnnnzs lax (u) Second, lhe Courl 0! Appeal IV! saban aeuaya (supra) and «ms Honourable Cam In Enlco Gorudl (supra) nave deemed that secuon 140(1) ov me ITA \s not applicable where a lax advanlage ws derived [mm an actual ouflay of expenditure which reduces me lax habmty m circumstances .n which me taxing sfatme awards a veduchon In |ax neznnuy. In the present manev. \he Inleres! exuenses Incurred by me Applucanl on me loans or debt Iransacuans for n... ; M12 sm nuuemuusnnzenxswu «mu. s.nn ...n.mn s. med u may he nrwhuflly -mm: dnunmnl VI mum v-max me purpose at acqulring lne businesses ana undenaklrlgs mm the Selllng Companies are lax deducllble undev seounn 3311){a) of me VTA no me has nol been dlspuled by the ma. ll ls lmdemahle mat lhe aoquislllon or busmesses and undsnaklngs were eelual lransacnens ano me lnleresl expenses lncurrad were Indeed Dald out by me Aupllcanl Yneretorel Fvolecl Salu Is rlo| e ficllllous arrangernenl and cannol be scan as a lax evoioanoe scheme nu) Thlrdl lhls Honourable coun ln Pun Dickson Power Izrupra) and on Concnlo Indualrln (supra) naa declded that me lRB has no aulnenry Io dlcrale how a taxpayer snoulu conduct lls Duslness and a laxpayev ls al us own llhany |o conducl lts buslrless wnn all available means la make a good prom and lo nnugale ms lncluerlee al lax. In the present matter, Prolecl Sam was Implemented lor llnanclal. oummerclal ano buslness reellues and lusllficavilons || mus| be nn|ed lnal Prolecl Salu V3 capable of explanatlcn by relarenee la ordlnary buslness deallngs and ll VS nol me provlnoe ol me R3 in dlclale haw lhs Appllcam ls (0 condua l|5 buslness. (lvj Founn me |rlte pnrlclple Iha| ln a Iaxlng am, one mu anlyleok larrly al |ha language used and man IS clearly Sald and that nolmng >5 (0 be read In nor lmplled (See Nnlonal Land Firlancn co-opmlive Society no V. nluem Gnnuul M I Ind Rlvlnun [1923] 1 IIILRA 54; [1993] 1 MLRA 51 [1:94] 1 ulL.l 99: (199312 AMR 3531; [1993] 4 cu 3:9; M Flnn, me pnnclple that a provlslorl WI a (axlng slalule rnual be read slnuly ls lo be aopueo agalnsl lhe revenue and max ll’! lle lavor ll meve VS any doubl ' rnus1 be resolved WV me laxpayere lavour. 192 TM Respondenls Deslslorl had been muonal analor unreasonable lor me loklowlng grounds — U) The Respondent s Declslon IS Mable m be quashed on the ground mal ll ls su unreasonable that no Dale 5 am r~ lpluavwxnnannzaxlxswn «mu. smnl nuvlhnrwm be u... u may r... uun.l-r -mm: dnuuvlml vn .nuun Wm! reasonama person could have come to man dec an Tms Vs aspamauy me when the Respondent had laxlsd to give any vahd jusuficslvon. veasan ov aasa var Ks decision mil to issue ma amuan and/av axemac me aramamy vatsed Nonces owmmanav Assessment. on There vs also a good bass for me Apphcam xa behave that me Rsspanaem had exercised ms sulhonly arbitrarily and/or mechamcafly wnlhoul apprymg us rmnd to ma facls and cvrcumslances anne Applicant (III) The Applmanl 3| EH maxenal wuss acied m good '3V"‘L gave mu caoparauan. made can and lmnk disclosure and obuimed pravessmnaz advxce in managmg Ils finnnca and tax affavs (rv) The decwsmns at me supenar owns m re\auon |o me mnarnraxauan and aonsxrucnan o1 Vegmauon and case Vaw are pan arms Varws of Malaysia and are bmdlng on me Respondenl. The Respondent had clearly «awed In lake rmgrvzanee 01 mass decnsmns (V) The lavlure la apprecwahe and gwe eflect to ma true enact and aaancauan M the HA amounts lo a dear conlraveminn r:1Anic\e 96 a! ma Federa\ Consmullon (F0). Amcle 96 avme FC dearty states man “No lax ar rile shafl be levied ay or hr the purposes 01 me Federafinn except by or under Ihe aumonny uf federal \aw' 10.3 The Resoannenrs Dec an was made w-mam havmg any regard |o the lagnlxmale expecn-mans oi the Appnaanc as the Respondent laH3d xa cansmav the decxsxons of am supencr owns and mi: Honourabh cam m relaliun In one |n|erpreIaunn and conslruclron oflegnslalmn and, hence, lhvs consumes a demal av me legmmaxa expeclalmn av me App HI and max ma Rasaanaem wm lake aagmzance of the same. page In at u m vpmavvxrmannzaxwxswn «ma. sm.‘ nmhnrwm .. met! a may a. mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-550-10/2022

PEMOHON 1. ) FAHRI, AZZAT & CO. 2. ) MUHAMMAD KHAIRUL ANWAR BIN KHAIRUDDIN RESPONDEN LEMBAGA KELAYAKAN PROFESION UNDANG-UNDANG MALAYSIA PENCELAH MAJLIS PEGUAM MALAYSIA

Judicial Review - Certiorari to quash the decision of the Respondent to disallow the 2nd Applicant's application as an articled clerk according to Rule 4 of the Legal Profession (Articled Clerk) Rules 1979 - Whether the Respondent had acted in excess of jurisdiction, irrational and/or unreasonable.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b5aad310-3d6b-47cb-9205-51161c5c2e40&Inline=true

29/01/2024 17:06:38 WA-25-550-10/2022 Kand. 35 S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N ENOqtWs9y0eSBVEWHFwuQA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal w.\—25-55u»1n/2n22 Kand. 35 29/an/znu 17:06-32; mum IMMKAMAH mas: MALAVA nu KUALA LUMPLIR mum wnxmc wanssxuwum «um LUIIPIJR. MALAYSIA xammuu KUASA-KUASA xms) pzmo pun uurux szm KEHAKIIMN N w Mn/21:22 oaram Perkara mengenar kenmusan LIMBBQB Kellynkln Pmlsnm Und:ng— Undang Mauym buunkh 5 egos 2:122 bemurmbor mum LKPU 100- znsmm/r22.az<) Dan aawam Pslkava mangema kepulusan Lemhifia mnymn Pmlasm Urmnwr Umarw Mamyxm a. mes‘/uaral s Januzn 1995. Dan flilam Pulkiu mangaruu pm" 5 dan Pemzm 44 Pevlsmbagaan Persekulu-In Dan uahm Perkana marvganlw uklyun 5. semen s. seksyen 2:: dan seksyen 21 Ana nmmn ummg-unaang 1973‘ Din aawam Penkara mengennv Kmdah 2, K.-sedan 3 am. Km»; o Kaedah—Kaedzh Proiesmn Undalvn-Undang (K:rIni Bavamkal) 1919. Dan damn Paruru -mg-nax pemtgganl mum knpnda ma Mahkamah Kahakmanteél. nu. as!-m P-nun: menwm mm pemmmnln mum penmah oemman‘ peflnlah mandamus‘ vamulth Vamngan Gan dekrsmsi. Dan damn Pemam mengenau Amran 5: xnann-K.-1-n Mshkamah zmz »...mn sm Euoqlwsfiyn-savzwnrwuun «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! ANYARA (1) mm, AIZAV A co. (szaum ruzm) (2) rnunmuun smunuu. ANWAR am KNAARIIDDM [ND.KlP:BIOBIl—0G-5103) Fumnhnn-Pumohnn um swans: xsumum pnorssnou uunmeamnmu . Runoman Juagmum Inlvaducflon 1 The Apphcams filed an lpphcauun lar judldal revvew (snclusurs a) undel Order 53 of Ina Rules of com 2012 (soc). 2 Leave was granled in me Applicants lor apphcauon co: ]ud|c\z\ review agamsx (he Respondent to seek (ha rouawmg reuevs - 2: Sualu perinlah serlxoran unluk memba|alkan kepmusan Respandsn dalam benmk sum: benankh 5 3.2022 bemombor mjukan LKPU 100-2/15/JI(1)/122321) ans masan bahawa xepumsan Responden ada\ah menyalahl undang-undang, melabvm kuasa‘ «max munasabah alnu merupakan penaflan lerhadap Jangkaan sah Pemonowpemonan avau kessmuanya alau ssbahagwan danpadanya; 22 Sualu penmah uerliorarl unluk memnaxaxkan kepulusan Responden yang Man dlbual :1. mesyuaral 81 I985 mas a\asan bahawa Kepulusan $11935 adahah menyalnm undangrundang, melebihl kuasa. mask munasaball avau merupakan penafan lemadap Jangkaan san Pemonon. Pemohen alau kesemuanya mu ssbahagxan daripadanya, 2.3 Eahawa Femohon-Pemahon dlbenkan kebenaran unluk memahun sualu dekkarasl bahawa Kepulusln Responden adalah menyeflam ma Pmieswon Undang-Undang ms dan »...mn m Eflflqtwsfiyh-savzwurwuun «mm. smm nmhnrwm s. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! la) Evury aupllcillon undlr ucnon mu pe mane bysummnns in cnlmbcn an on pulllnwl of mo nppulllnl ll no nu men e punlon, othivwill by oriqlnahnq summon); me Juduu n nnp me application may ln ms dlscufion -dlourn Ibo Ippllcatlon mm open Court. ul Every sumnnnl .n chambers or or-errunnu Slmmum. n ms me May be, mall oe suppofled by awruerlea on amoan: and shall be served voaamar mm ma zmdavll on me Board sum summons n cnampers av anglnalmg wmmorls shall non ha nearu oevore me exprry el lwalvu day! one: me am or servlce on me Euard lsl N or perore me neon.-g on me applncahon me man: may subrlll up we Judge a wnlldarlllal repon on me appllcarlll such repon shall ml be mad lfl Calm bu! a may (heme! shnll pa Vllmlxhld la «n. avollcanl ls) A mnmermal repon under lms seclmn shall no plwlleged (emphasis added) we secllon 2s onne LPA above clearly shows mac mere am pronsrone In lna LPA lor appeals agalnsl me declslurls or me Respondent. The Appllcsnls carvln| unllalerally Ignore (ms avenue of appeal In cneaslng to do so, mls male-al revlew appllcahun IS delecllve 19. H :5 my vlew man smoe ma suojeel rnaner cerlcemed IS me oeelalon onhe Respondent. Instead clapplylng In a Juogelora re»/law ol lna oaorslon by way or orlgmalmg summons‘ me Appllcanls had shorl clrculled by nlmg the lualclal revlew appllcauon la «ms com. 20 Tnerelpre. l s my View lnal me Applicants lherelrl are nol ermllea In lnlllafe a juorclal review prooeedlngs agalnsl lhe Respondent hereln as me Appllcanls had felled lo exnausl me grlevance prooedura under seellen 26 av me LPA more rlllng «ms ludlclal revlaw applleallon belore mls com 21 In Rubln Tun rang Hung V. mu. Pnngnrlh Kn nman Slkirja M-ll-Iyl ll Anor [2010] I MELR E1, [2010] 2 MLRA 571:[20|1] 2 mu 457; [2010] 9 CL! so: the Federal Counwas posed wllh the following questmn. whelner ma exlslsnce cfa slalulory appeal procedure I allerrlallve remedy IS a bar on judiclal revlew or oeclarawry rellel. v...mm am Enoqlwsfiyh-savzwkrwuun “Nair Smnl nuvlhnrwlll be met! a may he prwlrullly -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl erlum vtmxl The Federal Conn relerrea la the speech by Lard Templaman .r. Rs Fresxon 11955] I AC 535 (ha! .Iud\<:\a\ rewev. process smuld ml he aHuwed no supplant me norms! slammry avhul u...e.a..... And answered the queshon rr. the posmvs. 22 The Federal cm... decvsron m Rob Tan Pang Kong (supra) .s me.ero.e an aumonly (or me pvopa an ma. me exIs|ence or a statutory appsm procedure \s a bar (awdxcnal revxew. 23 Funher m me case awlck Hos Formul Steel Sdn arm ... Tribunal Rnyunn rum... a. Anor [mo] 3 MLRH 454; [mm] 1 cu 544 Azwah All J [as she men was) held that [51 1... -ppm... mould rm. .x.....n.¢ IM Ippoll mm . mo.- stage, as .1 would urlumounl to |..mm.r.g with on 1-‘ nxpondlnt 1...... ..u..r.g cm appul p....x..... balm‘ rm. and ..s rrgm under Ihe law an aa.ua.cane the maner ruarngrepn 2:» (er..pr...s.s added! 24 Further reference Is made (0 me case or Pengarill Kasum NIQIH Juno! 5 Anor V. Kldl Mlkan Kobun T07! (Suton Utlml) Sdn End a. ors and AnolhorAppeaI[1014]5 MLRAZ-12$; (201414 MLJ :m;[2o141m1'c 53-, (2014): cu m where me Courlo1Appea\ held [19] Ag r.‘ mm regard .o In: xmurnry remedy as conlavnefl under s an er the sexes Tax Act 1912 (supra) we are or me we" me. me Dosmnn .r. sun. 3 use .5 mher ....e ms mm .s guuisd by a s\ew of cases amanamw «mm mgh e...r.e...y such as Nhnpgar v Govammem or Sarawak A Annr [1370] . ms an new) 2 Mu M. Govemmam or Mllaysm s Armrv Jlgdws Smgh user] 1 cm :51. mm Cu man» no 2 ML! ms and Rnhm Tan Pans] Hang v Kema Fengalah Kesiman Sabrina Malaysxa a. Amv 12010] 9 cu 505 mesh cases have demand man when a slalult ms avenues for a runner nmman .....my co 3.. m.r..».a pany. um. .. would mm... imcumbcm um ncourse .....-mm bu run In mu: n mm. In an own: vo. mm .. Illlnllnlly . dr:m.so..-ry re . Yhe apex Com m Ins Ran.» Tan case Asuom) was gmdad by Mm Lon! re...paer..a.. nan ma m me Ra Praskm ease [1935] 1 AC 335m me loHowvna swear me 11 1:71] em Euoqnwsvyn-savzwurwuun “Nair s.... nmhnrwm .. ..... m my .. ..«....u-y mm: dnuumnl vu mum pm... “Jumcta\ renew process ihouki nor be auewea m supetam ma rmrrrat suhflory apaaat pracodum‘ tempnase added) 25 Thus, tne lanure M the Applicants to exhaust the recourse or renreates under Seclmn 25 at me LFA ts a bar lor a plooeedtng under tudIcra\ rewew It would flso be an abuse of court emaeas wnrm makes me tuaraal review apptrcatron premature. 26 Prermsed on tne areresam reasons, 1 find that me P0 ratsed by the Respondent nas rrrents and awormrrgly, I uphmd tne Responderrrs nbjemon However‘ var completeness. I wfll now deal wnn the meme Mme applicalton Tho R pendant mod illlqllly bnynnd nu powlr ny Iholuhlng Amcle clerkship nra Ruponaerrt Irratinnany rejected tn. 2"‘ Appllunft Iyplicn on 27 The Appllcanls submit (hat . 27 1 Gwen tnat rt Is mandalnry and/or dwecmry Var tne Resperruent to carry out lheir lunctmns about Amded Clarkshtp, lhe Respondem cannot nnw ignore me sad lunwons by unrlaterauy dedanng me Amcled Clerksmp abullshed. espeerauy when thou provlsmns rrr me LPA are nol repealed although 7 amendments were made since 8.1.1985; 27.2 The Responaent taitea ta show thew daetsron la Ibohsh Anicled cterksmp was necessary and rncreental m lhetr responsitnmtes. The Apphcanls submfl the aHeged abchlrcn aeteats me Isgtslamre s tnlanhon 0! Salmon 5 at me LPA and (or thrs reason ti cannot be eonsmerea as necessary and rncraenral. 27.3 Amcle Clerkshlp was mtroduced as a mode of adm en 0! advocates and sohottols vlde the LPA. a Partrarnentary Acl. Tneretore. rt rs onty ratranexe I1Amc\ed Clerkshtp rs abolished by tne same Pamanrerrtary Act ttrat enforced n VI the firs: use 13 em m Efloqlwsfiyh-savzwnrwuun «war. smut mmhnrwm a. U... w my r... nrW\ruH|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa v-mat place. and not the Respondent who ls merely a body eslabhshed under lne LPA 27.4 By lne Respondents leller dated 5 8 2022 the 2"“ Appllcanrs appllcallan was relected purportedly because the Respondent had abolished Anlcle Clerkshlp during lne rrlsetlng on 8.1.1985 and no langer accepted any ragletrallons. 275 However, on 522023, In mar Aflldavlt tn Reply, lne Respurrdenlclalrnea lney relecled theappllcallan because the Applicants are not empty wlln the requlrerrrerrls urmer the 1979 Rules. Tnlrl reason was glven 5 manths after men 5 5 2022 letter and ls clearly an aflermoughlr 27 6 Tne Respondent should be eeloppea lmrrl enarrglng ILS reason tar rejecting the 2'" Applicant’: applicallon 25. Upon perusal althe cause papers filed pelere lnls court, I fmd mat lne Appllcanls have lalled to comply wlln the requlrenlerrrs under me 1979 Rules lt ls clear Item the Respondents‘ Aflidavll ln Reply mat lrre appllcallon has been decllrlea due to me Applicants‘ nnrl~ oompllanoe wlln seueral rules. notably Rules 3 and 4 ol me 1979 Rula, among olllers (I) lneleaa or the 2"‘ Applleant. rt was me 1* Appllcelll who purporled la pmduce the documents under Rule 3. la) Among other documents produced was a copy pl “amuse” that had been executed by me Appllcants. not the proposed anlcles as requlred under me 1979 Rules, and (CI The “amcles“ that had been executed by the Applicants had prwlded for a data when the anlcles commenced This ls contrary to the 1979 Rules whlch pmvldu tea: the date 01 reglslrallurl olarllcles srlall be when the arllclesara raglslered and n0| when the arllcles are slgned /executed. 29. Gwen lne above, I am ollhe vlew lnal reasons Vorthe decislorl may be glven at a Ilme later when the parry was notified ol the declslan lncludlng during pmceadlngi Further‘ ll wnuld not be ms! or the Iallule ofthe Respondent in slate reasons at the malerlal llme when there IS no duty to give reasons run la .l 11 rn EMOvtwsfiyh-sBvEwHFwuQA “Nana Smut luvlhnrwm .. UIQG e may r... pflmnnllly sun. mm. VI .nuna Wm! 30 Hind suppml lor my wew by relerringlolhe OourIafAppsal demsmn m me case of nu sum Mlnuals Managnmont Aulhomy smwuk v. Guam om a Ruoulou Sun and mm; 1 ML! 263: [2020] Muu s7n; [znzoy MLRAU 119 where Mary Llm .IcA (now FCJ) held as follows — 1:251 Th: learned mdaa look n m be me waw |ha( mere .5 ndw a common ‘aw duly In gwe nelson! whln as wecen see lnev: ws none ma xnvucahon av Ina! duly us nnnmgn a menu process and un\y m axcapmnar clrcumslances It [5 am mw max um lppulIInL5' hllure to slam nlnnm u an mlblnal um {I not r.u|.. [65] run [xmhorny] mu disclose mm mam for mu rvfusal, amen In In: mu.-ma man In unpmlubn Io Ihc ppnuuon fur Judlclnl nvllw .nd In the nmner amdamx. ham 4% ma pennanenx seaeury m the aulhnnly and ma cammumcatsd ma max appeuanu vemsal In me Iawondenl [721 1n. Iumid mg. did no: Iddnu my of mm nasnns u -u, Iaklng me pa n Irulbluuse no reasons mu givnn at cm llml otlhe u-dam M m. mugn-d mu... a ralsonuma mlumnua :n.n me link aupzflanl nad not exemsefl strewn m accordance mun the ad was Inggumu Tm; undulllndlng Ind nppllullun mm uw. too, {I lnconocl. mnougn m axons my MI han mn gsv-n II III: mlhrlll llme cum Iunnn. [M run an n. uuum uunnl mm man known um: um. at wnildcraflon ny Ni: Lurdllup Once waned name We mun we ma may Baum Ia exarmna and wnsmerxmae reasons with a vnswm ascenammg flme Iflewimani cl mam: onna Mes cl nn|uli\ ,d cu nm om made out‘ lhal me decnsmns reached was devuud ul reason a d wnvam underwednesbury prmmmes and dwscvmmn mun bu axsmsad m mam nl quasmng mos: daemons (emphasis added) 31 Further, the com of Appeax m me case 01 Malayan Amino: Bhd v. Monlorl Sumbcr Illanuiia. M will a On man} u cu 74:; [2020] s MLRA 1n7 neld thallhe adure In gwe reasons does notof nsew neoessan|ysugges| wauonamy ol nne decwsxon when n held as Mlows. — 15:; n panama. Panubuhan V mm Jualme Jmggul [201 31 2 cm 362. [2013] 3 MLJ16 The Faderzl Cflufl hawd mamme an Ac! cl Pamamenl does not pm:/Me an express slaluwry dulylo guve reasons. men me sad duty does um anse me xs at 1: am ENDqIws‘1yD-sBvEwHFwuuA «mm. smm nmhnrwm .. d... w my n. nVW‘nlWY mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Wrm respsn I am unable to agree wnn me app|II:an| Flrxfiy II 45 an Iubllum pa-IIIonsII.wmI».mI nu II-»mIamyur.In Iy unpma ml all 4-mien Milan in win reasons var Imir Iincmcn. Snconflly.$oc1mn|1l[1):nflIl Man an do not rvqulu the R05 in nivt nun": Io: Inn an an. mu ll nu uvnu mmorv duly Imnossa on In. R05 to give reasons to lhe Awliunl. [591 In Mm4s1eral Labour. Mamym u cnsn Menu YuerI[1997l 4 cu Iaaa: [I992] I cu (Rap) 216‘ [1991] 2 ML! :37 Ins Sunrsma Conn mwralsd ma gsne«s.I pnncwfla Ihat me com unnoi campal III. duclllon-nukcrla gm masons Ior his Iinclllun mm mm Is no my Impond by Inw mac :0. However whali In. ducIlIun—ma|r.er mu nm am. my reason) lav ms dacmon Il may he a basIs lnr Ins com to make 2 nnmng um Ins decIsIoII was made Mlhum any rahonm reasnm Tm Supreme Court quoted Ins use av a V Sscratarynlslale Iurrraae and Inmmry, ex I; Lunmu me 4 [1939] I wm 525 men Lam Kzun MKIAIISI 5316 In me House M Lam: Yhu Ihuncl at renmnx Iur . dnclllon when there Is no duty In gin mm. cannon of llnfl providn uny Iunpon luv lhl -nuoutnn imtionnlhv ur Dal Is-cvxion. The omy sIQrIIm:ance aI Ins absence M reasons I5 |hz| n 2H amer known I. s Ind mun-snsnsss spam (0 pom! marwhalrrungly WI hvnur :1 s dmevenl fle<:IsInn ma asusmrnsxer who has given no masons can:-In mrnpIaIn I, the noun draws me Imnrmuze um us nss no rsIIansI reason (m In: dscmcm Iemphasns added) 32. Based an we above. and me provIsIons o! the LPA, I am oflhe wew |hal Ins Respondent IS non abliglted |o pmwde reasons under Ins LPA However, In Ins Inseam case. me Respondent. In Ian, has supplied reasons In Ms Affidawl In Remy on 3.2.2023. Tnerevoae, the Apphcams‘ argument |ha\ Ins Respondent IS hatred Irorn affenng reasons «or the norrcompllance wnn Ina 1979 was. mnsuaenng II a beIaIea altempl, due |u us absenoe (mm me daemon made on 5 a.2n22 Is unIsnubIs snu wIInouI rum 3:. Therefore, I am at me vIew InsI Ine Apphcams‘ suzmssron Ihal |he Respondent Is esuwped {mm lumIshirIg such reasons (or non- compliance based on the 1979 Rmes as It is 10 be an afterthought attempt, consmenng us absence (mm the dez:IsIcrI made an 5 s 2022 Is mIsconcaIvad and mIsp\aI:ed 34 Furmer, I find man case Law seems to sugges\ ma: sIoppeI cannm override Ina law as. If we law requires maI somelhmg Is to be done In a panicmar way, men Ins Iaw snowd be comphed wnh van Is .I u srn Efloqlwsfiyh-savzwkrwuun «mm. s.n.I nmhnrwm be I... It: may I... nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nF\uNa MI 35. Tms pnncxpla oi law nas been dearly slated by the Federa\ Com m we case at Dunk Blndzr Kuala Lumpur v. Parbadanan Pnnqumnn Yr: u 5 on Ind nlhci up [man] A MLRA H4; [2023] 3 MLJ 819: [2023] 5 CLJ 167; [ 23] 4 AMR 121. where m was nerd as louaws. - ‘[451][vm) Horweven a. mm and unwind poslllml ms oemhexl is um uloppol I. Immnnn In m. not of mm. or nu .w. um. IW4 uqulvu Ina! sumfihinq is to In don: -n . parliculavway, m (ms mrlanoe lhmugh . vapresemauve scum, mlhel man Waugh me marmg2men| cnvporallums or [am] managemenx hndses bncnwa Ihava _ nu uilulury am. In brmg [ml .3] rewew umcsedmgs m mun. on man Mme reswflenls of mew Lxmdomwnu 5, nm. m. .. m..:.: :. ompllud wun. In ml: cnnuxl. nu qnusflonofsundlng go1slaIhI]uriIdIc|ion om. w«fl(seeRv$ecre!afy n4 sum om swan Servsees and mum at vane cnnu Fuvevly Aclmn Gmup and amev:|1989]1 All an mm n [s um cunnclm mnmn.nm»g am. we at esmppsx or mnsenl mm a slams ewes no such capamly lo a slamlary body 4.. dicllun .1 m. court cunnol u cunlcma By conurn. Pm ...m.sm.y, esloppul cannvl ovum Ill: law: (emphasis added) (See also. Kok Hocng v. Loony cmong Kwcng unms Ltd [1963] 1 MLRA 34:; [1964] 1 MLJ 4:; [men] 1 ms 51; [1064] 1 AIIER son) as Gwen me above, «ms Caurl Is of the view mm when a “s(=|uIary obhgahcn ov an unoondmonal characlev" exis1s, me coun does not have me aunnomy na aHaw me pany bound by lhat annganun «a be excused from Mfllling n based on me ooncepl ol eslappet Tne smunory duty lakes precedence over escape], and the pany mus! nommy wuh xne stamlory reqmremenl reganflss ol any esIDppe\ argumems they may reuse, 37 The Respondent had svaxea m mew we-«er dated 5 A 2022 mat |he Apphcams‘ Amcled Clerksmu regvsuamun was re]ec1ed due 10 ns abommn. However, me Respandenl look a dmevem posi|ion in men mean: m Reply, stahng mat (he re]ec|Iun was due Io me App|n:an|s' nuntomaliance mm the reqwemems under Inc 1979 Rules Therefore, acoordmg to me Apphcanl [ms [5 a dear mse of auennaugm vuenorn sm Euoqnwsvyn-savzwurwuun «mm. smn ...m.mn .. U... w my me mm-y mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm] 3a This Coon is 01 me view that in any cncunrswance wnere the Respondent presents varmus reasons for ils decision to the Apphcinu. we Oaurl rnlmiams |ha discleuun ID uphald any 0! Ihe reasons by Ihe Respondenl. as long as any uniavorahle reasons provided by the Respandem does not dominate Ihe basis 10! me daemon 39 I find suppurl for my view by retening to are com umppeal case at Dr. Mam! Nnlr bln HIIl||m v. Mlnurl Dallm Nu url M-I-yu- [2008] 2 MLRA 395: [2006] 6 MLJ 213; [20171] 1 CLJ Is where n was new man — [24] Here we have a mass whsra ms Mmmer rem an Iwn wounds to deny rsgmramn av vs»: at me nalmrul men ans. Isl haw snrssay said‘ Is a me mason Ybe alher n . aaa ramn In my judglmm unm - public dlcixion-maknr guns Mo mason — a new one am a had on _ «or m. dI:ll|un um calm in nmlllod In uphnld an ummm decision nnmm am are bad msen was not me ovecrldinfl eenuamuon on which ma dtclxlun I: hind. ‘flu -ulllorlllu an an puml an lonlon. [251 In Slate M Mih-Irilmrz V Eabmal Kflparim Yakkanwm NR mean so 13§3.BachawalJ when dehvenng the mflgmenl m on Inman supreme Conn um rm nun:-we undenlymg xne.a daemons appslri us he am. An admnmsnralwe er nuns!-gndwcwil emu based on merax qmunds. an taken Iogemer, cannot be sustamed w u use Immd llIa| same at me gmlmds an mmqxmam or -rmevam Ind um 15 nmmng In shcwmat me amnomy wauki have yasued me order an me basis 01 the mar m\n|n| and uxwslmg around: on ma ulh-v hand‘ :1: order based on sevuramvounds some olvmxch are Iuundlu Demon-ex\s'lsmarInI\avllIIn can use susmmed n the Own is sausfled that me aumomy would have passed ma amer on ma bas4s ul nne o(he( |e\evan!am1 ensung gmunds and me ex:.1us\on 07 me Inehvam ar nun4x1s|en1 grounus wuld not have alhcled ma ummlh nprmon av asamn [251 In Zari Smgh V m Timon AIR new 5:: m1. Smut J are the Man can was ngnx m hulmng maleven mnere were amangslme renscns gwen hymu carnmnmner same men were exlmneous‘ me resx were relevvam um could be wvmdewd sulficuzm. me cumnnssmnnra mnellmmll wuuld run he vnmed ms pnnaxute max u same nuns reasons renee on by a Tnbunalfnrwts wnausnn tum omlu a. txlnmoux uvu|haIw\se unsascanaaua, nu daemon would be nnmea‘ spam in cues wn wnmn lhe cancmsnn us amvefl ax not an nuelumenl aiahpeawe 431:1: ar e»ndenL2,m1l on subpdlva salmamon The reason vs Ihal menu m um whom the daemon ws based on subpeclrve me n a. an srn Efloqlwsiyh-savzwkrwuun “Nana sanuw nmhnrwm a. H... e vsfly he annnnn mum: dnunmnl vn mum Wm! sanslacmrl I1 souls ul ms masons mm om lo he lnele-vzn| nr walla ll would M lmvusslhle Int 5 supevlm Ouufl In um um wmcn ul the nusorlsl Ialevarll m lrvelevarll, mm er lnvahd, had uruuqm about man sallsvscmn am VI! a case were me mnclnslorl IS cased on amealve hzlx am evident: wch s amsully would rm nun W ll n «ma ml were ms legal evldencc balm Irv: Trlbunah even n some or ll was lnulmnl, . supemv Calm wuuld ml lrltuflere .l lru Mndlng an be snstalned on lhe lest ul me swam The reason VS mat m a wrn pelman lol uemnvsn ms wpsnor Conn lines um sn ln appeal, hu| exzluse: nvlly supvvllory wnsalcllun. and (herehre dues not snler "nu ma uuullorl ol slmlcency cl evldvlce 129} ll. Ihe mesevll lnsvsrlee, l\ VS crystal clear mat the reason advanced on gmundl at nallonsl sammly win ml ms pmdumlnnnl reach 70! ms Ml-nslers declsmrl ll stands as a «palm: and mslmu gmwld lm leiusmg reglltralnorl at the nalmnal level ll V5 rlcl enlarlgled am mlxbd up wlln ms elm: reason ll am rlo| metehm mlinnilly slum ln. dsuslon based ml glmmd! olaspsnmsnlal pohq Accordingly‘ lms ls a case m vmn mu Mmls|II'l daclllun IL) deny vsvl mgmrahon al Ins nsllonal leved may be upheld And lwoula do so (emphasls added] 40, ll IS not dlipuled mm In ma lnslanl case, we Rewondenl nus provided al leasl lwo dlsllnct reasons lor relectlng lne Annllcams avullcauon. rust, there was apparenllya declsionlo abollsh Anlcles of Clerkxhip during a maeung or me Reaponderll on s.1.l9a5, ana seconds me Appllcanls‘ nonaompllanoe wlth Rule 3 and Ruie 4 al me 1979 Rules 41 ms Courl is of the oplnlan that even n‘ the am reason ls fnund wanllng, we second reason |haI denlonslrales lnal me Appllcams‘ appllcallan lar Anlclus was nu ma ml place llawea. 42. The Appllcanls canncn fume the Respondent to aceepl an applloallon mal ln ma nrsl plaw does not comply w n the 1979 Rules. TVISVEVOVE I vlew that the Anpllcanfs submis an that ll ls mandatory for the Respondent m anoept a flawed applcallun has nu marlls In law 43. Further. nus Courl ls oi me vlew lhal the Respondent has dlsarellan Io asclde on me mglslrallon ol 5 palun as an Anlcled clerk, laklng mm accmlnl me obzecllves outlmaa ln seclinn 6 0701: LPA rue ls cl 1] sm Efloqlwsiyh-savzwkrwurm “Nair Sum luvlhnrwm s. UIQG In my me snnnll-y mum: flnuavlml VI srlum Wm! 45 46. Conclu 47 as 49 50 51 The wororng tn Semlun 6 uses the word ‘m y", wnton stpnmes tnat me Respondent has dtscreunnary powers In oorng any necessary eno retevam azls to carry out tne purposes ot this Part and tte flmzrlmn Further‘ ttns court s ov me vtew tnat rneeung tne corrd cntena necessary to oornmenoe Amcles ooes nu| autnm confer upon me 2"“ Appllcanlme nghl to pe autornattcauy regtstersd as In Ameteo Clerk. Tnts Is aspectany so N |he appllcahon ror Antctes was rn tne nrst place flawed and not tn oornplranoe wdh tne I979 Runes Ii tnts court were to aooeot tne interpretatton asserted by the Appttoants, rtwouto eflectwety stnp tne Respondent oi tts otscretron to eyatuare me ellgthlltly ano/or entrttament or tnorvrouats epptymg to oeoome Amded cterks, leavmg tne Respondent to act as a rubber stamp ms cannot tre tne true purpose ot tne LPA The Appncsnts have rarteo to exhaust tne reoourse or vemedtes provided unoer tne LPA ano snouto not he porrmneo to pursue tne tuotoat review apptrcatron rne Appttcente nave tattoo to oornpty wrtn tne requtrements unoer tne 1979 Rules and tne judictal retnew oppltcatton wound be an exerorse tn tummy as me Appttoants‘ apptrcatton IS tlaweo. Tne Appuoant's argument tnat me Rsspnndenl is estpppeo trom ouering reasons other than tne one on 5.5 2022 is mtsconoeweo based on tne Goqrtn Opllmn (supra) dectsion Tne Respondent has not meae any attempt to atter rts reason but has. In fad, provvded addvhonal reasons for re]et:1mg tne Appttcams‘ sppncatron ror Aructe. Premlsed on me atoresaro reasons‘ t am or tne View tnat tne duo on 04 me Respondem Is not Iamled with sny error 01 Vawt irrat nahty and/or unreasonableness tnat warrants me Inlervenlton or ttus court. Pale 10 M n rn EMOqIws‘1yh-sBvEwHFwuuA “Nair s.n.t mmhnrwm .. med a may t... unrn.u-r sun. dnuumnl y. .rtuno Wm! Kaeaankaedan Fmfesiun Undang—Um1ang (Kerini Beran:kel)1979: 2A suam deldarasl bahawa Keputusan 5.1 V985 adaran menyavanmkua Pmfeslcn Undang4Jndang197G dan Kaeaan Kacdah Pmvesmn UrIdang»Undang (Keram senamken 1979, 2 5 Suatu permwh larangan be ujuan menghalang Responaen danpafla mangguna pakal kepulusan Respcndan m mesyuara| a1 1955 kersna kepulusan |e:sebu( menyalahl Akta Pmlesion Undang»Un(1ang 1976 dan Kaedah—Kaedah Prorenon Undang-Undang (Keraru Ber-amksI)1979‘ 26 Suatu pennlah mandamus yang mengarahkan Respcnden unluk mendaflarankan kemasukan Femuhorl Kedua dalam amkel selaras Akta Pmle n Undang-Undang 1915 den Kaedah-Kaedah Pmlesmn Undang-Undang (Kemm Eevamke\)1979 dalam mass 14 han Gar! Iarikh penghakiman permohunan inn 2 1 aanawa segava arahan dan penmah yang penu dan berakmal dibenkan: 2 a Bahawa kos pemmhcnan um, nan 2 9 Apa—apa veuev yang dlsflalkan sesual oleh Mahkamah yang Mulua mi 3 In essence, the Applvcsms med «ms apphcalvan In nmucuaxxy revwew me Respondenrs deusmn on 8.1.1985 lo dzsaHaw me 2'” Appncanrs application as an Amcvaa Clerk acmldmg xo Rule 4 of the Legal Professwon |Arlicled C\erk| Rules 1979 (lho 1919 Rulus). 4 me Respondent‘: daemon was made accordmg In Sermon a nflha Legal Pmfesslon Acl 1975 (LPN 5. Afler me haanng, 1 dlsmxsaed lha Apphcanfs Judlolil revxew applicanon (Enclosure 8). ‘runs pmgmenl slites the reason lor my deusnen vuesavn m Efloqlwsfiyh-savzwnrwuun «mm. smm ...m.mn .. U... m may he nrW\ruH|y -mm: dnuumnl Vfl muNa Wm! 52 As such. ma Apphcants‘ appnaauan fur1udic4a|IevIew1Enc|usure a) V5 msrmssed WWI costs at RMCLDOO DO sumac! to the allocator Dated ya Januan/2024 /V‘/*/\ Ahmad Kama! hm Md snamd Judge mgn Court Kuala Lumpur cuuns-Is For me Aunllcanls En. Joshua Wu Ka\—Ming mu Sabnna Muhd Amsen mm mm) Teman Fahn, Azzan 5. Co Fsguamnaxa dan Paguamcara 15. Jalan mu 7/16A‘ Munam Damansara. A7800 Psiahng Jays‘ Selanfiur Darul Ehsan. (Rn. Tuan 5911 FA SM) For «us Respondent: En Khoo rsuan Hual (En Muhammad Dams! lman mn Ahmad Ternmdm (pux) with mm) Taluan Sknne Peguambela flan Peguamcam Tingkal a, Wnsma UOA Damansara, 50, Jalan Dungun, Damansara Heights‘ 50490 Kuala Lumpur Watching anav for me Mains Peguarrv En. Fare: Mend Ah Jmnan Teman Fare: Jmnah Feguambela Gan Feguamcara A—11a05‘ Plaza Taragun Kelanan No, 3, Jalan ss 6/6. 47301 Pevahng Jaya, Se1ar\9fir namv Ehsan Dalenuvxl m Euoqlwsfiyh-savzwnrwuun «mm. saw nmhnrwm s. U... a may s. nrwhuflly -mm: dnunmnl VI nF\uNa Wm! Buckgraund Facts 6. The background tacts of ttte application gatheted from tne cause papers and sutuntsstons at the names are targety undtspmed and can be summanzed as tondws: - 3.1 on 27.5 2022. true 2"‘ Apphcanl underwem an Inlervtew conducted by tne 1= Appltcam, WM ma mtant at being assessed tor tne pmspective rate at an Amcle ctetk; 6 2 Subsequently, an |he 30,6 2022. an offer was extended by the 2w Anphcant lo the 1* Anphcant, propo ng the apputnlmenl at me 2“ Apphcam tor tne posmon at Amded Clerk wnmn me 1“ l\DDhcarIt's firm? 5 3 on 1 7.2022, the 2"“ Applicant submtllefl documents tor the purpose M rsgtslrahnn for the Amctss at cterksntp, |a the Respondent tor constderatton, ts 4 on 7.7 2022 the 2"‘ Appheanl tonnatly executed an tnstmntent otctentstup, oonfimtmg tne 2“ Appttcants appotntntent as an Amcled cterk, under tne tutelage of the 1“ Appltcant; 6 5 on 29 7.2022‘ the 1*‘ Auphcanlsenl a Iettartntne Respondent wtm the Regtslralmn Appltcatton, tnctuswe at some supporltve ddeumentatton, 5 6 However, on 5 5.2022. the Respondent issued a tetter to ttta 1-‘ Apphcanl, reteclmg tn» 2"“ Appttcants Amcted ctentsmp apultcatlcrli B 7 Pursuant to the Respondent s te1ec1tonIeuer,Itte Respondent axptatned me 2"“ Appncanrs anplicatinn tut Amcled ctarkstup was repecled due to the abclmorl t7fArliz:Ied Clerksmp; as Aucordtrtg lo the Respondent, was ttte above tenet, ma Respondent decided to abolish Amcled clerkship dunng a meeting held on 5.1.1985; and Pill a M n m znoqtwmmsevzwmuua «mu s.n.t ...n.mn .. u... u may t... nrW\n|“|Y -mm: dnuuvtml Vfl mutta v-mat a 9 on mat basis, the Appllcanls filed tnls appllcalmn la ludloially revlew the Respondent's declslorl In relecl me Appllcarlts‘ appllcalron tor Amcled Clerkshlv on the gmurrds lhal Arlinlad Clerkshlp was aballshed on 8.1.1965 The around: «or ju al review 7. Eased on the Statement, me Appllcanls seek In challenge we declslon dttne Respondenl on me ground that me Respondent had acted In excess cl lunsdlcuarl and acted NI an irrational / unreasdnanle manner The Applicants argue mat; 7 1 tne Respendenrs declsiorl and lne Decision on 31 1955 wmch relecled me Applrcanis appllcauon ldr leglstrallorl as an Arliclsd Clark llicanlrary to Ihe Respdndenrs vuncllons and fesponsiblllllss provided under Secllon 5 anne LPA, 1.: Rule 4 dune 1979 Rules dblrgales lne Responder“ to reglxlel the 2" Annllcant as an Amcled Clerk alter salrsiying all the cnndrlrdns pmvlded, 7 3 the Raspondenrs Dsclslorl and in: Declliion on B 1 1955 is lrl canlradlcllon ld Arltcle 44 ol the Federal cdnslllulion (Fc) whlch provides that Federal leglslahve power shall be vesled in Parliamenl: 7.4 tne Rspondenfs Decision and the Decision on 81 I985 cdnllrcts Wllh Amcle 5 dune FC as n denies U152“ Applrcanrs right to support mmselt and the 1" Applrcanrs ngnt ld provlde a living allowance in the 2* Applicant as an Anrcled Clerk which had been provided ldr under the 1979 Rules: 75 under section 5 dl (he LPA. me Respondenl IS duly empowered to make rules and do all necessary and mdenlal Ihlngs ld lmplemenl tne purposes ol the section. vuesut 11 rn znoqiwmmsavswnmea "Nair Smnl mmhnrwlll be UIQG a may i... innn.u-y mm: dnuurlml Vfl .nuna vtmxl 7 e the Respondent‘: declslnn shomd oe quashed as n 15 unreasonable as me 2*’ Apphcanl has met an the wndmons my the reglsu-Ilvon e1 me Anmles o1 Clarksmp promdea under me 1979 Rules mrough the supply of documems (or me purpose M reg1s1ra1ion as an Amored clerk, 7.7 we De on on 5.1 was shank! ha annuuao an 11 is unreasonable. considering lhe Responoenrs funcfians under me 1979 Rules which reouu-es me Respondem 1o nanore me enlry o1 any person mmugn (he AmI:\es o1 C\e1Ksh1p mm me aim o1 bemg admmeo as an advacala and salicnorz and 7.3 me Responoenrs oecmon and me daemon on s 1 1955 have den1ed1he1“App\1cam‘sIegmmala exaac1auanIhal 7.a.1as long as me A1Jp\icants oomphed with me rules provided by me Respondent, me Responoem wouki naqis|sr me 2"“ Aupllcanl as an Amcled mark by Rule 4 oHr1e19‘/9 R1115. 7.5 2 ma Rasponoenu wm oompuy war. and gwe eflecl 10 ms rules aeooromg 1o Section 5 of me LPA‘ 7 6.: me Responoenu will oomply wnlh me LPA no me 1979 Rubs m pervonning (heir dunes; and 7.8.4 the Respondem will pubhdy publish lhe declsxons made dunng Ihe meelings wmcn mmally were not open (0 the pubhc irldudirlg me Reapenoenrs dacwsmn at me 31 1935 meelmg on wmch me Respondent‘: Decismn 15 based. Tho Lxw 8. Judi al Review 1! generaHy concerned with the decismn making process where me unpugneo omson 1s flawed on the ground of procedural mlpmpnely »...s.vu m Euoqlwsvyh-savzwkrwuun «mm. saw ...n.mn .. 1.... 1: may 1... mm-y -mm: dnuamnl VI .m1a v-max 9 However, me law has now developed la allow a ueclslon |a be challenged on grounds ol lllegalily and lnallanamy, whlch men permlls me ca-ms losclulinlzelhe dGOl3lOH nol onlylorme process, bulalsalnrsubslanw, 10 ll ls saflled law lhal me Hlgh Own wlll rml lnlervere wlth a daemon 01 the Respondent unless ll can be eslabllshed man we aeuslon ls lnlecled wllh srmrs ol law 11. In me Federal ccun case ol Aklra sales 5. sarviou (M) Sfln Bhd v. Nadlan lee tn. Ahdullah and another appeal mm] 3 MLRA sac; (201312 cu 513; [2013] 2 MELR 3:17: (2013:: MLJ 5:7, lhe liberal approach an lualclal levlew In R. R-ma clundnn v. Yhe lllduslnal Court at Malaysia 5 Anor [1991] 1 MLJ 145; [I991] 1 CLJ 147 has been re-amphasllad as Iollows 1451 ln me same anneal, Edgar Joseph Jr rca lEusnN cu... u. agveenwm) uld Iha| an award could in luvlvwed Io! suhslanoe .3 wall u rm mural! ‘ll nnen we lhal luaml ml/aw .1 cmlclmad nu ma lha declsvcm am we decvilulrmaklrln Wuoess {See e 9 cm Constable m Nam Wallis Pollce V EvaMl19B2]1 wm H55) Tmspmpnslllon allulllace value may well convey ma lmu.-mu lhal me lunsdlalen ol the mm; m Judlclal Rawsw plvoeedlngs ls oonflned In nus! what: we aggnaved may nu ml IEDGIVM lav lrealmavfl «mm Iumorlly nu Much he has been subleaed Fuldmerermy. In me wmds mm Dlplmzk Cmmcil alclvll s-me. Unlnn: L011 V4 Mlnlunrlwlhn cm: smlcn lmsl AC an were me lmpugnsu dnclslon ls flawed an the gmuno av proceduval lmpmpm, Bm Lam Dlplecks ml grounds lol lmpugnlng a fleusmn mcepnma lo Jur.1l:laIRavlaw mm H -bundanliy clear lhal Inch 1 duclllon l. 9 open : challenpn on gmumlu ul lllugamy and ‘ mnlonalny and ln prlC“€Cu Inn rnnnlu (M mm to Knnlnlu uch dlclnlovll ml only lav Froclssl bln also for subuuvwu. In (N: nonlaxl, ll -s mm lo Hula haw Lon! omlua lat DD 4104!!) defined mslmee qmlmdsoi review m M! (l) lllagamy, my manunamy and llul Dmmdunl lmnmpllaly Yhls IS Mwhe pm ll ly ‘llhgallly’ as a grmmd om Judlclal Rmnew I mean Inzl me declsnn mm mm undamarld coneqly Ina law lhzl ngulalu Ins aecmumuak-nu nmram mus|glve anacllo ll Whelherhe run a. Huh par axcallenca - mm.nl- qnuhun la la. dacldld. m the am almspme. by mass persanx. me lungs; by wmm Ihe Jmlcml paw ulme um ls axemlsable raunu: sm zuoqlmwymsavzwumm “Nair ml mmhnrwlll .. U... m may he mm-y -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNa Wm! By n-union-lily‘. I mean mal ran by now be weclnmy velarved In an wsanasaay unmnmnnblumll (see Assaclalea mpymal plows Nnuses Lm y wsamlamy cam mus] l xa ml ll apphumldeclskm whlch Vsmnulmgaausln nsasnanpsomgm aralwcsdrad maul alanaama man no ulmhla person who naa appllaa ms mm In ma querllcn m be deemed mllla have almed al ll Whmhav a dlcmnn lam mum ms aalawry la a uuman mat luapes py mslr llama-p and expenence smuld be well Oaulppld In answer‘ DY alsa mare would D5 samalnlng badly wvong wvm our ludlclal syflem To lurnfy ms D0\AflS' exsmlsa ol ws me. man l mlnk ls «may rm lnngu needuu lo vlspwm lzaaumaa Innumous swlanalmn m Edwards y IrIlnw|1955] AC «A or lrrallonalny as a Qmulld for a mums reversal ul a dicllon by Iuznblnu ll In an lulu-an Ihuuuh unaavmapla mluukt at law by Ina asalsm maksr ‘lnallunalflf ny new can slanfl en la own lscl as an assumed ground on was» a daslslarl may as anasm by Juumlal Review l have doacvlbed ll-a ma mean as 'pmua..ml mwmvrlnty -amsl marl «allure la observe uaslc nlles ol natural lusllaa or l.llu.-la asmln pmneauul lllmoulmvanislha palaan mu wlll be afiecled by ms deizslons ms rs beuusa suID€P|ll>lHP/ lo lualclal mlaw undev ma head wvevs alsa fallme by an aamlnlslrallya llap-ml up observe Drocedunsl rules man ma expvessly lala down Vn the laglslalm lnslvumenl by Much us lunsdbnllml VI wnlsrvedl even wtluva such Vlfluva dou ml lrlvowe any aemal cl M|uml luslms. Lnrfl olploa am merlmnefl ‘proportionality’ as a possmls lolmh qmund cl VBVIBW Much callaa WW dtvelwmenl‘ (smpllasls added) 12. Further‘ me calm oi Appeal m Dale‘ 5 ul. Ahmad zanm hin Namldl, Menleli Dalam Nsgsri. Ksmanurian Dalam Nsgul a. Or: a. See LIIII A On ulna] 1 MLRA us; mm} a Cu 235; [2019] 1 MAR :35; [2013] 2 ML! was explained me Iesl cl reasanableness In a luulclal revlew as iollpws 1391 nu |ei1 cl reasonableness has been me supleclotmany nasesaverlms decades m mile! Corwflonweallh lunsaualans. Fm example‘ la deallllg willl ma ulwmrlancss unoerwhich on own ppm lnlervene lo quash the deaslon at an admmlslmllve amaal or umunal on ground pl unnasarublenan oi lrvslnonllllyl rlsnaly J of ma lm. COIAII m ma slals (all me Proseculmn of John «aspen and Emn J lysagml y nu Smuun vlam oompensallan Ynblmal {maul IR 542 sala number at am. wwmlanass ll. alnalsm (vmi. They are’ me n M 11 am Efloqlwsiyh-savzwkrwuun «ma. a.n.l navlhnrwm a. UIQG a my l... nflnlnnflly mum: flnuavlml VI nF\|.INfl Wm! 1 u rs ounaarnamauy an vanincs with reason and mmmnn sensa 2 n Is Irtdalenswe (av neanng .n me team 01 mam reason ana common sense. an : Becnuu ma court rs aanrsnaa hm hm amrnn-rnaxar his meacnea ms umsgalxm vmenehy me 'mus( ml flagrarmy rem or disregard lumnmanul raasan oannnan sense m reaching his demskvn my In Maadvws V Mlmsler Vov Juslwcl Equlny and Law rmann ana omen 12mm IESC 3 nennarn J n hermaa may set ml the lolluwmw lest we rean rncmaes me rrnpm uons1nu|ranaH|Mamn Mwnidwcmn m an docmon»mak\ng men anecu ngms and Gulls Imar aua -na aeermn. mmr smuld nor dnscegmd mnaamenrar reason or mmrnan senu In ruachmg ms or ner aesrsron me mnsuluhurml lvmtamn L7HImsa\a.rcn anses m|er nh: hum luv may onna mm: m prmoa ooni1nm-onamuhls Whcn a denswannmaker makes a decnsnan Much ameaa nghls men nr mvlvwmg ma r-aaonamarraaa ml the «sermon, (ar ma rnaane mull In vamnmly curmanad lo the nb1s\‘.1w: ems Veglslanon and nor armrary. unlavr or based on av uflmul consmnralnns. Ln) me nghll av nne person musl be rrnparraa as mm as pussrme: ana mare died an ngms shomd he pmpomonal to me objeclwe ‘ 13 In addmon, a aaaisron that Anvowes an error or Vaw is sub;sc| to Judicial ravrem as explamea by me Federal Com! m Mnjlls Pamnaann Pulnu Plnlug v. Syurikal Bnknrl mum. semaguna Sungal GI ugor nengan Tanggungan [1999] 1 MLRA33fl:[1BED]3 cu as;[1u9s1:uuR 3523; uses} a mu 1, whararlstaies: wn mmnewr marevare. unm-mans are spacrar nueumslancesgavemmg a ptmww case rwlwilhnanmng a pnvalwe clause at ms ‘nu: Io bu challenged. etc kmd, Judicial mm. will III to Imveuh all ermrs of In: men. by In Irdmlnillutivl bwfly nr lnbun unn, wt would mar rnvenor omms In In. words or Lam Dennmg In Psanman v narrow Schuul «arm an 9 747 no courl ot mu hi: my jufllulcltnn In rum an mm M It-van which me dnusmn .n flu an fluvtllus. If um um I: warn anerm, Ilgnu nmakdn n.s1une¢|suan ana mum’: will use an cmnn n." (emphasis added] 14. Based on me foregmng gassagea, it rs my view mane suooeea rn an appllcallon [or Jududal review‘ the AppH::anls mus: snow |ha| ma Respondent naa, amcng amers- - »...mu srn Efloqnwsvyh-savzwurwuun “Nana s.n.r lunhnrwm rs. U... a may rs. mmnuflly mm: dnuamnl vn mum mar a. Asked «sear irie wrorig questions, I: Considered imslevanl mallersi c. Failed |u lake reievani nieuers inw consideialion -1. Feiieu Io eepiytiie proper prinI:ip|e(s)a1lawi and/or a. Reached a decision iriai was no perverse Ihal no reasnrienie lnbunal under similar eireumsianees would have reecriea ii imiiniinery Objlclion (F0) 15 Al iiie ouiseiunhe hearing. me ieemed oourisei rer me Resvcriaeni raised a F0 on irie ground iriai me iudiciai review appiicaiiun was riled prerriaiiireiy and eeieeiive as me Appiicanis had nolexhausled irie grievance procedure below vesorllng 10 me iudiciei review. nie dcclllon emu Conn wimiier me judlclll rovllw is delectlvl is It is ie be noted ma\ me Applicants are chaiienging ine decision of crie Reeuonaeric wriicri rejeclnd irie Ipphcalion 01 irie V‘ Applicanl to register me 2"‘ Appiicerii as an Anicied Clerk 17 seciiari 2s imrie LPA provides as fulluws . Ruvluws Apnul «mi the aeeision offlnnrd iv Judy: 2a in Any vnrson dlssallsfitd Wilh any duclslon M we seen: mly Ipaly lo - meg. oer . uvluw nlmc music... (27 ii the seam Vail: Ia aeiemiirie any ieeuesi wflhifl SIX weak: mr ii vies mri mi submillsd ie in in. eppiicani mly eepiy iniaeii Ilzhun .. ii ine liquesl riea been eeieniiiiiea adversely |o riiiri r... In 17' 11 em zuoqiwmmsevswurmea “Nair s.ii.i nurihnrwm be UIQG M my i... nflmruflly mi. dnuuriml vn nFiuNfl Wm!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-25-22-01/2021

PEMOHON TIMREST SDN BHD RESPONDEN MENTERI KEWANGAN MALAYSIA PENCELAH Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri

Judicial Review- Mandamus - Seeking for order for Minister of Finance to give direction to DGIR to set aside or exempt Notice of Additional Assessment deemed served on the Applicant - Non reply or non- response of Minister to Applicant's letter - Whether section 135 of ITA impose legal duty on Minister to make decision - Whether Applicant circumvented and failed to exhaust domestic remedy i.e SCIT under ITA.

29/01/2024

YA Dato' Ahmad Kamal Bin Md. Shahid

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e5e11779-3928-449e-80e6-da0f3aa78439&Inline=true

29/01/2024 12:47:44 WA-25-22-01/2021 Kand. 79 S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N eRfh5Sg5nkSA5toPOqeEOQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—25—22—01/2021 Kand. 79 29/01/2n2L mu-u mum ummum rmecu MALAVA nu KLIALA LUMPUR mum wuuvm pznssxumm KUALA LUIIPUII. uuuvau (anvwsum xuAsA.xu:sA mus) we M AN snenssrmmc no wxzszz n1/2-:21 Da\am Pemava sualu penmmnnn ying talah mm: mm Ralpunflun manurm Stksysn «:5 dan Seksyen «man Akm cum Fund-pawn 1967 yang benankh a 1 2021 uan Kepunusan Responder! yang dwaflflwav dmakpz-un121 2021‘ Dan Damn pemw Mural! 5: Kaedah—Kaedah Mahkaman 2012 Amer: numssr sun arm Femumn Dan MENYERI xawmmu muvsu Rllnunden Dan KETUA psumuam MASIL mum NEGERI Pancelah Judgmenl lnlmductlon 1. The Ap m on 1.51.2021, filed an apphcauon (or weave Io cammenoe zumcm rawew pmceeding (Encloluvn I) under Order 53 ollhe Mes olCaIm 2012 (Roe) seekvng mxeranachevauawing — mm; sm -m«5Sw5nk§;.5xaFDqsEoQ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! 1.1 An order 1dr me Respondent td exevuse wts power under Semen 135 and/or Sec11on 127(3A) o1 Income Tax A11 1967 (ITA) 1:: set ds1de or axempl tne Nulice a1 Assessment var me years of assessment mu) 2012 2014, 2015 and Names d1 Additmna1 Assessment lor me \/As 2010, 2011, 2013, 2016 and 2017 an dened 2312 2G2D1ssu3d egemsc me Apphcanl (tn. Assulments) luv tne sum e1 RMSS, 321111 11 14 on the grounds met me said Assessmenls are .11ega1, void, unlawful and/or 1n excess 01 aulhanly, nad been matmnal and/or unreasonable and rasulled 171 a demar 01 the App\1canl‘s 1eg.tima1e expeclauons: 1 2 A Declaralvon met me galns ansmg 1mm tne dvspusal o1 cunwduon ngnus allhe s1mun;an Estate by me Appncant III the VA 2015 are subjscl to real properly gatns lax under me Real Properly Gams Tax Act1976(RPGTAj, 1.3 That an mnner pmceedmgs tncludlng tne enlcrcemenl and alien ol the deas1on be stayed unm me 1011 and 11na1 deIerrvIIr1aI1or1 a1 tne apphcanion to duasn 1ne decusmn‘ 1.4 That all necessary and oonsequanaal direclluns and order: be given, 1.5 That tne casts of H115 apphcallon be eosns In me cause. and 1 s All other and mnnev vellef M11571 1n1s Hcnnurable Conn deems at and Drover. 2. 1n essence, me Appltcanmled an applicauun 1m leave 1c commence judn:ia1 review based on me artegauon tnet Menten Kswangan Malaysia (Respondent) nad vailed |0 respond to me appucatmn made by me Apphnanl under secnon 135 and semen 127(3A) of the HA In exempt the Names e1Aesessment1or us 2012. 2014 and 2015 and Notices o1Add1t1dnaI Aisessmer1Il0rYAs 2010. 2011. 2013, 2016 and 2017 an dated 2312,2020 ralsed by me lnlervener 3. N12! the hem"? l msmissed the Appltnanrs applicamon for leave 10 commence Judloual review (Enclosure 1) I Wlll now set out lhe gmundslor rI\ydec1s1or1 P21: 1 M21 m -Rm55w5nkEA.5tnFDr1eEDQ «we. s.n.1...n.mm... d... It: may 1... mn.1-1 mm: dnuumnl Vfl .nuna M1 Sunenar Ccurlln remlxon to me vn|emre|aIvon and eonsuucnon of legnslauon and this consumes a denim of the Vegmmate expeexeuans of ma Appllcanl mm ma Respnnden| will Lake cogmsanue onhe same. case for mu Honourable Anomuy Gonuul and Imemnnr 11 The learned Federa\ Counse\ (FC} Vor the Honourable Anemey General and learned Revenue Counsel (R0) «or me lnlervener raised a swmdar prelnmmary amecuon (P0). The so was prenneea en mevouawung grounds . 1») No Daemon, Acl M onus;-on was made by me Respondenl (Mrmsler e1 Fmanee) under Order 53 onhe ROC: (u) The Nmice at Assessment raxsed by new whn was no! named as a pany «:2 [his aclmn. The Apphcam rehel m effem a mandamus however we Apphczrvt canned ta eexebwsn legal duty: (w) secuons 135 an: »2713A) of me ITA do not have nexus to set esme the Nance of Aeeeesmen: xssued by DGIR: M Applicant cmsumvemed and men to exhaust the uomesu: remedy pnmdea under the ITA The decision at me Court 12 I wm now dea\ mu me we raxsed by me learned FC and RC No a n. Act or Dmlnion was made bylho R yomltnl(MinlIInr at Funance) undnr order 5: mm: Rec 13 Order 53 Rure 2(4)o1|ne Rot: expressly allows persons who are 'adversery aflecied“ by me decxsxon made by a pubhc aulhonly to me 11 M12 m -Rm5Sw5nk§A.5lnFDueEDQ “Nana saw nmhnrwm e. n... e my n. mn.u-y em. dnuumnl Vfl mum em 14. 15. 15 17. Inlllile ludlolal revlew apphcallorls, For ease cl relerence, subrule 4 IS reproduced as follows 14) Any person mu m adversely alleclad by me dsclsoon action nramlssnn m relamn lo the axarma av Ihn puulc duly at Yulldlon am In Imrflod |a make the anflkcallan ' The raqmramenls dl Order 53 at the R06 are mandalory and must he aamplled wrm. lailing wmcn me applrsalldn would rml he emerlalrled by me Courl. The learned FC and RC submrl |haI the Rssparldam has made no declslon mal ls amenable to judlclal revlew and mal me Appllcanrs appllcallon ls prumalura. ll V3 to say that ma Respondanfs non- reply lo me Appllcarlfs lallar does nol amourll lo a decislun amenable lo Judlual revlew under order 53 ullhe ROG II ls late law lhal faulure or refusal by a publlc aulhorlly to make a daemon la also amenable to judlnlal levlew In Orange Ruderlel N): v. Kama Pengarah Hasil nalam new: lzml MLRHU 155; [2013] 1 ms nu; lzml rnuu zla, Azlzah Nawiwl J (Haw JCA) had allowed the leave appllcallon ind hid slaled (halt — an 41 On ma sama day‘ In: appllcaul Ilw mm to mo DGIR lining in llgal poslllun lhal pursdanna Anlue IX 0! ma Malays4a~D5rlmaIk DTA and me can laws Dlymenls moalvud by lhl Ivvllcnrrflmm WK! Swlva are um wnlecnd wrthholdmg lax Flmhelmnre‘ lhe app\lcsn| rerlelaled mm Amcle lx an ma Malaysla-Denmark rm prevalls over 5 AA llur al me ma new The appncaru also uxpuilly slam In an Iclur Ina! rt am new all; In nspami flnmunbly to ma Iplillclnfs rap: unhuon Ami apml, am. nu upllcanl mu mm: In aw--r and mmnmauon as bdnu relemd hymn new. us] when me new falls to respond lo ma zppllczms leller dalad 2912 2a1S.Ihe npbllcml hku ma poilllon line! we DGIRS laulardalad 2912 me I! ma dauwn 0! ma new and deemed to be have been iervad on me apvhclsnl an 29 1 2017 Mona, m lwnllcirrl "Inc an: Ippllcalinn lorjlmlclal ravlaw aclian. lempnasla added) so... xx 1:! )1 am -Rm55w5nk§A.5lnFDrlsEDQ “Nair ml nurlhnrwm a. d... a may r... mm-y -mm: dnuurlml Vfl aFluNfl Wm! 15, II Is Imparlanl to nme that Order 53 onne ROC aflows car a bvoader scope M revrewame decIsIans as compared |u Ine pnewous provmons under Ine Rulas 01 (ha mgr. Cmm I930 A aecman deemed made by me RuponaenI Is sufficIerI( lo Inmate an appIrcaIIorr Ior IudicIa\ rewew, In Tnng Kwor mm a on (supra) me Caurl uIAppeeI held - 1501 Ins olner pom 1a4sed by Ieamed oourwel more us‘ Mm Iar lass confidence‘ rs max (here was mvv nu 'de<:IsIIxI‘ try anyone And Smoe o 53 Y 214» speaks al a ‘deasIan‘, me .rppImms me no cause In Iran: on anapp\>cahan(ovIuflIcIi\ rm». A.fil|n.lclnnuIlgnI o. 53 r 2(4) must run Benin In Isomm. ll mus! ha ma canmmn y, Iagmhtr mm o. as r 1(5) wmch pmvvdes [51] mm sub-rules an mu Inqnivnrlnd III uuIr pinpurcovlhlxt. II can bc mn mu mm mud rum lluuyn B: an nclual doclllnn by smlwnm. (ernpnasre added) 19 I named Ina: Ine HIgh ceun has adapted e srrnner posmon In allowmg ,uuIcIaI revlew agamst deemed deusmns made by nubIIc euInorIIres. In nus regavd, me Hlgh com nae flecllnefl |o naIy an oldsrdecminns Inamere prervused upon omer 53 we zmoune Rules at HIgh (Dunn 1930‘ were me ambn cl revrewame dec1sIons Is |ImIIed 20 I can provide no beller reference man me case I11 Irnpiarr Seloka Sdn and v. Menlnrl Kuwangan Mllayala [2022] MLJU 3479; [2022] AME! 20:0 whemm my Iearned bmlhan Wan Anrnaa Fand J held as Ionows: - 1211 WI: Keamod Setwv mm-I cmrnm mrerm my allanl-on In Ina rrnpugnea Iearer and Ieferved nre (0 Ine mgn»enI more com otAppeaI Abdul Ruhlvun bun Abdullan Mum 5. cm Damk Banaav MI; Lumpur L Aner {anus} 5 MLJ m ca nu lllnwd src am. xuhmilhd max rm MInI.I.n non-vuponn In In. lmpunned lengr dues ml can! «I. u dnclllon wIIhIrI Ine mnanmg cn o 53 r 244) In short Ins Iezrnea src mnxended IneI any anemm |o conven 2 ‘deemed muIm~ would gm I-In In In .mIeI.I munlmz In In. were “de<lslm." [231 wmr reauem. nnnshmld approach mm. on an lms snacvfic Issue In Abdm Rahman hm Abdullah Mumr wrm cauflon My reason IS Inrs nu do llun In In. co-In M Appul II prumlud on o 53 r am of Ihelanur Rules am uh com: «um. II states as Isms V r... 11 aux em -m«5Sw5nks;.5IaFDqeEDQ “Nana s.n.I mmhnrwm .. I... M my me nrW\ruU|Y mm: dnuumnl Vfl nFIuNa v-m:I Any person mo vs .adverse\y aflefled by me «seems av any publw; xulmnly mu be ennmed to make me epnudmn Hmaevev, on nut o 5: r 2(A)uV me ROC pmxdes Bs(aHaws . Any person mm is advnrsuly an-cued by me decblun, acllon 07 em -Inn m relalmn In me emzm-,e on me awn: duty or m-mm snau be enwed Ia maks me aunneawn my Thu rww o 5: mm M ma no: but name an pr... -am;-nu, nclion or em on m nlillen In me ulslence oflhe nun duly nr lunctlan.” In myvluw. Ilsa mm! omlulon 1- Implynllllun uemm an n u . non-duclilon. wm. the introduction on». ward “om llon n me new 0 as r 2;‘). In. qunllon of an "-nmem flocliiovn" docs not aongu . us- [an] rm umlulon or u Mm-dc n. In my mind, 1. ........m- In |Iml:|-I review. In um: um Hap Naswuddm v we Reg: Irar Msoaexies [201 21 MLJU 1523, the avnhcanl lnplmd am vvgtslraluon ea uxm under me Sumehes Am 1966 We dacmon Io vewstemr olhemsa .5 wvlmn me ductahun Mme Ramslmr unflev me seceues Act me me Registrar ws unpmnld by me Socnelves Act In mnsnder ma nppmzlllnn and maka e deasuon Hflwever, me aegm-er had men «a make a decwsum — one wnyar me alhav vmlhnn Furamzguw JC mow JCA7 we mat: m my apmbn (M murdlrlibe and wnlunmng new wvxmm good mason m the msmnl cau ws equwvakanl to remsal m make a demon As me apphcam has sumcxem Vega! mlzvesl m ma aw, dc me Rsgwslral w nuke a decwsnn on me Epnhcnlmn m vagina! wanna H1u\dthI\\he remax m make a dwwsmn ws umawfm and we vnres Ihe Souemes Act 1966 (emuhasvs added) a) (See Syarikat Kapll Sdn Bhd v. Mnmn Kuwanuan Malaysia and mm eases (20231 AMEJ M71, [znza] uuu 524: b) an Agriculnm Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Memari Kawangau Malaysia [2023] 4 MR 961: [2023] MLJU 430: ch CMMT lnvasfment Lld v. Mam-ri Kowangan Malaysia [2022] MLJU Mo) 21. Based an me above‘ r: us evident that me Respondents deemed decision of 12.1 2021 ansmg lmm we nan-reply to the Apphcanfs lane! can be amenable In maven renew under Ordev 53 Rule 2(4) OHHS ROC Put In at 11 em -m«5Sw5nks;.5mFDs1eEoQ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. d... m my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 22 Thelefme, «ms Courl does not agree mm the oanlenlmn oi the Ieamsd FC and RC on this onjeuuon. The Mouse 0! Assnssmom umd by mo DGIR who was um namad u u puny lo ml: acuon 2: ma Iaamad FC argued lhal by not nimmg me DG\R vn ma present sml ws mdsed vnvolous and vexauous because we sumect manar relates w me assessmems raised by me new Hence, me aasusmenli by ma DGIR Is ma dacwswon lhal ma Aopluzanl ws dussausfied mm 24. Huweven pursuam to an war of thy: Caurl dated 15 2.2u23 me DGIR has been allowed to xnlervene as an Vnlervener m Ims ;udxaa\ review apphcaucn under Order 53 Rme 3 oi me RDC. Tnerewre, x View |haI ms weamse FC s omecnon is a nun-wssue and has became acadermc Tho Aonlicam to n affect a mandamus‘ However, the Ann mam Ialled lo eslahllsh Inga: duly 25. The Ieamed FC omected ma: me Appncam Is ndx enlnled |u a rehel lo comps! ma asspnndam |o san inside me Asssssmsms Issued by DGIR an dated 2312 2020 as me Respondent has no Vega! duiy to do 50. 2s The Federa\ caun m Mlnlalnr at Financl. Government of Sabah v. Pelrojasa Sdn Bhd [znon] 4 ML: 041; [znnnj 5 cm 32:; [21155] 1 MLRA 105, new man an order at mandamus can he gramad either (3) under Section 44 dune Speufic RehelAc11950(SRA). or (1)) me addmona\ powers at the Hugh Courl pmmdad by paragraph 1 av ma Schedule m ma cudns ul Judicalure Act 196A|C.lAj u... :5 at 22 m ->m5Sw5nks;.5xnFDqsEoQ «mm. and ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 27 II 15 also to he named that Order 53 Rule 1(2) anne ROC pmwdes mallhis Order (0 53 ' surzyeaxotne prevwslons aicnapcervm of Pan 2 01 me SRA. 25 Trverelora. any apphcanun «or an order of mandamus made by way of yuu maaw prmaaanga must oump\y with (he ruquxmmsnl 0! season 44 Mme srm 2»: Salmon 44 of me SRA raads as Ioflowst “ENFORCEMENT or ruauc nuns: Pnwev lo alder mnhlicurvanlsand others to do eamin spocific am 44 (1) A Judge may make an aide! vsqumng any speaflc an In be dams ur Vovbcme by my pawn nouamg a gum: amaa, Mamet av a pannanant ur a mmporsry nalum. av by any wvwralnn at any court subordmale In me man coun. vmmea |haI— (51 an apancam «much an ardev he mark by sum: person wnuse pmperlyy Vrancmse, oi pmanax mm would be wwred by me vomearing ardmnn u Ivva can may be, am: am specrfic -II!‘ ya) man dmng or iorbearmg ya, unflar nny \Iw car In: mm: mm m (mum uaanyincumzum on me Vevsan nrcoun m msnr us nuI7Iw<;chavaaar« man the oarpovnlmn m ua I>uIvaa|e amaanar. (c) m me npmnn 0! lbs Judge me doing or (arbennrvg Vs ounwnanl to nahmnd yuxhcw: mm In: Ipphcanl has In mflur Iplclrc and Idequnla may rumedy Ind (9) ma mmady gwsn by me amnr appuaa levwm bl cunpma (27 Nuwng m Ims sacum mun DI ueamau |o aulhanze a Judge- {aim make any amev bmdng on In: View d4—Fefluan Agong: 1») in make any mderon any sewanl of any Guvarnmem m MzlHY5\z. as such. manly (0 enioma ma sa|\:lnc\mn nl . cmm -pun mat Gavummumy M m Do Make lny urdurwmdl omm-am exvnssly lxcludud by any law my me mm mm; m lame. v... u M :1 am amfiswsnksmuwoquzoa “Nair saw ...m.mm be H... a my me mm-y am. flnuamnl y. muya may an 31 32. 33 :4 In Koon Hol Chow v. Prntam Singh[1D72]1 MLJ tnoa: [1972] 1 MLRH 497. snanna J (as ne men was) nad outllned four preroqumles assantlal lo the rssue at an order under seollon 44 of tne SRA or a mandamus- Il) Whether \he Aoolrcant has a clear and sperm legal ngm to me velielscughlt wnatner lnera VS a duty lmposed by law on lhe Raspondenls, wnalner suen duly IS at an rmperallve mtnistenal onaraelar lrwclving no judgment or dtscreoon on ma pm 0! ma Respondents, and (iv) wnecner the Apphcanl nas any remedy‘ olnar rnan by way ol mandamus, forme enforcement at me ngnl wnlon nas been derlled Io ntm Based on me case, in older to lssue lne order oi mandamus, lne App:-cant must snow not only mat ne nas a legal rlghl to have the act pertormed hu| lhat tne ngnt must be so clear, specific, and wall donned as to be free tram any reasonable oorltmversy The order cannot be lssued when lhe rIgh| ls dnuhllul, U a quillfied one or where ll depends upon an lssue 01 (ad |o be delermlned by {he Respondent The larlura to snow tne exIs|ence of any legal ngnt to compel lhe performance of a legal duty I251 upon the Rsspondem wlll deny (ha alder at mandamus Anolher important nurdle lnat needs to be crossed by me Appllranl lor an order at mandamus ls to snow that lnere la a du|y trnposed by law on tne Respondent ln tne absenoe oi soon legal duty, tne mandamus shall not he against tne Respondent. Oomlng backholhe facts tn lne nrlsen|case.|find(l1Il|he Anpllcant seeks an order to compel me Respondent tminlslerol Finance) to sat-aside lne Assessments all dated 23 t2.zo2o Tne queshon ls wnelner a legal duly exlsts «or (Ms court to grant a mandamus I nnd mat the relre4 sougnl by the Appllcanl ls Hke mandamus I e. to oompel lne Respondent to examse rls power undev section 135 and/or Secllon 127(3A) oltne rm ll must be borne in mind Ihatlhls power IS disoreuonary and ma Respondent has the tlberty In exerclse tts power wllhoul belng loroed to do so. u... n M22 m -Rm55w5nk§;.5ldFDrl-E00 «ma. Sum! navlhnrwm a. n... a may r... nflmnnllly sun. dnuavlml VI .nuna vtmxl 35 Mpreouer, me exernotran of tax sauont by me Apphcanl cannot be gtven wrmput wnsrdenng all the rerevant «acts and documents 0! ma case The aoproaen taken by me Applrcanl rs as .1 me Respondent has no aplwon other tnan to agree and awe by tne Apptrcant s request 36 rrterevore, rt S the respeottut mew ollhis court that there S no tegal duty |o be rmppsed on the Respondent under any law hence the Appncarrt 15 not antrued lo pompax the Respondent to 591 asrde the Assessment Issued by DGIR all dated 2312 2020 reason petnp Respondent has no tegal duly in set aside ute Assasments under me ITA section: 135 Ind 127(3A) M the ITA do not hnvo noxus to an utd. the Noticn of Assessment Ilsuad by lhl DGIR 31 The new V5 empowered by the ITA lo rarse tne assessments and the Applicant Is Irytng Io quasn me sad assessment by entommg |he Respondent to exams: Its dtscrettonary puwers under Section 135 and Seaman 127(3A) of H13 ITA whwch provides as follows’ — “us Fowl: M Mlnkurla pm dtrmtoru ta numtor Gcnnul Yhe Mtmlllr may an. [0 me DtranovGan:ra\avrec1.mns pt . generet charauer (um rnoonsrstent wtth tnrs Act) as no true exemvse at me (unchuns ot tna Dweclor senerat under um An. and me nnectar senarat snau awe eeteat In any dmacuons so p-van V 38 seexmn I27(3A) 4% me ITA reads as Iouows - E-umvmut lmm lax: general ‘mm The Munster may H1 any pamunav mse exempl any vemun trom an or my at the pronson M lhts Acl. snhar penarany pr VII respact at any rnponte at a Damcuvsr ktnd :17 any was: or muwme at a pameuvar MM‘ 39 upon readrng Sec n 135 and sectron 127(3A| pnne In t find met bo|h pravvstons parrytne word may wmcn cleany snows tnat the Respondent has a dlscreharl an wnetnerm exeretse tts poweror not under tnose said secttans and therelora‘ tne Applicanl cannot oornpet tne Respondent rttne Respondent enooses not to do so. nyxlevu rn -Rm55w5nkEA.5|rPDq-EDQ “None Snr1|\nanhnrwH\I>e med u may r... pflmnnflly mm: dnuamnl VI .nuna WM 40 41. 42. 43. 44 45 The word ‘may oonnole a ncwmandarory nanure as reflecned In nnne case on Lock Wee Keck v. Munneri Han Ehwll Danam Negeri 5. Ana: (199314 CLJ :11; [van] cc MLJ 531: mu] 1 MLRA Asa; [M9312 AMR 3169 where the nhern Supreme Cnurl he\d1haI:- ‘nan ms mg-nnnnaama 04 men a pvovmon nn ma nnnanp.-nannmn Acl wnnn renum (heleg:\dna1lman|o always enmfnna me use on me wnm smnr In its In-ndxlnry A-nu. In cnnlrnl to ms us. a! nu Marv ‘may’ whleh dunonn a mm on ur dlwnllnn" namphasns added) Going by the plam readnng on Sections 12713/n) or 135 or the ma, I am ohm vnew man no ngh| was gnven no the Apphcam enher no ask or dnrecl the Respondent (O exempt lhe assessmsru ransed by me DGIR. but nnsnaaa, in Is purely me drscretnun power of ma Respondenl (0 exemse or not Tms courn ns on the vnew man :1 Parnnamenn nnlsnds no an SD‘ Parlnimenl wnnn snana nrnan nrne Appnicann may make me appnncannon no the Respondent or me Respandsnn may nssus nnsnrucnnons In nnne DGIR on (he Applncanrs appnncannon. Therelore‘ nnne secnnan muslbe read plannly as negnsnanaa by nrne Parhamernl. nn nmnerpreling such provisions‘ wmsh are clear and unambnguous nrn meannng, this Honourable courn has ounsns1ermy nnenn nnan such provnsnons snnuuna be gwern um pnann, nanunan and ordnnary mesnnng. Furlher, our Supernor Courts have new man In innerprelmg sna|I.nlnry pmunsnorns, the Courts shnuld msreny gnve awacn In the laws enacnea by Pirhament and srnouna non usurp |ha le anive lunclrorn by exlendnrng s snanuns to meet a case «or which pmvnsion has cnaany and unuaunansuny non been made Based on the above. nms courn agrees wnnnn one submnssnorn of me neamed FC and RC man secniuns 135 and n21naA)o1nnne ITA :15 non nnaua nexus la sen asnde |he Assessmenns issued by ms DGIR. vageflauz m -Rm55w5nk§;.5nnFDrnsEDQ «wan. smnn mmnmwm .. u... u may n... mnmmny mm: dnuuvnml Vfl muua v-man Tho Appllcam circumvent and failed to Ixhanst the damuslil: mrrody provided nndu mo ITA 46 ll ls a van nol mspurea mat me Appllcanl challenged In me «arm at Nehces el Assassmems on me Appllcanl for VA: 24112, mm and 2015 and Nollces otmmluonal Assessments lur ‘(As 2010. 2011, 2013,2016 and 2017 allaaled 2312 2020 ralseu by me DGVR 47 The Apphcarll belrlg dlssahsfied and aggvieved by an assessmenl nu me said rlouces should make an appeal la me Speclal Oommlssluners 01 Income Tax (scln for delermlnallorl The rlghl no appeal is provlaea under Secuon as Mme VTA Afi. The Applltam had lnslead ‘shorl Elrculf and taken a ‘shancur to deal Wllh me addl|mrlal assassmem ralsed by me new Ihrougn the judlaal review applicatlon agalrlst ma Respondent 49 slnoe me Appllcant had already med Farm 0 lp appeal |o me son, «he applraalron tor luaiclel levlew by lha Applicarn is mvplpus, vexatlous and an abuse of the process pr me COWI Revemng to me case :2! Ta wu Realty Sdn and v. Dlrecmr Gennral at Inland Rovonun [mu] 1 MLRN 154; (2004) u cu awn: [1004] 4 MAR 52¢; [zonal 6 ML! 5:, me Conn re4used |he applleauon (or leave tar lualclal revlew and held that ‘[30] Further l mu also of me vlew mal the canwnem may or me lnslinl appilcaluzn am apphcams appeal uevpre me spepral Commsslnners canalrlly cansllluve . duvlrcllv ul Dvocgadmnl ind ll lndiad Invuluus velrztlaus and an almse mine pmcess enne mun * 50 There are numerous cases on lhls quesllon Mwhelhev an Apyllcanl shpula exnausl me domestic remedy available belore maklng an apphcallon for Judlclal vevlew, Cases have decldefl lhal me Aunllcanl ls not enmled in Inmate a ludlclal revlew pvooeedlng agalns| the Responder“ as the Appllcanl had falled lo exhausl Ihe slalulory appeal prppedure avallaple (See mu. Fongarah Hasll um... Nlgurl v. Aleml Luconl M ml. Sdn End 3. Ana: [2011] 1 MLRA 251; [2017] 2 cu mm 1 MLJ sss; Orlonlal Assombler Sdn Bhd v. Msnlari Knwangsm 5. Ann! [2o1a1 MLRNU 795; [2015] 1 LNS D15; Ta Wu Rlilly SI!!! Bhd V. Kellla Punqarnh Hail Dlllm M. 'a. Anor meal 2 MLRA 151; lzml so... to al .2 m -Rm55w5nk§A.5lnFDqeEDQ “Nair s.n.l mmhnrwm .. .l... m may he nflmnnllly ml. dnuuvlnnl VII .mm Wm! Background Facts 4 The hackgmund iaicls oi tnis case are extracted inani tna statement wlln suitable modification and are as iolluws: - 4 1 The Applicant is a company lnwivoraled in Malaysia and a wnolly owned Subsidiary ol Rtmburlan Sawit aeinao (R53). The Applicant is principally engaged in itia businesses oi eiiltivaiien of oil palm 4.2 viaa an Agreement and a Deed oi Asslgnmani tmiti ttaiao 30.12.2009 belween Rejarlfi Heipnt sun and and R53, the latter nasal had acquired an absolute assignment oi eeniineicial ngnt an Licence toi Flamed Faiesl tuvsl to eaiahlisn, develop and maintain tne plantation area locates in an estate known as siinunlan (cultivation ilgtita It trio siniuni-n Eat-t 4 3 on tne same day‘ RSB tiad assigned its ngnts over the LFF to me Applicant ioi lne latter ta carry out the cultivation at oil palni trees The assignment at lne cultlvatinrl rlghls at oie siriiunian Estate lo tne Applicant was undertaken wun me viewloi (a) apaiio lne oil palm culhvatiun business in Malaysia, particulafly in Sarawiki (b) Become one oi tne major oil palm plantation oonipaiiis listea in Malaysia, and let Extract greater tmsiiiess and cost synergies wniist boosting tne plofllahillty and assets tiase oi tlia oonipanieit iinitei ass incluaing tne Applicant. 4.4 Consaqltenuy. due to the decline in crude palm Oil pnoes in 2013, the Applicant encountered varlou: wmnllcaiians over rlslrlg operational casts, coupled with weak eeininpaity prices and crap pmduclmn Hence, me Applicant had decided In dispose of VIE cuitlvatlori rights at the Simurllxrl Estate as part oi the R53 Gmup's strategy to its |Dng—term piowtn plan. in doing so, the Applicant disposed of its culllvaliurl rights at the SWIUYIJEII Estate lo RSE vlde an agreamerfl dalad 20.2 2017. Duelclll IN -Rm55w5nkEI.5inFDusEDQ “Nair a.n.i nuvlhnrwlll a. UIQG In may i... nrtfllruflly MIMI dnuuvlnrll Vfl .nuna vlmxl 1 ILR 1; (200414 AMR 521; [2005] 5 CLJ 235: [2000] 1 MLJ 555 (court at Appeal): Romn Tan Pang Hang v. Kenna Fangamh Kenmn S-knrjn Mnlnynla a. Annr [mu] 1 mam 41; [2010] 2 MLRA 571; (201019 Cu 505: [2011] 2 MLJ 457). 51 Based on me above, ms Caun \s or me view Iha| me Apphcanrs appIvI:ahanlar]ud\cIa\ rewew-s premalure Thelaw pmwdas loran avenue la apnea‘ to be exhausted ms: before me scn pursuant m Semen 99 0! me Im Conclusion 52 Premlsed on me abresaxd reasons, \ am o1\he View met me Apphcanfs zpplmahcn «or leave |o commence judwcwm review ws mvulnus and vexahous and an abuse pmoess olthe com 53 As such, I msmnssed me Appllcams appucanon (or weave to commence Judicial vewew (Enclosure 1) mm cosls 01 RM2.5o0 00 lo the Hanourame Allamey Genem and Imervener wnhom me auacacavvee Dated lfl January 2024 Ahmad Kama! bm Mu Shamd Judge Hwgh Court Kuala Lumpur pmmm m -m«5Sw5nk§;.5xaFDqeEoQ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. 0.... m my s. mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! counsels Fov ma Apphcanl For the Honaurame Anomey General: For me Intervene! En s Sarsvanl Kumar (Cvk Tan Jess Key with him) Teluan Rash Dahlan Saravana Pannersmp, Feguamhela dam Paguamcara. Level 15, Menara 1 Dmamas‘ Solans Dmamas. No 1, Jalan Dulamas 1. 50450 Kuala Lumpur (Ru; Tuan: RDS/SKS/NH/2021/0441) cm Krishna Prvya A/P Venugopat Fsdera! CDUHSGL Jabatan Fesuarn Nagara, Eahaglan Gunman. 45, Persiaran Pervana‘ Presxnl J. 52100 Pulmjaya. cux Swan: Emu Ch: Vsmaxl‘ Revenue Counsel Lembaga Hasil Da\am Negen Mamysxa, Jabatan Rayuan Knas, Ara: 16,Menava Hasfl. Psvswaran Rimba Formal, C)/her 8. 63000 Cybeqaya. Se\anger. suaemm m -Rm55w5nk§;.5|dFDrq-E00 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! 4.5 The chronology at key events leadmg to me vssuance or the assessments‘ much are not VI mspute Is as foilows — Data ‘ 1a.7.2n2n The lmand Revenue Eaard(lRB)suhrmI1ed a I request to me Apphnant In iumrsn all V Informalwcn or documams, pursuant |o sectron B1 a1Ihe1TA,\n order1orlha\RB to connect tax eumt upon me Applrcant tor the me 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2015. Ulppltcanl. the IRE Issusd mt findings vid ‘1e||ev dared 12.10 2020 stong wrm Ils re sea lax eampmauens. Amnng me Vssues menu by the IRB are’ i 11.1t1.2ozn Pursuant to a lax auflll nonducled on the: 1 ta; The Applteanfs arsposex at (he cullwalvon ngms at the Swnuman Estate oonsmutes an adventure or wncem in cm nature a! true pursuant |o Saclmn 4(3) olthe ITA. (b)The chartering lees Incurred by me Appltcanl are not deuuctmle on the users that such expendtlures were na| mcurrsd In the course of proaucuan of grass Income under sectron 3341) at me ITA. (cmre payment nl labor costs Vn respect to nervesting and loading at tresn fnm bunches is no| deducnble nn me nests Ihalsuch expendnures were no eurrea V in me course at produclion of gross‘ rneerne unuer Semmn 33(1) et the ITA, and Bullet 11 m -Rmfiswsnksuatrforr-E00 «we. s.n.t lunhnrwm .. H... e may r... snmnsmy mm: dnuamnl VI .nuna Wm! (d|The expenditure manned by me Applicant in velaliun to me planting aciwilius an me Swmunjan Eslala were revenue in name and hence me Apphuanrs claim lor agnounme aHewsnce Is d11aHawed. I } 1u.1n.2a2n The Applsc.an| vpde 1!: Lu agem firm, Crows Tax (Samwak) Sdn Bhd. pvuvided damned ‘explanations at the Issues raised by me IRB Mme via Ianerdaled 19 10 2020. Among others. me Apphcanfs tax agent ekaboulsd m dam upon me lax creaxmem at me Appncanrs dlspnsal ol cuuwanon rights a| me Simuman Estate 11.11.2020 The IRS mamnamed as posman mm respect M 1113 audit vmdings. However, me >RB had; .pmvmea an oppcnumly lor me Applicant lo‘ provide further exmanahons. but at me same ume. slated 1s mtenhons 0! raising atmlnonm ‘ lax assessments (or me us mm 2010 no! 2017. 2.7 _ 25.11.2020 The Appvcanrs tax agent mmusnea turmer ‘ axmanalvons w1neIRB 14.12.2020 consequenuy, the RB had pn-mdea as response as loflwvs: (a)The gams ansmg from the Apphcanfs $59053‘ of the culllvalmn righls at the Simunian Es\a|s III ruvenue m name and hence can mm. me soaps Msecmn 4(5) at me IYA. 1 (b)The Appncam-s daxm my agncuuure‘ aflmvanoe .s disallawed on the bass max} an 1205!: manned by the Agghcam uurmg Iuesnvn m -Rmfiswsnksafinwfoq-E00 «mm. 5.11.1 ...m.mm .. .1... 1: my 1... mm-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! r the bass penod nap been computed as‘ tna amount of mnstderalicn recewed (C)The IRE aHowed tne Apptrrants exam for aeaumtons upon tne expenartures tnourreo on tne payment or Vabar posts VI respect to nan-estrng and loadmg aflresh trutt bundtes bul dtsallcwed me Appticanfscl rn tor oeauettons upon Ihe expendtlures incurred on enartenngtees. 5.1.2021 The tRs tssued the disputed assessments, wmctr were reoetved by tne Appltcam on 512021 r Th: Appltcam submtued s requesl to tne 5.1.2021 Respondent to one to tne Dtrector General of tntana Revenue diredions unoer seetron 135 5. or tne ITA and/at Io exempl tne lattes rateao under Seclton 127(3A) of the ITA t2.1.2a2t The Appltcanl tmprsssad upon the Respondent on tne urgency or me matter as me Appht:an|'s obhgatlon to pay tne addmonal taxes was ‘around the corner ep 4 e As tne Respondent had lartea to respono to ttta Applicant‘: reques| to tssue a dtrectton unoer sect 135 o1 tne VTA and/or exempt trre [axes arbnranty ra ed via the said Assessments nude! sectton 127m) ottrte ma, tn. Auphcanl ls makrng Ihls present application to preserve as tegat ngnta. Tne Reeponttenrs dactston tn ms tenure to respona ts treated as retecttng tne Apptreants apptrcatron tar request under sectron 135 oi tne ITA ana/or appllcauon tor lax exemption under Seaton t27taA)o1tna ITA Dueiovzz IN -Rmfiswsnksuattfort-E00 «war. smut ...n.rmr rs tr... e may r... pflmnuflly mm: dnunmnt vn mum vmut The uw 5 The Federal calm m WRP Asia Pacific Sdn and v. Tunuua Nesional and [2012] 4 CL: 413; [2012] 4 MLRA 257; [2012] A MLJ 205 aI303.spaaklng1hmugh Sunyadl Hallm Omar Fc.l (as he men was) held: Luv: muy bu meme: ll me have Ippllcilnun ll lIfl|\7$0Llfi'1(O'lSHIVD‘DU5l and ll leave is gvarlhud. an arguable mse lll lavur algranllng me new sought al lha slthslamlve heanng my be In: rusurlanl mnlonme A my musl be ememea la me appllcalmn mwgn LE unless me mallev for pudimal mew l3 smsrlablelolhdlclal mew emlmely rm suucsss may be snvlsaged The lest Iald down for leave lo commence a ]udICIE7 review in WRP MI: P-clflc Sdn and lsupu) are as lellows: 5 1 whether lhe sumecl matter ls amenable lo ludlclil review‘ and ll so 6 2 (mm me malerlals available, wnelner me apnllcelm l5 lrwoleus and W nol lhflughl as (nvolous, lo cmslder mat me Appllcanl has an arguable case le oblam me relleleeugm at me subslanllve hearing. The gun nles gavemingappllcallonslor leave (a cummenoe ludlcial review pmoeedlngs have also been set em m Tang Kwar Ham 5. on V. Flngumsnn Dlnahnru Nnlonal am: a On [zone] 1 IILRH 507; [zoos] 1 cu an; [2006] 5 ML! so at ea where Gupal sn Ram JCA [as he men was) held: my me me» ce-m emu ml go me me meme olme case El me lenve sage us mla ls only to see me epplmun for law: .5 lrlvnleus Sn coo wlll mu own he enlllled lo muse lenva n n. . us: were me nublnd matter 01 me lemems ours vlmch zw semen Lew: . erwmlen law urlne can-nan law) l5 mn-Judlclnnlt ' a. II ls me that me Applrcant have to sallsly me leele propaunded m me abovemanlluned eases lo secure me leava la commence me ludlcial review pmceedmgs. Al lhls slage. me court need not go lnlo me merils cl the case, bul only to see ll me sumecl maner IS amensbla lo lumclel revlew or wrlelher me appllealmn lar leave I5 lnvalous u... 7 at 12 em -Rm5Sw5nk§;.5lnFDqeEDQ “Nana ml nuvlhnrwlll e. H... e van! he mm-y -mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .mm mm 9 in any eireirl. a iudioial review is lrie disoialion ol llie Ooufli lne appllcallnrl lor leave lo ooninienoe iiidicial revlew may be allowed in exoeolional sircurirsianoes as explained oy me than supreme coun irl Govlmmlnl of Malaysia 5 Nlorv. Jagdis Singll (133712 MLJ us; [1933] I MLRA 207; [1957] CL! REF l1n wniai neld -Held allwwlrvg ms appeal (1) lliedisiaelion is still wiln lne mims In may my oi llafllclll iamw iiul wriere in-re IS an appeal droviiiori avalllbls id ins zppllum. eeneniri srrouid nol rioirriairy ISIHE Wlllli irisis is sriowii a clear lack lurlsdrcuorl or a niaianl iiiiliiia la Derlorrn same Slalulnly dlfly or in appvoplllla cases a serious branch orliie prlnclples oi riaiiirai iiisiiea - The around: to: ma judicial II aw 10 The grmmds ol ieliels sougni are based on «lie oonlonliori lnal lne Rasoondeiirs decision was illegal, void, in excess of aulnonly, unieasoriaole. iriaiioiial and riiade in oreaen ol me Applioanrs legi(lma|e exooolalion Tnese oonieriiioiis aio siioooned by seveval reasons among wnioli include lrie (allowing: - la 1 Thu said Assessrnenls are ullra wres, illegal‘ vuldi unlawful and/or in excess otamnonly loi lne lollowing grounds — (5) Firsily, lrie Resporidenl lailed lo realize lrial uiracloi General of Inland Revenue (DGIR) liad tailed to ooneidei lne express provisions olllie RPGTA, wrieieny pursuanl to section 2(1)‘ a ‘real prepefly' lncludss ‘any inierest, option or other nghls in or over such land’ in |hI5 eorilexi, ii is clear lriai ine Apolioanl derived a degree ol ooininercial rignls in or over llie siinunian Eslale, and suoli culllvaliun rignis oonlened no me Aoolioani sriduld be ieoognizod as me Aoolicanrs ‘veal piopeny lurlne purposes ol laxaiiori. (22) By siioieolirig lne gains arising iroiii lne Applieanra disposal or! oiillivalion iigriis al llie siinunian Eslale In Section 4(3) ol me in, lrie Respondenl tailed to realize lnel irie DGIR nad lailed lo lake cogriizarioo and disregarded lrie lrile pnnoiples established by me coininonweallri ooun wherehy ine disposal of iigrizs in or overland are cupllal in naiuia v... I or n IN -Rm55w5nkEA.5lwPDrl-EDQ “None Smnl luvlhnrwlll be UIQG a may i... nflnlrullly MIMI dnunvlml VI aFluNfl vtmxl tn McCLURE (tnspecto: 01 Taxes) u. Petr. (1993) 1 WLR 1355. tne Engttsn rttgh Coun ttad netd that me paymems received by ttte laxpayar tn punstdarattpn tot ttte disposal at a ttcertse to use tne tand lor depcsmng sptt were like eapttat and not revenue payments tn Able (UK) Ltd v. Rlvlnul and Cusloms Commllslonars [zoos] src m. ttta Engltsh cpttn ol Appear ttad dectded that ttte oortstdera|inrt received by ttte taxpayer consequent to tne dtsposat at the ngttt to use me tand as a tandtttt ttpptng stte ecnstttutee a capttat tecetpt tn Thu Glenbnlg utttpn Fl lay op. Lid .4. ttte Corllmllllnnorl DI Inllnd Rlvlnul 12 TC 417 me Ertgttsn Courl otsesston nettt tttat ttte paymenl recetved tor mmpensalton tn respect M trte disposal of me ngttt lo work mtrtarats on ma land was Hal 3 pmfil earned In the course at the taxpayefs trade, but was a capttal recetplt betng at payment made lur ttte stenttzattpn 0! a capttal asset. Apptytng lhe above estabttstted pnnctptes |o the present rVLa||Bft tt ttt cleav tttat |he gams ttnstng from ttte dtspussl at me cutttyatton rights at tne Stmuman Estate by ttte Appttcsnt ate captta nature and such gatns tau squarely wttntn ttta tour watts at Ihe RPGTA, (C) In detemnning wttetnet a partrcutat redetpt ts a reyenue at capitat tn nature, ttte Respnndart| snputd have realized tttat DGIR ts bound to look at the ctrcttrnstanees sttnpundtng tne dtsppsat as a wttote as evident tn NVF Rully Still and y. cntttpttattu of lnllnd Rotratttta [1974] 1 MLRH 39: [1935] 1 MTG 134; [1935] t ELI 234; [1974] 1 ML! 152 where ttte cautt ttetd tttat “the «peat patnt al Inquiry ts tne damtnant purpose «pr wtttatt ttte parttcular property was artginatty acqutred". tn lho present matter‘ twautd have been ouvtous to me Respcndenl tnat tttere ts elettrty no basts ttarttte new to merely tatse me ptesurnpucn |ha| tne gatns anstng (torn ttte dtsposat M trte Appttcants cutttyauon righ|s Dale s 0721 ru nRm55v5nkEI.5lnFDfisEDQ “Nair s.n.t nuvthnrwm be tn... M my t... nflmnnflly mm: dnuuvtnnl Vfl .nttne vtmxt mnsllmre buslrless lncarne wllhoul lakmg cognizance ol lne arcurnslances; and (.1) llwuuld have been abvlous to me Respondent. There l5 no basls lorlne DGIR la msallaw lne Apphcanfs alarm «or agnounure allowance upon me expandilums lrlcurrad on planllng acuwlies at me srmunlan EsIa|e desplle lne Appllcanl havlng sallsfied all me requlvemenls lrsred under Paragraph 7 Schedula 3 cl lne ln and lne llza 5 Public Rullng No. 1/2016 1o2 The Rasponaenrs daclslun had bcen lrrsllonal and/or unreasonable lnrlne lollowrng grounds — (at The Rssnonderlfs dcclsion is liable |a be quashad on the ground lnal ll is so unreasonable man no reasonama person could nave some m lnal deal n Thls ls aspeclally lrue when ms Respondenl had (ruled Io glve any valid ]I.ls|lVlcaIlon reason or laaslsvor as dsclslon not to exempt (I19 amltranly valsed taxes. (bl The Applrcanl a( all malenal limes amea rn good fallh, gave lull co-aperalmn, made lull and crank alsclosure and am.-lned pmlassienal same In managlng us finance and lax aflalrsr (C) The declsiuns 0! me comrnanwealln cams and our super-or corms ln ralallon Io lne rnlerurevanon and oonslrucllorl at leglslallon and case law are pan ol lne laws cl Malaysla and hlndlng on ma Responnenl The Respondent had clearly lalled la lake oagnlzance at muse deuslons; and (:1) The lallure loappreclale and glve effect to the true efiacl and appllcallorl ol Ihe ITA arnounls m a clear mrllravenllon OI Amda 96 U1 lhe Federal Consllmllon lrc) Anrcle es onna rc clearly states Ihal ‘No tax or rare snall be levied by or lor the purposes of me Fedarauon except by or under the aulhcrily of federal law" 10.3 The Responaenrs declslon was made wrlnoul navrng any regard In the decrsions of me comrnonwaalln Cllufls and our In: in n n m .nnssasnrs;.srar=o»..eoa “Nana Sum! navlhnrwm .. U... a may r... nflmnallly mm. mm. VI .nuna war

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

AA-38-842-05/2023

PLAINTIF MBSB BANK BERHAD DEFENDAN SARASWATHI A/P SHANMUGAM

Civil Procedure - stay of proceeding cannot be proceeded by the Defendant without prior sanction of Director General of Insolvency under s.38(1)(a) of Insolvency Act 1967 - Leave to set aside the Default Judgment in an unrelated case involving different party has no bearing on the Plaintiff's foreclosure proceedings. - A stay of proceedings cannot be granted to the Defendant based on an unrelated case involving different Plaintiffs but the same Defendant

28/01/2024

YA Tuan Moses Susayan

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=826d89e4-f15b-4433-b47c-63e8179d9049&Inline=true

GOJ Saraswathi v MBSB -(FINAL).pdf 28/01/2024 22:03:45 AA-38-842-05/2023 Kand. 27 S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N 5IltglvxM0S0fGPoF52QSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal no m 25 an 35 sw auuywxmasnvsverazusn ‘Nat! Sum M... M“ be use: m mvv ». .m.m m M nnmmgnl M muuc vim! AA—3a—aa2—n5/2023 2;, M /;;;< DALAM MAHKAMAH IINGGI MALAVA an Iron, DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN, MALAVSIA SAMAN PEMIJLA No. AA-Z4MFC»10<fl1!2|l23 PERLAKSANAAN no AA-33-B42—n5I2I)23 Dalam Perkava Mengvnai Seksyen 255 Elm: 251, Kamm mm. Negnm. 1955 DAN Dalam mum Mengenal Gndalan ke alas hananah dikenali sebagai GERAN mas: LOT 403653 MUKIM KAMPAR nnsmm KAMPAR PERAK mululul Perserahan No. 11374l2n1s beflankh: 1a.o5.2n1s) mm Dalam Perkarz Di hawah Alurzn :1 dan as Kaeaah-Kaenah Mahkamah zn1z. BETWEEN MBSE mum EERHAD 1115122.») (Na. Pendaflaran: 2on5mn3a9a1) Plalmlfl/Martgagee AND SARASWATHI A/P SHANMUGAM (Nu. K/P: 720516-035152) ...Da¢em1amIMungaguv GROUNDS or JUDGMENT Imreauecim. .e m. In (ms case, We Delendantmed an appuceuon (m Enclosure :7; on a cenilmate ev uvgenq seexmg an Ovdev |L7 s|ay an upcmmng e\ectrL7rHc Dublin anchor: schadmad Var December 5, 2023‘ at 11 on AM on me e LELONG websue. ms auchon penams xo (he Devenaenrs properly‘ Much has been schedmed for sa\e as a 45 vesull ol the Ordev lo! Sale and auclmn aheady obiamed an O::1aber19‘2D23. [21, The Delendanfs pnmery argumem rewowes around an apphcahon filed an August 29, 2023. seekmg weave |o se| asme me Delaull an Judgment ememea on February 12‘ 2020, m men Sasswcns Coun under sun no AA-A52NCC-61-01/2020. u .s -mponanx co note max (ms sums unrelated In me PVAWIMV here In me puesem aamn The sun nu AA—A52Nccmm/2020 was Insmuled by Ma\ayan Eankmg Bamad. where a Default Judgment was ublamad agamsl 55 me nevenaam and two zziomere by Malayan aenkmg Berhad. ms us evldern «mm ‘Exhlml s.r m me Deveaaenns emaevu suppomng me zpphcallon m Enclusure 17 (31. The Delsndam asserts me« her apnhcahnn m set aside me delauh sn Judgment has smug menls‘ e nenev subslarmaled Dy eawce «mm her cmmse\ She malmams mm .« her appllcalwon ws successlm m z N 5\H»;\vxMusn:GPuF5zusn we Sum M... M“ be used m mm e. nvW\ruH|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm an :95 am ms nu us aw smqwxmusnmwarszusn ma Sum nu-nhnv WW he used m mm a. nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm [I6]. [I1]. [us]. Inst Pewam Ftamlfl (mm membangkukan bahawa Guamsn smr up 22. 56-20475 (alan mamml ks alas Ptarmfl karma msndapa! sarvksr nlelv KPI sslaras dsrvgan sek J8(1)(a) Akra 350 yang merwakakan ‘ya; in: bankrupt shall be mmmpetenl in mamtam any aclmrv folhsrflvan an action Yardamayss m Iespecl DY an mjury (0 ms versofll wvmom me Drevrous sancuan a! me Drrecmr Gzrvzrsl 0/ Vnwlvancy, Therelore. I hold that me Delendant Vacks me reams-me slandma lo file lhe appumauan m Enclosure «7, am, as a mam‘ me sad Endusure Is msmissad. In any case, conoermng me menls ol me uevenaanrs avbluzauorh I agvee wnh me Hammers algumern mat me prooeedmgs relevenced m Enclusme 15 ¢Exmm 54; do um pertain |o the Flam|\fl‘s case. The lawsr cmm nroceadmgs‘ m wmcn ma nevenaam sought m set aside me Default Judgmem, are enhrew dmerent and unrelated to me Flamlw or man mreclosme achon The Plaimifl in Ihis mallev has already obtained a valid and move! coun ‘mdsr for sale‘ based an me mungaga and vmacuaaura Dmceedmgs, Even n ma netemanva appllcahan for leave In sel aswde Ihe Dsfauh Juagmam were |o succeed‘ wt wumd not have any heanng on Ihe Plenum lnredosure nrooeemngs and the aucuon scheduled cor December 5, zuza. The P\mnm1's ioneclnsure n pmceedlngs ale enlnaly lrldependerltuf ma Delendanfs actions VI ma lower own by Malayan Eanklng Bemad. The Flalnllfl relalns me nghl to proceed Wllh (he calm-oraeleu sale and aucllon, whlch 320 V5 based on lne lareclosule prooeedlngs ln-llalea due lo the uaranaanrs delaull W paymanl, leadlng la lna Issuance ul a slalulury nullce under Folm 16D VI accurdarlce wllh Sec1ion 254 onln Mauovul Land Col1n(RevII u Zfl2fl![Ac1B2l).resulllnQln lhe sulasequenl Order lor Sale an [IE]. snnllany, lna clrcumslanoes sulmlmdlrlg ma sui| W lpull Sessluns com Case no AA-ASZNCC-E1-01/2020, lrwolvlrlg a mllaranl pany, do nol amaunl lo a special clrcumslanoe jusllfylng a slay or pvoceedlrlgs In lne Plalrlmfs lureclosure acllan 330 [20]. whlle I do sympalhlza wl|h me nelennanl, who ls al rlsk ol Ioslrlfl me me! ovev her new and nave sugges|ed lnal lne pames explore ways la prevent the pmperly llum belng aucllanea m a mm party, I am nanemelass rlcl mcllned |L7 gram a stay nus declslorl ls based 135 on ma reasons I have Drevlnusly alaleal and l am also unwlHH'|§ lo pmvlde addlllunal Mme lorlhe Devendanl lo seek approval «mm me Dlleclor Geneml av Insolvency, pnnlanly because there IS no pending appeal or appllaallan Io sal aslde ma order cm sale Funllennorul even ll ona were lo s(rs|ch |helr lmaglnallon and w conslder ma: me appllcal-on lo sel ESVHG lhe aelaull luagmenl WI me lower mun sull nu AA—A52NCC(i1—UI/2020, has some relevance la the P\aln|lf1. n IS important In Hale mamna apphcallon was man very lale nu ma proaeaalngs. The nelaull Judgmem was N 5H1qlvxMuSnIGPuF52uSD ‘1 ma Sum M... wlll be used m mm a. nlwlrulllv mm; nnmmnnl VII .mna pm wssued m zuzo, whfle the apphcallon m se| :4 mm was mad m 145 Sep\ember2D23. Vn «ms regam, it \s wunh recallinqlhe rulmg Mme Feaerax Court m me case nf Tum H-wllilhmed Abdul Rlhman v Ann-Malayslnn Flnnnco End (1995) 1 cu 241,- [1995] 1 MLJ an Havmg samnannsnnmuue eddedmanhe epplrcanou to set Asa ssrde such sludgment Shawl! :2 made is! wvllv reasonable ymmymufla m nllvarwoms wwwv a rsawnama lime, mm; before me aersuaam has taken any nssn step alverbsmmmg aware .71 the vrregulanb’ “ Ooncluiiun ass [21]. In conausmn. me Delendam Vacks wows la malnlamthe avplvcanon and m any event me apphcauon Vacks mm and acmmmgly, I msrmss Enclosure 17 mm no omens as «o costs m Date: 23 January 2024 Whmsuqu MOSES SUSAYAN ass Judicial Oummissioner High Court In Malaya at Ipnh. Perak N smqwvxmasnmwurszusn B W; Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm Parties: m For m.-mm Ashmafll omman uogemer mm Mohamad man Naum hm Mend Alma} Mvacales and Soncwor [Messrs Zulpadlu s Eflham. Ku.a\.a Lumpuv] 3,, For Delendanl 1 Teehan Kumar Mvacales and Sohcuov [Messrs Kesh‘ Dave & Parlnevs. Kampar] m [Nance ms Gmunds afflecrsnon IS subject ya amoral ednorra! revision) Hendnolcs: cm Procedure — 5|ay of pmoeemng cannot be pwoeeded by me Defendant wrlhum nnar sanmmn av Director General av lnsoh/ency under us s.3am(a> M msalvency Act 1957 - Leave «a sec awe me Derauu Judgment m an unlemed case mvulwng dlllerent party has no nemg on me Flamlwfs lL7vec\osure pmceedings. — A s1ay of pruoeedings calvml be granted mm Davsnaan: based on an unrelated case mvomng dIWarsn| Plamms but me same Defendanl 1. N 5mq\vxMusn:GPaF51usn mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm me Ipan Sessluns cam, me necadn Judgment would el1ec|we\y became aaadenna rendenng any aucmon unnecessary Tneyenne the never-dam argues «nan -n Vs essenI\a\ for her appucanon m be as heard and deemed before me adcuon proceeds mus pom wm be daauwun later m me gmunds] (41. It ws me Defenflanfs sunnnssmn max w me am-on nroceeds as scheduled on December 5, 2023, u could render herapphcahan lor m slay yeaunaang palemlally Weeding In Llmusl consequences ms concern stems from me pussmimy that ma uevenaanc may umrnansxy succeed In ssmng as-de me devaun mdgmenx, onw lo find her pmpeny avesfly aucuoned W. 75 [5]. In summary, the Detendanrs appncanon seeks a stay of ma auclxon Drooesdmgs to saveguard her ngma and nrevam any Dolenum nusuce or Voss uesumng Vrom me sa\e of her uesmence Define her appllcahon m se| asma me delaml wagynenn ws heard and de|emw1ed an Puaimivrs objecliun [s]. The Plamull amacns In me Delendanfs appncanon for me stay 0! me puhhc auction. The Plaintiffs key arguments can be summanzed as (allows. N 5mq\vxMusn:GPaF5zusn we Sum M... Mu be used m mm a. mwvuulv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum pm xi 3) Fllslly, Irle Plalnlm mnlerlds mal lns Delendam, who was declared bankrllnl on March 3. 2021 and SW 15 an undlscharged barlKND|. musl oblalrl Drlur permlsslon and ssncllnn Imm me Insolvency nepsnrnenl before pursulng her appllnallun an bl seconaly. lne Plalnhfl mgnllgnls lnal lne nelenaanrs sppllcallnn lm slsy was made and filed wflhuut ohlalmrlg any speclficsancllun llum lne lnscll/ency Depanmenl. ms lack nl aumoilzalmny acouldlng |c me Plalnhfly renders me Delenaanrs aPD|II:a|lon null and mm as m. The Plalnml submits lne oolecllon on me nelenasnrs lack ol locus In Me Enclosure 17 (slay sppllcallonl is alone smclsnl lo dlsmlss me avnllcallony wllhuul havmg la consider |h2 mems DI me apnllcsllon. law [8]. The Dslsnaanrs lack ol locus slsrns lmm Irle playlslon als.3a(ll(sl ol Insolvency Acl1967 whlch plumes ‘:5 (1; Where a Dankruplllas nammslnsa NS mssnsygk (a) me barlkmplshallbelrmompelelll to mamlam any achorl Ntller ms Man an a:1lorl /ar damages WI nsspscl alsn m/M7 In M: Dersanl without the preylons sarlcnovl n! {he Dlvular General at Insolvency‘ [5]. The Delenannl-s appllcahorl ln Enclosure 17 {or a slay ul ms nu zuchon pmceedlrlg was suppuned by me Dslsnaanrs slnasyll (me undlschzrgad bankrupt) The zmazyn in suppcn nellher slzles nor N 5H1q\vxMOSnIGPuF51uSD ms Sum IHIWDIY wn be HSQG M yaw n. nnn.l-y Mvvls mm. y.. .;lm WM! exhlbl|s any sannlon «mm the Dlveclur General al lnsulvency On me mher hand, me Plalrlllfl, VI lhelr afildavll opnusmg me appllcallorl. ralsed obletmorls |o me luelenaanrs filing ol me 115 appllcallon Wlmoul ohlalrllng pflof sanchon lrom lhe Dlreclor eansval cl Insolvency There has been no [espouse «mm the Defendant la the Plalnlllrs allluavll m uvpusnlon nu). On the dale of lhe hearlng were me‘ whlch was on 4 December nu zuza, me Dalanaan: argued lhatlhere was no need hr sanctlorl because there was already an apphcallun Ned m ma lawerculm la set aslde lhe nelaull Judgmenl |ha| lea |D me nelenaanrs bankruptcy The Delenaanrs poslllon was lhal ll lhe ludgmerll IS suscasslully set aside, ms bankmplcy ovdev agalrlsl her would also 115 be lnvalidated. ll VS lmnunanl |L7 nala mat me ludgmenl H1 ualaull and ma resulllng bankmmcy amer agalnsl ma Dalanaanl were lssued by an umelslea pany, not me Plalnllfl [II]. The Delendanfs argument al nal needlng a szncllun la mamlam no her apflhcallorl ol slay ln Enclosure :7. IS misplaced. m]. In me case M Re Klma Klm Nack mm} 2 ML! 29, I| was eslabhshed that me requirement lm sammon does um avply m cenaln slmallans. These excenllarls Include cases where me 135 bankrupt ls seeking lo challenge in order m bankmplcy, applylng for dlscrlavge, or requeshng me wurfs dlscrellml in levlew, yescma, urvary any uldel lssued by me colm under lts bankruptcy N 5lH»;lvxMasnlGPaF5zusn ma Sum M... M“ be used m mm ua nlwlrulllv Mvvls nnmmnnl VII .;lma Wm mnsdizmnn The mlmnale behind this exception \s m ensue ms bankrum m chaflenge an urders wssued by a bankruptcy noun‘ Mn mcmmng appeals and appln:a|\ons m sel aside judgments that are Dan 01 the uanxmpxcy pmesamgs, wumwn ms necessny of omammg approval lmm me omman Asslgnee ms principle was aniculalad by Hws mmsmp Muhamad Azrm J as lolluws ‘Has/mg cansmared ms pmwsmns a1 Nye Eankmplcy Act as a us whole and the servo» rtsell u rs my mnmrea aprnrun (ha! me samman reumremervl ms nu! aw/y to 05525 where the Darvkmpfi rs sacking :0 ch:/fangs an omsr m nankruFI1‘?Y or where he vs apwymylu be drsmargw orwhere he rs seskmfl live caurl‘s drscrelmn m revrew rescmd D7 vary my mm .5» made by u undzrns bankruptcy/unsd:<lmn' [13]. The present case does not (all mm. me same sltuauon m Re Khoo Kim Nock(supn). The judgment m delauh andlhe resuhmg bankrunlcy aclvnn ws unmaled In one presem case. The same 155 asme app:-canon of ms judgment m uevaun and me bankruplcy pmceedmg ws helween me Delendam and Malayan Eankmg Eerhad [u]. On the comrary, sanchon .s usqum m Ihe preseru case, and m Secllan 33(1][a) at the Insolvency Act 1931 deals wwh me moumuelenoe of an unmscnargsu bankrupt m maintain legal actions mmoun Dnor sumo»/a1 Imm me Dnractor General 01 Insowenom n emphasizes ma: me term 'ac1Ion‘ rsrsrs In cwnl Iega\ pvoceedmgs, wmch encumpass vanous pmcesses such as filing 155 appeals‘ appwying for stays. sellmg aside defauh ;udgmen|s, and N 5mq\vxMusn:GPaF52usD 5 ms Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm fl nu 175 nu 1135 no 195 asserlmg cmmlevclalms Faflure In amam pnnr mnsem renders any achuns |aken null and vmd. Funhennoru‘ il 15 \mpL7rIan| |u nme man me rsnmremenl lnr War avbrovm Is no! merely a inrmalily but a cmusw asped our-e hankNp|'s legs! capawy, ms prmcwple was extenswely explamed m me declswcn by me Cuurl of Appea\ m Perwira Min Bank Bhd V Sardzr Mom! Rushzn Khan paw] 4 ML! 2a1. which Iflnd we am lo reproduce here “[17; u VS .mmu, mm us that M:/udgment m mmm Tlide s Deve7npmervISdn am, rs m rm position m assrslms customer m me mum appeal as the /3515 are subslarma/Vy dissimilar The mm»: Alter: nan nu! taken any iurlner step or anhcm m Ma plocsecnnys mm m the Wflcwsment aims 021': sanclron Indeed, the bankrupt had my taken stem 6! sclmns VI ma pmcceflmgs sitar be men secured III: on mm/mus sarmmzrv Hanca, the ram m... are raamly drslvrwurshable rm moss m the man: apnea! rm Sznron 35(1Hu7 set: am the mcmvwaiemre m an unmschargad bankrupt m mamtam an spoon in m. mwmg words m Whzre 5 bankrupt has not oblarned hr: mscnarge (aims barvkrunl man be mcompelsvu lo marmarn any man (alherllvsn an aclmn /ordamagfis m rssuecta/an In/my (L7 hrs nzrsunf wtlnum the yrevmus samclmrv L7] ma Director General or Insolvency [19] We [ind n Perlrr-van! In mu m Disc: me nmmp/ex enuncrutcd by me mun: m mnsldzrmg s asmm as ruuaws mm wold 'aolmn‘, wm has no! been defined m the Act‘ Mme grverv us mam meemngre crvv/acuon arcm! pmczeflmgs m mun perAugus1me my .10 (now H211 m cm Tm Hang Re 5. parts Came! {M} scm sw 5mg\vxMusrm3PuF51usn um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm mm as nu 115 m 115 Bm1[1995] ML./U 647111199712 AW? 1253‘ at p 1250 mm; mm WHMIIV m mm mferrzd mk V :capna;emss1uu 231 (21 Such cn/ll aclmn orpmceedtnvs Include (nun: Mmg an nalme Dfapm.-5! Amps wurmm Dawe V owrupmsm a Cummcrua! Bank ma; End new 1 ML./ 2342‘ 5: pa 231492 1:0» Re Low Kok Tush Ex u Ami:-Malaysran mmn.m am 5II<1I7-FYGIMUU M2. (179714 cu 155, at p 1895 mm, aw Eathamam a/p S:/Farah V Southern Fmance Cu Bhd 1209015 ML] 421 .x p 4:05 rm:/. {D)an apphcatrorv rarstay arm oamumm»ucm.»gs Re Lav Hes Sang Exams cmmema: Fmanm WI Blvd I2nm7IMLJu 475, [zonal 7:143:72 3117 am. {nun anprmm m 5.: um. : mm» ,..agm.m upon Wm ms banknmtoy Pwcsedlnys are founded Sabah Bank am: V Syankal Ernlarvg Yengsh Sdn em: [1592] 2 MLJ 555‘ at p 550 mm, 12041014 MLI2m al 211 Supreme Frmsnce WI End V Marvamad New My Everway ram Centre) 5 Or:[1§§.’!] 2 ML1 22 at p :1 (Ho; andfls Ma! San bm Hamid, en ,, Umlsd As4an Bank 5m1[1993] 1 (14202 an: 203. max (.1). caunlzrdatm GM Eng M V W: Luksamams may Evin and 1290413 ML./ 97, atp 11J1cA); (See arm Know Kay mm Law and Praclme af Earvkruntcy m Malawi (Ind an up zvs/. (J)(a)The word ’mamIim' does rm! mean that a bankrupt car-mo! my am any scum vwmom me prevrau: sarvctran gr m: cm, m. Dankmpl »x nut reqmmd m wrlhdraw that action and We am-ssh upon oblammg ms sm 5mg\vxMnsnu3PaF51usn mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Ian :35 140 us lsn 155 senctran as y: would mm msuce an the bankrupt Rnrmand ma; 5 Devzlnpmzrvl San am, and (J)(b)Ths wan}: ’mamlam any amen’ are we enough to mm mm the Magma or canunmng av an acuon already bmughl K rmur Garvey Ruwllvar and CD, my aeremam V MA Abdu/ Kader ms amoral assrymze arms oropevty o!KF' Peer Mohamed, A sanmpt (1933) mm 28 «CA ms/, {l)TIve acimnircalvorv or a parry as a bankrupt does not mean ma! Bl/pendmg scum ufmalpsrly womd reuse manual: on thutacmunl, urlhutihe bankmpled Daily ,5 rec-ma to wvlhdraw the aalonspendrng the amarmng or sancnun mm the 0A Whal that party could no! do wrl/mu! such 5 sarmbon was In take any mam.» stay m m. proedpdrngs S51 1». mauomy ,.mgm.m ur ma Smgapcm Cam orAp,~»ea/ m Tan Kmg Hrang v Llmred Envmeer: (smgunam PI: udlzanfil 3 sue 523 at p 5:5, mm cmmdarlds 1.’l1(1)[a)L7/msBankmplcyAc1 (cap 20, mo Rev Ed) or Smyauors lwlvmlv rs Bvur;-alien: in am: asrws» (5)11: mmm saltcvmrmufidne amemdta pzrsarufly paycosm Yorfi/mg an angmalmg malrmv rorms bankrupt who was rm! comnetent to nmceed wrlh mat ongmam molrun as this rs a ham: pnmme u/law wmm emy rsamrvalfly cmvlpslervl solrulor would have known Tan Kmg Mm. (6)ln an I-:1mn mm M Drench af cuniract by m: aersnaam res oppnsed 10 an anion m rsspecl or an mluly In me bsnkmprg ueuarw the bankrupt‘: estate and cause a! when an: v:s1ed m the an upon adjucltcalwm and unless the pnov sandton or me 0»: 5 oblalned m mamtam me man, me bsnxmm rs sm 5mg\vxMnsnu3PaF51usn mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm fl m 155 m 175 nu ma mcomvetent m do so m M: own name Dr in emwav an advocate and sulrcttur An ad M his own Denali wnlvmn the sanchon Clun Kan Nam 5 Anal V Char ‘fun Plwl Deve/oumenl Sdrv and 119961 4 ML./ 271 a! ;: 275.[1s55l 1 cu m .1 p 445 HC smn am am Tan Kmg Htsng s 244;, gas and Re Law Kak mam [man MLJ 201 3: 2:2 mm requirement afa sunclmn IS nut/us! . fumramy, :1 909510 his capacrly per new Hamrd Mohamed sex (lateral Maraym) In Guh Eng Nwa. (CAI sky :04 and (B) The signs flaky! Dy 5 Durvkmnl .n wn when ur pvocseamgs wvrhoul me plevwus omen: or the on m mnsmenuan afs 38(17Y&)are nu//and ma Sch Ervv nm on, Rrcmami mm & Develoumznt Sun and, (Ho; and Chnsloplver ran Kok Chmg v Ealhassan Dm Dr !199B]ML4L/533‘ 1199915 on 177 (NC) “[10] Dr da/am nas Tanavarvus Sdn smt v smn Jrnqkrw Pfrlgyuan I7995]2Mu 554 Isiah druutuxkan uleh Mahhamuh Tmygr ‘11{V[By vmus 075 s aims Au, allsrme mamng or 5 receiving order agems: the defendant me credrtor m whom the dzfenflanl wax mflzbled m r=:D:c1 gr any «so: pmvaora In oanmmay could not cammsncs an)’ /my Dmceedlnv agamsx the defendant vn respect of SMEII ma unless luvs a! the cam‘! have bzen my obtamecf syn 5mg\vxMus4nu3PaF51usn um smm n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII .nuNG pm [15]. The same was common taken m sunnm bln Abdul mum v. mu Abd mnnn om Abdul Jam (2022) MLJU 255, wheve me mgn Cnurl sam- 10

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

KA-A73KJ-200-04/2022

PLAINTIF 1. ) SEMAN BIN PIN (MENDAKWA SEBAGAI BAPA / TANGGUNGAN YANG SAH KEPADA MUHAMMAD SAFWAN BIN SEMAN, SI MATI) 2. ) RAHMAN BINTI ISHAK (MENDAKWA SEBAGAI IBU / TANGGUNGAN YANG SAH KEPADA MUHAMMAD SAFWAN BIN SEMAN , SI MATI ) DEFENDAN 1. ) SELVENDRAN A/L RAVI 2. ) SYED MOHD HIDZIR BIN SYED RODZI 3. ) UMI KHALSOM BINTI MOHD ADANALPIHAK KETIGA1. ) Mohd Khairul Anuar Bin Abdul Rahman 2. ) Jainudah Binti Raseh @ Suzlinah Rasi

Kemalangan jalan raya; liabiliti 70% Plaintif, Defendan Pertama 15%, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga 15%; Kemalangan Pertama di laluan kecemasan. Si Mati dijumpai berhampiran pembahagi lebuh raya. Pihak Ketiga berhenti di laluan kecemasan sebab kehabisan minyak. Kos pengkebumian RM 2000 sahaja, tiada resit atau bukti. Gantirugi tanggungan RM 400 sebulan.

28/01/2024

Puan Siti Nor Hasliza Binti Md Ali

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=c81cbefe-b4d2-4e38-90f4-e72f1ca2907f&Inline=true

ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Page!1!of!20! ! DALAM!MAHKAMAH!MAJISTRET!DI!ALOR!SETAR!1! DALAM!NEGERI!KEDAH!2! KES!SIVIL:!KA-A73KJ-200-04/2022!3! ANTARA!4! 1. SEMAN!BIN!PIN!(MENDAKWA!SEBAGAI!BAPA/!5! TANGGUNGAN!YANG!SAH!KEPADA!MUHAMMAD!6! !SAFWAN!BIN!SEMAN,!SI!MATI)!7! 2. RAHMAH!BINTI!ISHAK!(MENDAKWA!SEBAGAI!IBU!8! TANGGUNGAN!YANG!SAH!KEPADA!MUHAMMAD!9! !SAFWAN!BIN!SEMAN,!SI!MATI)! ! ! �PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF!10! DAN!11! 1. SELVENDRAN!A/L!RAVI! ! ! ! ! �DEFENDAN!PERTAMA!12! 2. SYED!MOHD!HIDZIR!BIN!SYED!RODZI! ! ! �DEFENDAN!KEDUA!13! 3. UMI!KHALSOM!BINTI!MOHD!ADANAL! ! �DEFENDAN!KETIGA!14! DAN!15! 1. MOHD!KHAIRUL!ANUAR!BIN!ABDUL!RAHMAN!�PIHAK!KETIGA!PERTAMA!16! 2. JAINUDAH!BINTI!RASEH@SUZLINAH!RASI! !!!!!!�PIHAK!KETIGA!KEDUA!17! !18! 28/01/2024 08:52:28 KA-A73KJ-200-04/2022 Kand. 47 S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!2!of!20! ! ___________________________________________________________________!19! ALASAN!PENGHAKIMAN!20! A.! PENGENALAN!21! [1]! Mahkamah! telah! memutuskan! bahawa! Defendan! Pertama! bertanggungan!22! sebanyak! 15%,! Defendan! Kedua! dan! Defendan! Ketiga! bertanggungan!23! sebanyak!15%!dan!Plaintif!70%!sumbang!cuai!di!dalam!kes!kemalangan! ini.!24! Pihak-pihak! tidak! berpuashati! dengan! keputusan! Mahkamah! dan! telah!25! memfailkan!rayuan.!26! !27! [2]! Pihak! Plaintif! dan! Defendan! Pertama! telah! memfailkan! rayuan! di! atas! isu!28! liabiliti.!Mana!pihak!Defendan!Kedua!dan!Defendan!Ketiga!telah!memfailkan!29! rayuan!terhadap!keseluruhan!keputusan!berkenaan!isu!liabiliti!dan!kuantum.!30! !31! B.! FAKTA!KES!32! !33! [3]! Secara!ringkasnya,!fakta!kes!adalah!seperti!berikut.!Pada!23!Februari!2020,!34! jam!lebih!kurang!1.50!pagi,!telah!berlaku!satu!kemalangan!di!KM!52.6!LRUS!35! Arah!Selatan.!!36! !37! [4]! Kemalangan!ini!melibatkan!sebuah!motorsikal!bernombor!pendaftaran!KEE!38! 6062!yang!ditunggang!oleh!Si!Mati!(selepas!ini!dirujuk!sebagai!�!motorsikal!39! Si!Mati!tersebut�),!sebuah!motokar!bernombor!pendaftaran!PCB!1367!yang!40! dipandu! dan! dimiliki! oleh! Pihak! Ketiga! Pertama! dan! Pihak! Ketiga! Kedua!!41! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!3!of!20! ! (selepas! ini! dirujuk! sebagai! �motorkar! Pihak! Ketiga! tersebut�),! sebuah!42! motokar! bernombor! pendaftaran! KEE! 9385! yang! dipandu! oleh! Defendan!43! Kedua! dan! milik! Defendan! Ketiga! (selepas! ini! dirujuk! sebagai! �motokar!44! Defendan! Kedua! dan! Defendan! Ketiga! tersebut�! )! dan! sebuah! motokar!45! bernombor! pendaftaran! JMX! 1102! yang! dipandu! oleh! Defendan! Pertama!46! (selepas!ini!dirujuk!sebagai!�motorkar!Defendan!Pertama!tersebut�).!47! !48! [5]! Pihak!Plaintif!telah!memanggil!empat!(4)!orang!saksi!iaitu:-!49! !50! (i) !Inspektor!Ahmad!Shukri,!seorang!Pegawai!Penyiasat!Ganti!(selepas!ini!51! dirujuk!sebagai!�SP1�);!52! !53! (ii) Seman!bin!Pin,!iaitu!Bapa!Si!Mati!yang!juga!Plaintif!Pertama!(selepas!54! ini!dirujuk!sebagai!�SP2�);!55! !56! (iii) Rahmah!binti!Ishak,!iaitu!Ibu!Si!Mati!yang!juga!Plaintif!Kedua!(selepas!57! ini!dirujuk!sebagai!�SP3�);!dan!58! !59! (iv) Seni!bin!Saad,!iaitu!Majikan!Si!Mati!(selepas!ini!dirujuk!sebagai!�SP4�).!60! !61! [6]! Manakala!pihak!Defendan-Defendan!menutup!kes!tanpa!memanggil!mana-62! mana!saksi!mahupun!Defendan-Defendan!sendiri.!63! !64! [7]! Bagi!Pihak!Ketiga,!Mahkamah!ini!merujuk!kepada!minit!Majistret!terdahulu!65! yang! bertarikh! 5! Januari! 2023! yang! mana! telah! mengarahkan! supaya!66! Defendan!untuk!memfailkan!Penghakiman!Ingkar!terhadap!Pihak!Ketiga.!67! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!4!of!20! ! C.! !VERSI!KEMALANGAN!68! !69! [8]! Tiada! versi! daripada! penunggang! motorsikal! KEE! 6062! kerana! telah!70! meninggal! dunia! disebabkan! kemalangan! ini.! Empat! orang! saksi! yang!71! dikemukakan!oleh!Plaintif! bukan!merupakan! saksi! yang!berada!di! tempat!72! kemalangan!ketika!kemalangan!berlaku.!73! !74! [9]! Versi! kemalangan! di! dalam! pernyataan! tuntutan! Plaintif! menyatakan!75! bahawa!pada!23!Februari!2022!jam!1.50!pagi,!Si!Mati!sedang!menunggang!76! motorsikal!KEE!6062!di!sepanjang!jalan!di!KM!52.6!Lebuhraya!Utara!Selatan!77! Arah! Selatan! [LRUS(S)]! di!mana! Si!Mati! telah! terjatuh! akibat! kemalangan!78! dengan!motorkar! PCB! 1367! yang! dipandu! dan! dimiliki! oleh! Pihak! Ketiga.!79! Setelah!itu,!Si!Mati!telah!dilanggar!oleh!motokar!JMX!1102yang!dipandu!dan!80! dimiliki!oleh!Defendan!Pertama!serta!motokar!KEE!9385!yang!dipandu!oleh!81! Defendan!Kedua!dan!dimiliki!oleh!Defendan!Ketiga!yang!datang!dari! arah!82! belakang!dengan!tiba-tiba!terus!melanggar!Si!Mati.!83! !84! [10]! Tiada! juga! versi! kemalangan! yang! dikemukakan! oleh! Defendan-Defendan!85! dan! Pihak! Ketiga! kerana! tiada! seorang! pun! yang! hadir! memberikan!86! keterangan! dalam! Mahkamah! Terbuka.! Oleh! itu,! Mahkamah! ini! hanya!87! merujuk!kepada!laporan-laporan!polis!yang!telah!dibuat!oleh!pihak-pihak.!88! !89! [11]! Defendan!Pertama!!dalam!! laporan!polisnya!menyatakan!bahawa!pada!23!90! Februari!2020! jam!2.00!pagi,!Defendan!Pertama!memandu!motorkar! JMX!91! 1102!dari!Sungai!Petani!menghala!Jitra.!Apabila!Defendan!Pertama!sampai!92! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!5!of!20! ! di! KM! 52.3! LRUS! (U),! motorkar! Defendan! Pertama! telah! terlanggar!93! motorsikal! KEE! 6062! yang! berada! di! atas! lebuhraya! yang! terjatuh! akibat!94! kemalangan.!95! !96! [12]! Manakala!Defendan!Kedua!pula!menyatakan!dalam!laporan!polisnya!bahawa!97! pada!23!Februari!2020!jam!2.00!pagi,!Defendan!Kedua!memandu!motorkar!98! KEE!9385!dari!Kuala!Ketil!menghala!ke!Alor!Setar.!Apabila!Defendan!Kedua!99! sampai!di!KM!52.3!LRUS,!Defendan!Kedua!telah!terlanggar!motorsikal!KEE!100! 6062!yang!berada!di!laluan!Defendan!Kedua.!101! !102! [13]! !Pihak! Ketiga! pula! menyatakan! dalam! laporan! polisnya! bahawa! pada! 23!103! Februari!2020,!Pihak!Ketiga!memandu!motorkar!PCB!1367!dar!arah!Kulim!104! menghala!ke!Alor!Setar!melalui!LRUS.!Apabila!sampai!di!KM!52.3!(U),!Pihak!105! Ketiga!memberhentikan!motorkarnya!di!laluan!kecemasan!kerana!kehabisan!106! minyak.! Semasa! Pihak! Ketiga! berhenti,! Pihak! Ketiga! rasa! hentakan! di!107! belakang! motorkar! dan! mendapati! sebuah! motorsikal! telah! melanggar!108! bahagian!belakang!motorkar!Pihak!Ketiga.!109! !110! D.!! PRINSIP!UNDANG-UNDANG!SIVIL:!BEBAN!PEMBUKTIAN!111! !112! [14]! Sebelum! mahkamah! mempertimbangkan! isu-isu! yang! dipertikaikan,!113! Mahkamah!terlebih!dahulu!meneliti!beban!pembuktian!pihak-pihak!dalam!114! membuktikan! tuntutan.!Adalah!menjadi! tanggungjawab!Mahkamah!untuk!115! membuat! penilaian! di! atas! imbangan! kebarangkalian! keseluruhan!116! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!6!of!20! ! keterangan! saksi-saksi! dan! keterangan! dokumen! samada! Plaintif-plaintif!117! telah! berjaya! dalam! membuktikan! tuntutan! sebelum! beban! pembuktian!118! berpindah!kepada!Defendan-Defendan!dalam!membuktikan!pembelaannya.!119! !120! [15]! Mahkamah! merujuk! seksyen! 101! Akta! Keterangan! 1950! di! mana!121! diperuntukkan!bahawa:!122! !123! �101.! (1)! Barang! siapa! berkehendakkan! mahkamah! memberi!124! penghakiman!tentang!apa-apa!hak!atau!liabiliti!di!sisi!undang-125! undang! dengan! bergantung! pada! adanya! fakta-fakta! yang!126! ditegaskan!olehnya,!mestilah!bahawa!faktafakta!itu!ada.!!127! (2)! Apabila! seseorang! terikat! untuk! membuktikan! adanya!128! sesuatu! fakta,! maka! adalah! dikatakan! bahawa! beban! bukti!129! terletak!pada!orang!itu.�!130! !131! [16]! Mahkamah!juga!merujuk!kepada!seksyen!102!Akta!Keterangan!1950!yang!132! memperuntukan!bahawa:!133! !134! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!7!of!20! ! �Beban!bukti!di!dalam!sesuatu!guaman!atau!prosiding!terletak!pada!135! orang!yang!mungkin!gagal!sekiranya!tidak!ada!langsung!keterangan!136! diberi!oleh!mana-mana!pihak.�!!137! !138! [17]! Begitu!juga!dengan!seksyen!103!Akta!Keterangan!1950!di!mana!dinyatakan!139! bahawa:!140! !141! �Beban! bukti!mengenai! sesuatu! fakta! tertentu! terletak! pada! orang!142! yang!berkehendakkan!mahkamah!mempercayai!tentang!adanya!fakta!143! itu,! melainkan! jika! ada! diperuntukkan! oleh! mana-mana! undang-144! undang!bahawa!bukti!mengenai! fakta! itu! terletak!pada!mana-mana!145! orang!tertentu.�!146! !147! [18] Selanjutnya,! prinsip! undang-undang! ini! juga! dinyatakan! di! dalam! kes! di!148! Mahkamah! Persekutuan,! Wong!Thin!Yit! v.! Mohamed! Ali! [1971]! 1! LNS!149! 151!sebagaimana!yang!berikut:!150! �In!a!negligence!action!the!onus!of!proof!rests!wholly!on!the!plaintiff,!151! whether! or! not! the! defendant! gives! evidence.! The! plaintiff! cannot!152! succeed!without!proof!of!the!defendant's!negligence.!Evidence!is!the!153! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!8!of!20! ! foundation!of!proof,!with!which!it!must!not!be!confounded.!Proof!is!154! that!which! leads!to!a!conclusion!as!to!the!truth!or!falsity!of!alleged!155! facts! which! are! the! subject! of! inquiry.! Evidence,! if! accepted! and!156! believed,!may!result!in!proof,!but!it!is!not!necessarily!proof!of!itself.!157! !158! [19]! Pihak!yang!menuntut!di!dalam!kes! ini!adalah!Plaintif-plaintif,!maka!beban!159! pembuktian!adalah!diletakkan!diatas!bahu!mereka.! Lanjutan!daripada! itu,!160! Plaintif-plaintif! juga! perlu! mencapai! standard! pembuktian! iaitu! di! atas!161! imbangan!kebarangkalian!untuk!membuktikan!tuntutan-tuntutan!mereka.!!162! !163! [20]! Asas!bagi!standard!pembuktian!ini!telah!banyak!dijelaskan!dan!diputuskan!164! oleh!kes-kes!tersohor!antaranya!kes!yang!telah!diputuskan!oleh!Mahkamah!165! Persekutuan,!Inas!Faiqah!bt!Mohd!Helmi!(an!infant!suing!through!her!father!166! and!next!friend,!Mohd!Helmi!bin!Abdul!Aziz)!v.!Kerajaan!Malaysia!&!Ors!167! [2016]!2!CLJ!885!sebagaimana!berikut:!168! !169! �[13]!The! standard! of! proof! in! civil! cases! is! the! legal! standard! to!170! which!a!party!is!required!to!prove!its!case,!namely!on!a!balance!of!171! probabilities.! In! civil! litigation,! the! question! of! the! probability! or!172! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!9!of!20! ! improbability!of!an!action!occurring!is!an!important!consideration!to!173! be!taken!into!account!in!deciding!whether!that!particular!event!had!174! actually! taken! place! or! not.! In! the! case! of!Miller! v.! Minister! of!175! Pensions![1947]!2!All!ER!372,!Lord!Denning!said!the!following!about!176! the!standard!of!proof!in!civil!cases:!177! The...![standard!of!proof]...!is!well!settled.!It!must!carry!a!reasonable!178! degree!of!probability...!if!the!evidence!is!such!that!the!tribunal!can!say:!179! 'We!think!it!more!probable!than!not'!the!burden!is!discharged,!but,!if!180! the!probabilities!are!equal,!it!is!not.�!181! !182! E.!! DAPATAN!MAHKAMAH!183! !184! (a) Isu!Liabiliti!185! !186! [21]! Dalam! kes! ini,! keterangan! di! dalam! Mahkamah! Terbuka! hanya! daripada!187! empat!(4)!orang!saksi!Plaintif,!iaitu!SP1,!SP2,!SP3!dan!SP4!sahaja.!Defendan-188! Defendan!tidak!mengemukakan!sebarang!saksi.!!189! !190! [22]! Walau! bagaimanapun,! dalam! menentukan! versi! kemalangan! mana! yang!191! lebih!berkemungkinan!dalam!kes!ini,!Mahkamah!hanya!boleh!mengambilkira!192! keterangan!SP1!dan!juga!mempertimbangkan!kesan!kemalangan!serta!bukti!193! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!10!of!20! ! senyap!sahaja!memandangkan!SP2!-SP4!tiada!di!tempat!kemalangan!pada!194! masa!kemalangan!ini!berlaku.!195! !196! [23]! SP1,! Pegawai! Penyiasat!Ganti! (Pegawai! Penyiasat!Asal! telah!berpindah! ke!197! KLIA)! dalam! keterangannya! secara! bersumpah! di! Mahkamah! telah!198! menyatakan! bahawa! semasa! Pegawai! Penyiasat! sampai! di! tempat!199! kemalangan,! Si! Mati! telah! dijumpai! di! bahagian! kanan! laluan! A2! -A3!200! berdekatan! besi! penghadang! tengah! lebuhraya! yang! ditandakan! sebagai!201! �I�di!dalam!rajah!kasar.! Jarak!antara!motorsikal!Si!Mati!dengan! tempat!Si!202! Mati!dijumpai!adalah!14.3!meter.!203! !204! [24]! SP1!juga!menyatakan!bahawa!terdapat!serpihan!komponen!kenderaan!dan!205! serpihan! kaca! yang! ditandakan! sebagai! �G�berdekatan! garisan! A3,! laluan!206! kanan!lebuhraya!berdekatan!dengan!Si!Mati!ditemui.!207! !208! [25]! Berdasarkan!siasatan,!SP1!menyatakan!bahawa!kemalangan!pertama!antara!!209! motorsikal!Si!Mati!dan!motorkar!Pihak!Ketiga!berlaku!di!lorong!kecemasan.!210! Semasa! pegawai! penyiasat! sampai! di! tempat! kejadian,! kedudukan!211! kenderaan!masih!belum!diubah.!!212! !213! [26]! Berdasarkan! keterangan! SP1! yang! merujuk! kepada! siasatan! pegawai!214! penyiasat,!Mahkamah!ini!berpandangan!kemalangan!pertama!yang!berlaku!215! antara! motorsikal! Si! mati! dan! motorkar! Pihak! Ketiga! adalah! di! laluan!216! kecemasan.!!217! !218! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!11!of!20! ! [27]! SP1!dalam!keterangannya!menyatakan!kemalangan!pertama!berlaku!antara!219! motorsikal!Si!Mati!dengan!motorkar!Pihak!Ketiga.!SP1!menyatakan!bahawa!220! motokar!Pihak!Ketiga!telah!berhentikan!motorkarnya!di! laluan!kecemasan!221! kerana!kehabisan!minyak.!222! !223! [28]! Dalam! situasi! ini,! kemalangan!pertama! yang!berlaku! di! laluan! kecemasan!224! menunjukkan! terdapat! kecuaian! di! pihak! si! Mati! kerana! menunggang!225! motorsikal!di!laluan!kecemasan!tersebut.!226! !227! [29]! !Walau!bagaimanapun,!disebabkan!tiada!saksi-saksi!mata!atau!Pihak!Ketiga!228! sendiri! mahupun! Defendan! yang! hadir! untuk! memberikan! keterangan! di!229! Mahkamah!ini!untuk!menceritakan!dan/atau!menjelaskan!apa!yang!terjadi!230! atau! apa! punca! yang! berlakunya! kemalangan! sehingga! menyebabkan!231! kematian! Si!Mati,!maka!Mahkamah! ini! dalam!memutuskan! kes! ini! hanya!232! bergantung!kepada!keterangan!SP1!dan!keterangan!senyap!yang!ada!dalam!233! kes!ini!sahaja.!234! !235! [30]! Mahkamah!ini!berpandangan!berdasarkan!keterangan!SP1!dan!keterangan!236! senyap! yang!ada,! kemalangan!pertama!yang!berlaku!di! laluan! kecemasan!237! bukan!merupakan!punca!utama!kematian!Si!Mati!dalm!kes!ini.! !238! !239! [31]! Melalui! keterangan! SP1! dan! bukti! senyap,! Mahkamah! ini! berpandangan!240! telah! berlakunya! perlanggaran! kedua! yang! mana! telah! menyebabkan!241! kematian!Si!Mati!yang!mana!pada!pandangan!Mahkamah!perlanggaran!ini!242! melibatkan!Defendan-Defendan!dengan!Si!Mati.!243! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!12!of!20! ! [32]! Sepertimana!yang!dikatakan!bahawa!tiada!keterangan!saksi!mati!mahupun!244! Defendan-Defendan! dan! juga! Pihak! Ketiga! yang! hadir! untuk!memberikan!245! keterangan,! maka! keputusan! Mahkamah! hanya! bergantung! kepada!246! keterangan!SP1!dan!bukti!senyap!!sahaja.!247! !248! [33]! Dalam!membincangkan!berkaitan!ketidakhadiran!Defendan-Defendan!untuk!249! memberikan!keterangan!di!Mahkamah,!Mahkamah!ini!merujuk!kes!Sundram!250! v.!Arujunan!&!Anor![1994]!3!MLJ!361,!di!mana!Yang!Arif!Hakim!Mahkamah!251! Agung!memutuskan!bahawa!(dengan!izin):!252! !253! ��A!defendant!is!legally!entitled!to!elect!not!to!give!evidence!but!takes!254! that!course!at!his!peril.!By!electing!not!to!give!evidence,!the!respondent!255! had!failed!to!rebut!the!prima!facie!case.�!!256! !257! [34]! Mahkamah!juga!merujuk!kepada!kes!yang!telah!diputuskan!oleh!Raja!Azlan!258! Shah!J,!Lim!Ah!Toh!v.!Ang!Yau!Chee!&!Anor![1969]!1!LNS!91,!di!mana!(dengan!259! izin):!260! !261! �By!either!proving!that!the!event,!that!is!to!say,!the!encroachment!into!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!262! the!plaintiff�s! lawful!path!was!due!to!a!specific!cause!and!that!such!263! cause!was!not!attributable!to!lack!of!care!on!his!part,!or,!that!the!event!264! is!due! to!some!cause!unknown!but!he!himself! throughout!exercised!265! that! degree! of! reasonable! care.! Unfortunately,! since! the! defendant!266! failed! to! turn!up! in!court!during! the! trial!and!his! counsel! elected! to!267! proceed!to!submit!at!the!close!of!plaintiff�s!case,! the!defendant!has!268! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!13!of!20! ! failed! to! show! that! he! was! not! negligent! whilst! driving! that! white!269! motorcar!at!the!material!time.�!!270! !271! [35]! Dalam!mempertimbangkan!isu!tersebut,!mahkamah!ini!juga!sedar!bahawa!272! kegagalan!Defendan-Defendan!memberikan!keterangan!tidaklah!bermakna!273! Defendan-Defendan! patut! didapati! sepenuhnya! cuai,! melainkan! terdapat!274! keterangan!bahawa!Defendan-Defendan!adalah!cuai.!!275! !276! [36]! Dalam!keadaan!tersebut,!adalah!menjadi!tugas!Mahkamah!ini!untuk!menilai!277! keseluruhan! keterangan! dalam! menentukan! samada! Defendan-Defendan!278! adalah!cuai!sepenuhnya!atau!kemalangan!tersebut!disumbang!cuai!oleh!Si!279! Mati!sepertimana!yang!diputuskan!di!dalam!kes!Azami!bin!Ahmad!&!1!lagi!280! v.! Mohd! Yunan! bin! Che! Ya! [2009]! 1! LNS! 851,! di! mana! VT! Singham! H!281! membuat!pengamatan:!!282! !283! �Dalam!keadaan!tersebut,!mahkamah!perbicaraan!masih!mempunyai!284! tugas! untuk!menilai! keterangan! keseluruhan! (there!must! be! proper!285! judicial!evaluation)!secara!kehakiman!sama!ada,!pertama,!Defendan!286! Pertama!cuai!dan!bertanggungjawab!terhadap!kemalangan!tersebut!287! dan! kedua,! sekiranya! Defendan! Pertama! didapati! cuai,! sama! ada!288! Plaintif!telah!menyumbang!kepada!kemalangan!tersebut.�!!289! !290! [37]! Namun,!keadaan!yang!mana!dinyatakan!bahawa!Si!Mati!ditemui!di!bahagian!291! kanan!laluan,!iaitu!di!A2-A3!berdekatan!besi!penghadang!tengah!lebuhraya!292! dan! jarak! antara! Si! Mati! ditemui! dengan! motorsikal! Si! Mati,! tempat!293! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!14!of!20! ! kemalangan!pertama!berlaku!adalah!14.3!meter!telah!memberikan!inferens!294! kepada!Mahkamah!ini!bahawa!terdapat!pelanggaran!antara!Si!Mati!dengan!295! Defendan!Pertama!dan!Defendan!Kedua.!296! !297! [38]! Disebabkan! tiada! keterangan! daripada! pihak! Defendan! Pertama! dan!298! Defendan! Kedua! yang! dapat! menyangkal! bahawa! tiada! sebarang!299! kemalangan! yang! berlaku! dengan! Si! Mati,! maka! Mahkamah! ini!300! berpandangan! terdapat! perlanggaran! yang! telah! berlaku! antara! Si! Mati!301! dengan! Defendan! Pertama! dan! Defendan! Kedua! yang! mana! telah!302! menyebabkan!Si!Mati!telah!tercampak!ke!bahagian!kanan!laluan,!iaitu!di!A2-303! A3!berdekatan!besi!penghadang!tengah!lebuhraya,!iaitu!14.3!meter!daripada!!304! tempat!kemalangan!pertama!berlaku.!!305! !306! [39]! Oleh! itu,! dengan! mengambilkira! kesemua! faktor! di! atas! Mahkamah!307! berpendapat! bahawa! Plaintif! juga!menyumbang! cuai! di! atas! kemalangan!308! yang!berlaku.!Oleh!yang!demikian,!mahkamah!memutuskan!bahawa!Plaintif!309! telah!berjaya!membuktikan!kes!di!atas!imbangan!kebarangkalian!terhadap!310! Defenda-Defendan.! Walaubagaimanapun! Plaintif! turut! menyumbang! cuai!311! terhadap!kemalangan!yang!berlaku.!!312! !313! [40]!! Maka,! berdasarkan! keterangan! saksi-saksi! dan! keterangan! senyap! yang!314! dikemukakan! di! Mahkamah! dan! setelah! menimbangkan! kes! ini! secara!315! keseluruhannya,!Mahkamah!mendapati!kedua-dua!pihak!telah!cuai!secara!316! bersama!pada!hari!kemalangan!berlaku.!!317! !318! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!15!of!20! ! [41]! !Justeru,! Mahkamah! ini! telah! memutuskan! Defendan! Pertama! adalah!319! bertanggungan! 15%,! Defendan! Kedua! dan! Defendan! Ketiga! adalah!320! bertanggungan! 15%! manakala! Plaintif! bertanggungan! 70%! terhadap!321! kemalangan! yang! berlaku.! Kemalangan! ini! mungkin! dapat! dielakkan!322! sekiranya! kedua-dua!pihak! lebih! berhati-hati! di! dalam!penunggangan!dan!323! pemanduan!masing-masing.!324! !325! (b) Isu!Kuantum!!326! !327! Gantirugi!Khas!(Atas!dasar!liabiliti!100%)!328! !329! [42]! Akibat!daripada!kemalangan!tersebut,!Si!Mati!telah!meninggal!dunia.!330! !331! [43]! Dalam!mempertimbangkan!award!ini,!Mahkamah!telah!merujuk!kepada!nas!332! undang-undang! yang! diputuskan! sebelum! ini! dan! juga! kepada! trend! dan!333! keadaan!ekonomi!semasa!untuk!menentukan!suatu!award!yang!munasabah!334! dan!setimpal.!!335! !336! [44]! Mahkamah!menggunapakai!garis!panduan!di!dalam!kes! Inas!Faiqah!Mohd!337! Helmi!(A!Child!Suing!Throuh!His!Father!and!Next!Friend;!Mohd!Helmi!Abdul!338! Aziz)! v.! Kerajaan!Malaysia! &! Ors! [2016]! 2! CLJ! FCJ,! di! mana!Mahkamah!339! Persekutuan,!Abdul!Hamid!Embong!FCJ,!menyatakan!bahawa!(dengan!izin):!340! !341! �It!is!trite!that!damages!serves!as!compensation,!not!a!reward,!less!still!342! a!punishment!(see!Ong!Ah!Long!v.!Dr!S!Underwood![1983]!2!CLJ!198).!343! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!16!of!20! ! In!assessing!damages,!the!court!should!not!be!motivated!by!sympathy!344! and! award! fair! compensation! based!on! cogent! evidence.! The! court!345! should!not!descend!into!a!domain!of!speculation.!The!evaluation!of!346! those!evidence,!which! form!the!basis!of!any! risk!of! future!damage,!347! must! therefore! still! be! undertaken.! And! the! trial! judge! can! only!348! evaluate! such! evidence! based! on! the! recognizes! balance! of!349! probabilities!standard.�!350! !351! [45]! Mahkamah!telah!memutuskan!bahawa:!352! !353! (i)! Item!! (a)!Kerosakan!motosikal!354! (b)!Kerosakan!pakaian,!jam!tangan,!topi!keledar!355! (c)!Kos!perjalanan!pergi/balik!hospital!untuk!perubatan!356! (d)!Kos!keluarga!Plaintif!untuk!melihat!Si!mati!di!hospital!357! !358! !Tidak!dibenarkan!kerana!tidak!dibuktikan.!359! !!360! (ii)! Item!! (e)!Kos!laporan!polis,!rajah!kasar!dan!kunci!gambar!kemalangan!361! ! ! ! (f)!Kos!laporan!post!mortem!362! ! ! ! (g)!Kos!carian!JPJ!363! !364! Dibenarkan!sebagai!kos!!!!!!!!365! !366! [46]! Manakala!bagi!kos!kesedihan!telah!diputuskan!seperti!berikut:!367! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!17!of!20! ! Item!! (i)!Kos!kesedihan!-dibenarkan!sebanyak!RM!30,000.00!seperti!yang!368! ditetapkan!di!bawah!Akta!Undang-Undang!Sivil!1956.!369! !370! [47]! Kos! kesedihan! ini! dibenarkan! sebanyak! RM! 30,000.00! sepertimana! yang!371! ditetapkan! di! bawah! Akta! Undang-Undang! Sivil! 1956.! Amaun! ini! juga!372! dipersetujui!oleh!pihak-pihak!sepertimana!dalam!hujahan.!373! !374! [48]! Bagi!kos!pengkebumian!iaitu:!375! !376! Item! (j)!Kos!pengkebumian!�!dibenarkan!sebanyak!RM!2,000.00.!377! !378! [49]! Dalam!keterangan!yang!dikemukakan!oleh!saksi-saksi!di!Mahkamah,! tiada!379! bukti!apa-apa!dokumen!berkenaan!kos!pengkebumian!ini.!!Plaintif!dalam!kes!380! ini!menuntut!sebanyak!RM!8,000.00!bagi!kos!pengkebumian.!381! !382! [50]! Mahkamah! ini! telah! membenarkan! sebanyak! RM! 2,000! sahaja! dengan!383! mengambilkira! tiada! sebarang! bukti! dokumentari! yang! dikemukakan! oleh!384! saksi-saksi! kepada! Mahkamah.! Mahkamah! ini! berpandangan! RM! 2,000!385! adalah!munasabah!bagi!kos!pengkebumian!Si!Mati!yang!merupakan!seorang!386! Muslim.!387! !388! [51]! Seterusnya,!Mahkamah!ini!telah!memutuskan!seperti!berikut!bagi!gantirugi!389! kehilangan!tanggungan:!390! !391! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!18!of!20! ! Item! (k)! Kehilangan! tanggungan! �! dibenarkan! sebanyak! RM! 400.00!392! sebulan!dengan!kiraan!berikut:!393! !394! ! RM!400!x!12!bulan!x!16!tahun!=!RM!76,800.00!395! !396! [52]! Mahkamah! ini! berpandangan! RM! 76,800.00! adalah! satu! jumlah! yang!397! munasabah!memandangkan! tiada! sebarang! bukti! yang! dikemukakan! oleh!398! pihak! Plaintif! di! Mahkamah! ini.! Keterangan! majikan! iaitu! SP4! gagal!399! membuktikan! pendapatan! Si! Mati.! Tiada! bukti! yang! dikemukakan! di!400! Mahkamah! ini! yang! dapat! membuktikan! bahawa! gaji! Si! Mati! adalah! RM!401! 3,000.00!sebulan.!Keterangan!SP2!dan!SP3!bahawa!Si!Mati!telah!memberikan!402! kepada! mereka! RM! 400! sebulan! yang! mana!menjadikan! jumlah! RM! 800!403! sebulan!juga!tidak!dibuktikan!oleh!apa-apa!bukti!dokumentari.!404! !405! [53]! Tuntutan! Plaintif-Plaintif! telah! dibenarkan! dengan! kos! sebagaimana! skala!406! kos!di!dalam!Kaedah-kaedah!Mahkamah!Rendah!2012.!Kadar!Faedah!secara!407! lazim!dibenarkan.! Faedah!pada! kadar! 5%! setahun! atas! ganti! rugi! am!dari!408! tarikh!saman!diserahkan!dan!2.5%!setahun!ke!atas!ganti!rugi!khas!dari!tarikh!409! kemalangan!sehingga!tarikh!penghakiman!dan!5%!setahun!ke!atas! jumlah!410! penghakiman!daripada!tarikh!penghakiman!sehingga!penyelesaian!penuh.!411! !!412! F.! KESIMPULAN!413! !414! [54]! Maka,! setelah! meneliti! semua! faktor! di! atas! dan! setelah! Mahkamah!415! mempertimbangkan!fakta-fakta,!keterangan!saksi-saksi,!keterangan!senyap!416! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!19 of!20 yang! dikemukakan! di!Mahkamah,! ekshibit-ekshibit! serta! hujahan-hujahan!417 yang!difailkan!oleh!pihak-pihak!dan! setelah!menimbangkan! kes! ini! secara!418 keseluruhannya,! Mahkamah! memutuskan! bahawa! pihak! Plaintif-Plaintif419 telah!berjaya!membuktikan!tuntutannya!di!atas!imbangan!kebarangkalian.!420 Namun,! Mahkamah! mendapati! Plaintif! juga! telah! menyumbang! cuai! di!421 dalam!kemalangan! ini.!Oleh! itu,!Mahkamah!membenarkan!tuntutan!pihak!422 Plaintif! dengan! Defendan Pertama! adalah! bertanggungan! 15%,! Defendan!423 Kedua!dan!Defendan!Ketiga! adalah! bertanggungan! 15% manakala! Plaintif!424 bertanggungan!70%!terhadap!kemalangan!yang!berlaku.425 426 Bertarikh:!25 Januari!2024427 428 (SITI!NOR!HASLIZA!BINTI!MD!ALI)429 Majistret!430 Mahkamah!Majistret!Alor!Setar431 Kedah432 433 Pihak-pihak:434 435 Bagi!pihak!Plaintif! :!Tetuan!N.M.!Tiong!&!Co436 Bagi!pihak!Defendan Pertama :!Tetuan!Gan,!Ho!&!Razlan!Hadri437 Bagi!pihak!Defendan!Kedua!&!Ketiga :!Tetuan!Dass,!Jainab!&!Ass438 439 440 S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page!20!of!20! ! !441! S/N /r4cyNK0OE6Q9OcvHKKQfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

DD-A73KJ-47-05/2022

PLAINTIF FATIMAH BINTI NOOR DEFENDAN RAHMAN BIN MOHAMAD PENCELAH ZURICH GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD

Interlokutori - permohonan defendan meminda pliding - permohonan defendan memanggil semula saksi plaintif untuk disoal balas - sama ada surat akuan bersumpah memadai - sama ada ketiadaan laporan polis penafian mencukupi - sama ada defendan lewat dalam membuat permohonan - sama ada permohonan defendan bona fide - sama ada defendan telah menjelaskan kelewatan - sama ada alasan kelewatan membuat permohonan defendan memadai - dalam kepentingan keadilan - sama ada mahkamah betul dalam menggunapakai budi bicara - sama ada defendan sambil lewa dalam pengendalian kes - sama ada defendan tidakn kompeten dalam pengendalian kes - sama ada prejudis kepada pihak lawan - sama ada permohonan akan membuka floodgates

27/01/2024

Tuan Mohd Fauzan Bin Mohd Suhairi

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9fd08373-6a9b-4412-a409-3eb8e02fd859&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI BACHOK DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: DD-A73KJ-47-05/2022 ANTARA FATIMAH BINTI NOOR …PLAINTIF DAN RAHMAN BIN MOHAMAD …DEFENDAN KORAM: MOHD FAUZAN BIN MOHD SUHAIRI, MAJISTRET ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN KANDUNGAN 19 (Permohonan Defendan untuk Meminda Pembelaan dan Memanggil Semula Saksi Plaintif untuk Disoal Balas) PENGENALAN [1] Kes ini melibatkan tuntutan Plaintif ke atas Defendan berkaitan satu kemalangan jalan raya yang dikatakan telah berlaku pada 23.11.2021 pada jam lebih kurang 2.00 petang di Jalan Padang Melintang, Bachok, Kelantan di antara Plaintif yang menunggang motosikal jenis Honda Beat bernombor pendaftaran TBV 741 dan Defendan yang 27/01/2024 21:58:42 DD-A73KJ-47-05/2022 Kand. 62 S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 merupakan pemilik berdaftar dan pemandu bagi motokar jenis Proton Wira bernombor pendaftaran WGJ 6563. [2] Perbicaraan penuh bagi kes ini telah berlangsung sehingga ke peringkat pihak Plaintif telah pun menutup kes pada 22.11.2022 setelah selesai memanggil dua (2) orang saksi pihak Plaintif iaitu Penolong Pegawai Penyiasat (SP1) dan Plaintif (SP2). [3] Setelah perbicaraan untuk kes pihak Defendan ditangguhkan beberapa kali atas permohonan Peguam bela Defendan, atas alasan kegagalan untuk menghubungi Defendan sendiri, dan akhirnya Defendan berjaya dihubungi, telah membawa kepada pemfailan permohonan di Kandungan 19 iaitu permohonan kebenaran untuk Defendan meminda Pernyataan Pembelaan dan Saksi-Saksi Plaintif dipanggil semula untuk disoal balas. [4] Pada 13.11.2023, Mahkamah ini telah menolak permohonan pihak Defendan di Kandungan 19 dengan kos sebanyak RM 1,000.00. [5] Justeru, ini adalah alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG - PINDAAN PLIDING [6] Aturan 20 Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 menyatakan seperti berikut: Rule 5. Amendment of writ or pleading with leave (O. 20 r. 5) (1) Subject to Order 15, rule 6, 6A, 7 and 8 and the following provisions of this rule, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow the plaintiff to amend his writ, or any party to amend his pleading, on such terms as to S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 costs or otherwise as may be just and in such manner (if any) as it may direct. [7] Dalam kes Yamaha Motors Ltd v Yamaha Malaysia [1983] CLJ Rep 428, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menggariskan prinsip undang-undang berkaitan pindaan ke atas pliding, sebagaimana berikut: “Under O. 20 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, which is equivalent to O. 28 Rules of Supreme Court, a Judge has a discretion to allow leave to amend pleadings. Like any other discretion, it must of course be exercised judicially … The general principle is that the Court will allow such amendments as will cause no injustice to the other parties. Three basic questions should be considered to determine whether injustice would or would not result, (1) whether the application is bona fide; (2) whether prejudice caused to the other side can be compensated by costs and (3) whether the amendments would not in effect turn the suit from one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character. If the answers are in the affirmative, an application for amendment should be allowed at any stage of the proceedings particularly before trial, even if the effect of the amendment would be to add or substitute a new cause of action, provided the new cause of action arises out of the same facts or substantially the same facts as a cause of action in respect of which relief has already been claimed in the original statement of claim.” [8] Pihak Defendan dalam alasan permohonannya menyatakan seperti berikut: i. Pada 21 Februari 2023, Defendan telah membuat surat akuan bersumpah di hadapan pesuruhjaya sumpah di Mahkamah Majistret Bachok mengatakan beliau dan motokar nombor WGJ 6563 tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan pada 23 November 2021, dengan motosikal nombor pendaftaran TBV 741 yang ditunggang oleh Plaintif. Laporan polis beliau S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 sebelum itu yang mengakui penglibatan adalah semata-mata untuk menolong Plaintif membuat tuntutan palsu. ii. Oleh kerana sebelum ini Defendan mengatakan beliau terlibat, Pernyataan Pembelaan telah difailkan berdasarkan laporan polis Defendan. iii. Pernyataan Pembelaan perlu dipinda selari dengan surat akuan sumpah Defendan. iv. Peguam bela pihak Defendan pada awalnya gagal untuk menemubual Defendan. Pemfailan Pembelaan asal adalah untuk mengelakkan penghakiman ingkar daripada dimasukkan. v. Terdapat beberapa perkara yang mencurigakan dalam laporan polis. Peguam bela pihak Defendan telah meminta pihak penyelaras untuk membuat siasatan. Defendan telah mengaku membuat laporan polis palsu bagi menolong Plaintif membuat tuntutan palsu. ANALISIS DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH - ISU PINDAAN PLIDING Sama ada permohonan pihak Defendan bona fide [9] Berdasarkan kronologi panjang sebutan kes sehingga ke peringkat perbicaraan penuh bagi kes ini, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa permohonan pihak Defendan adalah tidak bona fide. Hal ini demikian kerana permohonan yang dibuat adalah pada peringkat yang agak lewat iaitu setelah pihak Plaintif selesai memanggil kesemua saksinya dan telah pun menutup kes. Bahkan setelah Mahkamah ini dengan menggunakan budi bicaranya telah membenarkan beberapa siri penangguhan sambung bicara bagi kes pihak Defendan atas permohonan Peguam bela pihak Defendan yang memberikan alasan yang sama iaitu gagal untuk menghubungi Defendan. Perkara ini S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 adalah suatu senario yang tidak boleh diterima dalam konteks perbicaraan kes di Mahkamah. Ini juga menunjukkan bahawa Peguam bela pihak Defendan telah mengendalikan kes sejak dari awal lagi secara sambil lewa dan semberono tanpa mengambil serius terhadap keseluruhan kepentingan kes. Sudah tentunya situasi ini telah mengakibatkan prejudis kepada pihak Plaintif. [10] Pihak Defendan dalam Afidavit Sokongan turut menyatakan bahawa akibat kegagalan Peguam menghubungi Defendan, barulah pada ketika itu Peguam mengarahkan pihak penyelaras untuk menjalankan penyiasatan kes. Ternyata hal ini menunjukkan bahawa pihak Defendan bagai “baru bangun daripada tidur” dan terus mengambil tindakan-tindakan yang sepatutnya dilakukan sebelum perbicaraan bermula lagi. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa Mahkamah tidak seharusnya memberikan budi bicara kepada pengendalian kes yang tidak serius dan tidak kompeten yang secara langsung menyebabkan prejudis kepada pihak lawan serta melengah-lengahkan proses keadilan di Mahkamah. “Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt.” Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan bahawa demi kepentingan keadilan kepada kes-kes yang dibicarakan di Mahkamah, permohonan dalam konteks seperti kes semasa adalah tidak wajar dibenarkan mengambil kira faktor “floodgates”. Sama ada pihak Defendan telah menjelaskan berkaitan kelewatan memfailkan permohonan [11] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa pihak Defendan telah memfailkan permohonan untuk meminda Pernyataan Pembelaan agak lewat iaitu setelah pihak Plaintif selesai menutup kes. Satu-satunya alasan yang dikemukakan kerana kelewatan pemfailan permohonan ialah disebabkan Peguam bela pihak Defendan baru sahaja dapat menghubungi Defendan sendiri. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa ini bukanlah satu alasan yang kukuh dan munasabah serta patut untuk diterima bagi menjustifikasikan kelewatan pemfailan permohonan. S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [12] Dalam kes semasa juga, tiada laporan polis lanjut dibuat oleh Defendan bagi menafikan keterlibatan dalam kemalangan yang berlaku. Defendan hanya membuat Surat Akuan Sumpah untuk menafikan perkara berkenaan. [13] Rujukan dibuat kepada kes Worldwide Corporation Ltd v Gpt Ltd & Anor [1998] EWCA Civ 1894, yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Where a party has had many months to consider how he wants to put his case and where it is not by virtue of some new factor appearing from some disclosure only recently made, why, one asks rhetorically, should he be entitled to cause the trial to be delayed so far as his opponent is concerned and why should he be entitled to cause inconvenience to other litigants? The only answer which can be given and which, Mr Brodie has suggested, applies in the instant case is that without the amendment a serious injustice may be done because the new case is the only way the case can be argued, and it raises the true issue between the parties which justice requires should be decided. We accept that at the end of the day a balance has to be struck. The court is concerned with doing justice, but justice to all litigants, and thus where a last minute amendment is sought with the consequences indicated, the onus will be a heavy one on the amending party to show the strength of the new case and why justice both to him, his opponent and other litigants, requires him to be able to pursue it.” Sama ada cadangan pindaan telah mengubah karakter Pernyataan Pembelaan [14] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa cadangan pindaan kepada Pernyataan Pembelaan yang difailkan oleh pihak Defendan akan mengubah asas dan karakter kepada pembelaan pihak Defendan yang sedia ada. Hal ini demikian kerana pihak Defendan telah menafikan penglibatan Defendan dalam kemalangan yang berlaku. S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Walaupun ianya selari dengan Surat Akuan Sumpah yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan, tiada sebarang laporan polis lanjut yang berbentuk penafian dibuat dan/atau difailkan oleh pihak Defendan. Pernyataan Pembelaan asal yang telah difailkan oleh pihak Defendan tidak menafikan penglibatan Defendan dalam kemalangan yang berlaku sebagaimana cadangan pindaan kepada Pernyataan Pembelaan. [15] Merujuk kepada kes Mohamad Farid Asyraf Dasuki v Masdi Javiran [2021] 1 LNS 448, Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan seperti berikut: “The proposed amendments would make the claim against the Appellant a sham claim dan defamatory in nature. It sets the Writ as well as the Statement of Claim as be libellous and no less serious, the imputation that the police would be involved. To stretch it a little further the aspersions cast on the conduct of the solicitors acting for the Appellants that the 1st Statement of Defence was improperly prepared and filed.” [16] Dalam kes Tokio Marine Insurance (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Rathakrishnan Ramatasu & Anor and Anor Appeal [2017] 3 CLJ 678, Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “This amendment was also inconsistent with the first defendant’s police report. We are of the view, this amendment and the conduct relating to the amendment as well as the evidence in court do not promote administration of justice. The first defendant as an insured, cannot be treated, to use the words of Mac Kinnon LJ in Groom’s case, supra, “as a mere pawn in the game of “the insurer and the claimant.” [17] Justeru, cadangan pembelaan yang difailkan oleh pihak Defendan yang bertentangan dengan laporan polis yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan sendiri yang secara jelas tidak menafikan penglibatan Defendan dalam kemalangan yang berlaku, dan hanya bergantung sepenuhnya semata-mata kepada Surat Akuan Sumpah adalah tidak tuntas S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 dan tidak bermerit. Hal ini juga telah sama sekali mengubah asas dan karakter pembelaan pihak Defendan. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG - PEMANGGILAN SEMULA SAKSI [18] Seksyen 138(4) Akta Keterangan 1950 menyatakan seperti berikut: Section 138. Order of examinations and direction of re-examination. … (4) The court may in all cases permit a witness to be recalled either for further examination-in-chief or for further crossexamination, and if it does so, the parties have the right of further cross-examination and re- examination respectively. [19] Pada akhirnya, ianya adalah satu kuasa budi bicara Mahkamah dalam membuat keputusan berkenaan isu pemanggilan semula saksi dengan mengambil kira prinsip asas iaitu kepentingan keadilan. Dalam kes Ong Yoke Eng & Anor v Lim Ah Yew [1982] 1 MLJ 226, Hakim Arulanandom dalam penghakimannya menyatakan seperti berikut: “In civil proceedings, it is in the discretion of the court of first instance to recall a witness or call further witnesses after his case is closed. Although under ordinary circumstances it may not be necessary or permissible to allow a witness once examined and dismissed by a party to be recalled for it is expected that the advocate will interrogate him on all material points touching his case, unforeseen situations may develop and there may be also inadvertent omissions. In such a case the court may at its discretion allow a witness to be recalled, but surprise or prejudice to the other party should be guarded against. The objection by the defendant to the application was however not on these anticipated grounds. Nevertheless on allowing the application the court granted liberty to the defendant to cross- S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 examine the recalled witness and further witnesses and call evidence in rebuttal. (Emphasis added.)” [20] Dalam kes Prince Court Medical Centre Sdn Bhd v Germguard Technologies (M) Sdn Bhd [2016] 4 MLJ 1, Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[8] In my judgment, the better view is that expressed in Ong Yoke Eng. A trial judge must be given a wide discretion on matters relating to evidence. After all, the Evidence Act 1950 itself places the matter of relevance and therefore admissibility upon the court, for it provides as follows in s 136(1): (1) When either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the court may as the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and the court shall admit the evidence if it thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise. [9] The view that I have taken is supported by the decision in TD Canada Trust v McMaster et al [2003] BCD (Civ) 16394, where Garson J said: In Dudas v Munroe [1993] BCJ 2035 (SC) (QL), Braidwood J (as he then was) summarised the law concerning the court’s discretion to reopen a trial before judgment is entered as follows: In deciding whether or not to reopen a case, the governing considerations are first, would a miscarriage of justice probably occur without a rehearing; and second, would a rehearing probably produce a change of result? The discretion to reopen a trial before judgment is entered is an unfettered discretion but one that should be used sparingly (Sykes v Sykes (1995) 6 BCLR (3d) 296 (CA)) and has its purpose the correction of what would otherwise be a miscarriage of justice (Kemp v Wittenberg 1999 BCJ 810 (SC)). (Emphasis added.) S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [10] We take the view that if the application in encl 71 were to be allowed, it will allow the appellant to rectify, repair or cover up any loophole in their case after having the benefit of evaluating the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses and the respondent’s submissions. This will not be fair to the respondent and is not how litigation should be conducted in our adversarial system of justice. [11] Most importantly, the discretion to allow a party to reopen its case is a discretion that should be exercised sparingly: see Sykes v Sykes (1995) 6 BCLR (3d) 296 which the Court of Appeal cited with approval in Tan Kah Khiam referred to in para 9 above. [12] The policy consideration behind this is obvious, and that is to avoid opening the floodgates for similar applications in the future. In cases such as the one before us, the discretion should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. [21] Manakala dalam kes Silver Bird Group Bhd & Ors v Dato’ Tan Han Kook & Ors [2016] 9 MLJ 503, Hakim Azizah Nawawi (pada ketika itu) menyatakan sebagaimana berikut: “…the courts have a wide discretion to recall witnesses after the case is closed, where the application is based on unforeseen circumstances which may develop or that there may be inadvertent omissions, subject to issue of surprise or prejudice to the other party. As such, it depends on the factual matrix of each case as to where the justice of the case lies.” S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 ANALISIS DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH - ISU PEMANGGILAN SEMULA SAKSI [22] Dalam kes semasa, pihak Plaintif telah pun selesai menutup kes dengan pemanggilan dua (2) orang saksi iaitu Penolong Pegawai Penyiasat (SP1) dan Plaintif (SP2). Pihak Defendan telah memohon penangguhan perbicaraan kes Defendan beberapa kali walaupun terdapat bantahan daripada pihak Plaintif. Satu-satunya alasan yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dalam memohon penangguhan ialah kegagalan Peguam bela untuk menghubungi Defendan. Setelah Peguam bela berjaya menghubungi Defendan, Peguam bela memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa pihak Defendan akan memasukkan permohonan semasa kerana terdapatnya isu fraud. [23] Dalam memperhalusi isu ini, Mahkamah ini mendapat panduan berkenaan prinsip asas iaitu “in the interest of justice”. Satu-satunya alasan dalam membuat permohonan semasa yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan ialah Defendan sendiri telah memperakui membuat laporan polis palsu dan mengatakan bahawa tidak terlibat dalam kemalangan yang berlaku. Defendan, dalam bergantung kepada pernyataan ini, telah membuat Surat Akuan Bersumpah. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa dalam ketiadaan laporan polis lanjut yang menafikan keterlibatan Defendan dalam kemalangan yang berlaku, ianya tidak akan membawa apa-apa faedah dalam pemanggilan semula saksi Plaintif terutamanya melibatkan SP1 iaitu Penolong Pegawai Penyiasat. [24] Selain itu, isu prejudis kepada pihak lawan iaitu pihak Plaintif dalam kes ini sudah tentunya merupakan isu yang material dalam konteks keseluruhan pembawaan kes pihak Plaintif. Keseluruhan kertas kausa dan strategi pembawaan kes pihak Plaintif akan tergugat dengan permohonan semasa jika ianya dibenarkan. Ianya juga adalah satu peluang kepada pihak Defendan, “to have second bite at the cherry”. Mengambil kira situasi kes semasa, Mahkamah ini berpandangan adalah tidak wajar untuk membenarkan permohonan pemanggilan semula saksi-saksi Plaintif untuk disoal balas hanya bersandarkan dan berdasarkan semata-mata kepada Surat Akuan Bersumpah yang dibuat oleh Defendan. Pada hemat Mahkamah, ianya adalah tidak memadai dan tidak mencukupi dalam konteks kepentingan keadilan keseluruhan kes. S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [25] Pada akhirnya, Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menjustifikasikan kebenaran untuk permohonan semasa, “at the risk of repetition”, akibat keseluruhannya daripada pengendalian kes yang tidak kompeten oleh Peguam bela Defendan. Ini akan menyebabkan “threshold” kebenaran bagi permohonan semasa menjadi lebih ringan dan membuka “floodgates”. KESIMPULAN [26] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, permohonan pihak Defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang merit. Permohonan pihak Defendan di Kandungan 19, adalah dengan ini, ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM 1,000.00. Bertarikh pada 27 Januari 2024 t.t. MOHD FAUZAN BIN MOHD SUHAIRI Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Bachok Kelantan Bagi pihak Pemohon/Defendan : NORIAH BINTI MUHAMMAD Tetuan Shaharuddin Hidayu & Marwaliz Bagi pihak Plaintif : NOR ANIS BINTI HISHAM Tetuan Kuay & Partners S/N c4PQn5tqEkSkCT644C/YWQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

CB-12B-15-11/2022

PERAYU 1. ) SRIRAJA HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. 2. ) VELLAITHAN A/L MURUGAN RESPONDEN MOHAMAD HAFIZ BIN GHOZALI

Rayuan sivil tuntutan gantirugi kemalangan jalan raya - Rayuan terhadap amaun gantirugi - Tiada kekhilafan yang memerlukan campurtangan mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan - Rayuan ditolak.

26/01/2024

YA Tuan Roslan bin Mat Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=39604e1b-e7d4-4014-aea4-c2fb2a06a10d&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - CB-12B-15-11-2022 SRIRAJA HOLDING v MOHD HAFIZ GHOZALI -edited 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO. CB-12B-15-11/2022 ANTARA 1. SRIRAJA HOLDINGS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 575530W] 2. VELLAITHAN A/L MURUGAM … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN MOHAMAD HAFIZ BIN GHOZALI … RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. CB-A53KJ-303-12/2020 ANTARA MOHAMAD HAFIZ BIN GHOZALI …PLAINTIF DAN 1. SRIRAJA HOLDINGS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 575530W] 2. VELLAITHAN A/L MURUGAM … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] 26/01/2024 11:44:06 CB-12B-15-11/2022 Kand. 18 S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang telah membenarkan gantirugi khas yang keseluruhannya berjumlah RM1,122,311.40 dengan faedah 5 % setahun kepada gantirugi am dan 2.5 % setahun bagi gantirugi khas. Bagi maksud alasan ini, pihak-pihak akan dirujuk sepertimana prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen iaitu Perayu-perayu adalah Defendan-Defendan manakala Responden adalah Plaintif. [2] Tuntutan Plaintif ini adalah berkaitan dengan kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 24.01.2018. Kemalangan itu telah menyebabkan kecederaan dialami oleh Plaintif. [3] Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan telah sudi bersetuju dengan liabiliti dalam kes ini semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen iaitu Plaintif bertanggungan 10 % dan Defendan-Defendan bertanggungan 90 %. Oleh itu rayuan dalam kes ini adalah berkaitan kuantum gantirugi sahaja. [4] Plaintif telah mengemukakan empat orang saksi termasuk Plaintif. Di samping itu laporan-laporan pakar turut dikemukakan bagi menyokong tuntutan Plaintif. Ini dapat dilihat di halaman 51 hingga 58, 73 hingga 150, 192 hingga 263 Rekod Rayuan. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Analisa [5] Penentuan gantirugi dalam kecederaan yang dialami oleh individu adalah sesuatu yang sukar. Ia memerlukan penelitian kepada kecederaan yang dialami dan laporan pakar berkaitan kecederaan tersebut. Di samping itu pertimbangan juga perlu dibuat kepada keilatan yang dihadapinya itu telah menghalang Plaintif daripada menikmati kehidupan seperti biasa sebelum kecederaan itu dialami olehnya. [6] Hakikat gantirugi ekoran daripada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif telah dirumuskan dengan menarik oleh Dewan Pertuanan (House of Lord) dalam kes Parry v Cleaver [1970] A.C. 1 di mana Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest menyatakan seperti berikut: “To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but it is recognised that no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. No sort of arithmetical calculation is possible. Money cannot really compensate for the loss of a limb or for any permanent deprivation of physical abilities or indeed for pain and suffering. There can be no equation between purchasing power and those things which cannot be purchased. But a money award is all that is possible. It is the best that can be done.” S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [7] Semasa mendengar rayuan berkenaan dengan gantirugi Mahkamah ini perlu mempertimbangkan panduan yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Agong keadaan di mana mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan boleh campur tangan di dalam gantirugi yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Bicara. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani [1985] 2 MLJ 22 seperti berikut: “The principle that could guide this court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case, in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purposes of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the court is satisfied or convinced that the Judge has acted upon wrong principles of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.” [8] Begitu juga dalam kes Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 yang turut menegaskan garis panduan bilakah hakim bicara boleh campur tangan dalam gantirugi yang telah diputuskan oleh hakim bicara. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 “Or another way of putting it – that it is a matter of assessment but not of calculation. So far as this court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer L.J. in Flint Levell [1935] 1 KB 354 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.” [9] Penelitian kepada kes-kes di atas menunjukkan bahawa ruang untuk hakim yang mendengar rayuan campur tangan dalam keputusan hakim bicara berkenaan gantirugi adalah tidak luas. Ia hanya boleh dilakukan sekiranya didapati bahawa hakim bicara telah memutuskan gantirugi tersebut tidak berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang berkenaan dengan gantirugi, jumlah yang diberikan adalah tidak sejajar dengan keputusan-keputusan yang lalu berkenaan dengan gantirugi tersebut atau gantirugi tersebut terlampau rendah atau terlampau berlebihan. Di samping itu sekiranya gantirugi tersebut diberikan tanpa sokongan keterangan yang sewajarnya boleh juga menjadi asbab kepada campur tangan hakim rayuan dalam keputusan gantirugi tersebut. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Head Injury with Traumatic Brain Injury [10] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam kes ini telah memutuskan bahawa jumlah gantirugi bagi maudhu’ ini adalah RM100,000.00. Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa jumlah yang sepatutnya diberikan dalam kes ini adalah sebanyak RM70,000.00. Sementara peguam Plaintif memohon supaya dipertimbangkan jumlah RM300,000.00. Dalam hal ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah meneliti laporan pakar pihak Defendan yang telah memperincikan kelemahan yang dihadapi oleh Plaintif ekoran daripada kecederaan tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan di muka surat 4 alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. [11] Sementara itu jika diteliti kepada laporan yang dikemukakan oleh pakar Plaintif iaitu Dr. Khairul Muhsein Abdullah menyatakan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif adalah keilatan kekal. Oleh yang demikian ia telah menjadi sandaran kepada hujahan peguam Plaintif untuk meningkatkan gantirugi kepada RM300,000.00. Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah ini juga meneliti keputusan dalam kes Cheong Voon Han v Thevan a/l Subramaniam & Anor [2019] 11 MLJ 220 dan Ang Yee Cheng & Anor v Ang Siang Hock (person under disability suing through Koh Beng Guek, litigation representative) [2016] 9 MLJ 238 yang telah mengesahkan jumlah yang diawardkan kepada kecederaan yang melibatkan otak ialah RM300,000.00. [12] Berdasarkan laporan pakar yang disediakan oleh Dr. Khairul Muhsein Abdullah tersebut pada pandangan doktor pakar tersebut S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 keilatan yang akan dihadapi oleh Plaintif adalah melibatkan sakit kepala dan ia boleh dikawal dengan perubatan seperti ubat penahan sakit yang akan dialami oleh Plaintif sepanjang hayat beliau. Keilatan kognitif adalah sesuatu yang sukar dirawat dan ia adalah akan kekal. Mahkamah mendapati dalam kes ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membandingkan laporan pakar Plaintif dan laporan pakar pihak Defendan dan berpendapat bahawa jumlah yang sewajarnya adalah RM100,000.00 walaupun ia adalah lebih rendah daripada RM300,000.00 yang dinyatakan dalam kes di atas dan juga seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Cheong Poh & Anor v Teow Ah Keow [1995] 3 MLJ 89. Namun pertimbangan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut tidak mempunyai asas untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Ia hanya boleh dilakukan sekiranya dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen itu dibuat dengan hanya berdasarkan kepada laporan pakar Plaintif semata-mata. Namun dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat kedua-dua laporan pakar tersebut telah diteliti dengan sewajarnya oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah award tersebut adalah dikekalkan. Closed Fracture Proximal 3rd Left Humerus [13] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sejumlah RM25,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. Ia dalah berdasarkan kepada keputusan dalam kes Ramesh a/l Kumaran v Zamri bin Abdullah & Anor [2022] 1 PIR 58 yang telah mengawardkan RM27,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. Dalam hal ini secara perbandingan Mahkamah ini S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 merujuk kepada kes Majlis Perbandaran Kota Bharu Bandar Raya Islam (MPKB-BRI) lwn Muhammad Nafiz bin Zulkifli [2021] MLJU 2121 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengesahkan jumlah RM22,000.00 bagi gantirugi bagi kecederaan ini. [14] Mahkamah ini berpendapat pertimbangan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan dengan jumlah tersebut adalah wajar dan tidak perlu diganggu oleh Mahkamah ini. Left Preganglionic Brachial Plexus Injury [15] Bagi kecederaan ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sejumlah RM90,000.00. Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa jumlah yang sewajarnya adalah RM75,000.00. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam kes ini telah merujuk kepada kes Purubakaran a/l Sandran v Mohammad Benjamin bin Ahmad Faizal & 2 Ors [2021] 1 PIR 19. Sebaliknya Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini bukannya keseluruhan tangan bagi mewajarkan jumlah tersebut. Namun begitu jika dilihat kepada laporan perubatan menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah mengalami kecederaan complete brachial plexus dan juga claviculothoracic dislocation. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah meneliti kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam maudhu’ ini dan mengambil perhatian kepada keadaan kecederaan itu telah menyebabkan Plaintif telah hilang rasa sentuhan pada bahagian kiri C5 dan juga T1. Mahkamah ini berpendapat pertimbangan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut berkenaan kehilangan rasa sentuhan yang S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 dikaitkan dengan kecederaan tersebut adalah suatu yang mewajarkan jumlah RM90,000.00 diawardkan kepada Plaintif. Left Pneumothorax [16] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan RM10,000.00. Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami adalam kes ini adalah tidak serius jika dibandingkan dengan keputusan yang terdapat dalam kes Muhammad Shahid b Mohd Toha v Alwee Alywin bin Azlim [2020] 2 PIR 40. Oleh itu award yang sepatutnya diberikan adalah sebanyak RM5,000.00 sahaja. Namun begitu selain daripada alasan tersebut tiada hujahan daripada Peguam pihak Defendan yang menunjukkan bahawa award tersebut adalah tersasar daripada yang sewajarnya. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah RM10,000.00 tersebut dikekalkan. Hyposmia Secondary to TBI (Loss of Smell – 50 %) [17] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan RM35,000.00. Ia adalah berdasarkan kepada laporan yang menunjukkan bahawa keilatan yang dialami oleh Plaintif telah menyebabkan Plaintif telah mengalami hilang rasa bau iaitu 50 %. Oleh itu pertimbangan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang tidak membenarkan tuntutan sebanyak RM45,000.00 oleh peguam Plaintif dan peguam Defendan jumlah RM20,000.00 oleh Defendan adalah suatu yang munasabah dan wajar dengan meneliti kepada kadar kehilangan bau yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini. Oeh itu jumlah tersebut dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah ini. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Scarring [18] Peguam Plaintif memohon supaya jumlah yang diberikan sebanyak RM30,000.00. Sementara peguam Defendan mencadangkan jumlah sebanyak RM12,000.00. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen setelah menimbangkan parut-parut yang berada pada tubuh badan Plaintif/Responden dan telah membenarkan award sebanyak RM15,000.00 dengan juga mengambil kira kecederaan dan keilatan yang dialami oleh Plaintif. Mahkamah berpendapat award tersebut adalah suatu yang wajar dan tidak perlu gangguan daripada Mahkamah ini. Hematoma Over Left Eyebrow [19] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan award sebanyak RM8,000.00 dan menolak tuntutan RM10,000.00 dan bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan iaitu Plaintif bahawa laporan perubatan awal tidak menunjukkan kecederaan ini. Namun demikian dalam laporan perubatan Plaintif di muka surat 94 yang sebenarnya tiada laporan yang sedemikian. Penelitian Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa laporan yang berkaitan adalah di muka surat 107 hingga 111 dalam Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1. Namun demikian ia tidak dihujahkan secara mendalam oleh peguam pihak Defendan semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa jumlah tersebut telah dipertimbangkan berdasarkan kepada laporan daripada pakar yang berkenaan. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Small Puncture Wound Over Left Chest Wall [20] Jumlah yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah RM5,000.00. Ia adalah berdasarkan kepada kecederaan dan keilatan yang terdapat dalam laporan perubatan yang telah diteliti oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu sukar Mahkamah ini untuk mengenepikan jumlah tersebut tanpa keterangan yang dapat mengakaskan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut. Oleh itu jumlah itu dikekalkan. Left Cribriform Plate Fracture [21] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa jumlah sebanyak RM5,000.00 boleh diberikan kepada Plaintif walaupun dalam laporan perubatan awal tidak dinyatakan kecederaan ini. Namun begitu rujukan kepada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat ia wajar diberikan jumlah sedemikian. Mahkamah ini tidak dalam kedudukan untuk mengenepikan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap berkenaan award tersebut. Oleh itu ia dikekalkan. [22] Sementara itu bagi kos rawatan masa hadapan Mahkamah telah meneliti secara terperinci alasan penghakiman yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan perkara ini iaitu yang terdapat di halaman 16 hingga 21 iaitu di butiran 21 (a) hingga (g). Setelah meneliti hujahan pihak Plaintif dan Defendan-defendan Mahkamah mendapati tiada alasan yang wajar untuk dapatan-dapatan tersebut diketepikan oleh S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah ini mengesahkan dapatan dan award yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. [23] Sementara itu bagi gantirugi khas yang tertera di halaman 22 hingga 28, penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman dan hujahan pihak- pihak serta dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan juga tidak memberikan alasan untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan tersebut. Ia adalah dikekalkan. [24] Secara keseluruhannya Mahkamah ini berpendapatan tiada alasan untuk campur tangan dengan dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu rayuan oleh pihak Perayu adalah ditolak. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap kuantum adalah dikekalkan dan kos RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Bertarikh: 26 hb. Januari 2024 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu/Defendan Koh Jun Wen Tetuan Gan Ho & Razlan Hadri Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden/Plaintif Balvinder Singh Tetuan Saleem Gill & Partners Bentong, Pahang Darul Makmur S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

CB-12B-15-11/2022

PERAYU 1. ) SRIRAJA HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. 2. ) VELLAITHAN A/L MURUGAN RESPONDEN MOHAMAD HAFIZ BIN GHOZALI

Rayuan sivil tuntutan gantirugi kemalangan jalan raya - Rayuan terhadap amaun gantirugi - Tiada kekhilafan yang memerlukan campurtangan mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan - Rayuan ditolak.

26/01/2024

YA Tuan Roslan bin Mat Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=39604e1b-e7d4-4014-aea4-c2fb2a06a10d&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - CB-12B-15-11-2022 SRIRAJA HOLDING v MOHD HAFIZ GHOZALI -edited 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO. CB-12B-15-11/2022 ANTARA 1. SRIRAJA HOLDINGS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 575530W] 2. VELLAITHAN A/L MURUGAM … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN MOHAMAD HAFIZ BIN GHOZALI … RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. CB-A53KJ-303-12/2020 ANTARA MOHAMAD HAFIZ BIN GHOZALI …PLAINTIF DAN 1. SRIRAJA HOLDINGS SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 575530W] 2. VELLAITHAN A/L MURUGAM … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN] 26/01/2024 11:44:06 CB-12B-15-11/2022 Kand. 18 S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang telah membenarkan gantirugi khas yang keseluruhannya berjumlah RM1,122,311.40 dengan faedah 5 % setahun kepada gantirugi am dan 2.5 % setahun bagi gantirugi khas. Bagi maksud alasan ini, pihak-pihak akan dirujuk sepertimana prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen iaitu Perayu-perayu adalah Defendan-Defendan manakala Responden adalah Plaintif. [2] Tuntutan Plaintif ini adalah berkaitan dengan kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 24.01.2018. Kemalangan itu telah menyebabkan kecederaan dialami oleh Plaintif. [3] Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan telah sudi bersetuju dengan liabiliti dalam kes ini semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen iaitu Plaintif bertanggungan 10 % dan Defendan-Defendan bertanggungan 90 %. Oleh itu rayuan dalam kes ini adalah berkaitan kuantum gantirugi sahaja. [4] Plaintif telah mengemukakan empat orang saksi termasuk Plaintif. Di samping itu laporan-laporan pakar turut dikemukakan bagi menyokong tuntutan Plaintif. Ini dapat dilihat di halaman 51 hingga 58, 73 hingga 150, 192 hingga 263 Rekod Rayuan. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Analisa [5] Penentuan gantirugi dalam kecederaan yang dialami oleh individu adalah sesuatu yang sukar. Ia memerlukan penelitian kepada kecederaan yang dialami dan laporan pakar berkaitan kecederaan tersebut. Di samping itu pertimbangan juga perlu dibuat kepada keilatan yang dihadapinya itu telah menghalang Plaintif daripada menikmati kehidupan seperti biasa sebelum kecederaan itu dialami olehnya. [6] Hakikat gantirugi ekoran daripada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif telah dirumuskan dengan menarik oleh Dewan Pertuanan (House of Lord) dalam kes Parry v Cleaver [1970] A.C. 1 di mana Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest menyatakan seperti berikut: “To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but it is recognised that no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment. No sort of arithmetical calculation is possible. Money cannot really compensate for the loss of a limb or for any permanent deprivation of physical abilities or indeed for pain and suffering. There can be no equation between purchasing power and those things which cannot be purchased. But a money award is all that is possible. It is the best that can be done.” S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [7] Semasa mendengar rayuan berkenaan dengan gantirugi Mahkamah ini perlu mempertimbangkan panduan yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Agong keadaan di mana mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan boleh campur tangan di dalam gantirugi yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Bicara. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani [1985] 2 MLJ 22 seperti berikut: “The principle that could guide this court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case, in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purposes of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the court is satisfied or convinced that the Judge has acted upon wrong principles of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.” [8] Begitu juga dalam kes Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 yang turut menegaskan garis panduan bilakah hakim bicara boleh campur tangan dalam gantirugi yang telah diputuskan oleh hakim bicara. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 “Or another way of putting it – that it is a matter of assessment but not of calculation. So far as this court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer L.J. in Flint Levell [1935] 1 KB 354 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.” [9] Penelitian kepada kes-kes di atas menunjukkan bahawa ruang untuk hakim yang mendengar rayuan campur tangan dalam keputusan hakim bicara berkenaan gantirugi adalah tidak luas. Ia hanya boleh dilakukan sekiranya didapati bahawa hakim bicara telah memutuskan gantirugi tersebut tidak berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang berkenaan dengan gantirugi, jumlah yang diberikan adalah tidak sejajar dengan keputusan-keputusan yang lalu berkenaan dengan gantirugi tersebut atau gantirugi tersebut terlampau rendah atau terlampau berlebihan. Di samping itu sekiranya gantirugi tersebut diberikan tanpa sokongan keterangan yang sewajarnya boleh juga menjadi asbab kepada campur tangan hakim rayuan dalam keputusan gantirugi tersebut. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Head Injury with Traumatic Brain Injury [10] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam kes ini telah memutuskan bahawa jumlah gantirugi bagi maudhu’ ini adalah RM100,000.00. Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa jumlah yang sepatutnya diberikan dalam kes ini adalah sebanyak RM70,000.00. Sementara peguam Plaintif memohon supaya dipertimbangkan jumlah RM300,000.00. Dalam hal ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah meneliti laporan pakar pihak Defendan yang telah memperincikan kelemahan yang dihadapi oleh Plaintif ekoran daripada kecederaan tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan di muka surat 4 alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. [11] Sementara itu jika diteliti kepada laporan yang dikemukakan oleh pakar Plaintif iaitu Dr. Khairul Muhsein Abdullah menyatakan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif adalah keilatan kekal. Oleh yang demikian ia telah menjadi sandaran kepada hujahan peguam Plaintif untuk meningkatkan gantirugi kepada RM300,000.00. Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah ini juga meneliti keputusan dalam kes Cheong Voon Han v Thevan a/l Subramaniam & Anor [2019] 11 MLJ 220 dan Ang Yee Cheng & Anor v Ang Siang Hock (person under disability suing through Koh Beng Guek, litigation representative) [2016] 9 MLJ 238 yang telah mengesahkan jumlah yang diawardkan kepada kecederaan yang melibatkan otak ialah RM300,000.00. [12] Berdasarkan laporan pakar yang disediakan oleh Dr. Khairul Muhsein Abdullah tersebut pada pandangan doktor pakar tersebut S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 keilatan yang akan dihadapi oleh Plaintif adalah melibatkan sakit kepala dan ia boleh dikawal dengan perubatan seperti ubat penahan sakit yang akan dialami oleh Plaintif sepanjang hayat beliau. Keilatan kognitif adalah sesuatu yang sukar dirawat dan ia adalah akan kekal. Mahkamah mendapati dalam kes ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membandingkan laporan pakar Plaintif dan laporan pakar pihak Defendan dan berpendapat bahawa jumlah yang sewajarnya adalah RM100,000.00 walaupun ia adalah lebih rendah daripada RM300,000.00 yang dinyatakan dalam kes di atas dan juga seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Cheong Poh & Anor v Teow Ah Keow [1995] 3 MLJ 89. Namun pertimbangan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut tidak mempunyai asas untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Ia hanya boleh dilakukan sekiranya dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen itu dibuat dengan hanya berdasarkan kepada laporan pakar Plaintif semata-mata. Namun dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat kedua-dua laporan pakar tersebut telah diteliti dengan sewajarnya oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah award tersebut adalah dikekalkan. Closed Fracture Proximal 3rd Left Humerus [13] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sejumlah RM25,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. Ia dalah berdasarkan kepada keputusan dalam kes Ramesh a/l Kumaran v Zamri bin Abdullah & Anor [2022] 1 PIR 58 yang telah mengawardkan RM27,000.00 bagi kecederaan ini. Dalam hal ini secara perbandingan Mahkamah ini S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 merujuk kepada kes Majlis Perbandaran Kota Bharu Bandar Raya Islam (MPKB-BRI) lwn Muhammad Nafiz bin Zulkifli [2021] MLJU 2121 di mana Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengesahkan jumlah RM22,000.00 bagi gantirugi bagi kecederaan ini. [14] Mahkamah ini berpendapat pertimbangan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan dengan jumlah tersebut adalah wajar dan tidak perlu diganggu oleh Mahkamah ini. Left Preganglionic Brachial Plexus Injury [15] Bagi kecederaan ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sejumlah RM90,000.00. Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa jumlah yang sewajarnya adalah RM75,000.00. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam kes ini telah merujuk kepada kes Purubakaran a/l Sandran v Mohammad Benjamin bin Ahmad Faizal & 2 Ors [2021] 1 PIR 19. Sebaliknya Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini bukannya keseluruhan tangan bagi mewajarkan jumlah tersebut. Namun begitu jika dilihat kepada laporan perubatan menyatakan bahawa Plaintif telah mengalami kecederaan complete brachial plexus dan juga claviculothoracic dislocation. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah meneliti kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam maudhu’ ini dan mengambil perhatian kepada keadaan kecederaan itu telah menyebabkan Plaintif telah hilang rasa sentuhan pada bahagian kiri C5 dan juga T1. Mahkamah ini berpendapat pertimbangan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut berkenaan kehilangan rasa sentuhan yang S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 dikaitkan dengan kecederaan tersebut adalah suatu yang mewajarkan jumlah RM90,000.00 diawardkan kepada Plaintif. Left Pneumothorax [16] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan RM10,000.00. Peguam pihak Defendan menyatakan bahawa kecederaan yang dialami adalam kes ini adalah tidak serius jika dibandingkan dengan keputusan yang terdapat dalam kes Muhammad Shahid b Mohd Toha v Alwee Alywin bin Azlim [2020] 2 PIR 40. Oleh itu award yang sepatutnya diberikan adalah sebanyak RM5,000.00 sahaja. Namun begitu selain daripada alasan tersebut tiada hujahan daripada Peguam pihak Defendan yang menunjukkan bahawa award tersebut adalah tersasar daripada yang sewajarnya. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah RM10,000.00 tersebut dikekalkan. Hyposmia Secondary to TBI (Loss of Smell – 50 %) [17] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan RM35,000.00. Ia adalah berdasarkan kepada laporan yang menunjukkan bahawa keilatan yang dialami oleh Plaintif telah menyebabkan Plaintif telah mengalami hilang rasa bau iaitu 50 %. Oleh itu pertimbangan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang tidak membenarkan tuntutan sebanyak RM45,000.00 oleh peguam Plaintif dan peguam Defendan jumlah RM20,000.00 oleh Defendan adalah suatu yang munasabah dan wajar dengan meneliti kepada kadar kehilangan bau yang dialami oleh Plaintif dalam kes ini. Oeh itu jumlah tersebut dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah ini. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Scarring [18] Peguam Plaintif memohon supaya jumlah yang diberikan sebanyak RM30,000.00. Sementara peguam Defendan mencadangkan jumlah sebanyak RM12,000.00. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen setelah menimbangkan parut-parut yang berada pada tubuh badan Plaintif/Responden dan telah membenarkan award sebanyak RM15,000.00 dengan juga mengambil kira kecederaan dan keilatan yang dialami oleh Plaintif. Mahkamah berpendapat award tersebut adalah suatu yang wajar dan tidak perlu gangguan daripada Mahkamah ini. Hematoma Over Left Eyebrow [19] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan award sebanyak RM8,000.00 dan menolak tuntutan RM10,000.00 dan bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan iaitu Plaintif bahawa laporan perubatan awal tidak menunjukkan kecederaan ini. Namun demikian dalam laporan perubatan Plaintif di muka surat 94 yang sebenarnya tiada laporan yang sedemikian. Penelitian Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa laporan yang berkaitan adalah di muka surat 107 hingga 111 dalam Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1. Namun demikian ia tidak dihujahkan secara mendalam oleh peguam pihak Defendan semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa jumlah tersebut telah dipertimbangkan berdasarkan kepada laporan daripada pakar yang berkenaan. S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Small Puncture Wound Over Left Chest Wall [20] Jumlah yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah RM5,000.00. Ia adalah berdasarkan kepada kecederaan dan keilatan yang terdapat dalam laporan perubatan yang telah diteliti oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu sukar Mahkamah ini untuk mengenepikan jumlah tersebut tanpa keterangan yang dapat mengakaskan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut. Oleh itu jumlah itu dikekalkan. Left Cribriform Plate Fracture [21] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa jumlah sebanyak RM5,000.00 boleh diberikan kepada Plaintif walaupun dalam laporan perubatan awal tidak dinyatakan kecederaan ini. Namun begitu rujukan kepada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat ia wajar diberikan jumlah sedemikian. Mahkamah ini tidak dalam kedudukan untuk mengenepikan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap berkenaan award tersebut. Oleh itu ia dikekalkan. [22] Sementara itu bagi kos rawatan masa hadapan Mahkamah telah meneliti secara terperinci alasan penghakiman yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan perkara ini iaitu yang terdapat di halaman 16 hingga 21 iaitu di butiran 21 (a) hingga (g). Setelah meneliti hujahan pihak Plaintif dan Defendan-defendan Mahkamah mendapati tiada alasan yang wajar untuk dapatan-dapatan tersebut diketepikan oleh S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah ini mengesahkan dapatan dan award yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. [23] Sementara itu bagi gantirugi khas yang tertera di halaman 22 hingga 28, penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman dan hujahan pihak- pihak serta dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan juga tidak memberikan alasan untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan tersebut. Ia adalah dikekalkan. [24] Secara keseluruhannya Mahkamah ini berpendapatan tiada alasan untuk campur tangan dengan dapatan yang dibuat oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Oleh itu rayuan oleh pihak Perayu adalah ditolak. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap kuantum adalah dikekalkan dan kos RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Bertarikh: 26 hb. Januari 2024 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu/Defendan Koh Jun Wen Tetuan Gan Ho & Razlan Hadri Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden/Plaintif Balvinder Singh Tetuan Saleem Gill & Partners Bentong, Pahang Darul Makmur S/N G05gOdTnFECupML7KgahDQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

B-09(H)-107-03/2022

PERAYU MUHAMAD MIZAN BIN SAHARI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya

Section 288 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code - Appellant being a male adult of 35 years old is subjected to be whipped up to a statutory maximum of 24 strokes only - Appellant appealed against sentence for a shorter jail term - The total term of imprisonment handed down by the learned High Court Judge had a crushing effect on the Appellant - Unanimously find that the sentence imposed by High Court Judge is not manifestly excessive or inadequate – The High Court Judge had not erred in coming to this decision as he had taken relevant factor such as the age of both the Appellant and the victim and the Appellant as the guardian of the victim into consideration - The argument on the issue of whether the sentences was manifestly excessive or otherwise is not a new argument – The paramount importance in the administration of criminal justice is that the court below applies the correct judicial principles in the assessment of the sentence - The punishment meted out is within the sentencing trend for the similar type of offence - “guideline” to set out the wide range of factors or circumstances that the court can consider - (a) the gravity, seriousness and heinous of the crime committed;(b) age of the victim;(c) early plea of guilt or claim trial;(d) traumatic experience, emotional harm, humiliation and degradation suffered by the victim;(e) the protection of public interest;(f) crushing effect on the accused;(g) victim’s impact statement;(h) strong message to the public of the court's disapproval of this kind of crime;(i) court not to succumb to emotions and go overboard in passing impossible sentence;(j) current trend of sentencing in cases of similar nature;(k) previous conviction on record or first offender;(l) time spent in remand at the time of sentencing;(m) accused personal and family background which may include good character, job, age, marital status, parent, children and other relevant factors;(n) retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation;(o) lack of remorse;(p) any physical injuries that occurred to the victim;(q) relationship between the accused and the victim;(r) any weapon use and how?;(s) involvement of violence / no violence / low level of violence;(t) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed for the offence;(u) number of charges;(w) planning the crime;(x) co-operation with authorities;(y) concurrent or consecutive imprisonment terms; and(z) the involvement of more than one accused.-Unanimously affirmed the sentences meted out by the High Court in reducing the total number of imprisonments from 1050 to 42 years - Affirmed the conviction and sentence by the High Court - The total strokes of whipping from 210 to 24 to bring it to within the limit mandated by the Criminal Procedure Code is also affirmed.

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1fd5f850-aa1f-4458-a790-324c124b7124&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: B-09(H)-107-03/2022, B-09(H)-108-03/2022, B-09(H)-109-03/2022 & B-09(H)-110-03/2022 BETWEEN MUHAMAD MIZAN BIN SAHARI - APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR - RESPONDENT [In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya at Klang (Criminal Division) Criminal Trial No:B-42JSKS-89-02/2021 Between Muhamad Mizan Bin Sahari - Appellant And Public Prosecutor - Respondent] 26/01/2024 17:09:53 B-09(H)-107-03/2022 Kand. 50 S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Appellant was charged with 105 charges for offences under section 376B of the Penal Code for raping his stepdaughter, who was 12 years old at the time of incident. [2] The Appellant pleaded guilty to all the charges. He understood the nature and consequences of his plea. The facts of the case were tendered as exhibit along with other documentary evidence which were admitted as true by the Appellant. He was then convicted on the same. [3] After hearing the mitigation from the Appellant and the submission by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor for the Respondent, the learned Sessions Court Judge sentenced the Appellant to 10 years imprisonment from the date of arrest (20/2/2021) and 2 strokes of whipping for each of the said charges. The sentences were to run consecutively, making the total period of imprisonment to be 1050 years. [4] Aggrieved by the decision, the Appellant filed an appeal to the High Court for the imprisonment term be shortened and to run concurrently. S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Decision of the High Court [5] On 7/3/2022, the learned High Court Judge allowed the Appellant appeal and altered the sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge for being manifestly excessive. From the cumulative term of 1050 years imposed by the learned Sessions Court Judge, the imprisonment period was reduced to 42 years. The details of the sentenced imposed by the learned High Court Judge are as follows: (a) For the 58 charges of rape that took place in 2018, the Appellant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment from the date of arrest (20/2/2021) for each offence and 2 strokes of whipping for each offence in total he would receive 116 strokes of the rotan. The imprisonment term to run concurrently. (b) For the 35 charges of rape that took place in 2019, the Appellant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment from the date of arrest (20/2/2021) and 2 strokes of whipping for each offence. In total he would receive 70 strokes of the rotan. The imprisonment term to run concurrently. (c) For the 12 charges of rape that took place in 2020, the Appellant was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment from the date of arrest (20/2/2021) for each offence and 2 strokes of whipping for each offence in total he would receive 24 strokes of the rotan. The imprisonment term to run concurrently. (d) The term of imprisonment for the commission of rape that took place in 2018, 2019 and 2020 were to run concurrently. S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [6] After considering the combined term imprisonment which is to run concurrently, the Appellant has to serve 42 years imprisonment from the date of arrest. [7] As regard the sentence of whipping, notwithstanding a total number of 210 strokes were imposed on the Appellant, by virtue of s.288 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Appellant being a male adult of 35 years old, is subjected to be whipped up to a statutory maximum of 24 strokes only. Section 288 provides as follows: 288. (1) When the accused is sentenced to whipping the number of strokes shall be specified in the sentence. In no case shall the whipping exceed twenty-four strokes in the case of an adult or ten strokes in the case of a youthful offender, anything in any written law to the contrary notwithstanding. (5) When a person is convicted at one trial of any two or more distinct offences any two or more of which are legally punishable by whipping, the combined sentences of whipping awarded by the court of any such offences shall not, anything in any written law to the contrary notwithstanding, exceed a total number of twenty-four (24) strokes in the case of adults and ten strokes in the case of youthful offenders. [8] Dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal against sentence for a shorter jail term. His ground is that the total term of imprisonment handed down by the learned High Court Judge had a crushing effect on him. S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Our Decisions [9] After considering the facts from the notes of proceedings which requires no repetitions, mitigation and the seriousness of the offence, we unanimously find that the sentence imposed by learned High Court Judge is not manifestly excessive or inadequate. We now give our reasons. [10] In explaining the reason for reducing the imprisonment sentences, the learned High Court Judge in his ground of judgment which we reproduce herein below said: [9] Dari segi hukuman, Seksyen 376B Kanun Keseksaan memperuntukkan bahawa hukuman penjara yang boleh dijatuhkan adalah mencapai 30 tahun dan dengan itu, hukuman 10 tahun penjara bagi setiap pertuduhan adalah satu hukuman yang berada di dalam kerangka hukuman yang boleh dijatuhkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bagi pertuduhan ini. [10] Walau bagaimanapun, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di dalam kes ini menggunakan budi bicaranya untuk kesemua 10 tahun penjara tersebut berjalan secara berasingan ataupun consecutive dan ini telah menjadikan keseluruhan hukuman penjara mencecah 1050 tahun penjara laltu satu jumlah yang boleh dikatakan sebagai satu rekod untuk pemenjaraan di negara kita. [11] Bagi kes ini, semua pertuduhan melibatkan mangsa yang sama dengan kejadian berlaku di alamat yang sama. Bila diteliti fakta-fakta kes, semua kejadian adalah berlaku dengan cara yang lebih kurang sama. S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] Sehingga kini, tiada nas yang mengatakan bahawa jumlah hukuman yang boleh dijatuhkan oleh sesuatu Mahkamah bagi pertuduhan yang banyak (multiple charges) tidak boleh melebihi suatu angka yang disifatkan sebagai maksima (there is no authority that states that the total amount of imprisonment by the Court for multiple charges should not exceed a certain figure deemed as a maximum). [14] Namun begltu, Mahkamah dalam menjatuhkan hukuman perlu menilai banyak faktor dalam menjatuhkan hukuman dan perlu juga ditekankan di sini dalam mengatakan bahawa hukuman yang telah dijatuhkan adalah keterlaluan ke atas Perayu, namun Mahkamah tldak boleh memandang sepi terhadap nasib yang telah dialaml oleh mangsa yang mana di dalam kes ini baru berusia 12 tahun semasa kejadian jenayah bermula. [15] Di dalam nas Tuan Mat bin Tuan Lonik v PP [2009] 4 CLJ 638 telah dibuat pemerhatian bahawa umur lelaki Malaysia secara puratanya adalah 70 tahun. [16] Memetik nas tersebut: "It Is statistically accepted that the average lifespan of a Malaysian man is 70 years old whilst that of a Malaysian woman 75 years. In time the average lifespan will increase that being so with the Appellant now 48 years old, on average he has 22 years of good life left. To impose a sentence that will take him until the age of 123 years old and knowing fully well that he will never serve that full term, not only is bizarre but strains the intelligence S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 of the Court. Any illogical sentence may attract unnecessary scrutiny and negative comments from the public on how we awkwardly conduct ourselves." [17] Nas ini memberi panduan kepada Mahkamah bahawa sesuatu hukuman yang dljatuhkan tidak boleh bersifat tidak logik dan adalah tidak munasabah untuk hukuman yang dijatuhkan melebihi jangka hayat seseorang pesalah. [18] Namun begitu, terdapat nas yang menunjukkan Mahkamah tidak mengelak dari menjatuhkan hukuman yang amat berat bila ianya bersesuaian dan dibuat dengan pertlmbangan yang betul. [19] Nas Abdul Rahim bin Abdul Rahman v. Public Prosecutor [2010] 8 CLJ 519, adalah dirujuk. Di dalam kes tersebut, OKT menghadapi 22 pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 377B Kanun Keseksaan terhadap mangsa yang berumur 14 tahun 7 bulan. Pertuduhan berjalan di 2 Mahkamah Sesyen berlainan. [20] Bagi 10 pertuduhan di hadapan Mahkamah Sesyen 5 hukuman dijatuhkan adalah pemenjaraan untuk tempoh berjumlah 28 tahun manakala di hadapan Mahkamah Sesyen 6 pula menjatuhkan hukuman pemenjaraan untuk tempoh berjumlah 32 tahun untuk 12 pertuduhan lagi. Hukuman penjara adalah berjalan secara consecutive untuk hukuman-hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh 2 Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut menjadikan tempoh pemenjaraan mencapai 60 tahun. Walaupun dirayu, jumlah hukuman 60 tahun penjara tersebut telah dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan juga Mahkamah Rayuan. S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [21] Di dalam rayuan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, bila diteliti Alasan Penghakiman, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen seolah-olah tidak mempertimbangkan langsung latar belakang Perayu dalam menjatuhkan hukuman. [22] Perayu sekarang berumur 34 tahun dan mengambil iktibar daripada keputusan di dalam nas Tuan Mat Tuan Lonik tentang had umur seorang lelaki Malaysia, Mahkamah lni mendapatl hukuman 1050 tahun adalah satu hukuman yang sememangnya tidak munasabah kerana ianya tidak mungkin akan dapat dijalani kerana Perayu mustahil akan mencapai umur tersebut. Malahan umur 100 tahun pun jarang dicapai oleh seisi penduduk dunia. [23] Mahkamah dengan ini mendapati bahawa hukuman yang dijatuhkan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah bersifat suatu "emotional judgment” dan jelas "manifestly excessive". lanya juga adalah nyata suatu hukuman yang berbentuk "crushing sentence” dan oleh itu, campurtangan di peringkat rayuan adalah suatu kemestian. [11] The learned High Court Judge had rightly evaluated and considered the totality of the facts and evidence before imposing the appropriate sentence on the Appellant. We are unable to say that the learned High Court Judge had erred in coming to his decision as he had taken relevant factor such as the age of both the Appellant and the victim and the Appellant as the guardian of the victim into consideration. [12] Having cited the case of Tuan Mat bin Tuan Lonik (supra) in his written judgment and provided the reasons why he had to reduce the S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 lengthy imprisonment sentenced, we find it necessary to take a close look again and reproduced the impeccable reasoning given by the Court of Appeal in that decided case. [13] What do the case say? [5] The Appellant is the stepfather of the victim. His acts of raping the victim came to light only when she delivered a baby boy at a hospital on 22 July 2004. The victim's mother promptly lodged a police report of the rape incidents and on 28 July 2004 the Appellant was arrested. Investigations revealed that the victim had been raped by the accused since year 2001 when she was only 12 years old. She was last raped in November 2003 when she was 14 years seven months old. The question of consensual defence did not arise here as at the time of the rape incidents she never passed the age barrier of 16 years (s. 376B (b) of the Penal Code). [6] At the Sessions Court after the plea of guilt, and also before the High Court Judge, the Appellant had pleaded for leniency, and ventilated regrets for what he had done. He pleaded that he had a family comprising seven children of whom five were his own and two being stepchildren. The eldest child is 17 years old and the youngest nine months old. He ventilated that he supported his parents by sending RM50 to them every month. At the High Court he also pleaded that the sentences run concurrently. [8] The learned High Court Judge found that the punishment imposed by the Sessions Court was not excessive and indeed did commensurate with the seriousness of the offences. The learned S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 judge opined that in these types of offences despite the Appellant having pleaded guilty, no amount of mitigating factors could override public interest. The Appellant had failed his family, when instead of protecting his step-daughter, had instead taken advantage of her frailty. [14] Speaking through Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA (as he then was), in a great detailed judgment, His Lordship held as follows: [13] When this panel imposed the above sentences, we had to consider several factors but due to the factual matrix of the case, the factor of public interest was uppermost in our mind. Public interest varies with place, time and circumstances of each case including the age of the offender and the prevalence of the offence. A certain type of sentence may not satisfy public interest at another place (New Tuck Shen v. Public Prosecutor [1982] CLJ 606 (Rep); [1982] CLJ 38;[1982] 1 MLJ 27). The sentence must be deterrent enough, in that the prisoner will realize crime does not pay, with the punishment being debilitating to his freedom. Not only will would-be offenders be deterred from trying but so will it deter repeat offenders (Rex v. Kenneth John Ball [1951] 35 Cr. App. R 164). [14] The concept of retribution akin to 'tooth for a tooth', normally takes front stage if the offence is considered an offence against a member of the public, especially here when a step-daughter has been raped repeatedly since of tender age. Due to the special relationship here between the victim and the Appellant, let alone the rape incidents were repeatedly carried out until an illegitimate child S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 was born, the demand to satisfy society's needs to avenge the wrongful act of the Appellant must take centre stage. [16] Likewise it was also timely that we show our abhorrence of incestuous rape and impose the appropriate sentence in the circumstances of the case. Despite the above supplied facts and prognosis, this panel did not go overboard by ignoring the law or even rationality, and impose impossible sentences. We had occasion to remark in open court that judges should not be blinded by emotion and react emotionally as the law is not as evil as the Appellant. In the circumstances of the case, anything less than 30 years in jail would not suffice to qualify as retributive, hence that span of time ordered against the Appellant. [19] In the circumstances of the case, a lenient sentence, or reformative sentences may not be suitable. [20] The Appellant here had pleaded guilty to all the despicable offences committed during those years, when the stepdaughter was his ward. Even though a plea of guilt is a mitigating factor, and some credit or discount is normally given, not all pleas of guilt may be accorded that privilege. A court has the discretion not to entertain such discounts (Sau Soo Kim v. PP [1975] 1 LNS 158; [1975] 2 MLJ 134; Melvani v. PP [1971] 1 LNS 78; [1971] 1 MLJ 137; PP v. Sulaiman Ahmad [1992] 4 CLJ 2283; [1992] 3 CLJ (Rep) 447; PP v. Ravindran & Ors [1992] 1 LNS 47; [1993] 1 MLJ 45). It is widely known that incest statistically appears to be on the rise, with the victim getting younger by the day, as reported daily by the local media. And no amount of consensual defence will be accepted, be S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 it on ground of religion, morality or law. With the facts as they were, let alone public interest demands a retributive and deterrent sentence, discounts are not appropriate here (PP v. Govindnan a/l Chinden Nair [1998] 2 CLJ 370; PP v. Dato' Nallakaruppan Solaimalai [1999] 2 CLJ 596). [21] The Appellant is the authority in the household, and every member of the family would inevitably look up to him, not only for guidance, but also protection. Unfortunately, the trust was betrayed when he took advantage of his power of strength by regularly forcing himself on the victim. [24] An appellate court will not be overly ready to interfere with any sentence imposed by the trial court unless there are very good reasons to do so. For purposes of this case, suffice if we merely peruse the sentences meted down, subsequently to be affirmed by the High Court, from the point of view of logic. It is statistically accepted that the average life span of a Malaysian man is 70 years whilst that of a Malaysian woman 75 years. In time the average life span will increase. That being so, with the Appellant now 48 years old, on average he has 22 years of good life left. To impose a sentence that will take him until the age of 123 years old, and knowing fully well that he never will serve the full term, not only is bizarre but strains the intelligence of the court. Any illogical sentence may attract unnecessary scrutiny and negative comments from the public on how we awkwardly conduct ourselves. [25] With the sentences of the first and second charges to run consecutively, thus factually reducing the length of time of S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 incarceration to 30 years, and with deductions thrown in for good behavior, by the time he is released he will be about 70 years of age ie, the average life of a Malaysian man. Even if he lives to smell freedom at that age the likelihood of him besetting and causing trauma to anyone is slim. Our orders not only has taken public interest into account but also made the sentence sensible and fair. [29] Based on all the above reasons we allowed the appeal. We varied the High Court order as we refused to submit to public opinion; public opinion is like the sword of Damocles that hover over the head of any trial judge, constantly intimidating the court to surrender to the unreasonable demands of the public [15] Our observation of the above judgment makes it clear that it was perfectly legitimate for the learned High Court Judge to interfere with the finding made by the Sessions Court. Therefore, the duration of imprisonment is fair in this light. We find no substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding. [16] Turning to the present appeal, we would like to stress that the argument on the issue of whether the sentences was manifestly excessive or otherwise is not a new argument. In dealing with this, it is always of paramount importance in the administration of criminal justice to see that the court below applies the correct judicial principles in the assessment of the sentence and that the punishment meted out is within the sentencing trend for the similar type of offence. What would be the adequate sentence would depend on the particular circumstances of each case. S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [17] In Mohd Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. Public Prosecutor [1987] CLJ Rep 209; [1988] 1 MLJ 167 the Supreme Court held that:- “In assessing the length of custodial sentence, the court must look at the overall picture in perspective by considering, firstly, the gravity of the type of offence committed; secondly, the facts in the commission of the offence; thirdly, the presence or absence of mitigating factors, and, fourthly, the sentences that have been imposed in the past for similar offences to determine the trend of sentencing policy, if any. The fact that a sentence of imprisonment is imposed as a deterrence does not justify the sentencer in passing a sentence of greater length than what the facts of the offence warrant. The gravity of the type of offence involved must be considered in the light of the particular facts of the offence." [18] In Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139; [1982] 1 MLJ 83, Raja Azlan Shah A.g. LP (as His Royal Highness then was) had occasion to say:- “Is the sentence harsh and manifestly excessive? We would paraphrase it in this way. As this is an appeal against the exercise by the learned judge of a discretion vested in him, is the sentence so far outside the normal discretionary limits as to enable this court to say that its imposition must have involved an error of law of some description? I have had occasion to say elsewhere, that the very concept of judicial discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. That is quite inevitable. Human nature being what it is, S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 different judges applying the same principles at the same time in the same country to similar facts may sometimes reach different conclusions (see Jamieson v. Jamieson [1952] AC 525, 549). It is for that reason that some very conscientious judges have thought it their duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary sentences; whilst others equally conscientious have thought it their duty to view the same crimes with leniency. Therefore. sentences do vary in apparently similar circumstances with the habit of mind of the particular judge. It is for that reason also that this court has said it again and again that it will not normally interfere with sentences, and the possibility or even the probability, that another court would have imposed a different sentence is not sufficient, per se, to warrant this court's interference." [19] Finally, to take the points a little further, we find it useful as a “guideline” to set out the wide range of factors or circumstances that the court can consider when deciding an appropriate sentence for a convicted person. Some of these factors include: (a) the gravity, seriousness and heinous of the crime committed; (b) age of the victim; (c) early plea of guilt or claim trial; (d) traumatic experience, emotional harm, humiliation and degradation suffered by the victim; (e) the protection of public interest; (f) crushing effect on the accused; (g) victim’s impact statement; (h) strong message to the public of the court's disapproval of this kind of crime; S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 (i) court not to succumb to emotions and go overboard in passing impossible sentence; (j) current trend of sentencing in cases of similar nature; (k) previous conviction on record or first offender; (l) time spent in remand at the time of sentencing; (m) accused personal and family background which may include good character, job, age, marital status, parent, children and other relevant factors; (n) retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation; (o) lack of remorse; (p) any physical injuries that occurred to the victim; (q) relationship between the accused and the victim; (r) any weapon use and how?; (s) involvement of violence / no violence / low level of violence; (t) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed for the offence; (u) number of charges; (w) planning the crime; (x) co-operation with authorities; (y) concurrent or consecutive imprisonment terms; and (z) the involvement of more than one accused. Conclusion [20] We find no merits in the appeal. The appeal in R25, R26, R27 and R28 is dismissed. [21] We unanimously affirmed the sentences meted out by the High Court in reducing the total number of imprisonments from 1050 to 42 years. We affirmed the conviction and sentence by the High Court. The S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 total strokes of whipping from 210 to 24 to bring it to within the limit mandated by the Criminal Procedure Code is also affirmed. Date: 26 January 2024 - sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel For the Appellant : K Annamalai Ramu a/l Kandasamy [Law Practice of K.A. Ramu (Ayer Keroh)] For the Respondents : Dhiya Syazwani Izyan Binti Mohd Akhir [Deputy Public Prosecutor] S/N UPjVHxqWESnkDJMEktxJA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AA-42S-8-03/2022

PERAYU Naaresh A/l Thirunukarasoo RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Undang-undang Jenayah – rompakan – tertuduh ditangkap semasa melarikan diri selepas meragut mangsa – sama ada pembelaan membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah dalam kes pendakwaan.Tatacara Jenayah – HukumanSama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan memadai – sama ada kekerapan jenayah ragut, keseriusan kesalahan dan kepentingan awam di ambil kira oleh mahkamah perbicaraan.

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Bhupindar Singh A/L Gurcharan Singh Preet

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6577a68a-56b5-4bbc-a8d9-3184fe3036c9&Inline=true

26/01/2024 15:13:55 AA-42S-8-03/2022 Kand. 26 S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N iqZ3ZbVWvEuo2TGE/jA2yQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1u\—a2s—a—u3/2u22 Kand. 25 25,0;/22:4 ,:-12 55 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAVAH N ~AA-425-3-03/znzz ANTARA NAARESH AIL THIRUNUKARASOO PERAVU DAN FENDAKWA RAVA RESPONDEN DAN DALAM MAHKAMAH TINSGI MALAVA DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN. IIIMAYSIA RAVUAN JENAVAH N AA—42N 2I2n2z ANTARA PENDAKWA RAVA PERAVU um NAARESH AIL THIRUNUKARASOO RESFDNDEN PENGHAKIMAN Pemmmluan [1] Rayuan dalam kes N0 AA—42S—5—03/2022 mevupakan rayuan perayu Henuduh‘) lerhadap sabllan din hukuman manakma rayuan dalam kes AA42H—34.)Z/2022 Isiah rayuan Pendakwa Ray: Ierhadap hukuman Pada 1522022‘ selepas permcaraan, Hakim Mankamah Sesyen yang buaksana or-ems‘) telah measabllkan Ierluduh dan merualuhkzn hukuman pemeruaraan selama tlgz tahun bermma den we 2 2022 dan satu sebatan man Lam helakang kn [2] Pada 2a 9 ma, lanuduh lelah dnuduh dengan senrang lam IaI|u Knshnakumar all Sakaran (‘lerluduh kedua') dmgan pefluduhan sepem yang benkul Pelmm/nan Asa! 'Eahawakamupadnzl)/9Q016.jam)sbmI4uIangjaIn133Od1dep6nrumah llama! Nu m Leann Taman Panama, mm kr1sma_ da/am Duran lpah da/am Nsasn Vurik, mm mslakukan mmpakan Dovkumpman dun dengsn S9/rga/a mnnyubnckan csaerz pm» ksaada An May @ Cheang Lea Venn, dsn dengan Mu kamu Marv msmrukun kuxarahan yam Down drhukum m bawah seksyen 395 Karmn Ksnkxaan mbzca balsam: seksyen 397 Kamm yang sunu ~ 13] Fenuduhan pmdaan Ielah mkemuxakan padi 712 2016 den selelah perluduhan pnndaan dlbaca dan dllerangkan kepada lerluduh dan 2 sm xuzzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! beflaku pada so 12 2021 Se1e\ah mehha| rakaman cm saya mendapall bahawa HMS Imah menerangkan secala terpennm Kenya-(Iga pmnan :1. bawah perenggan 173|ha)KTJ Kepada Kerluduh Tenuduh man dlwaknln aleh dua urang peguam hela pada lankh Iersebul Iaflu Encxk snamugam aan Puan Km Selepas kel\ga—||ga pmhan mterangkan kepada lsnuduh, Enclk Shamugam (e\ah membemanu mahkamah bahawa Ierluduh memllm Lmluk member: Keterangan bersumpah Kemudlarmya. HMS mengesahkan perkara tevsehut yang lerluduh mgm member! kelevangan hersumpah aan menanya dalam bahasa apa |er!uduh mgun memuen kelerangan Jawapan yang dlbenkan valah Bahasa Me\ayu dan Lertuduh lelah mmmua pergw Ks Kandang saksl Lmluk member: xezevangan bersumpah [22] Berdasarkan rakaman CRT adalah jelas macara yang dmerunlukkan an hawah peranggan 1731ha) KTJ man mpalum men Au, nuaxterdapax salah laksana keadilan alau kegagalzn peradulan dalam kes In: dan wsu yang mkemukakan meh pembelaan udak berasss Vangsung (231 Semasa penghmahan m Mahkamah, peguam new lenuduh hanya mengangka| dua Isu sahaja sepem yang dvlerangkan m alas Wa\au bagalmanapun damn muahan bermhsnya, peguam belz le\sh men-bangm Isu mengenm pengecaman «enuuun oleh sm dan SP2 sena n m xuzzznvwviuuzrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! ‘denim beg |angan (lD10|, halo! air Iemms (mm, salu rangkax 4 kunm am; An) dan wang lunaw hercamplmcampur uoza) Feguam be\a le\ah menyalakan ferdapal lompang dalam kes pendakwasn kerana barang xes ml max dlkemukakan sebagai eksh [24] Oleh sebab‘ lerdapal wsu lam dalam hujanan berlulls peguam Dela «en-mun, Mahkamah mu wga akan menyenluh mengenal perkava Iersehul dalam penghaklman mu Perm duebskan bahawa Isu-wsu yang dmmbwkan .m (elah mpemmbangkan cleh Mahkamah Rayuan semass mengarahkan |enuduh unluk membela dm lsu-Isu Inl lldak sepalulnya dmngkn Wag: kevana Mahkamah Rayuan lelah memuluskan blhiwi Ierdapal sua|u kes prllrm /‘acre aan xenudun dlpennlahkan unluk membela dun. [25] Mahkamah Rayuan damn kes Kwok Pin Hwee Iwn. PF [2011] 1 LNS 533. Ielah menerangxan “[17]!/mtangrundang mm man "man lernang permekalan yang hams dumbrl men v4 Hakrm mcam aaram ksadaantervuduh wan amnnaman unluk membem am wen Mallkamah Rm." 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[ho uppnilanls may, Wu... an appeal ls pursued Illrlhsr at Me Federal Court, argue me] me clwnomppsalma m cnlilng upon me appellanm ll: enter on ma» deienu, Wu‘ on Durpall were W m million to ruvrew ln. ml: dectsvnn oflhu mm; panel alme Cowl DI/lppeal nl. mml appeal, in HM] wrw, snallla malls DIV wnolhsv Ins dslancs had fbued .9 lmmols doubt on ma pluwwhun case 1} sm luzaznvwvillazrszllnyq “Nair Sum! mmhnrwm be l... M mm .. mln.ll.y ml. dnuumnl VI mum puns! 125/ rn me mxlanl anpeal, smca all the sppvllanls ware called upon by me coma/Appaal lo orvleron lnslrdsllnce u musmscsssarvlymean Ina! Ihe com uVAppaal was sulufred mu ms pnzsscuoon nmpmea art live Angmdvsnls a/me mm, mo/wmg ms sosmene or common rntenborn before cannludmg that a plum um case naa been made out by Ina pmseculfnn man, was Ihemfms no necsssrfy for u: m rewsft me muss on whelher s pnma /am case had been made out What we need In consaoor was wnexnsr ma swdsmxs ivom ma cayenne ma cast a masanabla am: an me DIw9cIIIrorv’s cm [Vfl]Saln/1:: dengsn pnruly .1 ms harm mangsmml pendman osnm karm luiak gm msrmvma/vgkan ssmula rswsu yang eeran dmanykrlkm den dmuluskan an aklm kss pandukwaan clan Malvksmah Ruyuan zmanmu kscuan nu lardnpm‘ kslemrvgan ham yang amngman aleh pl/Ink panyu y.ng mm. memmbmkzn lmraguan yang nmnaman Xe alas kes pendakwaan Dengan nu, apa yang paint my aemmbangkzn adafialv same .943 ketaringan yang dtkunlukakan my pembelain mun beqnyn msmmbulkarv kslnguun yang munasabalv ks aras has psrvdnkwnan - [26] Semras dengan nas dx a(as, Mahkamah Im Deriu mempemmbangkan same sea Kelerangan yang dxkemukakan meh pembelaan (elah benaya memmhmkan Keriguan yang munasabah ke alas kes pendakwaan Versl pembelaan (enuduh ada\ah bevswfal penafuan semaoamaca dan lenuduh menaflkan yang ma lelah mengimbll beg \angan SP1 [27] Perkara yang penllng dan hams dnberl penekanan \aVaI1 da\am kes ml‘ spa man mellhal kqadmn (ersebul. mengejar dam menangkap xenudun SP3 dalam pemenksaan mama menyacakan 1. sm uszaznvwviuuzrszauyq «mm. smm nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mn.u.y mm: dnuumnl y. mum my 4 sum Ielakr bslpskman baju memn darn barium keledar msralv sedang mongul ssouan hag lmgan kapwvyaan sawsng Demmnuan cm 5 Born kamu cam... Inga! Mgtknh uda A-euranq Ielakr lm1>I. Lu;u me/‘uh pskm my keledar mslah ssdarvg rmragu! hag langan pemmyusn Ema, Kama mgal ram yang maria sllu tunuduh VH7 Balsh, v sup. yang pukmbu/u menw saw Nearest: yang pakal hem msmh darn Dollop! kllpdnr marsh Maksud Naaresh yang anmnoeg psrimpuun an M v Ya. . Apl pm. purzmarv Knshnskumarsemsia ewak Isngok kqldurv nmgm benakw .: Duduk alas molostkalf Ink!/nkuk Semasa pemenlsaan hams SP3 (elah mengesihkan perkara W -5 . Saw msncadangknrv kamu sabsnamya man we: kcndran mamgul hanya mendengsnsnlan sahaja J max setuju say: lmal Ana yam: kamu Ma!’ 4 Say: lmal sum lelskr /I-mus Isiah mvraqul salu Deg klpunynun pmmnuan one 5 Dan srspmmh Valnkr‘ ynng kamu ksna/paxlr Inemgal perumpuan terschu." 4 Salu felakl Indus yang aria awn kundlrvg Iunudun bemsmn Naeresh M. Vwvrvuhmwu “ Sswaklu memben ketarangan dw peringkaf pembelaan, lerluduh |e\ah mengesahkan ketsrangan pendakwaan ‘am; 5 Sudnll mm Ma new molosrlal Kama Derdua nun pm, helmel unluk kasalamalarn aamn :5 sm uszaznvwviuazrszauyq «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. HIGH m M, .. nrimruflly mm: dnuumnl VI mum Mn J sum 5 Dan Krfshnukumsr pm. helmet mm mm, ksmu pakar no/mot kalermemh. new .1 Sam! s Mucam yang EIILVK Naarssh cent: (am my ks/oaer yang drnampa: clan Ermk Naarasn ndnla/'1 herwsma marsh. mm 4 asm 2 halmcl yang dvrampas arsn pays, Emnk Nasrssn wamn nmn, Enmk Kn:/ma wama my mum J Balm 5 Sam Enmk Nauush yang berwamz marsh, berm J Eatul - [25] Anna! jslas lenuduh telah mengakul bahiwa semasa kepdxan ma memakal ham dan (op: ke\edav belwama mevah Kelerangan (enuduh selaras dengan keterangan SP3 yang melmax lermduh memkukan perbualan rngm dengan herpakavan baju merah dzn mp. keledar merah Bap: dan lop! ke\edar lenuduh lelah cmampas smelah lemmuh anangkap dan mcamxan oleh SP3 ldenllh lenuduh lelih d\kena\ pzsm dsngan lepa\ sebagal orang yang meragul beg eangan SP1 Pembexaan |erluduh lldak merumbulkan apa—apa Keriguan yang munasabah dalam kas pendakwaan [291 Vsu uauang Kes yang dlkemukakan oleh peguam bela Ierluduh max menjejaskan kes pendakwaan kerana terluduh telah amnax me\akukan 15 sm uszzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smnw nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m yam .. mn.ny mm: dnuumnl y.. mum pom! kesalahan yang mmauh dan umangkap asyurus selspas nu Ana yang panung walah lerdapal kelerangan yang menoukupx bag: mensihwkan lenuduh melampaul keraguan yang rmmasabah Bag! suam kssalahan rompakan‘ walaupun barang kes max dmemun, avang yang dlluduh masm man maamkan uka e\emen kesalahan mmpakan amukuxan memmpaul keraguan yang munasabah. [30] Damn Turumacanan an Teaguajan and Anor y. Public Pronculor, Mahknrnan Rayuan dalam Rayuan Jenayah Na: 5.0901)» 154414/2:222 a. B»4'l9(H)»159-04/2022 neuan memuluskan 727/ rn aw mm, the namdtscovery ana m1n—pmdu:!»on a( ma vobbsd Item is no: men undzrsecuan 395 o7Psmzl Code ummazary, u does na: change the (ac! NvatSF1 was ruobad ayma appeuanos Tms gmundloo lid: :25) rn Gunalarv Rnmacnandmn a 17:5 y PP[2004] 4 cu 551, Abdu/Hamvd Mnhamud./@155 he man was; Ivoldthar " as far «:1 am aware mere rs na law ma! ma axhfbfl reooversd must :2. mama m cow! and yv M1 ma pm.Iecu!Ian‘5 case must necessunry van n may or r: may nol, aaan aapanmng an me has and me mmumsllncns mam can Evan m a munkr lnal, ma dead body vs no! pmducedm aaan rn sannyang y Puhlrc Pmsecu!ar[1965] 2 ML./ 1F5{FC)me bodyolme w:1rm was nal evzn rec-ovsmd yet ma accused was canvmted o/nmnur Whal me pmsecmmn has m pm. .5 ma: . paflmu/al persan had men and me aawaeu naa caused Ins death The dezllv an». vvclrm rs nul amysa ay making at ms remams .n mun am by swaorvca DI witnesses‘ ma madncnl mpnfl, me tdenllly cam me P"°409'sphx andmon swarm ma dnagtra/Wokmg casa, ma drug may aa mt or aeslmyad subssquenl to ;: havmg been anarma by ma n sm uazzznvwviuazrszauyq “Nana s.n.‘ nmhnrwm a. a... m van; .. ananny mm: dnuumnl van mum perm chem/:1. men; may be a gap m Ihe chem a« the peopm lmopmg custody am sulmequenf to «I ha!/my been ans/yssdby ma charms! unm Ins aan av mat, but so am as more 15 no mum Ina! my my analysed by me chslvusl was ma same Ma ms! was rucavsrsd m we can and :1 vs m rsxpacl av that drug that the accused a mgaa, and there 1: a reasonable explanzlmn as 10 haw u was lost or destroyed or the reason Iorme gap, them rsno reason »1my!h:prn:ecuImn':cas9 shnufidlnfl - [:11 Bevballk kepada kes W, bavang kes P2‘ P3. P4 dan P5 ls\al1 mkemukakan darn mcamkan cleh saiswsaksx lermasuk sm Barang kes mga |e|ah dnmmkan oleh sm, sn=2 aan spa me\a|ux gambar umo, m1 1‘ ID12 dun lD23 Ie\ah mcamkan oleh pegawaw penywasat kes (SP5) Meskupun (eruapeu barang Res yang hflak mtandakan sebagal eksmblt‘ Va mak menmaskan kes pendakwaan kerana «ana damn kes Im dengan Ierang Ielah membuknkan lerluduh Iebah mdakukan mmpakan lersebul Tenuduh felah dmhat melakukan kesahhan kalsebul dan dnangkap u\eh SP3 semasa melankan dun [32] Mahkamah W menaapan bahawa HMS udak lerkhllaldan segx lakta mahupun undang-undang apabua mendapatl «emmm bersalah bag: penuduhan plndaan yang an-mm max Ierdapat apa—apa salah Iaksana keauuan alau kegagalan perauuan dmarn kes Im HMS (E|aIV menflaw dengan (elm pembelaan yang mkemuxakan dan Ielah membual kepulusin yang betul Iaum pembexaan gaga\ memmbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah da\am kes pendakwaan flan pendakwaan u srNu:z:IznvwvEuazrsE1;Myq “Nana Snr1n\nnuhnrw\HI>e med .a van; a. nnmnauuy MIMI dnuumnl VII mum perm xeran beljaya membukllkan kes melampaul keraguan yang munasabah Eerasaskan a\asan—a\asan an alas‘ rayuan mmmun 1emauap sabllan d\|o\aK Rayuzn Hukuman (Rayuan Janlylh No: AA42H.a—n2rzo22) [33] Du penngkal rayuan mengenaw hukuman‘ pvinslp undang-undang ada\ah manlap bahawa Mahkamah hanya akan mengganggu hukuman mankaman perblcaraan sexwanya hukuman yang dua|uhkan mevupakan nukuman yang temyata beneuman atau uermu nngan atau menyanarn undang-undang Keadaan lam yang membenarkan campur (angan Mankaman msngenal sesuatu hukuman ada\ah apabfla |erdapa| keknuacan uleh mankaman permcaraan lenlang undang-undarvg alau penumn pIInsIp—pr|ns|p hukuman darn hukuman yang duahmkan adalah max sesuar dengan Vakta dan na< Keadaan yang Ielah dxbuklxkan (hha1 Public Pmsmnor y. Mohamed Not 5 Or: [1995] 2 MLJ zan, Ehandulananfll Jaynlilake v. Public Pmacucor [1992] I ML] 33; [1931] 1 LN5 139 dan Public Prosecutor v. Loo Chaon Fn1(197s] 1 LNs1a2;[19ss]2 ML! 255; [34] Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes FF Iwn Moran Chekwnhe Chukwudi (2017) 1 LNS 554 (elah mengganskan beberspa laklor yang IN uazaznvwviuazrszauyq -um s.nn n-nhnrwm be 1;... m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm VIZ mum pans! perm mpemmbangkan oxen mahkamah ssbemm memaluhkan hukuman bagw sesuam Kssmahan “[51 n 5 wen Isubllshad that liver: am . number or facturs znex cow‘: lake rum carmderation before eenoencmg some allmm am as In/lows {5} the grawly or seventy of me 7301; consmultng me onence, m; we wnumstances In wen u ms aamnnned. 4:) me rampanry nlsuch allerms m 1». men‘ [U] ma mnaersprevnm mcom, (9)019 ollsndefs mnmbulmn and suppofl to In: rsrnuy members (/7 me onenam means, 49; me emu oi convmwolv and sentence on M5100 opnan-"vim, /m ms eye and mm- oune accused, n; whalharn 1.1 me am aflence U; wlvsmir me socusarlhad eoopomrea mm me peace sue: me comrmssmn oftha ollsncs, M wnemar me accused neameeaeaguury. {u status Dime accused {ml wnomsrlhva was vmence aunng me crlma, 4n; pub/M: mmesl, etc - [351 HMS semasa menjelaskan hukuman yang duamhkan lerhadap uenumm, dslam alasan penghaklmannya, sekadar menyarakan -5 14 Mahkamah men ms/uatuhkan Ivukmnan p.n,s.e 3 laflun aan salu seamen mlarv borflaurkan prmsAu~pnrmp purlghukumun Ivlemarvdungkan Velmdu/1 msrupakm pssalah porlamu, men me am pemah gsyfi/ msrvglvamn nlankamsh Mahkamalv juga mengumm/kw laklorbahau man lambs! dalsm ssbarang msodun pneym sew. din has my 5 vs Mulvkamah /uga msngambvfklri mar pandemlk mass mu dan msmumskan hukumsn pervjara dun sebalan ruler! temodsy Tsmmun adalah add dun saksams - [as] Manxaman W mendapall bahawa HMS udak mempemmbangkan kesevlusan kesawanan, kepenlmgan awam dzn trend hukuman bagx Kesmahan rompakan da\am merualuhkan hukuman Dalam kes Mom! 20 sm uszaznvwviuuzrszauyq «mm. sen» nmhnrwm .. med M mm .. nrighvnflly mm: dnuumnl VI mum pom! lenuduh kedua, mereka (elah faham perluduhan pmdaan dan mamohon agar kes mmcaraxan Penuauhan plndaan (ersebm berbunyn pmug Ivy! Pfndaun 'Bahawn kamu hsIsama—samI plda zomms, M mum kw-ulvg 13:7 yslang m Ivadapan mm ntamnl Nu m Lsbulv Taman Panama, mm Panama rpm, 4. am» Daemh Kmlz‘ av dalam Negsn Perak om Rrdzusn, man melakukan rumpakan banumupu/an 4.m.a.p An May Q Cheong Lee Yuan (No KP 440722-11-5132; aangun mengamml samlan beg Iangarv‘ mm msmandll, kadAYMdarv wIIvgIu0srRM1P6dan semnsn mmpakan lulsubul knmu bersamzrsama awgsrv saws]: menyababkan mm kepada Ah May @ Chsarvg Lao Yum om yang uemrmn Kamu Isiah melakukan mm komlnhan yang pom ovhukum .1; bawalv xsksyerv 394 Kamm Kasaluaan‘ [4] D1 akhir kes pendakwaan, HMS (e\ah memumskan bahawa pmak pendakwaan Ie\ah gaga\ membukllkin sua\u Kes prime lame bag: penuauhan plndaan dan kedua—t1ua tenuduh le\ah dlbebaskan dan dflepaskan Pmax pendakwaan |elah memlillkan vayuan lsmadap kepmusan HMS dan paaa 5 10 2019, rayuan bendakwaan telah auolax ms»: Mahkamah Tmggl Selevusnya. pmak pendakwaan lelah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan [51 Semasa :1. Mahkamah Ray-‘an, rayuan Pendakwa Raya lsrhadap Ienuduh kedua lelah dlbatalkan kerana nous perbmaraan rayuan twdak dapal dwserahkan Kepada |emmuh kedua Oleh mu rayuan an Mahkamah Rayuan hanya dnleruskan (emadap lenuauh sshaja Mahkzmah Rayuan : sm uszaznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom! Rldwan Mohd Vumlv. PP [2n14]1 LNS194n,Mahkamah Rayuan Ie\ah meruelaskan 711/ w .7. In this .p....: dolling with . snatch Mlk nlhnce arm. m. .mpmy altnls fypv nrorv-nu cnnlmuu unzbated. m victim: oltnalcn mm rncrdultt mm: . lrumondms amount onnum. n (Om Mm 0! m. p..,..n.:m with mm. cflmm-I .-mm. Some mm grlvlphyltrll lndumorlanzlstruu. somm. wan mm. m Coun: when asxessmg an zppmpnale mum (0 be meled mus! mun mmd ms modus operand! of ma wvongdoerm cmnmrtlmg ms sort 0! ullznces Mos! akun llvarv rial, the modu: apslandl m march mere mm; m cnme and curllvmg For mabsnoe deadly wsapons of vfalence are um willy ms Wen] m lhrsats/1 and lo mam /ear upon the vmhm The 1/aumaltc mm M! on the mm, m. wny m. wcnm: am Ihmalsmad wrllv mum rllhey an not do .5 mslructed, are «mm mm wsvgh nsavrry agams! mmy m the sentencmg oi such mum V1/E are of In: cansrdsled View mat the sentencsspsssedsllouldaervu the Iulluwmg Lwupwposss Frrsfly, rrshauld my punish (Iv: accused for {he grave 0/mvw Ihat ». mm mmmrfled and secondly, m the mass: :2! the publrc, ,4 should m as . wmmg and darelrence 2.: MI pofunlulalhndux [121 w. would lika 1.: nmlnd mu court‘ boluw to bk-judiclll mm or an trmrluing numhtrnicnmcs all My (:1 match men as ewdsnl mm: news cum oflencas Dung mnslnntly reparledm the med»: Cauns must be mcapm and Prearlhe rm cry Vouusltos mm m. snclebytn match melt new .5 in (In: case. and mspam by rmposfngl . pmyer sentence The rmuasmon nlzn appmprvalu pumxllmenl vs the manneurv which m. Conn: resound :9 Inc snugly‘: cull lar /uslm agsnml mm cnmmnls ma . demand: mu: m. Court: should Irnpnu punuhmlnk mm-.., me ermla :0 mm in mums in: public’: Ibhwnrvcc 12! such crime. Evory punishment lmpornd rt huund (:1 nm n. urhcl nol only on we Accused nlone, but also an m. aaciuty u . whore. u rs the duty or (he Courts to 595 mu nnpmnnale sentence /5 rmoossdrsgaru Dung mm In my commrssmn DI the cmns and us Impact on Ills meta! me, 1:... Guru 11 sm xuzzznvwviuuzrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! sasmm, Q Eenne Seklana vs Sm: alkamalaku, 12012; a soc m 2012 /nuraw so 252) Ipennkanam drrambalvl my man dapal dlnallkan kesalahan kes ragul kerap beflaku den ,nnnannya ssmakm memngkal sellap nan Lazlmnya warga amas dan wanna duadwkan sasaran Ksrana meraka lldak berupaya banawan mu memperlahankan dm danpada serangan peugm Benla kecederaan yang dmaml oxen mangsa kes ragul sudah meruam Vumrah dw laman akhbar |empatan Damn kes W mangsa IaI|u SP1 berumur 71 (ahun semasa kejadlan dan aknhal perbualan lelluduh, SP1 nuangaxaynu ksoederaan pavah wawtu keretakan pads vertebra L2 Semeshnya mangsa mengaxann Kesakflan teruk aklhat kere|akan unang belakang dan lrauma danpada ke,aman nu Cfleh nu, nukuman yang dusluhkan nenaaklan sellmpal dengan Kesalahan yang gnakuxan uleh tenuduh kerana kesalahan vagul mempakan kesamvan yang senus [351 Kepennngan awam menghendakx seorang pesa\ah kes ragm dlkenzkan hukuman pemenjalaan yang ssnmpal dan apaona dlperlukan dualuhkan hukuman yang Iemn lama agar kesmamalan arang swam nenannn Mahkamah mempunyal tanggungjawab unluk mehndungu orang awam danpada Kasalahan ragut yang semakln henemasa Ovang awam (emlamanya warga emas dan wanna mempunyal hak unmk bergerak 11 am nszzznvwviuazrsznuyq mm. snnnw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m yam .. nrighvnflly mm: dun-mm y.. mum pans! bebas G1 CENIDEII awam I’-VVD3 DBVVIA nsau akan kesebamatan mereka O\eh sebab nu, seslapa yang melikukin kesmahan ragut yang menggugat keselamatan awam mesh auaumxan hukuman yang sew/a1amya [39] Da\am kes Mom Ridwan Mohd Vuaof (supra) Mahkamah Rayuan juga lelah memwk (rend hukuman bag: kesalahan ragul apama mengekalkan hukuman Mahkamah Tmggl mm 10 lahun pemenwaan dan 5 sebalan man yang msngeleplkin hukuman Mahkamah Sesyen‘ pemeniaraan se\ama uga tahun aan lankh (angkap ~ The Vsamsd Dem/ly r-um Fmsvculur was ngllt m M momma: mu MI crmnct mlpolul lylinsl mu Apptllnmwu out ouup mm m. frindolllnllncing inwandby this own which w. wnuld name! an Caurt: below lo Inflow We would Ilko tom/aria me in/rwlnq cases 4:; Rapsrgumrv J/Ilxlanasegedam V PF(N4792J—u1r2o14), the cm o(Appeula/1 21Augusl2D14 had ssnlormd me gncused m mm Mrs rmgnsanmenl rm a charm unacrlha! can m which the accusedamihrs fnsnd mm mm a km]: rm nopaed the wclrm at me mama and robbed ms ma yhone and money nu Yuhaman am Abdu/ wmb (P-as-174-17740131, me Conn‘ cl Apusa/ on 17 Ayn! 2471: had smrmsdlhe decman aims Hrgll cm lhal Me Lqrm or em: gals rmmsonmen! su/hood var m. use In max case In: mm was me amussrfslmynboun :Igud60,whvchlIIesccusedIvax1 come from me back or m. vrctvm and snatched ms worm gem neck/ace nu; Mend Fsrzal Em mam warm v pp 4a.a9¢5;.25s.os/zmzy, lhe cm aIApuea/ an s FeDruaIy2l71A hsrlamrmedlhe decrsron aims um cmm rival Hzdmcraased lne rmviaonmenl terms «mm We 10 051515»: 2; sm xuzzznvwviuuzrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom! A Iherwfmh o(wn .!nI/on-rmsemeacvusedhad svrzed a bag oamamlng mobvle uhone men was camod by Ina vmhm rm vtclm mixed and managed lo mm ms accused rm mm bag was mm on the aucusufl nlatumyds av) wnsmmsa Amer hm Yaakab 1/ PF (VI/—a9-m.u4/2m), me counomwearon v January 2l71l.Iva:1amIvmd!)ve decvslan allne Hm Court llml sunk tho accusvd :9 mm M gn mar: wvlh lnrse stroke: 0/ wmgmg ms Incl: showed that me worm is Aady} wan Irv sun mu armed al name, and smsmy me mum ma mm to slash ma vicflm usmv n ‘DIrIIIP97"bur no mlunls wan rvponsu M PP V Nlk Mohamad K/ulru! mu mm rH7Nm7—12rza12L the com ulApp9a/on 28/Iugusl 2m Ivadsstasrdslhe domsnun a/me Nfgh cm and rvfrlstutsd me docvsnon or the Sassrons Cour! mm the accused be sent In gm... [or seven Ms wvm (Ive make: 9! wflmm In (N: case, the accused had snatched ms nerghboufs rrecklaco The mm, was was 57 Vials or agu was news huvsshold mm when M: mcrdenl napnenaa azsnsmsnsn dvtamballl [40] TPR yang mengendallkan Iayuan Im wga teaah mengemukakan trend hukuman bagx kesalahan vornpak sepem yang benkul an Nukunun 4 Muhammad um ‘. Feuyurrwnilkuslllh uluxnm V. w Denudunan an bauah ‘ nnyansmxx Izomums-as \. Hnkxmidihkimahsntyan marualuhkan mm... s cm... vim-n 4... 2 us...» wayum Pmyu ke am nbizn flan mm..." mum men Mlhkrvuh mw 2» sm wuzaznwvviuazrszaflvfl «mm. smm nmhnrwm s. U... us my s. nflmnnflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! [mm Mun :51 3 pr Y. Mom Hm:-u Rauly I1:-M11 ms u 2 1».,..1.k... my. . busmih din a.:.mux.n u. bawah s-men :94 xx mum hukumxn 5 Karma mam Rayuan men ma we-n 5 ‘ mm." u.<.»m..» mm mambonavkan rayuan Hukumnn pen;-.4 yams mxmxan macaw Raxvnndgn dmllvnnvkuu k: x mm uruuon a un baun Resfinnuen mnmu um. Dmudnlunm bawah mm» :94 xx mm Mznkzmah s yun menllluhkln hukunun s lihufl Dewar: ¢ Human V. pp mm] s cu us 5 pp Dunn-unm I-mull mm 1 ms ms Fzliyu .»--um nllh Penud-Man dw bum nksyan m xx mm Mihkimlh Sesyen man,-luhknn hukunun m mum penw: um um sebum xman rich wx x: mm hummnn Mahkzmlh um. n.emm.m. ra‘/um Nukumm pinma yang mxmm wmpanv Reswnden amamnam kg 12 um «mun. 5 un mm... mm oleh Petay-A mamclmn mlmman mvmwuuxln Mankzmzn nm‘ memuluskun Vlukumln to uhun n-um, dlknkalkan a... 1mm. uhal a.x....m... hula: s ubauu fiesvnnden manna» ulah n-nuuumn a. bamh mam an. xx mm Mzhkzman Sesyen muuillmxsn hummin WI [41] Trend hukuman dx alas yang dvkemukakan mm men wk mm mu-m Mzhkamzn mam membevuvxm fiavunn am dwganlwkzn mg." nukumxn pun:-n . .m mm an Inn: -mun oleh TPR kebanyakannya \a\ah bag‘ kes terludxm mengaku bersalah lsaapi dakam kes W perbmaraan pemm te\ah dualankan Hukuman yang dualunkan oleh HMS pugs adalah ‘sun lebm vendah danpada trend hukuman yang dlnyalakan dalam xes Molld Ridwnn Mom: vuml (supra) Mahkamah Inn sm wullznvwviuazrszaflvfl 25 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! mendapall hukuman yang dualuhkan men HMS hdak memadaw dan |er\alu nngan sena «max menggambarkan kesenusan kesalanan yang dllakukan oxen (ertuduh [42] Berdasarkan kepada a\asan—a\asan dan prlnsvp urmangmmang yang dmya\akan dw a|as dan seIe\ah mengamnu klra segala ha! Keadaan dalam kes ml‘ Mahkamah WU mengelspwkan hukuman pemeniaraan se\ama uga |ahun nan sam sebalan‘ flan menggannxannya dengan hukuman pemeruaraan selama Vapan tahlm belmma dam 7 <2 2023 dan empsl sezman mm Hukuman um beraas dalim halasan hukuman kes— kes lsrdahulu aan la mga menoermmkan trend hukuman semasa yang pads pengama|an saya adalah wager, berpatutan sens seumpax dengan kesalahan Ierluduh Benankh 26 Januan 2024 (Bl-OUPINDAR s GI-{A/L GURCNAR H PREET] Ham Mahkamah Tmggu Ma\aya ‘pa?! 1 / m wuzzznvwviuuzrszaflvfl mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Pmak—Pmak Bagx Pendakwaan Khaznn Ham: um Khahl, T\mba\an Fendakwa Raya Negen Ferak Bagx pmak Tenuduh Nathan Knshnan bersnma Dayang Nor Emma Teluan Nam, Guns 8. Farmers 17 m xuzzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! telah memumskan banawa suam kes pnma lame Celah benaya dikemukakan nleh pmak pendakwaan dam memenntahkan supaya Iertuduh dipanggn untuk membela dm lsmadap perluduhan pmdaan lersebut Kemudlannya‘ kes Aelan dulelapkan semula dw Mahkamah Sesyen unluk lenuduh membela dm [6] Fada 1522022, ssmah msndangar pembelaan Ierluduh, HMS [shah memumskan bahawa pembelaan Isiah gagal memmbmkan keraguan yang munasabah dalam kes penaakman dan pmak pendakwaan |e|ah membukllkan kes melampam keraguan yang munasabah Oleh VIII‘ tertuduh telah dxsabllkan dan dljallmkan hukuman nagx penuduhan pmdaan Tenuduh dan pmak pendakwaan masIng- masmg le\ah memlaflkan rayuan sepem yang xercam an perenggan Deflama Rmnkasln lnkla kes m Fads 209 2015 pm lehxh Kurang 1 so Iengah han, mangsa (sun man balnk danpada memnemuelah clan ma kemav dan kenderaan yang mpandu suammya (SP2) unluk membukz pmm pagar rurnahnya Tuba’ [ma dalang terluduh menalak plnlu kerelanya dan merampas beg langin SP1 yang dllalakkan an bahaglan Ielak kikw dx hadapan lempa| duduk penumpang sm menjem darn Cuba merampas bank beg zangannya, lalu m xuzzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! benaku pergelulan antala SP1 den lerluduh yang menyebabkan SP1 tenaluh [5] Selepas tsnatuh SP1 «max dapal bangun sendnn dan lerduduk dw smu SP1 lelah mehhal (enuduh Van bersama Ierluduh kedua dengan menggunakan mukzswkal Pada masa yang sama. SP1 nampak dua orang anggota pans yang berada m kawasan nu mengejar molosxkal berkenaan [9] Menurul SP1‘ beg tangannya rnengandungw dumpet mm (exsmbn P2), kad pengenawannya (eksmblt P3), kad ATM mihk SF1 (eksmmc P4), Vesen memandunyi (ekshlbn P5) dan wang tuna! Kmerangan SP1 dlsokong meh SP2 yang lurul melmat kefidlan lersebm SP2 uaak sempal mengew moIL)sxka\ berkenaan letapv lelah mehhzl dua orang anggola polls mengemr moIos\ka\ nu smepas kejadmn ragut tersebul [m] Koperal Kamanduan um Kassum Baba (SP3) dan Lans Knperal Bohby Pawns pada masa kejadwan sedang membual Iugas wndaan peneegaharv jenayah a. temper! kejadlan SP3 telah menyiksxkan bagalmana kejadwan ragut (erhadap SP1 benaku danpada ;arak Iebm kuvang A2 kaku SP3 dun Lans Kapera\ Bobby Paulus lelah menge]ar kedua-dua Kerluduh flan benaya menangkap mereka m hadapan Church m xuzzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! cl Tnaveetmn Kudaram Beg tangan yang dvagul aleh terluduh lelah benaya dllampas kembah [11] Dr Mnk Chung {spay \a\ah duklnr pakar pevundlng Onopedlk dan Hospwtm Falumah lpch yang merawat SP1 pada 2192015 dan Ie\ah menyedlakan laporan perubalin SP1 (eksmbn F15) Menurut eksmbil P15, sm mengalarm ‘compress/on Inmwe of 1.2 vertebra mm myslopamy’ Isu yang dihangkilkan dun dapmn Mahkamah [121 Isu perlama yang amangknkan oleh peguam Dela Kerluduh Ialah HMS Is\ah xemmai dan segw undang-undang dan lam apablla membenarkan pendakwaan mengemukakan perluduhan pmdaan me\aluI hum-an benulls pnhak pendakwaan dv akhlr kes pemheiaan dan penuduhan pmdaan tersebut «max mbacakan semu\a dan mterangkan kepada lenuduh Perkara mu hsnenlangan dengan seksyen 158 Kanun Talacara Jsnayah (‘KN’) [13] Asas hujahan In: berganlung kepada ma ke|evangan yang len:a(a| m muka suraI107 mngga ma Rekud Rayuan (‘RR’) ma 2 Oleh nu, amal penhng supaya no|a keterangan lersebul dwllhat dengan menu Nola kelerangan pada 16 2 2022 bevmma dengan m uszzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! ma» Kg: unIukksuu!usan.permgkaIakmruembthnrv‘ p.....~.mm Pa B9narFuan Man Adv punuduharv pmdaan ken yang dtksmukakan dulam submusron Kan we EenarPuan Man Tenma mm n=R o... Pusn, “mm dvbenarkan Puan Jrka mjuk kepada hu/shun psn<1akwun,pads muka sum! 2 palmduhan pmdaan Man ¢. Iakjslas ;- [14] talah mendengar rakaman CRT dan membaca nala kelerangan yang las \a\ah hahaglan perlama nma Kelerangan (ersehut Says mxemukakan HMS Ielah menanya "Ada penuuunan pmdaan kan ygg dfkemukakan dalam submrssran kan" Jwka anelm akan mdapall bahiwa penuduhan plndaan yang xemacax dalam hugahan benulls pendakwaan an akhlr kes pembelaan umac RR ma 4 ml: ea) merupakan pemmunan plndaan yang sama‘ yang «emn mxernukakan peas 7 \2 2016 (lmal RR ma 1 m/s 5) la juga merupakan penuduhan pmdazn yang sama yang Rem: dwbacakan dsn dnerangkan kepada keduardua Ienuaun sebelum permcarnan bermula pads 54 2017 mm RR ma 2 ms 1) Penuduhan plndaan lrll Ialah penuduhan pmdaan yang same semasa Mahkamah Rayuan meremltkan kes ke Mahkamah Sesyen unmk (enuduh mpanggn me-nbexa am Penu dllekankan bahawa Tlmbalan Fendakwa Ray: NPR‘) uaak mengemukakan spa-apa pefluduhan plndaan yang haharu m xuzzznvwviuuzrszauyq mm. smm ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmny mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! \1a\am penghwahan berluhs pendakwaan an akhvr kes pembelaan din apa yang dukatakan oleh peguam bela Iertuduh adalah udak berasas [151 Nola keterangan selerusnya ada\ah sepem ylng benkut "TPR Man TFR mp. rm Marv rm? Mah Pun, mm that says tsrsrlap tun: Puan, bslsarrnamarru .rhL7u(d rm! be m the pevluduharv pmdum senem man: yurvg Mal naaa Dsrkataan Datum:-sums Porluduhan ;1md.nan7 Dalam psnurluhan pmdaan yang dmsrlkan sebelum mm mm. pelmgkal Bsndakwian Be!-samarsaml m min ma ' ssrsammama link ads Puany saya typo almrdalam IN ox, says an have mm kasm Fuan Mahkaman szfela/1 menslm ksssmui kslamngnn an den kslslangun keseluruhan ms, maka mama" on gags! mzntmculkan ksriguan mumssabah dslam kss rm wan yang demmsn, pmakpendakwaan I9/zhmambuklrkan ks: ms/ampam keraguan yang mnasanan mum oxrmapg. bsrsalgg gm rsabvlksn am; an hon a m am [15] Jelas danpada nota keterangan an alas‘ HMS menanyikan «emang penuduhan pmdaan din kemumannya menymakan bahawa "Balsami- sama lak ada Kan" dan TPR menjawab ‘Bersama-sama rak ads P:/an, says typo envr dalam lnl “ Sm men-iapam Cerdapil seam: kekellruan dmam perbualan anlara HMS flan TPR, yang cuba mmanlaaxkan oleh paguim bela terluduh Im ada\ah Kerana dalam perluduhan pmdaan yang dlkemukakan afau dllallkan sebemm W (paaa 7 12 2015; sememzngnya u sm uszaznvwvsuazrsayuyq mm. Snr1n\nuuhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w my .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum am.‘ lerdapal perkataan “bersama-same’ umac RR JIhd1 m/s 3 dan RR Jam 4 ml: 61) Fendakwaan dalam hujahan berluhs m akmr kes pembelaan telah merujuk kepafla pemmuhan pmdaan nu dan bukannya penuduhan asal Inn adzdah kerana pefluduhan asal lakah dipmda pada 7.12 we Danpada perbualan dw alas, Nada apa—apa penuduhan plndaan bahavu dlkemukakan kepada Mankamah dan Mahkamah pun lldsk menandakan sxau menenma apa—apa penuduhan pmdaam baharu [17] Apa yang dlkatakan OVEN HMS Ia¥ah ‘OK saya dah bass’ mm mevujuk kepada pefluduhan plndaan yang yam: ads Perkara ml dlsokong dengan dapalan bersmah den sahnan Ke alas (enuduh yang dlbuakoleh HMS berdasarkan pertuduhsn pmdaan sepem mmdun Dalam alasan penghakxman HMS ]uga menuuk aan menca|aIkan penuduhan plndaan yang sedla ad: (hha( RR Jmd 1 ms 17) Tambahan pula Nada sebarang perluduhan plndaan baharu dusenakan dalim Rekud Rayuan OVEN Ru, ada\ame\as hada penuduhan plndaan haham mkemukakan afau dwlenma oleh Mahkamah dan (enuduh telah dwbwcarakan dan didapah hersalah alas penuduhan plndaan sepem yang dlluduh Txiak Um!‘/U‘ Isu bihawa terdapal perluduhan pmdaan yang Valn alau bahnru Berdasarkan alasan an mas‘ Mahkamah mendapam nsu yang amangkwkan oleh pemnexaan uaak berment m uszzznvwviuazrszauyq mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! [13] Vsu kedua yang dwbenlangkan uVeh psguam hem lenuduh .a|an nga pllman db bawah pelenggan 173(ha) KTJ Ildak dxbacakan dan \1I|erangkan kepada tenuduh men HMS, selepas Mahkamah Rayuan memanncanxan lerluduh membela am bag: perluduhan pmdaan Akwbal danpada kegagalan tersebut lerdapal kemudarauzn kepada lenuduh sena ksgagalan pevadflan (larlure alplslmaj yang meruidlkan perhlcarasn ml max sah dan sabman palm dlkeleplkan [191 Pewnlukkan perenggan 173(ha) KTJ aaaxan sepem yang benkul ‘VI/hen me Cour! calls upon ms accused 1.: enter on ms an/Mme unaar subparagrapn mm, 1». Own may read and expram :n. was aplrons to ma accuud winch m as (wows 4,; lo gws swam evrdsncw In the wttnsss mu, «u to gvvs unswom statement (mm me am or (M) to rsmam sum - [20] Berdasarkan muka sural so mngga 95 RR Jam 2 memarvg hdak mcatatkan an manarmana yang uga pmnan dw bawah perenggan wama) KTJ lelah dvbaca dan dnerangkan kepada Ienuduh sebelum (enuduh member: Keterangan DaVam kes ml‘ (ertuduh pada so 12 M21 telah member! kelerangan nsrsumpan dan mengemukakan pemyalaan berluhs yang dI|indakan sebagau ekshnbn D23 [21] Sebemm membual kepmusan bag: rayuan ml, says lemh mermma saunan rakaman CRT untuk manna: dan mendengar ape sebenarnya in m uzzzznvwviuuzrsayuyq mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 m mm .. my.u.y mm: dun-mm y.. mum pans!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

PA-24NCvC-764-06/2023

PEMOHON 1. ) KHALIQ MEHTAB BIN MOHD ISHAQ 2. ) ZOLKIFLY BIN MD LAZIM 3. ) ZULKIFLI BIN IBRAHIM 4. ) AFIF BIN BAHARDIN RESPONDEN 1. ) DEWAN UNDANGAN NEGERI PULAU PINANG 2. ) LAW CHOO KIANG (Disaman sebagai Yang di-Pertua Dewan Undangan Negeri Pulau Pinang)

Originating Summons - Plaintiffs seek inter-alia declarations that a motion dated 10th February 2023 pursuant to Article 14A of the Constitution of the State of Penang tabled and debated during the Penang State Legislative Assembly on 6th March 2023 which was duly passed and led to the four Plaintiffs having to vacate their seats as State Assemblymen was void/unlawful.The Plaintiffs also seek declarations that the Plaintiffs remained members of the State Legislative Assembly until its dissolution in June 2023 and entitled to all remunerations.Article 14A provides for vacancy if a member having been elected as a candidate of a political party, then resigns, is expelled or ceases for any reason whatsoever to be a member of that party. Issue - Was the Impugned Motion ex-facie defective?- Whether the Defendants had acted within the legal framework of Article 14A of the Constitution of the State of Penang in declaring the Plaintiffs’ seats vacant?- Whether the Impugned Motion and any resolution passed in pursuant thereto are non-justiciable by virtue of Article 18 of the Constitution of the State of Penang and/or Article 72(1) of the Federal Constitution and therefore cannot be questioned by this Honourable Court?The Court hold that the motion was not defective as it was clearly put before the 1st Defendant for it to resolve and declare the four seats vacant with the consequential decision that if such a declaration was passed, for the Election Commission to be informed of such vacancy as per Article 14(4) of the Constitution of the State of Penang. - there was no ambiguity in relation to the said motion. The Court conclude that the 1st Defendant had acted in excess of jurisdiction when it vacated the seats of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs as they are members of Bersatu at all material times and remains members of Bersatu till to date.In so far as the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs are concerned the Court concludes that they were properly removed as they had been elected as a candidate of the political party PKR and has since been expelled as a member of PKR. Matters raised now on the propriety of such expulsion i.e. without reasons or without a hearing are not matters that needs to be considered by this Court. The 1st Defendant clearly had the power to remove them based on the express provision of Article 14A.The Court therefore allows the claim by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs but dismiss the claims by the 3rd and 4th Plaintiffs with no order as to costs.

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Anand Ponnudurai

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=9bdbb807-5430-47e6-b121-b8da542643ac&Inline=true

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Ferkara—Perkam 5, 8, 10, 13 an MBA Penembagaan PersekI.nuan< Dan Dmam Derkara Perknra HA Penembagaan Nagen Pulau Pmang danlalau Enakmen Paflamhagaan Pulau P1nang1PmdaanJ2012, Dan Da\am perkala Seksyen 25(2) Akva Mahkamah Kehakmlan 1964. Dan Dalam perkara Aluran 92 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2:112 flan kuasa yams ada Mahkamah Tinggv Malaya: Dan V-yuan: um Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm u. nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm nalam perkara Seksyen 41 darn seksyen 44(1) Akna Rem Spa Ik 1950 ANYAHA 1. KHALID manna am MOHD ISHAQ (ND. KIP: veaezsoz-5517) 2. ZOLKIFLV am MD uzm (no. KIP: 541113103959) 3. ZULKIFLI am IBRAHIM (N0. mp: 191130-a1-5179) 4. AFIF am BAHARDIN mo. mp: 350513-10-5115) PLAINTIF-PLAINYIF DAN u. uiwm uumusm NEGERI PULAU mums 2. LAW CNDO KIANG (blsaman ubagal Ylng an mu. Duran Ulld-ng-n Nogari Pulnu Plnlng) . DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN sw a7mmx.au5ux\mavczDrA m. 1 Mil mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; mm. VII mum pm (s)hnVInv bun aloctud u . candidalu ala political party, In Iulgns or In oxpollnd from, M ceases for any menu whnlsoovtr la lu . membewl rhatparly: or (wlavlng been elected umelwrse man as a candidate ole polmcalperry, he jams a political perry l2)A member of me Legislative Assembly shall no! he required 2.; vacate his saarpursuanllo ma Artlcle only be reason af— (a)Ihe dfssolmlon or cancellallon ol me reglszlallon of ms parry; ol (b)hls resignatlan lrom the membershlp ol the pany upon dscllon as a Speaker {3)NolwImslandl'ng anythlng corllalnad m Amcls 13(5), 5 member of the Legls/allw Assembly who vacales his see! under lms Anlcle may seek re-e/action all any ensulng elm.-lmn. mm. Speaks! shall notify me Electron Corrlmlssion upon me occurrence of: vacancy umlsl lms Ame/5." 12a] The rdervznl par! of Anlelo 14A at me PSC wN::h W5 perIman| in ms mailer avnears to be Anlclc IM(I)(a} olme Psc sw a7lhmx.ml5kux\x:;:vczDr»\ me n 2131 ‘Nata Snr1n\n-nhnrwmlxe used m mm a. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] nF\uNG pm [271 The Wavlmfls suhmil lhal mere are Iwe Memenks which must be satisfied before Aflicln unmu) of mu Psc can be triggered. which are as inflows a. The assemblyman must be ekzcled as a ndvdale ol 5 golmcal $5 and b The assemmyman must rwgn or be expelled mm, or cease fcrany reason whatsoever to be a member mm pany. me] In my view, me above lwo elemems are required which sets out the lega\ lmms wnlmn which ma seat a1 a member ol me Penanfi Stale Legxslalwe Assemmy can be vacaled. [29] Beanng m mind man we fauna! curoumsnanoes remmg I/.3 me1’“ and 2" Plamnfls mfler rrom man 01 me 3'“ and 4“ Plmmms, I propose to deal mm eam paw separalmy and m «ms regard, I will am! wnh the 3" and 4'“ Plainws first. The 1" and 4" Plllntllh [30] Having oonsxderad me lads and aircumscances no me 3'“ and 4!" Plamliffs. lo wu. lhal may wear: elected as candldales oHhe Pmnuml parw PKR and have sinaa been exneuaa by PKR, n appear: Ihal Arficln14A(1)(I)°fflIn Psc applnas to mesa two Flairmfis In fact‘ wmm Valmad Counsel tor me Plaimms conwdes mm 1! does at firs1 blush apuear In be applrcabxe, he ansmpls to persuade me 10 IN a7:hmuzu5kux\b;:vczDrA rm :1 will -ma s.n.r n-uhnrwm be used m mm ms nrW\nnU|Y mm: flan-mm VI] muNG Wm mlerpret the provision in such a way so as lo render ll lnappltcable lo the 3” and 4*" Platnlills [31] ln lms regara, it ls submllled bylhe Plamtrws lhatthe words ‘expel/ed from, or ceases for any reason whatsoever to be a member 0/ that parry in Arliclu 14Alt)(a) Mme FSC must be read to lnclude an element o1 lrltenliorlal conducl ln otherwnrds,lorAnIc|n14A(1)(a) al the Psc la he apallcable, an Assemblyman who has been sublecled In expulsmrt eraessaheh olmembershtp must have done scmethmg la lusnfy lhe stpulslon er eessauen ol membership [32] The above is corrtended to be ln Ilne wlth me lnlemlon onhe fl-amels ol Article 14A ohm Psc, as revealed WI the Hansaru exhlbfled as Exhlbll “LCK- “ or the Defendants‘ Affidavll WI Reply wmch may contend Is to prevent the rll or Inlenllunal parly hopplng whrch could give nse to deslablllzatlon, II ls lurlher oonlellded that ll IS esnarnly not the lnlenlounlcle 14A ofthn Psc In punlsh an Assemblyman who dtd not switch alleglanm. [33] The relavanl excerpt or the Hansam rs reproduced as below. ‘Rang Undarlg-Undany ml‘ berrl.l/uarl unluk msmbual suslu pmdasll yang ems! pontlng kepada Per/embagaan Nsgarl Fulau Huang I ll mflnblntslli hlld I lldlk sllul darr tidak bunrllta, molompat dlrlpadn ntu pnm kn um pml uorrrlnenuerr palm, menegnkknn l/llegnly darl akaunllbilill swam sane msmularlgkan kl/asa demokrallk unlmt ms!-nillh Kerzyasrl den wskrl-wakll vakyal Kepada rakyal ' SIN B7lI7mx.BL15kuxlb;=\IC1DrA rm 1: n4 :- Nuns Smnl I-vlhnrwlll as used m van; me nflglrullly sum. glam. VIZ arlum wml [34] The Pieiniifls ihen subrnil lhal me 3'“ and 4“ Plsrnilfls were lnvoiurrieniy exbelieu as members or PKR without reasons given and wilhcul ins nghi ie be heard and mat ihey did not rnlenlronally switch parll. [35] Reierence was also drawn in me newly and recenlly passed Article In oi the Federal constitution which provides mat a member er the House oi Representailves shell not oease lo be a member by reason of expulsion oi his membership oi his political parry Reference was alsn drawn to Section s of the Consliultinvl (AmIIIdmnm)(No.J)A|:1 2n22 which also pmvidss ihei : member shall not cease to be a member only by reason oi expulsion oi membership from his po cal pany However. whilst Article 49A of mo Fldural Conslitiniovl is not applicable to a Slate Assembly and so rl 6 of (hi Consliluliun (Amendmonl)(No.3)Ael1nz2 use yet (0 come into Iowa in me State of Penang, the Pialnlifis urge INS court to inlerprel Article 14A bnhe PS5 so as in be consistent min the law in (he lulurs and that me court should read Articln 1411 M are Psc in such a way to reflect current use. [351 In (his regard, the Plaintiffs submit Ihai a hamlomous reading or Atlloln 14.1 of the Psc and Aniclu 49A oi the Federal corrsiilulior. can be adwleved ii one includes en elernenz av volumariness lo warrani vacating a seei. II is finally suhmlfled by lhe Plainlms inai Article 14A of mo Psc should noi be helu applicable to me 3"’ and 4" Plalntifis who were (mad Ia switch parlies afler SIN B7l|7mx£U5k|xibla\IC1DrA me u an at we s.n.i ...m.. will re used M van; me nligiruiily sun; dun-vlnhl VIZ briurm we they were expelled fmm their pamas esnscvafly when no grounds were provided for the expulsion [37] From the above, K can be gleaned Ihal despne me express wnrdmg alArllclo MA amm FSC, the 3'“ and 4“ Plainliws are In suhsoanee \x2n|ending that may were uniamy expelled (tom PKR without any reason and wnnum bemg afforded the nghl to be heard. [as] In my view‘ having considered an mslters, In respea er the 3'“ and 4' Plalnhfls, I find ma mamnrva oonlenuans to be wimom ment. Flrslly, WhHS1llIS contended Iha(Ar1I:lo IAA Oflhfi PSC Sholfld be read harmoniously wilh Article IYA of file Federal Conalilulion, me Fedeva\ Cowl in me veoent vase of lkl mm bln Mubarrak v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor 5. Annr[1DZl] 2 ram 323 has determined that akhuugh the Cnnsmmmn must be mlerpreled havmuniously. i7 the plain mwning ohhe words IS dear, men It must be grven ewaa w. Azahar Mohamed cm enuncialed as Inflows: “[105] As can be seen, me FC deliberately used specific language m descnbmg me nature dime prec/uaron clause In my opmion, ma wordmgs of ma ptsmluslon dauss are aampemng/y clear and urvequrvoval and admu olna amar mtslplslatron The clause rs as pla/n and clear as language can express n “ [:59] Furlherrncre, as auuuad Io eamar, newhev Anlcla an M on Foduul connnuuon nor Sncllon c 04 mi Covumutlnn (Amandmam)(No.a) Acl 2022 are applicable \n «ma regard, me mawnms nava no| SDLAQM any dac\ara|mn that Anlcla MA of «no an a7mmx.au5xax\a;=\IczDrA rue Is at :1 ‘Nate and n-nharwm be used m van; .. nr1g\ruHIy mm: dun-mm VIZ aF\uNG puns! Psc ls unconslilullenal lor being lneunsuslenl wllh Article ABA el lne F-dml corulllulion [Au] ln my lunher oonsldsred oplnion. Aniclu ml oHlla PSO ls clear and l5 appllcableln me 3-“ and 4'" Plainllwslorlnelollawing reasons [41] Flrsny, there ls no dispunng mac lhey were belh members ol PKR and were elected during GE-14 as candidates anne pallllcal pally l>l<R. They have also admlued ln lne Allidavll ln suppon that they were expelled as members at me palmcal party PKR on 1* July 2020 after the Sheraton Move [42] Ills nerlinent tu rrme that me 3"’ and Al" Plalnlma ma nal challenge me validlly oflhe expulsluns desulle me law pravldlng lhsm wllh an avenue to do so The nlgnesl Ccurlcll or cormnmee .n any aaeeqy -s bound by us consmuuun and does not have me power lo exceed lls junsdlclion by a wrong mterpretahun 0| such Cclnslllulmn. The Federal COW‘ nss an M0 occaslons de(ermined lnal me Conn: relaln lrre pcmer lo quash declslorls al seuetles made ln breach ol me rules of natural jusllne or wnlcn are arbitmry. [See the cases cl Dawk Pnsamanlckam 5. Anal v Agnes Joaopu R NI [law] 2 MLJ 92 and Tan Srl Hajl Muhylddln am my Mom: vaaaln 5. Anal v Dalllh Bln Hnjl Salloh [1 see] : MLJ Au] Inau [431 As seen earller, me 3” and 4"‘ r=lalnu«s aver ln men Amaavll In supporunal M5 neoesaary lo lnlmduoe an elernenl ulvulurlvarlness to ma pmase “expel/ad (mm, or seams let any mason whatsoever In by a member olmal party’ In me lnlarprslmlon ol Anlclo 14A of mo PSC la Irlgger lhe dlsquallllcalion lo sen clear legal lrrnil cl me slN B7l|7mx.EL15kuxlbl=\IC1DrA 724: N am we Smnl In-vlhnrwlll be flied a van; me mn.u.y sun. dun-mm vla .nuns wnxl power lo dlsquallfy a member anna slaxa Assembly wllrl respea, In my waw, sucn contenlian dues vlolanoa lo |he wordlrlg ol Anlclu 14A onho use l agree wlln Laamed counsel (or me Defendants that Arlicll 14A(1) of mu PSC uses the Wold ‘Ies4grls" as e sepamle limb as us plan and nalural meaning have an dement or volunlanness wnaraas me plan and nauural maamng ol 'expella.r connotes an element of mvnlumanness as s an adverse decision made by a Nghel anlhorlly agalnst me subien [See aannmcns ol -,es»'gns'anu ”expe0ed"m me Merrlam-Webs1er nlcnanary] [44] ln my vlew. In add an alamanl ol valurllarlness to ma 2“ and all limbs ln Anlclo 1M(I) at the rsc would nlsl, be lnherenfly conh-adlc1ory Io ma plain mearwlg Mme wens 'sxpa/led‘ and “for any reason wnalsoavar, and secondly, render me man: “reslgn" superfluous. [45] In oonauslan. nawng mnsldered all maflers and upon a close scrunny of me lasls relatlng to me am and 4* Plalnuws as well as cnnslderlng me provisions ol Annals 14A of me Psc. I nave no hesnallon Vfl concluding Ihal me same was applicable as me 3'“ and 4“ Plalnuiis and may am not ennuaa to me aaclarauons scughl. Thu 1-‘ and 2'" Plslnurls [45] In so far as me 1-I and 2"“ Plamtlffs are concerned. lne Plalnmls submll mal based on the lalaln reading and natural mearllng oi Anlch |4A(1)(a) afllle PSO, me pmvlslnn IS Inappllcable lo the I" and 2" plalnulls. sln B7l|7mx.EL15kuxlbl=\ICZDrA rue n at ;I -use s.n.l ...n.mn be used m mm ms nflmnnllly sun. dun-mm wa nFluNG ma [47] ms Is because me 1“ Ind 2"" Plamlifls have arways been and remaxn member: 0! Bersalu Even \Hhe1“ and 2" Plainlifls ran for GE—1A under me Inga uf FKR as part 01019 PH mahhon, may have nevev been membevs ul PKR It Is subnuuea max me use aune wage a1 anomer no ice! paI1)/(PKR) m «he GE-14 does not change the svams annew memberemp in Balsam. [431 n is further contended met me facl that Bersam was pan 0! an unregisvereu we n (PH) We nol change or afiec1 en membersmp -n aerssm. In fact, Eersam was run a pen orany formal coahfion new as PH «set! was nola regxslered pulmml pany allhal maledal |ime. [49] u nas also been hlghhghled men one I“ and 2" P\a\n|iffs had wnlesled as Balsam members wn me GE-14(de5pIle using the PKR logo] and may remem members at Bersalu |a this day. They have always been members at Bersalu and were nm and never have been members at FKR In other won1s,lhey have not Iefl the political party they were e\ec1ed |o and they cenainly have not resigned, been expelled, oveeased we be members av Bersalu. [so] Renance was a\sn planed on the Hansard my me Fenang Stale Leg\s\aUve Asse-nmy svllmg on 6* March 2023, vmerehy me reason Ior vlcaung me seal: 9! me 1-‘ ana 2"-= Puainnm was only on me hasls ma: Esrsalu had exned ma PH maman [51] It IS mus noncenuea mac qune apart «mm In: ten men PH was not a regmerea puma: pany an the «maria! tune and also me far: that IN a7mmx.au5kux\b;=\IczDnx Page 11 m :- -nne s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm VI] mune pm the 1‘ and 2"‘ Plannlnfls had oanles1ed and Man the seat as Bersalu members (and not as members of PH M PKR). the basis In remove mam was cleariy Inwnsnsnenl wnlh ma plann readnng an Anncn. unnmna) offllu Psc whnm uses ms word “havmg been elected as a candidate nf a polrlncal part}/‘ and ‘ceases for any reason whatsoever to be a member 0/thafpanf [521 As such, nl ns oonlended man one resolunon passed nn solar as me 1- and 2m n=na.nnn«s are aoncemed vnonanea Anin:la14A ems PSC whncll camamounu to the Dananaanns axeaaanng as legal nnmns nn this rward. it ns also submilted by the Fnalnllfls that me mere idea vf a pomncal parry Iealngning nnsenr benng a Xngger Ia dnsquilrfy ils members is a gluss overreach and does not amount Io party hnppnng as highhghted by the Mnnnster timing the Pannamamary debate on Arlicln an M me Fedoral Oonsflmflorn. [53] The Denendanns on me other hand submit lha| ms Pnannnnnns‘ onnlermorn above ns mnspnaoea. In this regard. wmnsn nn ns nomnspuled man the Hand 2"“ Pnannnnrns were Indeed members onaensam dunng (35-14 and have non ceased no be members of Bersam Io dale. ma crnnncal wards lo he wnsnaama m Anlclo In 0! an Pat: is me meamng of the words “political party“ The Densnaanna draw ma courts ananuon nu ma deflmlnon an ponnuml parly nn ma soclnun Act nun and submfls man it nnanuaaa a pnlmcal coalmnn whnch has been regnsneraa under ma socnauu Act 11m. The n:-enanaanna than snmmnn that the fact man Plkalan Harapan was nm mgnslersd an me um 1:! ma anaanon ns nmmanannan and man wnnl was manenan was man we 1- and 2- Fnannnnnns had chosen ma PKR pannnncan puny IN a7nhmx.au5kunbn=\IczDnx ma :5 M31 'NnI2 sman nnvnhnrwm be used m van; ..a nflgnnnnnly mm: dun-mm Va nF\uNG wnxn symooI when It stood for eIeclIon and It was that basis upon wmon voters cast Inetrvotes [54] WIIIV respecl I0 ‘earned Counsel for the Defendants, whilst the I“ and 2'“ Plairmfis do indeed wn|es1 In GE—14 under the PKR syrnboI, I am hard-pressed to agree wttn met submIssIon1haHhsy are tnereime m be omtsmerad as having been eIeaea as a candtdale M PKR In my VIEW, Ihe mere use 0! the symbm 07 Ihe PKR logo wnen mey contested VI (SE44 dues nul and cannot make them members ottne nolmwt party, PKR Even if I were to agree tnet they were so eIecteo as a oanaiaate ol PKR. I an uenainly not prepared to agree arlo oonduds mallheseoand lImboiArticln14A oi the PS6 Is applmable as In my vtew, may have certainly not resigned, expelled Iran. or ceased Ior any reason to he a member 0! ma; party In my vtew, the wards ‘mat party’ must necessanry mean that vety same pany onwntoh the Aasembryrnan was elected. In UIIS case, mere is no dIspu|e that me 1‘ and 2"’ Plalnufls are SI!“ members nl Estsatu |o date. [551 Even it tne 1- and 2"‘ Pletnms have sinue wtlhdmwn tneir support Ior the PH state Govemmenl ano women than suppan Ior aersatu, mat In my vtew, aces not hung them wttmn the ammt or Anlolo I4A(!)(a)I:1lhI P56 [56] In the upshm, as opposed In ma facts/siluaflcn In :aIatIon In ma 3'" and 4" Plainlnfls, In my view‘ ma 1" and 2-‘ Ptetntms have oanamty made out a case tnat Anlcln MA olmo PSI: was not appllcante Io tnern Ind as a rem lhereel, tne decIsIovI Ior mam to mate lhw IN a7Ihmx.au5kuxIo;=\IczDrA Panza M11 ‘Nata Snr1nIn-vthnrwmlxe used m mm ms ot1mn.HIy mm: dun-mm wa aFIuNG Wm GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Imvoaucaon [1] The law Flalnllfls were all previously duly elected Assemblyman lor lhe slale of Penang at me 14'" Malayslan General Eleclm (hereinafler rerenea to as -(35.14-l A molmn dated mm February 2023 pmsuam lo Arliclo MA M an consmullan al the scale :20 Fenang (harelnafler relerrsd to as ‘me PS0‘) was tabled and deba|ed durlng the Penang slale Lsglslalwe Assembly an 5% Maren 2023 whlch was duly passed which led to ma [our Plalnlms havlng In vacale meir seats as slale Assemblyman. [21 Through lhis Origlnalmg Summons. me lam Flalnnffs seek mlerana declavallcns man me sad vesolulion passed was vnla/unlamul and as a resull thereof also seek declamtluns ma: Ihe Plalmlfls remalned members at me Stale Leg-slalive Assembly unhl ils dlssnlulmn m June zczs. [3] ma Dllglnalmg Summons nnngs lo tore me sunslanlwe lssue for ludi al aalannlnauun asm whelherlha Delendanls had ac1ed wlmm the legal lramework cl Anlnlu MA ol nu Psc In aeolavlng ma Plsmllf1s' seals vacanl am llnal, whelherme lmpugnea mallon and rasolullnrl passed |hera|u am non—jus|lclah|a by vlrlue ol Anlm I! cum Psc and/or Anleln 11(1)-71 ma Fndual conallmuen [4] Upon hearing cmmaal wnn me aid ol malr wnllen submisslons, I had on ma 3* Decembev 2023 allowed me ualm 0! ma 1" and 2'“ Plamllus anu dlsmlssed me clalm at me 3“ and 4" Plainnws Them aw a7lbmx£u5l«uxlbl=\IczDrA Page a M 3: ‘Nate s.n.l n-vlhnrwlll as used m van; me nflglnnllly sum. dun-mm wa aFluNG wnxl seals being vmd ur unlawfm. ‘nus men leads me to me next Issue of whemer nr nm me mzmon passed/deciswon made is non-|usm:Iah\e lnu Wholhor mo lmgugnod Mmlun me my moluuon guud In Emmm moruto urn nnn- uullel-hlc by vlnuu ov Ame g 1; of gm Cunllllulicn arm. smu o1 P-nan Ind/orArflc|n 12 1 am" Fan- Covulilullon ma Ihlnloru cumin! bu gunuomd by (hi: Hunourlblu Slmi [571 The slamng pom: must be Anloln 13 of an PSC wmcn reads as vuuaws: “ Dacislon as to msqua/mcarron (1):! any quusfian -nus whornu . mambo: 0! Me Logislakivo Anlmbly nu bocomo disqualifiud Iw mombarship, rm decision oIthoA:5vmbIy shallbe tiktn and shall bu final Prowdsd that this Amue man not he taken In prevent Ins plasma 0/ the Assembly POS’IDOIving a decrsran m we: :0 allow ta me Iakmg at dstsnmnafion of any proceed/ngs max may aflecf [he deovsran (including pmcesdmgs «or removal olme aisqua/mcanan) (2)WheveemembeI a/me Legis/an-/9 Assembly becomes dlsqualrfsd under psmgrapn (e) ol Clause (1; III the mm. 13, or under sny (aw memronea rn paragraph (a sw a7mmx.au5m\mavczurA m. u .1 n -m sum ...m.. WW be .15.. m van; M m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! of Clause (1) olArricls 13, me forsgiwig Clause (1; she/V I70! apply. and he SPIBN cease in be 3 member of ms Legisiawe Assemmy, and his seal shall becvme vacant, mrmeuiaraiy upon as disquaimaauan Iak/rig effect in accordance with C/auss (3; omricie 13 ~ [53] As expected, the Deiondanis reiy on Anicin 13(1) onhe PS0 and contend inai ‘ms decision olms Assemb/y man be iaken and shaii be frnar and argue i.haHhe1‘ Deienoanrs decisian lo qualify the Plainlifis is nunju able and cannm be quasnoned by mis Conn. The Irue efieci oi Anicle 1B(I) oi in: PS6 and similar provisions such as Aniciu 72 oi the Fsdomi Conslllutlon have been considered by our Apex coun in numerous reoeni cases. [59] in one case oirno speaker or Dewar: Umiang Nagerl afslruwnk imuk Amlr Mohlmnd Asfia Awang uassar v Ting Tiong moon I. On and oiner Appuis [2020] A MLJ 30:. the issue [here onnoemsd me operairon o1AnIclo 19:71 me Sarawak Coiislltutlon which was identical in Anlcla 1a(1io1 me PS0. in man case, me Sarawak Siale usembiy had disquaiifisd an Assenmiyrnan irurn ins Dewan on ine basis that he had acquired Vnraign mlizenship belore his simian. The issue to be oeiennined there was wnemer me Dewan had acted wiinin ns junsdimion The High court had new mar Ihe newen had no power lo aisquairry me kssembiyman am man there was a moon or the ruies oi naiurai Justice. A1 in Cuuri r11AppeaL ino maiorily dismissed inespeakers appeal on one basis met me Dewan had not amen wimin irs .urisa' non. upon a funhu -ppoai io me Federal coun. Ihe appeai by ma Speaker was allowsd SIN B7ihmx.au5i«exii:;=\IczDrA Page 22 of 3: 'NnI2 s.n.i I-vihnrwiii be used M van; .. nflgiruiily sum. dun-mm VIZ urium wmi by a maiomy decision However. an the issue oi iiisiiaaniiiiy, David Wong CJS5 (as one oi the mlnnnty iiiagesi hid iieid ai paragraph so ifllhe iiiagmeni wim raiaiance ia me case 01 DIWIII umiaiigai. Nogorl saiaiiuor a. On v Muhalnad Nafarlum hln Hnlun (211151 I MLJ 831 that a decision (:78 DUN is jushciabie Whllsl the majority iii in-a Fedeml com had concluded Ihal me Speaker had acled wiiiiiii ice iiiiisiiiaiaii on ma iiacuiiai «ms or that case, uia iaiiwiiig Mmalks by Abdul Rahman semi FCJ (as His Lordship men was) speaking forms majority is periineiiiimieia HIS Lnmshlp enunciated as follows: ‘[155] me question wnemera membev continues to be quaiified as an a/aeiaa msmbel or me oewan afisr his appuirltmeni‘ in iiia House is me sde iremgaciva of the muse to dams M11119! art. 1911) or me Sarawak consiiiinian. riie member’: romodylfllo is dissafislled Will! file deeisiun is to bring [In mil!!! to the court [156] Anicie 1911; miisr be given a purposive inzevpreiaiion wnicri, iradapiea, mnlers an me Dewar! me ;unsI1:cInm[0dalermmewhemelthespeakslalamambal siiou/i1 vacala ms seal wriaiiaver vie quesllofl ol riis qiiamicaiibn "arises (1921 ma paw In «some on me qiia/mcaiion 0/ ma responaam as ii member «If ma Dawaii resides m ma Dewsn iinasr an 19(1) of ma Sarawak Corlslllumm and mi ma mun. I! is ma com, irai a//, iiiai will by inlringing on me dcctrms iv I! wars in intarfem wnri mo axamiss ol IN B71hmx£U5k|x\b;=\IC1DrA Bags 1; ai ;I ‘Nab! s.ii.i nnvihnrwm be flied ia van; me nflginnflly MIME dnunmnl Va nF\uNG mi ma: power unkggif an M shown um um gwer had bun Ixoccisnd imgmgly And In ucoss at the 'Iln'sdl'ct:':1n" [so] In ma case of Tang chanq Kim (aupnling as speam of Selangor sum Leg ativu Assembly) :1 Bndrul Hisllan: hir: Ahdullah 5. Ana: (mm: s MLJ 557 wmch re\aled in me issue that me Speaker declared the sea: vacant due to ma Assemb\yrr:sn's absence‘ me Fsdeml Own concluded that me Speakers t1ec:s:an was nmamenahle lo :::d::::a\ pmeeamgs as he had ac1ed wmmn ma hrmls 01 me power gwen and wlthm parameters. [51] In the case or Dewar: Undang new: so nnor as 0:: v Nluhd Nafarixan bin Hanm [2010] 4 mu m as well aslhe case owaug Diperlua, Dewan Rakyat a 0:: v Gohlnd Slngl: |1oo[20l4] s u::..: :12. (he Federal Courl have a:sa enur:c:a(sd Ihauhe Drotecuan 01 Article 72(1) a: ma Fodual cansmuuon .s pmvmed :: me Assembly had acted wmhv: us cor:s\:wI:or:a| and Vega! powers and .: there was a :ega: bas:s to make me decision made [521 Based on me above declsmnsa ma :>:amu«s submn ma: wrule me flecismr: as wdisqualmcanon oflhe P amms wswimm me mrlsdvcuon and prerogauva at me 1- ne:anaan:, :: can sun be queslmnad by r: was made vnpropeily and IN ms Honourable cow: :: [he den: zxoess or junsdmlon and/or mmou: saga: bas:s. [as] The above denuded cases appeared to be uuthanly 10: me pmpasman Ihal :: the de:::s:::r: In msquamy ma Plammfs was made sw B7:|7mx£L15nx\b:aVC1DrA Pa]: 2- :71 :- ‘Nab! s..:.: In-nhn: M“ be :5... m van; me n:\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm vn JVLING Wm: -n excess of the Vega! framework 01 Anicln MA at the P50, rt can sun be Iegaw challenged and quesncned by this Court Amcla 7211) n! ma Fsdarul Cnnsnumon [541 u Vs Ina Dslendlnts‘ vunner mrnpmror. lhal me prasenl meant. was non-;uslxc\a|:\e m ngm o1Anlc|o 12(1) M tho spam: cmsaumen wmcn provides prwusge [or me Legislative Axsambly [65] Anlclu 12(1) olhlu Fld-ml Cunllilulion pmvidei me: "Me Va/rdfry 0/ any proceedrngs rru (ha Lagrslatrve Assemb/y 0/ my Stale shall not be qussnonsd rr. any noun’ [56] The pmv an protects lhe proceedings 07 me State Legislative Assembly (mm bemg mlerfsnad with or questioned by me owns [57] Noiwilfmarldlng me abave, n Is now estabhshed (halArI1c|o 72(1) of mu Fa ml consmmioru womd only be applrcame n me Stale Lsglslahve Aseempry had med within me power uonlerred upon mm and that me immumty does not anse me Slate Legvslalive Assemuy acted outside ofovexueeds its powers In this ragard, me Federal Com m me case owing Tioun Chnon (supra) enunciated as follows: rp a71hmuzu5kux\b;=\ICzDrA me 15 0111 we sprm n-nhnrwm be pp... m van; .. nrimnnflly mm: dun-mm VIZ nF\uNG puns! -12011 The sifsnl afar! 72(1) or me Federal Consmuhon on ma dacrsmn by (he Dawsn lo discus//fy and remove me respondent from me House is that the dacfsron ‘shall not be quexlrcmad in any court‘ Thus so may as tho Dcwnn had acted within the limits 0! its pawei, the com would be in brush of an 12(1) 01 the Federal consmmron II it inmrmd with (In exorcise al ma: power [as] The Feuerar Conn in van Dale‘ Drlanlbry AN Kaaira Dr: V vs Sivakumar all Varatharaiu Naidu (Anomey General Mnlwysia, inlorvoner) [me] 4 ML] 24 had a\so concluded Ihal Aniclu 72(1) of ma mm: Constitution does not oust me Junsdlnllon ov me Court In that the Com has me Aunsdumon ca asceflam wnemer particular pmver has been pmwded for. n was new m that case as loliowsz -145] /1 /ouows ma: m 72(1) must be rud as may subject to me existence on pone! Mjurlalflcflon and mm the caumus mejurisdlzllnn to lszertaln whether a Mrllcullr power um has boon c/almod has in fact been pmvldcct fur. The Issues named by me spplrcanls am lnerslorsjusucielz/3 " [59] Vn Tang cmng mm (lppanllng as upon r :2! Solnngor sun Lcqnlnthn Alnmbly) V mum: Hlshnm an. Abdulllll 5 Anal mm 5 ML: 551. the Federal coun held Iha| sw a7mmuzu5nx\mavczDrA My 2: m :1 mm Sum IHIVVDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm -123] Thus, there can be no doubt met me buslrress cl Perirernent and stale Legislative Assernnires ere immune from ruarcrai rnterterence The courts have no power to interfere with me tnternei rrreneqernenl oi Parliament er any state Legislative Asserrroiy. Tnisirnrnunityarices lrurn the .-tectrlne olsepemriori afpowsrs between the three prlncIpB/ organ: at government, namely, the executive, trre legislature and me rudlcrary. 135) me questron rs wlrertier lhs speeiters action in declaring Blsdm/’s seat (or trre constituency of me Pslamlhan Klsrig mean! at a press conference was In sxsmtse aims Iunetierrs to regulate the rrrlemel allalrs of the SLA and was lmmune lrcrn criellerrge in mun. our answer IS in the emrrneliue, Fimfy, tore ueelerettan wes purelyrneue wltrnn are parameters set out by an 6? of me selerrgor constitution. Secondly, the aecleremn was rrteulteoly connected In the essential zzusrness ultrre 5m and was made in me pofiomtance of tile sneakefs essential Iunalon as e speaker. [37] nreretere, we ere 0/ wow trrat the spukel In trre present use nee ectea regeuy undo! art as of lhl selenyor canstttutlon ln eeciertng eeururs ms Feieeunan Kieng Consltrusricy seal vacant, rrre course Ialrsn by me speukar ls non-jusllclsbls as I! rs protected by an 72(1) oltne Federal Corlstiluliorl and peres 2 — 30! me scrreauie to en 77 wire selangcr constrruilerr IN B7|hmx.ELl5kux\b;=\IC1DrA me 17 em -nee Sunni ruvihnrwm be used m van; .. nflginnflly sun. dun-mm VIZ mum we [491 on appeal, we Conn e/Appeal upnam me aecisron DI the High Court On M71719! appeal [his cum in dismissing me appear, amangsr others, he/d (£6145 regards mis appear, it Is our [udgmtm ma unmbly must is! within us cunslilulional pnu legal powurs bclure we pmtecfian pravidedfolby .n my can arise before passing a nesa/won olan an ofcontempl’ naving been comlmfled beyond ma w.a«s pnne assemb/y The assemblys powers are /tmrtsd by the Se/angor szare consmunon /50) As ll! ZamDry‘s case, on me lads, Haranzams case »s also distinguishable from me piessnl mass. /n pom cases, ma nspmm Laglslative Assembues ma exceeded ll: /unsdlcuons as pmvided under me Cansmutlon a! no» sure mnea mm was room for judicial lnterlevence. 15v} rn concmsmn, we are 0/ me wew that m ma present me, me speaker in: acunq wmun lho /Innns or me power ylvul to him undei an as of ma Solangol Connlmflon when be amazed me ~45 Pslabuhan Klang canmpanay seat vacanl. Even though me dec/alabbn was made outside ma SLA pmcaaumgs .1 was mewtzlb/y connected wun ma essential businass aims sun, mm. wnmn me parnmlvva :1! ml! by an an em. Salinger sw a7mmx.au5xu\mavczDrA rule 2- pa :- -nme s.nn nnnhnv mu be used m van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum em Constitution and was made to ragulale me rnrernal affarrs 0/ the SLA. corrsequarmy, we me that the speaker's act is nomiusricrable and me speaker is entitled to are protection olpsmnrnemary privilege enjoyed by me su: as pmvidsd for under an 72(1) ar the Federal cor-rsrinmon and paras 2 9 of lhe Schedule to an 77 :21‘ the se/anger Consfilulio " [70] In Teng chang Kmm (uupra), me Speakev was empowered by Arlide ea uflho selangor sme cammution In dedare the seat vacant upon a members absence wxlhaul weave (or a penod of 6 momhs once sum primer was asnenauneu, me Cour! gave full regard to the immunity awarded to that declsmn. [71] In upholdmg me same pnnapner me Cauns nave oonversery decided mat me vmmunily shall cease to be appncanne when the State Assemmy had exceeded us junsmcnon. [72] The Fedelal coun wn me case ov Vang D|pem1a.Deonn Rnkyal a. On v Gonlna slngh Dee [2014] 6 MLJ 512 new as lullwwsi “[26] The judrcrav proncuuncemanls at ma Fsdsrsl Com rn as Date‘ Dr Zambry bin Abd Kauu 5 Dr: V vs Slvakumar all Varalhalaw Nam (Anomey General Malayua, rruervaner) (2009; I MLJ 2: apply mm aqua: fame nu ma argument on ma /ssue cl nonjusltciabilhy pmmrsad on an 53(1) oflho Consllnmon, even mougn max case was In Ia/alum m pmcsedmgs n a Lagmlarivs Assembly urmar m72(1) of the Conslmmon In mu aw a7mmx.au5kux\b;=\IczDrA vase is m 1: ‘Nate saw nnnhnrwm be used m van; .. nr1g\ruHIy mm: dun-mm VIZ mum puns! ma, ma Fvdolal Court h-Id ml! in 72(1) of ma Conflmlflon mun bi road Is bring Illbllcl la the oxistonco of me Conslfmtian lnusl be mad as laalng subjlct to ma uxistvnn of: powor aliurisdicllon (be it inharvnt or expnss) ta do wharlrvcr (ha! has been mana and that me court hud ma jurisdiction In ascemln wlmlm ma pawn! that has been daimcd nas been provided for, nanaallng ma issue raised by Ihn applicant in that case/llnlciabla. [40] ll ls mevelole in concelvable that Parllamenl. alzel nssslng a monon, /S permmed lo allude Ia slandfng orders when laced wlln me want af slamzoly authorlry, to suspend the remunevarbn olme respondent, a course cl acllon mal unwlmngry renders a corlsllluhanal pmvlslorl mesnlngless /n we mumslances of ms csss ll IS lhers/ole mantles!/y pazenl ma: me nlalion lo ulsenmle me rexpandom of llls allowance and benefits was devoid ollegnl Iaundlflon. A consmmlonal pmkecllon granted la Memhets cl! Flllllmont by the rlnpmuve provision clan 84 (2! me Federll conmmlon, which II :5 ln mo fuml ol me rlouses ol Parliament (Prtvlleges lndFowlra)Acl1952, cnuld nalslnlply ne displaced In one nnsenee alclelrlaw ~ [73] Funnel. ln Dvwan Undungan Nnglfl salnngar a. On v Mohd Hlfnrlxlm bln nnrun [2015] 4 ML! wan ma Fsdem Court held as follows: sw B7|bmx£U5Mx\b|iVCZDrA we Sum IHIWDIY Mu be used m van; ae m\g\luHIy MVM5 dun-mm VII mum puns! rm so (2131 has been no appesx by the weneanes agains1 my decman ta aflow me dam: afIhe1“am1 2“ Hannlifls em me aw and 4'“ P1amlvffs have en me am January 2024 med an swam against my demsrun to dismiss mew clawm. [51 As such. I wI\| set out me badground facts. me anpneabue my and pmvide my ana\ys\s oflhesame with e wart evpmviamg me reeenns an my declsmn m dlsrmssing me 3N and 4*" PlavrmfYs' c\aIm and in euawing me 1-‘ and 2-"4 Plawmflfs‘ damn. kgroumi Fan: [6] The background facts are Vargew undwspuled and can be summansed es ldlcws. [7] The Pakatan Harapan (heremafler referred to as “FH") cnalmon wntesled In (35-14 that was he\d on 9!" May 2015 Al man metenal pain! In ume, PH was naca regwslaed polmcal parlyand did no: have any members oi as mm. [51 The 1-‘ and 2"-1 Plamufis are members or Pam Pnbumw Bersalu Malayaxa (namznaner revemad to as 'Eursatu'| They have always been members at Bersalu and mey remain solo this day. The 1" and 2° Hammrs had In run lurGE-I4 under me logo/symbo\ alPani Keaanen Rakyal (heremnhu retarrea to as ‘nun-) smce PH was men unregmered, and my warn suocasslully abated as me scans Assammymen lmlhe mnsmueney seats at Eenam (N 2)lrId Telok Bahang (N 40) respecuyaxy IN a7mmz.au5kex\b;=\Icznnx Fun am -we em.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m van; me mm.u.y mm: dun-mm vu mum we -[37] ll is 10 be noted ms: lns conszmcl-‘on afan‘ 7211; has come up for dslsmwlallon by our apex com a number al nmes On this palm ll must always ln berm in mind that tho pan: al Farfiamlrll and tin Lugfslalivo An-mbllu nf ma Suits in Malaysia in Ilmlted by me Fudeul Consllrlnlon and tin snare constitution mspectlvely Thls prlnclple 75 as stated by sums» LP m lhe case olAn Thlan v Guvemmenf oIMsIsysls (197512 MLJ 112 al p 113 which reads as follows’ The doctrine pl supremacy of Par/lamenl does not apply In Ms/aysla Here we have a wmten consmumn The power of Pariiamenl and ol Stale Lsglslslules rn Malaysra VS Ilmiled by me consmumn, and they cannot make any /aw they please [45] As regards lhls lppell, II I: out judymult the assembly must act within Ils zmlsfllullonll and loyal pawns below me pmtocrion pnwlded Ior by -n 12(1) an arln, lmon pmlng a nmlullon ol In act of contomplilaving been comnlmad myomm. mlls pr ms usonlbly. The assamnlys powers Ira Ilmlnd by the Selnngor Still Conumullon [l7]A calelul perusal oflhe pmvislons alms Schedule m ms Salangol srale Colvstllllllcn. wmch corlivrs the paws: and prlvilsgss al ms assembly, reveal no pmvlslan Illa! IN a7lhmxml5ux\blavczDrA bk )1 mu -m Sum mm. WW he used M van; M m\g\luHIy mm; dun-mm VII mum puns! provides for contempt committed outside lna lagislaiive assembly. Ina delandanzs loo have fafied ro show which pravisron II! Inc schedule was nailed on Io pass the resolution. The assembly has [hernias exceeded Ihe /unsdiaren pmvldsd for in me Schedule [74] Based on llie aulrlanlres relerred to above, lne Plainlms subniii trial Aniula 72(1) of the Fodoul constimlimi does not hanhis Cour! lmni enquiring inlb ilie matter oenipiained at in Enciosure 1 In delerrnine wnellier me Delandanl had acted in excess on their powers presbnbed ulldel Article MA ol the Psc. [75] It is aniy when it Is ascertained that the Deleridanls had acted within me powe( collierled upon them by Artlnln 14A at tile PSC ||'ial il can be immune nan. legal aiallenge In iigni el Anlcln 12(1) el Ihe Fedoul conammlon. [75] In a nulsneii, learned caunsei for me Flalrllnfls Ill leiialice on the above cases submit man lne decision In Va®|e llie l=lainlills' saals is iusliuiabie. in ms regard, ll is eanlended that in so lar as me 1" and 2"’ Plainmls are bonoemad, ma Delendanl had acvad in excess 01 iurisdiclmn as Anlcln MA bl lnu Psc does no: appiy la main Iri lne rirsl plane in sn lar as lne 3'" and 4“ Piainlills ale udncamed, in is submmed lnnl lne decision was sirnilariy plshclable as lne exercise at power lied been exelused improperly againal lrieni. [17] ‘rlie above decisions el llia Federal own are clelriy binding on ma Caull. Learned ceurisal lar ma Dalendanle also releis la some bl iN a7.en.ausmieavczars ,.,, ,, E. ,. -use Smni l-vihnrwiii as used a van; me nflgiliniily Minis dun-vinlll VIZ aFiuNG wmi the above cases and submits that they lay dawn a single pnzpesitidri of law in that there must firsl be a legislative tzasis for the House or the State Legislative Assembly to act it is thus submitted by the Defendants that rt there is no legislative basis to act‘ the courts can intervene on the oantrery, ilthete is a legislative basis |o act‘ the court must retrain trorri interleiing as per Arttcle 12 at are Federal constitirtiun [73] in my view, in summary, and in reality, it is the ex s enoe at a power to act that can be questioned However, once: s determined that there exists such a power, the exercise at that power cannut be questioned er interlered with. [79] Having set am the above, the crucial quesban then is whether or not the 1-‘ Detlendant had a legislative basis to make the declstorl it made on 5'" Match 2023 tor the Plalntitte la vacate their teats For the reasons set out earlier in this iudgrnent based on the lacie Pena to the 3'" and A“ Plaintilts, I would conclude that there was oenarnly a legislative basis to make the decision penalning ie their seats. since Anlnle mt at the Psc was applicable to them and there was legislative haste tor the mtanzlse of that pwer to remove therri, as such‘ is ndniustleiatrle and cannot be intedered with. I would further conclude that the exerase of such power in rerniwe theni was not exercised inipmpeity as contended. [so] The position visa-vis the M end 2"‘ Plairitiws is however dittererit trurn the 3"’ end 4” Plelnutte as highlighted eartler in this iudginent. in my view, having mnctudsd earlier that Anlele 14(1)(n) of the no was not applieatite |o them in the tirst plane, there is certainly in B7lhmx.EU5kIxlbl=\ICZDrA run 1: mil we s.i.i In-vlhnrwfll re used M mm s. nflfllrieflly MIN: flnunvllnl v.. eFluNG WM! mam In "191! cI.)n|eMton Ihat mare was no leglslalwe bests for them to vacale their seats In my vtew, II was a stlualmn where there was no tegat tcwnuaticn tn lhefirsl ptaec rc even move the motion agatnsl the 1- and 2"-1 Ptatnrtrrs 131] tn my cnnstdered vtew, as held in the case of Gohind Sinfih Doc (zupru), tr the House had made a deciston rn excess or ns turtsfltnion, the deni on was tushcrarate and the Cowl ts snfnled In Intervene. [82] In the upshot, having considered an matters, tn my oplmon the mollnn for the 1- and 2"" Ptatrmffs to vacate thetr seats was devuld at Ieget fuundalmn tn mat Arliclu 14A of are no was not applicabte to them m the frrsl ptaee, This ts nul a srtuarmn where the Cuurl ‘ts rnterverrng wrrn the decrsrorr at the Detendahts or no determine whether :1 was wneclly made bul rather the court concluding that the dectsmn was made tn excess of us runearcnen wtnoh allows mum lcr jumctet Interference [ea] As hem by the rrrajortry in Thug Tlong choort (supra), whrtst the uower to deade on me quatmcanen restdes in the Dewart, the court Is entttted to rnrervere it tr can be shtwvn that the power had been exercised tn excess 01 junsdrcflon. tn my vtew, thts is a case where the Cowl rs or [M vraw mat the I" Derermanr had acted rn excess of yurrsdrctmn in vacalmg the seats at the M and 2" Ptatntme. rw a7tnmx£u5kuxte;:vczDrA M, ,. ,,,. 'NnI2 s.n.r In-vthnrwm be used m van; me nngtrrnuly sun. dun-mm y.. artum wnxt Conclullon [341 In the upsnoa (ha uinims at mhals suugnx by me 3“ and 4* Plalnfifls are dismissed. Howevav, tne claims :2! ma 1" and 2"-1 Piainnus are allowed -nu ma Cour! makes me ioiimung dscla "c) A demlaratmn that (Its 152 Plairlflfl was andnmameda member 0/ Stale Legislative Assembly III Fenang representing the constituency o/Barium (N 2; rev tne duration ollha Hm Shara Lsgislalive Assambry sun. Stat: oIPon-rig unlilils aissoiution. d) A declaration tnai ins 2nd Piainnfl was andmmamed n member of State Legislative Assembly of Panang representing lire consliruericy of reiok sanang {N 40) rm ms duration onne Min State Legislative Assembly of the Stat: of Pa-Hang untii tts dissolution.‘ g) A decimation me: any iener from the 2nd Defendanfinforming the Election Commission may a vacancy has arisen in ine state Lsgvs/am/s Assembly oipsnang in respect onne constituency DI Banam (N2) is I/nod,’ n) A dedaralian mat any /erter from tne 2nd Defendanrinfamling tns Elsclion commission the! 3 vacancy has arisen in tne state Legisiaiive Assembly olF’enang in respect unns constituency oi Teiok izanang (N40) is you, k) That the 1s( P/ainiiffns paid all financiai sntillsmsms as a sraie assembtyman for me constituency of Bsnam (N2) for me IN a7.um.uusy.uu,=uczm ...,, ,5 ,,, ,. -nu; s.n.i n-nhnrwm be used M yam .. mn.u.y MIN: dun-mm VIZ mum mu dumtrcn between me date the /mpugned Manon and Impugrmd Resolution were passed unlil Ins drssolm/on or the 2nd Defendant, indudfng but not /muted Ia all salanes, remuneration and allowances: and n The! one 2nd Prainmrbe para an finarvcial enmlsmenls as a stale assemblyman for me consmusncy ol Tslok Bahsng (N40) for me duralmn between me dale me lmpugned Malian and lnwugnud Rssomnon were passed unm ms dissolmron of the 2m uarenaanr. mzzluding am no: limited In all ssranss, remuneration and a/Iuwances: [us] As for cusvs, bearing m mind that new pames have been pamy successful. m me exemse av my msmanon, I make no me: as In 00515 and each pafly us to bee! their own casts. Dated 12-” January 21:24 VA Anand Pznnudurui Judg- Georgetown High Coun sw a7mmx.au5kux\b;=\Iczunx ms as an! -ms Snr1n\nnuhnrw\HI>e used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm cnun ( ) Tan Sri Datuk Azhar Bin Aztzan @ Hanan together with Mr cnetan Jelhwani and Ms Ava Gae vmm Messrs. Chelan Jetnwani 5 Company for the Plaintms Data‘ Malik Irrmaz Sarwar wgetnevwm Ms Khoo Suk Chyv from Messrs. Mahk Imuax Salwar and Mr Surendra Ananlh Vmm Masrs. Sumndra Anamh lurlhe Defendants c I R [crud Daluk Pssamamckam 3. Anor I/Aynes Joseph R Narayanan (193012 ML] 92 Dewar: L/ndangan Negen Setangor 4. 073 v Mohamed Hafanzam hm Hamn [21716] 4 ML] 551 no Pulls hm Mubamak v Kerafian Negen’ semnga & Anor 121221) 2 ML] 323 Tan su Haj! Muhytddtn Em Hay Mohd Vassin 5. Am)! v Dot/an Efn Ha]: Sal/011199913 ML] 454 Tang Chang Krm (appealing as speaker of Selangtv Stale Leg/’:/alive Assembly) v Badrul Msham bm Abdullah & Am)! 12:21:; 5 ML] 557 The Speaker nfbewsn L/ndang Nogen ofsarawak Daruk Amar Molvamad As1ra Awang Nasser V mg nong Cnoan 5 Or: and Olhel Appeals [2020] 4 ML! 30.? ms Dalo'DIZambry am And Kalil! 5. Or: V vs Sivukumara/I VarsIh.!ra[u Naldu {Attorney General Malaysia, mlsrvsnsl) [2009] 4 ML] 24 Yang Dlperlua, Dswan Rukyul & Ors V Gobmd Smgh D80 [ZOV4] 5 ML] 512 sw a1mmx.au5ku\b;=\Icznnx lane :1 at :- um am.‘ ...m.mm be ts... m van; .. nr1g\ruHIy mm. dun-mm VIZ mum puns! uglslan nsR term: in Article 14A aftha Consfitution ollha Slate ofPenang Federal Constitution, Amy: 10, 1-9. 49A and 72 (1) Sarawak Constifuricm, Arride 19 sslsngor Stare Conslmllion, Mine 69 IN a7mmuzu5kux\b;=\IczDnx vagealmu -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm [9] It is undwspuled mat the 1* and 2"‘ P\amriffs have naver been members or PKR on the other nand, the 3'“ and 4'" Fkalnllfls were 3| ms ma«ann\ lime in 2015 members av PKR and may canlasled under the rage olPKR. Tney war: suacesamny esecnad as (he Stale Assemblyman for me oonsmuency seals ov Sungai Acheh (N. 21) and Seberang Jaya (N. 10). no] In or around June mo, me a~ and 4"‘ Phlnlrffs wave waened from their pawns! pany, PKR. They now contend that my wave nm awmdad mm a prior nghl to be neard and no reason was gwen lor Inelrexpulsxan. [11] On 1u~ February 2023, a molten was tabled m me1- Defendanl cm the four P\a|nIiHs' seals |o be vacated pursuant In Article MA on the FSC (heremafler refierrm In as me unupugnad moImn'). Tna impugned mmmn was dmanad dunng the Penang State Leg\s\aIwe kssembiv simng on 5" Marm 2023 and was passed The Plamnfis were men asked to leave me 1- uevendanz on the same day usau wmch me (our Plainlflfs duly did. [12] The Hansard rm ma Fsnang scans Legislative Aasanmly smmg on 5- March zaza revewslhallhe impugned mdudn was basedlpassed an we rdudwing grounds/reasons: a In ralauon in me 1- and 2*“ Pluinms 4 because Eersalu naue exiled (mm the PH ooanuoa. n In ralaxion In ma 3'“ and 4' Plain-ms » because may were axpaned lwm PKR yn a7mmx.au5kux\b;=\IczDn\ ray 5 ac :- -ma am.‘ ...n.mm be used m mm .. mmnuuy mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm [I3] Pnor to this Originallnfi summons, it is to be noted that there was a similar niatien set to be tabled in the state Assembly in late Oclnber 2020. However, that motion was retracted and not tabled due lo legal proceedings filed by the Plalnllfls. Those legal proceedings were aimed at challenging the uonsatutmnality elArt1clet4A omie P50 and the Federal court ultinietely on 3'“ August znzziaund that Article 14A at the Psc is net inconsistent with Article 10 al the Federal constitution and determined that Article 14A of the P50 is not unconstitutional There were several other appeals pending on other related matters but all have SW09 been wrthdiawn based on the understanding between the parlies that the issua penaining to the val] ty ol the Plaintms having to vacate their seats would be lully canvassed in this 05. 1' To mined And rtln [14] it is the r=iaintiils' contention that the impugned motion and any resolutions passed pursuant thereto are invalid because it was not made within the parameters set by Afliclu 14A of the PS6 which will thus allow curial intervention. come its [151 The Defendants are contending the opposite in that they posit tnat his court cannot question or interlere with the decision of the 1“ Delendarit by virtue al Anlclo 15 af the PS0 and Article 72(1) of the Federal constitution ie . that the decslon is nan-iusticiatale. sin B7l|7mx.EU5kuxlbli\IC1DrA 92:: 5 all] -use s.ii.i Ilnvlhll will be used M van; me nllglrullly MIN; m.i.i. VIZ nFlt.ING wml [1 s1 Nlemalively. |he Defendant cnmends mat even an the menls of the aeaIsian, Amos IA! of use use was cnrveclly appIIea to all me PIaInI1ms [171 However, belore I oansder in gem and analyse (‘he above two subslanhva Issues, I wIu nneny deal with the Plmnms‘ uomention mauneInIpIIgnaI1 mmlon that was Iamed was ax-laoie delecuve based on its cements Inn Imgugn MuIlonExFac De! Iv 7 [18] The Plamms at me ouIseI somana nIaI due la the language used In the Impugnea Inauan, II was not a pmper nIoIIon max would operane In vacale the saaIs M ma P|aInIms. In Ims regard, II was rIIgrIIIgmee by learned counsel for ma Plamllfls that Ina omsclmn raIaea In Ims Iegald was nm a mans: e1 sarnanma. hul beanng In mind man we are aaanng mm a resnluuan av Ina Slate Assembly (and nol maI of a prvvaleenlerprise), II I5 aifical matme Iasoluuon has In be precise and slave uaclly wnan In Amends In do It Is pernaps am that I set um me 2023 resomuon wrII’uI reads as vouows: In B7|hmx.EU5k|x\b;=\IC1DrA Page 1 was we s.n.I n-nhnrwm be used M mm s. nrW\nnU|Y MIME dun-mm wa nF\uNG WM! E3TI£'Z‘m.n :G'n'§‘ [19] Learned counsel [or me Flalnmh submlllhallhe above Is flelacuve a S marely a mnllon In oonsmera mmbon am! not: motion ID as passed and Ihal anolher mmion wank: he raquimd mereafler. In fact. a compafisnn was dfilwn lo Ihe earlier mmlorl in 2020 which was withdrawn which learned Counsel mnlznds should have been me pmpu wmvlng of me 21:23 matron. The previous zozc mmlnn man: In falwusl ‘Euhawa Dewan ml me/u/usknn fling aran kek in am 1 4 kalusl Dewar: Urldan Ne I Pmau Pmang ukibat kagaga/an MI/—ah/I Dswan Undang Negod yang bmsnaan unmk mangoscngkan kemsf menka :12 Damn Porkva 14;: Fan! 1 Perlembagaln Negan PM-u Finnng rr-ngnyunmn nn-nun. m s7nmx.au5kuxIm:vczurA Page n all! «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! Ssnsrsi kemsi nisn Ahh Dawan Undang Nagen yang namoan aaaian sspsrli bsnkul: seberany Jaya(~1u)— vs Dr Amzin Bahavnfin sungai Acheh (N21) — VB zulkmi DWI Vbvahml Bensm(N2J - W. Khaliq Melirab bin Mohd Isnaq (iv) Teiok sanang (mu) — YE. Zolknfiy bm Md Lax/m“ [20] In is run dnspuled nnan no further maliori was presenned and that me Plainhffs had vacanao nnan saans upnri the above 2023 resoiunion being tabled, aaoanaa and passsa. 121] The Delendanls on ma anhor hand oanumd nnan nrie manion was nun an em delacliva and was nan a mnnmn no pass a iunure resalunon. [22] in my viaw, having considered all mailers, n rim: no mann In Ihe Plarnlrlfs‘ oonien|im and am ollhe opinion inan ma saia mnlton VS nun defecuve In my vbew, wnunsn the 2023 moliun may be singnuy unrisrennny waded Is compared no nne same: 2020 monion, me said monion oould nan have naan ananaa any aiaanar in was clanrly pun before ma 1-‘ Defendant «or I! no rosoiva and declare in rain saana vaoanlwrlh nne nansequenuai oscision man «such a oeciaranion was passaa, ion Ins Election Commission no he nnionnea :71 men vacancy. There was oernainny no oounn in anyonos mmd as no wnan was being nabieu and in: decisxan nnanwas made Even the Piannuns when I»: have no doubt anaun nna aocisnon made and ins effect wnsn may immsdiataiy iain ma 1-‘ naianaann arm men manunnon in s7nhmx.au5kuxib;:vczDrA Pa|< 9 am -naa s.n.i n-vihnrwm be used m mm In: nflninnflly sum. dun-mm wa arium v-man was paszred. Funher, as per Articlo 14(4), the Elecnon ComrI'IIssiorI was Indeed suI>ssquemIy Irrtnrrrrea oi the occurrence oi such vacanmes [221 In my wnsIdered vIew. II aI aII mere were issues with me manon, It would only be proper Iar ma maner Io be raised as an obIec1I0n at the malenal (Ima so lhal It cauld have been desk Wllh by the Speaker In my Iurmer mew, whelha or not me mofion Is In a lorm acpeprame under me Sianmng Orders IS umrnacety fuvlhe House to deaue and not In be alvacked poIIaIeraIIy In mese pmeeamgs. In any evem, as I have Iugmrgmea, no omecuorr was taken on me mahon ii the malenal tune and Ina subslanuve Idea arInlanlbehIm1 me same was very clear In aII and sundry. [24] I will naw move on In mrrsmer me subslanllve Issues. I : findallls had mod within the I III inrmwork g1Ag5' g ju annu Constitution of mu sum of Funny in dnclaring lh PI Mills‘: :1 I? [251 II is perhaps am that I firsl set out Anicla 11A mu. vac which reads as VoIkIws' r1)suIzI'ecr (0 (hrs Ame/5, a member 0/ ma Legislative Assembly sna/I vacate ms sea: /1- sw a7Ihmx£u5kuxII:I=\IczDrA Put Ill ac :- ‘Nuns Sum! I-vIhnrw\H be used M mm r. nr1mruHIy MIN: dun-mm Va nFIuNG wrm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

CB-12B-16-11/2022

PERAYU ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN ISMAIL RESPONDEN NOR PADILLAH BINTI AWANG

Rayuan sivil tuntutan gantirugi kemalangan jalan raya - Rayuan terhadap amaun gantirugi - Tiada kekhilafan yang memerlukan campur tangan mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan - Rayuan ditolak.

26/01/2024

YA Tuan Roslan bin Mat Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f2b9e9d9-cac8-479a-aca1-bc63c303941d&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - CB-12B-16-11-2022 ZAINAL ABIDIN ISMAIL v NOR PADILAH AWANG -edited 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO. CB-12B-16-11/2022 ANTARA ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN ISMAIL … PERAYU DAN NOR PADILAH BINTI AWANG … RESPONDEN [DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. CB-A53KJ-314-12/2020 ANTARA NOR PADILAH BINTI AWANG …PLAINTIF DAN ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN ISMAIL … DEFENDAN] 26/01/2024 10:06:01 CB-12B-16-11/2022 Kand. 18 S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkaitan dengan tuntutan gantirugi kemalangan jalan raya. Kejadian malang itu telah berlaku pada 22.12.2018. Ia telah menyebabkan kecederaan yang dialami pada Responden/Plaintif. Perayu/Defendan tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut. Dalam alasan ini Perayu dan Responden akan dirujuk sepertimana kedudukan pihak-pihak semasa prosiding di Mahkamah Sesyen. [2] Plaintif dan Defendan semasa di Mahkamah Sesyen telah dapat bersetuju bahawa liabiliti di dalam kes adalah 50 % kepada Plaintif dan 50 % kepada Defendan. Oleh itu isu liabiliti tidak menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Kes ini hanyalah berkaitan dengan kuantum sahaja. [3] Mahkamah Sesyen pada 07.11.2022 telah memutuskan semua gantirugi am dan gantirugi khas kesemuanya berjumlah RM2,141,512.05 dengan faedah 5 % setahun terhadap gantirugi am dan 2.5 % terhadap gantirugi khas. [4] Defendan tidak berpuas hati terhadap kuantum gantirugi tersebut di dalam beberapa maudhu’ tertentu. Maudhu’ tersebut yang tidak dipersetujui oleh Defendan. S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] Dalam kes ini Plaintif telah mengemukakan tiga orang saksi. Penelitian kepada nota keterangan tidak menunjukkan bahawa Defendan mengemukakan saksi. Namun begitu Mahkamah telah membenarkan pihak-pihak mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen iaitu laporan pakar bagi diteliti oleh hakim bicara untuk pertimbangan kuantum gantirugi am dan gantirugi khas. Analisa [6] Penentuan gantirugi dalam kecederaan yang dialami oleh individu adalah sesuatu yang sukar. Ia memerlukan penelitian kepada kecederaan yang dialami dan laporan pakar berkaitan kecederaan tersebut. Di samping itu pertimbangan kepada ilat yang dihadapinya itu telah menghalang Plaintif daripada menikmati kehidupan seperti biasa sebelum kecederaan itu dialami olehnya. [7] Dalam hal ini pandangan Lord Goddard dalam kes British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] A.C 185 adalah menarik untuk diteliti apabila dinyatakan seperti berikut: “The assessment of general damages in these cases is always a matter of difficulty. I do not think that restitutio in integrum has any application to general damages. The plaintiff receives compensation and not restitution. If he has lost an eye or a limb he can be compensated by money, but that will not restore what he has lost. So, too, if his earning capacity is lessened or destroyed, the loss cannot be S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 measured so as to ensure that he is no worse off in the future than he was in the past, and, indeed, if it turned out that the amount of his disability was less than was anticipated at the trial, he might even be overcompensated. On this matter I would quote Lord Dunedin in Admiralty Commissioners v. Susquehanna (Owners): "If the damage be general, … the quantification of such damage is a jury question. … For a jury question no rigid rules, or rules that apply to all cases, can be laid down, but in each set of circumstances certain relevant considerations will arise which, were the matter before a judge, it would be the duty of the judge in the case to bring before the jury." A judge sitting without a jury must act on the same principles and bear in mind the same considerations as he would direct a jury to do as to the fair amount to award both for pain and suffering and for loss of earning capacity, and I think it would be well to remember that it has always been laid down that damages cannot be a perfect compensation. Lord Wensleydale, when one of the judges of the King's Bench, as he was for six years, so charged the jury in Armsworth v. South Eastern Railway Co., and his direction was approved by the Exchequer Chamber in Rowley v. London & North Western Railway Co.” [8] Mahkamah juga perlu menimbangkan bahawa penentuan suatu gantirugi adalah bukannya semata-mata pengiraan angka dan jumlah tetapi ia adalah bergantung kepada keterangan-keterangan yang diputuskan oleh hakim bicara setelah meneliti laporan-laporan dan S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 keterangan-keterangan pakar berkenaan dengan kemalangan tersebut. Hakikat gantirugi itu telah dinyatakan oleh Lindley LJ dalam kes Rodocanachi v Milburn [1886] Q.B.D. 67 seperti berikut: “The next question is as to the damages. It must be remembered that the rules as to damages can in the nature of things only be approximately just, and that they have to be worked out, not by mathematicians, but by juries.” [9] Semasa mendengar rayuan berkenaan dengan gantirugi Mahkamah ini perlu mempertimbangkan panduan yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Agong keadaan di mana mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan boleh campur tangan di dalam gantirugi yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Bicara. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Tan Kuan Yau v Suhindrimani [1985] 2 MLJ 22 seperti berikut: “The principle that could guide this court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case, in particular the amount of the award. In a particular case therefore it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purposes of assessment some irrelevant considerations. If the court is satisfied or convinced that the S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Judge has acted upon wrong principles of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.” [10] Begitu juga dalam kes Topaiwah v Salleh [1968] 1 MLJ 284 yang turut menegaskan garis panduan bilakah hakim bicara boleh campur tangan dalam gantirugi yang telah diputuskan oleh hakim bicara. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “Or another way of putting it – that it is a matter of assessment but not of calculation. So far as this court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer L.J. in Flint Levell [1935] 1 KB 354 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.” [11] Penelitian kepada kes-kes di atas menunjukkan bahawa ruang untuk hakim yang mendengar rayuan campur tangan dalam keputusan hakim bicara berkenaan gantirugi adalah tidak luas. Ia hanya boleh S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 dilakukan sekiranya didapati bahawa hakim bicara telah memutuskan gantirugi tersebut tidak berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang berkenaan dengan gantirugi, jumlah yang diberikan adalah tidak sejajar dengan keputusan-keputusan yang lalu berkenaan dengan gantirugi tersebut atau gantirugi tersebut terlampau rendah atau terlampau berlebihan. Di samping itu sekiranya gantirugi tersebut diberikan tanpa sokongan keterangan yang sewajarnya boleh juga menjadi asbab kepada campur tangan hakim rayuan dalam keputusan gantirugi tersebut. Severe Head Injury (GCS 8/12) Multiple Intracranial Bleed Award [12] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan award sebanyak RM250,000.00. Peguam Defendan menyatakan sepatutnya tidaklah terlalu tinggi, sepatutnya diberikan sebanyak RM130,000.00 sahaja. Ini adalah kerana laporan Doktor Ravi yang menyatakan Plaintif mengalami kesan sampingan dari ubat psikiatri bukan dari kemalangan dan keterangan itu ditambah pula dengan fakta bahawa Plaintif boleh hadir di Mahkamah dan memberi keterangan di Mahkamah dengan baik dan beliau juga telah mencadangkan RM130,000.00 diberikan. Sebaliknya peguam Plaintif menyatakan jumlah RM250,000.00 adalah kecil dan perlu dinaikkan kepada RM400,000.00 kerana ia adalah merupakan kecacatan kekal yang dihadapi oleh Plaintif. [13] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpandangan bahawa walaupun keadaan terkini Plaintif dalam laporan menunjukkan terdapatnya pembelian awal namun kecederaan tersebut telah membawa S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 perubahan kepada sikap, mood dan halusinasi. Plaintif juga dikatakan pada tahap yang tidak membolehkan Plaintif berjalan bersendirian dan juga tidak boleh bekerja. Dalam kes tersebut Mahkamah Sesyen telah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Syukor bin Mohd Rasip v Nurdiana binti Ismail & Anor [2021] 1 PIR 3. Mahkamah ini berpendapat Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberi pertimbangan yang wajar berkenaan dengan keadaan Plaintif ekoran daripada kemalangan tersebut dan telah mengambil kira kecederaan dan keilatan yang dialami oleh Plaintif. Jumlah award tersebut adalah tidak wajar diganggu oleh Mahkamah ini. Maxillary Anterior Dentoalveolar Fracture with Soft Tissue Injury [14] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan RM15,000.00. Peguam Defendan telah berhujah ia wajar diturunkan kepada RM9,000.00 kerana terdapat kekeliruan dalam facial bones maxilla yang dicadangkan RM14,500.00 hingga RM30,000.00. Ia sepatutnya dirujuk kepada facial bones – alveolus yang dicadangkan oleh pihak Defendan adalah sebanyak RM7,000.00 hingga RM9,500.00 kerana terdapatnya kecederaan di tulang rahang maka dicadangkan sebanyak RM9,000.00. Peguam Plaintif mencadangkan bagi item ini award adalah munasabah dan perlu dikekalkan. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menyatakan bahawa asas kepada penentuan jumlah RM15,000.00 tersebut adaah disebabkan kecederaan yang dinilai oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan tahap pemulihan baik Plaintif dan tiada keilatan teruk seperti yang dinyatakan dalam laporan pakar yang dikemukakan. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa penetapan jumlah tersebut oleh S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah berdasarkan kepada penelitian hakim bicara kepada laporan pakar yang tidak mewajarkan jumlah yang lebih tinggi yang diberikan oleh hakim bicara iaitu RM 15,000.00. Mahkamah ini tiada alasan untuk mengganggu dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut. Subcutaneous Emphysema Of Posterior Right Chest Wall [15] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen mengawardkan sebanyak RM35,000.00 dan award ini mengikut hujahan peguam pihak Defendan telah melebihi trend yang dinyatakan dalam Compendium iaitu RM4,000.00 hingga RM5,000.00 per rib tetapi dalam kes ini ia telah melebihi dan mencadangkan supaya award global diberikan sebanyak RM27,000.00. Peguam Plaintif berhujah bahawa kecederaan yang dialami adalah parah dan jumlah RM35,000.00 itu adalah suatu yang tidak munasabah dan hendaklah dinaikkan kepada RM50,000.00. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan jumlah tersebut berdasarkan kepada lima kepatahan pada tulang rusuk. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah merujuk kepada Guidelines for Awards in Personal Injury Claim dan mendapati award yang boleh diberikan bagi setiap kepatahan tulang rusuk adalah RM4,000.00. Mahkamah ini berpandangan jumlah RM27,000.00 bagi lima kepatahan tulang rusuk tersebut adalah wajar dan tiada alasan untuk Mahkamah ini campur tangan dalam jumlah yang diawardkan tersebut. [16] Begitu juga adalah tidak wajar untuk jumlah tersebut dinaikkan kepada RM50,000.00 seperti yang dicadangkan oleh pihak Plaintif. Ini S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 adalah kerana keparahan yang dialami oleh Plaintif tersebut tidak boleh dilihat secara berasingan dengan jumlah tulang rusuk yang telah patah seperti yang dinyatakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut. Grade IV Liver Injury [17] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sebanyak RM20,000.00. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah berpandukan kepada Guidelines for Awards in Personal Injury Claim di mana dinyatakan jumlah yang paling rendah adalah RM12,000.00 dan paling tinggi adalah RM18,000.00. Mahkamah bicara telah menetapkan RM20,000.00 sebagai suatu yang sesuai dilihat kepada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif. Mahkamah ini mendapati ianya suatu yang tidak perlu kepada campur tangan Mahkamah. Ini ditambah pula terdapat keterangan menunjukkan terdapatnya kecederaan tahap 4 pada bahagian hati Plaintif. Grade I Splenic Injury [18] Sementara bagi Grade I Splenic Injury Peguam Defendan berhujah ia melebihi daripada trend dan dicadangkan sebanyak RM10,000.00 dan Peguam Plaintif mencadangkan ia dikekalkan. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengambil kira kecederaan dan keilatan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dan memutuskan bahawa jumlah RM15,000.00 adalah bersesuaian berdasarkan juga kepada panduan dalam kes Mohd Nazri bin Abu Bakar & Anor v Khalijah binti Man & Anor S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [2019] 1 PIR 56. Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat tiada alasan untuk mengubah dapatan hakim bicara. Closed Right Neck of Scapula Fracture [19] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan award sebanyak RM20,000.00. Peguam Defendan menyatakan jumlah tersebut tidak sepatutnya sedemikian disebabkan tiada sebarang kependekkan dan tidak melibatkan pembedahan. Peguam Defendan mencadangkan jumlah yang wajar adalah sebanyak RM14,000.00. Namun demikian Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen mendapati bahawa terdapatnya kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif iaitu malunited fracture of scapula with medial displacement of glenoid process. Ia telah menyebabkan berlakunya kesakitan kekal pada bahu kanan Plaintif. Kesakitan tersebut pada hemat Mahkamah ini adalah suatu sebab yang kukuh untuk jumlah sebanyak RM20,000.00 diberikan oleh hakim bicara sebagai gantirugi dan menolak jumlah RM25,000.00 yang dicadangkan oleh Plaintif dan RM14,000.00 yang diutarakan oleh Defendan. Ia adalah berpatutan dan tiada alasan untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu jumlah tersebut. Closed Fracture of Right Midshaft Clavicle with 1cm Shortening [20] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sebanyak RM30,000.00 yang ianya melebihi daripada trend iaitu RM20,000.00 tetapi mengikut peguam Plaintif ia adalah munasabah dan berpatutan dan memohon supaya dikekalkan. Mahkamah ini berpendapat jumlah tersebut adalah wajar dan berpatutan. Tiada keterangan yang S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 dikemukakan bagi membolehkan jumlah tersebut diganggu oleh Mahkamah ini. Traumatic Total Amputation of The Distal Phalanx of Right 5th Toe [21] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sebanyak RM14,000.00 dan dihujahkan bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf dalam hal tersebut dan ia tidak bergantung kepada garis panduan dan ia tidak tepat. Peguam Defendan memohon jumlah tersebut dikurangkan. Penelitian kepada alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang mengawarkan sejumlah RM14,000.00 tersebut bersandarkan kepada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dan berlaku pemotongan jari kaki sebelah kanan dan ia adalah suatu kecederaan kekal. Mahkamah ini berpendapat jumlah RM14,000.00 tersebut jika dilihat dengan kecederaan dan pemotongan jari kaki kanan tersebut ia merupakan kecederaan kekal adalah sesatu yang wajar diberikan dan tidak perlu campur tangan Mahkamah ini. Open Undisplaced Fracture of Proximal Phalanx of The Right 5th Toe [22] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan award sebanyak RM7,000.00. Peguam Plaintif mencadangkan jumlah yang sepatutnya diberikan adalah RM10,000.00. Mahkamah ini berpandangan jumlah RM7,000.00 itu adalah wajar berdasarkan kepada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif dan tidak perlu dilakukan sebarang penambahan kepada jumlah tersebut. S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Left Eye Chemosis [23] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sebanyak RM8,000.00 kerana Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen mengambil kira kecederaan tambahan yang berlaku. Peguam Defendan menyatakan ia adalah tidak wajar. Sementara peguam Plaintif menyatakan ia adalah suatu yang munasabah. Asas kepada jumlah RM8,000.00 yang ditetapkan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah berdasarkan kepada kecederaan yang dialami di bahagian kiri mata yang dikenali sebagai left periobital haematoma with chemosis. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini kecederaan tersebut adalah suatu yang wajar diberikan jumlah yang sedemikian dan adalah tidak wajar untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu jumlah tersebut. Multiple Scars [24] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan award sebanyak RM15,000.00 dan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan alasan mengapa beliau memberikan RM15,000.00 tersebut. Ia tidak menjadi apa-apa pertikaian dalam kes ini dan jumlah tersebut dikekalkan oleh Mahkamah. Loss of Teeth [25] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memberikan jumlah sebanyak RM15,000.00. Peguam Defendan menyatakan bahawa gantirugi itu adalah tidak wajar diberikan kerana tiadanya diagnosis kehilangan gigi S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 tersebut. Sebaliknya Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa ia harus dibenarkan disebabkan terdapatnya butiran kecederaan tersebut dinyatakan dalam laporan perubatan awal walaupun ia tidak dinyatakan dalam laporan perubatan pakar. Secara khusus terdapat laporan pakar yang mengesahkan bahawa Plaintif telah kehilangan beberapa gigi. Oleh kerana itu Mahkamah berpendapat garis panduan yang digunakan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam memberikan award sebanyak RM25,000.00 hingga RM30,000.00 bagi kehilangan gigi adalah wajar untuk diberikan. Sejumlah RM15,000.00 kesemuanya dalam kehilangan gigi Plaintif dalam kes ini. Muscle Wasting [26] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sebanyak RM10,000.00. Ia disebabkan terdapat laporan yang menunjukkan bahawa terdapat muscle wasting pada dua bahagian knee joint Plaintif. Tiada keterangan yang dapat menyanggah laporan tersebut dan ia adalah suatu yang betul untuk Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bersandarkan kepada laporan tersebut bagi mengawardkan jumlah RM10,000.00. Bilateral Moderate to Severe Mixed Hearing Loss [27] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sebanyak RM40,000.00. Namun ia dibantah oleh pihak Defendan disebabkan laporan ENT Defendan tidak menunjukkan kecederaan yang sedemikian. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa terdapat keterangan daripada laporan pakar Plaintif yang menunjukkan bahawa S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 Plaintif mengalami masalah pendengaran pada kedua-dua bahagian telinga dan keilatan tersebut adalah bersifat kekal. Sekali lagi dalam kes ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah merujuk kepada Guidelines for Awards in Personal Injury Claim yang menetapkan jumlah paling rendah adalah RM36,000.00 dan jumlah tertinggi adalah RM55,000.00. Ia adalah sesuai untuk Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen memberikan award sebanyak RM40,000.00 berdasarkan kepada kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif. Kos Rawatan Masa Hadapan [28] Seterusnya berkenaan dengan kos rawatan masa hadapan bagi kecederaan pergigian dan bantuan pendengaran, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa berdasarkan laporan pakar Plaintif berdasarkan kecederaan tersebut dan rawatan yang perlu dijalani untuk pemulihan kecederaan Plaintif dan setelah Mahkamah Sesyen membandingkan laporan Plaintif dan laporan Defendan pada hemat Mahkamah keputusan jumlah RM5,000.00 untuk rawatan kecederaan pergigian (dental injuries) dan RM75,000.00 untuk tujuan bantuan pendengaran dan RM15,000.00 untuk cord vocal adalah sesuatu yang wajar dan tidak membolehkan Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan tersebut. [29] Begitu juga dengan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan dengan gantirugi khas berkaitan pendapatan masa hadapan, kos penjagaan sebelum perbicaraan, penjagaan sebelum perbicaraan dan penjagaan selepas perbicaraan. Kesemua itu Mahkamah berpendapat penelitian yang wajar telah dibuat oleh Hakim S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Mahkamah Sesyen dalam mencapai jumlah yang telah diberikan atau menolak tuntutan-tuntutan tersebut. [30] Mahkamah ini tidak bercadang untuk membincangkannya secara terperinci tetapi memadai untuk menyatakan bahawa setelah meneliti alasan penghakiman dan keterangan saksi-saksi serta dokumen- dokumen yang dikemukakan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam hal tersebut adalah wajar dan tidak ada sebarang alasan untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan tersebut. [31] Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa Mahkamah ini tidak boleh mengenepikan atau mengganggu dapatan hakim bicara berkenaan dengan kuantum gantirugi semata-mata disebabkan tidak berpuas hati atau bersetuju dengan jumlah yang diputuskan oleh hakim bicara. Sebaliknya Mahkamah perlu meneliti sama ada hakim bicara telah mempertimbangkan keterangan-keterangan saksi-saksi, laporan- laporan pakar dan keterangan-keterangan lain di samping meneliti panduan yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah berkenaan dengan kuantum gantirugi tersebut. Jika Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah meneliti kesemua perkara-perkara tersebut dalam memutuskan jumlah amaun yang sewajarnya Mahkamah ini berpendapat tiada alasan untuk Mahkamah ini mengganggu dapatan tersebut. Dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mempertimbangkan perkara-perkara tersebut sebelum menetapkan jumlah amaun gantirugi seperti yang diputuskan dalam kes ini. S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [32] Setelah menimbangkan semua itu Mahkamah memutuskan rayuan oleh Perayu adalah ditolak. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen terhadap kuantum dikekalkan dan kos RM5,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. Bertarikh: 26 hb. Januari 2024 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu/Defendan Koh Jun Wen Tetuan Gan Ho & Razlan Hadri Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden/Plaintif Balvinder Singh Tetuan Saleem Gill & Partners Bentong, Pahang Darul Makmur S/N 2em58sjKmkesobxjwwOUHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AA-42H-3-02/2022

PERAYU Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] RESPONDEN Naaresh A/l Thirunukarasoo

Undang-undang Jenayah – rompakan – tertuduh ditangkap semasa melarikan diri selepas meragut mangsa – sama ada pembelaan membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah dalam kes pendakwaan.Tatacara Jenayah – HukumanSama ada hukuman yang dijatuhkan memadai – sama ada kekerapan jenayah ragut, keseriusan kesalahan dan kepentingan awam di ambil kira oleh mahkamah perbicaraan.

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Bhupindar Singh A/L Gurcharan Singh Preet

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bf3e4dc6-621c-4a60-bd53-15077b0a1849&Inline=true

26/01/2024 15:09:52 AA-42H-3-02/2022 Kand. 38 S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N xk0vxxiYEq9UxUHewoYSQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1u\—a2H—3—u2/2u22 Kand. 38 25,0;/22:4 ,:-09 :2 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAVAH N ~AA-425-3-03/znzz ANTARA NAARESH AIL THIRUNUKARASOO PERAVU DAN FENDAKWA RAVA RESPONDEN DAN DALAM MAHKAMAH TINSGI MALAVA DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN. IIIMAYSIA RAVUAN JENAVAH N AA—42N 2I2n2z ANTARA PENDAKWA RAVA PERAVU um NAARESH AIL THIRUNUKARASOO RESFDNDEN PENGHAKIMAN Pemmmluan [1] Rayuan dalam kes N0 AA—42S—5—03/2022 mevupakan rayuan perayu Henuduh‘) lerhadap sabllan din hukuman manakma rayuan dalam kes AA42H—34.)Z/2022 Isiah rayuan Pendakwa Ray: Ierhadap hukuman Pada 1522022‘ selepas permcaraan, Hakim Mankamah Sesyen yang buaksana or-ems‘) telah measabllkan Ierluduh dan merualuhkzn hukuman pemeruaraan selama tlgz tahun bermma den we 2 2022 dan satu sebatan man Lam helakang kn [2] Pada 2a 9 ma, lanuduh lelah dnuduh dengan senrang lam IaI|u Knshnakumar all Sakaran (‘lerluduh kedua') dmgan pefluduhan sepem yang benkul Pelmm/nan Asa! 'Eahawakamupadnzl)/9Q016.jam)sbmI4uIangjaIn133Od1dep6nrumah llama! 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Frmstp rm man :1:/9/askan dalam bebslaaa kos Dalnm has Pendakwa Rm V Sularman hm Sardm /247m] v cu m, 12011713 MLJ 383 Suleiman Daud mm msruallskarv -[271 Sebelum msmmuskan rsu auu Isa-mu yang henzangkrl mm myuan VI! kalm msndapall palm unluk mengumngr bahawa mnmn le/an drpanggll Imtuk mambe/a mn solemn mahkamzh rm, dalam rayuan Iuntnhulu‘ mengstsptkan Ksputusan nakrm meals a. akmrko: psrldnkwuan ssnunumn dsngarv rm, harm mandapal: ma ,2 sm xkwmvzqmxumwavsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom! Kspefluan bag! kaml AIMHK Ilbanrmballgkl/V samula mlsll yang Iehll dlflllluskslll ohm mahkamah IN lerdshulll mengenm ISAHSII ynrvg le/ah dmungkflknrv m ml ks: pandshwszn. mm m is/dapal Ksterangarrkelerangan Dam my drbarlgkflksn aleh pmlk pemoolaarv yang oalarl msmmbulklrv keraguarr ml/nasaball K0 was kas pandnhwsnn ~ Ferkara yang same man almlam jvga dahm Ala: Muhd Aznn mm on. Mon v Pnndakwa Ray: [201V] 1 ms 1304, 124121 l ,/vu 459 mumlm pangmamn mus: Mohamed NMR (kellka lru; v32). sspemmana yang my nymun sebeatar mdl. panel Mahlvamah Rayuan Huh msmuluskun Davis 3 0105 me bahawa lcrdapal ks: puma /we lemma psliyu Mm Inerv/adl Innggungawab pemyu wlluk msnyanglul ks: pnndnkwaan ml swam, psrayll Dolelv drsabflkafl ms: ketersrvqan yrlma rm. levsebur seklrinyi pauyu gagul manrmbulkan ksraguan mullllsahah kn all: kg: pendakwaan - seglm ma da/am mmnmlmn M mm V PP /2014} 1 ms lllz, Izavsj 1 MU la, dlnurusknn 722; In me wurse ulme SUDWVSSWHS, m hudsvughl cfianllcalmn lmm reamed nounsslandlt was made c/earls U: ml what we wore urged In no will: In mm the daemon ollhs firs‘/V0115 panclollllfs mm». callmg upon me appellants to my on me» dalance 1231 WINS! [ho uppnilanls may, Wu... an appeal ls pursued Illrlhsr at Me Federal Court, argue me] me clwnomppsalma m cnlilng upon me appellanm ll: enter on ma» deienu, Wu‘ on Durpall were W m million to ruvrew ln. ml: dectsvnn oflhu mm; panel alme Cowl DI/lppeal nl. mml appeal, in HM] wrw, snallla malls DIV wnolhsv Ins dslancs had fbued .9 lmmols doubt on ma pluwwhun case 1} sm xk|7vmVEumxuH:wnVSO “Nair Sum! mmhnrwm be l... M mm .. mln.ll.y ml. dnuumnl VI mum puns! 125/ rn me mxlanl anpeal, smca all the sppvllanls ware called upon by me coma/Appaal lo orvleron lnslrdsllnce u musmscsssarvlymean Ina! Ihe com uVAppaal was sulufred mu ms pnzsscuoon nmpmea art live Angmdvsnls a/me mm, mo/wmg ms sosmene or common rntenborn before cannludmg that a plum um case naa been made out by Ina pmseculfnn man, was Ihemfms no necsssrfy for u: m rewsft me muss on whelher s pnma /am case had been made out What we need In consaoor was wnexnsr ma swdsmxs ivom ma cayenne ma cast a masanabla am: an me DIw9cIIIrorv’s cm [Vfl]Saln/1:: dengsn pnruly .1 ms harm mangsmml pendman osnm karm luiak gm msrmvma/vgkan ssmula rswsu yang eeran dmanykrlkm den dmuluskan an aklm kss pandukwaan clan Malvksmah Ruyuan zmanmu kscuan nu lardnpm‘ kslemrvgan ham yang amngman aleh pl/Ink panyu y.ng mm. memmbmkzn lmraguan yang nmnaman Xe alas kes pendakwaan Dengan nu, apa yang paint my aemmbangkzn adafialv same .943 ketaringan yang dtkunlukakan my pembelain mun beqnyn msmmbulkarv kslnguun yang munasabalv ks aras has psrvdnkwnan - [26] Semras dengan nas dx a(as, Mahkamah Im Deriu mempemmbangkan same sea Kelerangan yang dxkemukakan meh pembelaan (elah benaya memmhmkan Keriguan yang munasabah ke alas kes pendakwaan Versl pembelaan (enuduh ada\ah bevswfal penafuan semaoamaca dan lenuduh menaflkan yang ma lelah mengimbll beg \angan SP1 [27] Perkara yang penllng dan hams dnberl penekanan \aVaI1 da\am kes ml‘ spa man mellhal kqadmn (ersebul. mengejar dam menangkap xenudun SP3 dalam pemenksaan mama menyacakan 1. sm xkwmvzqluxumwavsu «mm. smm nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mn.u.y mm: dnuumnl y. mum my 4 sum Ielakr bslpskman baju memn darn barium keledar msralv sedang mongul ssouan hag lmgan kapwvyaan sawsng Demmnuan cm 5 Born kamu cam... Inga! Mgtknh uda A-euranq Ielakr lm1>I. Lu;u me/‘uh pskm my keledar mslah ssdarvg rmragu! hag langan pemmyusn Ema, Kama mgal ram yang maria sllu tunuduh VH7 Balsh, v sup. yang pukmbu/u menw saw Nearest: yang pakal hem msmh darn Dollop! kllpdnr marsh Maksud Naaresh yang anmnoeg psrimpuun an M v Ya. . Apl pm. purzmarv Knshnskumarsemsia ewak Isngok kqldurv nmgm benakw .: Duduk alas molostkalf Ink!/nkuk Semasa pemenlsaan hams SP3 (elah mengesihkan perkara W -5 . Saw msncadangknrv kamu sabsnamya man we: kcndran mamgul hanya mendengsnsnlan sahaja J max setuju say: lmal Ana yam: kamu Ma!’ 4 Say: lmal sum lelskr /I-mus Isiah mvraqul salu Deg klpunynun pmmnuan one 5 Dan srspmmh Valnkr‘ ynng kamu ksna/paxlr Inemgal perumpuan terschu." 4 Salu felakl Indus yang aria awn kundlrvg Iunudun bemsmn Naeresh M. Vwvrvuhmwu “ Sswaklu memben ketarangan dw peringkaf pembelaan, lerluduh |e\ah mengesahkan ketsrangan pendakwaan ‘am; 5 Sudnll mm Ma new molosrlal Kama Derdua nun pm, helmel unluk kasalamalarn aamn :5 sm xkI7vmVEumxuHmavsu «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. HIGH m M, .. nrimruflly mm: dnuumnl VI mum Mn J sum 5 Dan Krfshnukumsr pm. helmet mm mm, ksmu pakar no/mot kalermemh. new .1 Sam! s Mucam yang EIILVK Naarssh cent: (am my ks/oaer yang drnampa: clan Ermk Naarasn ndnla/'1 herwsma marsh. mm 4 asm 2 halmcl yang dvrampas arsn pays, Emnk Nasrssn wamn nmn, Enmk Kn:/ma wama my mum J Balm 5 Sam Enmk Nauush yang berwamz marsh, berm J Eatul - [25] Anna! jslas lenuduh telah mengakul bahiwa semasa kepdxan ma memakal ham dan (op: ke\edav belwama mevah Kelerangan (enuduh selaras dengan keterangan SP3 yang melmax lermduh memkukan perbualan rngm dengan herpakavan baju merah dzn mp. keledar merah Bap: dan lop! ke\edar lenuduh lelah cmampas smelah lemmuh anangkap dan mcamxan oleh SP3 ldenllh lenuduh lelih d\kena\ pzsm dsngan lepa\ sebagal orang yang meragul beg eangan SP1 Pembexaan |erluduh lldak merumbulkan apa—apa Keriguan yang munasabah dalam kas pendakwaan [291 Vsu uauang Kes yang dlkemukakan oleh peguam bela Ierluduh max menjejaskan kes pendakwaan kerana terluduh telah amnax me\akukan 15 sm xkmmvzqwxumwavsu mm. smnw nmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m yam .. mn.ny mm: dnuumnl y.. mum pom! kesalahan yang mmauh dan umangkap asyurus selspas nu Ana yang panung walah lerdapal kelerangan yang menoukupx bag: mensihwkan lenuduh melampaul keraguan yang rmmasabah Bag! suam kssalahan rompakan‘ walaupun barang kes max dmemun, avang yang dlluduh masm man maamkan uka e\emen kesalahan mmpakan amukuxan memmpaul keraguan yang munasabah. [30] Damn Turumacanan an Teaguajan and Anor y. Public Pronculor, Mahknrnan Rayuan dalam Rayuan Jenayah Na: 5.0901)» 154414/2:222 a. B»4'l9(H)»159-04/2022 neuan memuluskan 727/ rn aw mm, the namdtscovery ana m1n—pmdu:!»on a( ma vobbsd Item is no: men undzrsecuan 395 o7Psmzl Code ummazary, u does na: change the (ac! NvatSF1 was ruobad ayma appeuanos Tms gmundloo lid: :25) rn Gunalarv Rnmacnandmn a 17:5 y PP[2004] 4 cu 551, Abdu/Hamvd Mnhamud./@155 he man was; Ivoldthar " as far «:1 am aware mere rs na law ma! ma axhfbfl reooversd must :2. mama m cow! and yv M1 ma pm.Iecu!Ian‘5 case must necessunry van n may or r: may nol, aaan aapanmng an me has and me mmumsllncns mam can Evan m a munkr lnal, ma dead body vs no! pmducedm aaan rn sannyang y Puhlrc Pmsecu!ar[1965] 2 ML./ 1F5{FC)me bodyolme w:1rm was nal evzn rec-ovsmd yet ma accused was canvmted o/nmnur Whal me pmsecmmn has m pm. .5 ma: . paflmu/al persan had men and me aawaeu naa caused Ins death The dezllv an». vvclrm rs nul amysa ay making at ms remams .n mun am by swaorvca DI witnesses‘ ma madncnl mpnfl, me tdenllly cam me P"°409'sphx andmon swarm ma dnagtra/Wokmg casa, ma drug may aa mt or aeslmyad subssquenl to ;: havmg been anarma by ma n sm xkmmvzqmxumwvsu “Nana s.n.‘ nmhnrwm a. a... m van; .. ananny mm: dnuumnl van mum perm chem/:1. men; may be a gap m Ihe chem a« the peopm lmopmg custody am sulmequenf to «I ha!/my been ans/yssdby ma charms! unm Ins aan av mat, but so am as more 15 no mum Ina! my my analysed by me chslvusl was ma same Ma ms! was rucavsrsd m we can and :1 vs m rsxpacl av that drug that the accused a mgaa, and there 1: a reasonable explanzlmn as 10 haw u was lost or destroyed or the reason Iorme gap, them rsno reason »1my!h:prn:ecuImn':cas9 shnufidlnfl - [:11 Bevballk kepada kes W, bavang kes P2‘ P3. P4 dan P5 ls\al1 mkemukakan darn mcamkan cleh saiswsaksx lermasuk sm Barang kes mga |e|ah dnmmkan oleh sm, sn=2 aan spa me\a|ux gambar umo, m1 1‘ ID12 dun lD23 Ie\ah mcamkan oleh pegawaw penywasat kes (SP5) Meskupun (eruapeu barang Res yang hflak mtandakan sebagal eksmblt‘ Va mak menmaskan kes pendakwaan kerana «ana damn kes Im dengan Ierang Ielah membuknkan lerluduh Iebah mdakukan mmpakan lersebul Tenuduh felah dmhat melakukan kesahhan kalsebul dan dnangkap u\eh SP3 semasa melankan dun [32] Mahkamah W menaapan bahawa HMS udak lerkhllaldan segx lakta mahupun undang-undang apabua mendapatl «emmm bersalah bag: penuduhan plndaan yang an-mm max Ierdapat apa—apa salah Iaksana keauuan alau kegagalan perauuan dmarn kes Im HMS (E|aIV menflaw dengan (elm pembelaan yang mkemuxakan dan Ielah membual kepulusin yang betul Iaum pembexaan gaga\ memmbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah da\am kes pendakwaan flan pendakwaan u sm xkwmvzqwxummvsu “Nana Snr1n\nnuhnrw\HI>e med .a van; a. nnmnauuy MIMI dnuumnl VII mum perm xeran beljaya membukllkan kes melampaul keraguan yang munasabah Eerasaskan a\asan—a\asan an alas‘ rayuan mmmun 1emauap sabllan d\|o\aK Rayuzn Hukuman (Rayuan Janlylh No: AA42H.a—n2rzo22) [33] Du penngkal rayuan mengenaw hukuman‘ pvinslp undang-undang ada\ah manlap bahawa Mahkamah hanya akan mengganggu hukuman mankaman perblcaraan sexwanya hukuman yang dua|uhkan mevupakan nukuman yang temyata beneuman atau uermu nngan atau menyanarn undang-undang Keadaan lam yang membenarkan campur (angan Mankaman msngenal sesuatu hukuman ada\ah apabfla |erdapa| keknuacan uleh mankaman permcaraan lenlang undang-undarvg alau penumn pIInsIp—pr|ns|p hukuman darn hukuman yang duahmkan adalah max sesuar dengan Vakta dan na< Keadaan yang Ielah dxbuklxkan (hha1 Public Pmsmnor y. Mohamed Not 5 Or: [1995] 2 MLJ zan, Ehandulananfll Jaynlilake v. Public Pmacucor [1992] I ML] 33; [1931] 1 LN5 139 dan Public Prosecutor v. Loo Chaon Fn1(197s] 1 LNs1a2;[19ss]2 ML! 255; [34] Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes FF Iwn Moran Chekwnhe Chukwudi (2017) 1 LNS 554 (elah mengganskan beberspa laklor yang perm mpemmbangkan oxen mahkamah ssbemm memaluhkan hukuman bagw sesuam Kssmahan “[51 n 5 wen Isubllshad that liver: am . number or facturs znex cow‘: lake rum carmderation before eenoencmg some allmm am as In/lows {5} the grawly or seventy of me 7301; consmultng me onence, m; we wnumstances In wen u ms aamnnned. 4:) me rampanry nlsuch allerms m 1». men‘ [U] ma mnaersprevnm mcom, (9)019 ollsndefs mnmbulmn and suppofl to In: rsrnuy members (/7 me onenam means, 49; me emu oi convmwolv and sentence on M5100 opnan-"vim, /m ms eye and mm- oune accused, n; whalharn 1.1 me am aflence U; wlvsmir me socusarlhad eoopomrea mm me peace sue: me comrmssmn oftha ollsncs, M wnemar me accused neameeaeaguury. {u status Dime accused {ml wnomsrlhva was vmence aunng me crlma, 4n; pub/M: mmesl, etc - [351 HMS semasa menjelaskan hukuman yang duamhkan lerhadap uenumm, dslam alasan penghaklmannya, sekadar menyarakan -5 14 Mahkamah men ms/uatuhkan Ivukmnan p.n,s.e 3 laflun aan salu seamen mlarv borflaurkan prmsAu~pnrmp purlghukumun Ivlemarvdungkan Velmdu/1 msrupakm pssalah porlamu, men me am pemah gsyfi/ msrvglvamn nlankamsh Mahkamalv juga mengumm/kw laklorbahau man lambs! dalsm ssbarang msodun pneym sew. din has my 5 vs Mulvkamah /uga msngambvfklri mar pandemlk mass mu dan msmumskan hukumsn pervjara dun sebalan ruler! temodsy Tsmmun adalah add dun saksams - [as] Manxaman W mendapall bahawa HMS udak mempemmbangkan kesevlusan kesawanan, kepenlmgan awam dzn trend hukuman bagx Kesmahan rompakan da\am merualuhkan hukuman Dalam kes Mom! 20 sm xkmmvzqwxumwavsu «mm. sen» nmhnrwm .. med M mm .. nrighvnflly mm: dnuumnl VI mum pom! lenuduh kedua, mereka (elah faham perluduhan pmdaan dan mamohon agar kes mmcaraxan Penuauhan plndaan (ersebm berbunyn pmug Ivy! Pfndaun 'Bahawn kamu hsIsama—samI plda zomms, M mum kw-ulvg 13:7 yslang m Ivadapan mm ntamnl Nu m Lsbulv Taman Panama, mm Panama rpm, 4. am» Daemh Kmlz‘ av dalam Negsn Perak om Rrdzusn, man melakukan rumpakan banumupu/an 4.m.a.p An May Q Cheong Lee Yuan (No KP 440722-11-5132; aangun mengamml samlan beg Iangarv‘ mm msmandll, kadAYMdarv wIIvgIu0srRM1P6dan semnsn mmpakan lulsubul knmu bersamzrsama awgsrv saws]: menyababkan mm kepada Ah May @ Chsarvg Lao Yum om yang uemrmn Kamu Isiah melakukan mm komlnhan yang pom ovhukum .1; bawalv xsksyerv 394 Kamm Kasaluaan‘ [4] D1 akhir kes pendakwaan, HMS (e\ah memumskan bahawa pmak pendakwaan Ie\ah gaga\ membukllkin sua\u Kes prime lame bag: penuauhan plndaan dan kedua—t1ua tenuduh le\ah dlbebaskan dan dflepaskan Pmax pendakwaan |elah memlillkan vayuan lsmadap kepmusan HMS dan paaa 5 10 2019, rayuan bendakwaan telah auolax ms»: Mahkamah Tmggl Selevusnya. pmak pendakwaan lelah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan [51 Semasa :1. Mahkamah Ray-‘an, rayuan Pendakwa Raya lsrhadap Ienuduh kedua lelah dlbatalkan kerana nous perbmaraan rayuan twdak dapal dwserahkan Kepada |emmuh kedua Oleh mu rayuan an Mahkamah Rayuan hanya dnleruskan (emadap lenuauh sshaja Mahkzmah Rayuan : sm xkmmvzqwxumwavsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom! Rldwan Mohd Vumlv. PP [2n14]1 LNS194n,Mahkamah Rayuan Ie\ah meruelaskan 711/ w .7. In this .p....: dolling with . snatch Mlk nlhnce arm. m. .mpmy altnls fypv nrorv-nu cnnlmuu unzbated. m victim: oltnalcn mm rncrdultt mm: . lrumondms amount onnum. n (Om Mm 0! m. p..,..n.:m with mm. cflmm-I .-mm. Some mm grlvlphyltrll lndumorlanzlstruu. somm. wan mm. m Coun: when asxessmg an zppmpnale mum (0 be meled mus! mun mmd ms modus operand! of ma wvongdoerm cmnmrtlmg ms sort 0! ullznces Mos! akun llvarv rial, the modu: apslandl m march mere mm; m cnme and curllvmg For mabsnoe deadly wsapons of vfalence are um willy ms Wen] m lhrsats/1 and lo mam /ear upon the vmhm The 1/aumaltc mm M! on the mm, m. wny m. wcnm: am Ihmalsmad wrllv mum rllhey an not do .5 mslructed, are «mm mm wsvgh nsavrry agams! mmy m the sentencmg oi such mum V1/E are of In: cansrdsled View mat the sentencsspsssedsllouldaervu the Iulluwmg Lwupwposss Frrsfly, rrshauld my punish (Iv: accused for {he grave 0/mvw Ihat ». mm mmmrfled and secondly, m the mass: :2! the publrc, ,4 should m as . wmmg and darelrence 2.: MI pofunlulalhndux [121 w. would lika 1.: nmlnd mu court‘ boluw to bk-judiclll mm or an trmrluing numhtrnicnmcs all My (:1 match men as ewdsnl mm: news cum oflencas Dung mnslnntly reparledm the med»: Cauns must be mcapm and Prearlhe rm cry Vouusltos mm m. snclebytn match melt new .5 in (In: case. and mspam by rmposfngl . pmyer sentence The rmuasmon nlzn appmprvalu pumxllmenl vs the manneurv which m. Conn: resound :9 Inc snugly‘: cull lar /uslm agsnml mm cnmmnls ma . demand: mu: m. Court: should Irnpnu punuhmlnk mm-.., me ermla :0 mm in mums in: public’: Ibhwnrvcc 12! such crime. Evory punishment lmpornd rt huund (:1 nm n. urhcl nol only on we Accused nlone, but also an m. aaciuty u . whore. u rs the duty or (he Courts to 595 mu nnpmnnale sentence /5 rmoossdrsgaru Dung mm In my commrssmn DI the cmns and us Impact on Ills meta! me, 1:... Guru 11 sm xkmunvzqwxumnovsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! sasmm, Q Eenne Seklana vs Sm: alkamalaku, 12012; a soc m 2012 /nuraw so 252) Ipennkanam drrambalvl my man dapal dlnallkan kesalahan kes ragul kerap beflaku den ,nnnannya ssmakm memngkal sellap nan Lazlmnya warga amas dan wanna duadwkan sasaran Ksrana meraka lldak berupaya banawan mu memperlahankan dm danpada serangan peugm Benla kecederaan yang dmaml oxen mangsa kes ragul sudah meruam Vumrah dw laman akhbar |empatan Damn kes W mangsa IaI|u SP1 berumur 71 (ahun semasa kejadlan dan aknhal perbualan lelluduh, SP1 nuangaxaynu ksoederaan pavah wawtu keretakan pads vertebra L2 Semeshnya mangsa mengaxann Kesakflan teruk aklhat kere|akan unang belakang dan lrauma danpada ke,aman nu Cfleh nu, nukuman yang dusluhkan nenaaklan sellmpal dengan Kesalahan yang gnakuxan uleh tenuduh kerana kesalahan vagul mempakan kesamvan yang senus [351 Kepennngan awam menghendakx seorang pesa\ah kes ragm dlkenzkan hukuman pemenjalaan yang ssnmpal dan apaona dlperlukan dualuhkan hukuman yang Iemn lama agar kesmamalan arang swam nenannn Mahkamah mempunyal tanggungjawab unluk mehndungu orang awam danpada Kasalahan ragut yang semakln henemasa Ovang awam (emlamanya warga emas dan wanna mempunyal hak unmk bergerak 11 am xkm/x.uVEuB1JxUHIvmVSD mm. snnnw ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m yam .. nrighvnflly mm: dun-mm y.. mum pans! bebas G1 CENIDEII awam I’-VVD3 DBVVIA nsau akan kesebamatan mereka O\eh sebab nu, seslapa yang melikukin kesmahan ragut yang menggugat keselamatan awam mesh auaumxan hukuman yang sew/a1amya [39] Da\am kes Mom Ridwan Mohd Vuaof (supra) Mahkamah Rayuan juga lelah memwk (rend hukuman bag: kesalahan ragul apama mengekalkan hukuman Mahkamah Tmggl mm 10 lahun pemenwaan dan 5 sebalan man yang msngeleplkin hukuman Mahkamah Sesyen‘ pemeniaraan se\ama uga tahun aan lankh (angkap ~ The Vsamsd Dem/ly r-um Fmsvculur was ngllt m M momma: mu MI crmnct mlpolul lylinsl mu Apptllnmwu out ouup mm m. frindolllnllncing inwandby this own which w. wnuld name! an Caurt: below lo Inflow We would Ilko tom/aria me in/rwlnq cases 4:; Rapsrgumrv J/Ilxlanasegedam V PF(N4792J—u1r2o14), the cm o(Appeula/1 21Augusl2D14 had ssnlormd me gncused m mm Mrs rmgnsanmenl rm a charm unacrlha! can m which the accusedamihrs fnsnd mm mm a km]: rm nopaed the wclrm at me mama and robbed ms ma yhone and money nu Yuhaman am Abdu/ wmb (P-as-174-17740131, me Conn‘ cl Apusa/ on 17 Ayn! 2471: had smrmsdlhe decman aims Hrgll cm lhal Me Lqrm or em: gals rmmsonmen! su/hood var m. use In max case In: mm was me amussrfslmynboun :Igud60,whvchlIIesccusedIvax1 come from me back or m. vrctvm and snatched ms worm gem neck/ace nu; Mend Fsrzal Em mam warm v pp 4a.a9¢5;.25s.os/zmzy, lhe cm aIApuea/ an s FeDruaIy2l71A hsrlamrmedlhe decrsron aims um cmm rival Hzdmcraased lne rmviaonmenl terms «mm We 10 051515»: 2; sm xkmmvzqwxumwavsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum pom! A Iherwfmh o(wn .!nI/on-rmsemeacvusedhad svrzed a bag oamamlng mobvle uhone men was camod by Ina vmhm rm vtclm mixed and managed lo mm ms accused rm mm bag was mm on the aucusufl nlatumyds av) wnsmmsa Amer hm Yaakab 1/ PF (VI/—a9-m.u4/2m), me counomwearon v January 2l71l.Iva:1amIvmd!)ve decvslan allne Hm Court llml sunk tho accusvd :9 mm M gn mar: wvlh lnrse stroke: 0/ wmgmg ms Incl: showed that me worm is Aady} wan Irv sun mu armed al name, and smsmy me mum ma mm to slash ma vicflm usmv n ‘DIrIIIP97"bur no mlunls wan rvponsu M PP V Nlk Mohamad K/ulru! mu mm rH7Nm7—12rza12L the com ulApp9a/on 28/Iugusl 2m Ivadsstasrdslhe domsnun a/me Nfgh cm and rvfrlstutsd me docvsnon or the Sassrons Cour! mm the accused be sent In gm... [or seven Ms wvm (Ive make: 9! wflmm In (N: case, the accused had snatched ms nerghboufs rrecklaco The mm, was was 57 Vials or agu was news huvsshold mm when M: mcrdenl napnenaa azsnsmsnsn dvtamballl [40] TPR yang mengendallkan Iayuan Im wga teaah mengemukakan trend hukuman bagx kesalahan vornpak sepem yang benkul an Nukunun 4 Muhammad um ‘. Feuyurrwnilkuslllh uluxnm V. w Denudunan an bauah ‘ nnyansmxx Izomums-as \. Hnkxmidihkimahsntyan marualuhkan mm... s cm... vim-n 4... 2 us...» wayum Pmyu ke am nbizn flan mm..." mum men Mlhkrvuh mw 2» sm xk|7vm‘(EL1WxuH:waVSO «mm. smm nmhnrwm s. U... us my s. nflmnnflly -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! 2 1p.,..¢.u... Run . x.yu.m.mm.1 5 ‘ Iluhnmmnd 2». mm." Em Mlrzulu nmman dun ammum a. u.<.»m..» Tmgql om» s-men :94 xx mambonavkan rayuan [mm Mun :51 deunm hukumxn 5 Karma mx...m pen]!!! yang mm. mum umaaav Raxvnmgn dmlnrnnvkuu k: x mm uruuon a un baun 3 wmm... . »z:..mn..\.n.....,..... a.yym..mm..... am... Rouly pnnudnlunm bawah hukumnn :eksy:»394KK Mahk:mmYIm7S1I Ilrusluusu . HakxmM2nk2mahS yun membenmmnrawnn menllluhklnhukununfi Nukumulplnmayanq um Dewar: mk.n.y.....n..m mm." d\D=Ni"9k:n ke m.m...,.;u..s..n ......... . y........y.» . s...ym.....“....... Rnyuarwolei-«Petey-A m.mm,....h memnlmnmltuman Iznmmms §.y..nm< mg...m . .«.mM...y.....ns..yen Mm..y.m.my man,-luhknn hukunun m memuluskun nukumln to {alum venlv-I um ‘H2 mum Dlnliu dlkukalkan W." a...;..mm...... a.x...m...u.p.u.s uh..." 5 pp u......um.. . .m.m.,.y.......u....i... Flyuanolehtfikkearzs I-m-ll p...m..m.:..y..n myu.m mm" 3» xx Mzhkamzn nrw |1n1Il1Lus12!5 . nammmzmumansesyen nvembennvkmfiayunndun muuiluhksn mmumin WI mganukzn derugan nukumxn pun:-n . .m mm an Inn: -mun [41] Trend hukuman dw alas yang dvkemukakan oleh TPR kebanyakannya \a\ah bag‘ kes lerludxm mengaku bersalah laaapi dakam kes W perbmaraan pemm te\ah dualankan Hukuman yang dualunkan oleh HMS pugs adalah ‘sun lebm vendah danpada trend hukuman yang dlnyalakan dalam Res Molld Ridwnn Mom: vuml (supra) Mahkamah Inn 2 sm xklrm-NEuIuxu>4mavsu 5 “Nair smm mmhnrwm .. HIGH w my .. mmmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum W mendapall hukuman yang dualuhkan men HMS hdak memadaw dan |er\alu nngan sena «max menggambarkan kesenusan kesalanan yang dllakukan oxen (ertuduh [42] Berdasarkan kepada a\asan—a\asan dan prlnsvp urmangmmang yang dmya\akan dw a|as dan seIe\ah mengamnu klra segala ha! Keadaan dalam kes ml‘ Mahkamah WU mengelspwkan hukuman pemeniaraan se\ama uga |ahun nan sam sebalan‘ flan menggannxannya dengan hukuman pemeruaraan selama Vapan tahlm belmma dam 7 <2 2023 dan empsl sezman mm Hukuman um beraas dalim halasan hukuman kes— kes lsrdahulu aan la mga menoermmkan trend hukuman semasa yang pads pengama|an saya adalah wager, berpatutan sens seumpax dengan kesalahan Ierluduh Benankh 26 Januan 2024 (Bl-OUPINDAR s GI-{A/L GURCNAR H PREET] Ham Mahkamah Tmggu Ma\aya ‘pa?! 1 / m xkm/xnviuiuxunuvmvsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Pmak—Pmak Bagx Pendakwaan Khaznn Ham: um Khahl, T\mba\an Fendakwa Raya Negen Ferak Bagx pmak Tenuduh Nathan Knshnan bersnma Dayang Nor Emma Teluan Nam, Guns 8. Farmers 17 m xkmunvzqwxumnovsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! telah memumskan banawa suam kes pnma lame Celah benaya dikemukakan nleh pmak pendakwaan dam memenntahkan supaya Iertuduh dipanggn untuk membela dm lsmadap perluduhan pmdaan lersebut Kemudlannya‘ kes Aelan dulelapkan semula dw Mahkamah Sesyen unluk lenuduh membela dm [6] Fada 1522022, ssmah msndangar pembelaan Ierluduh, HMS [shah memumskan bahawa pembelaan Isiah gagal memmbmkan keraguan yang munasabah dalam kes penaakman dan pmak pendakwaan |e|ah membukllkan kes melampam keraguan yang munasabah Oleh VIII‘ tertuduh telah dxsabllkan dan dljallmkan hukuman nagx penuduhan pmdaan Tenuduh dan pmak pendakwaan masIng- masmg le\ah memlaflkan rayuan sepem yang xercam an perenggan Deflama Rmnkasln lnkla kes m Fads 209 2015 pm lehxh Kurang 1 so Iengah han, mangsa (sun man balnk danpada memnemuelah clan ma kemav dan kenderaan yang mpandu suammya (SP2) unluk membukz pmm pagar rurnahnya Tuba’ [ma dalang terluduh menalak plnlu kerelanya dan merampas beg langin SP1 yang dllalakkan an bahaglan Ielak kikw dx hadapan lempa| duduk penumpang sm menjem darn Cuba merampas bank beg zangannya, lalu m xkmunvzqwxumnovsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! benaku pergelulan antala SP1 den lerluduh yang menyebabkan SP1 tenaluh [5] Selepas tsnatuh SP1 «max dapal bangun sendnn dan lerduduk dw smu SP1 lelah mehhal (enuduh Van bersama Ierluduh kedua dengan menggunakan mukzswkal Pada masa yang sama. SP1 nampak dua orang anggota pans yang berada m kawasan nu mengejar molosxkal berkenaan [9] Menurul SP1‘ beg tangannya rnengandungw dumpet mm (exsmbn P2), kad pengenawannya (eksmblt P3), kad ATM mihk SF1 (eksmmc P4), Vesen memandunyi (ekshlbn P5) dan wang tuna! Kmerangan SP1 dlsokong meh SP2 yang lurul melmat kefidlan lersebm SP2 uaak sempal mengew moIL)sxka\ berkenaan letapv lelah mehhzl dua orang anggola polls mengemr moIos\ka\ nu smepas kejadmn ragut tersebul [m] Koperal Kamanduan um Kassum Baba (SP3) dan Lans Knperal Bohby Pawns pada masa kejadwan sedang membual Iugas wndaan peneegaharv jenayah a. temper! kejadlan SP3 telah menyiksxkan bagalmana kejadwan ragut (erhadap SP1 benaku danpada ;arak Iebm kuvang A2 kaku SP3 dun Lans Kapera\ Bobby Paulus lelah menge]ar kedua-dua Kerluduh flan benaya menangkap mereka m hadapan Church m xkmunvzqwxumnovsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! cl Tnaveetmn Kudaram Beg tangan yang dvagul aleh terluduh lelah benaya dllampas kembah [11] Dr Mnk Chung {spay \a\ah duklnr pakar pevundlng Onopedlk dan Hospwtm Falumah lpch yang merawat SP1 pada 2192015 dan Ie\ah menyedlakan laporan perubalin SP1 (eksmbn F15) Menurut eksmbil P15, sm mengalarm ‘compress/on Inmwe of 1.2 vertebra mm myslopamy’ Isu yang dihangkilkan dun dapmn Mahkamah [121 Isu perlama yang amangknkan oleh peguam Dela Kerluduh Ialah HMS Is\ah xemmai dan segw undang-undang dan lam apablla membenarkan pendakwaan mengemukakan perluduhan pmdaan me\aluI hum-an benulls pnhak pendakwaan dv akhlr kes pemheiaan dan penuduhan pmdaan tersebut «max mbacakan semu\a dan mterangkan kepada lenuduh Perkara mu hsnenlangan dengan seksyen 158 Kanun Talacara Jsnayah (‘KN’) [13] Asas hujahan In: berganlung kepada ma ke|evangan yang len:a(a| m muka suraI107 mngga ma Rekud Rayuan (‘RR’) ma 2 Oleh nu, amal penhng supaya no|a keterangan lersebul dwllhat dengan menu Nola kelerangan pada 16 2 2022 bevmma dengan m xkmunvzqwxumnovsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! ma» Kg: unIukksuu!usan.permgkaIakmruembthnrv‘ p.....~.mm Pa B9narFuan Man Adv punuduharv pmdaan ken yang dtksmukakan dulam submusron Kan we EenarPuan Man Tenma mm n=R o... Pusn, “mm dvbenarkan Puan Jrka mjuk kepada hu/shun psn<1akwun,pads muka sum! 2 palmduhan pmdaan Man ¢. Iakjslas ;- [14] talah mendengar rakaman CRT dan membaca nala kelerangan yang las \a\ah hahaglan perlama nma Kelerangan (ersehut Says mxemukakan HMS Ielah menanya "Ada penuuunan pmdaan kan ygg dfkemukakan dalam submrssran kan" Jwka anelm akan mdapall bahiwa penuduhan plndaan yang xemacax dalam hugahan benulls pendakwaan an akhlr kes pembelaan umac RR ma 4 ml: ea) merupakan pemmunan plndaan yang sama‘ yang «emn mxernukakan peas 7 \2 2016 (lmal RR ma 1 m/s 5) la juga merupakan penuduhan pmdazn yang sama yang Rem: dwbacakan dsn dnerangkan kepada keduardua Ienuaun sebelum permcarnan bermula pads 54 2017 mm RR ma 2 ms 1) Penuduhan plndaan lrll Ialah penuduhan pmdaan yang same semasa Mahkamah Rayuan meremltkan kes ke Mahkamah Sesyen unmk (enuduh mpanggn me-nbexa am Penu dllekankan bahawa Tlmbalan Fendakwa Ray: NPR‘) uaak mengemukakan spa-apa pefluduhan plndaan yang haharu m xkm/mvzqmxumnovsu mm. smm ...n.mn .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmny mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! \1a\am penghwahan berluhs pendakwaan an akhvr kes pembelaan din apa yang dukatakan oleh peguam bela Iertuduh adalah udak berasas [151 Nola keterangan selerusnya ada\ah sepem ylng benkut "TPR Man TFR mp. rm Marv rm? Mah Pun, mm that says tsrsrlap tun: Puan, bslsarrnamarru .rhL7u(d rm! be m the pevluduharv pmdum senem man: yurvg Mal naaa Dsrkataan Datum:-sums Porluduhan ;1md.nan7 Dalam psnurluhan pmdaan yang dmsrlkan sebelum mm mm. pelmgkal Bsndakwian Be!-samarsaml m min ma ' ssrsammama link ads Puany saya typo almrdalam IN ox, says an have mm kasm Fuan Mahkaman szfela/1 menslm ksssmui kslamngnn an den kslslangun keseluruhan ms, maka mama" on gags! mzntmculkan ksriguan mumssabah dslam kss rm wan yang demmsn, pmakpendakwaan I9/zhmambuklrkan ks: ms/ampam keraguan yang mnasanan mum oxrmapg. bsrsalgg gm rsabvlksn am; an hon a m am [15] Jelas danpada nota keterangan an alas‘ HMS menanyikan «emang penuduhan pmdaan din kemumannya menymakan bahawa "Balsami- sama lak ada Kan" dan TPR menjawab ‘Bersama-sama rak ads P:/an, says typo envr dalam lnl “ Sm men-iapam Cerdapil seam: kekellruan dmam perbualan anlara HMS flan TPR, yang cuba mmanlaaxkan oleh paguim bela terluduh Im ada\ah Kerana dalam perluduhan pmdaan yang dlkemukakan afau dllallkan sebemm W (paaa 7 12 2015; sememzngnya u sm xkDvmVEuB\JxUH:wnVSO mm. Snr1n\nuuhnrwH\I>e LAIQ4 w my .. mmmy mm: dnuumnl VII mum am.‘ lerdapal perkataan “bersama-same’ umac RR JIhd1 m/s 3 dan RR Jam 4 ml: 61) Fendakwaan dalam hujahan berluhs m akmr kes pembelaan telah merujuk kepafla pemmuhan pmdaan nu dan bukannya penuduhan asal Inn adzdah kerana pefluduhan asal lakah dipmda pada 7.12 we Danpada perbualan dw alas, Nada apa—apa penuduhan plndaan bahavu dlkemukakan kepada Mankamah dan Mahkamah pun lldsk menandakan sxau menenma apa—apa penuduhan pmdaam baharu [17] Apa yang dlkatakan OVEN HMS Ia¥ah ‘OK saya dah bass’ mm mevujuk kepada pefluduhan plndaan yang yam: ads Perkara ml dlsokong dengan dapalan bersmah den sahnan Ke alas (enuduh yang dlbuakoleh HMS berdasarkan pertuduhsn pmdaan sepem mmdun Dalam alasan penghakxman HMS ]uga menuuk aan menca|aIkan penuduhan plndaan yang sedla ad: (hha( RR Jmd 1 ms 17) Tambahan pula Nada sebarang perluduhan plndaan baharu dusenakan dalim Rekud Rayuan OVEN Ru, ada\ame\as hada penuduhan plndaan haham mkemukakan afau dwlenma oleh Mahkamah dan (enuduh telah dwbwcarakan dan didapah hersalah alas penuduhan plndaan sepem yang dlluduh Txiak Um!‘/U‘ Isu bihawa terdapal perluduhan pmdaan yang Valn alau bahnru Berdasarkan alasan an mas‘ Mahkamah mendapam nsu yang amangkwkan oleh pemnexaan uaak berment m xkmunvzqwxumnovsu mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m mm .. mmmy mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! [13] Vsu kedua yang dwbenlangkan uVeh psguam hem lenuduh .a|an nga pllman db bawah pelenggan 173(ha) KTJ Ildak dxbacakan dan \1I|erangkan kepada tenuduh men HMS, selepas Mahkamah Rayuan memanncanxan lerluduh membela am bag: perluduhan pmdaan Akwbal danpada kegagalan tersebut lerdapal kemudarauzn kepada lenuduh sena ksgagalan pevadflan (larlure alplslmaj yang meruidlkan perhlcarasn ml max sah dan sabman palm dlkeleplkan [191 Pewnlukkan perenggan 173(ha) KTJ aaaxan sepem yang benkul ‘VI/hen me Cour! calls upon ms accused 1.: enter on ms an/Mme unaar subparagrapn mm, 1». Own may read and expram :n. was aplrons to ma accuud winch m as (wows 4,; lo gws swam evrdsncw In the wttnsss mu, «u to gvvs unswom statement (mm me am or (M) to rsmam sum - [20] Berdasarkan muka sural so mngga 95 RR Jam 2 memarvg hdak mcatatkan an manarmana yang uga pmnan dw bawah perenggan wama) KTJ lelah dvbaca dan dnerangkan kepada Ienuduh sebelum (enuduh member: Keterangan DaVam kes ml‘ (ertuduh pada so 12 M21 telah member! kelerangan nsrsumpan dan mengemukakan pemyalaan berluhs yang dI|indakan sebagau ekshnbn D23 [21] Sebemm membual kepmusan bag: rayuan ml, says lemh mermma saunan rakaman CRT untuk manna: dan mendengar ape sebenarnya in m xkmmvzqmxummvsu mm. smm ...m.mn .. LAIQ4 m mm .. my.u.y mm: dun-mm y.. mum pans!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

S-05-185-05/2021

PERAYU 1. ) Liew Ket Boh 2. ) Kenny Liew Ket Weng RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Timbalan Pendakwa Raya (TPR), Jabatan Peguam Negara]

Forfeiture proceeding under AMLATFPUAA - Whether every transactions in a bank account must be specifically linked to unlawful activity - Whether section 112 statements can be considered by AMLATFPUAA investigating officer.

26/01/2024

YA Datuk Ravinthran a/l ParamaguruKorumYA Datuk Nor Bee Binti AriffinYA Datuk Ravinthran a/l ParamaguruYA Dato' Haji Ghazali bin Haji Cha

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=169be9de-65ab-4730-bc23-fd4bb028c6b3&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. S-05-185-05/2021 BETWEEN LIEW KET BOH … 1ST APPELLANT (NRIC NO. 870113-49-5417) KENNY LIEW KET WENG ... 2ND APPELLANT (NRIC NO. 871005-12-5229) AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT [In the Matter of High Court of Sabah and Sarawak at Kota Kinabalu Criminal Application No. BKI-44-20/12-2019 Between Public Prosecutor And 1. Centrowest Trading (Company No. 0000121700-T) 2. Sun Constructions (Company No. 00015503-T) 3. Liew Ket Boh (NRIC No. 870113-49-5417) 4. Kenny Liew Ket Weng (NRIC No. 871005-12-5229)] 26/01/2024 15:49:06 S-05-185-05/2021 Kand. 48 S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORAM: NOR BEE BINTI ARIFFIN, JCA RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU, JCA GHAZALI BIN HAJI CHA, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court that allowed the application of the Public Prosecutor to forfeit monies in bank accounts belonging to Liew Ket Boh, Kenny Liew Ket Weng (Kenny Liew) and two others, namely Centrowest Trading and Sun Construction. The application was made under section 56(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities (the AMLATFPUAA). Centrowest Trading and Sun Construction did not contest the application of the Public Prosecutor. Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew opposed the application. The High Court allowed the application of the Public Prosecutor. Now, Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew who were the third and fourth respondents in the High Court have appealed against the forfeiture order made against the monies in their seized bank accounts. Affidavit evidence of the Public Prosecutor [2] The brief background facts summarized from the grounds of decision of the learned High Court Judge and the affidavits filed by the Public Prosecutor are as follows. S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [3] One Ferdinand Fascol complained that he lost the money that he had invested in a scheme initiated by an entity known as Grow Asia Capital Ventures (Grow Asia). He was led to believe that Grow Asia was involved in the business of exporting durians to China. He deposited a sum of RM12,000 into a current account under the name of Carousell Capital. Initially, he received a “return” on his “investment” but subsequently the payments ceased and he was unable to recover his deposit. He lodged a police report stating that he was cheated. [4] The police officer appointed to investigate the police report was Sarjan Zairey Lee. He is the predicate offence investigating officer. He investigated the case under section 420 of the Penal Code. The Public Prosecutor did not charge anyone with a criminal offence at the conclusion of the investigation. Forfeiture proceedings were instituted instead. [5] Sarjan Zairey Lee filed a lengthy affidavit to support the forfeiture application. Sarjan Zairey Lee confirmed in his affidavit that Ferdinand Fascol deposited RM12,000 on 9.11.2018 into a numbered account with CIMB Bank Berhad under the name of Carousel Capital. Ferdinand was promised a daily return of RM720 for a period of 78 days for his investment of RM12,000. However, Ferdinand only received a total of RM3,6000 for the period 12.11.2018 to 15.11.2018. He did not receive the promised returns or the balance of his deposit. [6] Sarjan Zairey Lee also discovered that 29 other complainants had lodged similar police reports in respect of their supposed investments in Grow Asia. The said complainants’ police reports are exhibited in the affidavit of Sarjan Zairey Lee. The monies of these investors were deposited into the account of Carousel Capital and another account under S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 the name of Grow Asia with CIMB bank. Sarjan Zairey Lee discovered that the bank accounts of Carousel Capital and Grow Asia received deposits of various sums of money from “investors” during the second half of 2018. [7] Sarjan Zairey Lee also discovered that Grow Asia was issued with a business registration licence by the Dewan Bandaran Kota Kinabalu (DBKK). It was registered under the name of one Wilton Sikin (Wilton). The monies from these two accounts were subsequently transferred to the Ambank account of Centrowest Trading and the Hong Leong Bank account of Sun Construction. On the same day, i.e. 30.11.2018, the CIMB accounts of Carousel Capital and Grow Asia were closed. [8] The Centrowest Trading and Sun Construction trading licenses issued by DBKK were registered in the name of Muhammad Jazrul bin Abdul Aziz (Jazrul). In his section 112 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) statement, Wilton said that Jazrul wanted to use his name for the trading licence of Grow Asia and promised him a “commission”. The apparent reason for using Wilton’s name was to shield Jazrul’s employer from being accountable for tax liabilities related to a road project awarded to his company. Wilton further claimed he was not aware of any of the transactions in the bank accounts in question as they were managed by Jazrul, who even retained control of the ATM cards. Armed with this information, Sarjan Zairey Lee proceeded to investigate Jazrul. [9] In his section 112 CPC statement, Jazrul explained that towards the end of 2015, Liew Ket Boh offered him a job and tasked him with registering trading licences and opening bank accounts to avoid tax liability. Jazrul said he convinced two individuals, namely, Anirah and S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 Wilton to allow him to use their names for the said trading licenses and bank accounts. Wilton’s name was used for Grow Asia’s account whereas Anirah’s name was used for Carousel Capital’s name. However, Sarjan Zairey Lee was unable to locate Anirah during the investigation. [10] Jazrul said the registration of the trading licences was arranged by Mariana binti Amat Alan under the instructions of Liew Ket Boh. Jazrul admitted that the Ambank account of Centrowest Trading and the Hong Leong Bank account of Sun Construction were registered under his name. However, he said that all transactions on these accounts were controlled by Liew Ket Boh. Jazrul’s involvement was limited to instances when he visited the bank for cash withdrawals. On these occasions, the withdrawn cash was later handed over to Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew. Jazrul also admitted that he had requested Wilton to sign cheques for the purpose of withdrawing cash from Grow Asia’s account in CIMB Bank. The cash was subsequently handed over to Liew Ket Boh. [11] Sarjan Zairey Lee also obtained a section 112 CPC statement from Mariana, who had been working for Liew Ket Boh since 2016 with a monthly salary of RM1,200. She corroborated Jazrul’s claim that Liew Ket Boh instructed her to register a trading licence under his name and open a bank account as well. She was later instructed by Liew Ket Boh to transfer monies in accordance with a list of business entities and bank accounts. Nine other employees were given the same task. However, she was asked to cease performing that task in November of 2018. [12] Sarjan Zairey Lee continued his investigation by taking a section 112 CPC statement from Kenny Liew, the second appellant herein. Kenny Liew said that Liew Ket Boh, also known as Ryan, is his cousin. He denied S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 being involved in Grow Asia’s business or the investment scheme in question. However, he admitted to the following in his statement. In November of 2018, Liew Ket Boh requested him to collect cash in the sum of RM400,000 from Jazrul and deposit it into an account under his name with CIMB bank. Kenny Liew carried out the said task for Liew Ket Boh. [13] In his section 112 CPC statement, Liew Ket Boh denied any involvement in collecting deposits from investors under the Grow Asia scheme. He said that he was only running a construction business. He also denied being in control of the accounts of Grow Asia or Carousel Capital. [14] The prosecution also relied on the affidavit of ASP Nor Hazwani binti Jasman to support the forfeiture application. She was the officer who conducted the money laundering investigation under the AMLATFPUAA. She accessed and studied all relevant documents including the statements of the bank accounts of Carousell Capital and Grow Asia. [15] She found that between July of 2018 and December of 2018, monies were frequently deposited into these accounts. She also examined the transactions between these bank accounts and the bank accounts of Centrowest Trading and Sun Construction. The Ambank account of Centrowest Trading was only opened on 12.10.2018. However, soon after that, a total sum of RM8,162,532.82 was transferred from the CIMB account of Carousell Capital and credited to the Ambank account of Centrowest in a series of 45 transactions. Additionally, RM3,256,998.00 was transferred from the CIMB account of Grow Asia into the same Ambank account in a series of 18 transactions. S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [16] ASP Hazwani also meticulously examined the Hong Leong Bank account of Sun Construction in connection to the account of Carousell Capital. The account was only opened on 8.10.2018. However, RM3,456,359.00 was transferred from the account of Carousell Capital and credited to the account of Sun Construction in a series of 18 transactions. Only RM18,066.32 remained in the account of Carousell Capital. A sum of RM2,701,675.00 was also transferred from the bank account of Grow Asia and credited to the same account in a series of 11 transactions. Only RM22,210.50 remained in the account of Grow Asia. ASP Hazwani noted that most of the monies in the accounts of Centrowest and Sun Construction were withdrawn through cash transactions. [17] ASP Hazwani proceeded to investigate the bank accounts of Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew. The MBB Account 51014365497 of Liew Ket Boh was opened on 8.7.2015. She noted two transactions involving cash between 25.10.2018 and 1.11.2018. A cash sum of RM40,000.00 and RM240,000.00 was deposited into this account during the said period. The customer service officer of the MBB Karamunsing branch in Kota Kinabalu confirmed that Liew Ket Boh personally deposited RM240,000.000 in cash into the said account on 1.11.2018. The balance at the time of seizure of the account under section 50(1) of the AMLATFPUAA by the Public Prosecutor was RM134,217.11. [18] The CIMB bank Fixed Deposit Account 50044655333 of Liew Ket Boh was opened on 24.10.2018 which was during the period that the victims of the Grow Asia scheme were depositing monies into the bank accounts registered in the name of Wilton and Anirah. RM200,000.00 was transferred to this fixed deposit account on the same day from the CIMB Current Account 8009653108 of Liew Ket Boh. On 1.11.2018, S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 RM315,000.00 was transferred to the same fixed deposit account from the CIMB Current Account 2589 of Liew Ket Boh. The remaining balance in the CIMB bank Fixed Deposit Account 50044655333 when it was seized under section 50(1) of the AMLATFPUAA was RM515,000.00. [19] ASP Hazwani also investigated CIMB Current Accounts belonging to Liew Ket Boh from which monies were transferred to his CIMB bank fixed deposit account 50044655333. He discovered that a cash sum of RM420,000.00 was deposited over the counter into CIMB Current Account 80081222589 on 1.11.2018. The balance in that current account prior to the said huge cash injection was only RM1,818.58. As stated earlier, on the same day, a sum of RM315,000.00 was transferred from that current account to Fixed Deposit Account 50044655333 CIMB bank. At the date of the seizure of CIMB Current Account 80081222589, the remaining balance was RM106,804.24. [20] In respect of CIMB Current Account 8009653108, ASP Hazwani noted that it was opened on 24.10.2018 with an over the counter cash deposit of RM160,000.00. On the same date, RM91,000.00 was transferred into this account from CIMB Current Account 8602170656 which also belonged to Liew Ket Boh. A sum of RM200,000.00 was then transferred from CIMB Current Account 8009653108 to the CIMB Fixed Deposit Account 5333 of Liew Ket Boh. At the date of seizure, the balance in CIMB Current Account 8009653108 was RM51,068.09. The remaining balance in CIMB Current Account 8009653108 that was seized was RM80,311.10. [21] The explanation that Liew Ket Boh gave in his statement recorded under section 32 of the AMLATFPUAA for above mentioned deposits in S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 his bank accounts and the related cash transactions is that he received the said monies in his capacity as a broker for real estate purchasers from investors. However, he failed to refer to any specific sale and purchase transactions. [22] ASP Hazwani also investigated the personal bank accounts of Kenny Liew. It must be recalled that in his statement, Kenny Liew had only admitted to collecting a cash sum of RM400,000.00 from Jazrul and depositing it into Liew Ket Boh’s bank account. However, ASP Hazwani found movement of large sums of money between various bank accounts of Kenny Liew during the period the “investors” of the Grow Asia scheme were duped. [23] Kenny Liew had opened CIMB Current Account 8009657699 on 25.10.2018. A sum of RM329,147.00 was transferred to this account from his CIMB Savings Account 7061229385. Thereafter, RM150,000.00 each were transferred to his CIMB Fixed Deposit Account 5006962359 and CIMB Fixed Deposit Account 5800744150. The balance remaining in the above-mentioned accounts of Kenny Liew at the time of seizure under 50(1) of the AMLATFPUAA are as follows. In CIMB Fixed Deposit Accounts 5006962359 and 5800744150 there was RM150,000.00 each. In Current Account 8009657699 there was RM36,264.46 whereas in CIMB Savings Account 7061229385 there was RM57,195.26. Affidavit evidence of Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew [24] In his affidavit to oppose the forfeiture application, Liew Ket Boh denied any involvement in the Grow Asia investment scheme, as stated in his section 32 AMLATFPUAA statement. He said he has no link to S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Centrowest Trading and Sun Construction and that he is not the registered owner. He said that Jazrul had falsely accused him during police investigation to escape prosecution. He also denied giving instructions to Mariana to transfer funds to various accounts according to a list supplied by him. He said that Sarjan Zairey Lee acted in bad faith by linking him to the Grow Asia Scheme to cheat investors. He contended that the RM400,000 that was deposited into his bank account was his commission from a successful sale of a property. However, he did not exhibit any supporting documents. He said that monies that were seized also represented his earnings from positions he held in his family companies. He said that the AMLATFPUAA investigation officer, i.e. ASP Hazwani acted in bad faith during investigations. [25] Kenny Liew also denied being involved in the Grow Asia investment scheme. He had no interest in Centrowest Trading or Sun Construction. He said that the transactions in his accounts were for the purpose of his business and private matters. He said his family company by the name of All Master Express Sdn Bhd was involved in marketing the “Amelia” brand ice cream throughout Sabah. All the monies in his accounts that were seized were derived from legitimate business and are not derived from unlawful activity. Decision of High Court [26] The evidence collected by the predicate investigating officer (Sarjan Zairey Lee) in the form of statements recorded under section 112 of the CPC from all the complainants and from Wilton, Jazrul, Mariana, Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew was before the learned High Court Judge. An objection was taken to the section 112 CPC statements by their S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 counsel on the ground that it is not allowed by section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court case of Public Prosecutor v CPO Resources and Others [2019] 1 LNS 846 was cited in support. However, the learned High Court Judge noted that the prosecution also adduced a statement given by Sarjan Zairey Lee under section 32 of the AMLATFPUAA. The contents of the section 112 CPC statements of the witnesses that Sarjan Zairey Lee interviewed for the predicate offence were repeated in that statement. In addition, as we stated earlier Sarjan Zairey Lee also affirmed an affidavit in which he repeated the evidence he gathered in the section 112 CPC statements. [27] Based on the above evidence, the learned High Court Judge found as follows. The unsuspecting investors made numerous deposits into the bank accounts of two entities that held trading licences; Grow Asia and Carousell Capital. Grow Asia was registered under the name of Wilton. Subsequently, the monies were transferred to the bank accounts of Centrowest and Sun Construction that also held trading licences registered under the name of Jazrul. The monies of the depositors flowed into these two accounts. Jazrul said that the two accounts were actually controlled by Liew Ket Boh under whose instruction he acted. The learned High Court Judge also noted that Kenny Liew admitted collecting a sum of RM400,000.00 from Jazrul to be deposited into Liew Ket Boh’s bank account. The learned High Court Judge was satisfied that Sarjan Zairey Lee, the predicate offence investigating officer and ASP Hazwani, the AMLATFPUAA investigating officer had carried out a careful investigation. The learned High Court Judge made a finding on a balance of probabilities that the monies seized in the accounts of the appellants, Centrowest and Sun Construction are linked to an illegal investment scheme in which investors were cheated. S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [28] The learned High Court Judge also gave careful consideration to the explanations of Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew in their affidavits in reply. Liew Ket Boh said that the huge sums of money that were seized in his bank accounts represented his earnings and his real estate dealings. The learned High Court Judge rejected the explanation as no details were given to support the said assertion. He rejected a similar explanation from Kenny Liew as well for the same reason. [29] His Lordship directed himself that the prosecution need not prove that the appellants committed the predicate offence under section 420 of the Penal Code but only need to prove on a balance of probabilities that the assets sought to be forfeited are derived from unlawful activity. As there was a link between the monies that were seized in the accounts of Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew and the investment scheme and their explanation in respect of the source of the monies was not satisfactory, the learned High Court Judge found that the prosecution had proved on a balance of probabilities that the said monies are proceeds of unlawful activity. Consequently, application was allowed and all the monies in seized bank accounts were forfeited. Issues [30] Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew were represented by the same counsel. He raised the following commons issues on behalf of both: (1) That the Public Prosecutor failed to identify which transactions are in respect of the proceeds of the predicate offence; (2) That the Public Prosecutor had failed to prove that his clients committed or abetted or participated in the commission of the S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 predicate offence for two reasons. The first reason is that the court cannot rely on the section 32 AMLATFPUAA statement of Sarjan Zairey Lee. The second reason is that the High Court allegedly relied on the section 112 CPC statements which are hearsay and inadmissible evidence. Identification of monies or transactions [31] Counsel for appellants submitted that the respondent failed to prove that the monies seized were derived from unlawful activity, i.e. the predicate offence of cheating under section 420 of the Penal Code. He cited the following passage from the judgment of the High Court and criticised it on the ground that it was unclear which transactions in the bank accounts were linked to the predicate offence. The passage is as follows: As for statements by ASP Hazwani in her Affidavit which was relied by the applicant to support the application. It was obvious she has checked the details and the transaction of the monies in the account and concluded that the proceeds were from the predicate offence was deposited into various account that are the subject matter of the present application. [32] Counsel for the appellants then submitted that the respondent failed to demonstrate the money trail between the predicate offence and the bank accounts of the appellants. He also argued that the respondent must point out the “exact transactions” on the bank statements of the appellants that were derived from the proceeds of the predicate offence. [33] We shall now address the issue whether there is a duty on the part of the respondent to prove that the “exact transactions” on the bank S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 statements of the appellants were the “exact” amounts of monies derived from unlawful activity. [34] In the instant case, the predicate offence was cheating under section 420 of the Penal Code. The general public were lured into investing in a fraudulent investment scheme with the promise of high returns. While numerous investors participated in the scheme, only 29 of them filed police reports. From the evidence that we summarized earlier, the total sum of deposits made by the investors amounted to millions of ringgit as evidenced by the bank statements Grow Asia and Carousel Capital. [35] In a forfeiture application under section 56(1) of the AMLATFPUA, the central question is whether, on a balance of probabilities, the prosecution has proven that the balances in the bank accounts of the appellants are the proceeds of unlawful activity. We find that the Public Prosecutor had tendered cogent evidence to prove this fact. However, in our opinion, it is not necessary to link the monies deposited into the bank accounts of Grow Asia and Carousel Capital by investors to every single transaction in the bank accounts of the appellants. This is what counsel for the appellants suggested that should have been done by the Public Prosecutor. He argued that the Public Prosecutor failed to prove that the “exact transactions” on the bank accounts of the appellant were linked to the unlawful activity. [36] We find that the authority cited for the said proposition by counsel for the appellants, i.e. the Court of Appeal case of Public Prosecutor v Billion Nova & Ors [2016] 4 MLRA 226 is distinguishable on the facts. Furthermore, we are of the view that the said authority does not impose S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 an onerous duty on the Public Prosecutor to prove the direct relationship of every transaction in a bank account to the unlawful activity in question. [37] But before we consider the facts of the Billion Nova case and its applicability to the instant case, for the sake of context, we shall briefly discuss the forfeiture regime set out in the AMLATFPUAA in cases where no prosecution is instituted by the Public Prosecutor as is the situation in this case. Forfeiture scheme under the AMLATFPUAA [38] Under section 56(1) of the AMLATFPUAA, if there is no prosecution, the respondent can apply for forfeiture of immovable or movable properties on the ground that it had been obtained as a result of or in connection with an offence under subsection 4(1) of the AMLATFPUAA. Section 56 read as follows: (1) Subject to section 61, where in respect of any property frozen or seized under this Act there is no applicant or conviction for an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, the Public Prosecutor may, before the expiration of twelve months from the date of the freeze or seizure, apply to a judge of the High Court for an order of forfeiture of that property if he is satisfied that such property had been obtained as a result of or in connection with an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence, as the case may be, or is terrorist property. (2) The judge to whom an application is made under subsection (1) shall make an order for the forfeiture of the property if he is satisfied-- (a) that the property is the subject-matter of or was used in the commission of an offence under sub-section 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence or is terrorist property; and S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 (b) that there is no purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration in respect of the property. (3) Any property that has been seized and in respect of which no application is made under subsection (1) shall, at the expiration of twelve months from the date of its seizure, be released to the person from whom it was seized. (4) In determining whether or not the property has been obtained as a result of or in connection with an offence under subsection 4(1) or a terrorism financing offence or is terrorist property, the court shall apply the standard of proof required in civil proceedings. (emphasis ours) Section 4(1) (a) of the AMLATFPUAA, in part, reads as follows: Any person who: (a) engages in, or attempts to engage in; or (b) abets the commission of, money laundering, commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding RM5 million or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. [39] In section 3(1), "money laundering" means the act of a person who: (a) engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves proceeds of any unlawful activity; “Unlawful activity" is defined in section 3(1) as: “any activity which is related, directly or indirectly, to any serious offence or any foreign serious offence”. As for "serious offence", in the same definition section, it means- (a) any of the offences specified in the Second Schedule; S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 In the Second Schedule, the offence of cheating under section 420 of the Penal Code is included as a serious offence. [40] We must also point out that under section 56(1) of the AMLATFPUAA, it is plain that there is no requirement on the part of the respondent to obtain a conviction against the owner of the property or anyone else for a money laundering offence or terrorism offence in order to apply for forfeiture. A section 56(1) proceeding is against property and not any individual. It is for this reason that section 61 of the AMLATFPUAA contains a provision for bona fide third parties to come forward to stake their claim to the seized property. In the instant case, no third parties came forward. The appellants herein are owners of the seized bank accounts. [41] The burden to prove that the monies in the bank accounts of the appellants were derived from unlawful activity is on the Public Prosecutor as the applicant. However, the standard of proof is the civil standard, i.e. on a balance of probabilities as stated in section 56(4). Furthermore, section 70 says that any question of fact in proceedings under the AMLATFPUAA, apart from proceedings to prove an offence, shall be decided on a balance of probabilities. The Billion Nova case [42] We shall turn to the Billion Nova case that was heavily relied upon by counsel for the appellants to argue that the monies in the accounts were not exactly identified as the monies that were derived from the unlawful activity in question, i.e. the offence of cheating committed through the fraudulent Grow Asia investment scheme. S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [43] The facts of the Billion Nova case are significantly different. There was no individual victim of the predicate offence in that case. Thus, no victim gave a section 112 CPC statement. It was the public purse that was the alleged victim as the predicate offence that was investigated was customs duty evasion under section 135(g) of the Customs Act 1967. It is an offence listed in the Second Schedule of the AMLATFPUAA. [44] Billion Nova Sdn Bhd was based in the Federal Territory of Labuan which is a duty-free zone. It was allowed to sell duty-free cigarettes and liquor only in Labuan. The accusation against Billion Nova Sdn Bhd was that it sold dutiable items outside of Labuan, namely Miri and Kota Kinabalu without payment of export duty. However, the investigation was not based on evidence of smuggled goods on which customs duty was not paid. Goods on which duty were not paid were not seized from Billion Nova Sdn Bhd while in transit out of Labuan. The investigation was based on purely on documentary evidence. The evidence uncovered during the investigation was that 82 cash deposits were made into 24 bank accounts of Billion Nova Sdn Bhd in Labuan from Miri and Kota Kinabalu. The investigating officer could not find a corresponding book keeping entry evidencing sale of goods in relation to the 82 cash deposits in the standard ledger book of Billion Nova. The Court of Appeal held that even if the 82 deposits were stated as cash sales for cigarettes in the standard ledger, it would be insufficient to conclude that an offence under section 135(g) of the Customs Act 1967 had been committed without evidence of a sale transaction in both locations, in Miri and Kota Kinabalu. The Court of Appeal also observed that there was no evidence of transportation of the cigarettes to Miri and Kota Kinabalu and that nothing in the law prohibits payment to be made for goods purchased in Labuan from Miri or Kota Kinabalu. Thus, the case for the existence of the predicate offence wholly S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 hinged on the evidence that payments were made from outside a duty- free zone to a supplier who is based within a duty-free zone. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal found that this was not sufficient. [45] However, counsel for the appellants in the instant case cited the above-mentioned case to argue that the AMLATFPUAA investigating officer never pointed out the “exact transactions on the bank statements of the first appellant’s accounts allegedly derived from the proceeds of the predicate offence”. In support, he cited paragraph [30] of the judgment in the Billion Nova case which reads as follows: Thus, save for their mere averment in the affidavits on the 82 cash deposits amounting to RM2,675,090, the appellant failed to prove that the remaining cash deposits were actually in respect of the cash sales of duty free cigarettes. The entries in the Labuan account merely indicate payments from Miri and Kota Kinabalu. Standing on its own, these entries in the Labuan account, without proof of corresponding entries in the standard ledger book, do not show that the cash deposits were indeed in respect of the cash sales for cigarettes. We are in no position to identify which entries in these documentary exhibits are in respect of the 82 cash deposits stated in the second affidavit save for the 16 cash deposits earlier-mentioned. It would not be sufficient for the appellant to persuade the court to accept these sums with the argument urged on its behalf that we should draw a conclusion that these were cash deposits in respect of cash sales of duty free cigarettes outside Labuan when there was a serious and glaring omission on their part to show the court these relevant entries. In any event, even assuming that all the 82 cash deposits were stated as cash sales for cigarettes in the standard ledger book, this is still insufficient to prove that the cigarettes were sold in Miri and Kota Kinabalu in the absence of any evidence of such sale transactions in both locations. If there is no such evidence, then surely the appellant could not expect the court to hazard a guess that these sums were in fact the proceeds of the respondents’ unlawful activity for this in our view would tantamount to sheer speculation. (emphasis ours) S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [46] In our view, the above-mentioned passage does not support the argument canvassed by counsel for the appellants. As we said earlier, in the Billion Nova case, the entire case for the existence of the predicate offence was based on the 82 cash deposits made from outside of Labuan into the accounts of the company. There was no other evidence of the predicate offence. This is the reason that the Court of Appeal said that “mere averment in the affidavits on the 82 cash deposits” is not enough. For the same reason, the Court of Appeal also said that “standing on its own”, the entries in the bank accounts without proof of corresponding entries in the standard ledger book cannot show that the deposits were in respect of cash sales of cigarettes. Thus, no evidence of the predicate offence was presented. [47] However, in the instant case, there is evidence that a cheating offence had been committed. This is the predicate offence. Twenty-nine victims lodged police reports and gave section 112 CPC statements saying that they had been cheated in the Grow Asia investment scheme and that they had lost their investment. Whether they had been cheated or not is question of fact. Under section 70 of the AMLATFPUAA, such a question of fact can be decided on a balance of probabilities. The High Court decided that they had been cheated. It is immaterial that the appellants or other individuals were not convicted of the offence of cheating as that is not a pre-condition under section 56(1) of the AMLATFPUAA. [48] Similarly, as we said earlier, there is no requirement to obtain a conviction for a money laundering offence under section 4(1) of the AMLATFPUAA against any individual before instituting forfeiture proceedings. Under the broad definition of money laundering, any S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 engagement directly or indirectly with proceeds of unlawful activity would be sufficient. And for the purpose of forfeiture proceedings, the standard of proof is the civil standard namely, balance of probabilities. Thus, the flow of the victims’ monies into any bank account is sufficient to prove the existence of the offence of money laundering on a balance of probabilities even though no individual was charged or convicted. This fact was clearly proven by the Public Prosecutor as found by the High Court. [49] We are of the view that the argument of counsel for the appellants that all the “exact transactions” on the bank accounts must be linked to the unlawful activity is not envisaged in the AMLATFPUAA. [50] “Proceeds of unlawful activity” is defined in section 3(1) as any property, any economic advantage or economic gain from such property, within or outside Malaysia – (a) which is wholly or partly- (i) derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person from any unlawful activity; (ii) derived or obtained from a disposal or other dealings with the property referred to in subparagraph (i); or (iii) acquired using the property derived or obtained by any person through any disposal or other dealings referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii); or (b) which, wholly or partly, due to any circumstances such as its nature, value, location or place of discovery, or to the time, manner or place of its acquisition, or the person from whom it was acquired, or its proximity to other property referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), (ii) or (iii), can be S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 reasonably believed to be property falling within the scope of subparagraph (a)(i), (ii) or (iii); (emphasis ours) [51] A careful reading of paragraph (b) would support the proposition that any property found together with property derived from unlawful property as defined in paragraph (a) can also be “reasonably” considered as proceeds of unlawful property if certain conditions are present. [52] In the instant case, the Public Prosecutor has successfully established the offence of cheating based on the statements of the victims involved in the Grow Asia’s investment scheme. The appellants have also been implicated on the scheme for the following reason. The monies of the victim were deposited into accounts under the names of Wilton and Anirah, with Jazrul instructing the opening of these accounts. He retained the ATM cards for these accounts, withdrew cash using cheques and subsequently handed over the withdrawn cash to Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew. Jazrul was employed by Liew Ket Boh who also gave instructions to Mariana and other employees in his company about the transfer of monies. For this purpose, a list of business entities and bank accounts was given to his employees. Thus, the large sums of monies in the seized accounts of Liew Ket Boh and Kenny Liew are clearly, as found by the High Court on a balance of probabilities, linked to the predicate offence. [53] Since the seized properties in question are liquid assets, it becomes a formidable challenge for enforcement authorities to prove the direct correlation of every single cash deposit or transaction in a seized bank account with the unlawful activity. However, in our view, the broad definition of “proceeds of unlawful activity” should come to the aid of the Public Prosecutor. Drawing an analogy, if the property in question is an S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 immovable asset purchased using partly proceeds of unlawful activity and partly other legitimate funds, the entire property would be caught by the said broad definition. Any other interpretation would jeopardize the objective of the AMLATFPUAA, which is aimed at depriving serious crime offenders of their ill-gotten gains. [54] For the above reasons, we find no merit in the first issue raised on behalf of both appellants. Admissibility of section 112 CPC statements [55] The second issue argued by counsel for the appellant is that all the section 112 CPC statements, in particular the statement of Wilton and Jazrul, that was recorded by the predicate offence investigating officer cannot used in a section 56(1) application. This argument was accepted by the learned High Court Judge. However, His Lordship relied on the statement of the predicate offence investigating officer that was recorded under section 32 of the AMLATFPUAA. Counsel for the appellant submitted the section 32 AMLATFPUAA statement is based on information derived from the section 112 CPC statements of Wilton and Jazrul. Therefore, according to counsel, the section 32 statement of the predicate offence investigating officer that was recorded by the AMLATFPUAA investigating officer cannot be relied upon. It follows that there is no evidence of the involvement of the appellants in the Grow Asia scheme. [56] We shall first consider the argument that section 112 CPC statements cannot be used in a proceeding under section 56(1) of the S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 AMLATFPUAA. The argument is based on section 113 of the CPC. Section 113 reads as follows: (1) Except as provided in this section, no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of a police investigation made under this Chapter shall be used in evidence. (2) When any witness is called for the prosecution or for the defence, other than the accused, the court shall, on the request of the accused or the prosecutor, refer to any statement made by that witness to a police officer in the course of a police investigation under this Chapter and may then, if the court thinks fit in the interest of justice, direct the accused to be furnished with a copy of it and the statement may be used to impeach the credit of the witness in the manner provided by the Evidence Act 1950 [Act 56]. (3) Where the accused had made a statement during the course of a police investigation, such statement may be admitted in evidence in support of his defence during the course of the trial. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement made in the course of an identification parade or falling within section 27 or paragraphs 32(1)(a), (i) and (j) of the Evidence Act 1950. (5) When any person is charged with any offence in relation to- (a) the making; or (b) the contents, of any statement made by him to a police officer in the course of a police investigation made under this Chapter, that statement may be used as evidence in the prosecution's case. (emphasis ours) S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [57] On the other hand, the learned Deputy Prosecutor argued that the section 112 CPC statements are admissible under section 71 of the AMLATFPUAA. Section 71 reads as follows: Where the Public Prosecutor or any enforcement agency has obtained any document or other evidence in exercise of his powers under this Act or by virtue of this Act, such document or copy of the document or other evidence, as the case may be, shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings under this Act, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any written law. (emphasis ours) [58] The same issue arose in the High Court case of Public Prosecutor v CPO Resources and Others (supra). In that case, the learned High Court Judge disallowed the section 112 CPC statements. His Lordship’s reasons are found in the following passages of the judgment: [57] It is clear from a reading of section 113 that a statement taken under section 112 can be used to impeach the credibility of a witness other than an accused person. However, an accused himself may utilize his statement in support of his defence. [58] The intent of section 113 is thus obvious. To hold otherwise as contended by the Applicant would be to render admissible through the back door what has been prohibited through the front door. [59] Further, if the statement made the accused under section 112 of the CPC is allowed to be used under the AMLA, it would be manifestly unfair if such statement was made under threat, inducement or promise and thus involuntary as there does not exist any mechanism for determining the voluntariness or otherwise of the statement in the AMLA proceedings. [60] I therefore find that the phrase "evidence" in section 68(2) of AMLA does not include a statement taken under section 112 of the CPC. I also find that the phrase "under this Act or by virtue of this Act" in section 71 of AMLA is S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 confined to that Act alone i.e. AMLA and does not extend to cover the provisions of the CPC. [61] The Applicant therefore cannot rely upon the statements of the Respondents taken pursuant to section 112 of the CPC in order to prove the case. [59] The learned High Court Judge in the instant case followed the above-mentioned authority and did not consider the section 112 CPC statements. However, his Lordship considered the section 32 AMLATFPUAA statement and the affidavit of the predicate offence investigating officer in which he repeated the contents of the section 112 CPC statements that he recorded. [60] In our respectful view, the section 112 CPC statements of Jazrul, Wilton and Mariana can be used in a section 56 proceedings for the following reasons. The references in section 113 are all associated with a criminal trial such as “accused”, “witness”, “impeachment proceedings” and “identification parade”. Thus, a holistic reading of all the limbs of section 113 of the CPC points to the conclusion that a section 112 CPC statement is barred from being used by the prosecution in a criminal trial only. It bears repeating that a section 56(1) proceeding under the AMLATFPUAA is not a trial against any accused person. It is a quasi- criminal proceeding against proceeds derived from unlawful activity only. [61] Furthermore, section 71 of the AMLATFPUAA is drafted widely and contains the words “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any written law. It allows any “document” or “evidence” obtained by the Public Prosecutor or enforcement agency to be used in a section 56(1) proceeding. In the instant case, the AMLATFPUAA investigating officer S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 using her powers under the said Act, accessed all the relevant documents and evidence including that obtained by the predicate offence investigating officer as stated in her affidavit. The information collected by the predicate investigating officer through the section 112 CPC statements of Jazrul and Wilton were repeated in his section 32 AMLATFPUAA statement. In the premises, in our view, the information contained in the section 112 CPC statements recorded by the predicate offence investigating officer clearly fall within the ambit of section 71 of the AMLATFPUAA. [62] In addition, given that the AMLATFPUAA is a special law governing matters connected with the offence of money laundering and forfeiture proceedings, the general provision of section 113 of the CPC should yield to section 71 of the former. In any event, section 71 is only concerned with admissibility of documents and evidence. As to the weight to be attached to such documents and evidence, it entirely up to the first instance court to consider the credibility and reliability of them. Therefore, we find no error on the part of the learned High Court Judge when His Lordship considered the section 32 AMLATFPUAA statement and affidavit of the predicate offence investigating officer that repeated the contents of the impugned section 112 CPC statements. [63] We are also fortified in reaching this conclusion by the decision in the Federal Court case of Public Prosecutor v Awalluddin Sham Bokhari [2018] 1 CLJ 305. The Federal Court considered section 40 of the AMLATFPUAA which reads as follows: S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 40. Statement to be Admissible The record of an examination under paragraph 32(2)(a), any property, document or information produced under paragraph 32(2)(b) or any statement under paragraph 32(2)(c) shall, notwithstanding any written law or rule of law to the contrary, be admissible as evidence in any proceedings in any court for, or in relation to, an offence or any other matter under this Act or any offence under any other written law, regardless whether such proceedings are against the person who was examined, or who produced the property, document or information, or who made the written statement on oath or affirmation, or against any other person. [64] The Federal Court held that any statement of police officers under section 32(2) is not hearsay by virtue of section 40 as it was acquired in the course of investigation. The relevant passage is as follows: [33] Any property, record, report or document obtained by the investigation officer pursuant to s. 32(2) of the Act are, by virtue of s. 40 of the Act, admissible as evidence in any proceedings in any court for or in relation to an offence or any other matter under the Act or any offence under any other written law. The Court of Appeal was clearly in error in holding that para. 32 of the investigation officer’s affidavit was “purely hearsay”. It also erred in ruling that the learned trial judge committed an error in relying “on an affidavit which is not worth the paper it is written on”. What had been deposed by these two senior police officers in their affidavits, which were based on their personal knowledge acquired in the course of investigation under s. 32 of the Act, could not be said as purely hearsay. [65] For the same reasons, we are of the view that the information contained in the statement of the predicate offence investigating officer (Sarjan Zairey Lee) recorded under section 32(2) of the AMLATFPUAA by ASP Nor Hazwani that was considered by the High Court is not hearsay as argued by the counsel for the appellants. S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Conclusion [66] For all the above reasons, we find no merit in the two issues raised by counsel for the appellants. We also find that the learned High Court Judge finding that the balances in the seized bank accounts of the two appellants are proceeds of unlawful activity does not warrant appellate interference for reasons that we adverted to earlier. We shall therefore dismiss the appeals of both the first and second appellants. SGD (RAVINTHRAN PARAMAGURU) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Putrajaya Dated: 24th January 2024 Parties Appearing: For the Appellants: Goldam bin Hamid [Messrs Liau Kee Siong & Co] For the Respondent: Zaki Asyraf bin Zubir Deputy Public Prosecutor Attorney General’s Chamber S/N 3umbFqtlMEe8I/1LsCjGsw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-112-07/2023

PEMOHON GAMMERLITE SDN BHD RESPONDEN JAMBATAN KEDUA SDN BHD

there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant's favor; - there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision; - there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought in that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed; there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Hajah Aliza binti Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ebaa3690-9a54-4b69-8a78-0560ee06477f&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-87-05/2023 BETWEEN JAMBATAN KEDUA SDN BHD (Company No.: 824573-U) ... PLAINTIFF AND GAMMERLITE SDN BHD (Company No.: 180947-D) ... DEFENDANT (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-112-07/2023 BETWEEN GAMMERLITE SDN BHD (Company No.: 180947-D) ... PLAINTIFF AND JAMBATAN KEDUA SDN BHD (Company No.: 824573-U) ... DEFENDANT 26/01/2024 12:53:12 WA-24C-112-07/2023 Kand. 26 S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] These suits involve the following applications: (a) the application by Jambatan Kedua Sdn Bhd (‘JKSB’) pursuant to s 16 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746] (‘CIPAA’) in Originating Summons No. WA- 24C-87-05/2023 (‘O.S. No. 87’) to stay the Adjudication Decision dated 28.4.2023 (‘AD’) by the learned Adjudicator, Mr. Ho June Khai (‘Adjudicator’) pending the final determination by way of arbitration (‘Stay Application’); and (b) the application by Gammerlite Sdn Bhd (‘Gammerlite’) pursuant to sub-s 28(1) CIPAA in O.S. No. WA-24C-112-07/2023 (‘O.S. No. 112’) to enforce the AD as corrected on 15.5.2023 (‘Enforcement Application’). [2] The parties agreed for the Stay Application and the Enforcement Application to be heard together. After having considered the affidavit evidence and the oral and written submissions of the parties, I had, on 27.9.2023, allowed the Enforcement Application and also the Stay Application in the alternative prayer i.e. for a conditional stay whereby the sum of RM8,137,527.93 is to be placed in a stakeholder and interest bearing account held by Gammerlite’s solicitors, within 30 days S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 from the date that the Order is sealed, until final determination of the disputes between the parties by arbitration. [3] JKSB is aggrieved with my decision in allowing the Enforcement Application whilst Gammerlite is dissatisfied with my decision in allowing the alternative prayer in the Stay Application. I now provide my full grounds of judgment for the purpose of the parties’ appeals. The Cause Papers [4] The cause papers in each application are as follows: The Stay Application: (a) JKSB’s O.S. dated 29.5.2023 (encl. 1); (b) JKSB’s Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) affirmed by its Chief Executive Officer, Faisal Bin Shahbudin on 29.5.2023 (encls. 2 - 5); (c) Gammerlite’s Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’) affirmed by its Project Director, Wan Razali Bin Wan Muda on 16.6.2023 (encl. 8); and (d) JKSB’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 28.6.2023 (encl. 9). S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The Enforcement Application: (a) Gammerlite’s O.S. dated 14.7.2023 (encl. 1); (b) Gammerlite’s AIS affirmed by the same deponent on 14.7.2023 (encl. 2); (c) JKSB’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 9.8.2023 (encl. 6); (d) Gammerlite’s Supplemental Affidavit affirmed by the same deponent on 18.8.2023 (encl. 7); and (e) Gammerlite’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 21.8.2023 (encl. 8). Background Facts [5] JKSB is wholly owned by the Minister of Finance Incorporated and has a registered address at 7th Floor, Bangunan Setia 1, 15 Lorong Dungun, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur and a business address at the 4th Floor of the same building. JKSB’s nature of business is constructing, developing and operating Jambatan Sultan Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah or the Second Penang Bridge (‘Bridge’). S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [6] Gammerlite has its business and registered address at Shoplot 117, 1st Floor, Taman Jindo, Jalan Kolam, 88300 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. Its business is the undertaking of contract and maintenance works. [7] JKSB is the concessionaire responsible for the design, construction, management, operation and maintenance of the Bridge. [8] By the Letter of Acceptance of Tender dated 12.1.2015 (‘LoA’), JKSB appointed Gammerlite as the contractor for the Integrated Asset Management System for the Bridge (‘Works’) for the sum of RM133,168,000.00, which was later revised to RM134,280,728.15. [9] Other than the LoA, the parties executed, amongst others, the Standard Form of Design and Build Contract PWD Form DB (Rev. 1/2010) and its addendum (‘Contract’). [10] The Works were divided into the Development Stage and the Implementation Stage. [11] The date for possession of the site was 19.1.2015. The original contract period was seven years with the date for completion for the whole of the Works was 18.1.2022. This was later extended to 17.2.2022. [12] The original date for completion for the Development Stage was 18.1.2016 and this was also extended to 28.2.2017. S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] According to Gammerlite, other than granting the extension of time (‘EoT’) until 28.2.2017, JKSB also certified that the actual percentage of work progress for the Development Stage as of 11.1.2017 is 89.50%. [14] On 28.3.2017, JKSB issued a Certificate of Practical Completion (‘CPC’) subject to, among others, the completion of the minor outstanding works as listed under Appendix 1, and certified that the Development Stage was satisfactorily completed on 28.2.2017 and taken for implementation on 1.3.2017. [15] The whole of the outstanding works as listed in Appendix 1 was to be completed on or before 30.4.2017, however, JKSB alleged that Gammerlite failed to do so. [16] In respect of the whole of the Works, Gammerlite requested for EoT to complete the same, but this was rejected by the Project Director. A Certificate of Non-Completion was issued on 9.3.2022 (‘CNC’). [17] Gammerlite then served a Payment Claim dated 7.6.2022 on JKSB pursuant to sub-s 5(1) CIPAA for the unpaid sums of RM16,387,889.60 [without Liquidated Ascertained Damages (‘LAD’)] or RM19,044,272.00 (with LAD) as per Progress Claim No. 75. [18] On 22.6.2022, JKSB served its Payment Response on Gammerlite disputing the entire claim. S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [19] This was followed with the service of the Adjudication Claim dated 16.12.2022. In essence, Gammerlite claimed for the sum of RM3,655,033.26 as outstanding payment for certified work and RM17,457,032.71 for uncertified work. [20] In JKSB’s Adjudication Response dated 17.1.2023, it sought for, among others, Gammerlite’s claim to be dismissed with costs. [21] Ultimately the Adjudicator determined that: “Q. ADJUDICATION DECISION 246. … 1) The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the sum of RM7,881,924.96. This is hereby recorded as the Adjudicated Sum. 2) The Respondent shall bear the full Adjudication Cost and pay the Claimant the amount of RM255,603.00. 3) The Adjudicated Sum together with the Adjudication Cost shall be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of this adjudication decision, ie. on or before 28th May 2023. This date S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 shall be called the Due Date for payment of the Adjudicated Sum and Adjudication Cost. 4) The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant simple interest at a rate of 5% per annum from the Due Date for payment until full payment of the Adjudicated Sum and Adjudication Cost.”. [22] Meanwhile, JKSB issued a notice to Gammerlite on 22.3.2023 to remedy the alleged events of defaults/ breaches and this was followed with a notice to terminate the Contract dated 11.4.2023. [23] On 25.5.2023, JKSB commenced arbitration proceedings against Gammerlite. I. THE ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION [24] JKSB initially raised the issue of non-compliance with O. 69A, r. 5(3) of the Rules of Court 2012 as Gammerlite did not exhibit the original or a certified true copy of the AD in exhibit “WR-4A” in the AIS (encl. 2). [25] However, on the hearing date, Ms. Victoria Loi informed that JKSB will not be pursuing that ground as Gammerlite had filed a Supplementary Affidavit exhibiting a certified true copy of the AD (see exhibit “WR-7”, encl. 7). S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [26] The provision on the enforcement of an adjudication decision as a judgment is provided in s 28 of the CIPAA which states that: “Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment 28. (1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court. (2) The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable. (3) The order made under subsection (2) may be executed in accordance with the rules on execution of the orders or judgment of the High Court.”. [27] In the AIR, JKSB averred that there is no failure to pay on its part as alleged by Gammerlite and the AD should not be enforced because, whilst the Adjudicator decided that Gammerlite is entitled to the sum of RM8,137,527.96 under the AD (‘Adjudicated Sum’), the Adjudicator had also found that the CNC is valid and JKSB is contractually entitled to impose LAD on Gammerlite. The Adjudicator had accordingly imposed LAD on Gammerlite in the sum of RM1,258,443.00 calculated from 9.3.2022 until 4.4.2022. S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [28] Pursuant to Clause 45.2 of the Conditions of Contract (‘CoC’), JKSB asserted that it is entitled to impose LAD until the date of issuance of the CPC or the date of termination of the Contract on 11.4.2023. Thus, to JKSB, in addition to the LAD in the sum of RM1,258,443.00, it is entitled to further LAD calculated from 5.4.2022 until 11.4.2023 amounting to RM17,338,548.00 (RM46,609.00 x 372 days). [29] JKSB submitted that the LAD has since accumulated to a sum that far exceeds the Adjudicated Sum and hence, the Adjudicated Sum is completely extinguished. JKSB is also entitled, pursuant to Clause 45.2 CoC, to recover the sum of RM17,338,548.00 as a debt due from Gammerlite and JKSB therefore has the right to set off the same against the Adjudicated Sum. Basically, it is Gammerlite that owes JKSB the sum of RM9,201,020.04 (RM17,33 8,548.00 - RM8,137,527.69). [30] JKSB additionally averred that the subject matter of the adjudication that culminated in the AD is pending final determination in the arbitration which was commenced by JSB vide the Notice of Arbitration dated 25.5.2023. In paragraph 16 of the AIR, JKSB provided a summary comparison of the issues in the adjudication and arbitration proceedings as shown below: Adjudication Arbitration (a) Works purportedly carried out by the Plaintiff and the valuation of such works as (a) Works purportedly carried out by the Plaintiff and the valuation of such Works as at S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 at 22.3.2022 (i.e., the date of valuation in IPC No. 75); (b) Imposition of LAD by the Defendant on the Plaintiff (until 4.4.2022); (c) Validity of the CNC issued by the P.D. in respect of the whole of the works; and (d) Plaintiff’s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations, including failure to complete the Works. 11.4.2023 (i.e., date of termination of the contract); (b) Imposition of LAD by the Defendant on the Plaintiff (until termination of the contract on 11.4.2023); (c) Validity of the CNC issued by the P.D. in respect of the whole of the works; (d) Validity of the CPC issued by the P.D. in respect of the Development Stage; (e) Plaintiff’s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations, including failure to complete the Works; and (f) Validity of the termination of the contract by the Defendant. S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [31] Section 13 of the CIPAA provides the effect of an adjudication decision in these terms: “13. The adjudication decision is binding unless – (a) it is set aside by the High Court on any of the grounds referred to in section 15; (b) the subject matter of the decision is settled by a written agreement between the parties; or (c) the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the court.”. [32] It is indisputable that JKSB did not file an application pursuant to s 15 CIPAA to set aside the AD. The subject matter of the AD has not been settled by a written agreement between JKSB and Gammerlite and the dispute has also not been finally decided by arbitration or the court. [33] Section 28 CIPAA confers a discretion on the High Court which must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under the CIPAA. This discretionary power does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15 CIPAA. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the court that – S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (a) there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant’s favor; (b) there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision; and (c) there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought in that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed; there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law [see Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 (CA) at paragraphs 24 - 26, pp 370 and 371]. [34] As all requirements laid down in Inai Kiara have been satisfied, I was persuaded to allow the Enforcement Application in keeping with the overarching purpose of statutory adjudication which is to facilitate speedy cash flow in the construction industry and the “pay now, argue later” dispute resolution process (see among others, Inai Kiara (supra, at paragraph 28, p 371), Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 (FC) at paragraphs 46 - 55, pp 242 - 246 and ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2022] 6 MLJ 392 (CA) at paragraph 40, p 406). [35] A dispute in respect of “payment” under a “construction contract” as defined in s 4 of the CIPAA, may, of course, be referred concurrently S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 to adjudication, arbitration or the court (see sub-s 37(1) CIPAA). In the circumstances of this case, I was not swayed by JKSB’s arguments regarding its entitlement to LAD which is said to extinguish the Adjudicated Sum or gives it a right to set off, and is pending final determination in the arbitration proceedings, as a reason to justify dismissing the Enforcement Application. [36] Among the grounds raised by JKSB in defending the Enforcement Application is that there are serious doubts as to Gammerlite’s ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum. These same grounds can be found in the Stay Application which will be discussed next. II. THE STAY APPLICATION [37] The Stay Application was made pursuant to s 16 of the CIPAA which reads as follows: “Stay of adjudication decision 16. (1) A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: (a) an application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court. (2) The High Court may grant a stay of the adjudication decision or order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA or make any other order as it thinks fit.”. [38] There is no doubt that JKSB has met the threshold requirement to apply for a stay of the AD as the subject matter of the AD is pending final determination by arbitration. However, this does not automatically result in the granting of a stay (see Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 (HC) and Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1393 (HC) which were referred by the Court of Appeal in ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals (supra) at pp 404 and 405; see too PWC Corp Sdn Bhd v Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2018] MLJU 152 (HC), Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35 (CA) and the decisions of this Court in Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 at paragraph 69, pp 286 - 287 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 8.8.2022, see [2022] MLJU 2107) and JEKS Engineering Sdn Bhd v PALI PTP Sdn Bhd and another case [2022] 9 MLJ 541 at paragraph 124, p 588). S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [39] The test as to whether a stay of the AD is to be allowed was laid down by the Federal Court in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 namely, the applicant must establish that there are clear errors in the AD, or that it is in the interest of justice for the enforcement of the AD to be stayed. The correct approach under s 16 of the CIPAA would be to evaluate the individual case on its merits where the financial capacity of the unpaid party to repay the adjudicated sum could be a factor but is not the only factor to be considered (see paragraphs 79 and 82 of the judgment at pp 47, 48 and 49). [40] JKSB averred in paragraph 40 of the AIS that it is in the interest of justice that the enforcement of the AD be stayed as – (a) the sum of RM8,137,527.96 which was awarded to Gammerlite pursuant to the AD had been extinguished completely owing to the accrued LAD and it is Gammerlite that owes JKSB a sum of RM9,201,020.04 (see paragraphs 41 - 47 of the AIS); (b) the subject-matter of the adjudication forms part of the subject- matter in the arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the parties and is pending final determination, in particular, Gammerlite’s entitlement to the sum of RM8,137,527.96 is subject to the issue of LAD for the Development Stage and JKSB’s claim for reimbursements being S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 finally decided in the arbitration (see paragraphs 49 - 59 of the AIS); and (c) there is a real possibility that Gammerlite is unable to repay the Adjudicated Sum to JKSB in the event that the outcome of the arbitration is in JKSB’s favour (see paragraphs 61 - 70 of the AIS). [41] There are several cases which have discussed how the tests of clear and unequivocal errors and justice of the case are to be applied in the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant a stay or otherwise (see EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia Marine And Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 AMR 594, Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1194, Pinnacle Supreme Sdn Bhd v. DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 852, Sun Plaza Development Sdn Bhd v. Hejingkang Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 629 and CRCC Malaysia Bhd v M101 Entity Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1305). [42] The determination as to what is right and fair so as to meet the justice of the individual case must necessarily be dependent on the factual matrix in each case. Justice of the case involves the exercise of discretion; whether the conscience of the court is pricked in the special circumstances of the case such that it is minded in granting the stay. Considerations of justice of the individual case to justify the stay of an adjudication decision have to be stringently applied lest it would defeat the statutory intent of the CIPAA to ensure cash flow in the construction S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 industry (see Genbina Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 2 MLRH 101 at p 111, EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Marine and Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd (supra, at p 603), Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734 and RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247). [43] In so far as the grounds as stated in subparagraphs 40 (a) and (b) are concerned, I agree with the submission by Mr. Ashok Kandiah for Gammerlite that the fact there is an ongoing arbitration between the parties and the subject-matter of the adjudication forms part of the subject-matter in the arbitration are irrelevant. The merits of JKSB’s case in the arbitration is also not a relevant consideration in the Stay Application [see ASM Development (supra) and Ireka Engineering (supra)]. [44] I was, however, persuaded by the submission by Ms. Victoria Loi for JKSB, relying on the Companies Commission of Malaysia Search (‘CCM Search’) on Gammerlite as at 19.5.2023 and Gammerlite’s “Financial Report for the financial year ended 31 May 2021” (exhibit “JKSB-11”, encl. 5) that there are serious doubts as to Gammerlite’s ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum if JKSB succeeds in the arbitration. My reasons are as follows: (a) Gammerlite’s current assets stands at RM32,200,388.00 and non-current assets is RM255,006.00 giving a total of RM32,455,394.00. Approximately 50% of Gammerlite’s current S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 assets is made up of “Cash and bank balances” in the sum of RM16,533,125.00 whereby the sum of RM16,513,087.00 is “Fixed deposit pledged for banking facilities” and RM7,714,944.00 is a bank overdraft resulting in a cash and cash equivalents of negative RM7,694,906.00 (see paragraph 9 in the “Notes to the Financial Statements” at p 32 of the Financial Report which has a remark that “All fixed deposits are pledged with the licensed bank for committed bank facilities.”). The cash and cash equivalents for financial year end (‘FYE’) 2020 is negative RM8,379.310.00. The total cash at banks and cash in hand is RM20,038.00 only. Gammerlite’s current assets have also reduced from RM34,800,814.00 for FYE 2020 to RM32,200,388.00 for FYE 2021. (b) Gammerlite has current liabilities of RM15,425,045.00 and non- current liabilities of RM116,714.00. The total liabilities for FYE 2021 increased to RM15,541,759.00 as compared to RM15,429,591.00 for FYE 2020. (c) Gammerlite recorded a gross loss in FYE 2021 of RM239,663.00 and a meagre gross profit in FYE 2020 of RM23,560.00. Its administrative expenses are, however, substantial at RM3,403,613.00 for FYE 2021 and RM4,778,540.00 for FYE 2020 which far exceeds the gross profit. This reflects an unhealthy trend. Gammerlite made consecutive losses of RM2,860,916.00 (after tax) for FYE 2021 and RM3,950,802.00 (after tax) for FYE 2020. S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 (d) Gammerlite’s current assets, after deducting the “Cash and bank balances” is RM15,667,263.00. With the total liabilities at RM15,541,759.00, Gammerlite does not have sufficient current assets to be liquidated to repay the sum of RM8,137,527.96. (e) Gammerlite has 11 unsatisfied charges in the total sum of RM65,342,300.00. This amount substantially exceeds its current assets of RM32,200,388.00, revenue of RM7,089,794.00 and retained earnings of RM15,413,634.00. In any event, retained earnings are not current assets that Gammerlite can utilise to repay the Adjudicated Sum to JKSB. In paragraph 11 in the “Notes to the Financial Statements” at p 33 of the Financial Report, it is stated that “… the Company will be able to distribute dividends out of its entire retained profits under the single tier tax system.”. Hence, the retained earnings may be distributed as dividends to the shareholders. (f) Gammerlite’s attempt in comparing its financial position with that of JKSB’s is misconceived because in determining whether a stay of the AD is warranted in the circumstances of this case, the relevant consideration is Gammerlite’s financial status, and not JKSB’s. [45] In the course of submissions, the learned counsels for the parties have relied on case authorities such as Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd v Formosa Plastics Marine Corporation & Ors and another case [2020] 1 LNS 737 and Wabina Constructions & Engineering Sdn Bhd v S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Fulloop Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2744 to support the argument for, or against, the finding on Gammerlite’s ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum. However, in my opinion, each case has to be evaluated based on the facts as affirmed by the parties in their affidavits and the documents produced whether in the form of the CCM Search, Financial Report(s) and/ or CTOS Report. [46] After giving utmost consideration to the CCM Search and the Financial Report for FYE 2021 and the parties’ affirmations and submissions on the contents of these documents, I was persuaded that, albeit no application was made by JKSB to set aside the AD under s 15 of the CIPAA, this is an appropriate case for the enforcement of the AD to be stayed in the interest of justice due to the precarious financial position of Gammerlite which raises a real concern as to its ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum if required to do so following the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. [47] In the exercise of my discretion, I was minded to allow the Stay Application in the alternative prayer i.e. to grant a conditional stay whereby the sum of RM8,137,527.93 is to be placed, not in a fixed deposit account jointly held by the parties’ solicitors as stakeholders as prayed, but instead in an interest bearing account to be held by Gammerlite’s solicitors as stakeholders until the final determination of the disputes between the parties in the arbitration proceedings. Initially, I ordered that this is to be done within 30 days from the date of the decision, however, upon the request by JKSB’s counsel, the period of S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 30 days would start to run only from the date of issuance of the sealed Order of the Court. [48] The order for a conditional stay would achieve the objective of striking a balance between the competing commercial interests of the parties in that, recognition is given to the Adjudicated Sum as reflected in the AD and the fear or concern of Gammerlite’s inability to repay the same is obliviated as the Adjudicated Sum will be earning interest in the stakeholder account (see Punj Lloyd Sdn Bhd v Ramo Industries Pte Ltd & Anor and another case [2019] 11 MLJ 57 at paragraphs 128 - 132, Samsung C & T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2642 at paragraphs 21 - 25, Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v KWSL Builders Sdn Bhd and another case [2023] MLJU 669 at paragraphs 21 - 25 and Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 at paragraph 28). [49] On a final note, I have allowed the Enforcement Application and the alternative prayer in the Stay Application as I am of the view that, legally there is no impediment for such orders to be made. There are no express prohibitions in the CIPAA to the effect that applications for stay of adjudication decisions must be dismissed if the applications for enforcement of the same adjudication decisions are allowed. Furthermore, an adjudication decision is not merged into a judgment if an application under s 28 CIPAA is allowed since an order obtained pursuant to that provision merely permits the adjudication decision to S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 be enforced as a judgment of the court; it is not a judgment in itself (see paragraphs 23 and 24 in ASM Development (supra), EA Technique (supra) and the decision of this Court in ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v. Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLRHU 939 which involved ASM Development’s application against Econpile and its directors for contempt of court). [50] There are several cases decided by the High Court where the applications to enforce the adjudication decisions and to stay the same have both been allowed (see Kuasatek (M) Sdn Bhd v HCM Engineering Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2018] MLJU 1919, Punj Lloyd (supra), Mudajaya Corporation (supra) and Marvesco Sdn Bhd v Apex Communications Sdn Bhd and another case [2022] MLJU 127). [51] As at the date of hearing (5.9.2023) and decision (27.9.2023) of the Enforcement Application and the Stay Application, the Court and the learned counsels were aware of the decisions by the Court of Appeal as delivered by Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA and Abu Bakar Jais JCA in ASM Development (supra; ‘CIPAA 1’) and ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd & other appeals [2023] 4 MLJ 720 (‘CIPAA 2’), respectively, and that the motions by the disgruntled parties for leave to appeal to the Federal Court in respect of the decisions in the applications pursuant to s 16 of the CIPAA have been allowed. [52] In the appeal against the decision in CIPAA 1, one of the questions of law posed to the Federal Court is “Whether an adjudication decision, S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 after having been enforced pursuant to s. 28 CIPAA as an Order of the Court, can be stayed pursuant to s. 16(1)(b) CIPAA”. [53] As at the time of writing these grounds of judgement, the Federal Court has decided, on 3.10.2023, to allow the appeal by Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd in CIPAA 1 and to dismiss the appeal by ASM Development in CIPAA 2. The full grounds of judgment have yet to be released. Conclusion [54] Based on the aforesaid considerations, both the Enforcement Application in O.S. No. 112 and the Stay Application in O.S. No. 87 were allowed. [55] In the circumstances, I exercised my discretion in making no order as to costs for both applications. Dated: 26 December 2023 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge Construction Court 2 High Court Kuala Lumpur S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 87 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 112: Victoria Loi Tien Fen (Hoo Yee Huan and Kienan Yeo with her) Messrs. Shook Lin & Bok Advocates & Solicitors 20th Floor, AmBank Group Building 55, Jalan Raja Chulan 50200 Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 112 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 87: Ashok Kandiah (David Soosay and Ashvinderjeet Kaur with him) Messrs. Haris Ibrahim Kandiah Partnership Advocates & Solicitors Suite 12.01, Level 12 Menara Choy Fook On Jalan Yong Shook Lin 46050 Petaling Jaya Selangor Cases, legislation and other sources referred to in the submissions by learned counsels and in the Grounds of Judgment: Cases: Aliran Asia Sdn Bhd v Astaka Padu Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 2562 ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2022] 6 MLJ 392; [2023] 1 CLJ 1 (CA) S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v. Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLRHU 939 (HC) Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Mayland Universal Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] MLJU 2245 CRCC Malaysia Bhd v M101 Entity Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1305 Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismain Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj v. Datuk Captain Hamzah Mohd Noor & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 329 EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia Marine And Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 AMR 594 Genbina Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1933; [2020] 2 MLRH 101 Hamidah Fazilah Sdn Bhd v Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia (UTHM) [2017] 7 MLJ 274 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 (CA) Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Tri Pacific Engineering Sdn Bhd and another summons [2020] MLJU 548 S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35 (CA) Kuasatek (M) Sdn Bhd v HCM Engineering Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2018] MLJU 1919 Leong Keng Chiang v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 714 Low Cheng Soon v. TA Securities Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 CLJ 309 Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1194 Marvesco Sdn Bhd v Apex Communications Sdn Bhd and another case [2022] MLJU 127 Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v KWSL Builders Sdn Bhd and another case [2023] MLJU 669 Ng Choon Mei v Yap Kean Hong [2021] MLJU 1096 Office 2 Go (M) Sdn Bhd v Probina Project Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 2009 Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1393 (HC) Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd v Formosa Plastics Marine Corporation & Ors and another case [2020] 1 LNS 737 S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Pinnacle Supreme Sdn Bhd v. DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 852 Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 (HC) Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2107 (CA) Punj Lloyd Sdn Bhd v Ramo Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2019] 11 MLJ 574 Pwc Corp Sdn Bhd v Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2018] MLJU 152; [2018] 1 LNS 163 RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247 Samsung C & T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2642 Samsung C&T Corporation Uem Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 Seal Properties (KL) Sdn Bhb v. Wabina Constructions & Engineering Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 680 S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Skyworld Development Sdn Bhd v. Zalam Corp Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals [2019] 1 LNS 173 Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 Sun Plaza Development Sdn Bhd v. Hejingkang Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 629 Syarikat TD Sdn Bhd v Jeks Engineering Sdn Bhd and another case [2019] MLJU 1754 Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] MLJU 242 Uzma Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Khan Co. Ltd and another summons [2020] 1 LNS 1153 View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22; [2019] 5 CLJ 479 Wabina Constructions & Engineering Sdn Bhd v Fulloop Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2744 YKS Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Aspirasi Ternama Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 1697 Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734 S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Legislation: Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, ss 5, 13,16 & 28 Rules of Court 2012, O. 1A, O. 2, O. 32, O. 69A rr. 2, 3, 4 and 5 & O. 92 r. 4 S/N kDaq61SaaUuKeAVg7gZHfw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-87-05/2023

PEMOHON JAMBATAN KEDUA SDN BHD RESPONDEN GAMMERLITE SDN BHD

there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant’s favor; - there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision; - there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought in that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed; there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Hajah Aliza binti Sulaiman

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=46725ee6-b936-4144-ac09-18647612d0ec&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-87-05/2023 BETWEEN JAMBATAN KEDUA SDN BHD (Company No.: 824573-U) ... PLAINTIFF AND GAMMERLITE SDN BHD (Company No.: 180947-D) ... DEFENDANT (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C-112-07/2023 BETWEEN GAMMERLITE SDN BHD (Company No.: 180947-D) ... PLAINTIFF AND JAMBATAN KEDUA SDN BHD (Company No.: 824573-U) ... DEFENDANT 26/01/2024 12:48:29 WA-24C-87-05/2023 Kand. 36 S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] These suits involve the following applications: (a) the application by Jambatan Kedua Sdn Bhd (‘JKSB’) pursuant to s 16 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746] (‘CIPAA’) in Originating Summons No. WA- 24C-87-05/2023 (‘O.S. No. 87’) to stay the Adjudication Decision dated 28.4.2023 (‘AD’) by the learned Adjudicator, Mr. Ho June Khai (‘Adjudicator’) pending the final determination by way of arbitration (‘Stay Application’); and (b) the application by Gammerlite Sdn Bhd (‘Gammerlite’) pursuant to sub-s 28(1) CIPAA in O.S. No. WA-24C-112-07/2023 (‘O.S. No. 112’) to enforce the AD as corrected on 15.5.2023 (‘Enforcement Application’). [2] The parties agreed for the Stay Application and the Enforcement Application to be heard together. After having considered the affidavit evidence and the oral and written submissions of the parties, I had, on 27.9.2023, allowed the Enforcement Application and also the Stay Application in the alternative prayer i.e. for a conditional stay whereby the sum of RM8,137,527.93 is to be placed in a stakeholder and interest bearing account held by Gammerlite’s solicitors, within 30 days S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 from the date that the Order is sealed, until final determination of the disputes between the parties by arbitration. [3] JKSB is aggrieved with my decision in allowing the Enforcement Application whilst Gammerlite is dissatisfied with my decision in allowing the alternative prayer in the Stay Application. I now provide my full grounds of judgment for the purpose of the parties’ appeals. The Cause Papers [4] The cause papers in each application are as follows: The Stay Application: (a) JKSB’s O.S. dated 29.5.2023 (encl. 1); (b) JKSB’s Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) affirmed by its Chief Executive Officer, Faisal Bin Shahbudin on 29.5.2023 (encls. 2 - 5); (c) Gammerlite’s Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’) affirmed by its Project Director, Wan Razali Bin Wan Muda on 16.6.2023 (encl. 8); and (d) JKSB’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 28.6.2023 (encl. 9). S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 The Enforcement Application: (a) Gammerlite’s O.S. dated 14.7.2023 (encl. 1); (b) Gammerlite’s AIS affirmed by the same deponent on 14.7.2023 (encl. 2); (c) JKSB’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 9.8.2023 (encl. 6); (d) Gammerlite’s Supplemental Affidavit affirmed by the same deponent on 18.8.2023 (encl. 7); and (e) Gammerlite’s AIR affirmed by the same deponent on 21.8.2023 (encl. 8). Background Facts [5] JKSB is wholly owned by the Minister of Finance Incorporated and has a registered address at 7th Floor, Bangunan Setia 1, 15 Lorong Dungun, Bukit Damansara, 50490 Kuala Lumpur and a business address at the 4th Floor of the same building. JKSB’s nature of business is constructing, developing and operating Jambatan Sultan Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah or the Second Penang Bridge (‘Bridge’). S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [6] Gammerlite has its business and registered address at Shoplot 117, 1st Floor, Taman Jindo, Jalan Kolam, 88300 Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. Its business is the undertaking of contract and maintenance works. [7] JKSB is the concessionaire responsible for the design, construction, management, operation and maintenance of the Bridge. [8] By the Letter of Acceptance of Tender dated 12.1.2015 (‘LoA’), JKSB appointed Gammerlite as the contractor for the Integrated Asset Management System for the Bridge (‘Works’) for the sum of RM133,168,000.00, which was later revised to RM134,280,728.15. [9] Other than the LoA, the parties executed, amongst others, the Standard Form of Design and Build Contract PWD Form DB (Rev. 1/2010) and its addendum (‘Contract’). [10] The Works were divided into the Development Stage and the Implementation Stage. [11] The date for possession of the site was 19.1.2015. The original contract period was seven years with the date for completion for the whole of the Works was 18.1.2022. This was later extended to 17.2.2022. [12] The original date for completion for the Development Stage was 18.1.2016 and this was also extended to 28.2.2017. S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [13] According to Gammerlite, other than granting the extension of time (‘EoT’) until 28.2.2017, JKSB also certified that the actual percentage of work progress for the Development Stage as of 11.1.2017 is 89.50%. [14] On 28.3.2017, JKSB issued a Certificate of Practical Completion (‘CPC’) subject to, among others, the completion of the minor outstanding works as listed under Appendix 1, and certified that the Development Stage was satisfactorily completed on 28.2.2017 and taken for implementation on 1.3.2017. [15] The whole of the outstanding works as listed in Appendix 1 was to be completed on or before 30.4.2017, however, JKSB alleged that Gammerlite failed to do so. [16] In respect of the whole of the Works, Gammerlite requested for EoT to complete the same, but this was rejected by the Project Director. A Certificate of Non-Completion was issued on 9.3.2022 (‘CNC’). [17] Gammerlite then served a Payment Claim dated 7.6.2022 on JKSB pursuant to sub-s 5(1) CIPAA for the unpaid sums of RM16,387,889.60 [without Liquidated Ascertained Damages (‘LAD’)] or RM19,044,272.00 (with LAD) as per Progress Claim No. 75. [18] On 22.6.2022, JKSB served its Payment Response on Gammerlite disputing the entire claim. S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [19] This was followed with the service of the Adjudication Claim dated 16.12.2022. In essence, Gammerlite claimed for the sum of RM3,655,033.26 as outstanding payment for certified work and RM17,457,032.71 for uncertified work. [20] In JKSB’s Adjudication Response dated 17.1.2023, it sought for, among others, Gammerlite’s claim to be dismissed with costs. [21] Ultimately the Adjudicator determined that: “Q. ADJUDICATION DECISION 246. … 1) The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant the sum of RM7,881,924.96. This is hereby recorded as the Adjudicated Sum. 2) The Respondent shall bear the full Adjudication Cost and pay the Claimant the amount of RM255,603.00. 3) The Adjudicated Sum together with the Adjudication Cost shall be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of this adjudication decision, ie. on or before 28th May 2023. This date S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 shall be called the Due Date for payment of the Adjudicated Sum and Adjudication Cost. 4) The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant simple interest at a rate of 5% per annum from the Due Date for payment until full payment of the Adjudicated Sum and Adjudication Cost.”. [22] Meanwhile, JKSB issued a notice to Gammerlite on 22.3.2023 to remedy the alleged events of defaults/ breaches and this was followed with a notice to terminate the Contract dated 11.4.2023. [23] On 25.5.2023, JKSB commenced arbitration proceedings against Gammerlite. I. THE ENFORCEMENT APPLICATION [24] JKSB initially raised the issue of non-compliance with O. 69A, r. 5(3) of the Rules of Court 2012 as Gammerlite did not exhibit the original or a certified true copy of the AD in exhibit “WR-4A” in the AIS (encl. 2). [25] However, on the hearing date, Ms. Victoria Loi informed that JKSB will not be pursuing that ground as Gammerlite had filed a Supplementary Affidavit exhibiting a certified true copy of the AD (see exhibit “WR-7”, encl. 7). S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [26] The provision on the enforcement of an adjudication decision as a judgment is provided in s 28 of the CIPAA which states that: “Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment 28. (1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court. (2) The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable. (3) The order made under subsection (2) may be executed in accordance with the rules on execution of the orders or judgment of the High Court.”. [27] In the AIR, JKSB averred that there is no failure to pay on its part as alleged by Gammerlite and the AD should not be enforced because, whilst the Adjudicator decided that Gammerlite is entitled to the sum of RM8,137,527.96 under the AD (‘Adjudicated Sum’), the Adjudicator had also found that the CNC is valid and JKSB is contractually entitled to impose LAD on Gammerlite. The Adjudicator had accordingly imposed LAD on Gammerlite in the sum of RM1,258,443.00 calculated from 9.3.2022 until 4.4.2022. S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [28] Pursuant to Clause 45.2 of the Conditions of Contract (‘CoC’), JKSB asserted that it is entitled to impose LAD until the date of issuance of the CPC or the date of termination of the Contract on 11.4.2023. Thus, to JKSB, in addition to the LAD in the sum of RM1,258,443.00, it is entitled to further LAD calculated from 5.4.2022 until 11.4.2023 amounting to RM17,338,548.00 (RM46,609.00 x 372 days). [29] JKSB submitted that the LAD has since accumulated to a sum that far exceeds the Adjudicated Sum and hence, the Adjudicated Sum is completely extinguished. JKSB is also entitled, pursuant to Clause 45.2 CoC, to recover the sum of RM17,338,548.00 as a debt due from Gammerlite and JKSB therefore has the right to set off the same against the Adjudicated Sum. Basically, it is Gammerlite that owes JKSB the sum of RM9,201,020.04 (RM17,33 8,548.00 - RM8,137,527.69). [30] JKSB additionally averred that the subject matter of the adjudication that culminated in the AD is pending final determination in the arbitration which was commenced by JSB vide the Notice of Arbitration dated 25.5.2023. In paragraph 16 of the AIR, JKSB provided a summary comparison of the issues in the adjudication and arbitration proceedings as shown below: Adjudication Arbitration (a) Works purportedly carried out by the Plaintiff and the valuation of such works as (a) Works purportedly carried out by the Plaintiff and the valuation of such Works as at S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 at 22.3.2022 (i.e., the date of valuation in IPC No. 75); (b) Imposition of LAD by the Defendant on the Plaintiff (until 4.4.2022); (c) Validity of the CNC issued by the P.D. in respect of the whole of the works; and (d) Plaintiff’s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations, including failure to complete the Works. 11.4.2023 (i.e., date of termination of the contract); (b) Imposition of LAD by the Defendant on the Plaintiff (until termination of the contract on 11.4.2023); (c) Validity of the CNC issued by the P.D. in respect of the whole of the works; (d) Validity of the CPC issued by the P.D. in respect of the Development Stage; (e) Plaintiff’s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations, including failure to complete the Works; and (f) Validity of the termination of the contract by the Defendant. S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [31] Section 13 of the CIPAA provides the effect of an adjudication decision in these terms: “13. The adjudication decision is binding unless – (a) it is set aside by the High Court on any of the grounds referred to in section 15; (b) the subject matter of the decision is settled by a written agreement between the parties; or (c) the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the court.”. [32] It is indisputable that JKSB did not file an application pursuant to s 15 CIPAA to set aside the AD. The subject matter of the AD has not been settled by a written agreement between JKSB and Gammerlite and the dispute has also not been finally decided by arbitration or the court. [33] Section 28 CIPAA confers a discretion on the High Court which must be exercised judiciously, having regard to the underlying facts and the applicable principles under the CIPAA. This discretionary power does not extend to requiring the applicant to show that there are no grounds for setting aside the adjudication decision under s 15 CIPAA. All that the applicant needs to do is to satisfy the court that – S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (a) there is an adjudication decision that has been rendered in the applicant’s favor; (b) there has been non-payment of the adjudicated sum by the date specified in the adjudication decision; and (c) there is no prohibition to the grant of the order that is sought in that the adjudication decision has not been set aside or stayed; there is no written settlement of the subject matter between the parties, or there is no final decision rendered on the payment claim, whether made in arbitration or by a court of law [see Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v. Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 (CA) at paragraphs 24 - 26, pp 370 and 371]. [34] As all requirements laid down in Inai Kiara have been satisfied, I was persuaded to allow the Enforcement Application in keeping with the overarching purpose of statutory adjudication which is to facilitate speedy cash flow in the construction industry and the “pay now, argue later” dispute resolution process (see among others, Inai Kiara (supra, at paragraph 28, p 371), Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 6 MLJ 224 (FC) at paragraphs 46 - 55, pp 242 - 246 and ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2022] 6 MLJ 392 (CA) at paragraph 40, p 406). [35] A dispute in respect of “payment” under a “construction contract” as defined in s 4 of the CIPAA, may, of course, be referred concurrently S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 to adjudication, arbitration or the court (see sub-s 37(1) CIPAA). In the circumstances of this case, I was not swayed by JKSB’s arguments regarding its entitlement to LAD which is said to extinguish the Adjudicated Sum or gives it a right to set off, and is pending final determination in the arbitration proceedings, as a reason to justify dismissing the Enforcement Application. [36] Among the grounds raised by JKSB in defending the Enforcement Application is that there are serious doubts as to Gammerlite’s ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum. These same grounds can be found in the Stay Application which will be discussed next. II. THE STAY APPLICATION [37] The Stay Application was made pursuant to s 16 of the CIPAA which reads as follows: “Stay of adjudication decision 16. (1) A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: (a) an application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court. (2) The High Court may grant a stay of the adjudication decision or order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA or make any other order as it thinks fit.”. [38] There is no doubt that JKSB has met the threshold requirement to apply for a stay of the AD as the subject matter of the AD is pending final determination by arbitration. However, this does not automatically result in the granting of a stay (see Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 (HC) and Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1393 (HC) which were referred by the Court of Appeal in ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals (supra) at pp 404 and 405; see too PWC Corp Sdn Bhd v Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2018] MLJU 152 (HC), Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35 (CA) and the decisions of this Court in Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 at paragraph 69, pp 286 - 287 (affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 8.8.2022, see [2022] MLJU 2107) and JEKS Engineering Sdn Bhd v PALI PTP Sdn Bhd and another case [2022] 9 MLJ 541 at paragraph 124, p 588). S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [39] The test as to whether a stay of the AD is to be allowed was laid down by the Federal Court in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22 namely, the applicant must establish that there are clear errors in the AD, or that it is in the interest of justice for the enforcement of the AD to be stayed. The correct approach under s 16 of the CIPAA would be to evaluate the individual case on its merits where the financial capacity of the unpaid party to repay the adjudicated sum could be a factor but is not the only factor to be considered (see paragraphs 79 and 82 of the judgment at pp 47, 48 and 49). [40] JKSB averred in paragraph 40 of the AIS that it is in the interest of justice that the enforcement of the AD be stayed as – (a) the sum of RM8,137,527.96 which was awarded to Gammerlite pursuant to the AD had been extinguished completely owing to the accrued LAD and it is Gammerlite that owes JKSB a sum of RM9,201,020.04 (see paragraphs 41 - 47 of the AIS); (b) the subject-matter of the adjudication forms part of the subject- matter in the arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement between the parties and is pending final determination, in particular, Gammerlite’s entitlement to the sum of RM8,137,527.96 is subject to the issue of LAD for the Development Stage and JKSB’s claim for reimbursements being S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 finally decided in the arbitration (see paragraphs 49 - 59 of the AIS); and (c) there is a real possibility that Gammerlite is unable to repay the Adjudicated Sum to JKSB in the event that the outcome of the arbitration is in JKSB’s favour (see paragraphs 61 - 70 of the AIS). [41] There are several cases which have discussed how the tests of clear and unequivocal errors and justice of the case are to be applied in the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant a stay or otherwise (see EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia Marine And Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 AMR 594, Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1194, Pinnacle Supreme Sdn Bhd v. DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 852, Sun Plaza Development Sdn Bhd v. Hejingkang Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 629 and CRCC Malaysia Bhd v M101 Entity Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1305). [42] The determination as to what is right and fair so as to meet the justice of the individual case must necessarily be dependent on the factual matrix in each case. Justice of the case involves the exercise of discretion; whether the conscience of the court is pricked in the special circumstances of the case such that it is minded in granting the stay. Considerations of justice of the individual case to justify the stay of an adjudication decision have to be stringently applied lest it would defeat the statutory intent of the CIPAA to ensure cash flow in the construction S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 industry (see Genbina Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2020] 2 MLRH 101 at p 111, EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v Malaysia Marine and Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd (supra, at p 603), Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734 and RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247). [43] In so far as the grounds as stated in subparagraphs 40 (a) and (b) are concerned, I agree with the submission by Mr. Ashok Kandiah for Gammerlite that the fact there is an ongoing arbitration between the parties and the subject-matter of the adjudication forms part of the subject-matter in the arbitration are irrelevant. The merits of JKSB’s case in the arbitration is also not a relevant consideration in the Stay Application [see ASM Development (supra) and Ireka Engineering (supra)]. [44] I was, however, persuaded by the submission by Ms. Victoria Loi for JKSB, relying on the Companies Commission of Malaysia Search (‘CCM Search’) on Gammerlite as at 19.5.2023 and Gammerlite’s “Financial Report for the financial year ended 31 May 2021” (exhibit “JKSB-11”, encl. 5) that there are serious doubts as to Gammerlite’s ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum if JKSB succeeds in the arbitration. My reasons are as follows: (a) Gammerlite’s current assets stands at RM32,200,388.00 and non-current assets is RM255,006.00 giving a total of RM32,455,394.00. Approximately 50% of Gammerlite’s current S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 assets is made up of “Cash and bank balances” in the sum of RM16,533,125.00 whereby the sum of RM16,513,087.00 is “Fixed deposit pledged for banking facilities” and RM7,714,944.00 is a bank overdraft resulting in a cash and cash equivalents of negative RM7,694,906.00 (see paragraph 9 in the “Notes to the Financial Statements” at p 32 of the Financial Report which has a remark that “All fixed deposits are pledged with the licensed bank for committed bank facilities.”). The cash and cash equivalents for financial year end (‘FYE’) 2020 is negative RM8,379.310.00. The total cash at banks and cash in hand is RM20,038.00 only. Gammerlite’s current assets have also reduced from RM34,800,814.00 for FYE 2020 to RM32,200,388.00 for FYE 2021. (b) Gammerlite has current liabilities of RM15,425,045.00 and non- current liabilities of RM116,714.00. The total liabilities for FYE 2021 increased to RM15,541,759.00 as compared to RM15,429,591.00 for FYE 2020. (c) Gammerlite recorded a gross loss in FYE 2021 of RM239,663.00 and a meagre gross profit in FYE 2020 of RM23,560.00. Its administrative expenses are, however, substantial at RM3,403,613.00 for FYE 2021 and RM4,778,540.00 for FYE 2020 which far exceeds the gross profit. This reflects an unhealthy trend. Gammerlite made consecutive losses of RM2,860,916.00 (after tax) for FYE 2021 and RM3,950,802.00 (after tax) for FYE 2020. S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 (d) Gammerlite’s current assets, after deducting the “Cash and bank balances” is RM15,667,263.00. With the total liabilities at RM15,541,759.00, Gammerlite does not have sufficient current assets to be liquidated to repay the sum of RM8,137,527.96. (e) Gammerlite has 11 unsatisfied charges in the total sum of RM65,342,300.00. This amount substantially exceeds its current assets of RM32,200,388.00, revenue of RM7,089,794.00 and retained earnings of RM15,413,634.00. In any event, retained earnings are not current assets that Gammerlite can utilise to repay the Adjudicated Sum to JKSB. In paragraph 11 in the “Notes to the Financial Statements” at p 33 of the Financial Report, it is stated that “… the Company will be able to distribute dividends out of its entire retained profits under the single tier tax system.”. Hence, the retained earnings may be distributed as dividends to the shareholders. (f) Gammerlite’s attempt in comparing its financial position with that of JKSB’s is misconceived because in determining whether a stay of the AD is warranted in the circumstances of this case, the relevant consideration is Gammerlite’s financial status, and not JKSB’s. [45] In the course of submissions, the learned counsels for the parties have relied on case authorities such as Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd v Formosa Plastics Marine Corporation & Ors and another case [2020] 1 LNS 737 and Wabina Constructions & Engineering Sdn Bhd v S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Fulloop Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2744 to support the argument for, or against, the finding on Gammerlite’s ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum. However, in my opinion, each case has to be evaluated based on the facts as affirmed by the parties in their affidavits and the documents produced whether in the form of the CCM Search, Financial Report(s) and/ or CTOS Report. [46] After giving utmost consideration to the CCM Search and the Financial Report for FYE 2021 and the parties’ affirmations and submissions on the contents of these documents, I was persuaded that, albeit no application was made by JKSB to set aside the AD under s 15 of the CIPAA, this is an appropriate case for the enforcement of the AD to be stayed in the interest of justice due to the precarious financial position of Gammerlite which raises a real concern as to its ability to repay the Adjudicated Sum if required to do so following the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. [47] In the exercise of my discretion, I was minded to allow the Stay Application in the alternative prayer i.e. to grant a conditional stay whereby the sum of RM8,137,527.93 is to be placed, not in a fixed deposit account jointly held by the parties’ solicitors as stakeholders as prayed, but instead in an interest bearing account to be held by Gammerlite’s solicitors as stakeholders until the final determination of the disputes between the parties in the arbitration proceedings. Initially, I ordered that this is to be done within 30 days from the date of the decision, however, upon the request by JKSB’s counsel, the period of S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 30 days would start to run only from the date of issuance of the sealed Order of the Court. [48] The order for a conditional stay would achieve the objective of striking a balance between the competing commercial interests of the parties in that, recognition is given to the Adjudicated Sum as reflected in the AD and the fear or concern of Gammerlite’s inability to repay the same is obliviated as the Adjudicated Sum will be earning interest in the stakeholder account (see Punj Lloyd Sdn Bhd v Ramo Industries Pte Ltd & Anor and another case [2019] 11 MLJ 57 at paragraphs 128 - 132, Samsung C & T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2642 at paragraphs 21 - 25, Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v KWSL Builders Sdn Bhd and another case [2023] MLJU 669 at paragraphs 21 - 25 and Samsung C&T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 at paragraph 28). [49] On a final note, I have allowed the Enforcement Application and the alternative prayer in the Stay Application as I am of the view that, legally there is no impediment for such orders to be made. There are no express prohibitions in the CIPAA to the effect that applications for stay of adjudication decisions must be dismissed if the applications for enforcement of the same adjudication decisions are allowed. Furthermore, an adjudication decision is not merged into a judgment if an application under s 28 CIPAA is allowed since an order obtained pursuant to that provision merely permits the adjudication decision to S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 be enforced as a judgment of the court; it is not a judgment in itself (see paragraphs 23 and 24 in ASM Development (supra), EA Technique (supra) and the decision of this Court in ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v. Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLRHU 939 which involved ASM Development’s application against Econpile and its directors for contempt of court). [50] There are several cases decided by the High Court where the applications to enforce the adjudication decisions and to stay the same have both been allowed (see Kuasatek (M) Sdn Bhd v HCM Engineering Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2018] MLJU 1919, Punj Lloyd (supra), Mudajaya Corporation (supra) and Marvesco Sdn Bhd v Apex Communications Sdn Bhd and another case [2022] MLJU 127). [51] As at the date of hearing (5.9.2023) and decision (27.9.2023) of the Enforcement Application and the Stay Application, the Court and the learned counsels were aware of the decisions by the Court of Appeal as delivered by Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA and Abu Bakar Jais JCA in ASM Development (supra; ‘CIPAA 1’) and ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd & other appeals [2023] 4 MLJ 720 (‘CIPAA 2’), respectively, and that the motions by the disgruntled parties for leave to appeal to the Federal Court in respect of the decisions in the applications pursuant to s 16 of the CIPAA have been allowed. [52] In the appeal against the decision in CIPAA 1, one of the questions of law posed to the Federal Court is “Whether an adjudication decision, S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 after having been enforced pursuant to s. 28 CIPAA as an Order of the Court, can be stayed pursuant to s. 16(1)(b) CIPAA”. [53] As at the time of writing these grounds of judgement, the Federal Court has decided, on 3.10.2023, to allow the appeal by Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd in CIPAA 1 and to dismiss the appeal by ASM Development in CIPAA 2. The full grounds of judgment have yet to be released. Conclusion [54] Based on the aforesaid considerations, both the Enforcement Application in O.S. No. 112 and the Stay Application in O.S. No. 87 were allowed. [55] In the circumstances, I exercised my discretion in making no order as to costs for both applications. Dated: 26 December 2023 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge Construction Court 2 High Court Kuala Lumpur S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 87 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 112: Victoria Loi Tien Fen (Hoo Yee Huan and Kienan Yeo with her) Messrs. Shook Lin & Bok Advocates & Solicitors 20th Floor, AmBank Group Building 55, Jalan Raja Chulan 50200 Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in O.S. No. 112 and the Defendant in O.S. No. 87: Ashok Kandiah (David Soosay and Ashvinderjeet Kaur with him) Messrs. Haris Ibrahim Kandiah Partnership Advocates & Solicitors Suite 12.01, Level 12 Menara Choy Fook On Jalan Yong Shook Lin 46050 Petaling Jaya Selangor Cases, legislation and other sources referred to in the submissions by learned counsels and in the Grounds of Judgment: Cases: Aliran Asia Sdn Bhd v Astaka Padu Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 2562 ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2022] 6 MLJ 392; [2023] 1 CLJ 1 (CA) S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v. Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLRHU 939 (HC) Bumimetro Construction Sdn Bhd v Mayland Universal Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2017] MLJU 2245 CRCC Malaysia Bhd v M101 Entity Sdn Bhd and other cases [2021] MLJU 1305 Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismain Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj v. Datuk Captain Hamzah Mohd Noor & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 329 EA Technique (M) Sdn Bhd v. Malaysia Marine And Heavy Engineering Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 AMR 594 Genbina Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1933; [2020] 2 MLRH 101 Hamidah Fazilah Sdn Bhd v Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia (UTHM) [2017] 7 MLJ 274 Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd v Puteri Nusantara Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 362 (CA) Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Tri Pacific Engineering Sdn Bhd and another summons [2020] MLJU 548 S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Ireka Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v PWC Corp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 35 (CA) Kuasatek (M) Sdn Bhd v HCM Engineering Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2018] MLJU 1919 Leong Keng Chiang v Prema Bonanza Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 714 Low Cheng Soon v. TA Securities Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 CLJ 309 Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 LNS 1194 Marvesco Sdn Bhd v Apex Communications Sdn Bhd and another case [2022] MLJU 127 Mudajaya Corporation Bhd v KWSL Builders Sdn Bhd and another case [2023] MLJU 669 Ng Choon Mei v Yap Kean Hong [2021] MLJU 1096 Office 2 Go (M) Sdn Bhd v Probina Project Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 2009 Pasukhas Sdn Bhd v Empire Multiple Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2019] MLJU 1393 (HC) Perkapalan Dai Zhun Sdn Bhd v Formosa Plastics Marine Corporation & Ors and another case [2020] 1 LNS 737 S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Pinnacle Supreme Sdn Bhd v. DSG Projects Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 852 Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd (and 2 Other Originating Summonses) [2022] 1 AMR 249 (HC) Puncak Niaga Construction Sdn Bhd v Mersing Construction & Engineering Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2107 (CA) Punj Lloyd Sdn Bhd v Ramo Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2019] 11 MLJ 574 Pwc Corp Sdn Bhd v Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2018] MLJU 152; [2018] 1 LNS 163 RA Suria Sdn Bhd v Cedy Third Contracting and Trading (M) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2023] MLJU 247 Samsung C & T Corporation UEM Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2642 Samsung C&T Corporation Uem Construction JV Sdn Bhd v Eversendai Constructions (M) Sdn Bhd [2023] MLJU 2555 Seal Properties (KL) Sdn Bhb v. Wabina Constructions & Engineering Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 LNS 680 S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Skyworld Development Sdn Bhd v. Zalam Corp Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals [2019] 1 LNS 173 Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 Sun Plaza Development Sdn Bhd v. Hejingkang Sdn Bhd [2021] 1 LNS 629 Syarikat TD Sdn Bhd v Jeks Engineering Sdn Bhd and another case [2019] MLJU 1754 Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd v Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and another case [2017] MLJU 242 Uzma Engineering Sdn Bhd v. Khan Co. Ltd and another summons [2020] 1 LNS 1153 View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 22; [2019] 5 CLJ 479 Wabina Constructions & Engineering Sdn Bhd v Fulloop Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2744 YKS Enterprise Sdn Bhd v. Aspirasi Ternama Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 1697 Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd v JAKS Sdn Bhd and other cases [2022] MLJU 2734 S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Legislation: Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012, ss 5, 13,16 & 28 Rules of Court 2012, O. 1A, O. 2, O. 32, O. 69A rr. 2, 3, 4 and 5 & O. 92 r. 4 S/N 5l5yRja5REGsCRhkdhLQ7A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-05(SH)-267-06/2022

PERAYU Ithisham Noor Elahi RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

An appellate court should be slow in disturbing the sentence meted out by the learned trial judge - Unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the decisions - The learned deputy public prosecutor urged not to disturbed the sentence handed down by the learned trial judge - Having regard to the public interest as well as the gravity of the offence - Whether the sentence was manifestly excessive? - Paramount importance in the administration of criminal justice - The court below applies the correct judicial principles in the assessment of the sentence - The punishment meted out is within the sentencing trend for the same type of offence at that material time - Appropriate sentence of fifteen (15) years imprisonment to run from the date of arrest would serve its purpose – Appeal allowed - Set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and substituted to that as ordered above.

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Paduka Azman Bin AbdullahYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a7a5aa60-35e6-4759-94ac-e9b09a0f28b3&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W-05(SH)-267-06/2022 & W-05(SH)-268-06/2022 BETWEEN ITHISHAM NOOR ELAHI - APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR - RESPONDENT In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Federal Territory Criminal Trial No: WA-45B-24-03/2017 Between Public Prosecutor - Appellant And Ithisham Noor Elahi - Respondent 26/01/2024 16:46:37 W-05(SH)-267-06/2022 Kand. 29 S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORAM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, JCA AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The appellant and another individual (Muhammad Said bin A. Zamzani) were originally charged at the High Court Kuala Lumpur for the following offence: “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama dengan seorang lagi yang telah dituduh iaitu Muhammad Said bin A. Zamzani (No. KP: 960110- 05- 5191), pada 4 Oktober 2016 pada jam lebih kurang 7.00 malam, di Blok C-17-16, Flat Danau Kota, Jalan 2/23D, Off Jalan Genting Klang, Setapak, di dalam Daerah Wangsa Maju, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, dalam mencapai niat bersama, telah melakukan bunuh dengan menyebabkan kematian terhadap ABDUL AZIZ BIN SURI (NO. KP: 570715-05- 5027), dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan dibaca bersama dengan seksyen 34 Kanun yang sama." S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [2] At the conclusion of the trial, the said Muhammad Said bin A. Zamzani was acquitted and discharged. The appellant was however found guilty for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 299 of Penal Code and sentenced to seventeen (17) years of imprisonment under section 304(a) of the same Code. [3] On 5/6/2022, the appellant filed an appeal against conviction and sentence to this Court. [4] On 10/6/2022, the respondent filed an appeal against the whole of the learned trial judge decision delivered on 25/5/2022. [5] The appeal before us was heard on 5/12/2023. [6] However, at the start of the party’s submission, the learned deputy public prosecutor agreed to retract their appeal on both conviction and sentence. Consequently, the appellant also retracts its appeal on conviction and will only confined his submission on the sentence. [7] Hence, the appeal before us was only in respect of the sentence. Brief Facts [8] We shall now lay out the background facts leading to the charge as encapsulated by the High Court, with slight modifications. During the trial, the prosecution had called 19 witnesses to testify against the appellant. S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [9] PW16 (Nur Azielia Binti Abdul Aziz) was a daughter of the deceased and former wife of the appellant. She lived at Block C-17-16 at Flat Danau Kota in Setapak, Kuala Lumpur. [10] At the material time, PW16, who worked in an insurance company, stayed at the flat with two others, namely her two-year old son and her father, a taxi driver and who is the deceased named in the charges. [11] In the morning of 4/10/2016 before going to work, PW16 sent her son to a childminder at a unit on the 7th floor at the same Flat Danau Kota. In the evening, back from work and after fetching her son, she entered the front door of her flat unit at around 7.00pm. [12] Once they were both inside, she tried to switch on the lights but as it did not turn on, she proceeded to the main switch to check. At that point, from behind her, someone put his hand over her mouth. She recognized his voice as the appellant’s. She also managed to see his face. PW16 also saw another person who was wearing a face mask (covering the nose and below) got hold of her son. She later identified him as the Muhammad Said bin A. Zamzani. She also saw dark patches on the carpet which she immediately recognized were splatters of blood. [13] PW16 and her son were held captive and confined to their home by the two until 6/10/2016. On that day, the appellant took PW16 and her son out of the flat to run away with PW16 driving her car. Whilst stopping at a McDonald restaurant for a take away, PW16 drove off with her son, leaving behind the appellant who was at the purchase counter. PW16 made a police report at 3.15 pm on that 6/10/2016. S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [14] PW16 had first after her escape, telephoned her aunt (PW2) who testified that PW16 sounded terrified and panicky when the latter said someone wanted to harm her and her child. PW16 and her son then made it to the home of PW2. [15] Following the report, on the same day, a police team went to the flat at Block C-17-16, broke open the door, and found the body of the deceased in one of the rooms. The body was confirmed to be that of the deceased by his daughter, PW16, and the investigating officer (PW19). [16] The pathologist (PW12) who conducted the post mortem on the deceased concluded that the cause of death is "attributable to fatal stabbed wound to the body”, as stated in her report in P63. [17] At the end of the prosecution case, the learned High Court Judge found that a prima facie case of murder was established against the appellant. He was called upon to enter this defence on the charge. He elected to give evidence under oath. [18] At the end of the defence case, the learned trial judge found the appellant guilty and thus convicted him for the commission of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 299 punishable under section 304 (a) of the Penal Code. The appellant was accordingly sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment with effect from the date of arrest. S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 The Law on Appellate Intervention [19] The law on the appellate intervention is quite settled. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing the sentence meted out by the learned trial judge unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the decisions. The appellate court can and will interfere in the sentence imposed by the lower court if it is satisfied that any of the following four grounds are made out: (a) The sentencing judge had made a wrong decision as to the proper factual basis for the sentence; (b) There had been an error on the part of the trial judge in appreciating the material facts placed before him; (c) The sentence was wrong in principle; or (d) The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or inadequate. (See R v. Ball [1951] 35 Cr App. R 164; Loo Weng Fatt v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 SLR 313 at para [65]; Public Prosecutor v. UI [2008] 4 SLR (R) 500). [20] The Supreme Court in Mohd Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. Public Prosecutor [1987] CLJ Rep 209; [1988] 1 MLJ 167 held that:- “In assessing the length of custodial sentence, the court must look at the overall picture in perspective by considering, firstly, the gravity S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 of the type of offence committed; secondly, the facts in the commission of the offence; thirdly, the presence or absence of mitigating factors, and, fourthly, the sentences that have been imposed in the past for similar offences to determine the trend of sentencing policy, if any. The fact that a sentence of imprisonment is imposed as a deterrence does not justify the sentence in passing a sentence of greater length than what the facts of the offence warrant. The gravity of the type of offence involved must be considered in the light of the particular facts of the offence." [21] In Bhandulananda Jayatilake v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 LNS 139; [1982] 1 MLJ 83, Raja Azlan Shah A.g. LP (as His Royal Highness then was) had occasion to say:- “Is the sentence harsh and manifestly excessive? We would paraphrase it in this way. As this is an appeal against the exercise by the learned judge of a discretion vested in him, is the sentence so far outside the normal discretionary limits as to enable this court to say that its imposition must have involved an error of law of some description? I have had occasion to say elsewhere, that the very concept of judicial discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. That is quite inevitable. Human nature being what it is, different judges applying the same principles at the same time in the same country to similar facts may sometimes reach different conclusions (see Jamieson v. Jamieson [1952] AC 525, 549). It is for that reason that some very conscientious judges have thought it their duty to visit particular crimes with exemplary sentences; whilst S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 others equally conscientious have thought it their duty to view the same crimes with leniency. Therefore, sentences do vary in apparently similar circumstances with the habit of mind of the particular judge. It is for that reason also that this court has said it again and again that it will not normally interfere with sentences, and the possibility or even the probability, that another court would have imposed a different sentence is not sufficient, per se, to warrant this court's interference." Our Decisions [22] On the question of sentence, this is what the learned trial judge said: “[260] The teamed counsel for the second accused in the mitigation for his client informed this Court that he was the eldest in the family, and his parents are still depending on him for his income to support them. He was working as a security guard at a salary of RM1,500 per month. He had already been in remand for the past five years, and impressed on this Court that a long custodial sentence would be wasteful especially considering that one of the principles of sentencing is reformation of the convict. As for the commission of the offence, the second accused attributed to what he referred to as provocation and his former wife's infidelity. Nevertheless, he was a first offender with no criminal records in this country or elsewhere. [261] Learned counsel also referred to a number of previous decisions which exhibited a range of custodial sentence of between 15 years and 18 years. These included the recent aforementioned S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 case of Pubalan a/l Peremal v. Public Prosecutor [2020] 5 MLJ 442 where the murder conviction was set aside and a jail term of 15 years under Section 304 (a) was ordered instead. [262] The prosecution, in response, briefly highlighted that the crime in question was very serious. A life had been lost for no good reasons at all. Public interest must be given paramount consideration such that since the original charge was murder, the second accused was deserving of a long custodial sentence. [263] My assessment on sentencing had taken into consideration all relevant factors for the purpose of meting out the sentence. It is clear, that the seriousness of the crime committed by the second accused is a significant aggravating factor. Whilst the rampancy of such violent offences must never be taken lightly. A person has lost his life. This is irreversible. [264] And these must be weighed against mitigating factors raised by the appellant as mentioned earlier. It is also plain that this Court must be especially mindful of considerations of public interest - particularly on the need to send a signal that this crime is downright abhorrent, with emphasis on the sentencing principle of deterrence. Reference must also be made to similar cases and ensure the achievement of a pursuit of seeking a sentence that as closely as possible reflect the key sentencing objectives of retribution and reformation but also especially prevention and deterrence (see PP v. Teh Ah Cheng [1976] 2 MLJ 186). S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [265] In my judgment, the sentence to be meted out against the second accused-of 17 years' imprisonment from the date of arrest- is in consonance with a careful attempt to strike a balanced determination of the most proportionate, fair and appropriate punishment for the second accused for his conviction under Section 304(a) of the Penal Code. [266] The second accused is therefore sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 17 years from the date of his arrest under Section 304(a) of the Penal Code, for his conviction of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” [23] In mitigation, the learned counsel for the appellant pleaded for leniency from this Honourable Court and states as follows: (a) He is currently 30 years old. He was only 23 years old when he was arrested in 2016 and has been in remand for seven (7) years from the date of his arrest (18/10/2016) (b) He is the eldest child in his family. His parents who reside in Pakistan are dependent on him to support them financially given the fact that they are elderly and have difficulties to garner sufficient income for themselves. The appellant is indeed a filial son to his parents. (c) Prior to his arrest, the appellant being a foreigner in this country, was earning a measly RM1,500 as a security guard and sent part of his monthly income to his family to alleviate their financial burden. The family now wishes for the appellant to S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 return to Pakistan and continue supporting them for their expenses. (d) He is a first offender with no past criminal record in this country or elsewhere. (e) He should be given an opportunity to reform himself and turn his criminal ways around to resume a normal and useful role in society. (f) The consideration of public interest should not only reflect the abhorrence of society against the crime by imposing elements of retribution and deterrence in the sentence, but should also ensure the promotion of rehabilitation and reformation on the part of the appellant himself. (h) A long period or incarcenation would be contrary to public interest as it would impose an onerous burden on taxpayers who will have to bear the costs of the appellant’s upkeep in jail. (g) Giving the appellant lengthy term of incarceration would undoubtedly deprive his family of his presence, love and financial support. In the end, a longer term of imprisonment would inevitably make the innocent people in his life be the victims of his incarceration and would further plunge them into depths of hardship and poverty. (i) The appellant wishes to express his regret and remorse over his actions and wishes to become a better person to support S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 his family. The appellant apologises to the Court and other parties, especially the family of the victim, and promises never to repeat his mistaken ways. (j) The appellant has served almost seven (7) years of imprisonment in Malaysian prison. An unduly lengthy imprisonment sentence would have caused him severe hardship. (k) Given the circumstances of the present case and the trend of sentencing, an imprisonment term of ten (10) years from the date of arrest is appropriate. [24] On the other hand, the learned deputy public prosecutor urged this court not to disturbed the sentence handed down by the learned trial judge having regard to the public interest as well as the gravity of the offence. [25] In this regard, it is plain that the argument on the issue of whether the sentence was manifestly excessive or otherwise is not a new argument. While, we acknowledge that the punishment now imposed may not be ideal and palatable to everyone, however, is it always of paramount importance in the administration of criminal justice to see that the court below applies the correct judicial principles in the assessment of the sentence and that the punishment meted out is within the sentencing trend for the same type of offence at that material time. [26] Having carefully considered the submissions from both sides, and the facts of the present case, we are of the unanimous view that an appropriate sentence of fifteen (15) years imprisonment to run from the S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 date of arrest would serve its purpose. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the sentence imposed by the High Court and substituted to that as ordered above. Date: 16 January 2024 - sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Counsel For the Appellant : Dato' Rajpal Singh, Cik Siti Anis Che Ab Wahab [Rajpal, Firah & Vishnu] For the Respondents : Parvin Hameedah Natchiar [Deputy Public Prosecutor] S/N YKqlpY1WUeUrOmwmg8osw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

P-05(M)-577-12/2019

PERAYU Seyedmohsen Namazikivaj Seyedreza RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - 'trafficking' - ‘manufacture’ - Section 39B(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - Section 34 of the Penal Code - The essence of the accused defence was that the exhibits identified and marked before the learned Senior Assistant Registrar in the absence of the learned trial judge - The procedure not provided under 172B of the Criminal Procedure Code - The exhibits tendered are said to be inadmissible - Contravention of section 172B (2)(vi) of the Criminal Procedure Code - Case Management - The record in the Notes of Proceedings does not shows what transpired on the 18/2/2019 and 19/2/2019 - All the exhibits tendered in court, was exactly the same exhibit that was seized from the premises - The identity of the drugs and the unbroken chain of evidence is never in doubt - Neither there were serious infirmities that had caused any prejudiced or occasioned miscarriage of justice - The case for the prosecution was not based on custody or control - The act of manufacturing does not require the act of possession to be proved in order to constitute trafficking in section of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 - The prosecution can rely primarily on direct evidence of trafficking - No presumptions in section 37 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 thereof to facilitate proof of that fact or the requirement to prove the existence of possession - The appellants were involved in the manufacturing of methamphetamine - Whether possession needs to be proven in a case involving ‘manufacturing’ before the trafficking definition can be invoked? - Existed nexus between the accused and the act of ‘manufacturing’ - Noticeable odour of chemicals and the running of the fans firmly establishes not only knowledge but also a common intention of the three accused to manufacture the drugs - DNA, fingerprint lifting or even traces of drugs are only corroborative in nature when all other overwhelming evidence of manufacturing are proven.

26/01/2024

YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Dato' Hadhariah Bt Syed IsmailYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d25be39f-6642-4a47-8e8e-4207cd19ca06&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: P-05(M)-577-12/2019 BETWEEN SEYEDMOHSEN NAMAZIVAJ SEYEDREZA …. APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya at Georgetown In The State of Penang Criminal Trial No: PA-45A-59-09/2017 Between Public Prosecutor And 1. Balakrishnan a/l Jaganathan 2. Mohammad Abbasi Younes 3. SeyedMohsen Namazivaj SeyedReza 4. Lacheme Devi a/p Balasundram 26/01/2024 16:22:36 P-05(M)-577-12/2019 Kand. 94 S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: P-05 (M)-595-12/2019 BETWEEN BALAKRISHNAN A/L JAGANATHAN … APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya at Georgetown In The State of Penang Criminal Trial No: PA -45A -59-09/2017 Between Public Prosecutor And 1. Balakrishnan a/l Jaganathan 2. Mohammad Abbasi Younes 3. SeyedMohsen Namazivaj SeyedReza 4. Lacheme Devi a/p Balasundram S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: P-05 (M)-609-12-12/2019 BETWEEN MOHAMMAD ABBASI YOUNES … APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR … RESPONDENT In the Matter of the High Court of Malaya at Georgetown In The State of Penang Criminal Trial No: PA -45A -59-09/2017 Between Public Prosecutor And 1. Balakrishnan a/l Jaganathan 2. Mohammad Abbasi Younes 3. SeyedMohsen Namazivaj SeyedReza 4. Lacheme Devi a/p Balasundram S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 CORUM: HADHARIAH BINTI SYED ISMAIL, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal against the conviction and sentence of the three (3) Appellants i.e SeyedMohsen Namazivaj SeyedReza (first appellant), Balakrishnan a/l Jaganathan (second appellant) and Mohammad Abbasi Younes (third appellant) on the amended charge under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. [2] All the three Appellants were found guilty and convicted of the offence by the Penang High Court. They were each sentenced to death. [3] Being dissatisfied with the said decision, the three Appellants appeal to this court. The Charge [4] To begin with, initially there were four (4) accused charged in the High Court at Georgetown, Penang under section 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. [5] They were as follows: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 i) Balakrishnan a/l Jaganathan as the first accused; ii) Mohammad Abbasi Younes as the second accused; iii) SeyedMohsen Namazivaj SeyedReza being the third accused; and iv) Lacheme Devi a/p Balasundram being the fourth accused. [6] The original charge preferred against all the four accused reads as follows: “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 20/8/2015 jam lebih kurang 2210 hrs di premis No. 57B, Perindustrian Kecil Taman Sri Rambai, dalam Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah melakukan suatu perbuatan bagi persediaan bagi tujuan mengedar dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine seberat 48,623 gram. Oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B (1)(c) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B (2) Akta yang sama dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan." [7] At the end of the prosecution case, the learned High Court Judge found that a prima facie case of trafficking by way of manufacturing was established against all the accused and amended the charge to one of an offence under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The four accused were called upon to enter their defence on the amended charge. They elected to give evidence under oath. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [8] At the end of the defence case, the learned trial judge acquitted and discharged the 4th accused for having successfully raised a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. Whilst the present three appellants/accused were convicted and sentenced to suffer death. Against the said order, the three appellants appeal. [9] We will for convenience in this appeal, refer the three appellants in the manner they were referred to in the High Court. The Prosecution’s Case [10] The case of the prosecution was well laid out by the learned trial judge in his grounds of judgment which is reproduced herein: “1. The prosecution's evidence shows that the police had targeted a premise for surveillance at the address of 57B, Perindustrian Kecil Taman Sri Rambai, dalam Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah, Penang ("the premise"). 2. The surveillance was carried out by 2 separate teams of police officers at different times. The first team was led by ASP Mohd Suhaimi (SP7). SP7 testified that on 19/8/2015 at about 9AM he had received a tip off of drug processing taking place at the premise. 3. SP7 arrived outside the premise at 5PM on 19/8/2015 and started the surveillance from a distance of 50 to 70 meters where he could see the entrance of the premise. SP7 divided his team into a number of groups each with their respective instructions. At 5PM SP7 saw a lorry with a red head arrive at the premise. He saw an S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Indian man later identified in court as the 1st accused alighting from the lorry. The 1st accused carried out a few boxes from the lorry and brought them into the premise. The 1st accused then left the premise. 4. At about 6.41 pm the same day SP7 saw the 1st accused return to the premise in a black MyVi car bearing the registration number WVT 3454. This time the 2nd 3rd and 4th accused who were with the 1st accused alighted from the car and entered into the premise. 5. At about 9.30 pm SP7 saw the 1st and 4th accused leaving the premise and return at 10.30 pm bringing back food packets and they again entered the premise. None of the 4 accused came out of the premise that night. 6. The next morning at 6.45 am SP7 saw the 1st and 4th accused come out of the premise with the 1st accused carrying 2 black plastic bags whereas the 4th accused carried 1 plastic bag. All the plastic bags were put into the MyVi and both the 1st and 4th accused left the premise. 7. SP7 decided to follow the MyVi leaving another team to continue surveillance of the premise. SP7 tailed the MyVi car to a distance of 4 to 5 km until the car stopped at a rubbish dump container. SP7 saw the 4th accused take out the 3 plastic bags and throw into the waste dump container. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 8. SP7 retrieved the 3 plastic bags and opening the plastic bags found in 1 plastic bag which he marked as A, 5 plastic trays labelled as Phosphorous Red, in the 2nd plastic which SP7 marked as B, SP7 saw 33 transparent plastic wrappers yellowish in colour and from the 3rd plastic bag which SP7 marked as C, SP7 found a plastic hose, 1 mineral bottle and 48 bundle of plastic wrappers. 9. After retrieving the plastic bags SP7 returned to the premise and sought the assistance of Inspector Mohamad Zaidi (SP1) to continue the surveillance of the premise. SP1 and his team were the second team who continued with the surveillance after taking over from SP7 at about 8 pm. 10. Meanwhile SP7 went to the police station and lodged a police report as well as handed the items seized to the Investigating Officer (SP3). 11. At 10pm while SP1 was on duty of look out nearby the premise he saw a Volvo car bearing registration plate PGK 265 stop in front of the premise. The 1st accused alighted from the car and entered into the premise. SP1 then directed his men to standby to carry out a raid on the premise. 12. At 10.10pm the 1st accused came out of the premise prompting SP1 to spring into action and approach the 1st accused. SP1 identified himself as a police officer and detained the 1st accused. SP1 then entered the premise and went to the 1st floor and upon entering smelled a smell of acid emanating from the 1st floor as well as heard loud sound of fan rotating. SP1 also saw 3 S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 metal containers boiling some chemicals on 3 stoves. SP1 also saw 2 large exhaust fans. 13. Upon further search SP1 saw the 2nd and 3rd accused in a room on the 1st floor. All 3 accused were searched and SP1 recovered the identity card of the 1st accused as well as assortment of keys. SP1 saw a lot of items on the 1st floor and listed down all the items in the search list which was tendered in court as P10. 14. SP1 continued the search on the ground floor and found many boxes containing chemical labelled as hydraulic acid, toluene, red phosphorous and others. SP1 and his men then searched the houses using the keys found on the 1st accused. In one house Inspector Mohammed Amirullah (SP10) found the 4th accused and detained her. 15. All the items seized by SP1 and all the 4 accused were handed to SP3 on 21/8/2015 at 4am. SP3 on receiving information about the raid had already arrived at the premise at about 1.30am and had brought along the police photographers who took all the photographs on the direction of SP3 after SP1 gave details of the raid to SP3. SP3 confirmed the smell of chemical emanating at the 1st floor. SP3 also drew a sketch plan of both the ground floor as well as the 1st floor detailing out the finding of the various items in the premise. 16. On reaching the police station and after being handed over all the seized items SP3 contacted the chemistry department to get the assistance of the chemist to visit the premise. At 11AM the chemist S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 from the Chemistry Department Penang Puan Afizawati(SP4) arrived at the premise and took samples of all liquids at the premise as well as took swabs. Her finding on analysis of all samples given to her as well as items seized were reduced into her report which was tendered in court and marked as P23. SP4 on analyzing all the items as well as seeing the premise concluded that the premise was used to process the dangerous drugs methamphetamine. 17. The police forensics team also visited the premise and took samples and swabs from the premise as well as the cars used by the 1st accused and prepared a forensics report which was tendered in Court.” Findings of The Learned Trial Judge at The End of The Prosecution’s Case [11] In the instant appeal, the learned trial judge, citing various authorities, centred his findings on the four accused’s involvement in manufacture of the dangerous drug, break in chain of evidence pertaining to the seized drugs, doubt in respect of the identity of the drug produced in court and failure to consider the element of possession, etc. The learned trial judge addressed to the aforesaid issues in the following’s words: 18. The burden upon the prosecution at the end of the prosecution's case is to prove a prima facie case. 19. The judgement in Looi Kow Chai v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 2 AMR 89 the Court of Appeal held: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [26] “It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s180 of the CPC has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question: if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal." 20. One of the challenges faced by the police in this case was to seize and mark every item found on the premise which amounted to hundreds of items. Some of the items were too bulky and hazardous to be brought to the court and had to be kept in special rooms at the police storage facility. To overcome this obstacle of tendering of this item as exhibits the court decided to have a proceeding of the court at the police storage facility, to mark, label and see the items seized. This was done in the presence of all the 4 accused and their defence counsel. The whole exercise took nearly 4 hours. In the court's observation all the items were well kept with the markings of the seizing officer as well as the markings of the investigating officer and the chemist all intact. In short there is no break in the chain of evidence of the items seized and which were later sent to the chemist and finally produced before the Court. 21. In the case of Gunalan a/l Ramachandran & Ors v. PP [2004] 4 MLJ 489, the Court of Appeal decided: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 “[41] First, by way of a general observation, I am of the view that, in a drug trafficking case what is important is that it must be proved that it is the substance that was recovered that was sent to the chemist for analysis and it is that same substance that is found to be heroin or cannabis etc and it is in respect of that substance that an accused is charged with trafficking. So, the chain of evidence is more important for the period from the time of recovery until the completion of the analysis by the chemist. Even then it does not necessarily mean that if the exhibit is passed from one person to another, every one of them must be called to give evidence of the handing over from one person to another and if there is a break, even for one day, the case falls. There should be no confusion between what has to be proved and the method of proving it. What has to be proved is that it is the substance that was recovered that was analysed by the chemist and found to be heroin, cannabis etc, and it is for the trafficking of that same substance that the Accused is charged with.” “[42] The proof of the chain of evidence is only a method of proving that fact. The fact that there is a gap does not necessarily mean that that fact is not proved. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. There may be a gap in the chain of evidence. But, if for example, during that 'gap' the exhibits are sealed, numbered with identification numbers, there is no evidence of tempering, there is nothing that would give rise to a doubt that that exhibit is the exhibit that was recovered in that case and that was analysed by the chemist, S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 the fact that there is a gap, in the circumstances .of the case, may not give rise to any doubt of that fact." 22. The Court also accepted the evidence of the chemist especially on her observation visiting the premise that it was used as a place to process the dangerous drug methamphetamine. The evidence of the chemist was not shaken during cross examination and the court had no reason to disregard her testimony. 23. In this case the Court concluded that there was direct evidence of trafficking without resorting to any presumption. The raid drew a clear picture of the complicity of all the 4 accused in processing the drugs. The complicity of the 1st accused was further established by the fact that the premise belonged to a Company in which he was a Director. Being in the premise overnight with the noticeable odour of chemicals and the running of the fans firmly establishes not only knowledge but also a common intention to manufacture the drugs. 24. The Court this case also determined that another suspect in this case by the name of Hariharan who was a purported tenant of the 1st floor of the premise and not called as a witness did not raise any adverse inference against the case for the prosecution. This person even if he was a tenant was not a material witness and his non-calling did not leave any gap in the case for the prosecution. The prosecution had tendered sufficient evidence to prove on prima facie base the complicity of the 4 accused in the manufacture of the drugs. 25. The Federal Court in Amri Ibrahim & Anor v. PP [2017] 1 CLJ 617 ruled: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “[56] The issue of the non-calling of Phee Chin Guan was argued before the Court of Appeal by the defence. The Court of Appeal held inter alia that Phee Chin Guan was not an essential or material witness to the prosecution in order to establish a prima facie case at the close of its case or to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt at the end of the defence case and the non-calling of Phee Chin Guan did not leave a gap in the prosecution's case. It was also held that on the facts of the case, the learned trial judge did not err in not invoking s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the prosecution.” “[57] The power of the court to draw an adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 is discretionary. It depends on the circumstances of the case and particularly in cases where the material witnesses are not produced (see Lau Song Seng v. PP [1998] 1 SLR 663). The scope of s. 114(g) has been explained by the Supreme Court in Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221 at p. 223; [1987] 1 MLJ 492 at p. 494: ... It is essential to appreciate the scope of section 114(g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there Is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case.” S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 “[58] On the facts of the case we agree with the finding of the Court of Appeal that adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act ought not to be drawn against the prosecution for not calling Phee Chin Guan as its witness. We agree with the reasons given by the Court of Appeal.” 26. Taking into consideration the entire evidence of the prosecution the court was satisfied that the prosecution had led sufficient evidence to prove that all the 4 accused were involved in the manufacture of the dangerous drug methamphetamine and were not merely preparing to manufacture the drugs. The finding of 48,623 grams of methamphetamine together with chemicals being boiled showed that further manufacture of the drugs was taking place. The court therefore taught it fit to amend the charge as the court is authorized to do so. 27. The amended charge by the court reads: “Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 20/8/2015 jam lebih kurang 10.10 malam di No. 57B, Perindustrian Kecil Taman Sri Rambai, dalam daerah Seberang Perai Tengah, di dalam negeri Pulau Pinang, telah mengedar dengan cara pembuatan (manufacturing) dadah berbahaya jenis Methamphetamine. Oleh itu, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 39B(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 39B(2) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan." S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 28. The offence of manufacturing dangerous drugs however would not need for the element of possession to be first proved. The Court of Appeal in Lee Boon Siah & Ors v. PP [2014] 3 CLJ 584 ruled: “[32] For the proper determination of this issue, It must be borne- in mind that, as stated in s.2 of the DDA, the term ‘manufacture' includes numerous and diverse processes or procedures namely making, producing, compounding, assembling, refining or transformation of the offending drugs. For that reason, in our judgment, unlike for example the act of keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs which constitute 'trafficking' as defined in s.2 of the DDA that involve the requirement of possession, the manufacturing of dangerous drugs as in the present case does not involve possession (see: PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649; [2000] 6 MLJ 705 and Public Prosecutor v. Mansur Md Rashid & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 233; [1996] 3 MLJ 560). In other words, possession of the impugned drugs need not be proven in a case involving 'manufacturing' before the trafficking definition in s.2 of the DDA can be invoked.” 29. Upon amending the charge, the charge was read and explained to the accused and all of them still claimed trial. The defense counsel also did not avail the opportunity given by the court to recall any witnesses. The court therefore directed all the 4 accused to defend themselves on the amended charge. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 The Case for The Defence [11] The four(4) accused defence had also been summarised by the learned trial judge, and we now reproduce: “30. In his defense the 1st accused sought to shift the blame to a person whom he had rented out the 1st floor of the premise by the name of Hariharan. According to the 1st accused he was a legitimate businessman and this was supported by the fact that there were numerous sacks of gloves which he traded in kept on the ground floor. Both the 2nd and 3rd accused were his customers and had ordered a huge quantity of gloves which needed to be sorted out and packed. This was done with the assistance of the 4th accused. The 2nd and 3th Accused had used the room upstairs to await the preparation of the documentation and consignment. According to the 1st accused the 2nd and 3rd accused were not in the premise overnight but had gone back to the place they were staying via the back door. 31. The 2nd and 3rd accused echoed the entire evidence of the 1st accused and further added particulars of their business in their home country. According to them they had come to Malaysia with the sole intent of buying a huge consignment of the gloves. They had got the 1st accused contact number online and had then come to Penang from Kuala Lumpur. 32. The 4th accused testified that she was employed by the 1st accused to do cleaning of the ground floor and had never gone up to the 1st floor. She further testified that she only assisted the 1st S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 accused when he called for her. She only came to the premise on an irregular basis once a week. On the day of the police raid she admitted that she was at the premise to sort out the gloves ordered by the 2nd and 3rd accused.” Findings of The Learned Trial Judge at The Conclusion of The Trial [12] The learned trial judge then analysed the evidence of the all the four(4) accused and concluded: “36. The evidence of the all the 4 accused is hardly believable and in fact borders upon absurdity. The attempt to shift the blame to his tenant by the 1st accused was pathetic. The 1st accused could not even produce any tenancy agreement although according to him he was receiving a rental of RM3,000 a month. Even more obvious is the fact that although he had rented the premise the 1st accused did not seem to have surrendered the possession of the 1st floor as he was free to use the 1st floor which he did in this case by allowing in his own words the 2nd and 3rd accused to wait in the room above. 37. Further the strong odour of the chemicals could have alerted anyone that something was literally cooking on the 1st floor and should be investigated. The 1st accused ignored all the alarm bells and in fact even allowed his tenant to keep large consignment of chemicals on the ground floor. The 1st accused is clearly lying and the Court made a firm finding that both the ground floor and the 1st floor belonged to the 1st accused and was used by him for his illicit trade. The sacks of gloves were just a front to camouflage the manufacture of the drugs. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 38. The photographs taken by the police speaks a thousand words and show a large number of paraphernalia being used in the production of the drugs. Even a blind man could see the drugs being cooked yet the 2nd and 3rd accused sitting in the room outside of which the chemicals were boiling in the containers feigned ignorance of any knowledge. 39. The evidence of the 2nd and 3rd accused that they were in the premise for a short period of time and had gone back to their apartment is a clear lie. The evidence of the police which the Court had no reason to disbelieve was that there were a number of teams holding a surveillance of the entire surroundings of the premise yet they did not see anyone leaving even from the back door. Further the photograph shows although there is a back exit it inaccessible due to large number of boxes blocking the way to the exit. The Court gain made a firm finding of fact that all the 4 accused were in the premise throughout the night and until the time the police raided the premise. 40. The evidence of the 2nd and 3rd accused that their sole purpose of coming to Malaysia was to source for gloves is hardly convincing for a number of reasons. The 3rd accused showed a photograph of his shop in his home country and it is apparent that the shop is too small to store the number of gloves which both the 2nd and 3rd accused claim that they were purchasing. Further in their testimony although they claimed their main intention of coming to Malaysia was to source for gloves yet they spent a large number of days sightseeing. Even more puzzling is although they claim to be such big and busy businessman they have not purchased a S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 return ticket back to their country. In short, the evidence of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused is fictitious, imaginary and does not even raise an iota of doubt in the face of the overwhelming evidence led by the prosecution. 42. As to the evidence of the 4th accused her testimony that she was working only part time for the 1st accused was not challenged by the prosecution. From the fact it is clear that she was aware of what was happening at the premise. In short, she knew something was being cooked but there is a reasonable doubt in the Court's mind of whether the 4th accused knew what actually cooking was illicit drugs. The 4th accused did not come across as being very intelligent and might not have fathomed that the 1st accused was involved in illicit trade. Therefore, the Court is of the view that it is more probable that the 4th accused did not have knowledge about the manufacturing of the dangerous drugs in the premise. 44. Therefore, this Court finds the 1st, 2nd and 3rd accused guilty on the amended charge and sentences them to death by hanging per the amended charge. There is also no evidence put forward that the three the accused falls under any of the provisions pursuant to section 39B(2A) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 to be spared from a death sentence. As for the 4th accused, the Court is of the opinion that there is reasonable doubt and hereby the 4th accused is acquitted and discharged.” S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 The Appeal [13] Before us, although the petition of appeal contained several grounds, learned counsels for the first, second and third accused submitted that they will be confined to only the following grounds of appeal. The combined grounds relied on by them were: (i) The learned trial judge erred in law and fact in amending the charge proffered against the appellants from one under section 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 to one under section 39B(1)(a) of the same Act at the end of the prosecution's case. (ii) The learned trial judge erred in law and fact in finding the appellants guilty of an offence of drug trafficking by way of manufacturing under section 39B (1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 without first making an affirmative finding of possession. (iii) The learned trial judge erred in hastily dismissing the appellants' defence without having accorded maximum evaluation and adequate judicial appreciation to it. (iv) The learned trial judge erred in law and fact in finding there was a common intention between the appellants to commit an offence of drug trafficking under Section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. (v) The learned trial judge erred in law and/or fact when His Lordship convicted the appellants based upon inadmissible S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 evidence i.e., exhibits which were not identified nor marked in His Lordship's presence. The Relevant Provision of Laws (i) Section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 defines 'trafficking' as follows: In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires- “trafficking" includes the doing of any of the following acts, that is to say, manufacturing, importing, exporting, keeping, concealing, buying, selling, giving, receiving, storing, administering, transporting, carrying, sending, delivering, procuring, supplying or distributing any dangerous drug otherwise than under the authority of this Act or the regulations made under the Act; (ii) Section 2 of the of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 defines ‘manufacture’ as follows: ‘manufacture': in relation to a dangerous drug, includes- (a) the making, producing, compounding and assembling of the drug; (b) the making, producing, compounding and assembling a preparation of the drug; S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 (c) the refining or transformation of the drug into another dangerous drug; and (d) any process done in the course of the foregoing activities. (iii) Section 39B(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 reads as follows: “39B. Trafficking in dangerous drugs. (1) No person shall, on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, whether or not such other person is in Malaysia- (a) traffic in a dangerous drug; (b) offer to traffic in a dangerous drug; or (c) do or offer to do an act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in a dangerous drug." (iv) Section 34 of the Penal Code provides as follows: “When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner is if the act were done by him alone." S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Our Decision [14] Having considered the submissions of both the learned counsels and learned deputy public prosecutor and having perused the appeal records, we unanimously decide as follows: [15] The essence of the accused defence was that the exhibits identified and marked before the learned Senior Assistant Registrar in the absence of the learned trial judge is a procedure not provided under 172B of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the exhibits tendered are said to be inadmissible due to its clear contravention of section 172B (2)(vi) of the Criminal Procedure Code. [16] For ease of reference, section 172B of the Criminal Procedure Code is reproduced below: Case Management 172B. (1) A Magistrate, Sessions Court Judge or Judge of the High Court, as the case may be, shall commence a case management process within sixty days from the date of the Accused being charged and claims to be tried. (2) At the case management, the Magistrate, Sessions Court Judge or Judge shall - (i) take into consideration all matters that have been considered and agreed to by the Accused and his advocate and the prosecution during the pre-trial conference; and where a plea S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 bargaining has been agreed between the accused and his advocate and the prosecution during the pre-trial conference, the Magistrate or the Sessions Court Judge or the Judge trying the case shall decide on the voluntariness of the accused in the plea bargaining according to the provisions of section 172c; (ii) where no pre-trial conference has been held on the ground that the accused is unrepresented, discuss with the accused and the prosecution any matter which would have been considered under section 172a; (iii) assist an accused who is unrepresented to appoint an advocate to represent the accused;determine the duration of the trial; (iv) subject to subsection (3), fix a date for the commencement of the trial; (v) subject to the consent of the accused and his advocate, and the prosecution, admit any exhibits; and (vii) give directions on any other matter as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (3) A subsequent case management, if necessary, may be held not less than two weeks before the commencement of the trial. (4) The trial shall commence not later than ninety days from the date of the accused being charged. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 (5) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (4), a failure for the case management or the trial to commence according to the time period specified in the subsections shall not (a) render the charge or prosecution against the accused as defective or invalid; or (b) be considered as a ground for appeal, review or revision. (6) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Evidence Act 1950, all matters that have been reduced into writing and duly signed by the accused, his advocate and the prosecution under subsection 172A(5) shall be admissible in evidence at the trial of the accused. [17] To answer those questions, it plainly requires us to closely examined the Notes of Proceedings in its entirety. [18] On 23/1/2019, the learned trial judge had exercised his power under section 172B(2)(vi) of the Criminal Procedure Code to allow the prosecution's application to have certain exhibits identified and marked at the storeroom located at Seberang Perai Utara, Kepala Batas, in view of the voluminous exhibits seized from the arrest. “Mahkamah: Ya ok. Untuk tujuan PTC pagi ini, saya ingat bolehkah pihak-pihak bersetuju tentang saksi dan juga dokumen. Barang kes fizikal terlalu banyak. TPR: Ya Yang Arif. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Mahkamah: Tak apa you buat yang ini dulu. Saya akan putuskan sama ada dan adalah permohonan DPP untuk pergi ke mana, balai ka? TPR: Pergi ke Stor Terkumpul di SPU (Seberang Perai Utara) di Kepala Batas. Mahkamah: Untuk melihat itu, tak boleh bawa sini, terlalu banyak? TPR: Satu terlalu banyak. The other one is hazardous Yang Arif sebab dia disimpan di bilik khas dekat bahan-bahan kimia. Mahkamah: Ok untuk sementara ini seperti yang saya kata, saya akan putuskan first case ditetapkan bulan depan. TPR: Ya Yang Arif. Mahkamah: Boleh buat arrangement ka since jurubahasa ada dengan tertuduh mungkin boleh pergi tengahari ini. TPR: Tengahari ini Yang Arif.? Mahkamah: Ya. Boleh buat persediaan untuk pergi tengahari ini because tak ada masa lain kerana bulan depan bicara. You buat persediaan pergi kalau tengahari boleh, saya nak pergi tengahari ini. TPR: Saya akan cuba tanya kepada IO. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Mahkamah: Yang lain buat sekarang, yang ptc lain buat sekarang. TPR: Boleh Yang Arif. Mohon tangguh sebentar. (see Notes of Proceedings dated 23/1/2019, pages 3-4, Vol. 2A Records of Appeal, Enclosure 17). [19] Having allowed the said application, the learned trial judge had further directed the following: (a) A case management be fixed on 18/2/2019 and 19/2/2019 to facilitate the identification and marking of the exhibits at the storeroom. (b) List of Exhibits be prepared during the identification and marking of the exhibits at the storeroom at Seberang Perai Utara, Kepala Batas. TPR: Untuk makluman Yang Arif, barang - barang kes ini masih belum disusun. Mahkamah: Kalau macam itu, you sediakan list ekshibit fizikal dan sediakan ekshibit itu untuk mahkamah melawat tempat itu atau pergi ke tempat itu so apa tarikh yang dicadangkan because saya nak dibuat sebelum tarikh bicara." TPR: 18,19 of Februari Yang Arif. Saya cadangkan untuk dua tarikh jika dapat siapkan satu hari because that date dates had been fixed before. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Mahkamah: 18 saya ada kes kan. So okay ini saya akan tetapkan 18hb Februari yang sesuai untuk semua pihak tapi saya akan tetapkan pada 2.30 petang so you buat arrangement 2.30 petang kita akan pergi ke tempat itu. Semua pihak termasuk tertuduh. So TP kena issue untuk mereka pergi ke tempat itu satu hari dah cukup untuk tengok saja kan. TPR: Saya takut peguam nak tengok marking tandaan-tandaan pada barang kes ini. Yang Arif setakat ini tandaan barang kes dadah saja yang boleh bawa ke mahkamah, barang- barang kes lain tak boleh Yang Arif. Mahkamah: 18 saya akan hadir sendiri ke tempat itu, tapi 19 tak perlu saya akan hantar SAR tapi kalau 19 masa pagi kalau SAR boleh pergi dia akan pergi daripada pagi lah. Untuk 19 saya tetapkan 10 pagi. TPR: 19, 10 pagi dan 18, 2.30 petang. Mahkamah: Ya TPR: Baik Yang Arif. (see Notes of Proceedings dated 23/1/2019, page 7, Vol. 2A Records of Appeal, Enclosure 17). [20] From the Notes of Proceedings, the learned trial judge had clearly stated that he will be present for the case management to have the S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 exhibits identified, marked and admitted as exhibits at the storeroom located at Seberang Perai, Kepala Batas. Unfortunately, the record in the Notes of Proceedings does not shows what transpired on the 18/2/2019 and 19/2/2019 at the said location. Hence, we are not in the position to exactly say what had actually transpired during the case management on these two scheduled dates. [21] Thus, it will not be correct for us to made assumption that the learned trial judge was not present on these two dates as submitted by the learned counsels. Be that as it may, from our examination of all the exhibits tendered in court, we find that it was exactly the same exhibit that was seized from the premises. To our mind the identity of the drugs and the unbroken chain of evidence is never in doubt. The chemist, SP4 had also identified each and every exhibit during the course of the trial before the learned trial judge. [22] To support our view in this regard, perhaps reference can also be made to the Notes of Proceedings at page 15 Vol. 2A Records of Appeal, Enclosure 17, where SP4 in evidence in chief said: TPR: Yang Arif, semua barang-barang ekshibit ini telah ditandakan semasa di Stor Barang Kes sebelum ini. Mahkamah: Ya, saya ingat semua peguambela bersetuju dengan pengecaman barang ini adalah mencukupi. Peguambela OKT-OKT: Ya S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [23] Their concession in this case undoubtedly speak volume. Now, before us, the learned counsels for the accused had also fairly, and quite properly conceded that the tendering and marking of all the items seized at the police storage facility was done in their presence and witness by all the four accused persons. [24] Having view the whole of the Notes of Proceeding and the evidence objectively and from all angles, we can safely say that the present complaint raised about the exhibits which were not properly identified nor marked in the learned trial judge’s presence have been over -emphasized, truly unacceptable and merely an afterthought. Neither there were serious infirmities that had caused any prejudiced or occasioned miscarriage of justice to all the accused. Hence, the learned counsels’ complaint on this ground of appeal is bereft of any merit. [25] Learned counsels next attacked the finding of the learned trial judge when he found the accused guilty offence of drug trafficking by way of manufacturing under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 without first making an affirmative finding of possession and the learned trial judge failure to do so amounted to a misdirection warranting appellate intervention. [26] To fortify this finding, we can do no better than referring to the learned trial judge’s discussion on this issue. In short, this is what he says: [28] The offence of manufacturing dangerous drugs however would not need for the element of possession to be first proved. The Court of Appeal in Lee Boon Siah & Ors v. PP [2014] 3 CLJ 584 ruled: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 “[32] For the proper determination of this issue, It must be borne in mind that, as stated in s.2 of the DDA, the term ‘manufacture' includes numerous and diverse processes or procedures namely making, producing, compounding, assembling, refining or transformation of the offending drugs. For that reason, in our judgment, unlike for example the act of keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs which constitute 'trafficking' as defined in s.2 of the DDA that involve the requirement of possession, the manufacturing of dangerous drugs as in the present case does not involve possession (see: PP v. Chia Leong Foo [ 2000] 4 CLJ 649; [2000] 6 MLJ 705 and Public Prosecutor v. Mansor Md Rashid & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 233; [1996] 3 MLJ 560). In other words, possession of the impugned drugs need not be proven in a case involving 'manufacturing' before the trafficking definition in s.2 of the DDA can be invoked.” [27] To this, perhaps we should add that the case for the prosecution was not based on custody or control thereby invoking the notion of men rea possession of the said drugs or attracting the presumption of possession and knowledge under section 37(d) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 or invoking the presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) of the same Act. We are mindful that before any act of trafficking within the definition of trafficking under section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 could be invoked, possession of the drug in question has to be proved. Augustine Paul J (as he then was) in PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2006] 6 MLJ 705, said: “It must be observed that most of the acts that constitute ‘trafficking’ as defined in s2 of the Act like, for example, keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying drugs involve the prerequisite S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 element of possession…… It follows that a person cannot keep, conceal, store, transport, or carry dangerous drugs within the meaning of ‘trafficking’ in the Act without being in possession of them.” [28] However, in the instant appeal, the act of manufacturing does not require the act of possession to be proved in order to constitute trafficking in section 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The reason is obvious which we will deal with now. [29] Gleaning from the entire evidence, we hold that when the learned trial judge at the end the prosecution case amended the charge to one of trafficking by way of manufacturing under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, there is certainly no necessity for the learned trial judge to first make an affirmative finding of possession. [30] At the risk of repeating, it is significant to remember that for an offence of trafficking by way of manufacturing, generally the laws does not imposes an obligation on the prosecution to prove possession of the impugned drugs to constitute ‘trafficking’ within the meaning of section 2 of the of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. Thus, the prosecution can rely primarily on direct evidence of trafficking to prove their case against the accused on the amended charge as there are no presumptions in section 37 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 thereof to facilitate proof of that fact or the requirement to prove the existence of possession. Hence, we find that the learned trial judge had not committed any appealable error in his decision for failing to make a definite finding of possession when he ordered the accused to enter their defence on the amended charge. Upon subjecting the entire evidence, we are satisfied that the first, second and S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 third accused had failed to exonerate themselves from their involvement in the trafficking of the impugned drugs. [31] As decided by authorities, most of the acts of trafficking, other than buying, selling, manufacturing and supplying, would invariably involve the essential element of possession of the dangerous drugs. In the case of Lee Boon Siah (supra) (affirmed by the Federal Court on 26/1/2015 in Lee Boon Siah & Ors v. PP Criminal Appeal No.: (05-182-08/2013), the facts showed that all the five appellants were jointly charged and tried together for trafficking in 29,460.17gram of methamphetamine with common intention, an offence in contravention of section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. They were arrested at the factory, which is said to be a drug manufacturing setting and clandestine drug laboratory. [32] The Court of Appeal found that the appellants were working at the said factory premise and that they are not there by accident. Though there was no eye witness who say that any of the appellants were in the act of manufacturing, there were pieces of evidence that incriminated the appellants. Chemical materials and other items that are needed to produce methamphetamine were discovered. The clothes they were wearing had stains of the same drugs found. Toothbrush, canned food, instant noodles, pillows and blankets were found. These show that the appellants was in the said factory during the day and night. All of which lead the Court of Appeal to hold that the appellants were involved in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. They were convicted and sentenced to death. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [33] The Court of Appeal speaking through Azahar Mohamed JCA (as he then was), in a great detailed judgment held among others as follows: [32] For the proper determination of this issue, it must be borne in mind that, as stated in s. 2 of the DDA, the term 'manufacture' includes numerous and diverse processes or procedures namely making, producing, compounding, assembling, refining or transformation of the offending drugs. For that reason, in our judgment, unlike for example the act of keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs which constitute 'trafficking' as defined in s. 2 of the DDA that involve the requirement of possession, the manufacturing of dangerous drugs as in the present case does not involve possession (see: PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649; [2000] 6 MLJ 705 and Public Prosecutor v. Mansur Md Rashid & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 233; [1996] 3 MLJ 560). In other words, possession of the impugned drugs need not be proven in a case involving 'manufacturing' before the trafficking definition in s. 2 of the DDA can be invoked. [34] Moving on, in Keong Gim Chye v. PP & Anor Appeal [2018] 1 LNS 592, the appellants were jointly charged and tried in the High Court at Penang with two offences of trafficking in dangerous drugs under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952 (‘the Act’) read with section 34 of the Penal Code. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned JC found both the appellants guilty and convicted them on both the charges. They were then sentenced to the mandatory death penalty prescribed under the Act. In dealing with the complaint of the offence of trafficking by way of ‘manufacturing’ the Court of Appeal held that once manufacturing S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 setting is proved, it is no longer incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the element of possession. [35] Kamardin Hashim JCA (as he then was), delivering the grounds of judgment of the court said: “[27] We agree with the learned JC’s findings at pages 16-21 of the Appeal Record Volume 1 regarding the same issue which we reproduce below: [25] SP2, the chemist, testified that from his examination of the house and the implements and articles found in there, the house were being used to manufacture Methamphetamine and to conduct a “heroin cutting process” in order to reduce the purity of its content. [29] From his analysis of the liquid discovered in the apparatus in the rooms, SP2 confirmed they contained amongst others, iodine, chloroform, ethanol, caffeine, diethyl ether, chloroquine and methanol. SP2 said that iodine and phosphorous were some of the ingredients used to produce Methamphetamine. SP2 also said that chloroform, ethanol and methanol were organic reagents needed to produce chemical reaction while caffeine, chloroquine were substances used to add into heroin in order to reduce its purity. [30] The above evidence clearly showed that the house was used for the manufacturing of dangerous drugs.” [33] In Public Prosecutor v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 6 MLJ 705, it was held: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 “It must be observed that most of the acts that constitute ‘trafficking’ as defined in s. 2 of the Act like, for example, keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs involve the prerequisite element of possession unlike, for instance, the sale and supply of dangerous drugs which need not necessarily involve possession as demonstrated by Pendakwa Raya v. Mansor bin Mohd Rashid & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 5560. It making, producing, compounding, assembling, refining or transformation of the offending drugs. For that reason, in our judgment, unlike for example the act of keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs which constitute ‘trafficking’ as defined in s. 2 of the DDA that involve the requirement of possession, the manufacturing of dangerous drugs as in the present case does not involve possession (see: PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649; [2000] 6 MLJ 705 and Public Prosecutor v. Mansur Md Rashid & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 233; [1996] 3 MLJ 560). In other words, possession of the impugned drugs need not be proven in a case involving ‘manufacturing’ before the trafficking definition in s. 2 of the DDA can be invoked. (Emphasis added). [37] From a distillation of the above-mentioned authorities, unlike those cases which involve the act of keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs which constitute ‘trafficking’ as defined in s.2 of the DDA that involve the requirement of proving possession, in the case of manufacturing under section 2, it is unnecessary for the prosecution to prove possession. In any event, possession could be inferred from the circumstances of the instant case. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [38] What is evident from the facts of the case, was that there was no one else besides both accused who were in the house at the time of the raid by the police. The prosecution evidence also indicated that at the time of the raid, the first accused was seen running downstairs and toward the direction of the back door while the second accused was arrested while trying to escape from the upstairs balcony. [39] The forensic evidence which revealed DNA profiles consistent with both accused persons on a face mask, towel and jeans found at the house further established their presence at the house. The fact that there was no forensic evidence found on other items for example, fingernails clippings did not prejudice the prosecution case in the light of the other overwhelming evidence. [40] There were various equipment and instruments for manufacturing drugs found in the rooms upstairs. Drugs of various types were also found there. The chemist, SP2, visited the house on 13.5.2011 at around 5.10 p.m. and carried out an examination of the house. He confirmed that the house was used to process Methamphetamine and to “cut” the drugs which is a process used to dilute the thickness of Heroin.” His Lordship then continued: “[28] Once manufacturing setting is proven, it is no longer incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the element of possession as was decided in Chia Leong Foo, supra. In Lee Boon Siah & Ors, supra, this Court reiterate the position in Chia Leong Foo, supra, as follows: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [31] It is true, as argued by learned counsel for the all the accused persons, that there was no eye witness who saw any of the accused persons in the act of making, producing, compounding, assembling or refining the impugned drugs. Still in our judgment, even without the evidence, there were a number of pieces of evidence as we have enumerated above that incriminated all the five accused persons in the commission of the offence. All of which leads us to conclude that all the five accused had knowledge and were involved in the manufacturing of methamphetamine because they were in a drug manufacturing setting in the factory premise. The clothes of all the accused persons, toothbrush as well as canned food and instant noodles were found in the middle room at the lower floor. A total of eight mattresses and pillows were also found. These show that they were in the said factory during the day and night. According to PW5, all the accused persons were in a state of fright and their clothing were in disarray, as if they had just completed carrying out some work. All the five accused persons were working in the said factory premise and that they were not there by accident. They were participants in the making and producing methamphetamine in the said factory. All this admissible circumstantial evidence when taken together, irresistibly and unmistakably lead to the conclusion that the five accused persons were actively involved in the manufacturing of methamphetamine in the said factory. As the Court of Appeal said in Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1960] 1 LNS 40; [1960] MLJ 296, circumstantial evidence should be such that when you look at all the surrounding circumstances, you find such a series of undersigned, unexpected coincidences that, as a reasonable person, you find your judgment is compelled to one conclusion. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 [32] For the proper determination of this issue, it must be borne in mind that, as stated in s. 2 of the DDA, the term ‘manufacture’ includes numerous and diverse processes of procedures namely making, producing, compounding, assembling, refining or transformation of the offending drugs. For that reason, in our judgment unlike for example the act of keeping, concealing, storing, transporting and carrying dangerous drugs which constitute ‘trafficking’ as defined in s. 2 of the DDA that involve the requirement of possession, the manufacturing of dangerous drugs as in the present case does not involve possession (see: PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649; [2000] 6 MLJ 705 and Public Prosecutor v. Mansur Md Rashid & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 233; [1996] 3 MLJ 560). In other words, possession of the impugned drugs need not be proven in a case involving ‘manufacturing’ before the trafficking definition in s. 2 of the DDA can be invoked.”. [36] With respect, this ground of appeal too has no merits. [37] However, before concluding on this critical issue of whether possession needs to be proven in a case involving ‘manufacturing’ before the trafficking definition can be invoked, our attention had been drawn to the case of Chan Wei Loon v. PP & Anor Appeal [2021] 6 CLJ 623 which the learned counsels had relied heavily on where the Federal Court in overturning the convictions and unanimously acquitted the appellants reiterated that trite law requires a trial judge to firstly consider and make findings vis-a-vis 'possession' in cases where the charge is one of trafficking by way of 'manufacturing' under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. Zaleha Yusof FCJ (as she then was) speaking on behalf of three judges of the Federal Court held as follows: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 “[77] Looking at the DDA 1952 further, the word "manufacturing" or the definition of ''manufacturer" under s.2 of the DDA 1952 is used as a verb. Verbs have traditionally been defined as words that show action or state of being. What it means, if a person is charged with manufacturing the dangerous drugs, it is the duty of the prosecution to provide that at the time of the police raid, the Accused person is in action, namely, is engaged in the acts of "manufacture" as defined by s.2 of the DDA 1952; for example, he was in the act of producing or making or refining the drugs. The evidence of such act must be there. This is what happened in Ong Hooi Beng, supra, and even Lee Boon Siah, supra. [78] Generally, we are of the view that possession is an essential ingredient to be proved for manufacturing cases. But of course, there will always be exceptions depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. For example, when an Accused person is caught giving instruction to others to process the drugs when he himself is not having the drugs on his body or not touching the machine. His presence there is not mere presence but for the purpose of manufacturing the drugs. The nexus is there, or as in the case of Lim Son Heng, supra, even though the Accused was not caught in action, based on the facts and circumstances of the case, he was still found to be in possession of all things inside the premises. [85] We are of the view that where the appellants were actually arrested in this case was extremely important to appreciate, as unlike the factual matrix in Lee Boon Siah, supra, it is doubtful S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 whether they actually had control and custody of the items found on the ground floor if they were caught or arrested on the first floor. [88] In the light of the contradictions inherent in the prosecution evidence, we could not but agreed with learned counsel for the appellants that there was grave doubt on the question of whether the appellants were arrested on the first or ground floor of the said premises and the benefit of the doubt ought to be resolved in favour of the appellants. [90] Our view is clear. The case of Lee Boon Siah, supra, and the case of Ong Hooi Beng, supra can readily be distinguished from the instant case. In those two cases, the present of the drugs on the appellants’ persons was a key element which provided the nexus between the appellants and the preparatory act of processing the drug. In consequence, they were arrested while they were engaging in the act of manufacturing. While in the instant appeal, there were no traces of drugs found on the persons of the appellant at the material time when they were caught. There were also no traces of drugs on their nails or clothes they were wearing then. There was also no evidence of the processing of the drugs found then, not even by the chemist. Therefore, we could not find any nexus between the appellants and the act of manufacturing. [95] We could not find any nexus to connect the appellant with the act of manufacturing. To reiterate, in our view, whether or not possession is necessary ingredients to be proven in a case involving manufacturing of dangerous drugs, would depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this instant appeal based on S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 the facts and circumstances on when and how the appellants were arrested, we were of unanimous view that possession needs to be proven. Unfortunately, the prosecution in our view had failed to do so. The courts below in our view had misdirected themselves by way of non-directions in not considering the ingredient of possession. [96] On the totality of the evidence before us, we found that the conviction on the first charge on this ground alone was unsafe. We need not consider the other issues. We therefore allowed the appeal of both the appellants on the first charge and quashed the conviction as ordered by the High Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and set aside the sentence of death. Consequently, we ordered both the appellants to be acquitted and discharged on the first charge. [97] On the second charge, for the purpose of appeal before us, the second charge was only against the first appellant. It was the learned trial judge’s finding that the premises of the second charge was used to store the drugs I manufactured in the first charge: [98] Learned counsel for the first appellant submitted that as premises in for the second charge was purportedly used to store the drugs purportedly manufactured by the first appellant, if the first charge against the first appellant fails, the second charge must also fail and the second charge against the first appellant must be reduced to mere possession. [99] We found merit in this argument. Especially so when there were other occupants in the house at the time of the raid. Hence, on the second charge, we quashed the conviction, set aside the sentence S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 of death under sub-s.39B(2) against the first appellant and substituted for an offence punishable under sub-s.12(3) of the DDA 1952. After taking into consideration the mitigation put forward by the first appellant, we sentenced the first appellant to imprisonment for a period of five years with effect from the date of arrest.” [38] In this context, it is significant to emphasise that the Federal Court in Chan Wei Loon (supra) had acknowledged that possession can be relevant in some manufacturing cases while not in others. The Federal Court held that there has been an exception for manufacturing cases as decided in Lee Boon Siah (supra), Ong Hooi Beng (supra) and Keong Gim Chye (supra). In these cases, the Court held that there was sufficient evidence to show that the accused persons were participants in the process of manufacturing dangerous drugs. [39] In these regards, we find ourselves in agreement with the learned deputy public prosecutor when he submitted that the case of Chan Wei Loon’s case is distinguishable and therefore has no application in the present case. [40] To recapitulate, in Chan Wei Loon the drugs and the apparatus were found on the ground floor. It was unclear whether the appellants were arrested in the first floor or the ground floor. The raiding officer in his police report (D184) stated that the appellants were arrested in the first floor, while the defence’s story was that they were arrested on the upper floor. However, during trial, he said that the appellants were arrested on the ground floor. The original charge reads "Lot 185-1" which was the addressed of the first floor of the shop house. This address was amended to "Lot 185" only after the prosecution had called 16 witnesses. The S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 Federal Court held that it was doubtful whether the appellants had possession of the drugs and other apparatus. The apex court had decided as such in light of D184 and the sudden amendment to the charge. Further, there were no traces of drugs found on the appellants at the material time when they were caught. [41] However, in the instant appeals, the three accused were arrested while they were engaging in the act of manufacturing. Support for this on- going manufacturing activities of methamphetamine can be found in the testimony of SP1 during the operation and we now reproduced (Notes of Proceedings dated 27/6/2019, pages 94-95 Vol.2A Records of Appeal, Enclosure 17). “Saya bersama pasukan serbuan lapan naik ke tingkat atas dan semasa perjalanan ke tingkat tersebut, saya telah mencium bauan yang menusuk hidung, bau asid dan bunyi deruman kipas yang sangat kuat di tingkat atas tersebut. Apabila sampai di tingkat atas, saya telah melihat tiga bekas aluminium yang bertangkai berada di atas dapur elektrik yang terpasang dengan keadaan ketiga-tiga bekas aluminium bertangkai itu ada cecair yang sedang mendidih dan saya juga melihat dua kipas besar sedut udara sedang terpasang yang diubahsuai di dinding premis tersebut untuk menyedut udara keluar daripada ruang tamu tingkat atas rumah tersebut. Kemudiannya saya melihat dua lelaki berada dalam bilik di bahagian atas itu seterusnya saya terus mengarahkan tangkapan dibuat ke atas kedua-dua lelaki tersebut yang pada masa tersebut saya syaki lelaki warganegara timur tengah dan setelah tangkapan dibuat ke S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 atas suspek. Suspek yang pertama yang ditangkap dibawah dikenali sebagai Balakrishnan, yang ditangkap di bilik pertama tingkat atas Mohd Abassi dan Mohamed Namazi, kedua-dua pada masa tersebut secara lisan Yang Arif, yang ditangkap di bahagian atas. Seterusnya saya melakukkan pemeriksaan badan tiada barang salah dijumpai dan saya seterusya menjalankan pemeriksaan yang menyeluruh di tingkat atas tersebut yang mana di ruang tamu tingkat atas tersebut saya telah jumpai pelbagai peralatan dan juga termasuk bahan kimia yang mana rampasan yang saya buat di tingkat atas itu saya tandakan sebagai A di setiap item yang luar seterusnya kotak saya telah tandakan sebagai A1 sehingga A61 Yang Arif. Semua item yang berada di kawasan ruang tamu di luar bilik dan di ruang tamu tersebut juga saya tandakan ke atas tandaan L yang mana L1 hingga L5 adalah melibatkan kepada bekas aluminium yang mempunyai cecair yang mendidih dan L1A merujuk kepada dapur elektrik yang sedang terpasang. Seterusnya bekas kedua saya tandakan sebagai L2, dapur elektrik L2A dan bekas aluminium bertangkai L3, dapur bertangkai L3A. Seterusnya L4 saya tandakan pada satu bekas plastik/tong besar warna biru, satu bekas plastik besar bertudung hijau yang dalamnya mempunyai cecair disyaki dadah jenis syabu anggaran berat 150.4 kg Yang Arif. L5 saya tandakan pada bekas biru bertudung biru juga mempunyai cecair disyaki dadah jenis syabu anggaran berat 120.10kg, seterusnya saya membuat pemeriksaan dalam bilik yang tangkap suspek yang disyaki warganegara timur tengah tadi.” S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 [42] SP4, testified and we now reproduced (Notes of Proceedings dated 21/3/2019, pages 20 - 21 Vol. 2A Records of Appeal, Enclosure 17). TPR: Boleh puan maklumkan apa dapatan yang puan boleh buat hasil pemeriksaan dan tempat kejadian ini puan. SP4: Saya dapati di premis tersebut bahan-bahan dan juga kelengkapan yang ada disitu adalah kelengkapan dan bahan-bahan yang kebiasaannya digunakan untuk memproses dadah methapathime, Yang Arif. Mahkamah: Ok TPR: Dan dapatan puan berdasarkan apa puan. SP4: Dapatan saya adalah berdasarkan analisa saya dan penglihatan saya Yang Arif. TPR: Dan puan maklumkan hasil pemeriksaan puan seperti Perenggan 11 puan maklumkan terdapat cecair hidroklorik asid. Saya rujuk kepada Perenggan 11A-1. Ada juga cecair toluene. Betul. SP4: Betul Yang Arif. TPR: Ada juga red phosphorus, manik yang berwarna putih iaitu sodium hidroksid asidton, selain daripada asid hidroklorik dan juga kesan methapathime. Boleh puan terangkan apa S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 fungsi untuk setiap cecair dan juga manik putih sodium hidroksid, satu persatu.Boleh. SP4: Asid hidroklorik, toluene, red phosphorus, dan sodium hidroside dan juga asothon digunakan untuk memproses bahan asas P-2P untuk menjadi methapathime, Yang Arif. Mahkamah: Apa dia? SP4: Phenyl-2-Propanone, Yang Arif. Mahkamah: Ini adalah bahan asas untuk methapathime. SP4: Ya, Yang Arif [43] Stretching the matter a little further, SP4 during cross examination had this to say: SP4: …. bagi saya bahan kimia dan juga peralatan yang ada di situ telah mencukupi untuk menyatakan bahawa premis tersebut digunakan untuk memproses dadah methamphetamine Yang Arif. TPR: Cukup untuk apa puan. SP4: Telah mencukupi untuk menyatakan bahawa tempat tersebut digunakan untuk memproses dadah methamphetamine Yang Arif. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 [44] To sum up, based on the evidence, facts and circumstances of the instant case, it is crystal clear that the present appeals fall under the exception as decided in the case of Chan Wei Loon. Far from casting any doubt that there existed nexus between the accused and the act of ‘manufacturing’, evidences presented clearly shows that the three accused were involved in trafficking the drugs in question. [45] Regarding common intention, we accept that it is virtually impossible to directly prove a pre-arranged plan between the accuseds. Common intention is a question of fact. The proof of common intention is the matter of inference from the circumstances. It is derived from the conduct of the three accused. This inference of their involvement in the manufacturing of methamphetamine in the said factory can be gathered when the three accused were seen together before the premises were raided. They were not there by accident or coincidence. The three accused were arrested at the premise. There was more than credible evidence that can be inferred that the three accused acted in concert or were participant in the manufacturing setting of methamphetamine in the said factory. All these acts when combined together proved the nexus between the three accused persons and the dangerous drugs exhibits seized. With the noticeable odour of chemicals and the running of the fans firmly establishes not only knowledge but also a common intention of the three accused to manufacture the drugs. We are with the learned trial judge. [46] There are many celebrated cases in this area of the law. Suffice for us to refer to a few leading local authorities. Way back in 1983, Hashim Yeop A Sani J (as he then was) in PP v. Dato’ Mokhtar Hashim [1983] 1 CLJ 138; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 721 at p.749 held as follows: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 “Under section 34 of the Penal Code, to succeed the prosecution must prove that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan or arrangement. In practice it is of course difficult to produce direct evidence to prove the intention of an individual. In most cases, however, it can be inferred from his act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case. (see Mahbub Shah v. King Emperor [1945] 72 I.A. 148,153).” Then, His Lordship continued: Thus, it is clear that the leading feature of section 34 of the Penal Code is the element of participation in action. Two preliminary elements are in fact necessary to fulfil the requirement of section 34. First, there must be evidence (direct or by inference) the Accused was present at the scene of the crime. Secondly, there must be evidence to show that there was prior concert or prearranged plan involving the Accused. This is logical because how can there be participation without physical presence. Even passive participation may require physical presence.” [47] In somewhat similar situation, the Supreme Court in Namasiyiam Doraisamy v. PP & Other Cases [1987] 1 CLJ 540; [1987] 2 MLJ 336 speaking through Syed Agil Barakbah SCJ (as he then was) set out the law to be applied on the question of common intention. The words still ring in our ear where His Lordship said (at pages 344-345): “In law, common intention requires a prior meeting of the minds and presupposes some prior concert. Proof of holding the same intention or of sharing some other intention, is not enough. There must be S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 proved either by direct or by circumstantial evidence that there was (a) a common intention to commit the very offence of which the Accused persons are sought to be convicted and (b) participation in the commission of the intended offence in furtherance of that common intention. Where the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances which are proved must be such as necessarily lead only to that inference. Direct evidence of a prior plan to commit an offence is not necessary in every case because common intention may develop on the spot and without any long interval of time between it and the doing of the act commonly intended. In such a case, common intention may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the Accused. (see the Supreme Court (of India) on Criminal Law 1950-1960 by J.K Soonavala page 188 to 193).” [48] The accused further complained that no DNA, fingerprint evidence or traces of drugs were found on either accused. It was argued that these essential facts are confirmed by the prosecution which show the absence of link between the accused and the impugned drugs. With respect, we are constrained to say that the argument is entirely fallacious. In whatever way one look at it, it does seem a little bit far-fetched. It is salutary to emphasis here that DNA, fingerprint lifting or even traces of drugs are only corroborative in nature when all other overwhelming evidence of manufacturing are proven. Here again, as we have indicated, there is ample evidence connecting the three accused with the commission of the offence rendering the forensic evidence to be of little relevant. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 [49] In Yeo Kwee Huat v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 5 CLJ 630, the Court of Appeal speaking through Sulaiman Daud HMR (as he then was) held as follows: “[31] Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa kotak kek P13 dan kedua- dua bungkusan plastik asal dadah yang dipersoalkan (P14A dan P14B) telah dihantar untuk pengesanan cap jari tetapi tiada penimbulan cap jari yang positif dikesan pada ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut. Atas alasan ini, peguam terpelajar perayu menghujahkan ketiadaan cap jari pada ekshibit-ekshibit tersebut turut menjejaskan kes pendakwaan. Kami mendapati tiada merit mengenai penghujahan sedemikian. Tujuan untuk menimbulkan cap jari pada sesuatu ekshibit adalah untuk menentukan identiti pesalah atau orang yang pernah mengendalikan ekshibit tersebut. Dalam kes sekarang ini tidak dipertikaikan bahawa semasa ditahan perayu sedang membawa beg P15 yang di dalamnya terdapat kotak kek P13 yang mengandungi dadah yang dipersoalkan. Oleh itu tiada keraguan bahawa dia mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan ke atas beg serta kotak kek dan dadah yang terkandung di dalamnya. Setelah elemen jagaan atau kawalan ini terbukti, maka anggapan di bawah s.37(d) terpakai bagi menunjukkan milikan atau pengetahuan. Oleh itu kami mendapati ketiadaan kesan cap jari pada ekshibit- ekshibit tersebut tidak langsung menjejaskan kes pendakwaan, lebih-lebih lagi setelah menolak watak “Peter” yang dikatakan oleh perayu orang yang memasukkan kotak kek tersebut ke dalam begnya.” [50] In PP v. Mansor Md Rashid & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 233 at p. 250, Chong Siew Fai CJ (Sabah and Sarawak) had the occasion to say the following: S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 “Where the identity of a culprit is in question or is required to be proved, fingerprint evidence will be of a great significance and immense value. In the present case under appeal, however, the charge alleged trafficking in the form of a ‘sale’ and there was evidence indicating the identities of the alleged offenders and the sale transaction. Fingerprint evidence on the newspaper wrapping, white plastic and the loytape, therefore, assumed little value or significance.” [51] In Ong Hooi Beng & Ors v. PP [2015] 3 MLJ 812, the appellants were charged for manufacturing of dangerous drugs read with section 34 of the Penal Code. They were arrested during a raid at a factory suspected to be used as a clandestine drug processing laboratory. At the time of their arrest, all of them were inside the factory where the drugs and drugs manufacturing apparatus were found. Further, traces of methamphetamine were found on the appellants' clothing. The Court of Appeal found that the evidence indicated the appellants' active involvement in processing the drugs at the factory. [52] There is one last point which we should deal and this arose from the accused persons concerns that the learned trial judge had misdirected himself when he failed to adequately appreciate the defence of the accused which was given under oath. We find it difficult to accept the criticisms levelled towards the learned trial judge evaluation of the defence evidence. A scrutiny of the said judgment revealed that he had judicially considered the defence advanced by the accused persons and weigh all their evidence before coming to a definite finding of fact. The learned trial judge had not run foul of the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 3 CLJ S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 2073, which requires no repetitions. With respect, we are not persuaded by such argument. [53] Furthermore, it is clear from the judgment that he had addressed his judicial mind to the defence, placed significance emphasis to it, meticulously considered their versions and adequately explained why he chose to disbelieve the evidence of the defence. Even after giving due appreciation at the defence evidence, the learned judge had no slightest doubt that the accused were at the premise throughout the night and until the time the police raided the place and were involved in the manufacture of methamphetamine. He found the explanation of the three accused unacceptable. That is a definite finding that the trial judge made. Again, on the facts and evidence analysed by the learned trial judge, we do not see how he can be said to be wrong. The learned trial judge was right when he finally makes a strong finding of fact that the defence was merely a mere denial and has not been able to raise any reasonable doubt in his mind. In this kind of situation, we are very mindful of our limitation sitting on an appellate capacity reading the record and without the benefit of oral testimony. [54] It is trite that credibility of a witnesses is within the domain of a trial judge (see Dato’ Mokhtar bin Hashim v. PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232 at 275; Dato’ Seri Anwar İbrahim and Anor Appeal [2015] 2 MLJ 293 at 313; Adiswaran a/l Tharumaputrintar v. PP & Anor Appeals [2014] 3 MLJ 228; Md Zainudin bin Raujan v. PP [2013] 3 MLJ 773 at 787]. [55] On the approach to be taken in dealing with the credibility of a witness, the Court of Appeal in Ong Hooi Beng & Ors v. PP (supra) S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 speaking through Abdul Rahman Sebli JCA (as he then was) held as follows: [29] In other words the learned trial judge disbelieved the appellants claim that they did not know they were processing drugs. Undoubtedly this is a finding of fact that is dependent on the trial judge’s assessment of the appellants credibility as witnesses, which is primarily a matter for the trial judge: Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 487; Antonio Dias Caldeira v. Frederick Augustus Gray [1936] 1 MLJ 110 111. [30] Having had the audio-visual advantage of seeing and hearing the appellants while they gave evidence, the learned trial judge was in the best position to assess their credibility and reliability, and certainly not us at the appellate stage who only have the benefit going through their evidence in cold print. It is true that the present day technology allows us to capture court proceedings so that we can always play back the audio-visual recordings to see for ourselves how the witnesses behaved or reacted to certain questions, but there is no substitute for seeing and hearing them first hand and in real time. [31] To entitle us to overturn the trial courts finding under such circumstances and substitute it with our own finding that the appellants were actually credible witnesses and that the belief that they entertained was in fact reasonably true, the burden is on the appellants to show that the finding is perverse and that the learned trial judge had failed to take proper advantage of his having seen and heard them giving evidence. We are not satisfied that the S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 appellants have discharged that burden. In Powell and Wife v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home [1935] AC 243; 104 LJKB 304; 152 LT 563; 79 Sol Jo 179; 51 TLR 289 Lord Wright in dealing with a similar issue said: Two principles are beyond controversy. First it is clear, that, in an appeal of this character, that is from the decision of a Trial Judge based on his opinion of the trustworthiness of witnesses whom he has seen, the Court of Appeal must, in order to reverse, not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right, but must be convinced that it is wrong. [56] Now, that the above key issues are settled and put to bed, we find it no longer necessary to dwell on the other ancillary issues (if any) submitted in the course of the respective submission by all parties. Our views on them would have no effect on our finding. Conclusion [57] Having deliberated on the entire defence evidence, we unanimously are of the view that the three (3) accused has failed to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, their version were unbelievable and inconsistent with their innocence. This is especially so where the findings of facts rest upon the substratum of oral evidence, the credibility of which is entirely for the learned trial judge to decide. For the reasons discussed, we find no real substance in this appeal to merit our interference. The evidence against the three accused was so clearly overwhelming. The conviction against the three accused is therefore safe. The appeal against conviction is dismissed. S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 [58] On sentence, with the Abolition of Mandatory Death Penalty Act 2023 (Act 846) which came into effect on 4/7/2023, the Court may consider the mitigating and aggravating factors in the exercise of its discretion in determining the appropriate sentence with either death by hanging or life imprisonment with whipping of not less than 12 strokes. Having considered the facts of the case, the element of public interest, the enormous quantity of the drugs manufactured, the mitigation by the learned counsel on behalf of the three accused persons and the call by the learned deputy public prosecutor to impose the death penalty, we find that the aggravating factors outweighs the mitigating factors. Hence, the sentence meted out by the learned trial judge is affirmed as it commensurate with the offence committed. Date: 26 January 2024 - sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 Counsel For the Appellant : 1. Foong Kitson 2. Vam Shir Mooi [ Kit & Associates (Kuala Lumpur)] For the Respondents : Mohd Khushairy Bin Ibrahim (Public Prosecutor) S/N nNb0kJmR0qOjkIHzRnKBg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AB-12BNCvC-3-03/2021

PERAYU Kunasegaran a/l Vadevelloo RESPONDEN Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad

Civil Procedure - Schedule 9 of Financial Services Act 2013 Principle of Uberrimae Fidei whether applicable - Appeal against decision of Sessions Court in dismissing the Plaintiff's claim for insurance pay out by 4 licensed insurers - Exclusion Clauses - Non-disclosure of material fact - Plaintiff did not declare existence of other policies at time of renewal of policies - Deceased did not possess valid licence to drive - Commission of unlawful act under RTA 1987 - Whether insurers entitled to repudiate liability - Appeals dismissed

26/01/2024

YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2297f2c6-5718-4321-a311-9f2e30b7ada8&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZWAN RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-2-03/2021 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLO [NO. K/P: 680329085479] …PERAYU DAN THE PACIFIC INSURANCE BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 91603-K] …RESPONDEN Yang didengar bersama-sama dengan: RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-3-03/2021 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PERAYU DAN BERJAYA SOMPO INSURANCE BERHAD [COMPANY NO.: 62605-U] …RESPONDEN RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-4-03/2021] ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PERAYU 26/01/2024 05:37:55 AB-12BNCvC-3-03/2021 Kand. 71 S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 DAN SYARIKAT TAKAFUL AM (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 1246486-D] …RESPONDEN RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-5-03/2021 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PERAYU DAN ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 735426-V] …RESPONDEN DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI TAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZWAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLO [NO. K/P: 680329085479] …PLAINTIF DAN THE PACIFIC INSURANCE BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 91603-K] …DEFENDAN Yang digabung dan didengar serentak dengan: S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-12-08/2019 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PLAINTIF DAN BERJAYA SOMPO INSURANCE BERHAD [COMPANY NO.: 62605-U] …DEFENDAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-13-08/2019 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PLAINTIF DAN ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 735426-V] …DEFENDAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-14-08/2019] ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PLAINTIF DAN SYARIKAT TAKAFUL AM (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 1246486-D] …DEFENDAN S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] Originally there were 4 appeals which were heard together by this Court. On 22.9.2023 this Court affirmed the decision of the Sessions Court in Taiping delivered on 26.2.2021 that had dismissed the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents with costs. Dissatisfied with this Court’s decision, the Appellant then filed 2 Notices of Appeals on 13.10.2023 in respect of Appeal Nos. AB-12BNCVC-2-03/2021 and AB-12BNCVC-3- 03/2021 against THE PACIFIC INSURANCE BERHAD and BERJAYA SOMPO INSURANCE BERHAD, respectively. [2] For convenience, I have prepared this Grounds of Judgment to encompass both appeals as they involved the same Plaintiff (Kunasegaran A/L Vadevello) but different insurance companies, in respect of the same subject-matter, which was one Raja A/L Krishnan (deceased) who was the Plaintiff’s employee. I will refer to the parties as the “Plaintiff” and “Defendant 1” (Pacific Insurance Berhad) and “Defendant 2” (Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad) since the trials were heard together by the Sessions Court. The Plaintiff took 4 separate actions against the two Defendants abovementioned as well as against SYARIKAT TAKAFUL AM (MALAYSIA) BERHAD and ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD. I will also refer to the other two insurers as “Defendant 3” and “Defendant 4”, where necessary. [3] The crux of the Plaintiff’s claim was the failure of the 4 insurers to pay him the agreed policy amounts due to the death of the deceased. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 THE APPEAL [4] Before delving into the issues at hand, it is noted that these suits were registered under commercial disputes by the Plaintiff and not as road accident claim. The evidence adduced in respect of the accident which occurred on 14.12.2018 were the precursor to the claim for compensation totalling RM990,000.00 which the Plaintiff claimed he was entitled, pursuant to the death of his employee. The Defendants refused to make payment under the respective policies, namely on 2 grounds i.e. that the deceased was riding a motorcycle without a valid licence at the time of the accident, and failure of the Plaintiff to declare that he had obtained policies with other insurers during the same period. [5] The Plaintiff had taken out 3 Group Personal Accident policies under the deceased’s name with Pacific Insurance, Berjaya Sompo and Allianz General. Then he took out 1 Group Personal Accident policy i.e. Syarikat Takaful insurance in respect of his 4 employees, including the deceased. Copies of the identity cards of the three (3) other employees were as per exhibit P19(A-C) and their names were as follows: i. Babelan A/L Kunasegaran; ii. Mathialegen A/L Nyanasgar; and iii. Nyanasgar A/L Vadevello. [6] Based on the names and address in the 3 identity cards above, it appeared that they were all related to the Plaintiff, unlike the deceased. It was the Plaintiff’s contention that Raja A/L Krishnan (the deceased) was offered employment via letter dated 9.5.2017 with a salary of RM4,500.00 as a General Worker (page 410 of the Record of Appeal, Part C). S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [7] Details of the renewed insurance policies taken out by the Plaintiff were as follows: No. Policy No. And Name Issuer and premium paid Date of Renewal Validity Period Amount Insured (RM) 1. CPN-PO174058-A4 (Pacific Super Protector) pages 426-479 RRBC Pacific Insurance (RM786.98) 22.10.2018 11.10.2018 – 10.10.2019 300,000.00 2. 18DTP/PQCE000042 (Ultima V3-Plan 5) pages 480-512 RRBC Berjaya Sompo (RM790.16) 5.10.2018 12.10.2018 – 11.10.2019 300,000.00 3. PGP-P0052438-30- AGT-17 (Polisi Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok) pages 561-599 RRBC Syarikat Takaful Am (RM1,865.00) 18.12.2017 29.12.2017 – 28.12.2018 150,000.00 4. No. 17PTP0000254-01 (Allianz Shield Plan 04) pages 513-560 RRBC Allianz General (RM540.00) 15.10.2018 11.10.2018 – 10.10.2019 240,000.00 Total 990,000.00 [8] A total of 7 witnesses testified for the Plaintiff and 6 witnesses testified for the Defendants. The Plaintiff’s witnesses were the Investigation Officer (SP1) and 2 other police personnel (SP3 and SP4), the medical officer and personnel (SP2 and SP5) as well as the owner of the motorcycle (SP6) and the Plaintiff (SP7). Meanwhile the witnesses who had testified for the Defendants were SD1 and SD2 (Defendant 1), SD3 (Defendant 2), SD4 and SD 5 (Defendant 4) and SD6 (Defendant 3). [9] Prior to the hearing of the appeal on 8.8.2023, the Court heard an application made by the Plaintiff in Encl. 18 (Defendant 1) and Encl. 14 (Defendant 2), Encl. 14 (Defendant 3) and Encl. 20 (Defendant 4) in the respective appeal numbers for extension of time to file the Draft Index of the Records of Appeal in accordance with O. 55 r.4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) after the Defendants raised preliminary objections on the S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Plaintiff’s failure to serve the same in accordance with the rules. The Plaintiff’s explanation for the delay was because of the extensive written grounds of judgment of the Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) and the Draft Index were inadvertently left out from the Records of Appeal and there was no prejudice to the Defendants. The Defendants argued that the prejudice they suffered was they were unable to comment on the inclusion or exclusion of documents in the records of appeal. [10] However, the Court noted that the Defendants did not deny when the Plaintiff stated they only included relevant documents from the lower court. The Court had considered the period of delay, the reason, chances of appeal succeeding if time was allowed and the prejudice caused to the opponent, and whether this could be compensated by costs. The Court also considered and applied O.1A of the ROC. The application was allowed and ordered the Plaintiff to pay costs to the Defendants. FACTS OF THE CASE [11] The Plaintiff was a businessman who owned 2 registered businesses, namely as sole proprietor of Kunasegaran a/l Vadivelloo (“the business”) and a partner for 11 years in Pesona Sdn Bhd with his wife Law Hooi Poh (“the company”). The business of the Plaintiff was to supply construction materials, retail goods, trader of oil palm fruits, fruits, furniture, poultry, agricultural products and metal scraps. He employed the deceased as a lorry driver to transport oil palm fruits from the surrounding areas of Selama and Pondok Tanjung in May 2017 with a monthly salary of RM4,500.00 (refer to pages 410-414 of the RR Part C). It appeared from the salary slips exhibited that the employer and employee was not contributing to EPF and SOCSO. The Plaintiff testified S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 that he took out the insurance cover for the deceased as an incentive for his worker. [12] In 2017, the Plaintiff purchased the policies of insurance (as set out above). About 1.5 - 2 months after the policies were renewed in 2018, the deceased met with an accident on 14.12.2018 at approximately 1.03 pm at KM 27 Jalan Taiping – Selama after a motorcycle bearing registration No. AFU 1730 on which he was riding alone was believed to have skidded and crashed. There were no eye-witnesses to the accident and the circumstantial evidence pointed to the fact that the deceased lost control of the motorcycle, was flung off and fell on the road. As he was not wearing a helmet at that time, the deceased sustained severe injuries to his head. He was warded at the Hospital Taiping wherein he passed away on 15.12.2018 at 6.38 pm due to “Severe traumatic brain injury” (refer to Exhibits P3, P4, P9 and P10). According to SP2, the injury was due to a hard fall from motor vehicle accident. [13] Although during the trial, counsel for Defendant 3 disputed the cause of the accident, nevertheless, the Investigation Officer (SP1) was firm in his findings that the accident occurred due to the deceased’s own carelessness. This was due to the fact that from a JPJ search in 2019 (page 415 of RR Part C) showed that the deceased did not possess a valid driving licence but had only obtained a Class B learner driver’s licence (L-licence) on 3.8.2001 which expired on 25.5.2003 and was never renewed thereafter, despite the Plaintiff claiming that the deceased was employed as a lorry driver. [14] The main issue of the disputes was the Defendants’ refusal to make out the compensation payments for the death of the deceased under the S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 4 policies although the Plaintiff had paid the required premiums (refer to the schedule above) and death occurred during the validity period of all the policies. The Defendants contended that they could not honour the respective agreement because the deceased was riding the motorcycle without a valid licence at the material time, which came within Exclusion No. 12 under the terms of the policy for Defendant 1, Exclusion No. 2 for Defendant 2, Exception 2(b) for Defendant 3 and Exclusion No. 13 for Defendant 4. Moreover, the Plaintiff failed to declare in the Proposal Forms during the renewal that he had obtained policies from other insurers, namely Defendant 2 and Defendant 3. ISSUES IN THE APPEAL [15] The grounds of complaint against the decision of the SCJ in the Memorandum of Appeal (refer to Encl. 5 and/or 45 pages 14-34) and Additional Memorandum of Appeal (refer to Encl. 13 and/or 52, pages 6- 43) were extensive and many of them repetitive. The Memorandum of Appeal contained 60 grounds and the Additional Memorandum of Appeal contained 85 grounds. The Defendants raised objections that the Plaintiff had filed an Additional Memorandum of Appeal without leave of the Court whereas it should have been filed as Amended Memorandum of Appeal. It was not an amended Memorandum of Appeal but the contents were additional grounds after the grounds of judgment of the SCJ was obtained. The Court did not make a ruling on this and proceeded to hear the appeal. The records of appeal were re-filed after the application for extension of time to file the Draft Index was granted. The issues in the appeal as summarised were as follows: (i) whether the insurance policy fell within the ambit of a consumer insurance contract or non-consumer insurance contract; S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (ii) if the Court finds that it is a consumer insurance contract, whether there has been compliance by the parties with the whole prosess or procedure under Paragraph 5, Part II Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758]; (iii) whether the Plaintiff received any notice in writing in respect of the pre-contractual duty to disclose prior to entering into the contract of insurance; (iv) can the Defendants be allowed to rely on a new ground which was never raised in the repudiation letter rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim; (v) has it been proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased died by accidental means; (vi) does the basis clause apply if the court finds that the contract of insurance is a consumer insurance contract; (vii) can the Defendants repudiate liability by relying on the Exclusion Clauses; and (viii) should section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 be invoked against the Defendants for failing to call as a witness their authorised agent(s) who filled up the proposal form on behalf of the Plaintiff who could not speak and understand the English Language. [16] It is trite that an appellate court would be slow to disturb the decision of the trial court unless the Court was convinced that there have been substantial misdirection of facts and law in the trial court which merited appellate intervention. Therefore, the appellant must convince the appellate court that the decision appealed from was wrong. The rationale for this is that the trier of fact would have had the benefit and advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and the opportunity to assess their S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 demeanour: Rasidin Bin Partojo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214. The trial judge would have had first-hand opportunity to evaluate and appraise the evidence of the witnesses who testify before him. [17] The appellate court then examines the trial court's process of evaluation of the evidence adduced and application of the relevant laws in arriving at its decision and compares them against the grounds raised in the Memorandum of Appeal. At the end of the day, similar to the trial court, the duty of the appellate court in a civil appeal is to determine whether the appellant has proved his case on a balance of probabilities. The legal burden of proof lay on the Plaintiff to prove his case that the Defendants have repudiated the respective contract of insurance without any legal basis. [18] The Court noted that the SCJ prepared 4 grounds of judgments but the contents were almost similar. In coming up with the decision on the appeals, the Court has used the grounds of judgment for Berjaya Sompo (Defendant 2) as reference for all the appeals since the SCJ has ruled the trials to be heard together but the issues for the 4 claims be dealt with separately. As stated earlier, the Plaintiff filed 2 notices of appeals to the Court of Appeal against Defendant 1 which had taken the view that the contract was a consumer insurance contract and Defendant 2 that purportedly argued it was a non-consumer insurance contract. [19] The Plaintiff’s evidence can be summarised as follows: i. That the Defendants’ agents by the name of Fong Kok Wai (Defendants 1 and 3), Yew Kai Chong (Defendant 2), and Abdul Saidi Bin Badri (Defendant 2) attended to him the first time when the Plaintiff wanted to purchase insurance for his employees; S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 ii. That the insurance agents had filled up the proposal forms whereby they would ask him questions and he supplied the answers; iii. That he had fulfilled his obligations to disclose when the proposal forms were being prepared by the said insurance agents; iv. That they had never asked him whether the proposed insured had a valid driving licence and road tax; v. That had they asked him those questions, he would have gone to see the employee to get his confirmation and then he would reverted to the respective agents with the answer(s); vi. That they also never asked him those questions upon renewal of all the policies; vii. All the said agents filled up the forms for him when he attempted to make the claims after the death of the deceased; viii. That all the policies had never been cancelled despite them rejecting his applications; ix. That the Defendants had never stated the reason why his applications were rejected; and x. That the agents of the Defendants had never asked him to make a disclosure as required under s.129, Part 2(4)(4) of the Financial Services Act 2013. [20] In summary, paragraph 19 of the grounds of judgment contained the SCJ’s finding that the Plaintiff did not come to court with clean hands because he did not disclose in the proposal forms that he did not know about or was ignorant of the Important Notice. He blamed the insurance agents who had filled out the proposal forms for him, namely Fong Kok Wai, Yew Kai Chong and Abdul Saidi Bin Bakri. However, the facts S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 showed that it was the Plaintiff who signed the proposal forms and therefore the SCJ held that the Plaintiff owed the duty to disclose as required under the law. It was noted that this was not pleaded in the Statement of Claim but instead in his Reply to Defence the Plaintiff brought up the issue that he was not asked about those questions in the proposal forms. The Defendants pleaded that the duty to disclose existed separately from any duty to fill out the forms. [21] In paragraph 20, the SCJ found that despite claiming that he was not familiar with the terms of the contract (ignorance), the SCJ found that he was a smart businessman who was maths-savvy (celik matematik) as he was the one who would gather the facts and figures for the proposal forms. He paid for all the premiums which the payout would add up to almost RM1,000,000.00. The deceased died about 2 months after the policies were renewed but no one saw how the accident happened. SP1 concluded from his investigations that the deceased was not wearing a helmet and did not have a valid driving licence, road tax (expired in February 2011) and the motorcycle was not insurance-covered (refer to the summary of SP1’s evidence in page 21). SP1 concluded that the deceased was incapable of handling the motorcycle and it was his own negligence that caused the accident. The deceased obtained an L-licence in the beginning but that was all. SP6, the owner of the motorcycle refused to cooperate with the police during the investigation stage. In paragraph 37, the SCJ found that clearly the deceased had breached the law. It was without doubt too that SP6 at the material time had breached the law when he allowed the deceased to use that motorcycle regardless of the fact that he stated in evidence the said motorcycle was not meant to be used on the road. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [22] Needless to say, as the trier of fact, the SCJ had the benefit of directly observing and assessing the demeanour of each witness who testified before her. This Court noted that the SCJ in the grounds of judgment had noted her observations in respect of the Plaintiff’s evidence at the trial. For ease of reference, I refer to the following paragraphs which are pertinent to her conclusion that the Plaintiff “was not as illiterate or ignorant such as he claimed to be”: “[61] Semasa perbicaraan, Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa beliau juga menjalankan perniagaan memungut dan membeli 'besi buruk' yang hanya dibantu oleh Raja a/l Krishnan iaitu melakukan kutipan besi buruk di sekitar Daerah Larut Matang dan Selama dan Daerah Kerian, Perak. Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun Plaintif tidak berpelajaran tinggi tetapi beliau tidak terhalang untuk berniaga dan menguasai pelbagai bahasa termasuklah bahasa Cina atau Inggeris untuk berkomunikasi dengan isteri, pemilik ladang berbangsa Cina, ejen insurans dan rakan perniagaan di sekitar Daerah Larut Matang dan Selama dan Daerah Kerian. … [63] Berdasarkan soalan dan jawapan dalam PSP7, dirumuskan bahawa SP7 sebagai majikan memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memperoleh fakta dan angka untuk untuk menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan di bawah polisi dengan 4 syarikat penanggung insurans, iaitu Pacific Insurance, Berjaya Sompo Insurance, Allianz General Insurance dan Takaful Malaysia. Naratif kes Plaintif dalam Penyata Saksi (yang ditandakan sebagai PSP7, Encl.74 dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019, mengandungi 164 soalan dan jawapan yang dibuat oleh Plaintif sendiri serta jawapan diaku benar oleh Plaintif) telah mengemukakan dokumen dalam Ikatan C dan D Encl.44 dan 45 dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/20191 bagi menyokong tuntutan terhadap 4 syarikat penanggung insurans, iaitu Pacific Insurance, Berjaya Sompo Insurance, Allianz General Insurance dan Takaful Malaysia. [64] SP7 telah menggunakan khidmat jurubahasa semasa memberi keterangan kerana mendakwa dia tidak fasih berbahasa Malaysia atau Inggeris. Mahkamah meragui perkara ini kerana SP7 telah menulis surat Tawaran Pekerjaan (ekshibit P20) dengan penggunaan bahasa dan penyusunan ayat yang baik dan jawapan kepada 164 soalan dalam Penyata Saksi dibuat dalam Bahasa Malaysia itu diaku benar dibuat olehnya sendiri? S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 … [70] Plaintif yang mengisytiharkan dalam borang cadangan untuk polisi 'Pacific Super Protector' bahawa maklumat peribadinya dalam Borang Cadangan bertarikh 11/10/2017 adalah benar (merujuk di muka surat 33 Ikatan D dalam Encl, 45) dan Plaintif bersetuju bahawa cadangan itu dijadikan dasar kontrak di antara pihak-pihak ('klausa asas'). Merujuk kepada soalan 1(d), hanya mengisytiharkan polisi yang dipohon kepada Allianz General Insurance. [71] Pacific Insurance ('defendan') menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan (‘si mati’) dalam jumlah RM300,000 terhadap kematian akibat kemalangan. Plaintif telah memperbaharu polisi asal CPNPOI 74058-A4 yang luput pada 11/10/2018, maka tempoh sah laku dilanjutkan bagi tempoh dari 11/10/2018 hingga 10/10/2019. Bagaimanapun, tiada borang cadangan baru ditanda tangan oleh Plaintif. Plaintif, semasa membaharukan polisi, tidak mengisytiharkan polisi diisu oleh Takaful Malaysia yang sah laku hingga 29/12/2018 atau polisi Berjaya Sompo Insurance yang bertarikh 05/10/2018 semasa melanjutkan tempoh sah laku polisi CPN-POI 74058-A4. [72] Apabila polisi insurans bernombor CPN-POI 74058-A4 yang luput pada 11/10/2018 diperbaharu untuk tempoh tetap dengan persetujuan bersama, borang cadangan asal polisi insurans bernombor CPN-POI 74058-A4 itu digabungkan dengan polisi bertarikh 22/10/2018 yang diperbaharui itu dan berterusan membentuk asas kontrak. Begitu juga dalam kes ini, terma mengenai pembaharuan dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa pembaharuan tarikh kuat kuasa tersebut adalah ‘tertakluk kepada semua terma, syarat dan pengindorsan dalam polisi asal’ [di muka surat 43 Ikatan D], ia termasuklah deklarasi dalam borang cadangan asal yang membentuk asas kontrak iłu. Itu juga membentuk sebahagian daripada polisi yang diperbaharui [rujuk di muka surat 51 Ikatan D]. … [74] Plaintif yang mengisytiharkan dalam borang cadangan untuk polisi 'Group Allianz Shield' bahawa maklumat peribadinya dalam Borang Cadangan bertarikh 11/10/2017 adalah benar [merujuk di muka surat 120 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45] dan Plaintif bersetuju bahawa cadangan itu dijadikan dasar kontrak di antara pihak-pihak ('klausa asas'). Merujuk kepada soalan 1(d), hanya mengisytiharkan polisi Pacific Super Protector CPN-POI 74058-A4 [merujuk di muka surat 119 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45] sedangkan polisi Takaful Group Personal Accident' [merujuk ekshibit D43] masih sah laku sehingga 29/12/2018. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [75] Allianz General Insurance ('defendan') menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan ('si mati') dalam jumlah RM240,000 terhadap kematian akibat kemalangan. Plaintif telah memperbaharu polisi asal 'Allianz Shield Plan 04' bernombor 17PTP0000254-01 yang luput pada 11/10/2018, maka tempoh sah laku dilanjutkan bagi tempoh dari 11/10/2018 hingga 10/10/2019. Bagaimanapun, tiada borang cadangan baru ditandatangan oleh Plaintif. Plaintif tidak mengisytiharkan polisi diisu oleh Takaful Malaysia yang sah laku hingga 29/12/2018 atau polisi Berjaya Sompo Insurance yang bertarikh 05/10/2018 semasa melanjutkan tempoh sah laku polisi 'Allianz Shield Plan 04' bernombor 17PTP0000254-01. … [77] Berjaya Sompo Insurance ('defendan') menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan ('si mati') dalam jumlah RM300,000 terhadap kematian akibat kemalangan, bagi tempoh dari 12/10/2018 hingga 11/10/2019. Bagaimanapun, Plaintif tidak mengisytiharkan polisi diisu oleh Takaful Malaysia yang sah Iaku hingga 29/12/2018 atau polisi Allianz General Insurance dan Pacific Insurance yang sah hingga 10/10/2019 semasa ejen Yew Kai Chong mengisikan Borang Cadangan Yang Ditanda tangan oleh Plaintif bagi Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima \/3. [78] Peguam Defendan bagi kes AB-A52NCC-12-08/2019 memohon supaya Plaintif disoal balas mengenai status kewangan dengan merujuk kepada dokumen Cukai Pendapatan (Borang B) bagi tahun Taksiran 2017 dan 2018 perniagaan Kunasegaran a/l Vadevello. Maka pemeriksaan balas ditangguh kepada 24/09/2020 bagi membolehkan Plaintif membawa dokumen e/B 2017 — 2018 bagi pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Defendan-defendan. [79] Pada 24/09/2020, pemeriksaan balas disambung dengar dengan penandaan e/Be Tahun 2017 (Ekshibit P51) dan e/B Tahun 2018 (Ekshibit P52). Semasa diperiksa balas oleh peguam Defendan yang mewakili Berjaya Sompo Insurance, SP7 juga dicabar atas kegagalan SP7 untuk mendedahkan fakta berkenaan perlindungan takaful khususnya merujuk pekerja bernama Raja a/l Krishnan semasa SP7 mengisi Borang Cadangan memperbaharu polisi insurans yang diisu oleh Pacific Insurance dan Allianz General Insurance. SP7 didapati gagal mendedahkan fakta bahawa SP telah memperoleh polisi insurans yang diisu oleh Pacific Insurance dan Allianz General Insurance semasa dia meminta ejen Yevv Kai Chong mengisikan Borang Cadangan untuk memperoleh Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3 [ekshibit P32] dari Berjaya Sompo Insurance. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [80] Semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Defendan yang mewakili Alianz General Insurance, SP7 hanya merujuk ekshibit PI 9 (A) - (C) mengenai pekerja bernama Kabelan a/l Kunasegaran [Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 25] yang diakui ialah anak SP7 yang mula bekerja sejak 5 tahun lalu dan dibayar RM3,000.00 sebulan. Mathialegen a/l Nyanasegar [Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 26] pula ialah anak saudara SP7 yang mula bekerja sejak 4 tahun lalu dan dibayar RM2,800.00 sebulan. Nyanasegar a/l Vadivelloo [Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 27] ialah adik SP7 yang mula bekerja sejak 7 tahun lalu dan dibayar RM4,500.00 sebulan. [81] Terdapat seorang lagi pekerja bernama 'Devanthiran' yang tidak disebut di bawah Sijil Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok bertarikh 04.01 2017. SP7 dirujuk kepada senarai pekerja yang dinamakan di bawah Sijil Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok bertarikh 04.01.2017 yang sah Iaku bagi tempoh 29/12/2016-28/12/2017, termasuk Devanthiran yang didakwa menggantikan Raja a/l Krishnan. Pada tahun 2016, senarai pekerja dalam Sijil Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok adalah termasuk Raja a/l Krishnan tetapi dokumen Surat Tawaran Kerja bertarikh 10/05/2017 (ekshibit P201 menunjukkan Raja mula kerja sejak 10/05/2017 dengan SP7 sebagai pemandu lori dalam kawasan ladang sawit. [82] Menurut SP7, Raja melakukan pelbagai kerja am di ladang bagi memunggah kelapa sawit dan lazimnya kerja mengutip buah kelapa sawit bermula jam 10-10.30 pagi dan dia mengambil masa 2-3 jam untuk memungut buah kelapa sawit bergantung kepada luas kawasan ladang sawit, dan ladang Ah Ling adalah berkeluasan lebih kurang 18 ekar sahaja. Lazimnya Raja selesai memungut buah sawit di ladang berkeluasan 60 ekar ialah dalam masa 4 - 5 jam. [83] Menurut SP7, gaji sebulan dibayar kepada Raja ialah RM4,500.00. Bukti penyata bayaran gaji (dalam ekshibit P21 yang disediakan kerani bernama Nadiana) tidak ada tandatangan Raja kerana Raja buta huruf. Peruntukan mengenai cuti rehat yang diperuntukkan juga tidak dinyatakan atas slip gaji. Gaji Raja dibayar penuh tanpa tolakan bayaran SOCSO. Raja tidak ada masalah kewangan atau membuat apa-apa pinjaman dengan Plaintif. Raja dilindungi polisi insurans pekerja yang diperoleh Plaintif sebagai majikan sepanjang Raja bekerja untuk perniagaan 'Kunasegaran a/l Vadevello' yang berdaftar sejak 2014 serta milikan tunggal SP7. [84] SP7 mengenali Govindasamy a/l Sinnian (pemilik motorsikal AFU1730) sejak 10 tahun dan mengenali majikan Govindasamy, Ah Ling yang berbangsa Cina. Luas ladang Ah Ling ialah 18 ekar. Raja a/l Krishnan dihantar 3 kali sebulan untuk mengutip buah sawit di ladang Ah Ling. SP7 yang akan S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 menghantar Raja dengan lori untuk mengangkut buah sawit. Selepas Raja dan lori dihantar ke ladang Ah Ling, SP7 balik ke pejabat dengan meminta bantuan kawan atau pekerja di Ladang Ah Ling untuk menghantarnya pulang ke pejabat di Batu Kurau. Pada 14/12/2018, Raja dihantar ke ladang Ah Ling untuk mengutip buah sawit. [85] Menurut SP7, Raja yang bekerja sebagai pemungut besi buruk, baru dikenali sejak setahun lalu. Raja a/l Krishnan hanya ada ibu dan seorang abang manakala bapanya telah meninggal dunia. SP7 tidak ada nombor telefon ibu atau abang Raja. Kumaran a/l Muniandy ialah abang sepupu Raja a/l Krishnan. SP7 menafikan dia telah menghubungi Kumaran untuk menyuruhnya membuat laporan polis mengenai nahas yang menimpa Raja. Ahli keluarga Raja a/l Krishnan bukan 'nominee' si mati bagi polisi yang diperoleh untuk menginsuranskan Raja atas kematian akibat kemalangan dan mereka berkemungkinan tidak ada pengetahuan tentang polisi insurans yang diperoleh Plaintif bagi perlindungan dari kecederaan diri atau kematian akibat kemalangan atas nama simati. [86] Semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Berjaya Sompo, SP7 mengatakan dia tidak ada pengetahuan bahawa motorsikal AFU1730 tidak dilindungi insurans dan cukai jalan motorsikal telah luput. Malah SP7 tidak ada pengetahuan sama ada si mati mempunyai lesen menunggang atau memandu kenderaan yang sah atau tidak. [87] Plaintif (SP7) menafikan dakwaan dalam soal balas oleh peguam Defendan-defendan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran prinsip uberimae fidei atau niat suci hati dan meletakkan beban ke atas 3 ejen penanggung insurans yang membantunya mengisikan Borang Cadangan atau dia tidak dijelaskan oleh 3 ejen penanggung insurans iaitu Fong Kok Wai, Yew Kai Chong dan Abdul Saidi bin Bakri tentang keperluan untuk isytiharkan semua polisi yang menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan. [88] Di peringkat pemeriksaan semula oleh peguamnya, SP7 mengatakan bahawa dia tidak pernah ditanyakan oleh ejen atau diberikan notis mengenai keperluan si mati untuk mempunyai lesen menunggang motorsikal atau memandu kenderaan yang sah jika polisi perlindungan insurans hendak dibeli atas penama Raja a/l Krishnan atau berkenaan batasan aktiviti memandu atau menunggang motorsikal dalam polisi-polisi sedia ada atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan. [22] I have highlighted the paragraphs above from the grounds of judgment as these were important points to note for the Court in deciding S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 whether the Defendants were justified in not honouring the claims submitted by the Plaintiff not long after the deceased died. A perusal of her summary of the Plaintiff’s evidence in paragraphs 76 and 77 showed that the SCJ found he did not declare that he had obtained coverage from Defendant 2 and Defendant 4. He had declared with Defendant 3, or rather, the agent Fong Kok Wai made the declaration, only when he applied for renewal of the coverage from Defendant 1 (refer to paragraphs 81-82) and he admitted that the deceased’s family may not know about the policies. [24] Then, the SCJ made her finding on the issue of the deceased not in possession of a valid full licence in paragraphs 206-207. This is where s.26 of the RTA comes in, namely, the requirement to have valid licence. The SCJ agreed with the Defendants’ submissions (refer to paragraphs 212, 213, 215). In paragraph 220 she found the insurers were not liable for repudiation of the insurance contract. The burden of proof was on the Plaintiff to prove his case that the accident was not caused by other things in order to qualify for the pay out but this he failed to do (refer to paragraphs 226 -231. The SCJ concluded in paragraph 232 that the deceased died due to a motor vehicle accident (MVA) but the exclusion clause(s) applied (refer to paragraphs 234 – 237). The SCJ stated in paragraph 249 that the Plaintiff was bound by his pleadings and this issue of consumer contract/life insurance was not pleaded; he was therefore barred from raising it at the submissions stage. [25] Finally, the SCJ arrived at the following conclusions: “[252] Setelah meneliti keterangan-keterangan lisan saksi-saksi plaintif dan defendan serta keterangan dari dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan dan setelah membaca hujahan bertulis peguam plaintif dan peguam defendan serta S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 hujahan balas yang difailkan dan setelah mendengar hujahan lisan pihak- pihak, keputusan saya dalam kes ini adalah seperti berikut: (i) Berdasarkan isu awalan ini sahaja, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa peruntukan Jadual ke-10 Akta 758 yang dibaca secara harmoni dengan terma Polisi Insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima V3 - Plan 05 [ekshibit P31 di muka surat 98 Ikatan D] bahawa pembayaran wang polisi apabila berlaku kematian orang yang diinsurankan adalah dibuat kepada wakil peribadi Orang Yang Diinsurankan (Raja a/l Krishnan). Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa oleh sebab Plaintif, tidak mempunyai hubungan kekeluargaan dengan simati, bukan waris kadim dan bukan nominee yang dinamakan dalam Borang Penamaan (ekshibit P32, rujuk muka surat 86 Ikatan D) adalah tidak tergolong sebagai wakil peribadi dan diputuskan Plaintif tidak ada locus dan tidak layak dibayar atas tuntutan pampasan di bawah polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima Plan 05 [ekshibit P31 yang bernombor 18DTP/PQCE000042]. (ii) terdapat ketidakdedahan fakta penting oleh Plaintif atau ketaknyataan yang material kepada soalan 6 dalam Borang Cadangan [rujuk muka surat 86 Ikatan D, encl. 45) yang mewajarkan penolakan liabiliti (dipli dalam perenggan 6 Pembelaan dalam encl. 5 dan Pembelaan Terpinda dalam encl. 21); (iii) penolakan liabiliti secara dasarnya adalah bergantung kepada Polisi yang diisu oleh Defendan di bawah terma pengecualian 2 (d) dan (e) mengenai ketakpatuhan Orang Yang Diinsuranskan (Raja a/l Krishnan) untuk memenuhi terma-terma, syarat-syarat dan pengendorsan Polisi ini setakat mana ia berhubung kait dengan apa sahaja yang perlu dilakukan atau dipatuhi oleh orang yang diinsuranskan iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan; (iv) faktor berlakunya kecederaan parah semasa ditimpa malang akibat kecuaian sendiri oleh orang yang diinsuranskan iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan yang tidak memakai topi keledar semasa menunggang motorsikal, dan perlakuan yang menyalahi kepentingan dan polisi awam/undang-undang sedia ada, iaitu menunggang motorsikal yang tidak dilindungi insurans dan tiada cukai jalan; dan (v) Mahkamah, dalam keadaan kes ini, dengan mempertimbangkan maxim “ex turpi causa non oritur” Mahkamah tidak menyetujui kemungkiran undang- undang oleh orang yang diinsuranskan iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan yang ternyata telah melakukan beberapa perbuatan yang menyalahi peraturan dan undang- undang jalan raya sedia ada. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 EVALUATION AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT [26] While I agreed with the decision of the SCJ in not allowing the Plaintiff’s claim, there were some errors made in her grounds of judgment. These errors, in my view, do not require appellate intervention because having considered the submissions and case laws cited by the parties, I am of the view that the SCJ’s decision can be upheld by this Court as there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. There must have been insufficient judicial appreciation of the relevant evidence which had occasioned a serious miscarriage of justice: Mackt Logostics (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Malaysian Airline System Berhad [2014] 5 CLJ 851. An appellate court has a duty to intervene where a trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion: Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy [1995] 3 MLJ 395. [27] From the numerous grounds raised in the Memorandum of Appeal and Additional Memorandum of Appeal, I agree with the Plaintiff to narrow down the issues to be decided by this Court as follows: (i) has it been proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased died by accidental means; (ii) whether the insurance policy fell within the ambit of a consumer insurance contract or non-consumer insurance contract; (iii) does the basis clause apply if the court finds that the contract of insurance is a consumer insurance contract; S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (iv) if the Court finds that it is a consumer insurance contract, whether there has been compliance by the parties with the whole prosess or procedure under Paragraph 5, Part II Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758] including the duty of disclosure; (v) whether the Plaintiff received any notice in writing in respect of the pre-contractual duty to disclose prior to entering into the contract of insurance; (vi) can the Defendants be allowed to rely on a new ground which was never raised in the repudiation letter rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim; and (vii) should section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 be invoked against the Defendants for failure to call their authorised agent(s) who filled up the proposal form on behalf of the Plaintiff as a witness. (i) Has it been proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased died by accidental means [28] I do not wish to spend a lot of time on this issue because the evidence from SP2 were very clear that the deceased died of “Severe traumatic brain injury” due to hard fall during motor vehicle accident. This finding was supported by the investigation of SP1 which concluded that the deceased was not wearing any helmet at the material time, based on SP5’s evidence who was among the first to arrive at the scene and did not find any helmet nearby the body. The SCJ found that the fatal injuries were due to hard fall sustained during an accident as explained by SP1 and SP2 and there was no reason not to accept the investigation officer’s evidence. There was also no evidence that the deceased was attacked by S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 known or unknown persons. The Plaintiff has proved this issue on a balance of probabilities despite the questions in cross-examination by the Defendants’ respective counsels. (ii) Whether the insurance policy fell within the ambit of a consumer insurance contract or non-consumer insurance contract [29] The SCJ in her grounds of judgment at paragraph 187 (Defendant 1’s suit) stated the issue of “consumer insurance contract” and “non- consumer insurance contract” was without merit as it was not pleaded by the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, this was a misdirection on the part of the SCJ as the court eventually still has a duty to determine the issue. The regime for insurance in Malaysia is comprehensively provided in s. 129(1) of Act 758 which sets out the pre-contractual duty of disclosure and representations for contracts of insurance in Part 2, and the remedies for misrepresentations relating to contracts of insurance in Part 3. For ease of reference, the relevant provisions of the law (Schedule 9) are reproduced as follows: “Interpretation 2. In this Schedule— “consumer” means the individual who enters into, varies or renews a consumer insurance contract, or proposes to do so with a licensed insurer; “consumer insurance contract” means a contract of insurance entered into, varied or renewed by an individual wholly for purposes unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or profession. ... PART 2 Pre-contractual disclosure and representation Pre-contractual duty of disclosure for insurance contracts other than consumer insurance contracts 4. (1) Before a contract of insurance other than a consumer insurance contract is entered into, varied or renewed, a proposer shall disclose to the licensed insurer a matter that— S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 (a) he knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer on whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied; or (b) a reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know to be relevant. (2) The duty of disclosure shall not require the disclosure of a matter that— (a) diminishes the risk to the licensed insurer; (b) is of common knowledge; (c) the licensed insurer knows or in the ordinary course of his business ought to know; or (d) in respect of which the licensed insurer has waived any requirement for disclosure. (3) Where a proposer fails to answer or gives an incomplete or irrelevant answer to a question contained in the proposal form or asked by the licensed insurer and the matter was not pursued further by the insurer, compliance with the proposer’s duty of disclosure in respect of the matter shall be deemed to have been waived by the insurer. (4) A licensed insurer shall, before a contract of insurance is entered into, varied or renewed, clearly inform a proposer in writing of the proposer’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure under this paragraph, and that this duty of disclosure shall continue until the time the contract is entered into, varied or renewed. Pre-contractual duty of disclosure for consumer insurance contracts 5. (1) Before a consumer insurance contract is entered into or varied, a licensed insurer may request a proposer who is a consumer to answer any specific questions that are relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied. (2) It is the duty of the consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions under subparagraph (1). (3) Before a consumer insurance contract is renewed, a licensed insurer may either— (a) request a consumer to answer one or more specific questions in accordance with subparagraph (1); or (b) give the consumer a copy of any matter previously disclosed by the consumer in relation to the contract and request the consumer to confirm or amend any change to that matter. (4) It is the duty of the consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions under subsubparagraph (3)(a), or confirming or amending any matter under subsubparagraph (3)(b). S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 (5) If the licensed insurer does not make a request in accordance with subparagraph (1) or (3) as the case may be, compliance with the consumer’s duty of disclosure in respect of those subparagraphs, shall be deemed to have been waived by the insurer. (6) Where the consumer fails to answer or gives an incomplete or irrelevant answer to any request by the licensed insurer under subparagraph (1) or subsubparagraph (3)(a), or fails to confirm or amend any matter under subsubparagraph (3)(b), or does so incompletely or provides irrelevant information, as the case may be, and the answer or matter was not pursued further by the insurer, compliance with the consumer’s duty of disclosure in respect of the answer or matter shall be deemed to have been waived by the insurer. (7) A licensed insurer shall, before a consumer insurance contract is entered into, varied or renewed, clearly inform the consumer in writing of the consumer’s pre- contractual duty of disclosure under this paragraph, and that this duty of disclosure shall continue until the time the contract is entered into, varied or renewed. (8) Subject to subparagraphs (1) and (3), a consumer shall take reasonable care to disclose to the licensed insurer any matter, other than that in relation to subparagraph (1) or (3), that he knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer on whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied. (9) Nothing in this Schedule shall affect the duty of utmost good faith to be exercised by a consumer and licensed insurer in their dealings with each other, including the making and paying of a claim, after a contract of insurance has been entered into, varied or renewed. [30] In relation to a non-consumer insurance contract, a proposer shall disclose to the licensed insurer a matter that (a) he knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer on whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied, or (b) a reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know to be relevant. Whereas in the case of a consumer insurance contract, it is the duty of the consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions. The policy speech of the then Deputy Finance Minister I, Datuk Dr. Awang Adek Hussin, when introducing the Financial Services Bill provided the reason why Parliament had enacted the Bill which created such distinct classes as aforesaid: S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 “Keenam, rang undang-undang ini akan menyediakan rangka kerja yang kukuh bagi perlindungan pengguna kewangan. Ini dicapai melalui: (i) …; (ii) …; (iii)...; (iv) memperuntukkan tanggungjawab penanggung insurans untuk memberi panduan kepada pengguna mengenai penzahiran yang diperlukan semasa peringkat pra kontrak dalam hal salah nyata atau misrepresentation yang dibuat oleh pengguna. Rang undang-undang ini memperuntukkan remedi bagi penanggung insurans yang lebih saksama bergantung sama ada salah nyata oleh pengguna tersebut dibuat secara sengaja atau melulu, cuai, atau tidak sengaja. Pada masa sekarang, kontrak insurans boleh dielak, avoidable secara langsung oleh penanggung insurans tidak kira sama ada salah nyata oleh seseorang pengguna tersebut dibuat secara sengaja atau melulu, cuai atau pun tidak sengaja.”. ((Dewan Rakyat Hansard) [DR 27.11.2012] at 1810) [31] The SCJ in paragraph 197 (Defendant 2’s grounds of judgment) stated that the policy was a consumer contract and this was in relation to the claim by the Plaintiff against Defendant 2 which allegedly had submitted it was a non-consumer contract. Upon perusal of Defendant 2’s submission, I found that this was misconceived by the Plaintiff as Defendant 2 contended it was clearly a consumer insurance contract. The Defendants submitted on the importance of disclosure and the court had analysed this issue in paragraphs 184 onwards. Specifically, I refer to the following paragraphs of the SCJ’s analysis for ease of reference: “[197] Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3-Plan 05 ini adalah suatu polisi Kontrak Insurans Pengguna (Consumer Insurance Contract, di muka surat 85 Ikatan D) dan satu notis penting (“Important Notice”) telah diberikan kepada Plaintif yang berniat memohon insurans yang memperuntukkan dalam Borang Cadangan (ekshibit P32 (m/s 1 1 encl 9, dan ekshibit P32 di muka surat 85 Ikatan D), bahawa: S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 “Kontrak Insurans Pengguna Menurut Perenggan 5 Jadual di bawah Akta Perkhidmatan Kewangan 2013, sekiranya anda memohon Insurans ini sepenuhnya bagi tujuan yang tidak berkaitan dengan perdagangan, perniagaan atau profesion anda, anda mempunyai kewajipan mengambil penjagaan munasabah supaya tidak membuat salah nyataan semasa menjawab soalansoalan di dalam Borang Cadangan dan/atau semua soalan-soalan yang dikehendaki oleh Syarikat dengan penuh dan tepat dan mendedahkan apa-apa perkara lain yang anda ketahui berkaitan dengan keputusan kami dalam menerima risiko dan dalam menentukan kadar dan terma yang hendak dipakai, jika sebaliknya ini boleh menyebabkan kontrak terbatal, penolakan atau pengurangan tuntutan, penukaran terma atau penamatan kontrak. Anda juga mempunyai kewajipan memaklumkan kepada kami dengan segera sekiranya pada bila-bila masa, selepas kontrak insurans dibuat, diubah atau diperbaharui dengan pihak kami, sebarang maklumat yang diberikan adalah tidak tepat atau telah berubah.” [32] In regard to the Defendant 2’s policy, that policy covered work- related accidents; this can be gathered from the evidence of SD3 and the absence of an exclusion clause of work-related accidents in the policy (Exclusion Clause No.7 only excludes subordinates not the life insured). This could attract the definition of consumer insurance policy having regard to the intention of the Plaintiff (where he alleged the policies served as an incentive to his employees) and the evidence of SD3 itself. [33] It is noted that paragraph 10 of Schedule 9 is only applicable to consumer insurance contract and renders any basis clause in a consumer insurance contract of no effect. It reads: “Any representation made before a consumer insurance contract was entered into, varied or renewed shall not be converted into a warranty by means of any provision of the consumer insurance contract or of any terms of the variation or of any other contract, whether by declaring the representation to form the basis of the contract or otherwise.” S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [34] In the analysis of the evidence before me, as the policies do not cover work-related accidents, the policies were unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or profession, and therefore, they come within the ambit of the definition of a consumer insurance contract. Notwithstanding the Plaintiff’s assertion, as well as the evidence of SD1, the construction of the policies prevailed as it was in accordance with the intention of Schedule 9. [35] It was evident from grounds of judgment of the SCJ she had concluded that the policies were consumer insurance contracts. But the SCJ also stated in paragraph 200 that the Proposal Form did form the basis clause of the contract with the insurer as follows: “[200] Dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah mengesahkan bahawa semua maklumat yang dinyatakan dalam Borang Cadangan itu (yang dibuat tanpa pendedahan tentang polisi pelbagai jenis dengan penanggung insurans Iain) merupakan maklumat penuh, lengkap dan benar dan merupakan asas bagi pembentukan kontrak insuran dengan Defendan. Ternyata, Borang Cadangan yang membentuk kontrak insurans ditandatangan oleh Plaintif sendiri [merujuk di muka surat 87 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45] yang memperaku dan memberi perisytiharan bahawa semua butiran (yang diisikan ejen bagi pihaknya) adalah benar. Yew Kai Chong (ejen insurans Berjaya Sompo Insurance) hanya diminta untuk mengisi Borang Cadangan. Sehubungan itu, Plaintif adalah terikat dengan perisytiharan dan bersetuju bahawa Cadangan itu dijadikan dasar kontrak di antara pihak-pihak (“klausa asas”) [ekshibit P31, merujuk di muka surat 88 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45].” (iii) Does the basis clause apply if the court finds that the contract of insurance is a consumer insurance contract [36] The SCJ discussed the merits of the basis clause in analysing the evidence as can be seen above. Does this mean that automatically her grounds of judgment is totally wrong by virtue of paragraph 10 of Schedule 9? I think not. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [37] In the case of Chong Lai Keng v. Prudential Assurance Malaysia Bhd [2024] 1 CLJ 293, the facts were similar on the issue of the insured person had not disclosed to the proposed insurers the existence of a few other policies. The learned Judicial Commissioner Jamhirah Binti Ali stated: “[48] As previously elucidated, para. 5 of Schedule 9 of the FSA which pertains to the pre-contractual duty of disclosure for consumer insurance contracts, imposed a statutory duty on the consumer to exercise reasonable care in avoiding any misrepresentation to the insurer. This duty was especially significant when responding to specific questions posed by the insurer, which were essential in the insurer’s determination of whether to accept the risk and in establishing the applicable rates and terms. The principle of uberrimae fidei remained applicable to the parties involved in an insurance contract. In accordance with this principle, the consumer was held to a standard of care defined as that of a ‘reasonable consumer’. Consequently, based on the underpinning of uberrimae fidei, the life assured, as the consumer, bore the duty of utmost good faith, necessitating full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge. In Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 1; [2006] 1 MLJ 710, the Court of Appeal held as follows: [15] It is settled beyond dispute that a contract of insurance is one that imposes a mutual duty on the parties to it to act uberrimae fides towards each other. On the part of the insured, he or she must make full disclosure of all material facts. It is not for him or her to decide in his or her own mind what is material. The duty is on the insured to make full disclosure of material facts within his knowledge. (emphasis added) [49] After careful examination of the evidence, the submitted documents, and the relevant law, I concluded that the existence of the three AIA policies constituted a “material fact”. This finding stemmed from the evidence that their disclosure would have had a negative impact on the defendant’s underwriting decision. If the defendant had been aware of the three AIA policies, they would not have issued the policies in question. Further, based on the factual circumstances and the sequence of events in this case, I concluded that the life assured had deliberately concealed or suppressed and had fraudulently misrepresented the existence of the three AIA policies.”. [Emphasis added] S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [38] The Court refers to the provision in paragraph 6 of Schedule 9 which provides the following: “Duty to take reasonable care 6. (1) In determining whether a consumer has taken reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation under subparagraph 5(2) or (4), the relevant circumstances may be taken into account including— (a) the consumer insurance contract in question and the manner in which the contract was sold to the consumer; (b) any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or authorized by the licensed insurer; and (c) how clear and specific, the licensed insurer’s questions were. (2) Subject to subparagraph (3), the standard of care required of the consumer under subparagraphs 5(2) and (4) shall be what a reasonable consumer in the circumstances would have known. ...”. [39] Although the third issue is to be answered in the negative, based on the construction of Paragraph 6 of Schedule 9 as well as Division 2 which will be analysed later I am of the view that the court still has a duty to evaluate the evidence and make a finding whether there has been misrepresentation at the point of submission of the Proposal Form. (iv) If the Court finds that it is a consumer insurance contract, whether there has been compliance by the parties with the whole prosess or procedure under Paragraph 5, Part II Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758] including the duty of disclosure [40] It was the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendants had waived the Plaintiff’s duty of disclosure as the insurers did not make a request in accordance with subparagraph (1) or (3) of Paragraphs 5(5) and/or 5(6). Moreover, Paragraph 5(7) requires a licensed insurer, before a consumer insurance contract is entered into, varied or renewed, to clearly inform the S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Plaintiff in writing of the consumer’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure and that this duty of disclosure shall continue until the time the contract is entered into, varied or renewed. [41] I will deal with the fourth and fifth issues together; the fifth issue was whether the Plaintiff received any notice in writing in respect of the pre- contractual duty to disclose prior to entering into the contract of insurance. “[211]... Notis juga diberikan kepada Plaintif bahawa “Jika Plaintif tidak memberikan maklumat ini dengan sepenuhnya dan sejujurnya, polisi insurans mungkin tidak sah atau Polisi mungkin tidak melindungi orang yang diinsurankan/pekerja dengan sepenuhnya”. Tiada sebab untuk mahkamah ini menyimpang daripada kedudukan undang-undang am mengenai kewajipan pendedahan fakta yang material di pihak Plaintif. [212] Saya juga bersetuju dengan hujah peguam defendan bahawa hujah- hujah peguam Plaintif adalah tidak bermerit dan tidak selari dengan Pemakaian perenggan 5 Jadual Kesembilan Akta 758 [rujukan kepada kes: Balamoney Asoriah v. MMIP Services Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 CLJ 476] mengenai kewajipan untuk mengambil langkah yang munasabah untuk tidak salah nyata dalam menjawab soalan yang terdapat dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa permohonan insurans ini) dan perlu menjawab soalan-soalan dengan penuh dan tepat. Kegagalan dalam mengambil langkah munasabah dalam menjawab soalan- soalan boleh mengakibatkan pembatalan kontrak insurans, keengganan atau pengurangan gantirugi, perubahan terma atau penamatan kontrak insurans selaras dengan remedi di Jadual 9 Akta Perkhidmatan Kewangan 2013 [Akta 758]. Plaintif juga dikehendaki mendedahkan perkara-perkara lain yang dia tahu akan mempengaruhi keputusan Defendan dalam menerima risiko dan menentukan kadar dan terma yang akan dikenakan. … [215] Pada setiap masa yang material, Plaintif mendakwa dia tidak diperjelaskan tentang kandungan dalam borang dan tidak ditanyakan tentang lain- lain polisi yang dia ada miliki sewaktu ejen mengisikan Borang Cadangan bagi polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima V3 - Plan 05 (merujuk penyata saksi dalam encl. 74 yang hanya difailkan pada 13/05/2020 dan Plaintif memberi keterangannya pada 18/09/2020). Dalam kes ini, Plaintif mengelakkan diri dari bertanggungan untuk menzahirkan pegangan polisi insurans yang dipegangnya dengan mendakwa dia menurunkan tanda tangan atas borang sebelum ejen Yew Kai Chong mengisikan butiran dan dia tidak fasih S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 membaca dalam Bahasa Malaysia atau Bahasa Inggeris dan khidmat ejen insurans digunakan bagi mengisi borang. Pada setiap yang material, Plaintif mendakwa dia tidak diperjelaskan tentang kandungan dalam borang dan tidak ditanyakan tentang lain-lain polisi yang dia ada miliki sewaktu ejen mengisikan Borang Cadangan bagi polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima — Plan 05. Tidak ada keterangan menyokong dipanggil dari pihak ejen Yew Kai Chong mengenai dakwaan Plaintif yang dibuatnya…”. [42] The SCJ did apply Balamoney’s Case (supra) which has been affirmed by the Federal Court in the case of Amgeneral Insurance Bhd v. Sa' Amran Atan & Ors And Other Appeals [2022] 8 CLJ 175. With respect, I am of the view that the Federal Court case above did not directly apply to the present case because there the issue again was in respect of avoiding liability under s.96(3) of the RTA and it concerned third party insurance. One of the issues was whether the insurer could avoid liability when the vehicle that was involved in an accident had been sold/transferred to another party. The issue in that Federal Court case can be compared with the facts in Balamoney’s Case (supra). [43] The SCJ found that the Plaintiff claimed that the notice was never explained to him but also found that he had willfully ignored the notice. Pursuant to the paragraphs above, since the Plaintiff had acknowledged that the notice was explained to him and regardless of his intention of what kind of policy he actually wanted to purchase, this Court found that the Defendants had sufficiently discharged their burden under Schedule 9 to explain to the proposer of his duty of disclosure in writing. The SCJ found further that the Plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had 2 other insurance policies other than with Defendant 3 which was stated in the proposal form. In the case of Defendant 2 he had omitted to fill in the question. I have no reason to disturb her finding that there was non- disclosure of the existence of the other 2 policies on the part of the S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Plaintiff. The question is, does this amount to a breach in his duty of disclosure? I refer to the case on uberrima fide as stated in Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 1; [2006] 1 MLJ 710 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA propounded: “[15] It is settled beyond dispute that a contract of insurance is one that imposes mutual duty on the parties to it to act uberrimae fides towards each other... On the part of the insured, he or she must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts. It is not for him or her to decide in his or her own mind what is material... The duty is on the insured to make full disclosure of material facts within his knowledge. ... [19] So much for the insured's duty. For completeness I would add that there is a corresponding duty on the part of an insurer to act with utmost good faith towards its insured. In Maschke Estate v. Gleeson (1986) 54 OR (2d) 753 at p 756, Montgomery J put the duty in this way: A contract of insurance is one of uberrimae fides, the utmost of good faith. This is not a situation where an insurer is indemnifying its assured and paying a third party. This is a case where the insurer is being asked to pay its own insured. The duty to act promptly and in good faith arises the day the insurer receives the claim. To find otherwise is to fail to understand the realities of the market place.”. [Emphasis added] [44] The principle of uberrimae fidei has been entrenched in Paragraph 5 of Schedule 9 as well, with some modification where a consumer no longer needed to voluntarily disclose information to the insurer but only to give information that was requested upon him, with reasonable care, to the insurer. The Plaintiff alleged that he had omitted to fill all of the policy because the insurer’s agent did not explain the question to him which led him to not completely filling them as he was not conversant in English. Later he said he was unsure whether the agent explained the questions in the Proposal Form. His counsel had contended that the S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Plaintiff did not breach the uberrima fide duty because, by virtue of paragraph 5(6), an incomplete information that was not further pursued by the insurer was deemed waived, as pointed out earlier. [45] I refer to the relevant paragraphs in the SCJ’s grounds of judgment for effect: [198] Merujuk kepada Borang Cadangan [ekshibit P32) bagi memperoleh polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima — Plan 05 yang hendak diisu oleh Defendan, soalan 6 [ekshibit P32, merujuk muka surat 86 Ikatan D] menanya kepada Plaintif tentang permohonan serupa atau pembaharuan polisi kemalangan diri atas nama Orang Yang Diinsurankan, Raja a/l Krishnan: “Have you or any person to be insured ever had an application for life or Personal Accident Insurance accepted with Sum Insured reduced or the renewal premium increased?” dan dijawab oleh ejen “No”. [199] Jawapan kepada soalan 6 ternyata tidak benar atau tidak tepat kerana dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dalam Ikatan D (dalam encl. 45 difailkan dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019 berikutan perintah gabung dengar bertarikh 17/09/2019 dan 16/10/2019) yang melibatkan 4 penanggung insurans, ternyata bahawa polisi perlindungan takaful ada dalam pegangan Plaintif sejak Disember 2016 tetapi pemerolehan polisi perlindungan Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok bertarikh 04/01/2017 yang juga melindungi penama Raja a/l Krishnan ini tidak pernah dimaklumkan kepada Defendan dan pemerolehan 2 lagi polisi insurans kemalangan diri atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan juga gagal didedahkan oleh Plaintif. … [201] Peguam Defendan berhujah bahawa beban pendedahan penuh dan tepat oleh Plaintif adalah dari permulaan kontrak insuran dimasuki dan beban itu akan berterusan sehingga tempoh kuatkuasa perlindungan insuran luput. la adalah undang-undang matan bahawa kewajipan pihak yang diinsuranskan untuk mendedahkan maklumat material kepada penginsurans merupakan kewajipan yang wujud secara berasingan daripada apa-apa borang cadangan [Kes: Tan Mooi Sim & Anor v United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd & Anor [2011] 8 MLJ 556 dan American International Assurance Co, Ltd v Nadarajan a/l Subramaniam [2013] 5 MLJ 195]. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [202] Di bawah tajuk “Kewajipan Pendedahan”; (di muka surat 88/(BM) muka surat 98 Ikatan D) dalam Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3-Plan 05 (ekshibit P31 di muka surat 98 Ikatan D], diperuntukkan bahawa: “Apabila Orang yang Diinsuranskan telah memohon insurans ini sepenuhnya bagi tujuan yang tidak berkaitan dengan perdagangan, perniagaan atau profesion Orang yang Diinsuranskan, Orang yang Diinsuranskan mempunyai kewajipan mengambil penjagaan munasabah supaya tidak membuat salah nyataan semasa menjawab soalan-soalan di dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa membuat permohonan Insurans ini). Orang yang Diinsurans perlu menjawab soalan dengan penuh dan tepat. Kegagalan dalam mengambil langkah yang munasabah dalam menjawab soalan-soalan boleh mengakibatkan pembatalan kontrak Insurans, keengganan atau pengurangan ganti rugi, perubahan terma atau penamatan kontrak Orang yang Diinsurans selaras dengan remedi di Jadual 9 Akta Perkhidmatan Kewangan 2013. Orang yang Diinsurans juga dikehendaki mendedahkan apa-apa perkara lain yang Orang yang Diinsurans tahu akan mempengaruhi keputusan Syarikat dalam menerima risiko dan dalam menentukan kadar dan terma yang dikenakan. Orang yang Diinsurans juga mempunyai kewajipan untuk memberitahu Syarikat dengan serta merta jika pada bila-bila masa selepas kontrak insurans Orang yang Diinsurans ditanda tangani, diubah atau diperbaharu dengan Syarikat, apa-apa maklumat yang diberikan dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa membuat permohonan Insurans ini) tidak tepat atau telah berubah.” [203] Berdasarkan terma polisi di atas, Plaintif juga mempunyai kewajipan untuk memberitahu Defendan dengan serta-merta jika pada bila-bila masa selepas kontrak insurans ditandatangani, diubah atau diperbaharui dengan Defendan, apa-apa maklumat yang diberikan di dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa permohonan insurans ini) tidak tepat atau telah berubah. Kewajipan untuk mendedahkan fakta material, dan kewajipan tersebut tidak dilepaskan semata-mata atas akuan fakta bahawa pihak yang satu lagi telah gagal menanya mengenai fakta material yang tidak didedahkan, tetapi fakta pemerolehan polisi-polisi yang lain adalah, pada setiap masa yang material dalam pengetahuan pihak Plaintif, bukan ejen yang mempunyai pengetahuan tersebut. Dalam mempertimbangkan hujah mengenai fakta yang dipli dalam Pembelaan berkaitan Borang Cadangan, tidak pernah berbangkit isu sama ada Borang Cadangan diisikan oleh ejen bagi pihak Plaintif. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [204] Merujuk kes Tan Jing Jeong v Allianz Life Assurance Malaysia [2012] 7 MLJ 179; [2011] 4 CLJ 710 mengenai kewajipan berterusan di pihak-pihak di bawah kontrak insurans, bahawa — “Sebaik sahaja kewajipan positif diberikan kepada sesuatu pihak oleh undang-undang untuk bercakap benar, termasuk untuk mendedahkan fakta material, kewajipan tersebut tidak dilepaskan semata-mata atas akuan fakta bahawa pihak yang satu lagi telah gagal menanya mengenai fakta material yang tidak didedahkan, tetapi fakta yang dalam pengetahuan pihak yang mempunyai pengetahuan tersebut.”. … [218] … Berdasarkan jawapan yang diberi kepada soalan dalam penyata saksi SP7 (encl. 74 dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019) dan semasa pemeriksaan balas pada 23/09/2020 oleh peguam Defendan, dihujahkan bahawa jawapan kepada isu yang membangkitkan kewajipan pendedahan pemerolehan polisi-polisi (dipli dalam perenggan 3 dan 6 encl.7) adalah satu pemikiran terkemudian untuk membangkitkan pembelaan pada tahap ini. Namun apabila Plaintif memberi keterangan pada 18/09/2020 dan 23/09/2020 mengenai dokumen polisi yang hendak dijadikan asas tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-defendan, syarikat penanggung insurans terlibat, atau semasa disoal balas mengenai butir lanjut nama pekerja yang disenarai dalam polisi Takaful, siapa pekerjanya yang diberikan manfaat di bawah polisi-polisi yang diambilnya dengan Takaful Malaysia dan jumlah perlindungan takaful bagi empat pekerjanya (yang ada kaitan tali persaudaraan dengannya) selain Raja a/l Krishnan, dirumuskan bahawa Plaintif adalah seorang peniaga yang sangat cerdik, yang celik angka/ matematik kerana dalam setiap polisi yang dibeli olehnya sebagai majikan, dia yang memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memperolehi fakta dan angka untuk dimasukkan dalam polisi; pihak Plaintif juga yang membayar premium bagi orang yang diinsuranskan bagi kesemua polisi atas penama yang sama iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan (si mati). Sekiranya terjadi kematian kemalangan menimpa pekerjanya Raja a/l Krishnan, jumlah pampasan yang akan dipungutnya akan mencecah RM1j. Semasa disoal balas peguam, Plaintif mengatakan insurans yang diperoleh itu mungkin tidak diketahui oleh ahli keluarga Raja a/l Krishnan. Oleh itu, fakta material mengenai polisi-polisi yang dipegang Plaintif sememangnya dalam pengetahuannya pada setiap masa yang material, bukan ejen insurans. Malah adalah satu perkara yang mustahil dan/atau subjektif untuk ejen mengetahui apakah yang perlu didedahkan pada masa mengisikan Borang Cadangan bagi pihak Plaintif. [219] Plaintif hadir ke mahkamah tidak secara suci hati kerana Plaintif tidak benar-benar menjelaskan bagaimana beliau boleh memperoleh S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 polisi-polisi insurans yang dipegangnya. Plaintif lazim memberi jawapan menyatakan bahawa dia tidak tahu (atau sengaja mengabaikan “Notis Penting” yang tertulis dalam dokumen kesemua polisi yang diperoleh) tentang kewajipan mengambil penjagaan munasabah supaya tidak membuat salah nyataan mengenai risiko yang berkaitan perlindungan yang hendak diberi atas seorang pekerja sahaja iaitu, Raja a/l Krishnan. Plaintif mengelakkan kewajipannya membuat pendedahan atau kewajipan memberi maklumat tepat tentang pemerolehan polisi-polisi dengan meletakkan beban ke atas 3 ejen insurans yang didakwa gagal menerangkan “Notis Penting” dalam dokumen polisi dan/atau kandungan Notis tidak dalam pengetahuannya disebabkan ejen insurans yang membantunya memperoleh polisj-polisi insurans dalam milikannya itu gagal menanyakan soalan-soalan material kepadanya, terutamanya berkaitan pemegangan lessen memandu yang sah oleh Raja a/l Krishnan. Semasa disoal balas peguam-peguam yang mewakili Defendan-defendan pada 18/09/2020 dan 23/09/2020, Plaintif mengatakan kandungan polisi yang diperolehnya terutamanya mengenai terma Pengecualian itu tidak pernah dijelaskan oleh ejen insurans kepadanya.”. [46] The Plaintiff contended that the SCJ misdirected herself when she applied Tan Mooi Sim’s Case (supra) which was decided before Act 758 was enacted by Parliament. Nevertheless, Act 758 did not abolish the duty to disclose by the consumers but rather, it had codified the duty and made it an offence under s.129(2) of Act 758 if a person contravened the duty of disclosure under Paragraph 11 of Schedule 9. The SCJ had made her findings of fact that the Plaintiff has not abided by the uberrimae fidei duty and that his version was an afterthought. But Paragraph 5.6 provided if the disclosure was not pursued further by the insurer, it was deemed waived. The burden to prove the matter lies on the Defendants. In Balamoney’s Case (supra), the Court of Appeal stated: “[49] Under sub-subparas. 5(3)(a) and (b), the respondent may do either of two things when there is an application to renew the insurance policy. The respondent may request Selvamani or whoever was renewing the insurance policy to answer one or more specific questions in accordance with sub-para. (1). The questions asked being specific questions that are relevant to the respondent's decision whether or not to accept the risk, and the rates and terms to be imposed. Alternatively, the respondent may give Selvamani or whoever S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 was renewing the insurance policy, a copy of any matter previously disclosed by Selvamani in relation to the contract and request Selvamani or whoever was renewing the insurance policy, to confirm or amend any change to the matter. [50] Where the respondent makes either of these requests, Selvamani or whoever was renewing the insurance policy, has a duty under sub-para. 5(4) "to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions under sub-subpara. (3)(a), or confirming or amending any matter under sub-subpara. (3)(b)''. [47] From the facts of the case and findings of the SCJ, I found that the Defendants have discharged this burden of proof. Counsel for Defendant 2 referred to the decision in Tan Siew Wei v Great Eastern Life Assurance (Malaysia) Berhad [2021] 1 LNS 770, Liberty Insurance Bhd v Marrison Sidai & Anor [2019] 8 CLJ 380, Etiqa General Takaful Berhad v Personal Representative of Fatimah Adam (Deceased) & Ors [2022] 6 CLJ 385 and Ulaganathan Muthiah v Prudential Assurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 435 in support of its case on the issue of pre-contractual disclosure and I agreed with the rationale of the learned Justices of the High Courts in the abovementioned cases. [48] In my broad grounds earlier, I had distinguished Balamoney’s Case (supra). I now give my reasons for doing so. I am of the view that the facts of that case warranted the Court of Appeal to intervene and grant the remedy that should have been granted to the appellant, unlike the present case. The facts were as follows: “On 28 October 2016, Jayandran Mathan ('Jayandran'), a minor, was riding pillion on a motorcycle which was involved in a collision with a motor van driven by the first defendant and owned by the deceased ('Selvamani'). Jayandran's mother ('the appellant') decided to sue on her son's behalf. As required under s. 96(3) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (‘Road Transport Act’), she served a notice on the insurer ('the respondent') prior to the filing of the suit ('the civil suit'). It was, however, discovered that Selvamani had passed away on 20 April 2016, well before the accident. It was also discovered that the insurance policy that Selvamani had taken with the insurers ('the policy') had expired on 4 May S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 2016, after his demise. The policy was nevertheless renewed in Selvamani's name from 10 May 2016 to 9 May 2017. The respondent filed an originating summons before the High Court seeking declaratory orders to the effect that it was not the insurer of the said motor van at the time of the accident; and that the insurance policy was null and void by reason of a fundamental breach of the principle of uberrimae fidei or duty of utmost good faith, the breach of which entitled the respondent to void the insurance contract. The High Court, in granting the respondent's application, held that when the material fact that Selvamani had already passed away was not disclosed to the insurer at the time the insurance policy was renewed by whoever had done the renewal, there was a breach of the principle of utmost good faith which entitled the insurer to void the renewed policy. Hence, the appellant appealed against the decision of the High Court. Held (allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court): (1) The declaratory orders sought by the respondent concerned the status and validity of the insurance contract made not between the parties, but between the respondent and Selvamani, who was not a party in the appeal. Given the nature of the issue, its determination by way of an exchange of affidavits and with the critical parties not before the court was not appropriate. The respondent's allegations of misrepresentation by Selvamani or by whoever had renewed the insurance policy without evidence of the circumstances as to how or when the insurance policy was actually renewed were necessarily questions of mixed fact and law; and the issue certainly involved Selvamani as well as the driver of the motor van. Further, no reasons were proffered as to their absence or lack of participation in the proceedings before the High Court. The appellant, who was not a party to the insurance policy, was not in the position to answer or even deal with the issue(s) posed by the respondent. The circumstances and conditions surrounding the renewal were clearly beyond the capacity and remit of the appellant to address, let alone answer. Hence, such applications ought not to be dealt with in the manner done, especially where the relevant and necessary parties were not before the court. (paras 21-23) … (4) The respondent had not discharged its burden of proof under s.129 read together with Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act so as to be entitled to the discretionary remedies. It never posed any questions to Selvamani or whoever was renewing the policy. This court did not see how just the fact that Selvamani was deceased ipso facto invalidated the renewed policy. This was incorrect. The whole process or procedure under Schedule 9 must be complied with and answered. There was no evidence at all of the respondent doing any of the matters that were mentioned in Schedule 9, especially sub- para. 5(3) nor of the judge addressing these critical matters. Under such S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 conditions, it was not open to the respondent to approach the court and complain that there was misrepresentation. The failure of the trial judge to apply s.129 and Schedule 9 was sufficient reason for this court to intervene and set aside the decision of the trial judge granting the declaration sought under s. 96(3) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (paras 48, 52 & 53) (5) Devoid of any compliance of the mandatory requirements emplaced under s. 129 and Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act, the respondent was not at all entitled to the orders granted by the High Court. It would be in direct contravention of s. 129 and Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act were this court to condone such breaches. It would bring untold injustice and prejudice to innocent third parties such as the appellant in this appeal, the parties who were the intended recipients of the benefits behind ss. 90 and 96 of the Road Transport Act 1987 and s. 129 of the Financial Services Act. There was no basis for the exercise of discretion in granting the declarations sought by the respondent. In fact, it would be unjust for the court to grant such orders. (paras 60 & 63). [Emphasis added] [49] The highlighted parts are the distinguishing features of that case with the present case. The SCJ in this case had heard all the evidence in a full trial and parties had been given the opportunity to fully ventilate their issues before the judge, unlike in Balamoney’s Case (supra) which was by way of exchange of affidavits (presumably by way of an Originating Summons application). In regard to the last point above, clearly there had been injustice to the victim’s family where a declaration under s.96(3) of the RTA was granted and liability avoided in respect of a third-party insurance such as in that case. I would just add further that in Balamoney’s Case (supra), the Court of Appeal did mention that misrepresentation is fact sensitive: “[45] As can be seen from sub-para. 7(4), much will depend on knowledge on the part of Selvamani or whoever renewed the insurance policy at the material time. Whether misrepresentation exists is therefore very much fact sensitive, confirming our earlier opinion on the unsuitability of how the whole application was conducted by the High Court. The burden is on the respondent to prove the existence of misrepresentation; that it would not S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 have entered into or renewed the insurance policy had it been aware of the true facts; and we have no information as to when the policy was actually submitted for renewal and the circumstances of the renewal.”. [Emphasis added] [50] In the present case, having gone through the notes of evidence in the records of appeal I found that the SCJ had not made any error in her assessment of the facts and evidence adduced by the Plaintiff and her observations in regard to the surrounding circumstances of the manner in which the policies were renewed. It was the Plaintiff’s contention that he took out the policies as an incentive to his employees but I found that the “bulk” of the policies amount payable.e. RM840,000.00 was made under the name of the deceased alone (3 of the policies, except Takaful). He also admitted that the deceased’s family members did not know about the policies taken in the name of the deceased and he did not know them personally (the family members). It appeared that the only beneficiary of the Group Policy was the Plaintiff. [51] The Plaintiff contended that the absence of a valid licence/road tax/insurance were trivial matters. He also contended that the deceased’s cooupation was a lorry driver and therefore, the absence of a valid motorcycle licence/road tax/insurance was irrelevant to his death. I agree with the Defendants’ submissions that these were not trivial matters as it would in effect have a bearing on the decision of the insurers to take on the risk of providing coverage for the deceased who was not in possession of a valid licence. The absence of of a valid licence was specifically spelt out in their respective exclusion clauses. This also constituted an “unlawful act” under the policies thereby triggering the exclusion clause S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 therein: Allianz General Insurance Malaysia v KL Chan & Associates [2017] 8 CLJ 517 (COA). [52] I am mindful of SD3’s evidence that the insured person need not possess a valid licence at the point of time when the Proposal Form was submitted as he could obtain one later. What was important for the insurers would be at the time when a claim was submitted (for instance due to death of the insured person), whether there was any breach of the law i.e. he had been riding without a valid licence. SP6’s evidence admitted the motorcycle was without a valid insurance and road tax. Therefore, SP6 had breached the provisions of s. 26(1), s.15(1) and s.90(1) of the RTA. [53] The Plaintiff contradicted himself when he stated that the deceased was employed as a lorry driver but the evidence was that he would drive “the lorry driver” to work in the oil palm plantation. Obviously, the Court can conclude that the Plaintiff had to do so as he was fully aware of the fact that the deceased did not possess a valid driving licence. He condoned this situation and it was clearly against the provision of s.26(1) of the RTA 1987. On a balance of probability, I found the Plaintiff’s evidence, that if he had known the deceased did not possess a valid licence he would have asked the deceased (then) to obtain one, was inherently improbable. The Plaintiff drove the deceased to work probably almost everyday (3 times weekly), it was highly improbable that he did not know or have the opportunity to ask the latter about it. [54] A person employed as a lorry driver must possess a valid and full licence to drive and operate such a “potentially dangerous” vehicle. A S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 motorcycle rider too must have a valid licence to ride, even if it was just an L-licence. That is a requirement of the law and it is proof of one’s capability and qualification to operate a vehicle be it a motorcycle, car, lorry, bus or whatever. The Courts should not condone the illegal behaviour of riding a motorcycle or driving a motor vehicle without a valid licence, insurance and road tax. The RTA is in place to ensure the safety of all road users. Full-stop. On this ground alone, I found that the Defendants were entitled to rely on this exclusion clause (riding/driving without a licence) to repudiate their respective liabilities: Lee Boon Siong v Great Eastern Life Assurance Malaysia Berhad [2020] MLJU 1376. [55] Therefore, separately from the duty of disclosure in respect of the deceased’s non-possession of a valid licence, I found that the Plaintiff was not forthcoming about the reason why he wanted to purchase the policies under the name of the deceased who did not possess a valid licence when the Plaintiff claimed that he (the deceased) was employed as a lorry driver: Ulaganathan Muthiah’s Case (supra). This will be discussed further later in this Grounds of Judgment. [56] I have answered issues (iv) and (v) in my analysis above. The Plaintiff as early as at the time when the Proposal Form had been filled up had not complied with the procedures under Paragraph 5, Schedule 9 to take care when making the representation whereas the Defendants had complied with the provisions of the law. (v) Can the Defendants be allowed to rely on a new ground which was never raised in the repudiation letter rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim [57] The new ground was the attempt by the Defendants to avoild liability by relying on SP1’s (and to a certain extent SP5) evidence that the S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 deceased was not wearing a helmet. The repudiation letters all stated that the insurers would not make the payment despite the Plaintiff’s claims because the deceased was found to be riding a motorcycle without a valid licence. This sixth issue was a non-issue as the Court found the exclusion clauses for each of the 4 insurers pertaining to riding a motorcycle without a valid licence was sufficient to enable the insurers to repudiate liability. [58] I refer to Paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 9 which is applicable here and it provides: Misrepresentation in respect of insurance contracts 7. (1) Part 3 of this Schedule— (a) in Division 1, makes provision for a misrepresentation made in relation to a contract of life insurance, whether or not a consumer insurance contract, which has been effected for a period of more than two years; and (b) in Division 2, sets out the remedies available to a licensed insurer for a misrepresentation made in respect of— (i) a consumer insurance contract of life insurance which has been effected for a period of two years or less; and (ii) a consumer insurance contract of general insurance. (2) The remedies set out in Division 2 shall be available to a licensed insurer for a misrepresentation made by a consumer before a consumer insurance contract referred to in subsubparagraph (1)(b) was entered into, varied or renewed if— (a) the consumer has made a misrepresentation in breach of his duty under subparagraph 5(2) or (4); and (b) the licensed insurer shows that had it known the true facts, it would not have entered into the contract, or agreed to the variation or renewal, or would only have done so on different terms. (3) For the purposes of this Schedule, a misrepresentation for which a licensed insurer has a remedy in Division 2 against a consumer may be classified as— (a) deliberate or reckless; (b) careless; or (c) innocent. (4) A misrepresentation is deliberate or reckless if the consumer knew that— S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 (a) it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it was untrue or misleading; and (b) the matter to which the misrepresentation related was relevant to the licensed insurer, or did not care whether or not it was relevant to the insurer. (5) A misrepresentation made dishonestly is to be regarded as having being made deliberately or recklessly. (6) A misrepresentation is careless or innocent, as the case may be, if it is not deliberate or reckless. (7) It is for the licensed insurer to show that a misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless on a balance of probability. (8) Unless the contrary is shown, it is to be presumed that the consumer knew that a matter about which the licensed insurer asked a clear and specific question was relevant to the insurer. … Division 2 Remedies for misrepresentation Application of Division 14. This Division sets out the remedies available to a licensed insurer for a misrepresentation by a consumer made in respect of— (a) a consumer insurance contract of life insurance which has been effected for a period of two years or less; and (b) a consumer insurance contract of general insurance. Remedies for deliberate or reckless misrepresentation 15. If a misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, a licensed insurer may avoid the consumer insurance contract and refuse all claims. [59] From the above there are 3 degrees of “culpability” in respect of misrepresentation by a consumer, namely deliberate or reckless, careless or innocent. In paragraph 7(5), a misrepresentation made dishonestly is to be regarded as having being made deliberately or recklessly. I had concluded earlier from the evidence, that the Plaintiff was fully aware of the fact that the deceased did not possess a valid licence and which was S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 why he drove the deceased to work in the plantation. This wilful act of the Plaintiff smacks of dishonest misrepresentation! [60] Section 26(1) of the RTA provides: “26. (1) Kecuali sebagaimana diperuntukkan selainnya dalam Akta ini, tiada seorang pun boleh memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor daripada apa-apa kelas atau perihalan, di sesuatu jalan melainkan jika dia adalah pemegang sesuatu lesen memandu yang membenarkannya memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor daripada kelas atau perihalan itu, dan tiada seorang pun boleh mengambil kerja atau membenarkan seseorang lain memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor di jalan melainkan jika orang yang diambil kerja atau dibenarkan memandu itu adalah pemegang sesuatu lesen memandu sedemikian.”. [61] The evidence of SP6, the Plaintiff’s own witness also confirmed that the Plaintiff would send the deceased to work when the fact was that the deceased was employed to work as a lorry driver. In my view, this is the most material of all facts in this case when the Plaintiff did not disclose that the deceased only possessed an expired L-licence. [62] The law has not abolished the duty to disclose on the part of the consumer and that in this case and this Court opines that we should not miss the forest for the trees. We must not lose focus of the fact that it was the Plaintiff who wanted to take out the policies of insurance from the insurers to cover his employee(s) allegedly as an incentive to the deceased. Was he acting honestly when he purchased the policies? He had been employing the deceased since 10.5.2017 as a lorry driver despite knowing the deceased did not have a licence, drove him to work in the plantation 3 times weekly and then in October 2017, S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 purchased the policies from Defendants 1, 2 and 4 to cover him alone. Meanwhile, the Takaful policy was purchased in late 2016. [63] The SCJ further noted the submission of the Defendant 2 in the grounds of judgment: “[149] Berdasarkan jawapan SP7 kepada soalan-soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas yang bermula pada 18/09/2020, SP7 mengaku sebenarnya bahawa selain polisi kemalangan diri yang diambil untuk pekerja, dia juga memperoleh polisi kemalangan diri untuk diri sendiri dan memiliki insurans bagi kenderaan bermotor yang dimiliki iaitu 2 buah motorvan Hilux, 4 buah lori (muatan 1 dan 3 tan) dan mesin jengkaut meratakan tanah. SP7 juga memiliki lesen memandu kenderaan bermotor yang sah dan lesen menunggang motorsikal. SP7 tidak perlu dijelaskan tentang keperluan mematuhi peruntukan Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan dirumuskan sebagai seorang yang celik undang-undang jalanraya serta didedahkan dengan keperluan memiliki perlindungan insurans! Malah, Plaintif adalah seorang peniaga yang sangat cerdik yang celik angka/ matematik kerana dalam setiap polisi yang dibeli olehnya sebagai majikan, dia yang memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memperolehi fakta dan angka untuk dimasukkan dalam polisi; pihak Plaintif juga yang membayar premium bagi orang yang diinsuranskan bagi kesemua polisi atas penama yang sama iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan (si mati). Sekiranya terjadi kematian kemalangan menimpa pekerjanya Raja a/l Krishnan, jumlah pampasan yang akan dipungutnya akan mencecah RM1j. [150] Rumusan dibuat oleh peguam Defendan berkait motif SP7 (yang sepatutnya dipertanggungkan membuat pendedahan maklumat) semasa pemerolehan polisi insurans atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan adalah berdasarkan kedudukan kewangan SP7 yang kurang kukuh dan jumlah pampasan yang bakal diperoleh SP7 sekiranya terjadi kematian kemalangan menimpa Raja a/l Krishnan. Oleh itu, motif pengambilan 4 polisi Kemalangan Diri atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan itu bukanlah untuk perlindungan risiko kecederaan atau kematian kemalangan si mati tetapi ada niat mendapat pampasan yang hampir RM1j... Plaintif telahpun berpengalaman memperoleh pelbagai insurans termasuklah pemerolehan polisi perlindungan insurans kemalangan diri untuk perlindungan Takaful bagi dirinya sendiri sejak 2016, selain memperoleh insurans perlindungan kenderaan bermotor seperti jentera jengkaut, 4 buah Iori muatan 1 dan 3 tan, juga kenderaan pacuan 4 roda iaitu 2 buah Hilux!”. [64] In Ulaganathan Muthiah’s Case (supra), the learned High Court Judge held that: S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 “Clearly, the deceased knew that his answers to the questions in the proposal form were untrue or misleading. He did not care whether or not they were untrue or misleading and had acted in breach of his duty of uberrimae fidei. His answers were relevant to the defendant for its assessment of the risks and whether to accept the risks … if the defendant had known of the non-disclosed information or deliberate and/or reckless misrepresentation, which clearly increased the defendant’s insurance risk, the defendant would either not have entered into the insurance policy or it would have done so on different terms.”. [65] The court in that case concluded that pursuant to paragraphs 7(1)(b), 7(2), 7(4), 7(8) and (15) of Schedule 9, the defendant was entitled to avoid the policy and to refuse all claims under the policy by reason of the deceased’s breach of his duty of uberrimae fidei and to reject the plaintiff’s claim. I need not go any further then to conclude that Paragraph 15 is applicable in these cases and it enables the insurers to avoid the consumer insurance contract and refuse all claims. If Paragraph 5 is to be upheld at all times in favour on the consumers, why does Act 758 also provide for remedies for insurers when misrepresentation is proved? (vi) Should section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 be invoked against the Defendants for failure to call as a witness their authorised agent(s) who filled up the proposal form on behalf of the Plaintiff [66] It was submitted for the Plaintiff that s.114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 should have been invoked by the SCJ against the Defendants for their failure to call the 3 agents as witnesses in the trial. However, I found that as the Plaintiff himself had subpoenaed them and then dismissed them without calling them to testify on his behalf, the presumption of adverse inference in s.114(g) cannot be applied in his favour. [67] In the often-cited case of Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492, the Supreme court held: S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 "Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case." [68] The Plaintiff contended, inter alia, an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Defendants because it was for the Defendants to prove that they have complied with the provisions of Schedule 9. The failure of the agents to explain to him his duty of disclosure and/or the failure of the agent to properly explain the question in the proposal form amounted to a breach of the insurer’s duty under Act 758. The Defendant 1’s counsel submitted (paragraphs 10-10.4 of Encl.68), that the Plaintiff did not raise this presumption in the trial. In order to invoke the presumption, there must be withholding or suppression of evidence, which the Defendants did not commit as the Plaintiff had subpoenaed the agents and later dismissed them. Since it was the decision of the Plaintiff to not put them in the witness stand, thus the Court must not punish the Defendants for the Plaintiff’s decision aforesaid. [69] I refer to paragraphs 250-251 of the grounds of judgment below: “[250] Hujah tentang isu yang dibangkitkan mengenai pemakaian seksyen 114 perlu dipertimbangkan dengan merujuk kepada persetujuan peguam Plaintif pada 15/01/2020 untuk tidak meneruskan panggilan sepina berkaitan Borang Cadangan yang diisikan oleh ejen bagi pihak Plaintif. Dengan berbuat demikian, Plaintif diestop untuk tidak menimbulkan isu pemakaian seksyen 114 terhadap Defendan, sebaliknya Plaintif sendiri yang terhalang membangkitkan apa-apa isu tentang pemanggilan ejen insurans untuk memberi keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah setelah bersetuju mengetepikan hak Plaintif untuk mendapatkan keterangan ejen-ejen insurans yang memberi khidmat mereka untuk mengisikan Borang Cadangan untuk memperoleh polisipolisi insurans bagi pihak Plaintif. [251] Ternyata, Borang Cadangan yang membentuk kontrak insurans ditandatangan oleh Plaintif sendiri. Justeru, 3 saksi yang disepina oleh Plaintif itu tidak diperlukan memberi keterangan mengenai apa-apa butiran yang telah dinyatakan dalam Borang Cadangan kerana kewajipan membuat pendedahan S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 fakta material termasuklah mengenai pemerolehan Polisi adalah kewajipan di pihak Plaintif, bukanlah ejen Plaintif yang menurunkan tandatangannya atas semua Borang Cadangan dan semua butiran diaku benar oleh Plaintif, bukan ejen yang mengisi Borang. Ketiga- tiga mereka dilepaskan dan dikecualikan kehadiran memberi keterangan bagi pihak Plaintif dalam kes di sini. [70] The SCJ found that the Defendants had discharged their duties under Act 758 since the Plaintiff had signed the acknowledgement clause, that the Plaintiff admitted the agent Fong Kok Wai did ask him questions in the Proposal Form and the agent filled it. As such, adverse inference need not be invoked against any of the parties in these circumstances. [71] To end this issue, I would also briefly allude at this stage to the point raised by the Plaintiff that being members of LIAM, it was incumbent upon the insurers to make background checks with each other upon receving the Plaintiff’s proposal forms through their respective agents. Specifically, I refer to paragraphs 107 – 108 of the SCJ’s grounds of judgment: “[107] Dicabar semasa pemeriksaan balas mengenai butiran dalam Borang Cadangan Yang Ditanda tangan oleh Plaintif bagi Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3 / Berjaya Sompo Insurance [ekshibit P32, Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 85- 87] dengan pengataan bahawa Defendan boleh menyemak status polisi sedia ada dan status lesen memandu yang dimiliki si mati, SD3 tidak bersetuju bahawa pada masa itu terdapat keperluan atau tanggungan ke atas Defendan untuk membuat apa-apa carian atau semakan status pemerolehan polisi-polisi insurans yang sedia ada milik Plaintif. [108] SD3 menekankan bahawa Plaintif yang bertanggungan untuk mematuhi “prinsip uberimae fidei atau niat suci hati” dan mendedahkan fakta pemerolehan polisi-polisi insurans yang sedia ada miliknya di bulan Oktober 2018, semasa Plaintif memperbaharu polisi-polisi insurans atau semasa Plaintif mengisi borang cadangan bagi mendapatkan polisi insurans baru yang melibatkan orang yang dinsurankan yang sama iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan.”. S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 LOCUS STANDI [72] Since I have made my decision that the representation was made dishonestly in 2017, I do not consider it necessary to address at length the issue of locus standi that was discussed by the SCJ upon submission of Defendant 2’s counsel. She has ruled that the Plaintiff did not have locus standi to bring the claim as he was not a nominee of the deceased. If the policies were taken out without dishonest misrepresentation on the part of the Plaintiff, I would agree with the Defendant 2’s submission that the family of the deceased stood as the rightful beneficiaries of the policies and the Plaintiff, as the employer, would be the right person to commence the claims on behalf of the deceased’s family members. Paragraph 8 of Schedule 10 may be applicable here (refer to paragraphs 22-30 of Defendant 2’s written submissions). EX TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR [73] Lastly, I will briefly touch on the issue of ex turpi non causa oritur that was raised by the Defendants in this appeal. Defendant’s counsel submitted at para 8 - 8.5 that the maxim applied since the deceased was riding without a safety helmet and also without a valid license. Counsel submitted that the Court should not lend its aid to a man whose cause of action was founded upon an illegal act. The Plaintiff submitted that the maxim applied to minor or trivial offences e.g. traffic violations. Counsel for the Plaintiff tried to trivialise the issue by stating the violations were punishable with fines and that the present case was on all fours with the recent Court of Appeal case of Ahmad Zulfendi Anuar v Mohd Shahril Abdul Rahman [2022] 9 CLJ 307 where the plaintiff did not hold a valid S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 licence to ride a motorcycle which also had not road tax and no policy of insurance against third party risks. The Court of Appeal went on to hold: “While violation of traffic laws must only be dealt with under the specific laws creating the relevant offences, such as in the Road Transport Act 1987 (“RTA”), the RTA does not contain any provision which restrict, let alone prohibit, the rights of any road user from making personal injury claims by reason of the claimant breaching the RTA, including in respect of the requirement for holding the requisite licence, road tax and insurance.”. [74] In Tay Lye Seng & Anor v. Nazori Teh & Anor [1998] 3 CLJ 466 the Court of Appeal held (per Siti Norma Yaakob JCA): “[1] While public policy would defeat any claim based on illegality, a balance has to be drawn based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. [2] The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio has limited application in tort. The role of the maxim lies mainly and most exclusively in actions based on contract. [3] The fact that the first respondent had no valid work permit per se, could not affect his claim for loss of earnings in Singapore. This was because the first respondent was working legally in Singapore initially. He had a valid work permit issued by the Singapore authorities but unfortunately that expired four months before the accident. The obligation to renew the work permit laid squarely with the first respondent’s employers and since there was no evidence that the had done so the first respondent had therefore not been culpably responsible for the predicament that he later found himself to be in. In these circumstances, the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio lacked moral justification and was not applicable in this appeal.”. [Emphasis added] [75] The Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) in her very lengthy grounds of judgment summarised the evidence and findings of SP1 in paragraphs 33-38 on the deceased’s liability. It was submitted that here the illegal act was of the deceased not the Plaintiff. Moreover, it was SP6 who owed the duty as the owner of the motorcycle to make sure it had a valid insurance cover and road tax at all time of and it the deceased must have a valid licence when riding the motorcycle; the Plaintiff cannot be faulted since S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 the breaches of the RTA were by SP6 and the deceased. This argument does not hold water in my view. At the risk of repeating myself, I reiterate the fact that it was the Plaintiff in the first instance who had not made a true representation of the deceased’s status of not having a valid licence when he purchased the policies. The above case can be distinguished on the facts as here, the claims were founded on illegal act of the Plaintiff in making a dishonest representation to the insurers. [76] I have considered the submissions and case laws cited by the Plaintiff but I am unable to agree with his position. He has misconstrued the law in regard to the duty to take care to disclose material facts to the insurers. The facts of the case showed that the Plaintiff’s claims were untenable wherein the insurers can repudiate the contract in accordance with Paragraph 15 of Schedule 9. CONCLUSION [77] The Plaintiff had failed to prove his claims on a balance of probabilities and therefore, the SCJ dismissed the claims. It was unnecessary for me to disturb the decisions of the SCJ. Premised on the above considerations, I dismissed the 4 appeals with costs. Appeals dismissed with costs. Dated 24 January 2024 Sgd. NOOR RUWENA BINTI MD NURDIN Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya, Taiping S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 For the Appellant: Ms. Shuroma Guha Thakurta Messrs Manjit & Co., Bukit Mertajam For the Respondents: For The Pacific Insurance Berhad Mr. Ananth Shanmugam Messrs. Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong, Kuala Lumpur For Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad Ms. Vinoshini Saminathan Messrs. Isharidah, Ho, Chong & Menon, Kuala Lumpur S/N xvKXIhhXIUOjEZ8uMLetqA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AB-12BNCvC-2-03/2021

PERAYU Kunasegaran a/l Vadevelloo RESPONDEN The Pacific Insurance Berhad

Civil Procedure - Schedule 9 of Financial Services Act 2013 Principle of Uberrimae Fidei whether applicable - Appeal against decision of Sessions Court in dismissing the Plaintiff's claim for insurance pay out by 4 licensed insurers - Exclusion Clauses - Non-disclosure of material fact - Plaintiff did not declare existence of other policies at time of renewal of policies - Deceased did not possess valid licence to drive - Commission of unlawful act under RTA 1987 - Whether insurers entitled to repudiate liability - Appeals dismissed

26/01/2024

YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a02f9f88-73af-404e-b1c6-ecbac69786d3&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZWAN RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-2-03/2021 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLO [NO. K/P: 680329085479] …PERAYU DAN THE PACIFIC INSURANCE BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 91603-K] …RESPONDEN Yang didengar bersama-sama dengan: RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-3-03/2021 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PERAYU DAN BERJAYA SOMPO INSURANCE BERHAD [COMPANY NO.: 62605-U] …RESPONDEN RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-4-03/2021] ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PERAYU 26/01/2024 05:31:00 AB-12BNCvC-2-03/2021 Kand. 76 S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 DAN SYARIKAT TAKAFUL AM (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 1246486-D] …RESPONDEN RAYUAN SIVIL NO: AB-12BNCVC-5-03/2021 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PERAYU DAN ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 735426-V] …RESPONDEN DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI TAIPING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZWAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLO [NO. K/P: 680329085479] …PLAINTIF DAN THE PACIFIC INSURANCE BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 91603-K] …DEFENDAN Yang digabung dan didengar serentak dengan: S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-12-08/2019 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PLAINTIF DAN BERJAYA SOMPO INSURANCE BERHAD [COMPANY NO.: 62605-U] …DEFENDAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-13-08/2019 ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PLAINTIF DAN ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 735426-V] …DEFENDAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: AB-A52NCC-14-08/2019] ANTARA KUNASEGARAN A/L VADEVELLOO …PLAINTIF DAN SYARIKAT TAKAFUL AM (MALAYSIA) BERHAD [No. Syarikat: 1246486-D] …DEFENDAN S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] Originally there were 4 appeals which were heard together by this Court. On 22.9.2023 this Court affirmed the decision of the Sessions Court in Taiping delivered on 26.2.2021 that had dismissed the Appellant’s claim against the Respondents with costs. Dissatisfied with this Court’s decision, the Appellant then filed 2 Notices of Appeals on 13.10.2023 in respect of Appeal Nos. AB-12BNCVC-2-03/2021 and AB-12BNCVC-3- 03/2021 against THE PACIFIC INSURANCE BERHAD and BERJAYA SOMPO INSURANCE BERHAD, respectively. [2] For convenience, I have prepared this Grounds of Judgment to encompass both appeals as they involved the same Plaintiff (Kunasegaran A/L Vadevello) but different insurance companies, in respect of the same subject-matter, which was one Raja A/L Krishnan (deceased) who was the Plaintiff’s employee. I will refer to the parties as the “Plaintiff” and “Defendant 1” (Pacific Insurance Berhad) and “Defendant 2” (Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad) since the trials were heard together by the Sessions Court. The Plaintiff took 4 separate actions against the two Defendants abovementioned as well as against SYARIKAT TAKAFUL AM (MALAYSIA) BERHAD and ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD. I will also refer to the other two insurers as “Defendant 3” and “Defendant 4”, where necessary. [3] The crux of the Plaintiff’s claim was the failure of the 4 insurers to pay him the agreed policy amounts due to the death of the deceased. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 THE APPEAL [4] Before delving into the issues at hand, it is noted that these suits were registered under commercial disputes by the Plaintiff and not as road accident claim. The evidence adduced in respect of the accident which occurred on 14.12.2018 were the precursor to the claim for compensation totalling RM990,000.00 which the Plaintiff claimed he was entitled, pursuant to the death of his employee. The Defendants refused to make payment under the respective policies, namely on 2 grounds i.e. that the deceased was riding a motorcycle without a valid licence at the time of the accident, and failure of the Plaintiff to declare that he had obtained policies with other insurers during the same period. [5] The Plaintiff had taken out 3 Group Personal Accident policies under the deceased’s name with Pacific Insurance, Berjaya Sompo and Allianz General. Then he took out 1 Group Personal Accident policy i.e. Syarikat Takaful insurance in respect of his 4 employees, including the deceased. Copies of the identity cards of the three (3) other employees were as per exhibit P19(A-C) and their names were as follows: i. Babelan A/L Kunasegaran; ii. Mathialegen A/L Nyanasgar; and iii. Nyanasgar A/L Vadevello. [6] Based on the names and address in the 3 identity cards above, it appeared that they were all related to the Plaintiff, unlike the deceased. It was the Plaintiff’s contention that Raja A/L Krishnan (the deceased) was offered employment via letter dated 9.5.2017 with a salary of RM4,500.00 as a General Worker (page 410 of the Record of Appeal, Part C). S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [7] Details of the renewed insurance policies taken out by the Plaintiff were as follows: No. Policy No. And Name Issuer and premium paid Date of Renewal Validity Period Amount Insured (RM) 1. CPN-PO174058-A4 (Pacific Super Protector) pages 426-479 RRBC Pacific Insurance (RM786.98) 22.10.2018 11.10.2018 – 10.10.2019 300,000.00 2. 18DTP/PQCE000042 (Ultima V3-Plan 5) pages 480-512 RRBC Berjaya Sompo (RM790.16) 5.10.2018 12.10.2018 – 11.10.2019 300,000.00 3. PGP-P0052438-30- AGT-17 (Polisi Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok) pages 561-599 RRBC Syarikat Takaful Am (RM1,865.00) 18.12.2017 29.12.2017 – 28.12.2018 150,000.00 4. No. 17PTP0000254-01 (Allianz Shield Plan 04) pages 513-560 RRBC Allianz General (RM540.00) 15.10.2018 11.10.2018 – 10.10.2019 240,000.00 Total 990,000.00 [8] A total of 7 witnesses testified for the Plaintiff and 6 witnesses testified for the Defendants. The Plaintiff’s witnesses were the Investigation Officer (SP1) and 2 other police personnel (SP3 and SP4), the medical officer and personnel (SP2 and SP5) as well as the owner of the motorcycle (SP6) and the Plaintiff (SP7). Meanwhile the witnesses who had testified for the Defendants were SD1 and SD2 (Defendant 1), SD3 (Defendant 2), SD4 and SD 5 (Defendant 4) and SD6 (Defendant 3). [9] Prior to the hearing of the appeal on 8.8.2023, the Court heard an application made by the Plaintiff in Encl. 18 (Defendant 1) and Encl. 14 (Defendant 2), Encl. 14 (Defendant 3) and Encl. 20 (Defendant 4) in the respective appeal numbers for extension of time to file the Draft Index of the Records of Appeal in accordance with O. 55 r.4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) after the Defendants raised preliminary objections on the S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Plaintiff’s failure to serve the same in accordance with the rules. The Plaintiff’s explanation for the delay was because of the extensive written grounds of judgment of the Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) and the Draft Index were inadvertently left out from the Records of Appeal and there was no prejudice to the Defendants. The Defendants argued that the prejudice they suffered was they were unable to comment on the inclusion or exclusion of documents in the records of appeal. [10] However, the Court noted that the Defendants did not deny when the Plaintiff stated they only included relevant documents from the lower court. The Court had considered the period of delay, the reason, chances of appeal succeeding if time was allowed and the prejudice caused to the opponent, and whether this could be compensated by costs. The Court also considered and applied O.1A of the ROC. The application was allowed and ordered the Plaintiff to pay costs to the Defendants. FACTS OF THE CASE [11] The Plaintiff was a businessman who owned 2 registered businesses, namely as sole proprietor of Kunasegaran a/l Vadivelloo (“the business”) and a partner for 11 years in Pesona Sdn Bhd with his wife Law Hooi Poh (“the company”). The business of the Plaintiff was to supply construction materials, retail goods, trader of oil palm fruits, fruits, furniture, poultry, agricultural products and metal scraps. He employed the deceased as a lorry driver to transport oil palm fruits from the surrounding areas of Selama and Pondok Tanjung in May 2017 with a monthly salary of RM4,500.00 (refer to pages 410-414 of the RR Part C). It appeared from the salary slips exhibited that the employer and employee was not contributing to EPF and SOCSO. The Plaintiff testified S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 that he took out the insurance cover for the deceased as an incentive for his worker. [12] In 2017, the Plaintiff purchased the policies of insurance (as set out above). About 1.5 - 2 months after the policies were renewed in 2018, the deceased met with an accident on 14.12.2018 at approximately 1.03 pm at KM 27 Jalan Taiping – Selama after a motorcycle bearing registration No. AFU 1730 on which he was riding alone was believed to have skidded and crashed. There were no eye-witnesses to the accident and the circumstantial evidence pointed to the fact that the deceased lost control of the motorcycle, was flung off and fell on the road. As he was not wearing a helmet at that time, the deceased sustained severe injuries to his head. He was warded at the Hospital Taiping wherein he passed away on 15.12.2018 at 6.38 pm due to “Severe traumatic brain injury” (refer to Exhibits P3, P4, P9 and P10). According to SP2, the injury was due to a hard fall from motor vehicle accident. [13] Although during the trial, counsel for Defendant 3 disputed the cause of the accident, nevertheless, the Investigation Officer (SP1) was firm in his findings that the accident occurred due to the deceased’s own carelessness. This was due to the fact that from a JPJ search in 2019 (page 415 of RR Part C) showed that the deceased did not possess a valid driving licence but had only obtained a Class B learner driver’s licence (L-licence) on 3.8.2001 which expired on 25.5.2003 and was never renewed thereafter, despite the Plaintiff claiming that the deceased was employed as a lorry driver. [14] The main issue of the disputes was the Defendants’ refusal to make out the compensation payments for the death of the deceased under the S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 4 policies although the Plaintiff had paid the required premiums (refer to the schedule above) and death occurred during the validity period of all the policies. The Defendants contended that they could not honour the respective agreement because the deceased was riding the motorcycle without a valid licence at the material time, which came within Exclusion No. 12 under the terms of the policy for Defendant 1, Exclusion No. 2 for Defendant 2, Exception 2(b) for Defendant 3 and Exclusion No. 13 for Defendant 4. Moreover, the Plaintiff failed to declare in the Proposal Forms during the renewal that he had obtained policies from other insurers, namely Defendant 2 and Defendant 3. ISSUES IN THE APPEAL [15] The grounds of complaint against the decision of the SCJ in the Memorandum of Appeal (refer to Encl. 5 and/or 45 pages 14-34) and Additional Memorandum of Appeal (refer to Encl. 13 and/or 52, pages 6- 43) were extensive and many of them repetitive. The Memorandum of Appeal contained 60 grounds and the Additional Memorandum of Appeal contained 85 grounds. The Defendants raised objections that the Plaintiff had filed an Additional Memorandum of Appeal without leave of the Court whereas it should have been filed as Amended Memorandum of Appeal. It was not an amended Memorandum of Appeal but the contents were additional grounds after the grounds of judgment of the SCJ was obtained. The Court did not make a ruling on this and proceeded to hear the appeal. The records of appeal were re-filed after the application for extension of time to file the Draft Index was granted. The issues in the appeal as summarised were as follows: (i) whether the insurance policy fell within the ambit of a consumer insurance contract or non-consumer insurance contract; S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (ii) if the Court finds that it is a consumer insurance contract, whether there has been compliance by the parties with the whole prosess or procedure under Paragraph 5, Part II Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758]; (iii) whether the Plaintiff received any notice in writing in respect of the pre-contractual duty to disclose prior to entering into the contract of insurance; (iv) can the Defendants be allowed to rely on a new ground which was never raised in the repudiation letter rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim; (v) has it been proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased died by accidental means; (vi) does the basis clause apply if the court finds that the contract of insurance is a consumer insurance contract; (vii) can the Defendants repudiate liability by relying on the Exclusion Clauses; and (viii) should section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 be invoked against the Defendants for failing to call as a witness their authorised agent(s) who filled up the proposal form on behalf of the Plaintiff who could not speak and understand the English Language. [16] It is trite that an appellate court would be slow to disturb the decision of the trial court unless the Court was convinced that there have been substantial misdirection of facts and law in the trial court which merited appellate intervention. Therefore, the appellant must convince the appellate court that the decision appealed from was wrong. The rationale for this is that the trier of fact would have had the benefit and advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and the opportunity to assess their S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 demeanour: Rasidin Bin Partojo v Frederick Kiai [1976] 2 MLJ 214. The trial judge would have had first-hand opportunity to evaluate and appraise the evidence of the witnesses who testify before him. [17] The appellate court then examines the trial court's process of evaluation of the evidence adduced and application of the relevant laws in arriving at its decision and compares them against the grounds raised in the Memorandum of Appeal. At the end of the day, similar to the trial court, the duty of the appellate court in a civil appeal is to determine whether the appellant has proved his case on a balance of probabilities. The legal burden of proof lay on the Plaintiff to prove his case that the Defendants have repudiated the respective contract of insurance without any legal basis. [18] The Court noted that the SCJ prepared 4 grounds of judgments but the contents were almost similar. In coming up with the decision on the appeals, the Court has used the grounds of judgment for Berjaya Sompo (Defendant 2) as reference for all the appeals since the SCJ has ruled the trials to be heard together but the issues for the 4 claims be dealt with separately. As stated earlier, the Plaintiff filed 2 notices of appeals to the Court of Appeal against Defendant 1 which had taken the view that the contract was a consumer insurance contract and Defendant 2 that purportedly argued it was a non-consumer insurance contract. [19] The Plaintiff’s evidence can be summarised as follows: i. That the Defendants’ agents by the name of Fong Kok Wai (Defendants 1 and 3), Yew Kai Chong (Defendant 2), and Abdul Saidi Bin Badri (Defendant 2) attended to him the first time when the Plaintiff wanted to purchase insurance for his employees; S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 ii. That the insurance agents had filled up the proposal forms whereby they would ask him questions and he supplied the answers; iii. That he had fulfilled his obligations to disclose when the proposal forms were being prepared by the said insurance agents; iv. That they had never asked him whether the proposed insured had a valid driving licence and road tax; v. That had they asked him those questions, he would have gone to see the employee to get his confirmation and then he would reverted to the respective agents with the answer(s); vi. That they also never asked him those questions upon renewal of all the policies; vii. All the said agents filled up the forms for him when he attempted to make the claims after the death of the deceased; viii. That all the policies had never been cancelled despite them rejecting his applications; ix. That the Defendants had never stated the reason why his applications were rejected; and x. That the agents of the Defendants had never asked him to make a disclosure as required under s.129, Part 2(4)(4) of the Financial Services Act 2013. [20] In summary, paragraph 19 of the grounds of judgment contained the SCJ’s finding that the Plaintiff did not come to court with clean hands because he did not disclose in the proposal forms that he did not know about or was ignorant of the Important Notice. He blamed the insurance agents who had filled out the proposal forms for him, namely Fong Kok Wai, Yew Kai Chong and Abdul Saidi Bin Bakri. However, the facts S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 showed that it was the Plaintiff who signed the proposal forms and therefore the SCJ held that the Plaintiff owed the duty to disclose as required under the law. It was noted that this was not pleaded in the Statement of Claim but instead in his Reply to Defence the Plaintiff brought up the issue that he was not asked about those questions in the proposal forms. The Defendants pleaded that the duty to disclose existed separately from any duty to fill out the forms. [21] In paragraph 20, the SCJ found that despite claiming that he was not familiar with the terms of the contract (ignorance), the SCJ found that he was a smart businessman who was maths-savvy (celik matematik) as he was the one who would gather the facts and figures for the proposal forms. He paid for all the premiums which the payout would add up to almost RM1,000,000.00. The deceased died about 2 months after the policies were renewed but no one saw how the accident happened. SP1 concluded from his investigations that the deceased was not wearing a helmet and did not have a valid driving licence, road tax (expired in February 2011) and the motorcycle was not insurance-covered (refer to the summary of SP1’s evidence in page 21). SP1 concluded that the deceased was incapable of handling the motorcycle and it was his own negligence that caused the accident. The deceased obtained an L-licence in the beginning but that was all. SP6, the owner of the motorcycle refused to cooperate with the police during the investigation stage. In paragraph 37, the SCJ found that clearly the deceased had breached the law. It was without doubt too that SP6 at the material time had breached the law when he allowed the deceased to use that motorcycle regardless of the fact that he stated in evidence the said motorcycle was not meant to be used on the road. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [22] Needless to say, as the trier of fact, the SCJ had the benefit of directly observing and assessing the demeanour of each witness who testified before her. This Court noted that the SCJ in the grounds of judgment had noted her observations in respect of the Plaintiff’s evidence at the trial. For ease of reference, I refer to the following paragraphs which are pertinent to her conclusion that the Plaintiff “was not as illiterate or ignorant such as he claimed to be”: “[61] Semasa perbicaraan, Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa beliau juga menjalankan perniagaan memungut dan membeli 'besi buruk' yang hanya dibantu oleh Raja a/l Krishnan iaitu melakukan kutipan besi buruk di sekitar Daerah Larut Matang dan Selama dan Daerah Kerian, Perak. Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun Plaintif tidak berpelajaran tinggi tetapi beliau tidak terhalang untuk berniaga dan menguasai pelbagai bahasa termasuklah bahasa Cina atau Inggeris untuk berkomunikasi dengan isteri, pemilik ladang berbangsa Cina, ejen insurans dan rakan perniagaan di sekitar Daerah Larut Matang dan Selama dan Daerah Kerian. … [63] Berdasarkan soalan dan jawapan dalam PSP7, dirumuskan bahawa SP7 sebagai majikan memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memperoleh fakta dan angka untuk untuk menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan di bawah polisi dengan 4 syarikat penanggung insurans, iaitu Pacific Insurance, Berjaya Sompo Insurance, Allianz General Insurance dan Takaful Malaysia. Naratif kes Plaintif dalam Penyata Saksi (yang ditandakan sebagai PSP7, Encl.74 dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019, mengandungi 164 soalan dan jawapan yang dibuat oleh Plaintif sendiri serta jawapan diaku benar oleh Plaintif) telah mengemukakan dokumen dalam Ikatan C dan D Encl.44 dan 45 dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/20191 bagi menyokong tuntutan terhadap 4 syarikat penanggung insurans, iaitu Pacific Insurance, Berjaya Sompo Insurance, Allianz General Insurance dan Takaful Malaysia. [64] SP7 telah menggunakan khidmat jurubahasa semasa memberi keterangan kerana mendakwa dia tidak fasih berbahasa Malaysia atau Inggeris. Mahkamah meragui perkara ini kerana SP7 telah menulis surat Tawaran Pekerjaan (ekshibit P20) dengan penggunaan bahasa dan penyusunan ayat yang baik dan jawapan kepada 164 soalan dalam Penyata Saksi dibuat dalam Bahasa Malaysia itu diaku benar dibuat olehnya sendiri? S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 … [70] Plaintif yang mengisytiharkan dalam borang cadangan untuk polisi 'Pacific Super Protector' bahawa maklumat peribadinya dalam Borang Cadangan bertarikh 11/10/2017 adalah benar (merujuk di muka surat 33 Ikatan D dalam Encl, 45) dan Plaintif bersetuju bahawa cadangan itu dijadikan dasar kontrak di antara pihak-pihak ('klausa asas'). Merujuk kepada soalan 1(d), hanya mengisytiharkan polisi yang dipohon kepada Allianz General Insurance. [71] Pacific Insurance ('defendan') menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan (‘si mati’) dalam jumlah RM300,000 terhadap kematian akibat kemalangan. Plaintif telah memperbaharu polisi asal CPNPOI 74058-A4 yang luput pada 11/10/2018, maka tempoh sah laku dilanjutkan bagi tempoh dari 11/10/2018 hingga 10/10/2019. Bagaimanapun, tiada borang cadangan baru ditanda tangan oleh Plaintif. Plaintif, semasa membaharukan polisi, tidak mengisytiharkan polisi diisu oleh Takaful Malaysia yang sah laku hingga 29/12/2018 atau polisi Berjaya Sompo Insurance yang bertarikh 05/10/2018 semasa melanjutkan tempoh sah laku polisi CPN-POI 74058-A4. [72] Apabila polisi insurans bernombor CPN-POI 74058-A4 yang luput pada 11/10/2018 diperbaharu untuk tempoh tetap dengan persetujuan bersama, borang cadangan asal polisi insurans bernombor CPN-POI 74058-A4 itu digabungkan dengan polisi bertarikh 22/10/2018 yang diperbaharui itu dan berterusan membentuk asas kontrak. Begitu juga dalam kes ini, terma mengenai pembaharuan dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa pembaharuan tarikh kuat kuasa tersebut adalah ‘tertakluk kepada semua terma, syarat dan pengindorsan dalam polisi asal’ [di muka surat 43 Ikatan D], ia termasuklah deklarasi dalam borang cadangan asal yang membentuk asas kontrak iłu. Itu juga membentuk sebahagian daripada polisi yang diperbaharui [rujuk di muka surat 51 Ikatan D]. … [74] Plaintif yang mengisytiharkan dalam borang cadangan untuk polisi 'Group Allianz Shield' bahawa maklumat peribadinya dalam Borang Cadangan bertarikh 11/10/2017 adalah benar [merujuk di muka surat 120 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45] dan Plaintif bersetuju bahawa cadangan itu dijadikan dasar kontrak di antara pihak-pihak ('klausa asas'). Merujuk kepada soalan 1(d), hanya mengisytiharkan polisi Pacific Super Protector CPN-POI 74058-A4 [merujuk di muka surat 119 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45] sedangkan polisi Takaful Group Personal Accident' [merujuk ekshibit D43] masih sah laku sehingga 29/12/2018. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [75] Allianz General Insurance ('defendan') menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan ('si mati') dalam jumlah RM240,000 terhadap kematian akibat kemalangan. Plaintif telah memperbaharu polisi asal 'Allianz Shield Plan 04' bernombor 17PTP0000254-01 yang luput pada 11/10/2018, maka tempoh sah laku dilanjutkan bagi tempoh dari 11/10/2018 hingga 10/10/2019. Bagaimanapun, tiada borang cadangan baru ditandatangan oleh Plaintif. Plaintif tidak mengisytiharkan polisi diisu oleh Takaful Malaysia yang sah laku hingga 29/12/2018 atau polisi Berjaya Sompo Insurance yang bertarikh 05/10/2018 semasa melanjutkan tempoh sah laku polisi 'Allianz Shield Plan 04' bernombor 17PTP0000254-01. … [77] Berjaya Sompo Insurance ('defendan') menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan ('si mati') dalam jumlah RM300,000 terhadap kematian akibat kemalangan, bagi tempoh dari 12/10/2018 hingga 11/10/2019. Bagaimanapun, Plaintif tidak mengisytiharkan polisi diisu oleh Takaful Malaysia yang sah Iaku hingga 29/12/2018 atau polisi Allianz General Insurance dan Pacific Insurance yang sah hingga 10/10/2019 semasa ejen Yew Kai Chong mengisikan Borang Cadangan Yang Ditanda tangan oleh Plaintif bagi Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima \/3. [78] Peguam Defendan bagi kes AB-A52NCC-12-08/2019 memohon supaya Plaintif disoal balas mengenai status kewangan dengan merujuk kepada dokumen Cukai Pendapatan (Borang B) bagi tahun Taksiran 2017 dan 2018 perniagaan Kunasegaran a/l Vadevello. Maka pemeriksaan balas ditangguh kepada 24/09/2020 bagi membolehkan Plaintif membawa dokumen e/B 2017 — 2018 bagi pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Defendan-defendan. [79] Pada 24/09/2020, pemeriksaan balas disambung dengar dengan penandaan e/Be Tahun 2017 (Ekshibit P51) dan e/B Tahun 2018 (Ekshibit P52). Semasa diperiksa balas oleh peguam Defendan yang mewakili Berjaya Sompo Insurance, SP7 juga dicabar atas kegagalan SP7 untuk mendedahkan fakta berkenaan perlindungan takaful khususnya merujuk pekerja bernama Raja a/l Krishnan semasa SP7 mengisi Borang Cadangan memperbaharu polisi insurans yang diisu oleh Pacific Insurance dan Allianz General Insurance. SP7 didapati gagal mendedahkan fakta bahawa SP telah memperoleh polisi insurans yang diisu oleh Pacific Insurance dan Allianz General Insurance semasa dia meminta ejen Yevv Kai Chong mengisikan Borang Cadangan untuk memperoleh Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3 [ekshibit P32] dari Berjaya Sompo Insurance. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [80] Semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Defendan yang mewakili Alianz General Insurance, SP7 hanya merujuk ekshibit PI 9 (A) - (C) mengenai pekerja bernama Kabelan a/l Kunasegaran [Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 25] yang diakui ialah anak SP7 yang mula bekerja sejak 5 tahun lalu dan dibayar RM3,000.00 sebulan. Mathialegen a/l Nyanasegar [Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 26] pula ialah anak saudara SP7 yang mula bekerja sejak 4 tahun lalu dan dibayar RM2,800.00 sebulan. Nyanasegar a/l Vadivelloo [Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 27] ialah adik SP7 yang mula bekerja sejak 7 tahun lalu dan dibayar RM4,500.00 sebulan. [81] Terdapat seorang lagi pekerja bernama 'Devanthiran' yang tidak disebut di bawah Sijil Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok bertarikh 04.01 2017. SP7 dirujuk kepada senarai pekerja yang dinamakan di bawah Sijil Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok bertarikh 04.01.2017 yang sah Iaku bagi tempoh 29/12/2016-28/12/2017, termasuk Devanthiran yang didakwa menggantikan Raja a/l Krishnan. Pada tahun 2016, senarai pekerja dalam Sijil Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok adalah termasuk Raja a/l Krishnan tetapi dokumen Surat Tawaran Kerja bertarikh 10/05/2017 (ekshibit P201 menunjukkan Raja mula kerja sejak 10/05/2017 dengan SP7 sebagai pemandu lori dalam kawasan ladang sawit. [82] Menurut SP7, Raja melakukan pelbagai kerja am di ladang bagi memunggah kelapa sawit dan lazimnya kerja mengutip buah kelapa sawit bermula jam 10-10.30 pagi dan dia mengambil masa 2-3 jam untuk memungut buah kelapa sawit bergantung kepada luas kawasan ladang sawit, dan ladang Ah Ling adalah berkeluasan lebih kurang 18 ekar sahaja. Lazimnya Raja selesai memungut buah sawit di ladang berkeluasan 60 ekar ialah dalam masa 4 - 5 jam. [83] Menurut SP7, gaji sebulan dibayar kepada Raja ialah RM4,500.00. Bukti penyata bayaran gaji (dalam ekshibit P21 yang disediakan kerani bernama Nadiana) tidak ada tandatangan Raja kerana Raja buta huruf. Peruntukan mengenai cuti rehat yang diperuntukkan juga tidak dinyatakan atas slip gaji. Gaji Raja dibayar penuh tanpa tolakan bayaran SOCSO. Raja tidak ada masalah kewangan atau membuat apa-apa pinjaman dengan Plaintif. Raja dilindungi polisi insurans pekerja yang diperoleh Plaintif sebagai majikan sepanjang Raja bekerja untuk perniagaan 'Kunasegaran a/l Vadevello' yang berdaftar sejak 2014 serta milikan tunggal SP7. [84] SP7 mengenali Govindasamy a/l Sinnian (pemilik motorsikal AFU1730) sejak 10 tahun dan mengenali majikan Govindasamy, Ah Ling yang berbangsa Cina. Luas ladang Ah Ling ialah 18 ekar. Raja a/l Krishnan dihantar 3 kali sebulan untuk mengutip buah sawit di ladang Ah Ling. SP7 yang akan S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 menghantar Raja dengan lori untuk mengangkut buah sawit. Selepas Raja dan lori dihantar ke ladang Ah Ling, SP7 balik ke pejabat dengan meminta bantuan kawan atau pekerja di Ladang Ah Ling untuk menghantarnya pulang ke pejabat di Batu Kurau. Pada 14/12/2018, Raja dihantar ke ladang Ah Ling untuk mengutip buah sawit. [85] Menurut SP7, Raja yang bekerja sebagai pemungut besi buruk, baru dikenali sejak setahun lalu. Raja a/l Krishnan hanya ada ibu dan seorang abang manakala bapanya telah meninggal dunia. SP7 tidak ada nombor telefon ibu atau abang Raja. Kumaran a/l Muniandy ialah abang sepupu Raja a/l Krishnan. SP7 menafikan dia telah menghubungi Kumaran untuk menyuruhnya membuat laporan polis mengenai nahas yang menimpa Raja. Ahli keluarga Raja a/l Krishnan bukan 'nominee' si mati bagi polisi yang diperoleh untuk menginsuranskan Raja atas kematian akibat kemalangan dan mereka berkemungkinan tidak ada pengetahuan tentang polisi insurans yang diperoleh Plaintif bagi perlindungan dari kecederaan diri atau kematian akibat kemalangan atas nama simati. [86] Semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguam Berjaya Sompo, SP7 mengatakan dia tidak ada pengetahuan bahawa motorsikal AFU1730 tidak dilindungi insurans dan cukai jalan motorsikal telah luput. Malah SP7 tidak ada pengetahuan sama ada si mati mempunyai lesen menunggang atau memandu kenderaan yang sah atau tidak. [87] Plaintif (SP7) menafikan dakwaan dalam soal balas oleh peguam Defendan-defendan bahawa terdapat perlanggaran prinsip uberimae fidei atau niat suci hati dan meletakkan beban ke atas 3 ejen penanggung insurans yang membantunya mengisikan Borang Cadangan atau dia tidak dijelaskan oleh 3 ejen penanggung insurans iaitu Fong Kok Wai, Yew Kai Chong dan Abdul Saidi bin Bakri tentang keperluan untuk isytiharkan semua polisi yang menginsuranskan Raja a/l Krishnan. [88] Di peringkat pemeriksaan semula oleh peguamnya, SP7 mengatakan bahawa dia tidak pernah ditanyakan oleh ejen atau diberikan notis mengenai keperluan si mati untuk mempunyai lesen menunggang motorsikal atau memandu kenderaan yang sah jika polisi perlindungan insurans hendak dibeli atas penama Raja a/l Krishnan atau berkenaan batasan aktiviti memandu atau menunggang motorsikal dalam polisi-polisi sedia ada atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan. [22] I have highlighted the paragraphs above from the grounds of judgment as these were important points to note for the Court in deciding S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 whether the Defendants were justified in not honouring the claims submitted by the Plaintiff not long after the deceased died. A perusal of her summary of the Plaintiff’s evidence in paragraphs 76 and 77 showed that the SCJ found he did not declare that he had obtained coverage from Defendant 2 and Defendant 4. He had declared with Defendant 3, or rather, the agent Fong Kok Wai made the declaration, only when he applied for renewal of the coverage from Defendant 1 (refer to paragraphs 81-82) and he admitted that the deceased’s family may not know about the policies. [24] Then, the SCJ made her finding on the issue of the deceased not in possession of a valid full licence in paragraphs 206-207. This is where s.26 of the RTA comes in, namely, the requirement to have valid licence. The SCJ agreed with the Defendants’ submissions (refer to paragraphs 212, 213, 215). In paragraph 220 she found the insurers were not liable for repudiation of the insurance contract. The burden of proof was on the Plaintiff to prove his case that the accident was not caused by other things in order to qualify for the pay out but this he failed to do (refer to paragraphs 226 -231. The SCJ concluded in paragraph 232 that the deceased died due to a motor vehicle accident (MVA) but the exclusion clause(s) applied (refer to paragraphs 234 – 237). The SCJ stated in paragraph 249 that the Plaintiff was bound by his pleadings and this issue of consumer contract/life insurance was not pleaded; he was therefore barred from raising it at the submissions stage. [25] Finally, the SCJ arrived at the following conclusions: “[252] Setelah meneliti keterangan-keterangan lisan saksi-saksi plaintif dan defendan serta keterangan dari dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan dan setelah membaca hujahan bertulis peguam plaintif dan peguam defendan serta S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 hujahan balas yang difailkan dan setelah mendengar hujahan lisan pihak- pihak, keputusan saya dalam kes ini adalah seperti berikut: (i) Berdasarkan isu awalan ini sahaja, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa peruntukan Jadual ke-10 Akta 758 yang dibaca secara harmoni dengan terma Polisi Insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima V3 - Plan 05 [ekshibit P31 di muka surat 98 Ikatan D] bahawa pembayaran wang polisi apabila berlaku kematian orang yang diinsurankan adalah dibuat kepada wakil peribadi Orang Yang Diinsurankan (Raja a/l Krishnan). Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa oleh sebab Plaintif, tidak mempunyai hubungan kekeluargaan dengan simati, bukan waris kadim dan bukan nominee yang dinamakan dalam Borang Penamaan (ekshibit P32, rujuk muka surat 86 Ikatan D) adalah tidak tergolong sebagai wakil peribadi dan diputuskan Plaintif tidak ada locus dan tidak layak dibayar atas tuntutan pampasan di bawah polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima Plan 05 [ekshibit P31 yang bernombor 18DTP/PQCE000042]. (ii) terdapat ketidakdedahan fakta penting oleh Plaintif atau ketaknyataan yang material kepada soalan 6 dalam Borang Cadangan [rujuk muka surat 86 Ikatan D, encl. 45) yang mewajarkan penolakan liabiliti (dipli dalam perenggan 6 Pembelaan dalam encl. 5 dan Pembelaan Terpinda dalam encl. 21); (iii) penolakan liabiliti secara dasarnya adalah bergantung kepada Polisi yang diisu oleh Defendan di bawah terma pengecualian 2 (d) dan (e) mengenai ketakpatuhan Orang Yang Diinsuranskan (Raja a/l Krishnan) untuk memenuhi terma-terma, syarat-syarat dan pengendorsan Polisi ini setakat mana ia berhubung kait dengan apa sahaja yang perlu dilakukan atau dipatuhi oleh orang yang diinsuranskan iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan; (iv) faktor berlakunya kecederaan parah semasa ditimpa malang akibat kecuaian sendiri oleh orang yang diinsuranskan iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan yang tidak memakai topi keledar semasa menunggang motorsikal, dan perlakuan yang menyalahi kepentingan dan polisi awam/undang-undang sedia ada, iaitu menunggang motorsikal yang tidak dilindungi insurans dan tiada cukai jalan; dan (v) Mahkamah, dalam keadaan kes ini, dengan mempertimbangkan maxim “ex turpi causa non oritur” Mahkamah tidak menyetujui kemungkiran undang- undang oleh orang yang diinsuranskan iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan yang ternyata telah melakukan beberapa perbuatan yang menyalahi peraturan dan undang- undang jalan raya sedia ada. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 EVALUATION AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT [26] While I agreed with the decision of the SCJ in not allowing the Plaintiff’s claim, there were some errors made in her grounds of judgment. These errors, in my view, do not require appellate intervention because having considered the submissions and case laws cited by the parties, I am of the view that the SCJ’s decision can be upheld by this Court as there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. There must have been insufficient judicial appreciation of the relevant evidence which had occasioned a serious miscarriage of justice: Mackt Logostics (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Malaysian Airline System Berhad [2014] 5 CLJ 851. An appellate court has a duty to intervene where a trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion: Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy [1995] 3 MLJ 395. [27] From the numerous grounds raised in the Memorandum of Appeal and Additional Memorandum of Appeal, I agree with the Plaintiff to narrow down the issues to be decided by this Court as follows: (i) has it been proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased died by accidental means; (ii) whether the insurance policy fell within the ambit of a consumer insurance contract or non-consumer insurance contract; (iii) does the basis clause apply if the court finds that the contract of insurance is a consumer insurance contract; S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 (iv) if the Court finds that it is a consumer insurance contract, whether there has been compliance by the parties with the whole prosess or procedure under Paragraph 5, Part II Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758] including the duty of disclosure; (v) whether the Plaintiff received any notice in writing in respect of the pre-contractual duty to disclose prior to entering into the contract of insurance; (vi) can the Defendants be allowed to rely on a new ground which was never raised in the repudiation letter rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim; and (vii) should section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 be invoked against the Defendants for failure to call their authorised agent(s) who filled up the proposal form on behalf of the Plaintiff as a witness. (i) Has it been proved on a balance of probabilities that the deceased died by accidental means [28] I do not wish to spend a lot of time on this issue because the evidence from SP2 were very clear that the deceased died of “Severe traumatic brain injury” due to hard fall during motor vehicle accident. This finding was supported by the investigation of SP1 which concluded that the deceased was not wearing any helmet at the material time, based on SP5’s evidence who was among the first to arrive at the scene and did not find any helmet nearby the body. The SCJ found that the fatal injuries were due to hard fall sustained during an accident as explained by SP1 and SP2 and there was no reason not to accept the investigation officer’s evidence. There was also no evidence that the deceased was attacked by S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 known or unknown persons. The Plaintiff has proved this issue on a balance of probabilities despite the questions in cross-examination by the Defendants’ respective counsels. (ii) Whether the insurance policy fell within the ambit of a consumer insurance contract or non-consumer insurance contract [29] The SCJ in her grounds of judgment at paragraph 187 (Defendant 1’s suit) stated the issue of “consumer insurance contract” and “non- consumer insurance contract” was without merit as it was not pleaded by the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, this was a misdirection on the part of the SCJ as the court eventually still has a duty to determine the issue. The regime for insurance in Malaysia is comprehensively provided in s. 129(1) of Act 758 which sets out the pre-contractual duty of disclosure and representations for contracts of insurance in Part 2, and the remedies for misrepresentations relating to contracts of insurance in Part 3. For ease of reference, the relevant provisions of the law (Schedule 9) are reproduced as follows: “Interpretation 2. In this Schedule— “consumer” means the individual who enters into, varies or renews a consumer insurance contract, or proposes to do so with a licensed insurer; “consumer insurance contract” means a contract of insurance entered into, varied or renewed by an individual wholly for purposes unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or profession. ... PART 2 Pre-contractual disclosure and representation Pre-contractual duty of disclosure for insurance contracts other than consumer insurance contracts 4. (1) Before a contract of insurance other than a consumer insurance contract is entered into, varied or renewed, a proposer shall disclose to the licensed insurer a matter that— S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 (a) he knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer on whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied; or (b) a reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know to be relevant. (2) The duty of disclosure shall not require the disclosure of a matter that— (a) diminishes the risk to the licensed insurer; (b) is of common knowledge; (c) the licensed insurer knows or in the ordinary course of his business ought to know; or (d) in respect of which the licensed insurer has waived any requirement for disclosure. (3) Where a proposer fails to answer or gives an incomplete or irrelevant answer to a question contained in the proposal form or asked by the licensed insurer and the matter was not pursued further by the insurer, compliance with the proposer’s duty of disclosure in respect of the matter shall be deemed to have been waived by the insurer. (4) A licensed insurer shall, before a contract of insurance is entered into, varied or renewed, clearly inform a proposer in writing of the proposer’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure under this paragraph, and that this duty of disclosure shall continue until the time the contract is entered into, varied or renewed. Pre-contractual duty of disclosure for consumer insurance contracts 5. (1) Before a consumer insurance contract is entered into or varied, a licensed insurer may request a proposer who is a consumer to answer any specific questions that are relevant to the decision of the insurer whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied. (2) It is the duty of the consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions under subparagraph (1). (3) Before a consumer insurance contract is renewed, a licensed insurer may either— (a) request a consumer to answer one or more specific questions in accordance with subparagraph (1); or (b) give the consumer a copy of any matter previously disclosed by the consumer in relation to the contract and request the consumer to confirm or amend any change to that matter. (4) It is the duty of the consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions under subsubparagraph (3)(a), or confirming or amending any matter under subsubparagraph (3)(b). S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 (5) If the licensed insurer does not make a request in accordance with subparagraph (1) or (3) as the case may be, compliance with the consumer’s duty of disclosure in respect of those subparagraphs, shall be deemed to have been waived by the insurer. (6) Where the consumer fails to answer or gives an incomplete or irrelevant answer to any request by the licensed insurer under subparagraph (1) or subsubparagraph (3)(a), or fails to confirm or amend any matter under subsubparagraph (3)(b), or does so incompletely or provides irrelevant information, as the case may be, and the answer or matter was not pursued further by the insurer, compliance with the consumer’s duty of disclosure in respect of the answer or matter shall be deemed to have been waived by the insurer. (7) A licensed insurer shall, before a consumer insurance contract is entered into, varied or renewed, clearly inform the consumer in writing of the consumer’s pre- contractual duty of disclosure under this paragraph, and that this duty of disclosure shall continue until the time the contract is entered into, varied or renewed. (8) Subject to subparagraphs (1) and (3), a consumer shall take reasonable care to disclose to the licensed insurer any matter, other than that in relation to subparagraph (1) or (3), that he knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer on whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied. (9) Nothing in this Schedule shall affect the duty of utmost good faith to be exercised by a consumer and licensed insurer in their dealings with each other, including the making and paying of a claim, after a contract of insurance has been entered into, varied or renewed. [30] In relation to a non-consumer insurance contract, a proposer shall disclose to the licensed insurer a matter that (a) he knows to be relevant to the decision of the insurer on whether to accept the risk or not and the rates and terms to be applied, or (b) a reasonable person in the circumstances could be expected to know to be relevant. Whereas in the case of a consumer insurance contract, it is the duty of the consumer to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions. The policy speech of the then Deputy Finance Minister I, Datuk Dr. Awang Adek Hussin, when introducing the Financial Services Bill provided the reason why Parliament had enacted the Bill which created such distinct classes as aforesaid: S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 “Keenam, rang undang-undang ini akan menyediakan rangka kerja yang kukuh bagi perlindungan pengguna kewangan. Ini dicapai melalui: (i) …; (ii) …; (iii)...; (iv) memperuntukkan tanggungjawab penanggung insurans untuk memberi panduan kepada pengguna mengenai penzahiran yang diperlukan semasa peringkat pra kontrak dalam hal salah nyata atau misrepresentation yang dibuat oleh pengguna. Rang undang-undang ini memperuntukkan remedi bagi penanggung insurans yang lebih saksama bergantung sama ada salah nyata oleh pengguna tersebut dibuat secara sengaja atau melulu, cuai, atau tidak sengaja. Pada masa sekarang, kontrak insurans boleh dielak, avoidable secara langsung oleh penanggung insurans tidak kira sama ada salah nyata oleh seseorang pengguna tersebut dibuat secara sengaja atau melulu, cuai atau pun tidak sengaja.”. ((Dewan Rakyat Hansard) [DR 27.11.2012] at 1810) [31] The SCJ in paragraph 197 (Defendant 2’s grounds of judgment) stated that the policy was a consumer contract and this was in relation to the claim by the Plaintiff against Defendant 2 which allegedly had submitted it was a non-consumer contract. Upon perusal of Defendant 2’s submission, I found that this was misconceived by the Plaintiff as Defendant 2 contended it was clearly a consumer insurance contract. The Defendants submitted on the importance of disclosure and the court had analysed this issue in paragraphs 184 onwards. Specifically, I refer to the following paragraphs of the SCJ’s analysis for ease of reference: “[197] Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3-Plan 05 ini adalah suatu polisi Kontrak Insurans Pengguna (Consumer Insurance Contract, di muka surat 85 Ikatan D) dan satu notis penting (“Important Notice”) telah diberikan kepada Plaintif yang berniat memohon insurans yang memperuntukkan dalam Borang Cadangan (ekshibit P32 (m/s 1 1 encl 9, dan ekshibit P32 di muka surat 85 Ikatan D), bahawa: S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 “Kontrak Insurans Pengguna Menurut Perenggan 5 Jadual di bawah Akta Perkhidmatan Kewangan 2013, sekiranya anda memohon Insurans ini sepenuhnya bagi tujuan yang tidak berkaitan dengan perdagangan, perniagaan atau profesion anda, anda mempunyai kewajipan mengambil penjagaan munasabah supaya tidak membuat salah nyataan semasa menjawab soalansoalan di dalam Borang Cadangan dan/atau semua soalan-soalan yang dikehendaki oleh Syarikat dengan penuh dan tepat dan mendedahkan apa-apa perkara lain yang anda ketahui berkaitan dengan keputusan kami dalam menerima risiko dan dalam menentukan kadar dan terma yang hendak dipakai, jika sebaliknya ini boleh menyebabkan kontrak terbatal, penolakan atau pengurangan tuntutan, penukaran terma atau penamatan kontrak. Anda juga mempunyai kewajipan memaklumkan kepada kami dengan segera sekiranya pada bila-bila masa, selepas kontrak insurans dibuat, diubah atau diperbaharui dengan pihak kami, sebarang maklumat yang diberikan adalah tidak tepat atau telah berubah.” [32] In regard to the Defendant 2’s policy, that policy covered work- related accidents; this can be gathered from the evidence of SD3 and the absence of an exclusion clause of work-related accidents in the policy (Exclusion Clause No.7 only excludes subordinates not the life insured). This could attract the definition of consumer insurance policy having regard to the intention of the Plaintiff (where he alleged the policies served as an incentive to his employees) and the evidence of SD3 itself. [33] It is noted that paragraph 10 of Schedule 9 is only applicable to consumer insurance contract and renders any basis clause in a consumer insurance contract of no effect. It reads: “Any representation made before a consumer insurance contract was entered into, varied or renewed shall not be converted into a warranty by means of any provision of the consumer insurance contract or of any terms of the variation or of any other contract, whether by declaring the representation to form the basis of the contract or otherwise.” S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [34] In the analysis of the evidence before me, as the policies do not cover work-related accidents, the policies were unrelated to the individual’s trade, business or profession, and therefore, they come within the ambit of the definition of a consumer insurance contract. Notwithstanding the Plaintiff’s assertion, as well as the evidence of SD1, the construction of the policies prevailed as it was in accordance with the intention of Schedule 9. [35] It was evident from grounds of judgment of the SCJ she had concluded that the policies were consumer insurance contracts. But the SCJ also stated in paragraph 200 that the Proposal Form did form the basis clause of the contract with the insurer as follows: “[200] Dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah mengesahkan bahawa semua maklumat yang dinyatakan dalam Borang Cadangan itu (yang dibuat tanpa pendedahan tentang polisi pelbagai jenis dengan penanggung insurans Iain) merupakan maklumat penuh, lengkap dan benar dan merupakan asas bagi pembentukan kontrak insuran dengan Defendan. Ternyata, Borang Cadangan yang membentuk kontrak insurans ditandatangan oleh Plaintif sendiri [merujuk di muka surat 87 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45] yang memperaku dan memberi perisytiharan bahawa semua butiran (yang diisikan ejen bagi pihaknya) adalah benar. Yew Kai Chong (ejen insurans Berjaya Sompo Insurance) hanya diminta untuk mengisi Borang Cadangan. Sehubungan itu, Plaintif adalah terikat dengan perisytiharan dan bersetuju bahawa Cadangan itu dijadikan dasar kontrak di antara pihak-pihak (“klausa asas”) [ekshibit P31, merujuk di muka surat 88 Ikatan D dalam Encl. 45].” (iii) Does the basis clause apply if the court finds that the contract of insurance is a consumer insurance contract [36] The SCJ discussed the merits of the basis clause in analysing the evidence as can be seen above. Does this mean that automatically her grounds of judgment is totally wrong by virtue of paragraph 10 of Schedule 9? I think not. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [37] In the case of Chong Lai Keng v. Prudential Assurance Malaysia Bhd [2024] 1 CLJ 293, the facts were similar on the issue of the insured person had not disclosed to the proposed insurers the existence of a few other policies. The learned Judicial Commissioner Jamhirah Binti Ali stated: “[48] As previously elucidated, para. 5 of Schedule 9 of the FSA which pertains to the pre-contractual duty of disclosure for consumer insurance contracts, imposed a statutory duty on the consumer to exercise reasonable care in avoiding any misrepresentation to the insurer. This duty was especially significant when responding to specific questions posed by the insurer, which were essential in the insurer’s determination of whether to accept the risk and in establishing the applicable rates and terms. The principle of uberrimae fidei remained applicable to the parties involved in an insurance contract. In accordance with this principle, the consumer was held to a standard of care defined as that of a ‘reasonable consumer’. Consequently, based on the underpinning of uberrimae fidei, the life assured, as the consumer, bore the duty of utmost good faith, necessitating full disclosure of all material facts within his knowledge. In Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 1; [2006] 1 MLJ 710, the Court of Appeal held as follows: [15] It is settled beyond dispute that a contract of insurance is one that imposes a mutual duty on the parties to it to act uberrimae fides towards each other. On the part of the insured, he or she must make full disclosure of all material facts. It is not for him or her to decide in his or her own mind what is material. The duty is on the insured to make full disclosure of material facts within his knowledge. (emphasis added) [49] After careful examination of the evidence, the submitted documents, and the relevant law, I concluded that the existence of the three AIA policies constituted a “material fact”. This finding stemmed from the evidence that their disclosure would have had a negative impact on the defendant’s underwriting decision. If the defendant had been aware of the three AIA policies, they would not have issued the policies in question. Further, based on the factual circumstances and the sequence of events in this case, I concluded that the life assured had deliberately concealed or suppressed and had fraudulently misrepresented the existence of the three AIA policies.”. [Emphasis added] S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [38] The Court refers to the provision in paragraph 6 of Schedule 9 which provides the following: “Duty to take reasonable care 6. (1) In determining whether a consumer has taken reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation under subparagraph 5(2) or (4), the relevant circumstances may be taken into account including— (a) the consumer insurance contract in question and the manner in which the contract was sold to the consumer; (b) any relevant explanatory material or publicity produced or authorized by the licensed insurer; and (c) how clear and specific, the licensed insurer’s questions were. (2) Subject to subparagraph (3), the standard of care required of the consumer under subparagraphs 5(2) and (4) shall be what a reasonable consumer in the circumstances would have known. ...”. [39] Although the third issue is to be answered in the negative, based on the construction of Paragraph 6 of Schedule 9 as well as Division 2 which will be analysed later I am of the view that the court still has a duty to evaluate the evidence and make a finding whether there has been misrepresentation at the point of submission of the Proposal Form. (iv) If the Court finds that it is a consumer insurance contract, whether there has been compliance by the parties with the whole prosess or procedure under Paragraph 5, Part II Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act 2013 [Act 758] including the duty of disclosure [40] It was the Plaintiff’s contention that the Defendants had waived the Plaintiff’s duty of disclosure as the insurers did not make a request in accordance with subparagraph (1) or (3) of Paragraphs 5(5) and/or 5(6). Moreover, Paragraph 5(7) requires a licensed insurer, before a consumer insurance contract is entered into, varied or renewed, to clearly inform the S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Plaintiff in writing of the consumer’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure and that this duty of disclosure shall continue until the time the contract is entered into, varied or renewed. [41] I will deal with the fourth and fifth issues together; the fifth issue was whether the Plaintiff received any notice in writing in respect of the pre- contractual duty to disclose prior to entering into the contract of insurance. “[211]... Notis juga diberikan kepada Plaintif bahawa “Jika Plaintif tidak memberikan maklumat ini dengan sepenuhnya dan sejujurnya, polisi insurans mungkin tidak sah atau Polisi mungkin tidak melindungi orang yang diinsurankan/pekerja dengan sepenuhnya”. Tiada sebab untuk mahkamah ini menyimpang daripada kedudukan undang-undang am mengenai kewajipan pendedahan fakta yang material di pihak Plaintif. [212] Saya juga bersetuju dengan hujah peguam defendan bahawa hujah- hujah peguam Plaintif adalah tidak bermerit dan tidak selari dengan Pemakaian perenggan 5 Jadual Kesembilan Akta 758 [rujukan kepada kes: Balamoney Asoriah v. MMIP Services Sdn Bhd [2020] 1 CLJ 476] mengenai kewajipan untuk mengambil langkah yang munasabah untuk tidak salah nyata dalam menjawab soalan yang terdapat dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa permohonan insurans ini) dan perlu menjawab soalan-soalan dengan penuh dan tepat. Kegagalan dalam mengambil langkah munasabah dalam menjawab soalan- soalan boleh mengakibatkan pembatalan kontrak insurans, keengganan atau pengurangan gantirugi, perubahan terma atau penamatan kontrak insurans selaras dengan remedi di Jadual 9 Akta Perkhidmatan Kewangan 2013 [Akta 758]. Plaintif juga dikehendaki mendedahkan perkara-perkara lain yang dia tahu akan mempengaruhi keputusan Defendan dalam menerima risiko dan menentukan kadar dan terma yang akan dikenakan. … [215] Pada setiap masa yang material, Plaintif mendakwa dia tidak diperjelaskan tentang kandungan dalam borang dan tidak ditanyakan tentang lain- lain polisi yang dia ada miliki sewaktu ejen mengisikan Borang Cadangan bagi polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima V3 - Plan 05 (merujuk penyata saksi dalam encl. 74 yang hanya difailkan pada 13/05/2020 dan Plaintif memberi keterangannya pada 18/09/2020). Dalam kes ini, Plaintif mengelakkan diri dari bertanggungan untuk menzahirkan pegangan polisi insurans yang dipegangnya dengan mendakwa dia menurunkan tanda tangan atas borang sebelum ejen Yew Kai Chong mengisikan butiran dan dia tidak fasih S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 membaca dalam Bahasa Malaysia atau Bahasa Inggeris dan khidmat ejen insurans digunakan bagi mengisi borang. Pada setiap yang material, Plaintif mendakwa dia tidak diperjelaskan tentang kandungan dalam borang dan tidak ditanyakan tentang lain-lain polisi yang dia ada miliki sewaktu ejen mengisikan Borang Cadangan bagi polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima — Plan 05. Tidak ada keterangan menyokong dipanggil dari pihak ejen Yew Kai Chong mengenai dakwaan Plaintif yang dibuatnya…”. [42] The SCJ did apply Balamoney’s Case (supra) which has been affirmed by the Federal Court in the case of Amgeneral Insurance Bhd v. Sa' Amran Atan & Ors And Other Appeals [2022] 8 CLJ 175. With respect, I am of the view that the Federal Court case above did not directly apply to the present case because there the issue again was in respect of avoiding liability under s.96(3) of the RTA and it concerned third party insurance. One of the issues was whether the insurer could avoid liability when the vehicle that was involved in an accident had been sold/transferred to another party. The issue in that Federal Court case can be compared with the facts in Balamoney’s Case (supra). [43] The SCJ found that the Plaintiff claimed that the notice was never explained to him but also found that he had willfully ignored the notice. Pursuant to the paragraphs above, since the Plaintiff had acknowledged that the notice was explained to him and regardless of his intention of what kind of policy he actually wanted to purchase, this Court found that the Defendants had sufficiently discharged their burden under Schedule 9 to explain to the proposer of his duty of disclosure in writing. The SCJ found further that the Plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had 2 other insurance policies other than with Defendant 3 which was stated in the proposal form. In the case of Defendant 2 he had omitted to fill in the question. I have no reason to disturb her finding that there was non- disclosure of the existence of the other 2 policies on the part of the S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Plaintiff. The question is, does this amount to a breach in his duty of disclosure? I refer to the case on uberrima fide as stated in Leong Kum Whay v. QBE Insurance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 1; [2006] 1 MLJ 710 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA propounded: “[15] It is settled beyond dispute that a contract of insurance is one that imposes mutual duty on the parties to it to act uberrimae fides towards each other... On the part of the insured, he or she must make full and frank disclosure of all material facts. It is not for him or her to decide in his or her own mind what is material... The duty is on the insured to make full disclosure of material facts within his knowledge. ... [19] So much for the insured's duty. For completeness I would add that there is a corresponding duty on the part of an insurer to act with utmost good faith towards its insured. In Maschke Estate v. Gleeson (1986) 54 OR (2d) 753 at p 756, Montgomery J put the duty in this way: A contract of insurance is one of uberrimae fides, the utmost of good faith. This is not a situation where an insurer is indemnifying its assured and paying a third party. This is a case where the insurer is being asked to pay its own insured. The duty to act promptly and in good faith arises the day the insurer receives the claim. To find otherwise is to fail to understand the realities of the market place.”. [Emphasis added] [44] The principle of uberrimae fidei has been entrenched in Paragraph 5 of Schedule 9 as well, with some modification where a consumer no longer needed to voluntarily disclose information to the insurer but only to give information that was requested upon him, with reasonable care, to the insurer. The Plaintiff alleged that he had omitted to fill all of the policy because the insurer’s agent did not explain the question to him which led him to not completely filling them as he was not conversant in English. Later he said he was unsure whether the agent explained the questions in the Proposal Form. His counsel had contended that the S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Plaintiff did not breach the uberrima fide duty because, by virtue of paragraph 5(6), an incomplete information that was not further pursued by the insurer was deemed waived, as pointed out earlier. [45] I refer to the relevant paragraphs in the SCJ’s grounds of judgment for effect: [198] Merujuk kepada Borang Cadangan [ekshibit P32) bagi memperoleh polisi insurans Kemalangan Diri Peribadi Ultima — Plan 05 yang hendak diisu oleh Defendan, soalan 6 [ekshibit P32, merujuk muka surat 86 Ikatan D] menanya kepada Plaintif tentang permohonan serupa atau pembaharuan polisi kemalangan diri atas nama Orang Yang Diinsurankan, Raja a/l Krishnan: “Have you or any person to be insured ever had an application for life or Personal Accident Insurance accepted with Sum Insured reduced or the renewal premium increased?” dan dijawab oleh ejen “No”. [199] Jawapan kepada soalan 6 ternyata tidak benar atau tidak tepat kerana dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dalam Ikatan D (dalam encl. 45 difailkan dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019 berikutan perintah gabung dengar bertarikh 17/09/2019 dan 16/10/2019) yang melibatkan 4 penanggung insurans, ternyata bahawa polisi perlindungan takaful ada dalam pegangan Plaintif sejak Disember 2016 tetapi pemerolehan polisi perlindungan Kemalangan Diri Takaful Berkelompok bertarikh 04/01/2017 yang juga melindungi penama Raja a/l Krishnan ini tidak pernah dimaklumkan kepada Defendan dan pemerolehan 2 lagi polisi insurans kemalangan diri atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan juga gagal didedahkan oleh Plaintif. … [201] Peguam Defendan berhujah bahawa beban pendedahan penuh dan tepat oleh Plaintif adalah dari permulaan kontrak insuran dimasuki dan beban itu akan berterusan sehingga tempoh kuatkuasa perlindungan insuran luput. la adalah undang-undang matan bahawa kewajipan pihak yang diinsuranskan untuk mendedahkan maklumat material kepada penginsurans merupakan kewajipan yang wujud secara berasingan daripada apa-apa borang cadangan [Kes: Tan Mooi Sim & Anor v United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd & Anor [2011] 8 MLJ 556 dan American International Assurance Co, Ltd v Nadarajan a/l Subramaniam [2013] 5 MLJ 195]. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 [202] Di bawah tajuk “Kewajipan Pendedahan”; (di muka surat 88/(BM) muka surat 98 Ikatan D) dalam Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3-Plan 05 (ekshibit P31 di muka surat 98 Ikatan D], diperuntukkan bahawa: “Apabila Orang yang Diinsuranskan telah memohon insurans ini sepenuhnya bagi tujuan yang tidak berkaitan dengan perdagangan, perniagaan atau profesion Orang yang Diinsuranskan, Orang yang Diinsuranskan mempunyai kewajipan mengambil penjagaan munasabah supaya tidak membuat salah nyataan semasa menjawab soalan-soalan di dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa membuat permohonan Insurans ini). Orang yang Diinsurans perlu menjawab soalan dengan penuh dan tepat. Kegagalan dalam mengambil langkah yang munasabah dalam menjawab soalan-soalan boleh mengakibatkan pembatalan kontrak Insurans, keengganan atau pengurangan ganti rugi, perubahan terma atau penamatan kontrak Orang yang Diinsurans selaras dengan remedi di Jadual 9 Akta Perkhidmatan Kewangan 2013. Orang yang Diinsurans juga dikehendaki mendedahkan apa-apa perkara lain yang Orang yang Diinsurans tahu akan mempengaruhi keputusan Syarikat dalam menerima risiko dan dalam menentukan kadar dan terma yang dikenakan. Orang yang Diinsurans juga mempunyai kewajipan untuk memberitahu Syarikat dengan serta merta jika pada bila-bila masa selepas kontrak insurans Orang yang Diinsurans ditanda tangani, diubah atau diperbaharu dengan Syarikat, apa-apa maklumat yang diberikan dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa membuat permohonan Insurans ini) tidak tepat atau telah berubah.” [203] Berdasarkan terma polisi di atas, Plaintif juga mempunyai kewajipan untuk memberitahu Defendan dengan serta-merta jika pada bila-bila masa selepas kontrak insurans ditandatangani, diubah atau diperbaharui dengan Defendan, apa-apa maklumat yang diberikan di dalam Borang Cadangan (atau semasa permohonan insurans ini) tidak tepat atau telah berubah. Kewajipan untuk mendedahkan fakta material, dan kewajipan tersebut tidak dilepaskan semata-mata atas akuan fakta bahawa pihak yang satu lagi telah gagal menanya mengenai fakta material yang tidak didedahkan, tetapi fakta pemerolehan polisi-polisi yang lain adalah, pada setiap masa yang material dalam pengetahuan pihak Plaintif, bukan ejen yang mempunyai pengetahuan tersebut. Dalam mempertimbangkan hujah mengenai fakta yang dipli dalam Pembelaan berkaitan Borang Cadangan, tidak pernah berbangkit isu sama ada Borang Cadangan diisikan oleh ejen bagi pihak Plaintif. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 [204] Merujuk kes Tan Jing Jeong v Allianz Life Assurance Malaysia [2012] 7 MLJ 179; [2011] 4 CLJ 710 mengenai kewajipan berterusan di pihak-pihak di bawah kontrak insurans, bahawa — “Sebaik sahaja kewajipan positif diberikan kepada sesuatu pihak oleh undang-undang untuk bercakap benar, termasuk untuk mendedahkan fakta material, kewajipan tersebut tidak dilepaskan semata-mata atas akuan fakta bahawa pihak yang satu lagi telah gagal menanya mengenai fakta material yang tidak didedahkan, tetapi fakta yang dalam pengetahuan pihak yang mempunyai pengetahuan tersebut.”. … [218] … Berdasarkan jawapan yang diberi kepada soalan dalam penyata saksi SP7 (encl. 74 dalam Saman AB-A52NCC-7-05/2019) dan semasa pemeriksaan balas pada 23/09/2020 oleh peguam Defendan, dihujahkan bahawa jawapan kepada isu yang membangkitkan kewajipan pendedahan pemerolehan polisi-polisi (dipli dalam perenggan 3 dan 6 encl.7) adalah satu pemikiran terkemudian untuk membangkitkan pembelaan pada tahap ini. Namun apabila Plaintif memberi keterangan pada 18/09/2020 dan 23/09/2020 mengenai dokumen polisi yang hendak dijadikan asas tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-defendan, syarikat penanggung insurans terlibat, atau semasa disoal balas mengenai butir lanjut nama pekerja yang disenarai dalam polisi Takaful, siapa pekerjanya yang diberikan manfaat di bawah polisi-polisi yang diambilnya dengan Takaful Malaysia dan jumlah perlindungan takaful bagi empat pekerjanya (yang ada kaitan tali persaudaraan dengannya) selain Raja a/l Krishnan, dirumuskan bahawa Plaintif adalah seorang peniaga yang sangat cerdik, yang celik angka/ matematik kerana dalam setiap polisi yang dibeli olehnya sebagai majikan, dia yang memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memperolehi fakta dan angka untuk dimasukkan dalam polisi; pihak Plaintif juga yang membayar premium bagi orang yang diinsuranskan bagi kesemua polisi atas penama yang sama iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan (si mati). Sekiranya terjadi kematian kemalangan menimpa pekerjanya Raja a/l Krishnan, jumlah pampasan yang akan dipungutnya akan mencecah RM1j. Semasa disoal balas peguam, Plaintif mengatakan insurans yang diperoleh itu mungkin tidak diketahui oleh ahli keluarga Raja a/l Krishnan. Oleh itu, fakta material mengenai polisi-polisi yang dipegang Plaintif sememangnya dalam pengetahuannya pada setiap masa yang material, bukan ejen insurans. Malah adalah satu perkara yang mustahil dan/atau subjektif untuk ejen mengetahui apakah yang perlu didedahkan pada masa mengisikan Borang Cadangan bagi pihak Plaintif. [219] Plaintif hadir ke mahkamah tidak secara suci hati kerana Plaintif tidak benar-benar menjelaskan bagaimana beliau boleh memperoleh S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 polisi-polisi insurans yang dipegangnya. Plaintif lazim memberi jawapan menyatakan bahawa dia tidak tahu (atau sengaja mengabaikan “Notis Penting” yang tertulis dalam dokumen kesemua polisi yang diperoleh) tentang kewajipan mengambil penjagaan munasabah supaya tidak membuat salah nyataan mengenai risiko yang berkaitan perlindungan yang hendak diberi atas seorang pekerja sahaja iaitu, Raja a/l Krishnan. Plaintif mengelakkan kewajipannya membuat pendedahan atau kewajipan memberi maklumat tepat tentang pemerolehan polisi-polisi dengan meletakkan beban ke atas 3 ejen insurans yang didakwa gagal menerangkan “Notis Penting” dalam dokumen polisi dan/atau kandungan Notis tidak dalam pengetahuannya disebabkan ejen insurans yang membantunya memperoleh polisj-polisi insurans dalam milikannya itu gagal menanyakan soalan-soalan material kepadanya, terutamanya berkaitan pemegangan lessen memandu yang sah oleh Raja a/l Krishnan. Semasa disoal balas peguam-peguam yang mewakili Defendan-defendan pada 18/09/2020 dan 23/09/2020, Plaintif mengatakan kandungan polisi yang diperolehnya terutamanya mengenai terma Pengecualian itu tidak pernah dijelaskan oleh ejen insurans kepadanya.”. [46] The Plaintiff contended that the SCJ misdirected herself when she applied Tan Mooi Sim’s Case (supra) which was decided before Act 758 was enacted by Parliament. Nevertheless, Act 758 did not abolish the duty to disclose by the consumers but rather, it had codified the duty and made it an offence under s.129(2) of Act 758 if a person contravened the duty of disclosure under Paragraph 11 of Schedule 9. The SCJ had made her findings of fact that the Plaintiff has not abided by the uberrimae fidei duty and that his version was an afterthought. But Paragraph 5.6 provided if the disclosure was not pursued further by the insurer, it was deemed waived. The burden to prove the matter lies on the Defendants. In Balamoney’s Case (supra), the Court of Appeal stated: “[49] Under sub-subparas. 5(3)(a) and (b), the respondent may do either of two things when there is an application to renew the insurance policy. The respondent may request Selvamani or whoever was renewing the insurance policy to answer one or more specific questions in accordance with sub-para. (1). The questions asked being specific questions that are relevant to the respondent's decision whether or not to accept the risk, and the rates and terms to be imposed. Alternatively, the respondent may give Selvamani or whoever S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 was renewing the insurance policy, a copy of any matter previously disclosed by Selvamani in relation to the contract and request Selvamani or whoever was renewing the insurance policy, to confirm or amend any change to the matter. [50] Where the respondent makes either of these requests, Selvamani or whoever was renewing the insurance policy, has a duty under sub-para. 5(4) "to take reasonable care not to make a misrepresentation to the licensed insurer when answering any questions under sub-subpara. (3)(a), or confirming or amending any matter under sub-subpara. (3)(b)''. [47] From the facts of the case and findings of the SCJ, I found that the Defendants have discharged this burden of proof. Counsel for Defendant 2 referred to the decision in Tan Siew Wei v Great Eastern Life Assurance (Malaysia) Berhad [2021] 1 LNS 770, Liberty Insurance Bhd v Marrison Sidai & Anor [2019] 8 CLJ 380, Etiqa General Takaful Berhad v Personal Representative of Fatimah Adam (Deceased) & Ors [2022] 6 CLJ 385 and Ulaganathan Muthiah v Prudential Assurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2020] 9 CLJ 435 in support of its case on the issue of pre-contractual disclosure and I agreed with the rationale of the learned Justices of the High Courts in the abovementioned cases. [48] In my broad grounds earlier, I had distinguished Balamoney’s Case (supra). I now give my reasons for doing so. I am of the view that the facts of that case warranted the Court of Appeal to intervene and grant the remedy that should have been granted to the appellant, unlike the present case. The facts were as follows: “On 28 October 2016, Jayandran Mathan ('Jayandran'), a minor, was riding pillion on a motorcycle which was involved in a collision with a motor van driven by the first defendant and owned by the deceased ('Selvamani'). Jayandran's mother ('the appellant') decided to sue on her son's behalf. As required under s. 96(3) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (‘Road Transport Act’), she served a notice on the insurer ('the respondent') prior to the filing of the suit ('the civil suit'). It was, however, discovered that Selvamani had passed away on 20 April 2016, well before the accident. It was also discovered that the insurance policy that Selvamani had taken with the insurers ('the policy') had expired on 4 May S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 2016, after his demise. The policy was nevertheless renewed in Selvamani's name from 10 May 2016 to 9 May 2017. The respondent filed an originating summons before the High Court seeking declaratory orders to the effect that it was not the insurer of the said motor van at the time of the accident; and that the insurance policy was null and void by reason of a fundamental breach of the principle of uberrimae fidei or duty of utmost good faith, the breach of which entitled the respondent to void the insurance contract. The High Court, in granting the respondent's application, held that when the material fact that Selvamani had already passed away was not disclosed to the insurer at the time the insurance policy was renewed by whoever had done the renewal, there was a breach of the principle of utmost good faith which entitled the insurer to void the renewed policy. Hence, the appellant appealed against the decision of the High Court. Held (allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court): (1) The declaratory orders sought by the respondent concerned the status and validity of the insurance contract made not between the parties, but between the respondent and Selvamani, who was not a party in the appeal. Given the nature of the issue, its determination by way of an exchange of affidavits and with the critical parties not before the court was not appropriate. The respondent's allegations of misrepresentation by Selvamani or by whoever had renewed the insurance policy without evidence of the circumstances as to how or when the insurance policy was actually renewed were necessarily questions of mixed fact and law; and the issue certainly involved Selvamani as well as the driver of the motor van. Further, no reasons were proffered as to their absence or lack of participation in the proceedings before the High Court. The appellant, who was not a party to the insurance policy, was not in the position to answer or even deal with the issue(s) posed by the respondent. The circumstances and conditions surrounding the renewal were clearly beyond the capacity and remit of the appellant to address, let alone answer. Hence, such applications ought not to be dealt with in the manner done, especially where the relevant and necessary parties were not before the court. (paras 21-23) … (4) The respondent had not discharged its burden of proof under s.129 read together with Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act so as to be entitled to the discretionary remedies. It never posed any questions to Selvamani or whoever was renewing the policy. This court did not see how just the fact that Selvamani was deceased ipso facto invalidated the renewed policy. This was incorrect. The whole process or procedure under Schedule 9 must be complied with and answered. There was no evidence at all of the respondent doing any of the matters that were mentioned in Schedule 9, especially sub- para. 5(3) nor of the judge addressing these critical matters. Under such S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 conditions, it was not open to the respondent to approach the court and complain that there was misrepresentation. The failure of the trial judge to apply s.129 and Schedule 9 was sufficient reason for this court to intervene and set aside the decision of the trial judge granting the declaration sought under s. 96(3) of the Road Transport Act 1987 (paras 48, 52 & 53) (5) Devoid of any compliance of the mandatory requirements emplaced under s. 129 and Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act, the respondent was not at all entitled to the orders granted by the High Court. It would be in direct contravention of s. 129 and Schedule 9 of the Financial Services Act were this court to condone such breaches. It would bring untold injustice and prejudice to innocent third parties such as the appellant in this appeal, the parties who were the intended recipients of the benefits behind ss. 90 and 96 of the Road Transport Act 1987 and s. 129 of the Financial Services Act. There was no basis for the exercise of discretion in granting the declarations sought by the respondent. In fact, it would be unjust for the court to grant such orders. (paras 60 & 63). [Emphasis added] [49] The highlighted parts are the distinguishing features of that case with the present case. The SCJ in this case had heard all the evidence in a full trial and parties had been given the opportunity to fully ventilate their issues before the judge, unlike in Balamoney’s Case (supra) which was by way of exchange of affidavits (presumably by way of an Originating Summons application). In regard to the last point above, clearly there had been injustice to the victim’s family where a declaration under s.96(3) of the RTA was granted and liability avoided in respect of a third-party insurance such as in that case. I would just add further that in Balamoney’s Case (supra), the Court of Appeal did mention that misrepresentation is fact sensitive: “[45] As can be seen from sub-para. 7(4), much will depend on knowledge on the part of Selvamani or whoever renewed the insurance policy at the material time. Whether misrepresentation exists is therefore very much fact sensitive, confirming our earlier opinion on the unsuitability of how the whole application was conducted by the High Court. The burden is on the respondent to prove the existence of misrepresentation; that it would not S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 have entered into or renewed the insurance policy had it been aware of the true facts; and we have no information as to when the policy was actually submitted for renewal and the circumstances of the renewal.”. [Emphasis added] [50] In the present case, having gone through the notes of evidence in the records of appeal I found that the SCJ had not made any error in her assessment of the facts and evidence adduced by the Plaintiff and her observations in regard to the surrounding circumstances of the manner in which the policies were renewed. It was the Plaintiff’s contention that he took out the policies as an incentive to his employees but I found that the “bulk” of the policies amount payable.e. RM840,000.00 was made under the name of the deceased alone (3 of the policies, except Takaful). He also admitted that the deceased’s family members did not know about the policies taken in the name of the deceased and he did not know them personally (the family members). It appeared that the only beneficiary of the Group Policy was the Plaintiff. [51] The Plaintiff contended that the absence of a valid licence/road tax/insurance were trivial matters. He also contended that the deceased’s cooupation was a lorry driver and therefore, the absence of a valid motorcycle licence/road tax/insurance was irrelevant to his death. I agree with the Defendants’ submissions that these were not trivial matters as it would in effect have a bearing on the decision of the insurers to take on the risk of providing coverage for the deceased who was not in possession of a valid licence. The absence of of a valid licence was specifically spelt out in their respective exclusion clauses. This also constituted an “unlawful act” under the policies thereby triggering the exclusion clause S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 therein: Allianz General Insurance Malaysia v KL Chan & Associates [2017] 8 CLJ 517 (COA). [52] I am mindful of SD3’s evidence that the insured person need not possess a valid licence at the point of time when the Proposal Form was submitted as he could obtain one later. What was important for the insurers would be at the time when a claim was submitted (for instance due to death of the insured person), whether there was any breach of the law i.e. he had been riding without a valid licence. SP6’s evidence admitted the motorcycle was without a valid insurance and road tax. Therefore, SP6 had breached the provisions of s. 26(1), s.15(1) and s.90(1) of the RTA. [53] The Plaintiff contradicted himself when he stated that the deceased was employed as a lorry driver but the evidence was that he would drive “the lorry driver” to work in the oil palm plantation. Obviously, the Court can conclude that the Plaintiff had to do so as he was fully aware of the fact that the deceased did not possess a valid driving licence. He condoned this situation and it was clearly against the provision of s.26(1) of the RTA 1987. On a balance of probability, I found the Plaintiff’s evidence, that if he had known the deceased did not possess a valid licence he would have asked the deceased (then) to obtain one, was inherently improbable. The Plaintiff drove the deceased to work probably almost everyday (3 times weekly), it was highly improbable that he did not know or have the opportunity to ask the latter about it. [54] A person employed as a lorry driver must possess a valid and full licence to drive and operate such a “potentially dangerous” vehicle. A S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 motorcycle rider too must have a valid licence to ride, even if it was just an L-licence. That is a requirement of the law and it is proof of one’s capability and qualification to operate a vehicle be it a motorcycle, car, lorry, bus or whatever. The Courts should not condone the illegal behaviour of riding a motorcycle or driving a motor vehicle without a valid licence, insurance and road tax. The RTA is in place to ensure the safety of all road users. Full-stop. On this ground alone, I found that the Defendants were entitled to rely on this exclusion clause (riding/driving without a licence) to repudiate their respective liabilities: Lee Boon Siong v Great Eastern Life Assurance Malaysia Berhad [2020] MLJU 1376. [55] Therefore, separately from the duty of disclosure in respect of the deceased’s non-possession of a valid licence, I found that the Plaintiff was not forthcoming about the reason why he wanted to purchase the policies under the name of the deceased who did not possess a valid licence when the Plaintiff claimed that he (the deceased) was employed as a lorry driver: Ulaganathan Muthiah’s Case (supra). This will be discussed further later in this Grounds of Judgment. [56] I have answered issues (iv) and (v) in my analysis above. The Plaintiff as early as at the time when the Proposal Form had been filled up had not complied with the procedures under Paragraph 5, Schedule 9 to take care when making the representation whereas the Defendants had complied with the provisions of the law. (v) Can the Defendants be allowed to rely on a new ground which was never raised in the repudiation letter rejecting the Plaintiff’s claim [57] The new ground was the attempt by the Defendants to avoild liability by relying on SP1’s (and to a certain extent SP5) evidence that the S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 deceased was not wearing a helmet. The repudiation letters all stated that the insurers would not make the payment despite the Plaintiff’s claims because the deceased was found to be riding a motorcycle without a valid licence. This sixth issue was a non-issue as the Court found the exclusion clauses for each of the 4 insurers pertaining to riding a motorcycle without a valid licence was sufficient to enable the insurers to repudiate liability. [58] I refer to Paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 9 which is applicable here and it provides: Misrepresentation in respect of insurance contracts 7. (1) Part 3 of this Schedule— (a) in Division 1, makes provision for a misrepresentation made in relation to a contract of life insurance, whether or not a consumer insurance contract, which has been effected for a period of more than two years; and (b) in Division 2, sets out the remedies available to a licensed insurer for a misrepresentation made in respect of— (i) a consumer insurance contract of life insurance which has been effected for a period of two years or less; and (ii) a consumer insurance contract of general insurance. (2) The remedies set out in Division 2 shall be available to a licensed insurer for a misrepresentation made by a consumer before a consumer insurance contract referred to in subsubparagraph (1)(b) was entered into, varied or renewed if— (a) the consumer has made a misrepresentation in breach of his duty under subparagraph 5(2) or (4); and (b) the licensed insurer shows that had it known the true facts, it would not have entered into the contract, or agreed to the variation or renewal, or would only have done so on different terms. (3) For the purposes of this Schedule, a misrepresentation for which a licensed insurer has a remedy in Division 2 against a consumer may be classified as— (a) deliberate or reckless; (b) careless; or (c) innocent. (4) A misrepresentation is deliberate or reckless if the consumer knew that— S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 (a) it was untrue or misleading, or did not care whether or not it was untrue or misleading; and (b) the matter to which the misrepresentation related was relevant to the licensed insurer, or did not care whether or not it was relevant to the insurer. (5) A misrepresentation made dishonestly is to be regarded as having being made deliberately or recklessly. (6) A misrepresentation is careless or innocent, as the case may be, if it is not deliberate or reckless. (7) It is for the licensed insurer to show that a misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless on a balance of probability. (8) Unless the contrary is shown, it is to be presumed that the consumer knew that a matter about which the licensed insurer asked a clear and specific question was relevant to the insurer. … Division 2 Remedies for misrepresentation Application of Division 14. This Division sets out the remedies available to a licensed insurer for a misrepresentation by a consumer made in respect of— (a) a consumer insurance contract of life insurance which has been effected for a period of two years or less; and (b) a consumer insurance contract of general insurance. Remedies for deliberate or reckless misrepresentation 15. If a misrepresentation was deliberate or reckless, a licensed insurer may avoid the consumer insurance contract and refuse all claims. [59] From the above there are 3 degrees of “culpability” in respect of misrepresentation by a consumer, namely deliberate or reckless, careless or innocent. In paragraph 7(5), a misrepresentation made dishonestly is to be regarded as having being made deliberately or recklessly. I had concluded earlier from the evidence, that the Plaintiff was fully aware of the fact that the deceased did not possess a valid licence and which was S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 why he drove the deceased to work in the plantation. This wilful act of the Plaintiff smacks of dishonest misrepresentation! [60] Section 26(1) of the RTA provides: “26. (1) Kecuali sebagaimana diperuntukkan selainnya dalam Akta ini, tiada seorang pun boleh memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor daripada apa-apa kelas atau perihalan, di sesuatu jalan melainkan jika dia adalah pemegang sesuatu lesen memandu yang membenarkannya memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor daripada kelas atau perihalan itu, dan tiada seorang pun boleh mengambil kerja atau membenarkan seseorang lain memandu sesuatu kenderaan motor di jalan melainkan jika orang yang diambil kerja atau dibenarkan memandu itu adalah pemegang sesuatu lesen memandu sedemikian.”. [61] The evidence of SP6, the Plaintiff’s own witness also confirmed that the Plaintiff would send the deceased to work when the fact was that the deceased was employed to work as a lorry driver. In my view, this is the most material of all facts in this case when the Plaintiff did not disclose that the deceased only possessed an expired L-licence. [62] The law has not abolished the duty to disclose on the part of the consumer and that in this case and this Court opines that we should not miss the forest for the trees. We must not lose focus of the fact that it was the Plaintiff who wanted to take out the policies of insurance from the insurers to cover his employee(s) allegedly as an incentive to the deceased. Was he acting honestly when he purchased the policies? He had been employing the deceased since 10.5.2017 as a lorry driver despite knowing the deceased did not have a licence, drove him to work in the plantation 3 times weekly and then in October 2017, S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 purchased the policies from Defendants 1, 2 and 4 to cover him alone. Meanwhile, the Takaful policy was purchased in late 2016. [63] The SCJ further noted the submission of the Defendant 2 in the grounds of judgment: “[149] Berdasarkan jawapan SP7 kepada soalan-soalan semasa pemeriksaan balas yang bermula pada 18/09/2020, SP7 mengaku sebenarnya bahawa selain polisi kemalangan diri yang diambil untuk pekerja, dia juga memperoleh polisi kemalangan diri untuk diri sendiri dan memiliki insurans bagi kenderaan bermotor yang dimiliki iaitu 2 buah motorvan Hilux, 4 buah lori (muatan 1 dan 3 tan) dan mesin jengkaut meratakan tanah. SP7 juga memiliki lesen memandu kenderaan bermotor yang sah dan lesen menunggang motorsikal. SP7 tidak perlu dijelaskan tentang keperluan mematuhi peruntukan Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan dirumuskan sebagai seorang yang celik undang-undang jalanraya serta didedahkan dengan keperluan memiliki perlindungan insurans! Malah, Plaintif adalah seorang peniaga yang sangat cerdik yang celik angka/ matematik kerana dalam setiap polisi yang dibeli olehnya sebagai majikan, dia yang memainkan peranan yang penting dalam memperolehi fakta dan angka untuk dimasukkan dalam polisi; pihak Plaintif juga yang membayar premium bagi orang yang diinsuranskan bagi kesemua polisi atas penama yang sama iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan (si mati). Sekiranya terjadi kematian kemalangan menimpa pekerjanya Raja a/l Krishnan, jumlah pampasan yang akan dipungutnya akan mencecah RM1j. [150] Rumusan dibuat oleh peguam Defendan berkait motif SP7 (yang sepatutnya dipertanggungkan membuat pendedahan maklumat) semasa pemerolehan polisi insurans atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan adalah berdasarkan kedudukan kewangan SP7 yang kurang kukuh dan jumlah pampasan yang bakal diperoleh SP7 sekiranya terjadi kematian kemalangan menimpa Raja a/l Krishnan. Oleh itu, motif pengambilan 4 polisi Kemalangan Diri atas nama Raja a/l Krishnan itu bukanlah untuk perlindungan risiko kecederaan atau kematian kemalangan si mati tetapi ada niat mendapat pampasan yang hampir RM1j... Plaintif telahpun berpengalaman memperoleh pelbagai insurans termasuklah pemerolehan polisi perlindungan insurans kemalangan diri untuk perlindungan Takaful bagi dirinya sendiri sejak 2016, selain memperoleh insurans perlindungan kenderaan bermotor seperti jentera jengkaut, 4 buah Iori muatan 1 dan 3 tan, juga kenderaan pacuan 4 roda iaitu 2 buah Hilux!”. [64] In Ulaganathan Muthiah’s Case (supra), the learned High Court Judge held that: S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 “Clearly, the deceased knew that his answers to the questions in the proposal form were untrue or misleading. He did not care whether or not they were untrue or misleading and had acted in breach of his duty of uberrimae fidei. His answers were relevant to the defendant for its assessment of the risks and whether to accept the risks … if the defendant had known of the non-disclosed information or deliberate and/or reckless misrepresentation, which clearly increased the defendant’s insurance risk, the defendant would either not have entered into the insurance policy or it would have done so on different terms.”. [65] The court in that case concluded that pursuant to paragraphs 7(1)(b), 7(2), 7(4), 7(8) and (15) of Schedule 9, the defendant was entitled to avoid the policy and to refuse all claims under the policy by reason of the deceased’s breach of his duty of uberrimae fidei and to reject the plaintiff’s claim. I need not go any further then to conclude that Paragraph 15 is applicable in these cases and it enables the insurers to avoid the consumer insurance contract and refuse all claims. If Paragraph 5 is to be upheld at all times in favour on the consumers, why does Act 758 also provide for remedies for insurers when misrepresentation is proved? (vi) Should section 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 be invoked against the Defendants for failure to call as a witness their authorised agent(s) who filled up the proposal form on behalf of the Plaintiff [66] It was submitted for the Plaintiff that s.114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 should have been invoked by the SCJ against the Defendants for their failure to call the 3 agents as witnesses in the trial. However, I found that as the Plaintiff himself had subpoenaed them and then dismissed them without calling them to testify on his behalf, the presumption of adverse inference in s.114(g) cannot be applied in his favour. [67] In the often-cited case of Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492, the Supreme court held: S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 "Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non-production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case." [68] The Plaintiff contended, inter alia, an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the Defendants because it was for the Defendants to prove that they have complied with the provisions of Schedule 9. The failure of the agents to explain to him his duty of disclosure and/or the failure of the agent to properly explain the question in the proposal form amounted to a breach of the insurer’s duty under Act 758. The Defendant 1’s counsel submitted (paragraphs 10-10.4 of Encl.68), that the Plaintiff did not raise this presumption in the trial. In order to invoke the presumption, there must be withholding or suppression of evidence, which the Defendants did not commit as the Plaintiff had subpoenaed the agents and later dismissed them. Since it was the decision of the Plaintiff to not put them in the witness stand, thus the Court must not punish the Defendants for the Plaintiff’s decision aforesaid. [69] I refer to paragraphs 250-251 of the grounds of judgment below: “[250] Hujah tentang isu yang dibangkitkan mengenai pemakaian seksyen 114 perlu dipertimbangkan dengan merujuk kepada persetujuan peguam Plaintif pada 15/01/2020 untuk tidak meneruskan panggilan sepina berkaitan Borang Cadangan yang diisikan oleh ejen bagi pihak Plaintif. Dengan berbuat demikian, Plaintif diestop untuk tidak menimbulkan isu pemakaian seksyen 114 terhadap Defendan, sebaliknya Plaintif sendiri yang terhalang membangkitkan apa-apa isu tentang pemanggilan ejen insurans untuk memberi keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah setelah bersetuju mengetepikan hak Plaintif untuk mendapatkan keterangan ejen-ejen insurans yang memberi khidmat mereka untuk mengisikan Borang Cadangan untuk memperoleh polisipolisi insurans bagi pihak Plaintif. [251] Ternyata, Borang Cadangan yang membentuk kontrak insurans ditandatangan oleh Plaintif sendiri. Justeru, 3 saksi yang disepina oleh Plaintif itu tidak diperlukan memberi keterangan mengenai apa-apa butiran yang telah dinyatakan dalam Borang Cadangan kerana kewajipan membuat pendedahan S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 fakta material termasuklah mengenai pemerolehan Polisi adalah kewajipan di pihak Plaintif, bukanlah ejen Plaintif yang menurunkan tandatangannya atas semua Borang Cadangan dan semua butiran diaku benar oleh Plaintif, bukan ejen yang mengisi Borang. Ketiga- tiga mereka dilepaskan dan dikecualikan kehadiran memberi keterangan bagi pihak Plaintif dalam kes di sini. [70] The SCJ found that the Defendants had discharged their duties under Act 758 since the Plaintiff had signed the acknowledgement clause, that the Plaintiff admitted the agent Fong Kok Wai did ask him questions in the Proposal Form and the agent filled it. As such, adverse inference need not be invoked against any of the parties in these circumstances. [71] To end this issue, I would also briefly allude at this stage to the point raised by the Plaintiff that being members of LIAM, it was incumbent upon the insurers to make background checks with each other upon receving the Plaintiff’s proposal forms through their respective agents. Specifically, I refer to paragraphs 107 – 108 of the SCJ’s grounds of judgment: “[107] Dicabar semasa pemeriksaan balas mengenai butiran dalam Borang Cadangan Yang Ditanda tangan oleh Plaintif bagi Polisi Kemalangan Diri Ultima V3 / Berjaya Sompo Insurance [ekshibit P32, Encl. 45, Ikatan D di muka surat 85- 87] dengan pengataan bahawa Defendan boleh menyemak status polisi sedia ada dan status lesen memandu yang dimiliki si mati, SD3 tidak bersetuju bahawa pada masa itu terdapat keperluan atau tanggungan ke atas Defendan untuk membuat apa-apa carian atau semakan status pemerolehan polisi-polisi insurans yang sedia ada milik Plaintif. [108] SD3 menekankan bahawa Plaintif yang bertanggungan untuk mematuhi “prinsip uberimae fidei atau niat suci hati” dan mendedahkan fakta pemerolehan polisi-polisi insurans yang sedia ada miliknya di bulan Oktober 2018, semasa Plaintif memperbaharu polisi-polisi insurans atau semasa Plaintif mengisi borang cadangan bagi mendapatkan polisi insurans baru yang melibatkan orang yang dinsurankan yang sama iaitu Raja a/l Krishnan.”. S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 LOCUS STANDI [72] Since I have made my decision that the representation was made dishonestly in 2017, I do not consider it necessary to address at length the issue of locus standi that was discussed by the SCJ upon submission of Defendant 2’s counsel. She has ruled that the Plaintiff did not have locus standi to bring the claim as he was not a nominee of the deceased. If the policies were taken out without dishonest misrepresentation on the part of the Plaintiff, I would agree with the Defendant 2’s submission that the family of the deceased stood as the rightful beneficiaries of the policies and the Plaintiff, as the employer, would be the right person to commence the claims on behalf of the deceased’s family members. Paragraph 8 of Schedule 10 may be applicable here (refer to paragraphs 22-30 of Defendant 2’s written submissions). EX TURPI CAUSA NON ORITUR [73] Lastly, I will briefly touch on the issue of ex turpi non causa oritur that was raised by the Defendants in this appeal. Defendant’s counsel submitted at para 8 - 8.5 that the maxim applied since the deceased was riding without a safety helmet and also without a valid license. Counsel submitted that the Court should not lend its aid to a man whose cause of action was founded upon an illegal act. The Plaintiff submitted that the maxim applied to minor or trivial offences e.g. traffic violations. Counsel for the Plaintiff tried to trivialise the issue by stating the violations were punishable with fines and that the present case was on all fours with the recent Court of Appeal case of Ahmad Zulfendi Anuar v Mohd Shahril Abdul Rahman [2022] 9 CLJ 307 where the plaintiff did not hold a valid S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 licence to ride a motorcycle which also had not road tax and no policy of insurance against third party risks. The Court of Appeal went on to hold: “While violation of traffic laws must only be dealt with under the specific laws creating the relevant offences, such as in the Road Transport Act 1987 (“RTA”), the RTA does not contain any provision which restrict, let alone prohibit, the rights of any road user from making personal injury claims by reason of the claimant breaching the RTA, including in respect of the requirement for holding the requisite licence, road tax and insurance.”. [74] In Tay Lye Seng & Anor v. Nazori Teh & Anor [1998] 3 CLJ 466 the Court of Appeal held (per Siti Norma Yaakob JCA): “[1] While public policy would defeat any claim based on illegality, a balance has to be drawn based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. [2] The maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio has limited application in tort. The role of the maxim lies mainly and most exclusively in actions based on contract. [3] The fact that the first respondent had no valid work permit per se, could not affect his claim for loss of earnings in Singapore. This was because the first respondent was working legally in Singapore initially. He had a valid work permit issued by the Singapore authorities but unfortunately that expired four months before the accident. The obligation to renew the work permit laid squarely with the first respondent’s employers and since there was no evidence that the had done so the first respondent had therefore not been culpably responsible for the predicament that he later found himself to be in. In these circumstances, the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio lacked moral justification and was not applicable in this appeal.”. [Emphasis added] [75] The Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) in her very lengthy grounds of judgment summarised the evidence and findings of SP1 in paragraphs 33-38 on the deceased’s liability. It was submitted that here the illegal act was of the deceased not the Plaintiff. Moreover, it was SP6 who owed the duty as the owner of the motorcycle to make sure it had a valid insurance cover and road tax at all time of and it the deceased must have a valid licence when riding the motorcycle; the Plaintiff cannot be faulted since S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 the breaches of the RTA were by SP6 and the deceased. This argument does not hold water in my view. At the risk of repeating myself, I reiterate the fact that it was the Plaintiff in the first instance who had not made a true representation of the deceased’s status of not having a valid licence when he purchased the policies. The above case can be distinguished on the facts as here, the claims were founded on illegal act of the Plaintiff in making a dishonest representation to the insurers. [76] I have considered the submissions and case laws cited by the Plaintiff but I am unable to agree with his position. He has misconstrued the law in regard to the duty to take care to disclose material facts to the insurers. The facts of the case showed that the Plaintiff’s claims were untenable wherein the insurers can repudiate the contract in accordance with Paragraph 15 of Schedule 9. CONCLUSION [77] The Plaintiff had failed to prove his claims on a balance of probabilities and therefore, the SCJ dismissed the claims. It was unnecessary for me to disturb the decisions of the SCJ. Premised on the above considerations, I dismissed the 4 appeals with costs. Appeals dismissed with costs. Dated 24 January 2024 Sgd. NOOR RUWENA BINTI MD NURDIN Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya, Taiping S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 For the Appellant: Ms. Shuroma Guha Thakurta Messrs Manjit & Co., Bukit Mertajam For the Respondents: For The Pacific Insurance Berhad Mr. Ananth Shanmugam Messrs. Azim, Tunku Farik & Wong, Kuala Lumpur For Berjaya Sompo Insurance Berhad Ms. Vinoshini Saminathan Messrs. Isharidah, Ho, Chong & Menon, Kuala Lumpur S/N iJ8voK9zTkCxxuy6xpeG0w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

DA-22NCvC-29-05/2019

PLAINTIF 1. ) WON HAN CHAI 2. ) WON HANG HOO DEFENDAN 1. ) ON A WAN @ WAN HAN CHUAN 2. ) WON ENG SOON

WASIAT - sama ada 3 Wasiat Tersebut yang dikatakan dibuat oleh Si Mati terbatal dan tidak sah berdasarkan kepada satu atau semua alasan berikut - Si Mati tidak mempunyai keupayaan berwasiat pada masa material - terdapat keadaan sekeliling yang meragukan dalam membuat 3 Wasiat Tersebut - Pihak Defendan telah menggunakan pengaruh tidak berpatutan (undue influence) ke atas Si Mati dalam memastikan penyediaan dan pelaksanaan 3 Wasiat Tersebut - sama ada penemuan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam Kes No.1 dan keputusan rayuan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan menimbulkan suatu halangan di bawah doktrin res judicata dan/atau estoppel secara terhad atau meluas dalam dakwaan Pihak Defendan berhubung dengan keupayaan Si Mati untuk berwasiat dan/atau keujudan keadaan yang meragukan dan/atau pengaruh tidak berpatutan dalam memastikan keujudan 3 Wasiat Tersebut - sama ada Si Mati meninggal dunia tanpa berwasiat - sama ada Pihak Plaintif perlu melantik Pentadbir Pesaka Si Mati dan diberikan Surat Mentadbir Pesaka.

25/01/2024

YA Dato' Roslan Bin Abu Bakar

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6860d150-169d-47dd-b0cb-eca8ebc1cddd&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - DA-22NCVC-29-05-2019 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO: DA-22NCVC-29-05/2019 ANTARA 1) WON HAN CHAI 2) WON HANG HOO … PLAINTIF DAN 1) ON A WAN @ WAN HAN CHUAN 2) WON ENG SOON … DEFENDAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Pihak Plaintif dalam tuntutan ini antara lainnya memohon untuk mengenepikan tiga buah wasiat masing-masing bertarikh 7.4.2014, 18.5.2014 dan 12.6.2014 (selepas ini dipanggil “3 Wasiat Tersebut”) sebagai tidak sah dan terbatal. [2] Plaintif 1 dan Plaintif 2 adalah saudara lelaki kepada Si Mati, manakala Defendan 1 (telah meninggal dunia) juga adalah saudara lelaki Si Mati dan Defendan 2 (anak Defendan 1) menjadi wakil diri dalam pertikaian ini. Fakta [3] Mendiang Won Siok Wan (selepas ini dipanggil “Si Mati”) adalah pembuat wasiat kepada 3 Wasiat Tersebut dan satu lagi wasiat bertarikh 19.6.2014 (selepas ini dipanggil “Wasiat Tidak Sah)”). Sebelum kes ini, Plaintif 1 dan seorang lagi telah berjaya mengenepikan Wasiat Tidak Sah sebagai tidak sah dan terbatal pada 21.9.2017 oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu vide DA- 22NCVC-8-03/2016 (selepas ini dipanggil “Kes No. 1”) antara lainnya atas alasan tidak menggambarkan niat Si Mati, keadaan yang meragukan (suspicious circumstances) dan keupayaan Si Mati untuk membuat wasiat (testamentary capacity). Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi ini telah disahkan oleh oleh Mahkamah Rayuan pada 11.4.2018. 25/01/2024 11:31:44 DA-22NCvC-29-05/2019 Kand. 82 S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [4] Selepas pelupusan Wasiat Tidak Sah dalam Kes No.1, Pihak Plaintif mendapati ada tiga lagi wasiat lain (3 Wasiat Tersebut) yang dibuat oleh Si Mati sebelum dia meninggal dunia pada 5.7.2014. Isu [5] Isu-isu yang perlu dibicarakan adalah: (i) sama ada 3 Wasiat Tersebut yang dikatakan dibuat oleh Si Mati terbatal dan tidak sah berdasarkan kepada satu atau semua alasan berikut: a) Si Mati tidak mempunyai keupayaan berwasiat pada masa material. b) terdapat keadaan sekeliling yang meragukan dalam membuat 3 Wasiat Tersebut. c) Pihak Defendan telah menggunakan pengaruh tidak berpatutan (undue influence) ke atas Si Mati dalam memastikan penyediaan dan pelaksanaan 3 Wasiat Tersebut. (ii) sama ada penemuan dan keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam Kes No.1 dan keputusan rayuan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan menimbulkan suatu halangan di bawah doktrin res judicata dan/atau estoppel secara terhad atau meluas dalam dakwaan Pihak Defendan berhubung dengan keupayaan Si Mati untuk berwasiat dan/atau keujudan keadaan yang meragukan dan/atau pengaruh tidak berpatutan dalam memastikan keujudan 3 Wasiat Tersebut. (iii)Ekoran dari itu: a) sama ada Si Mati meninggal dunia tanpa berwasiat. b) sama ada Pihak Plaintif perlu melantik Pentadbir Pesaka Si Mati dan diberikan Surat Mentadbir Pesaka. Kes Pihak Plaintif [6] Secara ringkasnya intipati kes/hujahan Pihak Plaintif adalah bahawa penemuan serta keputusan Kes No. 1 adalah relevan dan penting kepada kes ini kerana melibatkan isu-isu yang sama yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah dalam perbicaraan ini iaitu: S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (i) niat Si Mati dalam membuat 3 Wasiat Tersebut. (ii) keupayaan Si Mati untuk membuat wasiat pada bulan Mei dan Jun 2014. (iii) terdapatnya keadaan yang mencurigakan dalam penyediaan 3 Wasiat Tersebut iaiitu peranan Defendan 1, peranan peguam yang menyediakan wasiat-wasiat berkenaan dan ketiadaan doktor atau pakar yang memberikan pendapat/nasihat berhubung dengan keadaan mental Si Mati pada masa material. (iv) terdapatnya pengaruh tidak berpatutan ke atas Si Mati dalam penyediaan dan pembuatan wasiat-wasiat tersebut. (v) saksi-saksi Pihak Defendan tidak kredible dan tidak boleh dipercayai. [7] Oleh yang demikian disebabkan Mahkamah Tinggi dalam Kes No. 1 telah meneliti dan telah menutuskan Kes No. 1 berdasarkan alasan yang sama, maka dihujahkan doktrin res judicata adalah terpakai dalam perbicaraan ini. Kes Pihak Defendan [8] Pihak Defendan menghujahkan antara lainnya, pertamanya, tuntutan Pihak Plaintif ini adalah merupakan suatu “probate action” kerana melibatkan “contentious probate proceedings”. Oleh yang demikian Aturan 72, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (selepas ini dipanggil “KKM 2012”) adalah terpakai. Aturan 72 adalah mandatori dan kegagalan mematuhinya adalah fatal kepada kes Pihak Plaintif (prinsip kes Kok Chee Yoong & Anor v Wong Lee Yuen [2018 MLRAU 265 CA). [9] Kedua, Pihak Defendan menghujahkan doktrin res judicata tidak terpakai dalam kes ini kerana Kes No. 1 hanya melibatkan suatu wasiat sahaja (Wasiat Tidak Sah) dan tidak melibatkan 3 Wasiat Tersebut. Selain dari itu isu-isu, perkara pokok (subject matter) dan saksi-saksi adalah berbeza. [10] Ketiga, Pihak Defendan menghujahkan mereka telah berjaya melepaskan beban untuk menunjukkan bahawa Si mati mempunyai keupayaan membuat wasiat, menandatanganinya dan memberikan efek kepada 3 Wasiat Tersebut. S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Penelitian dan penemuan mahkamah [11] Mahkamah akan bermula dengan penghujahan Pihak Defendan bahawa Pihak Plaintif telah gagal mematuhi keperluan Aturan 72, KKM 2012 kerana tidak memfailkan “Affidavit of Testamentary Scripts” dalam suatu “contentious probate proceedings”. [12] Saya mendapati tujuan Aturan 72, Kaedah 9, KKM 2012 memperuntukan sedemikian adalah kerana pertama, memberikan detail apa yang termaktub dalam scripts (wasiat) Si Mati. Kedua, adalah untuk memaklumkan dimana scripts (wasiat) itu berada. [13] Saya bersetuju dengan hujahan Pihak Plaintif bahawa mereka telah mematuhi keperluan aturan tersebut tetapi tanpa melabelkannya secara khusus sebagai “Affidavit of Testamentary Scripts”. Afidavit- afidavit seperti keperluan aturan tersebut telah pun difailkan oleh Pihak Plaintif diperingkat probate/letter of administration sebelum memulakan writ saman ini. Malah dalam ikatan dokumen yang difailkan dalam kes ini juga telah dimasukkan affidavit-afidavit tersebut. Ini dapat dilihat dalam Bundle A5, muka surat 796, affidavit oleh Ong Chin Siong [SP1] yang diikrarkan pada 28.1.2019, Bundle A4, muka surat 482, affidavit oleh Won Hai Chai [SP3] yang diikrarkan pada 19.12.2018, Bundle A5, muka surat 482, affidavit oleh Won Chin Siong [SP3] yang diikrarkan pada 19.12.2018. [14] Saya berpendapat afidavit-afidavit ini telah mencukupi untuk Pihak Defendan mengetahui butiran dalam wasiat dan dimana wasiat tersebut berada serta mematuhi keperluan Aturan 72, Kaedah 9, KKM 2012. Ini selaras dengan keputusan kes In the matter of the estate of Patrick Dempsey. Michael Prendergast, Plaintiff v Liam Mcloughlin, Defendant [2010] 3 IR 445: “[27] It is also necessary to have regard to the fact that, in testamentary litigation, the plaintiff and defendant must file what is known as an affidavit of scripts or affidavit as to scripts. The relevant requirement is to disclose, by affidavit, all testamentary scripts of the deceased, executed or unexecuted, which have at any time come into the possession or knowledge of the parties. The affidavit concerned must describe any testamentary script of the deceased whose estate is the subject of the action of which the deponent has any knowledge or, if it be the case, state that the deponent knows of no such script… S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [29] As can be seen from the above, procedural rules on affidavits as to scripts clearly envisage that such an affidavit should disclose all written instructions which are in the possession or knowledge of the deponent. The definition of scripts does not seem to cover any oral instructions.” [15] Selanjutnya saya meneliti pula kepada merit kes. Pada masa material (2014), Si Mati berumur 59 tahun. Si Mati disahkan mengidap kanser pancreas tahap 4 pada bulan Februari 2014. Penyakit ini kemudiannya merebak ke bahagian paru-paru dan liver. Si Mati dimasukkan ke Hospital Selayang, Selangor untuk rawatan. Pada sekitar bulan tersebut hingga Mac 2014, Si Mati dihinggapi penyakit jaundis. Di hospital berkenaan, Si Mati menjalani beberapa prosedur rawatan, namun penyakit jaundis datang semula. [16] Pada sekitar bulan Mac-April 2014, Si Mati dimasukkan pula ke Hospital KPJ, Kota Bharu, Kelantan kerana mengidap penyakit demam yang tinggi dan inflammation of bile duct (selain dari penyakit kanser dan jaundis). Selanjutnya Si Mati dipindahkan ke Hospital Raja Perempuan Zainab 2, Kota Bharu, Kelantan pada 14.5.2014. Semasa di hospital ini, Si Mati telah dimasukan antibiotic intravenous. [17] Pada 11.6.2014, Si Mati dimasukkan pula ke Hospital Universiti Sains Malaysia, Kubang Kerian, Kelantan untuk prosedur rawatan “percutaneous transhepatic biliary drainage” kerana terdapatnya infection on pancreatic duct”. Kemudian pada 15.6.2014, Si Mati dipindahkan semula ke Hospital Raja Perempuan Zainab 2. [18] Disebabkan penyakitnya bertambah teruk dan tempoh hayat yang singkat, Si Mati dikeluarkan dari hospital berkenaan dan dibawa pulang ke rumahnya. Pada 5.7.2014, Si Mati meninggal dunia iaitu lebih kurang 5 bulan setelah dikesan mengidap kanser tahap 4. [19] Bermula dari bulan April 2014 hingga Jun 2014, Si Mati telah menyediakan sebanyak 4 buah wasiat iaitu wasiat bertarikh 7.4.2014 (eksibit D1), wasiat bertarikh 18.5.2014 (D2), wasiat bertarikh 12.6.2014 (D3) dan wasiat bertarikh 19.6.2014 (Wasiat Tidak Sah). Keempat-empat wasiat ini mempunyai ciri-ciri yang sama iaitu: (i) niat Si Mati (ii) harta-harta yang sama. S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (iii) disediakan oleh seorang peguam bernama Ting Hun Ying (selepas ini dipanggil “Ms Ting”) dari Tetuan Zaid Ibrahim & Co. (iv) disaksikan oleh saksi-saksi yang sama iaitu Ms Ting dan seorang lagi bernama Wee Siok Cheng (selepas ini dipanggil “Mdm Wee”). (v) Plaintif, Defendan dan ahli-ahli keluarga telah dinamakan sebagai benefisiari. (vi) Pihak Defendan menjadi executors. [20] Alasan-alasan yang digunakan untuk mengenepikan keempat- empat wasiat berkenaan adalah hampir sama iaitu berkisar kepada: (a) Si Mati tidak mempunyai keupayaan berwasiat pada masa material (tahap kesihatan). (b) keadaan sekeliling yang meragukan dalam membuat wasiat. (c) Pihak Defendan telah menggunakan pengaruh tidak berpatutan (undue influence) ke atas Si Mati dalam memastikan penyediaan dan pelaksanaan wasiat-wasiat tersebut. [21] Berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan dalam perbicaraan ini, saya mendapati terdapat persamaan fakta, isu, tuntutan, pihak-pihak dan harta terlibat seperti yang telah dibicarakan dan diputuskan dalam Kes No.1. Sehubungan itu saya bersetuju dengan hujahan Pihak Plaintif bahawa Kes No. 1 adalah relevan dan berkait rapat dengan fakta-fakta material kes ini. [22] Isu-isu utama seperti niat Si Mati kepada siapa untuk mewasiatkan hartanya, keupayaan Si Mati membuat wasiat (melibatkan keadaan kesihatan Si Mati), keujudan keadaan yang meragukan dalam penyediaan serta pembuatan wasiat dan pengaruh tidak berpatutan dari orang-orang sekeliling Si Mati telah pun diteliti dan dipertimbangkan oleh Yang Arif Hakim dalam Kes No. 1. Kesemua isu inilah yang dapat menentukan sama ada wasiat-wasiat yang dibuat Si Mati adalah sah atau tidak. [23] Walau pun Kes No. 1 hanya melibatkan satu wasiat sahaja (Wasiat Tidak Sah), namun pertimbangannya juga adalah terpakai kepada 3 Wasiat Tersebut jika ketiga-tiga wasiat dalam kes ini dibicara dalam Kes No. 1. Ini bermaksud penelitian, penemuan dan keputusan Kes No. 1 berhubung dengan isu-isu di atas menjadi finality dan adalah sama dengan kita yang dibicarakan ini. S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [24] Sehubungan itu saya berpendapat doktrin res judicata adalah terpakai dalam kes ini selaras dengan prinsip mantap dalam kes Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 93: “For a judicial decision to operate as res judicata, it must be final in the sense that it leaves nothing to be judicially determined or ascertained thereafter in order to render it effective and capable of execution, and is absolute, complete, and certain, and when it is not lawfully subject to subsequent rescission, review or modification by the tribunal which pronounced it. The true test of res judicata in its wider sense or issue estoppel may be stated thus: has there been a final determination of the issue? That is the crucial factor.  Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 3 MLJ 90 at p. 93 @ [Tab 12, PBA] [p. 213, Encl. 75].  Lin Wen-Chih & Anor v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor [2021] 4 MLJ 367 (CA) at [188] @ [Tab 13, PBA] [p. 269, Encl. 75] 158. Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 MLRA 611 FC: “[23] What is res judicata? It simply means a matter dadjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation - interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action - nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy.” S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [25] Bagi tujuan melengkapkan penghakiman ini saya merujuk kepada keupayaan Si Mati membuat wasiat (testamentary capacity). Tempoh di mana Si Mati dikesan mengidap kanser pancreas peringkat 4 iaitu pada bulan Februari 2014 hingga beliau meninggal dunia pada 5.7.2014 adalah selama lebih kurang lima bulan. Dalam tempoh itu penyakit kanser merebak pula ke bahagian paru-paru dan liver. Kemudian ditambah lagi dengan penyakit-penyakit lain seperti jaundis, penyakit demam yang tinggi dan inflammation of bile duct. [26] Dalam mengubati penyakit-penyakit tersebut, prosedur antibiotic intravenously telah dilakukan kepada Si Mati. Menurut Dr. Zuad Firdaus bin Rapiah dari Hospital Raja Perempuan Zainab 2 yang memberikan keterangan dalam Kes No. 1, menyatakan antibiotik tersebut memberikan kesan confusion, altered sensorium and altered behavior kepada Si Mati. Kesan ini akan menyebabkan Si Mati mengalami hallucination and experience decreased level of consciousness (muka surat 296-297, Bundle A). [27] Selepas itu Si Mati juga diberikan satu lagi antibiotic jenis “Ertapenem” yang memberikan kesan sampingan seperti sakit kepala, a confused state of mind, hallucianations and experience decreased level of consciousness (muka surat 299, Bundle A). [28] Merujuk kepada keadaan kesihatan dan rekod perubatan Si Mati ini, sebagai seorang yang munasabah tentu akan dapat memahami kesakitan, kesedihan, tekanan dan ketakutan kepada Si Mati. Tambahan pula kanser di bahagian pancreas adalah di tahap 4 dan kebiasaannya sukar lagi untuk semboh. Keadaan-keadaan ini telah menyebabkan Si Mati “terlihat” lembaga-lembaga nenek moyangnya dan memerlukan rawatan spiritual Taoist dan Buddhist. Keterangan SP1, SP2 dan SP3 menyokong kepada keadaan kesihatan Si Mati pada masa material. [29] Keadaan-keadaan ini pada pendapat saya tidak membolehkan Si Mati mempunyai keupayaan untuk berwasiat lagi dan tiada lagi dalam pemikirannya untuk membuat wasiat dengan memberikan harta-harta tertentu kepada ahli keluarga. Perlu diingat Si Mati mempunyai sebanyak 27 buah harta untuk diwasiatkan. Dari jumlah tersebut, sebanyak 24 buah harta dalam wasiat bertarikh 7.4.2014 diberikan kepada Defendan 1, 25 buah harta dalam wasiat bertarikh 18.5.2014 diberikan kepada Defendan 1 dan 26 buah harta dalam wasiat bertarikh 12.6.2014 diberikan kepada Defendan 1. S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [30] Saya berpendapat dengan keadaan fikiran Si Mati yang bercelaru, tidak stabil dan tidak fokus, daya ingatan sememangnya telah berkurangan. Dengan itu tidak mungkin Si Mati dapat memperincikan setiap butiran hartanya kepada Ms Ting untuk disediakan 3 Wasiat Tersebut. Keupayaannya memberikan butir- butir 24 hingga 26 buah hartanya kepada Ms Ting menimbulkan suatu keadaan yang mencurigakan. [31] Seorang doktor pakar perlu dipanggil pada masa material bagi mengesahkan keadaan mental Si Mati sebelum boleh dikatakan berupaya membuat wasiat. Surat perubatan bertarikh 18.5.2014 oleh Dr. Rosemi Salleh yang digunakan oleh Pihak Defendan adalah tidak mencukupi kerana Dr Rosemi sendiri mengakui dia bukanlah pakar dalam bidang kesihatan mental. [32] Tambahan pula yang mendapat faedah terbanyak dalam 3 Wasiat Tersebut adalah Defendan 1. Keterangan menunjukkan Defendan 1 mempunyai hubungan perniagaan dengan Ms Ting termasuk menjadi pemegang saham sebuah syarikat keluarga Si Mati. Dengan keadaan kesihatan mental dan fizikal Si Mati itu juga saya berpendapat boleh berlakunya pengaruh tidak berpatutan (undue influence) dari orang-orang sekelilingnya. [33] Keadaan kesihatan mental dan fizikal Si Mati pada masa material pada pendapat saya gagal memenuhi keperluan undang-undang untuk menjadikan sesuatu wasiat itu sah seperti yang diputuskan dalam kes: Lim Kang Hai & Ors v Lim Chik Lock [2013] MLJU 614: [7] Thus there are two basic legal requirements for a valid will, as follows: (1) The testator must be capable of understanding what he is doing when he makes the will; and (2) What is in the will must truly reflect what he freely wishes to be done with his estate on his death.” Gan Yook Chin (P) v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1 FC: [16] It is trite law that for a will to be valid, a testator must have testamentary capacity. Whether a testator has testamentary capacity depends on the facts of each S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 case. What is meant by testamentary capacity has been laid down by Chief Justice Cockburn more than a century ago in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549. This case was cited copiously by the Court of Appeal in the instant case. For the sake of emphasis it is appropriate to repeat the sentiments expressed by Cockburn CJ who said inter alia.” [34] Malah saya mendapati Si Mati dalam keadaan sedemikian tidak mempunyai sedikit pun keupayaan untuk membuat 3 Wasiat Tersebut yang melibatkan 26 buah harta. Ini selaras dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Tho Yow Pew & Anor v Chua Kooi Hean [2002] 4 MLJ 97: “The cases in which Wills have been held invalid for lack of testamentary capacity involve testators who were utterly insane either upon the finding of the probate court or by reason of an order appointing a committee on the ground of insanity of the testator.” [35] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan-penemuan tersebut saya berpendapat Pihak Defendan sebagai propounder telah gagal melepas beban untuk menunjukkan bahawa Si Mati mempunyai keupayaan untuk membuat 3 Wasiat Tersebut, tidak berlakunya pengaruh tidak berpatutan dan gagal menangkis keadaan yang mencurigakan dalam penyediaan dan pembuatan 3 Wasiat Tersebut. Keputusan [36] Berdasarkan kepada penemuan-penemuan yang sama dan atas imbangan kebarangkalian, saya membenarkan tuntutan Pihak Plaintif seperti relif yang dipohon iaitu: (i) suatu pengisytiharan wasiat-wasiat bertarikh 7.4.2014, 18.5.2014 dan 12.6 2014 adalah batal dan tidak sah serta tidak mempunyai sebarang kesan undang-undang. (ii) suatu pengisytiharan bahawa Si Mati (Won Siok Wan) telah mati tanpa wasiat. (iii) suatu pengisytiharan bahawa Won Han Chai dan Won Hang Hoo dilantik sebagai Pentadbir Harta Pesaka Si Mati. (iv) suatu pengisytiharan bahawa Pentadbir yang tertera di atas (perenggan [iii]) diberi surat-surat kuasa mentadbir berhubung dengan pusaka Si Mati. S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (v) suatu pengisytiharan bahawa harta pusaka Si Mati dibahagikan menurut Akta Pembahagian harta 1958. (vi) kos sebanyak RM25,000 diberikan kepada Pihak Plaintif. Bertarikh: 11 Disember 2023. (ROSLAN BIN ABU BAKAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu. PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi pihak Plaintif: Tetuan Benedict Cheang Naziruddin & Co, Lot 717, Tingkat 2, Seksyen 9, Jalan Sultanah Zainab, 15000 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi pihak Defendan: Tetuan Yeap & Ang, No.5P5 & 5P12, Tingkat 5, Kota Bharu City Point, Jalan Ismail Hilir, 15000 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. S/N UNFgaJ0W3Uewyyo68HN3Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

DA-45B-9-09/2018

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya] TERTUDUH MUHAMMAD AZWAN BIN ZULKARNAI

Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa hukuman pemenjaraan adalah lebih sesuai kepada OKT. Berdasarkan kepada mitigasi yang telah dibuat oleh Peguam OKT, Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman penjara selama 30 tahun dari tarikh tangkap dan 12 kali sebatan rotan. Eksibit-eksibit fizikal dipulangkan kepada TPR dan untuk dilupuskan setelah tempoh rayuan tamat Eksibit-eksibit dokumentari dikepilkan pada fail kes.

25/01/2024

YA Dato' Roslan Bin Abu Bakar

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=60d8df75-b065-45f6-8b74-bab6550d7f09&Inline=true

25/01/2024 11:17:42 DA-45B-9-09/2018 Kand. 380 S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N dd/YYGWw9kWLdLq2VQ1/CQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal DA—I5E-9-09/2015 Kand. 380 25/01/2024 n»n:A2 DALAM MANKAMAH nurse: MALAYA DI KOTA EHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM NIALAVSIA PEREICARAAN .:EN51A>4 No mus -as/ma ANTARA PENDAKWA nun DAN MUHAMMAD AZWAN am ZIJLKARNAI Psueuglmm Pungenarnn m Omng yang kena Iuduh (: pat In: avpun ‘I “0KT")d:luduh dz hawah Ssksyen an: Kanun Keslksaan sepeni hsnkul -mm kamu nndn 4 920VHeDmkumrrg]Im1?30LevIunIv n.n bsrlsmp-1 m Klmpung Kama, r.manyan_ m flalnm J-yllvan Mzmsny, duulam Nngenxelnmnnman mamnumm Rasmadr hm Abdul am (No K» asnrnauuas; dun dnngan Mu kamu mm mnfakukan mam knalalvarv yang halal: mmnmm :14 new snksyan aaz Kunwl xnseman ~ Faku rzy Pads 4 9 20:7 mu le . knrang 12 so Iengah nan dv |empe( k-nauian (naaapan sshuah mmah m Kampnng Kenna, Temangan, Machzng, Kelaman) semnsa s. Man sedang herbual dan melmal pzip an a. hadapen nlmahnya bersama dangan panama Mohd Rusm bm Hussam, on dengan menggunikan wpucuk senapang paun kepunyaan s Man lalah melepaskan dua das lembakin yang menganaw Si Man an manyebahkan kemahannyn [:1 Akiha|kan wmbakan |eIsehnl(ben1isaIkan Vaporan badah stasalj sy Man Lelah msngalaml sebanyak 15 MG lembakan yang mssuk di bahaglln sis: kni dan hadspan k badan nu tslah menyehabkan keaudersan pada ulganvrgan wla u ‘arming. paru—pnnI, hepar dan nmp. yang manyehabkan kamahannya [4] om man dllangkap pnlrs an rumahnya yang huseneranan mrnan 5. Man (hampat kejadnn) pada han yang sama den baring-baring kars Ie\ah anarnpas n mnvewwnwm zvm/co -’n.._ s.n.n...n..MnLL3.n...nmy..nnnnnnn.m.n.n.n..n_.nn W lsu [51 Bag: mammmkan perluduhan mmadap on‘ Plhak Pendakwaan psriu membukllkan elemewelemen perlufluhan lersebul Imlu my berlakunya sualu kemnmm talhsdap Rasmam bin Abdul Am (um:-s Inl alp--mall “s: M.Itl"D. my s. Mnh man mama: aan keeederaan yang u. alammya. pm kecedsraan yang malanu Iersebul aaaxah aklhat dan new-man on, dam. (w) aalam manyebabkan kecederaan he atas Sw Man on cam: sauna ada (37 dengan max mnyababkan kemauan s: Man. alau‘ I07 aengan mad unluk menyebabkan keesderaan badan yang on mengananm buleh menyababkan kamalnan‘ alau‘ (c) dangan mal umuk menyebabkan keuedevaan badan yang cukup umuk rnsnyehabkan kemalian dalam keadaan biasa (summsnl in ma ordinary muss olnslura to was damn), alau‘ (.1) dengan pengelnhuan bahawa pamuaxan nu aaman amal memanaya den akan menylbabkan kamauan nan kecadevaan yang akan maflnbabkan kemahan Fomlltlln din p-nun-nan nlahlumah di akhir kls pandallwaan [bedakumg sualu kemamn lam:-mag Rnsmafln n Ana lAzIz [51 Elemen Ini mempevurnukan mawa bellekunya sualu kemaflan |e<hndaDSvMa1I Suya mendapahtsrdipal kahsringan-kalerangan vans: memnuknkan sleman WU vaI|u m kelevangan amk un Si Mam yang bemama auman hum lbruhxm (spa) spa menyalakan selapas ksjidmn sn Mun dlhsmbak pafln nun berkenun, 3: Man eehn mmwa xe KIN-nk Temangan‘ Macnann. Kelauun D: khmk nemeoann S1 Mall flsankan «em momnggal mmla spa wga man danst mengscam mam S1 Man IN mNvewwwwLaLq2vm/co -ma Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm pengambtlan amt. bag: menennngkan mm akwhal gangguan bisikan yang dw ahamwnya [32] Da\am pembeiusn im Pmak Fanbulaan manghwahksn bahawi on adalah mm wars: (unsound mind) pad: mas: kejadlin Pemyalaan Im dtsokong oleh sum (Dr. Slramah mm: Mom Is: - Pakar Fstklam Hospital Bahwua um Kmca, Fsrik) mam Layman Pembanan Forenslk Psiklaln on Asksihul F'33)Ie|ah manyesahkan bimawa on mengalamu geia\a pswkusls mm kuvang 2 lahun sehelum kqaman aklbat penyzlahgunaan dadah Lapavan Derkanaan guga menwlakzln on mengalamw gangguan bwslknn suala ghaib (auditory nullucmatuunj an dams: paranma (paruncnd delusional] [33] Pihak Pemhelaan dengan r|u mengmqahkan hahawi on Dalah nenayu manunlnkan (eslibnshed) nada masa d|a maxakukan pemuuhin ssptm. pamlduhan‘ dia ada\ah Iwdak mm (:71 unsound mmd) merlgwkul keperluan kes John alk Nyumbci V up man 1 MLJ zos CA yang memumskan m The res! rm msamty mm: 5 94 071/15 Penal Code .a 5 Iagnvm rmta modma!lu1,Lc9armsanIly under: 54 rsolsum a um4m:.mpm ma mgnam I...-mm av . psrwn n mun miles M Mower mvsuarxe av mm-g mu nalws aims 304.01 ma! mm rm a mm .5 many or conlmy to law 1599 paras vua; ,2; mm 7»: dclsvrcs o/msarnty .s mlsod a cum! mun! camvdsr um rouawmg mums {:1 many my mum flwsun ms smxessiuw sslzbwshmi. as a pmmmary isms‘ llml at the mm av I=omrm!W|9 Me an as was ol unsound mm um M 4 he was omumma mmd, wnezm he Ims pluwn mallus unsomldmss uhmnd was on mm In mm Ium mcaplnk uflmawvng I»-natum allus attach-wry wrung N agullul m. llw mu noun mama um zwvsmir m. cxmumsllncli v/n::IvLvmeaI!urlIv:cnm:—wIm1vAra rruturrll mm-mnrllmn m flncoflmy wllalhu m. .,W.m: ma nluflud m. lesmmimslllsslnfilns 155.277’ :1 5w mvewmwmmzvamo «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [34] senanmnya Pmak Fem|7e\aan menghnjahkan sexeuan dapa| menurwkan bahawa on |idak warns semasa memkukan perbualan Inrsebm, langkah selevusnya adalah umuk msnunmknn bahawa on dlsehnbkan meh keudakwams (evsebul, dla um manlml Kmcafiame on mangenahux sihat vsmumannya sibah alau menyalahv undang—undang [35| nu ‘uga qmenuma Pthak Pembelann) lelah benay: dilimhulksn dsngan psrlakuan on Iallu sepem keaerangannya yang menyatnkan' -mun. 5; ma nmamanmarn, oxnnonymkun ma nm monambak 5; Man Ian»! nsmr om marlyllukan ma mm Innu suhub an. am In nmmya rmmsmhak 5: Man komna Mmn m..«..m dvuababkun mmn lunobal ow /um! mmnlakan dm bum/—bsM man): an sun mensmbak sealfloa sahlm mm: mama yam am unmask mesa nu on ma msnyamkm dva um bole» mm» baham monomhak Mam) nu saran dun mak mu bahawa yemaaun /mluna man ‘ [36] Plhak Pembelaan menghuphhan wag. dengin dwamhan pula aengan ganaguan msman mm din kessn Dswkosrs dun pengimbulan dadah‘ lelih menysbabkan on mengalaml unscundness nlmmd yang manyebabkan dia sampal kspada vanap hdak «am. bahzwa verbumannya adalan salzn [:71 Salemsnya Pihak Pembelaan telah menquk kepada keterangan sma dalam Iapnmrmya (P33) wng menyalakzan hahawa -on mampu lahu aklbal flan pemumannya admah Aalah can bemenmnnan an 5151 undlrm-undann ' Pmik Pembexsan menflhnyankan sum hanya penu mambenkan pendapalbemnbung a gen modcul insamty sauna‘: Iartu iama ada on Vayak di carakan sms lidak >ayax nmnben pandangan berkailan dengan legal Insanity yang merupakan bidangknasa mahkzmah Pmak Pemhelaan meruiuk kepada kepumsan Mahkamah Rayuan dakam kes pp v sn. In: El |2n16] 1 mu m yang menyalaknn Isa! WM . ma/wdae hm in do .. me first area m aommrnlw Whether the dalsncc or msamlr has new ammvshod Is to sea moms! ms mum: wss mmcawy Insane 3! me have he cummdlsd the ac! am Inodnoal swdnwe IS nmmry as me qmwn av wlnemovhe was mmcaavy man: u any flamcwar n sw mvewmwmmzvamo "Nuns smnw n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm uwnrmuma mm mmnnn wamnsnannnaa nn rm! snmammq my the com! can nelemlmz wrmaul me bensfil alexpevl Oflmon I54] Gnu ma! Wmshmd is crossed the ma slag n la! the ma: mag» 10 nollsrdsl wholhon by reaanrv M msdmal NEW ms accusad was mcanab/e ol knowma the nannn nl ms an! or Ma! was! no wns mom was sulnor wrung av conlmry to raw Expert mdrca( aammn .5 mll-van! :5 ma queshon o/whslhsl the accused was mnlpabld nlknawmg Ins nalulv at an nu 0! ma: he was domy vmnlwas my wrung urconlraly m law n a nnnm In n. mlund Imm the pmvad Ind: and wannmnm Md no: rnzm upon mace! npmn 1: n unruly a Azulmalv nl Ian /0! ms mar mg» 10 flelennmz - [331 Saya man marvel kepada napman herkenaan (P33) ann msmaaam pemyataan (ersehm ndalah an muka sum 4 . 5. perenggan23(h)’ In ‘lmsamnsflfltmdansepemyanv mdakwnpndalsaprpmbar son, bslmu man. 4! nnan. Aeadnun nanm my wnms dan radar akan 54/94 dan nnnn davlnadu namnann lzrnuu ma mnmpu umuk merwerahur mm pannnnan nmnn adalulv sun duv bamnlnrvgbn dun aeav undamrundmg - [as] Adalah Jena; dan pemyavaan Ienehm, sws me\ah membenkan pandangan bsrkallan dengin legal Insanity Bevdasarkan kapadz kes yang dlksmukaksn Peguambala on Iallu PP v snannu [supn] aan ks:-«ex \am is‘ in FF van: ' ' NznIi[2fl16]1 LNS 52 an FM on-one Taik Kaon [Iupm]. saya memuluskan penflapal sma balkallan dengan mgnl insamly dilalak den lidak holeh drlenma Kn Pihak Pnndlkwnn dnlnm pombolun on [40] Pvhak Pendakwaan pula msnghuyahkan on man gagal dzlam pen-wean um waras (Insanity) dw hawah Seksyan 34 Kamm Kaslksuan. Ini adalah kelanz on an pemvgkm panama lag: Iehlh gagax maunbuknixan hallzwa ma adalah seomng yang nnennnny insane semasa kqadran Lnpman paknr psmam (P33) man mengssahkan on bends da|am keadsan mental yang wams samasa kejndmn plda 4 9 znw naaa kamangan dalam P33 yang menyalakan om semng yang memos/Vyrnsane semasa kqadian u sw mnvewwynwunqzvm/co "Nuns s.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms annnnn mm: m.n.n vu munc v-vrm my Kelerangan om senmn (sun manunjuknn lungs! mental dam fizikalnya berada an (snap nannal nanu szpem panam- 1.; memecah mssuk ks rnmsh sn Man malalm pmm bewaxang (n; memaaan masuk ke bnhk an mana sanipang dan pamm msnupan. mengaku lmmgamhvl ianapeng dan pamnmya. msnambak sv Mam (421 Dnmnanxan pada masa kejaman on «max Magi berafla dl bawnh pengaluh dadah kerana walau pun nawan makan 5 bljl pd kuda pads malam sebelum kejadxan flan harass terung‘ pm pagl him kegadlnn om masm Veg: |emengar bvslkan bevkanaan dun memhuslnya maran onen nu on wax wag. bslada dalam keadaan inlaxmshon [431 naaa ma varaapan kelerangan sama ad: daviSP13. P33 dan dam on sendlrl banawa suarz hislkan berkenaan menyumhnya mangambu sanapang, memasukan peluvu aan menembnk Sr Man [441 Semasa dIsaa\ hula: pula Pmsk Pendakwaan mengrnnankan on be alum nanawa sermpnng adalan unma memanaya din psrlu mpan salami! Pads mm a. sail balas. on menyalakan \iada pangavanuan bahawa S1MI(ImamI|ik\senapeng.D\akmrsua\balas pura on menyalakan mangalahui Sw Mad me senapang dan dlgunakan u¥eh s Ma unluk msnambak hem us] xasemua kamangan ml dlhujzhkan msnunjukan mnga memal flan flzlkal on bevadz ananap nmnnn rnlerens yang wen umum ada\ah on sedar apa yang dllakukannya xaaann nu ma ;ahkan on mempu rnembus| perancannan unluk manembak s Mali Kedunrdua (embukin yang dvlapaskln dmuukan kapada S1 Man an bukan kapada SP14 dv mana Kamhakan kadua adauan semasa sn Man man rebah Jelas disxm mmnankan om mempnnyin nial unluk memhunuh Si Man [46] Salem dad nu hndakan oxr memncah masuk ke rumah Sv Man melalun pinlu helakang samaan «iaaa seslapa an rumah uwebm aaanan jams menuluukan on menyedan perbnakannyi adalah salah [471 Kdernngan sm. spa, sm dan sns hanyalah bemial -Inecdols tam: nawa msnaenoakan Iatamslakang sikap on :12" km: yang u IN mNveww9«wLaLq2vm/co -ma am.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm VII .mm mm wk: manyendin, javang hevgaw dengan adik betamk, uaaa kawan, ma menjavfl waklu malam flan suka mencomeng dmdmg Tmda ksterangan pagzvwal perubetnn dlkemukakan bag! menuruukan kezdazn memax on yang mxaxakan mink wars: Dmwahkan juga adalah hdak munasabsh sepem ka|erangan soz bahawa on |eli!h mengnlaml keidaan sedsrmklan labvh dari 20 Iahun din Mada Imdukan alau usaha hemmgguh ole?! ahh kaluavga unluk menguban om soz msnyalakan mak danat membawa on unwk rawa|an kuana om enggan dan masalah kewangan, Punumlan nan pm-muan mankimnh sum ken pembelnn [43] Secara amnya pnnswp mama daham pembelsan Udlk wares IN adalarr u) selmp orang ada\ah dlanggan waras melamkan dapal dlhukukan sahihknya. FF‘ v Channy mu Kenn |7fl1E]MLJU ssa: m: m Fawn ans! dshbamnan expuundodaslnuows 'me)44mt!ouqmIubI!oh1mnI1c.uusmlIIvuyman>$ pmaumsd m be sans, an-11:: mm . mm: «gm N mason m be msounsm mm mmn, mm zummry a. mmm mmsausmuan, and that to aysanm . nalanva an IM ground olmsamly u mus! a. may Dmved mm, at me lune at me mmmulmg av ma sci, mo pm amusud wu laboumvg Imdsruucn 5 mm m..m, /mm muan a/Illa mmd, as not an mm m. mu. undauumy oflha .4 n. was com or. mammwn lhalhadadnalknowhewusrlilw wnal was many ‘ (H) tmda beban pembuklran keplda Pmik Pandakwaan urnuk memnuknxan oxr seorang yang wams (mi beban pernbulman max wiras adzlah |aI\9tak sepanuhnya kepadz OKT Guh Yoke v PF[1i55]l ms 43: ‘A mm mus! no Prusumod to a. sane mm»: pr-was m (In eommry me qwslrovv, mmram, u rm! whether M9 mum was Msaund mmd om mm M Ma maduoullllamc wamuarsaumamma llwss mu/ol :5 5w mvewmwmmzvamo mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm ma nmmm la pmve mm the mzclued wns Msawni mmd - PF 14 Inn. bin Ibrnhim|1ii3].1 MLJ :4: "ma mm on om oipmvmq msamfy is on the accused Imd¢rs1D5 olma Evmm M17850 u wm I/vsrvlbw be aburvod mu 5 s4 ombuoves ma Iundamamal mmom Lfcnmmll law, mar rs to say. an act done does not cunnltuh . mm. unlcss dam mm a gun mtlnhan Thus. Mm: . pm urmsr Inns snhon has Dun sumassmlly rluad, ma ma rs [MI mm It rm cum.onwnn:n.u.nnrm..ccu:.4.sn.a..m:».v. ma momma man: ma .: 1». mm. nlzummmmy we mm me! u follow: me ma uuulum ullnu gum nl the accused am no{ gnaw .; n. cannot a. sun is have onmmmsd any allmms Tnsvdwu, ma llw manna: that an mdar uluvwm musl n. mm: mm ragani to the mac nmlaned Iguana! mm m. mun neon/ylsomrudmmakatsfinmvrv mama: mmmllrod me am orvmt“ Sekl un ms Kanun Kniknan: ~s-mu 105. commmmom and cmtinuancn 1:! me man: olprrvm mam olpropony. (11 7»: rvgnl ol pma. dllsmza ol plupeny eomrncwot mun . Ilasarmnld flfifilllvlrmon m danglr m 1». pmn-nx I-‘nmmnnus :2; ma nvm ulnrmla aster-2 arpmo-vry «gums: mall mntmuu M De aflalrder Ins .nm.: In: ulna! mm In: Dmnedy, M M nsausluuz 1:! MI publrc uumnnunx rsomametl arnttmepmvmq/nuxnpunmcuvuvd (3; The mm atpm/at: flcluvnz utpmpeny nvlsmsvmabnry Ixtnbmn as long I: mm mm. muss: m all-mm: m musetn anynerlmldeam mmn ormangrm msvmm. was mg as me leer armmm mm, m at mum mm at ullnnanl uavmnalmslrntnr conmme: (41 me Whrnfwrvale delencenlplfilierly mum mminnl Imspasa mmmw mwmuos as Iona as the mom: conlmuos m ms commtsalon av Mmmal mass or mawmai 15; ms rlvmolmvaza dslumse olpmoeny iaamslnouse bmakrrul uy mom mums as mg as ha44se—!resDIss wmcn has been begun by sm: house-omakmg conlmuss - sw mvewmwmmzvama mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm my lahap pemhuklian ketidakwarasan adalah alas Imbangan kebzrangkahan (pnnslp dalam kzs—kes PP v Jung cmn Ehln um] I MLJ zoo, Rajagopzl v PP (197711 ML! 5 din PP v Nnnalwnri [1994] 3 ML! 463) (v) kelldukwavasnn memax buknnlah dan segl peruhalan (mamcavy mune) te1spi din segl undangmndang (lsyally mane) PP v Muhammnn SuhaImlAI1duIAzIz[20Iu]1 cu m: ‘Ills sstllvd/awlmtllu unfunny almsnmfy mm 34 .; zancnmcd mm Illa Jcrzusvdl fwal rusawvsnbwy .1 m. Irml afme Ellngad Dfiunu and not um. mremelhe wis "many mszml an mm (mm Ratanlal and nnlujlarn um 01 Crime: (25% Earl), page 307: Wudlcahlrsanuy and ‘Inga! ms.umly' . Than a . me: am oldtlhrancn M..." mm: msunlly/' and -my »nsamly'1nfl mm: m 1>mn:Im-G my mm ma my mm: 1». manual npaa on». mnmr n vs not any mm nllmnln: Immnar ur somatnmy unmmunlubla m . men: ncbon, malpamraiumourmbaamadmsn )0 1:: uuemm Imm uumsnmem n #5 m4 mm encenmfllfr m smaulamy almarmev ma: would Mm memes ahnsunvfy Anmmlpmy almlnd >5 not by mu m/um: (H mm mm me mum mus! mm: mm Mule oi unsmmd mm Sum sxsmpllon cm on alarmed omy men M mum pnrwn xs mcapabla u! knowmvlhenurumofmtncrorbuptdolflyvmnv wmnv «contrary to law - [49] Bag: memnuxnxxn pembelaan Ildak warns, beban sepemmnya adalah kepaaa OKT dan mun Dfimhukllan ml mm atas Imbangan kebarangklllan Daflam mamuxusm sum: ads behan mi beliaya uihukukan o\sh oxr. mahkamah penulan menlmhangkan (i) samz ada on semasa melakukan Delbusun senem dllum penuduhan tusahut adalah searing yang hdak waras (unsoundmmd) :1 5w mvewmwmmzvamo «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [59] [511 [521 [53] [54] dlsababkzn oieh kelldakmvasan nu, adakah on man hunlvaya (rncapama an mengananu. swan pelbualannya rm ada\ah sa\ah ztau menyalahi undzngmndang (H) Bagi memnuman aia (mak wavzs, on menyalnkan dla mganggu uleh suara biswknn sejak lammzmfi Pads malam sebelum kejaulan manembak s. Mali. on mengalaml gangguan |ev:ahuI lag: Bag: mavadakan gangguan suara sevsawu, on man memakan sebanynk 3 my pu kudi. Namun pana pay! han kqadnan, ow manyacakan masnh ada suava ganggnan yang mamberllallwuya ada orang Vngin bargaduh dsngannya Ialapi max lahu slapa Fada pagi Ievsebul on keluar manm setmah manoakan dengan mambewa sebflah parang yang masannya Saya bevp2ndape| mangasah palzrlg inn admah bemmksud memamknn parting berkanaan mam on kemar unluk mencan omng yang mgm bevgaduh dangannya temp: uaak benumpa seswapa om balk samula ke mmahnya dan suara berkenaan mamhamammya hahawa sns mmnya). SP81kaksk saudam om dan Si Mali sedang bersemhun dalnm sehuah mum helkuncl m mmah 5! Man on kemudlannya henmdnk dengan {ems menendang pmm mnk belkenann mngga Lemuka dun menduplh liada seslapa m flalamnya sewammnya on menyacakan apanua pmm nmx barkenaan vamuxa, ma lernampak Iabuah bag senapang flan Iaupmsnana vemru d1 atas Vanlal. on Ielah mengamhil senapang flan Ialvmnggang palum belksnzan dan halik ke Iumahnya. Semasz sampal an Iuar mmahnya, om le\an |emnmpak mclakar kawan Si Mam ¢sP14 — Rosfll Husmn) misuk ke kwasan ruman on cams memasukan pamm ks dalam yenapang bevkenann dan manglkut matnkar nu nan hemkang Setelah momokar nu berhelm an haflapan Nmah su Mam oxr bavaaa d1beIa5<angnya(rmInkar) om dalam kalavangannya Iagw menyatakan apebfla sv Mali keluzr davl ksrela helkanaall, ma terns menembak 5: Man lanpa berflklv on menyalakan ma hdak mm sehah spa flan apa matnya menemhak 5' Man kemna fikwan bevsemhul dlsehabkan mazkan |ersebm on jugs menyalskan am balul-befiul mamh dun am menembak sesmpn samqa urang panama yang ma nampak mass nu on mga menynlakan ma (task buleh berflur bahawa u menembak amng ilu salah clan hank Dahu bahawa pemuatan nu jugz salah [551 Dalam menimhangkan pembalian mm wins on mi‘ say: mevujuk kzpcfla uuan yang dlpuluskan da\am kas PP v Julri Nnnti llullvll: 1:5; Smtwasdeuvlmmrmmd, malmdulummmgwmlvrar an m mm he cutagnmzndxs and mm M: lmaumud 1.: an act .1 msamty mm mm 54 n1 4». pm: cm 2: would -mus», mvntvv . mum lnruu Fm Inemmualbe . «mg. baaodmbnlyon m-mm! smug!/on Dy 5 uaymm mm 1». amlsvd pflrmn was surfacing from some ma urwmm unnmnon mat was allscllrw hm mum lacullws .: 4». mm-nu! Mus W5 can-smnn mny am . vanuly u! lnrmx as msmczw flesvmbant such .3 n. b-wry Iiamsuznll And so mm. Yhal common my cum 5 pm" as beinv mmauy mm am m.ammmpm. mm: mm": n; no auhrmmala ur oonolusrve ov me an my me aocuwd Pwmn IS many ms-no. . mam. Mm wlucll udmn 54 an». Penal cm 1.1 aolmmod mm naynnovaloclsmmundsvlhalaw renew-Ivy mm as ooaossdlo my musty mwmlvy mane. rm Person mus! m dslsrmmad by the payclliamsr m have lot! ms ooqmrrvs mm In . decree such max hmsrnpiflobtnalknamnymo Mmrsnlms arm mm: wnntllsts do--ms wvrmvwconlrirym/nw rmvaflul amum ammtcallosl. rm INS twovrdmnesu: a my us! Lnanm1Ju.|IAL'1 mm Znksm JCA II: he men Hail] mmm m. nu...“ Li mnmy urmav se¢.1ran.i4otInzPcna(Codrm1n-Iomwnngnunvrvr -2: ;. sauna m m: m. flalwca aims-my mm sscdon at .5 zomzamod with ma Imunds rm: mapanslbfibty mm mm mm. nttngndunpnn ma nut wan wheduorhowaum-danaflrmxnnanilhnllrnua 5.. maama Ray! V Zsmal Abudm am MnIZnn1[1ii3l1 cu u7,P6-v mmmaaj V cm 759,, Iv991)JMA./ 495 mm. ms mma authors ar Rmnm and Dmmnafls my a! Cams, 5:» am a! pact: 239 nm wmnnwhanfimcbunwfucadmmuaohncati msarmyun-torseolunn ac olmsknal cm «man how :9 oomvdur mo manor: Mmaly W mmnm zemad Wan» Ma 1m:¢us51u/[V aaummod, as a P'Immr-iryrssw, llulntms rm ohaommmnfime M! n. wnalunsuulld mm arrdflvlima wns almlmund .......:, whumma nu ptuven mm m: ummanm ol mmdwnsntzdngu-Inslbflyammlflotisltaimfiv 1; 5w mvewmwmmzvama mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm msubanod la that me avowed was mcapama or Imawvllalhsrlalura uihrsaansbmnv wroflvovaflsmsl Ihs1aw' ml rus lhsrsfwu mamas mama: ms Appenanwma mu burden al sslamvsrrmg me: he was or medmlir unswnd mm! nu: ma: he was my an mrsms and u-moses Vegafty Insane when na cunllmrfsd ma dlslnmiyaclmihnndlammncnnrgv - [56] Ssrdaiarkan kapadz prinsip kes hannanaan, ujian unanap panama yang perlu mpnnnsxan mahkamah adalah sama ads on mengala medically Insane Says mendapaliliada ke|erangan nan pakar psi Iaui yang menyalakan om mengalzum sedenuklan Ke|e<an§an SP13(PeKar Psmmn) din Lapoun Pembalan Fovenswk Psmam (P33) ma mak manyulakan seaannman oxen yang demlmn om telall aagax manunukan ma mangalamv medically msans. [571 Menuuk pula kepada kelevangan yang mberikan men snz, sna, am dan sus nanyaxan kelemngan nngkiss bevsIla| anamara Imlu mencemakan Ialsr helakang slknp on flan kecfl yang suka menyendin, flung uargaux dengan an beradlk. had: kaman. sun menlem wakhn "mam din snka maneonlzeng dlndmg saya oerpenaapat adalall Irdik munasabah ssplm kamangan snz bahawa on man mangaxann keadaan sedsrmklan lawn nan 2n lahun |91ap' ahh keluarga hdak mengamhil hndakan serius unmk menguhali ow Saya max dapal rnenanma kslerangan snz bahavm arm kemarga max naval membawa on unluk yamcan kerana on enggnn dan masanan kewangan [55] man (ship kedua pun: aaalan unluk menenlukan slmada on «man nuang cagnmve /acumes ke mam «snap dv mana ma ndak ban-naya ofknowmg Mn natur! ofhis ac? or wrung ur contrary to law. [591 Meneliri kepadz aanaknan on lerulamanyn msngambll sepucuk senapang flan tall pmggang hens: peluru pads pendapa|snya wanya menunjukan unap mama: aan pervuklmn on yang mien berfiknr secar: muons: wanu managunakan aenapang bersaml pslum aaaah vamn belkssan din menggunaxan pirang. [so] saya mak dapa| msnerima nnanan on bahawa seswapa saha;a lermasuk kaI\ak—kanak boleh memzsukan Pemru ke da\am zn N mnvewwyawmmzvavco ma a.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm wa mum Wm my kemvangan Pegawal Felubalan yang mennaxankan bedah slasal mayal 5. Man mm D! Ahmad Hafilam bun Hasm||SPI&) Elemen 2 (54 Man man ax kg dan kecederaan Eng as alzrrurlya) m Elemen kedua ml mampsrnnmkan bahawa mangsa telzh maxi nkman flan keoeduraan yang dialamlnya. Bag: memuluskan sama ada elsman kedua berjaya dlpenuhv uleh Pmak Pendakwaan‘ saya merumk din menulili kevzda kalerangan sma nnu Pegawal Perubalan yang merumankan bedah slasnl mznyal SI man pad: 5 9 201: pm Iebih kuvang 4 15 pelang SPIBIdaIah seorang Pakar Pembalan Fmenslk darn Hnsp1l.alKusIs Lmnpur. [a| sma menyalakan terdapal benyak Iuka dan kesan hsmbakan yang masuk keluav den badan Sw Mali. Luke :11 badan 5: Man mi xnuaklorlnya auavan dan alah km ke kanan dan menemhusl hanyak shuklur organ wax daVaman Si Man sepem ;ancung, pam-vim‘ hapar dan limpa yang menu xennn menyebshkan ke!na|n Keharangkallzn luka—Iulm lersehul menyababkan kemalian adalah mo-/.. (91 nan marpno\ogv1ukn-lukamnbakan mssuk sen: Iaburan \uka—luka bemennan‘ SF-15 berpendanit seniata yang drgurlakan adalah jen seruala benana: nun sapam sanapang panan yang menggunakan pelum penabur swa sswanjunnya menyanaknn heuau mga berpangalaman mallhal jams lukx-Huka yang sama sebalum Kes -nu. no] Manurul spm lagw bevdasarkan keadaan din ‘ems I-ma-xuka Iavsabul pads hadan SI Man, beltau borah mambuzt keslmpulan hahawa ‘amt! lembaknn yang mlapaskan adalah malabmi 1o kaki saya mendnpall kewangan rnenuenax jarak Iamhzkan um adalah selan dengan kememngan SP11 lam ASP Omar bin Semen, searing Fegawav Polls Cawingan Fovenswk n=»< Kelanlan yang lelsh nnmalankan pemalikszan an Iempnl kemilan [11] Betdaszrkan kepada ketarangan~ke1erIngsn lelsebm an alas. saya belpuas nan‘ alsmen kedua penuduhsn IN dibuklikan men Pmak Pendakwaan IN mnvewmwmmzvamo -nan snnnw ...n.mn be used m mm .. nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm VII mum pm senapang kemna m asanan sualu proaes mudah yang boleh dnnalqavi semssa menoman TV alau mam. saya bevpsndapit sesemang i|u memevlulun walu oanap pem. wan yang rislorm hagi memasukan pelum ke dilsm wanapang x a bahagxan hadavan alau belakang peluvu. Iarl\pa| memasukan pemm‘ membuka tarnpal mimasukan pelum dan kemudian memnupnya samma Kaadaan mania! yang rasio an Jnga dipariukan bag! mengacukan senapang den mlnamhak s. Mali (saszran) Says menflapnli waluu pun lerdinzn Sw Mz(i husamz spm |eIap\ sasalan adalah kapaaa 5. Man dangan dua das Iembakan lnl bevmaksud on memasukan paluru dua kall ke dalam senapang berkenaan dan menambak sasalan mg sum: [61] Keadaan menm on sumasa malakukan pamuanan bevkznaan jug: psflu mllhal pafla lsbalum, samasa dan selepas xayaman lpnnsvp k-5 FF v Plum 1: Tuyel Mai [ma] 5 ML! 404 EA) sapam yang sayz nyalakan |ad|, keadaun on sehelum kepdwan adalah masa nan baleh bemklr dengin bank. Selapai kqadwan menembak msebm‘ on [ems nalk xa mmarmya dan enygan menyerah am am lurun dan mmah sahlnggalall ditangkap pohs. Ferbunhn ml jugs pada panaapat saya manumukan pemdqlan on yang waras dart mengetahm sna| parbuatannya nu adaVah salah alau manyuxam undang»undang [521 Dalam melaksanakan hlgas diperingkal akhir kes pembelnnn my mallkamah perlulah menimbangkan semua kelelangan yang Kehh dvkamukakan aleh keduadua pmak (lemusuk xemevangsn dlpenngkal kes pendakwaan) sama ads Pmak Panaakwm rah?! buqaya memnuman kesnya malampam kalaguan yang munasabah [53] Im ‘alas dipenmlukun di bzwah Ssksyen mu Kanun Fmsedm Jen8'y:h* um... nu Pmeudun at tho cnncluslun oltho mu m A! the mnmusmn olm: mu ma caun mu mwluflar an ma swam. naduuau am. y Ind mun am. whathov mo Wnsscunun Iv-5 Dmvufl in run Myand vuaaanabla flout)! 42; 11 1». Cam mm Ina! ms pmsscuhon has mm us use bayc-m1 rusonabla mom ms comunau mm» nccustdallllry and »a may bu cvvmdod an n 2. N mvewmwmmzvamo ma Snr1n\n-nhnrwmbe used .a mm ms mm-y mm: dun-mm y.. muNG wrm m n ma Conn Imds ml Ina Dmsoculmn m noipmvsd mu mass bsyom rnasnnable com, me Cowl ma rscmd .n mm of nzvum - [541 Pnnslp bemantan dengan penkara m. page lelah dlpmuskan dmsm Ice:-kes om. Mahkamah Pevsskuman dalam ks: PP v Mohd Rndzl Abu Balm! [Iupn]: -so.m.gumm.;m..u..«.uasm, wilumnlnrnllsladlawsrlln mo-Inaranauldhar-nnby-Iwalmanurh-damn! Dtnucmbnsaun rwv mu m. «Max um, me mm mm to runnm Mm! mm zwwm M mm. mm .; cnitad ms nzvssd am. In gvvecvvdanuu 1ne«vu1mvu9IvInesleps::Lu1nmMmvFF(va£37 Mu as.-r Dan dalam kes Malv FP[1flS2]MLl 25:: -maposmm may be mnmmny smart as loltows— Isl Ilyml ans sarrsfiod oeywm rsawnama mm: 25 m the accused‘: own com: to» um amar ovbehsw ms atcusudls axp/imalmrv wow 11:} Ifyoudvrralzuxplorbolmvu mnaacund ..p:m:.an Do not wnwcl mu nonsm-r m. nul :11!!! bdaw m; Nyuudanntnuzpfnrnzhevelnenecued arnlamannn and Ina.‘ uplausnalvan noes not mine m ynurmtmiumamnablefloualuslulusgm/I Cmmv vs; II yuu an In)! an-.119! o. behave me mum arnlaunalmn but nevemmeaa a mass m yaw mmd . mnsonabte dauhlaala me want new - Klnumun [as] Se|e|ah mensni din manimblngkln kmenngin den ksdua-dun ak, saw mandapani on halal! §aga\ menimnuxxan pemnexa-n Insanny dw hawzh Seksyen 34 Kanun Kesnlmaan Sehubungan nu 11 sw mnvemsxwmmzvama mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm saya memumsknn r-max Pemiakwean man benaya mstubukhkan kesnyz memmpauv keragnan munsslbah on dangan mu mam salah dan dwhabllkan dengan mduhan an bawah Saksysn :02 Kamm Keslksaan [as] Sebemm mankaman menjaluhkan hukuman Iemadap on mahkamah mangarahkan pwhakplhak umuk memhual mm" dan mmgasi khasnya pemakaian Akin Pemansuhan Nukuman Man Mandztori 202: (Akla may [57] Selelah memmbangkan pengmanan kedus-dui pmak, say: man menggunakan panduan kepulusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kas Alowouln oluw.-luwon anmn v PP [2023] MLJU mo yang |e|ah meruluk kn: Deapak Rai v State ulliihzr [zany 4 MLJ(CRL)171' -m; Lbokmg 54 ms pvnvmon, m an olllvu wow lllal ma Iemstnlrvl Wflwsv of M Imwlflmnnl rs mtsndod m mm ssmm olrmbrrsonlmnlafla m wysars me win Vorarl orrme urmwummmmmrma mum M dum fur Ina mos! exzsoholvally sums, mt, wuw mumers arm n. callous In an arms: unbnhlvmla dngru - [say Mahkimah Rayuin iuga meruiuk kepada kapuhlsan Mahkamah Perwekuluan oalam ms Lon Hock Selig v PP[19w]2 ML.I13' ‘[25] :1 un n. 9151046 from m. cm: anwsmv m I!!! pnnsdnly pnmpmpllx mt cm sunhmx olnum ha: Donn mama wlmu an. mmdars cummmad mm mmuy mm. mm mm“ gmdsnml, mm honmrdw: urnmlnt nnd wmclv shacks nalnlw mma-4.»m.mammm.m.m«.a.v. mmnm of ma may A: . mm Wrdalmu, .1 .; am waw mat me am. pnnalw wnuld na Iusvmm in mm wrm. amar-v omen, Mad and mm! mm moss mm mm and kill mar vrdmv: my uurnma: :2! mm wmm dnmembor Ina mum av my vuclfma amsmua amm who we «mm mm mass me man a murder and execute u m .4 mm: mm manner - 2; 5w mvewmwmmzvamo «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm [59] (70) W! Saya |e\aII memhua| panimnangmpennmbangan bsnkul sebamm memuluskan hukuman lemadap DKT. my gangguan sham ghmh henarusan yang maharm on walau pun max sampal kepada tahap msanily Valamelakang kehldupln dan pembesaran on dengan keliadaan hapa den dvbesalkan oleh mu bersamz dengan llma (5) arang amx beradik lam poringal atau kelakuan on sqak kecrl yang men walau pun mask sampav kepada lahap msermy ianu lvdak bergiul sarna ads dengan ahli keluarga man masyarikal‘ maluenl pads wak|u |engah malam‘ menconlanq umumg mmah dangan puvkztaan 'Nlah“ am sebagamyl. penggunaan senapnng yang Mak ncang dan awax lelapx dllemui semm on memecah masuk ks dalam sehuah brhk mmah s. Man pads han keiadlan ksbergsn|ungan on kepada dadah nsnduan kepulusan dan Mahkamah Rayuan da\am ms Alawunll Oluwaiuwun Guam v FF [lupm] yang menuuk kepada bebempa nas lam dalem msmmn hukumzrl ansmam salain dan hukumnn man mu Bxtrame/y savage, heinuus, diabolical, gruesome, cruel. nonsnaous or must and wmbh shocks not only me1udmaleonscienw Du! mu Ins cafiective conscience ume socmfy W (Iv) (V) (W Say: mga msnuapan dan fzkla dan ke|erangan kes W eamawa ianya mask sempav kspada 6ak|ar—laklor levsebul an alas Juga sebagav "Lama yurdelmes' dun kes uarxenaan, oKr bukanlah a Med and nurval kt//ers, rape and km Merv wcflms‘ n1rsmemb9r the bodies dan sehagamya mi) da\zm usla sekarung (25 lama!) dun semasa wnsiden (20 lahun)‘ saya berpendapal on barpahmnn un|uk m reform Iemadip keulahan yang telah dwlakukannya Dsngin nu berdasavkan kepada kuasa aan pemnlukan \mdana— undang yang ads. says barpandapm hukuman psmenjarazn adalah lahih sesuaw, bevmunnlanl kepada on can mencapzw kepemingan awam. Eevdasarkan kepma rnmgasv yang mnuax nleh peguambela OKT, say: menmuhkan hukuman neniara salzma so lahun flan mum tnngkap din 12 xan sebatan mtan. 10 [72] Eksib ekslbfl nuke! dlpulangkan kupada Pihak Pendakwaan dan akan dllupuskan seteiah tampon Iayuan lama: Manama eks ' emon bevbemuk dokumen dikepllkan dz\am van kes Bnnnrikh: 14 Diumbar 202:. (Rosuu snow) aklm Mahkamah Tlnggl Kola Eharu. PIHAK-PIHAK: Ban! pmak Pamiakwaan TPR Knaiml Anuar bin Wahah‘ Twmbalan Fendskwa Ruya, Penna! Panasmal Undang—Undang Negsri Kelantzn. Txngkzl Bawah. Blok 5, ma mmmzum. 15050 Kola Ehalu‘ Ke\an'an Bagr pmak Terluduh Hahm Ashgav hm Mahd Hum. Teluan mum Ashgar. 2625. Jalin Azman. Taman Guru, «.5100 Kola Bharu. Keiaman 15 IN mmvewwmwumazvm/co mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Elemen 3 kecgdevsan yang dv srsmi tersehul adalah aklbal dan i”|2C[.\ L12) Ere"-en kalrga im mempsmnmksn hihawa kecederaan yang dlahmv lsrsebm adalah sums: flan uevausran on Mangenai elsmen ml says Ielah menelm kepuda kalsrangamkelerangan berm (u kemfangan adlk an 5: Man yang Demamz Ruhlah mm. Ibrahim 1sPE) SP8|s1ah mengecamkan on dawn mahkumah spa manyalakan pada pagl kepadmn. on (em: mengamuk iawlu me¥ibas—lihaskan dengan sebnlah parang spa iuna maIiha(OKT pergl ke rumah SI Man flan mengsmk pmlu hadapan rumah dengin paring berkanaan sambal mengajak SI Mun berglduh Akmmys spa malmat Si Msu benaya menenangkan on dam on msnsm momma: dan vergv davi silu Selepas nu spa belgerak perm ke Machang Sehelum ms bergarak. as (Jane! msnmsn Iakan s. Man, seomng bemama Mohd Rcwi bx Hssssm (SI-"14) dsnsng mengajnk s. Muu keluardengan sehuzh moiukav Dalam mm nsngsnsn ‘am Veblh many 12 an — 1 oo patang, semssa spa aslsm peria\anan pursng dari Mschang ke Kampong Karilla‘ dia «srsh bemuhung asngsn S1 Man dan berjumpa dangzn 5\ M "a. sehuah ksam mikan a. kampong berkenaan Dan si|u spa asn suaml bergerak unluk ssuk ke rumsh su Man an lmmpong berkennan Apsbus ssmpsi a. hadapan rumah bsrdakalan dengan sehuah pm as spa ledlhal 51 Man Ierbann an alas csnsn spa asn suaml mask bamm msngham '5. Man kenana lerdengar sans (Bmbakan. Apshus uswsn datang. spa |s\ah msmangku kepala S! Mam flan mehha| darah keluav dan mu!u| dan hiflung spa pga mshllal ham s. Mali berluhang asn terdapm kesan hmbakan Pada msss yang sama spa Ietllhsl oKr udang menyomk an amavs rumannys asngan mmsn Mamsllna a N mvewwmzasaszvsmo -ass ms n-nhnrwm as used s mm s. nflmnnflly sums dun-mm VII mum pm.‘ (ibu an den sepupu spa) spa (elah dapal meumau separun badan on paua mas: mu. Selamulnya saueuan keidain reds. spa mendapalu Mum belaksng mmah 3. Man lelah dupacahkan, kayu pmuu uenmyak flan muuk-muuk Ieniapal kesan dupecahkan serta diselongkar inmlasuk yang Si Man menyumr-an ssnapanu SP8;uga mehhatse . pavang uyang digunakan on pada pagl haru keuaduaru) dan sabuah |uku| di alas lama: (iu) kelerangan Mohd Rasnu hm Hussauuu (spun spu adllan kawan Su Malu. Sal pas minum dengan si Man du sebuah kedau makan du kampurlg rm [Jada hari ueuaauan. nanauam ueum kurzng12.DOIerugahan su Mall din sp14 bemerak ke mmah honor m hadapan mmah Semasz sedang bemlncang denguin Su Mun, sum Ierdengar salu flas bunyu bedlrauu den meumau Su Man uebah ke man dengan menyenuu perkalaan Allah spu berlan ke aran suahu kawassn hularu bsrdskalan daru (erdengar sa|u lagu bunyu bedilan. Pada masa nu sp14 merasa pemuu du langan kanan daru mendupau langarunya melecuv kstauangan pegawau pemmuan, saomrug beunama Dr 5 ' urKhaumh bumi Mann Roza1u|SP5) sps benuaas du Hasmal Machanfl aan mengesahkan ueua» nuevawel spu pad: jam 2 so pakang nan yang same sum merugalamu keoadamzn nrugan pada lamian kanan akubat lembakaru pehuu Iabuv dari senapang paiah (uv) ketemrugzm ASP Zukalli bun Said uspus) sP15 nuauan peaawau yana m-nangkap DKT daru merampas selaras senaviulfl bemma pouum du dalanunya dalu OKT. IN mmvewwmwmmzvaumo -um s.n.u ...m.mm be used m mm .. mumuuuy mu. dun-mm VII nruuum v-mxu Satslah mendapat makIuma| kejaman, SP15 lelan ke iemnat kajamzn Dalzm sehuah mmah .1. swm‘ sP15 msngintal dan luav mmah dan melihal on sedang be:-rzda dalam rumah nu SP15 dan anggnu kemudiarmya telah memumk on umuk menyenm am Eeberapa mlmt kemudlin on keluar dari mmah (evsebul flan anangksv oxen suns dan pasukannya Apabfla ananya‘ on mamhsmalw ianapang belkenlan berad: an mman nu Pumankiaan nlsh 5915 mendapen ssnavang ilu ada\ah jams Hamngmn a. Richardsun dan |evdapal sebum pemru dmam wsmbernya (PEA) (V) kelenangan spa sr=9 adalnh scoring bekas Puuruluaya RELA Daevah dan mengasahkan s. Man sebagzw semang anggmn RELA Ielall dibekalkan senapang herkenaan we») can lssen membzwa sena menggnnakannya (P22[7—151) spa mg: telah mengecam mayal s. Mal: melalul gambar (P22[7]) (vr) ke|erangan spa swa adalah seorana bemama ASP Nomlsyim Ian Ismail yam banvszas dv UM atan aalasnk. Makma\ Farensvk PERM, Cheras, Kuala Lummlr ma lalah marlsnma sepucuk senapang yang dlvampas bevkenazn (PEA) bersama sebum peluru den 2 ke\nns/any pelum (Pm flan Pam ) SPID ielah merwewhkan senapinfl can palum berkenaan kepada Inwekmr Ahmad Ikhwan an. M1 Nazv (sum) umuk nmnbuan wan sommmmy Lapnran unan «amount, senapami berksnaan belsama sa|u kekznsong pe\uru lelah msuanxan kamhalv pada s|=1n pada nan yang sama swm telah merqalankan analisa dan mendupnn kekwnsong pe\um yang diserahkan oleh srm selepns nqlan semceamlny rnempnnyai persarnaen man Infllwdual karekwsnx dengan dua kebnwng pelum 5 N mvewmwmmzvamo Nuns s.nn ...n.mn be used m mm n. nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm wa mum pm (WI E_:ner\_4 yang d1|emuId|Iempalke]adIan(P7Al dzn FBA1). Hasul anahsn nleh spm lelah mendapali kuligamga kelansang peluru Iersehm airspaskan a|au ditemhak dan salu senjahpl yang sauna iauu PEA kelsrangan SP1? spn adalah secrang bsrnama ASP Omar m Seman mu ka|ua pasukan Vovurvilc. IPK Kelaman yang memumpal 2 kskinsong psmm senaping an (empal kejafllan (PVAI dan pm) [13] walau pun uengan xenauaan sum mats‘ dengan merujuk kepada keselunman kemangan Plhak Pandakwsan Ialxu (B) (D) (5) (G) (8) 1') 19) U!) (i) (i) msmen pada pagA kepadian antara on dengan s. Man pemecahan darn penyslnngkzran mm moan Si Man menylmpan sennpengnya (PGA) on dlllhat aleh spa semasa mnmangku kepala s. Mun penemuan sanapang (PEA) dw lempal on harada semasa pegawul manangkap sampax keoedevaan pada sy Manman kebarangkahan hnlen man mow. penqesahan 2 kalolmmg pemm an temps! kapidlan adalah sama dengan salu kelmsong pemna yang «mum ujlan survioeabr/fly Sana digunakan pada senapang yang same: rmmmggu s. Mam new dun mam makan pada rsngahan nan kqadwan mak S1Mafl cflmmbak. menambak dangan sanu peluru aan kemudlannya mengisl dengan salu lag: dan lam: menimbak lag! sasanan peda Si Mali sahaja pada lambskin panama walau pun spu belada belsamz Si Man. [141 Keaernua kalarangan-kelavangan Im an kaselumhzn kularingan dallm ks: Pmak Pendakwnan‘ pada pendapal saya menunjukan kapada salu ksumpman sahsja mm on mempunyal nial unluk msmbunuh sx Man. O\eh yang demlklan saya memumskzn aleman keempa| juga |a|aII bsqiya dvbuklvkin oleh Fmax Pendakwaan IN mnvewwynwuwqzvm/co Nuns smm n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: dun-mm VII mum pans! u 51 saya mg: mamyuk kepada soal hula: on |arhadnp sakaaaxs. Pmak Pendakwaan ‘am; sualu pembelaan hahawa on mengammw masalah mamal, Mask wams can «max sedar Kepada pemualannya {ca} SPI3seorang Fake!PslklamdanHosp|laIEihagIa,Tg Rambulan. Perak nemn membua| pamlman xamadap on SP13 mandapau dan merumuskan bahawa on mengalami masalah kehefsanumgan kevada dadah dan Dslkusls akibat venyanahgunaan dadah yang lelah Dulm [<71 sma Iuga mandapah om adalah dalam keadaan menial yang waras. Sada! sllam sena zk\be| pemualannw, mampu mengelahul hahawa pemuaxannya adalah salah din berlenlangan dengsn undanudmdang sens sedardan waras kehka melakukan xesawanan separli pemlduhan [ma] Pemuavan-pevbuatannya sepeni yang szya huvalkan m peranggan e G! alas ‘adh nada pendapal saya menuruukan on adalah sanvarlg yang mempunyai memal yang mvas, sedar sflal sens aklbat psvhualannya, mampu mengemhul hahawn psrbualannya adalah salah dan benenlangan dengan undangmndang sans udav dan was kellka mehakukan kesalahan sepem penuduhan Kwhtuun an Ikhlv ku Dflldakwun [I9] Salsiah menelili dan menlmbangkzn secara makswmum (maximum svslusmzn) herhadap keselumhan keterangan Pmak Psndakwaan lermasuk sualarrsnalan balas Pihak Femhelaan Iemadap snks4— Saks: Pendakwaan, says herpuas nan Pwhak Pendakwaan |eIah herjaya memhukhknn suam plmla raua case mhaaap on dan memennvanxan cm unwx membela dun (Dun:-ID kas Laol Kow an 3 Ana! y PP [Z0031 1 cu 734, kev Balachandnn y PF [ms] 1 cu as dan kas FF y Ram bin Ahu Eaknv mos] 1 cm 451) Pnrlngkal kn pamhnlaan [ml nga cam pemheman Isiah auuangkan flan myauaskan kepada on flan om‘ mem-um unluk mmnenkan xexerang-n seeara bevsumpah den kandang sax:-. 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Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-22NCC-3-01/2021

PLAINTIF Mulpha Ventures Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Mula Holdings Sdn Bhd 2. ) Bestari Sepang Sdn Bhd 3. ) Spanstead Sdn Bhd 4. ) Seri Ehsan (Sepang) Sdn Bhd

Moneylenders – Moneylending transactions – Effect of non-compliance with Moneylenders Act 1951 – Whether unenforceable, void and/or illegal.Contract – Of unenforceable, void and illegal contracts – Restitution under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950.Remedies – Restitution – Money had and received – Unjust enrichment.Limitation – Whether applicable to void contracts – Acknowledgment and fresh accrual of action

24/01/2024

YA Dr Choong Yeow Choy

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2a011e7e-0007-4a7f-8055-b49aaeeafc4b&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. BA-22NCC-3-01/2021 ANTARA MULPHA VENTURES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 123405-V) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. MULA HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 464989-X) 2. BESTARI SEPANG SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 18588-D) 3. SPANSTEAD SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 383742-D) 4. SERI EHSAN (SEPANG) SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 270424-A) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 24/01/2024 15:07:46 BA-22NCC-3-01/2021 Kand. 110 S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 JUDGMENT Introduction [1] “Never lend books, for no one ever returns them; the only books I have in my library are books that other folks have lent me.” Does this apply to money lent? After all, as observed by one economist, “all loans, in the eyes of honest borrowers, must eventually be repaid”. [2] In a matter that involves a moneylending transaction, as in the present case, the law that governs moneylending dealings are well established. These precepts have repeatedly been invoked and applied by the courts. Nevertheless, the matter before this Court requires it to once again examine one of the principles relating to moneylending transactions by a licensed moneylender and a number of related legal issues. [3] The Plaintiff’s principal claim against the Defendants is predicated on 3 Loan Agreements pursuant to which the Plaintiff had lent the Second Defendant a total sum of RM41,191,801.20 (“Loans”). The Plaintiff is also seeking to recover from the Defendants charges incurred for and on account of the Fourth Defendant comprising the overdue and outstanding quit rent and assessments in respect of the land belonging to the Fourth Defendant amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus accrued interest (“Outgoings”). [4] This matter was filed as a Writ action. However, the parties reached an agreement that it be decided pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 on the following Questions of Law: S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 1. Whether the Loan Agreements are void and unenforceable due to a breach of s 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. 1.1. If yes, then whether the Loans and/or Outgoings are recoverable by virtue of: (a) money had and received to the use of the Plaintiff; and/or (b) s 66 of the Contracts Act 1950; and/or (c) unjust enrichment. 1.2. If no, then whether the Loans and/or Outgoings are recoverable for a breach of the Loan Agreements, Security Documents and the Restructuring Documents collectively known as ‘the Documents’. 2. Whether the Defendants are barred by res judicata (in the wider sense) and/or by judicial admission from challenging the validity of the Loan Agreements based on the pleadings, evidence given and affidavits filed in the Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit No. 22NCvC57-01/2015 (‘Shah Alam Suit’), and Shah Alam High Court Originating Summons No. BA- 243NCvC-1001-09/2020 (‘OS Proceedings’). 3. Whether the Plaintiff is debarred by limitation from pursuing recovery of the Loans and/or Outgoings. In this regard: 3.1. Whether limitation applies if the Loan Agreements are held to be illegal, void and/or unenforceable. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 3.2. Whether the Defendants acknowledged that the Loans are due and owing in the Shah Alam Suit and/or OS Proceedings thereby resulting in a fresh accrual of the Plaintiff’s claim on the respective dates of acknowledgment by the Defendants and consequently extending the period by which limitation sets in on the Plaintiff’s claim for recovery of the Loans and/or Outgoings. The Core Issues [5] The first of three principal issues to be resolved is whether the Loan Agreements are void and unenforceable due to a breach of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951? [6] In the event that the answer to the above issue is in the affirmative, the next key question for consideration is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to its alternative claims for (i) Restitution under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950; and/or (ii) Restitution for Money Had and Received and/or Unjust Enrichment? [7] If this Court were to conclude that the Plaintiff is entitled to pursue its alternative claims, the third major issue relating to the defence of limitation becomes relevant. The Parties and Their Contentions [8] The Plaintiff, Mulpha Ventures Sdn Bhd, is a company and a licensed moneylender under the Moneylenders Act 1951. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [9] The First Defendant, Mula Holding Sdn Bhd, is the Ultimate Holding Company of the Second, the Third and the Fourth Defendants, namely, Bestari Sepang Sdn Bhd, Spanstead Sdn Bhd and Seri Ehsan (Sepang) Sdn Bhd respectively. The Defendants are part of a Group of Companies. [10] The loans were disbursed to the Second Defendant. The First, the Third and the Fourth Defendants are the security parties to these moneylending transactions. Validity and Enforceability of the Loan Agreements [11] On the issue of whether the Loan Agreements are valid and enforceable, the Defendants in this suit have raised the defence that these moneylending transactions are illegal on the ground that they violate section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 and consequently the agreements are unenforceable and/or void. [12] Section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 provides as follows: Moneylending agreement to be given to the borrower 16. (1) No moneylending agreement shall be enforceable unless the agreement has been signed by all the parties to the agreement and a copy of the agreement duly stamped is delivered to the borrower by the licensee before the money is lent. (2) A licensee who executes a moneylending agreement which does not comply with this section shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both. [13] The Defendants also referred to section 2(g) of the Contracts Act 1950 (interpretation section) which states that “an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void”. [14] It is not disputed that the loan sums pursuant to the 3 agreements were released to the Second Defendant before the agreements were stamped. As a matter of fact, and as noted below, one of these Loan Agreements remains unstamped. The dates in which the pertinent event had taken place re the 3 Loan Agreements are as follows: 1st Moneylending Agreement Details Date 1. Moneylending Agreement 10.9.2013 2. Agreement signed 10.9.2013 3. Loan amount 3,500,000.00 4. Loan released/disbursed 10.9.2013 5. Moneylending Agreement stamped 18.9.2013 6. Date of delivery of the duly stamped copy of the Moneylending Agreement to Defendants 24.9.2013 2nd Moneylending Agreement Details Date S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 1. Moneylending Agreement 25.3.2014 2. Agreement signed 25.3.2014 3. Loan amount 34,700,000.00 4. Loan released/disbursed 25.3.2014 5. Moneylending Agreement stamped 28.3.2014 6. Date of delivery of the duly stamped copy of the Moneylending Agreement to Defendants 2.4.2014 3rd Moneylending Agreement Details Date 1. Moneylending Agreement 13.6.2014 2. Agreement signed 13.6.2014 3. Loan amount 3,000,000.00 4. Loan released/disbursed April 2014 5. Moneylending Agreement was stamped Unstamped 6. Date of delivery of the copy of the Moneylending Agreement to Defendants 24.8.2014 [15] In other words, the above point to a clear violation of the express requirements mandated in section 16(1) of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [16] The Defendants argued that this section does not call for any rule of interpretation as it is crystal clear. [17] In addition, the Defendants further submitted that as a result of the contravention of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the 3 impugned Loan Agreements are rendered illegal and that this Court should not lend any assistance to the Plaintiff to enforce an illegal contract as there are S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 no exceptions provided for any violation of Section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [18] As section 2(h) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that an agreement enforceable by law is a contract, the Defendants reasoned and submitted that “an agreement unenforceable in law is not a contract”. [19] The Defendants also relied on Golden Wheel Credit Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Siah Teong Din (No 2) [2023] AMEJ 0798; [2023] 6 CLJ 438; [2023] 11 MLJ 647; [2023] MLRHU 661 (“Golden Wheel Credit No 2) to support their argument that the Loan Agreements in this instant case ought to be declared as void and/or unenforceable. [20] On the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, the Defendant urged this Court take cognizance of section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 and to draw a distinction between a statutory illegality, which they submit as forming the root of the present case, as opposed to common law illegality, as was the substance before the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza. In other words, for purposes of the present matter, the Defendants is urging this Court to disregard Patel v Mirza. [21] In response, the crux of the Plaintiff’s arguments is that a transgression of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 merely renders a moneylending agreement as void and unenforceable but not illegal nor prohibited. [22] This Court was also referred to section 17A of the Interpretations Acts 1948 and 1967 which requires one to construe a provision of an Act in a manner “that would promote the purpose and object underlying the S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Act”. In this regard, this Court was urged to take judicial notice of the purpose and object of the Moneylenders Act 1951, which as spelt out in its preamble is “for the regulation and control of the business of moneylending, the protection of borrowers of the monies lent in the course of such business, and matters connected therewith”. [23] The Plaintiff reasoned that “the underlying purpose (object) or mischief sought to be addressed by section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 is the protection of the borrower by ensuring that he is in possession of the terms of his contract of repayment prior to the loan being disbursed and received”. Whereas section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 “calls for the attestation of the moneylending agreement with the attestor explaining the terms of the moneylending agreement to the borrower and certifying the borrowers understanding of it”. Hence, according to the Plaintiff, when section 16 is read together with section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, one will see that the “underlying purpose (object)/mischief is not violated in this case”. [24] The Plaintiff repeatedly alluded to the fact that the Defendants, being “sophisticated entities who were always legally represented”, were not prejudiced by the alleged non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [25] In addition to the above submissions, it was also contended by the Plaintiff that even if the section 16 defence applies, it only affects the Loan Agreements, that is, claim for the sum of RM41,191,801.20. According to the Plaintiff, this section 16 defence has no bearing on its claim for the charges incurred for and on account of the Fourth Defendant comprising the overdue and outstanding quit rent and assessments in respect of the S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 land belonging to the Fourth Defendant amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus accrued interest. Judicial Estoppel and Res Judicata [26] The Plaintiff alluded to two previous Suits involving the same parties and contended that since the Defendants had “treated the Loans as valid and regular in the Shah Alam Suit and the OS Proceedings, the Mula Parties are estopped and barred by res judicata from now asserting that the Loans are void and unenforceable – which is a diametrically opposite and mutually exclusive position from that taken previously by the Mula Parties”. The point raised by the Plaintiff is that the Defendants “could have raised the alleged non-compliance of s 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 in the previous proceedings but they failed to do so” and instead “elected to treat the Loan Agreements as valid and regular”. [27] On this ground, the Plaintiff relied on Leisure Farm Corp Sdn Bhd v Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu (formerly known as Dai-Ichi Shokai) & Ors [2017] 5 MLJ 63 (FC) at para [16]; [2017] CLJU 499, Syarikat Rodziah v Malayan Banking Bhd [2021] 5 CLJ 170 (CA) at paras [45] to [49]; [2021] AMEJ 0133; [2021] MLJU 166; [2021] 3 MLRA 556, Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti [1995] 3 CLJ 783 (SC) at 791 F-G, 792 A-B, 793 E-I; [1995] 3 AMR 2559; [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 1 MLRA 611 and Lin Wen-Chih v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2023] 6 AMR 561; [2023] 8 CLJ 671; [2023] 6 MLRA 1 (FC). [28] In reply, the Defendants pointed out that the provisions of law raised in the previous suits were sections 67 and section 132(g) of the Companies Act 1965 and that the issue of section 16 of the Moneylenders S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Act 1951 was never raised and considered. Hence, there was no final determination by the Shah Alam High Court on the validity of the 3 moneylending agreements mentioned herein. Alternative Claims [29] In the event that the Defendants are successful in invoking section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 with the Loan Agreements declared as void and unenforceable, the Plaintiff has proffered the following alternative claims, namely: (a) Restitution under s 66 of the Contracts Act 1950; and (b) Money had and received and unjust enrichment under common law. [30] In advancing its argument that it is entitled in law to the above alternative claims, the Plaintiff underscored the following points, that is, (i) the Loan Agreements were not prohibited moneylending agreements; (ii) there is no statutory prohibition for the granting of the loans as the purpose of the loan was not made with the object to commit an illegal act; and (iii) since there is neither statutory nor common law illegality about these loans, none of the limbs in section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 is engaged. [31] The position that the Plaintiff has adopted is that even though the Loan Agreements were unenforceable under the Moneylenders Act 1951, its recovery of the money lent is not confined to the said Act. In other words, the Plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to recover the loan under “any S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 other principle of law”. Indeed, Mary Lim J (as she then was) had made the above observation in Orix Credit Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Choong Keong Kor [2011] 1 LNS 111 at paras [25]-27]; [2011] 2 AMCR 110; [2011] MLJU 182; [2011] 2 MLRH 891 (“Orix Credit Malaysia”). Restitution under Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 [32] Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 reads as follows: 66. Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under the agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from who he received it” [33] It is the Plaintiff’s contention that since the Loan Agreements are not agreements that are void ab initio, section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 applies to the present case. Based on this provision and the Federal Court case of Tan Chee Hoe & Sons Sdn Bhd v Code Focus Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 AMR 9; [2014] 3 CLJ 141; [2014] 3 MLJ 301; [2014] 4 MLRA 11, the Plaintiff submitted that it must succeed in its alternative claim for restitution premised on section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. [34] In reply to the above submissions, the Defendants asserted instead that as a result of the contravention of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the 3 moneylending agreements are thus illegal. The Defendants further submitted that this Court should not lend any assistance to the Plaintiff to enforce an illegal contract and that there are no exceptions S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 provided for any violation of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. The defendants then argued that since section 2(h) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that “an agreement enforceable by law is a contract”, an agreement unenforceable in law is not a contract. [35] It is noteworthy that the Defendants made reference to Golden Wheel Credit (No. 2) and Mahmood bin Ooyub v Li Chee Loong & Other Appeals [2020] 1 LNS 660; [2020] 6 MLJ 755; [2021] 1 MLRA 609 (“Mahmood bin Ooyub”). In the latter case, it was pointed out by the Defendants that the Court of Appeal had made further reference to section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950, which outlines “what considerations and objects are lawful, and what not”, with “an agreement which is forbidden in law” as falling under the latter category. Money had and received and unjust enrichment [36] The elements for a claim of money had and received are: 1. that the defendant must have been enriched by the receipt of a benefit; 2. that the benefit must have been obtained at the plaintiff’s expense; and 3. that it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain that benefit. [See Golf & Jones – The Law of Restitution] and those for unjust enrichment are: 1. that the respondent was enriched by receiving a benefit; 2. that the benefit received was at the appellant’s expense; and S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 3. that the retention of the benefit by the respondent was unjust. [See Air Express International (M) Sdn Bhd v MISC Agencies Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 59] [37] The Plaintiff referred this Court to the Federal Court case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 AMR 601; [2015] 2 CLJ 453; [2015] 2 MLJ 441; [2015] 2 MLRA 247 which elucidated the nature and concept of restitutionary remedies and the United Kingdom Supreme Court case of Patel v Mirza concerning the “trio of considerations” when dealing with the illegality doctrine. [38] According to the Plaintiff, based on the facts in this case, all the elements for a claim in money had and received, and unjust enrichment are clearly met and fulfilled. Hence, the Plaintiff argued that it must succeed also in its alternative claim for restitution premised on money had and received and unjust enrichment for the sums claimed. Limitation [39] Another defence raised by the Defendants is that the Plaintiff’s claims are statute barred by section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. The basis of this limitation defence is that the Plaintiff’s cause of action would have arisen in the year 2013, when the monies were disbursed under the agreements. [40] The Defendants placed reliance on AmBank (M) Bhd v Abdul Aziz bin Hassan & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 553; [2010] 3 MLJ 784; [2009] 4 MLRA 458 and Thameez Nisha Hasseem (as the administrator of the estate of Bee Fathima @ dll, deceased) v Maybank Allied Bank Bhd [2023] 5 AMR S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 581; [2023] 5 CLJ 874; [2023] 4 MLJ 145; [2023] 4 MLRA 492 in support of their limitation defence. [41] Predictably, the Plaintiff argued otherwise, contending that the claim and/or the alternative claims to recover the loans were filed within the statutory limitation period. The Plaintiff put forward two principal reasons. [42] The first reason relates to the terms in the Loan Agreements. The Plaintiff pointed out that all the 3 Loan Agreements contain the following “Right of action”, clauses, that is: Right of action 5. (1) If the Borrower – (a) fails to repay any sum of instalment payable or any part thereof and any interest payable specified in Section 5 of the First Schedule for any period in excess of twenty-eight days after its due date; or (b) commits an act of bankruptcy or enters into any composition or arrangement with his creditors or, being a company, enters into liquidation, whether compulsory or voluntary, the Lender may terminate this Agreement. (2) Upon the occurrence of any of the events specified in subclause (1) herein, the Lender shall give the Borrower not less than fourteen days a written notice to treat this Agreement as having been repudiated by the Borrower and unless in the meanwhile such default alleged is rectified or such unpaid sum of instalment and S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 interest are paid, this Agreement shall at the expiry of the said notice, at the option of the Lender be deemed to be annulled. (3) In the event this Agreement has been terminated or annulled, the Lender may claim the balance outstanding from the Borrower in accordance with the provisions under Order 45 of the Subordinate Court Rules 1990 [P.U. (A) 97/1990] in case the balance outstanding does not exceed two hundred and fifty thousand ringgit or Order 79 of the Rutes of the High Court 1980 [P.U. (A) 50/1980] in case the balance outstanding is higher than two hundred and fifty thousand ringgit. [43] The Plaintiff alluded to the fact that a demand for the principal sum of RM41,191,801.20 was made on 21 January, 2015 and a 7-day period for payment of it to be made was given. The 7-day period expired on 28 January, 2015. The Second Defendant was given a notice on 27 February, 2015 to rectify the default or pay the sum demanded within 14 days of 27 February, 2015, failing which the Loan Agreements will be terminated at the expiry of the said 14 days. As the 14-day period had passed without any rectification of the default or payment, the Loan Agreements terminated at the end of it, that is, on 14 March, 2015. This date, according to the Plaintiff, is the date on which date the cause of action to sue arose. That being the case, limitation would only set in on 13 March, 2021. Since the action was filed on 8 January, 2021, the action is not time barred. [44] As for the alternative claims, as these were added by way of amendment on 3 March, 2021. The application of the doctrine of relation back meant that these alternative claims are deemed to have been commenced on 8 January 2021, the date the writ was issued. In any S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 event, these alternative claims were added even before limitation had set in on 13 March, 2021. [45] The second ground relied by the Plaintiff to challenge the limitation defence is premised on a proposition enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Khatijah bt Abdullah & Ors v Mohd Isa bin Biran [2017] 2 AMR (refd); [2017] 7 CLJ 513; [2017] 2 MLJ 1; [2017] 2 MLRA 509. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: [31] We agree with the appellants that the SPA had become void and s 33 of the Contracts Act 1950 applies. A void contract does not generate any enforceable right or duty. Where there is neither right nor duty, limitation cannot be invoked (see Hubah Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Pusaka (Penampang) Bhd & Ors. The defence of limitation is thus not available to the respondent. [46] Last but not least, the Plaintiff also raised the provisions in sections 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act 1953 in support of its assertion that its claims are not time barred under the Limitation Act 1953. This line of argument is raised in the event that this Court finds that the cause of action had arisen more than six years before the writ was issued. [47] The Plaintiff highlighted the following facts as amounting to an acknowledgment of debts and thereby giving rise to a fresh accrual of action, that is, (i) when the Defendants filed the Amended Defence & Counterclaim in the Shah Alam Suit on 17 August, 2015; and (ii) more recently on 21 September, 2020 when they filed the Originating Summons Proceedings to repay the debts and to redeem the land/securities; and (iii) when the Defendants through their principal and primary director S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 acknowledged and admitted in the Shah Alam Suit the sums advanced by the Plaintiff towards the Outgoings Incurred, and that it was a continuing loss that the Plaintiff had to incur. Hence, it is the Plaintiff’s contention that the right of action to recover the Loans and Outgoings Incurred shall be deemed to have accrued on 17 August, 2015 or 21 September, 2020, rendering the claim and/or the alternative claims to recover the loans as not time-barred. [48] This acknowledgement and henceforth fresh accrual of action argument was met with the counter argument by the Defendants that there was an absence of an unequivocal admission of any precise amount owed by the Defendants. [49] In rejecting this acknowledgment ground as raised by the Plaintiff, the Defendants relied on the provisions in sections 26(2) and 27 of the Limitation Act 1953, the Federal case of Wee Tiang Teng v Ong Chong Hooi & Anor [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 MLJ 54; [1978] 1 MLRA 366 on what constitutes as a sufficient acknowledgment and the Court of Appeal decision of Lay Hong Food Corp Sdn Bhd (previously known as Lay Hong Poultry Processing Sdn Bhd) v Tiong Nam Logistics Solutions Sdn Bhd [2017] 10 CLJ 680; [2018] 2 MLJ 66 that had explained that an acknowledgement must be unequivocal. The Decision of this Court [50] On the first principal issue of whether there has been a breach or non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the answer is undoubtedly in the affirmative. The strict and express requirement in the said provision mandates that the Loan Agreements are S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 to be stamped and delivered to the borrower before the loans are disbursed. This explicit pre-requisite has been flouted by the Plaintiff lender. [51] Crucially, the legal effect of such non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 must be determined. In this regard, references may be made to section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 itself and section 2(g) of the Contracts Act 1950. [52] Section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 unmistakeably declares any such moneylending agreement as unenforceable and by virtue of section 2(g) of the Contracts Act 1950, “an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void”. [53] This Court is of the considered view that the argument by the Plaintiff to the effect that the Defendants are “sophisticated entities” and were at all times “legally represented” and thus were not prejudiced by the alleged non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not hold water. The same can also be said of the Plaintiff. It too must be a sophisticated entity and not wanting in legal representation. [54] This Court has also considered the contention by the Plaintiff that in construing section 16 of the Moneylending Act 1951, it should be carried out in a manner that would promote the purpose and object underlying the said Act and when section 16 is read together with section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, one will see that the underlying purpose or mischief is not violated in this case. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [55] However, in light of the clear contravention of an express and explicit requirement laid down in the Moneylenders Act 1951 and the obvious resulting legal consequence, the 3 Loans Agreements in this present case are unenforceable and void. [56] Be that as it may, while the breach of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 has adversely affected the Loan Agreements, this section 16 defence has no bearing on the Plaintiff’s claim for the charges incurred for and on account of the Fourth Defendant comprising the overdue and outstanding quit rent and assessments in respect of the land belonging to the Fourth Defendant amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus accrued interest, that is, the outgoings incurred. [57] As for the Judicial Estoppel and Res Judicata ground raised by the Plaintiff, this Court has carefully considered the authorities cited by the Plaintiff against the background of this case. Unfortunately, it is unable to agree with the Plaintiff that Judicial Estoppel or the concept of Res Judicata, even in the wider sense, applies in the instant case. [58] This brings us to the Plaintiff’s alternative claims. As noted in paragraphs [29] – [31] above, the crux of the Plaintiff’s contention is that it is entitled to seek Restitution under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 and for money had and received and unjust enrichment under common law. [59] As this Court is in total agreement with the High Court in Orix Credit Malaysia Sdn Bhd that a Plaintiff is not confined to invoking the Moneylenders Act 1951 when seeking to recover a loan but may resort to S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 “any other principle of law”, it is apposite that the provision in section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 be examined detail. [60] The Defendants have adopted the position that as a result of the contravention of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the 3 moneylending agreements are illegal. [61] Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 deals with situations “when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void”. There is no mention of illegality. [62] The authorities cited by the Defendants, namely, Golden Wheel (No 2) and Mahmood bin Ooyub did refer to section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. Nevertheless, this Court observes that in these cases, there were elements of illegality in the moneylending transactions. [63] In Mahmood bin Ooyub, the Court of Appeal held that the sale and purchase agreements were a sham, to disguise illegal moneylending transactions to circumvent the strict provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951. Two of the lenders were also unlicensed moneylenders. [64] Likewise, in Golden Wheel (No 2), one of the material provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951 that the plaintiff had contravened was section 17 which stipulated that the interest for a secured loan shall not exceed 12% per annum. As observed by the High Court in that case, the contravention of this provision was a serious matter. More importantly, there was wrongful deduction and retention of the loan sums, conduct expressly prohibited and, as once again noted by the High Court, “a feature most commonly found in illegal moneylending by loan sharks or S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 'Along'”. These were in addition to the failure to provide stamped copies of the moneylending agreements and the statements of accounts. These factors clearly distinguish Golden Wheel (No 2) from the present case. [65] Unlike the above cases cited and relied on by the Defendants, there is no such element of illegality in the present case. [66] Admittedly, the 3 Loan Agreements are not agreements that were discovered to be void. However, they are contracts that subsequently became void. The events that rendered the contracts as subsequently becoming void was the release of the monies before the agreement were stamped and delivered. When the first Loan Agreement was signed on 10 September, 2013, it was a valid agreement. Similarly, when the second Loan Agreement was signed on 25 March, 2014, it was a valid agreement. The same can be said of the third Loan Agreement, when it was signed on 13 June, 2014. There was no evidence before this Court to suggest that these agreements are tainted by elements of illegality. [67] The upshot to this is that the Plaintiff may avail itself the provision in section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. [68] In the event that this Court is incorrect in invoking section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950, it is also of the considered view that the Plaintiff may rely on the doctrine of money had and received and/or unjust enrichment. [69] The elements for these restitutionary remedies as outlined paragraph [36] are present in the instant case. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [70] As it is this Court’s findings that the issue of illegality does not arise in the present case, there is no necessity to deliberate on Patel v Mirza’s trio of consideration to the present case. [71] This Court is also aware of the recent decision in Triple Zest Trading & Supplies & Ors v Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 8 AMR 225; [2023] 10 CLJ 187; [2023] 6 MLJ 818; [2023] 1 MLRA 144 where the Federal Court had disallowed the return of the principal loan sum, which the Court of Appeal had ordered the borrowers to pay back to the lender. Suffice to say that this decision of the Federal Court is distinguishable from the present case and the principle enunciated therein is not applicable to the instant case. [72] On the issue of limitation, this Court finds that the requirement for a valid acknowledgement has not been made out by the Plaintiff. Hence, the issue of a fresh accrual of action does not arise. [73] Regardless, the absence of acknowledgment has no bearing on this limitation point. Since the 3 Loan Agreements are unenforceable and void, the terms relating to the “Right of action” cannot be invoked. However, this Court is bound by the principle enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Khatijah bt Abdullah & Ors v Mohd Isa bin Biran that “a void contract does not generate any enforceable right or duty” and “where there is neither right nor duty, limitation cannot be invoked”. As in Khatijah bt Abdullah & Ors v Mohd Isa bin Biran the defence of limitation is thus not available to the Defendants in the present case. [74] In view of the above findings, the Plaintiff’s claims for the loans disbursed to the Second Defendant amounting to RM41,191,801.20 with S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 interest of 5% per annum from the date of the Writ until date of full payment and the outgoings incurred amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus interest incurred as pleaded in paragraph 22(4) of the Amended Statement of Claim are allowed with costs. [75] The Defendants to pay costs of RM40,000 to the Plaintiff, subject to allocator. Dated: 18 January, 2024 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Gopal Sreenevasan with Conrad Young, Mark Lau and Kristen Tan for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Sreenevasan Young) Ahmad Amir Mahmood for the Defendants (Messrs. Gunaseelan & Associates) S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-25-508-09/2022

PEMOHON NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES RESPONDEN 1. ) MAHKAMAH PERUSAHAAN MALAYSIA 2. ) HSBC BANK MALAYSIA BERHAD

Judicial Review — High Court — Application for judicial review on Award of Industrial Court — Industrial Relations Act 1967 (“IRA”) — s 29(fa) — Application to strike off the respondent Bank’s action at the Industrial Court — Industrial Court dismissed the application to strike off Labour law — Trade Union — Trade Union Act 1959 (“TUA”) — s 22(1) – The nature of immunity - Whether s 22(1) can be a ground to strike off the claim summarily at the Industrial Court under s 29(fa) of the IRA -— Whether immunity is carte blanche or only applicable when the tortious acts complained of were “committed by or on behalf of the trade union” — Who is to establish “committed by or on behalf of the trade unionLabour Law — Industrial Court — Jurisdiction — Reference under s 20(3) of the IRA — Whether jurisdiction of Industrial Court could be challenged without challenging the Minister's reference — Whether the threshold jurisdiction of the Industrial Court could be challenged by way of a preliminary objection

24/01/2024

YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8947d245-749b-4f94-9c7d-3721522eb396&Inline=true

24/01/2024 17:01:26 WA-25-508-09/2022 Kand. 45 S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N RdJHiZt0lEcfTchUi6zlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—25—508—U9/2022 Kand. 45 za/nuznu 1":a1-25 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KUALA LUMPUR DI WILAVAH FERSEKUTUAN MALAYSIA (EAHAGIAN KUASA-KUASA KHAS) PERMOflQflAN SEMAKAN KEHAK MAN No WA Sfiflflfiflflgl Dawn Dsrkava Mnmumxh P-mialcaan m Kuala Lumvllmzs No m-2831/21‘ Dan mam ulnar: Award mxenm No 19:: (alum 2022 dlpuluskan uleh Mahkamah Pcrunhaan m s<...:.. Lumpuv bonankh 1 12022‘ Dan Dalam perm: Aluran 53 Kaedah—Kasaxh Mahkamah 2012 um. Da\am pemarn smysn 22 um Akla Kasawan Sakena 1959. rm Da\am pelxara Seksyevv woe» Akla Femummgan Perusanaan 1967. Dan Dalam perkara mdang kuasa ssdla ada Mihknmah yang Muha m. flan/nun menunn Am; Mahkamah Keha Imam man dan/alau menum1AkuI RehI$pes\flk 1950 ANYARA NATIONAL UNION or BANK EMPLOYEES PEMOHON DAN 1. IIIANKAMAH PERUSANAAN. MALAYSIA 2. HSEC BANK MALAYSIA asmun ...RESPONDEN- (No.svARIKA - 127776-VI) RESPONBEN JUDGMEN1 | sm waMz1mE21Tmmax\w 3%.. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Yhe mural background [1] The applicam is me Naimnal union M Bank Employees a lrade union for Customer service Bankers, 5Del:Ia| clencal and Non- clancal bank employees and duly rsgiaiereu under s I2 urine Trade Unions Act 1959 |“TUA“|. [21 A lraus dispma was rilsa by nssc Bank Malaysia semsa, me 2~= iesponnenl, under s 18 oi the Industrial Relaliens Am 1967 l-IRA“) Under s 18(I)(b) or lne IRA‘ wners a trade aispuie uiss, max dlspu|a, W olherwise na| rasalvad. may be veporled In he Dlredar General or lndusinal Relalions (“Dlrec1crGenera|") [31 Tneaispuie was suhssquenlly relerred in me lnauslnal Ccurl by ina Mmlslef :11 Human Resources rune MlrllsleF') under s 2612) of iris IRA. [4] The cumplainis by me 2"“ vesporlderll Bank in relaiion Io Ina appllmnfs lnduslnal aclwilies are as lollwws: 4,1 Publishing various puslings. slalernenls. remarks aridlor oornmenls man were disparaging, aisrespecilul, dewgalory, andlor aeiamamry in naluru againsi ins 2"-1 iespanaenl Bank on its/theirwebslla and/or social media acoounis 4.2. REISIHQ a complain: lo lne ‘UK Naiianal Cnrllact Psini lor me OECD Guidelines Ior Mullinalional Enlernrlses“ againsl me 2"“ respolldem Bank. alleging violations oi ins OECD Guidelines by lne ri respundanl 4 3, Raising a mmplalm lo me Labour Department of Semenanjung Malaysia on me alleged unlair labour pracilees by the 2'” respondent. [51 Pursuanl [0 me raleianee, me 24 respundem Bank lnsn prepared me sialerneni or case and sought ins louwnng reliefs iur me industrial Cuurl IO: la) Order me applicant lo cease and desisl from‘ and (D) Slriks down. IN RalMlZlmEtlTmL1dx\v “Nair a.n.i nuvlhnrwm s. LAIQ4 w may i... nflnlnallly snn. dnuuvlnril VII arlum vtmxl evidence belore making any lindings of tact. It oertainly cannot be disposed at summarily (1) The legitimate ewpemalioni it any‘ must be based on the eonsct interpretation ol 5 22(1) or TUA [40] There is another issue that needs to be addressed ll is this ll lndsed the applicanl ls aggrieved by the Ministerial relerenoe. the proper cause cf action would be to commence a iudiciei review action to challenge the reverence and, secondly, to seek an oideroi prohibition against the Industrial court in Kalmrave/LI Ganesani eopal sn Ram JCA (later FCJ) remarked as toilowe: it Ialltlws that a pen, In . aispute who wlshes to contend that the industrial court was not have iuiisaictioii to enter upon tne inquiry, eg bicauielhe dispute is extra-lamlunal in nature lVluS| do so by seeking to quash the Ministers Mamnna, aria. in the nine appllciflnn ask car an order or pronipiiiori against that com! in other warns the rhrashotu iuiisaielian or the liiduniiai Cowl cannot be diaflenund wlmolfl pining the Minister aria seeking ieiiei agalns1 Hlflli [41] Aflhuugh Kalhiravelu Gsnssan was decided prlorto the mummy into force Ms zstlai or the in on 23 2 2005. the ralin is still applicable In other words, s 29(iat does not have the ellect orovetruiing the ratio In kathiravelu eanesan since the apphcam was inviting the industrial court to nullity the Ministerial reverence without totning the Minister That would be tantamount to a breach oi the principles or natural jus|ioe. i do not think by introducing s 29(la), Parliament intended to do away with the right ol the Mlnietierro be heard [42] Finallyi I| is not accurate to suggest that lhe matter belore the industrial court is purely legal, which enables the court to make a nllirig an the preliminary issue. As retiecteo in the statement or case, the issues raised are main legal and «actual. Issues such as the 2"" respondent aank's alleged attempt to seize the Leadership o1 staw supports club, unlair assessment ol perlomiance rating or brutal harassment lnr questioning appraisal rating are an laotual in nature IN RnlHi2lflEt!TmLmx\v “Nope s.n.i nuvlhnrwm be u... a my i... aniin.iiii uni. dnumlnnl Vfl nFiuNQ puiui [431 In the cwcunvslanoes, me factual "amen can only be delemwued and adwdlcaled by way 0! a proper healing and not summarily. Flndlng [441 For me aforesaxd reasons, mere was no serious error made by [he Vnduslrial Courl in me «arm of Wsdnssnury unreasonauleness or procedural rmproprrecy m dismissing me apphcanrs ap ' ‘ End 22A Iha| womd make me Award amaname In Ju al rewew. [45] ‘(he Indusunal Cnurl was corvect m vssumg the Award, [45] The mauer rs, lherefore. rermnen re me Irmusmar couruorche Court la proceed with was hearing and evemuar adrudrcauon [47] ms applwahon var Judwcm review As merevore msrmssad with casts n1 RM3,oou sub;sc| |o auacanur. Huh :4 Jnnuari 2014 L4 (WAN mum mun am wm SALLEH} Hakrm Mahkamah Tinggr Kuala Lumpur :2 m Ramrzlmzzwmumw “Nana smm mmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 w my r... mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII muNG v-max Pmak-Wwak Sam Pmx pamumn Na»/sen mm. Sa\nrvu7n a. Jmeph Km! muan Man Weng Kwm & Aswmau-s Bag! Pmak Responflen 2 Swabamh Nnmmjah‘ Bunadm um» Rnenn Enbtsogavam Teman Sheam Delaware 5. 00 u sm mmzzummum «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! tne atieged derogatory and deiamatory media posting. At tit ndustriat court [51 The applicant was 0! the View that the reliefs souont by the respondent Bank are in Ihe nature of imurto tons to pronrort and order tne applic-!n| Union to cease and destsllmm the swat media postings that were purportedry derogatory and defamatory [7] me applicam trten filed a nottoe of apottcattort under s 2B(fa]v1the iRA to Strike off the respondent Bank‘: action at the Industrial court. Under the subsection the industrtai court has the power to order a case to he !r|ruck of! or reinstated. [3] The application to strike oil in End 22A was ancrtored on s 2211 t at TUA. || pmwdes as iattows. Asmlagsinsta registered trade tmmn avagatrtst any members or n In theme! on behalf at thsmseives and an 9 er members or me trade union M tespccl or any human: at:| alieged to have been committed oy or an oatmr or in. trade union snati not be entenatrtsd by any court on 1.9.2022. the appiioation to s|nke on was dismissed by the Industrial Count [9] The grounds or me decisron or me Industrtai Ooun can be summarised as follows 9 1 me industnai court was M me View that a dispute between tne parties was on the rrnptementatrorr or apph::a|Ion of arty oiause in a collective Agreement will “clearly oe a trade dispute‘. The teamed chairman 010:: tndustnai court cited the tudgrnnnl oi ttra Supreme court In Dunlap Indusrms Employees Uniart V Dunlap Ma yall Industries 5 Anal [1987] 2 ML! 61 sc The supreme court held that s 55(2) oi the wt oieariy arroowarad tne irrdusrnai court to mike an award dealing wilh tne oamp|atn| in respect to any none mmphance wrtrr the cottective Agreement ru Rdt>trzIt'lE2t1mumiw “None S-rm nuvthnrwm rs. ti... w my r... mrr.rru sun. dnuuvtnrrl vn nrit.tNG v-mat 9 2 ones the Minister at Hunian Resouroes (“the Minister) revere a tradedispute under s 26(2) otthe IRAartt1 the reference was not set aside or quashed oy the High court, the industnai Own is theretore seized with the power and jurisdiction to hear the trade dispute between the parties and determine the issues oetore I|. tn Kethtmetu zieriesun A Anor v Kajlu Holdings and [1 9971 3 cu 777 SQ the seine situation amse vmen the Minister referred a trade dispute to the tndustnal court. The supreme Ccurl heid that in an cases where a party to e trade dispute intends to question the threshoid iunsdiotron or the Industrial court to make an adiudicatrpn. save upon the tirrnted ground that the representations under s 20(1) were made out of Ilmei he must do so by seeking to quash, by cerzioran, the Ministers reference and, in the same proceedings, seek an order tor pronihrziori against the tndustriei Ooun trorri entertaining the dispute upon the ground that the iatter has no iurisdrctipn to make an adiudication 9.3 The Industrial court has wide powers pursuant to s 291g) or the IRA, which states that the court may generally dtrect and do an suoh things as are necessary or expedient tor the expediuous deternun ' oithe malterbefarstt According to the teamed chainriari oi the industnai court, the powers under s 2919) must not he used by shutting the doors oi the Conn by summarily dispasing the use purety on a preinninary ooieaion without giving the parties all the opportunity to we re their respective oases to the tuitest. [In] For the aioresaid reasons the Iridustriet court, by a unanimous decision, dismissed the application to strike on in Encl 22A. The Judtcte Review [11] Aggneved, the eppheant cornrneriued this appiioation tor iudiciai review to quash the same. [12] Yhis appticauori tor iudieiat review is supported by the amdavit oi sendagran soienion all Joseph Ptlchay in Ent:I 2 t'Ats—2'i. [ta] Leave to commence iudioiai reinew was granted by this court on 28 9 2022. ru RalMiZlDIEt!TmLmx\v “None s.r.i nuvthnrwm a. u... is may i... arrii.ii-y MIMI dnuuvtnnl n. eF\t.ING Wm! [14] The appllcanfs case is premised on the ground that- (a) No nuestrens enact must be dealt with and taken into ewount belore a lull award can he handed down (I2) since there are no ques|iorls 0! last to be detennlned, the matter should be disposed at on a question at law‘ namely, whether s 22(l l of TUA applies The applicant contended that the industrial court should have applied s 22(l ) at TUAand that the utalm ol the 2” respondent Bank shduld not have been entenained In short, it sneuld have been struck M1. [15] Before me. learned edunsel tor the applicant raised three main issues alder lo establish that the impugned Award ought tu be quashed. la) The Award is tainted with illegality (bl The lndustnal court had acted irraudnally and unreasonably. (c) The applicants legitimate expectation that the immunity under s 22(1) 0! TUA should have been upheld by the lndustnal caun The illegality argument [15] Learned counsel lor the applicant attracted my altenhnrt that s 22m employs the phrase ‘shall nut be entertained by any court‘. This is in contrast with s 2t 0! mm whlch pidvides that no legal prepeedings shall be malrltairlable in any ClVl/ court agatns| any trade Lmlcn or its omders in respect to any as! done in conletrlpl or tunheranpe at a trade dispute. [1 71 In short, learned cnunsel eentended that the phrase any court in s 22 should include the lndustnat Courl. citing the iudpmsnt of the Federal claim in rel-iiri [7/n Mostepe v Hulhl-Dnnynl hin sail. [2o2n] 4 ML! 721 F0, learned wunsel lor |he appltran|$ubmlt1ed that where the wards dta statute are unamblguous, ptain and clear. they must be glverl their natural and ordinary meaning 5 ru RalHlZlflEtlTmLmxlw “Nair s.n.i nuvlhnrwlll be u... m my i... nflnlnnllly MVMI dnuuvlml Vfl .riuua mi [18] Annrylng me pvoposlllon lo lhe lnslsrll cesel learned counsel lrren argued meme wnrdlngsofs22|1)cDuld nol be more urlamblglmus, plaln and claar and the prrrese sha/lllclbe enlerlalnea by any coun nrusl be glverl lls plan and enlrn-ry meanlng [19] My auenllen was when drawn to anmner luagrnenl pl lne Federal court In lsrn-ll Nu-Iruddin bin Abdul Wullnb v Mrrlayslur Ami e sysmrr BM [2022] 6 Mu 414 FC. In lnlerprellng ss 21 and 22 of me TUA, lhe Federal Court held mar An emulayee cugnl no| la be dlimlsaad luv pulllclpalkln ln me unnrl rcllurlm carnee am In Ms capaltlly as e lreue urllon Mficcr or member‘ unless lne acllvllws are exlreneous lo made umcn allalls, or were carved out mnlllmusly, m In p manner mlcn knowingly or recklessly alsregaras |l-le rruln Lsamed counsel men urged lrus cpun |o conclude lnal ss 22 crme TUA epplres lo the lnduslrlpl Courl. [20] Au |olhe quesllon ollmlrlunllyr learned counsel referred rnelo lhe ludgmenl pl me coon pl Appeal In Nur Rasldlll bl Jarnaludin v Mnlnyln Blnklng arm .5 or Appnls [2015] 3 MLJ 127 CA The case ccrrles lhe Dl'DDOslllon mat a unlon is covered under me slelulury lmmunlly pgalnsl any [art at llbel regardless 01 the fad wnerner a lrade alspule exlels pelwcen me unlpn and the Bank [21] In llre clrcumsranoes, me appllcanr suprrrmed lnal the Award by me lndusmal Conn ls lernlea wlln lllegallly as ll runs aloul ol s 2211) cl lne TUA The Award rs Irrational and unreasonable [221 Learned counsel luv me applicant nlgnlrgnrea lc the calm (ha| lne cases railed upon by me lnduslllal Court In dlsmlssing llre applrcahun |o slnke ell lne applrcanrs Clalm were all declded prlor (0 the lrllroducllorl sub«sec|l:m 2903), which came lnw (arcs an 25.2 zoos ru RalMlzIl'lE2lTmLmxlw «nu. s.n.l nuvlhnrwlll rs. med w my r... nrwlrrnllly ml. dnuuvlnrrl Vfl .nuue ml [23] in any event, learned oourisel contended trial tne issue or immunity. unlike otrier pretiminary oblecliorls. oirglit to be decided at ltie outset. Learned oounsel relied on lslerrrle Flnlnclll services aoerd vMarliri Falrol Mohd Faroqrre ts Anrrr [2010] e CLJ in In tliat case. the l-tigli coun lield triat an issue on )LlVISdlC1lOfIi namely immunity lrorn suit or legal process, is a question ol law wliiori should be taken at ttie outset and witttout needing to tiearttie merits ol any partieilar application or suit. [24] Applying me said proposition |o ttie laets or trie casei learned counsel submitted lnat more an issue at immunity is raised an the preliminary stage. me Industrial court ougrit to address it first without delving into ltie merits [25] For the aloresaid reason. ttie applicant contended that ttie lndustnal Calm‘: eandusion ttiet it oould not strike M1 ttie 2"’ resporiderivs aarix case is irrational and unreasonable The legitrmale expeciallort [25] Acmrdlng lo the applicant, ttie Industrial court's dismissal oi tne appltcams application to sink! otl ttie 2"‘ respondents olairri constitutes an inlrinoernent on ttie applicants statutory immunity. [271 The dismissal olleridstne rigm olttie applicant asa registered union to operate and carry out its lunclioris witlieut lear of legal I ity in relation to any tartious allegations lrom any party, lncludlng Ihe 2"‘ respondent Bank [25] Let me begln by revi ing s 22(1) ol ma. The suoseclion employs ttie wards a “sull against a legislated trade tmlcrl“. Nowi lne quesaon is, could tlie claim filed by ltie 2"‘ respondent Bank at tlie lndustnal Court in the lorm eta trade dispute be considered a “suit" Wllhlh tlie meaning at s 22(1)? 'rtie word suit in it 2211) does stand on ns own it is in relation to “any lortieus act alleged lo have oeen committed by or on oetiall oltrie trade I.lrIIol'I'. ru RalMi2mIEtlTmLmxlw “Nair s.n.i nuvlhnrwlll i. u... M my i... ntwlriellly MIMI dnuuvlnril y.. eFluNG mi [29] Tns second quesiion is. man is a «odious a:I7 Rstaianoa is to be made in me iudgmem on via coun nf Appeal in Elnk Bumiputra umysin EM 1/ Ems 5-mu Sdn End a. Anor Appoll [2014] 2 MLJ 49 CA. Abdul Wahab Paiaii JCA, in delivering we iudgineni oi me Court, remarked as loiiaws. The iaw ul ions encompasses a Venue oi cm: wmiigs socn as nsgiigsnoa, osiainauoii. nuisance, harlvan .no Dislrig on ll irivuli/as ieineoy wneie iniuiy or damage is caused to Inolhlr rna iiaoiiny V! inioo-an on . psim mo inlerihonaily or negligenfly ms or laih to m in 2| pamcuiar manner [30] The uiim quesiiuri is, vimai is the cause oi action ai ine inousinai Oourl? Para 2 of the 2"‘ respondenfs sisiiemeni at Case ai ma industrial Courl states as ioiiows. in ms IS a ima aimuis flied by Illa Bank imders is oi the inousinai Rsianons Am 1967 rim 1967'). mieieoy the i-ionouiaois Minister at Humnn Resamms nao oeciosa io -isnvis same in mi. nonoumoia Omm Imfl-I ssciiai. 2542) in me IRA Io!’ aaiuoicaiion on ins Vniiewing innu- 2 i asiooaiory ano osi.nisio.y social media amino: nmi Duhiiulmnl made by ins union aqainsi me Bnnk.:nd 22 mi unions alegalnn oi breaches and unfair Vabuur puciious say we Bank There an: aisio olher issues raised by iris 2"’ rasponosni that iao to the ' sleviai reference, which Include a deliberaia deiay OI Ihe Oolleclive Aglaamenl renewal bmween the appilcaril Union and Me 2“ responaeni Bank There was a iunnei aiisgauan of me 2“ respuriderifs breach 0! the Calleciive Agreement including the unhygisnlc working can ns and the 2” issponoenrs Bunk iaiiuia to set up an occupaiionai saieiy and Health coinininae, see paia 3.9 oi hie Sia|emenI of Case K SIN RnIHi2li‘lEtiTmLmxiw “Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm s. UIQG In may i... nflflinnflly MIMI dnumiml Vfl nFiuNfl Wm! [311 me exislence at me Sald allegalrons was Vim denied by me Unlun on me comrary. me Umon agreed (0 ll as reneued in para 16 7 or me unions slalerneni WI Reply 15.7 Paragraphs 3 9 la 3 12 is [soc] reienea m ...d Igmad so tar as mnllan rim bun rulsafl er way 471 gnmianoes by me rnernoers cl lne Unlan [32] ll VS quite apparent mar me lrsde dispute referred id is errerrared on lhe alleged breach 0' Ihe Collective Agreement. II ls not purely based on “iofllous act alleged In have been eomrllifled by or on behall 01 me lrade union‘ wllhln me meaning of s 22(1) cl me TUA [33] ll Is my considered view, lrre union’: avewellanoe on Nrrr Rssidah auarnaludrrr rs misplaced My reasons are these. To begin with Nur Rasldan IS nor e judicial review case which ernanaied lrom me lnduslrial coun ll is a evil sun in oral case, the sale issue in me appeals nelare me Courl or Agpeal was wrielher s 22 e1 TUA awarded absolme lmmuruly la five employees against an acrion lur libel laken agalnsl lnern hy lnerr employer bank (“Mayhank"L The five employees were separalely sued by Maybank in me High Courl lo! publicly making dlsparaglng sraiernenls abou| me hank W conneclinn wrln an alleged unlarr labour pl1choama| had become lne subject of an drrgmng lrade drspule be|ween me Nalrdnel union at Bank Employees and Mayhank. [34] It was, merelore, an acllfln in libel where me High Conn was me eodrl al nrsl rnslance. [asl Tne Cuurl cl Appeal rreld lnal lrade lrmens and lnerr members or umoers were alasoluiely Immune [mm asliuns premised upon me ion of Ilbel pursuanl to s 22(1l ol TUA when in lorlinus ens complained of were ‘committed by or on nenall ol the trade union‘ [351 Nu! Rasidah rs, lrrereldre, dislinguished. [37] re expeclallon, lne ceurl of Agnes: In Znkllh bte Duran Nulu s Inga! Darul Ennrr [2005] s MLJ 517 CA was nflhe vlew lnellor egmrnale expeclalran to arise. lnere rnusr be evidence 0! a promise or undertaking made by me respondenl in that eflem Anmn zakeria FCJ (as me lonnsr crriel Jusuoe men was) remarked as lollews: rn RaIMizIl'lEtlTmLmxlw “Nana s.nn nuvlhnrwlll r. d... m vufli r... nflnlnnllly mini: dnuuvlnnl Vfl .nune war ln law lol leglllmzle expecmen la anse mere muel be avldenca nl a Dmmwi e. undulzklrlg made by lne lasplmderl| lo lnel eflecl we find no such evrdancl b-lure mo aaun On ma: wemlse we find lha| Ml elalm lo» blesrfn M legmmale upeaamn V5 whuly uniurlalnable [33] Applying me law lo lne melanl case, mere 15 no evldenoe of any represenlallon Of pmmlse maae to me unlon. [39] Under lhe olrcmnslancs, my nnalngs so far, are as lolIwws' Thu word 'SulI' In a 22m el me TUA does nel Include my Mlnlsvenal reverence In one lnduslnel Coun under s 2612) of me IRA lb) The lunsmctmn olme Industrial Court under s 26 ullne IRA is llnulea la |rade dlspules and lnerelare emlld nm lndude a elalm based purely on lomous eel The dlspms an lha lnuuslnal ceurl, as reflecled in the pleadings ollne parties, ls male than a lmel dalm II goes beynnd iL The Union even conceded In lna slalemenl WI Reply lnal me dlspu|e Includes allegaoons or lhe rBspl:nden|'s alleged breach or me Calleclive Agreement. (e) Llkewlse. VI order la give meanlng lo s 22(1)olTUA‘ lne word “any mun‘ M s 22(1) enne sermon must have relenea |c avll cuurls Only crvll oourls have iurisdlcllon In hear crvll wrung: lnal lrlvclve negllgense, defamalion (as can be seen n Nur Rasrdah), nulsanoe, trtspass and passlrlg ofl. la; The anendanl consequences al my nna-ng are me: e unlons lmmlmlly ln raped 0! lorllous sols can only be claimed al Ihe clvil cmlfis, or allemallvely. il the clalm at the lnduslrlel Court is purely based an ‘lemons acts" and naming more (a) ln any event, evarl lne coun al Awesl ln Nur Rasidah did nul say lha1 lne lmmunily under s 22(1) of TUA l5 cane blanene The ahsnlule lrnmunlly, aocomlng In lhe Cuurl of Appeal ale only appllaable wnen lne lorlious aels cnmplalned ol were “oommmed by or on behall a1 lne lrade unlon' The nniy way lo eslaullsh whether we alleged Iorlious acts were commllled by or on benell ol lne Unionls1or(hBlnduilnalCour\m hear u: m RalHlzIl'lE2lTmLmxlw “Nana Smnl ...n.mn be U... m my me nflnlnnllly sun. dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna ml

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-12ANCC-47-07/2023

PERAYU ONYX ENGINEERING SDN BHD RESPONDEN I CONZ DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD

Appeal from Sessions Court – Application to set aside JID - No Reasonable Explanation for the Delay to the application to set aside the JID - Failure of solicitors to act in time does not justify the exercise of the power of the Court to set aside the default judgment unless it is shown that the Appellant did not act with diligence when dealing with the suit - Documents produced shows goods were sold and delivered – No evidence of rejection or complaint as to price or quality of goods – Issuance of a cheque admitting liability – No Draft defence filed

24/01/2024

YA Dato' Indera Mohd Arief Emran Bin Arifin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=596b43bf-ae0c-46e0-9a5e-8128f0ed842a&Inline=true

GOJ Onyx Engineering not allowing appeal.pdf 24/01/2024 16:46:47 WA-12ANCC-47-07/2023 Kand. 18 S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—12ANCC—l7—D7/2023 Kand. 15 Ii/0lyl04A 1; Lb-4' DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGN MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAVAH FERSEKUTUAN RAVUAN SIVIL No WA-12ANcc-47-n7/2023 ANTARA omrx ENGINEERING SDN EHD (NO. SVARIKAT su4212—P) FERAVU DAN VCONZ DEVELOPMENT sun BHD (No SVARIKAT 1359902-X) RESPONDEN GROUNDS AFTER APPEAL DE SION or THE SESSIONS COURY A lnlmduciian 1 The Appellant is unhappy with me decwswon of me Sessions Conn WVHCVV had not allowed We appllcahon I0 set Esme the Judgment m Delaull omppsaranoe (ha| was entered by the ssssmns Caurl on 7-124022. 2 5w mMNvayMEaaxnEuao2EKv was Sum M... M“ be used m mm me nvwvufilv mm; “mm. VII mum Wm % 2 The Appeuanrs uaunsex admns mat me Judgment In Deraun cf Appearance dated 7—12—2u22 was vahd\y emered Background Facts 3. The P\amm's/ Responaenrs dawn xsiorgood sald to the Deiendam /Appellant «or me mal sum of RM 337‘ 543 09. A The Appellant failed to emer appearance to me enann aespne me wt and the slalement 01 New being validly served on n The ADDe|lan| naa apnmmed Messrs Syahniah Raw 3. Co as sohcllors to erner appearance, but the sam nrrn had (alled |o undsnaks ms aicrssaxd (ask. 5 Judgment m Devamc was enlered an 7422022 sunsequenw me Appeflant received a Mouse in WW1 Up the company under secuon 455 0! me Ccmpames Act dated M-1-2023 and a Wmdmg Up Fe dated 16- 2023. 5. u was my aner me Appellant recenea mess names and me Pemion did wt deude to Iermmate the services of Messrs Syahiifah Rani sw mMNvGyMEaaxnEnao2EKv ‘Nata Sum M... wm be used m mm me mwmnnulv mm; “mm. VII mum Wm 24 The Appellant also contends tnat tne sald loan dtd not some to lull trumen and as a result tne Appellant now sullers finanstal dlrltculttes and could not complete the works for the sald LRT 3 project. 25. The Appellant lunner contends tnat all tne works and gaods supphed are wttntn tne personal knowledge of Denms Lau. The documents requlred te delend ttns Sm! also allegedly are m tne nands at Dennls Lau To support tnese eententtons the Appellant reters to true Dollce reports il med tn relatton lo Denis Lau. 25. ll ls to be noted tnat tne Appellant dld not produce any documentary evldence ol the exlslence ol ||'lls alleged lotnt venture agreement Netther dld tt produce any Evldence at any letters or cunespunderlue hewveen parties evldenclng tne pcsslblllty of the exlslence dt suen a relatiunsntp between the names. There is also no evidence produced to snow the exlslenoe ol any loan as suggested oy tne Appellam. These allegallons are mere bare avermenls oy tne Appellant not supported oy any documentary evldence. N mMNt/GyMEaaxoEeao2EKll we Sum um... wlll be used m mm ea nlwlrulllv sun; flnntmnnl vn mung wrul % Documents produced shows goods were sold and delivered — no em enee oi reieoiion or cnmplzinl as to price in ouaiiry oi goods. 27 insiead, the documentary evidence before me shows inai me pumhase orders. invoices and dehvery orders oi the goods soid were produced by «he Resuondeni jushlying me sums claimed againsi the Appeuani. The Appeuani did not prdduoe any evidence to show mat the Invoices were onauenged at me me when ine goods and irwulces were received 28. My opinion IS further ouuressed by me vac: mai ine invoicesr purchase orders end dellveiy orders pmducsd oy the Respondems In response show me! me goods have been dehvered and accepted by me Appeuanr 29. I hnd the evidence disdosed in the aihdaviis filed shows that me Resnuridem is enhiied Io be paid tor me goods suoohed The Appeuani has no| shown ihai ine goods were reiected. insieadr the Appeuani received kepnne goods irmma|ing an intenhon to relam inem The aueged arguments raised by me AppeHan| do nei «an under any oi ine caiegones juwfying a inai oi this claim Reier to wee Lian Consvucriori sdn Bhd sw unurwaymzaaxozoaozzm -use Sam M... on re used m mm we uvwinuulv Mime nnmmnnl VIA mum wrui v I..gersou—./ax.’ (211101 1 cu 201 and Mukand Lm .. Malaysia Steel Works (KL) 5.1.. 5...: 1201.71 5 cm 2.22 so. Tr.e.evo.e, havmg relamed me goods, lhe AppeHan\ .5 reqwed (0 pay mam H1 accordance Wllh sections 12 and 55 of the S11: of Goods Act. I reier to the ‘augment of Gapal SH Ram In Interdeals Auramation (M) 5.1.. and v Hang Hang 12.7.1912 ELJ J21 — “[10]/is I have already sent Mrs .5 not a case ornnnaocapzanoa n vs a case ... w...c.-. mere was acczplarvna of goods and .. refusal In [my rm mam Accordmg/V» me app/mama nrovvsmn .5 5 5511; or the Act Much prescnbes me remedy or ar. ur.pa.u sa/rar Arm {hrs .5 wna. .1 says Where under a contract af Sara the pmazny .r. the guads has passed In the buyer and (he buyer wmngmfly neglecl: or refuses .0 pay «or me goods accordmg 142 the terms o/ms comracl, me sener may sue hrm rarme prrce or me gnarl: 1.. myjurlgmern, the ..a.....:,-ma should have apnlred m.-s secflon and found for me pIarr...rra.. me a.o..r.a ma. 4. was ar. ....para seller argaaas ma: r.... z..... .....m-4. Icnaptud ...a ...... Dy nr. duiundlnt ... .1. bInvfiL A: «ar llve counlerclarm arm: ma /udge Immd ugsrnsl I/1: defendant on me me. (ha! went in ma avurdancs and breach I2/me barman! he was aa..g.a to drsmrss .: . would therefore upheld his decrston on ma. pan of In: N murwaymzaaxnzaaozzxv ma 5.... M... WW be .5... m mm ..a ........... an... nnmmnnl VII mum W... % Appeiiani issued a cheque aiiinining iia ily. 31 More so when Ihe Appellant did Issue a cheque for the Sum of RM 24, 333 12 to ihe nespoiiueni This cheque was stopped by me Appeiiaiii wiiricui glvlng any ieiisons lor lrie siiia decision 32. ii islfile law ihai issuance afa cheque which ouuiu not he pieseiiieu lur paymem cieaies a cause uf aciicn under section 47 al the Bills of Exchange Act Reiei lo Yea Hiap sei-ig vAustraIian Faopd carp Pte Ltd (19911 3 MLJ 144 and Yee reek Wah v Lee criee Mona 120201 MLJU 1054 33. The issuance of ihe saie cheque aiso shows Ihat ihe Said allegation cnhe existence cian aiiegee ]C|InI venture is iiicie ihan hkeiylo be uniiue The Appeiiaiii has simply cieaiea a haiiious delence to iusiiiy its aIIemp| Io sei aside me Judgment in Delauli 34. Theieiaie. I do not him any reasons juslilyirig senirig asiae me Judgment iii Deiauii The Appeiiant has iaiieu to show any issue ihai iequiies a iiiai and has ' e in show any bona fide ueience ic hie Respunaenrs ciaiin siu VDNM/0:IMEaaXnEuEOZEKv -use s.ii.i llumhlv vim be used M WWW ne nVWiruH|Y Minis flnnuiinril vn AFVLING WM! 35 on me lssue allna pullue reparls, I also find tha| lne puliue reparls only concern the Appellanrs dispule wiln lls lnrnler employee Dennls Lau and nol wnh lne Respondent. I llnd me lnlernal dispule lne Appellanl has wlln Dennis Lau does ndl lllsmy seulng aslde lne Judgmerll ln Delallll. No man nevence filed. as Flnally, I also find |I1atIheAppeHan| nas m:| filed or even pryvared a draft delence lo me clalm nle llllng of a drall defence would have shown al me very least a serlous lnlenllon ln delend me clalrn and wduld have asslsled lna Appellant's aflsmpl lo snaw a lnable lssua er a lmna nae delence lnslllylng selllng aslde the Judgment ln Delaull ms was nol dons, and um explanahun was awarded In lnls caunlorlne lallurs |o ms a drain defence to the Respdndenrs clalm 37. I never lo llneludgrnenl al surlyadl Hallnr ornar J (as he men was) In Penqnlen cdneme sun Bhd v Chow Moo! 5 Anal [2lw:l] 5 cu 326 /I ls Irlla ms: rn a datnu!t[udgmsn1‘s Cass, ms sattlng asrd. ar matjrb mar rs generally me naml Thepresrdmy calmbelure sa dalng an the olherhsrld must have mrrre 900:1 reason and ma Mere ls a defence ml the rnenls adduced balms Me calm (Tan Om cm s Anal V Karlclllng Really Sdrl sadness; l 15 n mMNvGyMEaaxnEuao2EKll we Sum Mn... wn be used M mm na nlwlrulllv sun; nnmmnnl vn AFVLING Wm ms 226, pm; 1 ML./ 519/ me supposed gaad Ieasan grverv by me aerenasnas, as /acmunrsed me ewdence was #15! may were unaware olme case oemg called up «n mun an 9 Aprv/Z001, Ioundsd on me abovemsrmoned raiser! nrnensennee afme wms Factully, even n I were re suhmn‘ ta Mose evtdenualasseflmns, by 5 Apn/20171 they wens already In Ms/eys.e mnee neye before Iherrnasss were ca/led up In mm As / was ssnsneamamuoa service had taken praee Mrs pan of the mgrsdrsnl m, good rsaswv‘ had isnen an The next Ingredient m be eslsblnshed by the de/ervdsnls was whether mm was a defense olment before me for mnsrderznon Is‘ by at less! n/mg men dram defences in Van: H] Se/Jen V Fedsm! Auto Holdmgs Bna[1s75[ 1 ms as, (197912 ML./1A1$M:d Agr! Ezmskbun J had new to say The mnns In s case a/Mrs nnnne wefarlham be acceded an meals and no no» mvon pmmdwal miss m Prevent s defendant from serenmng an uclmn unless n nes no mints m ms aw/»ca»on The man in Ten cmang Bmlhers Mamie 151 Fla m V Lmuwewn: Concrete sun Bnd(19v7] e cu 75Pm srrm/ar Vern had remarked A aerem on the merits means a delsncv when dhsdosoi an arguable and (name Issue n dons not have In thaw that Mars .s a real asuacl cl means: or malrmas m cztrysomedagma u/mnvzwan /7! the current case n was mdupulsme I/wanna defendant: had (sued m pmmece ma! eu rmwfianl drsfl slalemenls o/defense wnnom menn /was mus wnnom any opnen but to find agarn farms plamtm‘, even on ms second mgrsdlvrvl No! enw was mere no pnm. lune dafence, rsrsmg sennus 7:51.125 as bans nae neesoneme aerenee msmugm to be Mem but (here was nor even a sham one {Hasu Ewm Perumahan s Or: v Umtsd Malayan sanxwy snamsu v cu 1237 Nut wrsmng la Mcuumg: . snsm aerense, and mzmnc esnve wns: else could have I done? conmn sense wou/d convmce anyone me: m a/Vow me appsa/, and 59! asme a asraumudgmen: when rm puma lame aefencs wnnny u/nonstdzmltun was Delays me mart wuum pannay me sum! as lame ducks om/angmg the agony A7! en Dame: wnnom them before me r could on/y syn mum/uyMEaaxnEuaozEKv wee sum In-uhnv wm he used m mm we nflmnnflly MW; dun-mm vn mum pm mm:/ude that In: dz/zndanls were definitely not senau: m than attempts In challenge we marnnfkielsyrng and deleelmq me /atler (ram Iakmg up mare anlmrpalory drama acmms durmg these bad llmss, and wamnq Yo! belts! ones‘ bzmg an: arm canclusmns mm mm amve .: ' 33. For me above reasons. I do not nno |haHhe Veamed Sessions com Judge had oommmeu any ermrs ma: warrant appeHat2 mterlerence by «ms Court E. Ordnrs onhis own 39. For me above reasons. this Court dismisses |he Appellant's appeal wnh costs of RM soon on sumect to aHocator. Dated «em January 2024 Data‘ Vndera Muhd Anal Emran hm Anfin Judge High Ooun of Ma\aya al Kuala Lumpur NCC 5 N «MN»/OyMEaaxnEeao2EKv we Sum M... M“ be used m mm we nvVWuH|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm Counsel Muhammad Nm Tamrin lor me Appeflant Messrs Zablr Imran 8. Partners Advocates 8. Snhcnms Prakash Chandrakant fur the Respondent Messrs Prakash & Cu Advocates & Sohcnors N .mwaymz.=x.z.,aozzxy mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm % ll. Co by leuer dated 2052023 The Appellenl only appolnled as current sul lclrs en so 2023 7. The apnlicalldn to sel aslde me Judgmerll in Delaull was only filed on 3l»3-2023 Tnls ls a delay olaeoul 113 days lmm lne dale wnen lne judgmem was enlered. The prevlous snllcltars lo: me Appellenl nan renewed me ludgmenl W ueleull un a—12—2n2a and (ms IS rlul eenlesled by me Appellanl 3. The learned Sesslorls cdun Judge ned eonsldered lne apdlleendn nled by me Appellant and deemed lnal lne appllcallorl does nut warrant |he exerclse cl‘ me powers onne Conn m se| aslde me Sald Jddgrnenl H1 Delault Aggellale Powers onne gh Cnurl 9. ll is Irile lewlnal when deallng wlln an appeal lrorn e declsldn nylne lcrwsr Courh thls Conn wlH be slow le mlenere wlln the nndlnge made by me codn below unless I| IS snewn lheune declslon was plalnly wrong lnel no reasonable oampe(en| Judge could have made sw vDNN»IGyMEaaxnEeaOzEKv -we Sum M... wlll be used m mm we nlwlrulllv mm; flnmmnnl VII .;lma Wm 1D I raver to me dECI$ICm cl |he Faaeiai Court W Ng Moo Kui 5. Armr v Wendy Tan Lee Pang. Admi "strata! ol me Esme or Tan Ewe Kwang, Doceasod & 015 12020110 CL.I1where Zabanah Mohd vusov FCJ hem‘ A: mg as (he Inaliu-1ge‘s condusron can be supported an . rational basis In View oflhe maianai amma live fact that ma apnenaie mun Yes/5 /Ike ll mm have muse rmfsisrvlly VS woman: In other WOMS, a finding of /act Mat wamd noi be remignsm to common sense ought not In be disturbed The insi iudge should be aocamsd a margin of spnrecialmn man his (ream-vent (:1 me evidence 75 examined by the appellate cuurls I1. I also reproduce me laHawmg paragraphs «mm the judgmenl or me Conn \31Appea\ In Mm: Di! 5 Gas Engineering V ran Back Kwee pins] 4 CLJ 665‘ where Na||In' Pammznaman JCA (as she men was) skated — mi The mwuiwmsnt my me ma/judge (0 have owns (0 a finding which was ‘plainly W70/w' before an appellate court may Intervene VS llvelefum well enuenchedinauraflfle/ValePhi/asfinhyandyructice in Henderson V Faxwmlh /nveslmerus Lid and anumen Lord my considered the meaning to be acculded to ma Phrisd Mainly wrong‘ (here may be same value III mnsidzrmg the meaning almatpllruse There IS anskmslrl maybe mismersioaa The adverb ‘iaiain/woes M1 refer lo the dsgrss olwnfidencs 19!! by the aiwsiiaia court that n wnuia not have isamaa ma same mndusmn as In: Ina!/unge ll am nu! marten mm whatever degree or aenainry mai me spueuaxe mun canwers that M would have reached a dtflsrsnl conclusion Whafmaflersls wnsmeime aacision undsraflfisahs one am no reusanablz/udge could hav: macficd SIN mMNvGyMEaaxnEuao2EKv nan Sum M... M“ be used m mm a. nflmrufllv mm; nnmmnnl VII AFVLING pm 1.5; 7...5 .5 5 pnml alsume Imyunance beams: .. ..n..e.5m.e5 me .e...on5.e ....m..e sppeuaae mums Hots!/rbefly to reverse armtefleretn me Iirvdmg ova maljwge even me appenaxe mm .5 0/eafly oune mew ma. .. wm: no. have .e.ene.. me mne...5...n me ...5....age ma .... me evmerme 5.. recmd befurz .. .. require: 5.....e....ng n.a.e The .eq...5ne ... mnee. standard ... be anplrcd .5 ma! no masunablsjwgs. on me ewaencs on remm e......: have reached ma wrlclusrorv om... Ivrafjuflgs rn omervmms, so long as me «..a...g5 otllle ma! /mfg: are p.5..5.:..e .... me ewdznce on .e.»n1, me.e .5 .... mum /e..n.e..e.e..ce mere/y an me grounds ma! me aweflale em... Iomvs a umerenx oltvmun an me same evrdervcs [!A[TIvere:s,IIa»1/ever,/rt!/2 mom for vnnahan ... me apphcalrun af me prrncrple ohnlen/enuun wnen me .na/mags .5 ‘Flam/V wrung‘ Alwel/an: courts uugn. m as cansrslvnr .n ervsurmg (ha! appeuene mtervsnllon any names abuul when .a lrvul ...age reaches 5 mnnlusmn ..n..5n rm rnasumable /udg: 5...... have reached A lack olsuch wnsmencynn appmaen would We nsemconxrderable uncerlamly .n we prams 5...: prowess an...ga..an Lrlrganls mmuyr. men counsel 5n....... be ewe ... assess wnn same degree alczrhsmry, an c/zarund dmvncl/y aynlredmvncrp/esol/aw, whemeramdgmenloblamedallirslmstance .5 nxery ... be avarlumsd ... no! This .5 only possrbls .r there .5 a cansrslervt apphcitmn mm: 'pLlmly wmng'pIln:1pl= ....ae..y.ng Ip;1:/Llletmenmnnan 1111 The abverse or countevvan .9 me .eq....e...e... re. aapeflate .e...5.... ... deannfl wun firrdms offer! by the ma/JWQS .5 ms nmdamenlal .equ..e.nen: that filejudgmant a/ms. mslarme does ... lac.‘ amuurv! m a mmwar-ervsm and cohesrve detenmnatron olme n.5.e...e....e.:e.s commmrvq me sublect manero.‘ a.:.a..;e bslore me mallwgs Tms mawes me ma. mge to undertake a mu av:/nation am... evmenee andtssuss pracea nsim me court A ms: ...5.anc5 mdgnlervl .5 aperv ... rhal/zngz wnen .. /5.5 ... address 5. who/Lv rgnmes n.5.5n5. ememe oussues p/zcsd before ... ... wnen bald findmgs arm. as made wrm no Ieamnwg or evidence to substannare such Ymdmgs Equally errors allav/. a e.e5..n.5..n..e.515n...ng a«.e.e..5... evrderm: and 5...’. 5.eany..1e..m.5o.e e.....5 w... EN mnmbule towards 5 decmon ma! waw be consrdered Io be ‘ms.../y wmny‘ 5... mmwuymzaaxnzuaozzxv we 5.... ...n... WW be .55.. 5 mm ... .........-y 5...; dnnnmnl ... .5.....c Wm. 12. my Judrcml decrsums are requrred to be harmed dawn exrreanrarrsry .rrr1 wrm mrmmum delay However lms orrgm not to comuramrse the fundamental rewwernerrr mar mauudyes undertake a commnensrve and no/rsnc apmam ya me evalualmn L7/evidence rrr ruclvmg Mztrllrmtrvgs at ilrsfmslamze A txflure In consrder Me Bnlrrery rr/me evrderm: and rrrrrrerrsr Issues . Isrlure (L7 make nrrarnns or fan or me mzkmg or bars fimiwgs or Iacl, an avow for answers rmemnerarr Apart imm me real possrbrmy at a rruscamage ouusm, such umtssmns by 5 lrml/udge reqmre me sprreurrre cuurl: In rm on Me ml: rr/ma mslancejwves am revvew me ewdence m us er-mrety avresh ms m lum amounts In a strain oruudrcrafmsourcvs The rmponancs cl: comprsnensm mnsrdzmlrun a/ me matter at first Instance rrrrrrrrrr be suflmervfly errrpnssrsea Equany wnerr mere has been Ms! such a ho/mm HIJWD-ach aaapreu. mere should be mnsmerab/s appeuare Ies1IamIex9Ic1sed when Ievrswmg a rrrsr rnslarvc:[udgIvIerv( an appeal “ I emu accept me: the appeal against any decision av lhe Sessions Court Is by way av rshearmg Tms appears m semran 29 unne Courts av Jumcamre Ad 13. Although the above referred deusrans were concermng apueals aller mans, \ believe me same cesc would be avmicame oonoermng any Inlsrioculnry ascrsrons made by the lower Court. sw mum/uyMEaaxaEuaozEKv we sum nawmv WW re used m mm re nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG wrm % n on s cairn 14 I have considered me grounds omie sessions com and found that the iearned Judge did not corrirrin any errors 0! iaw or fact that shouid be iriierierea wnri by «his coim Na Reasonable Explanalion for the Delay In the application In set aside me Judgrrierir iii Defzull 15 Firstly me Appeiiam has iailed to show ariyiusrincaiiun furlhe delay in the Buplicalion to set aside the Judgment iri Defaun. hie sole ground raised by me Appeiiarii is based on the alleged failure oi We previous soiiciior |a lake s|eps iri iris pmcesairigs below and asisriu me ciaim against iris Appeiiani 16 It is «me law that the Appellan ' required to show that he has acted eously and wimiri lhe 30-day period 40 iustiiy sening aside the iudgrriem in aelauu. I re!er lo me aecisinri oi Ganal sri Ram JCA (as rie then was) in Knor cherry wan v surrgei Wal Leasing Sdn 5IId[1.W7] 1 cu us: "It is a caldmalpmvcrp/5 uflaw, me: when a Vilvgantsnks ma rfllervalllvofl DI the mm! H‘! a matter that affect: his nghls H: must da SD eimamiy me vigiianrirairs mm doM'IleN!buS,[I1fE Suhvermml mougri havinw its mains in me 7 SN mMNi/0yMEaaxnEuao2EKv -we s.ii.i Mi... MU be used M mm we niwirufllv MW; nnmmnnl VII AFVLING WM! Cour! ul Chancery. rs ul uruversal apphcal/on Even m cases were a new rsexarcrsams ex dsbrlojuslvlvae, .3 coun maylsluss mnmuan mdofiervl/mgant In .uc.m in which may in nppmlching m. caurl :. in mm, m. am... rs upon me Illlvanl who has aetamuo render: satlsIacloI1eXDlanalInn for IL Whelnu the explmnon In a ylven use It mmmory ar ...sm..m. .:.,..nus upun m. rm: mu cimumlunml alnch m. and in . matter which .-"mm the exercise aldiacrerfon, it is I.» the/‘udge in whom the Iawpflmarlly vests the discretion. . 17 The lame oi summers to act in «me does not jushiy me exemse or the power onne coumo set asme the de(au\I judgment umess il ws shown |haHhe Appellanl dud nntacl wnh amgence when dealing wnn me sun The Appsuam cannot mers\y stand by on the sme am my abso\me\y on ms soncuors They must show mau they have auempxeu In protectmeur ngm 13, I vefev |o the decision 0! the cam ompueax in Mam or Ibrahim v Ros-my Effandy {mm renum Knaml L cc [2013] 2 ML] we In mat case the Cmm ol Appeal held: - ‘[27] 1: rs generally accepted mat a drum shomd not suffar «mm the rvaghgence or mrstake 0/ the mm», Eu: :1 rm realms: in be eslsmnshed that me negngem at mrslake .5 the act 0! the solncuor Omerwrxe, u wrll become common praclrcs lo ablarn a second bile al the chewy by changing counsel and mmmng ma ermrs m the Ivsluclmn A./pan MEEIEVIGMSSD/M21107, wnnautuny cm! sml Dem commenced and mamrarned agams: mat prams so/mrror n mum make a mockery arms system nl/ushce - N mMrwGymEaaxnEuao2EKv mm Sum mm... mm be used m mm u. nflmrufllv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm 19 I again relerlo the judgment :1! Gupal Sn Ram in me earher quoted case 0! row: Cheng war: It Sungei Wai Leasing Sdn Bhd (supra) where he stated: - /n we present case, me exnlanatmn cf the «am delendsnl for (he delay In making his explanamm «s, m summarvse ms awawra ma! its p/acsd me conduct of ms defence In ms was of a soltwur who am M79 (0 protect ms clrenfstnlerests /5 the! a masoname exp/anal/on7 The /earned Judqé ma Hm mm m was mm agree mm mm Undoubtedly tms Court mu not, whenever feastb/5 allow a chem ta su/fer /or Me negligence aims mm: 12:, Cheaw Chew mm V Abauuonan bm Abdu/Ranman[1995] 4 cu 127 an: 152 (199514 cm 127, mp 490 part/C George JCA Em there are /mm: In what may he done m ma Interest: af/usme Afler an luxuce is no! only for a de/aumng delendanl I! 75 Ior the D/amlrllas wefl And 2! the and arms day, a cammexamtrvahorv nfmv iacls and circumstance: reveals Ma! [he mm dzlandum um nolllmg m cammumcafle mm M: sa/Mylar a! any ear/terpomrm Irme lo drscoverlhe xlale In wmch me mam aaamslmm stood sum/yt n wamd as vyusncs In vrsrlme cmlsstlusrmes aim: tndrflsrence upnn ma hlsrnhlfs head “ zu. Tneratcrs, t do not accep| that me Appettam has shown any reasonable raasan why may and not wm. due a game set aside the Judgment tn Defau|| wn ' the me lrame pmvided under 42 me ta at 9 5w vt3MNvGyMEaaxnEuao2EKv ma Sum IHIWDIY Mu be .a.. m mm a. nvW\ruH|Y MW; nan-mm VII AFVLING mm % lne Rules ulCour1 Also reler |u Adnan bin Ishak 5 co vAF'TAssoci.ales Sdn and 1201512 AMR 2312 No Dulerlce to me claim shown by mu Appnllarlt. 21. As stated earller, lne clalrn agaIns| lhe Appellanl ls lor .9 Gem urlpald lor goods sold and supplled lo ll. 22 The Appellanfs argument Ihal mere should be a mal ol the clalm and iuslily the selllng aside of lhe Judgmerll oi nelaull revolves around me alleged loin: verlmre agreernenl loelween lne Appellarrl and me Rsspurlderll tor the LRT 3 Damarlsara pmjecl lor Mudalaya Graup laemau 2: The Appellanl wnlends mal me Respondent l Flalnllfl had taken a loan lrorn a lmrd puny for Denrus Lau Klrl wal. The sloressla loan was allegedly In asslsl wlln me said prolecl and me prom lrom me Sald prolecl wlll be shared belween lne Appellant and me Rsspanasm Therelors, lns Appellant oanlends mat the Sald goods supplled should nol he charged (or is lull prlDE sw vl7NNvOyMEaaxnEuaozEKv 'NnI2 Sum M... wn be used M mm o. nlwlrulllv sun; nnmmnnl VII nFlLING Wltll

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

JB-12ANCvC-8-07/2023

PERAYU 1. ) SAFIRUL BIN SABRI (SEORANG KANAK-KANAK MENDAKWA MELALUI IBUNYA ATAU SAHABAT WAKIL SA'DIAH BINTI SA'ADON) 2. ) SA'DIAH BINTI SAADON RESPONDEN 1. ) Wan Zeity Mazura Bin Wan Sahak (Wakil Persendirian Kepada Harta Pusaka Iskandar Bin Ibrahim, Simati) 2. ) IBRAHIM BIN AB GHANI

Interlocutory Appeal – Decision from Sessions Court – Allowing recalling of witnesses for further cross-examination - Application to stay the proceedings - Pending Appeal to Court of Appeal – Principles applicable – Whether rare and compelling circumstances – Or special circumstances – Appeal will become nugatory – Merits of the appeal.

24/01/2024

YA Tuan Suria Kumar a/l Durairaj Johnson Paul

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0ed07f0b-c526-4735-8bcd-8aa587688f4c&Inline=true

24/01/2024 11:24:27 JB-12ANCvC-8-07/2023 Kand. 23 S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JB—l2AIlCvC-B-D7/2023 Kand, 23 us-1nNzyc.a-a7/10231311:24-2‘ DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA nu MLIAR DALAIII NEGERI JDHOR. MALAVSIA RAVUAN SIVIL N0.: JmzAucvc.u.n1Izu2a ANYARA 1. SAFIRUL am sum (scoring kinak-Jxznak m-ndakwa llllalul Inunya mu nhabaz Wnkil SNDIAH awn $A'ADON) 2. SA'DlAH awn sA'ADoM PERAYU-PERAVU DAN 1. wm zzmr mzum am WAN snmx Iwakn wunaxnnn kapada mm punk. ISKANDAR am naruuuu. Sim: ) (NO. K/P : nmn2411.o1s1) 2. IERANIM am AB an-mm (N0.KIF:1104n§—fl3-5031) RESFONDEN-RESPONDEN rgalam Purkara Illlnglnai Mahknmah Sesfln DI mm Gunman No: JE-AEJKJ-4a~lI2 TAHUN zuzm ANTARA 1. SAFIRUL am swan (sealing knuk-buluk mnnd.|kw| Mala: unya alau nhabal wmu SNDIAH amn swxuorc) IN ca/uDmFMu¢uVqmzwrA ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be sued p. vecly M nhgmnhlv M W. mm. VII mun: W.‘ ummucvc-am/zozzi E 2. SA'D1ANElNTlSA'ADON .PLA|NYlF-PLAIITIF am 1. wag glrv mzmu am wan smm (wakil pnunndlrhn mad: ham punk: ISKAMDAR am uaruruuu, Slmali) (N0. KIP : nmnz-n1ms1) 2. maximum am AB srwu (N0.KlP:110AIJ6-036031) DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN KORAM: SURIA KUIIIAR A/L DURAIRAJ JOHNSON PAUL PESURUHJAVA KEHAKIMAN L1:1an1.-at.-«mmm:1L1tnmuuuaauandmmmmmumniuxskvmuuutam ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN anmumxx:1aauuumauuwmmummmuaxuscmmxuuummumm PENDAHUIJJAN [1] Vni adarah Rayuan Pevayu—Perzyu/P\aInM-P\a\MW‘ hrhadap kepumsan ms VB pads «annex menalak permonunan meveka unluk penggarmmgan pmsmmg seliruulnyi sehmgga Rayuun ke Mahkamah Rayuan barkauan sam kepulusan pevmchunan m|er1uku|ori oleh HMS YB yang d|keka\kan uleh Mahkamah mi dilupuskan IN ca/uDmrMuuuvq\nzxPrA — ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vevly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ up uucvc 7/znu] E [:2] Tambahan lag!‘ mammn PlaInm—P1amul, saks\~saksISP1 dan svz tsrssbm telah pun diwalbalas aleh bekas peguamcara Daranaar» Dave-wan dengan soalan-Amman my new anany: semen panmraan levsebul pa: Mahkamah lwdak dapal mananrna hujahan P|ain|fl—P\ain|rfinI kelana dalam Rawan Pia-um-Plamnr nemaaap kauumsan was vs umuk memanggnl semula saxsiaaks. sm flan spz, Mahkamnh nu |e|an pun memumskan bahawa kepulusan >-was va uruuk membenarkan saknisaksi sm dan spz mpanggn samula unluk moan balas uleh Defsndun-Delendan ida\ah mas pelakaanaan ('sxam:e”} budiblcaranya sendln s$aga\ Ham aura (-my wage”) dalam pvoswdmg parbiczraan yang sedang beqalan cxan yang dermkian, Mahkamah mi max haleh camp-r fangan dangan numcaua HMS vs levsebm [341 Lebm-Isbm lagn, pida kank: Mahkamah ml manmsk Rayuan P\aInl\r-Plalnm (erssbul, Mahkamah Jug: man mengirshksn agar pih:k~pmak meneruskan dengan sambung mcara di Mahkamah Sesyen KEFIJTUSAN [351 Maka bevdasalkan alasarvalasan Iarsebul dw alas, Mahkamall mv memuluskan bahawa Plamm-P\amM gaaal unluk menuruukkan wupmnya kaaaamxeaaaan khns un|uk Sam Penmzh pengganmngan pmsldmg sawanjumya sehmgga Rayuan mereka kc Mahkamah Rayuan uuupusxan. _ IN ca/unnFMuquVq\n2wrA ‘Nate sum runny wm ... M a «My Due nH§\mH|V MW; mm. Vfl muws rum [la—1zAncvr:—n-n7/Ian] E [as] web Yang uemuxun, Rlyuin Flam mtnlak dengan kos asmrm. pads 11 Dnsember 2u23 dv Muar da\am Negen Juhov Daml Takzm u. sunu KUMAR nu PAUL Pesunmjaya Kehakxman Mahkamah Tmggi Mahya Muir Jahov Darul Ts‘1Im Muhammad msrm wamae Em Mohd Nasir Bag: p -k Rulpunden-Rupandan YuwlFsrhan Elm Kanm Paquamcm: 3:; E k Pang xu mu... chum, Jan & Auacmn Peguambeln flan Peguamcali Na 44—« Jalan am 2 Taman Eukrt menu Muhara 75150 Melaka IN ca/uDmFMuquVq\nzwrA _ ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vevly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ I1a.mua/wow/znz:1 E [Nu Ru .. CJA/ACO/MR/412119) Bngi pl :11 msgmmnnaa-ganuun Tlluan Vin Pannm Peguambela din Peguamoara No 1311, men 13. Black a Phllen Damansara 2‘ 15‘ Jalan is/1 ovualan Dzmznsarz 45350 Selanaor [lto.Ru sIPII13I1/2I111K(HS)] Tarlkh Ponaonqann 11 Dlsember 202: mm. Kaputuun n Dlsernber 2023 IN ca/uDmFMuquVq\nzwrA ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vecly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ Luz mucvca 1/zuzsl E [11 Mankamah man menmsk Rayuln mu dan sekarang membenkan alasavnalasan m sun [5] Plhak hak am aummk seblflal Plalnhf-P\amIN flan Duhndam Dsfendan flalim pengnakman ml LATAR EELAKANG KES [ll Tmdakan W nmnm ukmax salu kamalinnin Jalunviya vada 1412 zma .1. mm P\:Irml Penzma, sealang kanak-kanak yang menunggang mmumkal Na AFJ 1522 an KM 14, Jalan 59 Man — Eukrt Gamblr asngan mamrsnkal No. JCX 5414 mm Dafundan Kedua yang dmmggang aleh Decenusn Panama. man Plamm Panama Ielah menga\amr kecederaan Kemk akuhm kemalangan |eIsabul dan kin: |a|aII Vumpuh dan hsrlanlardan membawa |un|man melaml Plamm Kean; Ibunya m Sewzkhl vemicaraan kee P|ain|i1—P\amI\I, Defendambelendzn maliww pegusmcara him merek: man mamvaukan satu permahonan Imluk memanggn semma snkswsnksx Plamm—FlmnuI IaI|u Femandu Ambulans (SP1) dan Panuknng Pegawaw Perulxatan dari Kfimk Kssihflan Sungav Man‘ zspz) -mm menyual halas Ian.-n kaduadus saksl m\ [51 Pad: 132022‘ HMS YE |e|ah munbenalkzn pemmhonan caveman-uevunaan bevsebm. m Laruulan danpadz i|u, P|aAn|i1—P1am|\l man berpuasham dengan kspuhnsan HMS vs xamm din man mstayu ks Mallkamah mv IN ca/unnFMuquVq\n2wrA ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH|V MW; mm. Vfl muws NM! IW-m"M+"7/"“I % [31 Fed: 12:72 2023. Mahkamah mi |e|ah menulak Rayuan Pla\mfl— Phirml (ersehul flan lelah mengsrlhkan agav perbkzaraan m Mahkamah Sesyen dnemskan [91 P\smM manm max bamuashah an m ssdang merzyu ke Mahkamah Rnyuan (emaflap Kevulussn Mahksmah W Oersabul [101 Sememari IVIM P<=unm=Ia.nnn man memahnn zgav pmsiding a. Mahkamah Sesyen wganmng sehmgga Rayuzn mereka ke Mahkamah Rayuan dllupuskan [11] Mahkamah Sesyen man menulak pennonanan Plamn1«Plnm(il lersebul dsn wm sdalah Rayuan (emadap ksuumsan luriubm ANALISA DAN DAPAYAH MAHKAMAN Isu punnulain [121 Fada pendaval Mankaman, Dmsadur yang sanamsnya diwkmx oleh PIzunlW~Plam(Il edalah umuk memohon ks Mahkamah Tmggv dan hukannya ke Mahksmah Sesyen unluk salu Penman panggznnmgan samngga Rayuan ke Mahkamnh Rayuan dnluvuskan (111 lni aaaxan kerzna Penman yang drrnyul nleh Pmnlwf-Plaxnlxf Ice Mahkamah Rayuan ada\ah (erhzdap kupuluszn Mahkamah Tmggl yang wan mengakalxan kepulusan Mahkamah Sssyen dan imipali pemmnanan unluk mengganlung pmshdmg Im aaaxan Immk ynng Iehah mengganlung pelzksanaan kepumszn Mahkamah mengekalkan kepmussn Mahkamah Sesyen yn ca/unnmuquvqwnzwrn ‘Nate sum runny wm ... U544 u. «my n.. mm» MW; mm. Vfl grwuus NM‘ Us zmcv: 7/may E [I41 Menurul saxsysn 73 Am Mahksmah Kshakrman mo » ‘An Iwasal shall not upstate as a slay of exscuhon 0: ol mocaadmas under me dsclsron appeamd Imm umass the gem! new or me Cou/1 ol 42%: so order: and no mlelmedmte uclurpmceeding slmllbs rnva/rdntsd amp: so Isrls the Court omppea/ may drrsct‘ [15] Marvakala m9nmu!Ka9\1ah 13 Kauai»-Kaednh Mshkaman Rayuan 1994 — “ 13 5:51 olgficnmg on aggm An appeal shall nolupelsts aa a my e/axacunan arof pvocssdings under me decision appealed [mm unless the mgn com or me Cour! so order: and no mfelmedrats act or pmceedilvg ma/I be invalidated excapm: /alas me Court may direct‘ us) Akmr sekali menurul Kaeaen 14 Kaedan—K5edah Mankamah Rayuan1994.- 14. mzmum mm my be mgde snhsr m Hg)! com or Cmmal A/Iobem :7 M Exes»! as omerw/ss pmvlded by any wnflsn Iaw, whenever appncamn may be mas either to me Htgh comma me com, nsnen be made m ma Itrxnnstsnce to the man Court ' IN ca/unnrMu.uvq\n2wrA W. sum ...m.., M“ e. wed Ix: my me angmuly Wm nnumeul VI arwuus rmm um.m..mm. E [111 Bernandukan kevada Derunlukkan-perunmkkan m. Mzhkamzh herpendapal Mahkamah Sesyen ma kuisa unmx memennunkan agar pmswdmg digarmmgkan sehingga Rayuan Pwamuwlaimn ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap kapulusan Mahkamah Tmggl uuunusxan m1 Tamhzhan pula, Mzhkamah mendapafi PIainm—P\ainM gags! Immk mengemukakan ghdwg da\am Rskud Rayuan subagaimanz menuvul Amran 55 Kaedsn 513) (Is) KKM 2012 m1 Walaupun Pembe\aan mane» dilmal dalnm Ahdawt Sokongan Plmrmf-F'|amM dilam Rskad Riyuan‘ namun wm din Pemyalaan runman langsung hunk mkemuxakan no: men yang uenman, Rayuan Plz\n(if—P\a|n|fl mi baleh ditmak di alas alasamalasan mu anal: Samzda Paarmiu-Iaimirbunak umuk mu puinhll ponygannmqan prorldlny. [211 Delendalrbeiendan memhznlah permuhanan im dun barman behawa PIain|W—P|aimil periu manunjukkzn wmudnya “ram and compellm circumstances’ umuk mampemlsm sam Fsvlmah pengganxungan pmslding sehmgga Rayuan meleka ke Mar-kaman Rayuan dilupuskan. {:1} Dalam membuat muanan ml, Dekmdan-Detandan bemamung kepada olnrin Mahksmah Rayuan aaram kes Pmlssm End v Tey Par Yie 5. Another Appeal [2012] 5 cu 299 m mana Mahkamzh Rayuan memuluskan sepem benkur. IN ca/unnruuauvqwnzwrn ‘Nate sum ...m., wm ... M Ix; «My Due nH§\mH|V MW; mm. Vfl muws NM! us znncvc M7/2:213! E “(:21 We have covmdsrvd lhs sulhomies mmmea ny mm peruas The law in rerenon ro zrra usue of staymg prncoedmys Igamsl nenpanree pending Mbmuhon rs rrer rn substance -1/Ifsmm‘ n ma cornmonweanr. [ufisdicflans However, we threshold to be apalkyd m rarenon In ma rigm olnarrpsltles to proceed wvlh Iherr actrons noernznsunarng amllratuhn egreernenzs, does vary. [:3] /n ma United Kingdom, the mrasnord mar mas to be reached to warrant the gram of e slay ofproceedmg: egarns: non-pamss pendmg irtmllran, was eensmered by Lord arngrrarn nl comnm cm In Rmchhold Norway ASA and Anomer v Goldman Seem lnlemalronal (2000) 2AI/ ER 579 ('RsrchhnId Norway 7 me: standard was stated m be (a) /nvokadin ~rara and mmpelhng cimumstuncss'.' (:1) Them ougm to he very strong reason: rorgrermng such a slay, (c) ‘I7-vs oenms //Ksly to result rmrn grannng such a stay of pmcaedmg: mus! oreerry ourwargr. any dvsacfl/alvlags 10 me nonparry [:41 (See also Mabey and Johnson v. 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[25] Mahkamah mendapzm prlnswp undang-undsng ‘rare and camoeumg circumstances‘ ssbagawmana yang dlpuluskan clah Mahkamah Rayuan aaram ks: Pmmco BM (supra) darn dlhnqzhkan oleh Defandan—Defendan terpnkai kepuda satu pengganlungan plvtidxng lerhzdap “mm—pam'es pending arhrtrabon“ can bukinnyi kepads kes-xas pmelcflng mu biasa an|arz prhalepwhak kepadi pmslding |ersehu( [25] Mahkamah man menganzflsa ntnrifimnmw bevkenaun pnnslp undang-undang pangganumgan pmsmng semngga satu Rayuan dflupuskan dan menaapan kaporiuan unluk manuruukkan wuwdnya keadaankczdaan khas adahah ujlan yang maslh larpakaw [211 Mahxamah Rayuan hsvwbam Im dalam kes Nwman or Tali!) A 073 V Mohd Nastr am Hasselv A on 120231 MLJU 2557 man pumskan sessonng pemohan perm memhuknkan wuwdnya kewaam keadann 511: Ma mjuk kepafl: ks: Mahkamah Ylnggv Nansen IN ca/unnFMuquVq\n2wrA — ‘Nate sum ...m.., WW ... uud » «My n.. nH§\mH|V MW; ....m. _ muus W nmuncvc -a1/1.021] I Qusny Pmducls Sdn Blvd s on cnong soon Hang 5. Or: (2472:) ML./U 5917 can AMBIHK (M) and v Metal Reclsmalran [Industries] Sun and 5 Or: /2015} 10 cm 205 yang dipumskzn o\eh Wang Klan Khenng .1 (pad; kelxka nu) [23] Da\am dapatan Mahkamah‘ kepmusln Mihkamnh Sesyen unmk memanggm semulil saks\—saks\ SP1 dan SP2 unmk dam‘ balas blunt Lfleh D2f2ndan—DufundalI manurut palakiinaan ("exemsfi budwbwcala hzkim bi-2r: (‘Mi//0499') dillm presiding perblcanan yzng sedang benalan hukimah saw keadain-keadaan khas [:91 lni adahah kerzna apa yang naming adalih unmk aayamana Mama! mendzkwa Aunmxannya secara ‘9xpsdIIw.3u:7y'dengan menemskan pevblcaraln taupe kelengahsn dew xsaauan Merit>mIriI Rayuln [so] P\aInlW-Plalnm jug: se\an‘u|nya hermuah bernenzan menhmam rayuan mevekz Menurul P\anrmf»FlainM, pemlahonan Defendan- Defendan un|uK mernanggu sen-ma uks»-smn PlmnM—Plz|inli1udnk wmsrdlbenalkan clan HMS YB [:11 Memmfl P\ainlW—P|ainn1, nn adalah kemna had: kepefluan unluk mumanggll ssmula saw Pemanflu Amhulnns (SP1) dan Pennkmg Pagawat Pemhnvan dari Klimk Kesihalan Sungai Mali (SP2) memandangkan mareka |a|ah pun membenkan kamevangan sepenuhnya pad: an 11 2021 flan mm nevenaan-uevanaan wga pang xem nu amkm oleh bekas peguamnam mereka IN ca/unnrMuuuvqm2nPrA wane sum rutnhu wm ... M n my ... nngwnnuly wm flnumeul VI mung my

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-22NCC-17-01/2021

PLAINTIF 1. ) TECH FOOD INGREDIENTS SDN BHD 2. ) A ONE PILING SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD 2. ) LYE SAM YUT 3. ) CHEAH CHEE MENG 4. ) CHIA HEONG LIN 5. ) ONG KIM HAI 6. ) PANG KIM WAH

Breach Of Contract-Negligence-Misleading -Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation And Deceit-Lifting Of The Corporate Veil- Breach Of Fiduciary Duty-Evidence Of Breach Of Contract- Damage And Quantum .

24/01/2024

YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64daff7c-d5db-4cef-8c5b-6a58ecafb47e&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCC-17-01/2021 ANTARA (1) TECH FOOD INGREDIENTS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 689104-H) (2) A ONE PILING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1194561-X) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN (1) BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 682694-V) (2) LYE SAM YUT (No. K/P: 760423-06-5183) (3) CHEAH CHEE MENG (No. K/P: 650823-06-5361) (4) CHIA HEONG LIN (No. K/P: 760620-14-5100) (5) ONG KIM HAI (No. K/P: 670124-09-5025) (6) PANG KIM WAH (No. K/P: 680802-05-5225) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN (Didengar Secara Bersama Dengan) 24/01/2024 15:17:57 WA-22NCC-17-01/2021 Kand. 470 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 66 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCC-518-11/2021 ANTARA BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran : 200501005647 (682694-V)) … PLAINTIF DAN (1) A ONE PILING SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran: 201601023622 (1194561-X) (2) TRUEPRO CONSULT SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran : 201001026168 (910087-X) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT (Post Trial) [1] This was primarily a case involving a contract to construct a cGMP (Current Good Manufacturing Practice) Processing Plant (“Factory”) in Klang between the 1st Plaintiff/2nd Plaintiff (“Tech Food” / “A One Piling”) and the 1st Defendant (“Blue Seal”). [2] The Factory was intended to be a refrigerated storage facility which includes cold rooms, freezer rooms and food processing rooms. [3] Tech Food and A One Piling’s claim was essentially that the Factory which was constructed by Blue Seal was not done in accordance with the contract, contained various defects in terms of the material used and workmanship and that the construction was not completed. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 66 [4] This case took some time to dispose given multiple interlocutory applications filed by parties. Nomenclature [5] As this case involves two cases and several parties, the cases and the respective parties will be referred to as follows: Suits i) Main suit (WA-22NCC-17-01/2021) - “Suit 17”; ii) Second suit (WA-22NCC-518-11/2021) - “Suit 518”; Parties iii) 1st Plaintiff (in Suit 17) - “Tech Food”; iv) 2nd Plaintiff (in Suit 17) and 2nd Defendant (in Suit 518) - “A One Piling”; v) 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (in Suit 17) – collectively as “Plaintiffs”; vi) 1st Defendant (in Suit 17) and Plaintiff (in Suit 518) - “Blue Seal” or “1st Defendant”; vii) 2nd to 6th Defendants (in Suit 17”) - “2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants”. The 2nd to 5th Defendants are directors of Blue Seal while the 6th Defendant is the Project Coordinator of the Project employed by Blue Seal; viii) The 1st to 6th Defendants (in Suit 17) – collectively referred to as “the Defendants”. ix) Truepro Consult Sdn Bhd (in Suit 518) - “Truepro”. Truepro is the Consultant and Superintending Officer (“SO”) appointed by Tech Food for the Project. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 66 A] CHRONOLOGY OF PROCEEDINGS [6] By Order dated 20.10.2021 Suit 518 was transferred from the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court to this Court to be heard together with the main suit, Suit 17. [7] Suit 518 contained a Counterclaim by the Defendants therein, A One Piling and Truepro. [8] On 20.6.2022, the following transpired in respect of Suit 518: i) Blue Seal withdrew its entire claim against both the Defendants, A One Piling and Truepro. Blue Seal’s main claim was then struck out with costs of RM40,000.00 in favour of A One Piling and Truepro; ii) A One Piling withdrew its entire Counterclaim against Blue Seal. A One Piling’s Counterclaim was then struck out with costs of RM40,000.00 in favour of Blue Seal; and iii) Truepro withdrew part of its Counterclaim against Blue Seal and only the reliefs in paragraphs 73.11, 73.14, 73.17 and 73.20 of the Amended Defence and Amended Counterclaim remained, they are mainly: a) Special damages of RM10,207,614; b) General damages to be assessed for loss of income and business opportunity [9] Given this turn of events what remained in respect of this case is: i) For Suit 17: Tech Food and A One Piling’s claim against the Defendants; and ii) For Suit 518: The remainder of Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal. [10] At the trial of this action and at the end of the Tech Food and A One Piling’s case, Blue Seal together with the 2nd to 5th Defendants S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 66 and the 6th Defendant submitted “no case to answer” and no evidence was led by any of their respective witnesses listed in the 1st to 5th and 6th Defendants’ list of witnesses. B] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [11] By way of a Letter of Award dated 6.5.2019 (“1st LOA”) Tech Food appointed Blue Seal as its Nominated Sub-Contractor (“NSC”) in respect of a project known as “Cadangan Membina Sebuah Kilang Di atas Lot 158490 (HSD 135860), Jalan Sungai Pinang 4/10, Kawasan Perindustrian Pulau Indah, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan Untuk Tetuan Tech Food Ingredients Sdn Bhd” for the construction and completion of a factory (“Project”) or otherwise known as a cGMP Processing Plant (“Factory”) subject to the terms and conditions of the 1st LOA and Blue Seal’s quotation dated 26.4.2019 (“Quotation”). [12] Tech Food is known as the “Owner/Employer” of the Project whilst the A One Piling is appointed as the Main Contractor of the Project by Tech Food and a contract was entered between Tech Food and A One Piling to that effect. [13] By a letter dated 19.7.2019 entitled “Supersede Letter of Award” (“Supersede Letter of Award”) Tech Food wrote to Blue Seal, inter alia, as follows: “Refer to the above matter and Letter of Award from Tech Food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn. Bhd. on 6th May 2019. We are writing to you to supersede the letter of award. All NSC letter of award shall be issue by the Main Contractor. However, your payment terms shall be paid by us. Kindly submit your payment schedule. You are required to write to us within 48 hours if you do not accept the supersede of this letter.” (own emphasis added) [14] By letter dated 23.8.2019 (“Acceptance Letter”) Blue Seal accepted the terms of the Supersede Letter of Award, inter alia, as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 66 “Refer to the above matter and letter in relation to supersede Letter of Award from Tech Food Ingredients Sdn, Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn. Bhd. on 19th July 2019. We are writing to you and are pleased to accept the supersede Letter of Award. Enclosed the duly signed Letter of Award issued by A One Piling Sdn. Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd on 6th May 2019. Payment terms shall be paid by Tech Food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. directly to Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd, the Nominated Subcontractor.” (own emphasis added) [15] Another Letter of Award also dated 6.5.2019 was then issued, this time by A One Piling to Blue Seal (“2nd LOA”). [16] Under the 2nd LOA the quotations in the Project have to be approved by Tech Food instead of A One Piling. [17] Tech Food and A One Piling claim that both the 1st and 2nd LOA are effective and enforceable while the 1st to 5th Defendants take the position that the 1st LOA has been terminated and no longer exists. [18] The 1st to 5th Defendants claim that pursuant to the 2nd LOA, the only contract is now between the A One Piling and Blue Seal. [19] Tech Food, A One Piling and the 1st to 5th Defendants agree that the Project is subject to the terms and conditions as stipulated in the 1st LOA, 2nd LOA and Quotation (collectively referred to as “the Contract”)). [20] Pursuant to the 2nd LOA the date of “Site Possession and Commencement of Works” shall be 20.5.2019 and the “Date of Completion” shall be 30.9.2019. [21] On 17.5.2019 Tech Food paid 10% as down payment in the sum of RM342.500.00 directly to Blue Seal. [22] Blue Seal commenced work to construct the Factory and between 20.8.2019 to 20.12.2019 Blue Seal submitted progress claims (Progress Claims Nos. 1 to 5) to Truepro and/or Blue Seal. Payments were made towards these Progress Claims until around 13.2.2020. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 66 [23] On 24.2.2020 Truepro issued a list of defects and “Make Good 2” document. [24] However, problems occurred from around 5.3.2020 when the director of Tech Food, Narendranath a/l T.V. Ramana (“PW-1”), raised a complaint against Blue Seal’s supervisor that he was playing games in the car and the employees are without PPE (personal protective equipment) attire while working at the site of the Project. [25] Thereafter, several joint physical and visual inspections of the Factory was conducted as follows: i) 9.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; ii) 11.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; iii) 12.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd, 4th and 5th Defendants. iv) On all the above 3 joint inspections, it was observed by the Defendants who attended that there were bubbles/blisters on the PU panels that were installed in the Factory. [26] Between 11.3.2020 to 12.3.2020, PW-1 raised issues regarding the Factory and specifically in respect of: i) the PU panels which had blisters/bubbles in them; and ii) that it was subsequently discovered that the PU panels that were installed were not certified Class “O” by the Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat Malaysia (“Bomba”). [27] There were several correspondences in the form of emails pertaining to the issue of repair, rectification and/or replacement of the said PU panels primarily between Tech Food and Blue Seal. [28] The dispute between parties culminated in a notice terminating the contract by Blue Seal. Some of the material correspondences between the parties between 12.3.2020 to 18.3.2020 are stated below. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 66 [29] By letter dated 12.3.2020 A One Piling informed the 1st Defendant, inter alia, as follows: “We refer to the above mentioned reference & project. From today onwards not allow to enter project site until further notice.” [30] By its solicitors’ letter dated 15.3.2020 (“Blue Seal’s Termination Letter”), Blue Seal informed A One Piling, inter alia, as follows: “c) the said Letter informing that our client was barred from entering the project site is wrong in law and in fact and in breach of the Contract; d) your actions as aforesaid clearly evince an intention on your part not to be bound by the terms of the Contract which amounts to a repudiatory breach of the Contract and which reputation our client accepts and the Contract is hereby terminated.” (own emphasis added) [31] The Plaintiffs’ solicitors then responded to Blue Seal’s Termination Letter vide their letter dated 18.3.2020, inter alia, as follows: “Thus, it is your client that has breached the terms of the contract by supplying and installing defective PU Panels which in fact your client has acknowledged and/or admitted in their e-mails transmitted on 11.3.2020 at 11.29 a.m. and 10.16 p.m. Your client’s attempt now to state otherwise and/or reasons for saying so is not contemporaneous with the documents and their conduct at the material time. As you are aware, our client’s rights are protected under the Sale of Goods Act 1957 in regards to your client’s warranty and representation that the goods namely the PU Panels are merchantable and fit for the purpose it was purchased and intended for. Our client has instructed us to inform you that they are accepting your client’s unlawful repudiation of the contract and will commence proceedings to recover the full contract sum and consequential losses which will include appointment of a third party contractor to rectify the defective PU Panels unless your client do take immediate steps to address and rectify the defective PU Panels supplied by your client.” [32] Blue Seal did not return to the Project site to do any further work or rectification work and the work on the Factory ceased. [33] By 17.5.2020 Tech Food had paid Blue Seal a total sum of RM3,093,854.38. The total contract sum under the 2nd LOA was RM3,425,000.00. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 66 [34] Suit 518 was subsequently filed on 25.6.2020 and Truepro’s (and A One Piling) Counterclaim against Blue Seal was filed on 24.7.2020. [35] Suit 17 was filed on 1.7.2020. SUIT 17 [36] Below are the reasons for my decision in respect of the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants in respect of Suit 17. Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal in Suit 518 will be dealt with separately in this Judgment. C] THE PLAINTIFFS’ (TECH FOOD AND A ONE PILING) CLAIM [37] The Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants arises primarily from the allegation that the Defendants had failed to construct the Factory in accordance with the terms of the Contract. The Plaintiffs further claim that there were several defects in the 1st Defendant’s work. [38] The Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants are based on the following causes of action: i) Breach of contract (against Blue Seal only); ii) Negligence; iii) Misleading and fraudulent misrepresentation (“Fraudulent Misrepresentation”); iv) Deceit; and v) Inducing the Plaintiff to enter into the LOAs knowing that they were not going to fulfil their contractual obligations and that their representations to the Plaintiffs are not true. [39] The reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs against all the Defendants, jointly and severally are, inter alia, as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 66 “83.1. A declaration that the corporate veil of the 1st Defendant be lifted by reason of deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation committed by the 1st to 5th Defendants and this action may be brought personally against its directors namely the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants herein; 83.2. A declaration that the entire cGMP Processing Plant that the 1st Defendant had supplied, manufactured, designed, built and installed in the Project is defective, unmerchantable and unfit for the 1st Plaintiff’s use, needs and purpose of business; 83.3. A declaration that the Defendants had committed deceit and/or fraudulent misrepresentation as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.4. A declaration that the Defendants had committed breach of contract of the 1st Loa and 2nd LOA as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.5. A declaration that the 1st to 5th Defendants had committed breach of fiduciary duties as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.6. A declaration that the Defendants were negligent in carrying out its and/or his duties as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.7. An order compelling the Defendants to forward to the Plaintiffs within three (3) days from the date of this order all relevant forms and/or documents that have to be submitted to local authorities and agencies such as Forms C1 and C2 and other similar forms and documents required for the purpose of obtaining CCC; 83.8. An order compelling the Defendants to hand over the keys to all doors in the premises of the Project that had been installed by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Plaintiff within three (3) days from the date of this order or alternatively special damages of RM40,000.00 being costs of replacing all the keys; 83.9. An order compelling the Defendants to return to the 2nd Plaintiff within three (3) days from the date of this order, the overpaid progress claim monies of RM98,255.80 that was over certified; 83.10. Alternatively, an order that the Plaintiffs is entitled to trace and recover the overpaid progress claim monies of RM98,255.80 from any fund and/or asset of the Defendants which the said monies have contributed to; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 66 83.11. An order allowing the 2nd Plaintiff to retain and utilise the balance 5% of the contract sums as part payment of the refurbishment costs of the factory; 83.12. Special damages of RM20,767,364.26 being the rectification costs of the factory as stated in Paragraphs 55 to 56.21.6 above; 83.13. Special damages of RM264,000.00 being cost for the loss of warranty on machines due to dismantle and reinstallation of machine and fixtures; 83.14. General damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court against the Defendants for breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duties and/or responsibilities and/or negligent; 83.15. General damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the Plaintiffs’ loss of reputation and business confidence as pleaded at Paragraphs 57 to 57.4 above; 83.16. General damages against the Defendants to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the Plaintiffs’ loss of income and business opportunity as pleaded at Paragraphs 58 to 58.3 above; 83.17. Aggravated damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court against the Defendants for the deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation committed against the Plaintiffs; 83.18. Damages against the Defendants to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the mental anguish, health issues and embarrassment caused to the Plaintiffs as pleaded at Paragraphs 59 to 60 above;” (own emphasis added) [40] As can be seen above the reliefs sought by Tech Food and A One Piling are very wide and convoluted, whereas the “actual” claim itself (primarily premised on breach of contract) is, with respect, quite straight forward. The long windedness of Tech Food and A One Piling’s pleaded claim did not assist their case and made in unnecessarily complicated. I will address this in more detail in the course of this Judgment. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 66 D] BLUE SEAL’S ADMISSION [41] Blue Seal made, inter alia, the following admission (paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 of the “Statement of Agreed Fact (between Plaintiffs and 1st to 5th Defendants” (Bundle D (Enclosure 294)). Paragraph 8 “By the Contract, the 1st Defendant was to supply and install PU panels that are not defective and are fit for purpose and are merchantable quality and are fire retardant and certified class “O” by Jabatan Bomba Dan Penyelamat Malaysia. Paragraph 9 “The 1st Defendant admits liability that the PU panels supplied to the Plaintiffs and installed at the 1st Plaintiff's CGMP Plant by the 1st Defendant are not certified class ‘O’ and that is the Breach of Contract.” Paragraph 12 “The cGMP Processing Plant cannot be used or operated as cGMP Processing Plant as the PU panels supplied and installed by the 1st Defendant are not class ‘O’ certified panels.” (own emphasis added) [42] It must be highlighted that this admission was made on 23.5.2022, about a month before the commencement of the trial. E] THE DEFENDANTS’ DEFENCE [43] Given Blue Seal’s above admission, the 1st to 5th Defendants’ defence is essentially: i) Notwithstanding the admission of the 1st Defendant above, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for the various causes of action set out in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim (“Statement of Claim”) as they have asked for one lump sum of RM20,767,364.26 at paragraph 83.12 without setting out the amount of damages claimed for each cause of action. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 66 ii) Given that there are different elements to be proved for each cause of action including damages, this then makes the claim for a lump sum wrong in law. iii) The 2nd to 5th Defendants are not parties to the contract and are only named as defendants based upon allegations of fraud. iv) Even if fraud is proven on a balance of probabilities, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on fraud as a basis for damages as they have not rescinded the contract (which it is alleged they were induced to enter into). In fact, they have affirmed the contract and asked for a declaration that the contract has been breached. v) The 1st to 5th Defendants have not caused the Plaintiffs any damage save that the PU panels need to be replaced. vi) There is no negligence or breach of fiduciary duties or fraud committed by any of the Defendants. [44] The 6th Defendant defence is essentially that as an employee of Blue Seal, he merely carries out Blue Seal’s instructions and the scope of work for which he is employed. He committed no wrongdoing. The Plaintiffs’ claim against him is misconceived and mala fide. F] CONTRACTING PARTIES [45] The contract to construct the Factory was initially between Tech Food and Blue Seal and is evidenced by the 1st LOA. [46] The 1st LOA was then superseded by the Supersede Letter of Award which like its namesake superseded the 1st LOA. [47] Blue Seal accepted the terms of the Supersede Letter of Award vide its Acceptance Letter. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 66 [48] Thereafter, A One Piling issued the 2nd LOA to Blue Seal which was also dated 6.5.2019, the same date as the 1st LOA (issued by Tech Food). [49] The Supersede Letter of Award read together with the Acceptance Letter by Blue Seal and the 2nd LOA clearly show that the 1st LOA is no longer valid and has been replaced by the 2nd LOA. The contents of these letters are clear and do not contain any ambiguity. [50] The 2nd LOA is not a tripartite agreement. Only A One Piling and Blue Seal are parties to the 2nd LOA and the 2nd LOA makes no reference to the 1st LOA or that it is still applicable. [51] It must be noted that it is Tech Food itself, being the owner of the Project, who had designed the contractual relationship of the parties involved to be in this manner. It cannot then change its stand on this. [52] Although Tech Food continued to be involved in the Project where, inter alia, its approval was required on certain matters, this does not make Tech Food a party to the 2nd LOA nor does it establish a contractual nexus as pleaded in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim. [53] The same applies even where payments are made directly by Tech Food to Blue Seal. In paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim, it was pleaded that due to Tech Food’s continued involvement in the Project a contractual nexus is established. However, as the 1st LOA is no longer valid, Tech Food’s said involvement is only as the owner of the Project and is transmitted contractually through Tech Food’s main contractor, A One Piling. [54] Therefore, the only contract that is in existence and enforceable in the present case is the 2nd LOA and any claim for breach of contract can only be made by A One Piling and not Tech Food. [55] I am aware that as the owner of the Project and the Factory, Tech Food may have ultimately suffered losses arising from a breach of contract by Blue Seal under the 2nd LOA but that is something Tech Food will have to take up with A One Piling. Tech Food has no privity or right to initiate a contractual claim against Blue Seal. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 66 [56] Thus, the contract relationship between parties can be summarised as follows: i) Between Tech Food and A One Piling (Owner and Main Contractor); and ii) Between A One Piling and Blue Seal (Main Contractor and NSC or Nominated Sub-Contractor). [57] In the circumstances the proper plaintiff in this case in respect of a breach of contract claim is A One Piling only. G] IMPLICATION OF THE DEFENDANTS ELECTING NOT TO GIVE EVIDENCE OR SUBMIT “NO CASE TO ANSWER” [58] Before I deal with the various causes of action raised by the Plaintiffs, the implication of the Defendants’ decision to submit of “no case to answer” needs to addressed first. [59] I will begin with the cases cited by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants on this issue and they are as follows: i) Yui Chin Song & Qrs v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417 (FC); ii) Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 (FC); iii) Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Neqeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609 (FC); iv) Leolaris (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 234 (HC); [60] I am in agreement with learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants’ submission that it can be distilled from the above cases with regards to the submission of “no case to answer” that: i) It is for the plaintiff to prove his case on a balance of probabilities and the fact that the defendant has led no S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 66 evidence or called no witnesses does not absolve the plaintiff from discharging his or her burden in law. ii) The mere fact that the defendant elects not to lead evidence does not mean that all the plaintiff’s evidence is automatically to be believed. iii) The defences of the defendant are not under consideration. It is the plaintiff’s case that is to be scrutinised for the sole purpose of establishing whether the plaintiff has proved his or her case on a balance of probabilities. iv) A submission of “no case to answer” can be on the basis that: a) accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at face value, no case has been established at law; or b) the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged. v) Even though the defendant does not call any evidence, it does not mean that the trial judge must believe everything the plaintiff has adduced. [61] In other words, just because the Defendants have elected to submit “no case to answer” does not mean the Plaintiffs’ claim will be automatically allowed. The Plaintiffs have to still prove their case. [62] However, what learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants did not submit on is how and what happens to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s where the defendant’s have chosen to submit “no case to answer”. [63] Before I continue on this issue and refer to the cases that were not cited by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants, it is important for me to first highlight some key factual features of the cases he had referred to: i) In Yui Chin Song (supra) all the defendants save for one made a submission of no case to answer. The plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 66 ii) In Kerumtum (supra) the second defendant did not give evidence and a total of 9 witnesses gave evidence for the defence. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. iii) In Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine (supra) no witnesses were called by the defendant and the plaintiff had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a settlement agreement which the plaintiff claimed existed. The plaintiff called 3 witnesses. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. iv) In Leolaris (supra) the defendant did not call any witnesses or cross-examine the plaintiff’s four witnesses. The plaintiff’s claim was allowed. [64] How the burden of proof is treated and the shifting of the burden in a case where the defendant makes a submission of “no case to answer” was decided in Keruntum (supra) where the Federal court held as follows: “[78] ]t is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party (see UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4). When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. See Tan Klim Khuan v Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697.” (own emphasis added) [65] Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied on the Federal Court case of Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 74 where the 1st respondent failed to attend court and give evidence. The appellant’s claim was allowed by the Federal Court and held, inter alia, as follows: “[4] In our judgment, two consequences inevitably followed when the first respondent who was fully conversant with the facts studiously refrained from giving evidence. In the first place, the evidence given by the appellant ought to have been presumed to be true. As Elphinstone CJ said in Wasakah Singh v. Bachan Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 at p 128: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 66 If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives or calls evidence which, if it is believed, is sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsity of the evidence is immaterial. For the purpose of testing whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to be true. Now, what the trial judge did in the present case is precisely what he ought not to have done. He expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant’s evidence without asking himself that most vital question: does the first defendant/ respondent have a case to answer? This failure on the part of the trial judge is a serious non-direction amounting to a misdirection which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was at that stage not concerned with his belief of the appellant’s evidence. She had given her explanation as to the discrepancies in the figures. And her evidence does not appear to be either inherently incredible or inherently improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the first respondent going the other way. He however failed to direct himself in this fashion thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice.” [5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the first respondent on the amount of the appellant’s contribution to the purchase price as well as the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will normally draw an adverse inference. See Guthrie Sdn Bhd v. Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1990] 1 MLRA 532; [1991] 1 MLJ 33; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 155. See also, Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 1 MLRA 605; [1997] 3 MLJ 693; [1997] 4 CLJ 509 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: “The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the appellants’ case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it.” There are two other authorities that are of assistance on the point. In Wisniewski v. Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, Brooke LJ when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal quoted from a number of authorities including the following passage from the speech of Lord Diplock in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] AC 877: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 66 The appellants, who are a public corporation, elected to call no witnesses, thus depriving the court of any positive evidence as to whether the condition of the fence and the adjacent terrain had been noticed by any particular servant of theirs or as to what he or any other of their servants either thought or did about it. This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold. Brooke LJ then went on to say this: From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case: (1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action. (2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. (3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. (4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified. The other case is Crawford v. Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40, where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the Advice of the Privy Council said: It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 66 [7] In the present instance, there is no doubt that the first respondent had intimate knowledge of the material facts relevant to the dispute and that she was privy to the several steps through which the transaction had proceeded. Based on the authorities already cited, it is patently clear that the trial judge in the present case ought to have held that the failure of the first respondent to give evidence apart from discrediting her case strengthened the appellant’s case on those vital points that lay at the axis of the dispute between the parties. This, the trial judge clearly omitted to do. Instead, he treated the first respondent’s failure to appear and give evidence as a matter of no apparent consequence. His non-direction upon such a crucial point as this certainly amounts to a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. To conclude the first issue, it is our judgment that there was no judicial appreciation of the appellant’s evidence. A reasonable tribunal correctly directing itself on the facts and the relevant law would have held that the appellant had indeed contributed RM194,610 towards the purchase price of the building; that there was a mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent that they shall be beneficial co-owners of the property in question in equal shares; and that the first respondent had acted in breach of that understanding.” (own emphasis added) [66] In Takako Sakao (supra), the Federal Court held that the effect of the defendant’s failure to give evidence, discredits his case and strengthens the plaintiffs case. [67] Justice Mary Lim (as she then was), in Leolaris (supra), examined the effect of the pleaded defence where the defendant submitted “no case to answer” and held as follows: “[23] In a submission of no case to answer, the defences pleaded are not under consideration. To put it bluntly, on such an occasion the defendant is actually saying that it need not bother to offer and lead any evidence on any of the pleaded defences because the plaintiff’s case is bad as it has not been made out and ought therefore to be dismissed without more. It is still the plaintiffs case that is scrutinised for the sole purpose of establishing whether the defendant has made a right submission. If the submission is properly taken on the law and on the facts, then the plaintiffs case would be dismissed. However, where the defendant fails in its submission and the plaintiff succeeds in discharging the burden of proof, the plaintiffs case will be allowed. That is why it is said that the defendant will stand or fall by the submission.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 66 [68] It can thus be summarised that while it is a given that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, however, in a situation where the defendant submits “no case to answer” the Court needs to be satisfied that: i) the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is sufficient to prove his case (Keruntum (supra); Takako (supra)); ii) where the defendant provides no reasons (or credible reasons) as to why he did not care to give evidence the Court will normally draw an adverse inference (Takako (supra)); iii) if such an adverse inference is drawn, it may strengthen the evidence adduced by the plaintiff or weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the defendant (Takako (supra)); iv) there must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the plaintiffs before the Court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue (Takako (supra)); v) the defendant’s defence will not be taken into consideration (Leolaris (supra); Takako (supra)). [69] I will conclude with the following passage from Yui Chin Song (supra) which in turn referred to a passage from the case of Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81: “[50] In this regard, Suriyadi, JCA (as His Lordship then was) in Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 ML] 81, recognised the above riding in the following passage: There are, however, two sets of circumstances under which a defendant may submit that he has no case to answer. In the one case there may be a submission that, accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its face value, no case has been established in law, and in the other that the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged. (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 66 [70] Therefore, to put it simply, as the Defendants have submitted “no case to answer” the issue is whether the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in this case is “so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged” (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)). It therefore follows that if the Plaintiffs succeed in discharging that burden of proof, then the Defendants shall have no defence against the Plaintiffs’ claim. [71] It must also be borne in mind that the evidence tendered by the Plaintiffs must also be examined in light of the admissions of liability made by Blue Seal regarding, inter alia, the PU panels coupled with the fact that the Defendants chose not to adduce any evidence by calling any witness or tendering any document to oppose the Plaintiffs’ evidence and case. The Defendants’ do so at their own peril (Takako (supra)) and it is a risk that they take. H] INDUCEMENT, FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND DECEIT [72] I will deal with the Plaintiffs’ causes of action in respect of Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit first and then followed by the cause of action on Breach of Contract. [73] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit allegations are essentially the same and I see no reason to treat them separately. They are in fact overlapping and it complicates matters to treat them as though they are two separate causes of action as was done by the Plaintiffs. Hence, my reference to Fraudulent Misrepresentation would include Deceit. [74] Ultimately, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation here revolve around the installation of the PU panels which are not Class “O” certified and the allegation that the Defendants concealed this fact from the Plaintiffs. [75] Unlike learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs did not, in his written submissions, specifically or clearly submit on how the Inducement, Fraudulent S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 66 Misrepresentation and Deceit affected the LOAs with reference to the Contracts Act 1950 (“CA 1950”). [76] Therefore, the Statement of Claim needs to be examined to see how the Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit are pleaded in relation to the contract, i.e. the LOAs. Some of the material parts of the Statement of Claim on these causes of action are reproduced below: Paragraph 27 “Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan Pertama melalui Pengarah- Pengarah dan pegawai-pegawainya terutama Defendan Ke-2, Ke-3, Ke-4, Ke-5 dan Ke- 6 telah berulang kali, dengan sengaja, dengan niat dan melulu menyatakan dan/atau mengakui (“represented”) melalui kelakuan dan perkataan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah seorang profesional yang berkebolehan dan mempunyai kemahiran dalam mereka bentuk, membuat, membekalkan, membina dan memasang mereka bentuk dan membina Loji Pemprosesan cGMP termasuk bilik sejuk, bilik sejuk beku dan bilik pemprosesan makanan yang mematuhi cGMP dan sesuai dengan sifat dan kegunaan perniagaan Plaintif Pertama. Plaintif-Plaintif juga merujuk butir-butir salah nyata fraud oleh Defendan-Defendan Pertama hingga Ke-5 dan Defendan Ke-6 secara masing-masing dalam perenggan-perenggan termasuk keseluruhan perenggan 72 (a)(72.1 hingga 72.3) dan (b) 72.3.i hingga 72.3.vii di bawah.” Paragraph 28 “Defendan Pertama di dalam Profil Syarikat (“Company Profile”) yang telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dalam usaha untuk mendorong/menggalakkan perlantikan sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Projek tersebut juga telah antara lainnya menyatakan dan/atau mengakui seperti berikut:- …..” Paragraph 29 “Sebagai sebahagian daripada usaha-usaha untuk mendorong/ menggalakkan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP di dalam Projek tersebut, Defendan Ke-2 sebagai salah seorang pengarah bagi Defendan Pertama telah secara dan dengan sengaja pada atau sekitar April 2019 mempelawa dan membawa Pengarah-Pengarah Plaintif Pertama untuk melawat sebuah kilang Kellogs’ di Negeri Sembilan yang mana telah kononnya juga, berdasarkan makluman oleh Defendan Kedua, melantik Defendan Pertama untuk mereka bentuk dan membina bilik pemprosesan makanan patuh cGMP yang serupa dengan kegunaan yang diperlukan oleh Plaintif Pertama.” S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 66 Paragraph 33 “Berdasarkan dan bergantung kepada semua pernyataan- pernyataan dan jaminan-jaminan di atas yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama melalui Pengarah-Pengarah dan pegawai- pegawainya terutama Defendan Ke-2, Ke-3, Ke-4, Ke-5 dan Ke-6, Plaintif-Plaintif telah bergantung kepadanya dan bertindak ke atas representasi-representasi tersebut dan telah didorong untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Projek tersebut. Plaintif-Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan-perenggan 24 hingga 26.7 di atas di sini. Plaintif-Plaintif juga merujuk butir-butir salah nyata fraud oleh Defendan- Defendan Pertama hingga Ke-5 dan Defendan Ke-6 secara masing-masing dalam perenggan-perenggan termasuk keseluruhan perenggan 72 (a)(72.1 hingga 72.3) dan (b) 72.3.i hingga 72.3.vii di bawah.” Paragraph 72.4 “Plaintif-Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan- perenggan 27 sehingga 33 di atas di sini dan seianjutnya menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan dan bergantung kepada semua pernyataan-pernyataan dan jaminan-jaminan di atas yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama terutama melalui Defendan Ke-2, Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Ke-2 telah bergantung kepadanya dan bertindak ke atas representasi-representasi tersebut dan telah didorong untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Project tersebut” (own emphasis added) [77] Therefore, the Inducement as pleaded in this case is the persuasion by the Defendants for Tech Food to enter into the 1st LOAs and for A One Piling to enter into the 2nd LOA. [78] The Inducement on its own does not amount to any wrongdoing but the Fraudulent Misrepresentation makes it wrongful. [79] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation here is essentially the allegation that: 1st to 5th and 6th Defendants i) The 1st to 5th Defendants misrepresented that Blue Seal was capable of constructing the Factory; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 66 ii) The Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the Contract knowing that Blue Seal was not able (or do not have the capability) to construct the Factory in accordance with the Contract; 6th Defendant iii) The 6th Defendant had dishonestly and fraudulently hidden from Linear Panel Marketing Sdn Bhd (“Linear Panel”) that the PU panels were not Class “O” certified; iv) The 6th Defendant conspired with the 1st to 5th Defendants to defraud the Plaintiffs by concealing that the PU panels were not Class “O” certified, are defective and not suitable to be used in the Project. v) Conspired with Blue Seal and the 2nd to 5th Defendants to sabotage the Project by intentionally allowing work to be carried out at the Project site without proper safety measures and safety equipment which may cause a “Stop Work Order” to be imposed. [80] Therefore, the fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation here must be in connection with the Contract. [81] Under CA 1950, the definition of “misrepresentation” can be found in Section 18 while the definition of “fraud” in Section 17 as stated below: Section 18 CA 1950 ““Misrepresentation” includes - (a) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (b) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gives an advantage to the person committing it, or anyone claiming under him, S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 66 by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; and (c) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.” Section 17 CA 1950 ““Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” (own emphasis added) [82] Thus, in the context of the present case, the Inducement for Tech Food to enter into the 1st LOA and for A One Piling to enter into the 2nd LOA is alleged to have been accomplished through the Fraudulent Misrepresentation (which includes Deceit) committed by the Defendants. [83] What then is the legal consequence of a contract which was entered into through fraud. The answer lies in Section 19 CA 1950 which provides as follows: “(1) When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. (2) A party to a contract, whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 66 performed, and that he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. Exception - If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Explanation - A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the party on whom the fraud was practised, or to whom the misrepresentation was made, does not render a contract voidable.” (own emphasis added) (see Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong [1983] 2 MLJ 320 (FC); Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v. Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1999] 2 MLJ 500 (COA); Seqar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tay Tho Bok & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 211 (COA)) [84] In Abdul Razak (supra) the Court of Appeal made the position clear on the rights of the representee in circumstances where the contract was entered through fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and held as follows: “Fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation renders a contract voidable at the instance of the representee. See the Contracts Act 1950, s 19(1). The representee is therefore entitled to apply to a court for a decree of rescission from a court and also to an award of damages. See Archer v Brown [1985] 1 QB 401. Damages are available in addition to rescission because an action for fraudulent misrepresentation is grounded upon the tort of deceit, and in the case of negligent misrepresentation upon the tort of negligence.” ………. “A representee who is the victim of a fraud may, at his election, abandon his right to rescind and may instead insist that the contract be performed, and that he be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. See the Contracts Act 1950, s 19(2). (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 66 [85] In the present case the Plaintiffs have prayed for the LOAs to be affirmed. In fact, they specifically prayed in paragraph 83.4 of the Statement of Claim for a declaration that the 1st to 5th Defendants committed a breach of contract, of the LOAs. [86] It is clear therefore that the Plaintiffs have decided not to rescind the LOAs but to affirm them instead. [87] In Segar Oil Palm (supra) which facts have some similarity to the present case the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, as follows: “….. Unfortunately, neither counsel nor indeed the trial judge went into the real significance of the passage cited from Chesire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract at p 430. We will repeat it here with the necessary emphasis: It is a fundamental principle that the effect of a misrepresentation is to make the contract voidable and not void. This means that the contract is valid unless and until it is set aside by the representee. On discovering the misrepresentation, the representee may elect to affirm or rescind the contract. (Emphasis added.) It is elementary law that a party to a contract, who alleges fraud, cannot avoid one part of the contract and affirm another, unless the parts are so severable as to be independent contracts. This proposition can be found in Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (7th Ed) pp 515 and 517 where the cases are set out. See also Vendor and Purchaser by RM Stoneham (1994) at p 815. The same proposition is repeated on The Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts (9th Ed) by Pollock and Mulla at p 458 which reads: ... a man cannot rescind a contract in part only, when he decides to repudiate it, he must repudiate it altogether. Having been put on notice on 9 August 1988 in no uncertain terms, the only option the purchasers had was either to perform the agreement according to its terms, or repudiate it altogether and sue for damages for fraud” (own emphasis added) [88] I agree with learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants that based on the, inter alia, Section 19 CA 1950 read together with the cases such as Abdul Razak (supra) and Segar Oil Palm (supra), the Fraudulent Misrepresentation that the Plaintiffs allege induced S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 66 them to enter into the Contract had the effect of nullifying their “consent” to enter into the LOAs. To put it another way the entire contract was voidable by reason of the fraud as there was a lack of consent and the contract could be easily unravelled. [89] In this regard, the Federal Court in Integrated Training and Services Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2022] 3 MLJ 77 had this to say on this point: “[22] In Campbell v Edwards [1976] 1 AH ER 785 it' was held, inter alia, where two parties had agreed that the price of the property was to be fixed by a valuer on whom they should agree and the valuer gave his valuation honestly and in good faith in a non-speaking report, ie one that did not give reasons or calculations, the valuation could not be set aside by either party on the ground that the valuer had made a mistake, for, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the valuation was binding on the parties by contract. Lord Denning MR at p 788 had stated the following: ... It is simply the law of contract. If two persons agree that the price of property should be fixed by a valuer on whom they agree, and he gives that valuation honestly and in good faith, they are bound by it. The reason is because they have agreed to be bound by it. If there were fraud or collusion, of course, it would be different. Fraud or collusion unravels everything.” (own emphasis added) [90] Therefore, the Contract which was entered into was voidable and is valid unless and until set aside. The Plaintiffs then had a choice to either rescind the contract and sue for damages or to affirm the contract and continue with it. [91] The victim of fraud must either set aside the agreement and sue for damages for fraud or affirm the contract (Section 19 of CA 1950; Segar Oil Palm (supra)). [92] The Plaintiffs cannot sue for both Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract. [93] Putting it another way, what the Plaintiffs are saying is that the Defendants’ Fraudulent Misrepresentation had caused them to enter into the Contract (the LOAs). They would not have entered into the Contract or consented to enter into it had they known of S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 30 of 66 the fraud. However, instead or unravelling or setting aside the Contract the Plaintiffs affirm it and then rely on it to say that Blue Seal has breached its terms. By doing this, Fraudulent Misrepresentation allegation no longer becomes an issue. [94] It is illogical for the Plaintiffs to plead they were induced by Fraudulent Misrepresentation by the Defendants to enter into the LOAs and at the same time rely on the very same LOAs to claim for breach of contract. [95] With respect, the Plaintiffs’ claim for Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit is flawed and can be dismissed on this ground alone. [96] It therefore follows that the reliefs in the Statement of Claim related to fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation cannot be maintained. [97] With respect to the Plaintiffs, further to what I had stated in paragraph 40 above, their pleaded case specifically in respect of Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit is fundamentally flawed. [98] It is of utmost importance that there is correlation between the cause of action pleaded and the relief(s) that follow, if not, the claim would make no sense. [99] I would conclude with a passage by the Federal Court in Giga Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 MLJ 449 where it was held as follows: “[42] Now, it is trite law that the plaintiff is bound by its own pleadings (see R Rama Chandran v The industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145; Anjalal Anmal & Anor v Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22; Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 302 (SC); Joo Chin Kia v Loh Seng Tek [1987] 1 CLJ 194; KEP Mohamed AH v KEP Mohamad Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10 (FC)). The plaintiff is not permitted to improve its pleading in any other manner other than by way of an application to amend. Otherwise it would be unfair and prejudicial to the defendants if the plaintiff could now be allowed to raise an issue that was not within the contemplation of the parties in the first place (see Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v South Port Corpn [1956] AC 218; Playing Cards (M) Sdn Bhd v China Mutual Navigation Co Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 182 (FC)).” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 31 of 66 [100] Notwithstanding the above, for the purpose of completeness, I have nevertheless still considered the alleged individual acts of the Defendants that is said to constitute Fraudulent Misrepresentation and the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs on this issue. I] FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL [101] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation pleaded by the Plaintiffs is to justify the lifting of the corporate veil or to go behind the corporate veil to make the Defendants liable together with the 1st Defendant. [102] An elaborate definition of “misrepresentation” can be found in Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar @ Tee Kim [2003] 3 MLJ 460 in which the Court of Appeal held as follows: “Now, it is trite that the expression ‘misrepresentation’ is merely descriptive of a false pre-contractual statement that induces a contract or other transaction. But it does not reflect the state of mind of the representor at the relevant time. The state of mind of the representor at the time he made the representation to the representee varies according to the circumstances of each case. It may be fraudulent. It may be negligent. Or it may be entirely innocent, that is to say, the product of a mind that is free of deceit and inadvertence (see Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd. Put another way, a misrepresentation is innocent ‘where the representor believes his assertion to be true and consequently has no intention of deceiving the representee.’ (Chesire & Fifoot, Law of Contract (6th Ed)). It is the particular state of mind of the representor that determines the nature of the remedy available to the representee. So, if the misrepresentation is made fraudulently, then the representee is entitled to rescission and all damages directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement.” (own emphasis added) [103] Therefore, the Plaintiffs must show that the Fraudulent Misrepresentation was: i) Made before the contract; and S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 32 of 66 ii) The state of mind of the Defendants at the time the Fraudulent Misrepresentation was made, in that the Defendants intended to deceive the Plaintiffs. [104] First and foremost, as I have decided earlier, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation allegation cannot stand in view of the Plaintiffs reliance on the Contract to sue Blue Seal for breach thereof. [105] Secondly, and in any event, it is clear from paragraphs 72.3J to 72.3.vii of the Statement of Claim that all the matters relied on by the Plaintiffs occurred after the Contract was entered into and hence cannot amount to a pre-contractual false statement of fact that had induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the Contract with Blue Seal (Sim Thong Realty (supra)). [106] Thirdly, though the allegations against the Defendants are made jointly, the pleaded particulars are only in respect of the 2nd Defendant (paragraphs 29 to 31 of the Statement of Claim). [107] The case of Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v. Yeoh Teen Earn & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 involved the joint allegation of fraud and Justice Mohd Nazlan (as he then was) observed the following: “[54] The plaintiff must furnish the requisite particularity by pleading the circumstances of material facts as to the questions of “who, what, where, when and how" of the alleged fraud and conspiracy in order to enable the defendants to provide a meaningful response. It cannot be emphasised enough that general statements which are vague and containing conclusory allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Order 18 r 7 and r 12. The statement of claim too cannot hide behind purported averments which in truth are nothing but merely a set of formulaic recitation of the ingredients of a cause of action. [55] Pleadings sans particularisation is bad pleading because matters such as fraud and conspiracy cannot be expected to be inferred from statements which are vague and general in nature, more so as the concept of fraud itself is not immutable. Similarly, when alleging fraud and conspiracy against more than one defendants, like presently, the plaintiff must specify, with particularity, each of the fourth and fifth defendant's offending conduct. The defendants cannot be grouped together without identifying which defendant has committed which wrong.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 33 of 66 [108] It is pleaded at paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim that Blue Seal acted through the 2nd to 5th Defendants. It follows that the circumstances of how the fraud occurred must be pleaded and proved in Court in particular: i) What each of these Defendants had done; and ii) How each of them had either ordered or procured the fraud in question before the Contract was entered into. [109] As the above two elements/facts were not pleaded or proved, it would appear that Fraudulent Misrepresentation was raised against the 2nd to 5th Defendants merely because they are directors of Blue Seal and against the 6th Defendant as he is Blue Seal’s employee. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Victor Cham & Anor v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 held as follows: “[8] In C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd & Anor, Slade LJ relying on the case of Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 stated the legal position in the following words: The mere fact that a person is a director of a limited company does not by itself render him liable for torts committed by the company during the period of his directorship: see, for example, Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in Hq) v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1924] 2 AC 465 at 488,.... Nevertheless, judicial dicta of high authority are to be found in English decisions which suggest that a director is liable for those tortuous acts of his company which he has ordered or procured to be done. [9] In Wah Tat Bank Ltd and another v Chan Cheng Kum [1975] 2 All ER 257, two banks brought an action against a shipping company and C, the company chairman and managing director, claiming damages jointly against them for conversion. In holding C liable, the Privy Council in its judgment delivered by Lord Salmon stated: No doubt the fact that the respondent is chairman and managing director of HSC does not of itself make him personally liable in respect of that company’s tortuous acts. A tort may he committed through an officer or servant of a company without the chairman or managing director being in any way implicated. There are many such cases reported in the books. If however the chairman or managing director S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 34 of 66 procures or directs the commission of the tort he may be personally liable for the tort and the damage flowing from it: Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd per Arkin LJ. Each case depends on its own particular facts. In the instant case the un- contradicted evidence proves that early in 1961 the respondent, as chairman and managing director of HSC, agreed with the directors of TSC the terms on which HSC would continue wrongfully to convert goods consigned to the banks just as they had done in the past. Their Lordships consider that in all the circumstances there is no answer to the banks’ contention that the respondent was personally liable for the conversion in respect of which judgement has been entered against HSC.” ……… “[11] In Thomas Bruce Morgan v Government of Saskatchewan, Neal Hardy and Darrel Binkley [1985] Sask R 129, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal made the following observation: On this branch of the case we refer to the following passage from judgment of Disber J, in Einhorn v Westmount Investments Ltd and Belzberg et al. (1969), 69 WWR (NS) 31, at p 36: Ordinarily an agent is subject to the control of another person, his principal. A company perforce is only able to act through its agents and servants. Consequently, while company directors are referred to as ‘agent’, the cold fact is that they control the company. As the directors pull the strings so the company must of necessity jump. Particularly is this true where, as here, the individual defendants were in 'complete control' of the company. This court in the exercise of its common-law jurisdiction in the field of tort considers the realities of the situations which come before it for decision, and the court is not restricted in so doing because individual carries out intentional tortuous acts through the medium of a puppet corporation whose every action they control. Individuals guilty of intentional tortuous acts do not escape personal liability by this device of clothing themselves in a corporate veil of their own spinning. And further the court said: So a director is not to be held liable merely because he is a director but may be liable when he participates in or orders a tortuous act and cannot S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 35 of 66 escape personal liability by asserting that his act was merely the act of the corporation. In other words, the 'corporate veil’ is not to be used as a shield to protect shareholders and directors when they have been guilty of wrongdoing. This approach is consistent with the notion that everyone should be answerable for his tortuous acts.” (own emphasis added) [110] The pleaded allegations of Fraudulent Misrepresentation against the 2nd Defendant are essentially in relation to: i) The visit to Kellogg’s Factory; and ii) The 1st Defendant’s company profile. [111] As for the Kellogg’s Factory visit, I do not find there to be evidence of Fraudulent Misrepresentation for the following reasons: i) PW-1 himself testified that PW-1 initiated the trip to the Kellogg’s Factory by “requesting” that the 2nd Defendant take him there. This alone negates the allegation of inducement; ii) It is alleged that the 2nd Defendant told PW-1 that the panels installed in the Kellogg’s Factory were going to be the same as the panels to be installed at the Factory. The Plaintiffs have not proven the existence of the element of “fraud” or “dishonesty” in this statement (CIMB Bank Bhd v. Veeran Ayasamy (Wakil Diri Kepada Letchimi Muthusamy, Si Mati) [2015] 7 CLJ 289). This is simply because the Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence of the type of panels installed at the Kellogg’s Factory or that the panels installed at the Factory are sub-standard compared to those installed at the Kellogg’s Factory. This would have required the Plaintiffs to actually adduce evidence of the panels at the Kellogg’s Factory which they did not do; iii) The truth of the statement is one thing but the issue of “dishonesty” is required to be proven where Fraudulent Misrepresentation is alleged. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove there was any dishonesty in the statement made by the 2nd Defendant. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 36 of 66 [112] Regarding Blue Seal’s company profile, it was not pleaded and neither was there clear evidence on how the Plaintiffs obtained the said profile, in particular from which of the Defendants. [113] As a company acts through its “agent” (Victor Cham (supra)) the Plaintiffs must plead and prove which of the Defendants, if any, had given Blue Seal’s company profile to the Plaintiffs. PW-1 had then named the 2nd Defendant in his oral testimony before the Court but this cannot be permitted. In this regard, the Federal Court in Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Global Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 1 MLJ 302 held as follows: “These issues brought up at the trial had not been pleaded in the Statement of Defence, and this was a contravention of Order 18 Rule 8 of the Rules of the High Court, and therefore the contentions should not have been entertained (Attorney General v. Lord Mayor etc. of City of Sheffield(1)" (own emphasis added) [114] Even if is accepted that the 2nd Defendant or either of the 3rd to 5th Defendants had given Blue Seal’s company profile to the Plaintiffs, it has not been shown that there is anything stated in Blue Seal’s company profile which is inaccurate or untrue and how it is tantamount to Fraudulent Misrepresentation. [115] In so far as conspiracy is concerned the requirements laid down in Renault SA v. Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394 have not been fulfilled in that the following have not been clearly pleaded or proven: i) an agreement between the 6th Defendant and the 1st to 5th Defendants; ii) an agreement for the purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs; iii) the overt acts that were done in execution of the agreement; iv) that the overt acts were done in execution of the agreement; and v) what are the acts purportedly done by each of the Defendants in execution of the agreement. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 37 of 66 [116] There is no direct evidence tendered by the Plaintiffs to prove Fraudulent Misrepresentation against any of the Defendants and in particular that they “knowingly” committed the alleged acts associated with the allegation of Fraudulent Misrepresentation, fraud and conspiracy. The following passages by the Federal Court in Keruntum (supra) is instructive on this issue: “[70] In order for the plaintiff to succeed in its case that the cancellation of its licence was to serve a political purpose, it is necessary for the plaintiff to adduce evidence if believed, sufficient to prove that the second defendant knew about the Ming Court affair prior to the cancellation of the plaintiff’s licence. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff had not adduced direct evidence to show that the second defendant knew about it. It was also the finding of the courts below that to link the aforesaid cancellation to a political motive is a mere conjecture.” (own emphasis added) [117] In order to prove the Defendants’ knew that the panels were not certified Class ‘O’ even before they were installed, the Plaintiffs relied on the letter dated 31.3.2019 from Bahagian Perancangan dan Penyelidikan Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat to Linear Panel (“Bomba’s Letter”). This is the main evidence that the Plaintiffs relied on to show knowledge of the Defendants. [118] However, I agree with learned counsel for the Defendants that Bomba’s Letter does support the Plaintiffs’ allegation as: i) Bomba’s Letter is only addressed to Linear Panel and not to any of the Defendants. It is also not copied to any of the Defendants; ii) Bomba’s Letter merely states that Linear Panel’s application to obtain a renewal for “Coldroom Panel (50mm thickness)” for Class ‘O’ was rejected; iii) nowhere in Bomba’s Letter is it mentioned whether the Class ‘O’ certificate (for which the renewal was rejected) referred to in the letter is in respect of PU panels or whether it is in respect of another type of cold room panel. The Quotation indicates EPS (Expanded Polystyrene) panels (which both parties agree was later changed to PU panels). S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 38 of 66 iv) Pooi Chee Hoog who is a director of Linear Panels mentioned in PW-1’s witness statement (WS(A)-PW1) was never called to testify by the Plaintiffs; v) the Defendants are not mentioned in Bomba’s Letter. [119] Hence, the summary of my findings are as follows: i) The Defendants did not commit Fraudulent Misrepresentation; ii) The Fraudulent Misrepresentation in the context of the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case is fundamentally wrong. The Plaintiffs cannot say they were induced to enter into the Contract (LOAs) but at the same time rely on the same contract to claim for breach thereof. iii) In the absence of fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation there is no ground to lift the corporate veil in the present case. In this regard the Court of Appeal in Lam Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 held as follows. “In my judgment, in the light of the more recent authorities such as Adams v Cape Industries Plc, it is not open to the courts to disregard the corporate veil purely on the ground that it is in the interests of justice to do so. It is also my respectful view that the special circumstances to which Lord Keith referred include cases where there is actual fraud at common law or some inequitable or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity. The former, that is to say, actual fraud, was expressly recognised to be an exception to the doctrine of corporate personality by Lord Halsbury in his speech in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, the seminal case on the subject.” (own emphasis added) (see also Solid Investments Ltd v. Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 784 (FC)) [120] I must stress here that Fraudulent Misrepresentation, fraud as well as conspiracy to defraud are serious allegations and in the absence of “dishonesty” as well as proof of the state of mind the S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 39 of 66 Defendants, these allegations remain nothing more than mere allegations. [121] Further, the causes of action of this nature involving fraud and dishonesty must not only be specifically pleaded but there must also be clear evidence to prove the nexus between the alleged wrongful acts and the defendant who is said to have committed those wrongful acts. The Plaintiffs have failed to do either of this. J] NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY [122] The Plaintiffs also included, in addition to the multiple causes of action, a claim based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. [123] The negligence as pleaded is that the Defendants were negligent in, inter alia, supplying, constructing and carrying out installation work at the Factory. [124] The allegation on negligence is also attached to the allegation of defective and latent defect in the material used, design and work quality. [125] These are all allegations regarding the Contract. The Plaintiffs claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty is premised on the Contract (the LOAs). [126] This is further confirmed in the answer to Question 33 in WS(A)- PW1: “Question 33: Apart from the above-mentioned breaches, can you explain to the Court, what are the other failures of the Defendants in supplying, manufacturing, designing, installing and delivering the cGMP processing plant to the Plaintiffs? Answer 33: a) Following from the admission by the D1 that PU panels supplied to and installed at the 1st Plaintiff’s cGMP processing plant are not certified as Class O and that is breach of contract, it is inter-related and evidently proved that D1 and its directors D2-D5 are negligent in carrying out their duties of care and skill, when Defendants knew that they were appointed S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 40 of 66 specifically as NSC for the Projects, so they owe a duty of care to us. ” (own emphasis added) [127] The negligence claim is pleaded jointly against all the Defendants based on the “Particulars of Negligence” against the Defendants in paragraphs 81.1 to 81.16 of the Statement of Claim. [128] At paragraph 80 of the Statement of Claim, it is also pleaded these same Defendants jointly owe a duty of care to the Plaintiffs as NSCs: “Selanjutnya dan/atau secara alternatif Plaintif-Plaintif menyatakan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material Defendan-Defendan mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan mengguna kemahiran tehadap Plaintif- Plaintif selaku SKD untuk membekal, membuat, mereka bentuk dan membina Loji Pemprosesan cGMP bagi Projek selari dengan SA No. 1 tersebut, SA No. 2 tersebut, undang-undang berkaitan di Malaysia dan semua representasi- representasi yang telah dibuat sama ada melalui tindakan atau perkataan yang telah diberikan terhadap dan dijaminkan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. Plaintif- Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan-perenggan 27 sehingga 33 di atas di sini.” (own emphasis added) [129] The Contracts do not involve the 2nd to 6th Defendants and as such they do not owe the Plaintiffs a duty of care regarding the Contract. [130] Further, I have stated earlier that the only contract in existence is the 2nd LOA between A One Piling and Blue Seal. [131] Therefore, the Plaintiffs claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty cannot be maintained against the 2nd to 6th Defendants who have no contractual relationship with the either of the Plaintiffs. [132] When it comes to Blue Seal, I find that the claim for negligence overlaps with the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract. That being the case, the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract will supersede their claim for negligence. [133] The issue of an obligation in contract superseding a duty in tort was dealt with in the Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 in which the Privy Council held as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 41 of 66 “Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the law's development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship. Though it is possible as a matter of legal semantics to conduct an analysis of the rights and duties inherent in some contractual relationships including that of banker and customer either as a matter of contract law when the question will be what, if any, terms are to be implied or as a matter of tort law when the task will be to identify a duty arising from the proximity and character of the relationship between the parties, their Lordships believe it to be correct in principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the law to adhere to the contractual analysis: on principle because it is a relationship in which the parties have, subject to a few exceptions, the right to determine their obligations to each other, and for the avoidance of confusion because different consequences do follow according to whether liability arises from contract or tort, e.g. in the limitation of action. …..” ………. “Their Lordships do not, therefore, embark on an investigation as to whether in the relationship of banker and customer it is possible to identify tort as well as contract as a source of the obligations owed by the one to the other. Their Lordships do not, however, accept that the parties' mutual obligations in tort can be any greater than those to be found expressly or by necessary implication in their contract. …” (own emphasis added) [134] The same position was taken by the Court of Appeal in Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v. SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 in respect of an attempt by the respondent there to impose a tortious duty of care on the appellant who was sued for negligence. The Court of Appeal referred to the case of Tai Hing Cotton Mill (supra) and held as follows: “[36] In essence therefore, and harkening to the fair, just and reasonable requirement as set out in Caparo, in cases where the parties must be taken to have intended their rights and obligations to be governed exclusively by the contract or contracts which, they have entered, especially in a commercial contract, that factor to be taken as a compelling one, or in some cases a decisive one, against the imposition of a duty of care in tort.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 42 of 66 [135] Therefore, to summarise my findings on this issue: i) The Plaintiffs have no cause of action for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty against the 2nd to 6th Defendants; ii) As A One Piling has a contract with Blue Seal under the 2nd LOA, it supersedes A One Piling’s claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Blue Seal. iii) Tech Food has no contractual claim or nexus with Blue Seal as the 1st LOA is no longer valid. Blue Seal owes no fiduciary duty to Tech Food and no claim for negligence can be maintained by Tech Food against Blue Seal in respect of the work Blue Seal carried out for A One Piling under the 2nd LOA, as the NSC of the Project. K] BREACH OF CONTRACT (THE 2ND LOA) [136] I now come to A One Piling’s claim for breach of contract against Blue Seal. This is the only part of the Plaintiffs’ claim that can be maintained and it is only confined to A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract. [137] As stated earlier in paragraph 40 above, Blue Seal has admitted to liability for breach of the terms of the 2nd LOA but the admission is limited to the following: i) Under the Contract, A One Piling was to supply and install PU panels that are not defective, are fit for the purpose, are of merchantable quality, fire retardant and certified Bomba class “O”; ii) Blue Seal failed to supply and install Bomba Class ‘O’ certified PU panels at the Factory; iii) As a result of this failure the Factory cannot be used or operated as a cGMP Processing Plant. [138] At the outset, Blue Seal’s admission was only made on 23.5.2022 about a month before the trial was scheduled to commence, i.e. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 43 of 66 20.6.2022. Even then it was after numerous requests and/or challenges made by the Plaintiffs for the documents to prove that the PU panels installed at the Factory were in fact Bomba certified class “O”. [139] Blue Seal’s failure to make this disclosure or admission works to its detriment and ultimately affects Blue Seal’s credibility. [140] Based on the admission of liability, the Factory could not be used or operated as a cGMP Processing Plant as intended because of Blue Seal’s failure to supply and install Bomba certified class “O” PU panels at the Factory. [141] However, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, the breach by Blue Seal is not only limited to the fact that the PU panels installed at the Factory were no Bomba certified class “O” but also that: i) The PU panels had bubbles or blisters on them. This is not denied by the Defendants. ii) The PU panels were in fact defective and damaged which became evident subsequent to their installation. The PU panels cover a large portion of the Factory. The entire Factory is a huge refrigeration storage facility. iii) The damage does not only extend to the PU panels themselves but also the other components that make up or come with the PU panels. As the Factory is used as a refrigerated storage facility the PU panels have to be installed with proper insulation and support. This is because the PU panels are installed at the inner walls, doors and ceilings of the Factory and they form a complete system (“Refrigeration system”). Perhaps in more simple or lay terms, the PU panels are like the inner walls of a fridge and the damage to the inner walls can cause a catastrophic effect to the whole fridge. This is what has happened to the Factory. iv) Blue Seal had failed to construct the Factory properly to enable it to function as a refrigerated storage facility, the very purpose for which Blue Seal was engaged. [142] Having examined the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in this case I find that the evidence substantiates A One Piling’s above S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 44 of 66 allegations namely that the PU panels were defective and that the installation of the PU panels and the overall Refrigeration system were not done properly. [143] In connection to this, there was a dispute raised by Blue Seal that the Contract and in particular the 2nd LOA did not include “design” work”. Whilst the terms of the 2nd LOA may not be absolutely clear on this and this had caused parties to engage in lengthy submissions, however, respectfully, I do not find the issue as complicated as it seems. This is based on the 2nd LOA (read together with the Quotation and other relevant documents) the construction of the Factory is very comprehensive. There can be no mistake or confusion that the Factory was to be used as a refrigerated storage facility and even a cursory review of the 2nd LOA and the Quotation will show that. Blue Seal’s work was to construct the Refrigeration system to enable the Factory to operate as a refrigerated storage facility. Thus, even if it is not explicitly stated, it can still be clearly implied that when Blue Seal constructs the Factory, it must ensure that the Factory can function as a refrigerated storage facility. [144] It would not make sense for Blue Seal to construct the Factory when it knows and ought to know that the Factory, upon being constructed, would not be able to function as a refrigerated storage facility. Therefore, Blue Seal cannot deny that there is a “design” element in the construction of the Factory. This is one of the complaints that was raised by the Plaintiffs, i.e. on the design work, which was also addressed by their expert, Raymond A.E.de Graaf (“PW-2”), in his reports and oral testimony at the trial. [145] Thus, in the construction of the Factory, Blue Seal must ensure that the Factory will ultimately function as a refrigerated storage facility and the work must be “designed” to achieve that. It is not open for Blue Seal to allege it only did what the Plaintiffs told it to do (e.g. to instal the PU panels) and if the Factory cannot operate as intended Blue Seal cannot be faulted as it did not design the Factory. [146] It must be borne in mind that the work under the 2nd LOA is comprehensive. Blue Seal must have the technical knowledge and ability to construct the Factory and use that knowledge and ability so that the Factory will function as a refrigerated storage facility. This is the reason for which A One Piling engaged Blue Seal and relied on Blue Seal’s expertise. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 45 of 66 L] BREACH OF CONTRACT - EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, DAMAGE AND QUANTUM [147] Regarding the allegations stated in paragraph 141 above PW-2 had testified, inter alia, as follows in his witness WS(A)-PW2: “Question 9 : Can you explain what is the opinion in your Assessment Report? Answer 9 : In summary, my opinion is as follows: a) Taking the general inadequate project conditions into consideration, which will result in high operational power consumption cost, accelerated depreciations, insurmountable deterioration, further bubble/blister phenomena, further delamination of the PPGI and structural stress damages on insulation and civil structures, substantial increased wear and tear on all related components, in particular the refrigeration equipment, insulation and possible concrete floor heaving, (it is paramount, to understand the problems and have raised awareness that expensive unforeseen repair- and replacement solutions during full operational periods will become inevitably. b) Having conducted the extensive survey and study of the Temperature-Controlled Production Facility concerned, that the most obvious recommendation that can be concluded is, to replace all insulation works and respective concrete floating floors, redesign the method statements and consider to conduct a thorough capacity calculation on the refrigeration equipment versus heat loads and thermal conductivity computations of the installed insulation systems. c) If however, the most obvious recommendation of replacement will not be implemented, it needs to be a paradigm of continuous monitoring the inspected and found defects, non-appliance parts of the method statements, inadequate applicable method statements, ice build-up in the tongue and groove panel connections, expected deterioration continuation, as well as the overall conditions of the total contracted works. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 46 of 66 d) It is obvious that a pre-operational trial runs need to be executed on all mechanical components that have been subject to a long period of a non-activity status combined with a thorough cleaning of the entire ex- and internal facility.” [148] PW-2 further testified on the condition of Factory as at 16.6.2022 (which is a few days before the trial) as follows: “Question 15 : Can you briefly explain about your assessment?? Answer 15 : a) I conducted another site assessment inspection at the request of Tech food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. on 16.06.2022 for the purpose of a comparison with my Assessment Report No. 1 dated 11.06.2020 and composed the assessment as Updated Status Report No. 1 dated 16.06.2022 and marked as Exhibit RDG- 3 in the Plaintiffs’ Expert Affidavit (No. 2) affirmed by me on 17.06.2022. b) In brief, I found all previous inspected external phenomenon of bubble/blister of PU walls-, partition walls-, and walkable/suspended ceiling sandwich insulation panels, the phenomenon of delamination/debonding on the external side of the walkable/suspended ceiling PU insulation sandwich panels, as well as the inadequate essential vapor barriers, door- & relief ports components and equipment in comparison to my Assessment Report 1, dated 11.06.2020 to be substantially deteriorated, no improvement whatsoever on the PU finishing floors, additional corrosion on the refrigeration equipment, dust and cobwebs. c) For these reasons, the only conclusion I can make is to demolish the entire PU insulation system, the PU floor insulation slabs in Freezer 1 & 2, combined with the concrete top floors, the freezer door frames and a thorough review of the conditions of the refrigeration systems and individual equipment of all capacities, heat load calculations, corrosion in order to re-design the entire system and amend the method statements on the entire insulation system in accordance with Bomba class ‘O’ certification.” S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 47 of 66 [149] In relation to this, it is crucial to note that Blue Seal or the other Defendants did not produce any expert report either on their own or in rebuttal. [150] In the absence of their own expert report or expert testimony, the cross-examination conducted by the Defendants on PW-2 in respect of technical or scientific matters would not have much of an impact on PW-2’s testimony unless the expert evidence is “obviously lacking in defensibility” and “is not supported by the basic facts of the case” (Majuikan Sdn Bhd v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171). This is not the situation in the instant case. [151] Any of the Defendants’ counsel who cross-examines PW-2 cannot presuppose he has knowledge on the scientific area involved without support from another expert report or testimony to base his cross-examination on (see Syed Abu Bakar bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 MLRA 318; PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLRH 841 on how the Court treats expert reports). [152] Therefore, this falls squarely under one of the circumstances in which adverse inference may be drawn under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA 1950”) and especially in the present case where the Defendants have submitted “no case to answer” (Takako (supra)). [153] To prove its claim for breach of contract A One Piling had adduced both documentary and viva voce evidence which are summarised as follows: i) One “Part A” bundle of documents where the authenticity and contents of the documents are agreed; ii) Eight “Part B” bundle of documents where the contents of the documents are disputed and not their authenticity. iii) One “Part C” bundle of document which only contains “Whatsapp” messages totalling 2 pages. iv) Six witnesses testified for the Plaintiffs. [154] The documentary evidence included pictures of the Factory and video recordings of the inspection carried out at the Factory. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 48 of 66 [155] It is proven from the totality of the evidence presented at the Trial that the Factory was not constructed properly (including defective or wrong materials used) and the construction work was incomplete. Even visibly, the damage especially to the PU panels can be seen in that most, if not all, of the PU panels installed at the Factory have blisters/bubbles on them. [156] To put it plainly, the Factory was in poor condition and in a deteriorated state. [157] The condition of the Factory was a direct result of Blue Seal’s failure to construct the Factory in accordance with the Contract and the entire Refrigeration system as stated in paragraph 141 above. This is clearly borne out by the evidence. [158] The condition of the Factory was described in detail in PW-2’s expert reports and in his oral testimony. PW-2 had inspected the Factory at least twice. [159] There is no reason for me to doubt or question PW-2’s testimony though learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants had argued that he was not independent. There is no evidence of this except for the attempts by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants to challenge PW-2’s credibility during cross-examination. During cross-examination I observed that PW-2 remained resolute, unwavering and consistent in his testimony which were supported by scientific explanation and data. [160] Given the admissions made by Blue Seal in particular that the Factory cannot be used or operated together with the totality of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs, I find that Blue Seal had committed breach of contract. Blue Seal had essentially failed to construct the Factory in accordance with the 2nd LOA and namely as stated in paragraph 141 above. [161] The said breach had then caused A One Piling to suffer losses. [162] Though there were multiple reliefs prayed for by A One Piling in respect of its the breach of contract claim, I had only allowed those which were the direct consequence of the breach and related to the 2nd LOA. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 49 of 66 [163] It must be noted at this juncture that some of the reliefs were withdrawn by the Plaintiffs such as the relief in prayers 83.10 and 83.13 of the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiffs also requested for “appropriate general damages” to be granted by the Court in place of prayers 83.7 and 83.11 of the Statement of Claim. [164] A One Piling’s contractual claim which I had allowed were confined to, inter alia, the following main reliefs in the Statement of Claim: i) Prayer 83.2 as prayed for; ii) Prayer 83.4 but only in respect of a declaration that there was a breach of contract of the 2nd LOA by Blue Seal as the NSC for the Project; iii) Prayer 83.9 for the refund of RM98,000.00 that was overpaid; iv) Prayer 83.11 for A One Piling to utilise the balance 5% of the Contract Sum which it is holding, against the costs of rectifying the Factory; and v) Prayer 83.12 for special damages but reduced to the sum of RM19,498,666.73 being the costs of rectifying the Factory; [165] Therefore, the two main relief for liquidated sums in the Statement of Claim which I allowed for breach of contract are: i) Prayer 83.9 for the refund of RM98,000.00 that was overpaid; and ii) Prayer 83.12 for special damages of RM19,498,666.73 being the costs of rectifying the Factory. [166] I will begin with the overpayment claim of RM98,000.00 which is specifically pleaded in the Statement of Claim. [167] Based on the testimony of PW-5, after Blue Seal terminated the 2nd LOA, PW-5, as the SO of the Project, was required to prepare the final account in respect of the same. At that point of time, after recalculation and inspection, it was discovered that the Project was over certified and many of the works that were supposedly done were not completed as claimed. In the circumstances, revised progress payment certificates were prepared, i.e. Progress S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 50 of 66 Payment Certificate No. 4A and Progress Payment Certificate No. 5A. [168] In support of its claim, A One Piling had produced pictures of the above incomplete works which were attached together with the Progress Claim No. 5A (Bundle B1). [169] It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiffs, that the RM98,000.00 overpayment was calculated as follows: “a) Progress Payment Certificate No. 4A: RM151,970.38 (add) b) Progress Payment Certificate No. 5A: -RM1 39,280.54 (less) c) Payment made by 2nd Plaintiff on 13.02.2019: RM110,945.64 Total: RM98,255.80” [170] As the 1st to 5th Defendants’ arguments against the evidence in respect of A One Piling’s claim for the overpayment of RM98,000.00 and special damages of RM19,498,666.73 are similar, I will deal with them together after addressing the said special damages claim. [171] Regarding A One Piling’s claim for special damages, the actual amount prayed in prayer 83.12 of the Statement of Claim, being the costs involved to rectify the Factory, was RM20,767,364.26. The particulars of this special damages were pleaded in, inter alia, paragraphs 56, 56.1 to 56.21.6 of the Statement of Claim. [172] A One Piling pleaded in detail the work and costs involved to rectify the Factory covering, inter alia, the work involved to the materials required and the related costs. [173] However, at the trial A One Piling was only able to prove special damages amounting to RM19,498,666.73. This was based on, inter alia, the testimonies of PW-5 and PW-6 as well as the documentary evidence adduced in, inter alia, Bundles B4 and B5 which include a document entitled “Summary For Loss and Damages (until 4/5/2022)” together with its supporting documents involving numerous quotations issued by various contractors and suppliers. The special damages of RM19,498,666.73 essentially represents the costs of rectifying the Factory. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 51 of 66 [174] In addition to this, PW-2, as an expert witness, had also testified on the what was needed to be done to rectify the Factory and to put it in working condition. [175] The 1st to 5th Defendants challenged the evidence adduced by A One Piling in respect of the above overpayment and special damages claim based on the following grounds: i) All the documents which were brought to the Court’s attention during post trial submissions are in Part B of the agreed bundle and the contents are disputed. ii) The Plaintiffs have presented their entire case without reading out any documents during the trial. They merely asked the Court to refer to certain pages in the agreed bundle and told the Court that the documents at those pages supported their case. No attempt was made to read out any document in Court. iii) By reason of issues (i) and (ii) above, the quotations were not properly admitted in evidence and their contents proved. iv) PW-2 is not a true expert in the area and his reports and testimony ought to be disregarded. [176] With regards to the issue at paragraph 175(i) above, it is not in dispute and is the correct position of law that the documents placed in Part B are disputed as to their contents and not their authenticity. The two cases below make it clear as to how Part B documents are to be treated: i) Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] MLRAU 376 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[24] It is clear that Bundle B contains documents where the authenticity of the same is not disputed but contents are. What that means is simply this. There is no requirement to call any evidence to prove the authenticity or existence of the document in question. However, if any party wants to rely on the contents of that document, he or she must call for the evidence, oral or otherwise, to prove the truth of the same. Unless that is done, the trial Court cannot give any evidential value to the contents of that document.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 52 of 66 ii) Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] 6 MLRA 52 in which the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[36] To answer that question it is necessary to consider O 34 r 2(2)(e). It provides that documents where the authenticity is agreed but the contents are in dispute, the documents are to be placed in Part B. This in turn means that while the parties are in agreement that such a document exists and is not a fabrication, the contents of the document remain in dispute. So the relevant witness is to be present at trial to be cross- examined on the contents only, of the document.” (own emphasis added) [177] Based on the above authorities, A One Piling will have to prove the contents of the documents that were placed in Part B by calling for the evidence, oral or otherwise (Melawangi (supra)) and where oral testimony is given the relevant witness must be in Court to be cross-examined by the Defendants (Tiow Weng Theong (supra)). [178] In the present case A One Piling had tendered the Part B documents and called the relevant witnesses to testify on those documents. A One Piling’s witnesses were then offered to the Defendants for cross-examination. Therefore, it is clear to me that A One Piling has satisfied the above two requirements laid out in Melawangi (supra) and Tiow Weng Theong (supra). [179] The next issue (paragraph 175(ii) above) pertains to the 1st to 5th Defendants’ argument that the said documents in Part B were only referred to by the Plaintiffs’ witnesses but were not read out in Court. Therefore, they do not form part of the evidence in the present case. [180] Whilst I agree that for A One Piling to prove the contents of the documents in Part B, the said documents must be referred to specifically by the relevant witness, however, I do not agree that they (i.e. the contents of these documents) need to be specifically read out in Court at the trial. [181] In this regard, the Supreme Court in Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 had clearly addressed this issue in, inter alia, the following passages: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 53 of 66 “Thirdly, such documents therein do not form automatically a part of the evidence of the case in question ipso facto, but any of such documents does become part of such evidence if it is read or referred to by either of the parties, wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention, either in examination of any witness, in submission at any stage or even on any unilateral drawing of court's attention to it by either of the parties at any time before the conclusion of the case. Fourthly, at the end of the whole case, the truth of the contents of any of the document is up to the court to determine, regard being had, inter alia, to any absence of challenge by either of the parties on any part of the document and similarly, the question of weight, eg either great or no weight to be given to any part of any document is also a matter for the trial court, which considers the documents including any 'written hearsay' contained therein. The court may refuse to give any weight at all to any document, but then it is accountable like in other matters, to the parties and to the appellate court for reasons for such refusal.” (own emphasis added) [182] Learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants had a different interpretation of the first paragraph of the above passages quoted from Jaafar bin Shaari (supra). He contends that the documents placed in Part B must be read in Court as the terms, “referred to” and “read” have different functions. With respect, I disagree. The wording of the above passages from Jaafar bin Shaari (supra) is clear. The word “or” in the passage “if it is read or referred to by either of the parties” is disjunctive. I am of the considered view that the party proving the contents of a Part B document may either “read” the document or “refer” to it at the trial, either through the witness’s statement or his oral testimony when he is examined. [183] I am also of the considered view that when the witness “refers” to a document placed in Part B, he only needs to identify the document in his testimony either “wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention” (Jaafar bin Shaari (supra)). [184] Thus, there is no necessity for the witness to read the document at the trial as argued by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants. [185] Learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants also referred to the case of Borneo Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Penang Port Commission S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 54 of 66 [1975] 2 MLJ 204 to support his argument that Part B documents must be read in Court and quoted the following passage from the said case: “Now Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 12th Edition, page 298 has this to say: — “If the correspondence is voluminous it will be necessary to have an agreed bundle for the use of the judge, the paging of which should be identical with that of the bundles for counsel on both sides. In default of special agreement, only such letters in the bundle as are actually read at the trial will be taken to be in evidence, and agreeing a bundle does not constitute an admission that all letters contained in it are admissible in evidence.” (own emphasis added) [186] With respect, I find learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants’ reliance on the above passage from Borneo Co. (supra) misplaced and taken out of context. Firstly, the use of an agreed bundle of documents were perhaps not a common thing in those days (in 1975) and preparing an agreed bundle was something relatively new. Secondly, it is clear from the words, “In default of special agreement” in Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 12th Edition, means that parties must agree on how the document is to be treated or categorised. The compilation and placing of documents in an “agreed bundle” in the context of the above passage is understood to mean for convenience and easy reference at the trial only. This is where the “special agreement” comes in on how the documents in the said agreed bundle are to be treated. In this day and age where the rules of civil procedure in Malaysia is now governed by the Rules of Court 2012, agreed bundles are categorised Parts A, B and C by agreement of parties well before the trial. Therefore, it is not useful nor instructive to refer to the above passage from Borneo Co. (supra). [187] In the present case, A One Piling’s witnesses had referred to the documents in Part B and in some instances had even given explanation on them during their testimonies. As such the contents of these Part B documents have been proven. [188] On the issue of whether the maker of a Part B documents needs to be called to testify, I find the Court of Appeal’s decision in Yeo Ing S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 55 of 66 King v. Melawanqi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 to be instructive, in which it was held as follows: “[10] If there is a dispute as to contents and/or its truth, it has to be placed in Bundle B. For example, in a case where the plaintiff is suing the defendant for breach of facility granted by the bank and the amount of claim is in dispute, the defendant can admit a bank statement to be placed in Bundle B and even agree to dispense with the maker of the statement to give evidence, to save costs and time and proceed to call his own witness such as a chartered accountant to show that the sum claimed in the bank statement is erroneous. In essence, placing a document in Bundle B does not mean that the maker must be called but if the opposing party dispense with the calling of the maker then that document must be marked as exhibit subject to proof of the contents. In any event, the court may want to give some probative force to that document taking into account a holistic view of the facts of the case (see Recaliva Design Steel (M) Sdn Bhd v Vista Access Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 604; [2008] 10 CLJ 491 and YB Dato’ Hj Husam bin Hj Musa v Mohd Faisal bin Rohban Ahmad [2015] 3 MLJ 364; [2015] 1 CLJ 787). In addition, the makers for Bundle B documents may be dispensed with, if the exception to the hearsay rule provided under the Evidence Act becomes applicable (see the EA 1950 ss 32, 73A, 90A, etc). In such event, the relevant documents must be marked as exhibits during trial.” (own emphasis added) [189] In the instant case, it was made clear to the parties well before the trial during case managements that if the maker of the document is required to be called by the opposing party then the document should be placed in Part C as formal proof is required for the documents to be admitted. Since parties have agreed for the documents to be placed in Part B, it is not a must for the maker to be called though it still falls upon the Court to determine the weight that should to be placed on the said document. [190] In connection with this, it was held in Melawangi (supra) as follows: “[27] Our view can be said to be corroborated by the many directions given by us when we were sitting as High Court Judges. Those directions were that there would be three bundles to be used at trial, namely Bundles A, B and C and documents therein must be agreed as what we have set out above. That has been the accepted practise among the legal practitioners prior to the Rules of Court 2012. This practice is in fact confirmed by counsel for the Appellant at trial as evidenced in this interchange between the learned Judge and counsel: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 56 of 66 YA : But the documents are in B? DRV : Yes it's in B. The documents are there, But the veracity are still subject to cross-examination. YA : Subject for cross, yes. Yes. DRV : So just because it's in B, it's not automatically like how it is in A.” (own emphasis added) [191] This then takes us to the issue of the cross-examination of the witnesses and the documents. [192] First and foremost, it is trite law that “it is essential that a party’s case be expressly put to his opponent’s material witnesses when they are under cross-examination.” (Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639). [193] It was also held in Lau Tiong Ik Construction Sdn Bhd v Lau Chung Ping & Anor (2015) MLRHU 1371 as follows: “[40] From what PW1 had stated above, the cash flow statement for FYE 1998 showed that there was no cash inflow of RM1,631, 200.00 which would have been the proceeds from the sale of the shares to the 1st defendant. The cash and bank balances in the said cash flow statement also did not increase by a proportionate amount of RM1,600,000.00. He said that this meant that there was no payment made by the 1st defendant and no payment received by the plaintiff. It is noteworthy that although deemed critical to the 1st defendant's case, PW1 was never cross- examined on this aspect of his evidence. This was to the detriment of the 1st defendant because it is a well settled rule of essential justice that wherever an opponent had declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all (see AEG Carapiet v. AYDerderian AIR 1961 Cal 359 at 362 applying Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67). In Ayoromi Helen v. PP [2004] 2 MLRA 322; [2005] 1 MLJ 699; [2005] 1 CLJ 1; [2005] 1 AMR 405 the Court of Appeal held that the failure to cross-examine a witness on a crucial part of the case will amount to an acceptance of the witness' testimony.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 57 of 66 [194] Whilst the 1st to 5th Defendants makes an issue of the manner in which the Part B documents were tendered by A One Piling, however, they themselves have failed to cross-examine A One Piling’s witnesses on these documents either entirely or specifically on material issues. [195] Learned counsel for the Defendants’ cross-examination of A One Piling’s witnesses were somewhat cursory and there was no specific reference to the documents which they now seek to challenge despite the fact that the said documents (mainly in Part B) were referred to by A One Piling’s witnesses at the trial. [196] PW-6 in particular was not cross-examined at all by the Defendants’ counsel. [197] As far as A One Piling is concerned it has discharged its evidential burden to prove its case and in this regard the contents of the Part B documents. Hence the burden shifts to Blue Seal (Keruntum (supra)). [198] A One Piling has adduced evidence to prove its overpayment claim of RM98,000.00 as well the special damages claim but only up to the sum of RM19,498,666.73. The details of these claims were specifically pleaded and both oral and documentary evidence adduced at the trial to support them. [199] Therefore, in respect of the issue in paragraph 175(iii) above, the quotations were properly admitted. The special damages were specifically pleaded and particularised and proved by documentary evidence (Rohgetana Mayathevan v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and Other Appeals [2017] 3 MLRA 53 at paragraph 16). Further the quotations can be used to prove loss or damages suffered (Chong Nge Wei & Ors v Kemajuan Masteron Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 135). [200] As far as the issue in paragraph 175(iv) is concerned, I reiterate my grounds in paragraphs 147 to 152 and 159 above. PW-2 testified that he had the expertise in the relevant area and the cross-examination of PW-2 by the Defendants were without any basis when in fact the Defendants did not adduce any contrary expert report or testimony to challenge PW-2’s expertise in the area. In any event I did not find the expert evidence of PW-2 to be obviously lacking in defensibility (Majuikan (supra)). PW-2 is well S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 58 of 66 qualified and has vast experience in the area. He had backed his reports and opinion with scientific facts and supporting data. [201] As I find that the evidence adduced by A One Piling satisfactory and reliable (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)), it is therefore the Court’s duty to accept the evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the Blue Seal to the contrary (Takako (supra)). [202] Blue Seal has also failed to provide any reason why it did not care to give evidence and therefore it is justified for the Court to draw adverse inference against Blue Seal (Takako (supra)). [203] In this situation, Blue Seal’s defence cannot be taken into account or considered (Leolaris (supra); Takako (supra)). [204] I find that the loss and damages were in fact suffered by A One Piling arising from Blue Seal’s breach of the 2nd LOA (Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 397) and this entitles A One Piling to the RM98,000.00 overpayment claim and the RM19,498,666.73 special damages claim which it has proven (Rohgetana Mayathevan (supra)). [205] I must emphasise that notwithstanding the evidence adduced by A One Piling to prove the losses and damages it suffered, it bears repeating that Blue Seal had admitted in no unclear terms that: “The cGMP Processing Plant cannot be used or operated as cGMP Processing Plant as the PU panels supplied and installed by the 1st Defendant are not class ‘O’ certified panels.” (own emphasis added) [206] Hence, it is only reasonable for A One Piling to be compensated for having to rectify the Factory which was not able to be used as a refrigerated storage facility for several years since Blue Seal terminated the 2nd LOA. [207] For brevity, only A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract, as the contracting parties under the 2nd LOA, is allowed. The 2nd to 6th Defendants are not privy to this contractual claim and therefore they cannot be made liable. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 59 of 66 M] THE OTHER RELIEFS [208] The Plaintiffs had prayed for a multitude of reliefs which include: i) General damages for breach of contract and/or fiduciary duties and/or negligence; ii) General damages for loss of reputation, business, income and business opportunity; iii) General damages for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation; iv) General damages for mental anguish, health issues and embarrassment. [209] As I had stated earlier the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants for Deceit, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duties are without merits and this has been dealt with earlier in this Judgment. Therefore, all the Plaintiffs’ claims and the reliefs connected to these causes of action are dismissed. [210] In so far as the general damages sought in relation to breach of contract is concerned, A One Piling’s special damages claim has covered these losses or damages and therefore A One Piling cannot be allowed the same claim twice or given a “second bite of the cherry” (Tekun Nasional v. Plenitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 6 MLJ 619 (FC)). [211] In any event, the reliefs which were not allowed were all unproven and no evidence were even adduced to prove that the losses were suffered. [212] It does not assist the Plaintiffs’ case by claiming a multitude of reliefs when they are not able to back those claims with actual evidence. It is also of utmost importance for the Plaintiffs to have first established the nexus between their claims and the reliefs sought before making those claims. [213] Save and except for A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract, the other claims are devoid of merit. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 60 of 66 [214] In the present case, as a result of a large number of the Plaintiffs’ claims being dismissed, costs for those dismissed claims were then awarded in favour of the Defendants. N] THE 6TH DEFENDANT [215] Earlier in this Judgment, I had discussed the Plaintiffs’ claims against all the Defendants including the 6th Defendant concerning Deceit, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Breach of Contract. However, I consider it necessary to specifically address the Plaintiffs’ claim against the 6th Defendant. [216] Firstly, the 6th Defendant is an employee of Blue Seal. He carries out his duties in accordance with the instructions given to him by Blue Seal and this would also be in line with his employment contract with Blue Seal. Blue Seal is the NSC of the Project and not the 6th Defendant. In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs continuously ties the alleged wrongdoings of the 2nd to 6th Defendants with Blue Seal as the NSC of the Project. There is no direct nexus between the Plaintiffs’ claim and the 6th Defendant. [217] Secondly, there is nothing for the 6th Defendant to gain by committing Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation unless he was conspiring with the other Defendants and this is what the Plaintiffs have alleged against him. [218] There is no evidence of conspiracy between the 6th Defendant and the other Defendants to commit Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation against the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence of the 6th Defendant committing Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation on his own either. [219] Thirdly, the 6th Defendant owes a duty to Blue Seal, not the Plaintiffs. If during the course of his employment the 6th Defendant commits an error in his work or is negligent in the execution of his duties related to the Project, Blue Seal would assume liability. [220] Hence there was no real reason or justification for the 6th Defendant to have been made a party to this action and as such I awarded a higher sum of costs in favour of the 6th Defendant. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 61 of 66 Suit 518 [221] Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal in Suit 518 is almost identical to the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants in Suit 17, with the sole distinction being that Truepro is only seeking damages and not pursuing any declaratory reliefs. [222] Truepro is not a party to the contract between Blue Seal and the Plaintiffs in Suit 17. Truepro has no contract with Blue Seal. Truepro is merely the Consultant and Superintending Officer appointed by Tech Food for the Project. [223] Truepro has not provided justification or cause of action for its Counterclaim against Blue Seal. [224] On this ground alone Truepro’s Counterclaim can be dismissed. [225] Nevertheless, for completeness, I have still examined the evidence given by PW-5 who testified for Truepro. PW-5 is a director of Truepro. [226] When PW-5 was asked to provide the basis for Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal, this was the answer he gave: “KS Ok. Can you explain to the Court the basis of your claim against Blue Seal? What is it, based on what, I mean the, based on the contract or whatever it is, can you please explain? SOO Yang Arif, ok. If we recall back, under this 518, ok? Blue Seal put A One and Truepro as a Defendant. If you say, we don't have the contract, and then, I cannot claim them, why they can sue me? Put in me as a Defendant? Ok? So, the, my, this is my counterclaim in the suit 518, ok, page 2. Ok? Under item (a)(i), 73.11, we are put there, “Special damage for the sum of RM250,000 incurred for the additional consultation and the administration, administrative costs for the project”. Ok? Because of the Blue Seal breach of contract, all the cGMP plant need to demolish and rebuild. Ok? Are you agree?” [227] The following can be deduced from PW-5’s above testimony: i) PW-5 does not seem to know the reason for Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 62 of 66 ii) It would appear the Counterclaim was because Truepro was made a party, 2nd Defendant in the main suit (Suit 518). iii) Truepro incurred additional costs which is it now claiming because of the breach of contract by Blue Seal in failing to construct the Factory properly. [228] There is no contractual or causal link between the special damages claimed by Truepro and Blue Seal. [229] If Truepro’s claim is a contractual claim then its nexus is with Tech Food. [230] Truepro presented evidence through PW-5, whom, during his testimony, failed to provide any justification for his claim against Blue Seal, except for requesting specific damages totalling RM250,000.00 and RM169,840.02, along with general damages to be determined by the Court. PW-5 submitted these figures without offering any explanation as to how they are derived. [231] It is important to note that Truepro’s Counterclaim only arose after Suit 518 was filed by Blue Seal. [232] Truepro’s pleaded claim is for special damages in the sum of RM10,207,614.00 but at the trial Truepro’s had limited its claim against Blue Seal to RM250,000.00 and RM169,840.02. No explanation was given nor any evidence tendered as to how any of these amounts were derived or why Truepro’s pleaded claim was about RM9.7 million higher. [233] As far as Truepro’s Counterclaim is concerned, it has not proven its case. Therefore, there is no case for Blue Seal to answer as the evidence led for Truepro is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the burden of proof has not been discharged (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)). O] CONCLUSION [234] For the reasons stated above, in respect of Suit 17, I allowed A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract only and essentially the following relief with some changes: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 63 of 66 i) Prayers 83.2, 83.4, 83.9, 83.11, 83.12 for the sum of RM19,498,666.73 and 83.19; ii) Costs of RM90,000.00 to be paid by Blue Seal to A One Piling in respect of A One Piling’s claim which was allowed; iii) Costs of RM40,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the 1st to 5th Defendant in respect of the part of the Plaintiffs’ claim which was dismissed; iv) Costs of RM30,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the 6th Defendant. [235] In relation to Suit 518, I dismissed Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal with costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by Truepro to Blue Seal. Dated this 19th day of January, 2024 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 64 of 66 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Dato’ Jasbeer Singh (Nur Hakimah Mohamad and Rachel Varghese together with him) Messrs Jasbeer, Nur & Lee No. 6-2nd Floor, Block C, Wisma RKT Jalan Raja Abdullah off Jalan Sultan Ismail 50300 Kuala Lumpur Tel.: 03-2694 8908 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR 1ST TO 5TH DEFENDANTS K. Sureindhren (Lee Yoke Chew together with him) Messrs Lee Y C & Co. No. 9, 2nd Floor, Jalan SS15/4G 47500 Subang Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel.: 03-5631 6861 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR 6TH DEFENDANT Dato’ Lee Chan Leong Messrs Chan Leong & Co No. 3-4B, Jalan Anggerik Vanilla N 31/N, Kota Kemuning, Seksyen 31, 40460 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel.: 03-5124 9863 Email: [email protected] S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 65 of 66 LEGISLATION CITED Evidence Act 1950 ▪ Section 114 illustration (g) Contracts Act 1950 ▪ Section 17 ▪ Section 18 ▪ Section 19 CASES CITED 1. Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v. Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1999] 2 MLJ 500 2. Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639 3. Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v. Yeoh Teen Earn & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 4. Borneo Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Penang Port Commission [1975] 2 MLJ 204 5. CIMB Bank Bhd v. Veeran Ayasamy (Wakil Diri Kepada Letchimi Muthusamy, Si Mati) [2015] 7 CLJ 289 6. Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v. SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 7. Chong Nge Wei & Ors v Kemajuan Masteron Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 135) 8. Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 397 9. Giga Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 MLJ 449 10. Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Global Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 1 MLJ 302 11. Integrated Training and Services Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2022] 3 MLJ 77 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 66 of 66 12. Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 13. Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 14. Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong [1983] 2 MLJ 320 15. Leolaris (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 234 16. Lam Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 17. Lau Tiong Ik Construction Sdn Bhd v Lau Chung Ping & Anor (2015) MLRHU 1371 18. Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81 19. Majuikan Sdn Bhd v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171 20. Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] MLRAU 376 21. PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLRH 841 22. Renault SA v. Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394 23. Rohgetana Mayathevan v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and Other Appeals [2017] 3 MLRA 53 24. Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Neqeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609 25. Seqar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tay Tho Bok & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 211 26. Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar @ Tee Kim [2003] 3 MLJ 460 27. Solid Investments Ltd v. Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 784 28. Syed Abu Bakar bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 MLRA 318 29. Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 74 30. Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 31. Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] 6 MLRA 52 32. Tekun Nasional v. Plenitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 6 MLJ 619 33. Victor Cham & Anor v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 34. Yui Chin Song & Qrs v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417 35. Yeo Ing King v. Melawanqi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-17-01/2021

PLAINTIF 1. ) TECH FOOD INGREDIENTS SDN BHD 2. ) A ONE PILING SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD 2. ) LYE SAM YUT 3. ) CHEAH CHEE MENG 4. ) CHIA HEONG LIN 5. ) ONG KIM HAI 6. ) PANG KIM WAH

Breach Of Contract-Negligence-Misleading -Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation And Deceit-Lifting Of The Corporate Veil- Breach Of Fiduciary Duty-Evidence Of Breach Of Contract- Damage And Quantum .

24/01/2024

YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64daff7c-d5db-4cef-8c5b-6a58ecafb47e&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCC-17-01/2021 ANTARA (1) TECH FOOD INGREDIENTS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 689104-H) (2) A ONE PILING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1194561-X) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN (1) BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 682694-V) (2) LYE SAM YUT (No. K/P: 760423-06-5183) (3) CHEAH CHEE MENG (No. K/P: 650823-06-5361) (4) CHIA HEONG LIN (No. K/P: 760620-14-5100) (5) ONG KIM HAI (No. K/P: 670124-09-5025) (6) PANG KIM WAH (No. K/P: 680802-05-5225) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN (Didengar Secara Bersama Dengan) 24/01/2024 15:17:57 WA-22NCC-17-01/2021 Kand. 470 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 66 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCC-518-11/2021 ANTARA BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran : 200501005647 (682694-V)) … PLAINTIF DAN (1) A ONE PILING SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran: 201601023622 (1194561-X) (2) TRUEPRO CONSULT SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran : 201001026168 (910087-X) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT (Post Trial) [1] This was primarily a case involving a contract to construct a cGMP (Current Good Manufacturing Practice) Processing Plant (“Factory”) in Klang between the 1st Plaintiff/2nd Plaintiff (“Tech Food” / “A One Piling”) and the 1st Defendant (“Blue Seal”). [2] The Factory was intended to be a refrigerated storage facility which includes cold rooms, freezer rooms and food processing rooms. [3] Tech Food and A One Piling’s claim was essentially that the Factory which was constructed by Blue Seal was not done in accordance with the contract, contained various defects in terms of the material used and workmanship and that the construction was not completed. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 66 [4] This case took some time to dispose given multiple interlocutory applications filed by parties. Nomenclature [5] As this case involves two cases and several parties, the cases and the respective parties will be referred to as follows: Suits i) Main suit (WA-22NCC-17-01/2021) - “Suit 17”; ii) Second suit (WA-22NCC-518-11/2021) - “Suit 518”; Parties iii) 1st Plaintiff (in Suit 17) - “Tech Food”; iv) 2nd Plaintiff (in Suit 17) and 2nd Defendant (in Suit 518) - “A One Piling”; v) 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (in Suit 17) – collectively as “Plaintiffs”; vi) 1st Defendant (in Suit 17) and Plaintiff (in Suit 518) - “Blue Seal” or “1st Defendant”; vii) 2nd to 6th Defendants (in Suit 17”) - “2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants”. The 2nd to 5th Defendants are directors of Blue Seal while the 6th Defendant is the Project Coordinator of the Project employed by Blue Seal; viii) The 1st to 6th Defendants (in Suit 17) – collectively referred to as “the Defendants”. ix) Truepro Consult Sdn Bhd (in Suit 518) - “Truepro”. Truepro is the Consultant and Superintending Officer (“SO”) appointed by Tech Food for the Project. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 66 A] CHRONOLOGY OF PROCEEDINGS [6] By Order dated 20.10.2021 Suit 518 was transferred from the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court to this Court to be heard together with the main suit, Suit 17. [7] Suit 518 contained a Counterclaim by the Defendants therein, A One Piling and Truepro. [8] On 20.6.2022, the following transpired in respect of Suit 518: i) Blue Seal withdrew its entire claim against both the Defendants, A One Piling and Truepro. Blue Seal’s main claim was then struck out with costs of RM40,000.00 in favour of A One Piling and Truepro; ii) A One Piling withdrew its entire Counterclaim against Blue Seal. A One Piling’s Counterclaim was then struck out with costs of RM40,000.00 in favour of Blue Seal; and iii) Truepro withdrew part of its Counterclaim against Blue Seal and only the reliefs in paragraphs 73.11, 73.14, 73.17 and 73.20 of the Amended Defence and Amended Counterclaim remained, they are mainly: a) Special damages of RM10,207,614; b) General damages to be assessed for loss of income and business opportunity [9] Given this turn of events what remained in respect of this case is: i) For Suit 17: Tech Food and A One Piling’s claim against the Defendants; and ii) For Suit 518: The remainder of Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal. [10] At the trial of this action and at the end of the Tech Food and A One Piling’s case, Blue Seal together with the 2nd to 5th Defendants S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 66 and the 6th Defendant submitted “no case to answer” and no evidence was led by any of their respective witnesses listed in the 1st to 5th and 6th Defendants’ list of witnesses. B] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [11] By way of a Letter of Award dated 6.5.2019 (“1st LOA”) Tech Food appointed Blue Seal as its Nominated Sub-Contractor (“NSC”) in respect of a project known as “Cadangan Membina Sebuah Kilang Di atas Lot 158490 (HSD 135860), Jalan Sungai Pinang 4/10, Kawasan Perindustrian Pulau Indah, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan Untuk Tetuan Tech Food Ingredients Sdn Bhd” for the construction and completion of a factory (“Project”) or otherwise known as a cGMP Processing Plant (“Factory”) subject to the terms and conditions of the 1st LOA and Blue Seal’s quotation dated 26.4.2019 (“Quotation”). [12] Tech Food is known as the “Owner/Employer” of the Project whilst the A One Piling is appointed as the Main Contractor of the Project by Tech Food and a contract was entered between Tech Food and A One Piling to that effect. [13] By a letter dated 19.7.2019 entitled “Supersede Letter of Award” (“Supersede Letter of Award”) Tech Food wrote to Blue Seal, inter alia, as follows: “Refer to the above matter and Letter of Award from Tech Food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn. Bhd. on 6th May 2019. We are writing to you to supersede the letter of award. All NSC letter of award shall be issue by the Main Contractor. However, your payment terms shall be paid by us. Kindly submit your payment schedule. You are required to write to us within 48 hours if you do not accept the supersede of this letter.” (own emphasis added) [14] By letter dated 23.8.2019 (“Acceptance Letter”) Blue Seal accepted the terms of the Supersede Letter of Award, inter alia, as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 66 “Refer to the above matter and letter in relation to supersede Letter of Award from Tech Food Ingredients Sdn, Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn. Bhd. on 19th July 2019. We are writing to you and are pleased to accept the supersede Letter of Award. Enclosed the duly signed Letter of Award issued by A One Piling Sdn. Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd on 6th May 2019. Payment terms shall be paid by Tech Food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. directly to Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd, the Nominated Subcontractor.” (own emphasis added) [15] Another Letter of Award also dated 6.5.2019 was then issued, this time by A One Piling to Blue Seal (“2nd LOA”). [16] Under the 2nd LOA the quotations in the Project have to be approved by Tech Food instead of A One Piling. [17] Tech Food and A One Piling claim that both the 1st and 2nd LOA are effective and enforceable while the 1st to 5th Defendants take the position that the 1st LOA has been terminated and no longer exists. [18] The 1st to 5th Defendants claim that pursuant to the 2nd LOA, the only contract is now between the A One Piling and Blue Seal. [19] Tech Food, A One Piling and the 1st to 5th Defendants agree that the Project is subject to the terms and conditions as stipulated in the 1st LOA, 2nd LOA and Quotation (collectively referred to as “the Contract”)). [20] Pursuant to the 2nd LOA the date of “Site Possession and Commencement of Works” shall be 20.5.2019 and the “Date of Completion” shall be 30.9.2019. [21] On 17.5.2019 Tech Food paid 10% as down payment in the sum of RM342.500.00 directly to Blue Seal. [22] Blue Seal commenced work to construct the Factory and between 20.8.2019 to 20.12.2019 Blue Seal submitted progress claims (Progress Claims Nos. 1 to 5) to Truepro and/or Blue Seal. Payments were made towards these Progress Claims until around 13.2.2020. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 66 [23] On 24.2.2020 Truepro issued a list of defects and “Make Good 2” document. [24] However, problems occurred from around 5.3.2020 when the director of Tech Food, Narendranath a/l T.V. Ramana (“PW-1”), raised a complaint against Blue Seal’s supervisor that he was playing games in the car and the employees are without PPE (personal protective equipment) attire while working at the site of the Project. [25] Thereafter, several joint physical and visual inspections of the Factory was conducted as follows: i) 9.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; ii) 11.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; iii) 12.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd, 4th and 5th Defendants. iv) On all the above 3 joint inspections, it was observed by the Defendants who attended that there were bubbles/blisters on the PU panels that were installed in the Factory. [26] Between 11.3.2020 to 12.3.2020, PW-1 raised issues regarding the Factory and specifically in respect of: i) the PU panels which had blisters/bubbles in them; and ii) that it was subsequently discovered that the PU panels that were installed were not certified Class “O” by the Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat Malaysia (“Bomba”). [27] There were several correspondences in the form of emails pertaining to the issue of repair, rectification and/or replacement of the said PU panels primarily between Tech Food and Blue Seal. [28] The dispute between parties culminated in a notice terminating the contract by Blue Seal. Some of the material correspondences between the parties between 12.3.2020 to 18.3.2020 are stated below. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 66 [29] By letter dated 12.3.2020 A One Piling informed the 1st Defendant, inter alia, as follows: “We refer to the above mentioned reference & project. From today onwards not allow to enter project site until further notice.” [30] By its solicitors’ letter dated 15.3.2020 (“Blue Seal’s Termination Letter”), Blue Seal informed A One Piling, inter alia, as follows: “c) the said Letter informing that our client was barred from entering the project site is wrong in law and in fact and in breach of the Contract; d) your actions as aforesaid clearly evince an intention on your part not to be bound by the terms of the Contract which amounts to a repudiatory breach of the Contract and which reputation our client accepts and the Contract is hereby terminated.” (own emphasis added) [31] The Plaintiffs’ solicitors then responded to Blue Seal’s Termination Letter vide their letter dated 18.3.2020, inter alia, as follows: “Thus, it is your client that has breached the terms of the contract by supplying and installing defective PU Panels which in fact your client has acknowledged and/or admitted in their e-mails transmitted on 11.3.2020 at 11.29 a.m. and 10.16 p.m. Your client’s attempt now to state otherwise and/or reasons for saying so is not contemporaneous with the documents and their conduct at the material time. As you are aware, our client’s rights are protected under the Sale of Goods Act 1957 in regards to your client’s warranty and representation that the goods namely the PU Panels are merchantable and fit for the purpose it was purchased and intended for. Our client has instructed us to inform you that they are accepting your client’s unlawful repudiation of the contract and will commence proceedings to recover the full contract sum and consequential losses which will include appointment of a third party contractor to rectify the defective PU Panels unless your client do take immediate steps to address and rectify the defective PU Panels supplied by your client.” [32] Blue Seal did not return to the Project site to do any further work or rectification work and the work on the Factory ceased. [33] By 17.5.2020 Tech Food had paid Blue Seal a total sum of RM3,093,854.38. The total contract sum under the 2nd LOA was RM3,425,000.00. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 66 [34] Suit 518 was subsequently filed on 25.6.2020 and Truepro’s (and A One Piling) Counterclaim against Blue Seal was filed on 24.7.2020. [35] Suit 17 was filed on 1.7.2020. SUIT 17 [36] Below are the reasons for my decision in respect of the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants in respect of Suit 17. Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal in Suit 518 will be dealt with separately in this Judgment. C] THE PLAINTIFFS’ (TECH FOOD AND A ONE PILING) CLAIM [37] The Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants arises primarily from the allegation that the Defendants had failed to construct the Factory in accordance with the terms of the Contract. The Plaintiffs further claim that there were several defects in the 1st Defendant’s work. [38] The Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants are based on the following causes of action: i) Breach of contract (against Blue Seal only); ii) Negligence; iii) Misleading and fraudulent misrepresentation (“Fraudulent Misrepresentation”); iv) Deceit; and v) Inducing the Plaintiff to enter into the LOAs knowing that they were not going to fulfil their contractual obligations and that their representations to the Plaintiffs are not true. [39] The reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs against all the Defendants, jointly and severally are, inter alia, as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 66 “83.1. A declaration that the corporate veil of the 1st Defendant be lifted by reason of deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation committed by the 1st to 5th Defendants and this action may be brought personally against its directors namely the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants herein; 83.2. A declaration that the entire cGMP Processing Plant that the 1st Defendant had supplied, manufactured, designed, built and installed in the Project is defective, unmerchantable and unfit for the 1st Plaintiff’s use, needs and purpose of business; 83.3. A declaration that the Defendants had committed deceit and/or fraudulent misrepresentation as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.4. A declaration that the Defendants had committed breach of contract of the 1st Loa and 2nd LOA as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.5. A declaration that the 1st to 5th Defendants had committed breach of fiduciary duties as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.6. A declaration that the Defendants were negligent in carrying out its and/or his duties as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.7. An order compelling the Defendants to forward to the Plaintiffs within three (3) days from the date of this order all relevant forms and/or documents that have to be submitted to local authorities and agencies such as Forms C1 and C2 and other similar forms and documents required for the purpose of obtaining CCC; 83.8. An order compelling the Defendants to hand over the keys to all doors in the premises of the Project that had been installed by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Plaintiff within three (3) days from the date of this order or alternatively special damages of RM40,000.00 being costs of replacing all the keys; 83.9. An order compelling the Defendants to return to the 2nd Plaintiff within three (3) days from the date of this order, the overpaid progress claim monies of RM98,255.80 that was over certified; 83.10. Alternatively, an order that the Plaintiffs is entitled to trace and recover the overpaid progress claim monies of RM98,255.80 from any fund and/or asset of the Defendants which the said monies have contributed to; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 66 83.11. An order allowing the 2nd Plaintiff to retain and utilise the balance 5% of the contract sums as part payment of the refurbishment costs of the factory; 83.12. Special damages of RM20,767,364.26 being the rectification costs of the factory as stated in Paragraphs 55 to 56.21.6 above; 83.13. Special damages of RM264,000.00 being cost for the loss of warranty on machines due to dismantle and reinstallation of machine and fixtures; 83.14. General damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court against the Defendants for breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duties and/or responsibilities and/or negligent; 83.15. General damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the Plaintiffs’ loss of reputation and business confidence as pleaded at Paragraphs 57 to 57.4 above; 83.16. General damages against the Defendants to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the Plaintiffs’ loss of income and business opportunity as pleaded at Paragraphs 58 to 58.3 above; 83.17. Aggravated damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court against the Defendants for the deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation committed against the Plaintiffs; 83.18. Damages against the Defendants to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the mental anguish, health issues and embarrassment caused to the Plaintiffs as pleaded at Paragraphs 59 to 60 above;” (own emphasis added) [40] As can be seen above the reliefs sought by Tech Food and A One Piling are very wide and convoluted, whereas the “actual” claim itself (primarily premised on breach of contract) is, with respect, quite straight forward. The long windedness of Tech Food and A One Piling’s pleaded claim did not assist their case and made in unnecessarily complicated. I will address this in more detail in the course of this Judgment. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 66 D] BLUE SEAL’S ADMISSION [41] Blue Seal made, inter alia, the following admission (paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 of the “Statement of Agreed Fact (between Plaintiffs and 1st to 5th Defendants” (Bundle D (Enclosure 294)). Paragraph 8 “By the Contract, the 1st Defendant was to supply and install PU panels that are not defective and are fit for purpose and are merchantable quality and are fire retardant and certified class “O” by Jabatan Bomba Dan Penyelamat Malaysia. Paragraph 9 “The 1st Defendant admits liability that the PU panels supplied to the Plaintiffs and installed at the 1st Plaintiff's CGMP Plant by the 1st Defendant are not certified class ‘O’ and that is the Breach of Contract.” Paragraph 12 “The cGMP Processing Plant cannot be used or operated as cGMP Processing Plant as the PU panels supplied and installed by the 1st Defendant are not class ‘O’ certified panels.” (own emphasis added) [42] It must be highlighted that this admission was made on 23.5.2022, about a month before the commencement of the trial. E] THE DEFENDANTS’ DEFENCE [43] Given Blue Seal’s above admission, the 1st to 5th Defendants’ defence is essentially: i) Notwithstanding the admission of the 1st Defendant above, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for the various causes of action set out in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim (“Statement of Claim”) as they have asked for one lump sum of RM20,767,364.26 at paragraph 83.12 without setting out the amount of damages claimed for each cause of action. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 66 ii) Given that there are different elements to be proved for each cause of action including damages, this then makes the claim for a lump sum wrong in law. iii) The 2nd to 5th Defendants are not parties to the contract and are only named as defendants based upon allegations of fraud. iv) Even if fraud is proven on a balance of probabilities, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on fraud as a basis for damages as they have not rescinded the contract (which it is alleged they were induced to enter into). In fact, they have affirmed the contract and asked for a declaration that the contract has been breached. v) The 1st to 5th Defendants have not caused the Plaintiffs any damage save that the PU panels need to be replaced. vi) There is no negligence or breach of fiduciary duties or fraud committed by any of the Defendants. [44] The 6th Defendant defence is essentially that as an employee of Blue Seal, he merely carries out Blue Seal’s instructions and the scope of work for which he is employed. He committed no wrongdoing. The Plaintiffs’ claim against him is misconceived and mala fide. F] CONTRACTING PARTIES [45] The contract to construct the Factory was initially between Tech Food and Blue Seal and is evidenced by the 1st LOA. [46] The 1st LOA was then superseded by the Supersede Letter of Award which like its namesake superseded the 1st LOA. [47] Blue Seal accepted the terms of the Supersede Letter of Award vide its Acceptance Letter. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 66 [48] Thereafter, A One Piling issued the 2nd LOA to Blue Seal which was also dated 6.5.2019, the same date as the 1st LOA (issued by Tech Food). [49] The Supersede Letter of Award read together with the Acceptance Letter by Blue Seal and the 2nd LOA clearly show that the 1st LOA is no longer valid and has been replaced by the 2nd LOA. The contents of these letters are clear and do not contain any ambiguity. [50] The 2nd LOA is not a tripartite agreement. Only A One Piling and Blue Seal are parties to the 2nd LOA and the 2nd LOA makes no reference to the 1st LOA or that it is still applicable. [51] It must be noted that it is Tech Food itself, being the owner of the Project, who had designed the contractual relationship of the parties involved to be in this manner. It cannot then change its stand on this. [52] Although Tech Food continued to be involved in the Project where, inter alia, its approval was required on certain matters, this does not make Tech Food a party to the 2nd LOA nor does it establish a contractual nexus as pleaded in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim. [53] The same applies even where payments are made directly by Tech Food to Blue Seal. In paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim, it was pleaded that due to Tech Food’s continued involvement in the Project a contractual nexus is established. However, as the 1st LOA is no longer valid, Tech Food’s said involvement is only as the owner of the Project and is transmitted contractually through Tech Food’s main contractor, A One Piling. [54] Therefore, the only contract that is in existence and enforceable in the present case is the 2nd LOA and any claim for breach of contract can only be made by A One Piling and not Tech Food. [55] I am aware that as the owner of the Project and the Factory, Tech Food may have ultimately suffered losses arising from a breach of contract by Blue Seal under the 2nd LOA but that is something Tech Food will have to take up with A One Piling. Tech Food has no privity or right to initiate a contractual claim against Blue Seal. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 66 [56] Thus, the contract relationship between parties can be summarised as follows: i) Between Tech Food and A One Piling (Owner and Main Contractor); and ii) Between A One Piling and Blue Seal (Main Contractor and NSC or Nominated Sub-Contractor). [57] In the circumstances the proper plaintiff in this case in respect of a breach of contract claim is A One Piling only. G] IMPLICATION OF THE DEFENDANTS ELECTING NOT TO GIVE EVIDENCE OR SUBMIT “NO CASE TO ANSWER” [58] Before I deal with the various causes of action raised by the Plaintiffs, the implication of the Defendants’ decision to submit of “no case to answer” needs to addressed first. [59] I will begin with the cases cited by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants on this issue and they are as follows: i) Yui Chin Song & Qrs v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417 (FC); ii) Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 (FC); iii) Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Neqeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609 (FC); iv) Leolaris (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 234 (HC); [60] I am in agreement with learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants’ submission that it can be distilled from the above cases with regards to the submission of “no case to answer” that: i) It is for the plaintiff to prove his case on a balance of probabilities and the fact that the defendant has led no S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 66 evidence or called no witnesses does not absolve the plaintiff from discharging his or her burden in law. ii) The mere fact that the defendant elects not to lead evidence does not mean that all the plaintiff’s evidence is automatically to be believed. iii) The defences of the defendant are not under consideration. It is the plaintiff’s case that is to be scrutinised for the sole purpose of establishing whether the plaintiff has proved his or her case on a balance of probabilities. iv) A submission of “no case to answer” can be on the basis that: a) accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at face value, no case has been established at law; or b) the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged. v) Even though the defendant does not call any evidence, it does not mean that the trial judge must believe everything the plaintiff has adduced. [61] In other words, just because the Defendants have elected to submit “no case to answer” does not mean the Plaintiffs’ claim will be automatically allowed. The Plaintiffs have to still prove their case. [62] However, what learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants did not submit on is how and what happens to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s where the defendant’s have chosen to submit “no case to answer”. [63] Before I continue on this issue and refer to the cases that were not cited by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants, it is important for me to first highlight some key factual features of the cases he had referred to: i) In Yui Chin Song (supra) all the defendants save for one made a submission of no case to answer. The plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 66 ii) In Kerumtum (supra) the second defendant did not give evidence and a total of 9 witnesses gave evidence for the defence. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. iii) In Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine (supra) no witnesses were called by the defendant and the plaintiff had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a settlement agreement which the plaintiff claimed existed. The plaintiff called 3 witnesses. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. iv) In Leolaris (supra) the defendant did not call any witnesses or cross-examine the plaintiff’s four witnesses. The plaintiff’s claim was allowed. [64] How the burden of proof is treated and the shifting of the burden in a case where the defendant makes a submission of “no case to answer” was decided in Keruntum (supra) where the Federal court held as follows: “[78] ]t is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party (see UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4). When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. See Tan Klim Khuan v Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697.” (own emphasis added) [65] Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied on the Federal Court case of Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 74 where the 1st respondent failed to attend court and give evidence. The appellant’s claim was allowed by the Federal Court and held, inter alia, as follows: “[4] In our judgment, two consequences inevitably followed when the first respondent who was fully conversant with the facts studiously refrained from giving evidence. In the first place, the evidence given by the appellant ought to have been presumed to be true. As Elphinstone CJ said in Wasakah Singh v. Bachan Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 at p 128: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 66 If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives or calls evidence which, if it is believed, is sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsity of the evidence is immaterial. For the purpose of testing whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to be true. Now, what the trial judge did in the present case is precisely what he ought not to have done. He expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant’s evidence without asking himself that most vital question: does the first defendant/ respondent have a case to answer? This failure on the part of the trial judge is a serious non-direction amounting to a misdirection which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was at that stage not concerned with his belief of the appellant’s evidence. She had given her explanation as to the discrepancies in the figures. And her evidence does not appear to be either inherently incredible or inherently improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the first respondent going the other way. He however failed to direct himself in this fashion thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice.” [5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the first respondent on the amount of the appellant’s contribution to the purchase price as well as the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will normally draw an adverse inference. See Guthrie Sdn Bhd v. Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1990] 1 MLRA 532; [1991] 1 MLJ 33; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 155. See also, Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 1 MLRA 605; [1997] 3 MLJ 693; [1997] 4 CLJ 509 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: “The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the appellants’ case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it.” There are two other authorities that are of assistance on the point. In Wisniewski v. Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, Brooke LJ when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal quoted from a number of authorities including the following passage from the speech of Lord Diplock in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] AC 877: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 66 The appellants, who are a public corporation, elected to call no witnesses, thus depriving the court of any positive evidence as to whether the condition of the fence and the adjacent terrain had been noticed by any particular servant of theirs or as to what he or any other of their servants either thought or did about it. This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold. Brooke LJ then went on to say this: From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case: (1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action. (2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. (3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. (4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified. The other case is Crawford v. Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40, where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the Advice of the Privy Council said: It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 66 [7] In the present instance, there is no doubt that the first respondent had intimate knowledge of the material facts relevant to the dispute and that she was privy to the several steps through which the transaction had proceeded. Based on the authorities already cited, it is patently clear that the trial judge in the present case ought to have held that the failure of the first respondent to give evidence apart from discrediting her case strengthened the appellant’s case on those vital points that lay at the axis of the dispute between the parties. This, the trial judge clearly omitted to do. Instead, he treated the first respondent’s failure to appear and give evidence as a matter of no apparent consequence. His non-direction upon such a crucial point as this certainly amounts to a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. To conclude the first issue, it is our judgment that there was no judicial appreciation of the appellant’s evidence. A reasonable tribunal correctly directing itself on the facts and the relevant law would have held that the appellant had indeed contributed RM194,610 towards the purchase price of the building; that there was a mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent that they shall be beneficial co-owners of the property in question in equal shares; and that the first respondent had acted in breach of that understanding.” (own emphasis added) [66] In Takako Sakao (supra), the Federal Court held that the effect of the defendant’s failure to give evidence, discredits his case and strengthens the plaintiffs case. [67] Justice Mary Lim (as she then was), in Leolaris (supra), examined the effect of the pleaded defence where the defendant submitted “no case to answer” and held as follows: “[23] In a submission of no case to answer, the defences pleaded are not under consideration. To put it bluntly, on such an occasion the defendant is actually saying that it need not bother to offer and lead any evidence on any of the pleaded defences because the plaintiff’s case is bad as it has not been made out and ought therefore to be dismissed without more. It is still the plaintiffs case that is scrutinised for the sole purpose of establishing whether the defendant has made a right submission. If the submission is properly taken on the law and on the facts, then the plaintiffs case would be dismissed. However, where the defendant fails in its submission and the plaintiff succeeds in discharging the burden of proof, the plaintiffs case will be allowed. That is why it is said that the defendant will stand or fall by the submission.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 66 [68] It can thus be summarised that while it is a given that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, however, in a situation where the defendant submits “no case to answer” the Court needs to be satisfied that: i) the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is sufficient to prove his case (Keruntum (supra); Takako (supra)); ii) where the defendant provides no reasons (or credible reasons) as to why he did not care to give evidence the Court will normally draw an adverse inference (Takako (supra)); iii) if such an adverse inference is drawn, it may strengthen the evidence adduced by the plaintiff or weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the defendant (Takako (supra)); iv) there must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the plaintiffs before the Court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue (Takako (supra)); v) the defendant’s defence will not be taken into consideration (Leolaris (supra); Takako (supra)). [69] I will conclude with the following passage from Yui Chin Song (supra) which in turn referred to a passage from the case of Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81: “[50] In this regard, Suriyadi, JCA (as His Lordship then was) in Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 ML] 81, recognised the above riding in the following passage: There are, however, two sets of circumstances under which a defendant may submit that he has no case to answer. In the one case there may be a submission that, accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its face value, no case has been established in law, and in the other that the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged. (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 66 [70] Therefore, to put it simply, as the Defendants have submitted “no case to answer” the issue is whether the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in this case is “so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged” (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)). It therefore follows that if the Plaintiffs succeed in discharging that burden of proof, then the Defendants shall have no defence against the Plaintiffs’ claim. [71] It must also be borne in mind that the evidence tendered by the Plaintiffs must also be examined in light of the admissions of liability made by Blue Seal regarding, inter alia, the PU panels coupled with the fact that the Defendants chose not to adduce any evidence by calling any witness or tendering any document to oppose the Plaintiffs’ evidence and case. The Defendants’ do so at their own peril (Takako (supra)) and it is a risk that they take. H] INDUCEMENT, FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND DECEIT [72] I will deal with the Plaintiffs’ causes of action in respect of Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit first and then followed by the cause of action on Breach of Contract. [73] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit allegations are essentially the same and I see no reason to treat them separately. They are in fact overlapping and it complicates matters to treat them as though they are two separate causes of action as was done by the Plaintiffs. Hence, my reference to Fraudulent Misrepresentation would include Deceit. [74] Ultimately, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation here revolve around the installation of the PU panels which are not Class “O” certified and the allegation that the Defendants concealed this fact from the Plaintiffs. [75] Unlike learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs did not, in his written submissions, specifically or clearly submit on how the Inducement, Fraudulent S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 66 Misrepresentation and Deceit affected the LOAs with reference to the Contracts Act 1950 (“CA 1950”). [76] Therefore, the Statement of Claim needs to be examined to see how the Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit are pleaded in relation to the contract, i.e. the LOAs. Some of the material parts of the Statement of Claim on these causes of action are reproduced below: Paragraph 27 “Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan Pertama melalui Pengarah- Pengarah dan pegawai-pegawainya terutama Defendan Ke-2, Ke-3, Ke-4, Ke-5 dan Ke- 6 telah berulang kali, dengan sengaja, dengan niat dan melulu menyatakan dan/atau mengakui (“represented”) melalui kelakuan dan perkataan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah seorang profesional yang berkebolehan dan mempunyai kemahiran dalam mereka bentuk, membuat, membekalkan, membina dan memasang mereka bentuk dan membina Loji Pemprosesan cGMP termasuk bilik sejuk, bilik sejuk beku dan bilik pemprosesan makanan yang mematuhi cGMP dan sesuai dengan sifat dan kegunaan perniagaan Plaintif Pertama. Plaintif-Plaintif juga merujuk butir-butir salah nyata fraud oleh Defendan-Defendan Pertama hingga Ke-5 dan Defendan Ke-6 secara masing-masing dalam perenggan-perenggan termasuk keseluruhan perenggan 72 (a)(72.1 hingga 72.3) dan (b) 72.3.i hingga 72.3.vii di bawah.” Paragraph 28 “Defendan Pertama di dalam Profil Syarikat (“Company Profile”) yang telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dalam usaha untuk mendorong/menggalakkan perlantikan sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Projek tersebut juga telah antara lainnya menyatakan dan/atau mengakui seperti berikut:- …..” Paragraph 29 “Sebagai sebahagian daripada usaha-usaha untuk mendorong/ menggalakkan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP di dalam Projek tersebut, Defendan Ke-2 sebagai salah seorang pengarah bagi Defendan Pertama telah secara dan dengan sengaja pada atau sekitar April 2019 mempelawa dan membawa Pengarah-Pengarah Plaintif Pertama untuk melawat sebuah kilang Kellogs’ di Negeri Sembilan yang mana telah kononnya juga, berdasarkan makluman oleh Defendan Kedua, melantik Defendan Pertama untuk mereka bentuk dan membina bilik pemprosesan makanan patuh cGMP yang serupa dengan kegunaan yang diperlukan oleh Plaintif Pertama.” S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 66 Paragraph 33 “Berdasarkan dan bergantung kepada semua pernyataan- pernyataan dan jaminan-jaminan di atas yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama melalui Pengarah-Pengarah dan pegawai- pegawainya terutama Defendan Ke-2, Ke-3, Ke-4, Ke-5 dan Ke-6, Plaintif-Plaintif telah bergantung kepadanya dan bertindak ke atas representasi-representasi tersebut dan telah didorong untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Projek tersebut. Plaintif-Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan-perenggan 24 hingga 26.7 di atas di sini. Plaintif-Plaintif juga merujuk butir-butir salah nyata fraud oleh Defendan- Defendan Pertama hingga Ke-5 dan Defendan Ke-6 secara masing-masing dalam perenggan-perenggan termasuk keseluruhan perenggan 72 (a)(72.1 hingga 72.3) dan (b) 72.3.i hingga 72.3.vii di bawah.” Paragraph 72.4 “Plaintif-Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan- perenggan 27 sehingga 33 di atas di sini dan seianjutnya menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan dan bergantung kepada semua pernyataan-pernyataan dan jaminan-jaminan di atas yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama terutama melalui Defendan Ke-2, Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Ke-2 telah bergantung kepadanya dan bertindak ke atas representasi-representasi tersebut dan telah didorong untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Project tersebut” (own emphasis added) [77] Therefore, the Inducement as pleaded in this case is the persuasion by the Defendants for Tech Food to enter into the 1st LOAs and for A One Piling to enter into the 2nd LOA. [78] The Inducement on its own does not amount to any wrongdoing but the Fraudulent Misrepresentation makes it wrongful. [79] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation here is essentially the allegation that: 1st to 5th and 6th Defendants i) The 1st to 5th Defendants misrepresented that Blue Seal was capable of constructing the Factory; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 66 ii) The Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the Contract knowing that Blue Seal was not able (or do not have the capability) to construct the Factory in accordance with the Contract; 6th Defendant iii) The 6th Defendant had dishonestly and fraudulently hidden from Linear Panel Marketing Sdn Bhd (“Linear Panel”) that the PU panels were not Class “O” certified; iv) The 6th Defendant conspired with the 1st to 5th Defendants to defraud the Plaintiffs by concealing that the PU panels were not Class “O” certified, are defective and not suitable to be used in the Project. v) Conspired with Blue Seal and the 2nd to 5th Defendants to sabotage the Project by intentionally allowing work to be carried out at the Project site without proper safety measures and safety equipment which may cause a “Stop Work Order” to be imposed. [80] Therefore, the fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation here must be in connection with the Contract. [81] Under CA 1950, the definition of “misrepresentation” can be found in Section 18 while the definition of “fraud” in Section 17 as stated below: Section 18 CA 1950 ““Misrepresentation” includes - (a) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (b) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gives an advantage to the person committing it, or anyone claiming under him, S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 66 by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; and (c) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.” Section 17 CA 1950 ““Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” (own emphasis added) [82] Thus, in the context of the present case, the Inducement for Tech Food to enter into the 1st LOA and for A One Piling to enter into the 2nd LOA is alleged to have been accomplished through the Fraudulent Misrepresentation (which includes Deceit) committed by the Defendants. [83] What then is the legal consequence of a contract which was entered into through fraud. The answer lies in Section 19 CA 1950 which provides as follows: “(1) When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. (2) A party to a contract, whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 66 performed, and that he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. Exception - If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Explanation - A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the party on whom the fraud was practised, or to whom the misrepresentation was made, does not render a contract voidable.” (own emphasis added) (see Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong [1983] 2 MLJ 320 (FC); Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v. Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1999] 2 MLJ 500 (COA); Seqar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tay Tho Bok & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 211 (COA)) [84] In Abdul Razak (supra) the Court of Appeal made the position clear on the rights of the representee in circumstances where the contract was entered through fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and held as follows: “Fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation renders a contract voidable at the instance of the representee. See the Contracts Act 1950, s 19(1). The representee is therefore entitled to apply to a court for a decree of rescission from a court and also to an award of damages. See Archer v Brown [1985] 1 QB 401. Damages are available in addition to rescission because an action for fraudulent misrepresentation is grounded upon the tort of deceit, and in the case of negligent misrepresentation upon the tort of negligence.” ………. “A representee who is the victim of a fraud may, at his election, abandon his right to rescind and may instead insist that the contract be performed, and that he be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. See the Contracts Act 1950, s 19(2). (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 66 [85] In the present case the Plaintiffs have prayed for the LOAs to be affirmed. In fact, they specifically prayed in paragraph 83.4 of the Statement of Claim for a declaration that the 1st to 5th Defendants committed a breach of contract, of the LOAs. [86] It is clear therefore that the Plaintiffs have decided not to rescind the LOAs but to affirm them instead. [87] In Segar Oil Palm (supra) which facts have some similarity to the present case the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, as follows: “….. Unfortunately, neither counsel nor indeed the trial judge went into the real significance of the passage cited from Chesire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract at p 430. We will repeat it here with the necessary emphasis: It is a fundamental principle that the effect of a misrepresentation is to make the contract voidable and not void. This means that the contract is valid unless and until it is set aside by the representee. On discovering the misrepresentation, the representee may elect to affirm or rescind the contract. (Emphasis added.) It is elementary law that a party to a contract, who alleges fraud, cannot avoid one part of the contract and affirm another, unless the parts are so severable as to be independent contracts. This proposition can be found in Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (7th Ed) pp 515 and 517 where the cases are set out. See also Vendor and Purchaser by RM Stoneham (1994) at p 815. The same proposition is repeated on The Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts (9th Ed) by Pollock and Mulla at p 458 which reads: ... a man cannot rescind a contract in part only, when he decides to repudiate it, he must repudiate it altogether. Having been put on notice on 9 August 1988 in no uncertain terms, the only option the purchasers had was either to perform the agreement according to its terms, or repudiate it altogether and sue for damages for fraud” (own emphasis added) [88] I agree with learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants that based on the, inter alia, Section 19 CA 1950 read together with the cases such as Abdul Razak (supra) and Segar Oil Palm (supra), the Fraudulent Misrepresentation that the Plaintiffs allege induced S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 66 them to enter into the Contract had the effect of nullifying their “consent” to enter into the LOAs. To put it another way the entire contract was voidable by reason of the fraud as there was a lack of consent and the contract could be easily unravelled. [89] In this regard, the Federal Court in Integrated Training and Services Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2022] 3 MLJ 77 had this to say on this point: “[22] In Campbell v Edwards [1976] 1 AH ER 785 it' was held, inter alia, where two parties had agreed that the price of the property was to be fixed by a valuer on whom they should agree and the valuer gave his valuation honestly and in good faith in a non-speaking report, ie one that did not give reasons or calculations, the valuation could not be set aside by either party on the ground that the valuer had made a mistake, for, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the valuation was binding on the parties by contract. Lord Denning MR at p 788 had stated the following: ... It is simply the law of contract. If two persons agree that the price of property should be fixed by a valuer on whom they agree, and he gives that valuation honestly and in good faith, they are bound by it. The reason is because they have agreed to be bound by it. If there were fraud or collusion, of course, it would be different. Fraud or collusion unravels everything.” (own emphasis added) [90] Therefore, the Contract which was entered into was voidable and is valid unless and until set aside. The Plaintiffs then had a choice to either rescind the contract and sue for damages or to affirm the contract and continue with it. [91] The victim of fraud must either set aside the agreement and sue for damages for fraud or affirm the contract (Section 19 of CA 1950; Segar Oil Palm (supra)). [92] The Plaintiffs cannot sue for both Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract. [93] Putting it another way, what the Plaintiffs are saying is that the Defendants’ Fraudulent Misrepresentation had caused them to enter into the Contract (the LOAs). They would not have entered into the Contract or consented to enter into it had they known of S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 30 of 66 the fraud. However, instead or unravelling or setting aside the Contract the Plaintiffs affirm it and then rely on it to say that Blue Seal has breached its terms. By doing this, Fraudulent Misrepresentation allegation no longer becomes an issue. [94] It is illogical for the Plaintiffs to plead they were induced by Fraudulent Misrepresentation by the Defendants to enter into the LOAs and at the same time rely on the very same LOAs to claim for breach of contract. [95] With respect, the Plaintiffs’ claim for Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit is flawed and can be dismissed on this ground alone. [96] It therefore follows that the reliefs in the Statement of Claim related to fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation cannot be maintained. [97] With respect to the Plaintiffs, further to what I had stated in paragraph 40 above, their pleaded case specifically in respect of Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit is fundamentally flawed. [98] It is of utmost importance that there is correlation between the cause of action pleaded and the relief(s) that follow, if not, the claim would make no sense. [99] I would conclude with a passage by the Federal Court in Giga Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 MLJ 449 where it was held as follows: “[42] Now, it is trite law that the plaintiff is bound by its own pleadings (see R Rama Chandran v The industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145; Anjalal Anmal & Anor v Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22; Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 302 (SC); Joo Chin Kia v Loh Seng Tek [1987] 1 CLJ 194; KEP Mohamed AH v KEP Mohamad Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10 (FC)). The plaintiff is not permitted to improve its pleading in any other manner other than by way of an application to amend. Otherwise it would be unfair and prejudicial to the defendants if the plaintiff could now be allowed to raise an issue that was not within the contemplation of the parties in the first place (see Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v South Port Corpn [1956] AC 218; Playing Cards (M) Sdn Bhd v China Mutual Navigation Co Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 182 (FC)).” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 31 of 66 [100] Notwithstanding the above, for the purpose of completeness, I have nevertheless still considered the alleged individual acts of the Defendants that is said to constitute Fraudulent Misrepresentation and the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs on this issue. I] FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL [101] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation pleaded by the Plaintiffs is to justify the lifting of the corporate veil or to go behind the corporate veil to make the Defendants liable together with the 1st Defendant. [102] An elaborate definition of “misrepresentation” can be found in Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar @ Tee Kim [2003] 3 MLJ 460 in which the Court of Appeal held as follows: “Now, it is trite that the expression ‘misrepresentation’ is merely descriptive of a false pre-contractual statement that induces a contract or other transaction. But it does not reflect the state of mind of the representor at the relevant time. The state of mind of the representor at the time he made the representation to the representee varies according to the circumstances of each case. It may be fraudulent. It may be negligent. Or it may be entirely innocent, that is to say, the product of a mind that is free of deceit and inadvertence (see Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd. Put another way, a misrepresentation is innocent ‘where the representor believes his assertion to be true and consequently has no intention of deceiving the representee.’ (Chesire & Fifoot, Law of Contract (6th Ed)). It is the particular state of mind of the representor that determines the nature of the remedy available to the representee. So, if the misrepresentation is made fraudulently, then the representee is entitled to rescission and all damages directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement.” (own emphasis added) [103] Therefore, the Plaintiffs must show that the Fraudulent Misrepresentation was: i) Made before the contract; and S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 32 of 66 ii) The state of mind of the Defendants at the time the Fraudulent Misrepresentation was made, in that the Defendants intended to deceive the Plaintiffs. [104] First and foremost, as I have decided earlier, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation allegation cannot stand in view of the Plaintiffs reliance on the Contract to sue Blue Seal for breach thereof. [105] Secondly, and in any event, it is clear from paragraphs 72.3J to 72.3.vii of the Statement of Claim that all the matters relied on by the Plaintiffs occurred after the Contract was entered into and hence cannot amount to a pre-contractual false statement of fact that had induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the Contract with Blue Seal (Sim Thong Realty (supra)). [106] Thirdly, though the allegations against the Defendants are made jointly, the pleaded particulars are only in respect of the 2nd Defendant (paragraphs 29 to 31 of the Statement of Claim). [107] The case of Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v. Yeoh Teen Earn & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 involved the joint allegation of fraud and Justice Mohd Nazlan (as he then was) observed the following: “[54] The plaintiff must furnish the requisite particularity by pleading the circumstances of material facts as to the questions of “who, what, where, when and how" of the alleged fraud and conspiracy in order to enable the defendants to provide a meaningful response. It cannot be emphasised enough that general statements which are vague and containing conclusory allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Order 18 r 7 and r 12. The statement of claim too cannot hide behind purported averments which in truth are nothing but merely a set of formulaic recitation of the ingredients of a cause of action. [55] Pleadings sans particularisation is bad pleading because matters such as fraud and conspiracy cannot be expected to be inferred from statements which are vague and general in nature, more so as the concept of fraud itself is not immutable. Similarly, when alleging fraud and conspiracy against more than one defendants, like presently, the plaintiff must specify, with particularity, each of the fourth and fifth defendant's offending conduct. The defendants cannot be grouped together without identifying which defendant has committed which wrong.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 33 of 66 [108] It is pleaded at paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim that Blue Seal acted through the 2nd to 5th Defendants. It follows that the circumstances of how the fraud occurred must be pleaded and proved in Court in particular: i) What each of these Defendants had done; and ii) How each of them had either ordered or procured the fraud in question before the Contract was entered into. [109] As the above two elements/facts were not pleaded or proved, it would appear that Fraudulent Misrepresentation was raised against the 2nd to 5th Defendants merely because they are directors of Blue Seal and against the 6th Defendant as he is Blue Seal’s employee. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Victor Cham & Anor v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 held as follows: “[8] In C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd & Anor, Slade LJ relying on the case of Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 stated the legal position in the following words: The mere fact that a person is a director of a limited company does not by itself render him liable for torts committed by the company during the period of his directorship: see, for example, Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in Hq) v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1924] 2 AC 465 at 488,.... Nevertheless, judicial dicta of high authority are to be found in English decisions which suggest that a director is liable for those tortuous acts of his company which he has ordered or procured to be done. [9] In Wah Tat Bank Ltd and another v Chan Cheng Kum [1975] 2 All ER 257, two banks brought an action against a shipping company and C, the company chairman and managing director, claiming damages jointly against them for conversion. In holding C liable, the Privy Council in its judgment delivered by Lord Salmon stated: No doubt the fact that the respondent is chairman and managing director of HSC does not of itself make him personally liable in respect of that company’s tortuous acts. A tort may he committed through an officer or servant of a company without the chairman or managing director being in any way implicated. There are many such cases reported in the books. If however the chairman or managing director S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 34 of 66 procures or directs the commission of the tort he may be personally liable for the tort and the damage flowing from it: Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd per Arkin LJ. Each case depends on its own particular facts. In the instant case the un- contradicted evidence proves that early in 1961 the respondent, as chairman and managing director of HSC, agreed with the directors of TSC the terms on which HSC would continue wrongfully to convert goods consigned to the banks just as they had done in the past. Their Lordships consider that in all the circumstances there is no answer to the banks’ contention that the respondent was personally liable for the conversion in respect of which judgement has been entered against HSC.” ……… “[11] In Thomas Bruce Morgan v Government of Saskatchewan, Neal Hardy and Darrel Binkley [1985] Sask R 129, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal made the following observation: On this branch of the case we refer to the following passage from judgment of Disber J, in Einhorn v Westmount Investments Ltd and Belzberg et al. (1969), 69 WWR (NS) 31, at p 36: Ordinarily an agent is subject to the control of another person, his principal. A company perforce is only able to act through its agents and servants. Consequently, while company directors are referred to as ‘agent’, the cold fact is that they control the company. As the directors pull the strings so the company must of necessity jump. Particularly is this true where, as here, the individual defendants were in 'complete control' of the company. This court in the exercise of its common-law jurisdiction in the field of tort considers the realities of the situations which come before it for decision, and the court is not restricted in so doing because individual carries out intentional tortuous acts through the medium of a puppet corporation whose every action they control. Individuals guilty of intentional tortuous acts do not escape personal liability by this device of clothing themselves in a corporate veil of their own spinning. And further the court said: So a director is not to be held liable merely because he is a director but may be liable when he participates in or orders a tortuous act and cannot S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 35 of 66 escape personal liability by asserting that his act was merely the act of the corporation. In other words, the 'corporate veil’ is not to be used as a shield to protect shareholders and directors when they have been guilty of wrongdoing. This approach is consistent with the notion that everyone should be answerable for his tortuous acts.” (own emphasis added) [110] The pleaded allegations of Fraudulent Misrepresentation against the 2nd Defendant are essentially in relation to: i) The visit to Kellogg’s Factory; and ii) The 1st Defendant’s company profile. [111] As for the Kellogg’s Factory visit, I do not find there to be evidence of Fraudulent Misrepresentation for the following reasons: i) PW-1 himself testified that PW-1 initiated the trip to the Kellogg’s Factory by “requesting” that the 2nd Defendant take him there. This alone negates the allegation of inducement; ii) It is alleged that the 2nd Defendant told PW-1 that the panels installed in the Kellogg’s Factory were going to be the same as the panels to be installed at the Factory. The Plaintiffs have not proven the existence of the element of “fraud” or “dishonesty” in this statement (CIMB Bank Bhd v. Veeran Ayasamy (Wakil Diri Kepada Letchimi Muthusamy, Si Mati) [2015] 7 CLJ 289). This is simply because the Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence of the type of panels installed at the Kellogg’s Factory or that the panels installed at the Factory are sub-standard compared to those installed at the Kellogg’s Factory. This would have required the Plaintiffs to actually adduce evidence of the panels at the Kellogg’s Factory which they did not do; iii) The truth of the statement is one thing but the issue of “dishonesty” is required to be proven where Fraudulent Misrepresentation is alleged. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove there was any dishonesty in the statement made by the 2nd Defendant. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 36 of 66 [112] Regarding Blue Seal’s company profile, it was not pleaded and neither was there clear evidence on how the Plaintiffs obtained the said profile, in particular from which of the Defendants. [113] As a company acts through its “agent” (Victor Cham (supra)) the Plaintiffs must plead and prove which of the Defendants, if any, had given Blue Seal’s company profile to the Plaintiffs. PW-1 had then named the 2nd Defendant in his oral testimony before the Court but this cannot be permitted. In this regard, the Federal Court in Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Global Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 1 MLJ 302 held as follows: “These issues brought up at the trial had not been pleaded in the Statement of Defence, and this was a contravention of Order 18 Rule 8 of the Rules of the High Court, and therefore the contentions should not have been entertained (Attorney General v. Lord Mayor etc. of City of Sheffield(1)" (own emphasis added) [114] Even if is accepted that the 2nd Defendant or either of the 3rd to 5th Defendants had given Blue Seal’s company profile to the Plaintiffs, it has not been shown that there is anything stated in Blue Seal’s company profile which is inaccurate or untrue and how it is tantamount to Fraudulent Misrepresentation. [115] In so far as conspiracy is concerned the requirements laid down in Renault SA v. Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394 have not been fulfilled in that the following have not been clearly pleaded or proven: i) an agreement between the 6th Defendant and the 1st to 5th Defendants; ii) an agreement for the purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs; iii) the overt acts that were done in execution of the agreement; iv) that the overt acts were done in execution of the agreement; and v) what are the acts purportedly done by each of the Defendants in execution of the agreement. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 37 of 66 [116] There is no direct evidence tendered by the Plaintiffs to prove Fraudulent Misrepresentation against any of the Defendants and in particular that they “knowingly” committed the alleged acts associated with the allegation of Fraudulent Misrepresentation, fraud and conspiracy. The following passages by the Federal Court in Keruntum (supra) is instructive on this issue: “[70] In order for the plaintiff to succeed in its case that the cancellation of its licence was to serve a political purpose, it is necessary for the plaintiff to adduce evidence if believed, sufficient to prove that the second defendant knew about the Ming Court affair prior to the cancellation of the plaintiff’s licence. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff had not adduced direct evidence to show that the second defendant knew about it. It was also the finding of the courts below that to link the aforesaid cancellation to a political motive is a mere conjecture.” (own emphasis added) [117] In order to prove the Defendants’ knew that the panels were not certified Class ‘O’ even before they were installed, the Plaintiffs relied on the letter dated 31.3.2019 from Bahagian Perancangan dan Penyelidikan Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat to Linear Panel (“Bomba’s Letter”). This is the main evidence that the Plaintiffs relied on to show knowledge of the Defendants. [118] However, I agree with learned counsel for the Defendants that Bomba’s Letter does support the Plaintiffs’ allegation as: i) Bomba’s Letter is only addressed to Linear Panel and not to any of the Defendants. It is also not copied to any of the Defendants; ii) Bomba’s Letter merely states that Linear Panel’s application to obtain a renewal for “Coldroom Panel (50mm thickness)” for Class ‘O’ was rejected; iii) nowhere in Bomba’s Letter is it mentioned whether the Class ‘O’ certificate (for which the renewal was rejected) referred to in the letter is in respect of PU panels or whether it is in respect of another type of cold room panel. The Quotation indicates EPS (Expanded Polystyrene) panels (which both parties agree was later changed to PU panels). S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 38 of 66 iv) Pooi Chee Hoog who is a director of Linear Panels mentioned in PW-1’s witness statement (WS(A)-PW1) was never called to testify by the Plaintiffs; v) the Defendants are not mentioned in Bomba’s Letter. [119] Hence, the summary of my findings are as follows: i) The Defendants did not commit Fraudulent Misrepresentation; ii) The Fraudulent Misrepresentation in the context of the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case is fundamentally wrong. The Plaintiffs cannot say they were induced to enter into the Contract (LOAs) but at the same time rely on the same contract to claim for breach thereof. iii) In the absence of fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation there is no ground to lift the corporate veil in the present case. In this regard the Court of Appeal in Lam Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 held as follows. “In my judgment, in the light of the more recent authorities such as Adams v Cape Industries Plc, it is not open to the courts to disregard the corporate veil purely on the ground that it is in the interests of justice to do so. It is also my respectful view that the special circumstances to which Lord Keith referred include cases where there is actual fraud at common law or some inequitable or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity. The former, that is to say, actual fraud, was expressly recognised to be an exception to the doctrine of corporate personality by Lord Halsbury in his speech in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, the seminal case on the subject.” (own emphasis added) (see also Solid Investments Ltd v. Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 784 (FC)) [120] I must stress here that Fraudulent Misrepresentation, fraud as well as conspiracy to defraud are serious allegations and in the absence of “dishonesty” as well as proof of the state of mind the S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 39 of 66 Defendants, these allegations remain nothing more than mere allegations. [121] Further, the causes of action of this nature involving fraud and dishonesty must not only be specifically pleaded but there must also be clear evidence to prove the nexus between the alleged wrongful acts and the defendant who is said to have committed those wrongful acts. The Plaintiffs have failed to do either of this. J] NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY [122] The Plaintiffs also included, in addition to the multiple causes of action, a claim based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. [123] The negligence as pleaded is that the Defendants were negligent in, inter alia, supplying, constructing and carrying out installation work at the Factory. [124] The allegation on negligence is also attached to the allegation of defective and latent defect in the material used, design and work quality. [125] These are all allegations regarding the Contract. The Plaintiffs claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty is premised on the Contract (the LOAs). [126] This is further confirmed in the answer to Question 33 in WS(A)- PW1: “Question 33: Apart from the above-mentioned breaches, can you explain to the Court, what are the other failures of the Defendants in supplying, manufacturing, designing, installing and delivering the cGMP processing plant to the Plaintiffs? Answer 33: a) Following from the admission by the D1 that PU panels supplied to and installed at the 1st Plaintiff’s cGMP processing plant are not certified as Class O and that is breach of contract, it is inter-related and evidently proved that D1 and its directors D2-D5 are negligent in carrying out their duties of care and skill, when Defendants knew that they were appointed S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 40 of 66 specifically as NSC for the Projects, so they owe a duty of care to us. ” (own emphasis added) [127] The negligence claim is pleaded jointly against all the Defendants based on the “Particulars of Negligence” against the Defendants in paragraphs 81.1 to 81.16 of the Statement of Claim. [128] At paragraph 80 of the Statement of Claim, it is also pleaded these same Defendants jointly owe a duty of care to the Plaintiffs as NSCs: “Selanjutnya dan/atau secara alternatif Plaintif-Plaintif menyatakan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material Defendan-Defendan mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan mengguna kemahiran tehadap Plaintif- Plaintif selaku SKD untuk membekal, membuat, mereka bentuk dan membina Loji Pemprosesan cGMP bagi Projek selari dengan SA No. 1 tersebut, SA No. 2 tersebut, undang-undang berkaitan di Malaysia dan semua representasi- representasi yang telah dibuat sama ada melalui tindakan atau perkataan yang telah diberikan terhadap dan dijaminkan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. Plaintif- Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan-perenggan 27 sehingga 33 di atas di sini.” (own emphasis added) [129] The Contracts do not involve the 2nd to 6th Defendants and as such they do not owe the Plaintiffs a duty of care regarding the Contract. [130] Further, I have stated earlier that the only contract in existence is the 2nd LOA between A One Piling and Blue Seal. [131] Therefore, the Plaintiffs claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty cannot be maintained against the 2nd to 6th Defendants who have no contractual relationship with the either of the Plaintiffs. [132] When it comes to Blue Seal, I find that the claim for negligence overlaps with the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract. That being the case, the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract will supersede their claim for negligence. [133] The issue of an obligation in contract superseding a duty in tort was dealt with in the Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 in which the Privy Council held as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 41 of 66 “Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the law's development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship. Though it is possible as a matter of legal semantics to conduct an analysis of the rights and duties inherent in some contractual relationships including that of banker and customer either as a matter of contract law when the question will be what, if any, terms are to be implied or as a matter of tort law when the task will be to identify a duty arising from the proximity and character of the relationship between the parties, their Lordships believe it to be correct in principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the law to adhere to the contractual analysis: on principle because it is a relationship in which the parties have, subject to a few exceptions, the right to determine their obligations to each other, and for the avoidance of confusion because different consequences do follow according to whether liability arises from contract or tort, e.g. in the limitation of action. …..” ………. “Their Lordships do not, therefore, embark on an investigation as to whether in the relationship of banker and customer it is possible to identify tort as well as contract as a source of the obligations owed by the one to the other. Their Lordships do not, however, accept that the parties' mutual obligations in tort can be any greater than those to be found expressly or by necessary implication in their contract. …” (own emphasis added) [134] The same position was taken by the Court of Appeal in Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v. SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 in respect of an attempt by the respondent there to impose a tortious duty of care on the appellant who was sued for negligence. The Court of Appeal referred to the case of Tai Hing Cotton Mill (supra) and held as follows: “[36] In essence therefore, and harkening to the fair, just and reasonable requirement as set out in Caparo, in cases where the parties must be taken to have intended their rights and obligations to be governed exclusively by the contract or contracts which, they have entered, especially in a commercial contract, that factor to be taken as a compelling one, or in some cases a decisive one, against the imposition of a duty of care in tort.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 42 of 66 [135] Therefore, to summarise my findings on this issue: i) The Plaintiffs have no cause of action for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty against the 2nd to 6th Defendants; ii) As A One Piling has a contract with Blue Seal under the 2nd LOA, it supersedes A One Piling’s claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Blue Seal. iii) Tech Food has no contractual claim or nexus with Blue Seal as the 1st LOA is no longer valid. Blue Seal owes no fiduciary duty to Tech Food and no claim for negligence can be maintained by Tech Food against Blue Seal in respect of the work Blue Seal carried out for A One Piling under the 2nd LOA, as the NSC of the Project. K] BREACH OF CONTRACT (THE 2ND LOA) [136] I now come to A One Piling’s claim for breach of contract against Blue Seal. This is the only part of the Plaintiffs’ claim that can be maintained and it is only confined to A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract. [137] As stated earlier in paragraph 40 above, Blue Seal has admitted to liability for breach of the terms of the 2nd LOA but the admission is limited to the following: i) Under the Contract, A One Piling was to supply and install PU panels that are not defective, are fit for the purpose, are of merchantable quality, fire retardant and certified Bomba class “O”; ii) Blue Seal failed to supply and install Bomba Class ‘O’ certified PU panels at the Factory; iii) As a result of this failure the Factory cannot be used or operated as a cGMP Processing Plant. [138] At the outset, Blue Seal’s admission was only made on 23.5.2022 about a month before the trial was scheduled to commence, i.e. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 43 of 66 20.6.2022. Even then it was after numerous requests and/or challenges made by the Plaintiffs for the documents to prove that the PU panels installed at the Factory were in fact Bomba certified class “O”. [139] Blue Seal’s failure to make this disclosure or admission works to its detriment and ultimately affects Blue Seal’s credibility. [140] Based on the admission of liability, the Factory could not be used or operated as a cGMP Processing Plant as intended because of Blue Seal’s failure to supply and install Bomba certified class “O” PU panels at the Factory. [141] However, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, the breach by Blue Seal is not only limited to the fact that the PU panels installed at the Factory were no Bomba certified class “O” but also that: i) The PU panels had bubbles or blisters on them. This is not denied by the Defendants. ii) The PU panels were in fact defective and damaged which became evident subsequent to their installation. The PU panels cover a large portion of the Factory. The entire Factory is a huge refrigeration storage facility. iii) The damage does not only extend to the PU panels themselves but also the other components that make up or come with the PU panels. As the Factory is used as a refrigerated storage facility the PU panels have to be installed with proper insulation and support. This is because the PU panels are installed at the inner walls, doors and ceilings of the Factory and they form a complete system (“Refrigeration system”). Perhaps in more simple or lay terms, the PU panels are like the inner walls of a fridge and the damage to the inner walls can cause a catastrophic effect to the whole fridge. This is what has happened to the Factory. iv) Blue Seal had failed to construct the Factory properly to enable it to function as a refrigerated storage facility, the very purpose for which Blue Seal was engaged. [142] Having examined the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in this case I find that the evidence substantiates A One Piling’s above S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 44 of 66 allegations namely that the PU panels were defective and that the installation of the PU panels and the overall Refrigeration system were not done properly. [143] In connection to this, there was a dispute raised by Blue Seal that the Contract and in particular the 2nd LOA did not include “design” work”. Whilst the terms of the 2nd LOA may not be absolutely clear on this and this had caused parties to engage in lengthy submissions, however, respectfully, I do not find the issue as complicated as it seems. This is based on the 2nd LOA (read together with the Quotation and other relevant documents) the construction of the Factory is very comprehensive. There can be no mistake or confusion that the Factory was to be used as a refrigerated storage facility and even a cursory review of the 2nd LOA and the Quotation will show that. Blue Seal’s work was to construct the Refrigeration system to enable the Factory to operate as a refrigerated storage facility. Thus, even if it is not explicitly stated, it can still be clearly implied that when Blue Seal constructs the Factory, it must ensure that the Factory can function as a refrigerated storage facility. [144] It would not make sense for Blue Seal to construct the Factory when it knows and ought to know that the Factory, upon being constructed, would not be able to function as a refrigerated storage facility. Therefore, Blue Seal cannot deny that there is a “design” element in the construction of the Factory. This is one of the complaints that was raised by the Plaintiffs, i.e. on the design work, which was also addressed by their expert, Raymond A.E.de Graaf (“PW-2”), in his reports and oral testimony at the trial. [145] Thus, in the construction of the Factory, Blue Seal must ensure that the Factory will ultimately function as a refrigerated storage facility and the work must be “designed” to achieve that. It is not open for Blue Seal to allege it only did what the Plaintiffs told it to do (e.g. to instal the PU panels) and if the Factory cannot operate as intended Blue Seal cannot be faulted as it did not design the Factory. [146] It must be borne in mind that the work under the 2nd LOA is comprehensive. Blue Seal must have the technical knowledge and ability to construct the Factory and use that knowledge and ability so that the Factory will function as a refrigerated storage facility. This is the reason for which A One Piling engaged Blue Seal and relied on Blue Seal’s expertise. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 45 of 66 L] BREACH OF CONTRACT - EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, DAMAGE AND QUANTUM [147] Regarding the allegations stated in paragraph 141 above PW-2 had testified, inter alia, as follows in his witness WS(A)-PW2: “Question 9 : Can you explain what is the opinion in your Assessment Report? Answer 9 : In summary, my opinion is as follows: a) Taking the general inadequate project conditions into consideration, which will result in high operational power consumption cost, accelerated depreciations, insurmountable deterioration, further bubble/blister phenomena, further delamination of the PPGI and structural stress damages on insulation and civil structures, substantial increased wear and tear on all related components, in particular the refrigeration equipment, insulation and possible concrete floor heaving, (it is paramount, to understand the problems and have raised awareness that expensive unforeseen repair- and replacement solutions during full operational periods will become inevitably. b) Having conducted the extensive survey and study of the Temperature-Controlled Production Facility concerned, that the most obvious recommendation that can be concluded is, to replace all insulation works and respective concrete floating floors, redesign the method statements and consider to conduct a thorough capacity calculation on the refrigeration equipment versus heat loads and thermal conductivity computations of the installed insulation systems. c) If however, the most obvious recommendation of replacement will not be implemented, it needs to be a paradigm of continuous monitoring the inspected and found defects, non-appliance parts of the method statements, inadequate applicable method statements, ice build-up in the tongue and groove panel connections, expected deterioration continuation, as well as the overall conditions of the total contracted works. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 46 of 66 d) It is obvious that a pre-operational trial runs need to be executed on all mechanical components that have been subject to a long period of a non-activity status combined with a thorough cleaning of the entire ex- and internal facility.” [148] PW-2 further testified on the condition of Factory as at 16.6.2022 (which is a few days before the trial) as follows: “Question 15 : Can you briefly explain about your assessment?? Answer 15 : a) I conducted another site assessment inspection at the request of Tech food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. on 16.06.2022 for the purpose of a comparison with my Assessment Report No. 1 dated 11.06.2020 and composed the assessment as Updated Status Report No. 1 dated 16.06.2022 and marked as Exhibit RDG- 3 in the Plaintiffs’ Expert Affidavit (No. 2) affirmed by me on 17.06.2022. b) In brief, I found all previous inspected external phenomenon of bubble/blister of PU walls-, partition walls-, and walkable/suspended ceiling sandwich insulation panels, the phenomenon of delamination/debonding on the external side of the walkable/suspended ceiling PU insulation sandwich panels, as well as the inadequate essential vapor barriers, door- & relief ports components and equipment in comparison to my Assessment Report 1, dated 11.06.2020 to be substantially deteriorated, no improvement whatsoever on the PU finishing floors, additional corrosion on the refrigeration equipment, dust and cobwebs. c) For these reasons, the only conclusion I can make is to demolish the entire PU insulation system, the PU floor insulation slabs in Freezer 1 & 2, combined with the concrete top floors, the freezer door frames and a thorough review of the conditions of the refrigeration systems and individual equipment of all capacities, heat load calculations, corrosion in order to re-design the entire system and amend the method statements on the entire insulation system in accordance with Bomba class ‘O’ certification.” S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 47 of 66 [149] In relation to this, it is crucial to note that Blue Seal or the other Defendants did not produce any expert report either on their own or in rebuttal. [150] In the absence of their own expert report or expert testimony, the cross-examination conducted by the Defendants on PW-2 in respect of technical or scientific matters would not have much of an impact on PW-2’s testimony unless the expert evidence is “obviously lacking in defensibility” and “is not supported by the basic facts of the case” (Majuikan Sdn Bhd v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171). This is not the situation in the instant case. [151] Any of the Defendants’ counsel who cross-examines PW-2 cannot presuppose he has knowledge on the scientific area involved without support from another expert report or testimony to base his cross-examination on (see Syed Abu Bakar bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 MLRA 318; PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLRH 841 on how the Court treats expert reports). [152] Therefore, this falls squarely under one of the circumstances in which adverse inference may be drawn under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA 1950”) and especially in the present case where the Defendants have submitted “no case to answer” (Takako (supra)). [153] To prove its claim for breach of contract A One Piling had adduced both documentary and viva voce evidence which are summarised as follows: i) One “Part A” bundle of documents where the authenticity and contents of the documents are agreed; ii) Eight “Part B” bundle of documents where the contents of the documents are disputed and not their authenticity. iii) One “Part C” bundle of document which only contains “Whatsapp” messages totalling 2 pages. iv) Six witnesses testified for the Plaintiffs. [154] The documentary evidence included pictures of the Factory and video recordings of the inspection carried out at the Factory. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 48 of 66 [155] It is proven from the totality of the evidence presented at the Trial that the Factory was not constructed properly (including defective or wrong materials used) and the construction work was incomplete. Even visibly, the damage especially to the PU panels can be seen in that most, if not all, of the PU panels installed at the Factory have blisters/bubbles on them. [156] To put it plainly, the Factory was in poor condition and in a deteriorated state. [157] The condition of the Factory was a direct result of Blue Seal’s failure to construct the Factory in accordance with the Contract and the entire Refrigeration system as stated in paragraph 141 above. This is clearly borne out by the evidence. [158] The condition of the Factory was described in detail in PW-2’s expert reports and in his oral testimony. PW-2 had inspected the Factory at least twice. [159] There is no reason for me to doubt or question PW-2’s testimony though learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants had argued that he was not independent. There is no evidence of this except for the attempts by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants to challenge PW-2’s credibility during cross-examination. During cross-examination I observed that PW-2 remained resolute, unwavering and consistent in his testimony which were supported by scientific explanation and data. [160] Given the admissions made by Blue Seal in particular that the Factory cannot be used or operated together with the totality of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs, I find that Blue Seal had committed breach of contract. Blue Seal had essentially failed to construct the Factory in accordance with the 2nd LOA and namely as stated in paragraph 141 above. [161] The said breach had then caused A One Piling to suffer losses. [162] Though there were multiple reliefs prayed for by A One Piling in respect of its the breach of contract claim, I had only allowed those which were the direct consequence of the breach and related to the 2nd LOA. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 49 of 66 [163] It must be noted at this juncture that some of the reliefs were withdrawn by the Plaintiffs such as the relief in prayers 83.10 and 83.13 of the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiffs also requested for “appropriate general damages” to be granted by the Court in place of prayers 83.7 and 83.11 of the Statement of Claim. [164] A One Piling’s contractual claim which I had allowed were confined to, inter alia, the following main reliefs in the Statement of Claim: i) Prayer 83.2 as prayed for; ii) Prayer 83.4 but only in respect of a declaration that there was a breach of contract of the 2nd LOA by Blue Seal as the NSC for the Project; iii) Prayer 83.9 for the refund of RM98,000.00 that was overpaid; iv) Prayer 83.11 for A One Piling to utilise the balance 5% of the Contract Sum which it is holding, against the costs of rectifying the Factory; and v) Prayer 83.12 for special damages but reduced to the sum of RM19,498,666.73 being the costs of rectifying the Factory; [165] Therefore, the two main relief for liquidated sums in the Statement of Claim which I allowed for breach of contract are: i) Prayer 83.9 for the refund of RM98,000.00 that was overpaid; and ii) Prayer 83.12 for special damages of RM19,498,666.73 being the costs of rectifying the Factory. [166] I will begin with the overpayment claim of RM98,000.00 which is specifically pleaded in the Statement of Claim. [167] Based on the testimony of PW-5, after Blue Seal terminated the 2nd LOA, PW-5, as the SO of the Project, was required to prepare the final account in respect of the same. At that point of time, after recalculation and inspection, it was discovered that the Project was over certified and many of the works that were supposedly done were not completed as claimed. In the circumstances, revised progress payment certificates were prepared, i.e. Progress S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 50 of 66 Payment Certificate No. 4A and Progress Payment Certificate No. 5A. [168] In support of its claim, A One Piling had produced pictures of the above incomplete works which were attached together with the Progress Claim No. 5A (Bundle B1). [169] It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiffs, that the RM98,000.00 overpayment was calculated as follows: “a) Progress Payment Certificate No. 4A: RM151,970.38 (add) b) Progress Payment Certificate No. 5A: -RM1 39,280.54 (less) c) Payment made by 2nd Plaintiff on 13.02.2019: RM110,945.64 Total: RM98,255.80” [170] As the 1st to 5th Defendants’ arguments against the evidence in respect of A One Piling’s claim for the overpayment of RM98,000.00 and special damages of RM19,498,666.73 are similar, I will deal with them together after addressing the said special damages claim. [171] Regarding A One Piling’s claim for special damages, the actual amount prayed in prayer 83.12 of the Statement of Claim, being the costs involved to rectify the Factory, was RM20,767,364.26. The particulars of this special damages were pleaded in, inter alia, paragraphs 56, 56.1 to 56.21.6 of the Statement of Claim. [172] A One Piling pleaded in detail the work and costs involved to rectify the Factory covering, inter alia, the work involved to the materials required and the related costs. [173] However, at the trial A One Piling was only able to prove special damages amounting to RM19,498,666.73. This was based on, inter alia, the testimonies of PW-5 and PW-6 as well as the documentary evidence adduced in, inter alia, Bundles B4 and B5 which include a document entitled “Summary For Loss and Damages (until 4/5/2022)” together with its supporting documents involving numerous quotations issued by various contractors and suppliers. The special damages of RM19,498,666.73 essentially represents the costs of rectifying the Factory. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 51 of 66 [174] In addition to this, PW-2, as an expert witness, had also testified on the what was needed to be done to rectify the Factory and to put it in working condition. [175] The 1st to 5th Defendants challenged the evidence adduced by A One Piling in respect of the above overpayment and special damages claim based on the following grounds: i) All the documents which were brought to the Court’s attention during post trial submissions are in Part B of the agreed bundle and the contents are disputed. ii) The Plaintiffs have presented their entire case without reading out any documents during the trial. They merely asked the Court to refer to certain pages in the agreed bundle and told the Court that the documents at those pages supported their case. No attempt was made to read out any document in Court. iii) By reason of issues (i) and (ii) above, the quotations were not properly admitted in evidence and their contents proved. iv) PW-2 is not a true expert in the area and his reports and testimony ought to be disregarded. [176] With regards to the issue at paragraph 175(i) above, it is not in dispute and is the correct position of law that the documents placed in Part B are disputed as to their contents and not their authenticity. The two cases below make it clear as to how Part B documents are to be treated: i) Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] MLRAU 376 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[24] It is clear that Bundle B contains documents where the authenticity of the same is not disputed but contents are. What that means is simply this. There is no requirement to call any evidence to prove the authenticity or existence of the document in question. However, if any party wants to rely on the contents of that document, he or she must call for the evidence, oral or otherwise, to prove the truth of the same. Unless that is done, the trial Court cannot give any evidential value to the contents of that document.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 52 of 66 ii) Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] 6 MLRA 52 in which the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[36] To answer that question it is necessary to consider O 34 r 2(2)(e). It provides that documents where the authenticity is agreed but the contents are in dispute, the documents are to be placed in Part B. This in turn means that while the parties are in agreement that such a document exists and is not a fabrication, the contents of the document remain in dispute. So the relevant witness is to be present at trial to be cross- examined on the contents only, of the document.” (own emphasis added) [177] Based on the above authorities, A One Piling will have to prove the contents of the documents that were placed in Part B by calling for the evidence, oral or otherwise (Melawangi (supra)) and where oral testimony is given the relevant witness must be in Court to be cross-examined by the Defendants (Tiow Weng Theong (supra)). [178] In the present case A One Piling had tendered the Part B documents and called the relevant witnesses to testify on those documents. A One Piling’s witnesses were then offered to the Defendants for cross-examination. Therefore, it is clear to me that A One Piling has satisfied the above two requirements laid out in Melawangi (supra) and Tiow Weng Theong (supra). [179] The next issue (paragraph 175(ii) above) pertains to the 1st to 5th Defendants’ argument that the said documents in Part B were only referred to by the Plaintiffs’ witnesses but were not read out in Court. Therefore, they do not form part of the evidence in the present case. [180] Whilst I agree that for A One Piling to prove the contents of the documents in Part B, the said documents must be referred to specifically by the relevant witness, however, I do not agree that they (i.e. the contents of these documents) need to be specifically read out in Court at the trial. [181] In this regard, the Supreme Court in Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 had clearly addressed this issue in, inter alia, the following passages: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 53 of 66 “Thirdly, such documents therein do not form automatically a part of the evidence of the case in question ipso facto, but any of such documents does become part of such evidence if it is read or referred to by either of the parties, wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention, either in examination of any witness, in submission at any stage or even on any unilateral drawing of court's attention to it by either of the parties at any time before the conclusion of the case. Fourthly, at the end of the whole case, the truth of the contents of any of the document is up to the court to determine, regard being had, inter alia, to any absence of challenge by either of the parties on any part of the document and similarly, the question of weight, eg either great or no weight to be given to any part of any document is also a matter for the trial court, which considers the documents including any 'written hearsay' contained therein. The court may refuse to give any weight at all to any document, but then it is accountable like in other matters, to the parties and to the appellate court for reasons for such refusal.” (own emphasis added) [182] Learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants had a different interpretation of the first paragraph of the above passages quoted from Jaafar bin Shaari (supra). He contends that the documents placed in Part B must be read in Court as the terms, “referred to” and “read” have different functions. With respect, I disagree. The wording of the above passages from Jaafar bin Shaari (supra) is clear. The word “or” in the passage “if it is read or referred to by either of the parties” is disjunctive. I am of the considered view that the party proving the contents of a Part B document may either “read” the document or “refer” to it at the trial, either through the witness’s statement or his oral testimony when he is examined. [183] I am also of the considered view that when the witness “refers” to a document placed in Part B, he only needs to identify the document in his testimony either “wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention” (Jaafar bin Shaari (supra)). [184] Thus, there is no necessity for the witness to read the document at the trial as argued by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants. [185] Learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants also referred to the case of Borneo Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Penang Port Commission S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 54 of 66 [1975] 2 MLJ 204 to support his argument that Part B documents must be read in Court and quoted the following passage from the said case: “Now Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 12th Edition, page 298 has this to say: — “If the correspondence is voluminous it will be necessary to have an agreed bundle for the use of the judge, the paging of which should be identical with that of the bundles for counsel on both sides. In default of special agreement, only such letters in the bundle as are actually read at the trial will be taken to be in evidence, and agreeing a bundle does not constitute an admission that all letters contained in it are admissible in evidence.” (own emphasis added) [186] With respect, I find learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants’ reliance on the above passage from Borneo Co. (supra) misplaced and taken out of context. Firstly, the use of an agreed bundle of documents were perhaps not a common thing in those days (in 1975) and preparing an agreed bundle was something relatively new. Secondly, it is clear from the words, “In default of special agreement” in Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 12th Edition, means that parties must agree on how the document is to be treated or categorised. The compilation and placing of documents in an “agreed bundle” in the context of the above passage is understood to mean for convenience and easy reference at the trial only. This is where the “special agreement” comes in on how the documents in the said agreed bundle are to be treated. In this day and age where the rules of civil procedure in Malaysia is now governed by the Rules of Court 2012, agreed bundles are categorised Parts A, B and C by agreement of parties well before the trial. Therefore, it is not useful nor instructive to refer to the above passage from Borneo Co. (supra). [187] In the present case, A One Piling’s witnesses had referred to the documents in Part B and in some instances had even given explanation on them during their testimonies. As such the contents of these Part B documents have been proven. [188] On the issue of whether the maker of a Part B documents needs to be called to testify, I find the Court of Appeal’s decision in Yeo Ing S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 55 of 66 King v. Melawanqi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 to be instructive, in which it was held as follows: “[10] If there is a dispute as to contents and/or its truth, it has to be placed in Bundle B. For example, in a case where the plaintiff is suing the defendant for breach of facility granted by the bank and the amount of claim is in dispute, the defendant can admit a bank statement to be placed in Bundle B and even agree to dispense with the maker of the statement to give evidence, to save costs and time and proceed to call his own witness such as a chartered accountant to show that the sum claimed in the bank statement is erroneous. In essence, placing a document in Bundle B does not mean that the maker must be called but if the opposing party dispense with the calling of the maker then that document must be marked as exhibit subject to proof of the contents. In any event, the court may want to give some probative force to that document taking into account a holistic view of the facts of the case (see Recaliva Design Steel (M) Sdn Bhd v Vista Access Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 604; [2008] 10 CLJ 491 and YB Dato’ Hj Husam bin Hj Musa v Mohd Faisal bin Rohban Ahmad [2015] 3 MLJ 364; [2015] 1 CLJ 787). In addition, the makers for Bundle B documents may be dispensed with, if the exception to the hearsay rule provided under the Evidence Act becomes applicable (see the EA 1950 ss 32, 73A, 90A, etc). In such event, the relevant documents must be marked as exhibits during trial.” (own emphasis added) [189] In the instant case, it was made clear to the parties well before the trial during case managements that if the maker of the document is required to be called by the opposing party then the document should be placed in Part C as formal proof is required for the documents to be admitted. Since parties have agreed for the documents to be placed in Part B, it is not a must for the maker to be called though it still falls upon the Court to determine the weight that should to be placed on the said document. [190] In connection with this, it was held in Melawangi (supra) as follows: “[27] Our view can be said to be corroborated by the many directions given by us when we were sitting as High Court Judges. Those directions were that there would be three bundles to be used at trial, namely Bundles A, B and C and documents therein must be agreed as what we have set out above. That has been the accepted practise among the legal practitioners prior to the Rules of Court 2012. This practice is in fact confirmed by counsel for the Appellant at trial as evidenced in this interchange between the learned Judge and counsel: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 56 of 66 YA : But the documents are in B? DRV : Yes it's in B. The documents are there, But the veracity are still subject to cross-examination. YA : Subject for cross, yes. Yes. DRV : So just because it's in B, it's not automatically like how it is in A.” (own emphasis added) [191] This then takes us to the issue of the cross-examination of the witnesses and the documents. [192] First and foremost, it is trite law that “it is essential that a party’s case be expressly put to his opponent’s material witnesses when they are under cross-examination.” (Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639). [193] It was also held in Lau Tiong Ik Construction Sdn Bhd v Lau Chung Ping & Anor (2015) MLRHU 1371 as follows: “[40] From what PW1 had stated above, the cash flow statement for FYE 1998 showed that there was no cash inflow of RM1,631, 200.00 which would have been the proceeds from the sale of the shares to the 1st defendant. The cash and bank balances in the said cash flow statement also did not increase by a proportionate amount of RM1,600,000.00. He said that this meant that there was no payment made by the 1st defendant and no payment received by the plaintiff. It is noteworthy that although deemed critical to the 1st defendant's case, PW1 was never cross- examined on this aspect of his evidence. This was to the detriment of the 1st defendant because it is a well settled rule of essential justice that wherever an opponent had declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all (see AEG Carapiet v. AYDerderian AIR 1961 Cal 359 at 362 applying Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67). In Ayoromi Helen v. PP [2004] 2 MLRA 322; [2005] 1 MLJ 699; [2005] 1 CLJ 1; [2005] 1 AMR 405 the Court of Appeal held that the failure to cross-examine a witness on a crucial part of the case will amount to an acceptance of the witness' testimony.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 57 of 66 [194] Whilst the 1st to 5th Defendants makes an issue of the manner in which the Part B documents were tendered by A One Piling, however, they themselves have failed to cross-examine A One Piling’s witnesses on these documents either entirely or specifically on material issues. [195] Learned counsel for the Defendants’ cross-examination of A One Piling’s witnesses were somewhat cursory and there was no specific reference to the documents which they now seek to challenge despite the fact that the said documents (mainly in Part B) were referred to by A One Piling’s witnesses at the trial. [196] PW-6 in particular was not cross-examined at all by the Defendants’ counsel. [197] As far as A One Piling is concerned it has discharged its evidential burden to prove its case and in this regard the contents of the Part B documents. Hence the burden shifts to Blue Seal (Keruntum (supra)). [198] A One Piling has adduced evidence to prove its overpayment claim of RM98,000.00 as well the special damages claim but only up to the sum of RM19,498,666.73. The details of these claims were specifically pleaded and both oral and documentary evidence adduced at the trial to support them. [199] Therefore, in respect of the issue in paragraph 175(iii) above, the quotations were properly admitted. The special damages were specifically pleaded and particularised and proved by documentary evidence (Rohgetana Mayathevan v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and Other Appeals [2017] 3 MLRA 53 at paragraph 16). Further the quotations can be used to prove loss or damages suffered (Chong Nge Wei & Ors v Kemajuan Masteron Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 135). [200] As far as the issue in paragraph 175(iv) is concerned, I reiterate my grounds in paragraphs 147 to 152 and 159 above. PW-2 testified that he had the expertise in the relevant area and the cross-examination of PW-2 by the Defendants were without any basis when in fact the Defendants did not adduce any contrary expert report or testimony to challenge PW-2’s expertise in the area. In any event I did not find the expert evidence of PW-2 to be obviously lacking in defensibility (Majuikan (supra)). PW-2 is well S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 58 of 66 qualified and has vast experience in the area. He had backed his reports and opinion with scientific facts and supporting data. [201] As I find that the evidence adduced by A One Piling satisfactory and reliable (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)), it is therefore the Court’s duty to accept the evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the Blue Seal to the contrary (Takako (supra)). [202] Blue Seal has also failed to provide any reason why it did not care to give evidence and therefore it is justified for the Court to draw adverse inference against Blue Seal (Takako (supra)). [203] In this situation, Blue Seal’s defence cannot be taken into account or considered (Leolaris (supra); Takako (supra)). [204] I find that the loss and damages were in fact suffered by A One Piling arising from Blue Seal’s breach of the 2nd LOA (Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 397) and this entitles A One Piling to the RM98,000.00 overpayment claim and the RM19,498,666.73 special damages claim which it has proven (Rohgetana Mayathevan (supra)). [205] I must emphasise that notwithstanding the evidence adduced by A One Piling to prove the losses and damages it suffered, it bears repeating that Blue Seal had admitted in no unclear terms that: “The cGMP Processing Plant cannot be used or operated as cGMP Processing Plant as the PU panels supplied and installed by the 1st Defendant are not class ‘O’ certified panels.” (own emphasis added) [206] Hence, it is only reasonable for A One Piling to be compensated for having to rectify the Factory which was not able to be used as a refrigerated storage facility for several years since Blue Seal terminated the 2nd LOA. [207] For brevity, only A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract, as the contracting parties under the 2nd LOA, is allowed. The 2nd to 6th Defendants are not privy to this contractual claim and therefore they cannot be made liable. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 59 of 66 M] THE OTHER RELIEFS [208] The Plaintiffs had prayed for a multitude of reliefs which include: i) General damages for breach of contract and/or fiduciary duties and/or negligence; ii) General damages for loss of reputation, business, income and business opportunity; iii) General damages for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation; iv) General damages for mental anguish, health issues and embarrassment. [209] As I had stated earlier the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants for Deceit, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duties are without merits and this has been dealt with earlier in this Judgment. Therefore, all the Plaintiffs’ claims and the reliefs connected to these causes of action are dismissed. [210] In so far as the general damages sought in relation to breach of contract is concerned, A One Piling’s special damages claim has covered these losses or damages and therefore A One Piling cannot be allowed the same claim twice or given a “second bite of the cherry” (Tekun Nasional v. Plenitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 6 MLJ 619 (FC)). [211] In any event, the reliefs which were not allowed were all unproven and no evidence were even adduced to prove that the losses were suffered. [212] It does not assist the Plaintiffs’ case by claiming a multitude of reliefs when they are not able to back those claims with actual evidence. It is also of utmost importance for the Plaintiffs to have first established the nexus between their claims and the reliefs sought before making those claims. [213] Save and except for A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract, the other claims are devoid of merit. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 60 of 66 [214] In the present case, as a result of a large number of the Plaintiffs’ claims being dismissed, costs for those dismissed claims were then awarded in favour of the Defendants. N] THE 6TH DEFENDANT [215] Earlier in this Judgment, I had discussed the Plaintiffs’ claims against all the Defendants including the 6th Defendant concerning Deceit, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Breach of Contract. However, I consider it necessary to specifically address the Plaintiffs’ claim against the 6th Defendant. [216] Firstly, the 6th Defendant is an employee of Blue Seal. He carries out his duties in accordance with the instructions given to him by Blue Seal and this would also be in line with his employment contract with Blue Seal. Blue Seal is the NSC of the Project and not the 6th Defendant. In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs continuously ties the alleged wrongdoings of the 2nd to 6th Defendants with Blue Seal as the NSC of the Project. There is no direct nexus between the Plaintiffs’ claim and the 6th Defendant. [217] Secondly, there is nothing for the 6th Defendant to gain by committing Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation unless he was conspiring with the other Defendants and this is what the Plaintiffs have alleged against him. [218] There is no evidence of conspiracy between the 6th Defendant and the other Defendants to commit Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation against the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence of the 6th Defendant committing Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation on his own either. [219] Thirdly, the 6th Defendant owes a duty to Blue Seal, not the Plaintiffs. If during the course of his employment the 6th Defendant commits an error in his work or is negligent in the execution of his duties related to the Project, Blue Seal would assume liability. [220] Hence there was no real reason or justification for the 6th Defendant to have been made a party to this action and as such I awarded a higher sum of costs in favour of the 6th Defendant. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 61 of 66 Suit 518 [221] Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal in Suit 518 is almost identical to the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants in Suit 17, with the sole distinction being that Truepro is only seeking damages and not pursuing any declaratory reliefs. [222] Truepro is not a party to the contract between Blue Seal and the Plaintiffs in Suit 17. Truepro has no contract with Blue Seal. Truepro is merely the Consultant and Superintending Officer appointed by Tech Food for the Project. [223] Truepro has not provided justification or cause of action for its Counterclaim against Blue Seal. [224] On this ground alone Truepro’s Counterclaim can be dismissed. [225] Nevertheless, for completeness, I have still examined the evidence given by PW-5 who testified for Truepro. PW-5 is a director of Truepro. [226] When PW-5 was asked to provide the basis for Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal, this was the answer he gave: “KS Ok. Can you explain to the Court the basis of your claim against Blue Seal? What is it, based on what, I mean the, based on the contract or whatever it is, can you please explain? SOO Yang Arif, ok. If we recall back, under this 518, ok? Blue Seal put A One and Truepro as a Defendant. If you say, we don't have the contract, and then, I cannot claim them, why they can sue me? Put in me as a Defendant? Ok? So, the, my, this is my counterclaim in the suit 518, ok, page 2. Ok? Under item (a)(i), 73.11, we are put there, “Special damage for the sum of RM250,000 incurred for the additional consultation and the administration, administrative costs for the project”. Ok? Because of the Blue Seal breach of contract, all the cGMP plant need to demolish and rebuild. Ok? Are you agree?” [227] The following can be deduced from PW-5’s above testimony: i) PW-5 does not seem to know the reason for Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 62 of 66 ii) It would appear the Counterclaim was because Truepro was made a party, 2nd Defendant in the main suit (Suit 518). iii) Truepro incurred additional costs which is it now claiming because of the breach of contract by Blue Seal in failing to construct the Factory properly. [228] There is no contractual or causal link between the special damages claimed by Truepro and Blue Seal. [229] If Truepro’s claim is a contractual claim then its nexus is with Tech Food. [230] Truepro presented evidence through PW-5, whom, during his testimony, failed to provide any justification for his claim against Blue Seal, except for requesting specific damages totalling RM250,000.00 and RM169,840.02, along with general damages to be determined by the Court. PW-5 submitted these figures without offering any explanation as to how they are derived. [231] It is important to note that Truepro’s Counterclaim only arose after Suit 518 was filed by Blue Seal. [232] Truepro’s pleaded claim is for special damages in the sum of RM10,207,614.00 but at the trial Truepro’s had limited its claim against Blue Seal to RM250,000.00 and RM169,840.02. No explanation was given nor any evidence tendered as to how any of these amounts were derived or why Truepro’s pleaded claim was about RM9.7 million higher. [233] As far as Truepro’s Counterclaim is concerned, it has not proven its case. Therefore, there is no case for Blue Seal to answer as the evidence led for Truepro is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the burden of proof has not been discharged (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)). O] CONCLUSION [234] For the reasons stated above, in respect of Suit 17, I allowed A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract only and essentially the following relief with some changes: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 63 of 66 i) Prayers 83.2, 83.4, 83.9, 83.11, 83.12 for the sum of RM19,498,666.73 and 83.19; ii) Costs of RM90,000.00 to be paid by Blue Seal to A One Piling in respect of A One Piling’s claim which was allowed; iii) Costs of RM40,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the 1st to 5th Defendant in respect of the part of the Plaintiffs’ claim which was dismissed; iv) Costs of RM30,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the 6th Defendant. [235] In relation to Suit 518, I dismissed Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal with costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by Truepro to Blue Seal. Dated this 19th day of January, 2024 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 64 of 66 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Dato’ Jasbeer Singh (Nur Hakimah Mohamad and Rachel Varghese together with him) Messrs Jasbeer, Nur & Lee No. 6-2nd Floor, Block C, Wisma RKT Jalan Raja Abdullah off Jalan Sultan Ismail 50300 Kuala Lumpur Tel.: 03-2694 8908 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR 1ST TO 5TH DEFENDANTS K. Sureindhren (Lee Yoke Chew together with him) Messrs Lee Y C & Co. No. 9, 2nd Floor, Jalan SS15/4G 47500 Subang Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel.: 03-5631 6861 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR 6TH DEFENDANT Dato’ Lee Chan Leong Messrs Chan Leong & Co No. 3-4B, Jalan Anggerik Vanilla N 31/N, Kota Kemuning, Seksyen 31, 40460 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel.: 03-5124 9863 Email: [email protected] S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 65 of 66 LEGISLATION CITED Evidence Act 1950 ▪ Section 114 illustration (g) Contracts Act 1950 ▪ Section 17 ▪ Section 18 ▪ Section 19 CASES CITED 1. Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v. Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1999] 2 MLJ 500 2. Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639 3. Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v. Yeoh Teen Earn & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 4. Borneo Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Penang Port Commission [1975] 2 MLJ 204 5. CIMB Bank Bhd v. Veeran Ayasamy (Wakil Diri Kepada Letchimi Muthusamy, Si Mati) [2015] 7 CLJ 289 6. Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v. SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 7. Chong Nge Wei & Ors v Kemajuan Masteron Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 135) 8. Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 397 9. Giga Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 MLJ 449 10. Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Global Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 1 MLJ 302 11. Integrated Training and Services Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2022] 3 MLJ 77 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 66 of 66 12. Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 13. Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 14. Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong [1983] 2 MLJ 320 15. Leolaris (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 234 16. Lam Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 17. Lau Tiong Ik Construction Sdn Bhd v Lau Chung Ping & Anor (2015) MLRHU 1371 18. Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81 19. Majuikan Sdn Bhd v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171 20. Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] MLRAU 376 21. PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLRH 841 22. Renault SA v. Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394 23. Rohgetana Mayathevan v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and Other Appeals [2017] 3 MLRA 53 24. Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Neqeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609 25. Seqar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tay Tho Bok & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 211 26. Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar @ Tee Kim [2003] 3 MLJ 460 27. Solid Investments Ltd v. Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 784 28. Syed Abu Bakar bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 MLRA 318 29. Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 74 30. Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 31. Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] 6 MLRA 52 32. Tekun Nasional v. Plenitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 6 MLJ 619 33. Victor Cham & Anor v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 34. Yui Chin Song & Qrs v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417 35. Yeo Ing King v. Melawanqi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCC-17-01/2021

PLAINTIF 1. ) TECH FOOD INGREDIENTS SDN BHD 2. ) A ONE PILING SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD 2. ) LYE SAM YUT 3. ) CHEAH CHEE MENG 4. ) CHIA HEONG LIN 5. ) ONG KIM HAI 6. ) PANG KIM WAH

Breach Of Contract-Negligence-Misleading -Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation And Deceit-Lifting Of The Corporate Veil- Breach Of Fiduciary Duty-Evidence Of Breach Of Contract- Damage And Quantum .

24/01/2024

YA Tuan Wan Muhammad Amin Bin Wan Yahya

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64daff7c-d5db-4cef-8c5b-6a58ecafb47e&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN DAGANG) GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCC-17-01/2021 ANTARA (1) TECH FOOD INGREDIENTS SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 689104-H) (2) A ONE PILING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1194561-X) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN (1) BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 682694-V) (2) LYE SAM YUT (No. K/P: 760423-06-5183) (3) CHEAH CHEE MENG (No. K/P: 650823-06-5361) (4) CHIA HEONG LIN (No. K/P: 760620-14-5100) (5) ONG KIM HAI (No. K/P: 670124-09-5025) (6) PANG KIM WAH (No. K/P: 680802-05-5225) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN (Didengar Secara Bersama Dengan) 24/01/2024 15:17:57 WA-22NCC-17-01/2021 Kand. 470 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 66 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR GUAMAN SIVIL NO: WA-22NCC-518-11/2021 ANTARA BLUE SEAL (M) SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran : 200501005647 (682694-V)) … PLAINTIF DAN (1) A ONE PILING SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran: 201601023622 (1194561-X) (2) TRUEPRO CONSULT SDN BHD (No. Pendaftaran : 201001026168 (910087-X) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT (Post Trial) [1] This was primarily a case involving a contract to construct a cGMP (Current Good Manufacturing Practice) Processing Plant (“Factory”) in Klang between the 1st Plaintiff/2nd Plaintiff (“Tech Food” / “A One Piling”) and the 1st Defendant (“Blue Seal”). [2] The Factory was intended to be a refrigerated storage facility which includes cold rooms, freezer rooms and food processing rooms. [3] Tech Food and A One Piling’s claim was essentially that the Factory which was constructed by Blue Seal was not done in accordance with the contract, contained various defects in terms of the material used and workmanship and that the construction was not completed. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 66 [4] This case took some time to dispose given multiple interlocutory applications filed by parties. Nomenclature [5] As this case involves two cases and several parties, the cases and the respective parties will be referred to as follows: Suits i) Main suit (WA-22NCC-17-01/2021) - “Suit 17”; ii) Second suit (WA-22NCC-518-11/2021) - “Suit 518”; Parties iii) 1st Plaintiff (in Suit 17) - “Tech Food”; iv) 2nd Plaintiff (in Suit 17) and 2nd Defendant (in Suit 518) - “A One Piling”; v) 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs (in Suit 17) – collectively as “Plaintiffs”; vi) 1st Defendant (in Suit 17) and Plaintiff (in Suit 518) - “Blue Seal” or “1st Defendant”; vii) 2nd to 6th Defendants (in Suit 17”) - “2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Defendants”. The 2nd to 5th Defendants are directors of Blue Seal while the 6th Defendant is the Project Coordinator of the Project employed by Blue Seal; viii) The 1st to 6th Defendants (in Suit 17) – collectively referred to as “the Defendants”. ix) Truepro Consult Sdn Bhd (in Suit 518) - “Truepro”. Truepro is the Consultant and Superintending Officer (“SO”) appointed by Tech Food for the Project. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 66 A] CHRONOLOGY OF PROCEEDINGS [6] By Order dated 20.10.2021 Suit 518 was transferred from the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court to this Court to be heard together with the main suit, Suit 17. [7] Suit 518 contained a Counterclaim by the Defendants therein, A One Piling and Truepro. [8] On 20.6.2022, the following transpired in respect of Suit 518: i) Blue Seal withdrew its entire claim against both the Defendants, A One Piling and Truepro. Blue Seal’s main claim was then struck out with costs of RM40,000.00 in favour of A One Piling and Truepro; ii) A One Piling withdrew its entire Counterclaim against Blue Seal. A One Piling’s Counterclaim was then struck out with costs of RM40,000.00 in favour of Blue Seal; and iii) Truepro withdrew part of its Counterclaim against Blue Seal and only the reliefs in paragraphs 73.11, 73.14, 73.17 and 73.20 of the Amended Defence and Amended Counterclaim remained, they are mainly: a) Special damages of RM10,207,614; b) General damages to be assessed for loss of income and business opportunity [9] Given this turn of events what remained in respect of this case is: i) For Suit 17: Tech Food and A One Piling’s claim against the Defendants; and ii) For Suit 518: The remainder of Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal. [10] At the trial of this action and at the end of the Tech Food and A One Piling’s case, Blue Seal together with the 2nd to 5th Defendants S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 66 and the 6th Defendant submitted “no case to answer” and no evidence was led by any of their respective witnesses listed in the 1st to 5th and 6th Defendants’ list of witnesses. B] SALIENT BACKGROUND FACTS [11] By way of a Letter of Award dated 6.5.2019 (“1st LOA”) Tech Food appointed Blue Seal as its Nominated Sub-Contractor (“NSC”) in respect of a project known as “Cadangan Membina Sebuah Kilang Di atas Lot 158490 (HSD 135860), Jalan Sungai Pinang 4/10, Kawasan Perindustrian Pulau Indah, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Selangor Darul Ehsan Untuk Tetuan Tech Food Ingredients Sdn Bhd” for the construction and completion of a factory (“Project”) or otherwise known as a cGMP Processing Plant (“Factory”) subject to the terms and conditions of the 1st LOA and Blue Seal’s quotation dated 26.4.2019 (“Quotation”). [12] Tech Food is known as the “Owner/Employer” of the Project whilst the A One Piling is appointed as the Main Contractor of the Project by Tech Food and a contract was entered between Tech Food and A One Piling to that effect. [13] By a letter dated 19.7.2019 entitled “Supersede Letter of Award” (“Supersede Letter of Award”) Tech Food wrote to Blue Seal, inter alia, as follows: “Refer to the above matter and Letter of Award from Tech Food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn. Bhd. on 6th May 2019. We are writing to you to supersede the letter of award. All NSC letter of award shall be issue by the Main Contractor. However, your payment terms shall be paid by us. Kindly submit your payment schedule. You are required to write to us within 48 hours if you do not accept the supersede of this letter.” (own emphasis added) [14] By letter dated 23.8.2019 (“Acceptance Letter”) Blue Seal accepted the terms of the Supersede Letter of Award, inter alia, as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 66 “Refer to the above matter and letter in relation to supersede Letter of Award from Tech Food Ingredients Sdn, Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn. Bhd. on 19th July 2019. We are writing to you and are pleased to accept the supersede Letter of Award. Enclosed the duly signed Letter of Award issued by A One Piling Sdn. Bhd. to Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd on 6th May 2019. Payment terms shall be paid by Tech Food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. directly to Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd, the Nominated Subcontractor.” (own emphasis added) [15] Another Letter of Award also dated 6.5.2019 was then issued, this time by A One Piling to Blue Seal (“2nd LOA”). [16] Under the 2nd LOA the quotations in the Project have to be approved by Tech Food instead of A One Piling. [17] Tech Food and A One Piling claim that both the 1st and 2nd LOA are effective and enforceable while the 1st to 5th Defendants take the position that the 1st LOA has been terminated and no longer exists. [18] The 1st to 5th Defendants claim that pursuant to the 2nd LOA, the only contract is now between the A One Piling and Blue Seal. [19] Tech Food, A One Piling and the 1st to 5th Defendants agree that the Project is subject to the terms and conditions as stipulated in the 1st LOA, 2nd LOA and Quotation (collectively referred to as “the Contract”)). [20] Pursuant to the 2nd LOA the date of “Site Possession and Commencement of Works” shall be 20.5.2019 and the “Date of Completion” shall be 30.9.2019. [21] On 17.5.2019 Tech Food paid 10% as down payment in the sum of RM342.500.00 directly to Blue Seal. [22] Blue Seal commenced work to construct the Factory and between 20.8.2019 to 20.12.2019 Blue Seal submitted progress claims (Progress Claims Nos. 1 to 5) to Truepro and/or Blue Seal. Payments were made towards these Progress Claims until around 13.2.2020. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 66 [23] On 24.2.2020 Truepro issued a list of defects and “Make Good 2” document. [24] However, problems occurred from around 5.3.2020 when the director of Tech Food, Narendranath a/l T.V. Ramana (“PW-1”), raised a complaint against Blue Seal’s supervisor that he was playing games in the car and the employees are without PPE (personal protective equipment) attire while working at the site of the Project. [25] Thereafter, several joint physical and visual inspections of the Factory was conducted as follows: i) 9.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; ii) 11.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; iii) 12.3.2020 in the presence of Tech Food and A One Piling’s representatives together with the 2nd, 4th and 5th Defendants. iv) On all the above 3 joint inspections, it was observed by the Defendants who attended that there were bubbles/blisters on the PU panels that were installed in the Factory. [26] Between 11.3.2020 to 12.3.2020, PW-1 raised issues regarding the Factory and specifically in respect of: i) the PU panels which had blisters/bubbles in them; and ii) that it was subsequently discovered that the PU panels that were installed were not certified Class “O” by the Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat Malaysia (“Bomba”). [27] There were several correspondences in the form of emails pertaining to the issue of repair, rectification and/or replacement of the said PU panels primarily between Tech Food and Blue Seal. [28] The dispute between parties culminated in a notice terminating the contract by Blue Seal. Some of the material correspondences between the parties between 12.3.2020 to 18.3.2020 are stated below. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 66 [29] By letter dated 12.3.2020 A One Piling informed the 1st Defendant, inter alia, as follows: “We refer to the above mentioned reference & project. From today onwards not allow to enter project site until further notice.” [30] By its solicitors’ letter dated 15.3.2020 (“Blue Seal’s Termination Letter”), Blue Seal informed A One Piling, inter alia, as follows: “c) the said Letter informing that our client was barred from entering the project site is wrong in law and in fact and in breach of the Contract; d) your actions as aforesaid clearly evince an intention on your part not to be bound by the terms of the Contract which amounts to a repudiatory breach of the Contract and which reputation our client accepts and the Contract is hereby terminated.” (own emphasis added) [31] The Plaintiffs’ solicitors then responded to Blue Seal’s Termination Letter vide their letter dated 18.3.2020, inter alia, as follows: “Thus, it is your client that has breached the terms of the contract by supplying and installing defective PU Panels which in fact your client has acknowledged and/or admitted in their e-mails transmitted on 11.3.2020 at 11.29 a.m. and 10.16 p.m. Your client’s attempt now to state otherwise and/or reasons for saying so is not contemporaneous with the documents and their conduct at the material time. As you are aware, our client’s rights are protected under the Sale of Goods Act 1957 in regards to your client’s warranty and representation that the goods namely the PU Panels are merchantable and fit for the purpose it was purchased and intended for. Our client has instructed us to inform you that they are accepting your client’s unlawful repudiation of the contract and will commence proceedings to recover the full contract sum and consequential losses which will include appointment of a third party contractor to rectify the defective PU Panels unless your client do take immediate steps to address and rectify the defective PU Panels supplied by your client.” [32] Blue Seal did not return to the Project site to do any further work or rectification work and the work on the Factory ceased. [33] By 17.5.2020 Tech Food had paid Blue Seal a total sum of RM3,093,854.38. The total contract sum under the 2nd LOA was RM3,425,000.00. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 66 [34] Suit 518 was subsequently filed on 25.6.2020 and Truepro’s (and A One Piling) Counterclaim against Blue Seal was filed on 24.7.2020. [35] Suit 17 was filed on 1.7.2020. SUIT 17 [36] Below are the reasons for my decision in respect of the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants in respect of Suit 17. Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal in Suit 518 will be dealt with separately in this Judgment. C] THE PLAINTIFFS’ (TECH FOOD AND A ONE PILING) CLAIM [37] The Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants arises primarily from the allegation that the Defendants had failed to construct the Factory in accordance with the terms of the Contract. The Plaintiffs further claim that there were several defects in the 1st Defendant’s work. [38] The Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants are based on the following causes of action: i) Breach of contract (against Blue Seal only); ii) Negligence; iii) Misleading and fraudulent misrepresentation (“Fraudulent Misrepresentation”); iv) Deceit; and v) Inducing the Plaintiff to enter into the LOAs knowing that they were not going to fulfil their contractual obligations and that their representations to the Plaintiffs are not true. [39] The reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs against all the Defendants, jointly and severally are, inter alia, as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 66 “83.1. A declaration that the corporate veil of the 1st Defendant be lifted by reason of deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation committed by the 1st to 5th Defendants and this action may be brought personally against its directors namely the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Defendants herein; 83.2. A declaration that the entire cGMP Processing Plant that the 1st Defendant had supplied, manufactured, designed, built and installed in the Project is defective, unmerchantable and unfit for the 1st Plaintiff’s use, needs and purpose of business; 83.3. A declaration that the Defendants had committed deceit and/or fraudulent misrepresentation as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.4. A declaration that the Defendants had committed breach of contract of the 1st Loa and 2nd LOA as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.5. A declaration that the 1st to 5th Defendants had committed breach of fiduciary duties as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.6. A declaration that the Defendants were negligent in carrying out its and/or his duties as the NSC for the cGMP Processing Plant in the Project; 83.7. An order compelling the Defendants to forward to the Plaintiffs within three (3) days from the date of this order all relevant forms and/or documents that have to be submitted to local authorities and agencies such as Forms C1 and C2 and other similar forms and documents required for the purpose of obtaining CCC; 83.8. An order compelling the Defendants to hand over the keys to all doors in the premises of the Project that had been installed by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Plaintiff within three (3) days from the date of this order or alternatively special damages of RM40,000.00 being costs of replacing all the keys; 83.9. An order compelling the Defendants to return to the 2nd Plaintiff within three (3) days from the date of this order, the overpaid progress claim monies of RM98,255.80 that was over certified; 83.10. Alternatively, an order that the Plaintiffs is entitled to trace and recover the overpaid progress claim monies of RM98,255.80 from any fund and/or asset of the Defendants which the said monies have contributed to; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 66 83.11. An order allowing the 2nd Plaintiff to retain and utilise the balance 5% of the contract sums as part payment of the refurbishment costs of the factory; 83.12. Special damages of RM20,767,364.26 being the rectification costs of the factory as stated in Paragraphs 55 to 56.21.6 above; 83.13. Special damages of RM264,000.00 being cost for the loss of warranty on machines due to dismantle and reinstallation of machine and fixtures; 83.14. General damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court against the Defendants for breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duties and/or responsibilities and/or negligent; 83.15. General damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the Plaintiffs’ loss of reputation and business confidence as pleaded at Paragraphs 57 to 57.4 above; 83.16. General damages against the Defendants to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the Plaintiffs’ loss of income and business opportunity as pleaded at Paragraphs 58 to 58.3 above; 83.17. Aggravated damages to be assessed by this Honourable Court against the Defendants for the deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation committed against the Plaintiffs; 83.18. Damages against the Defendants to be assessed by this Honourable Court for the mental anguish, health issues and embarrassment caused to the Plaintiffs as pleaded at Paragraphs 59 to 60 above;” (own emphasis added) [40] As can be seen above the reliefs sought by Tech Food and A One Piling are very wide and convoluted, whereas the “actual” claim itself (primarily premised on breach of contract) is, with respect, quite straight forward. The long windedness of Tech Food and A One Piling’s pleaded claim did not assist their case and made in unnecessarily complicated. I will address this in more detail in the course of this Judgment. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 66 D] BLUE SEAL’S ADMISSION [41] Blue Seal made, inter alia, the following admission (paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 of the “Statement of Agreed Fact (between Plaintiffs and 1st to 5th Defendants” (Bundle D (Enclosure 294)). Paragraph 8 “By the Contract, the 1st Defendant was to supply and install PU panels that are not defective and are fit for purpose and are merchantable quality and are fire retardant and certified class “O” by Jabatan Bomba Dan Penyelamat Malaysia. Paragraph 9 “The 1st Defendant admits liability that the PU panels supplied to the Plaintiffs and installed at the 1st Plaintiff's CGMP Plant by the 1st Defendant are not certified class ‘O’ and that is the Breach of Contract.” Paragraph 12 “The cGMP Processing Plant cannot be used or operated as cGMP Processing Plant as the PU panels supplied and installed by the 1st Defendant are not class ‘O’ certified panels.” (own emphasis added) [42] It must be highlighted that this admission was made on 23.5.2022, about a month before the commencement of the trial. E] THE DEFENDANTS’ DEFENCE [43] Given Blue Seal’s above admission, the 1st to 5th Defendants’ defence is essentially: i) Notwithstanding the admission of the 1st Defendant above, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages for the various causes of action set out in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim (“Statement of Claim”) as they have asked for one lump sum of RM20,767,364.26 at paragraph 83.12 without setting out the amount of damages claimed for each cause of action. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 66 ii) Given that there are different elements to be proved for each cause of action including damages, this then makes the claim for a lump sum wrong in law. iii) The 2nd to 5th Defendants are not parties to the contract and are only named as defendants based upon allegations of fraud. iv) Even if fraud is proven on a balance of probabilities, the Plaintiffs cannot rely on fraud as a basis for damages as they have not rescinded the contract (which it is alleged they were induced to enter into). In fact, they have affirmed the contract and asked for a declaration that the contract has been breached. v) The 1st to 5th Defendants have not caused the Plaintiffs any damage save that the PU panels need to be replaced. vi) There is no negligence or breach of fiduciary duties or fraud committed by any of the Defendants. [44] The 6th Defendant defence is essentially that as an employee of Blue Seal, he merely carries out Blue Seal’s instructions and the scope of work for which he is employed. He committed no wrongdoing. The Plaintiffs’ claim against him is misconceived and mala fide. F] CONTRACTING PARTIES [45] The contract to construct the Factory was initially between Tech Food and Blue Seal and is evidenced by the 1st LOA. [46] The 1st LOA was then superseded by the Supersede Letter of Award which like its namesake superseded the 1st LOA. [47] Blue Seal accepted the terms of the Supersede Letter of Award vide its Acceptance Letter. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 66 [48] Thereafter, A One Piling issued the 2nd LOA to Blue Seal which was also dated 6.5.2019, the same date as the 1st LOA (issued by Tech Food). [49] The Supersede Letter of Award read together with the Acceptance Letter by Blue Seal and the 2nd LOA clearly show that the 1st LOA is no longer valid and has been replaced by the 2nd LOA. The contents of these letters are clear and do not contain any ambiguity. [50] The 2nd LOA is not a tripartite agreement. Only A One Piling and Blue Seal are parties to the 2nd LOA and the 2nd LOA makes no reference to the 1st LOA or that it is still applicable. [51] It must be noted that it is Tech Food itself, being the owner of the Project, who had designed the contractual relationship of the parties involved to be in this manner. It cannot then change its stand on this. [52] Although Tech Food continued to be involved in the Project where, inter alia, its approval was required on certain matters, this does not make Tech Food a party to the 2nd LOA nor does it establish a contractual nexus as pleaded in paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim. [53] The same applies even where payments are made directly by Tech Food to Blue Seal. In paragraph 19 of the Statement of Claim, it was pleaded that due to Tech Food’s continued involvement in the Project a contractual nexus is established. However, as the 1st LOA is no longer valid, Tech Food’s said involvement is only as the owner of the Project and is transmitted contractually through Tech Food’s main contractor, A One Piling. [54] Therefore, the only contract that is in existence and enforceable in the present case is the 2nd LOA and any claim for breach of contract can only be made by A One Piling and not Tech Food. [55] I am aware that as the owner of the Project and the Factory, Tech Food may have ultimately suffered losses arising from a breach of contract by Blue Seal under the 2nd LOA but that is something Tech Food will have to take up with A One Piling. Tech Food has no privity or right to initiate a contractual claim against Blue Seal. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 66 [56] Thus, the contract relationship between parties can be summarised as follows: i) Between Tech Food and A One Piling (Owner and Main Contractor); and ii) Between A One Piling and Blue Seal (Main Contractor and NSC or Nominated Sub-Contractor). [57] In the circumstances the proper plaintiff in this case in respect of a breach of contract claim is A One Piling only. G] IMPLICATION OF THE DEFENDANTS ELECTING NOT TO GIVE EVIDENCE OR SUBMIT “NO CASE TO ANSWER” [58] Before I deal with the various causes of action raised by the Plaintiffs, the implication of the Defendants’ decision to submit of “no case to answer” needs to addressed first. [59] I will begin with the cases cited by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants on this issue and they are as follows: i) Yui Chin Song & Qrs v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417 (FC); ii) Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 (FC); iii) Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Neqeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609 (FC); iv) Leolaris (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 234 (HC); [60] I am in agreement with learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants’ submission that it can be distilled from the above cases with regards to the submission of “no case to answer” that: i) It is for the plaintiff to prove his case on a balance of probabilities and the fact that the defendant has led no S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 66 evidence or called no witnesses does not absolve the plaintiff from discharging his or her burden in law. ii) The mere fact that the defendant elects not to lead evidence does not mean that all the plaintiff’s evidence is automatically to be believed. iii) The defences of the defendant are not under consideration. It is the plaintiff’s case that is to be scrutinised for the sole purpose of establishing whether the plaintiff has proved his or her case on a balance of probabilities. iv) A submission of “no case to answer” can be on the basis that: a) accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at face value, no case has been established at law; or b) the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged. v) Even though the defendant does not call any evidence, it does not mean that the trial judge must believe everything the plaintiff has adduced. [61] In other words, just because the Defendants have elected to submit “no case to answer” does not mean the Plaintiffs’ claim will be automatically allowed. The Plaintiffs have to still prove their case. [62] However, what learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants did not submit on is how and what happens to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff’s where the defendant’s have chosen to submit “no case to answer”. [63] Before I continue on this issue and refer to the cases that were not cited by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants, it is important for me to first highlight some key factual features of the cases he had referred to: i) In Yui Chin Song (supra) all the defendants save for one made a submission of no case to answer. The plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 66 ii) In Kerumtum (supra) the second defendant did not give evidence and a total of 9 witnesses gave evidence for the defence. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. iii) In Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine (supra) no witnesses were called by the defendant and the plaintiff had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a settlement agreement which the plaintiff claimed existed. The plaintiff called 3 witnesses. The plaintiff’s claim was dismissed. iv) In Leolaris (supra) the defendant did not call any witnesses or cross-examine the plaintiff’s four witnesses. The plaintiff’s claim was allowed. [64] How the burden of proof is treated and the shifting of the burden in a case where the defendant makes a submission of “no case to answer” was decided in Keruntum (supra) where the Federal court held as follows: “[78] ]t is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party (see UN Pandey v Hotel Marco Polo Pte Ltd [1980] 1 MLJ 4). When the burden shifts to the other party, it can be discharged by cross-examination of witnesses of the party on whom the burden of proof lies or by calling witnesses or by giving evidence himself or by a combination of the different methods. See Tan Klim Khuan v Tan Kee Kiat (M) Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 697.” (own emphasis added) [65] Learned counsel for the Plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied on the Federal Court case of Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 74 where the 1st respondent failed to attend court and give evidence. The appellant’s claim was allowed by the Federal Court and held, inter alia, as follows: “[4] In our judgment, two consequences inevitably followed when the first respondent who was fully conversant with the facts studiously refrained from giving evidence. In the first place, the evidence given by the appellant ought to have been presumed to be true. As Elphinstone CJ said in Wasakah Singh v. Bachan Singh [1931] 1 MC 125 at p 128: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 66 If the party on whom the burden of proof lies gives or calls evidence which, if it is believed, is sufficient to prove his case, then the judge is bound to call upon the other party, and has no power to hold that the first party has failed to prove his case merely because the judge does not believe his evidence. At this stage, the truth or falsity of the evidence is immaterial. For the purpose of testing whether there is a case to answer, all the evidence given must be presumed to be true. Now, what the trial judge did in the present case is precisely what he ought not to have done. He expressed dissatisfaction with the appellant’s evidence without asking himself that most vital question: does the first defendant/ respondent have a case to answer? This failure on the part of the trial judge is a serious non-direction amounting to a misdirection which occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The trial judge was at that stage not concerned with his belief of the appellant’s evidence. She had given her explanation as to the discrepancies in the figures. And her evidence does not appear to be either inherently incredible or inherently improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the judge to have accepted her evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the first respondent going the other way. He however failed to direct himself in this fashion thereby occasioning a serious miscarriage of justice.” [5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the first respondent on the amount of the appellant’s contribution to the purchase price as well as the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will normally draw an adverse inference. See Guthrie Sdn Bhd v. Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1990] 1 MLRA 532; [1991] 1 MLJ 33; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 155. See also, Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 1 MLRA 605; [1997] 3 MLJ 693; [1997] 4 CLJ 509 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: “The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the appellants’ case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it.” There are two other authorities that are of assistance on the point. In Wisniewski v. Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, Brooke LJ when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal quoted from a number of authorities including the following passage from the speech of Lord Diplock in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] AC 877: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 66 The appellants, who are a public corporation, elected to call no witnesses, thus depriving the court of any positive evidence as to whether the condition of the fence and the adjacent terrain had been noticed by any particular servant of theirs or as to what he or any other of their servants either thought or did about it. This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable inferences as to what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold. Brooke LJ then went on to say this: From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case: (1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action. (2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. (3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. (4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified. The other case is Crawford v. Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40, where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the Advice of the Privy Council said: It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 66 [7] In the present instance, there is no doubt that the first respondent had intimate knowledge of the material facts relevant to the dispute and that she was privy to the several steps through which the transaction had proceeded. Based on the authorities already cited, it is patently clear that the trial judge in the present case ought to have held that the failure of the first respondent to give evidence apart from discrediting her case strengthened the appellant’s case on those vital points that lay at the axis of the dispute between the parties. This, the trial judge clearly omitted to do. Instead, he treated the first respondent’s failure to appear and give evidence as a matter of no apparent consequence. His non-direction upon such a crucial point as this certainly amounts to a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. To conclude the first issue, it is our judgment that there was no judicial appreciation of the appellant’s evidence. A reasonable tribunal correctly directing itself on the facts and the relevant law would have held that the appellant had indeed contributed RM194,610 towards the purchase price of the building; that there was a mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent that they shall be beneficial co-owners of the property in question in equal shares; and that the first respondent had acted in breach of that understanding.” (own emphasis added) [66] In Takako Sakao (supra), the Federal Court held that the effect of the defendant’s failure to give evidence, discredits his case and strengthens the plaintiffs case. [67] Justice Mary Lim (as she then was), in Leolaris (supra), examined the effect of the pleaded defence where the defendant submitted “no case to answer” and held as follows: “[23] In a submission of no case to answer, the defences pleaded are not under consideration. To put it bluntly, on such an occasion the defendant is actually saying that it need not bother to offer and lead any evidence on any of the pleaded defences because the plaintiff’s case is bad as it has not been made out and ought therefore to be dismissed without more. It is still the plaintiffs case that is scrutinised for the sole purpose of establishing whether the defendant has made a right submission. If the submission is properly taken on the law and on the facts, then the plaintiffs case would be dismissed. However, where the defendant fails in its submission and the plaintiff succeeds in discharging the burden of proof, the plaintiffs case will be allowed. That is why it is said that the defendant will stand or fall by the submission.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 66 [68] It can thus be summarised that while it is a given that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, however, in a situation where the defendant submits “no case to answer” the Court needs to be satisfied that: i) the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is sufficient to prove his case (Keruntum (supra); Takako (supra)); ii) where the defendant provides no reasons (or credible reasons) as to why he did not care to give evidence the Court will normally draw an adverse inference (Takako (supra)); iii) if such an adverse inference is drawn, it may strengthen the evidence adduced by the plaintiff or weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the defendant (Takako (supra)); iv) there must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the plaintiffs before the Court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue (Takako (supra)); v) the defendant’s defence will not be taken into consideration (Leolaris (supra); Takako (supra)). [69] I will conclude with the following passage from Yui Chin Song (supra) which in turn referred to a passage from the case of Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81: “[50] In this regard, Suriyadi, JCA (as His Lordship then was) in Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 ML] 81, recognised the above riding in the following passage: There are, however, two sets of circumstances under which a defendant may submit that he has no case to answer. In the one case there may be a submission that, accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its face value, no case has been established in law, and in the other that the evidence led for the plaintiff is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged. (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 66 [70] Therefore, to put it simply, as the Defendants have submitted “no case to answer” the issue is whether the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in this case is “so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the court should find that the burden of proof has not been discharged” (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)). It therefore follows that if the Plaintiffs succeed in discharging that burden of proof, then the Defendants shall have no defence against the Plaintiffs’ claim. [71] It must also be borne in mind that the evidence tendered by the Plaintiffs must also be examined in light of the admissions of liability made by Blue Seal regarding, inter alia, the PU panels coupled with the fact that the Defendants chose not to adduce any evidence by calling any witness or tendering any document to oppose the Plaintiffs’ evidence and case. The Defendants’ do so at their own peril (Takako (supra)) and it is a risk that they take. H] INDUCEMENT, FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND DECEIT [72] I will deal with the Plaintiffs’ causes of action in respect of Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit first and then followed by the cause of action on Breach of Contract. [73] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit allegations are essentially the same and I see no reason to treat them separately. They are in fact overlapping and it complicates matters to treat them as though they are two separate causes of action as was done by the Plaintiffs. Hence, my reference to Fraudulent Misrepresentation would include Deceit. [74] Ultimately, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation here revolve around the installation of the PU panels which are not Class “O” certified and the allegation that the Defendants concealed this fact from the Plaintiffs. [75] Unlike learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants, learned counsel for the Plaintiffs did not, in his written submissions, specifically or clearly submit on how the Inducement, Fraudulent S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 23 of 66 Misrepresentation and Deceit affected the LOAs with reference to the Contracts Act 1950 (“CA 1950”). [76] Therefore, the Statement of Claim needs to be examined to see how the Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit are pleaded in relation to the contract, i.e. the LOAs. Some of the material parts of the Statement of Claim on these causes of action are reproduced below: Paragraph 27 “Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan Pertama melalui Pengarah- Pengarah dan pegawai-pegawainya terutama Defendan Ke-2, Ke-3, Ke-4, Ke-5 dan Ke- 6 telah berulang kali, dengan sengaja, dengan niat dan melulu menyatakan dan/atau mengakui (“represented”) melalui kelakuan dan perkataan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah seorang profesional yang berkebolehan dan mempunyai kemahiran dalam mereka bentuk, membuat, membekalkan, membina dan memasang mereka bentuk dan membina Loji Pemprosesan cGMP termasuk bilik sejuk, bilik sejuk beku dan bilik pemprosesan makanan yang mematuhi cGMP dan sesuai dengan sifat dan kegunaan perniagaan Plaintif Pertama. Plaintif-Plaintif juga merujuk butir-butir salah nyata fraud oleh Defendan-Defendan Pertama hingga Ke-5 dan Defendan Ke-6 secara masing-masing dalam perenggan-perenggan termasuk keseluruhan perenggan 72 (a)(72.1 hingga 72.3) dan (b) 72.3.i hingga 72.3.vii di bawah.” Paragraph 28 “Defendan Pertama di dalam Profil Syarikat (“Company Profile”) yang telah diberikan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif dalam usaha untuk mendorong/menggalakkan perlantikan sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Projek tersebut juga telah antara lainnya menyatakan dan/atau mengakui seperti berikut:- …..” Paragraph 29 “Sebagai sebahagian daripada usaha-usaha untuk mendorong/ menggalakkan Plaintif-Plaintif untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP di dalam Projek tersebut, Defendan Ke-2 sebagai salah seorang pengarah bagi Defendan Pertama telah secara dan dengan sengaja pada atau sekitar April 2019 mempelawa dan membawa Pengarah-Pengarah Plaintif Pertama untuk melawat sebuah kilang Kellogs’ di Negeri Sembilan yang mana telah kononnya juga, berdasarkan makluman oleh Defendan Kedua, melantik Defendan Pertama untuk mereka bentuk dan membina bilik pemprosesan makanan patuh cGMP yang serupa dengan kegunaan yang diperlukan oleh Plaintif Pertama.” S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 24 of 66 Paragraph 33 “Berdasarkan dan bergantung kepada semua pernyataan- pernyataan dan jaminan-jaminan di atas yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama melalui Pengarah-Pengarah dan pegawai- pegawainya terutama Defendan Ke-2, Ke-3, Ke-4, Ke-5 dan Ke-6, Plaintif-Plaintif telah bergantung kepadanya dan bertindak ke atas representasi-representasi tersebut dan telah didorong untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Projek tersebut. Plaintif-Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan-perenggan 24 hingga 26.7 di atas di sini. Plaintif-Plaintif juga merujuk butir-butir salah nyata fraud oleh Defendan- Defendan Pertama hingga Ke-5 dan Defendan Ke-6 secara masing-masing dalam perenggan-perenggan termasuk keseluruhan perenggan 72 (a)(72.1 hingga 72.3) dan (b) 72.3.i hingga 72.3.vii di bawah.” Paragraph 72.4 “Plaintif-Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan- perenggan 27 sehingga 33 di atas di sini dan seianjutnya menyatakan bahawa berdasarkan dan bergantung kepada semua pernyataan-pernyataan dan jaminan-jaminan di atas yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama terutama melalui Defendan Ke-2, Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Ke-2 telah bergantung kepadanya dan bertindak ke atas representasi-representasi tersebut dan telah didorong untuk melantik Defendan Pertama sebagai SKD untuk Loji Pemprosesan cGMP dalam Project tersebut” (own emphasis added) [77] Therefore, the Inducement as pleaded in this case is the persuasion by the Defendants for Tech Food to enter into the 1st LOAs and for A One Piling to enter into the 2nd LOA. [78] The Inducement on its own does not amount to any wrongdoing but the Fraudulent Misrepresentation makes it wrongful. [79] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation here is essentially the allegation that: 1st to 5th and 6th Defendants i) The 1st to 5th Defendants misrepresented that Blue Seal was capable of constructing the Factory; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 25 of 66 ii) The Defendants induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the Contract knowing that Blue Seal was not able (or do not have the capability) to construct the Factory in accordance with the Contract; 6th Defendant iii) The 6th Defendant had dishonestly and fraudulently hidden from Linear Panel Marketing Sdn Bhd (“Linear Panel”) that the PU panels were not Class “O” certified; iv) The 6th Defendant conspired with the 1st to 5th Defendants to defraud the Plaintiffs by concealing that the PU panels were not Class “O” certified, are defective and not suitable to be used in the Project. v) Conspired with Blue Seal and the 2nd to 5th Defendants to sabotage the Project by intentionally allowing work to be carried out at the Project site without proper safety measures and safety equipment which may cause a “Stop Work Order” to be imposed. [80] Therefore, the fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation here must be in connection with the Contract. [81] Under CA 1950, the definition of “misrepresentation” can be found in Section 18 while the definition of “fraud” in Section 17 as stated below: Section 18 CA 1950 ““Misrepresentation” includes - (a) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true; (b) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gives an advantage to the person committing it, or anyone claiming under him, S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 26 of 66 by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of anyone claiming under him; and (c) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement.” Section 17 CA 1950 ““Fraud” includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract: (a) the suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it to be true; (b) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (c) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (d) any other act fitted to deceive; and (e) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” (own emphasis added) [82] Thus, in the context of the present case, the Inducement for Tech Food to enter into the 1st LOA and for A One Piling to enter into the 2nd LOA is alleged to have been accomplished through the Fraudulent Misrepresentation (which includes Deceit) committed by the Defendants. [83] What then is the legal consequence of a contract which was entered into through fraud. The answer lies in Section 19 CA 1950 which provides as follows: “(1) When consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. (2) A party to a contract, whose consent was caused by fraud or misrepresentation, may, if he thinks fit, insist that the contract shall be S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 27 of 66 performed, and that he shall be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. Exception - If such consent was caused by misrepresentation or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. Explanation - A fraud or misrepresentation which did not cause the consent to a contract of the party on whom the fraud was practised, or to whom the misrepresentation was made, does not render a contract voidable.” (own emphasis added) (see Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong [1983] 2 MLJ 320 (FC); Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v. Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1999] 2 MLJ 500 (COA); Seqar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tay Tho Bok & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 211 (COA)) [84] In Abdul Razak (supra) the Court of Appeal made the position clear on the rights of the representee in circumstances where the contract was entered through fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and held as follows: “Fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation renders a contract voidable at the instance of the representee. See the Contracts Act 1950, s 19(1). The representee is therefore entitled to apply to a court for a decree of rescission from a court and also to an award of damages. See Archer v Brown [1985] 1 QB 401. Damages are available in addition to rescission because an action for fraudulent misrepresentation is grounded upon the tort of deceit, and in the case of negligent misrepresentation upon the tort of negligence.” ………. “A representee who is the victim of a fraud may, at his election, abandon his right to rescind and may instead insist that the contract be performed, and that he be put in the position in which he would have been if the representations made had been true. See the Contracts Act 1950, s 19(2). (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 28 of 66 [85] In the present case the Plaintiffs have prayed for the LOAs to be affirmed. In fact, they specifically prayed in paragraph 83.4 of the Statement of Claim for a declaration that the 1st to 5th Defendants committed a breach of contract, of the LOAs. [86] It is clear therefore that the Plaintiffs have decided not to rescind the LOAs but to affirm them instead. [87] In Segar Oil Palm (supra) which facts have some similarity to the present case the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, as follows: “….. Unfortunately, neither counsel nor indeed the trial judge went into the real significance of the passage cited from Chesire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract at p 430. We will repeat it here with the necessary emphasis: It is a fundamental principle that the effect of a misrepresentation is to make the contract voidable and not void. This means that the contract is valid unless and until it is set aside by the representee. On discovering the misrepresentation, the representee may elect to affirm or rescind the contract. (Emphasis added.) It is elementary law that a party to a contract, who alleges fraud, cannot avoid one part of the contract and affirm another, unless the parts are so severable as to be independent contracts. This proposition can be found in Kerr on Fraud and Mistake (7th Ed) pp 515 and 517 where the cases are set out. See also Vendor and Purchaser by RM Stoneham (1994) at p 815. The same proposition is repeated on The Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts (9th Ed) by Pollock and Mulla at p 458 which reads: ... a man cannot rescind a contract in part only, when he decides to repudiate it, he must repudiate it altogether. Having been put on notice on 9 August 1988 in no uncertain terms, the only option the purchasers had was either to perform the agreement according to its terms, or repudiate it altogether and sue for damages for fraud” (own emphasis added) [88] I agree with learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants that based on the, inter alia, Section 19 CA 1950 read together with the cases such as Abdul Razak (supra) and Segar Oil Palm (supra), the Fraudulent Misrepresentation that the Plaintiffs allege induced S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 29 of 66 them to enter into the Contract had the effect of nullifying their “consent” to enter into the LOAs. To put it another way the entire contract was voidable by reason of the fraud as there was a lack of consent and the contract could be easily unravelled. [89] In this regard, the Federal Court in Integrated Training and Services Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2022] 3 MLJ 77 had this to say on this point: “[22] In Campbell v Edwards [1976] 1 AH ER 785 it' was held, inter alia, where two parties had agreed that the price of the property was to be fixed by a valuer on whom they should agree and the valuer gave his valuation honestly and in good faith in a non-speaking report, ie one that did not give reasons or calculations, the valuation could not be set aside by either party on the ground that the valuer had made a mistake, for, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the valuation was binding on the parties by contract. Lord Denning MR at p 788 had stated the following: ... It is simply the law of contract. If two persons agree that the price of property should be fixed by a valuer on whom they agree, and he gives that valuation honestly and in good faith, they are bound by it. The reason is because they have agreed to be bound by it. If there were fraud or collusion, of course, it would be different. Fraud or collusion unravels everything.” (own emphasis added) [90] Therefore, the Contract which was entered into was voidable and is valid unless and until set aside. The Plaintiffs then had a choice to either rescind the contract and sue for damages or to affirm the contract and continue with it. [91] The victim of fraud must either set aside the agreement and sue for damages for fraud or affirm the contract (Section 19 of CA 1950; Segar Oil Palm (supra)). [92] The Plaintiffs cannot sue for both Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Breach of Contract. [93] Putting it another way, what the Plaintiffs are saying is that the Defendants’ Fraudulent Misrepresentation had caused them to enter into the Contract (the LOAs). They would not have entered into the Contract or consented to enter into it had they known of S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 30 of 66 the fraud. However, instead or unravelling or setting aside the Contract the Plaintiffs affirm it and then rely on it to say that Blue Seal has breached its terms. By doing this, Fraudulent Misrepresentation allegation no longer becomes an issue. [94] It is illogical for the Plaintiffs to plead they were induced by Fraudulent Misrepresentation by the Defendants to enter into the LOAs and at the same time rely on the very same LOAs to claim for breach of contract. [95] With respect, the Plaintiffs’ claim for Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit is flawed and can be dismissed on this ground alone. [96] It therefore follows that the reliefs in the Statement of Claim related to fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation cannot be maintained. [97] With respect to the Plaintiffs, further to what I had stated in paragraph 40 above, their pleaded case specifically in respect of Inducement, Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Deceit is fundamentally flawed. [98] It is of utmost importance that there is correlation between the cause of action pleaded and the relief(s) that follow, if not, the claim would make no sense. [99] I would conclude with a passage by the Federal Court in Giga Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 MLJ 449 where it was held as follows: “[42] Now, it is trite law that the plaintiff is bound by its own pleadings (see R Rama Chandran v The industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145; Anjalal Anmal & Anor v Abdul Kareem [1969] 1 MLJ 22; Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1987] 1 MLJ 302 (SC); Joo Chin Kia v Loh Seng Tek [1987] 1 CLJ 194; KEP Mohamed AH v KEP Mohamad Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10 (FC)). The plaintiff is not permitted to improve its pleading in any other manner other than by way of an application to amend. Otherwise it would be unfair and prejudicial to the defendants if the plaintiff could now be allowed to raise an issue that was not within the contemplation of the parties in the first place (see Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v South Port Corpn [1956] AC 218; Playing Cards (M) Sdn Bhd v China Mutual Navigation Co Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 182 (FC)).” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 31 of 66 [100] Notwithstanding the above, for the purpose of completeness, I have nevertheless still considered the alleged individual acts of the Defendants that is said to constitute Fraudulent Misrepresentation and the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs on this issue. I] FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AND LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL [101] The Fraudulent Misrepresentation pleaded by the Plaintiffs is to justify the lifting of the corporate veil or to go behind the corporate veil to make the Defendants liable together with the 1st Defendant. [102] An elaborate definition of “misrepresentation” can be found in Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar @ Tee Kim [2003] 3 MLJ 460 in which the Court of Appeal held as follows: “Now, it is trite that the expression ‘misrepresentation’ is merely descriptive of a false pre-contractual statement that induces a contract or other transaction. But it does not reflect the state of mind of the representor at the relevant time. The state of mind of the representor at the time he made the representation to the representee varies according to the circumstances of each case. It may be fraudulent. It may be negligent. Or it may be entirely innocent, that is to say, the product of a mind that is free of deceit and inadvertence (see Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd. Put another way, a misrepresentation is innocent ‘where the representor believes his assertion to be true and consequently has no intention of deceiving the representee.’ (Chesire & Fifoot, Law of Contract (6th Ed)). It is the particular state of mind of the representor that determines the nature of the remedy available to the representee. So, if the misrepresentation is made fraudulently, then the representee is entitled to rescission and all damages directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement.” (own emphasis added) [103] Therefore, the Plaintiffs must show that the Fraudulent Misrepresentation was: i) Made before the contract; and S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 32 of 66 ii) The state of mind of the Defendants at the time the Fraudulent Misrepresentation was made, in that the Defendants intended to deceive the Plaintiffs. [104] First and foremost, as I have decided earlier, the Fraudulent Misrepresentation allegation cannot stand in view of the Plaintiffs reliance on the Contract to sue Blue Seal for breach thereof. [105] Secondly, and in any event, it is clear from paragraphs 72.3J to 72.3.vii of the Statement of Claim that all the matters relied on by the Plaintiffs occurred after the Contract was entered into and hence cannot amount to a pre-contractual false statement of fact that had induced the Plaintiffs to enter into the Contract with Blue Seal (Sim Thong Realty (supra)). [106] Thirdly, though the allegations against the Defendants are made jointly, the pleaded particulars are only in respect of the 2nd Defendant (paragraphs 29 to 31 of the Statement of Claim). [107] The case of Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v. Yeoh Teen Earn & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 involved the joint allegation of fraud and Justice Mohd Nazlan (as he then was) observed the following: “[54] The plaintiff must furnish the requisite particularity by pleading the circumstances of material facts as to the questions of “who, what, where, when and how" of the alleged fraud and conspiracy in order to enable the defendants to provide a meaningful response. It cannot be emphasised enough that general statements which are vague and containing conclusory allegations do not satisfy the requirements of Order 18 r 7 and r 12. The statement of claim too cannot hide behind purported averments which in truth are nothing but merely a set of formulaic recitation of the ingredients of a cause of action. [55] Pleadings sans particularisation is bad pleading because matters such as fraud and conspiracy cannot be expected to be inferred from statements which are vague and general in nature, more so as the concept of fraud itself is not immutable. Similarly, when alleging fraud and conspiracy against more than one defendants, like presently, the plaintiff must specify, with particularity, each of the fourth and fifth defendant's offending conduct. The defendants cannot be grouped together without identifying which defendant has committed which wrong.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 33 of 66 [108] It is pleaded at paragraph 27 of the Statement of Claim that Blue Seal acted through the 2nd to 5th Defendants. It follows that the circumstances of how the fraud occurred must be pleaded and proved in Court in particular: i) What each of these Defendants had done; and ii) How each of them had either ordered or procured the fraud in question before the Contract was entered into. [109] As the above two elements/facts were not pleaded or proved, it would appear that Fraudulent Misrepresentation was raised against the 2nd to 5th Defendants merely because they are directors of Blue Seal and against the 6th Defendant as he is Blue Seal’s employee. In this regard, the Court of Appeal in Victor Cham & Anor v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 held as follows: “[8] In C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd & Anor, Slade LJ relying on the case of Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1 stated the legal position in the following words: The mere fact that a person is a director of a limited company does not by itself render him liable for torts committed by the company during the period of his directorship: see, for example, Rainham Chemical Works Ltd (in Hq) v Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd [1924] 2 AC 465 at 488,.... Nevertheless, judicial dicta of high authority are to be found in English decisions which suggest that a director is liable for those tortuous acts of his company which he has ordered or procured to be done. [9] In Wah Tat Bank Ltd and another v Chan Cheng Kum [1975] 2 All ER 257, two banks brought an action against a shipping company and C, the company chairman and managing director, claiming damages jointly against them for conversion. In holding C liable, the Privy Council in its judgment delivered by Lord Salmon stated: No doubt the fact that the respondent is chairman and managing director of HSC does not of itself make him personally liable in respect of that company’s tortuous acts. A tort may he committed through an officer or servant of a company without the chairman or managing director being in any way implicated. There are many such cases reported in the books. If however the chairman or managing director S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 34 of 66 procures or directs the commission of the tort he may be personally liable for the tort and the damage flowing from it: Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd per Arkin LJ. Each case depends on its own particular facts. In the instant case the un- contradicted evidence proves that early in 1961 the respondent, as chairman and managing director of HSC, agreed with the directors of TSC the terms on which HSC would continue wrongfully to convert goods consigned to the banks just as they had done in the past. Their Lordships consider that in all the circumstances there is no answer to the banks’ contention that the respondent was personally liable for the conversion in respect of which judgement has been entered against HSC.” ……… “[11] In Thomas Bruce Morgan v Government of Saskatchewan, Neal Hardy and Darrel Binkley [1985] Sask R 129, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal made the following observation: On this branch of the case we refer to the following passage from judgment of Disber J, in Einhorn v Westmount Investments Ltd and Belzberg et al. (1969), 69 WWR (NS) 31, at p 36: Ordinarily an agent is subject to the control of another person, his principal. A company perforce is only able to act through its agents and servants. Consequently, while company directors are referred to as ‘agent’, the cold fact is that they control the company. As the directors pull the strings so the company must of necessity jump. Particularly is this true where, as here, the individual defendants were in 'complete control' of the company. This court in the exercise of its common-law jurisdiction in the field of tort considers the realities of the situations which come before it for decision, and the court is not restricted in so doing because individual carries out intentional tortuous acts through the medium of a puppet corporation whose every action they control. Individuals guilty of intentional tortuous acts do not escape personal liability by this device of clothing themselves in a corporate veil of their own spinning. And further the court said: So a director is not to be held liable merely because he is a director but may be liable when he participates in or orders a tortuous act and cannot S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 35 of 66 escape personal liability by asserting that his act was merely the act of the corporation. In other words, the 'corporate veil’ is not to be used as a shield to protect shareholders and directors when they have been guilty of wrongdoing. This approach is consistent with the notion that everyone should be answerable for his tortuous acts.” (own emphasis added) [110] The pleaded allegations of Fraudulent Misrepresentation against the 2nd Defendant are essentially in relation to: i) The visit to Kellogg’s Factory; and ii) The 1st Defendant’s company profile. [111] As for the Kellogg’s Factory visit, I do not find there to be evidence of Fraudulent Misrepresentation for the following reasons: i) PW-1 himself testified that PW-1 initiated the trip to the Kellogg’s Factory by “requesting” that the 2nd Defendant take him there. This alone negates the allegation of inducement; ii) It is alleged that the 2nd Defendant told PW-1 that the panels installed in the Kellogg’s Factory were going to be the same as the panels to be installed at the Factory. The Plaintiffs have not proven the existence of the element of “fraud” or “dishonesty” in this statement (CIMB Bank Bhd v. Veeran Ayasamy (Wakil Diri Kepada Letchimi Muthusamy, Si Mati) [2015] 7 CLJ 289). This is simply because the Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence of the type of panels installed at the Kellogg’s Factory or that the panels installed at the Factory are sub-standard compared to those installed at the Kellogg’s Factory. This would have required the Plaintiffs to actually adduce evidence of the panels at the Kellogg’s Factory which they did not do; iii) The truth of the statement is one thing but the issue of “dishonesty” is required to be proven where Fraudulent Misrepresentation is alleged. The Plaintiffs have failed to prove there was any dishonesty in the statement made by the 2nd Defendant. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 36 of 66 [112] Regarding Blue Seal’s company profile, it was not pleaded and neither was there clear evidence on how the Plaintiffs obtained the said profile, in particular from which of the Defendants. [113] As a company acts through its “agent” (Victor Cham (supra)) the Plaintiffs must plead and prove which of the Defendants, if any, had given Blue Seal’s company profile to the Plaintiffs. PW-1 had then named the 2nd Defendant in his oral testimony before the Court but this cannot be permitted. In this regard, the Federal Court in Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Global Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 1 MLJ 302 held as follows: “These issues brought up at the trial had not been pleaded in the Statement of Defence, and this was a contravention of Order 18 Rule 8 of the Rules of the High Court, and therefore the contentions should not have been entertained (Attorney General v. Lord Mayor etc. of City of Sheffield(1)" (own emphasis added) [114] Even if is accepted that the 2nd Defendant or either of the 3rd to 5th Defendants had given Blue Seal’s company profile to the Plaintiffs, it has not been shown that there is anything stated in Blue Seal’s company profile which is inaccurate or untrue and how it is tantamount to Fraudulent Misrepresentation. [115] In so far as conspiracy is concerned the requirements laid down in Renault SA v. Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394 have not been fulfilled in that the following have not been clearly pleaded or proven: i) an agreement between the 6th Defendant and the 1st to 5th Defendants; ii) an agreement for the purpose of injuring the Plaintiffs; iii) the overt acts that were done in execution of the agreement; iv) that the overt acts were done in execution of the agreement; and v) what are the acts purportedly done by each of the Defendants in execution of the agreement. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 37 of 66 [116] There is no direct evidence tendered by the Plaintiffs to prove Fraudulent Misrepresentation against any of the Defendants and in particular that they “knowingly” committed the alleged acts associated with the allegation of Fraudulent Misrepresentation, fraud and conspiracy. The following passages by the Federal Court in Keruntum (supra) is instructive on this issue: “[70] In order for the plaintiff to succeed in its case that the cancellation of its licence was to serve a political purpose, it is necessary for the plaintiff to adduce evidence if believed, sufficient to prove that the second defendant knew about the Ming Court affair prior to the cancellation of the plaintiff’s licence. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff had not adduced direct evidence to show that the second defendant knew about it. It was also the finding of the courts below that to link the aforesaid cancellation to a political motive is a mere conjecture.” (own emphasis added) [117] In order to prove the Defendants’ knew that the panels were not certified Class ‘O’ even before they were installed, the Plaintiffs relied on the letter dated 31.3.2019 from Bahagian Perancangan dan Penyelidikan Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat to Linear Panel (“Bomba’s Letter”). This is the main evidence that the Plaintiffs relied on to show knowledge of the Defendants. [118] However, I agree with learned counsel for the Defendants that Bomba’s Letter does support the Plaintiffs’ allegation as: i) Bomba’s Letter is only addressed to Linear Panel and not to any of the Defendants. It is also not copied to any of the Defendants; ii) Bomba’s Letter merely states that Linear Panel’s application to obtain a renewal for “Coldroom Panel (50mm thickness)” for Class ‘O’ was rejected; iii) nowhere in Bomba’s Letter is it mentioned whether the Class ‘O’ certificate (for which the renewal was rejected) referred to in the letter is in respect of PU panels or whether it is in respect of another type of cold room panel. The Quotation indicates EPS (Expanded Polystyrene) panels (which both parties agree was later changed to PU panels). S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 38 of 66 iv) Pooi Chee Hoog who is a director of Linear Panels mentioned in PW-1’s witness statement (WS(A)-PW1) was never called to testify by the Plaintiffs; v) the Defendants are not mentioned in Bomba’s Letter. [119] Hence, the summary of my findings are as follows: i) The Defendants did not commit Fraudulent Misrepresentation; ii) The Fraudulent Misrepresentation in the context of the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case is fundamentally wrong. The Plaintiffs cannot say they were induced to enter into the Contract (LOAs) but at the same time rely on the same contract to claim for breach thereof. iii) In the absence of fraud or Fraudulent Misrepresentation there is no ground to lift the corporate veil in the present case. In this regard the Court of Appeal in Lam Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 held as follows. “In my judgment, in the light of the more recent authorities such as Adams v Cape Industries Plc, it is not open to the courts to disregard the corporate veil purely on the ground that it is in the interests of justice to do so. It is also my respectful view that the special circumstances to which Lord Keith referred include cases where there is actual fraud at common law or some inequitable or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity. The former, that is to say, actual fraud, was expressly recognised to be an exception to the doctrine of corporate personality by Lord Halsbury in his speech in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, the seminal case on the subject.” (own emphasis added) (see also Solid Investments Ltd v. Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 784 (FC)) [120] I must stress here that Fraudulent Misrepresentation, fraud as well as conspiracy to defraud are serious allegations and in the absence of “dishonesty” as well as proof of the state of mind the S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 39 of 66 Defendants, these allegations remain nothing more than mere allegations. [121] Further, the causes of action of this nature involving fraud and dishonesty must not only be specifically pleaded but there must also be clear evidence to prove the nexus between the alleged wrongful acts and the defendant who is said to have committed those wrongful acts. The Plaintiffs have failed to do either of this. J] NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY [122] The Plaintiffs also included, in addition to the multiple causes of action, a claim based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. [123] The negligence as pleaded is that the Defendants were negligent in, inter alia, supplying, constructing and carrying out installation work at the Factory. [124] The allegation on negligence is also attached to the allegation of defective and latent defect in the material used, design and work quality. [125] These are all allegations regarding the Contract. The Plaintiffs claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty is premised on the Contract (the LOAs). [126] This is further confirmed in the answer to Question 33 in WS(A)- PW1: “Question 33: Apart from the above-mentioned breaches, can you explain to the Court, what are the other failures of the Defendants in supplying, manufacturing, designing, installing and delivering the cGMP processing plant to the Plaintiffs? Answer 33: a) Following from the admission by the D1 that PU panels supplied to and installed at the 1st Plaintiff’s cGMP processing plant are not certified as Class O and that is breach of contract, it is inter-related and evidently proved that D1 and its directors D2-D5 are negligent in carrying out their duties of care and skill, when Defendants knew that they were appointed S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 40 of 66 specifically as NSC for the Projects, so they owe a duty of care to us. ” (own emphasis added) [127] The negligence claim is pleaded jointly against all the Defendants based on the “Particulars of Negligence” against the Defendants in paragraphs 81.1 to 81.16 of the Statement of Claim. [128] At paragraph 80 of the Statement of Claim, it is also pleaded these same Defendants jointly owe a duty of care to the Plaintiffs as NSCs: “Selanjutnya dan/atau secara alternatif Plaintif-Plaintif menyatakan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material Defendan-Defendan mempunyai kewajipan berjaga-jaga dan mengguna kemahiran tehadap Plaintif- Plaintif selaku SKD untuk membekal, membuat, mereka bentuk dan membina Loji Pemprosesan cGMP bagi Projek selari dengan SA No. 1 tersebut, SA No. 2 tersebut, undang-undang berkaitan di Malaysia dan semua representasi- representasi yang telah dibuat sama ada melalui tindakan atau perkataan yang telah diberikan terhadap dan dijaminkan kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. Plaintif- Plaintif mengulangi dan menggunapakai kepada Perenggan-perenggan 27 sehingga 33 di atas di sini.” (own emphasis added) [129] The Contracts do not involve the 2nd to 6th Defendants and as such they do not owe the Plaintiffs a duty of care regarding the Contract. [130] Further, I have stated earlier that the only contract in existence is the 2nd LOA between A One Piling and Blue Seal. [131] Therefore, the Plaintiffs claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty cannot be maintained against the 2nd to 6th Defendants who have no contractual relationship with the either of the Plaintiffs. [132] When it comes to Blue Seal, I find that the claim for negligence overlaps with the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract. That being the case, the Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract will supersede their claim for negligence. [133] The issue of an obligation in contract superseding a duty in tort was dealt with in the Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 in which the Privy Council held as follows: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 41 of 66 “Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the law's development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship. Though it is possible as a matter of legal semantics to conduct an analysis of the rights and duties inherent in some contractual relationships including that of banker and customer either as a matter of contract law when the question will be what, if any, terms are to be implied or as a matter of tort law when the task will be to identify a duty arising from the proximity and character of the relationship between the parties, their Lordships believe it to be correct in principle and necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the law to adhere to the contractual analysis: on principle because it is a relationship in which the parties have, subject to a few exceptions, the right to determine their obligations to each other, and for the avoidance of confusion because different consequences do follow according to whether liability arises from contract or tort, e.g. in the limitation of action. …..” ………. “Their Lordships do not, therefore, embark on an investigation as to whether in the relationship of banker and customer it is possible to identify tort as well as contract as a source of the obligations owed by the one to the other. Their Lordships do not, however, accept that the parties' mutual obligations in tort can be any greater than those to be found expressly or by necessary implication in their contract. …” (own emphasis added) [134] The same position was taken by the Court of Appeal in Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v. SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 in respect of an attempt by the respondent there to impose a tortious duty of care on the appellant who was sued for negligence. The Court of Appeal referred to the case of Tai Hing Cotton Mill (supra) and held as follows: “[36] In essence therefore, and harkening to the fair, just and reasonable requirement as set out in Caparo, in cases where the parties must be taken to have intended their rights and obligations to be governed exclusively by the contract or contracts which, they have entered, especially in a commercial contract, that factor to be taken as a compelling one, or in some cases a decisive one, against the imposition of a duty of care in tort.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 42 of 66 [135] Therefore, to summarise my findings on this issue: i) The Plaintiffs have no cause of action for negligence or breach of fiduciary duty against the 2nd to 6th Defendants; ii) As A One Piling has a contract with Blue Seal under the 2nd LOA, it supersedes A One Piling’s claim for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Blue Seal. iii) Tech Food has no contractual claim or nexus with Blue Seal as the 1st LOA is no longer valid. Blue Seal owes no fiduciary duty to Tech Food and no claim for negligence can be maintained by Tech Food against Blue Seal in respect of the work Blue Seal carried out for A One Piling under the 2nd LOA, as the NSC of the Project. K] BREACH OF CONTRACT (THE 2ND LOA) [136] I now come to A One Piling’s claim for breach of contract against Blue Seal. This is the only part of the Plaintiffs’ claim that can be maintained and it is only confined to A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract. [137] As stated earlier in paragraph 40 above, Blue Seal has admitted to liability for breach of the terms of the 2nd LOA but the admission is limited to the following: i) Under the Contract, A One Piling was to supply and install PU panels that are not defective, are fit for the purpose, are of merchantable quality, fire retardant and certified Bomba class “O”; ii) Blue Seal failed to supply and install Bomba Class ‘O’ certified PU panels at the Factory; iii) As a result of this failure the Factory cannot be used or operated as a cGMP Processing Plant. [138] At the outset, Blue Seal’s admission was only made on 23.5.2022 about a month before the trial was scheduled to commence, i.e. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 43 of 66 20.6.2022. Even then it was after numerous requests and/or challenges made by the Plaintiffs for the documents to prove that the PU panels installed at the Factory were in fact Bomba certified class “O”. [139] Blue Seal’s failure to make this disclosure or admission works to its detriment and ultimately affects Blue Seal’s credibility. [140] Based on the admission of liability, the Factory could not be used or operated as a cGMP Processing Plant as intended because of Blue Seal’s failure to supply and install Bomba certified class “O” PU panels at the Factory. [141] However, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, the breach by Blue Seal is not only limited to the fact that the PU panels installed at the Factory were no Bomba certified class “O” but also that: i) The PU panels had bubbles or blisters on them. This is not denied by the Defendants. ii) The PU panels were in fact defective and damaged which became evident subsequent to their installation. The PU panels cover a large portion of the Factory. The entire Factory is a huge refrigeration storage facility. iii) The damage does not only extend to the PU panels themselves but also the other components that make up or come with the PU panels. As the Factory is used as a refrigerated storage facility the PU panels have to be installed with proper insulation and support. This is because the PU panels are installed at the inner walls, doors and ceilings of the Factory and they form a complete system (“Refrigeration system”). Perhaps in more simple or lay terms, the PU panels are like the inner walls of a fridge and the damage to the inner walls can cause a catastrophic effect to the whole fridge. This is what has happened to the Factory. iv) Blue Seal had failed to construct the Factory properly to enable it to function as a refrigerated storage facility, the very purpose for which Blue Seal was engaged. [142] Having examined the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs in this case I find that the evidence substantiates A One Piling’s above S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 44 of 66 allegations namely that the PU panels were defective and that the installation of the PU panels and the overall Refrigeration system were not done properly. [143] In connection to this, there was a dispute raised by Blue Seal that the Contract and in particular the 2nd LOA did not include “design” work”. Whilst the terms of the 2nd LOA may not be absolutely clear on this and this had caused parties to engage in lengthy submissions, however, respectfully, I do not find the issue as complicated as it seems. This is based on the 2nd LOA (read together with the Quotation and other relevant documents) the construction of the Factory is very comprehensive. There can be no mistake or confusion that the Factory was to be used as a refrigerated storage facility and even a cursory review of the 2nd LOA and the Quotation will show that. Blue Seal’s work was to construct the Refrigeration system to enable the Factory to operate as a refrigerated storage facility. Thus, even if it is not explicitly stated, it can still be clearly implied that when Blue Seal constructs the Factory, it must ensure that the Factory can function as a refrigerated storage facility. [144] It would not make sense for Blue Seal to construct the Factory when it knows and ought to know that the Factory, upon being constructed, would not be able to function as a refrigerated storage facility. Therefore, Blue Seal cannot deny that there is a “design” element in the construction of the Factory. This is one of the complaints that was raised by the Plaintiffs, i.e. on the design work, which was also addressed by their expert, Raymond A.E.de Graaf (“PW-2”), in his reports and oral testimony at the trial. [145] Thus, in the construction of the Factory, Blue Seal must ensure that the Factory will ultimately function as a refrigerated storage facility and the work must be “designed” to achieve that. It is not open for Blue Seal to allege it only did what the Plaintiffs told it to do (e.g. to instal the PU panels) and if the Factory cannot operate as intended Blue Seal cannot be faulted as it did not design the Factory. [146] It must be borne in mind that the work under the 2nd LOA is comprehensive. Blue Seal must have the technical knowledge and ability to construct the Factory and use that knowledge and ability so that the Factory will function as a refrigerated storage facility. This is the reason for which A One Piling engaged Blue Seal and relied on Blue Seal’s expertise. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 45 of 66 L] BREACH OF CONTRACT - EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, DAMAGE AND QUANTUM [147] Regarding the allegations stated in paragraph 141 above PW-2 had testified, inter alia, as follows in his witness WS(A)-PW2: “Question 9 : Can you explain what is the opinion in your Assessment Report? Answer 9 : In summary, my opinion is as follows: a) Taking the general inadequate project conditions into consideration, which will result in high operational power consumption cost, accelerated depreciations, insurmountable deterioration, further bubble/blister phenomena, further delamination of the PPGI and structural stress damages on insulation and civil structures, substantial increased wear and tear on all related components, in particular the refrigeration equipment, insulation and possible concrete floor heaving, (it is paramount, to understand the problems and have raised awareness that expensive unforeseen repair- and replacement solutions during full operational periods will become inevitably. b) Having conducted the extensive survey and study of the Temperature-Controlled Production Facility concerned, that the most obvious recommendation that can be concluded is, to replace all insulation works and respective concrete floating floors, redesign the method statements and consider to conduct a thorough capacity calculation on the refrigeration equipment versus heat loads and thermal conductivity computations of the installed insulation systems. c) If however, the most obvious recommendation of replacement will not be implemented, it needs to be a paradigm of continuous monitoring the inspected and found defects, non-appliance parts of the method statements, inadequate applicable method statements, ice build-up in the tongue and groove panel connections, expected deterioration continuation, as well as the overall conditions of the total contracted works. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 46 of 66 d) It is obvious that a pre-operational trial runs need to be executed on all mechanical components that have been subject to a long period of a non-activity status combined with a thorough cleaning of the entire ex- and internal facility.” [148] PW-2 further testified on the condition of Factory as at 16.6.2022 (which is a few days before the trial) as follows: “Question 15 : Can you briefly explain about your assessment?? Answer 15 : a) I conducted another site assessment inspection at the request of Tech food Ingredients Sdn. Bhd. on 16.06.2022 for the purpose of a comparison with my Assessment Report No. 1 dated 11.06.2020 and composed the assessment as Updated Status Report No. 1 dated 16.06.2022 and marked as Exhibit RDG- 3 in the Plaintiffs’ Expert Affidavit (No. 2) affirmed by me on 17.06.2022. b) In brief, I found all previous inspected external phenomenon of bubble/blister of PU walls-, partition walls-, and walkable/suspended ceiling sandwich insulation panels, the phenomenon of delamination/debonding on the external side of the walkable/suspended ceiling PU insulation sandwich panels, as well as the inadequate essential vapor barriers, door- & relief ports components and equipment in comparison to my Assessment Report 1, dated 11.06.2020 to be substantially deteriorated, no improvement whatsoever on the PU finishing floors, additional corrosion on the refrigeration equipment, dust and cobwebs. c) For these reasons, the only conclusion I can make is to demolish the entire PU insulation system, the PU floor insulation slabs in Freezer 1 & 2, combined with the concrete top floors, the freezer door frames and a thorough review of the conditions of the refrigeration systems and individual equipment of all capacities, heat load calculations, corrosion in order to re-design the entire system and amend the method statements on the entire insulation system in accordance with Bomba class ‘O’ certification.” S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 47 of 66 [149] In relation to this, it is crucial to note that Blue Seal or the other Defendants did not produce any expert report either on their own or in rebuttal. [150] In the absence of their own expert report or expert testimony, the cross-examination conducted by the Defendants on PW-2 in respect of technical or scientific matters would not have much of an impact on PW-2’s testimony unless the expert evidence is “obviously lacking in defensibility” and “is not supported by the basic facts of the case” (Majuikan Sdn Bhd v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171). This is not the situation in the instant case. [151] Any of the Defendants’ counsel who cross-examines PW-2 cannot presuppose he has knowledge on the scientific area involved without support from another expert report or testimony to base his cross-examination on (see Syed Abu Bakar bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 MLRA 318; PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLRH 841 on how the Court treats expert reports). [152] Therefore, this falls squarely under one of the circumstances in which adverse inference may be drawn under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 (“EA 1950”) and especially in the present case where the Defendants have submitted “no case to answer” (Takako (supra)). [153] To prove its claim for breach of contract A One Piling had adduced both documentary and viva voce evidence which are summarised as follows: i) One “Part A” bundle of documents where the authenticity and contents of the documents are agreed; ii) Eight “Part B” bundle of documents where the contents of the documents are disputed and not their authenticity. iii) One “Part C” bundle of document which only contains “Whatsapp” messages totalling 2 pages. iv) Six witnesses testified for the Plaintiffs. [154] The documentary evidence included pictures of the Factory and video recordings of the inspection carried out at the Factory. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 48 of 66 [155] It is proven from the totality of the evidence presented at the Trial that the Factory was not constructed properly (including defective or wrong materials used) and the construction work was incomplete. Even visibly, the damage especially to the PU panels can be seen in that most, if not all, of the PU panels installed at the Factory have blisters/bubbles on them. [156] To put it plainly, the Factory was in poor condition and in a deteriorated state. [157] The condition of the Factory was a direct result of Blue Seal’s failure to construct the Factory in accordance with the Contract and the entire Refrigeration system as stated in paragraph 141 above. This is clearly borne out by the evidence. [158] The condition of the Factory was described in detail in PW-2’s expert reports and in his oral testimony. PW-2 had inspected the Factory at least twice. [159] There is no reason for me to doubt or question PW-2’s testimony though learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants had argued that he was not independent. There is no evidence of this except for the attempts by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants to challenge PW-2’s credibility during cross-examination. During cross-examination I observed that PW-2 remained resolute, unwavering and consistent in his testimony which were supported by scientific explanation and data. [160] Given the admissions made by Blue Seal in particular that the Factory cannot be used or operated together with the totality of the evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs, I find that Blue Seal had committed breach of contract. Blue Seal had essentially failed to construct the Factory in accordance with the 2nd LOA and namely as stated in paragraph 141 above. [161] The said breach had then caused A One Piling to suffer losses. [162] Though there were multiple reliefs prayed for by A One Piling in respect of its the breach of contract claim, I had only allowed those which were the direct consequence of the breach and related to the 2nd LOA. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 49 of 66 [163] It must be noted at this juncture that some of the reliefs were withdrawn by the Plaintiffs such as the relief in prayers 83.10 and 83.13 of the Statement of Claim. The Plaintiffs also requested for “appropriate general damages” to be granted by the Court in place of prayers 83.7 and 83.11 of the Statement of Claim. [164] A One Piling’s contractual claim which I had allowed were confined to, inter alia, the following main reliefs in the Statement of Claim: i) Prayer 83.2 as prayed for; ii) Prayer 83.4 but only in respect of a declaration that there was a breach of contract of the 2nd LOA by Blue Seal as the NSC for the Project; iii) Prayer 83.9 for the refund of RM98,000.00 that was overpaid; iv) Prayer 83.11 for A One Piling to utilise the balance 5% of the Contract Sum which it is holding, against the costs of rectifying the Factory; and v) Prayer 83.12 for special damages but reduced to the sum of RM19,498,666.73 being the costs of rectifying the Factory; [165] Therefore, the two main relief for liquidated sums in the Statement of Claim which I allowed for breach of contract are: i) Prayer 83.9 for the refund of RM98,000.00 that was overpaid; and ii) Prayer 83.12 for special damages of RM19,498,666.73 being the costs of rectifying the Factory. [166] I will begin with the overpayment claim of RM98,000.00 which is specifically pleaded in the Statement of Claim. [167] Based on the testimony of PW-5, after Blue Seal terminated the 2nd LOA, PW-5, as the SO of the Project, was required to prepare the final account in respect of the same. At that point of time, after recalculation and inspection, it was discovered that the Project was over certified and many of the works that were supposedly done were not completed as claimed. In the circumstances, revised progress payment certificates were prepared, i.e. Progress S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 50 of 66 Payment Certificate No. 4A and Progress Payment Certificate No. 5A. [168] In support of its claim, A One Piling had produced pictures of the above incomplete works which were attached together with the Progress Claim No. 5A (Bundle B1). [169] It was submitted on behalf of the Plaintiffs, that the RM98,000.00 overpayment was calculated as follows: “a) Progress Payment Certificate No. 4A: RM151,970.38 (add) b) Progress Payment Certificate No. 5A: -RM1 39,280.54 (less) c) Payment made by 2nd Plaintiff on 13.02.2019: RM110,945.64 Total: RM98,255.80” [170] As the 1st to 5th Defendants’ arguments against the evidence in respect of A One Piling’s claim for the overpayment of RM98,000.00 and special damages of RM19,498,666.73 are similar, I will deal with them together after addressing the said special damages claim. [171] Regarding A One Piling’s claim for special damages, the actual amount prayed in prayer 83.12 of the Statement of Claim, being the costs involved to rectify the Factory, was RM20,767,364.26. The particulars of this special damages were pleaded in, inter alia, paragraphs 56, 56.1 to 56.21.6 of the Statement of Claim. [172] A One Piling pleaded in detail the work and costs involved to rectify the Factory covering, inter alia, the work involved to the materials required and the related costs. [173] However, at the trial A One Piling was only able to prove special damages amounting to RM19,498,666.73. This was based on, inter alia, the testimonies of PW-5 and PW-6 as well as the documentary evidence adduced in, inter alia, Bundles B4 and B5 which include a document entitled “Summary For Loss and Damages (until 4/5/2022)” together with its supporting documents involving numerous quotations issued by various contractors and suppliers. The special damages of RM19,498,666.73 essentially represents the costs of rectifying the Factory. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 51 of 66 [174] In addition to this, PW-2, as an expert witness, had also testified on the what was needed to be done to rectify the Factory and to put it in working condition. [175] The 1st to 5th Defendants challenged the evidence adduced by A One Piling in respect of the above overpayment and special damages claim based on the following grounds: i) All the documents which were brought to the Court’s attention during post trial submissions are in Part B of the agreed bundle and the contents are disputed. ii) The Plaintiffs have presented their entire case without reading out any documents during the trial. They merely asked the Court to refer to certain pages in the agreed bundle and told the Court that the documents at those pages supported their case. No attempt was made to read out any document in Court. iii) By reason of issues (i) and (ii) above, the quotations were not properly admitted in evidence and their contents proved. iv) PW-2 is not a true expert in the area and his reports and testimony ought to be disregarded. [176] With regards to the issue at paragraph 175(i) above, it is not in dispute and is the correct position of law that the documents placed in Part B are disputed as to their contents and not their authenticity. The two cases below make it clear as to how Part B documents are to be treated: i) Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] MLRAU 376 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[24] It is clear that Bundle B contains documents where the authenticity of the same is not disputed but contents are. What that means is simply this. There is no requirement to call any evidence to prove the authenticity or existence of the document in question. However, if any party wants to rely on the contents of that document, he or she must call for the evidence, oral or otherwise, to prove the truth of the same. Unless that is done, the trial Court cannot give any evidential value to the contents of that document.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 52 of 66 ii) Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] 6 MLRA 52 in which the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[36] To answer that question it is necessary to consider O 34 r 2(2)(e). It provides that documents where the authenticity is agreed but the contents are in dispute, the documents are to be placed in Part B. This in turn means that while the parties are in agreement that such a document exists and is not a fabrication, the contents of the document remain in dispute. So the relevant witness is to be present at trial to be cross- examined on the contents only, of the document.” (own emphasis added) [177] Based on the above authorities, A One Piling will have to prove the contents of the documents that were placed in Part B by calling for the evidence, oral or otherwise (Melawangi (supra)) and where oral testimony is given the relevant witness must be in Court to be cross-examined by the Defendants (Tiow Weng Theong (supra)). [178] In the present case A One Piling had tendered the Part B documents and called the relevant witnesses to testify on those documents. A One Piling’s witnesses were then offered to the Defendants for cross-examination. Therefore, it is clear to me that A One Piling has satisfied the above two requirements laid out in Melawangi (supra) and Tiow Weng Theong (supra). [179] The next issue (paragraph 175(ii) above) pertains to the 1st to 5th Defendants’ argument that the said documents in Part B were only referred to by the Plaintiffs’ witnesses but were not read out in Court. Therefore, they do not form part of the evidence in the present case. [180] Whilst I agree that for A One Piling to prove the contents of the documents in Part B, the said documents must be referred to specifically by the relevant witness, however, I do not agree that they (i.e. the contents of these documents) need to be specifically read out in Court at the trial. [181] In this regard, the Supreme Court in Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 had clearly addressed this issue in, inter alia, the following passages: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 53 of 66 “Thirdly, such documents therein do not form automatically a part of the evidence of the case in question ipso facto, but any of such documents does become part of such evidence if it is read or referred to by either of the parties, wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention, either in examination of any witness, in submission at any stage or even on any unilateral drawing of court's attention to it by either of the parties at any time before the conclusion of the case. Fourthly, at the end of the whole case, the truth of the contents of any of the document is up to the court to determine, regard being had, inter alia, to any absence of challenge by either of the parties on any part of the document and similarly, the question of weight, eg either great or no weight to be given to any part of any document is also a matter for the trial court, which considers the documents including any 'written hearsay' contained therein. The court may refuse to give any weight at all to any document, but then it is accountable like in other matters, to the parties and to the appellate court for reasons for such refusal.” (own emphasis added) [182] Learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants had a different interpretation of the first paragraph of the above passages quoted from Jaafar bin Shaari (supra). He contends that the documents placed in Part B must be read in Court as the terms, “referred to” and “read” have different functions. With respect, I disagree. The wording of the above passages from Jaafar bin Shaari (supra) is clear. The word “or” in the passage “if it is read or referred to by either of the parties” is disjunctive. I am of the considered view that the party proving the contents of a Part B document may either “read” the document or “refer” to it at the trial, either through the witness’s statement or his oral testimony when he is examined. [183] I am also of the considered view that when the witness “refers” to a document placed in Part B, he only needs to identify the document in his testimony either “wholly or partly, at length or in a briefest of mention” (Jaafar bin Shaari (supra)). [184] Thus, there is no necessity for the witness to read the document at the trial as argued by learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants. [185] Learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants also referred to the case of Borneo Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Penang Port Commission S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 54 of 66 [1975] 2 MLJ 204 to support his argument that Part B documents must be read in Court and quoted the following passage from the said case: “Now Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 12th Edition, page 298 has this to say: — “If the correspondence is voluminous it will be necessary to have an agreed bundle for the use of the judge, the paging of which should be identical with that of the bundles for counsel on both sides. In default of special agreement, only such letters in the bundle as are actually read at the trial will be taken to be in evidence, and agreeing a bundle does not constitute an admission that all letters contained in it are admissible in evidence.” (own emphasis added) [186] With respect, I find learned counsel for the 1st to 5th Defendants’ reliance on the above passage from Borneo Co. (supra) misplaced and taken out of context. Firstly, the use of an agreed bundle of documents were perhaps not a common thing in those days (in 1975) and preparing an agreed bundle was something relatively new. Secondly, it is clear from the words, “In default of special agreement” in Odgers on Pleading and Practice, 12th Edition, means that parties must agree on how the document is to be treated or categorised. The compilation and placing of documents in an “agreed bundle” in the context of the above passage is understood to mean for convenience and easy reference at the trial only. This is where the “special agreement” comes in on how the documents in the said agreed bundle are to be treated. In this day and age where the rules of civil procedure in Malaysia is now governed by the Rules of Court 2012, agreed bundles are categorised Parts A, B and C by agreement of parties well before the trial. Therefore, it is not useful nor instructive to refer to the above passage from Borneo Co. (supra). [187] In the present case, A One Piling’s witnesses had referred to the documents in Part B and in some instances had even given explanation on them during their testimonies. As such the contents of these Part B documents have been proven. [188] On the issue of whether the maker of a Part B documents needs to be called to testify, I find the Court of Appeal’s decision in Yeo Ing S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 55 of 66 King v. Melawanqi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 to be instructive, in which it was held as follows: “[10] If there is a dispute as to contents and/or its truth, it has to be placed in Bundle B. For example, in a case where the plaintiff is suing the defendant for breach of facility granted by the bank and the amount of claim is in dispute, the defendant can admit a bank statement to be placed in Bundle B and even agree to dispense with the maker of the statement to give evidence, to save costs and time and proceed to call his own witness such as a chartered accountant to show that the sum claimed in the bank statement is erroneous. In essence, placing a document in Bundle B does not mean that the maker must be called but if the opposing party dispense with the calling of the maker then that document must be marked as exhibit subject to proof of the contents. In any event, the court may want to give some probative force to that document taking into account a holistic view of the facts of the case (see Recaliva Design Steel (M) Sdn Bhd v Vista Access Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 604; [2008] 10 CLJ 491 and YB Dato’ Hj Husam bin Hj Musa v Mohd Faisal bin Rohban Ahmad [2015] 3 MLJ 364; [2015] 1 CLJ 787). In addition, the makers for Bundle B documents may be dispensed with, if the exception to the hearsay rule provided under the Evidence Act becomes applicable (see the EA 1950 ss 32, 73A, 90A, etc). In such event, the relevant documents must be marked as exhibits during trial.” (own emphasis added) [189] In the instant case, it was made clear to the parties well before the trial during case managements that if the maker of the document is required to be called by the opposing party then the document should be placed in Part C as formal proof is required for the documents to be admitted. Since parties have agreed for the documents to be placed in Part B, it is not a must for the maker to be called though it still falls upon the Court to determine the weight that should to be placed on the said document. [190] In connection with this, it was held in Melawangi (supra) as follows: “[27] Our view can be said to be corroborated by the many directions given by us when we were sitting as High Court Judges. Those directions were that there would be three bundles to be used at trial, namely Bundles A, B and C and documents therein must be agreed as what we have set out above. That has been the accepted practise among the legal practitioners prior to the Rules of Court 2012. This practice is in fact confirmed by counsel for the Appellant at trial as evidenced in this interchange between the learned Judge and counsel: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 56 of 66 YA : But the documents are in B? DRV : Yes it's in B. The documents are there, But the veracity are still subject to cross-examination. YA : Subject for cross, yes. Yes. DRV : So just because it's in B, it's not automatically like how it is in A.” (own emphasis added) [191] This then takes us to the issue of the cross-examination of the witnesses and the documents. [192] First and foremost, it is trite law that “it is essential that a party’s case be expressly put to his opponent’s material witnesses when they are under cross-examination.” (Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639). [193] It was also held in Lau Tiong Ik Construction Sdn Bhd v Lau Chung Ping & Anor (2015) MLRHU 1371 as follows: “[40] From what PW1 had stated above, the cash flow statement for FYE 1998 showed that there was no cash inflow of RM1,631, 200.00 which would have been the proceeds from the sale of the shares to the 1st defendant. The cash and bank balances in the said cash flow statement also did not increase by a proportionate amount of RM1,600,000.00. He said that this meant that there was no payment made by the 1st defendant and no payment received by the plaintiff. It is noteworthy that although deemed critical to the 1st defendant's case, PW1 was never cross- examined on this aspect of his evidence. This was to the detriment of the 1st defendant because it is a well settled rule of essential justice that wherever an opponent had declined to avail himself of the opportunity to put his essential and material case in cross-examination, it must follow that he believed that the testimony given could not be disputed at all (see AEG Carapiet v. AYDerderian AIR 1961 Cal 359 at 362 applying Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67). In Ayoromi Helen v. PP [2004] 2 MLRA 322; [2005] 1 MLJ 699; [2005] 1 CLJ 1; [2005] 1 AMR 405 the Court of Appeal held that the failure to cross-examine a witness on a crucial part of the case will amount to an acceptance of the witness' testimony.” (own emphasis added) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 57 of 66 [194] Whilst the 1st to 5th Defendants makes an issue of the manner in which the Part B documents were tendered by A One Piling, however, they themselves have failed to cross-examine A One Piling’s witnesses on these documents either entirely or specifically on material issues. [195] Learned counsel for the Defendants’ cross-examination of A One Piling’s witnesses were somewhat cursory and there was no specific reference to the documents which they now seek to challenge despite the fact that the said documents (mainly in Part B) were referred to by A One Piling’s witnesses at the trial. [196] PW-6 in particular was not cross-examined at all by the Defendants’ counsel. [197] As far as A One Piling is concerned it has discharged its evidential burden to prove its case and in this regard the contents of the Part B documents. Hence the burden shifts to Blue Seal (Keruntum (supra)). [198] A One Piling has adduced evidence to prove its overpayment claim of RM98,000.00 as well the special damages claim but only up to the sum of RM19,498,666.73. The details of these claims were specifically pleaded and both oral and documentary evidence adduced at the trial to support them. [199] Therefore, in respect of the issue in paragraph 175(iii) above, the quotations were properly admitted. The special damages were specifically pleaded and particularised and proved by documentary evidence (Rohgetana Mayathevan v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and Other Appeals [2017] 3 MLRA 53 at paragraph 16). Further the quotations can be used to prove loss or damages suffered (Chong Nge Wei & Ors v Kemajuan Masteron Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 135). [200] As far as the issue in paragraph 175(iv) is concerned, I reiterate my grounds in paragraphs 147 to 152 and 159 above. PW-2 testified that he had the expertise in the relevant area and the cross-examination of PW-2 by the Defendants were without any basis when in fact the Defendants did not adduce any contrary expert report or testimony to challenge PW-2’s expertise in the area. In any event I did not find the expert evidence of PW-2 to be obviously lacking in defensibility (Majuikan (supra)). PW-2 is well S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 58 of 66 qualified and has vast experience in the area. He had backed his reports and opinion with scientific facts and supporting data. [201] As I find that the evidence adduced by A One Piling satisfactory and reliable (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)), it is therefore the Court’s duty to accept the evidence as true in the absence of any evidence from the Blue Seal to the contrary (Takako (supra)). [202] Blue Seal has also failed to provide any reason why it did not care to give evidence and therefore it is justified for the Court to draw adverse inference against Blue Seal (Takako (supra)). [203] In this situation, Blue Seal’s defence cannot be taken into account or considered (Leolaris (supra); Takako (supra)). [204] I find that the loss and damages were in fact suffered by A One Piling arising from Blue Seal’s breach of the 2nd LOA (Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 397) and this entitles A One Piling to the RM98,000.00 overpayment claim and the RM19,498,666.73 special damages claim which it has proven (Rohgetana Mayathevan (supra)). [205] I must emphasise that notwithstanding the evidence adduced by A One Piling to prove the losses and damages it suffered, it bears repeating that Blue Seal had admitted in no unclear terms that: “The cGMP Processing Plant cannot be used or operated as cGMP Processing Plant as the PU panels supplied and installed by the 1st Defendant are not class ‘O’ certified panels.” (own emphasis added) [206] Hence, it is only reasonable for A One Piling to be compensated for having to rectify the Factory which was not able to be used as a refrigerated storage facility for several years since Blue Seal terminated the 2nd LOA. [207] For brevity, only A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract, as the contracting parties under the 2nd LOA, is allowed. The 2nd to 6th Defendants are not privy to this contractual claim and therefore they cannot be made liable. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 59 of 66 M] THE OTHER RELIEFS [208] The Plaintiffs had prayed for a multitude of reliefs which include: i) General damages for breach of contract and/or fiduciary duties and/or negligence; ii) General damages for loss of reputation, business, income and business opportunity; iii) General damages for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation; iv) General damages for mental anguish, health issues and embarrassment. [209] As I had stated earlier the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants for Deceit, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Negligence and Breach of Fiduciary Duties are without merits and this has been dealt with earlier in this Judgment. Therefore, all the Plaintiffs’ claims and the reliefs connected to these causes of action are dismissed. [210] In so far as the general damages sought in relation to breach of contract is concerned, A One Piling’s special damages claim has covered these losses or damages and therefore A One Piling cannot be allowed the same claim twice or given a “second bite of the cherry” (Tekun Nasional v. Plenitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 6 MLJ 619 (FC)). [211] In any event, the reliefs which were not allowed were all unproven and no evidence were even adduced to prove that the losses were suffered. [212] It does not assist the Plaintiffs’ case by claiming a multitude of reliefs when they are not able to back those claims with actual evidence. It is also of utmost importance for the Plaintiffs to have first established the nexus between their claims and the reliefs sought before making those claims. [213] Save and except for A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract, the other claims are devoid of merit. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 60 of 66 [214] In the present case, as a result of a large number of the Plaintiffs’ claims being dismissed, costs for those dismissed claims were then awarded in favour of the Defendants. N] THE 6TH DEFENDANT [215] Earlier in this Judgment, I had discussed the Plaintiffs’ claims against all the Defendants including the 6th Defendant concerning Deceit, Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duties and Breach of Contract. However, I consider it necessary to specifically address the Plaintiffs’ claim against the 6th Defendant. [216] Firstly, the 6th Defendant is an employee of Blue Seal. He carries out his duties in accordance with the instructions given to him by Blue Seal and this would also be in line with his employment contract with Blue Seal. Blue Seal is the NSC of the Project and not the 6th Defendant. In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs continuously ties the alleged wrongdoings of the 2nd to 6th Defendants with Blue Seal as the NSC of the Project. There is no direct nexus between the Plaintiffs’ claim and the 6th Defendant. [217] Secondly, there is nothing for the 6th Defendant to gain by committing Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation unless he was conspiring with the other Defendants and this is what the Plaintiffs have alleged against him. [218] There is no evidence of conspiracy between the 6th Defendant and the other Defendants to commit Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation against the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence of the 6th Defendant committing Deceit and Fraudulent Misrepresentation on his own either. [219] Thirdly, the 6th Defendant owes a duty to Blue Seal, not the Plaintiffs. If during the course of his employment the 6th Defendant commits an error in his work or is negligent in the execution of his duties related to the Project, Blue Seal would assume liability. [220] Hence there was no real reason or justification for the 6th Defendant to have been made a party to this action and as such I awarded a higher sum of costs in favour of the 6th Defendant. S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 61 of 66 Suit 518 [221] Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal in Suit 518 is almost identical to the Plaintiffs’ claim against the Defendants in Suit 17, with the sole distinction being that Truepro is only seeking damages and not pursuing any declaratory reliefs. [222] Truepro is not a party to the contract between Blue Seal and the Plaintiffs in Suit 17. Truepro has no contract with Blue Seal. Truepro is merely the Consultant and Superintending Officer appointed by Tech Food for the Project. [223] Truepro has not provided justification or cause of action for its Counterclaim against Blue Seal. [224] On this ground alone Truepro’s Counterclaim can be dismissed. [225] Nevertheless, for completeness, I have still examined the evidence given by PW-5 who testified for Truepro. PW-5 is a director of Truepro. [226] When PW-5 was asked to provide the basis for Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal, this was the answer he gave: “KS Ok. Can you explain to the Court the basis of your claim against Blue Seal? What is it, based on what, I mean the, based on the contract or whatever it is, can you please explain? SOO Yang Arif, ok. If we recall back, under this 518, ok? Blue Seal put A One and Truepro as a Defendant. If you say, we don't have the contract, and then, I cannot claim them, why they can sue me? Put in me as a Defendant? Ok? So, the, my, this is my counterclaim in the suit 518, ok, page 2. Ok? Under item (a)(i), 73.11, we are put there, “Special damage for the sum of RM250,000 incurred for the additional consultation and the administration, administrative costs for the project”. Ok? Because of the Blue Seal breach of contract, all the cGMP plant need to demolish and rebuild. Ok? Are you agree?” [227] The following can be deduced from PW-5’s above testimony: i) PW-5 does not seem to know the reason for Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal; S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 62 of 66 ii) It would appear the Counterclaim was because Truepro was made a party, 2nd Defendant in the main suit (Suit 518). iii) Truepro incurred additional costs which is it now claiming because of the breach of contract by Blue Seal in failing to construct the Factory properly. [228] There is no contractual or causal link between the special damages claimed by Truepro and Blue Seal. [229] If Truepro’s claim is a contractual claim then its nexus is with Tech Food. [230] Truepro presented evidence through PW-5, whom, during his testimony, failed to provide any justification for his claim against Blue Seal, except for requesting specific damages totalling RM250,000.00 and RM169,840.02, along with general damages to be determined by the Court. PW-5 submitted these figures without offering any explanation as to how they are derived. [231] It is important to note that Truepro’s Counterclaim only arose after Suit 518 was filed by Blue Seal. [232] Truepro’s pleaded claim is for special damages in the sum of RM10,207,614.00 but at the trial Truepro’s had limited its claim against Blue Seal to RM250,000.00 and RM169,840.02. No explanation was given nor any evidence tendered as to how any of these amounts were derived or why Truepro’s pleaded claim was about RM9.7 million higher. [233] As far as Truepro’s Counterclaim is concerned, it has not proven its case. Therefore, there is no case for Blue Seal to answer as the evidence led for Truepro is so unsatisfactory or unreliable that the burden of proof has not been discharged (Mohd Nor Afandi (supra); Yui Chin Song (supra)). O] CONCLUSION [234] For the reasons stated above, in respect of Suit 17, I allowed A One Piling’s claim against Blue Seal for breach of contract only and essentially the following relief with some changes: S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 63 of 66 i) Prayers 83.2, 83.4, 83.9, 83.11, 83.12 for the sum of RM19,498,666.73 and 83.19; ii) Costs of RM90,000.00 to be paid by Blue Seal to A One Piling in respect of A One Piling’s claim which was allowed; iii) Costs of RM40,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the 1st to 5th Defendant in respect of the part of the Plaintiffs’ claim which was dismissed; iv) Costs of RM30,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the 6th Defendant. [235] In relation to Suit 518, I dismissed Truepro’s Counterclaim against Blue Seal with costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by Truepro to Blue Seal. Dated this 19th day of January, 2024 -SGD- (WAN MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN WAN YAHYA) Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division (NCC 3)) S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 64 of 66 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF Dato’ Jasbeer Singh (Nur Hakimah Mohamad and Rachel Varghese together with him) Messrs Jasbeer, Nur & Lee No. 6-2nd Floor, Block C, Wisma RKT Jalan Raja Abdullah off Jalan Sultan Ismail 50300 Kuala Lumpur Tel.: 03-2694 8908 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR 1ST TO 5TH DEFENDANTS K. Sureindhren (Lee Yoke Chew together with him) Messrs Lee Y C & Co. No. 9, 2nd Floor, Jalan SS15/4G 47500 Subang Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel.: 03-5631 6861 Email: [email protected] COUNSEL FOR 6TH DEFENDANT Dato’ Lee Chan Leong Messrs Chan Leong & Co No. 3-4B, Jalan Anggerik Vanilla N 31/N, Kota Kemuning, Seksyen 31, 40460 Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Tel.: 03-5124 9863 Email: [email protected] S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 65 of 66 LEGISLATION CITED Evidence Act 1950 ▪ Section 114 illustration (g) Contracts Act 1950 ▪ Section 17 ▪ Section 18 ▪ Section 19 CASES CITED 1. Abdul Razak bin Datuk Abu Samah v. Shah Alam Properties Sdn Bhd and another appeal [1999] 2 MLJ 500 2. Aik Ming (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 639 3. Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v. Yeoh Teen Earn & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 4. Borneo Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Penang Port Commission [1975] 2 MLJ 204 5. CIMB Bank Bhd v. Veeran Ayasamy (Wakil Diri Kepada Letchimi Muthusamy, Si Mati) [2015] 7 CLJ 289 6. Credit Guarantee Corp Malaysia Bhd v. SSN Medical Products Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 MLJ 629 7. Chong Nge Wei & Ors v Kemajuan Masteron Sdn Bhd [2022] 3 MLJ 135) 8. Datuk Mohd Ali Hj Abdul Majid & Anor v. Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLRA 397 9. Giga Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v. Yip Chee Seng & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 6 MLJ 449 10. Gimstern Corporation (M) Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. Global Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 1 MLJ 302 11. Integrated Training and Services Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2022] 3 MLJ 77 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 66 of 66 12. Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as administrators of the estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v. Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 13. Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests & Ors [2017] 3 MLJ 281 14. Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong [1983] 2 MLJ 320 15. Leolaris (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bumiputra Commerce Bank Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 234 16. Lam Kam Loy & Anor v. Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 17. Lau Tiong Ik Construction Sdn Bhd v Lau Chung Ping & Anor (2015) MLRHU 1371 18. Mohd Nor Afandi bin Mohamed Junus v. Rahman Shah Along Ibrahim & Anor [2008] 3 MLJ 81 19. Majuikan Sdn Bhd v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] 1 MLJ 171 20. Melawangi Sdn Bhd v. Lim Kian Hian [2017] MLRAU 376 21. PB Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Samudra (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLRH 841 22. Renault SA v. Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 MLJ 394 23. Rohgetana Mayathevan v Dr Navin Kumar & Ors and Other Appeals [2017] 3 MLRA 53 24. Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Neqeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 3 MLJ 609 25. Seqar Oil Palm Estate Sdn Bhd v. Tay Tho Bok & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 211 26. Sim Thong Realty Sdn Bhd v. Teh Kim Dar @ Tee Kim [2003] 3 MLJ 460 27. Solid Investments Ltd v. Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 784 28. Syed Abu Bakar bin Ahmad v. Public Prosecutor [1983] 1 MLRA 318 29. Takako Sakao v. Ng Pek Yuen & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 74 30. Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd [1986] AC 80 31. Tiow Weng Theong v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2018] 6 MLRA 52 32. Tekun Nasional v. Plenitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2021] 6 MLJ 619 33. Victor Cham & Anor v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 MLJ 359 34. Yui Chin Song & Qrs v. Lee Ming Chai & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 417 35. Yeo Ing King v. Melawanqi Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 631 S/N fP/aZNvV70yMW2pY7K0fg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

JB-12ANCvC-8-07/2023

PERAYU 1. ) SAFIRUL BIN SABRI (SEORANG KANAK-KANAK MENDAKWA MELALUI IBUNYA ATAU SAHABAT WAKIL SA'DIAH BINTI SA'ADON) 2. ) SA'DIAH BINTI SAADON RESPONDEN 1. ) Wan Zeity Mazura Bin Wan Sahak (Wakil Persendirian Kepada Harta Pusaka Iskandar Bin Ibrahim, Simati) 2. ) IBRAHIM BIN AB GHANI

Interlocutory Appeal – Decision from Sessions Court – Allowing recalling of witnesses for further cross-examination - Application to stay the proceedings - Pending Appeal to Court of Appeal – Principles applicable – Whether rare and compelling circumstances – Or special circumstances – Appeal will become nugatory – Merits of the appeal.

24/01/2024

YA Tuan Suria Kumar a/l Durairaj Johnson Paul

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0ed07f0b-c526-4735-8bcd-8aa587688f4c&Inline=true

24/01/2024 11:24:27 JB-12ANCvC-8-07/2023 Kand. 23 S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N C3/QDibFNUeLzYqlh2iPTA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal JB—l2AIlCvC-B-D7/2023 Kand, 23 us-1nNzyc.a-a7/10231311:24-2‘ DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA nu MLIAR DALAIII NEGERI JDHOR. MALAVSIA RAVUAN SIVIL N0.: JmzAucvc.u.n1Izu2a ANYARA 1. SAFIRUL am sum (scoring kinak-Jxznak m-ndakwa llllalul Inunya mu nhabaz Wnkil SNDIAH awn $A'ADON) 2. SA'DlAH awn sA'ADoM PERAYU-PERAVU DAN 1. wm zzmr mzum am WAN snmx Iwakn wunaxnnn kapada mm punk. ISKANDAR am naruuuu. Sim: ) (NO. K/P : nmn2411.o1s1) 2. IERANIM am AB an-mm (N0.KIF:1104n§—fl3-5031) RESFONDEN-RESPONDEN rgalam Purkara Illlnglnai Mahknmah Sesfln DI mm Gunman No: JE-AEJKJ-4a~lI2 TAHUN zuzm ANTARA 1. SAFIRUL am swan (sealing knuk-buluk mnnd.|kw| Mala: unya alau nhabal wmu SNDIAH amn swxuorc) IN ca/uDmFMu¢uVqmzwrA ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be sued p. vecly M nhgmnhlv M W. mm. VII mun: W.‘ ummucvc-am/zozzi E 2. SA'D1ANElNTlSA'ADON .PLA|NYlF-PLAIITIF am 1. wag glrv mzmu am wan smm (wakil pnunndlrhn mad: ham punk: ISKAMDAR am uaruruuu, Slmali) (N0. KIP : nmnz-n1ms1) 2. maximum am AB srwu (N0.KlP:110AIJ6-036031) DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN KORAM: SURIA KUIIIAR A/L DURAIRAJ JOHNSON PAUL PESURUHJAVA KEHAKIMAN L1:1an1.-at.-«mmm:1L1tnmuuuaauandmmmmmumniuxskvmuuutam ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN anmumxx:1aauuumauuwmmummmuaxuscmmxuuummumm PENDAHUIJJAN [1] Vni adarah Rayuan Pevayu—Perzyu/P\aInM-P\a\MW‘ hrhadap kepumsan ms VB pads «annex menalak permonunan meveka unluk penggarmmgan pmsmmg seliruulnyi sehmgga Rayuun ke Mahkamah Rayuan barkauan sam kepulusan pevmchunan m|er1uku|ori oleh HMS YB yang d|keka\kan uleh Mahkamah mi dilupuskan IN ca/uDmrMuuuvq\nzxPrA — ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vevly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ up uucvc 7/znu] E [:2] Tambahan lag!‘ mammn PlaInm—P1amul, saks\~saksISP1 dan svz tsrssbm telah pun diwalbalas aleh bekas peguamcara Daranaar» Dave-wan dengan soalan-Amman my new anany: semen panmraan levsebul pa: Mahkamah lwdak dapal mananrna hujahan P|ain|fl—P\ain|rfinI kelana dalam Rawan Pia-um-Plamnr nemaaap kauumsan was vs umuk memanggnl semula saxsiaaks. sm flan spz, Mahkamnh nu |e|an pun memumskan bahawa kepulusan >-was va uruuk membenarkan saknisaksi sm dan spz mpanggn samula unluk moan balas uleh Defsndun-Delendan ida\ah mas pelakaanaan ('sxam:e”} budiblcaranya sendln s$aga\ Ham aura (-my wage”) dalam pvoswdmg parbiczraan yang sedang beqalan cxan yang dermkian, Mahkamah mi max haleh camp-r fangan dangan numcaua HMS vs levsebm [341 Lebm-Isbm lagn, pida kank: Mahkamah ml manmsk Rayuan P\aInl\r-Plalnm (erssbul, Mahkamah Jug: man mengirshksn agar pih:k~pmak meneruskan dengan sambung mcara di Mahkamah Sesyen KEFIJTUSAN [351 Maka bevdasalkan alasarvalasan Iarsebul dw alas, Mahkamall mv memuluskan bahawa Plamm-P\amM gaaal unluk menuruukkan wupmnya kaaaamxeaaaan khns un|uk Sam Penmzh pengganmngan pmsldmg sawanjumya sehmgga Rayuan mereka kc Mahkamah Rayuan uuupusxan. _ IN ca/unnFMuquVq\n2wrA ‘Nate sum runny wm ... M a «My Due nH§\mH|V MW; mm. Vfl muws rum [la—1zAncvr:—n-n7/Ian] E [as] web Yang uemuxun, Rlyuin Flam mtnlak dengan kos asmrm. pads 11 Dnsember 2u23 dv Muar da\am Negen Juhov Daml Takzm u. sunu KUMAR nu PAUL Pesunmjaya Kehakxman Mahkamah Tmggi Mahya Muir Jahov Darul Ts‘1Im Muhammad msrm wamae Em Mohd Nasir Bag: p -k Rulpunden-Rupandan YuwlFsrhan Elm Kanm Paquamcm: 3:; E k Pang xu mu... chum, Jan & Auacmn Peguambeln flan Peguamcali Na 44—« Jalan am 2 Taman Eukrt menu Muhara 75150 Melaka IN ca/uDmFMuquVq\nzwrA _ ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vevly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ I1a.mua/wow/znz:1 E [Nu Ru .. CJA/ACO/MR/412119) Bngi pl :11 msgmmnnaa-ganuun Tlluan Vin Pannm Peguambela din Peguamoara No 1311, men 13. Black a Phllen Damansara 2‘ 15‘ Jalan is/1 ovualan Dzmznsarz 45350 Selanaor [lto.Ru sIPII13I1/2I111K(HS)] Tarlkh Ponaonqann 11 Dlsember 202: mm. Kaputuun n Dlsernber 2023 IN ca/uDmFMuquVq\nzwrA ‘NEVA sum ...m., M“ be mad p. vecly M nH§\nnH|Y M W. mm. VII mun: NM‘ Luz mucvca 1/zuzsl E [11 Mankamah man menmsk Rayuln mu dan sekarang membenkan alasavnalasan m sun [5] Plhak hak am aummk seblflal Plalnhf-P\amIN flan Duhndam Dsfendan flalim pengnakman ml LATAR EELAKANG KES [ll Tmdakan W nmnm ukmax salu kamalinnin Jalunviya vada 1412 zma .1. mm P\:Irml Penzma, sealang kanak-kanak yang menunggang mmumkal Na AFJ 1522 an KM 14, Jalan 59 Man — Eukrt Gamblr asngan mamrsnkal No. JCX 5414 mm Dafundan Kedua yang dmmggang aleh Decenusn Panama. man Plamm Panama Ielah menga\amr kecederaan Kemk akuhm kemalangan |eIsabul dan kin: |a|aII Vumpuh dan hsrlanlardan membawa |un|man melaml Plamm Kean; Ibunya m Sewzkhl vemicaraan kee P|ain|i1—P\amI\I, Defendambelendzn maliww pegusmcara him merek: man mamvaukan satu permahonan Imluk memanggn semma snkswsnksx Plamm—FlmnuI IaI|u Femandu Ambulans (SP1) dan Panuknng Pegawaw Perulxatan dari Kfimk Kssihflan Sungav Man‘ zspz) -mm menyual halas Ian.-n kaduadus saksl m\ [51 Pad: 132022‘ HMS YE |e|ah munbenalkzn pemmhonan caveman-uevunaan bevsebm. m Laruulan danpadz i|u, P|aAn|i1—P1am|\l man berpuasham dengan kspuhnsan HMS vs xamm din man mstayu ks Mallkamah mv IN ca/unnFMuquVq\n2wrA ‘Nate sum runny WW ... M » «My n.. nH§\mH|V MW; mm. Vfl muws NM! IW-m"M+"7/"“I % [31 Fed: 12:72 2023. Mahkamah mi |e|ah menulak Rayuan Pla\mfl— Phirml (ersehul flan lelah mengsrlhkan agav perbkzaraan m Mahkamah Sesyen dnemskan [91 P\smM manm max bamuashah an m ssdang merzyu ke Mahkamah Rnyuan (emaflap Kevulussn Mahksmah W Oersabul [101 Sememari IVIM P<=unm=Ia.nnn man memahnn zgav pmsiding a. Mahkamah Sesyen wganmng sehmgga Rayuzn mereka ke Mahkamah Rayuan dllupuskan [11] Mahkamah Sesyen man menulak pennonanan Plamn1«Plnm(il lersebul dsn wm sdalah Rayuan (emadap ksuumsan luriubm ANALISA DAN DAPAYAH MAHKAMAN Isu punnulain [121 Fada pendaval Mankaman, Dmsadur yang sanamsnya diwkmx oleh PIzunlW~Plam(Il edalah umuk memohon ks Mahkamah Tmggv dan hukannya ke Mahksmah Sesyen unluk salu Penman panggznnmgan samngga Rayuan ke Mahkamnh Rayuan dnluvuskan (111 lni aaaxan kerzna Penman yang drrnyul nleh Pmnlwf-Plaxnlxf Ice Mahkamah Rayuan ada\ah (erhzdap kupuluszn Mahkamah Tmggl yang wan mengakalxan kepulusan Mahkamah Sssyen dan imipali pemmnanan unluk mengganlung pmshdmg Im aaaxan Immk ynng Iehah mengganlung pelzksanaan kepumszn Mahkamah mengekalkan kepmussn Mahkamah Sesyen yn ca/unnmuquvqwnzwrn ‘Nate sum runny wm ... U544 u. «my n.. mm» MW; mm. Vfl grwuus NM‘ Us zmcv: 7/may E [I41 Menurul saxsysn 73 Am Mahksmah Kshakrman mo » ‘An Iwasal shall not upstate as a slay of exscuhon 0: ol mocaadmas under me dsclsron appeamd Imm umass the gem! new or me Cou/1 ol 42%: so order: and no mlelmedmte uclurpmceeding slmllbs rnva/rdntsd amp: so Isrls the Court omppea/ may drrsct‘ [15] Marvakala m9nmu!Ka9\1ah 13 Kauai»-Kaednh Mshkaman Rayuan 1994 — “ 13 5:51 olgficnmg on aggm An appeal shall nolupelsts aa a my e/axacunan arof pvocssdings under me decision appealed [mm unless the mgn com or me Cour! so order: and no mfelmedrats act or pmceedilvg ma/I be invalidated excapm: /alas me Court may direct‘ us) Akmr sekali menurul Kaeaen 14 Kaedan—K5edah Mankamah Rayuan1994.- 14. mzmum mm my be mgde snhsr m Hg)! com or Cmmal A/Iobem :7 M Exes»! as omerw/ss pmvlded by any wnflsn Iaw, whenever appncamn may be mas either to me Htgh comma me com, nsnen be made m ma Itrxnnstsnce to the man Court ' IN ca/unnrMu.uvq\n2wrA W. sum ...m.., M“ e. wed Ix: my me angmuly Wm nnumeul VI arwuus rmm um.m..mm. E [111 Bernandukan kevada Derunlukkan-perunmkkan m. Mzhkamzh herpendapal Mahkamah Sesyen ma kuisa unmx memennunkan agar pmswdmg digarmmgkan sehingga Rayuan Pwamuwlaimn ke Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap kapulusan Mahkamah Tmggl uuunusxan m1 Tamhzhan pula, Mzhkamah mendapafi PIainm—P\ainM gags! Immk mengemukakan ghdwg da\am Rskud Rayuan subagaimanz menuvul Amran 55 Kaedsn 513) (Is) KKM 2012 m1 Walaupun Pembe\aan mane» dilmal dalnm Ahdawt Sokongan Plmrmf-F'|amM dilam Rskad Riyuan‘ namun wm din Pemyalaan runman langsung hunk mkemuxakan no: men yang uenman, Rayuan Plz\n(if—P\a|n|fl mi baleh ditmak di alas alasamalasan mu anal: Samzda Paarmiu-Iaimirbunak umuk mu puinhll ponygannmqan prorldlny. [211 Delendalrbeiendan memhznlah permuhanan im dun barman behawa PIain|W—P|aimil periu manunjukkzn wmudnya “ram and compellm circumstances’ umuk mampemlsm sam Fsvlmah pengganxungan pmslding sehmgga Rayuan meleka ke Mar-kaman Rayuan dilupuskan. {:1} Dalam membuat muanan ml, Dekmdan-Detandan bemamung kepada olnrin Mahksmah Rayuan aaram kes Pmlssm End v Tey Par Yie 5. Another Appeal [2012] 5 cu 299 m mana Mahkamzh Rayuan memuluskan sepem benkur. IN ca/unnruuauvqwnzwrn ‘Nate sum ...m., wm ... M Ix; «My Due nH§\mH|V MW; mm. Vfl muws NM! us znncvc M7/2:213! E “(:21 We have covmdsrvd lhs sulhomies mmmea ny mm peruas The law in rerenon ro zrra usue of staymg prncoedmys Igamsl nenpanree pending Mbmuhon rs rrer rn substance -1/Ifsmm‘ n ma cornmonweanr. [ufisdicflans However, we threshold to be apalkyd m rarenon In ma rigm olnarrpsltles to proceed wvlh Iherr actrons noernznsunarng amllratuhn egreernenzs, does vary. [:3] /n ma United Kingdom, the mrasnord mar mas to be reached to warrant the gram of e slay ofproceedmg: egarns: non-pamss pendmg irtmllran, was eensmered by Lord arngrrarn nl comnm cm In Rmchhold Norway ASA and Anomer v Goldman Seem lnlemalronal (2000) 2AI/ ER 579 ('RsrchhnId Norway 7 me: standard was stated m be (a) /nvokadin ~rara and mmpelhng cimumstuncss'.' (:1) Them ougm to he very strong reason: rorgrermng such a slay, (c) ‘I7-vs oenms //Ksly to result rmrn grannng such a stay of pmcaedmg: mus! oreerry ourwargr. any dvsacfl/alvlags 10 me nonparry [:41 (See also Mabey and Johnson v. Dams and carers (mm All ER (D) 177, where rne English Hrgn Court Islussd a my agamsl a non-parry to ma smrtrution rnere me allegation: were hand Md eonsprreoy which IN ca/unnrMuauvq\n2wrA -rm. sum number wm e. wed n my me ongmuly Wm nnumgul vn erxuws rmm us zimtvc av/zml Z [-751 I16) new a pammg Issemblsmte to me mszam apps-I/S Them the court highlighted me Importance or hearrrvg the "human wmrasses'in a public [Drum m rvlalmn la the allegsbaru ol oonuwacy and ma. Anolher my factor that Influenced Inemdgs was (M! the non-parry mkmg the stay appealed m be taking savamsgs or the my gram: 2» me srbflrzlrng panics to suggest am he Wm./Id be uni-my Msmd/cad. The com rajecfsd nus eantanlvhn /n ma course ofaxolmmg /Is dnclshon me /eamedjudgs mm the! me /am aaanoc fall wmmn ms ‘mm and campefiing circumstances“ envisaged rn Rwcllhold Amway) ms lflrashohi of ‘rare and compelling mun-muses‘ was awed by Komamy Supwah JC in the case :7! Jacob and ram» Caruumng Sdn and 5 Or: v. s»sm-ms Vnduslry samm. emrm 3 Ca And Or: [2013] 1 ms 914 whats It was new mams tssflo be uh/nssdwaslml that o spew umumszsncss“ nur rather the an and compelling cflcurvlslunces“ lest anunmered m Retchnold Norway The teamed judge rsawned mar n was cormstsnl wnn a runaamemsr ru/5 mm plamhffwas not only entrrted out rammed to Wuascuts ms crmm my mum expedfltous/y and pmceed mm Ins! On appeal, mu court ma not drssglss mm ms tssl app/fad bythe H»gh Court“ [:3] Manama Hamnl-Plamlrl Dula mrmuan bahawa panggamungan pmsmmg semenlara menunggu Rayuan ke Mankamah Rayuin IN ca/unnFMu.uvq\n2wrA W. sum ...m.., M“ .. wed » mm m. nngmuly MW; mm. VI muus NM! U*‘Z*~"=-W07/Inliwfl Idalah waJar din hams dmenarkan kerana wuwdnya headlan- keadaan khns dengan belganlung Kspwa omummriu Mzhkamah finggw wailu Maer Technology Sam and v Premlumtel Sdn sn.112019} MLJU 1999 dan Ksrsmn Malaysia v Esq'aya Times Square Sdn Bhd 120131 ML./LI 675 [241 Manurul P1zmM—FkainIi1‘ wwud keadaan-keadaan khas da\am parmohonin msieka W ksrina sekzranya pemanggllan semms snkmaku SP1 aan SP2 unmk dnsaal balas Ianjut hdak asgannmg, flan perhiczvaan dneruskan sanemm Riyuan kc Mahkamah Rayuan dipumskan, maka Rnyuan Plamm-F\aIrmf new man meruadv ma-ma rnugazoz/) sihaja. [25] Mahkamah mendapzm prlnswp undang-undsng ‘rare and camoeumg circumstances‘ ssbagawmana yang dlpuluskan clah Mahkamah Rayuan aaram ks: Pmmco BM (supra) darn dlhnqzhkan oleh Defandan—Defendan terpnkai kepuda satu pengganlungan plvtidxng lerhzdap “mm—pam'es pending arhrtrabon“ can bukinnyi kepads kes-xas pmelcflng mu biasa an|arz prhalepwhak kepadi pmslding |ersehu( [25] Mahkamah man menganzflsa ntnrifimnmw bevkenaun pnnslp undang-undang pangganumgan pmsmng semngga satu Rayuan dflupuskan dan menaapan kaporiuan unluk manuruukkan wuwdnya keadaankczdaan khas adahah ujlan yang maslh larpakaw [211 Mahxamah Rayuan hsvwbam Im dalam kes Nwman or Tali!) A 073 V Mohd Nastr am Hasselv A on 120231 MLJU 2557 man pumskan sessonng pemohan perm memhuknkan wuwdnya kewaam keadann 511: Ma mjuk kepafl: ks: Mahkamah Ylnggv Nansen IN ca/unnFMuquVq\n2wrA — ‘Nate sum ...m.., WW ... uud » «My n.. nH§\mH|V MW; ....m. _ muus W nmuncvc -a1/1.021] I Qusny Pmducls Sdn Blvd s on cnong soon Hang 5. Or: (2472:) ML./U 5917 can AMBIHK (M) and v Metal Reclsmalran [Industries] Sun and 5 Or: /2015} 10 cm 205 yang dipumskzn o\eh Wang Klan Khenng .1 (pad; kelxka nu) [23] Da\am dapatan Mahkamah‘ kepmusln Mihkamnh Sesyen unmk memanggm semulil saks\—saks\ SP1 dan SP2 unmk dam‘ balas blunt Lfleh D2f2ndan—DufundalI manurut palakiinaan ("exemsfi budwbwcala hzkim bi-2r: (‘Mi//0499') dillm presiding perblcanan yzng sedang benalan hukimah saw keadain-keadaan khas [:91 lni adahah kerzna apa yang naming adalih unmk aayamana Mama! mendzkwa Aunmxannya secara ‘9xpsdIIw.3u:7y'dengan menemskan pevblcaraln taupe kelengahsn dew xsaauan Merit>mIriI Rayuln [so] P\aInlW-Plalnm jug: se\an‘u|nya hermuah bernenzan menhmam rayuan mevekz Menurul P\anrmf»FlainM, pemlahonan Defendan- Defendan un|uK mernanggu sen-ma uks»-smn PlmnM—Plz|inli1udnk wmsrdlbenalkan clan HMS YB [:11 Memmfl P\ainlW—P|ainn1, nn adalah kemna had: kepefluan unluk mumanggll ssmula saw Pemanflu Amhulnns (SP1) dan Pennkmg Pagawat Pemhnvan dari Klimk Kesihalan Sungai Mali (SP2) memandangkan mareka |a|ah pun membenkan kamevangan sepenuhnya pad: an 11 2021 flan mm nevenaan-uevanaan wga pang xem nu amkm oleh bekas peguamnam mereka IN ca/unnrMuuuvqm2nPrA wane sum rutnhu wm ... M n my ... nngwnnuly wm flnumeul VI mung my

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-22NCC-3-01/2021

PLAINTIF Mulpha Ventures Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Mula Holdings Sdn Bhd 2. ) Bestari Sepang Sdn Bhd 3. ) Spanstead Sdn Bhd 4. ) Seri Ehsan (Sepang) Sdn Bhd

Moneylenders – Moneylending transactions – Effect of non-compliance with Moneylenders Act 1951 – Whether unenforceable, void and/or illegal.Contract – Of unenforceable, void and illegal contracts – Restitution under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950.Remedies – Restitution – Money had and received – Unjust enrichment.Limitation – Whether applicable to void contracts – Acknowledgment and fresh accrual of action

24/01/2024

YA Dr Choong Yeow Choy

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2a011e7e-0007-4a7f-8055-b49aaeeafc4b&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. BA-22NCC-3-01/2021 ANTARA MULPHA VENTURES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 123405-V) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. MULA HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 464989-X) 2. BESTARI SEPANG SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 18588-D) 3. SPANSTEAD SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 383742-D) 4. SERI EHSAN (SEPANG) SDN. BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT: 270424-A) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN 24/01/2024 15:07:46 BA-22NCC-3-01/2021 Kand. 110 S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 JUDGMENT Introduction [1] “Never lend books, for no one ever returns them; the only books I have in my library are books that other folks have lent me.” Does this apply to money lent? After all, as observed by one economist, “all loans, in the eyes of honest borrowers, must eventually be repaid”. [2] In a matter that involves a moneylending transaction, as in the present case, the law that governs moneylending dealings are well established. These precepts have repeatedly been invoked and applied by the courts. Nevertheless, the matter before this Court requires it to once again examine one of the principles relating to moneylending transactions by a licensed moneylender and a number of related legal issues. [3] The Plaintiff’s principal claim against the Defendants is predicated on 3 Loan Agreements pursuant to which the Plaintiff had lent the Second Defendant a total sum of RM41,191,801.20 (“Loans”). The Plaintiff is also seeking to recover from the Defendants charges incurred for and on account of the Fourth Defendant comprising the overdue and outstanding quit rent and assessments in respect of the land belonging to the Fourth Defendant amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus accrued interest (“Outgoings”). [4] This matter was filed as a Writ action. However, the parties reached an agreement that it be decided pursuant to Order 14A of the Rules of Court 2012 on the following Questions of Law: S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 1. Whether the Loan Agreements are void and unenforceable due to a breach of s 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. 1.1. If yes, then whether the Loans and/or Outgoings are recoverable by virtue of: (a) money had and received to the use of the Plaintiff; and/or (b) s 66 of the Contracts Act 1950; and/or (c) unjust enrichment. 1.2. If no, then whether the Loans and/or Outgoings are recoverable for a breach of the Loan Agreements, Security Documents and the Restructuring Documents collectively known as ‘the Documents’. 2. Whether the Defendants are barred by res judicata (in the wider sense) and/or by judicial admission from challenging the validity of the Loan Agreements based on the pleadings, evidence given and affidavits filed in the Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit No. 22NCvC57-01/2015 (‘Shah Alam Suit’), and Shah Alam High Court Originating Summons No. BA- 243NCvC-1001-09/2020 (‘OS Proceedings’). 3. Whether the Plaintiff is debarred by limitation from pursuing recovery of the Loans and/or Outgoings. In this regard: 3.1. Whether limitation applies if the Loan Agreements are held to be illegal, void and/or unenforceable. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 3.2. Whether the Defendants acknowledged that the Loans are due and owing in the Shah Alam Suit and/or OS Proceedings thereby resulting in a fresh accrual of the Plaintiff’s claim on the respective dates of acknowledgment by the Defendants and consequently extending the period by which limitation sets in on the Plaintiff’s claim for recovery of the Loans and/or Outgoings. The Core Issues [5] The first of three principal issues to be resolved is whether the Loan Agreements are void and unenforceable due to a breach of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951? [6] In the event that the answer to the above issue is in the affirmative, the next key question for consideration is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to its alternative claims for (i) Restitution under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950; and/or (ii) Restitution for Money Had and Received and/or Unjust Enrichment? [7] If this Court were to conclude that the Plaintiff is entitled to pursue its alternative claims, the third major issue relating to the defence of limitation becomes relevant. The Parties and Their Contentions [8] The Plaintiff, Mulpha Ventures Sdn Bhd, is a company and a licensed moneylender under the Moneylenders Act 1951. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [9] The First Defendant, Mula Holding Sdn Bhd, is the Ultimate Holding Company of the Second, the Third and the Fourth Defendants, namely, Bestari Sepang Sdn Bhd, Spanstead Sdn Bhd and Seri Ehsan (Sepang) Sdn Bhd respectively. The Defendants are part of a Group of Companies. [10] The loans were disbursed to the Second Defendant. The First, the Third and the Fourth Defendants are the security parties to these moneylending transactions. Validity and Enforceability of the Loan Agreements [11] On the issue of whether the Loan Agreements are valid and enforceable, the Defendants in this suit have raised the defence that these moneylending transactions are illegal on the ground that they violate section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 and consequently the agreements are unenforceable and/or void. [12] Section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 provides as follows: Moneylending agreement to be given to the borrower 16. (1) No moneylending agreement shall be enforceable unless the agreement has been signed by all the parties to the agreement and a copy of the agreement duly stamped is delivered to the borrower by the licensee before the money is lent. (2) A licensee who executes a moneylending agreement which does not comply with this section shall be guilty of an offence under this Act and shall be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to both. [13] The Defendants also referred to section 2(g) of the Contracts Act 1950 (interpretation section) which states that “an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void”. [14] It is not disputed that the loan sums pursuant to the 3 agreements were released to the Second Defendant before the agreements were stamped. As a matter of fact, and as noted below, one of these Loan Agreements remains unstamped. The dates in which the pertinent event had taken place re the 3 Loan Agreements are as follows: 1st Moneylending Agreement Details Date 1. Moneylending Agreement 10.9.2013 2. Agreement signed 10.9.2013 3. Loan amount 3,500,000.00 4. Loan released/disbursed 10.9.2013 5. Moneylending Agreement stamped 18.9.2013 6. Date of delivery of the duly stamped copy of the Moneylending Agreement to Defendants 24.9.2013 2nd Moneylending Agreement Details Date S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 1. Moneylending Agreement 25.3.2014 2. Agreement signed 25.3.2014 3. Loan amount 34,700,000.00 4. Loan released/disbursed 25.3.2014 5. Moneylending Agreement stamped 28.3.2014 6. Date of delivery of the duly stamped copy of the Moneylending Agreement to Defendants 2.4.2014 3rd Moneylending Agreement Details Date 1. Moneylending Agreement 13.6.2014 2. Agreement signed 13.6.2014 3. Loan amount 3,000,000.00 4. Loan released/disbursed April 2014 5. Moneylending Agreement was stamped Unstamped 6. Date of delivery of the copy of the Moneylending Agreement to Defendants 24.8.2014 [15] In other words, the above point to a clear violation of the express requirements mandated in section 16(1) of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [16] The Defendants argued that this section does not call for any rule of interpretation as it is crystal clear. [17] In addition, the Defendants further submitted that as a result of the contravention of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the 3 impugned Loan Agreements are rendered illegal and that this Court should not lend any assistance to the Plaintiff to enforce an illegal contract as there are S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 no exceptions provided for any violation of Section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [18] As section 2(h) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that an agreement enforceable by law is a contract, the Defendants reasoned and submitted that “an agreement unenforceable in law is not a contract”. [19] The Defendants also relied on Golden Wheel Credit Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Siah Teong Din (No 2) [2023] AMEJ 0798; [2023] 6 CLJ 438; [2023] 11 MLJ 647; [2023] MLRHU 661 (“Golden Wheel Credit No 2) to support their argument that the Loan Agreements in this instant case ought to be declared as void and/or unenforceable. [20] On the decision of the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42, the Defendant urged this Court take cognizance of section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 and to draw a distinction between a statutory illegality, which they submit as forming the root of the present case, as opposed to common law illegality, as was the substance before the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza. In other words, for purposes of the present matter, the Defendants is urging this Court to disregard Patel v Mirza. [21] In response, the crux of the Plaintiff’s arguments is that a transgression of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 merely renders a moneylending agreement as void and unenforceable but not illegal nor prohibited. [22] This Court was also referred to section 17A of the Interpretations Acts 1948 and 1967 which requires one to construe a provision of an Act in a manner “that would promote the purpose and object underlying the S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Act”. In this regard, this Court was urged to take judicial notice of the purpose and object of the Moneylenders Act 1951, which as spelt out in its preamble is “for the regulation and control of the business of moneylending, the protection of borrowers of the monies lent in the course of such business, and matters connected therewith”. [23] The Plaintiff reasoned that “the underlying purpose (object) or mischief sought to be addressed by section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 is the protection of the borrower by ensuring that he is in possession of the terms of his contract of repayment prior to the loan being disbursed and received”. Whereas section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 “calls for the attestation of the moneylending agreement with the attestor explaining the terms of the moneylending agreement to the borrower and certifying the borrowers understanding of it”. Hence, according to the Plaintiff, when section 16 is read together with section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, one will see that the “underlying purpose (object)/mischief is not violated in this case”. [24] The Plaintiff repeatedly alluded to the fact that the Defendants, being “sophisticated entities who were always legally represented”, were not prejudiced by the alleged non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. [25] In addition to the above submissions, it was also contended by the Plaintiff that even if the section 16 defence applies, it only affects the Loan Agreements, that is, claim for the sum of RM41,191,801.20. According to the Plaintiff, this section 16 defence has no bearing on its claim for the charges incurred for and on account of the Fourth Defendant comprising the overdue and outstanding quit rent and assessments in respect of the S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 land belonging to the Fourth Defendant amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus accrued interest. Judicial Estoppel and Res Judicata [26] The Plaintiff alluded to two previous Suits involving the same parties and contended that since the Defendants had “treated the Loans as valid and regular in the Shah Alam Suit and the OS Proceedings, the Mula Parties are estopped and barred by res judicata from now asserting that the Loans are void and unenforceable – which is a diametrically opposite and mutually exclusive position from that taken previously by the Mula Parties”. The point raised by the Plaintiff is that the Defendants “could have raised the alleged non-compliance of s 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 in the previous proceedings but they failed to do so” and instead “elected to treat the Loan Agreements as valid and regular”. [27] On this ground, the Plaintiff relied on Leisure Farm Corp Sdn Bhd v Kabushiki Kaisha Ngu (formerly known as Dai-Ichi Shokai) & Ors [2017] 5 MLJ 63 (FC) at para [16]; [2017] CLJU 499, Syarikat Rodziah v Malayan Banking Bhd [2021] 5 CLJ 170 (CA) at paras [45] to [49]; [2021] AMEJ 0133; [2021] MLJU 166; [2021] 3 MLRA 556, Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti [1995] 3 CLJ 783 (SC) at 791 F-G, 792 A-B, 793 E-I; [1995] 3 AMR 2559; [1995] 3 MLJ 189; [1995] 1 MLRA 611 and Lin Wen-Chih v Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd [2023] 6 AMR 561; [2023] 8 CLJ 671; [2023] 6 MLRA 1 (FC). [28] In reply, the Defendants pointed out that the provisions of law raised in the previous suits were sections 67 and section 132(g) of the Companies Act 1965 and that the issue of section 16 of the Moneylenders S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Act 1951 was never raised and considered. Hence, there was no final determination by the Shah Alam High Court on the validity of the 3 moneylending agreements mentioned herein. Alternative Claims [29] In the event that the Defendants are successful in invoking section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 with the Loan Agreements declared as void and unenforceable, the Plaintiff has proffered the following alternative claims, namely: (a) Restitution under s 66 of the Contracts Act 1950; and (b) Money had and received and unjust enrichment under common law. [30] In advancing its argument that it is entitled in law to the above alternative claims, the Plaintiff underscored the following points, that is, (i) the Loan Agreements were not prohibited moneylending agreements; (ii) there is no statutory prohibition for the granting of the loans as the purpose of the loan was not made with the object to commit an illegal act; and (iii) since there is neither statutory nor common law illegality about these loans, none of the limbs in section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950 is engaged. [31] The position that the Plaintiff has adopted is that even though the Loan Agreements were unenforceable under the Moneylenders Act 1951, its recovery of the money lent is not confined to the said Act. In other words, the Plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to recover the loan under “any S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 other principle of law”. Indeed, Mary Lim J (as she then was) had made the above observation in Orix Credit Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Choong Keong Kor [2011] 1 LNS 111 at paras [25]-27]; [2011] 2 AMCR 110; [2011] MLJU 182; [2011] 2 MLRH 891 (“Orix Credit Malaysia”). Restitution under Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 [32] Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 reads as follows: 66. Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under the agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from who he received it” [33] It is the Plaintiff’s contention that since the Loan Agreements are not agreements that are void ab initio, section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 applies to the present case. Based on this provision and the Federal Court case of Tan Chee Hoe & Sons Sdn Bhd v Code Focus Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 AMR 9; [2014] 3 CLJ 141; [2014] 3 MLJ 301; [2014] 4 MLRA 11, the Plaintiff submitted that it must succeed in its alternative claim for restitution premised on section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. [34] In reply to the above submissions, the Defendants asserted instead that as a result of the contravention of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the 3 moneylending agreements are thus illegal. The Defendants further submitted that this Court should not lend any assistance to the Plaintiff to enforce an illegal contract and that there are no exceptions S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 provided for any violation of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951. The defendants then argued that since section 2(h) of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that “an agreement enforceable by law is a contract”, an agreement unenforceable in law is not a contract. [35] It is noteworthy that the Defendants made reference to Golden Wheel Credit (No. 2) and Mahmood bin Ooyub v Li Chee Loong & Other Appeals [2020] 1 LNS 660; [2020] 6 MLJ 755; [2021] 1 MLRA 609 (“Mahmood bin Ooyub”). In the latter case, it was pointed out by the Defendants that the Court of Appeal had made further reference to section 24 of the Contracts Act 1950, which outlines “what considerations and objects are lawful, and what not”, with “an agreement which is forbidden in law” as falling under the latter category. Money had and received and unjust enrichment [36] The elements for a claim of money had and received are: 1. that the defendant must have been enriched by the receipt of a benefit; 2. that the benefit must have been obtained at the plaintiff’s expense; and 3. that it would be unjust to allow the defendant to retain that benefit. [See Golf & Jones – The Law of Restitution] and those for unjust enrichment are: 1. that the respondent was enriched by receiving a benefit; 2. that the benefit received was at the appellant’s expense; and S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 3. that the retention of the benefit by the respondent was unjust. [See Air Express International (M) Sdn Bhd v MISC Agencies Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 59] [37] The Plaintiff referred this Court to the Federal Court case of Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 AMR 601; [2015] 2 CLJ 453; [2015] 2 MLJ 441; [2015] 2 MLRA 247 which elucidated the nature and concept of restitutionary remedies and the United Kingdom Supreme Court case of Patel v Mirza concerning the “trio of considerations” when dealing with the illegality doctrine. [38] According to the Plaintiff, based on the facts in this case, all the elements for a claim in money had and received, and unjust enrichment are clearly met and fulfilled. Hence, the Plaintiff argued that it must succeed also in its alternative claim for restitution premised on money had and received and unjust enrichment for the sums claimed. Limitation [39] Another defence raised by the Defendants is that the Plaintiff’s claims are statute barred by section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. The basis of this limitation defence is that the Plaintiff’s cause of action would have arisen in the year 2013, when the monies were disbursed under the agreements. [40] The Defendants placed reliance on AmBank (M) Bhd v Abdul Aziz bin Hassan & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 553; [2010] 3 MLJ 784; [2009] 4 MLRA 458 and Thameez Nisha Hasseem (as the administrator of the estate of Bee Fathima @ dll, deceased) v Maybank Allied Bank Bhd [2023] 5 AMR S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 581; [2023] 5 CLJ 874; [2023] 4 MLJ 145; [2023] 4 MLRA 492 in support of their limitation defence. [41] Predictably, the Plaintiff argued otherwise, contending that the claim and/or the alternative claims to recover the loans were filed within the statutory limitation period. The Plaintiff put forward two principal reasons. [42] The first reason relates to the terms in the Loan Agreements. The Plaintiff pointed out that all the 3 Loan Agreements contain the following “Right of action”, clauses, that is: Right of action 5. (1) If the Borrower – (a) fails to repay any sum of instalment payable or any part thereof and any interest payable specified in Section 5 of the First Schedule for any period in excess of twenty-eight days after its due date; or (b) commits an act of bankruptcy or enters into any composition or arrangement with his creditors or, being a company, enters into liquidation, whether compulsory or voluntary, the Lender may terminate this Agreement. (2) Upon the occurrence of any of the events specified in subclause (1) herein, the Lender shall give the Borrower not less than fourteen days a written notice to treat this Agreement as having been repudiated by the Borrower and unless in the meanwhile such default alleged is rectified or such unpaid sum of instalment and S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 interest are paid, this Agreement shall at the expiry of the said notice, at the option of the Lender be deemed to be annulled. (3) In the event this Agreement has been terminated or annulled, the Lender may claim the balance outstanding from the Borrower in accordance with the provisions under Order 45 of the Subordinate Court Rules 1990 [P.U. (A) 97/1990] in case the balance outstanding does not exceed two hundred and fifty thousand ringgit or Order 79 of the Rutes of the High Court 1980 [P.U. (A) 50/1980] in case the balance outstanding is higher than two hundred and fifty thousand ringgit. [43] The Plaintiff alluded to the fact that a demand for the principal sum of RM41,191,801.20 was made on 21 January, 2015 and a 7-day period for payment of it to be made was given. The 7-day period expired on 28 January, 2015. The Second Defendant was given a notice on 27 February, 2015 to rectify the default or pay the sum demanded within 14 days of 27 February, 2015, failing which the Loan Agreements will be terminated at the expiry of the said 14 days. As the 14-day period had passed without any rectification of the default or payment, the Loan Agreements terminated at the end of it, that is, on 14 March, 2015. This date, according to the Plaintiff, is the date on which date the cause of action to sue arose. That being the case, limitation would only set in on 13 March, 2021. Since the action was filed on 8 January, 2021, the action is not time barred. [44] As for the alternative claims, as these were added by way of amendment on 3 March, 2021. The application of the doctrine of relation back meant that these alternative claims are deemed to have been commenced on 8 January 2021, the date the writ was issued. In any S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 event, these alternative claims were added even before limitation had set in on 13 March, 2021. [45] The second ground relied by the Plaintiff to challenge the limitation defence is premised on a proposition enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Khatijah bt Abdullah & Ors v Mohd Isa bin Biran [2017] 2 AMR (refd); [2017] 7 CLJ 513; [2017] 2 MLJ 1; [2017] 2 MLRA 509. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: [31] We agree with the appellants that the SPA had become void and s 33 of the Contracts Act 1950 applies. A void contract does not generate any enforceable right or duty. Where there is neither right nor duty, limitation cannot be invoked (see Hubah Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Pusaka (Penampang) Bhd & Ors. The defence of limitation is thus not available to the respondent. [46] Last but not least, the Plaintiff also raised the provisions in sections 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act 1953 in support of its assertion that its claims are not time barred under the Limitation Act 1953. This line of argument is raised in the event that this Court finds that the cause of action had arisen more than six years before the writ was issued. [47] The Plaintiff highlighted the following facts as amounting to an acknowledgment of debts and thereby giving rise to a fresh accrual of action, that is, (i) when the Defendants filed the Amended Defence & Counterclaim in the Shah Alam Suit on 17 August, 2015; and (ii) more recently on 21 September, 2020 when they filed the Originating Summons Proceedings to repay the debts and to redeem the land/securities; and (iii) when the Defendants through their principal and primary director S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 acknowledged and admitted in the Shah Alam Suit the sums advanced by the Plaintiff towards the Outgoings Incurred, and that it was a continuing loss that the Plaintiff had to incur. Hence, it is the Plaintiff’s contention that the right of action to recover the Loans and Outgoings Incurred shall be deemed to have accrued on 17 August, 2015 or 21 September, 2020, rendering the claim and/or the alternative claims to recover the loans as not time-barred. [48] This acknowledgement and henceforth fresh accrual of action argument was met with the counter argument by the Defendants that there was an absence of an unequivocal admission of any precise amount owed by the Defendants. [49] In rejecting this acknowledgment ground as raised by the Plaintiff, the Defendants relied on the provisions in sections 26(2) and 27 of the Limitation Act 1953, the Federal case of Wee Tiang Teng v Ong Chong Hooi & Anor [1978] 1 LNS 234; [1978] 2 MLJ 54; [1978] 1 MLRA 366 on what constitutes as a sufficient acknowledgment and the Court of Appeal decision of Lay Hong Food Corp Sdn Bhd (previously known as Lay Hong Poultry Processing Sdn Bhd) v Tiong Nam Logistics Solutions Sdn Bhd [2017] 10 CLJ 680; [2018] 2 MLJ 66 that had explained that an acknowledgement must be unequivocal. The Decision of this Court [50] On the first principal issue of whether there has been a breach or non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the answer is undoubtedly in the affirmative. The strict and express requirement in the said provision mandates that the Loan Agreements are S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 to be stamped and delivered to the borrower before the loans are disbursed. This explicit pre-requisite has been flouted by the Plaintiff lender. [51] Crucially, the legal effect of such non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 must be determined. In this regard, references may be made to section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 itself and section 2(g) of the Contracts Act 1950. [52] Section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 unmistakeably declares any such moneylending agreement as unenforceable and by virtue of section 2(g) of the Contracts Act 1950, “an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void”. [53] This Court is of the considered view that the argument by the Plaintiff to the effect that the Defendants are “sophisticated entities” and were at all times “legally represented” and thus were not prejudiced by the alleged non-compliance with section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not hold water. The same can also be said of the Plaintiff. It too must be a sophisticated entity and not wanting in legal representation. [54] This Court has also considered the contention by the Plaintiff that in construing section 16 of the Moneylending Act 1951, it should be carried out in a manner that would promote the purpose and object underlying the said Act and when section 16 is read together with section 27 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, one will see that the underlying purpose or mischief is not violated in this case. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [55] However, in light of the clear contravention of an express and explicit requirement laid down in the Moneylenders Act 1951 and the obvious resulting legal consequence, the 3 Loans Agreements in this present case are unenforceable and void. [56] Be that as it may, while the breach of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951 has adversely affected the Loan Agreements, this section 16 defence has no bearing on the Plaintiff’s claim for the charges incurred for and on account of the Fourth Defendant comprising the overdue and outstanding quit rent and assessments in respect of the land belonging to the Fourth Defendant amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus accrued interest, that is, the outgoings incurred. [57] As for the Judicial Estoppel and Res Judicata ground raised by the Plaintiff, this Court has carefully considered the authorities cited by the Plaintiff against the background of this case. Unfortunately, it is unable to agree with the Plaintiff that Judicial Estoppel or the concept of Res Judicata, even in the wider sense, applies in the instant case. [58] This brings us to the Plaintiff’s alternative claims. As noted in paragraphs [29] – [31] above, the crux of the Plaintiff’s contention is that it is entitled to seek Restitution under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 and for money had and received and unjust enrichment under common law. [59] As this Court is in total agreement with the High Court in Orix Credit Malaysia Sdn Bhd that a Plaintiff is not confined to invoking the Moneylenders Act 1951 when seeking to recover a loan but may resort to S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 “any other principle of law”, it is apposite that the provision in section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 be examined detail. [60] The Defendants have adopted the position that as a result of the contravention of section 16 of the Moneylenders Act 1951, the 3 moneylending agreements are illegal. [61] Section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 deals with situations “when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void”. There is no mention of illegality. [62] The authorities cited by the Defendants, namely, Golden Wheel (No 2) and Mahmood bin Ooyub did refer to section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. Nevertheless, this Court observes that in these cases, there were elements of illegality in the moneylending transactions. [63] In Mahmood bin Ooyub, the Court of Appeal held that the sale and purchase agreements were a sham, to disguise illegal moneylending transactions to circumvent the strict provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951. Two of the lenders were also unlicensed moneylenders. [64] Likewise, in Golden Wheel (No 2), one of the material provisions of the Moneylenders Act 1951 that the plaintiff had contravened was section 17 which stipulated that the interest for a secured loan shall not exceed 12% per annum. As observed by the High Court in that case, the contravention of this provision was a serious matter. More importantly, there was wrongful deduction and retention of the loan sums, conduct expressly prohibited and, as once again noted by the High Court, “a feature most commonly found in illegal moneylending by loan sharks or S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 'Along'”. These were in addition to the failure to provide stamped copies of the moneylending agreements and the statements of accounts. These factors clearly distinguish Golden Wheel (No 2) from the present case. [65] Unlike the above cases cited and relied on by the Defendants, there is no such element of illegality in the present case. [66] Admittedly, the 3 Loan Agreements are not agreements that were discovered to be void. However, they are contracts that subsequently became void. The events that rendered the contracts as subsequently becoming void was the release of the monies before the agreement were stamped and delivered. When the first Loan Agreement was signed on 10 September, 2013, it was a valid agreement. Similarly, when the second Loan Agreement was signed on 25 March, 2014, it was a valid agreement. The same can be said of the third Loan Agreement, when it was signed on 13 June, 2014. There was no evidence before this Court to suggest that these agreements are tainted by elements of illegality. [67] The upshot to this is that the Plaintiff may avail itself the provision in section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950. [68] In the event that this Court is incorrect in invoking section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950, it is also of the considered view that the Plaintiff may rely on the doctrine of money had and received and/or unjust enrichment. [69] The elements for these restitutionary remedies as outlined paragraph [36] are present in the instant case. S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [70] As it is this Court’s findings that the issue of illegality does not arise in the present case, there is no necessity to deliberate on Patel v Mirza’s trio of consideration to the present case. [71] This Court is also aware of the recent decision in Triple Zest Trading & Supplies & Ors v Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 8 AMR 225; [2023] 10 CLJ 187; [2023] 6 MLJ 818; [2023] 1 MLRA 144 where the Federal Court had disallowed the return of the principal loan sum, which the Court of Appeal had ordered the borrowers to pay back to the lender. Suffice to say that this decision of the Federal Court is distinguishable from the present case and the principle enunciated therein is not applicable to the instant case. [72] On the issue of limitation, this Court finds that the requirement for a valid acknowledgement has not been made out by the Plaintiff. Hence, the issue of a fresh accrual of action does not arise. [73] Regardless, the absence of acknowledgment has no bearing on this limitation point. Since the 3 Loan Agreements are unenforceable and void, the terms relating to the “Right of action” cannot be invoked. However, this Court is bound by the principle enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Khatijah bt Abdullah & Ors v Mohd Isa bin Biran that “a void contract does not generate any enforceable right or duty” and “where there is neither right nor duty, limitation cannot be invoked”. As in Khatijah bt Abdullah & Ors v Mohd Isa bin Biran the defence of limitation is thus not available to the Defendants in the present case. [74] In view of the above findings, the Plaintiff’s claims for the loans disbursed to the Second Defendant amounting to RM41,191,801.20 with S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 interest of 5% per annum from the date of the Writ until date of full payment and the outgoings incurred amounting to RM7,652,603.60 plus interest incurred as pleaded in paragraph 22(4) of the Amended Statement of Claim are allowed with costs. [75] The Defendants to pay costs of RM40,000 to the Plaintiff, subject to allocator. Dated: 18 January, 2024 sgd [CHOONG YEOW CHOY] Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam Counsel: Gopal Sreenevasan with Conrad Young, Mark Lau and Kristen Tan for the Plaintiff (Messrs. Sreenevasan Young) Ahmad Amir Mahmood for the Defendants (Messrs. Gunaseelan & Associates) S/N fh4BKgcAf0qAVbSarur8Sw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCvC-662-10/2021

PLAINTIF PERIGI EMAS RESOURCES (M) SDN BHD DEFENDAN INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA

Mah membatalkan tuntutan Plf dengan kos RM5000. Tertakluk kepada 4% alukator fi. The Court in this case dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim as the Plaintiff failed to attend Court on the scheduled date of case management which was also the date fixed for the hearing of the Plaintiff’s counsel’s application to discharge himself from representing the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s counsel applied to discharge himself as he had not received any instructions from the Plaintiff pertaining to the case. The Plaintiff’s counsel had served the application on to the Plaintiff and had also informed the Plaintiff of the date of hearing of the application.The Court’s decision to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim with a cost of RM5,000 is therefore appropriate in the present case.

24/01/2024

YA Dato' Haji Akhtar Bin Tahir

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d24526c4-834b-4d60-8d2c-e4e10fe40156&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA BAHAGIAN SIVIL NO. GUAMAN SIVIL : WA-22NCvC-662-10/2021 ANTARA PERIGI EMAS RESOURCES (M) SDN BHD (NO. PENDAFTARAN SYARIKAT: 200301014703/617123-P) …PLAINTIF DAN INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAYSIA (NO. PENDAFTARAN SYARIKAT: 198391995860/101067-P) …DEFENDAN JUDGMENT 24/01/2024 15:08:08 WA-22NCvC-662-10/2021 Kand. 20 S/N xCZF0kuDYE2NLOThDQBVg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Introduction 1. The Court in this case dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim as the Plaintiff failed to attend Court on the scheduled date of case management which was also the date fixed for the hearing of the Plaintiff’s counsel’s application to discharge himself from representing the Plaintiff. 2. The Plaintiff’s counsel applied to discharge himself as he had not received any instructions from the Plaintiff pertaining to the case. The Plaintiff’s counsel had served the application on to the Plaintiff and had also informed the Plaintiff of the date of hearing of the application. 3. Despite being informed of the date of hearing the Plaintiff failed to appear in Court on the date fixed. After considering the Plaintiff’s counsel’s application the Court duly allowed the application and discharged the Plaintiff’s counsel. 4. However, as the Plaintiff did not appear, the Court could not give further directives for the disposal of the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant. 5. The Plaintiff’s absence without any explanation as well as failure to give instructions to his counsel indicated to the Court that the Plaintiff was disinterested in pursuing his claim against the Defendant. It would be an injustice to postpone the case further S/N xCZF0kuDYE2NLOThDQBVg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal especially since the counsel for the Defendant was present and ready to proceed. Order 34 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules”) 6. The Court is empowered under the Rules to dismiss a claim on a non-compliance of any Court’s directive which will prevent a just, expeditious and economical disposal of a proceedings, even at the case management stage: 1. Orders and directions for just, expeditious and economical disposal of proceedings (O. 34 r. 1) (1) Notwithstanding anything in these Rules, the Court may, at any time after the commencement of proceedings, of its own motion, direct any party or parties to the proceedings to appear before the Court, in order that the Court may make such order or give such direction as it thinks fit so that- (a) all matters which must or can be dealt with on interlocutory applications and have not already been dealt with may so far as possible be dealt with; and (b) such directions may be given as to the future course of the action as appear best adapted to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal thereof. S/N xCZF0kuDYE2NLOThDQBVg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (2) Where the Court makes orders or gives directions under paragraph (1), the Court may take into account whether or not a party has complied with any relevant pre-action protocol or practice direction for the time being issued. (3) Where any party fails to comply with any order made or direction given by the Court under paragraph (1), the Court may dismiss the action, strike out the defence or counterclaim or make such other order as it thinks fit. (4) The Court may, in exercising its powers under paragraph (1), make such order as to costs as it thinks fit. (5) Any judgment, order or direction given or made against any party who does not appear before the Court when directed to do so under paragraph (1) may be set aside or varied by the Court on such terms as it thinks just. (emphasis mine) 7. However, the above provision also gives the Plaintiff an option to reinstate the case. In this case the Plaintiff has not availed himself this option and has instead chosen to appeal the Court’s decision. S/N xCZF0kuDYE2NLOThDQBVg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Conclusion 8. The Court’s decision to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim with a cost of RM5,000 is therefore appropriate in the present case. Dated: 23.1.2024 sgd DATO’ HAJI AKHTAR BIN TAHIR Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur S/N xCZF0kuDYE2NLOThDQBVg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Nama Peguamcara: Wong Zhun Huei Tetuan G. Ragumaren & Co. No. 56-1, RGA Chambers Jalan Telawi Bangsar Baru 59100 Kuala Lumpur. For the Defendant: Nama Peguamcara: Gayathri A/P Chandrakasan Tetuan Rao & Kamal No. 15-3, 3rd Mile Square Business Centre No. 151, Old Klang Road 58100 Kuala Lumpur. S/N xCZF0kuDYE2NLOThDQBVg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—22NCvC—662—lD/2021 Kano. 23 24, n,, mu 17 324;» DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMFUR DALAM WILAVAH PERSEKUYUAN MALAVSIA BAHAGIAN SIVIL NO. GUAMAN SIVIL ; WA-ZZNCVC-E62-IO/2021 ANTARA PERIGI EMAS RESOURCES (M) SDN BHD (NO PENDAFTARAN SVARIKAT. 200301014703/617123?) .PLA\NTlF DAN INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY MALAVSIA (NO PENDAFTARAN SVARIKAT. 195391995360/IaIos7—P) . DEFENDAN JUDGMENT sw xczEakuDvEzNLurhuoaVq -ms Sum M... W!“ be H544 M MW be nvwvufilv mm; nnmmgnl M mus Vin! lnlroduclion «. The coun «h ||'hs case msrmssea me P\a«n|IWs claim as me P\aTn«|H laflecl |o aflend cam on me scheuulea «1a|e oi case managemem when was also «he aa«e hxea for me heanng e« «he Waunmfs eeunsers apphcaheh «a discharge mmseh «mm represenhng me Plalnhfl 2. The P\am«|ffs eeuhsex applied |o mscharge mmseh as he had no| received any ms«mchehs from «he P\a|n«|W penammg «e me case The P\am«|ffs cmms«e\ has served me apphcemn en «a «he P\aTn«|H and had a\so mlarmed me P\aTrmff oi the date of heanng of me applucaheh 3. Despxte bemg mlarmed ol the «1a«e of heanhg «he mamhu «anea «e appear WI com on me «1a«e fixed Aner eohsmenhg «he P\a|n«|Ws eeunsers applucaheh «he ceun duly aHawed «he apphcamh and mscharged «he mamhrrs c0Ims«e\ 4. However, as «he Plammv am he: appear, the cam eemu ne« gwe lurther mrecmes (or me msposal oi me mamms clam agams« me De«enaan«. 5. The Plamhffs absence w««heu« any exwanelwon as well as «anme «e we «hs«mc««ehs «e |'HS cmmse\ m«ea«ea |o the cam ma| me Plalnhfl was msm«eres«e«1 «h pursmng ms mam agaIns| me De«enaan«. «« would he an Tmushce «e pc«s|pane «he case further N xczrakuDvE2NLoThunaVq we Sam M... am he used m wow u. nvwvufilv mm; nnmmnnl VII muna VWLIT especlafly smce me wunsex fur me Delendant was present and ready In pruceed Order :4 of me Rules of com: 2012 (“me Rules") 6 The com rs empowered under me Rmes ta dismiss a dam en a nunwrnpxranae 01 any Cuurfs dlrechve wnrcn wm prevent a ;usL expedlllaus and ecanernrcax arspesax al a pruceedmgs. even at me case managemem stage Orders and dire ns for jusl. exped us and posal of proceedings (0. :4 r. 1) (1) Nolwilhslanding anyl IheseRuIes,Il1e ceun e aner the commencement av may, at any pmcee gs. of Is own nr rr, direct any pany or pauses in are proceedings to appear before the cerrn. in orderlhal are com may make such order or give such direction as it thinks on so that- (a) an maners which musl or can be dean with on inlerloculory applicacions and have not already been deall with may so car as pos e be dean wim: and (:2; such directions may be g err as to me Iulure couvse enne action as aggeav hesl adagled to secure are "us: exged mrs and economical gosal Ihereol. N xczrakunvzznwrhnoavq we Sum '/“DH mu 3. use: m mvv K-e mwvuulv m we nnvnvenl V: mum: varw (2) where the court makes orders or gives directions under paragraph (1). the coun may take into account whether or not a party has complied with any relevant pre-action protocol or practice direction for the time being issued. (3) where any pag lails to comgly with anv order made or direction given by the court under paragraph 1) the coun mav dismiss the action st ke out Ihe defence or counlevcl or make suchotherorderas t nksnt. (4) The coun may. in exerc p ils powers under paragraph (1), make such order as to costs as it thinks (5) Any 'udgrnent order or dire n p en or made against any gag who does not aggar oeiore the coun when cted to do so under ara ra h 1 max he set as de or varied hv the coun on such terms as it thinks 'ust. (emphasis mine] 7 However. the aoove provision aiso gives me Piairiiih an option to reIns|a(e me case In ihis case the Piaintirr has notavaiied himseii this opinion and has irisiead chosen to appeai me Court’: decision N x<:zrakuDvE2NLuThimaVq ioe s.ii.i '/“DEV MM 3. use: m may I‘: DVWVHMVIY m VHS mmi. v. EFVUNG Pam! Conclu a. The Court‘: aemsm to msnuss me Plammrs clam w||h a cost of RMSDUO Is thereiore appmpnate m me presem case. Dated 23.1.2(l2A sad DAYO' HAJI AKHTAR BIN YAHIR Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur sw xczrakubvzzmamrmavq -ma Sum M... M“ be used m mm ua nflmrufllv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm PARTIES For me Fla Iilf: Nama Peguamcara Wong Zhun Hue: Teman G. Ragumaren a. Ca. Na sew, RGA Chambers .|a\an Te\aw\ Bangsar Barn sgcou Kua\a Lumpur For me Defendant: Nama Peguamcara Gayamn A/P Chandrakasan Teman Rao 5. Kama! Na 154, sue me Square Busmess Centre Na 151, mu mang Raad sacou Kua\a Lumpur sw xczrakubvzzmarhrmavq -ms Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvufilv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-12ANCC-47-07/2023

PERAYU ONYX ENGINEERING SDN BHD RESPONDEN I CONZ DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD

Appeal from Sessions Court – Application to set aside JID - No Reasonable Explanation for the Delay to the application to set aside the JID - Failure of solicitors to act in time does not justify the exercise of the power of the Court to set aside the default judgment unless it is shown that the Appellant did not act with diligence when dealing with the suit - Documents produced shows goods were sold and delivered – No evidence of rejection or complaint as to price or quality of goods – Issuance of a cheque admitting liability – No Draft defence filed

24/01/2024

YA Dato' Indera Mohd Arief Emran Bin Arifin

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GOJ Onyx Engineering not allowing appeal.pdf 24/01/2024 16:46:47 WA-12ANCC-47-07/2023 Kand. 18 S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N v0NrWQyu4EaaXoEo8O2EKg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—12ANCC—l7—D7/2023 Kand. 15 Ii/0lyl04A 1; Lb-4' DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGN MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM NEGERI WILAVAH FERSEKUTUAN RAVUAN SIVIL No WA-12ANcc-47-n7/2023 ANTARA omrx ENGINEERING SDN EHD (NO. SVARIKAT su4212—P) FERAVU DAN VCONZ DEVELOPMENT sun BHD (No SVARIKAT 1359902-X) RESPONDEN GROUNDS AFTER APPEAL DE SION or THE SESSIONS COURY A lnlmduciian 1 The Appellant is unhappy with me decwswon of me Sessions Conn WVHCVV had not allowed We appllcahon I0 set Esme the Judgment m Delaull omppsaranoe (ha| was entered by the ssssmns Caurl on 7-124022. 2 5w mMNvayMEaaxnEuao2EKv was Sum M... M“ be used m mm me nvwvufilv mm; “mm. VII mum Wm % 2 The Appeuanrs uaunsex admns mat me Judgment In Deraun cf Appearance dated 7—12—2u22 was vahd\y emered Background Facts 3. The P\amm's/ Responaenrs dawn xsiorgood sald to the Deiendam /Appellant «or me mal sum of RM 337‘ 543 09. A The Appellant failed to emer appearance to me enann aespne me wt and the slalement 01 New being validly served on n The ADDe|lan| naa apnmmed Messrs Syahniah Raw 3. Co as sohcllors to erner appearance, but the sam nrrn had (alled |o undsnaks ms aicrssaxd (ask. 5 Judgment m Devamc was enlered an 7422022 sunsequenw me Appeflant received a Mouse in WW1 Up the company under secuon 455 0! me Ccmpames Act dated M-1-2023 and a Wmdmg Up Fe dated 16- 2023. 5. u was my aner me Appellant recenea mess names and me Pemion did wt deude to Iermmate the services of Messrs Syahiifah Rani sw mMNvGyMEaaxnEnao2EKv ‘Nata Sum M... wm be used m mm me mwmnnulv mm; “mm. VII mum Wm 24 The Appellant also contends tnat tne sald loan dtd not some to lull trumen and as a result tne Appellant now sullers finanstal dlrltculttes and could not complete the works for the sald LRT 3 project. 25. The Appellant lunner contends tnat all tne works and gaods supphed are wttntn tne personal knowledge of Denms Lau. The documents requlred te delend ttns Sm! also allegedly are m tne nands at Dennls Lau To support tnese eententtons the Appellant reters to true Dollce reports il med tn relatton lo Denis Lau. 25. ll ls to be noted tnat tne Appellant dld not produce any documentary evldence ol the exlslence ol ||'lls alleged lotnt venture agreement Netther dld tt produce any Evldence at any letters or cunespunderlue hewveen parties evldenclng tne pcsslblllty of the exlslence dt suen a relatiunsntp between the names. There is also no evidence produced to snow the exlslenoe ol any loan as suggested oy tne Appellam. These allegallons are mere bare avermenls oy tne Appellant not supported oy any documentary evldence. N mMNt/GyMEaaxoEeao2EKll we Sum um... wlll be used m mm ea nlwlrulllv sun; flnntmnnl vn mung wrul % Documents produced shows goods were sold and delivered — no em enee oi reieoiion or cnmplzinl as to price in ouaiiry oi goods. 27 insiead, the documentary evidence before me shows inai me pumhase orders. invoices and dehvery orders oi the goods soid were produced by «he Resuondeni jushlying me sums claimed againsi the Appeuani. The Appeuani did not prdduoe any evidence to show mat the Invoices were onauenged at me me when ine goods and irwulces were received 28. My opinion IS further ouuressed by me vac: mai ine invoicesr purchase orders end dellveiy orders pmducsd oy the Respondems In response show me! me goods have been dehvered and accepted by me Appeuanr 29. I hnd the evidence disdosed in the aihdaviis filed shows that me Resnuridem is enhiied Io be paid tor me goods suoohed The Appeuani has no| shown ihai ine goods were reiected. insieadr the Appeuani received kepnne goods irmma|ing an intenhon to relam inem The aueged arguments raised by me AppeHan| do nei «an under any oi ine caiegones juwfying a inai oi this claim Reier to wee Lian Consvucriori sdn Bhd sw unurwaymzaaxozoaozzm -use Sam M... on re used m mm we uvwinuulv Mime nnmmnnl VIA mum wrui v I..gersou—./ax.’ (211101 1 cu 201 and Mukand Lm .. Malaysia Steel Works (KL) 5.1.. 5...: 1201.71 5 cm 2.22 so. Tr.e.evo.e, havmg relamed me goods, lhe AppeHan\ .5 reqwed (0 pay mam H1 accordance Wllh sections 12 and 55 of the S11: of Goods Act. I reier to the ‘augment of Gapal SH Ram In Interdeals Auramation (M) 5.1.. and v Hang Hang 12.7.1912 ELJ J21 — “[10]/is I have already sent Mrs .5 not a case ornnnaocapzanoa n vs a case ... w...c.-. mere was acczplarvna of goods and .. refusal In [my rm mam Accordmg/V» me app/mama nrovvsmn .5 5 5511; or the Act Much prescnbes me remedy or ar. ur.pa.u sa/rar Arm {hrs .5 wna. .1 says Where under a contract af Sara the pmazny .r. the guads has passed In the buyer and (he buyer wmngmfly neglecl: or refuses .0 pay «or me goods accordmg 142 the terms o/ms comracl, me sener may sue hrm rarme prrce or me gnarl: 1.. myjurlgmern, the ..a.....:,-ma should have apnlred m.-s secflon and found for me pIarr...rra.. me a.o..r.a ma. 4. was ar. ....para seller argaaas ma: r.... z..... .....m-4. Icnaptud ...a ...... Dy nr. duiundlnt ... .1. bInvfiL A: «ar llve counlerclarm arm: ma /udge Immd ugsrnsl I/1: defendant on me me. (ha! went in ma avurdancs and breach I2/me barman! he was aa..g.a to drsmrss .: . would therefore upheld his decrston on ma. pan of In: N murwaymzaaxnzaaozzxv ma 5.... M... WW be .5... m mm ..a ........... an... nnmmnnl VII mum W... % Appeiiani issued a cheque aiiinining iia ily. 31 More so when Ihe Appellant did Issue a cheque for the Sum of RM 24, 333 12 to ihe nespoiiueni This cheque was stopped by me Appeiiaiii wiiricui glvlng any ieiisons lor lrie siiia decision 32. ii islfile law ihai issuance afa cheque which ouuiu not he pieseiiieu lur paymem cieaies a cause uf aciicn under section 47 al the Bills of Exchange Act Reiei lo Yea Hiap sei-ig vAustraIian Faopd carp Pte Ltd (19911 3 MLJ 144 and Yee reek Wah v Lee criee Mona 120201 MLJU 1054 33. The issuance of ihe saie cheque aiso shows Ihat ihe Said allegation cnhe existence cian aiiegee ]C|InI venture is iiicie ihan hkeiylo be uniiue The Appeiiaiii has simply cieaiea a haiiious delence to iusiiiy its aIIemp| Io sei aside me Judgment in Delauli 34. Theieiaie. I do not him any reasons juslilyirig senirig asiae me Judgment iii Deiauii The Appeiiant has iaiieu to show any issue ihai iequiies a iiiai and has ' e in show any bona fide ueience ic hie Respunaenrs ciaiin siu VDNM/0:IMEaaXnEuEOZEKv -use s.ii.i llumhlv vim be used M WWW ne nVWiruH|Y Minis flnnuiinril vn AFVLING WM! 35 on me lssue allna pullue reparls, I also find tha| lne puliue reparls only concern the Appellanrs dispule wiln lls lnrnler employee Dennls Lau and nol wnh lne Respondent. I llnd me lnlernal dispule lne Appellanl has wlln Dennis Lau does ndl lllsmy seulng aslde lne Judgmerll ln Delallll. No man nevence filed. as Flnally, I also find |I1atIheAppeHan| nas m:| filed or even pryvared a draft delence lo me clalm nle llllng of a drall defence would have shown al me very least a serlous lnlenllon ln delend me clalrn and wduld have asslsled lna Appellant's aflsmpl lo snaw a lnable lssua er a lmna nae delence lnslllylng selllng aslde the Judgment ln Delaull ms was nol dons, and um explanahun was awarded In lnls caunlorlne lallurs |o ms a drain defence to the Respdndenrs clalm 37. I never lo llneludgrnenl al surlyadl Hallnr ornar J (as he men was) In Penqnlen cdneme sun Bhd v Chow Moo! 5 Anal [2lw:l] 5 cu 326 /I ls Irlla ms: rn a datnu!t[udgmsn1‘s Cass, ms sattlng asrd. ar matjrb mar rs generally me naml Thepresrdmy calmbelure sa dalng an the olherhsrld must have mrrre 900:1 reason and ma Mere ls a defence ml the rnenls adduced balms Me calm (Tan Om cm s Anal V Karlclllng Really Sdrl sadness; l 15 n mMNvGyMEaaxnEuao2EKll we Sum Mn... wn be used M mm na nlwlrulllv sun; nnmmnnl vn AFVLING Wm ms 226, pm; 1 ML./ 519/ me supposed gaad Ieasan grverv by me aerenasnas, as /acmunrsed me ewdence was #15! may were unaware olme case oemg called up «n mun an 9 Aprv/Z001, Ioundsd on me abovemsrmoned raiser! nrnensennee afme wms Factully, even n I were re suhmn‘ ta Mose evtdenualasseflmns, by 5 Apn/20171 they wens already In Ms/eys.e mnee neye before Iherrnasss were ca/led up In mm As / was ssnsneamamuoa service had taken praee Mrs pan of the mgrsdrsnl m, good rsaswv‘ had isnen an The next Ingredient m be eslsblnshed by the de/ervdsnls was whether mm was a defense olment before me for mnsrderznon Is‘ by at less! n/mg men dram defences in Van: H] Se/Jen V Fedsm! Auto Holdmgs Bna[1s75[ 1 ms as, (197912 ML./1A1$M:d Agr! Ezmskbun J had new to say The mnns In s case a/Mrs nnnne wefarlham be acceded an meals and no no» mvon pmmdwal miss m Prevent s defendant from serenmng an uclmn unless n nes no mints m ms aw/»ca»on The man in Ten cmang Bmlhers Mamie 151 Fla m V Lmuwewn: Concrete sun Bnd(19v7] e cu 75Pm srrm/ar Vern had remarked A aerem on the merits means a delsncv when dhsdosoi an arguable and (name Issue n dons not have In thaw that Mars .s a real asuacl cl means: or malrmas m cztrysomedagma u/mnvzwan /7! the current case n was mdupulsme I/wanna defendant: had (sued m pmmece ma! eu rmwfianl drsfl slalemenls o/defense wnnom menn /was mus wnnom any opnen but to find agarn farms plamtm‘, even on ms second mgrsdlvrvl No! enw was mere no pnm. lune dafence, rsrsmg sennus 7:51.125 as bans nae neesoneme aerenee msmugm to be Mem but (here was nor even a sham one {Hasu Ewm Perumahan s Or: v Umtsd Malayan sanxwy snamsu v cu 1237 Nut wrsmng la Mcuumg: . snsm aerense, and mzmnc esnve wns: else could have I done? conmn sense wou/d convmce anyone me: m a/Vow me appsa/, and 59! asme a asraumudgmen: when rm puma lame aefencs wnnny u/nonstdzmltun was Delays me mart wuum pannay me sum! as lame ducks om/angmg the agony A7! en Dame: wnnom them before me r could on/y syn mum/uyMEaaxnEuaozEKv wee sum In-uhnv wm he used m mm we nflmnnflly MW; dun-mm vn mum pm mm:/ude that In: dz/zndanls were definitely not senau: m than attempts In challenge we marnnfkielsyrng and deleelmq me /atler (ram Iakmg up mare anlmrpalory drama acmms durmg these bad llmss, and wamnq Yo! belts! ones‘ bzmg an: arm canclusmns mm mm amve .: ' 33. For me above reasons. I do not nno |haHhe Veamed Sessions com Judge had oommmeu any ermrs ma: warrant appeHat2 mterlerence by «ms Court E. Ordnrs onhis own 39. For me above reasons. this Court dismisses |he Appellant's appeal wnh costs of RM soon on sumect to aHocator. Dated «em January 2024 Data‘ Vndera Muhd Anal Emran hm Anfin Judge High Ooun of Ma\aya al Kuala Lumpur NCC 5 N «MN»/OyMEaaxnEeao2EKv we Sum M... M“ be used m mm we nvVWuH|Y mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm Counsel Muhammad Nm Tamrin lor me Appeflant Messrs Zablr Imran 8. Partners Advocates 8. Snhcnms Prakash Chandrakant fur the Respondent Messrs Prakash & Cu Advocates & Sohcnors N .mwaymz.=x.z.,aozzxy mm Sum IHIWDIY M“ be used m mm u. mm.“-y mm; mm. VII nF\uNG pm % ll. Co by leuer dated 2052023 The Appellenl only appolnled as current sul lclrs en so 2023 7. The apnlicalldn to sel aslde me Judgmerll in Delaull was only filed on 3l»3-2023 Tnls ls a delay olaeoul 113 days lmm lne dale wnen lne judgmem was enlered. The prevlous snllcltars lo: me Appellenl nan renewed me ludgmenl W ueleull un a—12—2n2a and (ms IS rlul eenlesled by me Appellanl 3. The learned Sesslorls cdun Judge ned eonsldered lne apdlleendn nled by me Appellant and deemed lnal lne appllcallorl does nut warrant |he exerclse cl‘ me powers onne Conn m se| aslde me Sald Jddgrnenl H1 Delault Aggellale Powers onne gh Cnurl 9. ll is Irile lewlnal when deallng wlln an appeal lrorn e declsldn nylne lcrwsr Courh thls Conn wlH be slow le mlenere wlln the nndlnge made by me codn below unless I| IS snewn lheune declslon was plalnly wrong lnel no reasonable oampe(en| Judge could have made sw vDNN»IGyMEaaxnEeaOzEKv -we Sum M... wlll be used m mm we nlwlrulllv mm; flnmmnnl VII .;lma Wm 1D I raver to me dECI$ICm cl |he Faaeiai Court W Ng Moo Kui 5. Armr v Wendy Tan Lee Pang. Admi "strata! ol me Esme or Tan Ewe Kwang, Doceasod & 015 12020110 CL.I1where Zabanah Mohd vusov FCJ hem‘ A: mg as (he Inaliu-1ge‘s condusron can be supported an . rational basis In View oflhe maianai amma live fact that ma apnenaie mun Yes/5 /Ike ll mm have muse rmfsisrvlly VS woman: In other WOMS, a finding of /act Mat wamd noi be remignsm to common sense ought not In be disturbed The insi iudge should be aocamsd a margin of spnrecialmn man his (ream-vent (:1 me evidence 75 examined by the appellate cuurls I1. I also reproduce me laHawmg paragraphs «mm the judgmenl or me Conn \31Appea\ In Mm: Di! 5 Gas Engineering V ran Back Kwee pins] 4 CLJ 665‘ where Na||In' Pammznaman JCA (as she men was) skated — mi The mwuiwmsnt my me ma/judge (0 have owns (0 a finding which was ‘plainly W70/w' before an appellate court may Intervene VS llvelefum well enuenchedinauraflfle/ValePhi/asfinhyandyructice in Henderson V Faxwmlh /nveslmerus Lid and anumen Lord my considered the meaning to be acculded to ma Phrisd Mainly wrong‘ (here may be same value III mnsidzrmg the meaning almatpllruse There IS anskmslrl maybe mismersioaa The adverb ‘iaiain/woes M1 refer lo the dsgrss olwnfidencs 19!! by the aiwsiiaia court that n wnuia not have isamaa ma same mndusmn as In: Ina!/unge ll am nu! marten mm whatever degree or aenainry mai me spueuaxe mun canwers that M would have reached a dtflsrsnl conclusion Whafmaflersls wnsmeime aacision undsraflfisahs one am no reusanablz/udge could hav: macficd SIN mMNvGyMEaaxnEuao2EKv nan Sum M... M“ be used m mm a. nflmrufllv mm; nnmmnnl VII AFVLING pm 1.5; 7...5 .5 5 pnml alsume Imyunance beams: .. ..n..e.5m.e5 me .e...on5.e ....m..e sppeuaae mums Hots!/rbefly to reverse armtefleretn me Iirvdmg ova maljwge even me appenaxe mm .5 0/eafly oune mew ma. .. wm: no. have .e.ene.. me mne...5...n me ...5....age ma .... me evmerme 5.. recmd befurz .. .. require: 5.....e....ng n.a.e The .eq...5ne ... mnee. standard ... be anplrcd .5 ma! no masunablsjwgs. on me ewaencs on remm e......: have reached ma wrlclusrorv om... Ivrafjuflgs rn omervmms, so long as me «..a...g5 otllle ma! /mfg: are p.5..5.:..e .... me ewdznce on .e.»n1, me.e .5 .... mum /e..n.e..e.e..ce mere/y an me grounds ma! me aweflale em... Iomvs a umerenx oltvmun an me same evrdervcs [!A[TIvere:s,IIa»1/ever,/rt!/2 mom for vnnahan ... me apphcalrun af me prrncrple ohnlen/enuun wnen me .na/mags .5 ‘Flam/V wrung‘ Alwel/an: courts uugn. m as cansrslvnr .n ervsurmg (ha! appeuene mtervsnllon any names abuul when .a lrvul ...age reaches 5 mnnlusmn ..n..5n rm rnasumable /udg: 5...... have reached A lack olsuch wnsmencynn appmaen would We nsemconxrderable uncerlamly .n we prams 5...: prowess an...ga..an Lrlrganls mmuyr. men counsel 5n....... be ewe ... assess wnn same degree alczrhsmry, an c/zarund dmvncl/y aynlredmvncrp/esol/aw, whemeramdgmenloblamedallirslmstance .5 nxery ... be avarlumsd ... no! This .5 only possrbls .r there .5 a cansrslervt apphcitmn mm: 'pLlmly wmng'pIln:1pl= ....ae..y.ng Ip;1:/Llletmenmnnan 1111 The abverse or countevvan .9 me .eq....e...e... re. aapeflate .e...5.... ... deannfl wun firrdms offer! by the ma/JWQS .5 ms nmdamenlal .equ..e.nen: that filejudgmant a/ms. mslarme does ... lac.‘ amuurv! m a mmwar-ervsm and cohesrve detenmnatron olme n.5.e...e....e.:e.s commmrvq me sublect manero.‘ a.:.a..;e bslore me mallwgs Tms mawes me ma. mge to undertake a mu av:/nation am... evmenee andtssuss pracea nsim me court A ms: ...5.anc5 mdgnlervl .5 aperv ... rhal/zngz wnen .. /5.5 ... address 5. who/Lv rgnmes n.5.5n5. ememe oussues p/zcsd before ... ... wnen bald findmgs arm. as made wrm no Ieamnwg or evidence to substannare such Ymdmgs Equally errors allav/. a e.e5..n.5..n..e.515n...ng a«.e.e..5... evrderm: and 5...’. 5.eany..1e..m.5o.e e.....5 w... EN mnmbule towards 5 decmon ma! waw be consrdered Io be ‘ms.../y wmny‘ 5... mmwuymzaaxnzuaozzxv we 5.... ...n... WW be .55.. 5 mm ... .........-y 5...; dnnnmnl ... .5.....c Wm. 12. my Judrcml decrsums are requrred to be harmed dawn exrreanrarrsry .rrr1 wrm mrmmum delay However lms orrgm not to comuramrse the fundamental rewwernerrr mar mauudyes undertake a commnensrve and no/rsnc apmam ya me evalualmn L7/evidence rrr ruclvmg Mztrllrmtrvgs at ilrsfmslamze A txflure In consrder Me Bnlrrery rr/me evrderm: and rrrrrrerrsr Issues . Isrlure (L7 make nrrarnns or fan or me mzkmg or bars fimiwgs or Iacl, an avow for answers rmemnerarr Apart imm me real possrbrmy at a rruscamage ouusm, such umtssmns by 5 lrml/udge reqmre me sprreurrre cuurl: In rm on Me ml: rr/ma mslancejwves am revvew me ewdence m us er-mrety avresh ms m lum amounts In a strain oruudrcrafmsourcvs The rmponancs cl: comprsnensm mnsrdzmlrun a/ me matter at first Instance rrrrrrrrrr be suflmervfly errrpnssrsea Equany wnerr mere has been Ms! such a ho/mm HIJWD-ach aaapreu. mere should be mnsmerab/s appeuare Ies1IamIex9Ic1sed when Ievrswmg a rrrsr rnslarvc:[udgIvIerv( an appeal “ I emu accept me: the appeal against any decision av lhe Sessions Court Is by way av rshearmg Tms appears m semran 29 unne Courts av Jumcamre Ad 13. Although the above referred deusrans were concermng apueals aller mans, \ believe me same cesc would be avmicame oonoermng any Inlsrioculnry ascrsrons made by the lower Court. sw mum/uyMEaaxaEuaozEKv we sum nawmv WW re used m mm re nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG wrm % n on s cairn 14 I have considered me grounds omie sessions com and found that the iearned Judge did not corrirrin any errors 0! iaw or fact that shouid be iriierierea wnri by «his coim Na Reasonable Explanalion for the Delay In the application In set aside me Judgrrierir iii Defzull 15 Firstly me Appeiiam has iailed to show ariyiusrincaiiun furlhe delay in the Buplicalion to set aside the Judgment iri Defaun. hie sole ground raised by me Appeiiarii is based on the alleged failure oi We previous soiiciior |a lake s|eps iri iris pmcesairigs below and asisriu me ciaim against iris Appeiiani 16 It is «me law that the Appellan ' required to show that he has acted eously and wimiri lhe 30-day period 40 iustiiy sening aside the iudgrriem in aelauu. I re!er lo me aecisinri oi Ganal sri Ram JCA (as rie then was) in Knor cherry wan v surrgei Wal Leasing Sdn 5IId[1.W7] 1 cu us: "It is a caldmalpmvcrp/5 uflaw, me: when a Vilvgantsnks ma rfllervalllvofl DI the mm! H‘! a matter that affect: his nghls H: must da SD eimamiy me vigiianrirairs mm doM'IleN!buS,[I1fE Suhvermml mougri havinw its mains in me 7 SN mMNi/0yMEaaxnEuao2EKv -we s.ii.i Mi... MU be used M mm we niwirufllv MW; nnmmnnl VII AFVLING WM! Cour! ul Chancery. rs ul uruversal apphcal/on Even m cases were a new rsexarcrsams ex dsbrlojuslvlvae, .3 coun maylsluss mnmuan mdofiervl/mgant In .uc.m in which may in nppmlching m. caurl :. in mm, m. am... rs upon me Illlvanl who has aetamuo render: satlsIacloI1eXDlanalInn for IL Whelnu the explmnon In a ylven use It mmmory ar ...sm..m. .:.,..nus upun m. rm: mu cimumlunml alnch m. and in . matter which .-"mm the exercise aldiacrerfon, it is I.» the/‘udge in whom the Iawpflmarlly vests the discretion. . 17 The lame oi summers to act in «me does not jushiy me exemse or the power onne coumo set asme the de(au\I judgment umess il ws shown |haHhe Appellanl dud nntacl wnh amgence when dealing wnn me sun The Appsuam cannot mers\y stand by on the sme am my abso\me\y on ms soncuors They must show mau they have auempxeu In protectmeur ngm 13, I vefev |o the decision 0! the cam ompueax in Mam or Ibrahim v Ros-my Effandy {mm renum Knaml L cc [2013] 2 ML] we In mat case the Cmm ol Appeal held: - ‘[27] 1: rs generally accepted mat a drum shomd not suffar «mm the rvaghgence or mrstake 0/ the mm», Eu: :1 rm realms: in be eslsmnshed that me negngem at mrslake .5 the act 0! the solncuor Omerwrxe, u wrll become common praclrcs lo ablarn a second bile al the chewy by changing counsel and mmmng ma ermrs m the Ivsluclmn A./pan MEEIEVIGMSSD/M21107, wnnautuny cm! sml Dem commenced and mamrarned agams: mat prams so/mrror n mum make a mockery arms system nl/ushce - N mMrwGymEaaxnEuao2EKv mm Sum mm... mm be used m mm u. nflmrufllv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm 19 I again relerlo the judgment :1! Gupal Sn Ram in me earher quoted case 0! row: Cheng war: It Sungei Wai Leasing Sdn Bhd (supra) where he stated: - /n we present case, me exnlanatmn cf the «am delendsnl for (he delay In making his explanamm «s, m summarvse ms awawra ma! its p/acsd me conduct of ms defence In ms was of a soltwur who am M79 (0 protect ms clrenfstnlerests /5 the! a masoname exp/anal/on7 The /earned Judqé ma Hm mm m was mm agree mm mm Undoubtedly tms Court mu not, whenever feastb/5 allow a chem ta su/fer /or Me negligence aims mm: 12:, Cheaw Chew mm V Abauuonan bm Abdu/Ranman[1995] 4 cu 127 an: 152 (199514 cm 127, mp 490 part/C George JCA Em there are /mm: In what may he done m ma Interest: af/usme Afler an luxuce is no! only for a de/aumng delendanl I! 75 Ior the D/amlrllas wefl And 2! the and arms day, a cammexamtrvahorv nfmv iacls and circumstance: reveals Ma! [he mm dzlandum um nolllmg m cammumcafle mm M: sa/Mylar a! any ear/terpomrm Irme lo drscoverlhe xlale In wmch me mam aaamslmm stood sum/yt n wamd as vyusncs In vrsrlme cmlsstlusrmes aim: tndrflsrence upnn ma hlsrnhlfs head “ zu. Tneratcrs, t do not accep| that me Appettam has shown any reasonable raasan why may and not wm. due a game set aside the Judgment tn Defau|| wn ' the me lrame pmvided under 42 me ta at 9 5w vt3MNvGyMEaaxnEuao2EKv ma Sum IHIWDIY Mu be .a.. m mm a. nvW\ruH|Y MW; nan-mm VII AFVLING mm % lne Rules ulCour1 Also reler |u Adnan bin Ishak 5 co vAF'TAssoci.ales Sdn and 1201512 AMR 2312 No Dulerlce to me claim shown by mu Appnllarlt. 21. As stated earller, lne clalrn agaIns| lhe Appellanl ls lor .9 Gem urlpald lor goods sold and supplled lo ll. 22 The Appellanfs argument Ihal mere should be a mal ol the clalm and iuslily the selllng aside of lhe Judgmerll oi nelaull revolves around me alleged loin: verlmre agreernenl loelween lne Appellarrl and me Rsspurlderll tor the LRT 3 Damarlsara pmjecl lor Mudalaya Graup laemau 2: The Appellanl wnlends mal me Respondent l Flalnllfl had taken a loan lrorn a lmrd puny for Denrus Lau Klrl wal. The sloressla loan was allegedly In asslsl wlln me said prolecl and me prom lrom me Sald prolecl wlll be shared belween lne Appellant and me Rsspanasm Therelors, lns Appellant oanlends mat the Sald goods supplled should nol he charged (or is lull prlDE sw vl7NNvOyMEaaxnEuaozEKv 'NnI2 Sum M... wn be used M mm o. nlwlrulllv sun; nnmmnnl VII nFlLING Wltll

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24NCvC-848-03/2023

PEMOHON FAMILA SDN BHD RESPONDEN 1. ) GOLDPAGE ASSETS SDN BHD (dalam likuidasi) 2. ) PLUSBURY DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD 3. ) BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD

This Court considered the circumstances of this case and finds that it is reasonable that both Bank Islam and Famila be awarded costs that ought to be paid forthwith. Goldpage is required to pay RM40,000 as costs to Bank Islam and RM25,000 to Famila. Plusbury is ordered to pay Bank Islam RM25,000 and to Famila the sum of RM25,000 as costs. Those amount are for both suits (OS 3741 and OS848).

23/01/2024

YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d48e7655-9157-436d-8da8-f0729be4ec14&Inline=true

23/01/2024 10:38:54 WA-24NCvC-848-03/2023 Kand. 39 S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N VXaO1FeRbUONqPBymTsFA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA—2dNCvC—8d8—03/2023 Kand. 39 23/01/2024 10:32-54 IN THE man COURT Iu MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN mE FEDERAL TERRITORV‘ MALAVSIA ORIGINATING surmous N0: WA»24NCvC-J141.1DI1022 BETWEEN GOLDPAGE ASSE1 SDN sun (In Liqmdafiun) [COMPANY No: 2unan1o1ss1:msea1A)1 rumnrs AND 1 BANK ISLAM MALAVSIA BERHAD lcomnuv Nu: 1sm1nu2su (M121-K)] 2. PLUSBURV DEVELOPMENT sun am: [COMPANY No. 2on4n1o2n7oo(nso2o4.K)] .. DEFENDANYS HEARD TOGETHER wlm sw vxamrsRx:uuNqPsymYsrA -um smm ...m.mm be used M mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm m THE HIGH COURT IN MALAVA AT KLIALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL ‘rzannonv, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING summons :4 A mcvc-345 312023 asrwesu FAMILA son EHD lcamuuv No :u22u1on2:1:(1uea7n-Pu PLAINTIFF AND 1 GOLDPAGE ASSEY sou am: (In Liqumllion) [COMPANY No: 2nnao1n15s13 (u1eao3.A)1 2. PLUSBURV DEVELOFMENY sun arm [COMPANY Nu: 2no4u1o2o1nn [esvznuq] 3 BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD [comunv Nu:19I3flI0fl29M[9B1Z1-l()] DEFENDANTS sw vxamrsRx:uuNqPsymYsrA -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII muNG pm mnderlhe SPA‘ which ns a cnonoe -n ac|non. In nnus courrs eunsndemd vnew allme oenehns and advantages aocmed tn Galdpage unaenhs SPA nnusn nnsnooe the puwer on sale. The sucnon nsno oy Bank nsnsm was pmsuanl no Go|dpags‘s oonaunn can no naken as dnspcsmg i rigms by way on a nunnen assngnmenl There occurred 2 uausner on Bank nsnsnrs legal nohn no me those nn uonnon no Famnna As hono by Ina Federal Court. (here was no neoessnly nor Bank nsnsm no wail no: me nm uv nognsuauon on a negan charge Io onspose on the comraausn nahns uhoav ma SPA assngnoo no nl [231 rsnuna, upon Ihe pvcpar suo uuooossnun oumnau oflhe property by way on me aucnnon‘ had awumsd the rnqmi, nnIeres| and oonemns undor nne spa The memorandum In me Pruclamauun on sans aanoo 12 9 2n22 ekonessny pro»/Idad msnn Yhe nssuancs on me nor wax never a pmraliunsnne 1m Bank nsnarn no make nh ' ngnns onaosonune as5nqnmen| Plusbuny can and ougm In Irans1er nhe nor ousnny no Famnla upon me issuance onme same. (Reneno ocac Bank (Malaysia) Ehd v Nz sm- Sdn am 5 Anal [2022] 3 cu 572, onus nsnumis Bank Bind v Klvaimddrn Abu Mass-n [2021] 4 cm 375; [24] Thus legal pasnnnon ns unassannaone no me angumehns by Goldpags and Plusbury Tms coun oosewea nhe conouon on me pan 0! sonapage wvuch may no ohlannnng nne nnancnng lacnlmes derrnonsvalad vdlnass no aosonuneny assnqh us horns no Bank nsnam when in due used For nl As oppuud no mo rbiuctanca no some by nhose same (arms when nho snnuannon oscame uhnsvouraone whumoy Bank nsnum had amen aooommg no nhu very |enm1 aonoeo upon. The authorities cnlad by munsal lor condoms and Plushury are mnsapp no no mo cam and cnrcums|ancas on u son was .kuuo»on=aynnn «mu. sunun luvnhnrwm .. u... o mm o. oflmnuflly mum: flnuavnml VI .nuuo v-man ms cxe. |PnIlIoAIIiId Bank (M) and v Euptrum Singlv u/I Av-lur singn 4 Anal [2002] 2 MLJ 513, Sin many fee A Dr: v char-g su Kenn 5 Ors 12015“ Mm 133) [251 To allowlhs assemons by Gowpege and Flusbury lhat lhe SPA and not come: me Dower M sa\e «a comma would be akin In aHuwmg amnrary resmclwe coruracmax cavenan| upon Bank mam. The Caurl cl App A! r. Lu Chln wan 5 Arm v Sllnc Calporullon Sdn arm 120231 5 cu 232 up 96 max rx wwxu Vead m passmla abuse ms coun reiscls lha sara zssanahnns . . bonvwmg the wards ol Jushce Lee Swee song in me send case Upon the 55/9. mo vendor /0555 5" ms statutory rrgr-us that we prevrousmrra: attached :9 the land‘ In mi; case‘ we purchase {man had been samsnen by Goldpaga to Pmsbury Also relsrred to by «hrs own are me damswcns ulme Supreme com in Voah Ah cm: v Ln Chang Hai [1994] 3 cu 20 and me Federal Cnun m ran Om: E!!! v man Kim Hang [2016] 3 cu 193. (251 n meal certainly rs true man 11 rs no: me duly or nus Conn la Iewrile cuntracis for me Dames wrum may were capable to have drawn, agrsea m and yelled on Io! (he financing and seounnsalmn my me enmmcus loan amount m 2013 The Coun heveby imerpms and enforces me unammguous express harms m mac me asswgnmenl was absolute and Bank Islam ma nghlly Invoked Ihe powers prwuea lhsvslo (599 Cal nyl sun Bhd v Snuppolnl Sdn sm1|2o21]2 MLJ 114 r 1: sm vxao uRnu0Nwr=aymrsrA «mm. sm-w nmhnrwm .. U... w my r... mm-y mum: flnuamnl vn mum WM Ros Inflcal /Issue Eslngggl [27] u was hughlugmeo dunng argurnsnns that me sun filed by Pmsnury m 2022 In mnmcl me ms: auclkan earned out by sank ls\am un May 2022; was on ma wmng and mistaken prevmse max sank Islam was a charges Al no poml Vn urns was there a uagax malge lodged m Eank warns favour as In: um was ysx ro be Issued Plushury had minnned sank mam wnan n agmed In the ahsmube mrgrnnsn: over ma pmpeny man chargus and cavaau wars not permilled to be lodged an as master mls as n womd eomphcala and runner Plusbury lo devebp omsrpans ullhs nana [zay rna learned counul «or Famula sunnunea |hsl ax man argument wnara Prusnury awed us grievances |hal sank Islam had no: wnsunoa n on lhe reserved pnoe. Flusbury scum have questioned sank |s\am‘s pawer av sale m we firs! mace Much sank Islam cons:s|enuy mamlamed that R was a right and power as absmutely assigned. In lalhng and/or reiusmg «a do so, u was subrnmed that me docmne of res nmrcace has sel Vn No! yusl agamst Pmsbury but also Gampaga wrra was cried as Ihe Second nerenaant In Pmsnurys aouon and a pan onne pmeemngs [291 The validlly at me aucuan conducled by sank wsnarn rs undoubtedly an we nean or ms argmnenrs In these we SLIVLS nos 3471 and 05 am) The aarreaness Mme said aucuon was chaflenged :1: me Flusbury sun n mararare csnnol be said man bum canaarnaa me .nxe-preuauan ov me DoA ms Cowl agms mm ms oonlanhsn Iha| ham Plulbury and Gnldwlga oould have and oughl lo hive mind this angra allhs argurnanx in ms Fluxbury sun They mmrm are prevented norn vanmamng n nara — sea me Supreme cuuns enahlushed merpnlshon of mu: means: In 1: srn vxao aRnu0NqPBymrsrA “Nana Snr1I\nanhnrwH\I>e HIQG s my r... nflmnuflly mum: flnuamnl VI .HuNa v-max Asia Commercial Frnancu (M; Bhd v Kawal Tedlti Sdn Ehd [I995] 3 MLJ IE9. [an] n a\s/.1 goes unescapad max nne ammm| reahsed by Bank mam lmm me sucoessfm auclmn In seH me progeny |o Famulz Is mum Vess man me auxsvenmng owad by Golflpage win» (he acuudncalnon ol Plusburys xmuncnon apphcalmn, as am .5 seen suspsexouely here as e means m (umar dehy and lruuvate Bank lslams enane m mlkmg good me callalaral «er sanepegee maemeeneee wnn me anemm to ram: me or ralhav van! um Issuls men cughl In havn been argued .n (ha! nmor sun by Fhnburv ?'|ll_Q.\‘_LhI!_EQIlE [31] The DOA emerged as me paramount ween of eviaence. The aecumanx 'n|egrzl (0 unee-sxenmng nne Imuzl terms agreed upon by pom pames— sorupage and Bank Islam mun concurrence of Plushury), prayea a crucial me In sneddmg hghl on me namre mane agreement psmculany regarding me asslgnmenl of me pmpeny as eecunuy «or me wean The om, by ms very essence. em:apsuIa|ed me In|ermons ane uneemanmngs ov me names a| me «me onne \oan's ncepuen A nnuough exennnenon men n macaw In delemunlng one extent aims ngme and nbhgahuns lha| were convened upon eeen party‘ eseeaeuy in velalmn Io Bank ‘slams conduct cl auchon no realize ma assel upon delaull my me count Md: me: Bank mam nee nuhfly ana Vegally mvukefl me powers M sa\a wmen was alasomlew eeugnee |a by Galdpage men rusunea xn Farnue being nne succexsfw bidder, were me sane an em vxao afinuowqfiaymrxn «we. s.nn ...n.mn be HIQG e vsfly he nrW\n|H|Y mum: m.n.n VI mum v-ma! pumnase were a\so mnducled lav./Fully Premvsed on me emenoe and me auvlicable laws, «ms Conn declares (a) The sale cl ms Dmpeny by Bank Islam |o Famfla by way of a aubuc aucnan cm 19 9.2022 5 valid, (:1) Fanula ws me uenenuax owner av me progeny, and 4c) Conssnl omuswywasnm requrrad (or am Islam |o asugn absclulely |o Finula the rims, benefits and m|emrsls m relauon tn me property and (he SPA beiwean Plusbury and Goldpsqs pursuant In me Dull [33] It ws me Lmiev oi «ms com me: Plusbury deliver an Famua wmw. seven days from me issuance of me separate document of we to me property (a) The ongmal xssue dmumenta1m1e(s] to Ihe properly‘ (a) A auvy sxecmod, valid and reglsllame (but unsumped) nnslrumen|oH1ansVs1VorIhe lransler of me pmpenylo Famnla, Ina (mm all lrans, charge; and olher encumbrances wnansumn xi necessary. (C) The cemfied we copy of ms cunem year qun rent and assessment receipts m rupee! arms pmpemr, and my All ulhev documems requvred of Flusbury m laminate me vagmrahun cl aznsfer m lavaur ov Famfla, indudmg. wnnam sm vxao .a.uo»».»=amnn «mm. Snr1I\nmhnrwH\I>e HIQG w may he mmuny mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! Hmrtanom ma requlsfle oorporaie am: sxamumy documsms or mummy, duly certified as we onpies by us secretary. [341 ms cam oonamama the czrmmslanbes cums case and finds Iha| m a reasonable max bum Bank Islam and Fzmda be awarded coscs mat oughlla be pamlonhwnlh Gompegsls required «a pay RMJO,D00as costs (0 Bank mam and RM25,Dnu :5 Farms Flusbury Is ardemd In pay Bank mam RM2§,DO0 and In ramua (he sum av nwzsoao as costs Those 3/noun| are «or how: suns (us 3741 am cssaa) DATED 21 DECEMBER 202: R02 MAWAR ROZNN JUDVCIAL cow/ussxousa HIGH COURT IN MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR For me P/smwl Alvm Tang and Low vun Hm together with Tea 4.; u rm Bodfpalar Pnnnudurar De S«/vs Fovma 1"Defendan1s Aedyta Dm Boksn T/n Nassor wan: Nam A Rtmm For ms 2~ Dolendanrs 5 Raven, s Davenossn, Dam‘ Mallk lmllaz Sarwur and Wang Mm Yen m. s Ravenasan For the Wart/ans! Gopal Smervevasan and Hazel Srau Ju Shusn rm snzaocm Lau Is ; sm vx.mr.mo»apaymnn mm. Snr1I\nmhnrw\HI>e HIQG a may he mm-y mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! GROUNDS or JUDGMENT m In the realm M finance and legal agreements, n :5 a eom-non phenomanun In wmess a aresuc sum nu ma exanca er names inmmea when urcumsnanoes allev, pamwlany m cases cl Voan defaulls. Al me inoeplmn al a rmanaal arrangemen|. when Ihe neeo for mone1ary asswslance Is paramount borrowers onen axnutma wmmgness (0 agree H: a vanely nnenns‘ mdudlng me pledqxng massels as security (or me man Thesa agreements, |u have been made m gm lawn and men clear mcennons, serve as a guaranhzelcr me lenderand a means to ssuure me raqmmd mnas lor me burrvwsr [2) Howvvev. me Vandstape cl such agreemenu can dramatically change \n me even! at a «(sun ms case presents a qumlsssenhal enamma when we borrower. nanng Imhllly asugnea an assan as caHalIral, a new conlulmg ma legalnly av nls salt pun-anvann. The mxnmars canlenhon mngls on me clam nna« wrma may had maeaa ssxiimud me 2553! my Ihu purpose of secunnq me man may had nnl exnressry oonhrmd Ina power of sale upun me Vendor This wdden N-:versa\ oc stance, ass-ninq a lack at power m assign the power of ab enne assel m me Venden ceaxwea banks! to me arguments of mm suns [3] The pamas lo me sums are Bank \s\am semaa (Bank wswam) max granhad finanung homes M RM1E,UOD‘DO0 m eompaga Asset sun and (Goldpage) In zma The secunty la man was an absulme Deed mi Assvgnmem dated xx 12 zma (DIM) which was pursuant la a commuted purchase xransacnon 01 property by eompage «mm Pmsbury Development Sdn arm (Plusburyj nmugn me master Inle was sull under am vxao -Rnu0NqPaymrsrA “Nana smn lunhnrwm s. met! a mm s. mn.u-y mum: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! Plusbnfly Tne umpeny oampnsefl of two parcels M commercial onnnmng nanos wnnn one and new storey hypsrrriarlnel building ans car perkmg ions oeanng oosnan address No 1 Jalan Feri Lama, Faslv Penambang, 45000 Kuals Selallgm sanangor iornnng pan M HSKD) 250907, Lon Nu FT was Sechon 2 (Funrnerny pan of Geran susse, Lon 619 5. 62a Muknm Keane Selzrngar, sons of Selangor Dzml Ensan; Upon nne oeieunn oi ina nnanonng iacnnmes. sank isnem proceeded in sell me oiooeay conaneraiisao In raninna Sdn sno (Familz) nnmogn an auctmn on 19 9.2022 {4} son. auina — Oliunnahrlg Summons No WA-24NCv(>37A1-10/2022 nos 3741) ano wn 24-NC»/C aae-on/202: nos may saughl inn oomvs oeciaianon as no me valldfiy M nne aocnion exeeoneu oy sank Islam omsunnn no ma non. os 3741 inmaneo oy soiooeoe eeeke inns Cuurls oioer no invalldzle ano nulhfy ma aucficm wninsn rarniia men 05 am for a deciaranion nnan nne sale was the auction was valid and man in is not nne negan and beoenoiai owner on me property nogenner winn omer conaseuennai orders [51 Feahnred «mm and cennren in oonn nne suns is me DoA eondoaoe argued nnannne assngnmenzaia non monuoe me mmeno seH me pmpeny Its argunienn was based on me posimn ms! was nne oeoeinoiei ownemf me omoeny with no soon powers no mean mn and/or uispose on nine property as nna mas|er nine was annnn leglslsrsd no Plusbury in cnrn|ernded nnen sank isnani s assigned ngnis oouno non oe grsalsr man Goiooage s, max sank mam nao no ngnns oi pawsr onaene om nne properly pursuant no me Dem onm nne glam on me nssoa cl Dncumant on Tine um) and me axacmmn on in. negai charge In sank tslanfs tavaur Plusbury anonao «saw no nne Dosnhnn or conooeors, Rehvenoe was maoa no Soulhlm em vxao aRou0NwiPaymrsrA “None s.n.i luvnhnrwm e. med e mm o. onnnn-y MIMI flnuavnml VI ariuna v-man smnsn Nauon-I rrusn Ltd v Pilher ac 3700037‘ Rodman v rm Pemnanmn Trustee co alum South warns ac 1souo2a The mod oVAsI|nnmonl [en The DuA wmnh was execunld as secnmly my me paymem by Galdpaga no Bank nsnam cl me nmemeanus Provnded Ihan Goidpage assngned Io Bank Islam ‘awn/Mary me property and m M and mm bsnafltand advznnllgs avanu urndsrlhe Vnslmmantav m/9 and a//ngnnrs), omnmn mIarlst[s) and um msmnrn nogezrm mm all ramming: thanaln Iar the pnlrposl aramocnng mo Vnsbumenl o(TnlIe 5.! secnmly lo! the payment no [Bunk Is/am] or the rndabladneu and an em» rnwruu plyable and covemnnau to be uwd by /Go/dpsga] to [Bank /mm} hemumiir PROVIDED THAT nolhmg m tin: Assfgnnmnl rs to be constructed or dumad as an assignment to me am ol Ihn obhgarnons and lrabflmes ol [Go/dpagel under me msnmmenn 0/ me '— Clause 3 n Doll [71 The nnsnmmenn or me relerred no me sane and Purchase Aqrsemem between Gcldpags and Plusbury dalsd we H N11 15»). The pmpany remanned pan cf the nnasna nnnne held by Plnnsbury man. I| was ohlngaled um: ms SPA la appny fur the nm and have m same translerred In sonapage [an An und\spuned1ac|ns man Flushury had consenleo no me DoA nu nns Endarsemenl or Bonsanl cl Ina wen dale, Pnusnury expressed Ins undanaking Io delnver no Bank mam nu. sapzrzls documenl ml we on slrala we to ma pmperly loglmur wilh ma mgnsnnabna lranslar nn mums 01 oonuuaga |a secure the ragnsnralnon of sonupage as me rsgnflemd prupnenor on ma prvuarly. Pnusnmy mm connmua man nl had new and 5 sm vxao .a.uo~».»=aymnn “Nana smun luvnhnrwm .. med w my n... mnnuny mum: flnuavnml VI mum v-man was Iaking aH reasanable sIeps Io oblaln a sepaIa|e dowmenl pt Iille or slmla «me ha me vmpedy [91 The next day on Is I2 2013 Plusbury Issued a Ienev to Bank Islam Ina: cnnflmled sompagn was me beflefimal owner cl me propeny wmch had been Band In IIIII [10] In cm rrmnarna, nnII| a legal charge In Iawour cl Bunk mam over me properly was execmed am the IDT was Issued Bank Islam “shall have me sale and absolute rrgm and power (:7 dial wrlh Ina Property In any malmrv in its unsarma uucrurron r'ncIudrr-g me Irynl and Power 0/ sale wneznsr by publrc suclmn mby pm/ale Ixmlracl as rm were me sore and beneficial owner Inereal PROVIDED THA rm power 0/ sale shall not he sxsrcrsed by [Bank Islam] accept the nappenrrrg or occwvence b any or me Even olbeiaull as perms Frnanmrg Dacumern “— Clause 3 9 DOA [11] The DDA gramea Bank Islam Ina power aranomey ‘to dealwtlhlhe Prppsrvy rn snymannsr wnalsoever. ' The broad powers expressly stated Influded up seH “under me paws! of sale mnfsrred bylms AssrgrrmenI |ha| Bank Islam deemed necessary an any sale o1GoIdpages ngms, We or Imevesl In Irre pmpsny underlhe porwei o1saIe. Gnldpage undertook |o thereafter rauvy and oennrrn Ine same — mause 4 DDA. [I21 Upon dalaufl when me rmaueanass became due and payable. Bank IsIarn had (no power wuhoul Iunhar name |o Gmdpaga up‘ amangsl omen. ‘Iran:/at nr mrgr-I Ins Property or any part lherwlal such pncs 5 sm vxao aRpu0NwI=ayrnrsrA “Nana Snr1|In.rIhnrwHII>e UIQG In my me MEVHIUIY mum: flnuamnl VI .rIuNa WM er pnnes and In sum manner as me Bank shall m its abm/me dlscrelran mmk fit‘ — mause 7 2 MA [13] mass dauses are rewewem and mmenal as Bank ls\am nan pmmlsefl us anon: on me powers provided Ihelem 1oHammg <3aI¢page‘s menu as avmanl In Bank Islam‘: may at demand dated 1 7 2021 man also sawed as a nouns av lermnnahon of meme wnn Ina nnenuen Xa sen me pmpany and me demand tor aemry of mam pcssasskzn. The arnounx wlsundlng awed by Gompage In sank lllim was RM27,5U0,125 es Gnfldpaga had aereunea m as monlhly paymenls as it was wounu up Dursuinl to a uafiunn med by a mum nany In 2021 mummy ml Pursuanl to me D°VVers m lhe DOA. Bank ma-n oummsnuea corecmsure Drvcsedings auams| me pmpeny An eucnsn data 01 25.3.2022 was fixed Aunosl on me we onhe auction. Plusbury umalned an nnenm Ivquncfion (mm me Kua\a Lumpur >-ngn Court on 23.3.2022 In sum me aucmm Gompage was mad as the Second Defendam ny Flusbury. ms mlenm Iruunchan was set aside and msrmssed an 31 5 zu2z. us} Bank rsram pmoeeded wun ma aucxian on 15 7 2u22 but (here was na bidder A samnfl aucuen was cnnducled on I9 92022 men Fame had managed 2 sueeessmu ma var ma properly Famnla has settled me balanu price on 1312 2022.ba1nru Ina sue me lnr Inn same Goldpsae (M Hauudahonj mac os 374: lg: sx aanx Islam and Pmshury em vxao -RnuoNru=aymrsrA «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. HIQG a my me nrW\n|H|y mum: flnuamnl VI .HuNa v-ms! ggunnenus cunlendlng Bank Isl-un .1 Mn have the gem of sun» no} Far as 374: zsampage took me posmon mac me DOA msmly asmgnad mewngms unflerlne spa |o Bank ls\am The SPA contained no express powsrolsala m Goidpage nor ma n gaannaa powarol allomey In Gohiplge lo enher dean wwh and/or duspase av me pvcpeny. eampage-s urgumenl stralched (o stale lnzl Imhl Ina nu: av ma properly Imulerrad and ramslarafl \n ma Mme o( cumpage. n had no pmpflehry ngms uvar lharc nrcpeny and (hus not enluled m “H ma pmpany Gnldpage mama Iha| Bank |s|zm‘s assigned nghxs ware my anlarcezhle agnmsl Pmhury ax lrustea and nm m respect aftha pmplny [171 Fhlsbury‘ m sunporl :1! as 3741 and avwsmu 05 ans‘ luck me same posman as Govapage Phxsbury ocmended|ha(vHhe|rIns1erM|he prvpenym Gnldpage coma not be commeted or regvsk-grad Galdpage has me ngm (0 either Isrmmale me SPA of pursue me remedy av spemfic peflorrnance as pa clauses 6 and QSPA In answeno |ms <:o«n's query as (u mat Iemedyfies) avau Bank Isnanu, Plusbury slated manna smmon was me same as man mm eumpage - Io enher lermmale and/or enlmce me SPA by way 0! specmc pervonnance [we] A wamng M me on us. unequwocally c\aar .n its language Ind mlem. oompzga, .n a me In secure me nonowmg :71 RM1a.n0u.ooo m zma, had unamblgucuny assigned ngmseveune propenym Bank Islam. sm vxao .n.uo~».»=aynnn «mm. s.nn nmhnrwm .. U... n may he nrW\n|H|Y mum: flnuamnl VI mum Wm! The asslgnmsnl csnrlm be nut merely symbolic om came: MN’! ll Ihs subslanllve right of Bank Islam up exelclsle lla absolute mscrenon lo deal wllh me properly ln llls event cf aelaull by Goldpage. The crux :2! me DoA‘5 purpose was to enable Bank lslam lo leallze me value at me splapagas maebleansss through me properly, Much was expllully provided as callalsaal and secunly lor me mmmlg ms arrangement, as laid oul lfl me DoA leaves rla loam vol amlugullyl oonrllmlng me pmpafly‘S 10!: as a ssculsd asssl agalnsl me flnanclal obllgamans ol eolapapa ml Far ease nha1alanoe.s4(37Cwll Liw m 1955 ll raproducad hare as l ls relled on by ma aulhnnllas and lms own s oormderali “Any absolute asslgnmenl. by mung, under nu hand al ma asslynor nol purpmlng to be Dy way a/charge an/y. olany den! or othar legal chose m anlan ol which axpnss notl'r:e in wrlllng has been glven lo the debtor, lmszea or other persons from whom ma assigns! would have been enllllea In receive orclalm me meal or the chose ln acllpn, snall be, and be deemed to have been, elraaual m law, subject In all aqumss which would have been enlll/ed lo prlomy 01/67 the ngm ame asslgnee lmdsv ma law as If axlsvsa m the Stale aelpm ma dale o/me comlllg into me onms Act, In pass and tranxler me legal ngm ol the am afchase ln actlon, from the 11519 of ma males, and all legal and oillel Iemudlas (at me same, and ma paws! Ia glvfi a good dlscrlsrge lot Ina same, wllhaut ma concurrence a! la. asslgnur " am vxao aRhLIONqFB‘1mYsFA “Nair Smnl navlhnrwlll as UIQG a may he nlwlnnlllll mm. flnuavlml VI nFl|.INQ Wm! [201 The roman cam ruled m Damal Fnlghl (M) Sdn Ehd v Alfin Bank Bemad [2015] 4 MLJ1A9|n delarmmmg vmemer an assvgnmsnl ws absomle referred «a the msuumema and us |em\s slated As me was ‘abso/ulely sssvgns were used n Mas new at para 25 alpI51 -ma /aw m to/anon to absolute assrg/Imenl rs clear. An absomla amgnmanz .5 an squrtnb/u mmgaga and (he amnce ol :3 morlguga rs Inst than u a lrlnshv nvma mummy or a chase m lcnon, not the /and, la the mortgagee (:99 Bupmdur Smgh and chum Eng Kang; my in was deemed bythe Fadeval Conn mm Ihe ahsomle asslunrmm was m relzunn lo 2 lransler ai ma Inga! "gm otme cum m aanun Ir-am me assugnonome asslgnse as assigned wwmm me meamng 0134(3) Cwll Law An Al para 25 wt was naracea >1: lofiows man when the bank sxsvmsed rts power L7/sale Lmdev lhs LACA Io drsposs alns lights by way ara mum» assvgnmenl. u only mvorves a Iranslav of a legal ngm m me chose m aclran Io ms purchaser rn me absence of any statutes :2: express pmvtsrons In me assignment resllrcmvg me disposal or such ngms, ma bank is enlrlled Io sxernfse Ils pawels 0/ sale and 10 have us ngms to ma chase In aanon trnnslevved Such pawsls and lights. m our wew, are no! exrlngmshod by mason ollha Issuance a/ma lam document nl mm to the ram: - 472] Bound by um: Vlgal prmdvla, |h|s Cami how: max Gnldpuge assigned ahsalmely to Bank mam was the DDA‘ fls canlmcxual right: m am vxao .a.uo»».»=amnn «mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. HIQG a may he mm-y mum: flnuamnl VI mum v-max

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

AC-82D-6-12/2021

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MOHD AMIRUL AMRIE BIN MOHD ZIMI

Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, s. 6 - Kesalahan memiliki dadah berbahaya jenis kanabis - Prima facie - Sama ad pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan inti pati-inti pati kesalahan - Sama ada tertuduh mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan dan pengetahuan terhadap dadah berbahaya - Kegagalan memanggil saksi-saksi material - Kegagalan menawarkan saksi kepada pembelaan - seksyen 114(g) Akta keterangan - credibility of investigating officer

23/01/2024

Puan Ashvinii a/p Thinakaran

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=30465dd6-3e08-40c5-ab92-f7cf5efa2927&Inline=true

KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN AC-82D-6-12/2021 PENDAKWARAYA VS MOHD AMIRUL AMRIE BIN MOHD ZIMI (NO.KP: 890429086327) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN LATAR BELAKANG KES Tertuduh dituduh bawah Seksyen 6 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (‘Akta’) kerana memiliki dadah berbahaya jenis kanabis. Fakta kes menunjukkan tertuduh ditahan ketika pihak polis sedang menjalankan sebuah operasi. Pada malam itu, Pegawai Serbuan (SP4) telah menerima arahan daripada Ketua Bahagian Narkotik Hilir Perak untuk menjalankan serbuan iaitu ASP V. Segaran. Arahan adalah bagi SP4 dan pasukan membuat serbuan ke atas rumah beralamat 593 Parit 8/6R, Jalan Chenderong Balai Kampung Belt, 36600, Chenderong Balai, Perak. Sejurus sampai di alamat tersebut, pihak polis telah melihat Tertuduh berdiri di hadapan rumah berkenaan dalam keadaan yang mencurigakan. Hal ini menyebabkan SP4 mengarahkan anggota- anggotanya untuk menghampiri dan memeriksa tertuduh. SP4 telah memperkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis dengan menunjukkan kad kuasa kepada Tertuduh. SP4 kemudian telah melakukan satu pemeriksaan fizikal atas Tertuduh. SP4 kemudiannya menemukan satu paket plastik lutsinar dadah disyaki cannabis ganja di hadapan poket sebelah kiri seluar panjang warna biru jenama Winmaster yang dipakai oleh Tertuduh. Selepas barang kes yang dirampas, barang kes diserahkan oleh SP4 kepada Pegawai Penyiasat (SP6). SP6 telah menyerahkan barang kes kepada Pegawai Kimia (SP3) melalui Inspektor Nurhazwani (SP2) untuk dianalisis, disahkan bahan tumbuhhan itu adalah dadah berbahaya jenis kanabis seberat 0.92g. Diputuskan (melepaskan dan membebaskan tertuduh daripada pertuduhan) 1. Demi mengemukakan satu kes prima facie bawah s. 6 Akta terhadap tertuduh, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah menunjukkan inti pati-inti pati kesalahan seperti: (i) dadah yang menjadi hal perkara pertuduhan adalah dadah berbahaya 23/01/2024 16:34:57 AC-82D-6-12/2021 Kand. 96 S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal sebagaimana yang ditetapkan bawah Akta; (ii) dadah berbahaya tersebut berada dalam milikan tertuduh (‘inti pati kesalahan kedua’); dan (iii) tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan ke atas dadah tersebut (‘inti pati ketiga’) 2. Secara ringkasnya, pihak pembelaan telah membangkitkan beberapa isu antaranya adalah keterangan SP4 selaku pegawai tangkapan adalah tidak konsisten tidak harus diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah. Adalah menjadi dapatan mahkamah bahawa keterangan SP4 adalah konsisten dan akan diterima pakai oleh mahkamah ini memandangkan soalan-soalan yang ditujukan kepada SP4 telah pun dijawab dan apa-apa percanggahan juga telah diperbaiki sewaktu dalam pemeriksaan balas. 3. Selain itu, isu kedua yang dibangkitkan adalah tandaan yang dibuat ke atas seluar barang kes dimana barang kes ditemui. Mahkamah ini menerima penjelasan SP4 yang menyatakan walaupun seluar tersebut telah disita dan tersenarai dalam borang bongkar namun begitu atas alasan berperikemanusiaan mereka tidak dapat membuat tandaan ke atas seluar tersebut memandangkan pada waktu kejadian berlaku OKT masih memakai seluar tersebut dan hanya boleh dibuat tandaan setelah sampai ke balai polis yang mana apabila pasukan serbuan bersama tertuduh sampai ke Balai Polis adalah pada hari esok. 4. Pembelaan juga telah membangkitkan isu, borang bongkar diisi oleh satu Sjn Aziz atas arahan SP4, dan kemudian SP4 telah menurunkan tandatangan ke atas Borang Bongkar tersebut. Sjn Aziz tersebut tidak dipanggil sebagai seorang saksi dalam kes ini. SP4 dalam keterangan telah menjelaskan kerana keadaan yang gelap dan atas dasar keselamatan SP4 telah mengarahkan Sjn Aziz yang menulis senarai barangan yang disita atas pemantauan SP4, dan setelah memastikan butiran adalah semua betul, SP4 baru menurunkan tandatangan. Alasan yang diberikan ini diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah. Maka, Mahkamah mendapati tiada isu berkenaan dengan Borang Bongkar. 5. Pihak Pendakwaan juga telah gagal menandakan paket plastik yang mengandungi barang barang sebagi P dan pembelaan menghujahkan barang kes tidak boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah memandangkan paket plastik itu tidak ditanda dan kekal sebagai ID14 dan barang sama juga tidak dirujuk kepada pegawai kimia untuk dicamkan dan juga untuk ditender sebagai barang kes. Persoalannya disini adalah sama ada barang kes tersebut boleh diterima oleh mahkamah ini dan dalam hal itu mahkamah mendapati chain of evidence dalam kes ini daripada sitaan oleh SP4 yang telah dipegang oleh SP4 sendiri dan telah S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal diserahkan kepada SP3 melalui SP6 dan SP2 adalah tidak terputus. 6. Akan tetapi kegagalan Pihak Pendakwaan menawarkan Sjn Aziz kepada pembelaan membangkitkan penggunaan Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan. Walaupun tiada keperluan dari pihak pendakwaan untuk membawa Sarjan Aziz sebagai seorang saksi memandangkan mereka untuk coroborate kenyataan- kenyataan oleh kesemua saksi secara keseluruhan. 7. Namun begitu memandangkan terdapat keraguan yang ditimbulkan oleh pihak pembelaan yang merupakan a line of defence pada tahap awal lagi, adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Pendakwaan untuk menawarkan saksi tersebut. Malah, mahkamah ini juga mendapati pihak pendakwaan gagal menawarkan mana- mana saksi lain kepada pembelaan. 8. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Suayri Ayapan menyatakan sekiranya mahkamah mendapati satu jurang atau kelompongan yang besar dalam kes pihak pendakwaan dan berpuas hati saksi yang tidak ditawarkan itu adalah saksi penting, dan pihak pendakwaan memendapkannya keterangan yang ada padanya yang sentiasa boleh diperolehi serta apa yang dilakukan pihak pendakwaan itu bagi tujuan utama mengecewakan pihak pembelaan untuk pembelaan, maka kegagalan memanggil saksi atau menawarkan saksi itu memberi inference yang tidak berpihak yang kuat kepada pihak pendakwaan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan. 9. Berikutan kegagalan pihak pendakwaan membuktikan elemen-elemen jagaan, kawalan dan pengetahuan, diputuskan tuntutan inti pati kesalahan kedua tidak dipenuhi. Serta dengan kewujudan penggunaan Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan kerana kegagalan Pendakwaan menawarkan saksi yang material dan penting kepada Pembelaan ada mewujudkan satu kelompongan besar dalam kes Pendakwaan. Oleh kerana tiada kes prima facie berjaya dikemukakan terhadap tertuduh, tertuduh dilepas dan dibebaskan daripada pertuduhan bawah s. 6 Akta tanpa perlu dipanggil untuk membela diri. PENGHAKIMAN PENDAHULUAN 1. Tertuduh telah dituduh melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah s. 6 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 [Akta 234] yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama. Pertuduhan terhadap tertuduh adalah seperti yang berikut: BAHAWA KAMU PADA 28/09/2021, JAM LEBIH KURANG 10.30 MALAM DI S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal HADAPAN SEBUAH RUMAH BERALAMAT 593, PARIT 8/6R JALAN CHENDERONG BALAI KG BELT, 36600 CHENDERONG BALAI, PERAK, DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN, TELAH ADA DALAM MILIKAN KAMU DADAH BERBAHAYA IAITU CANNABIS SEBERAT 0.92 GRAM. OLEH YANG DEMIKIAN KAMU TELAH MELAKUKAN SATU KESALAHAN DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 6 AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA 1952 DAN BOLEH DIHUKUM DI BAWAH SEKYEN 6 AKTA YANG SAMA. 2. Pihak pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah memanggil seramai enam orang saksi pendakwaan (“SP”): (i) Sjn Aliman bin Amel (SP1) (Penjaga Stor); (ii) Insp Norhazwani (SP2) (Penghantar dan Pengambil kimia); (iii) Faznur Adilah Binti Mohmud (SP3) (Ahli Kimia); (iv) Insp Tie Ngie Sieng (SP4) (Pegawai Tangkapan); (v) KPL Rasyidi (SP5) (Anggota Serbuan); dan (vi) Insp Azrul (SP6) Pegawai Penyiasat. KEDUDUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG DAN PRIMA FACIE: 3. S. 173(7i)(i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (KTJ) telah memperuntukkan berkenaan tugas mahkamah di akhir kes pihak pendakwaan adalah untuk memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh atas pertuduhan terhadapnya. Mahkamah perlu menilai keterangan-keterangan saksi pihak pendakwaan yang credible yang telah membuktikan semua intipati pertuduhan sebelum Tertuduh dipanggil untuk membela diri. 4. Perkataan prima facie tidak ditakrifkan di bawah KTJ. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balacahandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 [2005] 1 AMR 321: [2005] 2 MLJ 301 telah menghuraikan berkenaan ujian prima facie sepertimana yang berikut: ...The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie case. S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5. Maka, di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah meneliti keperluan untuk melakukan penilaian secara maksimum ke atas keseluruhan keterangan dan bukti- bukti sokongan di dalam kes ini. Seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dirujuk: Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code sets out the procedure to be followed by the court at the close of prosecution case as follows; (1) When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused. (2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal. (3) If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence. (4) For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction. 6. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Looi Kow Chai v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734 [2003] 2 MLJ 65; [2003] 2 AMR 89 berkenaan prima facie telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "In our respectful view, the correct test to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case has been made out under s. 180 of the CPC (and this would apply to a trial under s. 173 of the CPC) is that as encapsulated in the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (as he then was) in Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] CLJ Rep 101: [1983] 2 CLJ 10: [1983] 2 MLJ 232 at p 270: To summarize, it would therefore appear that having regard to the prosecution evidence adduced so far, a prima facie case has not been established against Nordin Johan and Aziz Abdullah, the second accused and the fourth accused which, failing their rebuttal, would warrant their conviction. In other words if they elect to remain silent now (which I hold they are perfectly entitled to do even though they are being tried under the Emergency Regulations) the question is can they be convicted of the offence of section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code ? My answer to the question is in the negative.' We are confident in the view we have just expressed because we find nothing in the amended s. 180(1) of the CPC that has taken away the right of an accused person to S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal remain silent at the close of the prosecution case. Further we find nothing in the legislative intention of Parliament as expressed in the language employed by it to show that there should be a dual exercise by a judge under s. 180 when an accused elects to remain silent as happened in Pavone v. Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 LNS 99: [1984] 1 MLJ 77. In other words, we are unable to discover anything in the language of the recently formulated s. 180 that requires a judge sitting alone first to make a minimum evaluation and then when the accused elects to remain silent to make a maximum evaluation in deciding whether to convict or not at the close of the prosecution case. It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s. 180 of the CPC has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question: if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal." 7. Kes Public Prosecutor v Poh Ah Kwang [2003] 3 AMR 670 menyatakan seperti berikut: “Since the standard of proof at this stage is prima facie proof, which means a maximum evaluation of the evidence on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence of SP2 is therefore for all intends and purposes uncorroborated in so far as the answers given by the accused were concerned..”. 8. Kes Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ turut dirujuk; “After the amendments to ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a Subordinate Court and the High Court under the amended section is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter his or her defence. 9. Bagi mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh dalam kes di bawah perenggan 6 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal menunjukkan intipati-intipati kesalahan yang berikut telah dibuktikan iaitu: (a) dadah yang menjadi hal perkara pertuduhan adalah dadah berbahaya sebagaimana yang ditetapkan bawah Akta; (b) dadah berbahaya tersebut berada dalam milikan tertuduh; dan (c) tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan ke atas dadah tersebut SEKSYEN KESALAHAN: [1] Dikemukakan seksyen-seksyen berkaitan pertuduhan dan kesalahan untuk rujukan mudah seperti berikut; Section 6. Restriction on possession of raw opium, coca leaves, poppy-straw and cannabis. Any person who keeps or has in his possession, custody or control any raw opium, coca leaves, poppystraw or cannabis or the seeds of the plants from which they may be obtained either directly or indirectly, except under and in accordance with an authorization such as is referred to in sections 4 and 5 or with any regulation made under section 7 thereof, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding **twenty thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. ELEMEN PERTUDUHAN: [2] Bagi isu pertama, tidak dipertikaikan bahawa dadah yang merupakan hal perkara pertuduhan adalah Cannabis sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah Seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [3] Keterangan ini disokong melalui keterangan ahli kimia SP3 yang menjalankan analisis terhadap bahan yang dijumpai dan dirampas di tempat kejadian serta disokong oleh laporan kimia SP3 [P7]. [4] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kes PP v. Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649 yang mana telah dinyatakan bahawa: As the evidence of a chemist on the analysis of drugs by him is not evidence of opinion but evidence of fact, he need not give particulars of the tests carried out S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal by him in his evidence. It follows that his report, tendered in evidence under s. 399(1), also need not contain such particulars. In any event it has been held by the trilogy of the (then) Supreme Court cases of Munusamy v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221; [1987] 1 MLJ 492, PP v. Lam San [1991] 3 CLJ 2410; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 391; [1991] 3 MLJ 426 and Khoo Hi Chiang’s case that the court is entitled to accept the evidence of the chemist on its face value without the necessity for him to go into details of what he did in the laboratory step by step unless it is inherently incredible or the defence calls evidence in rebuttal by another expert. Thus, if the accused is dissatisfied with the conclusion reached by the chemist it is for him to summon the chemist as a witness for that purpose or adduce evidence in rebuttal. This has not been done by the accused in this case. The chemist report tendered in evidence in this case is therefore not defective. Rantaian Keterangan Mengenai Barang Kes [5] Walau bagaimanapun, bagi membuktikan elemen pertama telah dipenuhi, adalah juga menjadi tanggungjawab pihak pendakwaan untuk mengemukakan keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa rantaian keterangan mengenai pengendalian barang kes tersebut adalah utuh dan tidak pada bila-bila masa terjejas sebagaimana yang telah dijelaskan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Mohd Osman Pawan v. PP [1989] 2 CLJ 388; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 108 SC; [1989] 2 MLJ 110; [1989] 1 MLRA 67. [6] Pihak pendakwaan perlu meyakinkan mahkamah ini bahawa rantaian keterangan berkenaan dengan identiti ekshibit dari masa dadah berbahaya itu mula ditemui dan dirampas sehinggalah masa ia dikemukakan sebagai barang bukti di mahkamah tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa terputus sebagaimana yang telah diputuskan dalam kes Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP [2004] 4 CLJ 551 CA; [2004] 4 MLJ 489; [2004] 2 MLRA 180; [2004] 6 AMR 189. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam penghakimannya telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: 41. First, by way of a general observation, I am of the view that, in a drug trafficking case what is important is that it must be proved that it is the substance that was recovered that was sent to the chemist for analysis and it is that same substance that is found to be heroin or cannabis etc., and it is in respect of that substance that an accused is charged with trafficking. So, the chain of evidence is more important for the period from the time of recovery until the completion of the analysis by the chemist. Even then it does not necessarily mean that if the exhibit is passed from one person to another, every one of them must be called S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal to give evidence of the handing over from [2023] 1 SMC PP lwn. Fairuzzamani Hamid 371 one person to another and if there is a break, even for one day, the case falls. ... 43. The second period is from the time that it was received back from the chemist until it is produced in court. In my view, the chain of evidence is less important during this second period. This is because, as far as I am aware, there is no law that the exhibit recovered must be produced in court and if not, the prosecution’s case must necessarily fall, it may or it may not, again depend on the facts and the circumstances of each case. [7] Selanjutnya dalam kes Sia Pang Liong v. PP [2012] 9 CLJ 848, berkenaan dengan rantaian keterangan barang kes dadah, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: [11] Thus, the identity of the drug exhibits was being challenged by the appellant. Once there is such a challenge, the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that there are no gaps in the chain of evidence. It is the burden of the prosecution to adduce evidence that the drug exhibits that were recovered from the appellant and that were sent to the chemist for analysis were the same drug exhibits that the appellant was charged with. ... [14] It appears that PW7 after collecting back the drug exhibits from ASP Izanizam, packed the drug exhibits and sent them to the chemist, But nowhere in his evidence that he had indicated that the drug exhibits that he received from ASP Izanizam on 28 October 2003 were the same drug exhibits that he sent to ASP Izanizam on 29 September 2003. PW7 did not identify the drug exhibits to be the same exhibits. [15] ASP izanizam could have saved the situation, but he was not called as a witness for the prosecution. Through PW7, it was revealed that the findings of ASP Izanizam on the presence of finger print on the drug exhibits were negative. It was for that reason (as argued by the DPP) ASP Izanizam was not called as a witness for the prosecution, but only offered as a witness to the defence. [16] But, we are of the view that the absence of positive identification by PW7 on the drug exhibits that he collected from ASP Izanizam were the same drug exhibits that he sent to ASP Izanizam earlier had put into doubt whether the drug exhibits that were analysed by the chemist were the same drug exhibits recovered from the appellant. S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [17] In the circumstances of this case, ASP Izanizam should have been called by the prosecution as its witness. This is bearing in mind that the drug exhibits were in ASP Izanizam’s custody for almost a month. If he was called as a witness, he could have explained what he did with the drug exhibits in particular as to how the drug exhibits were kept during the said period. Most importantly, he could have also identified the drug exhibits. But, it did not happen in this case. This has raised a doubt as to the identity of the drug exhibits. Therefore, we are giving the benefit of the doubt to the appellant. [8] Dalam kes PP v. Mohd Fikri Ramli [2022] 1 LNS 232, Mahkamah telah menerangkan bahawa terdapat dua senario yang boleh menyebabkan terputusnya rantaian keterangan. Pertama, apabila pihak pendakwaan gagal untuk memanggil saksi material berhubung dengan pengendalian ekshibit dan kedua apabila ekshibit yang menjadi persoalan telah dikendalikan dengan secara tidak jelas. [9] Mahkamah juga meruiuk kes PP v. Lee Yau Ket [2008] 1 LNS 172; [2008] 4 MLJ 223 berhubung dengan persoalan mengenai lompang/gap dalam pengendalian barang kes di mana mahkamah telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: [57] The gap brings into question too many possibilities as to what happened to the exhibits during that lacuna in the chain of custody, such that it cannot be definitively concluded, without any doubt, that the remaining exhibits were left untampered or unaltered. [10] Bagi meneliti isu sama ada terdapat apa-apa lompang (gap) dalam keterangan mengenai rantaian pengendalian barang kes yang boleh mewujudkan keraguan atas identiti barang kes atau tidak, mahkamah telah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan yang telah dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua belah pihak. [11] Dalam kes ini pihak pembelaan telah beberapa kali mencabar keterangan SP4 dan SP5 bahawa barang kes dadah yang kononnya dirampas daripada tertuduh adalah bukan milik Tertuduh. Pihak Pembelaan pada awal lagi telah meletakkan pembelaan mereka bahawa tertuduh pada setiap masa materiial tidak berada di luar rumah beralamat 593 Parit 8/6R, Jalan Chenderong Balai Kampung Belt, 36600, Chenderong Balai, Perak, malah berada di dalam rumah tersebut kerana sedang melawat seorang kawan bernama En Yahya. Malah perkara ini juga dipersetujui oleh SP4 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Q: Anak guam saya pergi ke rumah tersebut untuk tujuan berjumpa dengan encik Yahya yang baru sahaja kena serangan stroke, setuju tak setuju? A: Saya tak ingat nama enciik Yahya tapi dia memang bagitahu saya dia pergi melawat kawan. Saya ingat itu sahaja. Nama saya tidak ingat. [12] Selain itu, Pihak Pembelaan juga ada membangkitkan isu kepunyaan rumah tersebut adalah bukan milik Tertuduh yang mana disetujui oleh SP4. SP4 juga turut setuju alamat kediaman Tertuduh adalah di alamat lain dan tidak ada apa-apa keperluan untuk Tertuduh berlegar di hadapan rumah tersebut. Selain itu, Pihak Pembelaan juga telah meletakkan kepada SP4 versi pembelaan dimana, pihak polis sememangnya sedang menjalankan serbuan di dalam rumah yang sama, dan apabila Tertuduh sampai di hadapan rumah dengan tujuan melawat kawan bernama En Yahya, Tertuduh telah diarahkan oleh Lans Koperal Syakir untuk masuk ke dalam rumah. [13] Pembelaan turut menyatakan Lans Koperal adalah sebenarnya orang yang memeriksa Tertuduh dan bukan SP4. Walaupun SP4 tidak setuju dengan cadangan peguam di atas namun, Mahkamah mendapati Pendakwaan telah terkhilaf dengan tidak memanggil Lans Koperal Syakir ini bagi menjawab kepada cadangan Peguam. Malah, Pendakwaan juga gagal menawarkan Lans Koperal Syakir kepada Pembelaan juga. [14] Oleh itu, terdapat satu kelompong di dalam kes Pendakwaan dan persoalan utama adalah sebenarnya tertuduh ditangkap dimana? Di hadapan rumah tersebut atau di dalam rumah tersebut? Mengapa SP6 tidak siasat keberadaan Tertuduh di sana, sama ada memang betul Tertuduh hadir ke tempat itu untuk melawat rakannya En Yahya dan siapa sebenarnya pemilik rumah tersebut. Tiada apa-apa dokumen yang dikemukakan oleh Pendakwaan berkenaan milikan rumah tersebut. [15] Selain itu, Siapakah yang sebenarnya telah menjalankan pemeriksaan terhadap Tertuduh? Adakah SP4 atau Lans Koperal Syakir? Cadangan ini telah dikemukakan oleh Pembelaan pada awal lagi dimana, Pendakwaan sepatutnya membawa Lans Koperal Syakir sebagai seorang saksi untuk menjawab kepada persoalan Pembelaan. Maka, persoalan siapa sebenarnya orang yang periksa Tertuduh dan membuat sitaan ke atas cannabis tersebut masih tidak terjawab, malah keterangan yang dipertengahkan sewaktu perbicaraan oleh Pendakwaan adalah tidak mencukupi bagi membuktikan barang kes yang dibawa ke Mahkamah adalah S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal sememangnya milik Tertuduh. [16] Dalam hal ini, apabila terdapat cabaran terhadap keterangan mana-mana saksi pendakwaan berkenaan identiti barang kes dadah serta butiran pemeriksaan dan tangkapan Tertuduh, pihak pendakwaan perlulah mengemukakan keterangan yang melampaui keraguan yang munasabah bahawa tidak terdapat lompang atau gap dalam rantaian keterangan mengenai Cannabis yang ditemui dan dirampas daripada tertuduh pada hari kejadian. [17] Walau bagaimanapun, pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk memberikan penjelasan yang memuaskan berkenaan isu-isu yang telah berbangkit sepanjang kes pendakwaan seperti yang di atas. [18] Setelah meneliti keseluruhan kes pendakwaan, berhubung dengan isu sama ada terdapat apa-apa lompang (gap) dalam rantaian keterangan mengenai barang kes yang boleh mewujudkan keraguan atas identiti barang kes atau tidak, mahkamah mendapati pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan bahawa tidak terdapat lompang dalam keterangan mengenai rantaian pengendalian barang kes. Mahkamah juga mendapati kelompangan tersebut tidak dijelaskan/diisi dengan penjelasan untuk menutup kelompangan tersebut sehingga telah mewujudkan suatu jurang yang besar yang telah menimbulkan keraguan mengenai identiti barang kes dadah dalam kes ini. Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa inti pati pertama iaitu dadah yang merupakan hal perkara pertuduhan adalah dadah sebagaimana yang ditetapkan di bawah Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 telah gagal untuk dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. [19] Berkenaan dengan intipati kedua, iaitu sama ada dadah cannabis itu berada dalam milikan Tertuduh? [20] Prinsip berkenaan kes milikan dan pengetahuan ke atasnya boleh dilihat di dalam kes PP v Abdul Rahman bin Akif [2007] 5 MLJ 1. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan bersetuju dengan Lord Morris di dalam kes Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (supra) yang menyatakan: “If there is assent to the control of a thing, either after having the means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains or being unmindful whether there are means of knowledge or not, then ordinarily there will be possession. If there is S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal some momentary custody of a thing without any knowledge or means of knowledge of what the thing is or contains then, ordinarily, I would suppose that there would not be possession. If, however, someone deliberately assumes control of some package or container, then I would think that he is in possession of it. If he deliberately so assumes control knowing that it has contents, he would also be in possession of the contents. I cannot think that it would be rational to hold that someone who is in possession of a box which he knows to have things in it is in possession of the box but not in possession of the things in it. If he had been misinformed or misled as to the nature of the contents, or if he had made a wrong surmise as to them, it seems to me that he would nevertheless be in possession of them”. [21] Maksud “milikan” telah dijelaskan oleh Thomson J dalam kes Chan Pean Leon v. PP [1956] 1 LNS 17; [1956] 1 MLJ 237, yang menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “possession” for the purposes of criminal law involves possession itself - which some authorities term “custody or control” - and knowledge of the nature of the thing possessed. As to possession itself he cited the following definition in Stephen’s Digest (9th Ed), at p. 304), in which the exclusive element mentioned by Taylor J appears: A moveable thing is said to be in the possession of a person when he is so situated with respect to it that he has the power to deal with it as owner to the exclusion of all other persons, and when the circumstances are such that he may be presumed to intend to do so in case of need. [19] Once the elements needed to constitute possession are established, including the element of exclusive power to deal, then what is established is possession, not exclusive possession. So much for exclusive possession. [22] Berpandukan kepada kes Chan Pean Leon yang dinyatakan di atas, adalah menjadi suatu prinsip undang-undang yang mantap bahawa bagi membuktikan seseorang itu mempunyai “milikan”, pihak pendakwaan perlulah membuktikan melalui keterangan bahawa seseorang itu mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan ke atas sesuatu barang tersebut dan bebas berurusan atau mengendalikan barang tersebut sepenuhnya tanpa penglibatan orang lain (power of disposal to the exclusion of others) dan seseorang itu juga perlu mempunyai pengetahuan atas sesuatu barang tersebut. [23] Mahkamah juga merujuk kes Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor v. PP [2011] 4 CLJ 113 iaitu suatu keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan yang telah menyatakan prinsip undang-undang yang berikut berhubung dengan kawalan dan jagaan: S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “The law is well settled that having only custody or control over the said drugs is insufficient to establish ‘possession’. The physical act or custody must be accompanied with evidence that the accused had knowledge of the said drugs. In the absence of any statutory presumption, knowledge has to be proved either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Mere knowledge alone without exclusivity of either physical custody or control or both is insufficient in law to constitute possession, let alone trafficking.” [24] Berhubung dengan inti pati kedua ini, SP4 telah menyatakan dalam keterangan beliau bahawa dia telah memperkenalkan diri sebagai pegawai kanan polis, menunjukkan kad kuasa dan seterusnya menjalankan pemeriksaan ke atas badan Tertuduh, seterusnya membuat rampasan ke atas cannabis dan akhirnya membuat tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh. Keterangan ini disokong oleh SP5. [25] Namunpun begitu, Mahkamah ini mendapati Pembelaan ada mencadangkan versi pembelaan iaitu SP4 adalah bukan orang yang memeriksa mahupun tangkap Tertuduh, apatah lagi membuat sitaan ke atas cannabis tersebut. Selanjutnya, mereka menekankan orang yang sememangnya melakukan perkara itu adalah Lans Koperal Syakir dimana beliau tidak dipanggil sebagai seorang saksi untuk memberikan penjelasan berkenaan versi pembelaan malah juga tidak ditawarkan kepada Pembelaan. [26] Ini menyebabakan terpakai seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan sepertimana yang telah saya huraikan di atas. Maka persoalan di sini adalah, adakah pihak pendakwaan ada menyembunyikan kejadian sebenar yang berlaku? Maka, Mahkamah ini terpaksa bersetuju dengan cadangan Pembelaan dimana SP4 adalah bukan sememangnya orang yang menjalankan pemeriksaan ke atas Tertuduh, mahupun membuat rampasan ke atas barang kes atau tangkap Tertuduh. [27] Dikemukakan Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan: 114. Court may presume existence of certain fact The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ILLUSTRATIONS The court may presume-- (g) that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it; [28] Mahkamah ini mengambil berat bahawa pemakaian seksyen ini adalah mengikut kepada keadaan setiap kes dan kepentingan saksi/bukti yang dinyatakan tersebut. Kes Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492,494 (SC) telah menggariskan panduan bahawa: “It is essential to appreciate the scope of Section 114 (g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non- production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to the case”. [29] Mahkamah telah merujuk kes Mohd Nazaruddin Khairudin lwn. PP [2020] 2 CLJ 244; [2020] 5 MLJ 149 iaitu suatu keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: [53] Secara lebih spesifik, pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh bergantung kepada keterangan tentang pistol ekshibit P15C yang dikatakan dirampas dari perayu untuk meletakkan perayu di tempat kejadian pada masa yang material tersebut (The prosecution cannot rely on the evidence of the pistol allegedly seized from the appellant to place the appellant at the scene of crime at the material time). [54] Ini kerana saksi atau pegawai yang dikatakan merampas pistol tersebut dari perayu tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan untuk mengesahkan bahawa eksh pistol P15C yang dikemukakan di mahkamah dan yang digunakan oleh SP5 untuk ujian balistiknya adalah pistol yang sama yang beliau rampas dari perayu. Kegagalan untuk memanggil saksi tersebut telah mewujudkan lompang yang besar dalam kes pendakwaan. Kelompangan ini adalah ‘fatal’ bagi kes pihak pendakwaan. [30] Selanjutnya, dalam kes Ibrahim Mohamad & Anor v. PP [2011] 4 CLJ 113, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam membincangkan isu berkenaan budi bicara pihak S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pendakwaan dalam pemanggilan saksi telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: (4) Notwithstanding that the prosecution has complete discretion as to the choice of witnesses to be called at the trial, it has a duty to call all necessary witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative of the prosecution’s case... (5) There was a danger of relying on a tip-off case as there was a possibility that the drugs might have been planted in order to implicate the accused. (10) Whilst it is not denied that the prosecution has a complete discretion as to the choice of witnesses to be called at the trial, it has a duty to call all necessary witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative of the prosecution’s case. This was not done in the present case. The question as to how the vehicle came into the custody and control of both the accused still remains unanswered. We are of the view that Zainuddin being the registered owner of the vehicle is the one who holds the key to the unfolding of events, without which there are gaps in the prosecution’s case. [31] Mahkamah juga merujuk kes Abdullah Yaacob v. PP [1991] 1 LNS 68, Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ (Malaya) telah menimbangkan isu ini dan telah memutuskan bahawa: It is certainly true that, as was said in Su Ah Ping v. PP [1980] 1 MLJ 75, the Federal Court had held there that it is not required of the prosecution to call all the officers or the persons concerned who had seen or identified an exhibit. This is not the real intention of the law. Su Ah Ping [1980] 1 MLJ 75 only decided the general principles. But the facts of one case differ from those of another and the duty of the prosecution in each case is to prove the case beyond any reasonable doubt to the court. The case must be clearly proved without [reasonable] doubt or question that can be raised about the exhibits. See also Teo Hoe Chye v. PP [1987] 1 MLJ 220 at p 229. There should be no break in the chain of evidence giving rise to doubt relating to the exhibits. [32] Dalam suatu lagi keputusan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan yang turut menyentuh isu yang sama iaitu kes Ti Chuee Hiang v. PP [1995] 3 CLJ 1, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: Ianya jelas menurut undang-undang bahawa walaupun pendakwaan mempunyai budi bicara penuh mengenai pilihan saksi-saksi untuk dipanggil di perbicaraan, ianya juga berkewajipan untuk memanggil kesemua saksi-saksi yang perlu bagi membuktikan kes terhadap tertuduh tanpa keraguan yang S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal munasabah, dan jika, dalam melaksanakan budi bicaranya itu, ia gagal untuk memenuhi tanggungjawab tersebut, yang merupakan kewajipan statutori, tertuduh haruslah dibebaskan. [33] Berdasarkan autoriti-autoriti di atas, walaupun pihak pendakwaan mempunyai budi bicara untuk memanggil mana-mana saksi dalam kes pendakwaan, mahkamah berpendapat pihak pendakwaan tidak boleh mengabaikan keperluan untuk memanggil saksi penting yang boleh menghuraikan segala keraguan terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. [34] Mahkamah ini berpandangan memandangkan peranan Lans Koperal Syakir tidak dijelaskan secara spesifik oleh mana-mana saksi pendakwaan, merupakan saksi penting dan material yang dapat membentangkan naratif kes pendakwaan berkenaan pemeriksaan yang dijalankan terhadap tertuduh pada hari kejadian untuk menghuraikan apa-apa keraguan yang timbul sepanjang kes pihak pendakwaan serta memberi penjelasan kepada kesemua cadangan yang dibangkitkan oleh Pembelaan. [35] Selain itu, itu Borang Bongkar yang ditulis oleh Sjn Aziz juga dibangkitkan oleh Pendakwaan. Walaupun, (in the offset) Mahkamah ini menerima penjelasan SP4 berkenaan dengan keadaan gelap dan bertujuan menjaga keselamatan semua orang SP4 mengambil keputusan dan mengarahkan Sjn Aziz yang menulis senarai rampasan dalam Borang Bongkar sementara dipantau oleh SP4. Setelah SP4 membaca semula senarai dan berpuas hati semua betul, baru menurunkan tandatangan. Maka, Mahkamah ini berpandangan tiada isu berkenaan dengan Borang Bongkar yang dikemukakan oleh Pendakwaan. [36] Namun pun begitu, pihak pembelaan telah menimbulkan penggunaan seksyen 114 (g) kerana pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk menawarkan saksi Sarjan Aziz kepada pihak pembelaan. Memandangkan terdapat 1 keraguan yang ditimbulkan oleh pihak pembelaan yang merupakan ‘first line of defence’ maka adalah berpatutan untuk pihak pendakwaan menawarkan saksi tersebut kepada pembelaan memandangkan saksi tersebut adalah merupakan ahli serbuan. Dalam kes ini mahkamah juga mendapati pihak pendakwaan tidak ada menawarkan mana-mana saksi lain kepada pembelaan. [37] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Suayri Ayapan dimana menyatakan sekiranya mahkamah mendapati satu jurang atau kelompongan yang besar dalam kes pihak S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pendakwaan dan berpuas hati saksi yang tidak ditawarkan itu adalah saksi penting, dan pihak pendakwaan memendapkannya keterangan yang ada padanya yang sentiasa boleh diperolehi serta apa yang dilakukan pihak pendakwaan itu bagi tujuan utama mengecewakan pihak pembelaan untuk pembelaan, maka kegagalan memanggil saksi atau menawarkan saksi itu memberi inference yang tidak berpihak yang kuat kepada pihak pendakwaan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan. [38] Dalam keterangan SP4 mahkamah mendapati Sarjan Aziz masih lagi berkhidmat bersama dengan pihak polis di bahagian Hilir Perak dan boleh dipanggil untuk memberi keterangan malah sepatutnya ditawarkan juga kepada pihak pembelaan sepertimana Lans Kpl Syakir. Namun, pendakwaan gagal berbuat sedemikian. [39] Persoalan yang perlu dijawab adalah adakah saksi Sarjan Aziz dan Lans Kpl Syakir itu merupakan saksi-saksi penting dan saksi-saksi material yang seharusnya dipanggil oleh Pendakwaan untuk menjawab isu-isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Pembelaan ataupun sekurang-kurangnya ditawarkan kepada Pembelaan. [40] Dalam kes ini, Sarjan Aziz merupakan orang yang telah mengisi borang bongkar tersebut dan saksi mata kepada keberadaan Tertuduh pada waktu kejadian berlaku di mana versi pembelaan adalah Tertuduh pada ketika itu sebenarnya berada di dalam rumah setelah diarahkan oleh Lans Kpl Syakir. Oleh itu mahkamah mendapati Sarjan Aziz dan Lans Kpl Syakir adalah sememangnya saksi-saksi yang penting dan material [41] Selanjutnya, bagi membuktikan elemen pengetahuan, pihak pendakwaan telah bersandarkan keterangan SP4 mengenai reaksi tertuduh semasa pemeriksaan badan dilakukan, tertuduh dikatakan berada dalam keadaan terkejut dan kelihatan mencurigakan untuk menunjukkan tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan akan barang kes dadah yang dirampas. Malah, semasa disoal balas oleh pihak pembelaan SP4 mengakui Tertuduh kelihatan seperti menunggu seorang. SP4: Mencurigakan macam dia menunggu seorang. Tengok kiri dan kanan, tengok menunggu seseorang... [42] Perkara ini menyokong versi pembelaan dimana, Tertuduh pergi ke sana untuk berjumpa dengan rakannya En Yahya dan sementara menunggu Lans Kpl Syakir S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal telah arahkan Tertuduh masuk ke dalam rumah. Mahkamah ini turut bersetuju dengan cadangan Pembelaan yang menyatakan perbuatan menunggu seseorang itu bukanlah satu perbuatan yang mencurigakan. Setakat kelihatan sebagai menunggu seorang adalah tidak mencukupi untuk membuktikan Tertuduh mempunyai pengetahuan ke atas cannabis tersebut. [43] Selain itu, Pendakwaan juga bergantung kepada tempat dimana barang kes dijumpai iaitu poket seluar yang dipakai oleh tertuduh. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah berpandangan tiada keperluan untuk menghuraikan berkenaan seluar yang dipakai oleh Tertuduh memandangkan kejadian sebenar yang sepatutnya berlaku masih samar-samar dengan kegagalan pihak pendakwaan memanggil saksi-saksi berkaitan. Maka, persoalan-persoalan yang berbangkit dalam kes ini tiada hala tuju dan jawapan. [44] Oleh yang demikian, pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan inferens pengetahuan dadah yang dijumpai daripada tertuduh hasil pemeriksaan tersebut. Tanpa pengetahuan tersebut, apatah lagi kegagalan menunjukkan jagaan dan kawalan, pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan inti pati milikan secara positif melalui keterangan langsung. [45] Oleh yang demikian, mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa inti pati kedua iaitu dadah tersebut berada dalam milikan tertuduh telah gagal untuk dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. ISU LAIN YANG DIBANGKITKAN OLEH PEMBELAAN [46] Sama ada Pegawai Penyiasat iaitu SP6 dalam kes ini adalah seorang credible witness dan adakah keterangan SP6 tidak boleh dipercayai dan was was oleh Mahkamah ini sebelum satu keputusan boleh dibuat? Mahkamah merujuk kepada apa yang dikatakan oleh YA Gopal Sri Ram dalam kes PP v. Mohd Radi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457: "After the amendments to ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a subordinate court and the High Court under the amended sections is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter upon his or her defence. It involves an assessment of the credibility of the S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal witnesses called by the prosecution and the drawing of inferences admitted by the prosecution evidence. Thus, if the prosecution evidence admits of two or more inferences, one of which is in the accused's favour, then it is the duty of the court to draw the inference that is favourable to the accused. See Tai Chai Keh v. Public Prosecutor [1948] 1 LNS 122; [1948- 49] MLJ Supp 105: Public Prosecutor v. Kasmin bin Soeb [1974] 1 LNS 116; [1974] 1 MLJ 230. If the court, upon a maximum evaluation of the evidence placed before it at the close of the prosecution case, comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has not been made out, it should acquit the accused. If, on the other hand, the court after conducting a maximum evaluation of the evidence comes to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out, it must call for the defence. If the accused then elects to remain silent, the court must proceed to convict him. It is not open to the court to then re-assess the evidence and to determine whether the prosecution had established its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of any evidence from the accused that casts a reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case renders the prima facie case one that is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Put shortly, what the trial court is obliged to do under ss 173(f) and 180 of the CPC is to ask itself the question: If the accused elects to remain silent, as he is perfectly entitled to do, am I prepared to convict him on the evidence now before me? See Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] CLJ Rep 101; [1983] 2 MLJ 232. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the defence must be called. And if the accused remains silent, he must be convicted. If the answer is in the negative, then the accused must be acquitted." [47] Manakala, berikut yang dikatakan oleh YA Stephen Chung dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Alias bin Md Yusof [2019] 7 CLJ 618; [2019] 6 MLJ 392: "[31] We revisit the test to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case had been made out under ss. 173 or 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It has been settled that a judge sitting alone must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and ask himself whether if he decides to call the accused to enter his defence and the accused elects to remain silent, is the judge prepared to convict him on the totality of the evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative, then no prima facie case has been made out. It does not mean that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt at this intermediate stage: see Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] CLJ (Rep) 101; [1983] 2 MLJ 232 S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal followed in Looi Kow Chai & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734; [2003] 2 MLJ 65. As this exercise cannot be postponed to the end of the trial, a maximum evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be done at the close for the prosecution before the court can rule that a prima facie case has been made out in order to call for the defence: Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor [2002] 3 CLJ 457; [2002] 3 MLJ 193 (FC)." [48] Mahkamah turut merujuk kepada kes Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Haji Harun Bin Haji Idris (NO 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 15, Yang Amat Arif Raja Azlan Shah (pada ketika itu) telah menyatakan: "...In opinion discrepancies there will always be, because in the circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every single thing that happened. It may be open to criticism, or it might be better if they took down a notebook and wrote down every single thing that happened and every single thing that was said. But they did not know that they are going to be witnesses at this trial. I shall be almost inclined to think that if there are no discrepancies, it might be suggested that they have concocted their accounts of what had happened or what had been said because their versions are too consistent. The question is whether the existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize each evidence very carefully as this involves the question of weight to be given to certain evidence in particular circumstances." [49] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Noor Azmi Ibrahim V. Pp & Other Cases [2023] 6 CLJ 906 yang menyatakan, “The High Court as an appellate court does not have the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses and it is trite that an appellate court would be slow to disturb the findings of the subordinate court on the issue of credibility of witnesses unless the findings made was perverse. In the case ofDato' Mokhtar Hashim & Anor v. PP [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 101; [1983] 2 MLJ 232, the court held: (7) the credibility of a witness is primarily a matter for the trial judge. The functions of an Appellate Court, when dealing with a question of fact in which S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal questions of credibility are involved are limited in their character and scope and in an appeal from a decision of a trial judge based on his opinion of the trustworthiness of witnesses whom he has seen, an appellate court must in order to reverse not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right but be convinced that it is wrong. In this case the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of Atun, the prosecution witness, whom he found to be a consistent witness unshaken by very severe cross-examination and the Appeal Court could find no reason to interfere with his assessment. [50] Pembelaan sewaktu Pemeriksaan Balas SP6 dan juga dalam hujahan bertulis telah menimbulkan beberapa perkara yang mempersoalkan kredibiliti peranan SP6 sebagai seorang Pegawai Penyiasat dan sama ada keterangan beliau selaku Saksi Pendakwaan boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah ini tanpa sebarang syak wasangka. Antara isu yang ditimbulkan adalah tindakan SP6 bercakap dengan Tertuduh dalam aplikasi Whatsapp dengan cara tidak senonoh walaupun mengetahui Tertuduh telahpun diwakili oleh Peguam. Pembelaan turut mengemukakan beberapa salinan perbualan di dalam aplikasi Whatsapp diantara SP5 dan Tertuduh dimana perbualan tersebut langsung tidak dipertikaikan kesahihan perbualan tersebut malah mengakui oleh SP5 dan turut memberi penjelasan dan menyatakan perbualan tersebut tidak bermaksud rasuah. Namun begitu, penjelasan yang diberikan adalah amatlah remeh sehingga menimbulkan persoalan sama ada SP5 selaku Pegawai Penyiasat dalam kes ini mempunyai kebolehan untuk siasat kes ini dengan penuh professional. Mahkamah ini mempunyai satu kelebihan dimana Mahkamah ini telah menyaksikan ‘Demeanour’ SP6 yang turut menunjukkan perangai yang ‘tidak kisah’ dan ‘selamba’. [51] Mahkamah juga ingin menghuraikan SP6 yang merupakan Pegawai Penyisat kes ini juga Pegawai Penyiasat bagi kes Seksyen 15(1)(a) ADB 1952 Tertuduh yang sama. Sewaktu perbicaraan, Peguambela telah menimbulkan beberapa perkara berkenaan dengan perlakuan SP6 dengan Tertuduh bersama perbualan whatsapp yang teramat ‘incriminating’. Perbualan antara SP6 dan tertuduh yang dikemukakan oleh Pembelaan adalah menjurus kepada kedua-dua kes. Dimana, Mahkamah telah mengarahkan Peguambela untuk menghuraikan dalam Hujahan bertulis supaya tidak membazirkan masa Mahkamah. [52] Mahkamah ini berpendapat SP6 adalah bukan seorang ‘credible witness’ yang mampu menyiasat kes ini dengan penuh professional serta memberi keterangan yang boleh diterima dan dipercayai oleh Mahkamah ini tanpa apa-apa syak wasangka S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal memandangkan SP6 yang walaupun, merupakan seorang Pegawai Penyiasat senior namun telah mengeluarkan penyataan kepada Tertuduh yang berbaur rasuah dan tidak senonoh seperti berikut: a) “kalau rekemen adik hari tu kes ni dah settle”; b) “tak leh ms2 sgt kang kena cas ganggu anak guam lak”; c) “dah tau dah. Ini loyer x nak deal ngan saya ni. Ajak perang ni.” [53] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati SP6 adalah seorang yang tidak boleh dipercayai kerana seringkali memberi jawapan yang ‘evasive’. Sering kali tidak menjawab soalan Peguam seolah-seolah sedang mereka jawapan apa yang perlu diberi sehingga Mahkamah perlu beberapa kali memberi amaran kepada SP6 dan mengingati SP6 untuk menjawab soalan Peguam. [54] Keteranagn Saksi SP6 juga sungguh tidak tersusun dan banyak kekeliruan serta kesilapan. Setiap kali peguam membangkitkan isu tersebut jawapan saksi adalah ‘tak pasti’ dan ‘tidak ingat’. Keputusan di akhir kes pendakwaan [55] Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan di sepanjang kes pendakwaan dan hujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah di atas penilaian maksimum berpuashati untuk membuat Keputusan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan prima facie kes terhadap OKT, maka dengan ini OKT dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada Pertuduhan ini tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Barang kes TPR lupus dan tertakluk kepada rayuan. Wang jaminan dikembalikan. ..................tt................ Ashvinii Thinakaran 10.1.2024 S/N 1l1GMAgxUCrkvfPXvopJw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-153-06/2020

PLAINTIF 1. ) POOVANESWARAN A/L MOGAN 2. ) MOHANADAYALAN A/L MOGAN 3. ) LALITHKUMAR A/L JAPAILAN 4. ) VICNESWARY A/P JAPAILAN 5. ) JANAKI A/P M.KANNAN 6. ) PREMA A/P MUNIANDY 7. ) SELVATHURAI A/L NACHYMATHESAMY 8. ) KALAIYARASI A/P MUNIANDY 9. ) DEMADU A/L POLAYAL 10. ) SANJAY A/L TANNABALL11. ) GUNASUNTHRI A/P MOGAN1 2. ) PATHMAVATHY A/P RAMU DEFENDAN SURESH A/L MURUGARPILLAI

Dispute relating to management of Hindu temple; suit by and against society; dissolution of society; sections 9(c) and 9(c) of Societies Act 1966; non-members of society; locus standi; statement of accounts, collection of funds for rebuilding of temple.

23/01/2024

YA Dato' Faizah Binti Jamaludin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ff01f417-26cd-4aa7-93d3-b8071a9e32fb&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA WRIT SAMAN NO. BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 ANTARA 1. POOVANESWARAN A/L MOGAN (NO. K/P: 850730-56-5013) 2. MOHANADAYALAN A/L MOGAN (NO. K/P: 880304-14-5187) 3. LALITHKUMAR A/L JAPAILAN (NO. K/P: 821004-05-5753) 4. VICNESWARY A/P JAPAILAN (NO. K/P: 870329-43-5042) 5. JANAKI A/P M. KANNAN (NO. K/P: 780720-08-5998) 6. PREMA A/P MUNIANDY (NO. K/P: 800825-08-5702) 7. SELVATHURAI A/L NACHYMATHESAMY (NO. K/P: 660819-08-5959) 8. KALAIYARASI A/P MUNIANDY (NO. K/P: 720929-10-5094) 9. DEMADU A/L POLAYAL (NO. K/P: 570607-08-6459) 10. SANJAY A/L TANNABALL (NO. K/P: 900424-10-6023) 11. GUNASUNTHRI A/P MOGAN (NO. K/P: 860830-56-5634) 12. PATHMAVATHY A/P RAMU (NO. K/P: 560203-06-5054) PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF 05/02/2024 08:59:41 BA-22NCvC-153-06/2020 Kand. 41 S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 2 DAN SURESH A/L MURUGARPILLAI (NO. K/P: 831006-10-6015) DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is a civil suit by the plaintiffs against the defendant in respect of the operation and management of the Sri Kottai Sanggili Karuppar Alya Temple Ulu Langat located on Jalan Rasa Sayang, Cheras, Selangor (the “temple”) and the collection of funds from the public for the rebuilding and expansion of the temple. [2] After full trial, I dismissed the plaintiffs’ action against the defendant, and the defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiffs, for lack of locus standi and for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements in section 9(c) of the Societies Act 1966 (“the Societies Act”). [3] The full reasons for my decision are set out in this judgment. Key Background Facts [4] The temple has its beginnings as a prayer hut built in 2007 by the first and second plaintiffs in front of a factory building rented by the first plaintiff. They had built a small hut with a Hindu prayer symbol — a trisula, which the plaintiff later replaced with the statute of a deity, and the prayer hut converted into the temple. S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 3 [5] The temple was managed by plaintiffs and others, who are members of an informal committee set up in 2014. The members of the informal committee are termed “ahli jawatankuasa asal” in the statement of claim. They were not members of a registered society. Nevertheless, to ensure uniformity of reference between the pleadings and this judgment, the members of the informal committee set up in 2014 are termed as the “original committee members” in this judgment. [6] In 2015, the defendant voluntarily offered his services to rebuild and enlarge the temple. The plaintiffs allowed the defendant to undertake construction works to rebuild and enlarge the temple. [7] Unbeknownst to the plaintiffs and the original committee members of the temple, on 14.06 2017, the defendant and his father registered two societies with the Registrar of Companies i.e., (i) Persatuan Penganut Sri Kottai Sangili Karrupar Ayya Ulu Langat (PPM-030-10-14062017) (“Persatuan Penganut”) and (ii) Persatuan Kebajikan Sri Sangili Karrupar Ayya Ulu Langat (PPM-003-10-2111017) (“Persatuan Kebajikan”), for the management of the temple and the collection of funds for the temple. The plaintiffs contend that they only found out about the registration of the societies in 2018. [8] On 02.02.2018, the original committee members entered into an agreement with the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan for both societies to do the following: (i) provide the accounts of the kumbhaabishegam (consecration) festival of the temple; S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 4 (ii) call for an election of new office bearers and new committee members of the societies; and (iii) make public the accounts of the societies. [9] Both the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan failed to honour the said agreement. The dispute between the original committee members and the societies was brought to the Malaysia Hindu Sangam, which is the national committee of Hindu affairs in Malaysia. [10] The Malaysia Hindu Sangam, in a letter dated 02.04.2018 to the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan, requested that both societies, honour the agreement of 02.02.2018. In its letter the Malaysia Hindu Sangam reminded both societies that “a Hindu temple is public place of worship and every Hindu in the locality has a right to a member of the Hindu Temple. Therefore, please comply with the terms of the Agreement.” [11] Nonetheless, both the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan failed to comply with the agreement: they did not provide the accounts for kumbhaabishegam festival, make public the accounts of both societies or call for an election of new office bearers and new committee members. [12] The plaintiffs then sought the help and support of YB Ganabathirau, a member of Selangor State Exco, and YB Erdy Faizal bin Eddy Yusof, who is the ADUN for N23 Dusun Tua. YB Erdy Faizal requested that the Malaysia Hindu Sangam coordinate the election of the new committee members for the temple. S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 5 [13] On 27.01.2019, the Malaysia Hindu Sangam held a general meeting of the temple’s management. Around 77 members of the public voted in the election. The first plaintiff was elected as the new chairman, Rajendran Marimuthu was elected as deputy chairman and K Pannirselvam was elected as secretary. The Registrar of Societies was informed of the election results on 15.02.2019. Both the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan ignored the results of the election. [14] Subsequently, on 11.07.2019, the plaintiffs registered a new society named Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar Ulu Langat (“Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar”). They then filed this writ action against the defendant in June 2020. [15] The main remedies sought by the plaintiffs are declaratory orders relating to the temple: namely, that the temple is owned by the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar; it is to be managed by a new management committee; and that the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar is the valid society to operate and manage the temple. They also seek that this Court declare the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan be dissolved by the Registrar of Societies; that both societies are prohibited from operating and managing the temple; and together with the defendant both societies are no longer connected with the temple. The plaintiffs also seek an order that the defendant provide a statement of account of all the funds collected for the temple. [16] The defendant denied the plaintiffs’ claims and in turn counterclaimed, among others, for an order that the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar be deregistered, and that the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan be declared as valid societies entitled to manage the S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 6 temple. He also seeks injunctive orders prohibiting the plaintiffs from holding any meetings for the appointment of the new chairman and/or committee members of the temple. Analysis [17] The questions before this Court are (i) whether the plaintiffs and the defendant are the correct parties to this suit, which in essence is related to the management of the temple and the collection of funds for the rebuilding of the temple; and (ii) whether the plaintiffs and the defendant are entitled to the reliefs sought in their claim and counterclaim? I. Are the parties to this suit the correct parties? Do they have locus standi to bring this claim and counterclaim? [18] Both the Persatuan Penganut and the Persatuan Kebajikan are societies registered under section 7 of the Societies Act 1966. The plaintiffs are neither members nor office bearers of either society. [19] Section 9(c) of the Societies Act states that a registered society may sue or be sued in the name of one of its members registered as the public officer of the society. But if no such public officer is registered in the name of any office bearer of the society. Section 9(c) reads: The following provisions shall apply to registered societies- ……….. (c) a society may sue or be sued in the name of such one of its members as shall be declared to the Registrar and registered by him as the public officer of the society for that purpose, and, if no such person is registered, it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society to sue the society in the name of any office-bearer of the society. S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 7 [20] The statutory requirement is in section 9(c) of the Societies Act is mandatory: see Ramachandaran a/l Meyappan & Ors v Chellapana a/l K Kalimuthu (sued as a public officer on behalf of the Management Body of Sri Maaha Mariamman Temple, Seafield under s.9(c), Societies Act 1966) [2019] MLJU 113; UMNO Bahagian Pekan v PP [2020] 9 MLJ 362; [2020] 2 CLJ 272; [2020] 1 AMR 391. [21] In Jega Jothy A/P C Thiagarajah & Others v Persatuan Rumah Berhala Sri Nageswari [2021] MLJU 2203; [2021] 1 LNS 2393; [2021] AMEJ 2078, Mohd. Nazlan Ghazali J (as he then was) held that pursuant to section 9(c) of the Societies Act, any action for any wrongdoing or misconduct of office bearers of a society must be brought by the society itself against the said office bearers for wrong committed by the office bearer against the society and losses caused to it. [22] Accordingly, any suit for any alleged mismanagement of the temple and/or failure to account of funds collected for the rebuilding of the temple, must be brought in the name of the member of the Persatuan Penganut and/or Persatuan Kebajikan, who is registered as the society’s public officer. In the absence of such a public officer, the suit must be brought in the name of one of its office bearers. [23] Additionally, the plaintiffs, not being members of the Persatuan Penganut and/or Persatuan Kebajikan, do not have the locus standi to bring this suit against the defendant in respect of the temple. In Jega Jothy A/P C Thiagarajah & Others v Persatuan Rumah Berhala Sri Nageswari (supra), Mohd. Nazlan Ghazali J (as he then was) held: [37] In my view, and as has been made abundantly clear in the plaintiffs' own pleadings, their claim is about the Temple. That the funds of the Temple had been allegedly misappropriated. It is not about the plaintiffs or any alleged losses they S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 8 personally suffered. And neither are they members of the management committee of the Temple. The nexus between the plaintiffs and the defendant is missing. The plaintiffs have no locus standi to commence let alone maintain this suit against the defendant. This ground alone renders the suit unsustainable and must be struck out for not only being frivolous and vexatious but also an abuse of process. ………… [39] It seems reasonable to state that the real intention of the plaintiffs is to sue the relevant office bearers whom they alleged had caused losses to the Temple. [40] As such, on locus standi, the plaintiffs' suit totally fails on account of two basic rules. The first is given the complaints of the plaintiffs, the correct plaintiff should have been the association. And the second is the association should have sued the relevant office bearers. ………... [Emphasis added] [24] Similarly, in this instant suit, the plaintiffs as the founders of the temple and members of the original committee care about the temple. Their claim against the defendant is about his alleged usurpation of the management of the temple from them and the unaccounted collection of funds from the public for the rebuilding of the temple. It is not about any loss or damages that the plaintiffs personally suffered. Moreover, they are not members of the Persatuan Penganut and Persatuan Kebajikan. Thus, they do not have the locus standi to bring this claim against the defendant. [25] As for the defendant in this suit, pursuant to section 9(c) of the Societies Act, a public officer, or in the absence of such public officer, one of the officer bearers of the Persatuan Penganut and/or Persatuan Kebajikan, must be named as the defendant in this suit. The defendant is an office-bearer of the Persatuan Penganut and/or Persatuan Kebajikan. However, in this instant suit, the plaintiffs have not sued the defendant in S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 9 his capacity as an office-bearer of either society but have instead brought this suit against him in his personal capacity. [26] Accordingly, because the plaintiffs and the defendant in this suit do not comply with the statutory requirements in section 9(c) of the Societies Act, and because they lack locus standi, the plaintiffs action against the defendant and the defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiffs must fail. II. Are the parties entitled to the reliefs claimed in this suit? [27] The plaintiffs’ dispute is with the defendant, who they claim had usurped the management of the temple from them — the founders and the original committee members of the temple, and who had behind their back set up the Persatuan Penganut and the Persatuan Kebajikan to manage the temple and who had collected funds from the public for the renovation of the temple: collections, which they plead, the defendant had not accounted to them as founders of the temple. [28] The plaintiffs dispute is not with the Persatuan Penganut and the Persatuan Kebajikan or with the temple. Their dispute is with the defendant. Nonetheless, in this suit, the plaintiffs seek, among others, for orders that the Registrar of Societies deregister both the Persatuan Penganut and the Persatuan Kebajikan and that the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar, which they had set up, be declared as the valid society to manage the temple. The defendant, vice versa, in his counterlclaim seeks for the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar to be deregistered and the Persatuan Penganut and the Persatuan Kebajikan to be declared as valid societies and entitled to manage the temple. S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 10 [29] Under section 9(h) of the Societies Act, members of a society, being not less than three-fifths of the members of the society, may seek for a society to be dissolved and for the necessary steps to be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the society. Section 9(h) states: The following provisions shall apply to registered societies- ……….. (h) in the absence of specific provision in the rules of a society, any number not less than three-fifths of the members of any such society for the time being resident in Malaysia may determine that such society shall be dissolved forthwith or at a time agreed, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of such society, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules (if any) of the said society applicable thereto and if none, then as the governing body shall direct: Provided that if any dispute shall arise among the members of the said governing body or the members of such society under paragraph (h) of this section, such dispute may be decided by the Registrar. Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar under this paragraph may within thirty days from the date of such decision appeal to the Court. [30] Based on section 9(h) of the Societies Act, the plaintiffs. not being members of the Persatuan Penganut and/or the Persatuan Kebajikan, do not have the legal capacity to come to Court to seek an order for the dissolution of the societies. Even if they are members of the Persatuan Penganut and/or the Persatuan Kebajikan and make up at least three- fifths of the members of either or both societies, they cannot bypass the statutory requirements in section 9(h) of the Societies Act by coming directly to Court to seek a declaration that the temple belongs to another society — in this case the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar. [31] Under section 9(h) of the Societies Act, members of a society must first seek to dissolve the society, and take all necessary steps to dispose S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 11 of the societies’ property through the statutory mechanism stipulated in the section and in accordance with the rules of the society. Secondly, if there is a dispute between the members with regards to the dissolution of a society and/or the disposal of the society’s property, the dispute can be decided by the Registrar of Societies. Thirdly, any person aggrieved by the Registrar’s decision can appeal against the decision in Court. [32] Similar statutory provisions apply to the defendant. As he is not a member of the Persatuan Penganut Madurai Karuppar, he too cannot ask this Court for a declaration for the deregistration of the said society. [33] The plaintiffs and the defendant cannot circumvent the statutory provisions in section 9(h) of the Societies Act by coming to Court to seek the dissolution and deregistration of the said societies. [34] As for the order sought by the plaintiffs that the defendant provide a statement of account of all the funds collected for the temple, the defendant, as a member and office-bearer, of both societies, has a duty to account for the funds collected for the temple to the members of the Persatuan Penganut and the Persatuan Kebajikan. He does not have a duty to provide the statement of account to the plaintiffs, who not being members of the societies do not have any right to information relating to the societies’ accounts. [35] For these reasons, I find that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs claimed in their statement of claim. I also find that the defendant is also not entitled to the reliefs claimed in his counterclaim. S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 12 Decision [36] Accordingly, for these reasons, the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendant is dismissed. [37] The defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiffs is also dismissed. [38] There is no order as to costs. Dated: January 23, 2024 (FAIZAH JAMALUDIN) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-153-06/2020 Poovaneswaran A/L Mogan & Ors v Suresh A/L Murugarpillai 13 COUNSELS: For the Plaintiffs: Dinesh Muthal (Low Tze Ken with him) Messrs Dinesh Muthal & Co No. 17, Jalan PJS 7/13, Bandar Sunway, 47500 Petaling Jaya, Selangor For the Defendant: Darshan Singh Messrs T. Harpal & Associates No. 47/1F, Block C, Jalan Maju 3/1, Taman Lembah Maju 3/1 56100 Kuala Lumpur S/N F/QB/80mp0qT07gHGp4yw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AC-82D-1-01/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH SHAHRUL ASWAD BIN ABDULLAH

Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, seksyen 15, self-administration, pemberian minuman sebelum ujian air kencing, label botol, Kegagalan memberikan penjelasan munasabah terhadap percanggahan-percanggahan pada keterangan saksi-saksi

23/01/2024

Puan Ashvinii a/p Thinakaran

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2f1d1239-4d26-44f7-b969-c2e8a8fb0941&Inline=true

KEPUTUSAN DI AKHIR KES PENDAKWAAN AC-82D-1-01/2023 PENDAKWARAYA V SHAHRUL ASWAD BIN ABDULLAH (NO.KP: 960803095153) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] PENDAHULUAN Tertuduh telah dituduh melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah perenggan 15(1 )(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952[Akta 234] yang boleh dihukum di bawah Seksyen 15 Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh adalah seperti yang berikut: PERTUDUHAN BAHAWA KAMU PADA 02/10/2020, JAM LEBIH KURANG JAM 5.30 PETANG BERTEMPAT DI PEJABAT BAHAGIAN SIASATAN JENAYAH NARKOTIK IPD HILIR PERAK, DI DALAM DAERAH HILIR PERAK, DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL RIDZUAN, TELAH MEMBERIKAN KEPADA DIRI KAMU SENDIRI DADAH BERBAHAYA JENIS AMPHETAMINE DAN METHAMPHETAMINE, OLEH YANG DEMIKIAN KAMU, TELAH MELAKUKAN SATU KESALAHAN YANG BOLEH DIHUKUM DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 15(1)(a) AKTA DADAH BERBAHAYA 1952 (PINDAAN 2003) DAN DIBACA BERSAMA SEKSYEN 38B AKTA YANG SAMA. [2] LATAR BELAKANG KES 2.1 Pada awalnya kes ini telah dituduh pada 28.10.2020 dengan nombor kes AC- 82D-5-10/2020. Bagi kes ini, keterangan 3 org saksi iaitu Pegawai Tangkapan (SP1), Pengawai Pengiring Ambil Urin (SP2) dan Ahli Patologi (SP3) telah didengar oleh Puan Majistret terdahulu. Namun pada 25.7.2022 kes ini telah di DNAA oleh Majistret yang sama atas alasan tiada saksi yang hadir untuk sambung bicara. Seterusnya, pihak pendakwaan telah tuduh semula kes yang sama pada 13.1.2023. TPR telah memohon untuk guna pakai keterangan dalam kes AC-82D-5-10/2020 bagi kes yang baru dan permohonan ini telah dibenarkan oleh Puan Majistret. Puan Majistret tersebut 23/01/2024 11:36:05 AC-82D-1-01/2023 Kand. 33 S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal kemudiannya telah berpindah ke Mahkamah Tinggi Ipoh, dan kes ini selanjutnya telah saya ambil alih dan disambung dengan keterangan SP4. 2.2 Saya telah meneruskan bicara kes ini dengan bergantung kepada nota keterangan yang telah disediakan oleh Puan Majistret terdahulu dan juga rujukan kepada Sistem Rakaman Audio Video Mahkamah (RVT). Saya telah menyemak rakaman tersebut dan dapat melihat suasana perbicaraan serta demeanor saksi-saksi yang telah memberikan keterangan. 2.3 Peguambela dalam kes ini telah memohon agar Puan Majistret terdahulu yang mendengar kes ini memandangkan terdapat hanya 2 orang lagi saksi iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat dan Pengambil Urin. Akan tetapi, arahan Pengarah Mahkamah Perak adalah agar Majistret baru untuk mendengar kes ini. Pada tarikh 28.6.2023 kes telah ditetapkan untuk sambung bicara dan Pendakwaan membuat keputusan untuk hanya memanggil saksi terakhir iaitu Pengawai Penyiasat (SP4). Saya juga memilih untuk meneruskan bicara tanpa memanggil semula saksi-saksi pendakwaan yang telah memberi keterangan sebelum ini kerana nota keterangan yang telah disediakan oleh Puan Majistret terdahulu dan rakaman RVT mahkamah adalah jelas dan boleh difahami. [3] FAKTA KES PENDAKWAAN 3.1 Pihak Pendakwaan dalam kes ini telah memanggil seramai empat orang saksi pendakwaan ("SP"): (a) ASP. VIJIVARAJ A/L RAJAMURTHI (SP1); (Pegawai Tangkapan) (b) INSP. SAIFUL BAHRI BIN ABD RAHMAN (SP2); (Pegawai Pengiring Mengambil Urin) (c) ASLINDA BINTI TAJUDIN (SP3); (Pegawai Sains Kimia Hayat) (d) INSP VIJAY A/L KUMAR (SP5); (Pegawai Penyiasat) 3.2 Pihak Pendakwaan telah mengemukakan keterangan bahawa pada 2.10.2020, pukul 4.30 petang SP1 bersama Insp Mohd Khudri telah membuat tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh di Bahagian Pencegahan Jenayah dan Keselamatan Komuniti, IPD Hilir Perak S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal kerana disyaki terlibat dengan penyalahgunaan dadah. Tiada tangkapan lain yang dibuat. SP1 kemudian telah membuat satu repot tangkapan iaitu P2. Seterusnya, SP1 telah serahkan Tertuduh kepada SP2 pada hari yang sama, jam lebih kurang 5.15 petang. 3.3 SP2 telah mengarahkan Tertuduh untuk memilih satu botol urin didalam kotak, botol urin dalam keadaan dalam bungkusan plastik, berserta penutup, sticker label dan seal warna biru ada nombor siri. Setelah memastikan nombor siri di penutup botol dan dengan nombor siri yang terdapat di luar plastik adalah sama, SP2 telah escort Tertuduh ke tandas dan berdiri dibelakang Tertuduh semasa Tertuduh kencing. Tiada orang lain dalam tandas pada waktu tersebut. SP2 kemudiannya telah menjalankan ujian saringan awal dengan menggunakan 6 test strip dan hasil ujian mendapati test strip bagi Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine positif dan yang lain negatif. Setiap satu test strip itu dicelup satu per satu. Setelah itu, SP2 telah isi label, seal, buat report dan serah kepada SP4 pada hari yang sama. Laporan Polis ditandakan sebagai P3 dan Borang Serah Menyerah ditandakan sebagai P5. 3.4 Pada 5.10.2020, jam lebih kurang 7.30 pagi SP4 telah dengan seorang diri pergi ke Jabatan Patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur dan mengisi 1 borang UPD serta borang permintaan balik botol urin. Borang UPD sebagai P6 dan Borang Permintaan Balik Botol Urin sebagai P13. SP4 telah menyerahkan botol urin kepada SP3. SP3 kemudian telah memberikan resit penerimaan botol urin. 3.5 Pada 19.10.2020, SP4 telah menerima Laporan Patologi daripada D/SI Ku Ahmad Zamri dan Laporan menunjukkan positif Amphetamine dan Methamphetamine yang telah dijadualkan di bawah Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. Seterusnya pada 30.10.2020, SP4 telah menerima 1 botol sampel air kencing bagi penama Shahrul Aswad Bin Abdullah dengan nombor siri beg plastik DRL 3856 daripada D/SI Ku Ahmad Zamri. 3.6 Tertuduh kemudiannya telah dituduh di bawah perenggan 15(1 )(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [4] FAKTA KES YANG SEBENAR 4.1 Pada tahap ini Mahkamah ingin menekankan, kesemua keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh saksi Polis adalah tidak memberangsangkan memandangkan pada tahap awal sewaktu Pemeriksaan Utama, tiada satu pun saksi yang menjelaskan kejadian yang sebenarnya berlaku. Mereka hanya bersetuju setelah kejadian tersebut S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dicadangkan oleh Peguambela sewaktu Pemeriksaan Balas. Perkara ini menimbulkan syak wasangkan terhadap keterangan saksi-saksi sama ada mereka berniat untuk menyembunyikan perkara sebenar? 4.2 Pada 2.10.2020, Pejabat Bahagian Pencegahan Jenayah dan Keselamatan Komuniti di IPD Hilir Perak, pada jam lebih kurang 4.00 petang telah menjalankan satu operasi yang melibatkan seramai lebih kurang 60 orang anggota Polis untuk menjalankan ujian saringan awal. Operasi ini diketuai oleh ASP Mohd Saufi dan dikendalikan bersama ASP Vijivaraj a/l Rajamurthi (SP1). 4.3 SP1 selaku Ketua Bahagian Integriti dan Pematuhan Standard, telah memberi taklimat pada jam lebih kurang 4 petang sebelum ujian saringan awal dijalankan keatas semua 60 orang polis. Kemudian selepas 15 minit kesemua 60 orang diarahkan memberi sampel air kencing bagi tujuan menjalankan ujian saringan awal. 4.4 SP1 telah membuat tangkapan ke atas Tertuduh seorang lebih kurang jam 5.00 petang manakala ASP Mohd Saufi membuat tangkapan ke atas 59 pegawai yang lain. SP1 kemudiannya hanya membuat laporan tangkapan pada jam 7.07 malam walaupun dalam keterangan memaklumkan telah membuat tangkapan seawal jam 4.30 petang. 4.5 Operasi ini dijalankan di kawasan garaj dan ujian air kencing dijalankan di atas 1 meja yang panjang dimana ASP Mohd Saufi menjalankan ujian air kencing untuk 59 orang polis yang lain manakala SP2 menjalan ujian air kencing ke atas Tertuduh seorang. SP2 juga mengakui hanya ada 1 tandas sahaja yang digunakan untuk kesemua 60 orang. 4.6 SP2 telah menunggu selama ½ jam untuk Tertuduh kencing kerana sukar nak bagi air kencing. Kemudian, SP2 mengaku telah memberikan air mineral kepada Tertuduh tetapi telah tukar keterangan dan memaklumkan tidak pasti siapa yang bagi air mineral tetapi yang pastinya Tertuduh telah minum air mineral yang dibekalkan kepadanya. SP2 hanya sempat mengambil ujian air kencing Tertuduh lebih kurang 5.30 petang. SP2 juga memaklumkan Tertuduh tidak dibawa ke Hospital Teluk Intan walaupun jarak ke Hopsital dari tempat kejadian adalah lebih kurang 10 minit. 4.7 SP2 telah membuat laporan ujian saringan awal positif jam 7.16 petang. Kemudiannya, SP2 telah serahkan test strip yang digunakan untuk saringan awal ujian air kencing Tertuduh, sampel air kencing dalam botol urin, laporan ujian saringan awal dan borang serah menyerah kepada SP4 pada hari yang sama, jam lebih kurang 7.30 petang. 4.8 Peguambela telah menghantar permohonan kepada Pejabat Pengarah Pendakwaan Negeri Perak untuk mendapatkan sampel urin Tertuduh. Surat dan AR S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Kad ditandakan sebagai D14 dan D15. 4.9 Fakta yang lain adalah sepertimana di atas. [5] KEDUDUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG DAN PRIMA FACIE: 5.1 S. 173(7i)(i) Kanun Tatacara Jenayah (KTJ) telah memperuntukkan berkenaan tugas mahkamah di akhir kes pihak pendakwaan adalah untuk memutuskan sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh atas pertuduhan terhadapnya. Mahkamah perlu menilai keterangan-keterangan saksi pihak pendakwaan yang credible yang telah membuktikan semua intipati pertuduhan sebelum Tertuduh dipanggil untuk membela diri. 5.2 Perkataan prima facie tidak ditakrifkan di bawah KTJ. Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Balacahandran v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 85 [2005] 1 AMR 321: [2005] 2 MLJ 301 telah menghuraikan berkenaan ujian prima facie sepertimana yang berikut: ...The test at the close of the case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no prima facie case. 5.3 Maka, di akhir kes pendakwaan, Mahkamah ini telah meneliti keperluan untuk melakukan penilaian secara maksimum ke atas keseluruhan keterangan dan bukti- bukti sokongan di dalam kes ini. Seksyen 180 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dirujuk: Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code sets out the procedure to be followed by the court at the close of prosecution case as follows; (1) When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused. (2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record an order of acquittal. (3) If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall call upon the accused to enter on his defence. (4) For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction. 5.4 Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Looi Kow Chai v. Public Prosecutor [2003] 1 CLJ 734 [2003] 2 MLJ 65; [2003] 2 AMR 89 berkenaan prima facie telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "In our respectful view, the correct test to be applied in determining whether a prima facie case has been made out under s. 180 of the CPC (and this would apply to a trial under s. 173 of the CPC) is that as encapsulated in the judgment of Hashim Yeop Sani FJ (as he then was) in Dato' Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1983] CLJ Rep 101: [1983] 2 CLJ 10: [1983] 2 MLJ 232 at p 270: To summarize, it would therefore appear that having regard to the prosecution evidence adduced so far, a prima facie case has not been established against Nordin Johan and Aziz Abdullah, the second accused and the fourth accused which, failing their rebuttal, would warrant their conviction. In other words if they elect to remain silent now (which I hold they are perfectly entitled to do even though they are being tried under the Emergency Regulations) the question is can they be convicted of the offence of section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code ? My answer to the question is in the negative.' We are confident in the view we have just expressed because we find nothing in the amended s. 180(1) of the CPC that has taken away the right of an accused person to remain silent at the close of the prosecution case. Further we find nothing in the legislative intention of Parliament as expressed in the language employed by it to show that there should be a dual exercise by a judge under s. 180 when an accused elects to remain silent as happened in Pavone v. Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 LNS 99: [1984] 1 MLJ 77. In other words, we are unable to discover anything in the language of the recently formulated s. 180 that requires a judge sitting alone first to make a minimum evaluation and then when the accused elects to remain silent to make a maximum evaluation in deciding whether to convict or not at the close of the prosecution case. It therefore follows that there is only one exercise that a judge sitting alone under s. 180 of the CPC has to undertake at the close of the prosecution case. He must subject the prosecution evidence to maximum evaluation and to ask himself the question: if I decide to call upon the accused to enter his defence and he elects to remain silent, am I prepared to convict him on the totality of the S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal evidence contained in the prosecution case? If the answer is in the negative then no prima facie case has been made out and the accused would be entitled to an acquittal." 5.5 Kes Public Prosecutor v Poh Ah Kwang [2003] 3 AMR 670 menyatakan seperti berikut: “Since the standard of proof at this stage is prima facie proof, which means a maximum evaluation of the evidence on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence of SP2 is therefore for all intends and purposes uncorroborated in so far as the answers given by the accused were concerned..”. 5.6 Kes Public Prosecutor v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ turut dirujuk; “After the amendments to ss. 173(f) and 180 of the CPC, the statutory test has been altered. What is required of a Subordinate Court and the High Court under the amended section is to call for the defence when it is satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out at the close of the prosecution case. This requires the court to undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call on the accused to enter his or her defence. 5.7 Bagi mengemukakan suatu kes prima facie terhadap Tertuduh dalam kes di bawah perenggan 15(1 )(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, pihak pendakwaan hendaklah menunjukkan intipati-intipati kesalahan yang berikut telah dibuktikan iaitu: (a) spesimen urin dalam botol tersebut adalah daripada Tertuduh; (b) pemeriksaan spesimen urin Tertuduh telah memenuhi kehendak Sekysen 31A Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952; dan (c) dadah yang dikesan dalam spesimen urin Tertuduh telah disenaraikan dalam Bahagian III Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. [6] SEKSYEN KESALAHAN: 6.1 Dikemukakan Seksyen-Seksyen berkaitan pertuduhan dan kesalahan untuk rujukan mudah seperti berikut; 15. Self administration. (1) Any person who— (a) consumes, administers to himself or suffers any other person, contrary to section 14 to administer to him any dangerous drug specified in Parts III and IV of the First S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Schedule; or (b) is found in any premises kept or used for any of the purposes specified in section 13 in order that any such dangerous drug may be administered to or smoked or otherwise consumed by him, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. (2) For the purpose of this section, “consumes” includes eat, chew, smoke, swallow, drink, inhale or introduce into the body in any manner or by any means whatsoever. [7] ISU UNDANG-UNDANG 7.1 Isu di hadapan Mahkamah adalah seperti yang berikut: (a) sama ada spesimen urin dalam botol tersebut adalah daripada Tertuduh; (b) sama ada pemeriksaan spesimen urin Tertuduh telah memenuhi kehendak sekysen 3lA Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952; (c) sama ada kegagalan pihak polis untuk menqqunakan dua botol sampel urin dalam menialankan uiian saringan awal adalah fatal; (d) sama ada dadah yang dikesan telah disenaraikan dalam Bahagian III Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. 7.2 Bagi membuktikan intipati pertama sama ada spesimen urin dalam botol tersebut adalah daripada Tertuduh, pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan keterangan seperti yang berikut: i. SP2 telah mengarahkan Tertuduh untuk memilih 1 bungkusan plastik berseal dan Tertuduh sendiri telah memilih 1 bungkusan plastik berseal dimana bungkusan plastik itu adalah berseal, dalam keadaan elok dan tidak terdapat kesan koyakan atau bocor yang mengandungi satu bekas khas bertutup PDRM. Bekas ini mempunyai nombor siri yang sama dengan pembungkus plastiknya iaitu A0017409. ii. Tertuduh kemudiannya telah serahkan bungkusan tersebut kepada SP2. Selepas 5 minit Tertuduh dengan membawa bekas khas tertutup telah diiring oleh SP2 ke tandas yang terletak di tingkat bawah IPD Hilir Perak; iii. Tertuduh telah kencing ke dalam botol spesimen yang dipilih pada jam 5.30 petang dengan SP2 berdiri belakang tertuduh; iv. SP2 telah mengarahkan Tertuduh sendiri membawa botol berisi spesimen urin milik Tertuduh tersebut ke Pejabat Bahagian Pencegahan Jenayah dan Keselamatan Komuniti untuk ujian saringan awal serta mendapati hasil ujian S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal saringan awal adalah positif dadah Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine; v. Botol berisi spesimen urin yang mempunyai nombor botol, maklumat nama Tertuduh dan nombor kad pengenalan Tertuduh telah dihantar untuk tujuan analisa; vi. Spesimen tersebut telah diterima dan seterusnya diperiksa/dianalisa oleh Pegawai Sains (Kimia Hayat) (SP3) daripada Jabatan Patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur; dan vii. Analisa tersebut telah mengesahkan spesimen urin milik Tertuduh mengandungi dadah Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine. 7.3 Namun begitu, terdapat beberapa isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Pembelaan berkenaan dengan masa dan kendalian spesimen air kencing Tertuduh. Antara isu yang dibangkitkan oleh Peguam adalah berikut: i. Pembelaan mencadangkan sebenarnya Tertuduh telah pun memberi sampel air kencing pada jam 4.30 petang sewaktu Operasi besar-besaran dijalankan. Ujian saringan awal Tertuduh pada ketika itu negatif. Namun begitu, Tertuduh telah diarahkan untuk memberi sampel air kencing untuk kali kedua akan tetapi Tertuduh mengalami kesukaran untuk kencing semula. Jadi, Tertuduh telah dibekalkan air mineral supaya boleh bagi sampel air kencing semula. ii. Pukul berapa sebenarnya Tertuduh telah memberi sampel air kencing? Jika betul Tertuduh bagi sampel air kencing jam 5.30 petang, mengapa Laporan Ujian Sariangan awal hanya dibuat jam 7.16 malam? iii. Apa jadi dengan spesimen botol air kencing dari jam 5.30 petang hingga 7.30 malam sebelum diserahkan kepada IO? Dimanakan botol spesimen air kencing Tertuduh disimpan sewaktu itu? iv. Bagaimana keadaan meja panjang apabila terdapat botol spesimen air kencing daripada 60 orang yang lain? Adakah botol spesimen Tertuduh juga berada di atas meja yang sama? Adakah kemungkinan botol spesimen Tertuduh tertukar dengan spesimen orang lain? v. Siapa yang memberikan air mineral kepada Tertuduh? Mengapa IO kes (SP4) tidak siasat air mineral tersebut dimana beliau mengaku itu adalah fakta yang material dalam kes ini? Adakah air mineral Tertuduh mengandungi dadah sepertimana yang dibangkitkan oleh Peguam? vi. Kenapa daripada 60 orang yang diarahkan hadir untuk operasi ujian saringan awal, tertuduh sahaja dilayan berbeza dari awal? Ianya adalah agak pelik S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal mengapa ASP Mohd Saufi boleh buat tangkapan ke atas 59 orang polis yang lain dan Tertuduh ditangkap oleh SP1 seorang. Mengapakah Tertuduh sahaja yang diiringi oleh SP2 untuk ujian saringan awal, manakal 59 orang polis yang lain dijalankan oleh ASP Mohd Saufi. vii. Kenapa terdapat perbezaan yang ketara akan layanan terhadap Tertuduh dengan 59 orang polis yang lain? Apakah tujuan sebenar 60 orang tersebut telah diarahkan hadir ke tempat kejadian? 7.4 Mahkamah ini mendapati ‘adverse inference’ terbangkit dari pihak Pendakwaan apabila mereka gagal untuk mendedahkan sebenarnya berapa ramai orang yang ditangkap pada hari tersebut sehinggalah saksi-saksi diperiksa balas. Maka, Mahkamah ini mendapati terpakai Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan. 7.5 Mahkamah merujuk kepada Seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan dan dikemukakan untuk rujukan mudah; 114. Court may presume existence of certain fact The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. ILLUSTRATIONS The court may presume-- (g) that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it; 7.6 Mahkamah ini mengambil berat bahawa pemakaian Seksyen ini adalah mengikut kepada keadaan setiap kes dan kepentingan saksi/bukti yang dinyatakan tersebut. Kes Munusamy v PP [1987] 1 MLJ 492,494 (SC) telah menggariskan panduan bahawa: “It is essential to appreciate the scope of Section 114 (g) lest it be carried too far outside its limit. Adverse inference under that illustration can only be drawn if there is withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence. It may be drawn from withholding not just any document, but material document by a party in his possession, or for non- production of not just any witness but an important and material witness to S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the case”. 7.7 Mahkamah turut merujuk kes Suayri Ayyapan lwn. Pendakwa Raya [2019] MLRHU 423 pg 7 yang telah menjelaskan seperti berikut; “Sekiranya Mahkamah mendapati terdapat satu jurang atau kelompangan yang besar dalam kes pihak pendakwaan dan berpuas hati saksi yang tidak ditawarkan itu adalah saksi penting dan pihak pendakwaan memendapkannya keterangan yang ada padanya yang sentiasa boleh di perolehi serta apa yang dilakukan oleh pihak pendakwaan itu bagi tujuan utama mengecewakan pihak pembelaan untuk pembelaan maka kegagalan memanggil saksi atau menawarkan saksi itu memberi inferen yang tidak berpihak yang kuat kepada pihak pendakwaan di bawah s 114(g) Akta Keterangan. 7.8 Persoalan Mahkamah adalah mengapa kejadian sebenar berkenaan operasi besar-besaran yang dikendalikan untuk 60 orang polis yang turut ditangkap tidak di maklumi lebih awal sewaktu Pemeriksaan Utama dan hanya disetuju dengan keterangan ini setelah dibangkitkan oleh Pembelaan? Selain itu, kegagalan kedua-dua SP1 dan SP2 membuat laporan polis dengan serta merta turut menujukkan terdapat satu kelompongan besar dalam kes pendakwaan. Selain itu, kendalian botol spesimen tertuduh turut samar-samar tanpa ada keterangan yang kukuh apa yang terjadi selama 2 jam sebelum diserahkan kepada Pegawai Penyiasat. Maka, kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mendedahkan kejadian sebenar dan berapa ramai tangkapan yang dibuat jatuh dibawah Seksyen di atas. 7.9 Mengenai isu ini, saya ingin mengingatkan diri saya tentang panduan yang telah ditetapkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes PP lwn Ahmad Saiful Islam Mohamad [2023] 2 CLJ 714 berkaitan dengan kewajipan yang dipikul oleh pihak pendakwaan untuk membuktikan kes mereka di bawah s.15 DDA 1952: [54] To our minds, the prosecution has to ensure that the urine specimen in the bottle which was sent to SP5 for analysis was actually taken from or belonged to the respondent. In the absence of any DNA evidence, the prosecution must ensure that there is no mistake in the labelling of the bottle which would otherwise affect the identity and credibility of the respondent’s urine sample. There must not be any break in the chain of evidence. Anything short would definitely raise serious doubts as to whether the urine sample was actually taken on the day in question and whether the urine sample actually belonged to the respondent. S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7.10 Berbalik kepada kes hari ini, tiada bukti DNA yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Maka, ia menjadi tanggungjawab pendakwaan untuk memastikan, botol spesimen Tertuduh telah dilabel dengan betul dan tidak tertukar dengan orang lain serta tidak terputus rantaian bukti bagi memastikan spesimen yang dihantar ke Jabatan Patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur adalah sememangnya milik Tertuduh. 7.11 Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk memperbaiki keterangan mereka sujurus menjawab kepada persoalan yang dibangkitkan dari awal lagi oleh Pembelaan maka mereka telah gagal membuktikan element (a) dalam kes ini dan seterusnya telah gagal untuk membuktikan intipati pertama bagi pertuduhan terhadap Tertuduh. 7.12 Adakah element (b) iaitu sama ada pemeriksaan spesimen urin Tertuduh telah memenuhi kehendak sekysen 31a Akta Dadah Berbahava 1952 dipatuhi oleh Pendakwaan? Seksyen 31 (1a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 telah memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: (1A) For the purpose of preservation of evidence, it shall be lawful for a police officer not below the rank of Sergeant or an officer of customs to require an arrested person to provide a specimen of his urine for the purposes of an examination under subsection (1) if it is not practicable for the medical officer or the person who is acting in aid of or on the direction of a medical officer to obtain the specimen of the urine within a reasonable period. 7.13 Berhubung dengan tafsiran Seksyen ini juga, mahkamah telah membuat rujukan kepada kes-kes yang telah menyentuh tentang keperluan Seksyen 31A (1a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 iaitu- a) PP v. Samsul Arifm Bakar [2019] 2 CLJ 692; [2019] MLRAU 438 yang telah memutuskan bahawa the non- compliance of Section 31A(1) is not fatal to the prosecution's case. b) Muhammad Nazrin Avan v. PP [2020] 1 LNS 1513 di mana Lim Hock Leng J telah memutuskan bahawa: ... Even if the evidence were illegally obtained, as relevant evidence, it is still admissible. S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal c) PP v. Mohamad Rasid Jusoh [2009] 9 CLJ 557. Ravinthran Paramaguru J telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "...Assuming, for the sake of argument, the police breached the proviso to sub-s. 1A in obtaining the urine specimen from an arrested person, the evidence procured thereby will be considered as improperly or illegally obtained evidence. However it is settled law that in our system of justice, illegally or improperly obtained evidence is admissible provided it is relevant (see Kuruma v. R [1955] AC 197 and Saminathan v. Public Prosecutor [1936] 1 LNS 65; [1937] MLJ 39).." 7.14 Mahkamah juga merujuk kes PP v. Samsul Arifm Bakar [2020] 7 CLJ 503 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyentuh mengenai penggubalan kedua-dua Seksyen 31A dan juga 31A(1A) dan telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: [8] Our view on s. 31A (1) and s. 31A (1A) is as follows. Section 31A (1) was inserted in 1983 via Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 1983 (ActA553) as s. 31A. The provision was subsequently amended in 2002 via Act 1167 by the addition of two new sub-sections of which sub-s. 1A is one. The original s. 31A which is now sub-s. 31A (1) provides for a medical examination of person who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence against the Act. We should think that it is not necessarily limited to analysing the urine sample of a suspect Thus, suspects who had swallowed dangerous drugs to use their body as a container could be medically examined under this section. [9] Section 31A (1A) which was added as a sub-section in 2002 appears to target drug addicts specifically. As pointed out by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, the Parliamentary Secretary who tabled the Bill in Parliament said in his speech that the main aim of s. 31A (1A) provision is to preserve evidence as it may not be practicable for a Medical Officer to procure a urine sample from an arrested suspect The aim of s. 31A (1A) is also stated in die opening words of the provision, ie„ "for the purpose of preservation of evidence..." To our mind, these words are the key to interpreting this provision. Otherwise, the intention of Parliament in enacting the provision to preserve evidence in the face of the exigencies faced by enforcement authorities while carrying out operations against drug addicts would be defeated. [10] The learned High Court Judge opined that several pre-conditions must be satisfied before a urine sample can be taken by a police officer not below the S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal rank of sergeant His Lordship said that the police must prove in court that it was not practicable for a Medical Officer to obtain the urine sample from the arrested person. His Lordship also said that the determination whether the procurement of the urine sample by a Medical Officer is practicable must be made by the Medical Officer himself. In our view, such a reading of the provision is not warranted by the words of s. 31A (1A). If the police are obligated to wait for the determination of the Medical Officer, precious time would be wasted and it is possible that traces of drugs in the body of a suspect would have disappeared by the time the urine sample is obtained. [11] In respect of the argument that the police have to "prove" that it was not practicable to send the suspect to the hospital for the Medical Officer to obtain the urine sample, we note that s. 31A (1A) does not impose that duty. It is a provision designed to preserve evidence depending on constraints of the situation faced by the enforcement authorities. Therefore, the test result from a urine sample is not rendered inadmissible merely because the police could not prove that sending the suspect to see a Medical Officer to take a urine sample is not practicable. [12] We find analogical support for this view in the judgment of this court in PP lwn. Mohd Safwan Husain [2017] 7 CLJ 685; [2017] 5 MLJ 255 which was cited by the learned DPP. In that case which also involved the collection of urine sample under s. 31A (1A) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, the Respondent was acquitted on the ground that Prosecution failed to prove that he was an "arrested person" which appears to be a pre-condition of s. 31A (1). The Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the High Court and the Magistrate's Court and said as follows: Harus juga dicatat lanjut bahawa s. 31A ADB 1952 tidak menvebut di mana-mana bahawa kegapalan untuk mematuhi kehendak di situ boleh membuatkan ana iua bukti yang dioeroleh hasil daripada pemeriksaan vana dilakukan akan meniadi tidak boleh diterima sebagai keteranaan (inadmissible).Ini berbeza dengan peruntukan s. 113 KPJ atau pun s. 37A ADB 1952 yang memperuntukkan dengan jelas bahawa percakapan tertuduh selepas ditangkap dan tanpa diberikan kata-kata amaran tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan (inadmissible). Seperti mana yang dinvatakan di atas berkenaan dengan obiektif s. 31A, Seksyen ini memberikan keabsahan undang-undana (lawfulness) ke atas tindakan yang dilakukan oleh Deaawai-peaawai atau orang vang disenaraikan dalam menaambil sample dan membuat pemeriksaan ke atas S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal orang vang ditangkap. Pada pandangan kami itulah dasar utama peruntukan s. 31A ini. Pada pengamatan kami lagi, skema peruntukan tersebut jelas membezakan antara pemberian kebenaran vis-a-vis kesahan dengan kerelevanan sesuatu bahan bukti yang diperoleh daripada tindakan tersebut. ini dapat dilihat daripada perkataan dan ungkapan yang digunakan dalam s. 31A (1A) itu sendiri iaitu For the purpose of preservation of evidence... 7.15 Berdasarkan otoriti-otoriti di atas, SP2 dalam kes ini ialah seorang anggota polis berpangkat Inspektor yang telah mengiringi Tertuduh untuk memberikan sampel air kencing Tertuduh bagi maksud ujian saringan awal. SP2 telah menerima botol urin tersebut daripada Tertuduh sendiri dan telah menjalankan ujian saringan awal maka tindakan ini adalah selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah Seksyen 31A (1a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. 7.16 Melalui isu di perenggan (b) juga, telah berbangkit isu sama ada Tertuduh telah ditahan sebelum beliau diarahkan untuk memberikan sampel air kencing beliau? 7.17 Mahkamah ini membuat rujukan terhadap kes PP v. Mohd Safwan Husain [2017] 7 CLJ 685. Mahkamah berpendapat bagi maksud pembuktian intipati di bawah Seksyen 15 (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, tidak ada keperluan untuk tangkapan terhadap Tertuduh dibuat terlebih dahulu dalam apa-apa keadaan dan situasi, memandangkan kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 15 adalah berdasarkan bahan dadah terlarang yang dikesan dalam badan Tertuduh, yang menyebabkan tangkapan walaupun dibuat selepas penemuan/pengesanan itu boleh diterima. 7.18 Dalam kes di atas Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "(2) Perkataan tangkapan dan penentuan bila satu-satu tangkapan itu berlaku, sama ada bagi tujuan s. 37A atau s. 31A ADB, seharusnya sama dan akan bergantung pada fakta dan keadaan sesuatu kes. Seksyen 31A tidak memperuntukkan kuasa menangkap pada pegawai polis. Kuasa tersebut diberikan dalam s. 31 ADB yang memberikan kuasa tangkapan jika terdapat kepercayaan munasabah bahawa satu-satu kesalahan bawah ADB telah dilakukan atau akan dilakukan. Ini mewajarkan pengemukaan maklumat yang diterima oleh pihak polis sebagai keterangan untuk menentukan isu tangkapan ini. (perenggan 33 & 34) S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (3) Semasa spesimen air kencing responden diambil bagi tujuan pemeliharaan dan pemeriksaan bawah s. 31A(1) dan (1A) ADB, responden merupakan seorang yang telah ditangkap dan orang tangkapan dalam maksud peruntukan tersebut. Penahanan telah dibuat berasaskan maklumat berkenaan satu kesalahan bawah ADB yang telah dilakukan oleh responden, dan penahanan itu bukan satu tindakan sekadar untuk membuat pertanyaan kepada responden. Walaupun responden dikatakan memberikan kerjasama, dan adalah seorang anggota polis sokongan, namun kebebasannya telah disekat dan dia dipaksa mengikut apa yang diarahkan oleh SP2. (perenggan 34 & 35) (4) Seksyen 31A ADB tidak menyebut di mana-mana bahawa kegagalan mematuhi kehendak peruntukan tersebut boleh membuatkan apa jua bukti yang diperoleh hasil daripada pemeriksaan yang dilakukan akan menjadi tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan. Ini berbeza dengan peruntukan s. 113 KPJ atau s. 37A ADB yang memperuntukkan dengan jelas bahawa percakapan tertuduh selepas ditangkap dan tanpa diberikan kata-kata amaran tidak boleh diterima sebagai keterangan. Seksyen 31A memberikan keabsahan undang- undang atas tindakan yang dilakukan oleh pegawai-pegawai atau orang yang disenaraikan dalam mengambil sampel dan membuat pemeriksaan ke atas orang yang ditangkap. Skema peruntukan s. 31A jelas membezakan antara pemberian kebenaran viz-a-viz kesahan dengan kerelevanan sesuatu bahan bukti yang diperoleh daripada tindakan tersebut. Berikutan itu, sampel darah yang diambii, walaupun diperoleh secara tidak sah, wajar diterima masuk sebagai keterangan. (perenggan 36)". 7.19 Semasa Tertuduh diarahkan untuk memberikan sampel air kencing Tertuduh telah pun ditahan memandangkan beliau perlu mengikut arahan pihak polis untuk memberikan sampel urinnya dan pergerakannya telah pun dibatasi, oleh yang demikian Tertuduh telah pun menjadi seseorang yang ditangkap bagi maksud peruntukan Seksyen 31A, Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. 7.20 Oleh itu, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa Seksyen 31A Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 telah dipatuhi oleh pihak Polis dan sekaligus intipati element kedua berjaya dibuktikan oleh Pendakwaan. S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7.21 Berhubung dengan isu kehendak dua botol sampel urin atau satu botol sampel urin dalam menjalankan ujian saringan awal, Mahkamah telah merujuk keputusan kes terbaharu yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu PP v. Ahmad Saiful Islam Mohamad [2023] 2 CLJ 714. Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes ini telah mengambil panduan keputusan Mahkamah dalam kes Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Chew Thai Kav & Anor [2022] 2 CLJ 333. YA Azahar Mohamed CJ (Malaya) dalam keputusannya telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: [30] We will say at once that overturning our own precedent is a serious matter. This court must always respect its own precedents. The rule of legal precedence must be followed in the interest of certainty. Great sanctity must be attached to the finality of our judgment. This is not to say that this court should never depart from an earlier decision. We do not blindly honour stare decisis. White it is true that we can overturn our own precedent in exceptional cases where it is really necessary, as an apex court, we need to be cautious about departing from our own earlier decision especially in a case that concerns the interpretation of a legislative provision, lest we lose the trust of public by persistent shifts of laws. The law is about stability, predictability and certainty that allow the public and the business community to plan and organise their lives based on the previous precedent. A degree of certainty, consistency and predictability in the law is one of the foundations upon which our justice system operates. Therefore, we remind ourselves that it is of utmost importance this court adheres to its past rulings. 7.22 Selanjutnya Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Ahmad Saiful Islam Mohamad juga telah merujuk kes Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v. Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 3 CLJ 153; [2020] 2 MLJ iaitu suatu keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan yang dipetik sebagai menyebut: [83] Indeed, the doctrine of stare decisis dictates that as a matter of a general rule of great importance the Federal Court is bound by its own previous decisions. However, there are exceptional circumstances that allow them to depart from the earlier decision, but such power must be used sparingly. ................. [79] Any decision of the Federal Court must be treated with utmost deference. More significantly, in my opinion, it is not a good policy for us at the highest court of the land to leave the law in a state of uncertainty by departing S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal from our recent decisions. That will put us in a bad light as the Federal Court will then purports to be in a state of quandary when deciding a case. It is also a bad policy for us to keep the law in such a state of uncertainty particularly upon a question of interpretation of a statutory provision that comes up regularly for consideration before the courts. [72] While judges may no doubt sincerely have differences in views, there is also public interest to consider. It would be a lamentable state of the law if members of the public, in whatever sector, are unable to secure legal advice of sufficient certainty in order to properly conduct or regulate their affairs because of a confusing melee of conflicting legal decisions by the courts. 7.23 Mahkamah Rayuan juga telah memberi pertimbangan bahawa keputusan dalam kes Rosman Saprey juga telah disahkan oleh kes Majlis Angkatan Tentera Malaysia v. Mohd Nurul Ami Mohd Basri [2019] 2 CLJ 772(CA) dan PP v. Samsui Arif in Bakar [2020] 7 CLJ 503(CA). 7.24 Mahkamah Rayuan selanjutnya telah memutuskan bahawa kegagalan polis mengambil sampel air kencing responden dalam dua botol adalah tidak fatal kepada kes pendakwaan. 7.25 Selanjutnya dalam kes PP v. Rosman Saprev & Anor [2019] 4 CLJ 767, dalam keputusan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan berhubung dengan Perintah Tetap Ketua Polis Negara F103 ('PTKPN F103') dan Garis Panduan Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia Bil. 6/2002 ('GPKKM 6/2002'), Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: 7.26 PTKPN F103 menyebutkan contoh air kencing diambil dengan menggunakan dua botol urin (perenggan 8.2). Satu botol air kencing adalah untuk tujuan ujian awal di peringkat polis jika perlu dan satu botol lagi untuk dihantar ke hospital bagi penganalisaan. Oleh itu dua botol air kencing bukan satu kehendak mandatori jika contoh air kencing tersebut tidak dibuat ujian awal di peringkat polis. Botol yang mengandungi contoh air kencing akan di hantar terus ke hospital bagi penganalisaan (penekanan ditambah). Pendakwaan ke atas seseorang yang mentadbirkan dadah ke dalam tubuh badan juga tidak dilakukan berdasarkan hasil ujian awal atau saringan yang hanya merupakan satu proses indikatif. Pertuduhan sekiranya dibuat akan diasaskan kepada hasil ujian analisis oleh ahli sains atau ahli kimia kerajaan yang menggunakan S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal kaedah analisis yang diiktiraf oleh undang-undang. 7.27 Garis Panduan KKM Bil. 6/2002 mengatakan hanya satu botol contoh urin diperlukan untuk analisis. Tetapi sekiranya ujian awal dan ujian analisis dilakukan di dua tempat yang berasingan, maka dua botol urin diperlukan (dipanggil botol pertama dan botol duplicate) (perenggan 6(c)). Botol kedua (duplicate) adalah untuk kegunaan ujian awal (screening) jika hendak dibuat dan botol duplicate ini akan disimpan oleh pegawai yang membuat ujian awal. Botol pertama yang mengandungi contoh air kencing akan dihantar ke hospital untuk dibuat analisis. Oleh itu Garis Panduan KKM Bil. 6/2002 tidak menjadikan pengambilan dua botol urin sebagai mandatori sekiranya ujian awal (screening) tidak dilakukan (penekanan ditambah). 7.28 Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes ini juga telah menyentuh mengenai elemen kuat kuasa undang-undang force of law bagi Perintah Tetap Ketua Polis Negara F103 ('PTKPN F103') dan Garis Panduan Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia Bil. 6/2002 {'GPKKM 6/2002'), Mahkamah Rayuan yang tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam bela terpelajar bagi pihak responden yang menghujahkan bahawa PTKPN F103 dan Garis Panduan KKM Bil. 6/2002 sebagai dokumen yang mempunyai kuat kuasa undang- undang (force of law) yang memerlukan pematuhan mandatori oleh pihak polis atau pegawai perubatan dan akan menjejaskan sekiranya gagal dipatuhi telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: "[52] Walaupun terdapat s. 44 ADB 1952 memberikan kuasa kepada Menteri mewakilkan kuasa dan fungsinya kepada mana-mana pegawai yang sesuai dalam mentadbirkan ADB 1952, tetapi tidak terdapat perwakilan kuasa di bawah s. 44 telah dilakukan. Oleh itu PTKPN F103 dan Garis Panduan KKM Bil. 6/2002 tidak boleh dikaitkan dengan s. 44 tersebut untuk diberi pengiktirafan sebagai mempunyai elemen "force of law". [53] Juga, walaupun terdapat s. 47 ADB 1952, yang memberi kuasa kepada Menteri untuk membuat undang-undang subsidiari, iaitu peraturan- peraturan dalam menetapkan perkara-perkara yang diperlukan di bawah Akta, tetapi Menteri tidak ada membuat apa-apa peraturan yang berkaitan dengan kaedah pangambilan contoh air kencing dan cara menguruskannya. Oleh itu PTKPN F103 dan Garis Panduan KKM Bil. 6/2002 bukan dikeluarkan di bawah s. 47 tersebut untuk mempunyai elemen "force of law". S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [54] Seksyen 28 Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) 1983 (Akta 283) memberi kuasa kepada Menteri untuk membuat kaedah- kaedah dalam melaksanakan peruntukan Akta 283. Sub-perenggan (e) s. 28(1) Akta 283 memberi kuasa kepada Menteri untuk mengadakan peruntukan mengenai kaedah-kaedah berhubung dengan ujian-ujian yang hendak dijalankan di bawah Akta 283. Bagaimanapun, tidak terdapat sebarang kaedah yang dibuat oleh Menteri di bawah Akta 283 yang berkaitan dengan tatacara pengambilan air kencing bagi ujian dan cara menguruskannya. [55] Ketiadaan peraturan-peraturan atau kaedah-kaedah yang disebutkan di atas telah menyebabkan pihak polis mengambil usaha mengeluarkan PTKPN F103. Pihak Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia pula mengeluarkan Gan's Panduan KKM Bit. 6/2002. PTKPN F103 hanya dihasratkan untuk dijadikan panduan oleh pegawai polis dalam melaksanakan tugasan mereka. PTKPN F103 dengan itu lebih merupakan garis panduan dalaman untuk diguna pakai oleh pegawai polis khususnya Jabatan Narkotik PDRM. [56] Garis Panduan KKM Bil. 6/2002 pula, jika dilihat pada bahagian pengenalan, garis panduan tersebut ditujukan kepada pegawai- pegawai perubatan Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia. Hasrat garis panduan ini juga jelas hanya untuk dijadikan panduan dalam menjalankan tugas oleh pegawai perubatan berkaitan dengan ujian/analisis air kencing". 7.29 Berdasarkan otoriti-otoriti di atas, Mahkamah berpendapat kegagalan pihak polis untuk mengambil sampel air kencing Tertuduh dalam dua botol adalah tidak fatal kepada kes pendakwaan. Maka element (c) berjaya dibuktikan oleh Pihak Pendakwaan. 7.30 Berhubung dengan element (d), Mahkamah merujuk kes Noorismail Abu Bakar v. PP [2020] 1 LNS 1101 [42] yang telah membuat rujukan dan membuat analisa terhadap keputusan kes Kamarul Farkaruddin Mohamed lwn. PP [2013] 7 CLJ 636 yang telah menyatakan prinsip yang berikut: "....it is not sufficient for the urine test report to merely state that, for example, methamphetamine was found in the urine sample of the accused, but that it was also necessary to state that the methamphetamine that was found was a dangerous drug prescribed in Parts III and IV of the first schedule to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952" S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7.31 Kes Kamarul Farkaruddin Mohamed juga telah merujuk tiga kes bagi menyokong kesimpulan ini dan Mahkamah dalam kes Noorismail Abu Bakar telah membuat anaiisa terhadap tiga kes yang berikut; Loo Keck Leona v. PP [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 195; [1992] 3 CLJ 1332: [1992] 2 MLJ 177: Shukri Mohamad v. PP [1995] 3 CLJ 799; [1995] 3 MLJ 229 danHo Kiat Swee v. Rex [1946] 1 LNS 6: [1947] 13 MLJ dan telah membuat kesimpulan bahawa walaupun ketiga-tiga kes ini melibatkan fakta yang agak berbeza, namun prinsip yang sama terpakai dalam kes terhadap perayu dalam kes ini. Prinsip yang diputuskan dalam kes-kes tersebut adalah bahawa ahli kimia hendaklah menyatakan dengan tepat bahan dadah berbahaya tersebut seperti diperuntukkan di bawah undang-undang. 7.32 Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Noorismail Abu Bakar telah menyatakan dalam analisanya terhadap ketiga-tiga kes "it was unclear whether the samples in question were of the nature and quality as to attract the presumption of trafficking (as was the case in Shukri Mohamad v. PP and Loo Keck Leong v. PP) or that was proscribed by law at all (as was the case in Ho Kiat Swee v. R)" By contrast, there is no ambiguity in the term methamphetamine. No evidence was led to show that the expression could be used to describe compounds of differing chemical composition. Accordingly, once the expert has testified that the urine samples contained methamphetamine, it could have only meant one thing: that the accused had within him a dangerous drug that had been proscribed under Part III of the first schedule to the Dangerous Drug Act 1952. In my judgment, no doubt at all arose in the present case that "methamphetamine" is listed in Part III of the first schedule to the Act. For as long the substance found to have been ingested by the accused was methamphetamine, then this ingredient of the offence under section 15(1) is proven. Unlike cannabis and chandu - expressions which may be ascribed to various chemical compounds of differing composition and which have necessitated specific statutory definitions-there is no ambiguity in the term methamphetamine. For this simple reason, I see no necessity for the urine test reports to have expressly referred to Part III of the first schedule to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952". 7.33 Dalam kes ini SP3 dalam Laporan Patalogi yang disediakan olehnya iaitu P7 S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal telah menyatakan dengan spesifik dadah yang dikesan dalam sampel urin milik Tertuduh adalah dadah yang tersenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Bahagian III Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, dan SP3 telah hadir ke Mahkamah dan telah menyatakan dalam Pernyataan Saksinya (PS-1) berkenaan penyenaraian dadah jenis Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine dalam Jadual Pertama Bahagian III Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 seperti yang berikut: "Hasil analisa ujian pengesahan mendapati sampel air kencing bagi penama SHAHRUL ASWAD BIN ABDULLAH (No.KP: 960803095153) adalah ada mengandungi AMPHETAMINE dan METHAMPHETAMINE iaitu dadah- dadah yang tersenarai di Jadual Pertama Bahagian 3 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 ". 7.34 Peguam juga tidak pada bila-bila masa pernah mencabar pernyataan SP3 dalam pernyataan saksi, mahupun mencabar pengesanan dadah Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine. Memandangkan Peguam tidak pernah mencabar mengenai pernyataan SP3 berhubung dengan Methamphetamine dan Amphetamine yang tersenarai dalam Jadual Pertama Bahagian 3 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952, adalah pendapat Mahkamah seterusnya intipati ketiga telah berjaya dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. [8] ISU LAIN YANG DIBANGKITKAN OLEH PEMBELAAN 8.1 Keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di peringkat pendakwaan dilihat ada meninggalkan gap yang material berkenaan kendalian sampel air kencing Tertuduh yang merupakan intipati terpenting dalam pertuduhan hari ini. Kegagalan pendakwaan untuk membuktikan rantaian bukti adalah tidak terputus dan kendalian barang kes adalah tepat menimbulkan pelbagai keraguan yang munasabah. 8.2 Pada tahap ini, adalah penting saya mengingati akan kewajipan Pembelaan dalam kes jenayah sepertimana yang dijelaskan dalam kes Mohamad Radhi Yaakob v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 3 CLJ 2073: It is a well-established principle of Malaysian criminal law that the general burden of proof lies throughout the trial on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused for the offence with which he is charged. There is no similar burden placed on the accused to prove his innocence. He is presumed innocent until proven guilty. To earn an acquittal, his duty is merely to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. In the course of the prosecution case, the prosecution may of course rely on available statutory presumptions to prove one or more of the essential ingredients S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal of the charge. When that occurs, the particular burden of proof as opposed to the general burden, shifts to the defence to rebut such presumptions on the balance of probabilities which from the defence point of view is heavier than the burden of casting a reasonable doubt, but it is certainly lighter than the burden of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt. To earn an acquittal at the close of the case for the prosecution under s. 173(f) or s. 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court must be satisfied that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction (Munusamy v. PP [1936] 1 LNS 32). If defence is called, the duty of the accused is only to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. He is not required to prove his innocence beyond reasonable doubt. To earn an acquittal, the Court may not be convinced of the truth of the defence story or version. Raising a reasonable doubt in the guilt of the accused will suffice. It is not, however, wrong for the Court to be convinced that the defence version is true, in which case the Court must order an acquittal. In appropriate cases it is also not wrong for the Court to conclude that the defence story is false or not convincing, but in that instance, the Court must not convict until it asks a further question that even if the Court does not accept or believe the defence explanation, does it nevertheless, raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt? It is for this reason that in dealing with the defence story or explanation, the majority of Judges rightly prefer to adopt straight away the legally established “reasonable doubt” test, rather than to delve in the “believable and convincing” test before applying the “reasonable doubt” test. 8.3 Dalam kes PP v. Saimin & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 16, Mahkamah mendapati: The following definition of “reasonable doubt” is often quoted: “It is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs and depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.” It has again been said that ‘“reasonable doubt’ is the doubt which makes you hesitate as to the correctness of the conclusion which you reach. If under your oaths and upon your consciences, after you have fully investigated the evidence and compared it in all its parts, you say to yourself I doubt if he is guilty, then it is a reasonable doubt. It is a doubt which settles in your judgment and finds a resting place there.” Or as sometimes said, it must be a doubt so solemn and substantial as to produce in the minds of the jurors some uncertainty as to the verdict to be given. A reasonable doubt must be a doubt arising from the evidence or want of evidence and S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal cannot be an imaginary doubt or conjecture unrelated to evidence. 8.4 Oleh yang demikian, kegagalan pihak pendakwaan untuk memaklumi dengan awal kejadian sebenar serta mendedahkan berapa ramai tangkapan dan keadaan tempat kejadian sewaktu operasi adalah fatal dan membangkitkan anggapan di bawah Seksyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan1950. Selain itu, Pendakwaan juga gagal menutupi kelompongan yang ditimbulkan oleh Pembelaan dalam kes mereka berkenaan kendalian eksibit serta kedudukan eksibit selama 2 jam sebelum dikemukakan kepada SP4 dan kenapa hanya Tertuduh dilayan dengan beza sewaktu Operasi tersebut dan mengapa SP4 gagal menyiasat berkenaan air mineral yang dibekalkan kepada Tertuduh. 8.5 Mahkamah turut merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Tinggi terkini, PP v. Jarizal Jasni [2023] 8 CLJ 951 yang menyatakan: [39] It is incumbent on the police to investigate both the allegation and the respondent’s defence fairly and professionally. It cannot be said that the defence put up by the respondent is a belated defence. Timely disclosure have been made by the respondent and there is no evidence of delay on his part in offering an explanation. The respondent’s 112 statement under the CPC is made contemporaneously during the course of investigation and failure on the part of the police to investigate the respondent’s defence adequately, adversely affect the prosecution’s case. Even if there is a failure on the part of the respondent to put up his defence, it can never by itself relieve the prosecution of the duty of establishing the charge against the 964 [2023] 8 CLJ A B C D E F G H I Current Law Journal respondent on a prima facie basis at the prosecution’s stage. This court finds that the learned Magistrate has not erred in accepting the defence’s version that there is evidence where inference can be made that dangerous drugs were added to the soft drinks consumed by the respondent without his knowledge. This court is of the considered view that it cannot be said that the respondent’s version cannot be true. The prosecution must disprove this important part of the respondent’s version of the facts which they did not. In those circumstances there is doubt as to whether the respondent did consume or administer dangerous drugs type MDMA to himself with mens rea or by statutory presumption. Accordingly, the respondent was rightly acquitted at the close of the prosecution case on these grounds alone. S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [9] Keputusan di akhir kes pendakwaan Berdasarkan penilaian keterangan secara maksimum terhadap keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal untuk mengemukakan keterangan yang kukuh untuk membuktikan intipati - intipati bagi pertuduhan di bawah Seksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan, ekshibit-ekshibit yang dikemukakan di sepanjang kes pendakwaan dan hujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah di atas penilaian maksimum berpuashati untuk membuat Keputusan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah gagal membuktikan prima facie kes terhadap Tertuduh, maka dengan ini Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan daripada Pertuduhan ini tanpa dipanggil untuk membela diri. Barang kes TPR lupus dan tertakluk kepada rayuan. Wang jaminan dikembalikan. ..................tt................ Ashvinii Thinakaran 10.1.2024 S/N ORIdLyZN90S5acLoqPsJQQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-342-08/2022

PLAINTIF REEZAL JAI RIHAN BIN ABDULLAH DEFENDAN 1. ) DANESH A/L SIVADAS 2. ) BUVANA A/P KULAMARAN

TORT: Defamation – Claims for defamatory statements made by the Defendants; and Claims for civil fraud and/or forgery of documents by the Defendants in order to damage the Plaintiff’s reputation as an upstanding and successful individual in the insurance industry − Whether the complaints pertaining to the insurance policies taken by the D1 contained words that tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society? − Whether Plaintiff has establish the elements of the tort of defamation – The complaints were not published to anybody except the AIA.

23/01/2024

YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5011e45d-9e74-469c-8724-d002e1548a1a&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN NO.: BA-22NCvC-342-08/2022 ANTARA REEZAL JAI RIHAN BIN ABDULLAH (NO. K/P: 810122-14-5131) − PLAINTIF DAN 1. DANESH A/L SIVADAS (NO. K/P: 880119-14-5011) 2. BUVANA A/P KULAMARAN (NO. K/P: 910601-14-5452) − DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Plaintiff is a Unit Manager in AIA Berhad (“AIA”) and operates his own insurance agency, Life Associates Sdn Bhd. [2] The Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants are for two causes of actions – (a) Claims for defamatory statements made by the Defendants against the Plaintiff; and 23/01/2024 13:50:12 BA-22NCvC-342-08/2022 Kand. 64 S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 (b) Claims for civil fraud and/or forgery of documents by the Defendants in order to damage the Plaintiff’s reputation as an upstanding and successful individual in the insurance industry. [3] The Plaintiff seeks for the following reliefs and/or remedies: With respect to the defamatory statements: (a) declaration that the Defendants had jointly and/or individually committed acts of defamation against the Plaintiff. (b) declaration of apology by way of oral and/or written apology to be issued by the Defendants either jointly and/or individually towards the Plaintiff, AIA, Life Associates and Life Associates’ agents for all the defamatory statements made against the Plaintiffs. (c) payment of sums RM 1,000,000.00 by the Defendants either jointly and/or individually to the Plaintiff as damages suffered by the Plaintiff as result of the first defamatory statements and the loss of reputation suffered by the Plaintiff. (d) payment of sums RM1,000,000.00 by the Defendants either jointly and/or individually to the Plaintiff as damages suffered by the Plaintiff as result of the second defamatory statements and the loss of reputation suffered by the Plaintiff. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 (e) exemplary damages as deemed fit by this Court for the Defendants’ actions in respect of the 2 defamatory statements. (f) general damages to be assessed by this Court for the losses and distress suffered by the Plaintiff by reason of the Defendants’ defamatory statements against the Plaintiff. (g) interests and costs. With respect to the Fraud and/or Forgery: (a) declaration that the Letter of Intent is null and void by reason of the Defendants fraud and/or forgery committed and therefore unenforceable against the Plaintiff. (b) payment of sums RM1,000,000.00 by the Defendants either jointly and/or individually to the Plaintiff as damages suffered as result of the Defendants’ act of fraud and/or forgery. (c) general damages to be assessed by this Court by reason of the Defendants act of fraud and/or forgery against the Plaintiff. (d) interests and costs. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Who is the Plaintiff? [4] In the statement of claim, the Plaintiff has stated about himself and his background as follows, among others: • the Plaintiff is a Malaysian individual. • the Plaintiff is a Unit Manager in AIA Berhad (“AIA”) and operates his own insurance agency, Life Associates Sdn Bhd (Company No.: 1340731-H) (“Life Associates”) a company incorporated in Malaysia with registered address at Suite 8.02, Menara AIA, Intan Millennium Square, Jalan Batai 4, 41300 Klang, Selangor. Life Associates is an insurance agency with forty (40) agents. • the Plaintiff’s Achievements and Accolades (a) at all times, the Plaintiff is an upstanding and successful individual in the insurance industry. (b) the Plaintiff as an individual has been part of AIA Bhd for 5 years and had been promoted to an Assistant Unit Manager on 2018 and was promoted to Unit Manager on 2019. (c) the Plaintiff is also the managing director of Life Associates (an insurance agency). S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (d) the Plaintiff as part of Life Associates had achieved the following accolades awarded by AIA throughout the years from 2019 to 2022, i.e. Million Dollar Round Table qualifier for year 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022; President Club Qualifier; Sydney MDRT Qualifier; Star Club Qualifier; Corporate Solutions Master; Corporate Solutions Platinum Advisor; Corporate Solutions Champion Club Qualifier; Summit Qualifier; and Million Dollar Agency for year 2019, 2020 and 2021, consecutively. Who are the Defendants? [5] In the statement of claim, the Plaintiff has stated about the Defendants as follows: The First Defendant (D1): • D1 is a Malaysian individual and residing at Kota Kemuning, 40460 Shah Alam, Selangor. • D1 is one of the directors of Limbo Solutions Sdn Bhd (Company No. 1230876-T), a company incorporated in Malaysia with registered address at Jalan Klang Lama, Kuala Lumpur (is refer to as “LIMBO”). S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 The Second Defendant (D2): • D2 is a Malaysian individual and residing Taman Sri Muda, 40400 Shah Alam, Selangor. • D2 is also a director of LIMBO. The facts The Plaintiff’s version: [6] Meeting between the Plaintiff and D1: Around December 2020, the Plaintiff had met D1 by chance, in a cafe in Kota Kemuning. Prior to this, the Plaintiff has no knowledge of the 1st Defendant. At that time, D1 had introduced himself as the owner of LIMBO, a company which focuses on trading and specialises in online marketing and branding. D1 and the Plaintiff kept in touch after their initial meeting. After several non-formal meetings between the D1 and the Plaintiff, D1 had offered to provide training sessions in online marketing and branding to agents introduced by the Plaintiff, from Life Associates. The Plaintiff was reluctant to take up the offer. However, D1 was insistent and had tactically persuaded the Plaintiff to agree to his offer. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Thereafter, D1 and the Plaintiff came to an understanding for D1 to provide online marketing and branding to the agents from Life Associates introduced by the Plaintiff. Based on the above understanding alone, on 29-3-2021, D1 insisted that LIMBO and Life Associates to enter into a non-disclosure agreement before commencing the online marketing and branding training sessions. The Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”): [7] On 30-6-2021, the NDA was digitally signed by the Plaintiff as the Managing Director of Life Associates Sdn Bhd. [8] The Plaintiff highlights that the NDA was backdated to 29-3-2021, despite it being signed by the Plaintiff on 30.6.2021. [9] The relevant terms of the NDA are summarised, as follows: (a) the NDA is between LIMBO and Life Associates; (b) Life Associates as the Recipient undertakes to protect the confidentiality of the confidential information disclosed by LIMBO to LIFE Associates (Clause 3 of the NDA); and (c) the confidential information is defined as, any financial, commercial, statistical and/or technical data or information pertaining to LIMBO’s business operations, systems and affairs, business plans, processes and procedures, technology, methods, techniques, formulae, know-how, S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 research, products, developments, samples, inventions, designs, drawings, specifications, creations, engineering, trade secrets, intellectual property, trademarks, copyrights, trade names, IT systems(s), program development and configuration, software, object/source codes, services, marketing strategies, regarding any other business of LIMBO and/or its related companies and any other information which may be disclosed directly or indirectly from, or pursuant to discussions, correspondence or negotiations between the Parties in written, printed, electronic or other tangible form, whether in oral or visual form (Clause 1 of NDA). [10] The Plaintiff avers that based on the terms of the NDA, it has no relation to the Defendant’s alleged training in online marketing and branding to the Life Associates’ agents introduced by the Plaintiff. [11] The Plaintiff contends that the Defendants had tactically persuaded the Plaintiff to enter into the NDA with malicious intent and to extort monies from the Plaintiff. D1’s Purchase of Insurance Policies: [12] On or around May 2021, D1 had purchased 5 insurance policies from the Plaintiff (“the Insurance Policies”). The insurance policies purchased by D1 are for − i. Sivadas a/l R K Bhaskaran ii. Managoran a/l Sankaran iii. Sumangi a/p VG Gopala Panick S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 iv. Danesh a/l Sivadas (D1) v. Buvana a/p Kulamaran (Second Defendant/D2) [13] On 19-5-2021, the Defendants through LIMBO made payment in total sums of RM3,874.30 for the Insurance Policies. [14] At around the same time, the Plaintiff had personally visited the D1 at his residence in order for the Insurance Policies holders as named above, to sign and proses the Insurance Policies. [15] In this respect, the Plaintiff learned that the Insurance Policies holders are all family members of D1, i.e. Sivadas a/l R K Bhaskaran is D1’s father; Managoran a/l Sankaran is D1’s uncle; Sumangi a/p VG Gopala Panick is D1’s Mother; and Buvana a/p Kulamaran is D1’s Business Partner. [16] At that time, D1 had requested for the Insurance Policies to be paid by the Plaintiff. In return, the Defendant through LIMBO would pay directly to Life Associates for the monthly premiums for the Insurance Policies. [17] Under D1’s persuasion, the Plaintiff had set up a pre-paid AEON Card (“the Aeon Card”), to carry out payment of monthly premiums for the Insurance Policies. The Plaintiff had made it clear that the payment for the Insurance Policies through the pre-paid AEON card would only be made after the Plaintiff had received the total monthly premiums in respect of the Insurance Policies. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [18] The Plaintiff emphasises that D1’s purchase of the Insurance Policies is independent of any agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants and/or Life Associates and LIMBO. The purchase of the insurance policies was made by the Defendants on their own accord. D1’s online marketing and branding training sessions: [19] On 28-6-2021, the Plaintiff had introduced several agents from Life Associates to the D1 to undergo training in online marketing and branding. The Plaintiff also had provided the details of the agents who would be joining the Defendants’ training sessions. [20] On or around July 2021, the agents began their training with the Defendants. However, upon attending the alleged training sessions conducted by D1, the agents had informed the Plaintiff that they were in fact were briefed and trained in trading of cryptocurrency and not in online marketing and branding. [21] The Defendants had allegedly promised a return of around RM5,000.00 to RM10,000.00 a day. [22] The Plaintiff was further informed by the agents namely, Ruslan Vadivelan, Muhammad Ridzuan and Maitreya that the Defendants as part of their alleged training, had asked the agents to open bank accounts and to apply for any loans. These loan sums are intended to be utilised as capital for the cryptocurrency trading under the guidance of the Defendants. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [23] The Defendants then will take a percentage of any earnings made by the agents from the cryptocurrency trading, as fee for their services. D1’s suspicious conduct: [24] The Plaintiff also noticed that there was daily payment of less than RM10 from LIMBO to Life Associates. The Plaintiff was concerned of this peculiar and out of norm transaction to the Life Associates account. [25] The Plaintiff was concerned and questioned D1 regarding these daily transactions and was informed that those transactions were premium payments for the Insurance Policies. When questioned, D1 informed the Plaintiff that this was necessary as LIMBO had to close its financial account daily as part of its business operations. Therefore, premium payments for the Insurance Policies would be made daily. This had further raised the Plaintiff’s suspicion of the Defendant’s conduct. [26] The discontinuance of the alleged training by the Life Associates agents: The Plaintiff was concerned about the Defendants’ character, motives and actions with respect to the Life Associates’ agents introduced by the Plaintiff to the Defendants. [27] The Plaintiff advised the agents from Life Associates to discontinue their training with LIMBO and the Defendants, out of concerns of the legality of the Defendants operation, the Defendant’s motives and intentions with regard to the Life Associates’ agents. [28] Thereafter, the Life Associates agents discontinued their alleged training with the Defendants and LIMBO. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [29] Despite the agent’s discontinuance of their training with the Defendants and LIMBO, the D1 had continuously attempted to communicate and convince the agents take part in the cryptocurrency trading activities conducted by the Defendants. [30] In this regard, the Plaintiff had on multiple occasions on behalf of the Life Associates agents informed and requested D1 to stop calling and harassing the Life Associates agents. However, D1 had failed, refused and/or neglected to comply with the Plaintiff’s request. [31] On 11-7-2021 by way of letter from the Plaintiff on behalf of Life Associates to the Defendants, the Plaintiff had terminated the NDA signed between LIMBO and Life Associates, as there were no longer any training sessions conducted by the Defendants for the Life Associates’ agents. Cancellation of the Insurance Policies: [32] Subsequent to the Life Associates’ agents’ discontinuance of training with the Defendants, on 13-7-2021, D2 had instructed the Plaintiff to cancel the Insurance Policies. The Plaintiff had also on or around July 2021, received similar instructions from the other Insurance Policies holders. [33] In this regard, the Plaintiff avers that in the meanwhile, D1 had actually requested for the Insurance Policies to be transferred and placed under the purview of the Deputy Manager, Mr Chiew Chee Sian. Mr Chiew Chee Sian however, declined to take over the Insurance Policies. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [34] The Plaintiff avers that the Defendants’ decision to cancel the Insurance Policies was due to the discontinuance of the alleged training by the Life Associates’ agents. [35] As part of the cancellation of the Insurance Policies, the Plaintiff forwarded to the Defendants’ and the other Insurance Policies’ holders, the cancellation and surrender forms to cancel the said policy. The Defendants and the other Insurance Policies holder had executed and returned the said cancellation and surrender form accordingly. [36] Subsequently, the Insurance Policies were cancelled and the premium sums paid up to that time in total of RM1,115.30 was returned to the Defendants on 10-7-2021. The Defendants’ allegation of breach of agreement and demand for RM9,900.00 from the Plaintiff: [37] On 15-7-2021, the Plaintiff had received an email enclosing a letter from the Defendants’ solicitors, Messrs Sangram Jai Singh, a law office based in New Delhi, India alleging amongst others, as follows (“Defendants’ Indian solicitors’ letter”): (a) that the termination of the NDA is allegedly invalid and unlawful. (b) that as a result of the Plaintiff alleged conduct, the Defendants had suffered loss of RM9,900.00 for time allegedly wasted. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (c) that the Plaintiff is to transfer within 14 days of receipt of the letter, sum of RM9,900.00 to LIMBO’s bank account or 0.0682 BTC to Bitcoin wallet address given on the day of transaction, for the alleged losses suffered by the Defendants. [38] Upon receipt of the Defendants’ Indian solicitors’ letter, the Plaintiff on the same day (15-7-2021) lodged a police report against the Defendants to record his statement and as precautionary measure against any future actions by the Defendants. [39] On 16-7-2021, the Plaintiff had also lodged a complaint against the Defendants and LIMBO to Bank Negara Malaysia, the Inland Revenue Board, Securities Commissions and the Police. [40] Despite so, the Plaintiff was still harassed and received complaints due to the Defendants’ action. Therefore, he had on 22.7.2021, lodged another police report to record his statement and as precautionary measure against any future actions by the Defendants. [41] On 29-7-2021, the Plaintiff replied to the Defendants’ Indian solicitors’ letter refuting all the allegations made out in the said letter. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 The Defendants lodged complaints against the Plaintiff to AIA: [42] The Plaintiff has pleaded that the 2 complaints by the Defendants to AIA are false, the details are as in the table − First complaint: • on 23-8-2021 by way of letter from AIA to the Plaintiff (“the AIA Letter”), the Plaintiff learned that the Defendants complaint against the Plaintiff were based on the following allegations: (a) the Plaintiff had utilised money given by the Defendants to purchase the Insurance Policies without their knowledge and consent. (b) when the Defendant had discovered that the Plaintiff had allegedly used their monies to purchase the Insurance Policies, the S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 requested a refund of the said sums, but the Plaintiff allegedly refused to do so. (c) the Plaintiff had allegedly forged the Defendants signatures in the Application Authorisation Forms and the AIA Vitality Membership Application Forms. (d) the Plaintiff had allegedly registered the Plaintiff’s personal credit card and/or debit card (AEON) as the credit/debit card for the Insurance Policies. • pursuant to the AIA Letter, the Plaintiff was provided 7 days from the said letter to answer the allegations. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 Second complaint: • on or around July 2021, the Defendants by way of email to AIA made a second complaint against the Plaintiff. • the Defendants allege that the Plaintiff had by way of a Letter of Intent for Proposed Joint Venture between LIMBO and Life Associates dated 5-5- 2021 (“the alleged Letter of Intent”), had agreed for the creation of a Joint Venture between LIMBO and Life Associates for the purposes of engaging in Insurance in Bitcoin business, named Bitcoin City Project. A copy of the alleged Letter of Intent was enclosed together with the Second Complaint and was provided to the Plaintiff by AIA. • the Plaintiff was again under internal investigation by AIA. In this regard, AIA had forwarded to the Plaintiff the alleged Letter of Intent in order for the S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 Plaintiff to respond and defend against the complaint made by the Defendants against the Plaintiff. [43] In this regard, the Plaintiff emphasis that throughout the Plaintiff’s term as an agent and later Unit Manager under AIA, this was the first time, a complaint was made out against the Plaintiff. [44] As a result of the Defendants’ complaints, the AIA Letter was issued to the Plaintiff. [45] In the statement of claim, the Plaintiff pleads that these complaints had damaged and hurt the Plaintiff’s reputation as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. [46] Premised on the above, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendants had committed defamatory acts to cause disrepute and damage, which hurt the Plaintiff’s reputation as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 The defence The Defendants’ version of fact: [47] The Defendants in its defence to the facts as per the Plaintiff’s version are as follows: Agreed Reply by Defendants Plaintif merupakan Pengurus Unit di AIA Berhad dan yang mengendalikan syarikat sendiri iaitu Life Associates Sdn Bhd serta alamat pendaftarannya (a) Surat Pengesahan Pendaftaran Syarikat Life Associates Plaintif di dalam sistem MITI bertarikh 7.7.2021 (“surat MITI tersebut”), syarikat Plaintif tertera dikategorikan sebagai sektor perkhidmatan Makanan dan Minuman dan bukanlah agensi insurans yang dikatakan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan-Defendan. (b) Pada awalnya, Plaintif telah memperkenalkan dirinya kepada Defendan-Defendan, secara khususnya D1, sekitar sebelum November 2020 dimana pada ketika itu, Plaintif memaklumkan bahawa beliau S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Agreed Reply by Defendants memerlukan ejen dan memberi promosi jualan bagi agensi insurans beliau di Life Associates Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Life Associates”) dan memerlukan bantuan dari Defendan- Defendan menerusi syarikat mereka iaitu LIMBO Solutions Sdn Bhd (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “LIMBO”). (c) Semasa perjumpaan pertama itu juga, D1 memaklumkan kepada Plaintif bahawa beliau merupakan salah seorang pemilik bagi syarikat LIMBO yang mengendalikan L- licensing, I-investing, M- marketing, B-Branding Online di dalam industri Bitcoin. (d) Setelah ketahui bahawa syarikat Defendan-Defendan mempunyai potensi untuk Plaintif berurusan bersama di dalam perjanjian perniagaan, S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Agreed Reply by Defendants Plaintif kerap menghubungi D1 untuk menetapkan perjumpaan dengan pihak Defendan-Defendan bagi tujuan untuk membantu beliau dalam menjayakan satu cadangan usahasama/Joint Venture. Kedua-dua pihak selanjutnya bersetuju untuk memasuki satu surat berniat untuk cadangan berkerjasama antara syarikat Life Associates Sdn Bhd dan Limbo Solutions Sdn Bhd iaitu surat LOI tersebut. (e) Pada satu sesi perbualan WhatsApp bertarikh 14.6.2021, Plaintif berterusan menawarkan kepada D1 untuk mencairkan atau menukarkan bitcon daripada pelanggan- pelanggan Defendan- Defendan kepada satu pelaburan semasa dengan dengan minimum pelaburan sebanyak USD15,000.00. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 Agreed Reply by Defendants (f) Plaintif juga berterusan memohon Defendan- Defendan untuk mengambil polisi insuran AIA yang dianggap sebagai daily allocation iaitu dana untuk usahasama ke arah kegunaan insurans di dalam industri Bitcoin. (g) Berdasarkan kepada representasi dan tawaran oleh Plaintif, Defendan-Defendan telah berusaha untuk memastikan bahawa usahasama tersebut berjaya dan telah memaklumkan kepada pelanggan-pelanggan mereka berhubung tawaran yang dicadangkan oleh Plaintif. Defendan-Defendan juga bersetuju untuk mengambil polisi insuran AIA menerusi Plaintif bagi memulakan usahasama tersebut. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Agreed Reply by Defendants (h) Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah diterangkan secara terperinci mengenai polisi yang akan didaftarkan di atas nama Plaintif. Plaintif kerap kali berjanji akan memberikan penjelasan tetapi tidak pernah melakukannya sehinggalah Defendan-Defendan menerima pesanan ringkas daripada AIA bahawa nama Defendan- Defendan telah di daftarkan di dalam satu polisi. (i) Menerusi pesanan Whatsapp yang berterusan, Plaintif menggesa Defendan- Defendan membuat bayaran ke atas polisi tersebut dan berjanji akan menerangkan berkenaan polisi yang didaftarkan kepada Defendan- Defendan. Plaintif juga mula mengelak daripada perbincangan berkenaan usahasama yang akan dijalinkan. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Agreed Reply by Defendants (j) Pada 9-7-2021, menerusi satu pesanan WhatsApp D2 telah memberikan amaran kepada Plaintif untuk memberikan penjelasan berkenaan polisi yang didaftarkan di atas nama Defendan-Defendan tetapi Plaintif masih juga cuba mengelak dan/atau gagal untuk memberikan maklumat berhubung nombor polisi dan juga perlindungan yang diberikan. Oleh itu, Defendan Pertama memberikan satu pesanan WhatsApp mengarahkan Plaintif untuk menukarkan polisi mereka kepada agen lain yang bernama Chee Sian namun Plaintif mengatakan bahawa dia tidak akan menukarkannya. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 Agreed Reply by Defendants (k) Pada 10-7-2021, akibat kegagalan Plaintif untuk bersikap jujur dan Defendan- Defendan akhirnya menyedari bahawa mereka telah ditipu, D2 bagi pihak dirinya dan D1 telah memberikan arahan kepada Plaintif untuk membatalkan pendaftaran polisi tersebut dan menggesa agar wang yang dibayar oleh mereka dipulangkan oleh Plaintif. (l) Plaintif yang bertindak untuk meyakinkan Defendan- Defendan dalam proses untuk memulakan perniagaan bersama Plaintif memberikan representasi bahawa kolaberasi antara syarikat Plaintif (Life Associates) dan syarikat Defendan-Defendan (LIMBO) dapat memperolehi nilai pendapatan yang banyak dan lebih berpotensi untuk dijayakan. Malah sesi S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 Agreed Reply by Defendants perjumpaan telahpun dibuat yang melibatkan antara Plaintif, salah seorang Pengarah Life Associates iaitu Puan Razlin Irawati Binti Johar yang merupakan isteri kepada Plaintif dan juga D1. Keseluruhan pertemuan dan mesyuarat ini diadakan antara kedua-dua pihak sebelum memasuki LOI. (m) Berdasarkan persetujuan dan persefahaman bersama, kedua-dua pihak menjalankan Peer to Peer (P2P) trading dimana: Defendan-Defendan akan menyalurkan dana kepada Life Associates Sdn Bhd sebagai Daily Allocation dan/atau Insurans dan akan memberikan 5% bahagian keuntungan kepada Life Associates Sdn Bhd sekiranya, (a) Plaintif akan menggunakan dana yang diberikan oleh Defendan- S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 Agreed Reply by Defendants Defendan dalam bentuk Daily Allocation dan/atau Insurans itu untuk kegunaan mempromosikan insurans dalam industri penggunaan Industry Bitcoin yang dilaburkan oleh Defendan- Defendan; (b) Agen-agen daripada Life Associates Sdn Bhd akan mendapat latihan dalam menjalankan operasi dan sistem menggunakan Ringgit (MYR) dan Industry Bitcoin; (c) Penyediaan promosi secara online dan branding kepada Life Associates Sdn Bhd adalah berdasarkan operasi dan sistem penggunaan Ringgit (MYR) dan Bitcoin. Plaintif memberi keyakinan bahawa Industry Bitcoin boleh dimasukkan ke dalam polisi AIA tanpa sebarang masalah. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Agreed Reply by Defendants (n) Defendan-Defendan meminta Plaintif memberikan tandatangan digital ke atas ‘Non-Disclosure Agreement’ (“NDA”) kerana ia adalah prosedur biasa memandangkan Plaintif tidak dapat salinan fizikal. Oleh itu salinan digital memerlukan tandatangan digital. (o) Defendan-Defendan masih belum “membeli” 5 polisi insurans tersebut kerana masih belum jelas apakah polisi yang sepatutnya mereka terima kerana tiada penjelasan daripada Plaintif. Walaupun Defendan- Defendan membuat pembayaran ke atas 5 polisi insurans tersebut, ia merupakan pembayaran tergantung “Floating” sehingga disahkan polisi apakah yang S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Agreed Reply by Defendants akan diterima oleh Defendan- Defendan. Pada setiap masa, Plaintif yang telah tandatangan sebarang jenis borang pendaftaran polisi, menghidupkan polisi dan membuat pembayaran terdahulu dengan tergesa- gesa mengunakan kad debit Plaintif sendiri TANPA pengetahuan Defendan- Defendan ketika itu. Pada masa material, Plaintif mengetahui bahawa salah seorang pelabur TRV Sdn.Bhd dan LIMBO sudah mula mencurigai tindak tanduk beliau ketika itu yang kelihatan ingin mengelak daripada membincangkan berkenaan usahasama industry bitcoin antara mereka. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Agreed Reply by Defendants (p) Plaintif cuba menipu Defendan-Defendan dengan memberikan bil lebih mahal daripada harga sebenar polisi insurans yang ditetapkan oleh AIA. Bayaran sebenar yang sepatutnya dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan adalah RM3,874.30 tetapi Plaintif telah memberikan bil berjumlah RM4,558.00 menerusi sebutharga bertarikh 19-5-2021. (q) Plaintif tidak pernah berjumpa dengan Defendan-Defendan untuk meminta tandatangan daripada Defendan-Defendan dan kesemua pemegang polisi insurans. Bahkan Plaintif terus gagal untuk menjelaskan apakah polisi yang didaftarkan oleh Plaintif tanpa merujuk kebenaran daripada Defendan-Defendan dan pemegang polisi insurans lain. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Agreed Reply by Defendants (r) Plaintif melakukan penipuan nyata kerana pemegang- pemegang polisi insurans tersebut tidak pernah berjumpa dengan Plaintif dan tidak pernah memberikan tandatangan mereka kepada Plaintif. Bukti Plaintif menipu dalam memberikan kenyataan di dalam Penyataan Tuntutan beliau ialah Plaintif tidak mengenali pemegang insuran tersebut dan hanya membuat anggapan salah bahawa Sumangi a/p VG Gopala Panicker adalah ibu kepada Defendan Pertama. Puan Sumangi bukanlah ibu kepada Defendan Pertama malahan beliau adalah pelabur kepada LIMBO. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 Agreed Reply by Defendants (s) D1 tidak pernah meminta Plaintif membayar polisi insurans mereka sebaliknya D1 meminta untuk diselaraskan agar D1 membuat pembayaran secara harian. (t) latihan tidak sempat untuk diadakan selepas Defendan- Defendan mendapat tahu Plaintif tidak berhasrat untuk meneruskan dengan usahasama. Plaintif gagal untuk memaklumkan kepada agen bahawa mereka akan mendapat latihan berkenaan dengan cryptocurrency dan kesemua agen-agen ini tiada pengetahuan berkenaan bitcoin. Ini menyebabkan agen-agen ini salah faham terhadap penjelasan Defendan-Defendan. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Agreed Reply by Defendants Manakala Defendan- Defendan menyangka agen- agen ini sudah dimaklumkan secara ringkas sebelum dihubungi oleh Defendan- Defendan. Plaintif dengan sengaja ingin menimbulkan salah faham antara agen-agen tersebut dengan Defendan-Defendan. (u) Ketiga-tiga agen tidak dimaklumkan terlebih dahulu oleh Plaintif bahawa mereka akan dilatih berhubung Bitcoin hingga menyebabkan salah faham. Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah meminta agen-agen ini membuka akaun kerana tiada keperluan untuk buka akaun memandangkan Plaintif telah meminta Defendan-Defendan menanggung kos latihan agen-agen ini. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 Agreed Reply by Defendants Defendan-Defendan berhak untuk mengambil sebahagian keuntungan daripada transaksi Bitcoin yang dilakukan oleh agen-agen kerana mereka akan belajar secara percuma. Defendan-Defendan hanya mengenakan percentage yang kecil daripada keuntungan keseluruhan agen-agen ini bagi menampung kos pembelajaran mereka. Bahkan peratusan bahagian yang diterima oleh Defendan- Defendan akan dibahagikan peratusannya pula kepada Plaintif atas permintaan Plaintif sendiri. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Publications by the Defendants [48] The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had published the 2 complaints that are defamatory statements to AIA, specifically but not limited to, members of the AIA’s Investigation Department, Gershon Isidore Wilfred, Chiew Chee Sian and Damond Teo Sze Ming. [49] According to the Plaintiff, in the first complaint its natural and ordinary meaning is mean to understood that Plaintiff – (a) is a person who has committed criminal acts; (b) is a person who allegedly misappropriated monies from his clients; (c) is a person who disobeys instructions given by his clients; (d) is a dishonest person who is capable of forging signatures on documents for his own benefit; (e) acts on premeditation and wilful intent to misappropriate monies from his clients; and (f) Plaintiff is a disreputable and unethical insurance agent and/or member of society. And also, the first complaint that is defamatory statement by way of innuendo is mean to understood that – (a) Plaintiff is a dishonest persons; S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 (b) Plaintiff is capable of criminal acts; and (c) Plaintiff has no concern and/or responsibilities towards AIA, Life Associates, Life Associates’ agents and or his clients. [50] The consequences of the first complaint are that the Plaintiff – • was under investigation by AIA. This had caused disrepute and damage, which hurt the Plaintiff’s reputation as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. • has been brought into public ridicule, contempt and hurt of his reputation and position as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. • has been lowered in the estimation of right-thinking persons, in general. As a result, the Plaintiff has suffered mental and emotional anguish and suffering. [51] According to the Plaintiff, in the second complaint the Defendants wrote the following defamatory statements in reference to the Plaintiff: (a) that the Plaintiff had entered into the alleged Letter of Intent in order to profit from the Defendant’s scrupulous activities. (b) that the Plaintiff had cheated and misappropriated sums allegedly belonging to the Defendants. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 (c) that the Plaintiff had acted in detriment to the Defendants. The Defendants had published the second complaint to AIA, specifically but not limited to, members of the AIA’s Investigation Department, Gershon Isidore Wilfred, Chiew Chee Sian and Damond Teo Sze Ming. [52] The Plaintiff firmly stated that in the second complaint, its natural and ordinary meaning is mean to understood that Plaintiff – (a) is a person who has committed criminal acts; (b) is a person who allegedly misappropriated monies from his clients; (c) is a person who disobeys instructions given by his clients; (d) is a dishonest person who is capable of forging signatures on documents for his own benefit; (e) acts on premeditation and wilful intent to misappropriate monies from his clients; and (f) a disreputable and unethical insurance agent and/or member of society. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [53] And also, the second complaint by way of innuendo is mean to understood that Plaintiff – (a) is a dishonest persons; (b) Plaintiff is capable of criminal acts; and (c) has no concern and/or responsibilities towards AIA, Life Associates, Life Associates’ agents and or his clients. [54] The consequences of the second complaint are that the Plaintiff – (a) was under investigation by AIA. This had caused disrepute and damage, which hurt the Plaintiff’s reputation as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. (b) has been brought into public ridicule, contempt and hurt of his reputation and position as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. (c) has been lowered in the estimation of right-thinking persons, in general. As a result, the Plaintiff has suffered mental and emotional anguish and suffering. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 [55] Therefore, the Plaintiff pleaded the losses suffered by him as follows: (a) Plaintiff could potentially be demoted, replaced and/or dismissed from his position as the Unit Manager of AIA. (b) Life Associates could potentially lose out its agency agreement with AIA. (c) Plaintiff could potentially lose the Life Associates’ agents who contribute to the Plaintiff’s earnings as the Managing Director of Life Associates. (d) Plaintiff could lose out on his current clientele who contribute to the Plaintiff’s earnings as a Unit Manager of AIA and as a Managing Director of Life Associates. (e) Plaintiff’s ability to recruit new agents is diminished which affects the Plaintiff’s earnings as a Unit Manager of AIA and as a Managing Director of Life Associates. (f) Plaintiff’s ability to enlist new clients is diminished which affects the Plaintiff’s earnings as a Unit Manager of AIA and as a Managing Director of Life Associates. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 (g) Plaintiff estimated earnings with respect to the above mentioned are – (i) Plaintiff earns an estimated sum of RM700,000.00 yearly as a Unit Manager of AIA; and (ii) Plaintiff earns an estimate sum of RM 300,000.00 yearly as a Managing Director of Life Associates. Premised on the above, the Plaintiff claims that as a result of the 2 defamatory statements, the Plaintiff’s earnings in this regard are put in jeopardy. Therefore, the Plaintiff seeks to claim from the Defendants loses of RM1,000,000.00 for potential income loss as a result of the 2 defamatory statements. [56] As for civil fraud/forgery, the Plaintiff avers that the Defendants had committed civil fraud and/or forgery based on the following facts: (a) the Defendants had tactically persuaded the Plaintiff to digitally sign on the NDA. (b) the Defendants had with malicious intent persuaded the Plaintiff to digitally sign the NDA, in order to have access to a copy of the Plaintiff’s signature. (c) the Defendants forged the Plaintiff’s signature as signed on the NDA on to the alleged Letter of Intent. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 (d) the Defendants intends to rely on the alleged Letter of Intent to extort monies from the Plaintiff and/or to cause disrepute and damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation as a Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. [57] The Plaintiff avers that through the Defendants’ acts of fraud/forgery was intentionally carried out by the Defendants in order to disrepute and damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation as Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society. [58] By reason of the Defendants’ act of fraud/forgery, the Plaintiff is exposed to the Investigation by AIA based on the alleged Letter of Intent; disrepute and damage to the Plaintiff’s reputation as Unit Manager of AIA, the Managing Director of Life Associates and a contributing and responsible member of society; and the alleged claims arising from the Letter of Intent from the Defendants. [59] Premised on the above, the Plaintiff seeks to claim from the Defendants loses of RM 1,000,000.00 for potential income loss as a result of the Defendants’ acts of fraud and/or forgery. [60] The Defendants pleaded that – “48. Perenggan 50 PT Plaintif adalah dinafikan secara keseluruhan dan dianggap sebagai satu pembohongan untuk menyalahguna kuasa Mahkamah dan pihak polis. Defendan-Defendan tidak lagi menghubungi Plaintif setelah membuat aduan kepada pihak AIA. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 Defendan-Defendan menyerahkan kepada AIA untuk menjalankan siasatan dan memulangkan kembali wang Defendan-Defendan.”. [61] And also the Defendants had defended themselves by stating that – “TIADA UNSUR FITNAH i. Aduan Defendan-Defendan sebagai pelanggan kepada pihak AIA Berhad – Perlindungan atas keistimewaan (Privileged): 49. ... menegaskan bahawa aduan yang dikemukakan oleh Defendan-Defendan bukanlah aduan palsu tetapi ianya adalah aduan yang dibuat oleh Defendan-Defendan sebagai klien AIA. (a) pada 11-8-2021, Defendan-Defendan telah mengemukakan aduan kepada pihak AIA menerusi talian pelanggan AIA (‘Customer Careline’)/e-mel kepada [email protected] berkenaan dengan Polisi Insurans di bawah kawalan Plaintif sebagai salah seorang ejen AIA. (b) pada 12-8-2021, Defendan-Defendan telah menerima balasan e-mel dari Encik Anandsingam Bahagian Customer Care yang meminta Defendan-Defendan untuk mengemukakan sebarang bukti sokongan ke atas aduan yang dibuat terhadap Plaintif bagi pihak AIA untuk memulakan penyiasatan yang sewajarnya. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 (c) Pertukaran e-mel antara Defendan-Defendan dan AIA berlaku pada 14-8-2021, 17-8-2021, 19-8-2021 dan 25- 8-2021 di mana Defendan-Defendan telah melampirkan dokumen-dokumen sokongan kepada AIA atas permintaan AIA bagi tujuan melengkapkan penyiasatan terhadap Plaintif di mana ianya dibuat atas dasar permintaan Defendan-Defendan ‘to refund the amount in total and cancel the policy account’. E-mel Defendan- Defendan bertarikh 19-8-2021 juga memberikan penjelasan kepada AIA bahawa Plaintif dan Defendan- Defendan berniat dan telah membentuk satu usahasama antara syarikat Life Associates dan LIMBO bagi mendapat manfaat bersama dan meluaskan portfolio rangkaian business AIA menerusi penyerapan transaksi Industry Bitcoin ii. Aduan dibuat adalah tanpa niat jahat/malice: 52. ... Defendan-Defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang pengetahuan tentang perkara yang dikendalikan oleh pihak AIA dan Plaintif. Pada setiap masa material, Defendan- Defendan hanya dihubungi sekali sahaja dari bahagian AIA Complaince mengenai aduan yang dibuat oleh Defendan- Defendan pada 11.8.2021. iii. Justifikasi: Tindakan Plaintif yang memberikan representasi salah nyata apabila memasuki perjanjian berdasarkan polisi AIA tanpa mendapatkan kelulusan secara bertulis dari pihak AIA. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 53. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa justifikasi terhadap aduan-aduan mereka kepada pihak AIA adalah berdasarkan kepada fakta-fakta yang berikut: 53.1 Surat Niat bagi Cadangan Usahasama antara LIMBO dan Life Associates (“LOI tersebut”) adalah dibuat dan dimasuki atas persetujuan bersama oleh kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan dimana Plaintif telah meyakinkan Defendan-Defendan untuk bekerjasama/colloboration dan membentukkan usahasama tersebut/Joint Venture yang dapat memberi manfaat bersama dan menguntungkan kedua-dua portfolio perniagaan. 53.2 Dalam masa yang sama, Plaintif juga telah memberi kepercayaan penuh bahawa ejen insurans yang bekerja dibawah Life Associates akan diberi peluang untuk dilatih/diberi konsultasi oleh syarikat LIMBO untuk mengendalikan pelanggan-pelanggan yang berniat untuk membuat transaksi digital Bitcoin bagi tujuan untuk menjana pendapatan serta pelaburan semula ke dalam polisi AIA. 53.3 Namun, Defendan-Defendan hanya bergantung sepenuhnya ke atas Plaintif untuk mengendalikan polisi insurans AIA dengan pihak AIA di mana hal ini adalah di luar kawalan dan pengetahuan Defendan-Defendan. Ini kerana pada setiap masa material, Defendan- Defendan hanya berurusan dan membuat perjanjian S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 dengan Plaintif yang merupakan seorang ejen dari AIA Berhad. ... 56. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa pembelian polisi insurans dibawah selia Plaintif adalah atas dasar dana pelaburan daripada Defendan-Defendan dan sememang tidak patut digunakan oleh Plaintif untuk membayar polisi insurans selagi belum mendapat penjelasan dan/atau kelulusan daripada Plaintif. 57. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa tiada penyebaran kepada orang awam dilakukan. Sebaliknya Defendan- Defendan telah memberikan emel kepada unit-unit berkaitan sahaja. 58. ... Defendan-Defendan menegaskan bahawa keseluruhan kenyataan dalam perenggan tersebut bukan fitnah ataupun sindiran tetapi secara justifikasi adalah gambaran tepat berkenaan personaliti, etika kerja dan tahap professionalism Plaintif. 59. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan adalah prosedur biasa bagi sebuah syarikat untuk membuat siasatan apabila ada salah laku aduan daripada awam atau pelanggan-pelanggan mereka. Tindakan siasatan tersebut seharusnya dilakukan terhadap Plaintif supaya AIA tidak dimalukan dimata masyarakat. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 60. ... Plaintif ... diletakkan dengan beban bukti yang kukuh kerana kenyataan tersebut sangat dramatik dan direkaceritakan. Pada setiap masa Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah menerbitkan kenyataan tersebut untuk dilihat oleh orang awam ataupun pekerja- pekerja Life Associates dan pekerja-pekerja AIA selain unit-unit yang berkaitan dengan isu antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. 61. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan kenyataan tersebut bukan berunsur fitnah atau sindiran sebaliknya merupakan justifikasi terhadap fakta yang berlaku di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. 62. ... tiada penyebaran kepada pengetahuan umum. Defendan- Defendan hanya memberikan e-mel aduan kepada unit-unit yang berkaitan sahaja. 63. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan keseluruhan kenyataan dalam perenggan tersebut bukan fitnah atau pun sindiran tetapi secara justifikasi adalah gambaran tepat berkenaan personaliti, etika kerja dan tahap professionalism Plaintif. 64. ... Defendan-Defendan menyatakan adalah prosedur biasa bagi sebuah syarikat untuk membuat siasatan apabila ada salah laku aduan daripada awam atau pelanggan-pelanggan mereka. Tindakan siasatan tersebut seharusnya dilakukan terhadap Plaintif supaya AIA tidak dimalukan dimata masyarakat. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 65. ... Plaintif adalah ... diletakkan dengan beban bukti yang kukuh kerana kenyataan tersebut sangat dramatik dan direkaceritakan. Pada setiap masa Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah menerbitkan kenyataan tersebut untuk dilihat oleh orang awam ataupun pekerja-pekerja Life Associates dan pekerja – pekerja AIA selain unit-unit yang berkaitan dengan isu antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan.”. Issues to be tried: [62] Issues to be tried is filed only by the Plaintiff and enclosed in Enclosure C. [63] The Plaintiff raises 4 issues to be determined − (a) whether the Defendants email to AIA contains defamatory statements against the Plaintiff? (b) whether the Defendants had made defamatory statements to AIA? (c) whether the Plaintiff and the Defendants had executed the purported Letter of Intent for Proposed Joint Venture between LIMBO and Life Associates dated 5-5-2021? (d) whether the Defendants are liable for losses and damages suffered by the Plaintiff by reason of the defamatory statements to AIA? S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 The decision on 3-11-2023 [64] I dismiss the Plaintiff’s suit against the Defendants and the decision as pronounced by this Court on 3-11-2023 is as follows: “KEPUTUSAN BICARA PENUH Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan ialah mengenai perbuatan dan kenyataan fitnah terhadap Plaintif. Plaintif memplidkan bahawa aduan-aduan Defendan-Defendan terhadap Plaintif berkenaan dengan polisi insurans AIA adalah palsu. AIA telah menjalankan siasatannya terhadap Plaintif. Plaintif telah menjawab “show cause letter AIA” tersebut. Butir-butir kerugian yang ditanggung oleh Plaintif akibat daripada aduan-aduan tersebut telah mendedahkan Plaintif kepada kerugian dan perbelanjaan sebagaimana dalam perenggan 80 pernyataan tuntutan. Pliantif juga memplidkan bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah melakukan penipuan sivil dan/atau pemalsuan untuk mencemarkan dan merosakkan reputasi Plaintif. Keputusan dan dapatan Mahkamah Dalam perbicaraan, Mahkamah ini telah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi kedua-dua pihak. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 Berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan adalah didapati bahawa aduan-aduan yang berunsur fitnah kepada AIA adalah aduan rasmi Defendan-Defendan berkenaan dengan polisi insurans yang diambil ddengan/daripada Plaintif selaku ejen insurans kepada Defendan-Defendan. Berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, “perkataan yang dipersoalkan” dan disiarkan oleh Defendan-Defendan dalam surat aduan mereka tidak membawa apa-apa maksud untuk merendahkan reputasi Plaintif SP-1 (penyiasat insurans) dan Plaintif sendiri telah memberikan keterangan dan keterangan tersebut gagal menunjukkan bahawa “perkataan yang dipersoalkan” mendedahkan Plaintif kepada kerugian, kesusahan dan perbelanjaan yang dialami oleh Plaintif. Berdasarkan penelitian Mahkamah ini selepas meneliti semua dokumen dan keterangan lisan dan dokumentar yang dibentangkan oleh pihak-pihak di hadapan Mahkamah ini, dan hujahan bertulis serta hujahan balasan pihak-pihak, Mahkamah ini mendapati atas imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif gagal untuk membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-Defendan. Oleh yang demikian, saya menolak tuntutan Plaintif dan dengan kos sebanyak RM10,000.00 (tertakluk kepada fi alokatur).”. [65] The Plaintiff is unsatisfied and aggrieved by the decision had then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 The trial & the witnesses [66] On 12-9-2023, 13-9-2023 & 14-9-2023 this Court has heard the full trial. [67] The Plaintiff’s witnesses, summarily as follows: PW-1: Mr. Gershon Isidore Wilfred Assistant Manager, Investigation Department, AIA PW-2: Mr. Reezal Jai Rihan bin Abdullah (the Plaintiff) Unit Manager, AIA [68] The Defendants’ witnesses, summarily as follows: DW-1: Mr. Danesh A/L Sivadas (D1) Entrepreneur DW-2: Ragumaran A/L Doriasamy Entrepreneur DW-3: Mrs. Sumangi A/P VG Gopala Panick Admin Coordinator, Alice Smith School S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 DW-4: Ms. Buvana A/P Kulamaran Peer 2 Peer Training Agent DW-5: Mr. Rabindra A/L Vijayapal Business Owner The Law [69] The gist of the defence is – • qualified privilege • fair comment • section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 [Act 286] – “Justification. In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.”. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 [70] The decision in the Federal Court (FC) in the case of Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor v. Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli [2022] 4 AMR 695; [2022] 3 MLJ 758; and [2011] 5 CLJ 487, Y.A.A Azahar Mohamad CJ (Malaya) [Y.A.A as he then was] held that the High Court correctly directed itself in law that in order to succeed in his defence of fair comment, the respondent will need to establish the 4 elements in Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong [1989] 3 MLJ 1 − (i) the words complained of are comment, although they may consist or include inferences of fact; (ii) the comment is on a matter of public interest; (iii) the comment is based on facts; and (iv) the comment is one which fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved. [71] In paragraph [56] FC quoted the test of “fair” comment in Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam (supra) – “The trial judge quoted very aptly from the direction given in the jury by Diplock J (as he then was) in Silkin v Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd at p 759: The matter which you have to decide and I emphasise this again, because it is so important, is not whether you, any of you, agree with that comment. You may all of you disagree with it, feel that is comment that is not S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 correct. But that is not the test. I will remind you of the test once more. Could a fair-minded man, holding a strong view, holding perhaps an obstinate view, holding perhaps a prejudicial view – could a fair-minded man have been capable of writing this?”. [72] The Federal Court in the case of Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn. Bhd. v. Hue Shieh Lee [2019] 3 CLJ 729 held – “The Law on Defamation [29] Defamation is committed when the defendant publishes to a third person words or matters containing untrue imputation against the reputation of the plaintiff… [30] In Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 321, His Lordship Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) has dearly laid down the necessary procedure in establishing claim for libel (with which we agree), when he said at p. 155: In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the words are defamatory: (2) the words refer to the plaintiff: and (3) the words were published. …”. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 [31] In other words, the plaintiff must prove three elements of the tort of defamation, which are: (i) the plaintiff must show that the statement bears defamatory imputations; (ii) the statement must refer to or reflect upon the plaintiff’s reputation; and (iii) the statement must have been published to a third person by the defendant.”. [73] The Court of Appeal through the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the case of Chok Foo Choo @ Chok Kee Lian v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461; [1999] 1 MLJ 371 where it was held that – “In my judgment; the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the Plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory. …”. [74] The case of Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146; [1973] 2 MLJ 56 where his Lordship Mohamed Azmi J (as he then was), quoting Gatley on Libel and Slander, 6th edn, p. 4 had stated as follows: “There is no wholly satisfactory definition of a defamatory imputation. Any imputation which may tend ‘to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, ‘to cut him off from society,’ or ‘to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule,’ is defamatory of him. An imputation may be S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 defamatory whether or not it is believed by those to whom it is published.”. Further, at p. 14, para 31, Gatley says: A defamatory imputation is one to a man’s discredit, or which tends to lower him in the estimation of others, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure his reputation in his office, trade or profession, or to injure his financial credit. The standard of opinion is that of right-thinking persons generally. To be defamatory an imputation need have no actual effect on a person’s reputation; the law looks only to its tendency. Thus, the test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true. Another test is: would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?”. [75] Ong Hock Sim FJ in Rajagopal v. Rajan [1972] 1 MLJ 45 Federal Court [Tab C] said at page 47 B-D – “In deciding whether the words complained of were per se defamatory, it would be necessary to construe the words in their natural and ordinary meaning in the sense in which reasonable men of ordinary intelligence would like to understand them. … that the words complained of have a secondary meaning by innuendo, consideration must be taken as to the manner of their publication and the persons to whom they were published.”. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 At page 47 G-H – “It is not what the appellant meant that is relevant in construing whether the words are defamatory but what the words convey to a reasonable person to whom they are published.”. [76] Y.A Mary Lim JCA (as Y.A then was) at page 522 in Raja Syahrir bin Abu Bakar & Anor v. Manjeet Singh Dhillon and Other Appeals [2020] 3 MLJ 482 Court of Appeal further dealt with the defence of qualified privilege. The case of Dato Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v. Nurul Izzah bt Anwar & Anor [2018] 3 MLJ 726 was cited and referred – “[55] A defence of qualified privilege is founded on the need or duty on the part of the alleged defamer to impart information to the public at large and that there is a duty on the part of the public to receive that information…Although the law of defamation exists to protect reputations, it is recognised that in particular situations it is to the benefit of society generally for people to be able to communicate without fear of being sued for defamation. This is so despite the risk that a person’s reputation will be damaged and they will not be able to restore it by bringing a claim for defamation. Its rationale resides in the wider consideration that a general public good in such exercise overrides the need to protect individual reputation…”. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 Evaluation & Findings of this Court [77] This defamation suit by the Plaintiff against the Defendants was based on the complaints made by the Defendants to the AIA, i.e. the Plaintiff’s employer. The question is whether the complaints pertaining to the insurance policies taken by the D1 contained words that tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society? (“the impugned statements”). [78] It is undisputed that the complaints made by the Defendants are not poison pen letter or surat layang as in Malay language. It is directed to the insurance company, the correct and related party pertaining to the complaints. [79] It is also undisputed that the complaints are not swept under the carpet or it is not ignored by AIA. [80] The matters raised and/or complained by the Defendans had been investigated and PW-1 was assigned to investigate the Defendants’ complaints. In his testimony, PW-1 stated that the Plaintiff is the AIA’s agent, so PW-1 would copy the complaints to Chiew Chee Sian (District Manager, which is someone because the Plaintiff was Unit Manager at that time so he will be reporting to District Manager); Tan San San/Susan Tan (Chief Agency Officer); Teoh Chee Kiang, Terence Teoh (Senior Director of Agency); and Teo Sze Ming, Damond Teo (Director of the Agency). S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 [81] PW-1 confirmed that if there is any fraudulent conduct or misconduct by the agent, generally resulted termination of the agent contract. [82] This Court, after thoroughly, pay her attention with regard to every detail, understanding of the subject and with great care analysing the Plaintiff claims, finds that the complaints and the accusations made by the Defendants against the Plaintiff are not defamatory. [83] Let me starts with documents in Common Bundle (B1) at pages 78 to 81, namely – (a) the email dated 11-8-2021 at 11.44 AM, with D1’s name, and mobile phone number were stated and the title of the email was “FRAUD/MOST URGENT” and was addressed to [email protected]” and D1 wrote to – AIA Fraud & Compliance Dept Level 10, Menara AIA, 99 Jalan Ampang 50450 Kuala Lumpur This email was cc to [email protected]. The contents as per the email – “I’m communicating this information in good faith to this concerned dept. In order to assess the plight, I S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 and my Key Managerial Personnel had faced. (“I”, “We”, “Us” or “Our”). This is to intimate and inform this dept that “Fraud” had taken place through Life Associates Sdn Bhd via its Mr. Managing Director Mr. Reezal Jai Rihan bin Abdullah (hereinafter referred as “Fraudster”). The said Fraudster had deceived us and took up insurance policies in our name (the fund provided him were meant for a different privileged project) for which we never agreed to in the very instance, nor were the policies taken with our volition, “as is” those policies have not been signed by us and acknowledged by us or even applied by us. Kindly provide us with reason why this incident could happen in your organization, take steps to cancel the policies and refund the rightful amount in total to each individual policy holder saving’s A/c. (Detail provided below) BUVANA A/P KULAMARAN NRIC NO.: xxx POLICY NO.: xxx DANESH A/L SIVADAS NRIC NO.: xxx POLICY NO.: xxx”. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 (b) AIA’s reply to D1’s email can be seen at page 79, AIA’s email dated 12-8-2021 at 2.19, from [email protected], that requested D1 to provide AIA with any evidence or supporting documents which may include voice recordings, emails, WhatsApp messages, SMSes for example, for AIA to substantiate the allegations against the abovementioned agent. AIA has given D1 the timeline that is by 16-8-2021. (c) AIA’s reply to D1’s email dated 17-8-2021 can be seen at page 81 whereby AIA had referred to D1’s email dated 14- 8-2021 and had further requested D1 to provide clarification on the certain matters. AIA also had stated that “We have escalated the matter to the relevant departments for review”. [84] PW-1 as the investigating officer has sent a letter dated 23-8-2021 by email to the Plaintiff and the relevant portions of the contents are – • informing the Plaintiff about the Defendants’ complaint to the D1 and D2 insurance policies that were registered by the Plaintiff. • the allegations made by the Defendants were stated. • the Plaintiff is given 7 days to provide the Investigation Department in writing the answers to the allegations. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 • The note stated “Please take note that in the event you fail to provide us with answers to the allegations within the stipulated time, it will be construed by us that you admit to the allegations and in such an event we shall proceed to take all necessary action against you in accordance with your contract with AIA Bhd & AIA Public Takaful Berhad.”. • this email was cc to: DM Chiew Chee Sian. CAO Tan San San, Susan. SDOA Teoh Chee Kiang, Terence. DOA Teo Sze Ming, Damond. [85] D2 has forwarded the AIA’s email dated 25-8-2021 to the Defendants’ solicitors (please refer to document at page 86/B1) where AIA’s approval to cancel and refund the amounts paid for D1’s and D2’s policies. [86] The fact that the Defendants had addressed the complaints to AIA is good enough to rule out that the Defendants querries and suspicious about the insurance policies taken through the Plaintiff. After the closure of the investigation, AIA’s action is to refund the Defendants. Nothing was said about “why this incident could happen in AIA” and the Plaintiff’s position in AIA. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 [87] I quoted the learned counsel for the Defendants authority of case that laid out the principle with regards to defamation claim by Y.A Abdul Wahab Patail in the case of Subramaniam a/l Paramasivam v. Courts Mammoth Bhd & Anor [2010] 9 MLJ 363 – “(6) There is no cause of action in defamation where a bona fide complaint made to a professional disciplinary authority against a professional is dismissed. The threat of litigation would only intimidate persons with bona fide complaints from making a complaint, and deny members of the public their right of protection from unprofessional professionals. In the instant case, the defendants did have a bona fide grievance when they issued the letter of termination and the letter of complaint. It was thus not necessary to consider the defence of justification.”. [88] The Defendants were well within their rights to file complaints against the Plaintiff, as they were negatively impacted by the Plaintiff's unprofessional behavior. Their complaint emails were made in good faith and were intended to protect the public’s interests by preventing potential fraud against other customers. Submitting a complaint to AIA's customer service email was recognized and endorsed by AIA as a legitimate channel for customers or the public to register complaints against any of their agents. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 [89] I quoted the learned counsel for the Defendants authority of case in Ernest Cheong Yong Yin (suing in the name and style Ernest Cheong PTL Chartered Surveyors) v. Low Kim Yap & Ors [2006] 5 MLJ 780 – “The defendants were the very people who were directly affected by the act of the plaintiff, a registered valuer who had clothed himself in the guise of a company to protect himself from the laws that govern his professional conduct (see para 5). The defendants were exercising their rights given by the law to complain against a registered valuer. The complaints were done in accordance with a written law that provides for a proper avenue of complaint. A claim for defamation must be based on an original publication or statement and the alleged defamatory statement must be particularized in accordance with O 78 r 3 RHC. Both these requirements were absent in this case (see para 19). As the defendants had complied with the procedure for making complaints, no malice could be inferred. There was no evidence that the complaints were communicated to any person outside the complaint process. Allowing a defamation suit of this nature to continue, would defeat the whole purpose of the complaint process set up by law and must not be encouraged. If claims of this nature were allowed, the floodgates would be open to defamation suits S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 whenever disciplinary bodies receive complaints from the public against their members.”. [90] By applying the principles established in both cases, the Plaintiff's claim has faltered, as the Plaintiff was unable to substantiate, on the balance of probabilities, that defamatory statements were made by the Defendants against him. [91] This Court agrees with the learned counsel for the Defendants’ submission that – “The Plaintiff had failed to state in his Statement of Claim the exact words in the Defendants’ emails of complaints allegedly being defamatory. In his Statement of Claim, specifically at paragraph 53 on page 61 of Ikatan Pliding, the Plaintiff indeed referenced the statements crafted by SP1 as the defamatory statements. These phrases, as indicated in his Statement of Claim, did not originate from the Defendants themselves. The emails of complaints were not published to 3rd party.”. [92] As for the Plaintiff's claim of the second complaint, this Court is of the view that it does not have a basis in reality and does not exist. Both parties were unable to locate any evidence within the bundled documents to support the existence of the second complaint. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 [93] The Court of Appeal in Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail & Anor (supra) did not disturb the High Court’s finding that on failure to prove malice. In this regard, the Federal Court held that “it is trite law that proof of malice defeats the defence of fair comment because a comment that is made maliciously is not fair comment.”. Here, in this case, the Defendants did make the complaints against the Plaintiff to AIA but the basis of the complaint is about the Defendants querries that need the action/explanation from AIA. The complaints against the Plaintiff are fair and no malice. [94] The third issues that is whether the Plaintiff and the Defendants had executed the purported Letter of Intent for Proposed Joint Venture Between LIMBO and Life Associates dated 5-5-2021, the documents tendered before this Court had proved that the existence of Letter of Intent which is marked as Exhibit P1 is a document to support the existence of the NDA and it serves as evidence of a business collaboration between the Plaintiff and the LIMBO. [95] The issue raised about the digital signature for the NDA and alleged to be forged and that the Plaintiff sought to imply that he had been coerced into executing the NDA through tactics employed by the Defendants, the Defendants had revealed that the Plaintiff had received a digital version of the NDA and had ample time to execute it without any pressure. It was also noted that the Defendants were not present during the Plaintiff's execution of the NDA S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 [96] I have read the learned counsel for the Plaintiff’s submission in reply, i.e. − “The Defamatory Statements have been sufficiently pleaded with respect to the Defendants contention, the Plaintiff submits that through the pleadings before this Honourable Court, the Plaintiff had pleaded the essential Defamatory Statement and related facts giving rise to the Plaintiff's claim. In this regard, the Plaintiff emphasises that the letter dated 23.8.2021 from AlA bearing the Defamatory Statement was issued as direct consequence of the Defendants emails dated 11.8.2021 and 14.8.2021 (reference, pg. 78-79 of Bundle B1) (“Defendants’ email to AIA"). This was confirmed by SP-1, the AIA’s Investigating Officer. The Plaintiff respectfully refers to the High Court decision in Keith Richard Judd v Suppayah a/l Krishnan [2016] 9 MLJ 380 – [50] Having considered the plaintiff's statement of claim, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has particularised the facts of each email that is defamatory of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has particularised the relevant facts from the whole contents of each email which brings the imputation that expose the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule and contempt in the mind of a reasonable man. The two authorities cited by the defendant are distinguishable on its facts. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 [61] It is also my findings that the said emails were sent by the defendant to third parties based on the said emails. the evidence of the plaintiff and PW3 who also received most of the emails referred to earlier. PW3 testified that PW3 confirmed that the emails were sent by the defendant as the defendant had referred to these emails many times during meetings. PW3 evidence was also corroborated by PW2 on this issue.” Premised on the High Court decision of Keith Richard, it is submitted that the Plaintiff have fulfilled the prerequisite requirements. That the Letter of Intent (P1): (i) The legitimacy of the Letter of had been executed by the intent is challenged by the Plaintiff Plaintiff herein. (ii) The Defendants did not provide any supporting evidence to prove that the Letter of Intent were executed between the parties. ON THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF FRAUD AND FORGERY: In connection thereto, the Plaintiff further submits that the Defendants despite alleging the said Letter of Intent was executed and delivered to the Plaintiff, had failed to raise any supporting evidence of the execution of the same. In this regard, a presumption against the Defendants can be drawn based on Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 In this regard, it the Plaintiff's submission that the Defendants’ complaint to AlA, being the basis of the Defamatory Statement is not a “bona fide” complaint and in fact one intended to cause grievance and malice towards the Plaintiff. It is emphasised that the Defendants’ email to AIA being the basis of the Defamatory Statement were made only after the breakdown of the relationship between the parties. The Plaintiff also refers to the Federal Court decision of Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd [2021] 5 MLJ 79 whereby the Federal court held that an element in reliance on the defence of qualified privilege is the parties have attempted to verify the information published therein as held at para. 80 of the decision: [80] The second limb of the Reynolds defence of responsible journalism or qualified privilege requires the appellants to satisfy the court that the steps to gather, verify and publish the information were responsible and fair. It is evident that based on the facts of the case herein that the Defendants have failed to verify the information that it had sought to publish to AIA. Despite having avenue of communication and the Plaintiff's willingness to assist the Defendants on the Insurance Policies until 16.7.2021 (reference to, pg. 170-176 and 185 of Bundle B2), the Defendants did not attempt to verify the information published to AIA.”. S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 [97] After looking and analysing the evidence before me, the Plaintiff has failed to prove its claims for civil fraud and/or forgery of documents by the Defendants and also to prove that it had damaged the Plaintiff’s reputation as an upstanding and successful individual in the insurance industry. Conclusion [98] In all the above circumstances, the subject matters in this suit against the Defendants pertaining to the Plaintiff are merely complaints that were not published to anybody except the AIA. The impugned statements are not defamatory of the Plaintiff. [99] AIA has investigated the Defendants’ complaints against the Plaintiff. The Defendants cannot be faulted for “damaging the Plaintiff’s reputation as an upstanding and successful individual in the insurance industry”. [100] In view of the foregoing reasons, I therefore dismiss the Plaintiff claim with costs. Dated: 23 January 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Judicial Commissioner Shah Alam High Court Civil NCvC12 S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 Counsels: For the Plaintiff: Syed Mohamed Ashiq Tetuan Harold & Lam Partnership, Kuala Lumpur For the Defendants: Nurhidayaty binti Maidin together with Nurul Farhana Zaini Tetuan Nur Maidin & Co., Subang Jaya S/N XeQRUHSenEaHJNAC4VSKGg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-44-01/2018

PLAINTIF SCP ASSETS SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN PERBADANAN PENGURUSAN PD I

Land Law — Strata title — Developer — Rates — Management Corporation imposed different rates of maintenance charges and contribution to sinking fund between commercial parcels and car parks pursuant to AGM — Whether different rates of maintenance charges and contribution to sinking fund between commercial parcels and car parks by the defendant was valid in law — Strata Management Act 2013 s 60(3) – “significantly different purposes”

23/01/2024

YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2368e653-4940-4202-a38f-4e52f0873ea9&Inline=true

23/01/2024 09:42:08 BA-22NCvC-44-01/2018 Kand. 198 S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N UZoI0BJAkKjj05S8IcqQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal aza—22m:vc—u—n1/2019 Kand. 195 23/01/202; neuz-ms IN THE HIGH count or MALAVA AT sum ALAIII IN THE STATE or SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN. MALAYSIA cIvII. sun No ' aA-zzNcvc-44-n1/2nIa BETWEEN sop ASSETS sou BHD (COMPANY NO.: Io5un:.K) . PLAINTIFF AND PEREADANAN PENGURUSAN PD»! (REGISTRATION No. SEL: I29/2017) ...DEFENIJANT JUDGMENT The Farm: [1] The pIamm Is a company Incorporated In Malayswa. [2] The darendam IS a managemenl coruuraliun Ihal was established under the sums mes Acl 1965 (“STA“) to manage and mamtam a Imxed cumrnercIs\ developmenl known as Pusal Dagangan Pmlso Damansara 1 (“Pm Ccmp\ex'). {3} PD! Cammex was erected on a prece av land new under me mas|er mle Geran Mukxm 571 La! 45017, Ssksyen 39, Bandar Pelalung Jaya. Negen sewangur r-me Mascer Tflle“). The Complex IS develnped and sold by AAB Damansam Sdn Bhd (“the Developer) The Daveraper is lormefly krmwn as Phuleo Damansara Sun and 1 Imam sauwu Qfi W Tllu Faclull Background [41 Pm Complex ls a mixed comrnerctal development oavtsisllng nf (a) seven blocks (Block A ta at 0! shop/offroes camprlslrlg 72 paroels cl gmurld floor snaps and 551 parcels of wees: (b) one block ola 7»s|arey omce Tower known as Eangunarl vtn (“Earlgunan vat"); and (c) Ground lloor surface car patk bays and three levels cl basement car park bays. [5] The plamttll VS the registered pmpriemr ultne car park bays, namely (a) Three levels o1 basement car park Days at Levels B1, B2 and as at FD1 Complex‘ and (la) surtaoe car park bays al the gmurm floor or PD1 complex as awesscry parcel (oollectwely referred to as “Car Park Parcels‘) The car Park Parcels are held under seven separate strata Tttles » all under the Master Tllle The Anatomy of the Car Parks [6] The chmnulugy ol me ownershtp of the car Parks is as lollcms: (a) Pulsuanl to a sales and Purchase Agreement (“SP/R“) datea 6 9.2000, Ihe Developer sold the Basement car Parks PD1 corporate Farklrlg Sdn and |'PD1 corporate Parkxng'| The sale mvelvea the Basement Cir Pants or Blocks A In G at the purchase Dflce ol RM39.975,utx1 tn) Pursuant to a supplemental SPA daled 26.3.2002, the Developer sold the surlace car Parks at Black A to G at a purchase pnce of RM1,9o5,nou. IN uzammmrnsseueaa «ma s.n.l nuvlhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my r... nflfllhnflly sun. dnuuvlnhl VII .nuna vtmxl [291 The Nlgh Courl lrl Sodame held met. me MC ls ampuwmu la lmpau charges In! lhe malnlevlzmce smne wmrmn pmnerry hased an Inn lullwmg laams (:1 ms pwpomwl 9/ the share umlsar pmvlllmlll -um unlls of ms plums or pmnsmnal blocks. and la) xne MC may de|:mlml ummnl rates ol snarges rm we namslsu my are and for slqmfizanl/y dllfsranl pmpasu nu Arrival ol Purl sum lsnl on 26.7.2023. me com or Appaal had me opponumly Ia rsvlsil and dlscuss lne lmpllcalmn M s solsllbl o1 lhs SMA WV Poarl Sulfa ulmgomom corpomlan V VI Sing cm: 5 Ols own Appeal sull No; W-02(NCVC)(A)—1323-07/2022: c-vll Appeal Sun No. w. 02(NCVC)(AH38§—l)7/2022 [all unlonunalely. we do no: have me aensm 01 ms lull gmunds ol ludgmem cl‘ me coun of Appeal Hawever‘ according to the broad grounds cl ,uagmanL the coun at Appeal was of ms vlew ma! lhere Is no naoessfly I0 confine the apnllclllon of 5 6D(3)(h) SMA lo only ses lrwulvlng change ol use ol the parcels. The coun 0! Appeal Iunhar held Ihal under Ihe scheme o1meSMA, Ihe charges lmposed have ll) be far! and reasonable wvlh relevance lo the actual or expected expendllure lrlcuned [321 The Hlgh coun. a| msl inslunce In Pain suns, hald lhal a Managemenl Corporation can only lmnnsa dlfierenl merges iflhere happens la be a snange ol use ol ms parcels mun lls onginal use. [33] Before me, learned counsel tar me defendant submllled that me uulccme a! me broad ludgmenl M the Courl omapsal H1 Pearl Slma li [hit the dsclslnrl aflhe Hlgh Calm ls Mfedlvely overlumsd [34] Lsamed oounsel lor lhe delenaanl oonlended mat. lusl llke Pearl suna |he lmposfllorl ol me maintenance charges was based on me wlculallon cl shared expenses and owner expenses lrlcnrred wllhln u m uzalummmssauauu «mu. Smnl nuvlhnrwlll be u..a w my u. nflnlnnllly mm: dnuuvlnnl Vfl .nuus ml Ina Developmenl. Tne serne exerelse was earned ou| by Ina delerldanl balm: the lahllng or Pnvale Mellon No. 1 ln lne AGM [35] ll is for lllis reason lnal leirrlad wurlsel (or llle delendam lnlrlled lnls Conn lo conclude that me charges lmpased by llle defendanl are based on llle expenses lncunea by each parcel owner. wnlcn ls lusl and reasonable Cnrlclulkm so lav [391 Learned counsel lor me delenaanl urged lnis Coun lo come to a oonduslnn me: me delendarll, as me Managenlenl corporallon, has me alsclellan ta dalarmlne I1 dlflsranl tales ougnl la be lnlueser: Acoordlng |o nlrll. me Cuurl must leave ll lo lne wlsaern of me defendant. In all lairness, learned uounsel, however, stopped sllon of cnnlerldlrlg lnal the alsmllen ls lrnlenaled. or (nurse, ncl lrnlellered ll rlas been sald agalrl and agaln rrnlenelea discretion ls e cellrraalcllun ln lernls. [37] Tne d91EVYd8I'||U’IE7€'0V€l (‘arlnotargue man s up to a Marlagenlenl Cclrporalmn ll.) declde llarlcl when alllererll reles oughllo be charged and men eulcxly seek refllge under s en|3)1b| ofllhe SMA. Ida nal respecllully lrlink Ina! lnal ls me cunen prcpuslfion, nellller ls ll lhe |rl|erlIlun cl Parllamelll. [as] lam nol saylngl even «or one rrlumenl, lnal Management Corperallcln Is not enllllefl to rely on S fiDl3)Ib) H can, In snort. (here Is nolhlng to slap lne Managsmerll curporallon [mm mlylng on me nhrase “slgmficantly allrerenr purposes“. Buuhe general glrluellne is that. as was rlela by me Cowl cl Appeal ln Pearl Suns, such an exercise 01 dlsclullon must be lusl and reasonable. Wna| ls lust and lsasanable ls. lnerelore, a quesllon nrflacl in me cinzunlslanoes cl eacn ease [av] I wlll now apply llle said proposlimn lo [he facts aullls case. [401 It has been eslabllsned Ina! me prernlse or Blefclslng dlscreuon. as admllled by nwz. was Erlcnovfid on me bellehhlillhe Imi|s had been inequilably aI4oca|ed Even if (ms Cuun were In accept |hIS argument as a valld grcund lo rely on s GD13)(b). lne burden ls srlll on me defendant In sslabllsh (ha! lhe snare units were lnaqullably allocated m uzelnmmrnssalsllu «war. Snnll nuvlhnrwlll re UIQG M my l... nnnlnnllly MIMI glam. Vfl nFluNG ml [41] There are a law potnts tttat I would Ittte to make. Tttey are these [42] It tndeed, tne detendant ts aggrteved with wttat ll setd |o be an trtequttttbte attocatten at the share units, what woutd be the ttgttt coutse at aetton to take7 Ttte process of asuerlairting and allocating share untts tn apptytrtg let the atmdtvtsion ol tend and strata tttte tnvotwed ttte Devetoper. tnetr agent, ttta ttcensed land surveyor Ind the setangor Dtrectar of Lands and Mtnes. [431 Ttte Isller dated 4.4 2017 trcttrt |he Mattts Bartdarayu Petettng Jaya |o Put Jotttt Managemem Body|“PD1 JMB'). The detendattt tstne sueeessor at PD1 JMB, Yhe letter dated 4.4.200 trtter alis states as tottews tn. belllmklll un\| mt seltap pefiak Vzlah drsedtakart at-rt Jumkuvianah Dachau! petttatu dart ttntt syer lersebm lzalih dtttttttsttan aleh Pvtnarih Ylrtlh mt. cut... at bawah Saksyan 18‘ Amt ate eetaetttnt Attta 157 Lmrkuatkuasa [441 Tttete ts another letter tram tne setartgar Director at Lands and Mtnes dated 16. 2017 addressed to PDI JME. wtttut confirmed that ttta allocation of ttte sttare ttntts was based on ttte seutng price torrrtttta: Unluk mttttturttan ptnatt lunrt |AlH| syar DIQI aetak dt kzwasart pentat-ten Fusat Duqarvian Flatten Damansam t Nlenglkul tetntttta mtg; tt-atan [45] During Cms54XammaUorIt DW2 was certtrontau wtth Ine tetter dated 4.4.2017 and asked the lottawtng quesltons' PIC. AI m And INE allocalton tn.t ymt sly wastncunectty done mtts| neeessatay by ttte BUIIIOMJES‘ tn tttts case by ttte Dtleclaruf tartar and wnesv rxwz vet we cenecrt Now yet. wtttttttewea agvee wtttt tna emu nun tram any tattm la: tne Dirarloraf Lands and Mtnes, you have nt)|dIred£dnl\ysut|lagaIrBHheD\re1:lm or Luna: and Mtnes, tn vmnl tn. detendatrt atteges ta be ttmrtectty atteeatee whitest meet? 13 sm L1Zn\nBdItb.Kfl5Sl|wD “Nair s.n.t luvthnrwm be tr... In may t... tnttutttt mt. mm. VI mum vtmxt ow: Nalasolcunenlaale ll is lrlerelore clear lnal despne leellng aggrleved wlln ole purpaned in::orrec1 allocalian or me share unllsl me defendanl did nolmng to challenge me lmpugned decislon. [46] II ls not that me eslenaanl was not aware ollhe lmpugnsa decislun of me Dlrec1or av Lands and Mines They are penecuy aware of me lmpugned declslonl as can be seen ln we exchange durlng me cmss-examlnatlnn 07 DW2 we klngm New. em you mnnnn ml MBPL ornalherMal\is Birldalaya Pelallrlg Jayz nan lrllwmsd the plnl managenenl may man we snare unlls WEIE annnma by me Dlleamal Land: and Mmes pursuzlll la. ll yuu leak nl Akta ale ln lam IM Strum mes M Van ale awale el M317 nwz Va: [47] By challenglng me lmpugrled declslon ln lnle sun, llle delendanl ls, ln eflecl. l llallng a eullalel-el snack agelnsl me dauslon-maker, ln one ease. the selarlgor Dlrector of Lands and Mines, who IS nel even made a early. With lespecl, I do nol lhlnk lnal unis ls allowed. The lnnaugnee declilun is nu| even a mlxlure cl punllc and pm/ale law. It ls purely wilnin lrle ambll 01 public law [451 To begln wlln, me Dlmclor cl Lands and Mlnas ls a publlc aulhorily. Any challenge agalnsl llls d an must he commanced by way ol a lumcial revlew under 0 53 al lne Rules olCoul1 2D121'ROC") [A9] Ills lnerelore Koo lale IVI lhe day rm ms delendanl lo assen lrlal lhe allocallon ol me snare unils IS inequnable and lo use lnis argumerll la seek refuge under s eo(:l)(nl lweula aver: venlure lunnarla slats lnal lne «allure curls ealeneanl to challenge the lmpugned declslon makes me whole exerclse nl relymg an s eomlnl plenlalure [50] In sum Kend-ea-ny v Lembagn Waklf Hindu Fulau Pinanv 4. as [2022] 1 ms 2111 CA. lne appellanl was me ex—<;halrmarI of s seciely known as Psrlubl/him Srl Mangslanayagl Amman sukll Tengah, sebensng Psral range». which had ls reglsnallan cancellad by the Reglslrar cl Soclelles Tne appellanl, ln ms Onglnanng Summons(‘0S13“)l1al.lghllar declaratory Dldelsl Inlurlaive rellels, m uzalnmmmssausau «wan Sum! nuvlhnrwm be naa la my l... nflmnnllly ml. dnuuvlnnl Vfl eFluNG Wm! damages and cos|s in respem ollhsacllons Laksn by the delerldanls 3118! me canoellallorl or me reglslraflorl 94 me Dereglslered Soclely [51] 0513 was dismlssed by me Hbgh calm Aggneved, (he appellanl appealed to lhe Cclurl of Appeal, whlch was also dismissed. ln delmering |he judgment ol me Court at Appeal, Nanlna Balan JCAV remarked as lollows. my ln any mnl, these ale quesllans av isslus wmch ouanl In be laken -4: In 3 Jladlual nanaw appllcauon As ll sandal by nm pullulrlgafitdlclal Revlsw waoma 53 M m Runs ul Cowl 2n‘2l ma Flalnlifl has nal awn. cmuad ms lmeshuld and marvel wnmala «me am: we OMB 1271 Yhus even aswmlrlg qwlunaul aanaludlndl «run we lie mm: W 0513‘ n 75 our onncluslon ma! by {allmg lo Ink: IM mine! up vlu om: 5: cl lna Rules at cdun aw, lne Plaimifl has sflomlvely smanuelell ma oppurlurlI|y ln venllIa|e mess «mama: Judrclal Revlew appllcahml [52] Applylng ma sald pmpasillon, ll ls my consldered vlew that bylalllng In lake Ihe mailer up na 0 5:: cl me Roe, ma dalendanl has eflacllvely wuarldarad ma oppmunny la vemilals an Iha lssue al wflemer me alldcallon olthe share umls IS lnequilable. [531 Them has m be a finallly ln me lmpugnsd dsclsion made hy me Selangor Dlreclor ol Lands and Mlnes VII April 2017. The dalandanl uses this sull, wfllch was man In .lar\uar\/2018, lu rnounla oa|la|eral challenge agamsl lna lmpugned declsiun wnan me Diraclor was rml even a party lo me sun To begln wim, (hls approach is oenalnly nol deslrabla. In Lemlnga Lcbuhriya Malaysla v Cahaya Ban: Dtvolopmnm Bhd [2009] 5 ML} 14 CA, the raspundenl. who was me plalnm at firsl lnscanca, sougm declavamry rellels by way at an anglnaung summons wlmoul maklng me Land Admlnlsll-ator a pany when the declaratory reheis snugnl would allacl ma llallnory dunes and powers of the Land Adnwnslralor Abdul Mallk lsnak JCA. In ms Judgmern al ma Courl cl Appeal, remarked as lollows m uznnmmnnssauau «ma smal nuvlhnrwm .. U... w my me nnnn-y mm: dnuuvlml Vfl .nuna wax FWBIVY4 ll‘ seeklrlg lhuu dedarmory Iellelx by way ul an uhglnalmg summons unlhwx maklrlw lh. land adrn-nlsualdr as . plny Mlun lhe declalelory rvllels seughl weuld nlle-:1 me st-Mary dun-as -ha power: al lhe land admlnlslrabnrltannvl beeurmnea nylnls mun lh Au Expnss Vntsmallooal (up sun BM v ulsc Agsrrcle: Sdrl BM1[2008] 9 cu 209, me nlainm wugnl vznaus declnmlnly orders aaulhu lm maven. Depnnmum Slnca lhe laller wasrlul made a may and had he eaperlunlly lo ael-nu luell, Abdul wanan Palall l, numly -eluud ld 9(arl| lhe declarmmrls 5galrls| lne Cuslnms neperuuem [54] ln lhe auculnslehoes, whalevev experl ewdenee tendered by lhe delandanl should have been adduced when enellenglng lhe lmpugrled declslorl by way cl 5 judlclal mm. W indeed lhe impugned declslcn dl lhe Dlreclol ol Lands and Miles was lalnled wl|h Wedrlesbury unreasonablerless or Arlisminlc endr, ll should have been ehellenged wuhln lhe llme sllpu|a|ed under 0 53 r 3(6) ol lhe RDC The delendenl should naue uenlllaled lhe ergurnenl agemsl lhe selling pnce lcrmula eddpled by me selangdr nueelerol Lands and Mlners Wl an upplK:a|lon lav judiclal review and nel in lhls suit. [55] ll should he recalled lhel lhe delehdanrs rellance on e 60(3)(b] dl lhe SMA ls anchored on the pulpnrled lneqlulable allocallon cf lhe share umls Fov lhe reasons lhall have slaled, lnal aecleldn el me ellacalidn dl the share unlls by lhe seler-gar Dlractov el lands and Mmes slahds unchallenged ln me drcumsulnoes‘ the delendanrs case has no legs In Hand on The wheleargurnenl aallapses like lhe provarblal house all cards on lhe Coullhrcllllll [56] I wlll firs| deal wllh lhe allegallon lhel lhe plalnlllv cdnsplrecl wllh lhe Developer |o allocale a rnllurhal share of unlls lo the Car Park Parcels [an To deglrl wllh, hellher lhe plaihlrll ndr lhe Developer was lhe final amller ld allocele me share unlls Al lhe risk el lzelng repetllwel lhe dacislorl maker was me Salarlgor Dlreclor ol Lands and Mlnes, is 15 sru uzaluaunmnssaueue «mu. emu nuvlhnrwlll a. u... e may he uuln.l-l mm. dnumlml Vfl muun Wm! can be seen in me letters dated 4 A 2017 and 15.4 2017 in tact, Ihs letter dated 4.4.2017 is enlllled “Unit syer Vang Dimiuskeii oleh Pa/aha! Tanah den Geiian Adslah Muklamad den Hams Digilna Pakai it goes to snuw that “ISL the allocation oi snares was made tiytne DIreclorcv1Land5 and Mines, and secamtiy, ‘ final and mus| be adapted by an parties [ea] seiaie ine, reamed cpiinsei for itie delendant contended that tneie was a pcseiniiity D! collusion between me neiieippenind tiie plam|lWi wriicn ieeiiited in me minimal aiieeation in share units ic trie piaintiii. witii respect, tnie poesibiiityte insumcient tor tne Ccurl lo conciude mere was indeed an aiieged ceiiiisipii [59] wtiat ttien IS a oaiiusienv in Gov/iridasamy s/o Mulllulingam V cm- Kec cnye 6 Anor[2012] 7 MLJ 254, epiiusipn is deriiied as ‘an agreement lo defraud another or |o detain scmelhing lurbiddan by law“. This purported agveemenl, «it existed at an, piwiiicn nc finding IS made neiei iniiet Involve not cniy ine pieiniitt and tne Developer eiit aieo tne nnat deaeipii maker. the Dtrackx ul Lands and Mines. unieniinateiy, and I mus1 iiiidenine this in gieat «dice. ttiere is not an iota ol evidence to suggesl tnat me niiectai was in any way inetniinentai in consplnng with the piaintiii and me Davveloper to deviant: tne delendanl at to obtain spinetning icitiidden kw law. [60] The delendanl musl Dome ln this Ccun Will! more than me particuiais pi eenininii diieetais and shareholders iniipiving tiie Deveioper and the piaintiu lo estaniisii cpiiitsion or even conspiracy. Even inne standard ei picci is on the blianoe ei pmba es, tne deiendant must establish that in arriving at |he impugned decision, lhe Director 01 Lands and Mlnfi (00, was involved In me aiieged ooilusion [61] Noining pi mat son nae been aslahltshed I trieieiore iioid Ihe deiendant has tailed to eittaciisn inc alleged caiiuslon. [52] The delendanl even comes |n inns Oourl, inter siia, seeking iur the snare units In he re-aildpated in a manner that, in (hell ppiiiion is more equitable with respect for the reasons aiiiided to eariier, this court cannot accede |o the relief sougm by the delendent in its miintaiclaim. ii IN uzainimiminssaienu “Nair s.n.i mmhnrwm be UIQG in my ii. nflflirinflly MVMI dnulvilril Vfl AHLING Wm! [ea] In the resun, my nnaings on me issues raisea are as ibubws. 111 Private Mofion ND 1 and me subsequem increase in Charges and sinking lurid wninbmnns b ma deiendani againai ma plalnlm are based on me premise Ihal me uniis had been inequuabiy aHaca|ed. The aflocalion or me share uniis was made by me Selangnr Direclors bi Lands and Mines. Any ehauenge made againsi me inibugnea decision musl be by way bi a jumciai review appiieaiion since were was no enaiienge niaua. ma Illocllion made on |he snare unils was‘ mereibre, nnai. in me circumsvanoes. me delendsril had no aulhorfly la base Pnvals Motion N1: 1 wnribuunsc challenging (he impugned basisiun. In shun. Pnvaie Manon No 1 is prernaiure. (H) S 5D(3|(h) 11! the SMA allows the deiendanh as the Management Corporation, I0 reiy on me pnrase “sigrwcarilly dmerem purpnses' and, 1nere1are, impose ameieni i.-.15 oi charges In! the dlfleranl parcels. Eu| such an exercise Oi discrefiflfl musi be Just and reasonable since the aeienuanx «am In cnauenge the impugned deuston through a Judicial review‘ It is n01 open for We defendant in sny now that the impugned aeasibn IS not equiiabie. That ambums to a cullaterai attack, which [his Caurt vefuses tn allow. However‘ mere IS no evidence beiore the court mat Frwaie Mbuon No. 1 and me subsequent increase m charges and sinking Fund Cunmbullons by me uetermanc agains| the piainm is banned wi|h me/e //ds Dnflerent imerweianbns cube iaw. aibeu In error, wimoui more, cannoi be cbnsimed as ma/a fide (IV) Since me passing of Private Manon N0. 1 is wrong In law, me auendanl oonsequences would be the unlawful increase in the cnarges and sinking Fund Conlnbulmns by the aevendani ag nsune piaimiu baa caused loss and damage to me piainim in |heI ibe plainiirt is sumecl to a higher paymeni Much is not iegany 1usb«ea. xx m uzsiummnssaueau «mu. s.n.i nuvihnrwm be u... a my line annn.u-y mm: dnuumnl y. arium Wm! [vi The allocation oi tne snare UHVBUIS1 was oaseo on me setting onoe tormuia was not oetetniineo by the Developev, let atone amtiraniy sinoe tne iinougneo oeoision was made by trie Director or Lanos ano Minest ano more was no ohaiienge made an the same. this coitrtcannot tssue an order tor trie re— aiiooatton at the snare units tor tne car Park Pareeis. Granltng an oroer sougtit by ttie oetenoant wouto inutte a oraaon ot trio principles ot natural iustice since the Director oi Lands and Mines ought to be given the rignt to oe nearo (Vi) Evert ii tiie oeterioant were to add the neyeiooan Lroenseo Land Surveyor ano the Selangor Direoxoi ot Lanos and Mines as parties to this Suit, Cher: Is FWIHIHQ lhal this Cuurl muid do since me proper rnooe o1 oonnnenoenient to oriaiienge the impugned oeoision wouid be by way ol a judicial review. (vit) Even it tne expert eindenoe aodueed by the delendanl is aornissioie and Dledlbiey it cannot on its own give me iunsoiotion to true court to ouasri ine impugned oeoieion niaoe by tne Director o1 Lanos ano Mines [34] I ttieretore make the ioiiowing oroers (a) A deciaraimn mat Private Motion No. 1 is premature and lhelafore uniawtui, invaiio and void in) An iniunctton restraining tne oetendant, vlrielher by eit or tnrougn its agent or servant, irorn nulltrig into enact or aniorcing uie rate :11 cnarges in Pnyate Motion No. 1 passed at the AGM ot the aeienoant on 3011.201? (oi An injunction oioenng and directing trie detenoant to canoe: an the Tax invoioes issued by ttie deienoant to the piaintm tonne oenoo iroin January 2015 |o Maren 2018 and an otnar Tax invoices that may be issueo with rates and criarges mentioned in Friva|e Motion No. 1. id) The counterclaim against me otaintiii is dISlY|iS5Sd. [55] I am not aiimting any damages, eitner general or exemplary, as sought by tne otainttii since it nas not been shown to me that in passing Private Motion No 1,tne oeienttant was acttng rria/a Me. In anon, than is no evioenoe or bad taitn on ttie pan onne oetenoant. 19 IN L1ZainBJI1b.KM16SH|wD “Nair s.n.i mnihnrwiii be u... M my i... ntwiriniily MIMI dnuuvinrit Vfl aFiuNG mi And as I anuoad to eimer. dlfisrem Irwerbrelauons av me law wmno-A more 15 no! evidence 01 bad Iauh. (66) Casls ws mm at RM5o,ooo subject |n auucamr. ‘r-rum: 13 Janunri 2024 LA (wm AHMAD FARID BIN WAN SALLEH) Hakim Mahkamah Tmggl Kuava Lumpur Pwnakdhhak Eam Pivak Ptavmfl Ashnk Kamlmh all K Shanmuganmhan. Celine T571 512 Nina a. my Chen‘: Wei Teluan Ho Lake 5. KM saw man Deiendan Llm Jun Rm s. m Ru Val rem" Sheam Delamm a. Cu zn sm uzawnaaumfissalnnu «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... w my me mmuny mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! (cl Pmsuanl in another SPA dated 15.3.2lIUE,Ihe Devsloper and lnlersmne Lelsule sun Blld sold the Car Parks in Bangunan Yin lo FD1 carporsle Parklrlg an me purchase pnoe ol RM2,52o,ooo [7] Due la a corporate reslmclunrlg exercise, the plalnnll acquired all me Car Park Parcels from FD1 Cnvporala Parking Tnarelore. as alluded to earllen the plalnllff IS now the owner M the Car Park Parcels. nu olspuls [:31 The crux of me plalnulrs clam agalnsl lne defendant ls on me lssue or me msimsnanos charges and slnklrlg lund imposed by me uelendanl wide! a mollnn trelerred la as “Pnvale Manon Na. 1“) which was passed lmougn a poll vote at Ihe 1*‘ Annual eenecal Maellrlg (“AGM“) Mme dalenaanl held an an n 2017 [9] By lna passlng ol Prlvale Mollon No. 1. me delendanl, as |he Management Comovallnrl, ls al llbsrly |n impose alwersnl ra|es per share unll (or dlllerenl types cl parcels HI PD1: (aj Pm Office . RM) 10 usrsnare unll lo) PDI Ground Floor — RMD.32 per share lmll ls) Earlgunarl wn Offloe - RM1 .03 per sham uml (dl Eangurlan V-n Gmurld Floor RMD 30 per share urll| (e) PD1 aasemenl Carpark - RM4.B5 pershare um! (I) Eangunan wn aasemenl Carpark — RM11.Q1 Dy share unll As can be seen‘ under Private Motion Na. 1, the aelsndanl ls allowed to lmposa werenl ralas psr shale unll lcr o/pas el pamels at the same use m Pm. m uzamemx ynésalmu “Nair Smnl nmlhnrwm s. u... m may he mm-y mm: dnuuvlnnl VII mum ml [to] The plalrltlfflvnk umbrage |o the Motion. Awordtng lo the plalnttw. Private Motion No. 1 is ultra vires the strata Management Act 2013 |“SMA"j or the STA and unlawful. The p|aIn|M‘s epteetiens are anchored on the lpllpwino gmunds. ta) Private Mmlon No, t runs Ioul oi the concept art share units as envisaged by the SMA andlor STA (D) Prior to the issuance oi the tnatvtaual slrala (tiles tor the parcels, the allocated share units, as ttetenntneo by the licensed surveyoroi the ttetreloperoi Pm complex, hao been approved by the retevsntauthpnttes. According to the plainllil, the appmval was made ener the relevant authorities oonstdered the various purposes and usages oi the parcels oornpnseu tn the Pot complex to) what IS more important is the purposes and usages ot the various paroels in Pnt Complex have never changett «rpm the outset and remain the same at present. This includes the car Park Pamels to) Thurs is no basis or tustmcattcn tor the tteienuant to charge dttlerent rates or charges on the ottterent parses, including the car Park Parcels within the Put complex unflev s sot3)(o) oi the sum, in short. the rmplementstton M Pnvale Motion No t. which imposes atrterent rates at charges, is oestgnea to compel the ptstnttrttc pay unusually higher charges compared to other plmel awnars tel In the al|ema|we. s eotaxol oi the SMA does not entitle the detenaant to impose the increased charges against the ptatnttit such dtiiersnt rates ol charges. tiany. shall only be charged where the parcels are used tor stgnlrrcentty omerertt purposes and VI respect oi provisional blocks (I) Pm/a|e Motion No 1 ts |alnIed with bad laith and represents ongoing oiscrtminatory conduct to harass and/or |o undermine the Platnttlrs entoyment and commercial exploitation oi the Car parlt Farces. rn uzatnmmrnsseusae “Nair s.n.t nuvlhnrwm rs. tr... w my t... nflmnallly mt. dnuuvlnrll wa aFluNG vtmxl The rfillsfs sougrii [11] For me aloieseia reasons, the plaintirl seeks me lollowing reliels against me delandanl (a) A rteclamtion lhal Fnvale Motion No 1 is unlawml. inueliu amt/or void. (b) An inrunction to restrain the delendarll lrom enloreing the rate ol charges in Private Motion No. 1 as passed at the AGM on 30.11.2017 (c) An lnluncuorl ordering me oetenuant to immediately canoe! all 019 Tax invoices (ram January 2018 10 March 2018 and all other Tax lrtvotoes that may be issued wllh rates and charges mentioned in Pnvale Motion No.1. (d) Geneml and exemplary darnsgee against trie itelenpant. iuitrier or inner orders. and costs. Devlenoe and caunzerotarrn [12] The Detenoe is oased on me premise that trie oiwerent nitss or charges inippseit puvsuam to the passing of Private Motion No. 1 are in aooaidanoe witn IIw tor iniar ulia. vie lollowing reasons » (a) The deiendant is en|l|le\‘1 lo levy diilerent rates at ctiarges under s 6D(3)(b) cl iris SMA in respect M parcels used lor “significantly eierilpiirposes". tn) sinoe s sntsltol of iris sum is clear and urisrnoiguous, pursuant to the niles governrng slaluwry interpretation, trie phrase ‘significantly ailterent purposes" mus1 be given its literal meaning (cl Aoooming la me deferiderll, me impugned provision means triai, as long as two panels in me same development are used «or significantly different purposes. tnen arter opnsraenng me expendflure assocla|sd wiin tlie maintenanoe M a paroei relative to tne mainiensnee at a parcel lha| has a “slgnlVlcan|ly s ru uzaiuimmrnsseiouu «mu. s.r.i mmhnrwlll be in... M my i... nrwlnellly mi. dnuuvlnrrl Vfl nFlt.lNG vtmxl omerent purpose: the delendant as the Management corporatlon can unpose dmerent rates tor the parcels but lrl pmpnmolt at the allocated share u e. Thli lnterpretatlon, aecordtng to the delendanl, lS conststent wl|h the scheme or SMA as a whole. to) The ewendllure tor mainta o the common pmperly wtthlrl a strata development may vary dependlng on the use ot the parcels vntnln the strata devekzpmenl. l| ls theretore only lair and reasonahle tor the Management Corporallort to allocate the total expendllure/malnlenance oosts to the types at parcels conoemeo [13] In any event, the detendant has the statutory duty to oeterrnrne charges based on the expenses lneurred In malrttairtlrtg and rnanagtng the oeveldpment area. [14] The delendantturther evened aelollovvs ta) There exlsted a relattonshlp between the Developer, the pIam|Ifl‘S dlredors and shareholders As a result etthls alleged relattonship, the dererrdant contended that the pleintilt, Pat corporate Parktrtg and the Developer eolluded at the expense ot other parcel owners to) The plalnttrl had oeen paylng a very nnnnnal amount to the rnatntenanee charges ano sinklng tunds oespne the plalnttws subslltttlal ownership or ptepertles. (C) There can he no dlscrlmlnallon lrdm enlorcing the tnulttple rates as Pnvate Molten 1 was passed wlth ntatanty votes at the AGM In the circumstances, all propnetors are bound by ll. [15] The adunterclatrn filed against the platnttlt ts on the total uttlslartdtrtg tncreased rnaintenanoe charges and Slnklrlg funds The defendant also sought an outer tor the share dntts to he reallocated tn the manner that the delendant sald would he more equtlaole. [Is] In the clrcurrlsfances. the delendant seeks the lollowtng tenets trorn the plaintirl IN uzammmtnssauete «ha. s.n.l nuvlharwlll a. tr... a my r... ennmun sun. dnuuvlnht v.. mane v-mxl (a) The principal sum of RM2e5,sa3 as at 21.03 zine at such amount this court deems fit and proper and lurtner amount due on an accruing balls, wl|h interest at the rate oH0%1mm 1.l.2ola until he eale nfltlll realisation. (tat Interest at the rate p15‘/. per annum on the mtal judgment sum train the dale pl iudgment la the da|e offull realisation (c) An araerthal the share units allocated to Pm appmved by the selangor Director at Lands and Mines are null and vein (d) That the court orders the aetenaanl or any other body who has a duty to maintain the Subdlvlded unit lo re-allocate share unite aoopreing tip the loimula set ml III the strata Titles tselangor) Rules 2015, te) That, lurther and in the alternative, pursuant to s 417 of the Nauonat Land Code I965. the court orders the Dtveclor cl Surveyarid the Director o1Land: and Mines seiangprto adopt the share units In the whole development area tas defined in the SMA) ol the defendant the Issues to he trlea [171 l have gone through the pleintilrs issues to be tried in Enel 25 and the defendant‘: written submission in Erlcl I79 and have taken the Ilbefly lo summarise the issues |o be tried as lollows to whether Private Mulrpn No 1 and/or the subsequent increase H1 Charges and sinking lund eontnbunons by the delenaant i« is ultra was the SMA andlor STA and/at is (II) whether s sutattht er the SMA entrtles the uetendant to impose emerent rates at charges tor the eillerent parcels (in particular, the car Park Parcels when by the plarntim within Put Complex rn UZalflmMKAI“6SllDfiD «nu. s.ri.i nuvlhnrwlll be u... M new i... nflnlhnllly Mthln dnulvllnl Vfl uFlt.lNG mi (ni) Whether Privala Mollun No. 1 and ma xubnquarllinclease In charge: and Slnking Fund Canlnbuuons by me delendanl agilnsl the plamlrll ls lrrallorlal. dlsl:rlmlna|cry and Iainled wllh mula Iider nu) Whelher lne Increase in me charges and Slnklng Fund Corllrlbullnns by me delendanlag-rnsl me plalmlfi has caused loss and damage In me plalnlm (V) Whether me selllng prloe could have been delennrned amilrarily by me devvelaper ll lhe answer is rn the alnrmalwe, whether «ms Com can issue an drderlurlne re-allocalron al lha share mm: lorms Car Park Pmels in accordance wnn the appllcahle law (yr) Whether ma lailuru M ma dalendanl la add Iha Developer. Lloensed Land Surveyor and me Selangur Dlrecldr cl Lands And Mlnes ls lalal (vlij whether expert evldence adduced by (he delendanl ls admlssrble and credlble. SIO(3}{b) nhhe SMA [18] I wlll deal wlln lssuss ll ) and (ii) logemer slnoe lhsy ale lnlewelaled. [191 To begln wllrr‘ s scram») at me SMA pmvldes mar are Managernenl Corporalmn may‘ at a general meellng: mlse me ammmls w dauarrmned by rmnosrng Cmllgu on me pmwreum In Dmnumorl lo the mare umls or pmvismnnl sharv umli on lhelr rzspedl parmlsorpmvlslmlzlblm:ks,and\7le manual -nu oorpclrahnn miy uulamllrle dnlerenl rules at charges k) be pald ln reaper.-. av pmsls mm m usod lur ilgnwlnanlly dmerenl nurposas and m respecl ol Ihe plovlsaunal mm; m uzalnmunfissabnu “Nana smnl ...n.mur .. U... M my r... mruu-y mm: dnuuvlml Vfl nFluNa Wm! [20] The puestten fit theretore. tl s SD(3)(b) does trtdeed entttle the detendant to trrttrese dlflerent rates or charges tor dmerent parcels. then Pm/ate Molton Ma. 1 does no| rlm fuul at the concept cl shares ttntts as envisaged by the SMA and STA. mt Learned counsel tor the plstntttl stlhntttted that the delehdant aetttd only levy payments mandated by the statutes and nothing else The extertstcn cl the argument rs that the trttpdsitten of any levy not sancltorted by statute would be ttltra vlres, Perbadanan Ptnqurusln Endlh P-r-dc v Magrrmcerrt Dllyrlph Sdn Bhd [ZD13] 6 MLJ 343 CA. [22] Accordlng lo teamed counsel tor the plalrttttt, the detertdanl can only levy payments mandated by statute and such changes, tl any. ntust be In propenton lo the share ttntls at the vespechve parcel. [23) In any event‘ learned wunsel tor the platnttw Submllled that the exams! at resuntng to s sotzttbt at the SMA had nothlng to do wtth the laat that there was an tncreese tn the rrtetntenence costs Irtsing out d1 the plaintiffs car park pamels On the catttrary, teamed counsel contended that tt was rrtade based an the delettdanrs rt at the alleged tnequttatzly allocated share urttte. [24] Dullllg the txess-exarrttneltott el nwz, Ang l<ltrt Jhew was asked about the two pessthle reasons tor the proposal cl the mulltple servtce charge rates Enclk Ang ts the drte who proposed Prlvale Mutton No. t The two reasons are: (it Dtsprepdtttortate allecatton a1 share tmrts tc the dtrlerent parcels tn the PD1 Development Area; and (tt) Incorrect ellocaliun of share Wills to the dttterent parcel FD1 Development Area. the P/C Can you please answer my qIAesll0n’7 H‘; a strrtpte ‘yes’ nr'llu' Ara Illau IWB ralluns that Private lttetprt No t was rteeesseryw nwz ves IN czetntmmrnsselete “Nntze Smut nuvlhnrwlll a. HIGH a my t... nflmnallly MVMI dnuuvlnrtl VII aFluNG vwul [25] Learned counsel forth: prairnrmnsn reverrea rne re lhe judgment oi me Shah Nam Hrgn Com M Sc» Assets Sdn Bhd v Pu-badarran Fnngurunn PD1 [24:21] MLJU 523, wnero my rearneo bruther Tee eeok Hock JC (now J) remarked as tcHows: rn rnnsonoasrea oornron ollms Conn flseclmn 6o13xn)sMA mm were ro be arven me rnerar rmerpvelalmn rn ms mannav suogesr.-so by me nsunoanr mm rs so long rnere re a parcel nnron has been nseo nu some dwterern purpose, rnon rns management ooroorsuon rs empowered ro Impose dflfevvnt ribs 01 snarqes against that parcel. rr womd (own man rnsr at every Annnsr seneror Meerrno. me rats: or cnarges wumd Vhmuate srrnpry ry, me mu Mme mawrlly ol the mamhnrs D1 rns Management (lorpauahm, cnnsrng unnecessary and rrsqusnr «name and chaos In ma mnluunwty or rn. snonrnea development Such altmrziry oulwms mm rrurosrsrs or swans rn a slralslred dlvslvvmtnt ouuld nol have osen rrre rnrennon or rne Pam.amen| rn me absence ct use! and express vmduo rnnr effect [25] In any event. DW2, during hrs crass-examination, conceded that the orsrnm had used me Car Park Parcels tor eornnrsrcrsr pwpusss and mat me purpose had never changed Based on rrns resunrony of DW2, learned zxnmsel for the phlmtlfl mbmrued that {here had been no change H’! the purpose 0! the Car Park Parcels, Vet a\one ‘significantly oruerenr purposes“ within the meaning or s soranm. [27] on me other hand, reamed cuunsel for the delendant aIlrac|ed my altenllon to s 60l3)1b) oi the SMA, which erniues me defendant ro rmpose urnsrsnu ram 01 charges for dmerem parcels. [23] The rrne ursrgunrenrov resrneo munser Ior mo osrsnasnr rs that me Management Corporauon‘ Vn (NS case, the delendanl, may delsmwle different vates of service charges on pares‘: used for srgnrncsnuy uruerenr puruoses. cnrrrg Sodalirt Sdn emu. ors v 1 Mom’ ram And mm 2 Mnnsgernsnr Corporation rs ars 120211 12 MLJ 113. learned aounsat (D! the defendant subrwlled that a Management Corpcmum has powers to mflerenliate the different Iypes or onarges to be Imposed on propnelcrs subject to me wnflrhon that the bard nwwsr must IIo| exceed the Ilmnahon pmwded an rn uzsrnmmnsssronu “None s.n.r nmhnrwm rs. med w my r... oflmnsuly snn. dnuumnl Vfl .rruno onnr

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-22NCvC-258-07/2020

PLAINTIF LINGKARAN EFEKTIF ENERGY SDN. BHD. DEFENDAN 1. ) KHAIRUL FADZLIN BINTI ABD KHALID 2. ) MOHD HEREYMAN BIN ABD RASHID 3. ) REDVALE ALLIANCE SDN. BHD. 4. ) WAN MOHD AYUB NAJMUDDIN BIN WAN MOHD ZAINI

Claim against director and shadow director for breach of fiduciary duties-failure to disclose interest in a contract awarded by Plaintiff company-whether damages claimed proven-insufficient to prove mere failure to disclose-proof of director and Defendant company profiting from the breach is essential-whether the amount claimed sufficiently proven-same facts upon which breach of fiduciary duty is premised used to prove tort of conspiracy to injure-whether claim for conspiracy misconceived

23/01/2024

YA Puan Alice Loke Yee Ching

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d5a57518-6c63-4045-b816-b24117f617ce&Inline=true

Lingkaran Efektif Energy Sdn Bhd v Khairul Fadzlin binti Abd khalisd and 3 Others (1) 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM (BAHAGIAN S IVIL) GUAMAN SIVIL NO. BA-22CVC-258-07/2020 ANTARA LINGKARAN EFEKTIF ENERGY SDN BHD. (NO. SYARIKAT : 1208443-X) …PLAINTIF DAN 1. KHAIRUL FADZLIN BINTI ABD KHALID (NO. K/P: 820124-10-5052) 2. MOHD HEREYMAN BIN ABD RASHID (NO. K/P: 741108-06-5315) 3. REDVALE ALLIANCE SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT : 1227658-U) 4. WAN MOHD AYUB NAJMUDDIN BIN WAN MOHD ZAINI …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Plaintiff sues the 1st, 3rd and 4th Defendants (“D1, D3 and D4”) for damages consequent upon the breach of D1 and D4’s fiduciary 23/01/2024 07:23:53 BA-22NCvC-258-07/2020 Kand. 58 S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 duties and the tort of conspiracy to injure. The suit against the 2nd Defendant has since been withdrawn. [2] At the material time, D1 was both a director of the Plaintiff and D3. D4 is the spouse of D1. The Plaintiff awarded a contract to D3 which D1 as the director, failed to disclose her interest in. The Plaintiff now seeks to recover amounts paid to D3 from the said contract, totaling RM 1,685,207.25. Liability is also sought against D4 on the basis that he was the shadow director of the Plaintiff as he was making decisions for the Plaintiff, through D1. Plaintiff’s case [3] The Plaintiff was incorporated on 9.11.2016. The majority shareholder of the Plaintiff at the material time was Lingkaran Efektif Sdn. Bhd. (“LESB”). [4] Prior to the incorporation of the Plaintiff, LESB sought the views of D4. At the material time, D4 was based in Penggerang, Johor. He had knowledge of the Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Commissioning for the Petronas Refinery and Petrochemical Integrated Development Complex in Penggerang (“Rapid Project”) which LESB was interested in. Upon his advice, the Plaintiff was incorporated to undertake part of the Rapid Project as the subcontractor of LESB. D1 was appointed one of the two directors of the Plaintiff. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] Some five months thereafter, a company known as Redvale Alliance Sdn. Bhd. (D3), was incorporated on 19.4.2017. D1 was one of the directors of D3. She was also the sole shareholder. [6] On 7.8.2017, D1 caused the Plaintiff to issue a purchase order LEESB/PO/0817/025/009 RO (“Purchase Order”) to D3. The Purchase Order was pursuant to the Plaintiff appointing D3 to supply manpower for the Rapid Project. The contract sum was RM 616,044.00, excluding GST. [7] Between August 2017 and February 2018, Plaintiff paid a total amount of RM 1,685,207.25 to D3. [8] The Plaintiff then discovered that D1 failed to disclose her interest in D3 to the Plaintiff when the manpower supply contract was awarded to D3. The facts pertaining to the alleged breach by D1 have been set out in paragraph 9-13, 27 and 28 of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim. Notwithstanding the numerous allegations of facts pleaded, the Plaintiff’s complaint is essentially, that D1 failed to act in the best interests of the Plaintiff had therefore acted contrary to her common law and statutory duties as a director mandated by the provisions in the Companies Act, 2016. [9] D4 is the husband of D1. Although he held no position in the Plaintiff, he was in fact the controlling mind, through D1. D4 was involved in incorporating D3. He had knowledge that D1 was a director of D3. He also took an active part in the management of the Plaintiff by being present at the meetings of the Board of Directors of the Plaintiff. Although he had knowledge of D1’s S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 position in D3, he failed to disclose that fact during the meetings. He acted as a shadow director and, like D1, owed a responsibility to act in the best interests of the Plaintiff. Similar to D1, he is alleged to have breached his fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff. [10] Apart from the alleged breach of fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff also claimed that D1, D3 and D4 committed the tort of conspiracy to injure the Plaintiff resulting in the latter making payments to D3. It therefore seeks to recover the amounts paid to D3. [11] The sum of RM 1,685,207.25 paid by the Plaintiff to D3 is claimed as special damages. In the alternative, the Plaintiff prays for general damages to be assessed by this court. Defence case [12] All the three defendants are represented by the same solicitors. D1 denied the allegations of breach of fiduciary duties. She did not take an active part in the operations of the Plaintiff, although she was present at the Board of Director’s meetings. [13] As for D3, it denied receiving the alleged payment of RM 1,685,207.25 by Plaintiff. However, it admitted it was awarded the contract to supply manpower vide the Purchase Order. Pursuant thereto, it had fulfilled its obligations under the said contract. [14] D4 like D1, denied any breach of fiduciary duties on his part. Instead, he was instrumental to the award of the Rapid Project to the Plaintiff arising from his experience and commercial contacts S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 which he had from established companies in the industry. He also injected monies into the Plaintiff to allow it to be incorporated and to carry out the contract awarded by LESB. Issues for determination [15] From the respective positions taken by the opposing parties, the predominant issue that arises for determination is a factual one, which turns on the evidence establishing breach of fiduciary duties and conspiracy to injure, adduced at the trial. Analysis and decision of this court [16] It is trite law that the Plaintiff bears the onus of proving his case and the existence of those facts which would establish his case. (See: sections 101 and 103 of the Evidence Act, 1950 and Letchumanan Chettiar Alagapan (as executor to SL Alamelooo Achi (Deceased) & Anor v Secure Plantation Sdn. Bhd.) [2017] 5 CLJ 418). It follows therefore that the burden to prove breach of fiduciary duties and the tort of conspiracy to injure lies on the Plaintiff (See: Wong Kar Juat & Anor. v S7 Auto Parts (M) Sdn Bhd [2015] 9 CLJ 590, Court of Appeal). Judicial Admission by the Defendants [17] Apart from the evidence led at the trial which I will discuss later, the Plaintiff’s case against D1, D3 and D4 rests primarily on the judicial admissions made in their Defences dated 8.9.2020 in response to the averment of facts in the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [18] As the Plaintiff’s contention on judicial admission was heavily relied on, I consider it necessary to refer to the specific paragraphs in the Statement of Claim cited. They are:- (i) Paragraph 21 Pada 7.8.2017, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua telah menyebabkan Plaintiff menganugerahkan kontrak bekalan tenaga pekerja kepada Defendan Ketiga dengan mengeluarkan Pesanan Pembelian (“Purchase Order”) seperti mana yang berikut: No. Purchase Order Jumlah 1. LEESB/PO/0817/025/009 RO RM 616,044.00 (ii) Paragraph 24 Antara Ogos 2017 hingga Februari 2018, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua menyebabkan Plaintiff membuat bayaran-bayaran berikut kepada Defendan Ketiga: Tempoh Jumlah (RM) August 2017 107,492.00 September 2017 135,727.00 October 2017 229,479.75 November 2017 260,124.25 December 2017 310,577.75 S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 January 2018 327,026.75 February 2018 314,779.75 Jumlah Keseluruhan RM 1,685,207.25 [19] In their Defence filed, both D1 and D3 admitted to paragraph 21 of the Statement of Claim. As for paragraph 24, D1 admitted to it, but was denied by D3. [20] The Plaintiff also relies on partial admissions made by the Defendants to its allegations in the Statement of Claim. The relevant paragraphs in the Statement of Claim are :- (i) Paragraph 32 Selanjutnya dan secara alternatif, memandangkan segala pembayaran yang diterima oleh Defendan Ketiga adalah berbangkit dari perlanggaran tugas Defendan Pertama dan Kedua, Plaintif memplidkan bahawa Defendan Ketiga telah diperkaya dengan tidak adil. (ii) Paragraph 34 Plaintiff memplidkan bahawa Defendan Ke-4 pada semua masa yang material merupakan ejen dan/atau pengarah bayangan Plaintiff berdasarkan perkara-perkara berikut:… S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [21] In response to the above, D3 denied that the payments made to it arose from breaches of fiduciary duties. Instead, D3 stated that they were made for work done. [22] As for D4, he admitted to being a shadow director but his role was to principally advise Ahmad Najmuddin bin Mohamed (PW1). PW1 is currently the director of the Plaintiff with effect from 7.11.2018. [23] Premised on the admissions/partial admissions in the Defences of D1, D3 and D4, the Plaintiff contends that the following had been established:- (i) D1 caused the Plaintiff to award the manpower supply contract by issuing the Purchase Order to D3; (ii) Payment of RM 1,685,207.25 had been made to D3 by the Plaintiff; and (iii) D4 was a shadow director of the Plaintiff and had knowledge of the incorporation of D3. [24] I am of the view that whilst on the face of it, it would appear that the Defendants made certain concessions, these statements are not to be viewed in isolation. Otherwise the import of these statements would be given more significance than is warranted. Instead, these statements ought to be construed in the light of the other evidence adduced by the Defendants. In short, the totality of the evidence adduced at the trial must be considered. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [25] My view of the alleged admissions is this. Firstly, the award of the manpower contract to D3 vide the Purchase Order is not in dispute. The fact that D1 was the director of the Plaintiff at the material time is also not in dispute. Therefore, for D1 to agree that she caused the Plaintiff to award the contract to D3 is not surprising. [26] Secondly, D1 in her evidence in chief admitted in a forthright manner that she made a mistake in paragraph 9 of her Defence by admitting to the Plaintiff’s allegation at paragraph 24. In her evidence, she stated that, “Dengan izin, Yang Arif. Saya berlaku kesilapan semasa dalam proses pembelaan. Saya tidak mengetahui dan tidak terlibat dalam sebarang operasi dan pengurusan company. Jadi saya tidak tahu apa yang dimaksudkan dengan perenggan tersebut.” [27] I accept her explanation that she had no intention to admit that she caused the Plaintiff to pay RM 1,865,207.25 to D3. It was a mistake on her part to plead paragraph 9 of the Defence. She further stated that she was not involved in the operations of the Plaintiff. [28] Having observed her at the trial and the explanation proffered, I find no reason to disbelieve her. It would make no sense for her to admit in the manner contended by the Plaintiff as that would be as good as admitting liability. The concession in her pleading was unintentional in view of the entire tenor of her evidence at the trial which was a denial of the allegations by the Plaintiff. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [29] The evidence of PW1 confirmed the fact that D1 was not involved in the running of the Plaintiff. In cross, he unequivocally stated that “Saya setuju D1 tidak terlibat dengan operasi syarikat.” [30] In any event, D3 and D4 in their Defence denied the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Statement of Claim. It would make no sense for D1 to admit but D3 and D4 to deny. There would be a glaring inconsistency in their defence. I therefore surmise that it was a genuine mistake in the statement made in the Defence. Therefore, having considered the evidence on the alleged admission, I conclude that it was but an unintended statement when D1 agreed to the allegations of the Plaintiff. [31] Thirdly, as for the alleged partial admissions by D3 and D4, I am of the view that one ought not to be pedantic about the statements made in the Defences filed. I would regard them as inadequacies in drafting rather than an intended admission. The overall justice of the case ought instead to be the paramount consideration. Breach of fiduciary duties on the part of D1 and D4 [32] The law on breach of fiduciary duties is settled law. It is a duty imposed both in common law and by statute. The common law fiduciary duties have now been codified in the Companies Act, 2016. (See: Board of Trustees of the Sabah Foundation & 2 Ors v Datuk Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamad & Anor [2008] 5 MLJ 469, Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra bin Tengku Indra Petra Perdana Sdn Bhd and Anor Appeal [2018] 2 MLJ 177). S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 [33] The main complaint of the Plaintiff is that D1 and D4 failed to declare their interests in the contract awarded by the Plaintiff. In other words, they acted contrary to their duty to avoid a conflict of interest as provided in section 221 of the Companies Act, 2016 which states, Every director of a company, who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company shall, as soon as practicable after the relevant facts have come to the director’s knowledge, declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the board of directors. [34] D1 candidly admitted she did not inform the Plaintiff that she was also the director of D3 when the contract to supply manpower was awarded. She failed to do so as she was not aware that she had an obligation to disclose. In any event D4, her husband, took an active role in the operations of the Plaintiff. D4, confirmed that D1 was not involved in the running of the Plaintiff. On his part he stated that he was ignorant of his obligation to inform the Plaintiff regarding the contract that was awarded to D3. [35] I am of the view that the ignorance of D1 as to her statutory obligation in section 221 of the Companies Act, 2016 is not a valid defence. Her conduct which was contrary to section 221 clearly established a breach of her fiduciary duties as a director of the Plaintiff as she failed to disclose her interest in D3 when the contract was awarded. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [36] As for the claim against D4 for breach of fiduciary duties, I find it to be misconceived. The claim against him was on the ground that he was a shadow director of the Plaintiff, making the decisions of the company. The Plaintiff contends that he owed the same duties as D1 and a claim against him can be brought for breach of fiduciary duties. [37] It is my view that the statutory duties are imposed only on a director duly appointed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Companies Act, 2016. Clearly, D4 was not. The Plaintiff has also not cited any authorities to persuade me otherwise. Tort of conspiracy to injure [38] Apart from the cause of action founded on breach of fiduciary duties, the Plaintiff’s case is also premised on the tort of conspiracy to injure. This cause of action has been given judicial recognition in our courts, evident in the cases of Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and other appeals [2010] 5 MLJ 394 and Yeohata Machineries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Coil Master Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 810 which held that the essential elements to sustain and action of conspiracy to injure are:- (i) a combination or agreement between two or more individuals; (ii) an intent to injure; (iii) pursuant to which combination or agreement and with that intention, certain acts were carried out; and S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 (iv) the acts resulted in loss and damage to the plaintiffs. [39] The Court of Appeal in Global Ventures Network Sdn Bhd v Lokman bin Dato’ Mohd Kamal and another appeal [2018] 6 MLJ 103 further defined the tort by making a distinction between the means employed to carry out the conspiracy. It held, …in order to make out a case of conspiracy, the plaintiff would need to establish that there was an agreement between two or more persons to injure the plaintiff; and that the acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage to the plaintiff… The principles which are applicable depend very much on the specific allegations of conspiracy that are pleaded in the statement of claim. In Wu Yang Construction Group Ltd v Zhejiang Jinyi Group Co, Ltd and others [2006] 4 SLR 451 at p 491, the court expressed that: 75. It is apposite to note that the actual principles of law relating to the tort of conspiracy are none too clear. What is clear is that there are traditionally, two separate and distinct aspects or ways of applying the tort of conspiracy. As might have been surmised, the legal principles with respect to each aspect are somewhat different. 76. There is, first, the situation where unlawful means have been used (also known as ‘wrongful means conspiracy’). The relevant law in this context appears to be straightforward. In particular, there is no need for the plaintiff concerned to prove that there has been a predominant intention on the part of the defendant to injure it. It would appear that the very utilisation of unlawful means is, by its very nature, sufficient to render the defendants liable, regardless of their predominant intention. This would appear to be both logical as well as just and fair, especially if we bear in S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 mind the fact that the central core, as it were, of the tort of conspiracy hinges on the proof that the conspiracy is somehow unlawful and that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed provided that it can prove that it has suffered damage. 77. Secondly, there is the situation where lawful means have been used (also known as ‘simple conspiracy’ or ‘conspiracy to injure’). Unlike the first category referred to briefly in the preceding paragraph, this second category requires that the plaintiff prove that there has been a predominant intention on the part of the defendants to injure it (see the leading House of Lords decision of Lornho plc v Fayed [1992] 1 AC 448 (‘Lornho’)). This additional element is required simply because, without it, the alleged conspiracy would be devoid of any element of unlawfulness. It is precisely because there is a predominant intention on the part of the defendants to injure the plaintiff that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed provided (again) that it (the plaintiff) can prove that it has suffered damage. It is this concerted predominant intention to injure that renders the conduct of the defendants, which would otherwise have been lawful, unlawful or illegitimate. As Lord Bridge of Harwich, who delivered the substantive judgment of the House in Lornho (with which the other Law Lords agreed), observed (at pp 465-466): Where conspirators act with the predominant purpose of injuring the plaintiff and in fact inflict damage on him, but do nothing which would have been actionable if done by an individual acting alone, it is in the fact of their concerted action for that illegitimate purpose that the law, however anomalous it may now seem, finds a sufficient ground to condemn their action as illegal and tortious. But when the conspirators intentionally injure the plaintiff and used unlawful means to do so, it is no defence for them to show that their primary purpose was to further or protect their S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 own interests; it is sufficient to make their action tortious that the means use were unlawful. [40] In its Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff relied on the same set of facts in respect of breach of fiduciary duties for its cause of action for tort of conspiracy to injure. The Plaintiff is wholly misconceived here. Based on the principles enunciated in the authorities cited above, the elements to be established where the tort of conspiracy is relied on are clearly distinct from breach of fiduciary duties. [41] In MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and other appeals [1995] 2 MLJ 493, the Court of Appeal recognised that conspiracy is a tort that is not always capable of proof by direct evidence. However, the same can be inferred from the conduct of the defendants. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) held at p 515 that: Conspiracy is a tort that is not always capable of proof by direct evidence. Like so many other facts, an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means may be established by evidence of circumstances from which such an agreement may be inferred: Barindra Kumar Ghose & Ors v The Emperor (1909) 14 CWN 1114. It is axiomatic that there must be proof and not mere conjecture. In the present case there was sufficient evidence from which a conspiracy could be properly inferred. [42] In this instance, I am unable to infer from the evidence adduced at the trial, that there was a conspiracy between D1, D3 and D4 within the meaning enunciated by the authorities on this point. The Plaintiff’s case on the tort of conspiracy, therefore fails. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Damages [43] I now come to the issue of damages. Even if the Plaintiff succeeds in proving that D1 breached her fiduciary duties, it must demonstrate that actual harm or loss has been suffered as a result of D1’s breach. [44] The pleaded case of the Plaintiff was that the breach of D1 had occasioned a loss of RM 1,685,000.00 to the Plaintiff by causing the said amount to be paid out to D3. It seeks to recover this amount. [45] It bears repeating that the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving its allegations of fact, in particular the loss of RM 1,685,000.00. [46] There is absolutely no evidence in support of this amount. Notwithstanding that the details of the amount allegedly paid have been set out in paragraph 24 of the Statement of Claim, there is absolutely no documentary evidence adduced as proof. As the judicial admission of this amount paid out has been disregarded by this court, the Plaintiff’s case is bereft of any proof on the loss which resulted. The amount of RM 616,044.00 in the Purchase Order relied on is not consistent with the amount claimed by the Plaintiff. The Purchase Order by itself is not proof of RM 1,685,000.00 received by D3. [47] The Defendants do not deny that payments were made by the Plaintiff in respect of manpower supply contract. The fact that D3 S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 received payment is not ipso fact evidence of loss to the Plaintiff. To a specific question asked by the court during the trial, PW2 admitted that D3 did supply manpower for the Rapid Project. Therefore, it cannot be denied that work was done by D3. [48] This is evident from the minutes of meeting of the Plaintiff held on 7.11.2018 which was tendered in evidence. At the said meeting, D4 requested for payment towards the invoice issued by D3 for the amount of RM 262,000.00. This invoice was issued for the supply of manpower. The meeting however decided to reject D3’s claim on the ground that D3 was set up without the knowledge of the Plaintiff. [49] In this regard, the Court of Appeal case of Soh Chee Gee v Syn Tai Hung Trading Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 MLJ 379 is particularly instructive. Although the Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court finding of breach of fiduciary duties on the part of the Chief Executive Officer of the Plaintiff, it disallowed the claim for damages on the ground that it was not proved. The Court of Appeal held, However, we are not convinced that the defendant can be said to be solely responsible for the losses of the company stated to be RM16m plus. This case is unlike other cases where the employee acted in breach of his fiduciary duties and appropriated the company’s funds for himself. In such an event, the losses are clearly attributable directly to the acts of the employee and should be ordered to be disgorged. That is not the case here. Several factors go into assessing the cause for the losses stated to be suffered by the plaintiff company, particularly the role played by Cosmo and the benefit received by it. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 As an employee, unless it can be established that he acted dishonestly and enjoyed pecuniary gains as a result of his misconduct, there is no legal basis to hold him liable for the totality of the losses that was not the thrust of the charges preferred against him; neither were such clear findings of fact made against him by the domestic inquiry panel. In the absence of such evidence, the defendant’s liability for the entirety of the losses is not made out. On liability alone, this aspect of the claim for damages is not established. [50] Therefore, as far as the evidence goes, I find nothing to support the claim for special damages of RM 1,685,000.00. To recapitulate, work was in fact done by D3 in fulfilment of its obligation under the manpower supply contract. There is no evidence of financial detriment occasioned to the Plaintiff from the award of the contract to D3. Neither was it proven that D1, D3 and D4 had profited from the breach of fiduciary duties of D1. In addition, there is no evidence to establish that the sum claimed was in fact paid to D3. In the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s claim for special damages is not allowed. [51] I note that the Plaintiff has, in its Statement of Claim, prayed for general damages to be assessed. Even if D1 had breached her fiduciary duty to disclose her interest, the Plaintiff must show the circumstances which warrant an order for damages. There is no evidence remotely supporting its claim for general damages. [52] For the sake of completeness, I would also add that the Plaintiff’s claim that the Defendants had been unjustly enriched by the amount of RM 1,685,000.00 also fails. S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Conclusion [53] Premised on the findings as aforesaid, and on a balance of probabilities, I do not find the Plaintiff’s claim to have been proven against the Defendants. In the circumstances, its claim must necessarily be dismissed. [54] Taking into account the fact that no particular issues of complexities arise for determination in this case, the duration of the trial and the number of witnesses called, I order that costs of RM 25,000 be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. Dated: 22nd day of January 2024 -SGD- ....………………..….... Alice Loke Yee Ching Judge High Court in Malaya at Shah Alam S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Counsel for the Plaintiff : Mr. Mohd Wafiy bin Azman (Miss Marina Tiwol with him) Messrs. Azmi & Associates Counsel for the 1st, 3rd & 4th : Mr. Khairul Anuar bin Kashim Defendants Messrs Anuar Yusof & Partners S/N GHWl1WNsRUC4FrJBF/YXzg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24F-187-06/2023

PEMOHON A R T RESPONDEN G A N

Family law - Reference to conciliatory body - Application by Applicant wife for exemption from reference to conciliatory body- Whether Applicant had established exceptional circumstances - Whether there was hope of reconciliation - Whether Respondent husband was deliberately delaying divorce by opposing Applicant's application - Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 section 106

23/01/2024

YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=88c537e1-fcf7-4fdc-a698-f81688f3be96&Inline=true

WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24F-187-06/2023 Dalam Perkara Petisyen Perceraian yang dicadangkan untuk pembubaran perkahwinan DAN Dalam Perkara Seksyen 106(1)(vi) Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian), 1976 DAN Dalam Perkara bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah Tinggi di bawah Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 BETWEEN ART ....APPLICANT AND GAN ...RESPONDENT 23/01/2024 19:33:29 WA-24F-187-06/2023 Kand. 21 S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Applicant Wife for exemption from referral of the marital dispute to the conciliatory body pursuant to section 106(1)(vi) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (“Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act”). [2] In the interest of privacy of the parties concerned, and sensitivity of the issues in these proceedings, the Applicant, and Respondent Husband have been anonymised in this judgment as ART and GAN respectively. The factual background [3] The involved parties, the Applicant, a citizen of Vietnam, and Respondent, a Malaysian (collectively, “the Parties”), aged 34 and 47 respectively at the time of the hearing of this Application, were married in May 2017, and were blessed with a son, born in August 2017 (“the Child”) whose birth was documented in a Vietnamese birth certificate. [4] The marriage began to unravel in 2019, prompting the Parties to live separately. The Applicant and Child resided in Vietnam, while the Respondent remained in Malaysia. [5] In January 2020, the Respondent had unilaterally relocated the Child from Vietnam to Malaysia without the Applicant’s consent. Despite the S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 Applicant’s persistent requests for the Child’s return, the Respondent adamantly refused. The Applicant encountered difficulties returning to Malaysia but managed to do so in April 2022, only to find that the Respondent had vacated his residence. [6] Faced with these circumstances, the Applicant urgently filed an application for guardianship, custody, care, and control of the Child on an urgent, ex parte basis. Although the Applicant obtained a court order in April 2022, challenges arose in serving the cause papers to the Respondent. Meanwhile, the Applicant diligently sought the Child, who had been taken to Kuala Terengganu by the Respondent, a development that was brought to the Court’s attention during case management in May 2022. [7] Following the Court's directive, the Respondent complied by appearing in Court and producing the Child on 13 May 2022. Subsequently, constructive discussions between the Parties, facilitated by their respective solicitors — Messrs Ras & Co representing the Applicant and Messrs Yoon & Partners representing the Respondent — led to the formulation of an agreement. This agreement was formalised and recorded in a consent order dated 20 May 2022 ("the Consent Order"). According to the terms of the Consent Order, joint guardianship and joint custody were granted to the Parties, with primary care and control to the Applicant. Parties had also agreed that the Applicant would reside with the Child in Vietnam. [8] However, implementing the Consent Order presented challenges, leaving the Applicant to file, in June 2023, an application to vary the S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 terms of the Consent Order vide enclosure 26 in Originating Summons No: WA-24F-120-04/2022 (“Enclosure 26”). [9] In the same month, the Applicant filed this Application, seeking exemption from referring the marriage to a conciliatory body, pursuant to section 106(1)(vi) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act which reads: Section 106 – Requirement of reference to conciliatory body before petition for divorce (1) No person shall petition for divorce, except under sections 51 and 52, unless he or she has first referred the matrimonial difficulty to a conciliatory body and that body has certified that it has failed to reconcile the parties: Provided that this requirement shall not apply in any case – (i) where the petitioner alleges that he or she has been deserted by and does not know the whereabouts of his or her spouse; (ii) where the respondent is residing abroad and it is unlikely that he or she will enter the jurisdiction within six months next ensuing after the date of the petition; (iii) where the respondent has been required to appear before a conciliatory body and has wilfully failed to attend; (iv) where the respondent is imprisoned for a term of five years or more; (v) where the petitioner alleges that the respondent is suffering from incurable mental illness; or (vi) where the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which make reference to a conciliatory body impracticable. [Emphasis added.] S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 [10] It is essential to highlight that the Respondent, having enlisted the services of new solicitors, Messrs Isaacs & Isaacs, in June 2023, filed an application, in July of the same year, to vary the terms of the Consent Order vide enclosure 33 in Originating Summons No: WA- 24F-120-04/2022 (“Enclosure 33”). By the conclusion of July 2023, the legal representation changed to Messrs Siva Nada & Associates, who assumed responsibility for the Respondent's case. [11] In August 2023, the Respondent filed an application seeking to stay the Consent Order. That application was subsequently dismissed. The issues [12] The central matter before this Court in this Application was the determination of whether there existed exceptional circumstances justifying the exemption of the Parties from the obligation to refer their matrimonial dispute to a conciliatory body. [13] The Court had to also deal with an additional challenge in the form of a preliminary objection raised by the Respondent that highlighted a discrepancy in the dates between the Notice of Application and the Applicant’s affidavit in support thereof. [14] The preliminary objection was dismissed, and this Application was allowed for the following reasons: S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 Contentions, findings, and evaluation Whether discrepancy between dates in Notice of Application and affidavit in support rendered the latter defective [15] At the outset, the Respondent raised a preliminary objection asserting a defect in the Applicant's affidavit in support of this Application. This objection stemmed from the fact that the affidavit in support was affirmed on 1 June 2023, while the Application itself was filed on 28 June 2023. [16] The Respondent in raising the preliminary objection, relied on the cases of Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Serajudin Mohd Ismail & Anor [1999] 6 CLJ 405 and Oriental Bank Bhd v Sathunavakey [1998] 4 CLJ SUPP. [17] At this juncture, it became necessary to highlight that Counsel for the Respondent had cited outdated and inapplicable cases. A more relevant precedent would be the case of S Vigneswaran M Sanasee v Maju Institute of Educational Development (MIED) [2010] 7 CLJ 640. In that case, the learned Mah Weng Kwai JC (as he then was) had dismissed a similar objection. The dismissal was based on the rationale that there is no statutory requirement for such chronological alignment between the application and the affidavit in support, and even if there was, such discrepancy could be cured by Order 1A (Court or judge shall have regard to justice) and Order 2 (Effect of non- compliance) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (now Rules of Court 2012). This view was elucidated in the following passages of the judgment: S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [6] Counsel for the defendant relied on the decision in the High Court case of Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Serajudin Mohd Ismail & Anor [1999] 6 CLJ 405 which stated that if an affidavit is affirmed before the filing of an application, the affidavit cannot be said to have been affirmed in a cause or matter because at the time of filing the affidavit, the cause or matter did not yet exist. In that case the affidavit was excluded by the court as it was affirmed a week before the filing of the originating summons which it purported to support. [7] In his written submission, counsel for the defendant submitted that if the preliminary objection is upheld and encl. 2 is excluded the originating summons stands unsupported and must be dismissed in limine. Counsel then proposed that to remedy the situation, the plaintiff should file a further affidavit to adopt and verify the contents of his affidavit (encl. 2). The reason for the proposal by counsel was so that the plaintiff cannot escape liability in the event action is taken against him on matters stated in his affidavit, for example contempt of court, on the ground that his affidavit was not properly filed or regularly before the court as at the time of filing the affidavit, the originating summons was not yet in existence. I dismissed the defendant's preliminary objection and held that the affidavit (encl. 2) was properly filed before the court for the following reasons: (a) I wholly disagree with the contention of counsel for the defendant and his reliance on the rationale in the decision in Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra). (b) There is nothing in O. 41 RHC which requires an affidavit to be filed after an application which sets out the cause or matter has been filed. (c) O. 41 r. 9(2) RHC merely states that every affidavit must be indorsed with a note showing on whose behalf it is filed and the dates of swearing and filing, and an affidavit which is not indorsed may not be filed or used without the leave of the court. The rule does not prohibit the swearing of an affidavit before an application is filed. (d) In most cases, for practical reasons (and almost without exception), affidavits are invariably affirmed before an application is filed. In reality affidavits are usually affirmed a day or just before an application with the affidavit in support are filed in court. S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 (e) The procedure in Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra) is honoured more in its non-compliance. To comply with the decision, a party intending to file an application with an affidavit in support would have to go to court, file the application, await a case number to be given to the application by the court clerk at the registration counter, then have the affidavit in support affirmed by the deponent in the presence of a commissioner for oaths before returning to the registration counter to file the affidavit that has just been affirmed. This unnecessary procedure will cause untold inconvenience to litigants for no real or perceived benefit. Invariably what is required in Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra) is never followed. (f) There is absolutely no prejudice caused to a defendant who is served with an application together with an affidavit in support which was affirmed earlier, whether by a day or a week, before the application was filed. I do not see how such a situation can be disadvantageous to the defendant. (g) Even assuming the court is wrong in not agreeing with Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra), the court can without hesitation rely on O. 2 r. 1(1) RHC to regard the non-compliance as an irregularity which shall not nullify the proceedings before the court. (h) The court can also rely on O. 1A RHC and shall have regard to the justice of the case and not only to the technical non-compliance of the rules. (i) Importantly, counsel for the defendant has chosen to ignore a host of decisions delivered after Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd (supra) wherein the learned judges have for good reasons, disagreed with the decision of RK Nathan J in Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd. I need only refer to the cases of: (i) Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Nor Harizan Mohd Ali [1999] 6 CLJ 466 per Azhar bin Hj Ma'ah J (now JCA); (ii) Yang Lak Man v. Yang Paw Man [1999] 7 CLJ 131 per Mohd Hishamuddin bin Mohd Yunus J (now JCA); (iii) Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Arivalagan Krishnan & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 168 per Low Hop Bing J (now JCA) and (iv) Bank Utama (Malaysia) Bhd v. Chai Koh Shon & Sons Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 CLJ 264 per Sulaiman Daud J (now JCA). S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 In all the above cases, it was held that the RHC do not expressly or by implication require that an affidavit in support should only be affirmed after the filing of the originating cause or matter. Low Hop Bing J (now JCA) went on to say that in view of the filing and extraction procedure practiced in the court registry, it will be inconvenient and impractical for the affidavit to be affirmed on or after the date of the filing of the originating summons. It is unfortunate that counsel for the defendant saw it fit to raise the preliminary objection which, in light of the above-cited cases, rendered it frivolous and without merit. (j) The affirmation by the plaintiff in encl. 2 before the filing of the originating summons is not detrimental to the defendant in any way and has not occasioned any miscarriage of justice. [Emphasis added.] [18] Reference was made also to Order 41 rule 4 and Order 92 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 empower this Court to look at the overall justice of the case before entertaining any objection pertaining to affidavits. The relevant provision reads: Order 41 – Affidavits Rule 4 – Use of defective affidavit An affidavit may, with the leave of the Court, be filed or used in evidence notwithstanding any irregularity in the form thereof. ***** Order 92 – Miscellaneous Rule 4 – Inherent powers of the Court For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. [Emphasis added.] [19] The preliminary objection was evidently devoid of merit and was summarily dismissed. It was opportune at this point to remind Counsel for the Respondent of the principle that the 'relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress; and that the Court ought not to be so far bound and tied by rules' (as articulated by Lord Collins MR in Re Coles and Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1). Consequently, raising technicalities devoid of relevance to the merits of this Application was unwarranted. [20] Furthermore, the axiom that 'procedural skirmishes ought not to prevail, to defeat substantive justice' (in the words of Hamid Sultan Abu Backer JCA in Reebok (M) Sdn Bhd v. CIMB Bank Bhd [2019] 9 CLJ 230) underscored the inability to entertain the Respondent’s preliminary objection. [21] Guidance was also sought from the case of Kumpulan Protection Sdn Bhd v. Global Globe (M) Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 CLJ 733, wherein the Court took a stance that an error in the intitulement would not be fatal to an application unless the party complaining of such error suffered prejudice. [22] Unwilling to let procedural minutiae overshadow substantive justice, I proceeded to address the merits of this Application. S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 Whether the Applicant had established exceptional circumstances [23] In this Application, the primary contention put forth by the Applicant was her assertion of having primary care and control of the Child, with both of them residing in Vietnam. Additionally, she underscored the inconvenience she would face if the mandatory reference to the conciliatory body was not exempted, emphasising the need for multiple trips to Malaysia. [24] The Respondent opposed this Application, insisting that the Applicant should present her case before the conciliatory body and articulate her reasons for seeking a divorce in that forum. He further alleged that the Applicant was evading potential queries from the members of the conciliatory body. [25] The Respondent’s argument appeared to be untenable for multiple reasons. Firstly, an examination of the historical context surrounding this case strongly implied that the Respondent had no genuine intention to reconcile. Instead, it became evident that his primary motivation was to intentionally create challenges in the Applicant’s life, even it meant disregarding the obligations outlined in the Consent Order. [26] Notably, in a police report dated 1 June 2023, he had expressly stated “saya dengan isteri saya sehingga sekarang belum lagi bercerai tetapi saya akan memfailkan petisyen penceraian di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur.” This statement had clearly indicated his willingness to pursue a divorce. The Respondent’s sole S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 motive behind opposing this Application, therefore, was to prolong the divorce proceedings, and consequently to make life difficult for the Applicant. [27] Secondly, the Applicant’s rationale for seeking exemption held merit, drawing guidance from the precedent set in the case of Khoo Kay Peng v Pauline Chai Siew Phin [2015] MLJU 158. In that case, the court had asserted, in the following passage, the legitimacy of a similar basis, providing support for the Applicant’s plea for exemption from referral to the conciliatory body. [127] I am of the view that the words “exceptional circumstances which render it impracticable” are wide enough to cover not only the situations mentioned by learned Counsel for the Wife i.e. the practical or even logistical aspects e.g. whether it is too costly, too inconvenient, or not practical to be carried out, but it can also cover situations, as in the present case, where both parties confirm that there is an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and it would be a failure, and therefore “not able to be done or put into practice successfully” the conciliatory process required by s106(1)(vi) of the LRA [Emphasis added.] [28] The passage quoted from Khoo Kay Peng v Pauline Chai Siew Phin further reinforced my view that allowing this Application was imperative. Dismissing it would subject the Applicant to logistical challenges, increased expenses, and undue inconvenience, especially considering the evident irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. [29] I am cognisant that section 106 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act is an obligatory provision designed to foster reconciliation. S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 Parliament’s intent in introducing this section was to ensure that marital disputes are initially referred to a conciliatory body. The conciliatory body endeavours to resolve issues arising from the dispute by providing a platform for the parties to articulate their concerns. Adherence to section 106 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act is mandatory, subject to exceptions delineated therein. [30] However, while this Court is obligated to endorse reconciliation, it must also consider the principles of public policy and justice. Prolonging the resolution of an unhealthy marriage could be contrary to these principles. The notion that a court should, at times, advocate for divorce rather than compelling couples to endure unhappy marriages acknowledges the potential adverse effects of remaining in dysfunctional unions both for the individuals involved and any children in the family. [31] This was particularly pertinent in the present case where the Respondent seemed intent on extending the Applicant’s hardships. Not only had he failed to comply with the terms of the Consent Order, as alluded to earlier, but the Respondent had applied to vary, and to even stay the implementation of the terms of the Consent Order, causing unnecessary delay and hardship to the Applicant in proceeding with the divorce. [32] In this context, I found the case of Bowman v Bowman [1949] 2 All ER 127 particularly instructive, wherein Lord Denning remarked in the following passage: S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 The really important consideration in all these cases is to see whether there is any chance of reconciliation. On this point it is most material to inquire what the applicant has already done to try to make the marriage a success or to become reconciled. Is the breakdown of the marriage due to any failing or maladjustment on the part of the spouse who applies to launch her petition within three years of the marriage? Has the applicant consulted a probation officer or anyone else specially qualified to help? If the court is not satisfied that all which is reasonable has been done in this respect, it may well dismiss the application. [Emphasis added.] [33] In my assessment, directing the matrimonial dispute to the conciliatory body would be futile as there was no prospect of reconciliation between the Parties. The Applicant was resolute in moving forward with the Child independently of the Respondent. [34] It was imperative to note, at this juncture, that I had dismissed the Respondent’s application to vary in Enclosure 33; while allowing the Applicant’s application to vary in Enclosure 26, awarding her sole guardianship and custody. Access was granted to the Respondent but was restricted to supervised visits in Vietnam, a measure necessitated by the Respondent’s persistent attempts to separate and conceal the Child from the Applicant. [35] Furthermore, the case of Kiranjit Kaur Kalwant Singh v. Chandok Narinderpal Singh [2010] 3 CLJ was brought to my attention, referencing the English case of Fay v. Fay [1982] 2 All ER 922. In Fay v. Fay, the House of Lords clarified that the determination of exceptional hardship or circumstances is within the purview of the trial S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 15 judge, to be based on his or her assessment. The relevance of this concept is evident in the following passage: The House of Lords explained: Parliament deliberately intended that the decision on what is or is not exceptional hardship or depravity in a particular case should be a matter for the judge at first instance to decide by making his own subjective value judgment as to whether the hardship or depravity was out of ordinary, when judged by prevailing standards of acceptable behavior between spouses and after taking account of all relevant circumstances [Emphasis added.] Conclusion [36] In the current proceedings, following a thorough examination and judicious consideration of all the evidence adduced — comprising both oral and documentary, along with submissions from both Parties, I concluded that requiring the Applicant to refer the matrimonial dispute to the conciliatory body would impose exceptional hardship. In light of these considerations, and in the interest of avoiding unnecessary prolongation of the matter, I deemed it appropriate to allow this Application, with costs. Dated: 23 January 2024 S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 16 SIGNED …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Applicant – Raspreet Kaur; Messrs Ras & Co For the Respondent – Sivanesan Nadarajah; Messrs Siva Nada & Associates Cases referred to: ➢ Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v. Serajudin Mohd Ismail & Anor [1999] 6 CLJ 405 ➢ Bowman v Bowman [1949] 2 All ER 127 ➢ C v A [1998] 6 MLJ 222 ➢ Fay v. Fay [1982] 2 All ER 922 ➢ Khoo Kay Peng v Pauline Chai Siew Phin [2015] MLJU 158 ➢ Kiranjit Kaur Kalwant Singh v. Chandok Narinderpal Singh [2010] 3 CLJ ➢ Kumpulan Protection Sdn Bhd v. Global Globe (M) Sdn Bhd [2016] 7 CLJ 733 ➢ Oriental Bank Bhd v Sathunavakey [1998] 4 CLJ SUPP. ➢ Re Coles and Ravenshear [1907] 1 KB 1 S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-187-06/2023 23 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 17 ➢ Reebok (M) Sdn Bhd v. CIMB Bank Bhd [2019] 9 CLJ 230 ➢ S Vigneswaran M Sanasee v Maju Institute of Educational Development (MIED) [2010] 7 CLJ 640 Legislation referred to: ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – section 106 ➢ Rules of Court 2012 – Orders 1A, 2 ➢ Rules of the High Court 1980 – Orders 1A, 2 S/N 4TfFiPf83EmmPgWiPOlg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22NCvC-753-11/2020

PLAINTIF Grohe Malaysia Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Angie Tan Lin Li 2. ) Wong Wai Cheong 3. ) Wo Mun Sum 4. ) Yong Pui Ling 5. ) Yong Pui Mun

Tuntutan Plf dibatalkan dengan kebenaran untuk memfailkan semula dan tanpa perintah kos.The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants was struck out by the Court as the Statement of Claim did not comply with the Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules”). The Plaintiff’s claim as noted from the Statement of Claim is against 5 Defendants in different capacities. The claim against the 1st Defendant is as an individual who was employed by the Plaintiff whereas the claim against the other Defendants is as owners of different business enterprises supplying goods to the Plaintiff.Having regards to the factors above the Court did not regard this case as fit to allow for just amendment. What was required was a complete reconstruction of a new pleading. For this purpose, the Court struck out the Plaintiff’s claim but with a liberty to file afresh and with no order as to cost.

23/01/2024

YA Dato' Haji Akhtar Bin Tahir

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0bc14152-854b-4e92-b6c4-c6c6a3ed9ba7&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA BAHAGIAN SIVIL NO. GUAMAN SIVIL : WA-22NCvC-753-11/2020 ANTARA GROHE MALAYSIA SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 201101010715 (938845-W)) …PLAINTIF DAN 1. ANGIE TAN LIN LI (NO. K/P.: 780901-14-5582) 2. WONG WAI CHEONG (NO. K/P.: 821205-08-5393) 3. WO MUN SUM (NO. K/P.: 770221-14-5539) 4. YONG PUI LING (NO. K/P.: 781211-14-6216) 23/01/2024 08:31:59 WA-22NCvC-753-11/2020 Kand. 68 S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5. YONG PUI MUN (NO. K/P.: 820721-14-5386) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction 1. The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants was struck out by the Court as the Statement of Claim did not comply with the Rules of Court 2012 (“the Rules”). The Statement of claim Misjoinder of parties and cause of action 2. The Plaintiff’s claim as noted from the Statement of Claim is against 5 Defendants in different capacities. The claim against the 1st Defendant is as an individual who was employed by the Plaintiff whereas the claim against the other Defendants is as owners of different business enterprises supplying goods to the Plaintiff. 3. The cause of action against the 1st Defendant is for breach of employment, dishonesty and corruption. The cause of action against the other Defendants which also includes the 1st Defendant is for conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff. next thing to note is that the cause of actions against the Defendants are different. S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4. A major portion of the Statement of Claim of almost 70 paragraphs is dedicated to outlining the breach of employment, dishonesty and corruption by the 1st Defendant and only a few paragraphs outlining the allegation of conspiracy against the other Defendants. 5. The only nexus between the claim against the 1st Defendant and the other Defendants is that the 1st Defendant had appointed the other Defendants as supplier of goods to the Plaintiff leading to the claim of conspiracy. 6. Order 15 of the Rules allows joinder of cause of action in the circumstance’s stipulated: 1. Joinder of causes of action (O. 15 r. 1) (1) Subject to rule 5(1), a plaintiff may in one action claim relief against the same defendant in respect of more than one cause of action- (a) if the plaintiff claims, and the defendant is alleged to be liable, in the same capacity in respect of all causes of action;(emphasis mine) 7. From the Rule above it is clear that joinder of cause of action is allowed only against the same Defendant and not against multiple Defendants as in this case. S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8. The Rules allows for joinder of Defendants under certain circumstances. Order 15 Rule 4 stipulates as follows: 4. Joinder of parties (O. 15 r. 4) (1) Subject to rule 5(1), two or more persons may be joined together in one action as plaintiffs or as defendants with the leave of the Court or where- (a) if separate actions were brought by or against each of them, as the case may be, some common question of law or fact would arise in all the actions; and (b) all rights to relief claimed in the action (whether they are joint, several or alternative) are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. 9. Under the above provision there are 2 conditions to join the Defendants i.e. there must a common question of law and fact and arise out of the same transactions or series of transactions. Both the conditions are not met in this case. 10. In this case there is no common question of law and fact between the claim against the 1st Defendant for breach of employment contract and the claim for conspiracy against the other Defendants. In fact, there is no common question of fact even between the other Defendants who are owners of different businesses S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal supplying different good at different times to the Plaintiff involving different invoices. 11. In this case the Court finds there is a misjoinder of both cause of action and Defendants. The effect of a misjoinder is as stated in Order 15 Rule 6: 5. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties (O. 15 r. 6) (1) A cause or matter shall not be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of any party, and the Court may in any cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and interests of the persons who are parties to the cause or matter. (2) Subject to this rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter, the Court may on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application- (a) order any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party; 12. Although a misjoinder does not defeat a claim as stated in the above provision, this provision is subject to other provision of the Rules. One such provision is Order 34 of the Rules which directs S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the Court to conduct a case in “just, expeditious and economical disposal of proceedings”. In this case the Court felt that joining the causes of action and Defendant might lead to confusion and multiplicity of proceedings 13. This in turn will lead to “prejudice, embarrassment or delay of the fair trial of the action”. This is in fact a reason to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim under Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules. Pleading evidence not facts 14. Apart from misjoinder, there is another glaring defect in the Statement of Claim whereby large portion of the Statement of Claim contains evidence rather than facts. This is clearly prohibited under the Rules which states: 7. Facts, not evidence, to be pleaded (O. 18 r. 7) (1) Subject to the provisions of this rule and rules 10, 11 and 12, every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as the case may be, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved, and the statement shall be as brief as the nature of the case admits. (emphasis mine) S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15. As an illustration paragraph 12 reproduces in full certain clauses of the employment agreement between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, paragraph 14 reproduces in full certain clauses in the Code of Business Conduct Acceptances form purportedly signed by the 1st Defendant, paragraph 19 give details of the Plaintiff’s standard operation procedures, paragraph 21 tabulates full details of products supplied by each of the 2nd to 5th Defendants. 16. In the Court’s views what was stated in a large portion of the Statement of Claim could have been led as evidence during trial by way of production of the various agreements and documents in the Bundle of Documents. 17. Apart from pleading evidence the Court saw that a number of irrelevant facts were pleaded. As an illustration the facts contained under the title “DAPAT KEMBALI KOMPUTER RIBA YANG DIMILIKI OLEH DEFENDAN PERTAMA”. This flouts the above provision which only allows material facts in summary form to be pleaded. 18. A further defect noted by the Court is that although a cause of action of conspiracy has been stated in the Statement of Claim against the Defendants, no further particulars of the conspiracy has been given. Conspiracy involves a pre-arranged plan to defraud the Plaintiff. The nature of this pre-arranged must be expressly stated which should include the dates, the time, the place where this pre-arranged plan took place, The fact that it was the 1st Defendant who appointed the other Defendants cannot be a fact indicating conspiracy. S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19. The Rules states as follows: 12. Particulars of pleading (O. 18 r. 12) (1) Subject to paragraph (2), every pleading shall contain the necessary particulars of any claim, defence or other matter pleaded including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing words- (a) particulars of any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default or undue influence on which the party pleading relies; and (b) where a party pleading alleges any condition of the mind of any person, whether any disorder or disability of mind or any malice, fraudulent intention or other condition of mind except knowledge, particulars of the facts on which the party relies. 20. It can be summarised that the Plaintiff in this case have flouted and disregarded the Rules with regards to drafting a proper pleading with impunity. The Court cannot ignore this intentional flouting of the Rules as the flouting of the Rules in this case cannot be regarded as mere technical non-compliance. This non compliances can in fact lead to a miscarriage of justice. S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Conclusion 21. Having regards to the factors above the Court did not regard this case as fit to allow for just amendment. What was required was a complete reconstruction of a new pleading. For this purpose, the Court struck out the Plaintiff’s claim but with a liberty to file afresh and with no order as to cost. Dated: 18.1.2024 sgd DATO’ HAJI AKHTAR BIN TAHIR Judge High Court of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PARTIES For the Plaintiff: Nama Peguamcara: Caleb Sio / Chen Mei Yan Tetuan Tay & Partners. Tingkat 6, Plaza See Hoy Chan Jalan Raja Chulan 50200 Kuala Lumpur. For the Defendant: Nama Peguamcara: So Chien Hao (Def 1 - Def 2) Tetuan Zailan & Co. Lot 6.10, 6th Floor Wisma Central Jalan Ampang 50450 Kuala Lumpur Nama Peguamcara: Khoo Wai Tuck (Def 3, Def 4 & Def 5) Tetuan Hariati & Khoo. Suite 11-09, Level 11 Wisma UOA II No. 21, Jalan Pinang 50450 Kuala Lumpur S/N UkHBC0uFkk62xMbGo2bpw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

JA-24NCC-35-12/2022

PEMOHON 1. ) MERGE JATI ENGINEERING SDN BHD 2. ) HOW KEN KON @ LOW KEN KON RESPONDEN 1. ) KANG JIT SING 2. ) NG MUI KOON 3. ) KANG KOK WEE, KELVIN 4. ) KANG KOK YONG, JASON 5. ) TONGOD OIL PALM SDN BHD 6. ) PINANGAH OIL PALM SDN BHD 7. ) WEST BORNEO RESOURCES SDN BHD

section 346 oppression whether proven - opening of bank account without Plaintiffs’ knowledge - absence of Plaintiffs signature on DCR - whether the majority rule principle in the running of 7th Defendant goes against the purpose of its set up - whether there was attestation to the Audited Financial Statement by the Plaintiffs that refute disagreement with the handling of funds of the 7th Defendant - whether there exists any facts based on the acts of the Plaintiffs to move the Defendants to rule out acting unfairly.

23/01/2024

YA Puan Nurulhuda Nur'aini Binti Mohamad Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ffab748b-53d9-487f-8d10-5dfa6cd1de1d&Inline=true

2201-JA-24NCC-35-12-2022 MERGE JATI 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TA’ZIM, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: JA-24NCC-35-12/2022 Dalam perkara mengenai West Borneo Resources Sdn. Bhd (Syarikat No: 871672-A) Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 223 dan Seksyen 346 dan peruntukkan-peruntukkan lain yang berkaitan di bawah Akta Syarikat 2016 Dan Dalam perkara mengennai Aturan 7 dan 88 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara bidang kuasa sedia ada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini ANTARA 1. MERGE JATI ENGINEERING SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 480344-A) 2. HOW KEN KON @ LOW KEN KON (NO. K/P: 610323-10-6175) ... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 23/01/2024 08:55:44 JA-24NCC-35-12/2022 Kand. 78 S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 1. KANG JIT SING (NO. K/P: 531111-01-5903) 2. NG MUI KOON (NO. K/P: 530717-66-5084) 3. KANG KOK WEE, KELVIN (NO. K/P: 811219-71-5035) 4. KANG KOK YONG, JASON (NO. K/P: 840801-71-5041) 5. TONGOD OIL PALM SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 200601028301 (748057-W) 6. PINANGAH OIL PALM SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 200601001516 (721264-K) 7. WEST BORNEO RESOURCES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 871672-A) ...DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] The Plaintiffs applicant filed this suit seeking for remedies under section 346 of the Companies Act 20161 (the Act) on allegation of 1 Section 346. Remedy in cases of an oppression (1) Any member or debenture holder of a company may apply to the Court for an order under this section on the ground— (a) that the affairs of the company are being conducted or the powers of the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members or debenture holders including himself or in disregard of his or their interests as members, shareholders or debenture holders of the company; or (b) that some act of the company has been done or is threatened or that some resolution of the members, debenture holders or any class of them has been passed or is proposed which unfairly discriminates against or is otherwise prejudicial to one or more of the members or debenture holders, including himself. (2) If on such application the Court is of the opinion that either of those grounds is established, the Court may make such order as the Court thinks fit with the view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters complained of, and without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the order may— S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 oppression in respect of the carrying the affairs of the 7th Defendant. The reliefs sought are for the following declaration: a) that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants acted jointly and/or severally: i. in conducting the affairs of the 7th Defendant in a manner that is oppressive and in disregard of the Plaintiff’s interests as members of the 7th Defendant; and ii. caused the affairs and conducts of the 7th Defendant to be done in a manner which has and/or will unfairly discriminates against or which is or will otherwise to the Plaintiff as members of the 7th Defendant; (a) direct or prohibit any act or cancel or vary any transaction or resolution; (b) regulate the conduct of the affairs of the company in the future; (c) provide for the purchase of the shares or debentures of the company by other members or debenture holders of the company or by the company itself; (d) in the case of a purchase of shares by the company, provide for a reduction accordingly of capital of the company; or (e) provide that the company be wound up. (3) If an order that the company be wound up is made under paragraph (2)(e), the provisions of this Act relating to winding up of a company shall apply as if the order had been made upon a petition duly presented to the Court by the company, with such adaptations as are necessary. (4) If an order under this section makes any alteration in or addition to any constitution, then, notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Act, but subject to the order, the company concerned shall not have power without the leave of the Court to make any further alteration in or addition to the constitution inconsistent with the order, but subject to the foregoing provisions of this subsection, the alterations or additions made by the order shall be of the same effect as if duly made by resolution of the company. (5) An office copy of any order made under this section shall be lodged by the applicant with the Registrar within fourteen days from the making of the order. (6) The applicant who contravenes subsection (5) commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit and, in the case of a continuing offence, to a further fine of five hundred ringgit for each day during which the offence continues after conviction. S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 b) a declaration that the Plaintiffs are “locked-in” minority shareholders in the 7th Defendant; c) a declaration that the Joint Venture Agreement dated 3.11.2022 entered between the 7th Defendant and PT Adau Agro Kalbar is null and void; d) an order that the 5th-6th Defendants do buy-out and/or purchase the 1st and 2nd Plaintiff’s shares in the 7th Defendant at a fair value based on the percentage of shareholdings of the 1st Plaintiff (Merge Jati Engineering Sdn. Bhd) 16.4% and 2nd Plaintiff (How Ken Kon) 14.25%; e) for the purpose of paragraph (4) above, an independent valuer (nominated by the Plaintiffs) and approved by this Court shall within 30 days from the date of this order, value the Plaintiffs shares in the 7th Defendant (determined value) and the valuation shall be conducted on the basis that: i. the 7th Defendant is a going concern; ii. by reference to the assets, profitability and prospects of the 7th Defendant; and iii. On the basis of willing buyers, willing sellers and on pro rata basis with no discount on minority holding of the Plaintiffs in the 7th Defendant; f) that within 7 days from the completion of the valuation of the shares held by the Plaintiffs, the valuer shall forward a copy of the report containing the Determined Value to all parties and have the same filed in Court via an affidavit pursuant to Order 40 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012; g) that the 5th and 6th Defendants jointly and/or severally shall pay to the Plaintiffs the Determined Value based on the shareholding percentage in paragraph (4) above within 7 days S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 from the expiry of the 30 days stipulated under paragraph (6) above; h) Upon the full compliance of paragraph 7 above and within 7 days, both the Plaintiffs shall resign their representative directors and to perfect the transfer of the Plaintiffs’ shares in the 7th Defendant and to deliver such transfer documents together with the original certificates to the 7th Defendant’s company secretary and the 7th Defendant’s company secretary shall forthwith use the transfer documents to transfer all of the Plaintiffs’ shares in the 7th Defendant; i) an alternative order to paragraphs (e), (f), (g) and (h) above (the same relief as per paragraph 5, 6, 7 and 8 in enclosure 1), that the 7th Defendant be wound up by this Court; j) damages to be assessed; k) parties at liberty to apply; l) cost to be borne by the 1st to 6th Defendants jointly and severally and be paid to the Plaintiffs. [2] Having perused the cause papers, having heard submissions by both parties and cross-referred to the relevant provisions of the law and authorities cited by both parties, this Court came to a finding that the affairs of the 7th Defendant were not conducted in accordance with its articles of association, there was mismanagement of the 7th Defendant’s assets by failure to handle the ‘assets’ in an honest and professional manner by failure to secure a reasonably better price for disposal of the 7th Defendant’s shares, there was mismanagement in the funds of the respondent resulting in it improperly utilized by the Defendants that gives rise to oppression, and allowed the reliefs sought albeit partially and some, with consequential modifications. S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Background: observation and deduction by this Court [3] For the purpose of application in section 345 in support of section 346 of the Act, the affidavit of the 1st Plaintiff was affirmed by Mr. Low Meng Koon (LMK@ Jason Low) a director and shareholder of the 1st Plaintiff, who is also the Director of the 7th Defendant and the 2nd Plaintiff Mr. How Ken Kon (HKK), a director and shareholder of the 7th Defendant (see: CCM search exhibit ‘LMK-2’ of Affidavit In Support [AIS] 1st Plaintiff enclosure 2). Both the affidavits deposed the events that transpired giving rise to the complaint by the Plaintiff of conduct by the Defendants (the family of Kang) in relation to the 7th Defendant, said to be in a manner oppressive. [4] According to the affidavits of the 1st and 2nd Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is the leading taskmaster of the Kang family and married to the 2nd Defendant. This is based, as found by this Court, the presence of the 1st Defendant’s name in all the correspondences via e-mail and the resolutions of the 7th Defendant. The 3rd and 4th Defendant are the children of the 1st and 2nd. The 7th Defendant (WBS) was set up in 2009 by 3 sets of integral parties being: a) Kang family members; b) Merge Jati Engineering Sdn Bhd (MJE) the (1st Plaintiff); c) How Ken Kon@Low Ken Kon (HKK@2nd Plaintiff), this fact not disputed by the Defendants. [5] It is also not disputed that the 7th Defendant’s set up as an investment holding company was on the proposal by Mr. LMK and Ann Kok Seng (AKS) (directors of the 1st Plaintiff), made to the Kang Family Members and the 2nd Plaintiff (HKK), to jointly venture into business opportunity. This came about when a piece of land suitable for oil palm S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 plantation in Indonesia was found by LMK and AKS. With the set up of the 7th Defendant ‘WBS’ on 9.9.2009, it would acquire percentage of stocks in an Indonesian company PT Sandai Makmur Sawit (PT SMS) which will then acquire the said oil palm plantation in Indonesia. [6] The 7th Defendant’s shareholders (see: CCM search exhibit ‘LMK- 2’ AIS 1st Plaintiff enclosure 2) at the time of the establishment of WBS are: a) the 5th Defendant Tongod Oil Palm Sdn Bhd: 48%; b) the 6th Defendant Pinangah Oil Palm Sdn Bhd: 25%; c) the 1st Plaintiff MJE: 12%; and d) the 2nd Plaintiff HKK himself: 15%; with the 5th and 6th Defendant owned by the Kang family as they formed the Directors and shareholders of the said companies (see: CCM search exhibit ‘LMK-3’). The defendants did not dispute this. [7] The complaints raised by the Plaintiffs centered on the act of the Defendants who were said to have come to a management decision by force and abruptly despite putting forth the issues for the Plaintiffs’ opinion, resulting in a loss to the Plaintiffs. This Court agrees as submitted by the Plaintiffs that if true, means breaches of the ‘majority rule’ principle going against the corporate democracy and good governance that would create oppressive conducts upon the minorities. [8] The Plaintiffs complaint of mismanagement by the Kang family members of the large funds collected by a third party in Indonesia to the 7th Defendant involving a sum of 65Rp billion Indonesian, the sum which was said improperly diverted into a Bangkok Bank Account. The tracing of the sum money, say the Plaintiffs shows the movement that paved the S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 way back to the Defendants which then saw a transfer to third parties and simultaneously illegally retaining paid back sums to the Plaintiffs. [9] The Defendant Jason Kang however said all these moves and transactions were not objected to by the Plaintiffs as a WhatsApp group was created by LMK known as ‘SMS Plantation Board’ the members of the WA group are LMK, AKS, Ben Soo Han Keong (Ben Soo) all of MJE, the 1st Defendant, 3rd Defendant, Kang Kok Yong Jason (Jason Kang @4th Defendant) and HKK for the purpose of collaboration with PT SMS. [10] In 2009 WBS acquired 95% of stakes in PT SMS. As local regulatory requirement mandated Indonesian ownership in an Indonesian Company, the remaining 5% of the shareholding in PT SMS had to be owned by an Indonesia entity identified as PT Mega Sawit Abadi (MSA) who hold 5% shareholding in PT SMS. This, from the Plaintiff’s perspective means MSA was holding 5% in PT SMS as a nominee. The Defendants deposed no knowledge of any of the transactions between MJE and PT MSA. [11] As WBS was set up by 3 integral parties being the Kang family members (in relation to the 5th and 6th Defendant), Merge Jati Engineering Sdn Bhd (MJE) and How Ken Kon@Low Ken Kon (HKK@2nd Plaintiff), the Plaintiffs contend that each of the 3 have equal participation in the management of WBS’s business and affairs and this includes full and total control with mutual understanding between all 3 parties over the affairs of the wholly owned Indonesian subsidiary company. This is disputed by the Defendants to the extent that any decisions must be made by the board members of WBS. This, therefore did not materialize in favor of the Plaintiffs. S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [12] The Plaintiffs submitted that the contrary resulted with the Plaintiffs being the minorities are ‘locked-in’ within the 7th Defendant, without any control over the affairs and the very purpose of setting up the 7th Defendant as an investment holding company being realized, by virtue of its sale of 51% shareholding in its previous wholly-subsidiary. This, the Plaintiffs contend would move a buy-out under section 346. [13] The Plaintiffs in support of the contention, annexed documents being the (WBS) 7th Defendant’s Memorandum of Association that states the power of the company to take, buy or acquire shares, stocks, debentures or other securities, with the latest company search with CCM on the name of Directors, proof of capital investment with % of shareholding reflected as follows: a. Kang Family Members: 69.35% b. MJE: 16.40% c. 2nd Plaintiff: 14.25%. [14] In February 2020, Jason Kang (4th Defendant) via e-mail dated 4.2.2020 notified the directors and shareholders of WBS that WBS was at the stage of finalizing a term sheet agreement on a joint venture agreement (JV) for PT SMS with an Indonesia plantation source ‘Mukti Group’ (Mukti) through a company identified as PT Adau Agro Kalbar (PT AAK) (see: exhibit ‘LMK-5’ enclosure 2 for the Indicative Term Sheet). [15] According to the 1st Plaintiff, this act of Jason Kang heading the discussion with Mukti as the representative of WBS was never followed with an authorization from the board nor with any prior discussion held with MJE and HKK. The draft term sheet of the JV was opposed by LMK S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 and HKK as the terms were not in WBS’s favor and queries were raised by LMK and HKK on why the need for participation of PT AAK in PT SMS’s move to obtain a loan, that necessitate PT AAK to purchase a 51% equity stake in PT SMS by procuring the subject company itself that is said by the Plaintiffs to be absurd. This would render the move by PT SMS to procure the loan from BNI and to pledge the assets of PT SMS as collateral for BNI. [16] The Defendant, to the contrary took the stand that shareholders of WBS have long intended to dispose PT SMS or to explore a new source of financial income to PT SMS, having viewed PT SMS as experiencing loss and is affecting WBS as the parent company. The queries suggested by LMK and HKK were responded by Jason Kang via e-mail dated 10.2.2020 and 16.10.2021 stating he was merely acting as an independent accountant and consultant (see: exhibit ‘LMK-7’ and ‘LMK-9’ enclosure 2 and affidavit Jason Kang enclosure 6). The Plaintiffs on the other hand, viewed this as indicative of the dominant position played by Jason Kang (4th Defendant) in the discussion with the Indonesia plantation source ‘Mukti’. [17] It is crucial to present the terms of the draft Term Sheet for the JV with PT AAK, it being the focus that triggered the allegation of oppression on the Plaintiffs. The alternative option was raised by Beng Soo (one of the directors of the 1st Plaintiff) with Jason Kang but was disproved, the extract of the Term Sheet amongst others, as below: “The transaction price is at Rp130 billion for 100% Enterprise Value of SMS said for the purpose of this transaction, the whole S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 amount of Rp130 billion is deemed as shareholder loan from WBR (WBS) to SMS”. [18] With these ‘queries’ brought up and ‘addressed’, the draft Conditional Joint Venture Agreement (CJVA) and the Side Letter of the CJVA were circulated to HKK and LMK on 15.6.2021. On 21.6.2021, the CJVA was executed by WBS, MSA, PT AAK and PT SMS (see: exhibit “LMK-8” of enclosure 2). This moved changes in the shareholding of WBS and PT SMS when in October 2021, the 5% shareholding of MSA in PT SMS was transferred to WBS that sees WBS retaining a 100% shareholding, then simultaneously followed with a dilution of WBS shareholding in PT SMS from 100% to 49% and PT AAK acquired 51% of shareholding through subscription (see: exhibit “LMK-15” letter from counsel for the Defendants dated 19.9.2022 and exhibit “LMK-8” CJVA in enclosure 2). [19] As a result, the primary purpose in setting up WBS to own PT SMS being reduced in term of its shareholding in PT SMS from 100% to 49%, with the take-over of 51% by PT AAK. This, according to the Plaintiffs means that WBS looses its simple-majority and sovereign over PT SMS. The issue arising is did or did not both MJE and HKK execute the necessary documents that sees the 51% take-over by PT AAK and hence been made aware of the outcome? Role of MJE and HKK vs Conduct by the Defendants said in a manner oppressive [20] The Plaintiffs contended that although Jason Kang had provided the MJE and HKK the updates of the negotiations, the Kang Family Members have bulldozed the terms and turned a blind eye to the objections made S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 by both MJE and HKK. This Court found this supported, as can be seen from the exchanged of e-mails between MJE via Ben Soo and HKK with Jason Kang, notifying of their intention to exit WBS as a result of this oppressive conduct (see: exhibits ‘HKK-5’ in enclosure 3, exhibit ‘LMK-5’ in enclosure 2). [21] In the e-mails exhibited as ‘HKK-5’ and ‘LMK-5’, WBS had mooted the concern on the speed the documents pertaining to the JV was handled and executed, including putting across the forecasted outcome that is seen in the JV as disposing the shareholding in WBS and a move to dispose MJE’s shares in WBS. Although contents of e-mail tact, what can be seen in this e-mail is there exist a clear concern by both MJE and HKK that questioned the said terms in the JV and a mark by both MJE and HKK to exit WBS (see: exhibit “LMK-6” of AIS enclosure 2). [22] The conduct of the Defendants against MJE and HKK being the minorities in WBS, said to be ‘in a manner oppressive’ according to the Plaintiffs can be seen in the discreet handling of the funds from the 51% take over by PT AAK into illegal bank account and other account. It is the undisputed fact (Defendant did not refute this fact) that WBS official company bank is with RHB Bank Berhad of a particular account number with 2 signatories of the 3 parties as follows: “To be signed by either one from “Group A” and either one from “Group B” Group A Kang Family Members S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Group B How Ken Kon@ Low Ken Kon (No. K/P: ……) Low Meng Koon (No. K/P: ……)” [23] The Plaintiffs state that the above arrangement is to ensure a check and balance mechanism amongst the 3 parties consistent with the idea when setting up of WBS initially originated. Although this is denied by the Defendants in paragraph 42 of their affidavit in reply enclosure 5, the balanced representative coming from the 3 parties respectively would, to this Court’s finding, surely formed the understanding, then. [24] The Plaintiffs contend that Jason Kang via his e-mail dated 18.1.2022 made a misrepresentation to LMK on the movement of the Rp60 Billion when he states that Rp50 Billion was released from PT SMS to WBS and the remaining Rp10 Billion will be withheld. This goes against what actually transpired when funds from BNI were illegally transferred from BNI Loan, in an illegal Bangkok bank account opened in the name of WBS, which the minorities never had knowledge nor approved. [25] The Defendants impressed on the fact that the Plaintiffs did not oppose this idea as the Plaintiffs instead, were keen to eject out as shareholders of WBS. By contrast, the directors of WBS (acting on the majority decision of the board of directors of WBS as deposed by Jason Kang in enclosure 6) had explored this idea by meeting with the investors introduced by AKS and had opportune the representatives of the Bangkok Bank with a visit to the farms of WBS, knowing no banks would be interested to offer funds to WBS without the involvement of PT AAK in the said JV for the purpose of facilitating a local guarantor in the said funding by the bank. S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [26] The proof to this allegation by the Plaintiffs of refuting knowledge can be found in the Director’s Circular Resolution dated 21.10.2020 and 26.11.2020 (see: “HKK-15” enclosure 7 of 2nd Plaintiff’s ‘AIR’) for the opening of the account with Public Bank Berhad and Bangkok Bank Berhad respectively, and absence of the Plaintiffs’ signature on the said resolutions to support the contention of no knowledge on their part. [27] It is not disputed that this DCR was never circulated to the Plaintiffs and therefore the Audited Financial Statement for the financial year ending 30.6.2021 relied upon by the Defendants to have been approved by the Plaintiffs on 30.12.2021 as exhibited in enclosure 6 “KKY-6” (it should read “KKY-4”) appears to miss the ‘Independent Auditors Report’ reflected as pages 31-34. The AFS that was circulated and exhibited missed this very important information. [28] The totality of what had transpired with the intention to exit by the Plaintiffs, moved the Plaintiffs to execute the legal documentation for the 51% Take-Over by PT AKK. This, the Court views it as a logical and rational explanation as to why the Plaintiffs made the said move to executing the said documents which the Defendants regarded it as an inference of an act of endorsement towards agreeing to those transaction. Whether a case of Oppression proven and Court’s finding [29] Based on the facts above, the findings made by this Court are as follows: i. The delegation of the tasks to Jason Kang to negotiate and discuss on behalf of the 7th Defendant without any resolution by the 7th Defendant being shown; S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 ii. The straightforward view taken by the Defendants on the queries raised by the Plaintiffs pertaining to the draft conditional JV agreement without full and further engagement with the Plaintiffs, demonstrates the stand by the Defendants of ‘majority rule’ going against the Plaintiffs strong believe that WBS ought to be in full control heading future; iii. The application of the majority rule principle as against the minority in the 7th Defendant that goes against the purpose of setting up the 7th Defendant; iv. There was evidence to support absence of knowledge on the part of the Plaintiffs on the opening of accounts with the Public Bank Berhad and Bangkok Bank Berhad for want of affirmation of the DCR by the Plaintiffs; v. The transfer of the funds from BNI to PT SMS then diverted, amongst others to KJSCSB of the Defendants before finding its way back to PT SMS account, a fact not disputed by the Defendants save it was said to be a repayment of loan from WBS to KJSCSB (see: para 46 AIS Plaintiff HKK enclosure 3 and para 45 AIR Defendant Jason Kang enclosure 6) but yet, absence of such notice to the Plaintiffs. The principles in a section 346 of the Act [30] With these facts extracted above, it is next crucial to lay down the principles found in the case authorities pertaining to section 346 (or formerly section 181) of the Act. In Pan-Pacific Construction Holdings Sdn Bhd v Ngiu-Kee Corp (M) Bhd & Anor [2010] MLJU 269; [2010] 6 CLJ 721, Richard Malanjum CJSS (later CJ) held that exercise of powers of the directors in an oppressive manner, with disregard of its interests qualifies as a case under section 181 when he said as follows: S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 “[25] Therefore, in order to succeed in its petition pursuant to s 181 the petitioner has to establish and ‘must eminently be determined according to the facts’ of this case that the affairs of the company are being conducted or that the powers of the directors are being exercised in an oppressive manner or in disregard of its interests, or to its prejudice some unfairly discriminatory or prejudicial act of the company has been done or threatened, or that some resolutions of the members, debenture holders or any class of them has been passed or is proposed to be passed. [26] In other words s 181 permits judicial remedy on four categories of conduct, namely, oppressive conduct, conduct in disregard of interests, unfairly discriminatory conduct or prejudicial conduct. [27] It may also be noted that from the wordings of s 181 its basic theme is ‘unfairness’. However, unfairness ‘does not mean that the court can do whatever the individual judge happens to think fair. The concept of fairness must be applied judicially and the content which it is given by the courts must be based upon rational principles. ‘The court … has a very wide discretion, but it does no sit under a palm tree’ (see: O’Neil v Philips [1999] 2 All ER 961)”. [31] V C George J (later JCA) in Chan Choon Ming v Low Poh Choon & Ors [1994] MLJU 351; [1995] 1 CLJ 812 on the power to act of a Director and Board as collective said as follows: “Article 90 which is one of the articles under the general heading ‘Proceedings of Directors’, has to be read in the context of the principle that the powers conferred upon directors are conferred on them collectively as a board. In that context, it is inconceivable that S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 notice of an intended resolution of the directors need not be given to every member of the board. If upon the majority signing such a resolution it is not necessary to pass it on to the others who are present in the country there could be a situation of a company being managed, not by the board, but by a clique, no doubt consisting of the majority of the board, using article 90 type of resolutions and leaving the minority completely in the dark as to what is happening in and to the company. It cannot then be said that the business of the company is managed by the directors (as provided by article 73). In Pulbrook v Richmond Consolidated Mining company [1878] 9 Ch D 610, 612, what Jessel MR, said, in dealing with the case of a director who was improperly and without cause excluded from meetings of the board, is I think applicable to a director kept in the dark in respect of an article 90 resolution. He said: He has been excluded. Now, it appears to me that this is an individual wrong, or a wrong that has been done to an individual. It is a deprivation of his legal rights for which the directors are personally and individually liable. He has a right by the constitution of the company to take a part in its management, to be present, and to vote at the meetings of the board of directors. He has a perfect right to know what is going on at these meetings. It may affect his individual interest as a shareholder as well as his liability as a director, because it has been sometimes held that even a director who does not attend board meetings is bound to know what is done in his absence. S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 In my judgment to make article 73 meaningful and to give effect to the collective responsibility of the board, although all that is required for an effective Art 90 resolution is that it be signed by the majority, it must be taken as implied that every member of the board has to have the resolution circulated to him or her before it can be accepted as a directors’ resolution. Which is why in board room parlance, an article 90 type of resolution is usually referred to as a circular resolution. Each of the said resolutions, notice of which was not given to the plaintiff, is, in my judgment, ineffective”. [32] In Gua See Sew & Ors v Heng Tang Hai & Ors [2020] MLJU 46, it was held that management operations of the company and specifically so the opening of bank account without the knowledge of the minority fits into act of oppression under section 346 when it says as follows: “... under s.346 for oppression has been made out when there w[h]ere changes of critical management operations within the company such as change of company secretary and change of bank signatories by the oppressors without the knowledge of the minority”: [67] Even before the filing of the OS 168, the 1st. and 2nd. Defendants have carried out a series of acts to completely exclude the Plaintiffs from the management of the company. These include: The 1st and 2nd Defendants surreptitiously caused the company secretary (Law Cheok Yin) to resign on 12.3.2019 and appointed a new company secretary on the same date. This change was done without the Plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent. As a result, the former company secretary was S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 unable to provide any documents to the Plaintiffs as the books and records have been handed over to the new company secretary. … The 1st and 2nd Defendants surreptitiously instructed Alliance Bank to remove the Plaintiffs as authorized signatories for G&P Structures’ Alliance Account. The Plaintiffs were never informed of the change. The Plaintiffs wrote to the Defendants and the bank on 18.4.2019 to protest about the change of signatories. On 19.4.2019, the 1st and 2nd Defendants caused a legal firm i.e. Messrs Gan, Lee & Tan, to write on behalf of G&P Structures to respond to the Plaintiffs’ letter stating that the change of bank signatories was made pursuant to a board of directors’ resolution. The Plaintiffs were not made aware of such board of directors’ resolution. [Emphasis added.] [68] The aforesaid conduct by the 1st. and 2nd. Defendants are clearly a breach of the Plaintiffs’ legitimate expectation that they have the right to participate in the management of the company and in disregard of the Plaintiffs’ interests as the beneficial owners of the shares. Given that throughout the years, the 1st and 2nd Defendants have always recognized and acknowledged the Plaintiffs’ rights and interest under the Company Policy and the Shareholders’ Agreement in relation to the affairs of G&P Structures, the conduct is oppressive and come within the section 346(1) of the CA 2016”. [33] A pertinent case on point quoted by the Plaintiffs is the case of Lim Kah Keng v Teng Taim Sing & Ors [2021] MLJU 1903 where it was held S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 that the exclusion of minorities from management without an exit offer is a clear oppression when quoted the following with approval: “[48] In Tob Chee Hoong v Tob Chee Choong & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 1256, Mohd Nazlan Mohd Ghazali J held that exclusion from management without an exit offer is clear oppression: “[105] Even if my assessment on the plaintiff having successfully proven oppression is less than accurate, I would additionally rely on that House of Lords decision of O’Neill v. Phillips which is also an authority for the proposition that any such exclusion from management would still not be construed as being unfairly prejudicial if the majority make a fair and reasonable offer to buy out the minority. This makes much practical sense for where relationship of trust and confidence has broken down, and where oppressive and prejudicial conduct is apparent, there may not necessarily be oppression in the sense stated in the statute book if a genuine, fair and reasonable buy-out offer is made to the complainant who would probably welcome the exit option. [106] However, there is no hint of any offer in this case made by either the first, second or third defendant. This manifestly is oppressive, when taken together with the entire series of conduct and decisions taken by them in sidelining the plaintiff in the fourth defendant and their removal of the plaintiff from the management of Orchard Circle. The plaintiff was clearly made to feel unwelcome in the fourth defendant as a director and shareholder. Yet the defendants steadfastly refused to permit any buy-out of the plaintiff’s stake in order to facilitate the plaintiff exiting the group. The plaintiff is S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 thus caught in a most unenviable position. Internally he has to put up with challenges brought about by the defendants, especially his nephews. But his attempt to get them buy his shares, as he pleaded in his originating summons went wholly unheeded.” [49] Further in the case of Rahya Trading Sdn Bhd v Tong Khin Company Sdn Bhd & Anor [2014] 5 CLJ 726, the decision of the Plaintiff in wanting to leave the company was held to be reasonable and fair as the company itself was no longer involved in any business. It was held that to require the Plaintiff to remain as shareholder to venture into other businesses, which are still undecided is not the bargain the Plaintiff entered into with the company. It was further stated in that case that the rejection by the company is evidence of oppression on the part of the company against the Plaintiff as it is fully aware that it was not engaging in any business at that point of time but yet it refused the reasonable proposal by the Plaintiff to sell its shares”. [34] Based on all these authorities applied to the facts as summarized and found by this Court in paragraph 29 above, the conclusion by this Court is a case of oppression proven with the Plaintiffs being the minority shareholder ‘locked-in’ the 7th Defendant and allowed all reliefs including on a buy-out and Plaintiffs permitted an exit out of the 7th Defendant as sought in paragraph 1 of this judgment, with the exception of relief (c). Relief (c) is excluded on the basis that the declaration if allowed will be in breach of the ‘Audi alteram partem’ principle ‘the right to be heard’ as except the Defendants, no representative from PT Adau Agro Kalbar was present before the Court to argue otherwise. The Plaintiffs despite arguing S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 that section 346 confers the Court with wide power, candidly did not push for this relief. [35] As to the alternative prayer in (i) to other reliefs in (e), (f), (g) and (h) pleaded by the Plaintiffs to declare the 7th Defendant be wound up which was granted by this Court, there is no confusion as alleged by the Defendants as to which relief takes priority as firstly relief (i) is a relief sought by the Plaintiffs as a last resort only if there is failure on the part of the Defendants to comply and satisfy with the order granted in relief (e) to (h). Secondly, for an application to wound up the 7th Defendant by this Court, it must be followed with the necessary procedure under the Companies Act and Winding-Up Rules. It is not merely a relief to make a declaration for the 7th Defendant to be pronounced and declared ‘wound up’. [36] Furthermore, relief (i) is only triggered subject to certain primary actions in relief (e) to (h) on the buy-out requirement that must be complied with by parties and subject to the willingness on the part of the Defendants to follow through with the said order, before it can be said relief (i) comes to life and be invoked. This is further demonstrated in the affidavits by the Plaintiffs stressing on all the reliefs as in (e) to (h). For these reasons, with the exception of relief (c), all the reliefs sought are allowed. Signed (NURULHUDA NUR’AINI BINTI MOHAMAD NOR) Judge High Court of Malaya Johor Bahru Dated: 22nd January 2024 S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 COUNSEL For the Plaintiffs: Ryan Chu Soon Wei Lau Zhong Yan (Samantha Au Yong Chi Yan Yap Rui Xuen (PDK) bersamanya) Messrs. Tuang, Chu & Co Advocates & Solicitors A-G-23A, Menara Prima Jalan PJU 1/39, Dataran Prima 74301 Petaling Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan For the Respondents: Yap Chee Kai (Tania Pillai a/p Velasamy bersamanya) Messrs. Lee & Tengku Azrina Advocates & Solicitors Unit 13-01, Level 13, Menara Landmar 12 Jln Ngee Heng 80000 Johor Bahru S/N i3Sr/9lTf0iNEF36bNHeHQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCvC-457-11/2020

PLAINTIF SITI MARYAM BINTI BUSRI DEFENDAN SITI AISAH BINTI LANI

Temporary occupation licence to occupy State Land (TOL), "gantiusaha" of TOL land; sections 65 and 68 of National Land Code 1965; Agreed Facts need not be proved during trial; section 58 of Evidence Act 1950; time does not run against equitable owner of land; section 9 of Limitation Act 1953; alienation of TOL land; equitable owner of alienated land.

23/01/2024

YA Dato' Faizah Binti Jamaludin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b15ff6a3-abe5-4563-a9f7-923bded5f5dc&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA WRIT SAMAN NO. BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 ANTARA SITI MARYAM BINTI BUSRI (NO. K/P: 621123-10-7206) PLAINTIF DAN SITI ASIAH BINTI LANI (NO. K/P: 590803-10-5678) DEFENDAN JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendant in respect of a piece of alienated land held under title H.S.(M) 12944 PT 44569, Kampung Sungai Plong, Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor (“the Alienated Land”). The Alienated Land was previously State Land located at Batu 16, Sungai Plong, Sungai Buloh, Selangor (the “TOL Land”). The TOL Land was alienated by the State Authority in 2002. [2] The plaintiff seeks a declaratory order from this Court that she is the beneficial owner of the Alienated Land. She also seeks consequential orders for the Deputy Registrar of this Court to execute the memorandum of transfer of the Alienated Land from the defendant to the plaintiff and for the Pendaftar Hakmilik Daerah Petaling, Selangor to register the transfer of the Alienated Land after payment of the requisite stamp duty and registration of transfer fees. [3] The defendant was the holder of a licence to temporarily occupy the TOL Land and is the registered owner of the Alienated Land. She, in turn, 23/01/2024 13:40:16 BA-22NCvC-457-11/2020 Kand. 94 S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 2 counterclaims against the plaintiff for orders that the plaintiff demolish the house that the plaintiff had built on the land in 1995 within 30 days from the date of judgment; that the plaintiff return the issue document of title for the Alienated Land, and that the private caveat lodged by the plaintiff on the Alienated Land be removed. The defendant counterclaims, in the alternative, for damages to be assessed by this Court for the rental payable by the plaintiff for her occupation of the TOL Land, and later the Alienated Land, to be calculated from 1995 to the date of judgment. [4] After full trial, I gave judgment for the plaintiff and made the orders sought for by the plaintiff. I dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim. [5] The full reasons for my decision are set out in this judgment. Key Background Facts [6] The plaintiff is the defendant’s sister-in-law: the defendant is married to the plaintiff’s brother. [7] In 1987, the State Authority permitted the defendant temporary occupation of the TOL Land from April 1987 to 31.12.1987 through a Temporary Occupation Licence (Lesen Menduduki Sementara) No. A 906038 dated 08.04.1987 (the “TOL Licence”). The defendant had renewed the TOL Licence annually until its alienation in 2002. [8] In 1995, at the plaintiff’s request, the defendant allowed the plaintiff and her family to occupy and build a house on the TOL Land for payment of the sum of RM12,000.00 from the plaintiff to the defendant. In 2002, the State Authority alienated the TOL Land. Upon issuance of a Form 5F (Notice to take out issue document of title) dated 22.07.2003 by the State Authority, the plaintiff gave the defendant the sum of RM14,490.00 for S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 3 payment of the premium due to the State Authority for the issuance of the issue document of title of the land. [9] The plaintiff and her family have lived in the house that they built on the TOL Land, which was later alienated to the Alienated Land, from 1995 until 2019. In 2019, the plaintiff and her husband moved to live with their daughter in Bangi after the plaintiff’s husband was diagnosed with cancer. He succumbed to the disease in 2020. Now that her husband has passed away, the plaintiff wants to sell the house that she had built on the Alienated Land together with the land but is unable to do so because the land has not been transferred to her. [10] The defendant had allowed the plaintiff and her family to live in the home that the plaintiff built on the land without hindrance since 1995. She had not asked the plaintiff for the payment of any rental. It was only after the plaintiff filed this instant suit, did the defendant counterclaim against the plaintiff for, among others, the demolition of the plaintiff’s house on the land or in the alternative, the payment of rental from 1995 to the date of judgment. [11] It is an agreed fact that the plaintiff had paid the quit rent for the Alienated Land since its alienation to date, and that she had paid the assessment for the land every year, save for a few years where the defendant paid the assessment. [12] The plaintiff contends that since the issuance of the title of the Alienated Land, the plaintiff had on numerous occasions asked the defendant to transfer the Alienated Land to the plaintiff’s name. However, the defendant has refused and continues to refuse to do so to date. Hence, this present suit by the plaintiff against the defendant. S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 4 Issues for determination [13] One of the matters raised during the trial was the two statutory declarations affirmed by the defendant’s husband (“DW4”). The first statutory declaration is dated 29.08.2011 (marked as “P3”) and the second statutory declaration is dated 14.05.2020 (marked as “P1”). In P1, DW4 affirmed that the defendant had “menyerahusaha” the TOL Land to the plaintiff for a consideration in the sum of RM12,000.00. He said that the plaintiff and her late husband had given the defendant the sum of RM14.851.00 being RM14,490.00 for payment of the premium, RM270.00 for the survey and marking of boundary fee and RM91.00 for the quit rent for purposes of the alienation of the TOL Land. He had also confirmed the payment of the RM12,000.00 and the RM14,851.00 in an earlier statutory declaration that he had affirmed on 29.08.2011 (“P3”). [14] DW4 admitted that he had signed both statutory declarations voluntarily. However, he said that he was deceived by the plaintiff to sign the statutory declaration (marked as “P1”). As regards the statutory declaration marked as “P3”, DW4 claimed that he did not read the contents of the document before signing it. Under cross-examination, DW4 said he was angry that it was stated the statutory declaration marked as “P1” that it would be used to support the plaintiff’s suit in Court. It is noted that DW4 did not say he was angry because the contents of the statutory declarations were untrue. [15] Although DW4 confirmed that he had affirmed both statutory declarations, these declarations are not necessary to support the fact that the defendant had received the RM12,000.00 and the RM14,490.00 premium from the plaintiff. This is because both these facts form part of S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 5 the Fakta-Fakta Yang Dipersetujui (Agreed Facts) filed by the parties before the trial. The fact that the RM14,490.00 premium for the issue document of title of the land was paid using the Plaintiff’s and her husband’s monies also formed part of the Agreed Facts. [16] Under section 58 of the Evidence Act 1950, facts admitted by the parties before the hearing need not be proved in any proceeding. Section 58 reads: 58. Facts admitted need not be proved (1) No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or which before the hearing they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions. (2) This section has no application to criminal proceedings. [17] Accordingly, because the facts have been agreed by the parties in the Agreed Facts filed before the trial, it is not necessary for this Court to rely on DW4’s statutory declarations to determine whether or not, the defendant had received the RM12,000.00 and the RM14,490.00 from the plaintiff. [18] Whether or not the defendant received both sums from the plaintiff is also not an issue to be determined by this Court since parties have agreed it. Instead, the issue is what the nature and purpose of the said payments by the plaintiff to the defendant were. S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 6 [19] The issues for determination are: (i) what were the nature and purpose of the payments of the sums of RM12,000.00 and RM14,490.00 by the plaintiff to the defendant? (ii) is the plaintiff the beneficial owner of the Alienated Land? (iii) is the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant time-barred? and (iv) whether the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is void for illegality of contract? Issue (i): What were the nature of the payments of the sums of RM12,000.00 and RM14,490.00 by the plaintiff to the defendant? [20] The plaintiff’s case is that she had paid the sum of RM12,000.00 to the defendant to “ganti usaha” the TOL Land, and that the understanding reached between her and the defendant was that when the State Authority approves the alienation of the TOL Land, she will pay the premium and other sums due to the State Authority in respect of the TOL Land and the defendant will transfer the Alienated Land to her upon the issuance of the title for the land. As stated above, it is an agreed fact that the plaintiff had paid the defendant the sum of RM12,000 and the sum of RM14,490.00 for the premium for the issuance of the issue document of title for the land. [21] The defendant agreed that she had permitted the plaintiff to build a house on the TOL Land. She also admitted that she had received the sums of RM12,000.00 and RM14,490.00 from the plaintiff and used the RM14,490.00 to pay the premium. However, the defendant claims that she had only permitted the plaintiff to build a small house and not a big house and that the RM12,000.00 was a saguhati (gift) from the plaintiff to her. As S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 7 for the RM14,490.00, which she admitted having received from the plaintiff, the defendant pleads in her defence that that sum was an assistance (bantuan) offered and given voluntarily by the plaintiff to the defendant as a “thank you” for allowing the plaintiff to build a small house on the TOL Land and to stay on the TOL Land without being charged any payment or monthly rental. However, in her witness statement, the defendant said the RM14,490.00 was an advance (pendahuluan). [22] There is a touch of the unbelievable in the defendant’s claim that the RM12,000.00 was a gift from the plaintiff to the defendant for allowing the plaintiff to build a house on the TOL land and to occupy the said land with her family. The fee for the TOL licence is RM200.00 per year. Also, Encik Zaidi bin Awang (“DW-3”), a tenant who had rented a wooden house on the TOL Land from the defendant from 1993 to January 1995, testified that the rental per month was RM150.00. He said he paid the rental monthly in cash, and that he delivered the cash to the defendant personally. [23] The sum of RM12,000.00 is equivalent to 60 years of the TOL licence fee and 80 months of rental. It does not make any financial sense for the plaintiff to pay the defendant 80 months (or 6 years and 8 months) of rental in advance as a “gift” for being allowed to build a small house and live on the land. This is especially true since, according to the defendant she only allowed the plaintiff to stay on the land for a short while only (“untuk sementara waktu sahaja” — see the defendant’s answer QA22 in her witness statement). [24] As for the sum of RM14,490.00 the defendant received from the plaintiff for the payment of the premium — which version of the defendant’s claim is true? Is it her pleading that the plaintiff had offered S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 8 and given her the sum of RM14,490.00 as an assistance (bantuan) to assist the defendant with the payment of the premium for the alienation of the TOL Land as a thank you to the defendant for allowing her to build a house and stay on the land? Or is it the defendant’s statement in her witness statement that the RM14,490.00 was an advance (pendahuluan) from the plaintiff? [25] The sum of RM14,490.00 is a relatively large sum of money. Together with the RM12,000.00 that the plaintiff had given the defendant in 1995, the fees for the survey and measurement of boundary (RM270.00) and the quit rent (RM91.00) which had to be paid together with the premium to the Selangor State Authority for the issuance of the title, the total sum that was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant in relation to the TOL Land was RM26,851.00. [26] It beggar belief that the plaintiff would have paid the defendant the total sum of RM26,851.00 as a thank you for being allowed to build a house and stay on the TOL Land. Also, if indeed the sum of RM14,490.00 received by the defendant from the plaintiff in 2002 was an “advance”, why has the defendant not repaid the sum to the plaintiff? [27] The defendant was a defensive and evasive witness. From her demeanour and conduct in during the trial, I found her not to have told the truth as to the real reason she had received the RM12,000.00 and the RM14,490.00 from the plaintiff in respect of the TOL Land. When asked during cross-examination if the RM14,490.00 was indeed an advance, why had she not paid the monies back to the plaintiff, the defendant said that because she and the plaintiff had a falling out over the land and were S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 9 no longer talking to each other, she was not able to pay the plaintiff the RM14,490.00. [28] To my mind the defendant’s answer to why she still has not repaid the plaintiff the RM14,490.00, if indeed the sum was an advance, is incredulous. Even if she was no longer talking to the plaintiff, she could have transferred the payment directly to the plaintiff’s bank account or paid the monies to her through cash, cheque or banker’s draft — she did not need to talk to the plaintiff to pay back the “advance”. [29] Alternatively, if the RM14,490.00 was indeed an “assistance” from the plaintiff to the defendant for payment of the land alienation premium, it does not make any financial sense for a tenant/occupier of a TOL Land to give the TOL licence holder the whole sum of the premium payable together with the survey fees and quit rent for the issuance of the title following the alienation of the land. What was it in for the plaintiff to pay such sums? It is highly improbable that the plaintiff would have given the defendant such a large sum of money — more than 8 years of rental at the rate of RM150 per month. It surely cannot be out of the goodness of her heart. In my view, the only plausible explanation is that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant to gantiusaha the TOL Land, and that the defendant would transfer the land to her upon its alienation. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the plaintiff had continued to stay on the land since 1995 without any hindrance from the plaintiff. And by the fact that the plaintiff has paid the quit rent since its alienation to date. S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 10 [30] It was telling that under cross-examination, the defendant said she would sell the land to the plaintiff but at the current market value and not for the RM12,000.00 that she had paid the defendant in 1995. [31] Accordingly, based on these facts and the testimonies of the witnesses, I find that the plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that the nature and purpose of the sum of RM12,000.00 and the RM14,490.00 that she had paid to the defendant was pursuant to an agreement between reached between them that the plaintiff gantiusaha the TOL land and that the defendant would transfer the land to the plaintiff when it is alienated by the State Authority. Issue (ii): Is the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant time-barred? [32] Learned counsel for the defendant submits that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is time-barred because the plaintiff had paid the sum of RM12,000.00 to the defendant in 1995 and she only filed this suit against the defendant in 2020. She cites section 9 of the Limitation Act 1953 (Act 254), which states: 9. Limitations of actions to recover land (1) No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him, or if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person. (2) Nothing in this section or in subsection 11(2) of this Act shall be deemed to affect the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359], or the National Land Code (Penang and Malacca Titles) Act 1963 [Act 518], or to apply- (a) to the Ruler of any State, in respect of State land or land reserved for a public purpose situate in such State; or (b) to any person registered under or by virtue of the National Land Code 1965 [Act 56 of 1965], or the National Land Code (Penang and Malacca Titles) Act 1963, as the proprietor of the land sought to be recovered, or S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 11 to any person claiming through a person so registered, except to the extent that such Code or Act so provides or permits. [2] In Munah v Fatimah [1968] 1 MLJ 54, [1967] CLJU 108, the plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the defendant and her brother, who were beneficiaries of the estate of their late father, Hamat, to purchase a piece of padi land, which was registered in Hamat’s name. The plaintiff went into occupation of the said land and cultivated it with padi, and enjoyed possession and profit from the land without hindrance from the defendants for 19 years. She had also paid the annual quit rents for the land. She brought the action against the defendant, as administratrix of Hamat’s estate, for the land to be transferred and registered in her name after years of asking the beneficiaries to take out letters of administration in respect of Hamat’s estate so that they could transfer the land to her. [3] In dealing with the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s claim was statute barred, Raja Azlan Shah J (as HRH was then), citing his earlier judgment in Kersah La’uisn v. Sikin Menan [1966] 2 MLJ 20; [1964] CLJU 57, held that as from the time the plaintiff went into occupation of the land, she was the equitable owner of the land. Hence, time did not run against the plaintiff as it was not a species of laches which would prevail against the equitable title. [4] In Kersah, his lordship relied on the English case of Williams v. Greatrex [1957] 1 WLR 31, where Denning L.J.: … once the purchaser went into possession of the land, having the contractual right to be there, he not only had an equity to be there, but also the benefit of a contract to sell him these two plots. That was not only an equity: it was an equitable interest in the land. He was in a sense the equitable owner of the land. So long as he was in possession of the land, he does not lose his rights simply by not proceeding at once for specific performance. S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 12 [5] The principle in Munah v Fatimah and Kersah that time did not run against the equitable owner of a land was adopted by the Federal Court in Othman & Anor v Mek [1972] 2 MLJ 158; [1972] CLJU 103 and in Tengku Mariah Binte Sultan Sulaiman v Halmah Binte Abdullah [1980] 2 MLJ 234; [1979] CLJU 114. [6] In Tengku Mariah, the respondent brought an action for an order that the appellant execute a transfer of the title of a piece of land which the respondent claimed had been sold to her. The appellant's defence was that the action was time-barred as it was commenced more than twelve years after the title was registered in the appellant's name. The Federal Court held (as reported in the headnotes of the MLJ law report): (1) as the facts showed that the respondent was in possession of the land and had built two or three houses on it, she was the equitable owner of the land and so long as she was in possession of the land she did not lose her rights simply by not proceeding at once for specific performance [7] Syed Othman FJ delivering the judgment of the Federal Court in Tengku Mariah said at pg. 235 of the MLJ law report: In our view the respondent's action is not affected by limitation by reason of her having been in possession of the land from the time of purchase, and the present case fits squarely with the principle laid down by Raja Azlan Shah J. (as he then was) in Munah v Fatimah [1968] 1 MLJ 54 55 ……….. [Emphasis added] [8] Similarly, in this instant suit, the plaintiff, relying on the agreement between her and the defendant, went into occupation of the land, built a house on the land and lived with her family in the house since 1995. She has been in possession of the land since 1995, and the issue document of title of the Alienated Land since the title was issued without any hindrance from the defendant. She also paid the premium for the S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 13 alienation of the land and the annual quit rents for the Alienated Land since its alienation to date. [9] By reason of her continued occupation of the land since 1995, from the time it was a TOL Land until it was alienated by the State Authority, the plaintiff is the equitable owner of the Alienated Land. Accordingly, her action is not affected by limitation and is not statute barred: see Williams v Greatrex; Kersah La'uisn Sikin Menan and Munah v Fatimah, Othman & Anor v Mek and Tengku Mariah Binte Sultan Sulaiman v Halmah Binte Abdullah (supra). [10] Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is not statute-barred. Issue (iii): whether the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is void for illegality of contract? [11] Section 65 of the NLC empowers the State Authority to permit the temporary occupation under licence of State Land, mining land and reserved land. Section 68 of the NLC states that a temporary occupation licence except as otherwise prescribed, shall not be capable of assignment. Section 68 of the NLC states: 68. Except so far as it is otherwise prescribed, a temporary occupation licence shall not be capable of assignment; and every such licence shall, except as provided in section 416, terminate on the death of the person, or dissolution of the body, for the time being entitled to the benefit thereof. [12] Salleh Abas CJ (Malaya) (as he then was) in Paruvathy d/o Murugiah v Krishnan s/o Doraisamy [1983] 2 MLJ 121; [1983] CLJU 19, FC (“Paruvathy Murugiah”) explained the principle behind section 68 of the NLC as follows: S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 14 It is obvious from this section that a TOL, being a licence only confers a personal right to the licence holder. This right comes to an end when the holder in the case of a natural person dies or in the case of a company or a firm or other bodies is dissolved. Being a personal right, the legal relationship thereby created is only between the licensor and the licensee. The licence is therefore non-transferable or incapable of assignment at the option of the licensee. It is not a right in rem which its holder can deal with as he or it pleases to the detriment of the issuing authority. Thus any assignment or arrangement purporting to transfer or assign the whole or any part of the licensed land will be of no effect and such assignment or arrangement will be illegal under section 24 of the Contracts Act (see Heng Cheng v Krishnan [1955] MLJ 103 and Murugesan v Krishnasamy & Anor [1958] MLJ 92.) [13] The respondent in Paruvathy Murugiah claimed that he had a right to stay on the land because he had built a house on the land and because the document (marked as “D8” during the trial) purported to partially transfer the appellant’s rights or interest in the land to the respondent. [14] In that case, the appeal at the Federal Court rested on the issue of whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel can be invoked against the holder of a temporary occupation licence. The Federal Court held that the principle of equitable estoppel applied against a TOL licence holder. However, it found that on the facts of the case, namely that the document (D8) was fraudulent and contravened section 68 of the NLC and the house built on the land by the respondent was built using the appellant’s money, the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply against the appellant. [15] Learned counsel for the defendant submits that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for the gantiusaha of the TOL Land is invalid and void for illegality because there is no term “gantiusaha” for TOL lands under the NLC, and because the assignment of the TOL licence is prohibited under section 68 of the NLC. S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 15 [16] I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that section 68 of the NLC prohibits the assignment of a TOL licence. However, I am puzzled by her submission that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant is void for illegality by reason of section 68 of the NLC. The plaintiff did not plead that the defendant had assigned the TOL licence to her. It is not the plaintiff’s case that there was an assignment of the TOL licence from the defendant to her. The plaintiff’s case is that there was an oral agreement between her and the defendant that she would “gantiusaha” the TOL Land in consideration of payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the sum of RM12,000.00 and the premium for the alienation of the TOL Land, and that the defendant would transfer the Alienated Land to her when the TOL land is alienated by the State Authority. [17] What does “gantiusaha” mean? I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that the word “gantiusaha” is not defined in the NLC. However, I find it difficult to follow the logic of her argument that because the word “gantiusaha” is not defined in the NLC, the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for the plaintiff to “gantiusaha” the TOL Land, and when the land is alienated, for the defendant to transfer the Alienated Land to the plaintiff, is void under section 68 of the NLC. [18] To support learned counsel for the defendant’s argument that an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for the plaintiff to “gantiusaha” the TOL Land is void for illegality, the defendant must prove that an agreement to “gantiusaha” of the TOL Land means it is an agreement to assign the TOL licence by the defendant to the plaintiff. [19] However, learned counsel for the defendant did not submit that the word “gantiusaha” means the assignment of the TOL licence by the S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 16 defendant to the plaintiff. Neither did the defendant plead or adduce any evidence during the trial that the term “gantiusaha” means “assignment of the TOL licence”. [20] More importantly, the defendant did not plead or adduce any evidence that she had assigned the TOL licence to the plaintiff. In fact, the defendant’s own case is that the defendant continues to hold the TOL licence for the land and that she had paid the fees for the renewal of the TOL licence every year until the land was alienated. [21] It follows, therefore, that since the defendant failed to prove that the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was for the assignment of the TOL licence by the defendant to the plaintiff, the agreement is not void for illegality. [22] For these reasons, I find that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant does not breach section 68 of the NLC. Accordingly, the agreement is not void for illegality. Issue (iv): Is the plaintiff the beneficial owner of the Alienated Land? [23] Based on the principle of law in Williams v Greatrex; Kersah La'uisn Sikin Menan and Munah v Fatimah, Othman & Anor v Mek and Tengku Mariah Binte Sultan Sulaiman v Halmah Binte Abdullah (supra), by reason of the fact that the plaintiff had built the house on the TOL Land at her own cost and has continued to occupy the house and the land since 1995 without hindrance from the defendant, paid the premium for the issuance of document of title for the Alienated Land, paid the annual quit rent since the alienation of land to date, this Court finds that the plaintiff is the equitable owner of the Alienated Land. S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 17 Decision [24] Accordingly, for the reasons above, this Court gives judgment to the plaintiff. [25] It is declared that the plaintiff is the beneficial owner of the Alienated Land. [26] It is ordered that the Deputy Registrar of the High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam be empowered to execute the memorandum of transfer to transfer the ownership of the Alienated Land to the plaintiff. [27] It is ordered that the Pendaftar Hakmilik Daerah Petaling, Selangor, register the transfer of the Alienated Land to the plaintiff after payment of the requisite stamp duty and registration of transfer fees. [28] The defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed. [29] Costs of RM15,000.00 to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, subject to the allocatur fee. Dated: January 23, 2024 (FAIZAH JAMALUDIN) Judge High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA-22NCVC-457-11/2020 JUDGMENT Siti Maryam Busri v Siti Aisah Lani 18 COUNSELS: For the Plaintiff: Idris bin Md Isa Messrs Idris & Partners 2(1F), Jalan BRP 7/2A, Bukir Rahman Putra, 47000 Sungai Buloh, Selangor For the Defendant: Maknawiah binti Muslim (Nor Shafizah Sahaat with her) Messrs Maknawiah Raziah & Partners No. 7, 1st Floor, Lorong Pengkalan Machang 1, Taman Pengkalan Machang, 13800, Sungai Dua, Butterworth, Pulau Pinang S/N o/ZfseWrY0Wp95I73tX13A **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

CB-15-6-02/2023

PERAYU TAN TIAN MENG RESPONDEN Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Bentong

Rujukan tanah - kadar pampasan hartanah, kesan mudarat dan pisah pisah tidak memadai - Pentadbir Tanah Bentong gagal menimbangkan pampasan berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang - Penelitian kepada dokumen-dokumen dan laporan penilaian didapati perintah Pentadbir Tanah Bentong adalah teratur - Pampasan, kesan mudarat dan pecah pisah dikekalkan.

22/01/2024

YA Tuan Roslan bin Mat Nor

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=49334c02-52f9-43fb-ab09-2213fdc29fb7&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - CB-15-06-02-2023 TAN TIAN MENG v PTD Bentong - edited 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR RUJUKAN TANAH NO: CB-15-6-02/2023 ANTARA TAN TIAN MENG … PEMOHON DAN PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH BENTONG … RESPONDEN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rujukan tanah yang berkaitan dengan pengambilan tanah untuk Projek Laluan Rel Pantai Timur (East Coast Rel Link – ECRL) bagi Daerah Bentong, Negeri Pahang (Fasa 1 Jajaran Utama). Ia melibatkan lot nombor PT 26167, No. Hakmilik GM 4141, Mukim Bentong, Daerah Bentong, Negeri Pahang. Luas lot ini ialah 1.106 hektar. Jumlah yang diambil adalah sebanyak 0.3242 hektar. Ia adalah tanah pertanian dan syarat nyata dalam hakmilik tersebut adalah hendaklah digunakan untuk tanaman getah sahaja. 22/01/2024 16:10:37 CB-15-6-02/2023 Kand. 23 S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 [2] Pentadbir Tanah telah mengadakan inkuiri pengambilan tanah ini dan telah memutuskan pampasan yang diberikan adalah berkaitan tanah ialah RM389,040.00, kos pecah pisah (severance) adalah RM187,632.00 dan kos kesan mudarat (injurious affection) adalah RM93,816.00. Jumlah keseluruhan pampasan yang diberikan kepada Pemohon adalah RM670,488.00. Selain daripada itu Pentadbir Tanah juga telah mengawardkan kos bicara sebanyak RM400.00. [3] Penelitian kepada nota prosiding di hadapan Pentadbir Tanah adalah didapati bahawa nilai hartanah yang diambil kira dalam menentukan jumlah yang sewajarnya adalah pada kadar RM1,200,000.00 sehektar. Bantahan Pemohon [4] Dalam hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pemohon adalah dinyatakan bahawa perbandingan nilai yang diberikan oleh Pentadbir Tanah adalah tidak wajar. Ini adalah disebabkan Pemohon menggunakan lima perbandingan sebaliknya Pentadbir Tanah telah menggunakan lapan perbandingan. Perbandingan tersebut adalah tidak wajar dipertimbangkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah. Oleh itu lot perbandingan yang sepatutnya yang diambil kira adalah lima lot iaitu Lot 8410, Lot 8442, Lot 15712, Lot 9052 dan Lot 8422. [5] Dalam erti kata lain Pentadbir Tanah dikatakan gagal untuk menggunakan garis panduan yang diberikan di bawah Perenggan 1 (1) (a) Jadual Pertama Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960. Sebaliknya S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 Responden berhujah bahawa perbandingan yang dibuat oleh Pentadbir Tanah adalah teratur berdasarkan kepada perbandingan yang wajar dibuat. Analisa [6] Penelitian kepada Borang N yang dikemukakan kepada Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Bentong oleh Pemohon dan Borang O yang dikemukakan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Bentong kepada Mahkamah ini menunjukkan bahawa bantahan dikemukakan terhadap amaun pampasan berkaitan dengan nilai pasaran sebenar bagi tanah tersebut, pampasan yang setimpal untuk pecah pisah dan kegagalan Pentadbir Tanah memberikan pampasan yang setimpal terhadap kesan mudarat. Harga Pasaran [7] Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 telah memperihalkan tatacara penilaian harga pasaran seperti yang dinyatakan di bawah Jadual Pertama Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 seperti berikut: FIRST SCHEDULE PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE DETERMINATION OF COMPENSATION S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 1. Market value (1) For the purposes of this Act the term "market value" where applied to any scheduled land shall mean the market value of such land- (a) at the date of publication in the Gazette of the notification under section 4, provided that such notification shall within twelve months from the date thereof be followed by a declaration under section 8 in respect of all or some part of the land in the locality specified; or (b) in other cases, at the date of the publication in the Gazette of the declaration made under section 8. (1A) In assessing the market value of any scheduled land, the valuer may use any suitable method of valuation to arrive at the market value provided that regard may be had to the prices paid for the recent sales of lands with similar characteristics as the scheduled land which are situated within the vicinity of the scheduled land and with particular consideration being given to the last transaction on the scheduled land within two years from the date with reference to which the scheduled land is to be assessed under subparagraph (1). (1B) Where only a part of the land is to be acquired, the market value of the scheduled land shall be determined by S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 reference to the whole land as shown in the document of title of the scheduled land and after having regard to the particular features of that part. (1C) In assessing the market value of any scheduled land, regard shall not be had to the evidence of any sales transactions effected after the date with reference to which the scheduled land is to be assessed under subparagraph (1). (1D) Where the scheduled land to be acquired is held under a title for a period of years, in assessing the market value, regard may be had to the date of expiry of the lease as shown in the document of title, but regard shall not be had to the likelihood of a subsequent alienation to the person or body who is the proprietor thereof immediately before the expiry of the lease. (2) In assessing the market value- (a) the effect of any express or implied condition of title restricting the use to which the scheduled land may be put; and (b) the effect of any prohibition, restriction or requirement imposed by or under the Antiquities Act 1976 [Act 168] in relation to any ancient monument or historical site within the meaning of that Act on the scheduled land, shall be taken into account. S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (2A) In assessing the market value of any scheduled land which is Malay reservation land under any written law relating to Malay reservations, or a Malay holding under the Malay Reservations Enactment of Terengganu [Terengganu En. No. 17 of 1360 (A.H)], or customary land in the State of Negeri Sembilan or the State of Malacca, the fact that it is such Malay reservation land, a Malay holding, or customary land shall not be taken into account except where the scheduled land is to be devoted, after the acquisition, solely to a purpose for the benefit of persons who are eligible to hold the land under such written law. (2B) (Deleted by Act A999:s.33) (2BA) In assessing the market value of any scheduled land, where the information provided by the State Director of Town and Country Planning or the Commissioner of the City of Kuala Lumpur, as the case may be, under section 9A indicates that the scheduled land is within a local planning authority area, then the land shall be assessed by having regard to the specific land use for that land as indicated in the development plan. (2C) In assessing the market value of any scheduled land which but for the acquisition would continue to be devoted to a purpose of such a nature that there is no general demand or market for that purpose, the assessment shall be made on S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 the basis of the reasonable cost to the proprietor of the scheduled land of using or purchasing other land and devoting it to the same purpose to which the scheduled land is devoted, if the Land Administrator is satisfied that this is bona fide intended by the proprietor of the scheduled land. (2D) In assessing the market value of any scheduled land which is an estate land, or forms part of an estate land, the market value of such land shall be determined taking into consideration section 214A of the National Land Code. [(2D) Am. Act A1517:s.42] (3) If the market value of any scheduled land has been increased, or is currently increased, in either of the following ways, such increase shall be disregarded: (a) an increase by means of any improvement made by the owner or his predecessor in interest within two years before the declaration under section 8 was published in the Gazette, unless it be proved that such improvement was made bona fide and not in contemplation of proceedings for the acquisition of the land; (b) an increase by reason of the use of the land, or of any premises thereon, in a manner which could be restrained by any court, or is contrary to law, or is detrimental to the health of the inmates of the premises or to the public health. S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (c) (Deleted by Act A388). (3A) The value of any building on any land to be acquired shall be disregarded if that building is not permitted by virtue of- (a) the category of land use; or (b) an express or implied condition or restriction, to which the land is subject or deemed to be subject under the State land law. (4) - (5) (Deleted by Act A388). 2. Matters to be considered in determining compensation In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for any scheduled land acquired under this Act there shall be taken into consideration the following matters and no others: (a) the market value as determined in accordance with section 1 of this Schedule; (b) any increase, which shall be deducted from the total compensation, in the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put; (c) the damage, if any, sustained or likely to be sustained by the person interested at the time of the Land Administrator's taking possession of the land by reason of severing such land from his other land; (d) the damage, if any, sustained or likely to be sustained by the person interested at the time of the Land S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Administrator's taking possession of the land by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, whether movable or immovable, in any other manner; (e) if, in consequence of the acquisition, he is or will be compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change; and (f) where only part of the land is to be acquired, any undertaking by the State Authority or by the Government, person or corporation on whose behalf the land is to be acquired, for the construction or erection of roads, drains, walls, fences or other facilities benefiting any part of the land left unacquired, provided that the undertaking is clear and enforceable. 3. Matters to be neglected in determining compensation In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for any scheduled land acquired under this Act the following matters shall not be taken into consideration: (a) the degree of urgency which has led to the acquisition; (b) any disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired; (c) any damage sustained by the person interested which, if caused by a private person, would not be a good cause of action; S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (d) any depreciation in the value of the land acquired likely to result from the use to which it will be put when acquired; (e) any increase to the value of the land acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired; (f) any outlay on additions or improvements to the land acquired, which was incurred after the date of the publication of the declaration under section 8, unless such additions or improvements were necessary for the maintenance of any building in a proper state of repair and unless, in the case of agricultural land, it is any money which has been expended for the continuing cultivation of crops on it. (g) - (h) (Deleted by Act A388). 4. Limitation on award Where at any inquiry made by the Land Administrator under section 12, or in any statement in writing required by the Land Administrator under subsection 11(2), any person interested has: (a) made a valuation of or claimed compensation for any land or any interest therein, such person shall not at any time be awarded any amount in excess of the amount stated or claimed; (b) refused, or has omitted without sufficient reason to be allowed by a Judge, to make a claim to compensation, such person shall not at any time be awarded any amount S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 in excess of the amount awarded by the Land Administrator.” [8] Selain daripada itu garis panduan yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Atasan berkenaan dengan tatacara penentuan pampasan berkaitan dengan harga pasaran juga menjadi suluh panduan untuk Mahkamah menimbangkan berkenaan harga pasaran bagi maksud pengambilan tanah di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960. Ini telah diutarakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ng Tiou Hong v Collector of Land Revenue [1984] 2 MLJ 35. [9] Sementara itu Mahkamah Persekutuan juga telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan sejauh manakah Perenggan 1 Jadual Pertama Akta tersebut perlu digunakan oleh Mahkamah dalam menentukan harga pasaran. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Amitabha Guha & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2021] 3 CLJ 1 seperti berikut: “[47] In the light of the ruling of this court in Semenyih Jaya (supra ), the market value rule in para 1 of the First Schedule must not be construed strictly. As such, acquisition comparables may also be considered in assessing market value provided that regard be had to sale comparables transacted within the last two years of the date of the publication of (i) a preliminary notice of likely acquisition under s. 4 in Form A; and or (ii) a declaration of intended acquisition under s. 8 in Form D, as the case may be.” S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [10] Penilai Swasta telah membuat perbandingan dengan lima bukti jual beli iaitu bagi Lot 8410, Lot 8442, Lot 15712, Lot 9052 dan Lot 8422. Sementara itu Penilai Kerajaan pula menggunakan lapan bukti jual beli iaitu bagi Lot 8378, Lot 1093, Lot 1095, Lot 2242, Lot 26108, Lot 26088, Lot 7549 dan Lot 26137. Penilai Swasta telah mendapatkan penyelarasan harga jualan tanah-tanah tersebut pada kadar RM2,402,808.99 hingga RM4,013,377.93 sehektar. Sementara itu Penilai Kerajaan pula mendapati bahawa harga adalah di antara RM1,047,733.51 hingga RM1,431,467.96 sehektar. [11] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti peta lokasi bagi melihat kedudukan lot-lot tersebut bagi mempertimbangkan sama ada perbandingan- perbandingan tersebut adalah wajar bagi mendapatkan penyelarasan pampasan berkaitan dengan nilai pasaran tanah yang terlibat dalam pengambilan tanah dalam kes ini. [12] Pengapit Kerajaan telah bersetuju dengan memilih perbandingan kelima iaitu Lot 26108 GRN 45548 Mukim Daerah Bentong sebagai perbandingan terbaik kerana transaksi terkini dan kawasan yang sama dan telah dibuat penyelarasan oleh Pengapit Kerajaan dan menyatakan bahawa selepas penyelarasan kadar nilai adalah RM1,100,000.00 dan dalam kes ini Pentadbir Tanah telah memberikan pampasan sebanyak sebanyak RM1,200,000.00 sehektar. Oleh itu Pengapit Kerajaan berpendapat tiada tambahan pampasan wajar diberikan dan award Pentadbir Tanah dikekalkan. S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [13] Sementara itu Pengapit Swasta pula berpandangan bahawa perbandingan yang dibuat oleh Penilai Kerajaan iaitu lapan bukti jual beli telah diambil kira oleh Pengapit Swasta iaitu empat daripada Jabatan Penilaian dan Perkhidmatan Harta (JPPH) dan Penilai Swasta yang mana Pengapit Swasta mendapati bahawa nilai yang wajar ialah di antara RM1,062,292.33 sehektar hingga RM2,754,491.02 sehektar dan mencadangkan bahawa pampasan bagi tanah tersebut adalah dengan mengambil kira nilai RM1,160,000.00 sehektar. Dalam erti kata lain terdapat perbezaan di antara pandangan yang dikemukakan oleh Pengapit Kerajaan dan Pengapit Swasta dalam lingkungan perbezaan sebanyak lebih kurang RM 500,000.00. [14] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah dalam mempertimbangkan pandangan kedua-dua Pengapit, Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pandangan Pengapit Kerajaan. Ini adalah disebabkan perbandingan yang dilakukan oleh Pengapit Kerajaan adalah terhadap tanah yang mempunyai nilai dan syarat-syarat yang sama dengan tanah yang dipertikaikan ini. Ia juga mengambil kira bukti jual beli yang berlaku dalam tanah yang diperbandingkan tersebut. Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga melihat kepada aktiviti-aktiviti yang terdapat di tanah tersebut dan membandingkannya dengan aktiviti-aktiviti yang dilakukan di atas tanah ini. Ia bagi melihat sama ada nilai pasaran tanah tersebut adalah satu yang setimpal dan munasabah bagi dijadikan asas untuk penilaian harga pasaran tanah tersebut. S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [15] Mahkamah juga mengambil kira urus niaga yang melibatkan tanah-tanah yang berhampiran dengan tanah yang diambil. Ini bagi membantu Mahkamah untuk menilai harga pasaran tanah tersebut. Apa yang jelas akhirnya Mahkamah perlu melihat keseluruhan faktor-faktor di atas dengan mengambil kira panduan dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 bagi mencapai satu penentuan harga pasaran bagi tanah yang diambil ini. [16] Jika diteliti Lot 8378 ia adalah tanah yang dikategorikan sebagai pertanian dan mempunyai syarat nyata tanaman getah sahaja. Ia juga terlibat dalam pengambilan tanah untuk tujuan Projek Laluan Rel Pantai Timur (East Coast Rel Link – ECRL). Catatan juga menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya pindah milik pada 09.09.2021 yang melibatkan jumlah harga RM1,047,733.51 sehektar. Ia adalah terletak di lapisan pertama Jalan Kuala Lumpur lama iaitu jalan utama. Sementara itu bagi Lot 1093 pula ia juga berada di lapisan pertama jalan utama dan syarat kategori adalah pertanian untuk tanaman getah sahaja yang telah dinilaikan harganya sebanyak RM1,007,580.85 sehektar. Bagi Lot 1095 adalah kategori tanah pertanian untuk getah sahaja. Ia juga berada di lapisan pertama jalan utama yang telah dinilaikan RM1,431,467.95 sehektar. Sementara itu, bagi Lot 2242 tanah tersebut juga terlibat dalam Projek Laluan Rel Pantai Timur (East Coast Rel Link – ECRL). Ia dikategorikan sebagai tanah pertanian untuk tanaman getah sahaja dan nilaiannya adalah RM1,062,292.33 sehektar. Seterusnya bagi Lot 26108 tiada kategori dan nilai tanah adalah RM1,372,369.62 sehektar. Sementara bagi Lot 26088 adalah dalam kategori tanah pertanian tanaman getah dan jumlah nilaiannya adalah S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 RM708,089.93 sehetar iaitu lapisan pertama Lebuh Raya Kuala Lumpur - Karak dan tanah ini adalah mempunyai rupa bumi berbukit-bukit. Bagi Lot 7549 tanah yang tiada kategori harganya adalah RM867,414.25 sehektar berada di lapisan pertama jalan utama dan berbentuk empat segi bujur dan mempunyai rupa bumi berbukit. Sementara Lot 26137 adalah kategori pertanian, syarat nyata adalah tanaman dusun sahaja. Ia berada di lapisan pertama Lebuh Raya Kuala Lumpur - Karak berbentuk empat segi bujur dan mempunyai rupa bumi berbukit-bukit dan nilaiannya adalah RM864,502.75 sehektar. [17] Sementara itu Penilai Swasta telah membuat perbandingan dengan tanah-tanah yang melibatkan Lot 8410 yang merupakan tanah pertanian nilaian RM920,000.00 sehektar. Sementara Lot 9052 adalah tanah pertanian. Nilai tanah tersebut adalah RM2,350,000.00. Bagi Lot 8422 juga dikategorikan tanah pertanian dan nilaiannya adalah RM2,650,00.00. Lot 15712 juga tanah pertanian nilaiannya adalah RM920,000.00. Bagi Lot 8442 kategorinya adalah tanah pertanian nilaiannya adalah RM2,500,000.00. [18] Adalah didapati bahawa perbandingan yang dibuat oleh Penilai Swasta dan Penilai Kerajaan terdapat tanah yang sama telah dirujuk yang dijadikan sebagai asas kepada harga pasaran bagi tanah yang diambil ini. Namun demikian Mahkamah mendapati bahawa kedudukan tanah tersebut adalah jauh daripada tanah yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini, iaitu lebih kurang 20 km daripada tanah yang menjadi isu dalam kes ini. Mahkamah mendapati terdapat terdapat transaksi jual beli yang berdekatan yang tidak diambil kira oleh penilai pihak Pemohon. Oleh itu S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa perbandingan yang sesuai digunakan ialah perbandingan bagi Lot 26108. Ini adalah disebabkan lokasi Lot 26108 tersebut berada berhadapan dengan Lebuh Raya Kuala Lumpur - Karak dan ia adalah merupakan lapisan pertama Lebuh Raya Kuala Lumpur - Karak. Ia juga merupakan tanah pertanian getah dan terdapat jalan masuk. Begitu juga lot ini adalah sebanding dengan tanah yang diambil alih ini. Kadar nilai selepas perlarasan pada hemat Mahkamah adalah lebih kurang RM1,100,000.00 sehektar dan Pentadbir Tanah telah memberikan award pampasan tanah pada kadar RM1,200,000.00 juta sehektar. Ia dalah suatu perbandingan yang wajar. [19] Oleh itu Mahkamah ini berpendapat keputusan Pentadbir Tanah berkenaan dengan nilai pasaran yang dijadikan asas untuk pampasan sebanyak RM1,200,000.00 juta sehektar tersebut adalah sesuatu yang tidak wajar diganggu oleh Mahkamah ini. Keputusan Pentadbir Tanah yang memutuskan bahawa pampasan adalah RM389,040.00 adalah dikekalkan. Kesan Mudarat (Injurious Affection) [20] Penelitian kepada pelan tanah adalah jelas menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya kesan tanah baki yang terjejas secara fizikal. Ini adalah disebabkan terdapatnya bentuk dan saiz tanah tersebut telah berubah ekoran daripada pengambilan tanah ini. Ini dapat dilihat melalui kesan daripada pengambilan tanah ini ia menyebabkan landasan keretapi ECRL tersebut melalui di tengah-tengah tanah ini dan ia menyebabkan berlaku pemisahan dua tanah tersebut yang dilalui oleh landasan S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 keretapi ECRL tersebut yang mana darjah keparahannya adalah dalam 20 %. Mahkamah ini berpendapat jumlah 20 % yang diambil kira oleh Pentadbir Tanah itu adalah wajar dan tidak memerlukan gangguan Mahkamah ini. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah juga mengambil kira pandangan yang dinyatakan dalam kes Zainal Azahar bin Mohd Zain v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Utara, Pulau Pinang [2017] 3 MLJ 453 yang menyatakan bahawa Mahkamah yang mendengar Rujukan Tanah perlu mempertimbangkan kesan mudarat dan pecah pisah. Ini dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[4] We are of the view that in a situation where an acquisition exercised of part of a land would have effect on the remaining and existing land then the issue of injurious affection would be relevant. It must be borne in mind that the constitutional rights of the respondent was being taken away by the provisions of the LAA and therefore those provisions must be strictly adhered to. We refer to the First Schedule of the Act, and in particular para 2(d) and we quote: Matters to be considered in determining compensation 2. In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for any scheduled land acquired under this Act there shall be taken into consideration the following matters and no others: S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 (a) the market value as determined in accordance with section 1 of this Schedule; (b) any increase, which shall be deducted from the total compensation, in the value of the other land of the person interested likely to accrue from the use to which the land acquired will be put; (c) the damage, if any, sustained or likely to be sustained by the person interested at the time of the Land Administrator’s taking possession of the land by reason of severing such land from his other land; (d) the damage, if any, sustained or likely to be sustained by the person interested at the time of the Land Administrator’s taking possession of the land by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, whether movable or immovable, in any other manner; (e) if, in consequence of the acquisition, he is or will be compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such change; and (f) where only part of the land is to be acquired, any undertaking by the State Authority, or by the S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Government, person or corporation on whose behalf the land is to be acquired, for the construction or erection of roads, drains, walls, fences or other facilities benefiting any part of the land left unacquired, provided that the undertaking is clear and enforceable. (Emphasis added.) [5] We are of the view that para 2(d) clearly provides that the question for severance and injurious affection can be raised. The only issue for us to consider now is whether the High Court at a reference stage can consider the question of severance and injurious affection. We refer to the decision of the Federal Court in Collector of Land Revenue v Looi Lam [1981] 1 MLJ 300 where it was held: As paragraph 2(d) of the First Schedule to the Land Acquisition Act 1960, refers to the damage ‘likely to be sustained’ by the person interested, the damages for injurious affection to the house in this case could be claimed and was rightly awarded in the course of a reference to the High Court under the Act. We also refer to the judgment of His Lordship Suffian LP (as he then was) and we quote p 302 para E-G: To allow the owner to pursue her claim in the course of the reference which was not heard until May 30, 1978, ie S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 nearly eight years after the completion of the river deviation work on December 12, 1970, was, Datuk Mansor argued, unfair to Government; because by then any suit by the owner would certainly have been time- barred under the Public Authorities Protection Ordinance 1948, which prescribed a one-year time limit, and allowing consideration of this claim in the course of the reference was tantamount to reviving a time-barred cause of action. What the owner should have done, it was submitted, was to sue Government separately for this damage. With respect we do not agree. In our judgment the learned judge was right in ruling that the owner need not have sued separately for this damage and that the court has power to consider and adjudicate on her claim in the course of the reference. With respect we agree with the law stated by the Calcutta Court in RH Wernicke v The Secretary of State for India in Council. There Government acquired part of a tea garden for the purpose of extending a rifle range near Darjeeling. The owners were left with about eight acres of tea land behind the butts where it was extremely unsafe to work when firing was going on. They claimed injurious affection of these eight acres. Counsel for Government opposed the S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 claim, arguing that any damage should be the subject of a suit. Richardson J at pp 1059-1060 disposed of this argument as follows: There remains the claim for injurious affection which is laid as Rs 2,540. It is said that the rifle range will interfere, with the working of eight acres of land behind the butts and I think that there can be no doubt as to this. It will not be safe to put coolies on the land when the range is being used. Mr Sinha for the Government contended that the contemplated injury was contingent, that it could only arise from the negligent use of the range and that the tea garden was not entitled to compensation now but would be entitled to a remedy by suit when the injury occurred. The case to which he referred His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda v Gandhi Kachrabhai Kasturchand is not an adequate support for this proposition and the learned counsel for the claimants cited good authority for the view that the tea garden is entitled to compensation now even if the injury which is contemplated be of the nature of an actionable nuisance (Land Acquisition Act, s 23, clause fourthly) Croft v L & NW Ry Co and Cowper Essex v The Local Board of Acton. S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 As to Datuk Mansor’s argument that to allow consideration of the owner’s claim in the course of reference was tantamount to reviving a time-barred claim, it cannot be said that the owner has been guilty of delay at all. The collector made his award on January 30, 1970; and the owner promptly by Form N asked for her objection to be referred to the High Court. This form, be it noted, was dated March 4, 1970, one month and a few days later and certainly well within the one-year limit prescribed by the Protection of Public Authorities Ordinance 1948. Moreover, as can be seen from this Form at p 28 of the appeal record, the owner specifically gave notice that she intended to make a claim under para 2(d) of the First Schedule. An additional reason for holding that the owner’s claim under this paragraph may be considered in the course of the reference is the absence from the Land Acquisition Act 1960, of a section corresponding to s 31 of the FMS Land Acquisition Enactment (FMS Cap 140) which provided that when an owner had made a claim to the collector, the High Court in a reference might not award a sum exceeding the sum so claimed: this implies that the Legislature when enacting the Act desired to let the High Court have in a proper case a free hand to award more than the sum claimed before the collector. What case can be more proper than this one where at the time of enquiry S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 there was only the possibility of damage and soon after the completion of the river deviation work there was indeed damage and extensive damage at that? Finally, it is in the public interest that as many related matters in controversy as possible should be ventilated and determined in the same proceedings- to save time and costs. (Emphasis added.) [6] We are therefore of the view the learned judge erred in law in refusing to consider the question of severance and injurious affection at the stage when the matter was referred to the learned judge by way of reference under the LAA.” [21] Pada masa yang sama Mahkamah juga harus mengambil kira berkenaan dengan kesan daripada pengambilan tanah tersebut terhadap pemilik tanah yang tidak lagi menikmati tanah tersebut seperti sebelum ianya diambil oleh pihak berkuasa. Ini bagi menentukan bahawa terdapatnya kesan mudarat ekoran daripada pengambilan tanah tersebut. Dalam kes ini Mahkamah ini mengambil kira berkenaan dengan kesan mudarat tersebut. Namun apa yang menjadi pertimbangan ialah berapakah kadar yang wajar bagi kesan kemudaratan tersebut. [22] Di samping itu Mahkamah juga meneliti kes Datuk Dr. Murugasu Sockalingam & Anor v Suprintendent Of Lands And Survey, First Division, Sarawak [1983] 2 MLJ 336 yang memberi garis panduan S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 ujian yang perlu digunakan bagi menentukan sama ada kesan mudarat boleh dipertimbangkan. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: “The learned Judge rejected the substantial claim for diminution of value due to severance and injurious affection and the contention of the objectors' valuer that an area of approximately 12.35 acres would be rendered totally useless as the land happened to be in the flight path of incoming and outgoing aircraft as he found no reliable evidence to support such a contention. It was not in dispute that the remaining portion of Lot 614 had the potentiality of being developed for housing purposes but that such potentiality was not yet ripe at the material date. The reason was that residential lots along Airport Road and Penrissen Road near the subject land had not yet been developed by 1972. Although the valuers from both sides did not dispute this potentiality they disagreed on the time factor for the potentiality to emerge. For these reasons the learned Judge was perfectly right to stress that despite the severance, the potentiality of the remaining portion of the subject land was not and did not seem to have been affected. The question of injurious affection found some support from the learned Judge, because after acquisition of a portion of Lot 614, the frontage of the subject land was reduced by S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 slightly less than one-third in length. Despite this, the remaining area still retains and possesses a very substantial frontage into Penrissen Road and would still be viable for development as a self-contained housing estate.” [23] Ini juga telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia v Sime Darby Plantation Bhd & Ors [2022] 5 MLJ 318 yang menerima pakai ujian dalam kes Datuk Dr. Murugasu Sockalingam & Anor (supra). [24] Dalam laporan penilaian yang dikemukakan oleh Pemohon berkaitan dengan tuntutan kesan mudarat telah dinyatakan bahawa kedudukan landasan keretapi ECRL dengan bakal dibina dengan ketinggian 34 meter hingga 37 meter beserta dengan tiga tiang yang dibina di antara kedua-dua bahagian di bahagian tengah hartanah berkenaan akan menyebabkan pandangan hartanah tersebut akan terhalang. Selain daripada itu juga dikatakan bahawa pembangunan hartanah berkenaan sama ada secara berasingan atau sepadu adalah sukar kerana hartanah tersebut telah terpisah. Ia disebabkan tanah tersebut telah menjadi memanjang dan kecil. Oleh yang demikian ia akan menjejaskan pembangunan tanah tersebut pada masa akan datang disebabkan penggunaan tanah tersebut adalah tertakluk kepada pelbagai syarat di antaranya ialah Peraturan-peraturan Keretapi 1998 dan Akta Keretapi 1991. Sebaliknya laporan penilaian daripada JPPH berkenaan perkara ini pula telah menyatakan bahawa tiada sebarang kesan mudarat yang dialami oleh pihak Pemohon. Keterangan tiada dikemukakan untuk membuktikan kewajaran S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 pampasan untuk tujuan kemudaratan ini mengikut kadar yang diminta oleh Pemohon. Mahkamah ini juga telah meneliti pandangan kedua- dua Pengapit Kerajaan dan Pengapit Swasta yang bersepakat bahawa tiada sebarang keterangan yang ada bagi membolehkan Mahkamah ini mempertimbangkan tuntutan kesan mudarat mengikut kadar yang diusulkan oleh Pemohon. [25] Mahkamah ini berpendapat tuntutan kemudaratan yang diutarakan oleh Pemohon adalah sesuatu yang tidak dapat disokong oleh apa-apa keterangan. Ia hanyalah merupakan suatu telahan yang dibuat berkenaan dengan tanah tersebut yang mempunyai kesan pembangunan ekoran daripada pembinaan landasan keretapi tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati tiada sebarang keterangan sokongan sama ada melalui dokumen ataupun kajian yang boleh menyokong tuntutan pihak Pemohon dalam kes ini. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat perintah Pentadbir Tanah berkenaan kesan mudarat adalah dikekalkan iaitu sebanyak RM93,816.00. Pecah Pisah (Severance) [26] Penelitian kepada laporan Penilai Pemohon menyatakan bahawa terdapat kesan pecah pisah. Ini adalah disebabkan tanah tersebut telah dibahagikan kepada dua bahagian ekoran daripada pengambilan tanah ini. Laporan daripada JPPH juga menyatakan bahawa terdapat pecah pisah serta berlaku penyusutan nilai ekoran daripada pengambilan tanah ini di mana baki di Bahagian A adalah berkeluasan 0.3878 hektar manakala baki Bahagian B adalah 0.3940 hektar. Namun ia masih S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 boleh diakses oleh Pemohon disebabkan pembinaan landasan keretapi itu dibuat di atas jambatan. Ia membawa maksud tuan tanah masih mempunyai akses kepada tanah tersebut dengan melalui di bawah jambatan tersebut. Ia bukanlah keadaan di mana kedua-dua bahagian tanah tersebut tidak boleh langsung diakses oleh Pemohon dan adalah dicadangkan bahawa jumlah yang diberikan adalah sebanyak 5 %. [27] Pengapit Kerajaan telah menyatakan bahawa terdapat kewajaran untuk pampasan diberikan kepada pecah pisah tersebut disebabkan terdapatnya tanah baki sebanyak 0.7818 hektar dan Pentadbir Tanah telah memberikan kadar 20 % di atas tanah baki seluas 0.7818 hektar tersebut pada nilai RM1,200,000.00 sehektar yang menjadikan jumlahnya RM187,632.00. Sementara itu Pengapit Swasta berpandangan bahawa pecah pisah tersebut perlu diberikan pampasan disebabkan terdapatnya penurunan nilai akibat pengambilan terhadap tanah tersebut disebabkan ia telah memisahkan tanah tersebut kepada dua bahagian. Pengapit Swasta bersetuju dengan jumlah award yang diberikan oleh Pentadbir Tanah iaitu sebanyak RM187,632.00. [28] Mahkamah ni setelah meneliti dan menilai laporan Penilai Kerajaan dan Penilai Swasta serta pandangan Pengapit Kerajaan dan Pengapit Swasta di samping meneliti kedudukan tanah tersebut selepas daripada pengambilan tanah serta nilai yang diberikan oleh Pentadbir Tanah berkenaan dengan pecah pisah tersebut, Mahkamah berpendapat tiada alasan untuk Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan jumlah RM187,632.00 seperti yang diawardkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah. Ia adalah dikekalkan. S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 Bertarikh: 22 hb. Januari 2024 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Pemohon Zeffree bin Zainuddin Tetuan Zeffree Azmi Suite 13A-3A, Level 13A Binjai 8, No. 2 Lorong Binjai 50450 Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden Azizah binti Ahmad Pejabat Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Pahang Tingkat 3, Blok B, Wisma Sri Pahang 25000 Kuantan Pahang Darul Makmur S/N AkwzSflS0OrCSIT/cKftw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

PA-22NCvC-98-05/2021

PLAINTIF GUNALAN A/L SAGARAN (berurusaniaga atas nama dan gaya sebagai FUTURE RISE AGENCY ) DEFENDAN 1. ) MOHD NASRI BIN ABDUL RAHIM 2. ) MUHAMAD ERMAN BIN OMAR HATTAB 3. ) HASWIRA AIMAN BIN HASSAN MERICAN 4. ) NAR TRADING TRADERS SDN. BHD. 5. ) ABDUL WAHAB BIN S MOHD MYDIN 6. ) MOHAMMAD HAFEEZ BIN ABDUL WAHAB 7. ) RESOOL BIVI BINTI YUSOF GANI

1 The 1st Defendant to the 4th Defendant company (D1-D4Co) applies to strike out the Plaintiff’s (P) claim as against them. D1-D4 applies to strike out P’s Writ and Statement Of Claim (SOC) under limbs (a), (b) and (d) of Order 18 Rule 19(1) of the Rules Of Court 2012.2 Limb (a) is the ground that P’s SOC discloses no reasonable cause of action against D1-D4Co. Limb (b) is the ground that P’s SOC is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. And limb (d) is the ground that P’s SOC is an abuse of the process of the Court.3 Should P’s claim against D1-D4Co be struck out in this case?

22/01/2024

YA Tuan Kenneth Yoong Ken Chinson St James

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d2003d12-4cdc-4e42-b996-997159b12e9e&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT PENANG CIVIL SUIT NO. : PA-22NCvC-98-05/2021 BETWEEN GUNALAN A/L SAGARAN (NRIC No.: 800807-08-5531) (Trading in the name and style of FUTURE RISE AGENCY (Registration No.: 201503101174 (PG0364614-D) ... PLAINTIFF AND 1. MOHD NASRI BIN ABDUL RAHIM (NRIC No.: 860529-35-5697) …FIRST DEFENDANT 2. MUHAMED ERMAN BIN OMAR HATTAB (NRIC No.: 880508-35-5223) …SECOND DEFENDANT 3. HASWIRA AIMAN BIN HASSAN MERICAN (NRIC No.: 920830-07-5645) …THIRD DEFENDANT 4. NAR TRADING TRADERS SDN BHD (Registration No.: 201701002858 (1217008-M)) …FOURTH DEFENDANT 22/01/2024 10:48:24 PA-22NCvC-98-05/2021 Kand. 44 S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5. ABDUL WAHAB BIN S MOHD MYDIN (NRIC No.: 691014-07-5261) …FIFTH DEFENDANT 6. MOHAMMAD HAFEEZ BIN ABDUL WAHAB (NRIC No.: 950223-07-5931) …SIXTH DEFENDANT 7. RESOOL BIVI BINTI YUSOF GANI (NRIC No.: 720805-07-5604) … SEVENTH DEFENDANT JUDGMENT (STRIKING OUT) PRELUSION [1] The 1st Defendant to the 4th Defendant company (D1-D4Co) applies to strike out the Plaintiff’s (P) claim as against them. D1-D4 applies to strike out P’s Writ and Statement Of Claim (SOC) under limbs (a), (b) and (d) of Order 18 Rule 19(1) of the Rules Of Court 2012. [2] Limb (a) is the ground that P’s SOC discloses no reasonable cause of action against D1-D4Co. Limb (b) is the ground that P’s SOC is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious. And limb (d) is the ground that P’s SOC is an abuse of the process of the Court. [3] Should P’s claim against D1-D4Co be struck out in this case? P’S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST D1-D4 S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [4] P pleads that D1-D4Co breached their contract with P; that D1- D4Co cheated P; and that D1-D4Co committed a fraud on P. P’s causes of action against D1-D4Co are for breach of contract, cheating and fraud. THE PERTINENT PLEADED FACTS [5] D1 owns D4Co. D1, D2 and D3 are directors of D4Co. I will refer to D1, D2 and D3 together as “D1D2D3”. [6] D5 and D6 are partners in a firm (business). [7] D5 and D7 are partners in another firm (another business). [8] D1 and D5 have various businesses, such as hotels, an aquaponic farm, an oil palm plantation, a rubber plantation, and a durian orchard. [9] In April 2019, D1D2D3 and D5 asked P to invest in their businesses. P told them that he did not want to invest in their businesses, but he would, instead, give them a loan. They agreed, and D1 and D5 promised to return P's money by 31.12.2020. [10] P banked approximately RM4.78 million into D4Co’s account. [11] The Defendants failed to return the money to P by 31.12.2020. [12] P also discovered that the businesses that D1 and D5 represented that they had, were dormant or not in operation. P’S PRAYER IN THE APPLICATION [13] Foremost, I would like to point out that D1-D4Co’s striking out Application prays that an Order be given to strike out P’s claim entirely i.e. not only as against D1-D4Co, but as against all the Defendants. S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal THE LAW ON STRIKING OUT PLEADINGS [14] A review of the law on striking out pleadings under Order 18 Rule 19(1) is found in the Federal Court case of Tan Wei Hong (a minor suing through guardian ad litem and next friend Chuang Yin Ee) & Ors v Malaysian Airlines Bhd & Other Appeals [2019] 1 MLJ 59 (FC); [2018] 6 AMR 529; [2018] 9 CLJ 425. [15] Tan Wei Hong (supra)sets out— [15] Order 18 r 19 of the ROC provides: 19 Striking out pleadings and endorsements (Order 18 rule 19) (1)The court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be stuck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that — (a)it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b)it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c)it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d)it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. (2)No evidence shall be admissible on an application under paragraph (1)(a). (3)This rule shall, as far as applicable, apply to an originating summons as if it were a pleading. [16] The principle for striking out of pleadings pursuant to O 18 r 19 of the ROC is well settled. It is applicable only in a plain and obvious case or where a claim is, on the face of it, obviously unsustainable (see: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7 (SC); Hubbuck & Sons, Limited v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark, Limited [1899] 1 QB 86; Attorney-General of the Duchy of Lancaster v London and North Western Railway Company [1892] 3 Ch 274). [17] The tests for a striking out application under O 18 r 19 of the ROC, as adopted by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder are, inter alia, as follows: [2019] 1 MLJ 59 (SC) at 68 (a)it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule; (b)this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable; (c)it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence; S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal … (e)the court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable. [18] The Court of Appeal, in Sivarasa Rasiah & Ors v Che Hamzah Che Ismail & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 473; [2012] 1 CLJ 75, had adopted the well-settled principle of striking out in the following passage: A striking out order should not be made summarily by the court if there is issue of law that requires lengthy argument and mature consideration. It should also not be made if there is issue of fact that is capable of resolution only after taking viva voce evidence during trial (see: Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565 (FC)). [19] The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’, ie, the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the statement of claim without having to go into a lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into a lengthy detailed argument and mature consideration of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at the trial. [20] The established rule on this point is that the court should not examine the evidence in summary proceedings in such a way as to amount to conducting a trial on the conflicting affidavit evidence. As rightly said by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords case of American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 at p 407: … The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court’s function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial … This passage was cited with approval by the Privy Council in the Malaysian case of Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212; [1979] 1 LNS 18 . . [64] We are also of the view that in dealing with an application for striking out, the court must exercise great care and caution, bearing in mind that the court must not drive away any litigant however weak his case may be from the seat of justice (see: Lee Nyan Choi v Voon Noon [1979] 2 MLJ 28)... MY FINDINGS [16] Case law authorities guide me that I should not minutely examine the affidavit evidence when I am considering a striking out application. I S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal should instead peruse pleadings, namely P’s SOC and D1-D4Co’s Defence. [17] The following is what I found. I found that there are averments in D1-D4Co’s Defence that D1-D4Co were involved in the factual matrix that P found his causes of action in this suit. [18] D1-D4Co knew about the relationships between D5, D6 and D7, and their businesses [Defence paragraph 5]. I will refer to D5, D6 and D7 together as “D5D6D7”. [19] D1-D4Co trusted D5 to use D5D6D7’s businesses to return the “hibah” to D4Co’s clients [Defence paragraph 10e] [20] D1-D4Co admit that P gave a loan to D4Co between May 2019 to July 2020. In this period, seven contracts had ended, and the “hibah” was given to P. But there were five contracts which were still active [Defence paragraphs 12 and 13] [21] D1-D4Co admit that D4Co received RM4.12 million from P [Defence paragraph 14b] [22] D1-D4Co deny committing any fraud, because the cheating and misappropriation of money was committed by D5 [Defence paragraph 18] [23] Further, from what I can decipher, D1-D4Co’s reasons to support this striking out Application include— S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (1) D1-D4Co did not sign any relevant contract with P. But in this regard, I must note that contracts do not necessarily have to be in writing. (2) The party who committed the cheating or fraud was D5. But I hold the view that just saying so, does not exonerate D1- D4Co. It certainly does not justify bypassing or side-stepping a trial of P’s claim against D1-D4Co. There must be cogent evidence to prove their assertion. (3) D1-D4Co have the burden to prove, at the trial of P’s claim, that it was D5 who committed the cheating and the fraud, and not them. Just as conversely, P has the burden to prove that D1-D4Co committed the cheating and fraud which caused loss and damage to P. [24] Perusing P’s SOC and D1-D4Co’s Defence, I am compelled to find that P’s claim against D1-D4Co is not a plain and obvious case to be summarily struck out. I also find that P’s claim against D1-D4Co is not obviously unsustainable. I further find that P has disclosed a reasonable cause of action against D1-D4Co. And I find that P’s claim is not scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, nor is it an abuse of the process of the Court—Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (SC); [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7. [25] In Bandar Builders (supra), the Supreme Court held thus (at MLJ page 43)— The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7, and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable' (see AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Rly Co 8). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (see Wenlock v Moloney & Ors 9). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in pari materia with our O 33 r 2 of the RHC) (see Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7). The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable BALANCE OF JUSTICE [26] Finally, a fundamental ground for my decision is the balance of justice. [27] Order 1A of the Rules Of Court 2012 compels me to “have regard to the overriding interest of justice”. And Order 92 Rule 4 behoves me “to prevent injustice”. And so I consider the balance of justice. [28] If D1-D4Co’s striking out Application is allowed, then P would lose the opportunity—actually, the procedural right—to prove his claim against D1-D4Co, at trial. P will not be given his day in Court. [29] If, on the other hand, D1-D4Co’s striking out Application is not allowed, D1-D4Co have not lost their case. The merits of D1-D4Co’s Defence will still be canvassed, heard and determined by this Court, at trial. S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [30] The Order 18 Rule 19 striking out procedure is the exception rather than the rule in our legal system. That is the reason that P is given every opportunity to show that he can sustain his claim at trial. And D1-D4Co are given the converse but equal opportunity to defend against the claim. [31] I have to be mindful of these effects and circumstances when I weigh the balance of justice. And I am inclined to say that in this suit, it is just to dismiss D1-D4Co's striking out Application, so that both sides’ respective cases can be heard and determined, not summarily, but by the process of a trial. Both parties should be given their day and time in Court to prove their claim and their defence. [32] For these reasons, I dismiss D1-D4Co’s striking out Application with costs of RM7K to be paid by D1-D4Co to P by 18.9.2023. Costs are subject to the allocatur. Dated: 22 January 2024 signed KENNETH ST JAMES Judicial Commissioner Penang High Court Counsel/Solicitors For the Plaintiff: Amareson K. Velu [Messrs. Amareson & Meera (Penang)] S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal For the First to - Fourth Defendants: [Messrs. Amli & Associates (Petaling Jaya)] For the Fifth to Mashitah Jamaluddin @ Mohammad Seventh Defendants: Shukri [Rosli Ismail & Co. (Penang)] Legislation referred to: 1. Order 18 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012. Cases referred to: 1. Tan Wei Hong (a minor suing through guardian ad litem and next friend Chuang Yin E) & Ors v Malaysian Airlines Bhd & Other Appeals [2019] 1 MLJ 59 (FC); [2018] 6 AMR 529; [2018] 9 CLJ 425. 2. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7 (SC). S/N Ej0A0txMQk65lplxWbEung **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

RA-83-672-09/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH SHAHRUL HAKIM BIN SHAARI

Keuarga Tertuduh tidak seharusnya diheret bersama untuk menanggung penderitaan sekiranya Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman yang berat terhadapnya

22/01/2024

Puan Ana Rozana binti Mohd Nor

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22/01/2024 16:37:53 RA-83-672-09/2023 Kand. 14 S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N hbdBc7gDUmwKjmr6rA/w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal R.\—a3—s72—u9/2023 Kand. 14 mun umuum munsrnsr suns»: mum NEGER| PERLIS xss JENAYAN ru umnmn ANIARA pemuxwa rum LAWAN SHANRUL HAKIM am sum: ALASAII wsuemmun L PENDAHLILUAN 1 1 Yanuduh mo. dlluduh nI\a|uukan mm mun“ as bawah uiuytn ans mun Knaoiaun yang um dmukum :41 hawlh uiuym ymg lama. Pemmunan lemadap Tenmun adzlah sepem yang mm "Bunnwu knmu p-an ozmauzz Jun lnhlh kurlnn «man n-nx bommvlt di ubuih ma: rurlcil hlfllanul as zuuu Amal Enhrvriu‘ Yaman M:|:li1 Band, amo Kmgu. rum. wan. an-an Fading sour, dalnm noguri Porlll, nu-nu maluud hondak mengalhkul Inmmvlatzn panama Numl Zul-Ikhl am numm, no. Kn: mumawuu uluh Illolmnjuklun n..m.:..... mm. mm...» mums wpuyl Illununnuu kuanuuun um: zuuunn. him‘ Nu .m, >4». xr-vr: omowwast dun my-n um n-mu n-Ian nnhhmknn mum kunlnhnn ynng mm. uhml di birah --sum sot Kanlm KeI:knun". 1 2 ramdmu lahh am-a.m Dual kah pefliml pm 22 Samernbev znza dan nun nu remmm ralnh memehnn unluk mm:-r-knn 1 3 Yamaduh xamumznnya man menukav vengakuan mum pengakuan berulah pnda 23 Navembel 202: an kn man dfrataplcan pad: 14 Dmamberznzl unmk sebum: mm mm N mnadauumwxlmra-A/w mm s..1.1...m..w111.. used 1,: mm 1.. nflmnnflly mm; dun-mm VII .m1c M1 sw mnar.7aDumwKp-um»./w «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 1 4 Mnhkanuh mun m...u.m- panqnmn nhh rsnmm, merekodkan pewakuan Delialah Yemadun din man mensamkan nmmn diwin ksalahan ubawmm venwumn an memlwhksn Mkuman uem. RMa,5m) an 9.4.: mm m mm paw. . mmx KE! 2: Pmnk Fendltwlan Mill rmngunukakan Iaku re. nngkn: Iahsgnmnnn ynnglalah dihndllln elm Mnhkmmh sebogm PI 22 Faku K5 mamlqukkan hnlmwn pma 2/srmzz pm Iehm mung was 969:‘ semi Pengadu wanu Numl Zukalkna mm. Hashim Isdlnu name an ubulh um: mm mm bevllamll a. Zlmu Ami! Erllalpnue. hm... Memh Emmi, mm. ml». dmng . lung mm Mthyu mm.» up sahnr ynng mplklmyl um mammuldun Immllulnnyl mm. Pengndu mm . mm Melayu mmnm.n; murmur! my..." a. kaunlav 2 3 Fnlgidu ksmudllnnya mun msmbull hpurln pan: dun nun saunun mainlm nknmnn rlknmnn ccrv mung: um bnhawu Ymluduh Iauh mm. dnlnm mm mncmmucumn mombuku an mum. nnvum PIIIAKPIHAK 31 Pmak Izembdaan seen mengemuhakan rayuan mnnqasl bngw manrlgankan hukwnan dan ma. menyafiakan Bahama mmun mempaluh flouting kanm mu yI"u mmnaaungemun ovum hnmnnflln mm mm y-nu mlruy-knn Inov-nq IHII mmlh uvemm mu dun mm -mu mun, dm av--u xruk mm... m cm 4 mm .1... mm on ‘(Inn mm um um 22 Famikuan salah Tenuduh mun menmanun has dun mnsa pmlk Ink unvl win manmm talcum y-M1 nun;-rm 3 3 Yemduh rnerwalun peuwuh penanu din Ihhklvwmndakasmrusnya duanmkan rmxuman mm flan vemevyaman ma umuk membenluan pelunng kupldt Tunumm umuk hemblh 2 34 Sememnk kqndhn Temam «am mnnyuul Alan pemnahnlvyu flan u-am blrusaha mm mnoau keiahn yang hznar 3 5 Tavllduh mm lk-n u...\.n... dxn utzl "ma-auum woman pm: umnk mcngilnsi mnnlnh yum «map. nan Bel-mm Idak um. menguluvm kesalahul yang mu 3 a Pink Puldukwun mum kn m. Mnyl mmomn wpayu Mlnknmnh munjlluhlxln hukumin yang uumpux ubnw pulvgu‘ un kupldl Yummuh . mus»: vsuenuxunu 41 Fzkwv Deflama flan pemmg yang mm dlambul kin nleh Mankamih nbeium mafltanmkan nukuman Ialah keptmnsln Iwam um pemndungnn knpndn mnynmul M-hknmnn rmqux kn R v mmm John aumm .2: c 53; R 154 may J man manyivzkan uauam mamuhukzn hukmrlan yanu usual mnhlumnh mm: “mu... munbln p-Ilinblngln kapnd: kzpsnmgnn Iwlm Undlng-umlnq ,m.y.n rnmlflm dnmnmn um. seam mm. mm . mg: um.» «um menghukum ;uu.y.n_ um. pun: denganh .9-n unlukmanaegamya 4.2 43 Nukmun ..a.m.x.,. my. men msnghlllng ponjanlylh mm mp-.1. mmm pnlylh x.,,. .1.“ nmvdnvnnnnyn mink mum mp-u. Dtnpmaynh mm. m.a...m yang luiur x.,.m... mm sememangnyu ¢mn..«..., nu. pesaym «mm umuk mm damida uli penayan man: mm-mm ViV|fli|lur A4 Dlhm kn . sni Mann: YI:kubJCA man man '77nP¢InclD'I:uIsammc1Wbave)DIIflDsmomIunm>cdmaw¢lI mm m uurulmaul r.w1«nx»m.».. Ind . mun Jmzod win mm sm mnar.7aDumwK:rnm».m 3 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm Nmamlnnumpowmdlomowrvonaeournlmioflowfil awnudtral-on: :1; my mum and announce: mm mm mvvmflm 12):» 90-PIP!!!-an s mlooeduvu, M1 1.1; mepamc Anmast (actor rn. man mama mum .n.».m :..m.m rmlzhc ml-naumi nu nlzruv ulhle mzuafl - 4 s smnmy. u.mm.n 1.... man mamgux ken MonlmodJ bin A 1 c 1 - 1 1.1 nu ma yum «.1.» mnynt-km mam y-nu mum 'lnouv-oawrlo smtsna cmbc ummodby: mpumvumauanumu. Muvylnsnrsmudbvtlkenmolwwnllwolflngtulhlalnmsrunnal uanmdMdA.-dean Inthuriwoctwuuouldanwut-rmnnlnmamnnn mlchvrouldbatakuvhwonoeoumkvlhvwbumrlrmvn-uauoulln HisDWY1HzNsolE!r1ondIHM:hamEdirofl)vnllAn~9.Pin :55 TM Cc-ml, :1 MW I»: punmmom rm my Dlnlnulu mm M! Ilka mm mmldnalmn Inn rulun arm. alhmx, rm umummm. m am :4 was wmmnoamavmuamm-onmmuymomnaumwuwunm wnoclvlulvnmoowod, vm.mnmsuwuvmnc.. may-csaaamsume prnnlmiup m».m.a..mna-, mtnga u.m.m.z.«- AG sum-n 509 um-n Kuduun um. lvlumvwulnukkun mlmmln nu-Ian yang holeh an-pi lima mm, sun sand: mu kaaumuunyu 47 Mlhkamah dalzn memben pefllmbanwn ueuaaa kbvanlluan zwrn mun menlmuhknn mm»... and. Rmsao so saw! him 10 bub" unw- muvundnnuknn hlllnhln ,....y.r. ylng kukm obi! mua-m -a. kunllhan yang mm. dun hukumln 4m mg: mm m. .pm.,...n mm. bukan aha: Termdnm mam um pesaun a. musnnama nu-nu sm mna<.7uDumwK:rnm».m ‘ mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! As Mahknmah mg. memm hukuman ynnq mpmhknn mmm umuk momburi nryam man: Temmm an on: pesaun aw Iuav sana supiyz lnenghnflan pemuaun-pemuavan ylng mm rnangqirvggu bsunlunan seaming pemmpuan ks-In 5:1-p pecanpunn nu mempunym hug: an ymg Imam dun muvunh y-nu poflu am»... 49 Walau bagamunzoun, Mzmumah |uga Han mempemmhangkan mm Tevluduh flask msmwnyaw rahod Ixnvau din tahh bevtaruygunggawah lbs knsalmannya denann memhun panglkulrl nhh .1. pamlglul mu dun Tonuflnn umnnnyn mmnn mean u... dlluun um pnnqlkuln ..:.my. 4 10 Fma ham: Temmuh man msmbui panuakuln nwah msrupalun kkiur mmgm mg mun dumhn kwa nut Mahknmah dahm nrenmuhknn hukumnn mm 1-«mu Mamaman dalzm nan um teun mam:-.;< nanduan unlam ks: Sun Sea rum v. mm: Egg; [gm 1 L»; 13 yang mun mmmu.m upon. nng mm wnemnr . veuun u . namunm mm: av nu, I be! last a pin .1 gmny Ihnu\dbeItuIedu:m\ugmu;Innnr Rrlmmnyxavultulnmtryagvul upmu cl . \-nvmy um um lha mu 1.... Ind Imammhrta at mm, n-mm ow. mu.‘ 4-H Seiarww-= dawn kes l@ mm dvumskan sepem yang benkut on at In nllnapvu n nnanum u can . vurwland pirnrl mud n. mvun a Gscounl lot pteaam way A rdumun of um: um um Mm: um.” wocfld wmwna have been manned \s name», gm hm. hmnver, 3 ml: ma mi ms me man may‘ n In vxamsa «us nsmm, mm m gum lny drwoum Th uvwlv mm vfllnu um. . bus: .1. am... mnvmmn mw «mum IM mrwllww mm mm: gum on In um um dlmxvdl av puhfln mm re. 2 «mm mam .. vnel .. me lI—m>I m : awe all-use or u aw mflxamng «man we gm pie: dun: um mum-waxy arms In cmv-mo . Iuuvwn-nmml - sw mnar.7aDumwKp-um»./w 5 «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 4 12 Mnhknmah dl||m munpimhkln mum.» kapnd: rsmmun lehh meneml Vzlavhehkarug Temmuh yang huumur 34 tam)! am mempakzn seovzng kaum an vnmun pemaman. us Mahkmuh my mnnglmbnl kin mm. Yemmun menunknn nmmm mm. mum: am when mm Mndlaman Ielu-rm 414 lI1anTannflIm mlrupakin mung run -mun yang Iedangnvll mm .1... mllunnk mun mun mg. hcndxohh‘ nelnln nu, mmmm jug: rlhnnnwunq may. yunq wdlh mam hununmng nnup x.p.:...y. us ulah, um.-ma hukumnn puuanmu. dxenakan. nvllvlulzknn mu wan Tanudnh Temmuh umnunym Kehflupln ynng stand flan mnsa depm yang sauesnnyn am. 415 Mahkaman pug: bsapemapan keiuarw Tsmuduh Idak aeharusnya amem basalna mu m.nggum pendemnnn sadmnyn Mnnkamnh mnmunm nmmn ylng belaltemsdnpnya 417 awn ha! ini‘ Mahkarnah Inlah rnamjuk kas pp v. an-nu-n bu sm yw hem momma v-mum seven-v-na berm ‘mwum-n pvvnu y-no uemu Wu-r-2 um um um mwvvundmlkuw vo-m.m..un mum" bmynkhmak .n..m..n.u..n.n.n..am. nun mu bu blpinyl yznq unlyum hm dlpaunagulupwllzkln hug! mew-nu manna mum mnmmua. mgumnnm mm Dfilulkun sun (smaduh mm kunnmnn -seam vlmsnkumnyu .1. mmknnuh u.:..». bnlm mm udlr an mu: r-mun: x...:.m yum: dinmurmyn um mm M: mmw-mgmum alaskaulahamansbu Hlhumanyanu wapxdiunakan wmsdlutamnun n...a.u=r. mmvihn mm hukuman yang bemvwman p....g.:..n um um rmntmhmkm kaudnmt dxn kmnutzn um: I-nu-sun Dd-M um. flu hukum-n :..mm mm .n M. mnruvakm -um Inlmm-nyang mm mmmm pdhunv pavmlhun an mmmunwm rnmmun‘ sw mnar.7aDumwKp-um»./w 5 «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 4 Va Mlhkanuh dnlnm has .1. a... «nun mmmm mm. hukumln yvlg dimulllun uleh Mahkzmah Inruslah berpetannn sehagal pemzgamn air: max memmmuun keaedlran darn kamsafin kaplda mm-m ma mamhuka Deluaug um memuihkan Yemaduh 419 mum MI um Mnhhumnh nun manmumn mm.» ma. vwagao on ma: mar 10 um-n mm. flan hukumln mm: mm dnkirkln wuur umuk rnsrmelikan 1-mun peluaun kedua umuk mmn kg man yang berm 4 2n Muhlumuh :m.nu mm Muir: hukumln (M al nvvloncmg) um. b--no-n... mew mmomw, domain! can nruwnlran I: ma bemulhnur selngairehabdttatws unluk menwilakkan farluduh mamam scoring mm mg memalum umngunaang um rakyav yaw tmtarwuungizwan damnn rnrapan bahtui Yemduh akan beruban sduflgus mmghmmm undmg-undang an peumnn y-lg wujud uulnllmana yang «am mpumsm dalam us mum pflqmfla smsv 5. Kssnuruuu 51 semn Mahkaman mambual pemmbangan dun pemm. mmmum remadap alnun-nhun ymg dlnyxhlun m am, Mzhkunuh plraya bahawa hukumln ylw an-mm mam remaauh -a-I-n ylng um mmvut, mu, wupv dun munuuluh manurm awn uvuilw-umnng am:-am 22 Jamnn 2024 .n.R....z@., Mauve! Mlnkanah Minstrel Kanuav Perl: sw mnar.7aDumwKp-um»./w 7 «ms smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm nnnmmux Baal pmx pnndlkwun ., Puun Numl Anm n. ‘Ah mm Baal pun mmu» _.Em:xk Sync Muhfl ummam syn Lohnm Hlldm sm mnac7aDumwK:rnm».m 5 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

RA-83-677-09/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH SHAHRUL HAKIM BIN SHAARI

Keluarga Tertuduh tidak seharusnya diheret bersama untuk menanggung penderitaan sekiranya Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman yang berat terhadapnya.

22/01/2024

Puan Ana Rozana binti Mohd Nor

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22/01/2024 17:07:59 RA-83-677-09/2023 Kand. 13 S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N J/isZWLmFEGg7TflW9xNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal R.\—a3—s77—u9/2u23 Kand. 13 ”/on/2044 ya:-5; nu.m umxuun Iulsmzr nus»: mun ueczm venue KES JENAVA twauvumzoza Aumu psunuwa mu uwm smmnuu um»: um smuuu ALASAN psmsnmum 1. PENDAHULUAN « 1 nnmm. Iedah «mam. meukukan sum: umum a. mum uhynn snw mm. mm In mg um dmukum dw hawah uiuynu ylng Ianu. Pemuduhan I-madap Temmm adalah sdP°I1Iy1n§ mum -amm Iumu nu. ounuzma pm mm. kurlng nan r... u.n......: an Fnrmnuauhll, :u.m.mo mm a IlnrnJ:lnn K: :51: dnlxm u. nh Padznn Blur. dalam nlnlrl van: .¢-mu mmua Inndnk nnngllhlun kohorrnatzn p-mm Nauallnl Mum: bimi Mu . No. KP'I’:I4o$fl8471£§Y2 um: mmunjuklun hlhnglnn punggung (duhun Iumu aongnn maloud nuvlyn m-noulniau klnnnnun Nunml mm. mm mm, Na. Kw: uwnav-551: dun dlnoln Ila: Iumu ml-n molnlmlun -um mum» mu mun dlnulwm at Iuwnh uklyln saw Kannn Kpoakluvf 4 2 Temmuh relah ammm tam kali porlanu pads 22 SapVsm!:Ir2fl23 flan mu nu Iemmuh man metvlnhon unmk mmcamxan N .mszwLmFEGy7YmmxNA mm Sum IHIVVDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII mum pm 1 3 Temmm kemudunnyn vein menukav pengnkunn kanuin pangaku-n buulah wda 23 Nuvembev 202: flan has new nmankan van: 1: Duanba znza u-mu ucuun «aha hukum 1.4 Mlhklmah um memnru pengum iulah 1mm.m‘ mamkodkan pevlglknln mm.» Tmudm an mm. mm um Tunuduh dingun ksullhan nmamunu vemnunan dun menllmhk-I hukuman um. RM3,5oa on man may we buhn penian mmx K2: 2: Punk Pendlkwun mu manuamukakan mm was rlrinlus lebngmmnna ynna cum amamn men M-nnnun ubngm P1 2 2 Fan: Ines Iwenumukkan hnhmm pm. 9 Ma 2023 pm nae». knmng 11 50 mm, umau Penslldu nedanq bekarla an rarmznnssaml yam bemaman an No a mu n Mun, mu. m. Buknl‘ emu, rm-, T-numm Huh aaunq Ia-nnnynkm mm; mm um: um lam: mmumukknn bnmgnn plllgqunqnyl mun. Pombdu 23 Pavlsildu win mammal Vaporin val: dan menyennkan rirzman cow milk human newsman 2 4 Huul Iluulnn mu «-4.» mamblva mm Iznatlnln Tenudnn flux mm: u. man. but dun Iabuuh Iain m-rv-mm Mun 'NEI'TO' Aux sm leIlhd\b1lI|fliliPldi m -. mum mvom PIIIAKPIHAK 31 mm n-um... um nungunuiukun rlyuln mmglu may msmglnkln huhumnn dun mun mllvynlalun mu. Tom-uun meruoaknh mum: sum" hank yam: menlnpgung emplx mum lmqaunnnn mm mm ylng sm mszwLmFEGy7n\wwxNA 1 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm mentpukin sea-my nun mnuh npemm mun dun siding um rum mu orvlv unuk wumur 10 an 4 um din searing mu yam wan mm uswa 3 2 Pmuuknan salan Yennduh (emu nuarumnlknn km dun mm p\hIk1:1HIk um um manlllam bum mg pnnwug 3 3 Imam mevuplkln pulllh perlnmn an Manklmnh mnkuarumlml dipmhkzn hukuman Dem am pemeruarnn hm: umuk mentunkan pemlng mm: remmm umu mun.» 34 Savlunpk kqaaun, Tanuduh man mecvyesm ms pemullannya am mm nenuhn unluk mm-n kc plan my hanar 3 5 Tecmdm mm mm Inuallhin din cub: -maapmm mm" paw urlmk menualasr mnumh yang dmndapv um hfililmw lidak akan mevvgulangx kesahlun yzna am; a a mu Pena-kwnn mum ks: An! hwy: mlmuhuu suplyu Mmaman mlnmulmmn hukumln yum ummpd ..e.g.. p.nq....... knpldl Tnnuuuh 4. musnz psuanuxwm 4.: ram pemma dun psnlmg yang mm aixumr kw: uleh Mahkamah sebemm nvemamhkuu Vmkumln mun luepennngan Iwam nan pemnuungu. mm nuxyamm Mankamnh menqukkzs uguum Jena :5 CI. R m 4 2 Hlrbary J rslnh Inenyiukan awn Ivlarmmulkan hukuman yang mum mahkalvlah hams seams: member: pemmblngan xspuua kepammgln mm. undanuvnaang penayah meman amamuuvan secs: mmka, mm" um.‘ d-mun hqulrl mengmlmm [Mayan Islam ma emu. mmnln umuk mnnzaglllnyl sm mszwLmFEGy7n\wwxNA 3 mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm 4: 44 45 Hukuman sednmlkun M. mm. m-lighting ps..,.n.y.h nrlemu dlnpida maiakulun mwnn way. an meuammgm nnluk beraih mnnma n>~»en-yan henna. kahidupln y-nu Mm Kavennncan mm bememangnya umvmuhan, mm peslllh dnomng umuk mm a.-up-a at-Ilnnlyllu mun. Iwmduvm ynmuuwr Dahm ks: Vuunartn bin Slmlumv Mn PP mu 4 cu 3:1, Sm Nmma v-am: JCA lilah n-rm: -m. plmwzlu m ynmlclnu Alva rm bun umma um mil urtladmouramlndlnw/umpmvmevmvdncvmulndmhsuav mmzvmnsampwmmmrmmxwwrnmwng mnsdammm m m mm -«.4 nnwmosc alme oflbvw eammrm :2; 1»: am pm». nnmouwvm ma rs) ma mm mm: mm m cowl mm me abatanca nmm punk: mmmstlnd m. ntsndamahsvuuad” sunmnyu M-vnnun Mn Mun manuuk has & gggum gm Agthlr v. PP[1B4fl 4 ms 1:- may 1: nu no yam tel-VI menyntzkan sepem ynng hem: ‘lnowviewnoamlenucmbenuasodbyasvllniemallremmcnrkzrmma MU'VVo¢4aIsmu.lbIlnkonmln|uw4mlnmwflWloAhvam4nJ4uIzunI ncilrvlwvldulhrnm Vnlhalruwcfwivazuldwlwdlarmnmtalhumnluvs mmmmnu.mm.mmmmn.mgpwmm.m.ssaamm HMIDWy’sL:waIEn9‘and(HansIuam saw; mmuz PM-an mcoum nllnlvgtfvlpmvlllnltrllllzr-vvypInuMlIrcrIIIl.vnWIIAl:1I4a eonmdomm In: nature olme mm m. cnunnllmxx m mm. n m eommilld. the domes omammaw. slmwnby me mm Ihewwncamxv 4 sm mszwLmFEGy7n\wmNA mm. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dun-mm VII mum pm mmnmnansmsa,w:»emmmm.wmm m..m.u,.1.»mm.. pn:nmrnpk:tvrulwvrau(seII(a»avh4s|9sandmarIu15r' u smm son Klnun Kaukuun mun rlwmpavunnlkkm mum-n penjlu ymg Imbh umpav um. um‘ nu ma: -nu ke¢uu~41uInyI 4 7 Ilahkxnah dalam mernben pemmbanwn mum kepemmgan mam um ntenmuhkan hukumln dendu RM3,500.0D yagll new :0 mlan pemari memanaaoqkul kanmhm jmym yug dllalmlun nun Ymuduh mam. -um knlhh-n ma um». dun hukumm m. M. mum nlzngu pong-pun Iwpudl mm um. Tonuduh mm mm vnnlnh m numm [up as Mahlumah jug melalui hukuman yang aiamnm bemasvm unluk member! 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Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24F-1-01/2021

PEMOHON KATHLEEN WONG CHUIN LING RESPONDEN JUSTIN LAW JUN MING PENCELAH DICADANGKAN1. ) Ong Hoo Kip 2. ) Anthony Wong Chee Hoong

1. Kathleen Wong secured an Order for sole CCC of the said children on 14.04.2022, however she passed away intestate on 07.10.2022. 2. On 15.11.2022, RH was given the full CCC of the said children.3. The deceased’s parents, the applicants filed an application under O.15 r.6(2)(b) and O.92 r.4 RC 2012, for leave to intervene in this proceeding. 4. After finding this application has no merits, I dismissed it with an order for costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid to RH within 14 days from the date of this order.

22/01/2024

YA Puan Hayatul Akmal binti Abdul Aziz

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a3b78455-cf16-41b2-a518-7a87b9c1dc23&Inline=true

WA-24F-1-01/2021 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR 5 DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO.: WA-24F-1-01/2021 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 87 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang 10 (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian), 1976 (Akta 164) Dan 15 Dalam Perkara Perkahwinan di antara Kathleen Wong Chuin Ling dan Justin Law Jun Ming Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 87, 88, 89, 90, 93 20 Akta Membaharui Undang-Undang (Perkahwinan dan Perceraian), 1976 Dan 25 Dalam Perkara mengenai kanak-kanak Perkahwinan Aiden James Law Guan Xian dan Adam Zhachary Law Guan Yan 30 ANTARA KATHLEEN WONG CHUIN LING 35 (No. K/P: 850808-14-5060) …PEMOHON DAN JUSTIN LAW JUN MING 40 (No. K/P: 851017-14-6141) …RESPONDEN JUDGMENT (Enclosure 112) 45 22/01/2024 13:40:34 WA-24F-1-01/2021 Kand. 137 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 2 INTRODUCTION [1] In this Originating Summons (OS): 50 (a) Kathleen Wong Chuin Ling (the deceased) passed away on 07.10.2022, approximately six months after securing the Order for sole CCC of the said children, from the Court on 14.04.2022. (b) On 15.11.2022, RH was given the full CCC of the said children. (c) The deceased’s parents, the proposed interveners, Anthony 55 Wong Chee Hoong (NRIC No. 541020-08-5067) and Ong Hoo Kip (NRIC No. 540614-08-5334) filed enclosure112 under O.15 r.6(2)(b) and O.92 r.4 Rules of Court 2012 (RC 2012) seeking leave to intervene in this proceeding. 60 [2] Parties were heard before me on 29.11.2023, and after considering all the cause papers and respective written submissions of the parties, I dismissed enclosure 112 with costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid to RH within fourteen (14) days from today. Dissatisfied, the applicants have filed this appeal, and my reasons are as follows: 65 BRIEF FACTS [3] The deceased and RH: (a) Were married on 14.02.2014. (b) They have two (2) boys named Aiden James, born on 70 10.05.2019 (now 4+ years old), and Adam Zachary, born on 26.08.2020 (now 3+ years old), collectively will be referred to as the said children. S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 3 (c) Alleging domestic violence, the deceased walked out of RH’s house on 23.12.2020 and stayed with her parents at their home. 75 [4] On 04.01.2021: (a) Under a certificate of urgency, the deceased filed this Originating Summons Ex-Parte (OS) for interim custody care and control (CCC) of the said children. 80 (b) On 08.01.2021, an interim CCC of the said children were granted to the deceased. [5] On 15.02.2021: (a) RH applied in enclosure 10 to set aside the said ex-parte order 85 dated 08.01.2021; or (b) On the alternative for him to be given reasonable access to the children. [6] On 19.11.2021: 90 (a) The deceased applied in enclosure 48 under a certificate of urgency for an injunction under section 101 of the Marriage Law Reform Act (LRA) to stop RH from taking the said children overseas pending the disposal of their divorce petition. (b) On 22.03.2022, an order was granted. 95 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 4 [7] On 14.04.2022: (a) After the inter-parte hearing, the deceased was granted the 100 sole CCC of the said children, while RH was given limited structured access. (b) The deceased and her children were staying with the applicants at their home in Taman Tun Dr Ismail, Kuala Lumpur. (c) Approximately six months later, on 07.10.2022, the deceased 105 passed away intestate due to a significant cardiac arrest in Australia, also contributed by some serious ailment. She was cremated in Australia on 12.10.2022. (d) The applicants surrendered the children to RH on 25.10.2022, about eighteen days after the deceased's passing, with an offer 110 for RH to take custody of the relevant children's documents. [8] Thereafter, a month later, on 09.11.2022: (a) RH applied in enclosure 103 to amend the sole CCC order, seeking that he be granted the sole CCC of the children instead. 115 (b) Further, the maternal grandparents (the applicants) are to deliver the said children to him within three (3) days. (c) On 15.11.2022, RH was given the full CCC of the said children and the applicants were ordered to surrender the said children and other related orders. 120 (d) The maternal grandparents had already surrendered the children on 25.10.2022 before the Court Order for CCC was made to favour RH. S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 5 [9] About six months after the passing of their daughter (the deceased): 125 (a) On 14.04.2023, about five months after the Order of CCC was finalised and granted to RH, the children's maternal grandparents filed the present application (enclosure 112) seeking leave to intervene. (b) The parties were heard on 29.11.2023, and in my judgment, the 130 applicant failed to discharge their burden of meeting the legal requirement needed. (c) Accordingly, I dismissed enclosure 112 with costs. THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS 135 [10] I have duly observed and considered the parties' arguments in canvassing for their positions in enclosure 112: The Applicants arguments: 140 10.1 In varying the sole CCC Order granted to the deceased and in turn granting the CCC to RH on 15.11.2022, certain orders were made against the Applicants in their absence (when they were not parties in the proceeding). 145 10.2 Ever since securing the 15.11.2022 Order for CCC, the Applicants have not been allowed to see the children as often as they had wished. In filing enclosure 112, they seek scheduled access to the said children: 150 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 6 (a) The applicants cited section 88 of the LRA that empowers the Court in exceptional circumstances where it is undesirable to entrust the welfare of the children to either parent or place the children temporarily in the care of some other person. In addition, the Court is empowered to order a child to visit any 155 members of the family of the deceased parent, and any member of the family of the deceased parent be given the right to access the children. (b) It was argued, section 88 clothed the applicants with a right to 160 intervene for the welfare of the children, and in the premise further argued that: (i) The 15.11.2022 Court order (enclosure 111), in paragraph 2(a), implicates the applicants when it was ordered that they surrender the children with all relevant documents (birth certificates, passports, 165 insurance policies, school records, medical records, immunisation records, etc) to RH in seven days from the order. (ii) Natural justice demands that the applicants be accorded the right to be heard on this issue. The applicants cited Mila Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong She yen [1995] 3 MLJ 537, FC, in reaffirming the principle of 170 natural justice, which said that no one should be condemned unheard. The privy Council in Pegang Mining Co. Ltd v Choong Sam & Anor [1969] 2 MLJ 52, PC said that the Court shall have the power to bring all the parties before it and determine the rights of all- in-one proceedings. This was adopted with approval by the Federal 175 Court in Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622, FC. (iii) By RH including these prayers in his application (enclosure 103), it invites the applicant to intervene. 180 (c) The applicants alleged that RH had not been forthright and transparent in implicating the applicants in enclosure 103 with the facts (enclosure 104: Supporting Affidavit) when the facts are not what he had alleged to the Court: S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 7 (i) The fact was that when he filed enclosure 103, the children were 185 already in his custody when the applicants surrendered them on 25.10.2022, about eighteen days after the passing of the deceased. (ii) Without the Court’s intervention, the applicants had already informed RH on 18.11.2022 that he could collect the children’s documents. (iii) There was no resistance from them in the foregoing matters. 190 (iv) The prayer in enclosure 103 to compel the applicants on the foregoing matters was to cast a negative aspersion on them, insinuating that they are a problem in the foregoing matters when they have never been. 195 10.3 The applicants further claimed: (a) That they have an interest in the subject matter of this suit, particularly the children. (b) They had cared for the said children from their tender years 200 since 22.12.2020 when they were still a baby (19 months old) and an infant (4 months old), where RH never provided any care for them after the deceased, and the children moved in with the applicants. 205 (c) Since sole CCC was granted to the deceased initially, at her demise, it was argued by the applicants that they, as the maternal grandparents, assumed an immediate right and interest in the affairs and welfare of the children. 210 (d) The applicants cited the rebuttable presumption in section 88(3) of the LRA that it is good for the welfare of the child below seven to be with the mother. At the same time, the Court shall regard the undesirability of disturbing a child's life by changes in custody. In the premise, it was further argued that the maternal 215 grandparents would be the best party to care for the children after the mother's passing. S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 8 (e) Though in enclosure 112, the applicants did not apply for CCC, it was argued that the Court should consider the applicable 220 presumption to favour the applicants’ application and grant them leave to intervene. 10.4 The applicants alleged that Enclosure 112: (a) Is necessitated by RH’s unreasonable refusal to grant sufficient 225 and proper access to the said children. His refusal to make amiable, proper, and scheduled visits for the applicants requires the Court’s intervention to set it right. If RH can agree to reasonable and structured access to the applicants, enclosure 112 would not have been required. 230 (b) The excuse by RH that he needed time to bond with the children is untenable. It is a continuation of his vengeful retaliation against the deceased in his earlier feud, where the deceased secured the sole CCC over the children. 235 (c) His present action is not for the welfare of the children by disallowing them to spend sufficient time with their maternal grandparents during their nurturing and tender years. 240 (d) The applicants and the children played no part in his feud with the deceased, where the Court’s decision granting sole CCC to the deceased was grounded on the facts proven at the time. He cannot use the Court’s Order as an excuse to have suffered lost time with the children for the past two years. It is just untenable. 245 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 9 10.5 The applicants cited: (a) Section 4 of the Probate and Administration Act of 1959 to argue on the death of the deceased intestate. 250 (b) The children, RH and the applicants are all beneficiaries in her estate. (c) The applicants asserted that the Court, in considering 255 enclosure 112, should be mindful that for the deceased’s estate matter, the applicants have every right to apply as joint administrators and, therefore, should be allowed to intervene in this OS. 260 (d) As lawful beneficiaries in the deceased's estate, the applicants have every right to caveat the estate to prevent their rights from being ignored or compromised by RH. He has no right to deny it or find cause against it. 265 10.6 The applicants argued that RH failed to clarify why the applicants had no interest in this OS when he had included them in enclosure 103 for CCC. There is no part in it that he denied that the applicants have no right to access the children. 270 The Respondent Husband’s (RH) arguments: 10.7 RH denied the applicant's allegation that he did not accommodate their requests for a meaningful, structured, and regular visit of the children. He argued that: 275 (a) After RH secured the 15.11.2022 order for CCC, the applicants' solicitor wrote (03.02.2023) asking for access to the children (exhibit C, Applicants Affidavit in Support, enclosure 113). S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 10 (b) RH’s solicitor replied on 08.02.2023 (exhibit C, Applicants Affidavit 280 in Support, enclosure 113). He stated on the record, among other things, that the applicants have never been denied access to the said children as their maternal grandparents. The children are always in WhatsApp communication with them and have been informed several times of the suitable time and date for 285 access. RH also considered his time for bonding with the children that he had lost for almost two years when his access was allegedly scheduled and obstructed. The children and he need to normalise their relationship brought about by the sudden death of the children’s mother. The allegation of 290 denying access to the applicants does not arise. It was claimed that: (i) RH contracted Covid-19 on 12.11.2022 and was isolated. (ii) On 20.02.2023, his grandmother passed away, and as he was attending the funeral arrangement, he was informed via a phone call 295 of the wishes of the applicants. (iii) Regardless of the situation, the applicants filed in enclosure 112 seeking to intervene on 14.04.2023. (iv) Citing Mohamed Azmal Noor Naina Mohd Noor v Arab Malaysia Finance Bhd & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 505, CA that had ruled 300 intervention will be allowed to assist the Court in the appropriate and complete determination of the matter. RH, however, argued that the intervention was unnecessary when CCC had already been granted to RH. (v) He further cited section 6(1) of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1961, 305 which states that on the death of a parent, the surviving parent shall be guardian to the infant. Grandparents are not within the definition of parent under the Act. S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 11 (vi) With enclosure 112, the applicant is attempting to compel RH to grant more access than is deemed necessary by the children’s lawful 310 guardian. (c) The applicant's solicitor replied on 28.02.2023, expressing the applicant's desire only to maintain a relationship with the grandchildren and not RH (exhibit C, Applicants Affidavit in Support, 315 enclosure 113). (d) Several days later, on 01.03.2023, RH discovered that the applicants had lodged a caveat over the estate of the deceased, who had died intestate without informing RH. 320 The applicants argued that: This should not be an issue; it is a non-starter. The lawful right to lodge a caveat on the deceased's estate is accorded to the legal beneficiaries to protect their interests. The applicants are also the lawful beneficiaries. 325 (e) Before the CCC Order of 15.11.2022, RH claimed he had no opportunity to care for the children as he was only entitled to a structured visit with limited access by the ex-parte Court Order (enclosure 9). It was not by his choice. 330 The applicants argued that: RH's structured and limited access is by a valid Court Order, granted on proven facts at the time. Indeed, this cannot be the grounds to claim restricted access occasioned by the deceased. The said orders were 335 never set aside, varied, or stayed until the untimely death of the deceased. (f) Contrary to the argument by the applicants that they had voluntarily surrendered the children on 25.10.2022, about 18 days after the death of the children’s mother (07.10.2022), RH 340 asserted that it was not out of goodwill but rather in compliance S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 12 with a Court order dated 14.04.2022 (amended on 14.6.2022) in giving limited structured access to RH. The applicants argued that: Though RH asserts that he had never denied the applicants access to the 345 children, he fails to show what access he agreed to for the applicants. It was argued that the applicant’s right to access cannot be merely subjected to the whims and fancies of RH. Most of the submissions by RH on access are irrelevant since enclosure 112 is not about access but about the right to intervene in the OS. RH did not argue that the applicants do not have 350 the right to access the children. Contrary to the assertion of RH, the applicants claimed that they voluntarily surrendered the children 18 days after the demise of the deceased. At this juncture, it is sufficient for the Court to decide that the applicants have the right to intervene before a substantive application for 355 access and any other ancillary orders are made where the full facts and circumstances would be canvassed and ventilated before the Court. (g) RH further asserted that the intention of the applicants in enclosure 112 is not bona fide because despite receiving large 360 sums of insurance payout for the death of the deceased, they could have used the money to assist in the children’s educational and health needs. The applicants have no intention of nurturing a healthy relationship with RH and only wish to maintain a relationship with the children. 365 The applicants argued that: Notwithstanding RH’s argument on the insurance payout, he has never challenged the applicant's lawful right to receive it. The applicants deny any assertion that they have manipulated the children. These are just bare allegations with no compelling materials to support them. 370 (h) RH he alleged that the applicants have constantly harassed him with legal letters and emotional blackmail messages. The applicants argued: This is another unsupported argument against them. He was merely being 375 asked to allow reasonable access to the children, which he disagreed with. S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 13 Enclosure 112 could have been avoided had he agreed to an amiable and reasonable visitation for the children. (i) Even though RH and the deceased were not yet divorced at the 380 time of her passing, the applicants kept secret the deceased exact ward number and made sure that it was a task for him to speak to the doctors to find out about the condition of the deceased at the hospital. The applicants even kept secret the death certificate of the deceased. 385 (j) The applicants' tendency to manipulate the situation with the minor children to favour them can never be discounted in the circumstances. That would not be in the welfare of the children in their nurturing and growing up years. The applicant argued that: 390 The unsupported accusations against the applicants that are vehemently denied. There is not an iota of evidence to support it. (k) Contrary to the applicant's claim that they are close to the children, RH asserts that on one occasion in November 2022, 395 the children refused to return to the applicant's house in TTDI and cried to follow RH home. (l) It was further argued by RH that, even when he arranged to meet up with the children, the applicants did not use the time to 400 spend a meaningful visit with the said children. The applicants responded that: The facts that transpired when they met with the children are stated in paragraph 17 of their Affidavit in reply in enclosure 115. It contradicts the allegations of RH. 405 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 14 (m) RH had, in the circumstances of the development of the children, suggested that the applicants meet up with the children once every three months, which the applicants disagreed with by placing their interest above that of the 410 children. The suggestion by the applicants for overnight access every fortnight is contrary to the children's outdoor timetable activities and RH’s rights as the biological father and guardian of the children who is fully capable of providing care and upbringing of the children. There is no evidence to date by the 415 applicants to refute his ability. The applicants’ argued: It is never their argument that RH is an incapable parent. Whether he is or is not is not the issue. What is relevant is the applicants' right to appropriate and meaningful access to their grandchildren, which RH had 420 denied. A proposed short visit of once every three months is evidently in appropriate in the circumstances. (n) RH alleges that the applicants had not sufficiently addressed the law on intervening in a proceeding. Citing Arab Merchant 425 Bank v Dr Jamaludin Dato Mohd Jarjis [1991] 2 CLJ 862, SC, where the Supreme Court made it clear that one of the principal objects of O.15 r.6 of the RHC 1980 is to enable the Court to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment by proceeding to adjudicate 430 upon the matter in dispute without giving the proposed intervener an opportunity of being heard. In the present case, the OS is a concluded matter with an Order for CCC already granted to RH on 15.11.2022. The said order has been finalised and is no longer a pending matter. The application in enclosure 435 112 by the applicants was only made about four months later S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 15 when it should have been before the final judgment was rendered. There is no longer any proceeding before the Court as far as the CCC of the children is concerned: Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 440 MLJ 622, FC. In the circumstances, RH prays that enclosure 112 is dismissed, while the applicants pray that leave to intervene is allowed. 445 THE LAW ON INTERVENER [11] The law on interveners: 11.1 As provided under O.15 r.6 RC 2012, it is trite that an application to intervene is generally made to prevent injustice and multiplicity of proceedings. In Chan Yee V Chan Yoke Fong [1990] 2 CLJ 732, 450 SC where the Supreme Court observed that: “…under the rule, the court has a wide discretion to make the order…so that all matters in dispute could be effectively determined and adjudicated upon”. 11.2 This would avoid two possibly different decisions being reached 455 concerning the same questions or issues. In Tajul Ariffin bin Mustafa V Heng Cheng Hong [1993] 1 AMR 119; [1993] 2 MLJ 143, SC, Edgar Joseph JR SCJ (delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court) said: “The objects of r 6(2)(b) as to joinder of parties are, generally speaking, the 460 same as the object of the rules governing third-party proceedings that is to say: (a) to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and to enable the court to determine disputes between all parties to them in one action, and (b) to prevent the same or substantially the same questions or issues being tried all over again with possibly different results”. 465 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 16 11.3 The legal criteria required could be seen in Pegang Mining Co. Ltd V Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52, where it was determined that an applicant is a proper person to be added if it can be shown: (a) His presence before the Court is imperative for the adjudication of the 470 subject matter of the case. (b) He has direct legal or financial interests in the action. (c) His rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action is directly affected by any order which may be made in the action. 475 [12] The law makes it incumbent: 12.1 The application must be made as soon as possible or when the applicant first had knowledge of the proceeding and an opportunity to take the necessary steps. (See: Chong Fook Sin V Amanah 480 Raya Bhd & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 917, FC). 12.2 The threshold test to be an intervener is for the applicant to demonstrate direct interest: Jerry WA Dusing & Anor v MAIWP [2017] 1 CLJ 133, CA: 485 “The threshold test to be an intervener is for the applicant to demonstrate direct interest. In the instant case, MAIWP will not be affected by any court order and had no rights over and owes no liabilities to the appellants…”. 490 [13] A plaintiff: (a) Is prima facie entitled to sue any party he chooses and leave out any person as a defendant from an action as he wishes Tajul Ariffin bin Mustafa V Heng Cheng Hong (supra); Abidin V Doraisamy [1994] 1 MLJ 617, SC. 495 (b) The plaintiff cannot be compelled to proceed against other persons he does not desire to sue. (c) The court nevertheless has the power to join a party as a defendant upon the plaintiff's application. S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 17 (d) Unlike an application to add a plaintiff to an action, the court will 500 not add a person as a defendant if the plaintiff claims no remedy from him (see Ang Eng Lee V Lim Lye Soon [1985-1986] SLR (R) 931, CA Sg; Tajul Ariffin Bin Mustafa V Heng Cheng Hong [1993] 1 AMR 119; [1993] 2 MLJ 143, SC. 505 [14] In Dato’ Dr Haji Mohamed Haniffa bin Haji Abdullah and Anor V Koperasi Doktor Malaysia Bhd & Ors [2008] 4 AMR 293; [2008] 3 MLJ 530, CA, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal said: “Order 15 r 6(2)(b) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 permits intervention on two 510 separate grounds. Sub-para (i) of the rule enables intervention where the presence of a party before the court is necessary. In sub-para (ii), intervention is enabled where a party to an action claims relief or a remedy which will materially affect the non-party intervener's rights. In such circumstances, the court is empowered to permit intervention if it believes that doing so will be just and convenient.” 515 [15] A person who is not a party: (a) May be added as a defendant against the wishes of the plaintiff either on the application of the defendant or on his own intervention, or in rare cases by the court of its own motion 520 under O.15, r.6(2)(b) RC 2012. (b) The jurisdiction of the court under this rule is entirely discretionary: Ramachandran s/o Appalanaidu & 107 Ors V Dato Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2012] 6 AMR 124; 525 [2012] 6 MLJ 519, CA, observed that the power of the court to join a party to an action as “a matter of the court’s discretion in the totality of the circumstances” and “ultimately depends on the factual matrix before the court”. 530 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 18 (c) Premised on O.15, r 6(2)(b)(i) RC 2012, a person may be added as a party if it can be shown the person is directly affected, either legally or financially, by any order which may be made in the action: Privy Council in Pegang Mining Co Ltd V Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52, PC. The Privy Council in Pegang Mining 535 formulated the approach as follows, “will his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by an order which may be made in the action?” 540 (d) The approach formulated in Pegang Mining has been adopted in numerous decisions, among others in Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd [1992] 2 MLJ 63 [1992] 1 CLJ 344, SC; Soo Hong & Leong Kew Moi V United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 690, CA. 545 (e) O.15, r 6(2)(b) RC 2012 confers a more comprehensive power on the court to add a person as a party where a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the action may exist that it would be just and 550 convenient to determine between him and that party as well as between the parties to the action. [16] For a third party to intervene and be joined as a party in an action, the proposed intervener must demonstrate that they have some interest 555 directly related to or connected with the subject matter of the action. If a person wishes to be joined because of a financial interest and not a legal interest, in the outcome of the case, the court is unlikely to allow the third party to intervene (see Soo Hong & Leong Kew Moi & Ors V United S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 19 Malaysian Banking Corp Bhd & Anor (supra); Tai Choi Yu V Syarikat 560 Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 MLJ 275, CA). [17] The Supreme Court of Malaysia in the case of Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd (supra), endorsed the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in the case of Pegang Mining (supra) and said: “It is 565 settled law, on the authorities, that a party may be added if his ‘legal interest’ will be affected by the judgment in the action but not if his ‘commercial interest’ alone would be affected”. This was referred to in the Federal Court decision in the case of Chong Fook V Amanah Raya Berhad (as administrator for the estate of Raja Nong Chik Bin Raja 570 Ishak, deceased) & Ors [2011] 1 MLJ 721. [18] The Federal Court in Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622, FC concerning an application to intervene, amongst other 575 things, observed: 18.1 The words at ‘any stage of the proceedings...’ necessarily mean that a proceeding is still pending before the Court. Once judgment is recorded, there is no longer a proceeding for the party to intervene. The judge has also become functus officio. 580 18.2 The application must be made promptly. Once a judgment is entered, the proceeding has come to an end. O.15 is concerned with the very early stage of a proceeding, to have all the necessary parties in before the trial begins. 18.3 Where non-parties try to intervene in the proceedings, they must do 585 so under O.15 r.6 RHC 1980 and must necessarily comply with the said provision. While the principles laid down in Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 MLJ 52, PC as to exercising S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 20 the Court’s discretion are applicable, all requirements of O.15 r.6(2) must be satisfied. The intervener must have a sufficient legal 590 interest in the subject matter and outcome of the proceeding. 18.4 An affidavit must support an application for leave to intervene. The presiding judge merely decides on affidavit evidence whether to grant or deny the leave. At this stage, the judge should not make a definitive finding of facts, which, as envisaged by O.15 r.6 RHC, will 595 and can only be made after all evidence has been adduced in the trial that would subsequently follow. FINDINGS OF THIS COURT [19] In the present application (enclosure 112) by the applicants (the 600 children's maternal grandparents) for leave to intervene in this OS, they prayed to be added as an intervener before filing the required substantive application for access and other ancillary orders. I have examined all- cause papers and the parties' respective submissions in canvassing for their position in the present suit. Considering my observation in the totality 605 of the evidence and my observations in the parties' respective arguments in paragraph [10] 10.1-10.7 above, in addition, it is my considered determination that: 19.1 Cognizance is taken that enclosure 112 strictly seeks leave to intervene in the present OS. No application is made on access over 610 the children, though parties argued on it, which I take as irrelevant for enclosure 112. Regarding an intervener’s application for leave, I find guidance in the words of Gopal Seri Ram JCA in Dato’ Dr Haji Mohamed Haniffa bin Haji Abdullah and Anor V Koperasi Doktor Malaysia Bhd & Ors [2008] 4 AMR 293; [2008] 3 MLJ 530, 615 S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 21 CA, that O.15 r 6(2)(b) of RHC 1980 permits intervention on two separate grounds: (a) Sub-para (i) of the rule enables intervention where the presence of a party before the court is necessary. (b) In sub-para (ii), intervention is enabled where a party to an 620 action claims relief or a remedy which will materially affect the non-party intervener's rights. (c) In such circumstances, the court is empowered to permit intervention if it believes doing so will be just and convenient. 625 19.2 In considering enclosure 12 within the confines of principles above, it has to be dismissed looking at the following: (a) Chronology of events: (1) The deceased was granted sole CCC after an inter-parte hearing on 14.04.2022 630 (2) About six months later, on 07.10.2022, she met her untimely death in Australia. (3) The applicants surrendered the children to RH eighteen days after the demise of their mother on 25.10.2022. (4) At this juncture, it is fitting that guardianship over the children would 635 fall on the surviving parent (RH). (5) About a month later, on 09.11.2022, RH applied in enclosure 103 to vary the sole CCC Order of the deceased and instead prayed that he be granted CCC over the children. (6) About a month later, on 15.11.2022, the Court granted CCC to RH. 640 (7) At this juncture on 15.11.2022, no more proceeding is pending in the present OS; it had been concluded. The court order for the CCC has been finalised. (8) About five months after the finalisation of the Order for CCC above, on 14.04.2023, the applicants filed enclosure 112 to intervene. 645 (9) On 29.11.2023, I dismissed enclosure 112. (b) In arriving at my decision, I am guided by the Federal Court in Hong Leong Bank Bhd (formerly Hong Leong Finance Bhd) v Staghorn Sdn Bhd and other appeals [2008] 2 MLJ 622, 650 FC that had observed for a right to intervene, it must be before a pending proceeding. Once judgment is recorded and S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 22 finalised, there is no longer a proceeding for the party to intervene. The application to intervene must be made promptly. This accords with the legal maxim that equity does not assist a 655 tardy litigant. O.15 is concerned with the very early stage of a proceeding, to have all the necessary parties in before the trial begins. Once it is concluded with a judgment recorded and finalised, the court becomes functus officio. 660 19.3 It is also my observation: (a) That in line with the ruling by the Court of Appeal in Ramachandran s/o Appalanaidu & 107 Ors V Dato Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2012] 6 AMR 124; [2012] 6 MLJ 519, CA, that the power of the court to join a party to an action is “a 665 matter of the court’s discretion in the totality of the circumstances” and “ultimately depends on the factual matrix before the court’. (b) Though the law is trite and the LRA recognises under section 670 86 (2)(c) and (d), the visitation rights of grandparents denied access, I could not find sustainable or compelling materials from the applicants to give me cause in the circumstances of the case as to why I should allow a concluded matter on the CCC Order granted to RH before the Court to be unravelled 675 over issues of access by the maternal grandparent, which could be addressed under separate and relevant provisions of the LRA. [20] It is a trite law that an Order for CCC and maintenance of the 680 children are never final as to be cast in stone. On an application by any S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal WA-24F-1-01/2021 23 interested party, the Court is empowered under section 96 of the LRA to vary custodial and maintenance orders founded on (1) any misrepresentation, (2) mistake, and (3) material change in circumstances. The Court will always act for the best interests and welfare of the children 685 at all times and not for the feuding parties if and when they do not act in the children's best interest. Mahabir Prasad v Mahabir Prasad [1982] 1 MLJ 189, FC: The first and paramount consideration is the child's welfare, which is now statutorily embodied in section 88 LRA. 690 CONCLUSION [21] All things considered, on the balance of probabilities, I find the applicants have failed to meet the legal requirements and prove the merits of enclosure 112. In the circumstances, this application is dismissed with costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid to RH within 14 days from the date of this 695 order. Dated 22.01.2024. HAYATUL AKMAL ABDUL AZIZ 700 JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR 705 Counsels: Mr. K. Jeyaraj Messrs. K. Jeyaraj Fadhli Sin Counsel for the proposed Interveners 710 Mr. Ragumaren Gopal, together with Ms Amelia Marie Gasper Messrs G. Ragumaren Gopal & Co Counsels for the Respondent Husband S/N VYS3oxbPskGlGHqHucHcIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-22NCC-104-08/2022

PLAINTIF KOPERASI PEKEBUN KECIL NEGERI SEMBILAN BERHAD DEFENDAN 1. ) AGRO CAPITAL MANAGEMENT BERHAD 2. ) MICHAEL MARCUS LIEW 3. ) JAMIL BIN ABU BAKAR

TORT: Pelaburan via penerbitan sukuk – Pelaburan oleh sebuah koperasi – Kegagalan, pengabaian dan/atau kecuaian untuk membayar keseluruhan pelaburan sebanyak RM5 juta, keseluruhan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) yang tertunggak dan pampasan − Sama ada representasi palsu/konspirasi penipuan/frod yang dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan – Sama ada baki tunggakan dividen sebagaimana terkandung dalam perjanjian dan jaminan hendaklah dibayar sebagaimana kaedah disebut dalam jadual – Sama ada pembelaan Defendan-Defendan bermerit − Pengakuan dan kelakuan Defendan Pertama adalah amat jelas bahawa mereka tiada pembelaan bermerit kerana wang pelaburan telah dinikmati oleh Defendan Pertama untuk projek ternakan udang.

20/01/2024

YA Puan Rozi Binti Bainon

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8f1e47cc-a4c7-4f24-9ed4-bc25a4d585b4&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN NO.: BA-22NCC-104-08/2022 ANTARA KOPERASI PEKEBUN KECIL NEGERI SEMBILAN BERHAD (Koop Negeri No.: 35) − PLAINTIF DAN 1. AGRO CAPITAL MANAGEMENT BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 201401020709/1096795-U) 2. MICHAEL MARCUS LIEW (No. Pasport: K0677134R) 3. JAMIL BIN ABU BAKAR (No. K/P: 550704-07-5729) – DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Plaintif memfailkan writ saman dan pernyataan tuntutan terhadap Defendan-Defendan berkenaan dengan skim pelaburan di mana Plaintif menuntut Defendan-Defendan secara bersesama dan berasingan membayar kepada Plaintif wang pelaburan berjumlah RM5,000,000.00 (RM5 juta); jumlah baki dividen penuh sebanyak RM312,500.00; Ganti rugi Am untuk ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah; caj bayaran lewat pada kadar 20/01/2024 18:42:21 BA-22NCC-104-08/2022 Kand. 54 S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 5% setahun ke atas jumlah RM5,312,500.00 dikira dari 16-5-2022 sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; dan kos bagi tindakan ini. [2] Perbicaraan penuh telah diadakan di Mahkamah ini pada 28-8-2023 dan 29-8-2023 di mana Plaintif memanggil 3 orang saksinya dan Defendan memanggil 2 orang saksinya. [3] Pada 2510-2023, Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif dan memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “KEPUTUSAN SELEPAS BICARA PENUH [1] Tindakan undang-undang Plaintif terhadap Defendan- Defendan ialah mengenai representasi palsu/konspirasi penipuan/frod yang dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan bagi pelaburan sebanyak RM5,000,000.00. [2] Skim Pelaburan yang di antara Plaintif dan Defendan- Defendan ialah melalui penerbitan sukuk. [3] Tempoh Sukuk bermula 18-5-2018 hingga 15 Mei 2021. [4] Perenggan 25 pernyataan tuntutan memplidkan bahawa Plaintif hanya diberikan dividen berjumlah RM1,937,500.00 sahaja. Baki dividen tertunggak yang dikira dari November 2020 sehingga November 2021 ialah sebanyak RM312,500.00. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [5] Perenggan 27 pernyataan tuntutan memplidkan bahawa dividen tertunggak dibayar sebagaimana kaedah disebut dalam jadual. [6] Berdasarkan keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Plaintif berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-Defendan dan dengan itu Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif. Selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan Defendan- Defendan secara bersesama membayar Plaintif − (a) wang pelaburan berjumlah RM5,000,000.00. (b) baki dividen sebanyak RM312,500.00. (c) delay in the projected returns/dividend payment 4% p.a. payable on a pro-rate basis dari November 2021 hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh. (d) kos sebanyak RM10,000.00.”. [4] Defendan-Defendan tidak berpuas hati dan terkilan dengan keputusan Mahkamah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Pliding [5] Dalam tuntutannya, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Plaintif ialah sebuah koperasi yang ditubuhkan di bawah Akta Koperasi 1993 dan mempunyai alamat berdaftarnya di Medan Perniagaan Senawang Jaya, Senawang, Negeri Sembilan. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 Manakala Defendan Pertama ialah sebuah syarikat yang ditubuhkan di bawah Akta Syarikat 1965 (Akta Syarikat 2016) yang mempunyai alamat berdaftarnya di Petaling Jaya dan alamat perniagaannya di Pekan, Pahang. Defendan Kedua ialah seorang bukan warganegara yang menetap di Petaling Jaya dan ialah salah seorang daripada pengarah syarikat dalam Defendan Pertama. Defendan Ketiga ialah warganegara Malaysia yang menetap di Datok Keramat, Kuala Lumpur dan ialah salah seorang daripada pengarah syarikat dalam Defendan Pertama. Skim pelaburan: [6] Pada sekitar bulan April 2018, berdasarkan representasi oleh Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua, Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membuat pelaburan modal mengikut konsep pelaburan patuh Shariah menggunakan instrument sukuk. [7] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa representasi yang diberikan oleh Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua ialah – (a) pelaburan tersebut dijanjikan akan mendatangkan pulangan dividen yang lumayan; (b) sijil sukuk akan dikeluarkan kepada Plaintif; S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 (c) pelaburan tersebut akan disalurkan untuk tujuan kolam ternakan udang laut (marine shrimp) yang dikomersialkan serta akan diuruskan oleh pihak Defendan Pertama selaku Farm Operator (selepas ini sisebut sebagai “Projek tersebut”). (d) dokumen yang diberikan dan ditunjukkan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif ialah salinan profil syarikat Defendan Pertama mengenai kepakaran dan pengalaman Defendan Pertama dalam pembangunan projek akuakultur di Malaysia dan ternakan udang yang diusahakan oleh Defendan Pertama yang mendapat pensijilan daripada Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia dan Defendan Pertama ialah ahli berdaftar dengan Jabatan Perikanan Malaysia. Selain itu, Defendan Pertama juga menunjukkan salinan keratan akhbar mengenai lapran media berkaitan dengan kejayaan Defendan Pertama dalam projek akuakultur. [8] Berlandaskan penelitian Plaintif kepada representasi dan dokumen oleh Defendan Pertama, maka selepas melalui mesyuarat Ahli Lembaga Koperasi (ALK) bertarikh 18-4-2018, Plaintif melabur sebanyak RM5 juta dalam syarikat Defendan Pertama untuk tempoh 36 bulan dengan kadar pulangan keuntungan sebanyak 15% setahun. Tarikh cek Plaintif bagi pelaburan itu ialah 14-5-2018. Defendan Pertama telah mengeluarkan resit rasmi bertarikh 18-6-2018 kepada Plaintif sebagai bukti pembayaran. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 [9] Berdasarkan perjanjian bertulis yang dimasuki, Plaintif menyatakan bahawa – • Agro Capital Management Corporation (No. Syarikat: E0543862013-7) yang beralamat di New York sebagai penerbit sukuk. • Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd (No. Pendaftaran: 201735663- C) yang beralamat di Singapura sebagai pengurus dan/atau wakil kepada pengurus sukuk. • tarikh perjanjian ialah pada 10-5-2018 dan tarikh penerbitan sukuk ialah bermula 15-5-2018 sehingga 15-5-2021. • komunikasi di antara pihak-pihak adalah di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama dan tanpa apa-apa penglibatan Agro Capital Management Corporation dan Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd. Dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return): [10] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa jadual pembayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) adalah sebanyak RM62,500.00 sebulan bermula 15-6-2018 (iaitu sebulan selepas tarikh penerbitan sukuk) sehingga 15-5-2021 (tarikh tamat sukuk) di mana jumlah keseluruhan pembayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) ialah sebanyak RM2,250,000.00. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [11] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa setakat pemfailan guaman ini, Plaintif hanya dibayar sebanyak RM1,937,500.00 sahaja dan baki pulangan dividen tertunggak ialah sebanyak RM312,500.00 (iaitu dari bulan November 2020 sehingga November 2021). [12] Berdasarkan surat Defendan Pertama bertarikh 23-3-2021 kepada Plaintif, Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa kelewatan bayaran dividen ialah kerana wabak Covid-19 dan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) akan diteruskan seperti biasa dan tunggakan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) adalah dibayar mengikut jadual berikut: 30-4-2021: 35% dari keseluruhan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) yang tertunggak. 31-5-2021: 35% dari keseluruhan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) yang tertunggak. 30-6-2021: 30% dari keseluruhan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) yang tertunggak. Dan berdasarkan surat Defendan Pertama bertarikh 23-3-2021 itu juga, Defendan Pertama menyatakan bahawa akibat kelewatan pembayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return), Plaintif boleh menjangkakan pampasan sebanyak 4% setahun sebagai tambahan yang dibayar mengikut asas pro-rata. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [13] Kegagalan, pengabaian dan/atau kecuaian untuk membayar keseluruhan pelaburan sebanyak RM5 juta, keseluruhan bayaran dividen/unjuran pulangan (projected return) yang tertunggak dan pampasan, maka Plaintif mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap Defendan-Defendan. Tindakan Defendan-Defendan: [14] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa akibat daripada representasi palsu/konspirasi penipuan/frod dan kecuaian Defendan-Defendan yang mana setiap butir-butir tindakan diperihalkan dalam perenggan 30 dan 31 pernyataan tuntutan maka Plaintif anggota-anggota Plaintif telah diprejudiskan dengan teruk dan mengalami kerugian dari segi masa, wang, tenaga serta modal perniagaan akibat kegagalan Defendan- Defendan melunaskan tanggungjawab mereka di bawah perjanjian tersebut. Relief yang dipohon oleh Plaintif: [15] Plaintif memohon perintah Mahkamah yang berikut: (a) deklarasi bahawa skim pelaburan di bawah Sijil Sukuk SF No.: SUKUK29-002 diisytiharkan telah tamat dan matang pada 15- 5-2021. (b) Defendan-Defendan secara bersesama dan berasingan membayar kepada Plaintif jumlah sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 yang dilaburkan; jumlah baki dividen penuh sebanyak RM312,500.00; Ganti rugi Am untuk ditaksirkan oleh S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Mahkamah; caj bayaran lewat pada kadar 5% setahun di atas jumlah RM5,312,500.00 fikira dari 16-5-2021 sehingga ke tarikh penyelesaian penuh. (c) kos bagi tindakan ini. Pembelaan [16] Defendan-Defendan memplidkan yang berikut: (a) Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua merupakan pengarah, pegawai dan/atau pekerja di Agro Capital Management Berhad (Defendan Pertama). Oleh itu, apa-apa pernyataan yang diberikan dan/atau tindakan diambil oleh Defendan Kedua dan/atau Defendan Ketiga adalah atas kapasiti melaksanakan tanggungjawab oleh Defendan Kedua dan/atau Defendan Ketiga sebagai pengarah, pegawai dan/atau pekerja di Defendan Pertama dan bukannya dalam keupayaan individu Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga. Oleh itu, Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga tidak patut disaman sebagai Defendan-Defendan dalam tindakan ini. (b) Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah membuat apa-apa pernyataan yang tidak tepat kepada Plaintif. (c) Defendan-Defendan tiada pengetahuan mengenai perjanjian sukuk tersebut; tidak pernah menyediakan, memberi dan/atau meminta Plaintif untuk menandatangani perjanjian sukuk tersebut. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 (d) Defendan Pertama dalam perniagaan pertanian dan tidak terlibat dalam apa-apa pelaburan yang salah di sisi undang- undang. (e) Defendan-Defendan bukan salah satu pihak dalam perjanjian sukuk tersebut yang Plaintif masuki secara sukarela. (f) Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah memberi apa-apa jaminan, komitmen, akujanji dan/atau indemniti berkenaan dengan pelaburan dan pulangan pelaburan kepada Plaintif. [17] Selanjutnya, Defendan-Defendan menyatakan − (a) Agro Capital Management Corporation yang beralamat di New York adalah pemegang saham Defendan Pertama dan penerbit sukuk serta menjadi salah satu pihak yang menandatangani Perjanjian Langganan bertarikh 10-5-2022. (b) Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd yang beralamat di Singapura merupakan salah satu pihak yang menandatangani Perjanjian Langganan bertarikh 10-5-2022. (c) Defendan Pertama (Agro Capital Management Berhad) tidak pernah menandatangani Perjanjian Langganan bertarikh 10- 5-2022. (d) Agro Capital Management Corporation, Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd dan Agro Capital Management Berhad (Defendan Pertama) ialah entiti yang berbeza di sisi undang-undang. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 (e) pada masa memasuki Perjanjian Langganan bertarikh 10-5- 2022, Plaintif mengetahui mengenai perhubungan Agro Capital Management Corporation, Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd dan Agro Capital Management Berhad (Defendan Pertama). (f) Perjanjian Langganan bertarikh 10-5-2022 ditandatangani oleh Plaintif dengan Agro Capital Management Corporation, Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd. [18] Berdasarkan fakta yang dinyatakan, Defendan-Defendan membela dirinya dengan menyatakan bahawa Plaintif melabur dengan dan wang pelaburan diberikan kepada Agro Capital Management Corporation dan Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd. dan bukannya dengan Defendan Pertama (Agro Capital Management Berhad). Resit rasmi dikeluarkan oleh Agro Capital Management Corporation dan/atau Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd. [19] Defendan Pertama tidak pernah mengeluarkan apa-apa resit, tidak pernah memberikan apa-apa representasi yang tidak tepat dan tidak pernah membayar apa-apa dividen kepada Plaintif. [20] Maka, dengan kedudukan fakta bahawa kemungkiran kontrak dibuat oleh pihak ketiga (Agro Capital Management Corporation dan/atau Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd.), Defendan-Defendan memohon agar segala tuntutan Plaintif ditolak dengan kos dan Plaintif tidak berhak untuk mendapatkan apa-apa ganti rugi akibat kemungkiran kontrak. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Keputusan [21] Pada 25-10-2023, Mahkamah ini memutuskan – KEPUTUSAN SELEPAS BICARA PENUH [1] Tindakan undang-undang Plaintif terhadap Defendan- Defendan ialah mengenai representasi palsu/konspirasi penipuan/frod yang dilakukan oleh Defendan-Defendan bagi pelaburan sebanyak RM5,000,000.00. [2] Skim Pelaburan yang di antara Plaintif dan Defendan- Defendan ialah melalui penerbitan sukuk. [3] Tempoh Sukuk bermula 18-5-2018 hingga 15 Mei 2021. [4] Perenggan 25 pernyataan tuntutan memplidkan bahawa Plaintif hanya diberikan dividen berjumlah RM1,937,500.00 sahaja. Baki dividen tertunggak yang dikira dari November 2020 sehingga November 2021 ialah sebanyak RM312,500.00. [5] Perenggan 27 pernyataan tuntutan memplidkan bahawa dividen tertunggak dibayar sebagaimana kaedah disebut dalam jadual. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [6] Berdasarkan keterangan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Plaintif berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-Defendan dan dengan itu Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif. Selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan Defendan- Defendan secara bersesama membayar Plaintif − a) wang pelaburan berjumlah RM5,000,000.00. b) baki dividen sebanyak RM312,500.00. c) delay in the projected returns/dividend payment 4% p.a. payable on a pro-rate basis dari November 2021 hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh. d) kos sebanyak RM10,000.00. [22] Defendan-Defendan merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Dapatan dan Keputusan Mahkamah ini Isu-isu untuk dibicarakan: [23] Peguam cara Plaintif telah memfailkan senarai isu untuk dibicarakan di mana terdapat 10 isu iaitu – (i) sama ada Defendan-Defendan secara bersesama dan/atau berasingan telah bertindak cuai terhadap Plaintif berhubung urusan melibatkan skim pelaburan di bawah Sijil Sukuk? S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 (ii) sama ada Defendan Pertama, Agro Capital Management Corporation, Agro Capital Advisory Pte Ltd dan Defendan Kedua adalah kumpulan yang sama atau secara alternatif, dikepalai oleh Defendan Kedua? (iii) sama ada Defendan Kedua adalah pihak yang telah mencatur kesemua perihal projek dan pelaburan yang melibatkan Defendan Pertama, Agro Capital Management Corporation, dan Agro Capital Advisory Pte Ltd? (iv) sama ada Defendan-Defendan secara bersesama dan/atau berasingan telah bertindak melakukan konspirasi penipuan atau frod yang mengakibatkan kerugian kepada Plaintif? (v) sama ada Defendan-Defendan telah membuat representasi- representasi palsu dan telah memperdayakan Plaintif memasuki perjanjian dengan pihak Agro Capital Management Corporation dan/atau Agro Capital Advisory Pte Ltd yang tidak berdaftar di Malaysia sedangkan semua urusan bayaran wang pelaburan, bayaran dividen, bayaran zakat dan surat- menyurat adalah pada hakikatnya melibatkan Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama manakala projek yang dijalankan juga adalah di Malaysia? (vi) sama ada Defendan-Defendan, telah melakukan representasi palsu kepada Plaintif berkenaan tempoh matang pelaburan di mana tempoh 36 bulan telah tamat pada 15 Mei 2021 sedangkan modal pelaburan sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 masih belum dipulangkan kepada Plaintif sehingga kini? S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 (vii) sama ada Defendan Pertama pernah membayar dividen kepada Plaintif dan bertanggungan membayar baki dividen kepada Plaintif? (viii) sama ada Defendan-Defendan adalah privy dalam perjanjian langganan yang dimasukki antara Plaintif dan Agro Capital Management Corporation dan/atau Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd.? (ix) Sama ada tindakan kausa Plaintif dalam tindakan ini adalah berkenaan dengan kemungkiran/pembatalan kontrak? (x) sama ada Defendan Kedua dan Defendan Ketiga, sebagai pengarah-pengarah di Defendan Pertama, perlu bertanggungan sendiri (personally liable) terhadap tindakan Defendan Pertama? Perbicaraan: [24] Untuk membuktikan kesnya, Plaintif telah memanggil 3 orang saksi iaitu – (i) Zainordin bin Bahari (SP-1), berumur 73 tahun, menjadi Bendahari Plaintif dari bulan Jun 2011 hingga bulan Mei 2022. (ii) Nur Aizatullhuda binti Ahmad (SP-2) berumur 42 tahun, mantan pegawai pemasaran Defendan Pertama dari bulan Mei 2017 hingga Januari 2021. Kini bekerja sebagai trader saham. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 (iii) Mohamed Nor bin Hassan (SP-3), berumur 48 tahun menjadi Timbalan Pengurus Besar Plaintif sejak tahun 2017 dan menjadi Pengurus Besar Plaintif sejak tahun 2019 sehingga kini. [25] Defendan-Defendan telah memanggil 2 orang saksinya iaitu − (i) Jamil bin Abu Bakar (SD-1), berumur 69 tahun, pencen, salah seorang pengarah Defendan Pertama. (ii) Michael Marcus Liew (SD-2), berumur 44 tahun, warganegara Singapura, Defendan Kedua, pengarah Defendan Pertama, pengarah Agro Capital Management Corporation dan pengarah Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd. Dapatan, Analisa dan Keputusan Mahkamah [26] Lord Goddard dalam kes Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 at p. 178 memutuskan − “… plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damage; it is not enough to write down the particulars, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: ‘This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages’. They have to prove it.”. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [27] Mahkamah ini pasti prinsip bahawa “The well-established principle that the burden of proof at all times is borne by the Plaintiff on the balance of probabilities to establish his case against the Defendant or the existence of a legally enforceable claim against the Defendant. It is upon the Plaintiff, and certainly not the Defendant, to discharge that burden. It is for the Plaintiff to prove his case and satisfy the court that his claim is well-founded before the court can grant judgment on his claim” adalah terpakai dalam memastikan beban pembuktian. [28] Dalam kes MIE-AFA Corporation Sdn. Bhd. v. Razali Mohd Sham & Anor [2023] 1 LNS 1267, the court explained that the burden of proof lies throughout with the party who wishes the Court to belief the facts of their case; and the Federal Court in the case of Keruntum Sdn Bhd v. The Director of Forests and Ors [2017[ 4 CLJ 676 at page 698 held: “[78] It is settled law that the burden of proof rests throughout the trial on the party on whom the burden lies. Where a party on whom the burden of proof lies, has discharged it, then the evidential burden shifts to the other party.” [29] Dalam kes Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 CLJ 584 yang mana YAA Richard Malanjum, Ketua Hakim Negara memutuskan bahawa – “… there are only two standard of proof, namely beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases and on the balance of probabilities for civil cases. As such, even if fraud is the subject in a civil claim, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities. There is no third standard. … The criminal aspect S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 of the allegation of fraud and the standard of proof required is irrelevant in the deliberation …”. “… the standard of proof is only a balance of probability [NOT beyond reasonable doubt] and this burden has been discharged by the Plaintiff during the trial vide witness testimonies [weight attached to testimony/evidence], documents [admissibility] filed in this Court, admissions by the Defendant and facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim and Reply.”. [30] Mahkamah ini mematuhi prinsip undang-undang mengenai beban pembuktian. Penganalisaan keterangan yang dinyatakan oleh Plaintif melalui keterangan lisan dan keterangan dokumentarnya dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa Plaintif gagal mencapai tahap “on balance of probabilities. [31] Dalam kes Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia v Chan Soon Huat [2018] 9 MLJ 782, the Court summarized the definition and application of balance of probabilities as proving an event is AT LEAST 51% more likely than not. [32] Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa the Court not only to weigh such evidence on a balance of probabilities but it is also incumbent upon the court to look at all the surrounding factors and to weigh and evaluate contemporaneous documents that may tend to establish the truth or otherwise of a given fact. In the present case, I had to take into consideration the witnesses’ power of observation, their accuracy for recollection, and capacity to explain what they remember. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [33] Dalam tuntutan ini, Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan-Defendan untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa skim pelaburan via pelaburan sukuk yang dibuatnya adalah tamat dan matang pada 15-5-2021. Maka dengan pengisytiharan itu, Plaintif menuntut terhadap Defendan- Defendan pemulangan jumlah wang pelaburannya sebanyak RM5,000,000.00, baki dividen tertunggak sebanyak RM312,500.00, ganti rugi am untuk ditaksirkan oleh Mahkamah, caj bayaran lewat pada kadar 5% ke atas jumlah RM5,312,500.00 yang dikira dari 16-5-2022 sehingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh dan kos bagi tindakan. [34] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan pengakuan Plaintif bahawa Plaintif tidak pernah membuat tuntutan terhadap Defendan-Defendan berasaskan apa-apa kausa tindakan pelanggaran kontrak. Adalah menjadi satu fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa tiada kontrak secara langsung dimeterai di antara Plaintif dan Defendan-Defendan. [35] Plaintif memplidkan bahawa beban pembuktian yang terletak ke atasnya ialah untuk membuktikan tuntutan bagi kes kecuaian, representasi palsu dan tort konspirasi penipuan. [36] Fakta yang jelas mengenai tuntutan ini ialah di mana Defendan Pertama telah mendekati Plaintif untuk melabur dalam skim pelaburan sukuk iaitu salah satu bentuk pelaburan dalam fiqah Islam di mana sijil- sijil kewangan dan/atau bon dikeluarkan kepada pelabur. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [37] Saksi Plaintif Kedua (SP-2) iaitu Pn Nur Aziatullhuda binti Ahmad, yang pada masa material ialah bekas pegawai pemasaran di Defendan Pertama mengakui berdasarkan skop tugasnya, SP-2 telah memperkenalkan Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif (pelabur yang berpotensi). SP-2 ini dalam keterangannya mengakui terlibat dalam siri mesyuarat dengan wakil-wakil Plaintif. SP-2 menunjukkan profile syarikat (Defendan Pertama) berserta dokumen mengenai pencapaian Defendan Pertama dalam bidang akuakultur. SP-2 telah mempelawa Plaintif untuk melabur dalam Defendan Pertama. Selain SP-2, SP-2 menyatakan bahawa Puan Jeff Medina selaku Pengarah Operasi Defendan Pertama dan Puan Irene Ng selaku Senior Vice President Defendan Pertama juga terlibat dalam pertemuan dengan wakil-wakil Plaintif. [38] Bertitik tolak dari situ, Plaintif bersetuju dan secara nyata telah melabur dengan Defendan Pertama iaitu bagi projek udang laut dan jumlah pelaburan Plaintif ialah sebanyak RM5,000,000.00. [39] SP-2 merujuk kepada dokumen berkenaan dengan jaminan bagi pelaburan Plaintif iaitu surat jaminan pelaburan bertarikh 11-5-2018, perjanjian antara Plaintif dan Agro Capital Management Corporation di mana wang pelaburan sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 bersama dividen terakru di mana wang pelaburan tersebut telah dilabur melalui satu instrumen sukuk. [40] Berkenaan dengan kewujudan pelaburan dan pembayaran pelaburan sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 oleh Plaintif ini adalah tidak diragui. Ini kerana, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa – S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 (a) wang pelaburan Plaintif sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 tersebut kemudiannya dimasukkan kepada dan/atau diterima Defendan Pertama untuk menjalankan projek perternakan dan pengkomersilan udang laut (marine shrimp) di alamat ladang Defendan Pertama di PTP 7.1556 Sungai Miang, Mukim Pekan, Daerah Pekan, Pahang, Malaysia. (b) dalihan Defendan-Defendan dalam Pembelaan adalah suatu penafian liabiliti di mana dakwaan bahawa Defendan- Defendan hanya terlibat dengan aktiviti pertanian sahaja dan tiada pengetahuan tentang pelaburan Plaintif melalui skim sukuk yang dibuat antara Plaintif dengan Agro Capital Management Corporation yang berpengkalan di Amerika Syarikat; dakwaan bahawa Defendan-Defendan tidak privi kepada perjanjian sukuk antara Plaintif dan Agro Capital Management Corporation, yang disebut sebagai “pihak ketiga”; dan dakwaan Defendan-Defendan bahawa Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah memberikan komitmen atau jaminan untuk membayar balik wang pelaburan Plaintif. Kelewatan membayar tunggakan dividen sebagai pulangan pelaburan Plaintif: [41] SP-2 dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa suatu surat Defendan Pertama bertarikh 23-3-2021 dengan jelas menunjukkan pengakuan bahawa terdapat kelewatan untuk membayar dividen kepada Plaintif atas alasan impak wabak Covid-19 dan Defendan Pertama dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa bayaran dividen bagi jumlah yang tertunggak akan di buat sebanyak 3 kali iaitu pada 30-4-2021, 31-5-2021 S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 dan 30 Jun 2021. Di samping itu juga, Defendan Pertama akan membayar pampasan pembayaran tambahan sebanyak 4% setahun yang dibayar mengikut asas pro-rata. [42] SP-2 juga mengetahui bahawa SP-2 sendiri telah menjelaskan/menerangkan kepada Plaintif bahawa pembayaran dividen oleh Defendan pertama akan dibuat kepada Plaintif pada setiap 1 haribulan dan 15 haribulan pada setiap bulan. [43] Sebelum mengakhiri keterangannya, SP-2 menyatakan bahawa alasan pihak Defendan untuk tidak membayar dividen/capital Plaintif disebabkan oleh PKP adalah tidak munasabah. [44] Soalan-soalan yang ditanya kepada SP-2 semasa pemeriksaan balas gagal menangkis keterangan bahawa Plaintif adalah pelabur yang berhak kepada wang pelaburannya dan dividen bagi pelaburannya. [45] Pembelaan dan keterangan 2 orang saksi Defendan-Defendan gagal sama sekali menangkis fakta dan keterangan yang telah dibuktikan Plaintif semasa perbicaraan penuh. [46] Di dalam kes ini, adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa suatu Perjanjian Langganan (Subscription Agreement) bertarikh 10-5-2018 berkenaan dengan penerbitan sukuk telah dimeterai di antara Plaintif dengan Agro Capital Management Corporation/ACMC di Amerika Syarikat sebagai “Sukuk Issuer”; dan Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Ltd./ACAPL di Singapura sebagai “Manager”. Struktur asas penerbitan sukuk wujud dan pelaburnya ialah Plaintif dan ada balasan yang dibayar oleh Plaintif iaitu wang sebanyak RM5,000,000.00. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [47] Dalam First Schedule kepada Subscription Agreement (Perjanjian Langganan), Plaintif sebagai Pelabur (Investor) melabur sejumlah wang sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 melalui Sukuk yang diterbitkan oleh ACMC. Tiada bayaran dibuat di dalam matawang US Dollar walaupun ACMC sebagai penerbit sukuk adalah berpengkalan di Amerika Syarikat. [48] Pada Recitals B dan C Subscription Agreement tersebut menyatakan bahawa pihak-pihak bersetuju bahawa tujuan pelaburan adalah untuk digunakan melabur di dalam projek ternakan komersil udang laut (marine shrimp) oleh Defendan Pertama yang berada di Pekan, Pahang Darul Makmur. [49] Dalam Second Schedule kepada Subscription Agreement, Defendan Pertama ialah “Farm Operator” yang dilantik oleh ACMC untuk menjalankan perusahaan ternakan komersil udang laut (marine shrimp) di PTP 7.1556, Sungai Miang, Mukim Pekan, Daerah Pekan, Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur. [50] Secara ringkasnya, carian Plaintif mengenai Defendan Pertama, ACMC dan pihak-pihak yang terlibat dalam skim pelaburan menguruskan dana Plaintif untuk projek perternakan dan pengkomersilan udang laut (marine shrimp) adalah dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Syarikat Defendan Pertama (Agro Capital Management Berhad) adalah anak syarikat iaitu “wholly owned subsidiary” kepada Agro Capital Management Corporation/ACMC di Amerika Syarikat di mana 100% saham Defendan Pertama dimiliki oleh ACMC. [Lihat carian SSM di mukasurat 4 Ikatan B1] S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Syarikat Agro Capital Advisory Pte. Limited/ ACAPL di Singapura juga adalah anak syarikat “wholly owned subsidiary” kepada ACMC di Amerika Syarikat. Malah, Defendan Kedua itu sendiri (Dato’ Seri Marcus Liew) mengakui bahawa beliau adalah pengarah Syarikat (common director) untuk ketiga-tiga syarikat tersebut yang berdaftar di Malaysia, Amerika Syarikat dan Singapura. SD2: I was director in all these entities. P/D: Okay and what is your job as a director in all these entities? SD2: I was in charge in administration of these company. Malah, Defendan Kedua itu sendiri (Dato’ Seri Marcus) turut mengakui bahawa Sukuk tersebut diterbitkan untuk tujuan meraih pelaburan untuk projek Defendan Pertama. Sukuk diterbitkan oleh ACMC kerana Defendan Pertama tidak memenuhi kriteria penerbitan sukuk di Malaysia.”. [51] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa – • walaupun Defendan Pertama bukan privi kepada Subscription Agreement, Defendan Pertama adalah pihak yang memainkan peranan utama dalam pengendalian wang pelaburan Plaintif dan dalam mengendalikan projek ternakan S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 udang laut yang merupakan perniagaan utama untuk tujuan pelaburan Plaintif. • peranan Defendan Pertama dalam pelaburan Plaintif ini diakui sendiri Defendan Kedua (Dato’ Seri Marcus). • semasa pemeriksaan balas Defendan Kedua (SD-2), beliau turut mengakui bahawa Defendan Pertama adalah pihak sebenar yang menerima wang pelaburan dan/atau manfaat dari wang pelaburan Plaintif sebanyak RM5,000,000.00. (Rujuk Mukasurat 66 Nota Keterangan: P/P: Yes, but finally ultimately the fund will be used to finance project run by the first Defendant, correct? SD2: Yes in the Malaysia Company. P/P: Correct, so can you confirm the funds goes to the first Defendant? SD2: Yes correct.) [52] Walaupun peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan mengenai perkara penerbitan sukuk menggunakan ACMC di Amerika Syarikat hanyalah disebabkan Defendan Pertama tidak memenuhi kelayakan menerbitkan sukuk di Malaysia. Mahkamah ini mendapati isu kesahan penerbitan bukan menjadi inti pati dalam tuntutan sebenar oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [53] Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa transaksi dan skim pelaburan melalui terbitan sukuk oleh ACMC ini adalah ditujukan kepada bakal pelabur yang berpotensi iaitu Plaintif yang merupakan sebuah koperasi di Negeri Sembilan yang pada hakikatnya telah menyalurkan pelaburan kepada Defendan Pertama yang berada di Malaysia demi “menjana pendapatan” melalui projek ternakan udang. [54] Jumlah pelaburan yang besar pada kacamata Mahkamah ini khususnya buat pelabur (Plaintif) yang sekadar sebuah koperasi dan bukan seperti 1MDB tidak boleh dinafikan haknya (Plaintif) untuk memperoleh semula wang pelaburannya yang mana telah digunakan oleh ACMC untuk manfaat Defendan Pertama. Apakah yang dihujahkan oleh Defendan-Defendan? [55] Mahkamah ini telah membaca dengan teliti hujahan peguam cara terpelajar Defendan-Defendan. [56] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan-Defendan menghujahkan bahawa “He who asserts must prove: It is trite that the Plaintiff has to prove whatever the Plaintiff asserts as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950”. [57] Peguam cara terpelajar Defendan-Defendan menghujahkan bahawa perkara asas yang berikut menjadi faktor bahawa Mahkamh ini perlu menolak tuntutan Plaintif: (a) illegality. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 (b) no negligence, false representation, conspiracy to cheat and/or fraud on the part of the Defendants at all material times. [58] Berkenaan dengan isu illegality, peguam cara terpelajar Defendan- Defendan menghujahkan dengan panjabg lebar mengenai points berkenaan dengan pelaburan Plaintif dalam skim sukuk ini, iaitu − Illegality of the Investment by the Plaintiff: • It is not disputed that the Plaintiff is a co-operative society formed and governed under the Co-Operative Societies Act 1993 [Act 502]. Being a co-operative society governed under Act 502, there are certain provisions and pre-requisite procedures that the Plaintiff has to adhere to in relation to investments made by the Plaintiff. 27. Section 54 of the Co- Operative Societies Act 1993. • All the claims of the Plaintiff cannot sustain at all as this investment of RM5,000,000.00 made by the Plaintiff was not done in compliance with the mandatory statutory requirements as laid down in the Co-Operative Societies Act 1993, the Co-Operative Societies (Investment) Regulations 2010 and the Guideline. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 • Premise on the provisions and case law cited above, the Defendants humbly submit that this Honourable Court ought to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim with costs as the Plaintiff’s claim cannot sustain at all due to the fact that such investment made by the Plaintiff is illegal and in contravention of the Co- Operative Societies Act 1993. • At all material time, the Plaintiff’s representative has knowledge that such approval by the Commission is necessary and required prior to the Plaintiff making such investment. Yet the Plaintiff insisted to proceed with the investment even though the approval of the Commission was not obtained. • Based on the testimonies of SP-1 and SP-3, the resolution has been passed by the Plaintiff’s Board on 18-4-2018. • Although SP-3 during cross-examination insists that the resolution that has been passed is conditional, there are no documents tendered in court by the Plaintiff during trial to substantiate such testimony of SP-3. Thus, it can only be inferred that the Plaintiff has decided to proceed with the investment on 18-4-2018, which was almost a month prior to receiving the letter dated 11-5-2018 from the First Defendant. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 • Despite the fact that both SP-1 and SP-3 gave testimonies in relation to the fact that the Plaintiff’s Board has passed a resolution on 18-4-2018 pertaining to this investment, a copy of this resolution was however not tendered in Court and was unable to be sighted. Reference is made to the Federal Court case of Tan Keen Keong @ Tan Kean Keong v Tan Eng Hong Paper & Stationery Sdn Bhd & Ors and other appeals [2020] MLJU 2204. • Further, it is also a requirement under Rule 3(1)(e) of the Co- Operative Societies (Investment) Regulations 2010 that the investment is to be approved by the Board of co-operative society before a co-operative society invests its surplus funds. • However, despite the fact that two of the Plaintiff’s witnesses, SP-1 and SP-3 (who were both part of the Board of the Plaintiff during the material time) have testified during the trial that the Plaintiff’s Board has passed a resolution on 18-4- 2018 pertaining to this investment, however, no such resolution has been tendered in Court to substantiate the testimonies of the Plaintiff’s witnesses. • From SP-3’s testimony, it is clear and straightforward that the Plaintiff has neglected its own mandatory duty imposed on it by law and did not take the necessary steps neither did the Plaintiff conducted any due diligence to determine that the investment shall provide returns or benefits to the co- operative society and its members. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 • The Plaintiff’s non-adherence to such statutory requirements despite having the knowledge that such approval of the Commission has to be obtained is blatant ignorance of the law and thus the law should not aid such ignorance of the Plaintiff which rendered their investment of RM5,000,000.00 illegal due to their own actions. • It is also a requirement under Rule 3(1)(c) of the Co-Operative Societies (Investment) Regulations 2012 that before a co- operative society invests its surplus fund, a co-operative society shall determine the investment shall provide returns or benefits to the co-operative society and its members. In other words, the Plaintiff has to conduct its own due diligence and not blindly believing and trusting in any representations made by any party prior to making an investment using the surplus funds of the co-operative society. [59] Dalam hujahan balas, peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menjawab mengenai isu “illegality” yang dibangkitkan iaitu− “Yang Arif, Plaintif di sini berhujah bahawa Defendan-Defendan tidak boleh membangkitkan isu baru di peringkat hujahan sedangkan isu-isu di atas tidak pernah dibangkitkan di dalam pembelaan dan tidak pernah dijadikan isu untuk dibicarakan. Jika isu-isu yang disebutkan adalah penting dan menjadi intipati utama pembelaan Defendan-Defendan, maka ia perlu dijadikan sebagai isu dan diplidkan secara spesifik, supaya tiada apa-apa “element of surprise” ketika perbicaraan tindakan ini. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Isu berkaitan ketiadaan resolusi Lembaga Koperasi adalah tidak relevan untuk dibangkitkan kerana isu ini tidak pernah dibangkitkan sebagai isu di dalam pliding pihak-pihak. Defendan-Defendan sendiri tidak pernah memohon penzahiran dokumen tersebut. Sejak dari tahun 2018 sehingga kini, Defendan Pertama telah menerima wang pelaburan RM5 juta tersebut daripada Plaintif untuk digunakan bagi projek ternakan udang laut. Ini diakui sendiri saksi Defendan (SD2) yang juga Defendan Kedua di dalam tindakan ini. Tiada apa-apa isu pun dibangkitkan oleh Defendan-Defendan sejak dari tahun 2018 sehingga kini (lebih 5 tahun), untuk mempertikaikan keesahan pelaburan Plaintif dan perjanjian langganan. Malah, Defendan-Defendan tidak pernah pun meminta resolusi Plaintif ketika memohon wang pelaburan. Isu ketidaksahan yang dibangkitkan Defendan-Defendan pada saat akhir ini setelah menikmati wang pelaburan Plaintif adalah jelas tidak bona fide dan perlu ditolak oleh Mahkamah. Isu ini adalah satu taktik untuk mengelak liabiliti memulangkan wang pokok pelaburan Plaintif yang telah dinikmati oleh Defendan Pertama sejak tahun 2018. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes United Trade Arena (M) Sdn Bhd v. Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad [2016] 1 CLJ 979 telah memutuskan − “[26] The learned judge found that the averments made by the Appellants that the asset sale agreement was executed prior to the asset purchase agreement were mere allegations and unsubstantiated, made as an attempt to evade the Appellant’s contractual obligations. We agreed with the findings of the learned judge that the Appellants who were fully availed by the Respondent cannot now, after seven years dispute the validity of the agreements by suggesting they were executed in a different order. Be that as it may, both the documents were dated the same date and most probably were executed at about the same time. Both parties were aware of what they were contracting for.”. Di dalam kes sekarang, apa-apa ketidakpatuhan kepada seksyen 54 Akta Koperasi 1993 tidak akan menjadikan pelaburan Plaintif atau perjanjian yang dimeterai sebagai tidak sah. Ini kerana seksyen 54(3) Akta Koperasi 1993 hanya memperuntukkan penalti jenayah (criminal penalty) ke atas koperasi (jika disabitkan) dan bukannya memperuntukkan perjanjian sebagai tidak sah atau terbatal. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Beca (M) Sdn Bhd v. Tang Choong Kuang & Anor [1986] 1 CLJ 20; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 64 di mana diputuskan: ... Not every breach of a statutory prohibition would render an agreement illegal or void though such breach may attract criminal penalty. The fundamental question is whether the Enactment means to prohibit the agreement. It is important that the courts should be slow to imply the statutory prohibition of agreements, and should do so only when the implication is clear. Whether an agreement is implicity forbidden depends upon the construction of the statute, and for this purpose no one tests is decisive. Persons who deliberately set out to break the law cannot expect to be aided in a court of justice. It would be a different matter when the law is unwittingly broken. An agreement for the sale of, say, frozen food, is not to be considered illegal or void merely because the premises in which the frozen food is sold does not comply with the law. We recognize that each case must be decided by reference to the relevant statute. [60] Mahkamah ini menolak pembelaan, dalihan dan hujahan Defendan- Defendan untuk melepaskan diri mereka daripada bertanggungjawab ke atas tuntutan Plaintif mengenai pemulangan wang pelaburan sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 dan tunggakan dividen atas alasan Plaintif sebagai sebuah koperasi telah melakukan “kesalahan” di bawah undang-undang koperasi kerana membuat pelaburan sebagaimana yang berlaku dalam kes ini. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 [61] Tiada apa-apa bukti dikemukakan oleh Defendan-Defendan bahawa ahli-ahli koperasi Plaintif mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap Plaintif berkenaan dengan pelaburan dalam skim sukuk ini. Dua orang saksi Plaintif yang berjawatan Pengurus Besar (SP-3) dan Bendahari (SP-1) telah memberikan keterangan berkenaan dengan kelulusan bagi pelaburan tersebut. Tindakan undang-undang ini diambil untuk mendapatkan semula wang pelaburan dan tunggakan dividen yang perlu untuk manfaat ahli-ahli koperasi Plaintif. [62] Berkenaan dengan isu “no negligence, false representation, conspiracy to cheat and/or fraud on the part of the Defendants at all material times”, peguam cara terpelajar Defendan-Defendan menghujahkan bahawa − “The Plaintiff has willingly come to the decision to make the investment of RM5,000,000.00 and thus the Plaintiff should be estopped from claiming any negligence, false representation, conspiracy to cheat and/or fraud on the part of the Defendants. Further, the Plaintiff had all opportunity to read and review the Subscription Agreement (Refer to Bundle B1, Page 15 – 28) prior to executing the same. The Plaintiff should have exercised their due diligence and read through the contents of the Subscription Agreement prior to executing the same. The Plaintiff would have known that the parties to the Subscription Agreement were ACMC and ACAPL and not the First Defendant. The First Defendant is merely the entity who runs the shrimp farm. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 The Plaintiff’s representative has admitted that no due diligence was conducted personally by the Plaintiff prior to coming to a decision of making the investment of RM5,000,000.00. Furthermore, despite the fact that the Plaintiff tried to rely on the letter dated 11.05.2018 (Refer to Bundle B1, Page 59) issued by the First Defendant to the Plaintiff and signed off by the Second Defendant on behalf of the First Defendant, it is the Defendants’ stand that there was no reliance on the said letter of undertaking by the Plaintiff when coming to a decision to make this investment of RM5,000,000.00.”. [63] Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa ketiadaan salahnyataan mengenai pelaburan yang dicadangkan oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif tidak boleh sama sekali menafikan hak Plaintif bagi relief yang dituntutnya. [64] Pegawai Defendan-Defendan yang membuat representasi ialah SP-2 yang sudi dan bersedia menjadi saksi kepada Plaintif. Penglibatan SP-2 untuk meyakinkan Plaintif melabur sebanyak RM5,000,000.00 telah pun menjadi kenyataan. Ketiadaan 2 orang pegawai lain Defendan- Defendan iaitu Jeff Medina Dan Irene Ng tidak menjejaskan keterangan yang dapat menyokong tuntutan Plaintif. [65] Siri perbincangan/mesyuarat, lawatan ke tapak projek dan lain-lain dokumen yang berkaitan dengan cadangan pelaburan adalah dibuat oleh Defendan-Defendan kepada Plaintif. Defendan-Defendan berjaya menarik pelaburan melalui representasi pegawai-pegawai Defendan- Defendan, maka untuk menafikan hak Plaintif dalam memperoleh apa jua S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 jaminan yang termeterai dalam perjanjian adalah menjadi beban pembuktian kepada Defendan-Defendan. [66] Defendan-Defendan menyatakan bahawa fakta yang berikut: • bahawa Defendan Pertama bukanlah pihak sebenar yang menerima wang pelaburan Plaintif. • Defendan-Defendan mendakwa bayaran dibuat secara terus ke ACMC di Amerika Syarikat dan tidak berkaitan dengan Defendan-Defendan. [67] Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa dakwaan dan/atau penafian Defendan-Defendan adalah tidak benar dan adalah jelas bercanggah dengan beberapa keterangan kontemporari (“contemporaneous documents”) yang menunjukkan bayaran wang pelaburan dibuat di Malaysia dan diterima Defendan Pertama. Dokumen yang berikut telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan: Perihal dokumen (a) Baucar Bayaran Plaintif bertarikh 7-5-2018 untuk jumlah RM5 juta adalah kepada Defendan Pertama melalui My Premier ACMC Trust Account. Mukasurat 13 Ikatan B1 S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 Perihal dokumen (b) Cek Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad milik Plaintif sebanyak RM5 juta yang didepositkan pada 14/5/2018 ke Maybank di Kuala Lumpur melalui MyPremier ACMC Trust Account. Mukasurat 14 Ikatan B1 (c) Resit Rasmi (Official Receipt) bertarikh 18/6/2019 Defendan Pertama yang menggunakan “letterhead” dengan alamat Defendan Pertama di PTP 7.1556, Sungai Miang, Mukim Pekan, Daerah Pekan, Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur. Mukasurat 58 Ikatan B1 [68] Keterangan oleh Defendan Kedua kononnya resit rasmi penerimaan bayaran adalah daripada ACMC di Amerika Syarikat dan bukannya oleh Defendan Pertama. Ini kerana ACMC dan Defendan Pertama menggunakan logo dan “letterhead” berbeza adalah keterangan yang gagal menangkis keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif. [69] Isu mengenai logo pada letterhead sama ada milik Defendan Pertama atau milik ACMC adalah persoalan yang sama sekali bukan penyebab untuk Mahkamah ini menolak tuntutan Plaintif. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 [70] Defendan Kedua (SD-2) telah menjelaskan bahawa logo adalah sama tetapi perbezaan hanya pada letterhead. Alamat yang tertera ialah alamat di Malaysia (PTP71556 Sungai Miang Mukim Pekan, Daerah Pekan, Pahang). [71] SD-1 iaitu satu-satunya saksi yang dipanggil untuk menyokong keterangan Defendan-Defendan adalah dengan jelas diperalatkan untuk menjadi orang tempatan dalam syarikat Defendan Pertama. Keterangan SD-1 adalah nyata bahawa penubuhan Defendan Pertama di Malaysia memerlukan sekurang-kurangnya seorang warganegara Malaysua dalam barisan Lembaga Pengarahnya. SD-1 dilantik sebagai pengarah Defendan Pertama walaupun SD-1 tidak pernah terlibat dalam perniagaan mahupun terlibat dalam apa-apa urusan dalam Defendan Pertama. [72] Berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang dibentangkan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah memutuskan atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa – • terdapat hubungan antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama yang menjalin kepada tugas berhati-hati (duty of care) terhadap Plaintif dalam mengendalikan wang pelaburan Plaintif, menjalankan projek ternakan udang melalui wang pelaburan Plaintif. • terdapat jaminan mengenai pembayaran semula wang pelaburan dan dividen kepada Plaintif. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 • Surat Jaminan bertarikh 11/5/2018 yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama dan ditandatangani Defendan Kedua di Mukasurat 59 Ikatan B1: Surat Jaminan ini secara jelas menunjukkan Defendan Pertama memberikan jaminan dan komitmen kepada Plaintif bahawa wang pelaburan pokok sebanyak RM5 juta akan dibayar dan dikembalikan selepas cukup tempoh matang 3 tahun. • Tempoh 3 tahun pelaburan Sukuk tersebut bermula dari 15- 5-2018 sehingga 15-5-2021 adalah tempoh di mana Plaintif dijanjikan dan diberikan representasi akan mendapat pulangan dividen sebanyak RM62,500.00 sebulan seperti Jadual yang dilampirkan di Mukasurat 60 Ikatan B1. • SD-2 (Defendan Kedua) pada Soalan No. 6 Penyata Saksi telah mengesahkan bahawa semua komunikasi yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama adalah berdasarkan arahan (instruction) daripada ACMC di Amerika Syarikat dan SD-2 mengakui bahawa beliau adalah CEO di ACMC di Amerika dan segala keputusan dan tindakan Defendan Pertama adalah berdasarkan arahan ACMC di Amerika. • surat Defendan Pertama sendiri bertarikh 23-3-2021 kepada Plaintif memaklumkan akan membayar pampasan kelewatan pembayaran dividen. Ini diakui oleh SD-2. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 [73] Selanjutnya, fakta bahawa – • SD-2 mengesahkan melantik Tetuan Ramakrishnan & Associates mewakili Defendan Pertama untuk berurusan dengan Plaintif bagi membayar balik wang pelaburan Plaintif. • Tetuan Ramakrishnan & Associates bagaimanapun tidak dipanggil oleh Defendan-Defendan sebagai saksi. Namun, apa yang jelas bahawa terdapat Perjanjian Penyelesaian (Mukasurat 9-14 Ikatan B2) iaitu Ekshibit P6 telah disediakan oleh peguam cara tersebut di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama di mana Defendan Pertama bersetuju membayar balik wang pokok pelaburan sebanyak RM5 juta kepada Plaintif. • Perjanjian Penyelesaian (Mukasurat 9-14 Ikatan B2) telah diterima sebagai keterangan di Ekshibit P6 dan tidak dibantah peguam Defendan-Defendan. • Walaupun pihak-pihak tidak dapat bersetuju mengenai tempoh bayaran, apa yang pasti adalah Defendan Pertama telah mengakui liabiliti untuk membayar balik wang pelaburan RM5 juta kepada Plaintif. Jumlah bayaran balik wang sebanyak RM5 juta ini adalah dipersetujui dan tidak dipertikaikan Defendan Pertama. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 • Berdasarkan kelakuan dan tindakan Defendan Pertama ini, adalah jelas bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menerima arahan ACMC untuk menanggung liabiliti membayar wang pelaburan RM5 juta kepada Plaintif. • Penyelesaian berkenaan dengan persetujuan ini adalah mengikat Defendan Pertama. • Nas undang-undang kes yang dirujuk oleh peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif dalam kes Genneva Malaysia Sdn Bhd v. Tio Jit Hong & Ors [2020] 4 CLJ 449, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan – “[50] It is trite law that apart from writings, conduct of parties may amount to acceptance. … [54] In our view, the fact that the defendant having accepted the offers which followed by payments into the defendant's bank account and some by partly giving gold at an agreed value and used them for defendant's benefit, the defendant's conduct is consistent with having accepted the offers made by the plaintiffs. By the defendant's own conduct, the defendant is therefore estopped from denying that there is a valid and binding contract between defendant and the plaintiffs.” S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [74] Peguam cara terpelajar Plaintif menghujahkan – “Daripada pengakuan dan kelakuan Defendan Pertama, adalah amat jelas bahawa mereka tiada pembelaan bermerit kerana wang pelaburan telah dinikmati oleh Defendan Pertama untuk projek ternakan udang. Wang tersebut perlu dipulangkan kepada Plaintif selepas tempoh 3 tahun tamat pada 15-5-2021. Kini, selepas hampir 2 tahun lebih, wang pelaburan RM5 juta tersebut masih belum dibayar dan ia memprejudiskan Plaintif. Selain itu, berdasarkan Surat Jaminan bertarikh 11-5-2018, Defendan Pertama perlu melunaskan komitmen dan jaminan yang diberikan oleh Defendan Pertama untuk membayar sebanyak RM5 juta kepada Plaintif kerana Defendan Pertama yang memberi jaminan bahawa pelaburan tersebut selamat dan terjamin. Segala surat-menyurat dan urusan pelaburan adalah di antara Plaintif dan Defendan Pertama. Ini dapat dilihat pada (a) Penyata Pulangan Pelaburan bertarikh 15/7/2018: Mukasurat 30 Ikatan B1; (b) Surat notifikasi Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif berkenaan pelantikan peguamcara Tetuan Ramakrishnan & Associates: Mukasurat 31 Ikatan B1; dan (c) Surat pemakluman bayaran zakat ke Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan oleh Defendan Pertama bagi pihak Plaintif: Mukasurat 56-57 Ikatan B1. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 Daripada dokumen dan surat-menyurat, adalah dihujahkan bahawa Defendan Pertama sewajarnya diletakkan tugas berhati-hati untuk melindungi kepentingan Plaintif kerana semua urusan pelaburan Plaintif pada hakikatnya adalah diuruskan dan dijalankan oleh Defendan Pertama. Berkenaan dengan isu kecuaian ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Tenaga Nasional Malaysia v. Batu Kemas Industri Sdn Bhd And Another Appeal [2018] 5 MLJ 561; [2018] 6 CLJ 683 telah memutuskan pemakaian prinsip Caparo seperti berikut: Our Decision [33] The first matter that must be established to proceed with a claim based on the tort of negligence is that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. “The tort of negligence requires first of all that there be a duty of care on the part of the (defendant) not to do any act or omit to do any act the doing of which or the omission of which could foreseeably affect other persons resulting in damage or loss to such other persons” (Siew Yaw Jen v. Majlis Perbandaran Kajang & Another Appeal [2015] 5 CLJ 189; [2015] 4 MLJ 411 per Zaharah Ibrahim JCA, as she then was, delivering the judgment of the court). “Tortious liability arises from a wrongful act where the common law imposes a duty to take reasonable care” (Lok Kok Beng & 49 Ors v. Loh Chiak Eong & Anor per Zainun Ali FCJ delivering the judgment of the court). Once a duty existed, the plaintiff must show that the defendant breached it. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 Di dalam kes sekarang, adalah adil dan wajar untuk Mahkamah meletakkan tugas berhati-hati ke atas Defendan Pertama kerana Defendan Pertama adalah pihak yang tahu semua aspek pelaburan, menjalankan projek ternakan udang dan menguruskan semua aspek dokumentasi pelaburan Plaintif. Akibat kecuaian Defendan Pertama melindungi kepentingan pelaburan Plaintif, Plaintif telah menanggung kerugian di mana sehingga kini, wang pelaburan RM5 juta masih belum dibayar sedangkan wang pelaburan ini adalah daripada hasil kutipan ahli-ahli koperasi Plaintif yang terdiri dari kalangan pesara-pesara askar.”. Penutup [75] Berdasarkan alasan yang dinyatakan dalam penghakiman ini, Plaintif berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya terhadap Defendan-Defendan dan dengan itu Mahkamah ini memutuskan untuk membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif. Selanjutnya adalah diperintahkan Defendan-Defendan secara bersesama membayar Plaintif − (a) wang pelaburan berjumlah RM5,000,000.00. (b) baki dividen sebanyak RM312,500.00. S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 (c) delay in the projected returns/dividend payment 4% p.a. payable on a pro-rate basis dari November 2021 hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh. (d) kos sebanyak RM10,000.00. Bertarikh: 20 Januari 2024. RoziBainon ( ROZI BINTI BAINON ) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Sivil NCvC12 Peguam cara: Bagi Plaintif: Muhammad Shafiq bin Samsul Anuar Tetuan Azri & Co., Kuala Lumpur Bagi Defendan-Defendan: Esther Yong Zhen Ying Tetuan L Y Yu & Co., Kuala Lumpur S/N zEcej8ekJEe1LwlpNWFtA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24C-41-05/2023

PEMOHON TURNPIKE SYNERGY SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN KAY CORPORATION SDN. BHD.

1)2 Originating Summonses.2)both the Setting Aside OS and Notice of Application are dismissed.the Enforcement OS is allowed.3)a total cost of RM5,000.00 subject to allocator shall be paid by Turnpike to Kay Corp accordingly.

19/01/2024

YA Puan Sumathi a/p Murugiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=26781c8c-fe92-45f0-8369-c7375e59627c&Inline=true

Alasan Penghakiman Turnpike v Kay Corp.pdf 19/01/2024 15:18:54 BA-24C-41-05/2023 Kand. 83 S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N jBx4JpL8EWDacc3XllifA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal aA—2ac—41—u5/2u23 Kano. E3 ,<z,rx,,:ruA 17 ,2-74 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAVA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARIJI. EHSAN ORIGINATING suMMoNs N0: EA-24c-41-n5/2023 BETWEEN TURNPIKE SVNERGV sun. BHD PLAINTIFF (company No 964307-M) AND KAY CORPORATION sun. BHD DEFENDANT (Company Mr: 104021rM) (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAVA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINAYING suMMoNs NO: BA-24C-61-DB/2023 BETWEEN KAY CORPORATION sou. BHD PLAINTIFF (Cumpany Nu 1o4o21—M) AND TURNPIKE SVNERGV SDN. EHD DEFENDANT (camnany No 964307-M) N 1BxuvLaEwDaccJxHwA mm Sum M... M“ be used m MN m. nvwvufilv mm; nnmmgnl M mum Wm % fl JUDGMENT (2 Ongmaling summonses) A. mmonucnou m In September 2022‘ Kay curporamorr Sdn Ehd (“Kay Corp") had commenced Adrumcauon Pvoceedmgs pursuant In me Conslrucllon Industry Payrrrem and Adjumeanon Am 2012 1C|F'AA 2012; agamsr Turnprxe sa arm. (“Tump\Ke“) in claim a sum oIRM17‘2U2,421.33 as me rrnparu sum ansmg from a oanstrucuan cnmracl made helwsen them The Adjudmalar decreed In favour 01 me Kay Carp In ms Aajrmrcarrorr Dzcisiun (“AD“) [2] As a result 0! me An, me ionowings were med by me panies qr) 05 Na. BA-24c-414:5/zuza (sun 41) was filed by mmprxs against Kay Corp [or weave at court to set asrue the AD we «ms 05‘ Turnpike had filed a Ncnice ul Applicahun for S|ay ol Execmrorr vflhe AD (End 2); and (H) os No. BA-245-61-08/2023 (Swl 5:) was filed by Kay Corp for a court order to enioroe the AD pursuant to 5.28 01 CIPAA 2012 [3] since mere are 2 05.5 and a Notice o1Apphcauon filed m relalion in ms AD. the panies agreed w having both the 05s and me Enclosure 2 0! sun 41 new together and var me decrsron ov the same to be dehvered lagemer srN1lzxuvLaEwDaccJxurrA -we Sum M... wm be used m mm we mtmruulv mm; nnmmnnl VII Mme wrm iaised by tmlh panies are id be considered and a decision is 10 be derived inereironi. in me case di ACFM Enginenring L consmiciion sdn. Bhd. v. Ema: Vlalon Sdn Bhd ai anoiiisi Ippoal [2016] 1 ms 152:; [2015] MLJU moi iiie cdun di Appeai neid “[17] Wm-sn and speaks olnaturauuslice, ii is rmlhmg more inaii what we can the Duncan! 4 amaediimi «ainiess~ which needs in he assumed (0 me Dania: in a dispuie ala hes/I/V9 “ [271 in iriis case, as seen in me AD‘ me Adiiididaidr nad deiineraied an an we issues raised by new Turnpike and Kay cdrp at me Adiddicaiidn Proceedings al iendin and riad come to her conclusion wiin iegaids to me veiiie oi irie varialiorl works. The Adiudicaior ried provided boiri paflles ineii oppcrlurlilies lo siaie ineir case iespediiveiy ai iiie adiudicaiion proceedings and had ndi isll any issues raised at iiie said pmceedings undehbelaled Tiieneidne, niinpixes aiiegaiidn inai lhe ieamed Adiddiaaidi nad iaiied and/Dr ieiiised in lake ccignisanoe e1 andidi appreeiaie Tumpi e's cdnieiiiidns and me evidence adduced at me adiudicaiion relaling to me vaiiaiion wuiks amounl and iriaz irie Adiiidieeioi ried denied ii irie iigrii to be mean: is uriloimded. [25] I ieiei id me case of Blna rim consimeiion sdn and v Hing Nyil Enierprise sdn. and. [2015] 3 cu 723 where K was siaied as lniiows “ Seaiori is has iardnded iiniiied gmnds on wnicn the decision or me Aflludicalor may be set awe Since an application under s is is not an upuea/, tn: decision of me Adludicufur cumin! be revtewzd an menls “ N lBxUvLBEWDaccZ|XHi?A we s.ii.i numb]! M“ be used m mm ea nHfliruH|Y Minis nnnminril vn .;iniia win $ [29] As such, whether we Adrudrcaror nad assessed the rssues versed cdrrecuy or not is no| up ro «hrs oaurl |D delerrmne as me decrsran oi the Adjudmalar canno| be revrewed on us rnerus. [an] Funnennore, s 250) or CIPAA 2012 provrdes the Adrudrcarar me power 10 indursnorially take me innramre Io asoerlam me fact and the Vaw required lor rne decision The Adrudicaror is rree to rdnn nis op mdependemly durum names and lo rely on miormallon wnrcn rs warned by her own rnvssugauon. I3‘! mlerim measure tn salve Issues relared In payments, any errars or srnce me aunrdrcarran proceedmgs pursuant to CIPAA 2012 rs an onnssron ansmg lrom «ms proceeding can be rerne d we a rrnex detenmnallon mmugh armrrauon or mud as provided lor under 513 or CIPAA 2012. (see Eeonpr/e (M) Sdn Ehd v. IRDK Ventures Sdn and a another use [2016] 5 cu M2) [32] Based on me loregmng‘ Turnpike has fafled |u drecnarge ws burden are show that me Adjudwcaknr nas breached me rules 01 natural rusuce puvsuanl In s.15-(b) ol CIPAA 2012 lll.s.15(c) orcIPAA 2012 [:31 An AD can he set asrue n can be es|abhshed pursuant In 5. 15¢) do CIPAA 2012 ir the Hamlifl drsenarges us |ega\ burden met me Adjudrcazor Vacked independence or impana y m conduamg Ihe amudlcalion proceedings and In dehvering the AD 12 srN1lzxuvLaEwDacc3xurrA -we Sum M... M“ be used m mm me numruulv mm; nnmmnrrl VII mum wrm [34] Even though they are genevally used synonymausly, ‘independence’ and '|mDMia y‘ are oonoems wnicn nave msnne: mnerenees In the wmext ol amumcauon pursuam to s 15(0) 0! CIPAA 2m2, lack nf Independence descnbes an adjuducamr who nas pnor or exwslmg nexanensrnps belween mmself and any one aune pames an we adlhdi non proceedings [35] In me book. consmmuon Adjudicl on Malaysia by Lam Wax Lacn ana wan v F L00 (Chapter 5 para 5.13)‘ the mllowmg was some m uennmg ‘impartiality. ‘As stated In Muslm 5 am Commsmal Arhmvahon mu Eamon/, rmpsma/My n the antonym al bras’ Eras can came In many ronns, As per Lard Pnmps «n as Msdrcamems and Related Classes or Guods ma 2» Eras .s an amlude of mmd whrch urevenls me Judge rm making an amenvve dslerrmnalrorl or ma Issues that ne nas to resolve A Judy: may be biased humus: ns nas reason :9 prefer one outcome aims case In anomer He may be imaged bscauss ns nas reason to ravw one party miner man another. He may be mam not In /avuur at one olnmmi at me ms»-ne am because af a nnamrsa In Isvaur 5/ or against . pamcular wrmess wmah prwems an mwamal assessment arms ewaenoe onna: wvmess Eta: can come In may runns n may Consist of rnslmnal we/udme or It may anse (mm msmcular circumstance: whrm for /ogrcal reasons uremsnnse a Judge towards a namcurarvrew onne ewaenca orrssues before mm ' [35] In «ms case‘ K \s Tump\ke‘s ccmenlwon mat me clanflcauun sessuon auowed by the Adwmcawv was unnecessary and that unlwke Kay Corp, Tumpwke was not allowed to Dress"! any evmence at me send u 3 nan. Sum Mn... wm be used m mm s. snnnnn suns nnmmnnl vn mum pm clavmcahon sessron and was a\sn not snowed in cross examme As suen, the Admdwcalor nas been \mp\ica|ed Io Vack independence or Imparllamy rn assessing the Issues bebre her [371 By me definmuns or whal cunsmule ‘Independence’ and ‘imparIia|I|y' as stated m me vuregoing paragraphs. aparl lrom me aHega\Ions made agamst me Adwdicalon Turnpike had nol adduced any cogem evidence or mad made any oarnpemng Vegal submission juslwfymg une Adjudlcalofls Vack ov mdepsndencs or impartiality In amvmg to her decxsxon As menuened m me above paragraphs deanng with s «sun 0! CIPAA‘ me Ad;udn:a|or had reasoned out every conclusion ma: she had reached m deliberating me Issues bl0ugh| berare ner [331 A1 «ms juncluve, 1 reverm me Hugh Courl case 01 Team: Wiramus sdn Bhd v. Thleu Sung Chan sdn Bhd [2017] 1 ms 519; [2017] 4 AMR 501 where Lee Swee Sang J (as he then was) hem as (allows -- 119) There rs arse no Dasrs /or the Respondent to anege that Ms Ad/udrcalar had lulled la 5:! rndependenfiy and rmpamslly The «ac: ma! me Ad/udrcamr ma nm agree mm me Resiiondevws posmun on the Yaw .5 na pmdr ma! he had rauea to act xnctspenaenrvy 3"” """”"a'Iy Such an afltgatrmv slvuuld rm! he launched wrthmn some evmencz Domrma mexorsbly to 5 lack or mdeuendence or rmnsma/W m the hsarmg and the denvery or (he Amudrcanon Dscrsron ‘ [391 Therelcve. not bemg me pany who lhe Adjudwcalov was m lavuur do cannoz consmule as evidence 10 «ms assenlcn made against Ihe Adruduceror. As such, I am nm convmoed mm me Turnpike has N 1BxuvLaEwDaccJxHwA we Sam M... Mu be used m mm we nnmnaulv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm fl discharged the burden ol proving the allegation made against the Aaiuiticator under this ltrriti. iv. s.15(d) MCIFAA 2012 [401 it is Tiirnpike's eonlehtion ma| the Auiiioieator had acted in excess oi tier iurisoictioh because she had dealt and based her decision on the Agreement Confirmation which is akin |o a settterrient agreement As such, this does no| come within the ambit ol CIPAA 2t)t2 and theretarei the Aaiuaicator had acted in excess ot her iunstticticin [41] Szdlcln 27 at CIPAA 2ot2 prouioes the iurisaiatiurial boundaries in which the Adiudieator can act in adiudicahon Dlooeedlngs. s 21(3) particularly gives the Adjuttteatoi the ittscretieh to proceed and complete the aaiuaieation proceedings notwithstanding any iunsaietion challenge. without preiuttiee In the rights under e.t5 aria s 25 acoeraingly [421 in this case, nul at any time during the adjudication pruceedlngs aid Turnpike raise any ooiection against the Adiuaieator auiuaieatiiig the issue pertaining to the Agreement connrrnatien on the basis that this issue is not within her iurisuiotion in tact, the only issue which Turnpike had raised a iurieaictianal ooiectian against the Auiuaicator is on the ISSUE pertaining to Key Carp‘s etaiin lpr loss and expenses. [43] Be that as it may, the issue penalning to the value of the variation works is not alien to the construction contract oetweeh the parties which comes within the arntiit pt cll=AA 2012. ‘lliereiore. it is undeniable that is SIN lBxUvLBEWDaccI|XHltA -we s.ii.i M... will be used M mitt Die nlVWuH|Y MW; flnmninrll vn AFVLING WM! $ inis is an issue which arose ironi ine peyrneni eiaim by Kay corp and not one wnicn is independent irorn ii [441 Furlherrnare‘ s zsiii oi‘ CIPAA 2012 provides me Adiudicaiar iiie power in Inquisilonally rake me iniuarive ia asaenairi irie (act and irie law required for die decision Tne Adiudicaior is iree |o iorrri rierop ion irideperiderriiy oi ooiri panies and io rely on information which is oourined by her own Invesligaiion. [45] in my opinion, iiie Adiddicaior acted weii wimin her idnsdiciion. since ine adiudioaiion praoeedings pursuani |o CIPAA 2012 is an iriierirn measure in salve sues reiaied In payments, any errars or omission arising irorn iriis proceeding can be reme d via a iinai deierrninaiion iriraugn aroiiraiion or court as provided ior under s 13 oi CIPAA 2012 isee. Econpl/e (M) Sdn Ehd v. IRDK Ventures sdrr Bird & arroiirrrr use [2016] 5 cm 552) [46] Thereluve, nairirrg iaiied io esraoiisrr s 15(3), in), (:1) and (d) oi CIPAA 2012 againsi die Adiudicaior, Tumpike's apphcaiwn io sei aside ine AD is hereby dismissed wiin cosl oi RM5iooo 00. ll. siay or Exocrmon-Enci 2 in sun 41 [47] since, irie aooiiaairdn ior siay oi Execuliun oi iiie AD was pursuant to s,1611|1a) oi cii=AA 2012, having decided that me selling aside apoiicaiion is heveby dismissed, inere is no ionger me need no dehberale on me gmimds ior wnicn ihis apoiiceiion was med in (he firsl piaoe is sin iBxUvLBEWDaccZ|XHi?A -we s.ii.i rm... M“ r. used m mm Die nVWiruU|Y Minis nnmninnl VII AFMNG WM! [A8] Tlrerelore. me anplleacrorr lor stay ls hereby dlsmlssed aeeormngly Wllh no order as to cost. Ill. Errlorcemem as — Suil El (s.2B of CIFAA 2012) [49] As gulded by Her Ladyship Mary Llm Thlam Suan JCA (as she men was) lrr me com ol Appeal case ol lnni Kim Sdn Bhd v. Puuri Nuaamau sarr Elm [2019] 2 cu 229, me eoun may exerclse lle dlscrennn lo grant leave under 5. 25m and (2) cll=AA |a srrlorcs an adludlcallcm declslon rl the lollowrng lhree mndlhons (3 Cnndlllorls) are mel “Ifl me zd/udlcarlorl declslarl has been made rn Iavaur or me party aPP’ylIlg Yorlsave urlders 23 CVPMJ z2l me Iaarfy égalnsl whom an adllldlcauorl oeclslorl ls made, has rarlea In pay me ad/udlcated amormr on me dale specmsa lrl we ad/udmalllnn declslofl. ml gal mere 15 N7 Prolllblllorl an we mun‘: dlsclsmzrlary power to grant leave to enforce the aaruareamm dsctslon ~ [50] In one case, all 3 cundltluns have been sallsfled and srrrce me senrng Aside and the slay of Execuliun omre AD have been dismissed, Kay com‘: application to erllorce lhe AD is allowed wlor no order as to cns|s. 3 we s.rr.r M... MU be used m mm we mlnlrulllv MW; “Mm. VII .;rrr~e wrul 5. CONCLUSION [51] Prermsed on me above ewaences and reasons‘ 4‘) mm me Setung Aside as and Name uf Appllc are dismwssed. In) me Envcrcement 05 us snowed, and on) a (ma! ms! at RM5‘K)D0 no sub]ec| to auocamr shall be pend by Tumpwke to Kay Carp accnrdmgly. SUMAYHI AIP MURUGIAH Judwcwal Commwsswoner High Coun ol Malaya Shah Alam. Se\angor Daml Ehsan DATE: 1! JANUARY 2024 1; SW 1BxuvLaEwDaccJxHwA -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm Counsel my Tumprks .- Ms. Valsala Ralnasabapalhy, Mr Khang Hang Kat & Ms Shalizah Muhamed Shrhab {Messrs Zam .4 co) Counse/ /or Kay Co/porslron: Mr Jason Ng Kau 3 Ms. sen Wong cma P91 (Messrs. Jason N9 .5 Partners) 1: srN1lzx4JnLaEwDaccJx\wA . -mm Sum ...m.. WW be used M vs-W u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm $ 3. BRIEF BACKGROUND [4] Tumpxke nad appomled Kay Corp as me mam odnuaaor Var nne Prqeci vla Letter 07 Award daled 25 03 2018 [or a propel known as me “Prupnsed Rebcallun and Ralsmg M 275kV K1 132kV Overhead Trsmsrmsswon Lmes at me Proposed Sungal ae um Kelang E\eva|ed Expressway (SUKE) from Sg Eesw aeund lo we Kelang Bound 1Loca|\on 2:" (me “Fro;ez:l“) [5] The Prmsct did not span me enme length cf the SUKE expressway mscead, me Pro]ec| mvolved rebcaung seyerax overhead cransnnssudn pyldns and assdcmed puwerhnes alung a cenaln sedmn do me expresswav suecmcany, Kay Corp was an relocate 6 (six) exxslmg Ivansrmsslon pylons man were m me pam uf me sum: expressway‘: p\anned angnrnem [51 Kay Corp was engaged by Tumpxke in dany em a specmd scape Dlwofk m relalmn «dune Prqect (‘wdrkswdr an angmax Cflnlrad sum dv RM4o,75u,oao on ('Ongma| Contracl Sum") u \s undwspuled met me scope of Works was men expanded to mdude me voudwmg me ¢s) nems ov yanauan works — under vanauon Order Nos. 1a, m. 2, 3 and 4 une “Vanahon WorKs“):» (a) v0 may Live line maIn|enance a. restmg plalfunn (bl V0 10.)) -cnange ACSR 2x Zebra Ia ACIR 2x INVAR (c) V0 2- slope prozecuorv stabilny a| 6 numbers at pylon Iocahons sw 1BxuvLaEwDacc3xHwA -nae Sum Mn... wm be used m any we mwvuulv mm; nnmmnnl vn mum Wm (4) vo 3 — Destructive lype test hr 2 numbers 01 mcnopmes zypes MF42 and MP43 at aeumg, China (e) vo 4 - suppny, ms|aH. testing a. commissioning a! cow system [7] The «nan cummauve cenified va\ue 0! me wnlran Includmg me vos of RMA4,650.113 14 and me ex-gralla paymenls lowards loss and expense ov 393314.00 ws RM84.9G4,263 54 ('Fmal Convact Sum") [31 The Cemficate ol Pracucal campleuan was wssued don 25 7.2019 [9] on 254 2022, Kay Corp served a Payment C\a\m (or me sum ul RM1 7202.421 33 bemg for a) RM10‘570.494 91, bemg me unoerlmed and/or under Cemfioatlon M Vananon workl WDFK done; 1)) RM50‘2BU 00‘ bemg |he clam [or Loss and Expense due to the pmlanganun ul Pnnsat, and c) RM6,AE1‘666 52, bemg me mlerest on aH overdue accounts [10] Turnpwke had mspuled the amount dawned by Kay Corp we Ks Payment Response and had made a cross clam M Rmasasmuo wmch had been paid by Tumpxke in Kay Com m a mu and nnax semement av Kay Corp’: clams lar luss and expense, on ma basis ma: Kay Corp had reneged on me ssmemem of the said claims by seekmg aaamonax V055 and expense m me sawd Aanmxca on sw 1lzxuvLaEwDaccJxHwA -ma Sam M... Mu be used m mm ua nflmrufllv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm fl c. ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS [I1] Due to npn—paymerii pi lhe paymerii piaim made by Kay Corp, aayiiuipaiipn proceedings was imiiaiea by Kay Corp by Issuing a Ncilice pi Aayuaicaiien dated 1305 2u22 and an Adyuaicaiipri Claim followed suit on 15 7 2022, Turnpike had served an Adjudication Response on 27.7 2022 arid ine same was replied by Kay Corp on 4 5.2022. [I1] Upmi Wnclusinn at me adjudication proceedings‘ "19 Adiudicalor‘ Tan Swee lm aeciaeu m iavmir pi Kay Corp and Turnpike was to pay |o Kay Corp wilhin 30 calendar days irum me date ullhe AD as ipiipws — a) a sum ei RMs,31:i.ass 26‘ n) mieresi ai irre reie oi 5% sirnuie iriieresi per arrnum irom ii November 2019 imiii me aaie oi reaiisaiion oi the AD, and c) oasis pi adiudication proceedings in me sum ai RM13‘/‘S57 an [13] Being pissaiisiieu with me An, Turnpike had iiieu ip sei aside me same aria vending ims seiimg aside. a Siay oi Execuiion oi me AD was aisn mad (or which a decision was made by this CDLAI1 an 30.10.2023. Being dissatisfied WIU1 this oourfs decision, Turnpike had filed a Noiice 0! Appeal SIN lBxUvLBEWDaccZ|XHiiA -we s..i.i M... MU be used m mm we niwiruiilv sum; nnmmnrri via AFVLING WM! $ D. OBJECT CIPAA 2012 [14] CIFAA 2012 \s a creature av the Veglsmllon Intended to (acIlIla|e speedy and regmar payments m we conslmclnon Industry. As cash new is the utmost Important lanur m we constmcmon mduslry, CIPAA provides Inlenm measures to dlspulmg pames Io so\ve payment wssues expedilloushr so as not to Aeupardise me conlmuance ol the constvucuon contract emerea mlo by mam (see Manage Sam and v. Arkilek Meor & Chew Sdn and and Another appeal [2019] 5 cu 433,- [2019] 5 AMR 516 F0, Eenam Development sun Ehd V. R84: Cergas Tegnh Sdn Ehd[2nI7]1 ms 222:) E. ISSUES [15] Tump\Ke‘s appnoauon m set asme me AD pursuant In 5.15 (at. (by (c) and (d)a1C\PAA 2U12|s premised on me followings. . that there was swear error oHac1 and that me decision was umuroneriy procured on me basis 0! a Agreement Cormrmahnn which ex\s|enoe was dwspmed by Turnpike‘ |ha( me Veamed Aamcanor had failed and/or refused |o |aKe cugmsance cl and/ur apprecIa|e Turnp\ke‘s cunlenlmns and me ewaence adduced at me aajumcauon relating to the variation works amount srN1ExuvLaEwDacc3xHwA -ms Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvufilv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm that me danficallon sassron auowed by me Adwdlcalor was unnecessary. unnke Kay corp, Turnmke was nm aHowed Ia preseru any evwdenoe at the Sam clarificalwon session. Tumpwke was also not allowed to cross examme, and iv that me Agreement confinnauun wnrcn me Adjudwcamr had based her decision on Is a sememenl agreement, which lalls omsrae of the arntm or CIPAA and merelore rendenng une Admdwcslar In nave acted In axoess 0! nor junsmclwan us] Turnorxes appncauon (or a say 0! axecuuon or me AD pursuam Io s1e nf CVPAA 2012 Is premised as luflows i the Dendlng ol mis sun Le. Sun 41 to se¢ aside me AD pursuant |n 5.1611 )(a) of CIPAA 2012: n. that [here are clear and uneqmvocal errors m me An, ana mat Kay Corp rs nnancrauy weak and as sucn womd render me declsiun or urns ouurl shuuld wt be m lavuur or Turnprxa m we sening asrde apphgauon nugatory [11] Kay Cords apphoauon to enlorce me AD pursuant to 528 0! CIPAA 2012 Is premised as ¢oIIows: . mat the Adwdxcaled Amount Is not paid by Turnpike‘ u mat ma AD Is not sel aside ur stayed, and w. that mere Is no final delerlmnauun by Arouramon or com. srN1lzxuvLaEwDaccJxurrA . -ma sum Mn». M11 as used m mm a. annnn-r mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm $ F. FINDINGS OF THE COURT I. Sult 41 - selling Aside os (s.1s ol CIPAA 2n12) i. s.15(aleH:lPAA2ol2-Fraud [18] In addressing me issue el fraud 1s151a|ofC|PAA 2012)‘ ll rnusl be unaersloorl (ha| lne burden lo prove lraue lles on me one we srnee nere, Turrlplks nee allegee llrel Kay Corp nee lmproperly procured by way or [laud the AD rn lls lavaurr |he burden ls on Tumplke to prove so an a balance el pmbabllllles [see me Federal Cmlfl case or Sinnziyah ll. Sans Sdn Bhd v. narnal seua Sdn End [2015] 7 cu 534: [2015] 1 MLJ 1. at [4Bl‘[53]\] esserls ll. [19] In lnls case‘ N Is TIm|DIke'S eonlenllon lnal Kay Corp had by way el lrauaulenl means precuree lne AD In rls layour [ram me Adludlcator for yanalren works by usmg a document relerree la as me Agraernenl Cunfirrnallon wnrcn earnes only Kay corps slgrlalure and not Tl.lmplke‘s as well [20] Aooordlrlg |o Turnpike lne doclmlem relerrea m as me Agreemem conllnnellen by Kay Corp never s><ls|sd H1 llre rnanner ll was srrown by Kay Corp as mere exrsl only a documem wnlcn nas pmpclsals lml nor an egreemem as alleged by Kay Corp an lhe value el me yanalren works Thls document ls sald to be anaeneu Io Kay corps leller daled 26.3 2020 as Apnen x 9 l“Apl>enulx 9') SW lBxUvLEEWDaccZ|XHlrA ‘Nuns s.n.r M... wn be we m mm we anrmrry mm; nnmmnnl vn -slum wrul [21] Anpenmx 9 wmcn conlents are srn-ilar um nut \den|Ica\ to me Agreement Conlxrmmion rs claimed by ‘rurnprke has only emerged at we appneeuan as n nae been reeenuy lound Now, I find rt slrange that aespue Kay Carp havmg produced me Agreement oarmrmanan nghl (rum me begmnlng 0! me adjudication pmceedmgs and havmg an me oppurlumty gwen mreugn the process and by me Adjuareamr mcluding a clanflcahon sessron, «or me enme duranon 0! me adludicallon pmceedmgs of almos| one (1; year‘ Appendix 9 ma nac emerge or even made msrmoned by Turnpike ac any ume mmprxe some have slapped une adjudication proceedings .1 rt reaHy had |houghl tha| Kay Carp was bnngmg Ms manms by way or rreuuulem means‘ which eleany n me not. [See Gumi As Elek zl Sdn am: v Dazzling Electrical (M) Sdn EM and anomercase [2020] MLJU 315) [221 The Adjumcator had on «ms Issue arrived at her findings based on EH the documents. evidence and clanlwcaucn filed at the pmceedmgs and or hrough| nevore her. “so ueweven on Me evmencs balms me r rm as a matrsroffacl, that an the Damned at probabr/mes more was agreement an en. vsluairon er en. I/snalwn Walks rn me sum oVRM5fl,95A Mo 00 ansma (mm the meelmga held an 15 my 2:219 and 23 My my and me Agreement Confirmalron Issued by me Respolndant n Is this sum winch caught 10 um Dun rncmm .n ma Fmal Accuurvl /ur \/unalrun Wurks ms“.-ad Dime M. er mm 650,113 74 51 n .5 not drsputed ma: Ihe sum or RM44,s50, 113 74 rnermyea rn me Fmal Accuum has almsdy Dean me by me Respondent and Ieaervcd by me cmmenr 3 we Sum M... M“ be used m mm we mm-r Mm; nnmmnrrl VII mum Wm $ 52 Amrmng/y, /find n Yavourolthe C/armam In ma sum oH?Ms,a13 ass 25 mung me difference Dslwserv me amaurvl oIi'M5n,w64,omz an wmclv I nna as Max/my been agreed, and the amaunl 0.‘ RAM, 55mm 74 wmch has neen Pardlo and recerved Dyme Crarmaru - [231 Furlhermore, there us no evidence which shows that Turnpike had nemner chaHenged me aucnenucny of the Agveemem connnnauon nor mu m deny me preparation 0! me same by u. The omy evmsnce wmcn ex\s| .e Tump|ke's meme! to the agreemem at the vams al nne vanalucm works as claimed by Kay Corp [24] In the upshot. il Is ems courrs iindmgs that Tumpxke had lailed |o move on a tmance of pmbamlmes mat Kay Corp nad procured me AD by fraudulent means. i. s. I5(h) MCIFAA 2012 [25] In exammmg whether s.15(b) of CIPAA 2012 Le mere has been a demal oi na\ura\ meme, can be esta I maker to me case ov MRCE Builders Sdn Bhd v. Wazam vnmum Sdn Bhd and znolhel case mun] 1 LNS a51;[2o2o1 MLJU 20:, where Wong man Khecmg J (as he men was) held that .1 \s summenn |a msluage a cumpxann ul breach 0! na|ura| jusllce n ma Admdlcalur had gwen just one reasun to have arrived in ms decwswon [26] The prlnclme 0! natural justice mm Is sam In nave been denied here ws me right to being nsam. sud! alteram paflem. Vn an Amumcanon Proceedings, me Adwdxcator has me my to accord pmoeuurax iaurnsss to me parlies during me course av me pruneedmgs whereby me wssues m sw 1BxuvLaEwDaccJxHwA we s.n.‘ Mn... Mu be we m mm we mwvuulv mm; nnmmnnl vn mum Wm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-22NCvC-498-09/2023

PLAINTIF BLH PROPERTY SDN BHD DEFENDAN 1. ) CHONG CHIUN YIH 2. ) LEE CHEE CHOON

Bound by the trite legal principles in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7, their application resulted in the finding by this Court that the Appellant’s suit was obviously unsustainable. It was frivolous, vexations and abuse of the court process. The summary dismissal of a lawsuit, particularly in instances such as this where there was no discernible reasonable cause of action, reflected a commitment to judicial efficiency and the avoidance of unnecessary litigation.

19/01/2024

YA Puan Roz Mawar binti Rozain

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b1715b78-cef6-44dd-9181-9d47fa06b578&Inline=true

IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: WA-22NCvC-498-09/2023 BETWEEN BLH PROPERTY SDN BHD (Company No. 202301026008) … PLAINTIFF AND 1. CHONG CHIUN YIH [NRIC No: 730416-04-5101/A2490822] 2. LEE CHEE CHOON [NRIC No: 750415-14-5491/A2937682] … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURE 8) [1] It was pivotal to this Court to acknowledge the fundamental principles underpinning the summary process available to courts in matters where the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. This 19/01/2024 10:19:38 WA-22NCvC-498-09/2023 Kand. 38 S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal process of striking out the claim, designed as an essential judicial mechanism, aims to uphold the administration of justice by ensuring that the courts' time and resources are devoted to disputes meriting detailed examination and trial. It serves to filter out cases that lack a legal basis or are inherently unmeritorious, thereby preserving the court's capacity to focus on disputes with substantive legal and factual grounds. This procedure underscores the balance between the right to a fair hearing and the practical need to prevent baseless or frivolous claims from overburdening the judicial system. [2] On 11.12.2023 this Court had exercised these powers under Order 18 Rule 19(1) Rules of Court 2012 (RoC) and struck out the Plaintiff’s suit with costs of RM10,000. This Court that there was no reasonable cause of action disclosed in the Plaintiff’s pleadings and that its suit was frivolous, vexatious and abuse of the court process. With the Plaintiff’s suit struck out, the Plaintiff’s application for an interim injunction pending trial consequentially was not heard. The facts pleaded [3] The Defendants were the registered owners of a property held under Hakmilik Individu Pajakan Negeri 48621, Lot 30415, Mukim Setapak, Daerah Kuala Lumpur, Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan that consisted of one office unit with three floors. The postal address of the property was No 52A, 52A-1, 52A-2 Plaza Usahawan Genting Kelang, Jalan Danau Niaga 1, Taman Danau Kota, 53300 Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur. This property was bought by the Defendants on 16.6.2014. S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [4] The Defendants had suffered difficulty in meeting the monthly instalment payment for the loan that financed the property. The amount of monthly repayment was RM13,327 whilst the income from the tenancy of the property was RM7,700. They could no longer sustain the property and had decided to sell it. [5] On 30.6.2023, the Defendants were contacted by a real estate agent of the Plaintiff who was interested to purchase the property. Discussions and negotiations between them resulted in the execution of the Letter of Confirmation for Sale on 14.7.2023. It was signed by the parties subjected to Clause 5a and to Special Condition 1, the latter was a condition precedent. Reproduced for easy reference are the clauses: “5. Execution a. I/We hereby undertake to execute the Sale and Purchase Agreement within 21 working days from the date of acceptance of this offer by the Vendor, failing to do so will result in the Earnest Deposit being forfeited and this agreement shall be treated as null and void. Thereafter, neither party shall have any rights or claims whatsoever over the other party. b. In the event that the title, for any reason whatsoever, cannot be transferred to the Purchaser(s) (Except where there is default on the part of the Purchase), the Vendor(s) shall refund the Earnest Deposit to the Purchaser(s) forthwith. S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5a(1) The Vendor shall be entitled to 50% of the Earnest Deposit as liquidated damages compensation to the Vendor, in the event of the Earnest Deposit being forfeited. Special Conditions: 1. Subject to loan approval, if the Purchaser cannot get the bank loan, the earnest deposit shall fully refund to the Purchaser. 2. The transacted amount RM2,600,00 excluding any agency commission. IQI Realty to get 1% as agency fees from the Purchaser. 3. For the Clause No. 4, Ground Floor is subject to the existing tenancy. 4. For Level 1 and Level 2, the tenants will be given 12 months to continue their tenancy from the date of signing the Sale and Purchase Agreement (S&P). Upon the bank releasing the full amount of the loan to the Vendor, the rental charges for Level 1 and Level 2 will increase to RM2,500 and RM2,000 respectively. The Purchaser will then start collecting the rentals, with the first month’s rental being based on a pro-rated basis according to the date when the Purchaser fully disburses the balance monies to the Vendor.” S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [6] The Sale and Purchase Agreement (S&P) was not executed by the parties within 21 working days from 30.6.2023. The drafts sent by the Plaintiff’s solicitors to the Defendants were not yet approved by the Plaintiff It was the complaint of the Plaintiff that the draft S&P that its’ solicitors forwarded via e-mail was not attended to and commented on. The mode of communication of the Defendants was vide the Whatsapp application on the mobile phone. [7] As at 1.8.2023 the Plaintiff had yet to obtain a bank loan. Its previous application was rejected by the bank. Due to the condition precedent of the Letter of Confirmation for Sale not met by the Plaintiff – it had not obtained a bank loan to enable the execution of the S&P within 21 working days from 14.7.2023, the First Defendant communicated on 22.8.2023 that the conditional sale was to be aborted. The Plaintiff’s suit [8] The Plaintiff filed this action to obtain this Court’s order for specific performance of the conditional sale of the property by the Defendants to theAppellant. It sought to injunct the Defendants from disposing their property and instead carry out all actions to ensure the successful transaction of the sale of the property to the Plaintiff. This Court’s consideration [9] All the clauses agreed to in the Letter of Confirmation for Sale must be read together and interpreted harmoniously. Having scrutinised the Letter of Confirmation for Sale, the sale of the property was conditional S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal upon the Plaintiffhaving obtained a bank loan. This was condition precedent which the Letter of Confirmation for Sale was subjected to. In the event that the Plaintifffailed to obtain a bank loan which was in this case, that condition precedent provided for the return of the earnest deposit paid by the Plaintifft in the sum of RM52,000. [10] This Court agreed with the legal position submitted by the Defendants where the failure to satisfy that condition precedent to obtain a bank loan, the Letter of Confirmation for Sale was not binding on the parties. The condition was expressly stated as Special Condition. At the point of termination by the Defendants of the Letter of Confirmation for Sale, the Plaintiff was not successful in having secured financing from the bank. Even at the date of the filing of this suit by the Plaintiff, it had not procured any bank loan to finance the purchase of the property. [11] The Defendants were informed on 1.8.2023 that the Plaintiff’s loan application was rejected by the bank. The Plaintiff’s real estate agent had suggested to replace an individual as the buyer of the property (this suggestion was not incorporated in the draft S&Ps that the Plaintiff’s solicitor forwarded to the Defendants vide email). The Plaintiffhad only RM100 in paid up capital and at that time was just two months old with no assets or business records. This Court observed that UOB Bank Bhd had approved on 15.8.2023 for a loan to a totally different company – BLH Coffee & Tea Powder (M) Sdn Bhd which was a stranger to the Letter of Confirmation for Sale and the negotiations for the sale of the property by the Defendants to the Plaintiff. There was no evidence of whether it was related to the Plaintiff and how so. There were no discussions as to this S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal matter which was central to the condition precedent between the two parties. [12] It was also a condition that the execution of the S&P had to be executed within 21 working days from 14.7.2023. Which meant that taking into account the public holiday of Awal Muharram which fell on 19.7.2023, the S&P ought to have been executed by 15.8.2023. Clause 5a clearly stipulated that failure of such execution of S&P would result in the forfeiture of the earnest deposit and the nullity of the Letter of Confirmation for Sale. The Plaintiff blamed the Defendants for not having answered to its solicitor’s email that contained the draft. But the Plaintiff itself had yet to approve of such draft. This Court observed that there was nothing in the emails for the Defendants to have considered. Furthermore, it was undisputed that the mode of communications with the Defendants was to be by way of the Whatsapp application. As with the execution of the Letter of Confirmation for Sale and the conduct of the Plaintiff and through its real estate agent, the Plaintiff was to approve of the terms of the S&P prior to the Defendants. [13] The arguments were moot because whatever it was, the Plaintiff had failed to fulfil the Special Condition which was the condition precedent. With the absence of a secured bank loan, the Plaintiff had no legal legs to stand on to enforce the Letter of Confirmation for Sale. The case of Lee- Parker and another v Izzet and others (No 2) [1972] 2 All ER 800 disclosed similar facts where the Chancery Division held that as long as the condition precedent which was to obtain a mortgage was not fulfilled, there was no binding contract of sale to buy the freehold house. Likewise, S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the condition precedent that required the mortgage was silent as to the timeframe, but the Chancery Division read the clauses in their entirety where there was a general printed condition that stated the date of completion. [14] Here, it was 21 working days from the date of the Letter of Confirmation for Sale which was by 15.8.2023. When the Plaintiff was not successful in obtaining a bank loan by then, it meant that there was no longer any enforceable contract for the sale of the property against the Defendants. [15] It is very plain and obvious that the Plaintiff had not disclosed any reasonable cause of action in the pleadings. The Letter of Confirmation for Sale was not a legally enforceable contract when the Special Condition which was it condition precedent was not met by the Appellant. The time period of 21 working days until 15.8.2023 had expired without the signing of any S&P since the condition precedent had yet to have been met. [16] The Federal Court through its decision in Tan Chee Hoe & Sons Sdn Bhd v Code Focus Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 CLJ 141; [2014] 3 MLJ 301 held that no aid shall be granted to a litigant that sought to enforce a void contract. At p170 it maintained: “As stated earlier in this judgment, a void contract or agreement cannot be enforced by law. When a contract or agreement is void, the whole terms in the contract are void and cannot be enforced. No term of the said contract can be spared… It is perfectly settled, that S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal where the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce, is expressly or by implication forbidden by the common law or statute (as in the present case) no court will lend its assistance to give effect, more so where both parties to the contract (as in the present case) were consciously and willingly agreed to the contravention of the law by not complying with the requirement of s132C.” [17] The bevy of cases affirm that the Plaintiff had not a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants – see Aberfoyle Plaintations Ltd v Cheng [1959] 3 ALL ER 910, National Land Finance Co-Operative Society Ltd v Shahridal Sdn Bhd [1983] 2 MLJ 211, Gula Perak Bhd v Datuk Lim Sue Beng & other appeals [2018] MLJU2107, Langkawi R&D Academy Sdn Bhd v Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia & Ors [2013] 3 CLJ 1066; [2012] 5 MLJ 662, Tetuan S Muthu Partnerships v Thanapakiam a/p KA Nachan [2018] MLJU 668, Nor Azlina binti Abdul Aziz v Expert Project Management Sdn Bhd [2017] MLJU 230. A recent authority from the Court of Appeal in Detik Ria Sdn Bhd & Anor v Prudential Corp Hodling Ltd v Anor [2022] 5 MLJ 541 upheld the position that until the condition precedent was met, the contract was inoperative. [18] Bound by the trite legal principles in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7, their application resulted in the finding by this Court that the Plaintiff’s suit was obviously unsustainable. It was frivolous, vexations and abuse of the court process. The summary dismissal of a lawsuit, particularly in instances such as this where there was no discernible S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal reasonable cause of action, reflected a commitment to judicial efficiency and the avoidance of unnecessary litigation. DATED 12 JANUARY 2024 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR Counsel for the Plaintiff : Tetuan Ng, Gan & Partners Counsel for the Defendants : Tetuan Iza Ng Yeoh & Kit S/N eFtxsfbO3USRgZ1Hga1eA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-43-40-10/2023

PEMOHON Pendakwa Raya RESPONDEN MISS WANIDA CHINNABUT

Revision under s. 323 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) - Whether witness statements under s.112 of the CPC (“s.112 statements”) are privileged documents – Whether s.124 EA 1950 apply s.112 statements as not communications made to a public officer in “official confidence” - Whether s.112 statements are to be provided to the defence via application made under s.51 of the CPC – Whether any distinction exist in application made prior to or during the commencement of the trial or even at the defence stage

19/01/2024

YA Dr Wendy Ooi Su Ghee

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1ff699fe-cbfa-4e95-ac98-cea8f46d7576&Inline=true

19/01/2024 11:50:49 BA-43-40-10/2023 Kand. 13 S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N /pn2H/rLlU6smM6o9G11dg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Bk—I3—llJ—10/2023 19/01/2044 IN THE HIGH COURT or MALAVA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE $ELANGOR DARUL ENSAN gglmuu REVISlQ§ ug gggggung/19;; puauc FROSECUTOR RESPONDENT AND WANIDA CHINNABUT APPELANI GROUNDS or JUDGMENT Inxroaunuon [II An avpllcaflon for rwssun under s. 32: ohm cnmmaw Procedure Code (‘the CFC’) was made to «ms couruo rewse ma oraaranne lsnmed Sessbns Cmm juuga dakad 27.10 2023 m In ms and amp ma Veamad sesuons coun mane allowed me appucsnan by me aevenoe to be supphed mm (he svavemem 0! Menu Zamdl bin Mustapha (‘ma amused‘: husband“) recorded under 5 112 at ma cwc as wall as |ranscnm_I oi Iha inlarvlaws wi|h ma aoausaws Wm chfldrun, narne\y Norwatflna mnm Mann Zarudi and Nnrwanl smaya mm Mohd Zamdv rme documents’). The learned Sessmns cam Indie am mama cm documwls be supplied by me pmseculmn to me devenca mm. three (3; days «mm ma da|e cflhe sand order sw !rm2H/vUU£smMEaVG1 my -ma Sum IHIWDIY Mu be used m mm aa nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm Kand. 13 ,1v5J 4'4 pi Agdneved by me said drdsn ins pmsscunon filed ms abava said appirdsmon im rsuision by mud ole ienerdaisd 31 1o.2a2a. mus seeking mia so-in lo exercise its revisidnary powers to se1 suds me said order Blckgvaimd [4] The aooussd was chewed undsf s. 31(1) criiid run 2001 iornsalen or s oniid by me hams oi izznsn Hsris bin lrwan snanq thus causing rum physical injurywhich svdmuaiiy iad to nis daain. [5] on 26 07 20211119 maiiudgs iound mac pwseculiun has rnsds mil a prime rsaa case ugaIns| ms accused Aaeaidingiy, ma aodussd was ordarad |o snlsr nardsianas in which sna did wnara sh! apusarsd as ins nrsi dsianoa witness on 22 05.2023. (51 Nmnevel, on m.1o.2n2a, arior on me camvig oi ma accused's nusoand as ins 2"‘ defence witness‘ ine defence applied ror me said witness‘: siaiern-ni rasoidsd undar s 112 si me are Vnllhlly‘ ma Dmlacuflnfl imandad I0 caH ins accusads husband as (me at ma wiinssses Hdwausr, na was noi daiisd as a nrdsscuiidn witness nor ufleled by ma nmtecuhan to me deienoe si me close di ins orusscuiidn siafls. m we defence aisd aought In be suppiied wflh the mriscrlpis oi me inkzrvisws with ma socuseds children Norwsdiria omn Mend Zamdi and Nor Warn Sofiw Dino Mnhd Zamdi [3] On 27 10.2023. noun hearing me submissions by own I11: Dmsscimon and me dslerice. the learned Sessians coun lU€E§ aiiawed me apaiicaiion by me defence and mdered me dodumens sought be supplied by ms Vmsacu|iL7n In ma defanca within Ihrse (3; days «om ma da|e dune said oidsr. S!NVDVI1HIlUUflimMEaVGHflI None s.n.i In-vihnrwm as used M mm ms nflmnnflly sun. dun-mm via muue Wm! persene (i e me accused‘: nueoene ena Ma (2) children] wars in me house at the nrne 0! me Inc am which led to me cnerge In Iluasuon The presence or mese mree (3) persons were runner suppenee by me evldsnue L1f|hs rnuesnpanrng aflicaras submmsd ey me defence based nn pages 243 » 244 eune notes nflevldenos [an] Henoe, me eetenee eleany um um go on e vreuc or we own by eskrng (mm me prossculion whatsoever eowrnerne my new way men hands en Vns1aad. me documents they requesnea ene seugm fur were vmrn meee nnrae (cu irnpenern eye-wwnessss uneeniamy, men statements would be or areal Inrpomeme and aserenenee cp me defence eeee. Even mere so‘ when me maiden! nappenee almcsl rour (4) were ago and m reeuueer what had happened that day nuy nu! be es eesy as n seems. [av] Thus, in eeny me devenee 0! me aerd eoeurnence would lantamoum Io disregarding me pnnmma of eeuemy of errne rn e cnminal pmeeeprnp, and u\limaha\y the non: to e {air mi! [401 As such, unis oeun find: me erpurnem by me prwsenulmn max the dafanoa cnuld avweye interwew me wI(n$ses 11 2 me aopueewe husband and two 12; chflflreni and Ihai mere was no euppreaaien or uvvflence lay me prosecution ‘rs wnnoun mam. [41] Reverenoe Vs nreee to me much qumed judgment of Parker U in R v Lnwson (lupvu) - - n enoum be borne m rrune, naweven man an Anflexmle appluscn to mess emrnsranees can walk rruurllw For -xenrpvo, tho vrmrmunernery mzy mm men men rm dnhncc mnmeny IN): to Vntorvlnw him. or he Imy mmsl ta nlako any fuvlhll shtonnnt. me Dells! precnu Is to snow me deienm 2p :99 sum eeeremenrs unreee were re good reeeon ror not eorng so.‘ (empneere added) u n rpnzunuuasrnmrsavst my me e.n.r ...n.r MU be used e van; me m\g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ mum puns! as well as the judgmam of Harmlndar Smgh JCA m sm Auysn (lnprl) - "1831 Also. wvmoul ms mm.» smsmms, ms rlsfsrms would run Ina risk onnwsmmsm afsum wrlnasxss by me pmesouflon lnmagn me use ollhs police stalomenla 1.. their custody nus would csflmn/y sum ms squsmy 0! mm: panalple and me /mlspmdenne that has summed hum ~- lm ummaxely, 1: an bofls mm I» ma alemsnloflalmessin atrial «:2 mm the prosewuon and defiance (I a aquaury or arms pnnclma). The Engfish common Vyw dearly laud dawn the prindplss Iha| unless mare are goon Ieaswns lor nnn—d\sv:\nsum, the pmsecmmn have 21 duty |o dkclnse and nmvids, «mm me unused malarial, winnass stzalnmanlx in ma defence [see RV LIIwwn(1s9I1) an crllw R 1:17: R VWIN1 new un ER577 and R v Bmmn (wmmn) [ms] AC :51 mm». were ralerrud lo m an Aliynh (lupr:)] [431 Echmng ma Supreme own at Canada demsiun m R V Sllnchoomho [I991] 3 son :29 where il was rewgnised that 2 . the fi'u1I: of ms uwesngauon wruclv an m me possession nlcounsal let me Cmwn am no! my pmperfy nfms Clown for use m secumg a convrcnon mu ma Dmnartyoflha publlcloba mam ansuretha!/u51»coIsA1ans'{psr Sonfnka ./ at p 3331. [u] R v Sllnchcombo was also rvelenvd ln sm Mayan (wnrl) mm m hnememn‘ n was held by me Conn of Appeal — "my Slmplypur, meuuryome praseculion fsloactlinfy mysm csnainly not ab/Vgsd to lead avtdsrms mm. may urvdamfllvc ms» as-. ma In/max: requires me urmssd mmnsr m rls nosmwn, Muclv may undormms us case, orbs warm to As adversary. be drsdossd to me defsnos The mny .s . 11 N rrmznnuunsmmrsavst 14:: ms Sum ...m.. WW be used m mm me nvwhufllli mm; dun-mm VI] muNG pm prosmnw would mm M um ban! on murmg - convlcrlun -r I/I can: thus rming Injusllu.” (amphssissildsdj [45] Thus. uniess and lmlil the decision in siii Aliyah (mum) is set aside by me Federal COIJVI ur by a iaiar own omppaai which decisinn aims «mm Ihato1§IllA|Iynh(|up<I),Ihe Cuun of Auyeai deciaian in siii Allyih (IMDVI) is snii good iaw in rsspem oi apdiicaiidn for 5.112 stslamams eiwimessas a| ma defunce siade. [451 Aocordinglyi bound bylhe dscislnfl in s yam-upra). lhls caim find: there is a common law duty on the pmsecuiinn In dlscluse In the delarica «he paline smamanis aims wiinesaea wnich were necessary and aesirabia m their case. Cunnlullan [A71 Mar having czmmlly considered Ihn submissions by bum names, mis mm finds no piausibls reason in dishnb the umer graniad by the iaamad Sessiaris coun judge The appiicaiian (or revision is hsrsby dismissed for lack ol merit Daled 5'" Ja dry, 2024 High Cuurl dish Nam (cnmmai 5) I3 sin !wi1HIILiU£smMEavG1 My -ma Sum mm. M“ be used m yam me niigiruiily MIN; dun-mm vn JVLING mi Pumas Pmmumonz Mr Mohimld Fwaoua hln Mohamed Idris Deputy Pubric Prosamnar, Fmm Smangar Scale Legal Advusmy Chamber Defence Caurue\' Desmond Ho 5 Assocvllaa Palahnv ma. Se\arI§Ior u sw Irmmnuuasmmaavst 14:: mm smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm Flndlngn by ml. noun [91 In this revision herein, the Demnanl issues to be addressed are as follows - (i) The appucanun ofma dncmmz av sme dscisls (ii) Whmher wnneaz. soacemenxs under 5.112 Mme cpc (‘xx 112 statements") are DVIvHeg2d aowmenm and (mi Whamar 5.112 s1a(emems are m be provided «a me aevanna ma aanhcauon made under: 51 mm CFC” [1 n1 Vn rsspsL1o1lhas2\ssues‘(ha relevam case lawslhm come In mind ave ma snarl auomd Hugh own decision m Hnnd| v Puhll: Platinum! [1 ml 2 ML! JI)l,FsdIraICounde1::sxons|n Hum: v Public Froncutor [mo] 2 MM an arm um‘ sn Mohd mum HI AM Rank v FF 5 AnMIInrAppIaI [2019] MLHJ 132; me Cour! or Appeal dsmswns In sun Alsyuh v P-mu: Pmmnur [my] 4 MLJ 46 and ms rsosnl Court at Amman decision in Data’ sn Mohd mm: H] Ahd Rank v PF 5 Anvlhnr Anna: [2025] 1 cu 572 [11] Undsmandably, Ihssa cases were can by nmn ma prosecution and defence in |ne\r ruspecuve :ubm\ss\ons In me rension more Ihis noun. now u ol sum dlcisls [121 Enafly‘ m was me oamenmon allha pmsaculxan max based an Ins duclnne afstars dscrsrs‘ it \s Ins Federal Court aamim m my sn Illolld mm: (won) and not me coun omppeal dedslon In sm my-n (Iupu) man bmds «ms court in respect aims wssuss nnsea m me rsvisinn harem srN!pvv1H/vuuasmmrsavsudv 'NnI2 sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; mmn VII nF\uNG pm As sum ma pmssculinn summed mac Ihe spoiicaiion ior me dowmenls by me deienos (a be dismissed [13] However, it is ins findmu oi mi: coun mat me casas oi Hula! (sum) as wall as boin cases oi Dam’ Srl Mund MINI: (supnl am disunauiuned from me Ievlsiun herein The dislmguishing fame! being ma aidresaid idur cases involved apphcaliuns by me defanca ior ma Dmdunmn aflhe 5.112 statemants prior In me oomnuncainenionne in iein advanca cl 019 mi ikm in a prs—In2Il discovery in s cnrninai proceeding mi Unllka me cases oi Nusdl (mm) and Duke‘ sn uiond Nnj\b (supra) were me appimaiions lnr 5.112 siaiemanis wave made prior In the commencemen\ oima inai, ma daianoa in inia iaviaion apphad forms sama anhe defence snags. [151 It was submmad by ma defence based on oaga 2 arms noias oi avidanm, me wiinass statement sougni ior is «mm ins aoouseds nusoano whom ina proseouuon innaiiy intended In can as a pmsacuuan witness Howavar. me Dmseoullon subsequen||y dacided againsi ii and ma museds husband was aiao ndi ullanad no mo deianoa Henoe. me danger and risk oimness Iampeflng by ins deienoe no ionger oeoomas an issue since me accused‘: husband VS now me defence witness And one oenainry does noi iamoar wnn nns's mmess As such‘ ma cases of riuudi (warp) and um‘ Srl Mend Najlh (supra) are dislinguished on ma iacia whereupon Ihs decisions made inorsin do noi bind inis ooun. mi rum-ennore, me Fedeml com in bmn Nuldi sum) and nuns Sri Mohd Nun (supra) nad ma dogdnuniiy to hold me dsniai oi such appiicauons in apniy across ma board radardiess or wheihel me apoiicaiion were made priorm ur dunno ins oornmanoeineni oiine Ina! or sin Irminnuuasmmaavsi my -mu Sum mm. MU he used m mm o. mum-y MW; dnunvinnl VII .nunc mm even amre delenoe slage vel in mm eases. me Federal coun cnoee nel lo do so (171 In leer, me Federal Cmlrl ln new sri ulolrd Najlh (man) could have eel aslds me COW! el Appeal decleian ln Sltl Al-yen (supra). yel once again ncneee rm to do no [la] As such. ll can be lnlerred lnal me daclslorls made by the Federal coun rn bo|h lne eeses enly rneanl lor epollcelrens made prlor to me oommeneemenl at me ldal. Hence‘ me leer Ind rlsk ln me rarnpenng cf wllneeeee by me delenee as noted bylhs Federal ceun ls elearlylusmled [191 that being said, sud: risk and leer ere no longer presenl enee lne defence calls a wllneee wnrcn was lrllnally rnrended In be a prmeeurlon wrlness The same person nerwrlrrslenulng was enee a polenllel Dmseculioll witness ls new a willless lnr lne defence. Ae slated earllerr ene cennlnly does ner tamuur mm one‘: own wnnese. [20] Conversely. elmller to me feels leading re me revlelon hereln I: ma case of Slll Alsynelr (supra). ln (act me lssun relsed and addressed by me cnurr el Appeal ln slu Alsyah (supu) ls also almns|5imi1arl0Iha ravislnn al nand. The leeee being - wnemer me pmsecullon can be urdslsd, al me and ol me use ler me pmsaculiun, and wlrere delenee has been celled. |c runuen le me aocussd a copy el wllnese elalemerrra recorded under s.112 el lne cl>c or wllneuee oflersd In lhe eelenee wrnen ere nralenal and much may essrel the delenee case [211 The serum 01 Appeal ln slrl Alsylll (eupu) Imarllmously allowed me Ippeal by rne delenca [appellant and eel eerde lne order enne Hlgh own wnrcn diemleeed me eppellenre eepllcellon under 5.51 or me cl>c lor lne pmduclmn aleeyen (7) wllness eulernenrs recorded under 5112 at me cvc. slN lwrzu/rl.ll.l£srnMr:al7s1 my me s.n.r ...ne.r wlll re used m yam me nllglrullly mm; den-vlnrrl vu erlum we [221 Thus, by vlme oi tn. doc1r1ne 09 -5137! den/S15‘ |hIs mu lnslaad bound by the daemon of SN Allylh (supru) and nut [he FEGGVBV Conn aecnvons tn Nusfll (sum) and mm‘ SYI Mohd NnJ\b (supru) Prlvli-am documoml [221 The prosemmon atsc mtmsa |o tna mam com aemsion in surnhanllyi sokurm v onuk unnk blnlsrrull[ZoI5l1 tau 1:: tn ms argument on the apwnallwn of s 124 EA mso In 5 112 statements [24] Comcidenlally. ms case at suruvtanllyu Snkuvlli (warn) ma me uraumenl on me appllcalton at s 124 EA 1950 to 5112 statements were alsn rzissd and alguad by me pmsscuhun VI sin Alsyall (supra) 1: was omnanded by me prosectmon that me Fsaenav Cam in Datuk lamk (mm) cmtaerea the 5.112 statements wars protected 1mm anctoauna under 5.12.: EA195n [25] on tnis nuts, tna Coun of Appeal In A ylh (snprll msltngulshed tne case at tmux Ishnk [iuprl) :5 tone»: — "1711 my mstmflursmng faster, In our vvsw, vmx ma! dliclosum mere was sought for aw pmmsdmgs anu, urmku me Instant me, my Faasrsr com fsfled naawty on ma carrier-It: afan alfidavit mm by me mvssbigalmg olfimr at ms appsnant aerate oonctuarng nu: ma ststemenls were mnotdud in olfiasl mrvfidrncc and mat dtsclwms was not In ms public mtsrust.“ my Acsnrdtnwyt ans mun adopt tna findmgs cf tna cmm of Appeat In sin Alsyan (mm) In distinguishing (ha case utnumk lshlk (Iupn) in mm rvavlston harem syn !rm2HItuu£srnMr:a)7s11dv warn sum In-nhnv wm he ts... m mm n. nvVmtuH|y mm; dun-mm VII .mm mm 1271 Furlhel, as held lay me Com omopeal ln Sl|IA|syaII(:upr:),s124 EA 1950 noes nan apply to ma polloa swalalnanls in quaslian as may were nol communlnalluns mada lo a pool: ofioer ln 'ofl|clal confidence‘ The pnolloga under s.I2A EA 1950 la analogous lo Imunnallon pruvldad by lnlonners, lor wlmpla, male lnena la a corlfldlrlg ol secve|§ lollooao by a conaaoonolng pmmlse olsaonaoy. pa] Cnnvenuly, ma slalalnenu ana mnacnpls requesled In «no rsvlsiurl hsrsin are lvom lna husband and children olma acalssd. As soon mesa statements and lrunscnwis Ira nol mnde WI Tlffizfial oarlfid9rlce' but by lno ooamwa pmcass of ma law. Than; IE no quhi pm ooo or oummurllcallng lnlonnollon on mo oaals or saclacy and confidence nana Aocoralnoly, thus was also no only lo preaelva connaanco -no there cannot lhen be any breach oleonlluenoe [291 no Caurl or Appeal ln snl Alayah (luau) also fllsagmsd wilh Nuldi -non) lnal pollo. slatemanls are absolulaly privllsgsd basod on ma lollowlno findings . ll) Under 5 mm 01 ma CFC, me vsmoll glnna - Whce s1aIam9rlt ‘shall be legally bound lo slalo mo lnm‘. ll the oolloa alalalnenl la rouno lo belalsel ms rnakercan oeonargoo Vnrglvlrlw lalse evldence unaenna Penal cooa and its maker cannon olalrn lnal mo cammunicallan between nlnl and ma pa afficar lo privilsgsd and lharafora not aon-laslola ln ovloanoa (H) mere are no sxalmary orovmona whmh allow for olsolosma ol pollee alalalnenla, male are 350 no pmvislorls Much dadars lnal such polloo slalemenls snall nol oa dlaoloaeo. Unllke uooumoncs svldandvlg aflails of slam 1:423 EA 1950). lo: olfiolal cummu ' lons (5124 EA 1950), comrnunlcallons 7 an lwlZHnLlU£smMl3avG1 my -ma a.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used a van; was nnglruflly MIN: dun-mm VIZ nFluNG am nunns fnamags U! mantel prlvllegs ($122 EA 1950), and nmtessianal communlcallons between an attvecate and me cllanl or legal pvvteaslenal prlvtlege ts: 126-129 Emasot where these wwletons lmavanttne relevant vnmastrvm taetna etnnpetlea tn disclose such eentnttlntcattnns Io anyune irlcludlng tne mun except as provided. the tea tttet paragraphs s 32(I)(i) and (ll EA 1950 are |(: he lndspsndsnl at eactt other and ll: be mad disjurxniveiy rasulfing in the admlsetnillty at statements which tell within tne tour cataqorles ht Denurts ntermoned tttereln. tn.) (W) s1alu|L7vy law alluws such e.tt2 statements In be eltmttlea in svldence tn cenatn cltwmslanoes. For example, 2 11342) at me cwc prevlau Ihal Ihs own an tntervena and enter pmducllorl 0! s ttz statements farms purpasas of enallengtng and nnpeaettlngtne clsdil u1wilnassas.5|mi|ar1y,s 113(3), (4) and (st of tlte CFC alluws s 112 statement he eamtttea ln evidence undar the sand suluecttons. [so] Nofwllftslzanding me Cowl at Appeal tn mte- sn Muhd Najib (Iupra) held tttal witness statements recorded bylnvesttgaang euttterlttes are p gee ttowments. may are however, not absolutely Dflvllefied based an the abovesald reasons stated tn Sll|Al1yult(uu|-lri) [31] Thu Courl at Awe: Date’ srl Malta Najlh (luprl) also Ickrtowlsdaed that mete are no slawlory nruvletons wntctt we the ngnt te lrI5DB€1 such statements Hence‘ the reason our net ttlsclestng was In avold ttte real dangemtlempetlng wlttt wttneesee SlNVwlZHnl.lU£smMEal7st1dv -we s.n.t 1-vthnrwm be .n.. M mm e. nflmruflly sum. dun-mm wa eFluNG Wm! pa A4:oord|ng\y. as held by tna Cmm auppaav In sm Alsynh (nu-urn), than are min nu nalmnw Drovmons Wrflch declare Ihal such nouoe statsmama snau not be utsuossa. For mstanoa, unhke ma Evmenoe Am 1950 (EA 1950) won pmwdes oenaln 6/pas of communxcauon, statsments is pnvllaged, \ a snalamanm avldencmg state 01 aflaus (5 123 EA 1950), ulfldal onmmunicalianl (1124 EA 1950), manta: priviloge (s 122 EA 1950) and max pro1I.ss\onaV Vnvllsgs under 3.1% EA19§0. m] Henoe, unless mam are good reasons To! nononsmusuna, ma prosecunon have a duty In mimosa and provide the documents sougmar by the defence In tna case for this temsmn herein. However‘ ma pmsactmnn ma nm atsuosa any good reasnns 6nrnon~dlsc\osule, Instead nauen heaVHy on the argument that ii Vs nits vaw witness statements recorded by tnvestigaung aumonnes are onvuageo dncuman|s [tn] Be that as It may, the an:-flysis and fintflngs mm: own on pnvilsged documents sna atzsouutaty privHegsd oocumsms era as Ebavamenlmnad. As suott, ttns mun finds no mm M Ihs argument tansad by me pmseculmn 1.51 ollhe cm [351 The next qussmm fmlhis cum to eonswaor was whether we defence had fulfiflad ma dual raquvements Mnecesswy and dsstrabmly unoers 51 outta cpc. Secflon 51 Mlhs owe s1a|es as Ionowa 51 summons to pmduoa dooumsnfor omsr thmg: 44; Mmenevur any com 07 pom wear makmg n ponos r‘nvss1IgaIvan oonwsrs that me pmduc!/an ol any pmmmy or document rs nmsmy ur aasmsote for ma pawns: or any mvsslrgslton, ‘mquvy. mm or all-tar pnnx-omy under nus Code by orbslum tnar com or 9 N rpnzn/tutmsmmaavst to, nus Sam n-nhnrwm as used M van; me nr1g\ruHIy mm; dun-mm VIZ anutm Mn u/am, sum Comtmayrssus a summons ovwm affcsr ammsnwnsrmmepermnmvmnssnbssssyanw power mu pmosny or doeumenl «. mam tn be requmngn/mmmendandpmduoe/lortopmdum/lat me Irme am:/m mm m the summnns or my 42) Any lismnn mqwred undsr rm; secfran mslsly nu pmdune any pmpeny M document shaflbs doomed lo haw mmp/rm mm an rnqmsitian 4 1» camp: ma propevvy or doannenl to no pmcmca metead av auondiny Pmanauy to produce me sam- (3; Nothing In (N: mum shall be flssmsd to am: the pruvisions arany rm mlotmg to evidence let me me bomg /11 late: or m apprym any postal mm, megram or am: mum: m ma custody of mu posm or talarfilzh sumorflfu ml Thu avnhcatinm under 551 M me CFO and ms Vrmmnlas le\a|ad Iherulo‘ name!)/. ma Nqmmmsnls aI'nsceu6I16I unmet.-were c\ear1Y dawn m cm Fsdaml Conn dsdsmns m Puhllc Pmcaculnv v Raymond cm. Klm Chwn [was] 2 mm as and am‘ sm Anwar bin Ibrahim v Puhllc Pronemar [am] 2 ML: 312 In man, me dual rsqmremsnu oi neees ma aemulny were Hmsd to eflmlname ma roving orfishmg expedI|iun by he delenw in asking curaacumencs m we genera! sense. [37] By cumpanson, ms devenos harem has plnpomlsd and nam-mad dawn me documents mquas1ad(ia.|I1a 5.112 s1alemam arma acmsmrs husband as wall aslha video Intalvlswlranscnms -mm; acouu-:d's1wo(2) children] was submmea by Ina defenca based on page 1w1 nllhe nexus or evmme, that me vamer M the aaoeasea vlcflm lesnned «me we: (:4! m N Irmznnuuasmmaavst 14:: um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BE-A73KJ-66-11/2021

PLAINTIF ASHOK KUMAR MUTHU RAMAN DEFENDAN 1. ) KANNAN A/L SALWOM 2. ) PUVANASWARAN A/L MUNUSAMY PENCELAH PACIFIC & ORIENT INSURANCE CO. BERHAD

kemalangan jalan raya - liabiliti - kuantum - gantirugi am- gantirugi khas - defendan tidak memangil saksi - percanggahan keterangan saksi-saksi plantif - tuntutan palsu plantif - gantirugi am isu overlapping -gantirugi khas - kos pembedahan masa hadapan gagal diplidkan

19/01/2024

Puan Siti Hajar Binti Ali

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=bae94882-3bc5-4c03-81ef-2520bd5b05fb&Inline=true

DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET DI SUNGAI BESAR DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR, MALAYSIA WRIT SAMAN NO: BE-A73KJ-66-11/2021 ANTARA ASHOK KUMAR MUTHU RAMAN (NO. K/P: 770511755079) …PLANTIF DAN KANNAN A/L SALWOM (NO. K/P: 940124085721) …DEFENDAN PERTAMA PUVANASWARAN A/L MUNUSAMY (NO. K/P: 870612435603) …DEFENDAN KEDUA PACIFIC & ORIENT INSURANCE CO. BERHAD …DEFENDAN KETIGA (NO. Syarikat: 12557-W) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN MUKKADIMAH [1] Ini adalah alasan penghakiman terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini yang telah menolak tuntutan Plantif dengan kos mengikut skala pada 16.1.2024. Sekadar makluman, pada masa alasan penghakiman ini selesai ditulis, tiada notis rayuan difailkan oleh mana-mana pihak. 19/01/2024 14:40:25 BE-A73KJ-66-11/2021 Kand. 54 S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal A. LIABILITI [2] Versi Plantif yang dibentangkan adalah pada 8.6.2020 jam lebih kurang 4.00 petang, ketika plantif sedang berjalan kaki di sekitar Taman Kenangan Sabak Bernam dari rumah Plantif di No.49 Taman Kenangan untuk mencari buah kelo, sebuah motorkar yang dipandu oleh Defendan(1) yang mempunyai no. plet BFT 3079 yang telah datang dari arah belakang Plantif telah melanggar Plantif di bahagian kaki kanan sehingga menyebabkan Plantif jatuh ke dalam longkang. [3] Mahkamah mendapati terdapat satu sahaja versi kemalangan iaitu versi pihak Plantif. Ini disebabkan, pihak defendan gagal dan/atau tidak mengemukakan saksi (tiada saksi pihak defendan yang hadir). Kendatipun, Defendan(3) menegaskan bahawa Plantif tidak dilanggar oleh Defendan(1) pada bila-bila masa sekaligus Defendan(3) tidak bertanggungan untuk membayar sebarang gantirugi kepada Plantif. Terdapat isu yang meragukan dan melibatkan penipuan (frod) yang mana Defendan(3) mendakwa tuntutan Plantif terhadap Defendan- Defendan adalah tuntutan palsu demi menuntut gantirugi daripada Defendan(3). [4] Tiada keterangan daripada saksi bebas di tempat kejadian ketika kemalangan dikatakan berlaku. Mahkamah bergantung kepada keterangan saksi bebas lain iaitu Pegawai Penyiasat (SP1) di samping keterangan senyap seperti gambar kejadian, rajah kasar dan laporan polis. Analisa & Dapatan Mahkamah [5] Sungguhpun Defendan-Defendan tidak megemukakan sebarang saksi atau membentangkan kesnya di hadapan Mahkamah ini, prinsip undang-undang mantap menyatakan beban pembuktian kecuaian pada tahap imbangan kebarangkalian adalah kekal di atas bahu Plantif. Ini juga sejajar dengan kehendak Seksyen 101 dan Seksyen 102 Akta Keterangan 1950. [6] Dalam memahami pekara ini, kes-kes duluan berikut adalah dirujuk; WONG THIN YIT V. MOHAMAD ALI [1971] 2 MLJ 175: In a negligence action, the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence and the plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of the defendant's negligence. Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes KUNASEGARAN MANICKAM V. BAULA SINGH KIPA SINGH & ANOR & ANOTHER CASE [1982] CLJ (REP) 506: S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The fact that the defendants had not been called to rebut the plaintiff's case did not mean judgment must be entered in favour of the plaintiff. The question of tilting the balance of probabilities in the plaintiff's favour would only arise where the plaintiff has proved his case. Prinsip tersebut juga telah dirujuk dalam kes CHE PAH BINTI ITAM V. CHANG BEK LEE [1998] 4 CLJ 517: Although the defendant had not adduced any evidence he had nevertheless filed his statement of defence denying any liability whatsoever for the said accident. In the absence of the defendant's evidence is the court compelled to accept in toto the plaintiff's version? It is trite law that the onus of proving negligence lies on the plaintiff. In Wong Thin Yit v. Mohamed Ali [1971] 1 LNS 151 Ong CJ (as he then was) held: In a negligence action the onus of proof rests wholly on the plaintiff, whether or not the defendant gives evidence.The plaintiff cannot succeed without proof of defendant's negligence. [7] Sehubungan itu, adalah amat penting bagi Mahkamah untuk menentukan sama ada kemalangan sebenarnya telah berlaku antara Plantif dan Defendan(1) memandangkan Defendan(3) mempertikaikan berlakunya kemalangan tersebut. Mahkamah ini perlu menimbang beban pembuktian penipuan dalam kes ini atas imbangan kebarangkalian bagi menentukan sama ada kemalangan sebenarnya berlaku seperti yang telah diputuskan dalam kes SINNAIYAH & SONS SDN BHD V. DAMAI SETIA SDN BHD [2015] 7 CLJ 584 seperti berikut: We therefore reiterate that we agree and accept the rationale in re B (Children) (supra) that in a civil claim even when fraud is alleged the civil standard of proof, that, is, on the balance of probabilities, should apply. [8] Terlebih dahulu Mahkamah membincangkan keterangan SP3 yang merupakan adik ipar Plantif. Pada masa kejadian, beliau tidak melihat kemalangan berlaku. SP3 mengakui bahawa Laporan Polis – P2B yang dibuat pada 9/6/2020 adalah hasil daripada percakapan antara beliau dan kakaknya. Pada setiap masa yang material, kakaknya juga tidak menyaksikan kemalangan kerana berada di rumah ibu mereka dan tidak dipanggil di Mahkamah sebagai saksi. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah berpendapat keterangan SP3 adalah suatu keterangan dengar cakap (hearsay). Segala keterangan berkenaan kemalangan yang didakwa berlaku ke atas Plantif bukan berasal daripada pengetahuan peribadi SP3 berdasarkan pengalaman yang dialami sendiri. Maka, keterangan beliau dan isi kandungan Laporan Polis – P2B tersebut tidak akan dipertimbangkan dan diambilkira oleh Mahkamah ini kerana bercanggah dengan Seksyen 60 (1) Akta Keterangan 1950. S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [9] Seterusnya, Mahkamah merujuk kepada keterangan SP1 yang merupakan pegawai penyiasat kes ini. Beliau mengesahkan bahawa kemalangan berlaku pada 8/6/2020 antara Plantif dan motorkar no. plet BFT 3079 yang dipandu oleh Defendan tetapi tiada apa-apa kerosakan pada motorkar tesebut. Kawasan kemalangan adalah satu jalan lurus di kawasan taman perumahan yang mana Defendan bergerak dari bawah ke atas dan titik pertembungan pertama adalah di “x” pada rajah kasar – P4. Tiada apa-apa kesan kemalangan dijumpai di atas jalan raya melainkan beliau menjumpai kesan tanah manusia jatuh ke dalam longkang. Beliau telah ke tempat kemalangan apabila menerima laporan polis yang dibuat SP3 pada 9/6/2020 dan telah berjumpa dengan Defendan (1) di sana. Keputusan kes – P5 telah dikeluarkan SP1 yang mana Defendan (1) telah disaman di bawah Rule 10 Road Traffic Rules 1959. [10] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah merujuk kepada keterangan SP4 yang merupakan Plantif dan keterangan SP2 yang merupakan doktor yang pertama merawat SP4 selepas kemalangan pada 8/6/2020 secara serentak. Adalah fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa Plantif sememangnya mengalami kecederaan patah kaki seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Laporan Perubatan – P6 pada 8/6/2020. [11] Walaubagaimanapun, Mahkamah mendapati terdapat pecanggahan keterangan berkenaan bagaimana Plantif mengalami kecederaan tersebut atau apakah yang menyebabkan Plantif mengalami kecederaan tersebut. Pada hemat Mahkamah ini adalah pekara atau aspek material dalam kes kemalangan jalan raya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes GUNALAN RAMACHANDRAN & ORS V. PP [2006] 2 MLJ 197 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa: What need to be considered is whether the discrepancies relate to material aspects of the case or otherwise. As stated in Sarkar on Evidence 15th edn. p. 112: Minor discrepancies are possible even in the version of truthful witnesses and such minor discrepancies only add to the truthfulness of their evidence (Sidhan v. State of Kerala [1986] Cri LJ 470, 473 (Ker)). But discrepancies in the statements of witnesses on material points should not be lightly passed over, as they seriously affect the value of their testimony (Brij Lal v. Kunwar, 36 A 187: 18 CWN 649: A 1914 PC 38). The main thing to be seen is whether the inconsistencies go to the root of the matter or pertain to insignificant aspects thereof... [12] Berbalik kepada kes di hadapan Mahkamah, Plantif menyatakan bahawa sebuah motorkar no. plet BFT telah datang dari arah belakang melanggar kaki kanan sehingga beliau terjatuh ke dalam longkang. Namun pada hari kemalangan beliau tidak pasti kenderaan apa yang melanggarnya. Pada setiap masa yang material bermula dari dilanggar hingga ke hospital Plantif tidak pengsan dan sedar apa yang berlaku. S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [12] Seterusnya Mahkamah meneliti kepada Laporan Perubatan – P6 di bahagian History dan Laporan Klarifikasi – P7, jelas tertulis bahawa kecederaan yang dialami itu disebabkan oleh Plantif merupakan penunggang motorsikal dan telah terbabas dan jatuh ke dalam longkang kerana mengelak daripada kemalangan dengan sebuah kenderaan. Di sini keterangan SP2 dan Plantif adalah penting dan perlu diperhalusi sebaiknya bagi mengesahkan dan menjelaskan percanggahan tersebut. Melalui keterangan SP2 mengesahkan bahawa sejarah pesakit diperolehi daripada Plantif sendiri pada 8/6/2020 dan Plantif dalam keadaan tidak pengsan, sedar pada keadaan sekeliling dan apa yang beliau katakan semasa SP2 membuat pemeriksaan ke atas Plantif. [13] Berikut adalah keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan utama yang menjelaskan berkenaan percanggahan tersebut: Terdapat percanggahan kerana pesakit hanya memberitahu saya dia jatuh ke dalam longkang sahaja dan tiada perlanggaran dengan apa-apa kenderaan sewaktu saya ambil sejarah perubatan. Rujuk ikatan E m/s 2 dan ikatan D m/s 24, pemahaman saya terhadap motorbike skidded ialah tiada berlaku apa- apa perlanggaran dengan kenderaan yang lain tetapi melalui penceritaan pesakit, dia menyatakan bahawa dia mencuba untuk mengelakkan berlakunya perlanggaran dengan motorkar Berikut adalah keterangan SP2 semasa pemeriksaan balas yang menjelaskan berkenaan percanggahan tersebut: Lihat bahagian history, betul beliau menunggang motorsikal Tidak semestinya motorbike skidded jika tiada kenderaan yang lain terlibat seperti kes ini Setuju ini adalah cerita dari pesakit sediri, motorbike skidded Rujuk P7, Setuju beliau cuba elak dr langar kenderaan lalu beliau terjatuh Berikut adalah keterangan Plantif semasa pemeriksaan balas yang menjelaskan berkenaan percanggahan tersebut: Saya tahu apa itu motorsikal dalam bahasa melayu Saya faham jatuh dalam longkang dalam bahasa melayu Saya faham rider- motorcycle rider Rujuk laporan perubatan, saya tidak setuju saya beritahu saya adalah rider motorsikal Setuju saya ambil risiko sendiri untuk pegi ke hospital swasta dr hospital Kerajaan Setuju saya patah kaki kanan S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Setuju saya sampai jabatan kecemasan saya sedar dan tidak pengsan Setuju bahawa dalam laporan perubatan semuanya betul kecuali bagaimana kemalangan berlaku Setuju doctor tak kata benar berkenaan bagaimana kemalangan berlaku [14] Berdasarkan kepada kedua-dua keterangan SP2 & Plantif tersebut, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa kredibiliti SP2 adalah tidak tercabar dan Mahkamah menerima penjelasan SP2 keseluruhannya di samping beliau adalah saksi bebas yang tidak mempunyai kepentingan. Penjelasan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah adalah berkeyakinan, konsisten, boleh dipercayai dan munasabah. [15] Manakala bagi Plantif, kredibilitinya adalah diragui dan penjelasan berkenaan percanggahan ini tidak boleh dipercayai. Kendatipun, Mahkamah mempercayai bahawa Plantif mengalami kemalangan pada 8/6/2020 yang menyebabkan beliau menghadapi kecederaan sebegitu rupa yang dinyatakan dalam laporan perubatan. Walaubagaimanapun, Plantif gagal membuktikan bahawa kemalangan tersebut adalah berpunca daripada pelanggaran dengan motorkar yang dipandu oleh Defendan (1). Mahkamah berpendapat peralihan fakta yang berlaku bermula hari kejadian 8/6/2020 ketika Plantif dirawat oleh SP2 kemudian peralihan fakta pada 9/6/2020 apabila laporan polis pertama oleh SP3 dan 24/6/2020 laporan polis Plantif dibuat adalah sebenarnya suatu afterthought. Plantif semasa memberikan keterangan mengesahkan beliau tidak tahu apakah kenderaan yang melanggarnya dan hanya membuat andaian motorkar Defendan (1) yang berbuat demikian apabila beliau bangun dari longkang. Malahan itu, Plantif telah hadir berjumpa dengan SP2 sejurus kemalangan berlaku dalam keadaan beliau sedar dan waras yang mana Mahkamah berpandangan daya ingatan dan kefahaman tentang apa yang terjadi adalah masih segar dalam ingatan Plantif. Tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan Plantif dalam keadaan trauma ataupun tidak waras semasa hadir di hospital. [16] Selanjutnya, Mahkamah mendapati Defendan (1) tidak hadir ke Mahkamah memberikan keterangan bagi membentangkan versi beliau. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah hanya boleh merujuk kepada keterangan SP1 yang menyiasat kes ini dan SP2 yang merawat Plantif pada 8/6/2020 usai kemalangan dialami Plantif. Mahkamah berpendapat siasatan yang dilakukan oleh SP1 adalah tidak menyeluruh dan sempurna walhal kertas siasatan kes ini dibuka di bawah Seksyen 43 (1) APJ 1987 yang merupakan kesalahan yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai kesalahan jenayah jalan raya yang mempunyai hukuman yang berat. Mahkamah mendapati SP3 tidak menyiasat berkenaan bagaimana kehadiran Defendan (1) di situ pada hari beliau hadir menyiasat di kawasan kemalangan sehari selepas kemalangan. Hal ini demikian, Defendan (1) secara tiba-tiba muncul semasa beliau hadir di tempat kejadian S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dan mengakui beliau telah melanggar Plantif dan menunjukkan di mana kejadian berlaku. Lagipun, situasi sebegini adalah amat jarang berlaku walaupun ia tidak mustahil. Fakta sebegini apabila digabungkan dengan fakta bahawa Laporan polis – P2A yang dibuat 16 hari selepas hari kejadian oleh Plantif jelas menimbulkan keraguan di mana kemungkinan isu penipuan wujud dan perlu disiasat sebaiknya oleh SP1. Malah, Plantif mengakui bahawa laporan polis – P2A dibuat atas pertolongan isterinya. Alasan cadangan penyelesaian awal antara pihak-pihak dan Plantif menerima rawatan di hospital adalah tidak mencukupi atas imbangan kebarangkalian bagi membuktikan versi kemalangan Plantif. Mahkamah berpendapat versi kes Plantif ini adalah direka dan suatu afterthought bagi membantu Plantif membuat tuntuan insurans. [17] Mahkamah turut berpendapat semasa siasatan dijalankan SP1 sepatutnya menyedari semasa keterangan SP3 diambil (berdasarkan laporan polis yang dibuat SP3) bahawa SP1 perlu menyiasat lanjut dengan mengambil keterangan isteri SP3. Hal ini kerana, SP3 bukan saksi mata dan pegetahuan SP3 berkenaan kemalangan tersebut adalah diperolehi daripada isterinya. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mendapati tiada apa-apa keterangan yang mampu mengesahkan kenderaan apa yang sebenarnya melanggar Plantif ketika sedang berjalan atau sebenarnya Plantif yang sedang menunggang motorsikal sebenarnya terbabas sendiri lalu jatuh ke dalam longkang untuk mengelak daripada dilanggar oleh mana-mana kenderaan yang gagal dipastikan. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa tindakan SP1 dalam menyaman Defendan (1) bukan bukti mutlak kecuaian Defendan (1). Malah keterangan SP1 yang menyatakan terdapat kesan tanah manusia jatuh semasa menyiasat di tempat kejadian tidak boleh memberi konklusi nyata ianya disebabkan pelanggaran oleh motorkar Defendan (1) terhadap Plantif. Mahkamah perlu menilai keseluruhan bukti yang dikemukakan seperti yang dibincangkan di atas. Oleh itu, tuntutan Plantif dalam tindakan ini ditolak. B. Kuantum (atas dasar 100%) (i) Gantirugi am [18] Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah gantirugi am yang tepat yang perlu dibayar kepada Plantif adalah sesuatu yang mustahil untuk dicapai. Akan tetapi jumlah gantirugi am yang diberikan perlulah munasabah agar ianya dilihat berpadanan dengan kesesangaraan dan kesakitan yang dihadapi oleh Plantif. Namun sekiranya jumlah gantirugi yang keterlaluan tinggi akan meyebabkan ketidakadilan kepada Defendan. Sehubungan itu, amat baik bagi Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Compendium on Personal Injury Awards Revised (setakat 6 Julai 2018) dan otoriti kes duluan yang telah diputuskan di samping hujahan pihak-pihak dalam kes ini. S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Pekara ini adalah bertepatan dengan apa yang telah dinyatakan dalam kes ABDUL WAFFIY WAHUBBI & ANOR V. AK NAZARUDDIN AHMAD [2017] 5 LNS 52 bahawa: [39] It is axiomatic and imperative that when awarding damages for pain and suffering for personal injuries, the court must endeavour to ensure that the sum awarded falls within the range as stipulated in the Compendium and it would be wrong for trial courts to ignore the range of damages as recommended in the Compendium and to pluck a quantum from the air and make an award for a particular injury which does not resonate with the range in the Compendium. [40] I would also venture to say that it is the duty of counsel on both sides to guide the court to make an award which falls within the range as provided in the Compendium. Of course, even then there has to be medical evidence to support an award which leans towards either the higher or lower end of the range. Having said that, I do accept that the Compendium is not a statutory code but only a guideline which does not fetter the court's discretion and that the court is, subject to exceptional factual circumstances, at liberty to depart from the Compendium. [19] Adalah jelas bahawa Laporan Perubatan Pakar tidak ditanda sebagai Eksibit dan tertakluk kepada hujahan pihak-pihak sebagaimana dimaklumkan kepada Mahkamah pada hari perbicaraan. Hanya laporan perubatan dari Hospital Kerajaan yang dimasukkan dalam Ikatan Dokumen yang dipersetujui dan diterima. Dokumen berkenaan dengan tuntutan Plantif bagi gantirugi am adalah berdasarkan laporan-laporan berikut: a) Laporan perubatan bertarikh 16/2/2022 Hospital Tengku Ampuan Jemaah – P6 b) Laporan perubatan Rawatan Sri Kota Specialist – (ID10) Ikatan D m/s 13 c) Laporan perubatan Pakar Othopedik Plantif – Ikatan D m/s 14-22 d) Laporan perubatan Pakar Othopedik Defendan – Ikatan F m/s 1-4 i. CLOSED FRACTURE RIGHT TIBIA AND FIBULA: RM 35,000.00 -Plantif berhujah jumlah RM40,000.00 mankala Defendan berhujah jumlah RM23,000.00. Manakala Compendium mencadangkan RM 21,500.00 – RM 42,000.00 Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM35,000.00. - Sebagai panduan Mahkamah merujuk kes MOHD SHAFRI REHAN V. MOHD NURRUL AMRY MOHD RAHIM [2005] 5 LNS 4: S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [50] Bagi kecederaan ini, Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Mohd Shafri Rehan v. Mohd Nurrul Amry Mohd Rahim [2005] 5 LNS 4 di mana Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut:- iii) Close fracture right tibia and fibula with 2cm shortening - RM25,000.00 Penilaian pada kecederaan ini telah dilakukan oleh Dr. Ramu dan dalam Laporan Pakar dinyata antara lainnya; - 2cm shortening of right lower limb - able to squat fully. Peguam terpelajar plaintif telah merujuk kepada kes-kes Engketerama a/l Ramasamy v. Zulkifli bin Johari [2000] MCL para 696, Joseph Ng Choon Hiang v. Vittorio Luigi Roveda suit No. 988 of 1995, Vittorio Luigi Roveda v. Singapore Bus Service [1997] MCL para 54 dan berhujah RM45,000.00 wajar diberi untuk kecederaan ini. Di pihak defendan, RM25,000.00 telah dicadangkan. Kes-kes Tan Tong Chin v. Loh Shu Fun [1999] MCL 513, Liew Ah Meng v. Tan Chor Tak [2001] MCL 1170 dan Ng Hoon Kim v. Hong Wei Huang [2002] MCL 1100 dikemukakan sebagai sandaran untuk meyakinkan Mahkamah ini supaya berpihak kepada cadangannya. Secara amnya, amaun gantirugi yang diberi dalam kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh pihak plaintif bukan sahaja setakat kepatahan tulang tibia dan fibula tetapi termasuk juga beberapa kecacatan yang lain. Dalam kes Joseph Ng Choon Hiang (supra), S$30,000.00 adalah untuk fracture of right tibia and fibula with extensive sift tissue, bone loss and limition of knee and ankle movement. Begitu juga dalam kes Vittorio Luigi Roveda (supra), deformity, limitation of right knee, 3cm shortening, scars and ostoearthitis of right knee telah diambil kira untuk membenarkan amaun sebanyak S$45,000.00. Jika dibandingkan dengan kes-kes diatas, plaintif disini hanya mengalami kependekatan 2cm pada bahagian lower limb sahaja. Dengan menerima pakai kes- kes diatas dan setelah membuat perbandingan secara menyeluruh, saya percaya RM25,000.00 adalah satu jumlah yang munasabah dan tidak terlalu rendah untuk apa S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal yang dideritai oleh plaintif disini. Malah jumlah ini adalah selari dengan apa yang pernah diawardkan oleh Mahkamah menerusi kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh pihak plaintif. -Mahkamah berpendapat walaupun Laporan Pakar Defendan adalah pada tahun 2022 manakala Laporan Pakar Plantif adalah tahun 2021 menunjukkan Laporan Defendan adalah yang terkini namun kedua-duanya saling melengkapi bagi membantu Mahkamah memutuskan awad yang munasabah dan adil. Mahkamah ambil maklum Plantif menganggung kecacatan kekal pada kependekan kaki kanan (pendek 1cm) walaupun menurut Laporan Pakar Defendan ianya secara klinikal tidak penting. - Mahkamah mengambil maklum berkenaan pekara-pekara residual disabilities berikut seperti yang dinyatakan dalam rujukan kepada Laporan Pakar Plantif: pain right leg; limitation of movements of the right knee & ankle joint; inability to stand, squat for long time and pain during cold weather and strenuous activities. Rujukan kepada Laporan Pakar Defendan: discomfort over the right leg on prolonged walking, squat and sit cross-legged; he cannot run & jog and difficulty to climb stairs. -Mahkamah mengambil maklum Tahun 2024 adalah tahun yang amat mencabar bagi ekonomi dunia. Malaysia tidak terlepas dalam menghadapi kesan kenaikan harga barang, kos sara hidup dan kadar inflasi yang tidak menentu. Oleh itu, memandangkan kes Mohd Safri Rehan diputuskan hampir 20 tahun yang lepas maka berpendapat peningkatan jumlah award adalah munasabah dan masih dalam lingkungan cadang Compendium. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes RAJI TRANSPORT SDN BHD V. IDAYU ZULKAFLI [2004] 5 CLJ 479: The considerations of inflation and enhanced cost of living over a period of more than two decades since the decision in Lau Ee Ee v. Tang King Kwong [1983] 1 LNS 72; [1986] 1 MLJ 308 should be given proper weight in the assessment of quantum of damages in personal injury litigation. ii. SCARS: RM 3,000.00 -Plantif berhujah jumlah RM 8,000.00 manakala Defendan berhujah jumlah RM 3,000.00. Manakala Compendium mencadangkan bagi minor scarring to leg adalah RM1,300.00 - RM3,300.00. Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM 3,000.00. -Mahkamah mendapati berdasarkan kedua-dua Laporan Perubatan Pakar kesan parut yang wujud pada Plantif adalah; 4cm surgical scar over anterior right knee, 1 cm S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal surgical scar over right upper thigh & 2 cm surgical scar over right distal tibia. Namun berdasarkan Laporan Pakar Defendan “the scars are not hypertrophic or keloid”. -Mahkamah berpendapat jumlah RM 3,000.00 adalah munasabah mengambil kira ketiga-tiga bahagian kakinya dan kecacatan rupa fizikalnya seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam gambar Laporan Pakar Plantif namun ianya tidak terlampau parah dan boleh ditutupi berbanding dengan bahagian muka. -Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes MUHAMMAD SAIFUL SUFFIAN BIN ZULKAFLI V. MUHAMMAD RAZIF BIN HASHIM & ANOR [2020] 2 PIR [17] & MOHAMMED SYUFIAN MOHD NOR V. NG ENG CHENG [2015] 5 LNS 78 sebagai perbandingan kerana berdasarkan kes-kes tersebut, parut-parut yang dialami Plantif adalah lebih parah. Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa awad yang dicadangkan oleh Defendan bagi kecederaan ini adalah memadai dan mengikuti trend-trend kes yang dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua pihak. iii. OSTEOARTHRITIS OF THE RIGHT ANKLE: RM 4,000.00 -Plantif berhujah jumlah RM 2,000.00 manakala Defendan berhujah jumlah RM 3,000.00. Manakala Compendium mencadangkan RM 5,000.00. Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM 4,000.00. -Mahkamah mendapati dalam Laporan Pakar Plantif menyatakan there is probability of osteoarthritis of the right ankle joint due to the fracture of right tibia and fibula sustained at the time of the accident which is a permanent disablity. Manakalah dalam Laporan Pakar Defendan menyatakan is predisposed to osteoarthritis of the right ankle. -Mahkamah berpendapat awad berjumlah RM 4,000.00 adalah berpatutan dan adil memandangkan Plantif berusia 46 tahun yang dikategorikan bukan muda dan di samping kesan-kesan yang sedang dialami oleh Plantif seperti yang dinyatakan residual disabilities pada para (i). Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes ABDUL WAFFIY WAHUBBI & ANOR V. AK NAZARUDDIN AHMAD [2017] 1 LNS 2296 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: [51] Next, as far as osteoarthritis is concerned, the defendants' medical report seems to agree that the plaintiff maybe pre-disposed to osteoarthritis. As such, I do not think that it is too much of a conjecture that eventually the plaintiff will suffer from S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal osteoarthritis. Looking at the multiple injuries to the right knee area, it is in my view more likely that he would suffer osteoarthritis in due course. The SCJ's award of RM5,000.00 for osteoarthritis is therefore fair and reasonable. Pertindihan (overlapping): 10% penolakan dibenarkan [20] Defendan berhujah bahawa kesemua kecederaan dan residual Plantif yang dinyatakan tersebut adalah tertumpu kepada bahagian kaki yang sama. Oleh itu, satu pengurangan untuk pertindihan (overlapping) wajar dilakukan. Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan berkenaan pekara ini. Maka, pengurangan atau penolakan sebanyak 10% dalam awad gantirugi am secara keseluruhan adalah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Jumlah keselurahan gantirugi am yang dibenarkan adalah RM 37,800.00 [ RM 42,000.00 – (1/10 x RM42,000.00)] [21] Ini adalah berlandaskan kepada Compendium yang telah mencadangkan “Injuries are sometimes overlapping and this need to be taken into account before a figure is decided upon.” Mahkamah juga mengambil panduan daripada kes MOHAMAD SHAHNNY RAHAMAN @ ZAINAL LWN. ORATHAI @ FATIMAN ABDULLAH [2009] 1 LNS 610 di mana Hakim Kamardin Hashim memutuskan pada perenggan 16 dan perenggan 25: 16. Kesemua kecederaan yang dialami berserta residual adalah di kaki kanan plaintif termasuk kepatahan tulang tibia dan fibula dan 4 cm kependekan, kehilangan tulang sepanjang 1cm, bone grafting, ankle and subtler shift, bengkokan, muscle wasting, calar-calar, osteoarthritis serta parut-parut. Hampir keseluruhan berada di kaki kanan plaintif. HMS telah membuat award yang berasingan untuk kepatahan tibia dan fibula, muscle wasting, calar- calar, osteoarthritis serta parut-parut dan yang kesemuanya berjumlah RM86,000. HMS membenarkan kesemua jumlah tersbut tanpa membuat sebarang tolakan atas pertindihan sedangkan jelas kesemua kecederaan tersebut adalah bertindih. Dalam kes-kes melibatkan kecederaan di bahagian badan yang berbeza, maka cara pemberian award secara berasingan mengikut item adalah wajar (lihat Jamil bin Harun v. Yang Kamsiah [1984] 1 CLJ 11 (Rep); [1984] 1 CLJ 215; [1984] 1 MLJ 217 keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan). Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah mempunyai budi bicara untuk membuat award secara global dan membuat tolakan atas fakta pertindihan seperti yang terjadi dalam kes kita sekarang (lihat Chong Chee Khong & Anor v. Ng Yeow Hin [1997] 4 CLJ Supp. 17; dan Wintsun Durai Samuel Vidamonickam v. Azlan bin Samad [2002] 1 LNS 239)…… 25. Dalam kes dihadapan saya sekarang, saya telah mengakseskan GRA seperti berikut iaitu item (a) bagi open fracture right tibia and fibula dengan 4 cm kependekan dibenarkan RM35,000, item (b) untuk muscle wasting RM3,000, item (c) untuk abrasions RM2,000, item (d) untuk osteoarthritis RM5,000 dan item (e) untuk parut-parut RM5,000, berjumlah S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal RM50,000 dan saya menolak 10% untuk pertindihan (RM5,000) dan menjadikan GRA dibenarkan berjumlah RM45,000. Jumlah ini adalah munasabah dan berpatutan dalam keadaan kecederaan yang dialami oleh plaintif dalam kes ini. Kes-kes yang dirujuk oleh peguamcara plaintif dan defendan adalah keputusan HMS yang tidak diketahui samada terdapat rayuan atau tidak terhadap keputusan tersebut. Sebagai panduan saya telah merujuk kepada kes Kanan Subramaniam & satu lagi v. Aman Syah Abadzyuid [2002] 6 CLJ 34 oleh Y.A. Hakim V.T. Singham PK (ketika itu) dimana telah mengekalkan award RM54,000 bagi kecederaan patah kaki yang jauh lebih serius dan dikatakan award itu adalah 'too generous' walau bagaimanapun, tidak digangu kerana dikatakan tidak melampau (not manifestly excessive). Dalam kes Azizi Amran v. Hizzam Che Hassan (supra) untuk 2 kepatahan pada kaki kiri iaitu ditulang femur dan tulang tibia dan fibula dimana telah juga dimasukkan besi, bone grafting, 4 cm kependekkan, muscle wasting, parut-parut, deformity terhadap knee joint diberikan RM28,000 sahaja. (ii) Gantirugi Khas [22] Adalah menjadi undang-undang mantap bahawa plantif perlu membuktikan dengan ketat apa jua ganti rugi khas yang dituntut. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Inggeris tersohor BONHAM CARTER V. HYDE PARK HOTEL [1948] WN 89 yang acapkali telah dirujuk oleh mahkamah-mahkamah tertinggi mahupun mahkamah-mahkamah rendah di Malaysia yang memutuskan bahawa: Plaintiff must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damages; it is not enough to write down the particulars, and so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying, "This is what I have lost, I ask you to give me these damages". They have to prove it. [23] Berpandukan kepada otoriti tersebut, berikut adalah gantirugi khas yang dibenarkan: a) item 1: RM 56.00 b) item 2: RM 10.00 c) item 3: RM 250.00 & RM 40.00 d) item 4: RM 753.00 e) item 12: RM 2400.00 Kos Pembedahan Masa Hadapan [24] Merujuk kepada kedua-dua Laporan Pakar Perubatan, implant yang dipasang pada tulang kaki Plantif boleh dikeluarkan kerana tulangnya telah bercantum yang mana satu S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pembedahan perlu dijalankan bagi tujuan tersebut. Plantif berhujah kos keseluruhan bagi pembedahan ini adalah RM 10,000.00. Akan tetapi dalam hujahannya menyatakan RM 10,000. Manakala Defendan berhujah bahawa awad ini tidak harus diberikan kepada Plantif kerana item ini tidak diplidkan dengan spesifik. [25] Mahkamah meneliti Penyataan Tuntutan Terpinda, ternyata benar ianya gagal diplidkan secara spesifik. Oleh yang demikian, kos pembedahan di masa hadapan adalah ditolak. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah merujuk kes merujuk kepada kes NUR FARZANA AIDA FAIZAL & ORS V. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA [2022] 1 CLJ 692 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan: [28] There is a plethora authorities on the need to plead special damages in the pleading and to prove them. The general principle is that the plaintiff must be prepared to prove the special damages unless it has been agreed. It is not enough for the plaintiff to write down the particulars and leave them for the court to decide. It is for him to prove them (see Sum Kum v. Devaki Nair & Anor [1963] 1 LNS 131; [1964] MLJ 74,75 and Khoo See Moi v. Tay Teik Chang [1970] 1 LNS 48; [1970] 2 MLJ 249 at p. 250). [26] Selanjutnya, Plantif telah memplidkan item 15 – Penyataan Tuntutan Terpinda; awad bagi kesakitan dan kesengsaraan bagi pembedahan masa hadapan. Walaubagaimanapun, Mahkamah ini telah menolak kos pembedahan masa hadapan atas alasan seperti di atas, maka tidak perlu untuk Mahkamah mempertimbangkan item ini. Kos Rawatan Fisioterapi [27] Mahkamah mengambil maklum bahawa berdasarkan Laporan Pakar Defendan, rawatan fisioterapi adalah tidak diperlukan oleh Plantif berbanding dengan Laporan Pakar Plantif yang menyatakan sebaliknya. Mahkamah membenarkan awad untuk item 12 ini diberikan berdasarkan keperluan kepada rawatan ini bagi pemulihan kecederaan yang dialami oleh Plantif seperti yang disyorkan di dalam Laporan Pakar Plantif. [28] Akan tetapi, Mahkamah tidak bersetuju untuk membenarkan awad berdasarkan kos untuk rawatan tersebut di hospital swasta sepertimana yang dinyatakan dalam Laporan Pakar Plantif tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati Plantif tidak mengemukakan sebarang alasan munasabah untuk mendapatkan rawatan tersebut di hospital swasta sejumlah RM 7200.00 bagi tempoh 3 bulan. Oleh itu, Mahkamah mengambil pendekatan untuk membenarkan awad sejumlah RM 2400.00 sahaja untuk rawatan ini [1/3 x RM 7200.00] dan tanpa faedah. S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal C. Faedah & Kos Mahkamah merujuk kepada Aturan 42 Kaedah 12A KKM 2012 yang mana kecuali yang dipersetujui pihak-pihak, kadar faedah bagi awad mahkamah ditentukan oleh YAA Ketua Hakim Negara yang mana menurut Arahan Amalan Bil. 1 Tahun 2012 iaitu kadar faedah yang ditetapkan adalah sebanyak 5% setahun yang berkuat kuasa bermula 1 Ogos 2012. Berikut adalah faedah yang dibenarkan: (i) faedah pada kadar 2.5% setahun atas ganti rugi khas yang dikira dari tarikh kemalangan hingga tarikh penghakiman; (ii) faedah pada kadar 5% atas jumlah penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh; Seterusnya kos mengikut skala di mana kos perlu dibayar Plantif kepada Defendan-Defendan. Bertarikh pada 18 Januari 2024 Disediakan oleh: SITI HAJAR BINTI ALI Majistret Mahkamah Majistret Sungai Besar Selangor Peguamcara Plantif --- Chambers of Siva Peguamcara Defendan Pertama & Kedua --- Kalai & Partners Peguamcara Defendan Ketiga --- M. Ravendran & Associates S/N gkjpusU7A0yB7yUgvVsFw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-23NCvC-5-01/2020

PLAINTIF Tai Yat Choy DEFENDAN Yun Hong Kew @ Yun Hong Keow

Pencerobohan - kacau ganggu - ujian munasabah - keterangan pakar - beban - pembuktian atas imbangan kebarangkalian - elemen-elemen dan kesan ganggu.

19/01/2024

YA Puan Indra Nehru Savandiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=40f85e0a-6d4a-4a89-ab3e-6baa9cb223ac&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN GUAMAN NO.: BA-23NCVC-5-01/2020 ANTARA TAI YAT CHOY … PLAINTIF [NO. K/P: 481005-14-5023/7762857] DAN YUN HONG KEW@YUN HONG KEOW … DEFENDAN [NO. K/P: 411205-10-5049] _________________________________________________________ ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan 1. Kes ini diremit dari Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia dan telah dibicarakan semula. 2. Sebab musabab untuk perbicaraan semula adalah seperti berikut: (i) PW2 was an expert (Quantity Surveyor) who was called by the Plaintiff to give evidence on costing (quantum), but PW2’s report also touched on the soil erosion issue and implicated the defendant in 19/01/2024 11:52:57 BA-23NCvC-5-01/2020 Kand. 104 S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 terms of the liability issue. The trial judge relied, inter alia, on PW2’s report to find liability against the defendant. Of course, there are also photographs and WhatsApp messages and letters by the plaintiff to the defendant which support the finding of liability against the defendant. But as we said, the trial judge misdirected himself in relying on PW2’s report for purposes of liability; (ii) further as for the quantum which was awarded, we find that they cannot be reconciled with PW2’s report and the plaintiff’s claim. We are also unable to make any adjustments to the figures that were awarded as it requires a complete re-calibration of the figures, which can only be undertaken at a trial. 3. Mahkamah Rayuan telah mengarahkan keterangan saksi-saksi semasa perbicaraan terdahulu dikekalkan. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 4. Walau bagaimanapun, pihak-pihak diberi peluang untuk memanggil semula saksi-saksi lama dan juga saksi-saksi baru. [rujukan dibuat kepada Lampiran 55). 5. Semasa perbicaraan terkini plaintif telah memanggil 3 saksi, antaranya saksi-saksi terdahulu dan defendan memanggil 1 saksi. 6. Perbicaraan ini diteruskan dan Mahkamah telah memutuskan isu liabiliti yang memihak plaintif sepenuhnya. 7. Mahkamah memerintahkan taksiran gantirugi dibuat berhubung perintah-perintah yang dibenarkan. 8. Pihak defendan tidak berpuas hati dan rayuan ini difailkan. Ringkasan Kes Plaintif 9. Plaintif dan defendan memiliki tanah bersebelahan antara satu sama lain. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 10. Sempadan yang dikongsi bersama antara mereka adalah lebih kurang 100 meter. 11. Di hartanah defendan terdapat satu bukit kecil. Jarak antara kaki bukit dengan pagar hartanah plaintif adalah lebih kurang 3 meter (dikenali sebagai “buffer zone”). 12. Plaintif mendakwa tindakan defendan menggali, memotong dan melonggokkan tanah daripada bukit di “buffer zone” mengakibatkan keadaan hartanah defendan lebih tinggi daripada hartanah plaintif di sempadan hartanah-hartanah tersebut. 13. Berlanjutan dari itu kini wujud satu cerun bukit yang tidak stabil di sempadan antara hartanah plaintif dan defendan. 14. Plaintif juga mengadu terdapat besi-besi buruk bersaiz besar yang dilonggokkan di sempadan hartanah defendan. 15. Ianya besar kemungkinan akan jatuh ke hartanah plaintif sekiranya berlaku tanah runtuh. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 16. Adalah dakwaan plantif pencerobohan dan kacau ganggu yang dikenal pasti telah menggagalkan rancangan plaintif membina sebuah kilang baru di hartanahnya. 17. Pokok-pokok tinggi dan besar yang dibiarkan tumbang ke kawasan hartanah plaintif ketika hujan lebat turut menyumbang kepada kacau ganggu dan pencerobohan di hartanah plaintif. 18. Pada sekitar Oktober dan November 2020, defendan telah menjalankan kerja-kerja pembinaan di kawasan sempadan antara hartanah plaintif dan defendan, dan ianya telah mengakibatkan kerosakan-kerosakan seperti berikut: (i) kerosakan terhadap pagar plaintif dimana pagar plaintif tercondong dan hampir jatuh; (ii) kerosakan terhadap longkang-longkang plaintif yang tertutup ataupun tersumbat menyebabkan pengaliran air terbantut. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (iii) kerosakan paip pili bomba sehingga terpaksa dialihkan oleh plaintif; (iv) banjir akibat longkang tersumbat/tertutup. 19. Maka plaintif memohon perintah-perintah seperti di dalam penyata tuntutan. Ringkasan Kes Defendan 20. Defendan setuju beliau ialah jiran plaintif. Defendan telah membeli hartanah tersebut pada 27.1.2000. 21. Kategori tanah defendan adalah untuk perindustrian. 22. Fakta sebahagian tanah defendan lebih tinggi dengan bukit tidak dipertikaikan. 23. Defendan mendakwa sekitar April 2019 di atas permintaan plaintif, defendan menebang pokok-pokok yang dahannya terlampau besar mencerobohi tanah plaintif. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 24. Seterusnya defendan, sekitar bulan Oktober 2020 telah menjalankan dan menyempurnakan kerja-kerja pembinaan longkang di sepanjang sempadan plaintif di hartanah defendan. 25. Defendan sekeras-kerasnya menafikan segala dakwaan plaintif dan pohon tuntutan plaintif ditolak dengan kos. Isu-isu Untuk Diputuskan 26. Status kedudukan topografi tanah plaintif dan defendan. 27. Samada tindakan-tindakan defendan yang didakwa oleh plaintif dibuktikan atas imbangan kebarangkalian. 28. Samada berlanjutan dari tindakan-tindakan sepertimana yang didakwa oleh plaintif wujud kacau ganggu dan pencerobohan ke atas tanah plaintif. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Prinsip Undang-Undang 29. Kes Mahkamah Rayuan Chin Moy Yen & Ors v Chai Weng Sing & Ors [2020] 1 MLRA 122 memutuskan seperti berikut: “trespass to land consist of any unjustifiable intrusion by one person upon land in the possession of another. The slightest crossing of the boundary is sufficient.” “ ….. nuisance is an act or omission which is an interference with, disturbance of or annoyance to a person in the exercise or enjoyment of (a) a right belonging to him as a member of the public, when it is a public nuisance; or (b) his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, profit or other right used or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a private nuisance.” 30. Kes tersebut juga memutuskan pencerobohan melibatkan tindakan kendiri manakala kacau ganggu berlaku tanpa kehadiran. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 31. Tambahan lagi, kes Chin Moy Yen (Supra) memutuskan ujian “munasabah” dengan rujukan kepada kes seperti berikut: “For an interference to amount to nuisance, while it may not be lawful or authorised and done on one’s own land or property; that act must interfere with neighbour’s reasonable enjoyment of the neighbour’s land. The test of what is “reasonable” would “perhaps be what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in society or more correctly in a particular society, as opined by Lord Wright in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880, 903.” 32. Rujukan dibuat kepada buku teks Clerk of Lindsell on Torts (20th edition), di mana definisi pencerobohan dan kacau ganggu dihuraikan seperti berikut: “Trespass differs from nuisance in that it is a direct as opposed to a consequential injury, and is actionable S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 without proof of damage, whereas damage must be proved in nuisance. Thus, if a defendant throws stones, rubbish or other materials of any kind on the land of another, or if he sends the stinking water in his yard into his neighbour’s cellar, these are acts of trespass for which he will be responsible without any proof of damage. But if a defendant causes such material to pass on the claimant’s land as the result of the exercise of his own rights of property, as where he fixes a spout on his roof, whereby the rain-water is discharged on the claimant’s land, or suffers his privy to be out of repair, whereby the fifth flows into his neighbour’s cellar, or allows the branches of his trees to spread over his boundary, or the roots of his trees to grow into his neighbour’s land, or permits storm-water or sewage to flow on to his land, or a game of cricket results in the escape of balls hit over the boundary. These are acts of nuisance, not trespass …” S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Keputusan Mahkamah 33. Berhubung dengan isu topografi hartanah plaintif dan hartanah defendan adalah terbukti melalui keterangan plaintif bahawa walaupun keadaan landskap di antara sempadan hartanah beliau dan hartanah defendan adalah pada aras yang sama tetapi terdapat satu bukit di sebahagian tanah defendan. Cerun bukit tersebut adalah lebih kurang 3 meter daripada sempadan tanah plaintif dan defendan. 34. Plaintif telah membuat lakaran keadaan topografi yang ditandakan sebagai ekshibit P3. [Sila rujuk ekshibit P3] S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 35. Keterangan SP1 tidak tercabar berhubung fakta kedudukan tanah beliau dengan tanah defendan seperti mana yang dilakarkan di P3. 36. Sehubungan dengan isu kedua, defendan telah berhujah bahawa plaintif berpengetahuan akan keadaan hartanah defendan yang lebih tinggi dan bercerun berbanding dengan hartanah plaintif. 37. Adalah juga hujahan defendan, plaintif sebagai pemilik tanah yang lebih rendah tidak seharusnya mengadu terhadap aktiviti tanah yangn dilakukan oleh defendan. 38. Dalam konteks ini rujukan dibuat oleh defendan kepada laporan pakar geologi plaintif Syed Lukman Hakim Syed Mustapha di mana dinyatakan seperti berikut: “this area used to be a hilly area that has been cut and developed into an industrial area. This hilly area still can be observed on the eastern boundary of Lot PT1788.” [Sila rujuk muka surat 75, (Lampiran 57)] S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 39. Oleh yang demikian defendan berhujah cara bagaimana defendan menggunakan hartanah beliau iaitu melonggokkan tanah mahupun meletak besi buruk adalah penggunaan selaras dengan hak penggunaan semulajadi tanah tersebut oleh defendan. 40. Defendan mengesyorkan plaintif seharusnya mendirikan dinding demi menjaga kepentingan diri sendiri. 41. Mahkamah berpeluang menilai keterangan plaintif, saksi-saksi plaintif dan saksi defendan berhubung isu ini. 42. Hasil kajian keterangan plaintif menjurus kepada dapatan fakta yang tidak tercabar bahawa keadaan tanah plaintif dan tanah defendan adalah seperti di P3. 43. Keterangan plaintif yang tidak dicabar adalah akan status kedudukan tanah dan kerosakan-kerosakan yang berlaku di hartanah plaintif. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 44. Keterangan plaintif disokong oleh laporan pakar geologi yang mengesahkan fakta-fakta seperti seperti berikut: “The observation discovered that the ground level of Lot PT1788 is higher than PT1783, with estimation of 3 m height difference (Figure 3). Originally both lots have the same level but the owner of Lot PT1788 has carried out the earthwork to increase ground level which erected a fill slope on the boundary of the lot. However, this fill slope does not have a sufficient buffer zone which result damage to the iron fence and drain of Lot PT 1783 where there is a soil movement due to erosion. Due to soil movement, the accumulate of soil case, the bulging at the toe slope.” [Sila rujuk muka surat 80, (Lampiran 57)] 45. Rujukan dibuat kepada keterangan pakar geologi di Mahkamah yang telah menghuraikan kesan-kesan akibat cerun yang tidak mematuhi “buffer zone” yang mengakibatkan kerosakan kepada S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 pagar besi, longkang dan paip pili bomba di hartanah plaintif akibat hakisan tanah. 46. Keterangan pakar geologi berhubung isu ini adalah seperti berikut: “Based on these cross sections, this is the observations on the ground level on the condition of the slope on PT2788 which estimate of three-meter height. Originally lots … both lots have the same level, but the owner of 1788 has carried out the work to increase the ground level. So, this is the current condition of the site. So, this is the current condition of the site. So, this slope is … basically is … not engineer slope. We call it not engineer slop means they are not making this slope as a proper. In proper condition, because this is we call it field slope because this slope does not have any sufficiency of buffer zone or set back buffer zone or we sometimes we call it setback which result the damage of the iron fence and the drains of Lot 1783 due to the soil movement. So this is the condition, so the S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 red color .. the yellow color on the cross sections is debris or soil that leaning on the fence” [Sila rujuk muka surat 35, baris 11-27, (Lampiran 85)] 47. Dalam mengambil kira keterangan fakta-fakta yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan juga keterangan pakar geoplogi, yang mana kesahihannya tidak tercabar, terbukti tindakan defendan yang mengakibatkan wujudnya cerun yang bukan semula jadi yang mengakibatkan segala kerosakan-kerosakan di hartanah plaintif. 48. Tindakan defendan gagal ujian “munasabah” kerana ianya telah mengakibatkan kerosakan di bahagian pagar besi, longkang dan paip pili bomba plaintif, bukan merupakan suatu perbuatan menggunakan tanah secara semulajadi. 49. Plaintif dinafikan menikmati penggunaan semulajadi hartanah akibat kerosakan di bahagian pagar besi, paip pili bomba dan longkang tersumbat. Adalah terbukti ianya kacau ganggu. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 50. Oleh yang demikian tindakan defendan adalah menepati elemen- elemen kacau ganggu seperti mana yang diputuskan dalam kes Chin Moy Yen & Ors v Chai Wei Sing & Ors (Supra). 51. Kewujudan longgokan tanah di atas hartanah defendan bukanlah satu penggunaan semula jadi hartanah tersebut, di mana defendan dikecualikan tanggungjawabnya apabila berlaku hakisan yang merosakkan harta benda plaintif. 52. Selanjutnya defendan mengemukakan hujahan bahawa longkang telah dibina untuk menyempurnakan pengaliran air. 53. Adalah pendirian defendan jika terdapat limpahan air disebabkan akibat hujan lebat, maka ianya bukan tanggungjawab defendan sebab plaintif sedia maklum akan keadaan hartanah defendan yang lebih tinggi dan bercerun. Plaintif dikatakan harus bersedia menghadapi risiko-risiko akibat situasi sebegitu. 54. Mahkamah mendapati melalui keterangan fakta yang dikemukakan kerja-kerja pembinaan longkang oleh defendan dilakukan pada S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 akhir tahun 2020 iaitu lebih kurang 10 bulan selepas tuntutan plaintif difailkan. 55. Walau bagaimanapun masalah kacau ganggu telah pun dialami oleh plaintif sejak tahun 2015. 56. Aduan berhubung perkara ini telah dibawa kepada perhatian defendan melalui sepucuk surat yang bertarikh 11.06.2015 yang mana adalah seperti berikut: [Sila rujuk muka surat 10, (Lampiran 94)] S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 57. Selanjutnya keterangan pakar geologi juga membantu Mahkamah membuat dapatan fakta bahawa longkang yang dibina oleh defendan tidak berefektif langsung. 58. Keterangan beliau dirujuk seperti berikut: “Based on my opinion, the drain was not supposed higher on .. normally the drain will build on the toe of the slope, not in the middle of the slope unless the slope gut burns. We call it burn green. So these looks have no burn. It’s just a single slope, so supposed to be there is no drain there and the drain is supposed to be at the toe of the slope.” [Sila rujuk muka surat 36, baris 19-23, (Lampiran 85)] 59. Beliau juga memberi keterangan akan kewujudan pergerakan minyak daripada hartanah defendan ke dalam longkang di hartanah plaintif. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 60. Ini bukanlah satu situasi penggunaan tanah secara semulajadi oleh defendan. 61. Mahkamah telah mengambil kira fakta-fakta berhubung pergerakan minyak, limpahan air dan lain-lain ke dalam hartanah plaintif beserta pembinaan longkang yang tidak efektif oleh defendan. Ianya membuktikan kacau ganggu ke atas hartanah plaintif. 62. Dalam mengguna pakai prinsip ujian “munasabah” dalam kes Chin Moy Yen (Supra), adalah dapatan fakta oleh Mahkamah, defendan seharusnya menjangka ataupun peka akan risiko yang dihadapi oleh plaintif akibat tindakan beliau yang sia-sia membina longkang yang tidak efektif. 63. Berdasarkan sebab-sebab di atas Mahkamah memutuskan justifikasi defendan bahawa longkang dibina untuk menangani masalah-masalah tersebut tidak boleh diterima. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 64. Keterangan fakta bahawa pokok-pokok besar dari hartanah defendan yang tumbang ke dalam hartanah plaintif membuktikan pencerobohan fizikal. 65. Mahkamah mengaplikasikan ujian “munasabah”, fakta pokok- pokok besar tumbang ke dalam hartanah plaintif sehingga menggugat plaintif menikmati penggunaan semulajadi hartanahnya 66. Defendan semestinya sudah jangka pokok-pokok besar akan tumbang ke dalam hartanah plaintif dan ini bukanlah hak penggunaan semulajadi hartanah defendan. 67. Segala pembuktian kerosakan-kerosakan pada pagar, longkang dan paip pili bomba plaintif berjaya dibuktikan melalui keterangan sokongan iaitu rakaman video dan gambar-gambar. 68. Ianya diterima masuk sebagai bahan bukti kes. 69. Defendan tidak hadir memberi keterangan di Mahkamah. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 70. Keterangan wakil defendan sendiri sering kali bercanggah dengan keterangan pakar geologi. 71. Antaranya adalah fakta berhubung penyelenggaraan kawasan sempadan defendan dan pembinaan dinding penahan. 72. Pakar geologi menidakkan fakta-fakta tersebut dan keterangan beliau tidak tercabar. 73. Wakil defendan tidak ada surat perwakilan dari pihak defendan untuk memberi keterangan di Mahkamah. 74. Beliau juga mengesahkan fakta bahawa beliau tidak tahu isu-isu yang menjadi pertikaian antara plaintif dan defendan. 75. Gambar-gambar yang kononnya dirakam oleh beliau tidak ada tarikh. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 76. Justeru ianya tidak membantu Mahkamah membuat sebarang dapatan fakta sebab tarikh penting dalam kes ini untuk dikaji situasi lokasi hartanah-hartanah yang mana wujud isu-isu pertikaian kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini. 77. Hasil kajian isu kedua dan isu ketiga membuktikan plaintif berjaya membuktikan atas imbangan kebarangkalian bahawa defendan bertanggungan liabilti sepenuhnya terhadap tuntutan plaintif di dalam kes ini. 78. Kes ini diputuskan pada peringkat liabiliti sahaja dan ditetapkan untuk taksiran gantirugi dibuat. 79. Ini adalah kerana beban pembuktian masih pada plaintif untuk mengemukakan bukti akan gantirugi yang dialaminya. 80. Mahkamah di peringkat taksiran gantirugi akan mengkaji keterangan yang dikemukakan untuk menentukan tindakan yang sewajarnya berhubung perintah-perintah yang dipohon. S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Kesimpulan 81. Setelah meneliti fakta-fakta keterangan saksi-saksi, keterangan dokumentasi dan rakaman video, Mahkamah ini memutuskan plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kes terhadap defendan bagi isu liabiliti sepenuhnya. 82. Kos tindakan dibenarkan RM20,000.00 tertakluk fi alokatur. Tarikh: 19 Januari 2024 (INDRA NEHRU SAVANDIAH) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam Tarikh keputusan: 28 November 2023 Peguam-Peguam: Bagi pihak plaintif: Samreet Singh, [Tetuan Gurdip Sarjit & Co.] Bagi pihak defendan: Mohd Hafizuddin & Ammar Ghalip, [Tetuan John & Associates] S/N Cl74QEptiUqrPmuqnLIjrA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24FC-355-05/2023

PEMOHON AMBANK (M) BERHAD RESPONDEN GLOBALCON HOLDING (M) SDN BHD

LAND LAW: Charge-Charge of Land-Land charged as security for loan-Default of payment-Order for Sale of charged land-Resistance by Chargor-Sanction for Scheme of Arrangement dismissed -Appeal for Sanction of Scheme of Arrangement pending- Whether can give rise to equity or establish a ‘cause to the contrary’-National Land Code 1965, s.256(3), Rules of the Court 2012, O.83

19/01/2024

YA Puan Jamhirah binti Ali

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=400c8d00-fcc9-435f-a11a-eee763dd99d9&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24FC-355-05/2023 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 256 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 Dan Dalam Perkara Gadaian yang didaftarkan di bawah Bil Perserahan No. 482/2019 ke atas tanah di bawah Hakmilik HS(D) 136846, PT No. 54155, Mukim Cheras, Daerah Ulu Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 83, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 2012 ANTARA AMBANK (M) BERHAD (NO. SYARIKAT: 8515-D) …PLAINTIF DAN 19/01/2024 14:52:47 BA-24FC-355-05/2023 Kand. 21 S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 GLOBALCON HOLDING (M) SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 853165-K) …DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The Originating Summons, filed by the Plaintiff and dated 3 May 2023, seeks an Order for Sale of the property known as HS(D) 136846, PT 54155, Mukim Cheras, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor, which is charged by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff. 2. The Defendant contested the said Order for Sale, contending that the subject matter of this suit – the Charge - was encompassed in suit no WA-24NCC-366-08/2021 (Suit 366). Suit 366 involved an application for a Creditors’ Scheme of Arrangement under section 366(1) of the Companies Act 2016. Therefore, the Defendant asserted that there existed a cause to the contrary. BRIEF FACTS 3. By letters of offer dated 14 November 2018, 11 March 2020, 27 March 2020 and 15 January 2021, respectively, the Plaintiff approved an overdraft facility amounting to RM1,500,000.00 in favour of the Defendant. The Defendant entered into an agreement for the said overdraft facility on 6 December 2018. S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 4. In consideration and/or security for the overdraft facility, the third parties, acting as guarantors, executed a Letter of Guarantee (Guarantee & Indemnity) on 6 December 2018. Simultaneously, on the same date, the Defendant charged its property known as HS(D) 136846 PT 54155, Mukim Cheras, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor, in favour of the Plaintiff. The charge was officially registered on 7 January 2019, as documented in "Bil Perserahan No 482/2019” (the Charge). 5. The Defendant, having failed to adhere to the agreed terms of the charge, defaulted on the payments stipulated under the overdraft facility. 6. On 22 July 2021, the Plaintiff sent a Letter of Demand seeking payment of the total outstanding sum of RM2,534,993.32 as of 15 July 2021 with interest. 7. Subsequently, the progression of the Plaintiff’s legal action against the Defendant came to a halt as the Plaintiff was served with an order dated 25 October 2021, pursuant to section 366(1) of the Companies Act 2016. This order, granted by the court in Suit 366, sanctioned the Defendant to convene a Creditors’ Scheme of Arrangement Meeting, resulting in the cessation of all ongoing legal actions against the Defendant. 8. The Plaintiff applied to intervene in Suit 366 and to set aside the order dated 25 October 2021. While the court granted the Plaintiff S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 leave to intervene, it dismissed the application to set aside the said order. Hence, the Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. 9. Nevertheless, as a secured creditor, the Plaintiff filed and served the duly affirmed Proof of Debt to the Scheme Manager, encompassing the debt related to the said charge. 10. On 23 October 2022, the Scheme of Arrangement Meeting was convened. During this session, the Plaintiff objected to the meeting's conduct and the Defendant's methods. A majority of 77.36% of creditors in attendance voted in favour of the Scheme of Arrangement (the said Scheme). Subsequently, on 18 January 2023, the Defendant filed an application seeking the court's sanction for the said Scheme under Suit 366. The Plaintiff objected to the said application. 11. Upon considering the merits, on 7 June 2023, the High Court dismissed the Defendant's application for sanction for the said Scheme. Dissatisfied, the Defendant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal on 4 July 2023. The said appeal is currently pending a hearing. 12. Subsequently, on 23 February 2023, the Plaintiff served Form 16D (Notis Kemungkiran Mengenai Suatu Gadaian) dated 26 February 2023, pursuant to section 254 of the National Land Code 1965 (NLC 1965), and Form 16K (Notis Mengambil Milik: Dengan Cara Menduduki) dated 23 February 2023, under section 272 of the NLC 1965, detailing the sum of RM2,534,993.32 as of 15 July 2021, along with accrued interest. S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 13. Despite the Plaintiff's demands, the Defendant failed to make any payments. Consequently, the Plaintiff initiated this Originating Summons, seeking an Order for Sale under section 256 of the NLC 1965 and Order 83 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012). 14. As of the hearing of this suit, the Defendant did not obtain an order to stay proceedings pending its appeal against the decision in Suit 366. ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT 15. In contesting this action, the Defendant raised the following two issues before this Court: a. that the subject matter in this suit is identical to the subject matter in Suit 366. b. that there is an ongoing appeal filed by the Defendant against the High Court decision on 7 June 2023, in Suit 366. THE LAW 16. Section 256 of the NLC 1965 states as follows: “256. Application to Court for order for sale (1) This section applies to land held under (a) Registry title; S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (b) the form of qualified title corresponding to Registry title; or (c) subsidiary title, and to the whole of any divided share in, or any lease of, any such land. (2) Any application for an order for sale under this Chapter by a chargee of any such land or lease shall be made to the Court in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of any law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure. (3) On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary.” [emphasis added] 17. It is trite that in an application for Order for Sale made under section 256 of the NLC 1965, the Court is entitled to refuse an Order for Sale of charged property once it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary. The Supreme Court case of Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. [1997] 1 MLJ 77, explained what is meant by ‘cause to the contrary’. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) explained as follows: “In our judgment, 'cause to the contrary' within s 256(3) may be established only in three categories of cases. First, it may be taken as settled that a chargor who is able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 indefeasibility doctrine housed in s 340 of the Code establishes cause to the contrary. ... Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s 256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale. For example, failure on the part of the chargee to prove the making of a demand or service upon the chargor of a notice in Form 16D would constitute cause to the contrary. So too, where the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the chargee. See Co- operative Central Bank Ltd v Meng Kuang Properties Bhd [1991] 2 MLJ 283. However, in such a case, it would be open to the chargee to subsequently serve a notice or a proper notice (as the case may be) before commencing proceedings afresh as the cause shown to the contrary does not in substance affect the chargee’s right to apply for an order for sale. Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order for sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule of law or equity. This principle finds its origins in the judgment of Aitken J in Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1939] MLJ 296 at p 298…” FINDINGS OF THE COURT 18. After reviewing all the cause papers filed by the parties and considering both oral and written submissions from the Plaintiff and the Defendant, I granted the Plaintiff's application for an Order for Sale as the Defendant had failed to show cause to the contrary. The reasons for my decision are stated below. S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 19. The Defendant contended that the subject matter of litigation in this suit, represented by the Charge registered as Bil Perserahan No. 482/2019, fell within the said Scheme and was simultaneously under consideration in Suit 366. The Defendant asserted that this was also affirmed by the Plaintiff in its Affidavit in Reply. 20. Furthermore, the Defendant asserted that it had lodged a Notice of Appeal dated 4 July 2023 with the Court of Appeal, challenging the High Court Order dated 7 June 2023. The said appeal pertained to the subject matter under contention in this suit. 21. Therefore, the Defendant argued that pending the Court of Appeal’s adjudication on the appeal against the High Court order dated 7 June 2023, it was contrary to the doctrine of equity for this Court to issue an Order for Sale against the Defendant. Such an action, prior to the final determination by the Court of Appeal, would substantially prejudice the rights of the Defendant, as the resolution of the subject matter in this suit would precede the conclusive determination of the parties’ rights. 22. The Defendant further submitted that the Plaintiff would not suffer prejudice during the pendency of the Court of Appeal's hearing to decide on the Defendant's appeal. 23. Subsequently, the Defendant argued that the initiation of this suit by the Plaintiff was premature and lacked bona fides, considering that the Plaintiff was aware of the Defendant’s appeal yet to be deliberated by the Court of Appeal. S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 24. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant had classified the Plaintiff as a secured creditor under the said Scheme for Settlement. This indicated that the Defendant had acknowledged the fact that the Plaintiff held a charge as security and further recognised the Plaintiff’s interest in the said Scheme. 25. The Plaintiff asserted that neither an admission by the Plaintiff nor a proposal by the Defendant existed to relinquish the Plaintiff’s right over the property charged for the benefit of other creditors. Consequently, the disposal of the charged property would not impact the Defendant’s appeal or cause prejudice to the Defendant’s position. 26. The Plaintiff argued that the filing of an appeal by the Defendant did not automatically warrant the dismissal or setting aside of the Originating Summons for Order for Sale. Additionally, the Plaintiff contended that the Defendant had incorrectly challenged the Order for Sale sought in this suit. Instead, the Defendant should have applied to stay the proceedings pending the appeal, rather than disputing the Originating Summons. 27. The Plaintiff maintained that there was no provision in law to challenge the Plaintiff’s right in rem based on the filing and pending status of an appeal. Therefore, all issues raised by the Defendant did not provide any cause to the contrary for the Court to disallow an Order for Sale. S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 28. I concur with the Plaintiff’s contention. While the Charge is the subject matter of the said Scheme under section 366(1) of the Companies Act 1965, the said Scheme was not sanctioned by the High Court. Additionally, as of the date of the hearing of this suit, the Defendant had not obtained an order for a stay of proceedings pending its appeal. Therefore, there was no impediment for this Court to proceed with this suit. 29. I am guided by the principles set in the case of Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. (supra) and find that the Defendant had not demonstrated any cause to the contrary in this action for the Court to disallow the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons for an Order for Sale. The issues raised, such as the Charge being a subject matter of Suit 366 and the existence of a pending appeal, are not causes to the contrary. 30. The Plaintiff, in seeking an Order for Sale in this foreclosure proceedings pursuant to section 256 of the NLC 1965, was merely enforcing its rights as a chargee by exercising its statutory remedy against the Defendant as a chargor in default. The Charge, in this case, was registered. The Court of Appeal in the case of Lim Ban Hooi & Anor v Malayan Banking Bhd. [2018] MLJU 510 stated as follows: “[45] This view was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Kandiah Peter v Public Bank Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 119: S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 ‘The principles governing the matter are well settled by authority and are not open to question. A chargee who makes an application for an order for sale in foreclosure proceedings under s 256 of the Code does not commence an action. He merely enforces his rights as a chargee by exercising his statutory remedy against the chargor in default. The chargee, therefore, does not sue for a debt. It is also clear that his claim for an order for sale is not based upon a covenant but under a registered charge. The order for sale when made under s 256 of the Code is not a judgment or a decree. The Court hearing the application for foreclosure does not make, and in any event ought not to make, any adjudication upon any substantive issue. These principles are called from several decisions of our courts which have correctly stated the law upon the subject.’ See also Federal Court decisions in Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 77; and CIMB Investment Bank Bhd v Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 9 CLJ 1012.” [emphasis added] 31. I find there was no element of being "contrary to some rule of law or equity" in this case. In Low Lee Lian (supra) His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship then was) observed: “This principle finds its origins in the judgment of Aitken J in Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1939] MLJ 296 at p 298 where he said: I agree that equitable principles should not be invoked too freely for the purpose of construing our S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Land Code, but surely a chargor, who shows that there would be no need to sell his land if the chargee paid up in full what is due from himself in another capacity, has shown good and sufficient cause why the land should not be sold. Section 149 of the Land Code obviously contemplates that there may be cases in which charged land should not be sold, even though there has been a default in payment of the principal sum or interest thereon secured by the charge; and it seems to me that a chargor may 'shew cause' either in law or equity against an application for an order for sale, and that the courts should refuse to make an order in every case where it would be unjust to do so. By 'unjust' I mean contrary to those rules of the common law and equity which are in force in the Federated Malay States.” … “It is thus clear that to fall within the scope of the principle in Murugappa Chettiar's case, the chargor must be able to point to a statutory direction or some rule of the common law or doctrine of equity operating in his favour and against which an order for sale would militate. Anything that falls short of this requirement will not amount to cause to the contrary under s 256(3).” [emphasis added] 32. In the Privy Council case of Keng Soon Finance Bhd. v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn. Bhd. & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 (PC) Lord Oliver of Aylmerton held: - “Section 256(3) of the National Land Code is mandatory. The court 'shall' order a sale unless it is satisfied of the S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 existence of 'cause to the contrary'. Granted that these words have been construed in Malaysia as justifying the withholding of an order where to make one would be contrary to some rule of law or equity, they clearly cannot extend to enabling the court to refuse relief simply because it feels sorry for the borrower or because it regards the lender as arrogant, boorish or unmannerly.” [emphasis added] 33. However, in the present case, aside from asserting an appeal filed against the High Court’s decision dismissing the sanction for the said Scheme and emphasising that the Charge was a subject matter in the said Scheme, the Defendant failed to present any evidence indicating that it would be contrary to the rules of common law and equity in force in this country for this Court to grant an Order for Sale, hence, deeming it unjust to grant an Order for Sale. The Defendant must be able to cite a statutory provision, a common law rule, or an equitable doctrine in their favour, against which an order for sale would go against. 34. There is no dispute that the Defendant classified the Plaintiff as a secured creditor in the said Scheme for Settlement. Consequently, the Defendant, having full knowledge, acknowledged the Plaintiff's rights and interest as a secured creditor. There is no evidence presented in this Court indicating the Plaintiff's agreement to waive its rights and interest in the charged property for the benefit of other creditors. I concur with the Plaintiff's contention that, being the secured creditor, it has the right to exercise its rights in rem to dispose of the property. Therefore, the disposal of the charged S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 property would not adversely affect the Defendant's appeal or prejudice the Defendant's position. 35. Moreover, the Defendant had not obtained a stay of proceedings pending its appeal against the High Court’s decision in dismissing the said sanction. A pending appeal would not constitute a cause to the contrary under section 256(3) of the NLC 1965. The Plaintiff is merely enforcing the rights in rem upon the Defendant’s default, which is not disputed. 36. Furthermore, the Plaintiff had complied with all the requirements under section 256 of the NLC 1965 and Order 83 of the ROC 2012. The relevant statutory notices were served on the Defendant. The Defendant had not raised any issues or objections regarding non- compliance with any provisions under the NLC 1965 or Order 83 ROC 2012 by the Plaintiff. Hence, this Court finds no cause to the contrary shown by the Defendant. 37. For the reasons mentioned above, I, therefore, ordered that the Plaintiff’s application in its Originating Summons be allowed with costs of RM3000.00. Dated: 19 January 2024 -sgd- JAMHIRAH ALI JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER High Court of Malaya at Shah Alam (NCVC 1) S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 To the parties’ solicitors: For the Plaintiff : Muhammad Nasim Shafie (Messrs Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis) For the Defendant : Ng Yi Ying (Messrs Vilasiny Gan & Co.) S/N AI0MQMn8X0OhGu7nY92Z2Q **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24C-61-08/2023

PEMOHON Kay Corporation Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN Turnpike Synergy Sdn Bhd

1)2 Originating Summonses.2)both the Setting Aside OS and Notice of Application are dismissed.the Enforcement OS is allowed.3)a total cost of RM5,000.00 subject to allocator shall be paid by Turnpike to Kay Corp accordingly.

19/01/2024

YA Puan Sumathi a/p Murugiah

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=76ffe8a3-5e81-4b28-82b7-d83f770aac23&Inline=true

Alasan Penghakiman Turnpike v Kay Corp.pdf 19/01/2024 15:25:13 BA-24C-61-08/2023 Kand. 47 S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N oj/doFeKEuCt9g/dwqsIw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal aA—2ac—s1—ua/2u23 Kano. 47 ,<z,rx,,:ruA 17 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAVA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARIJI. EHSAN ORIGINATING suMMoNs N0: EA-24c-41-n5/2023 BETWEEN TURNPIKE SVNERGV sun. BHD PLAINTIFF (company No 964307-M) AND KAY CORPORATION sun. BHD DEFENDANT (Company Mr: 104021rM) (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAVA AT SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINAYING suMMoNs NO: BA-24C-61-DB/2023 BETWEEN KAY CORPORATION sou. BHD PLAINTIFF (Cumpany Nu 1o4o21—M) AND TURNPIKE SVNERGV SDN. EHD DEFENDANT (camnany No 964307-M) N uVduFuKEuc19gmwus\w mm Sum M... M“ be used m MN m. nvwvufilv mm; nnmmgnl M mum Wm 34% JUDGMENT (2 Ongmaling summonses) A. mmonucnou m In September 2022‘ Kay curporamorr Sdn Ehd (“Kay Corp") had commenced Adrumcauon Pvoceedmgs pursuant In me Conslrucllon Industry Payrrrem and Adjumeanon Am 2012 1C|F'AA 2012; agamsr Turnprxe sa arm. (“Tump\Ke“) in claim a sum oIRM17‘2U2,421.33 as me rrnparu sum ansmg from a oanstrucuan cnmracl made helwsen them The Adjudmalar decreed In favour 01 me Kay Carp In ms Aajrmrcarrorr Dzcisiun (“AD“) [2] As a result 0! me An, me ionowings were med by me panies qr) 05 Na. BA-24c-414:5/zuza (sun 41) was filed by mmprxs against Kay Corp [or weave at court to set asrue the AD we «ms 05‘ Turnpike had filed a Ncnice ul Applicahun for S|ay ol Execmrorr vflhe AD (End 2); and (H) os No. BA-245-61-08/2023 (Swl 5:) was filed by Kay Corp for a court order to enioroe the AD pursuant to 5.28 01 CIPAA 2012 [3] since mere are 2 05.5 and a Notice o1Apphcauon filed m relalion in ms AD. the panies agreed w having both the 05s and me Enclosure 2 0! sun 41 new together and var me decrsron ov the same to be dehvered lagemer sw umuruxzuctfigrnwnsxw -we Sum M... wm be used m mm we mtmruulv mm; nnmmnnl VII Mme wrm iaised by tmlh panies are id be considered and a decision is 10 be derived inereironi. in me case di ACFM Enginenring L consmiciion sdn. Bhd. v. Ema: Vlalon Sdn Bhd ai anoiiisi Ippoal [2016] 1 ms 152:; [2015] MLJU moi iiie cdun di Appeai neid “[17] Wm-sn and speaks olnaturauuslice, ii is rmlhmg more inaii what we can the Duncan! 4 amaediimi «ainiess~ which needs in he assumed (0 me Dania: in a dispuie ala hes/I/V9 “ [271 in iriis case, as seen in me AD‘ me Adiiididaidr nad deiineraied an an we issues raised by new Turnpike and Kay cdrp at me Adiddicaiidn Proceedings al iendin and riad come to her conclusion wiin iegaids to me veiiie oi irie varialiorl works. The Adiudicaior ried provided boiri paflles ineii oppcrlurlilies lo siaie ineir case iespediiveiy ai iiie adiudicaiion proceedings and had ndi isll any issues raised at iiie said pmceedings undehbelaled Tiieneidne, niinpixes aiiegaiidn inai lhe ieamed Adiddiaaidi nad iaiied and/Dr ieiiised in lake ccignisanoe e1 andidi appreeiaie Tumpi e's cdnieiiiidns and me evidence adduced at me adiudicaiion relaling to me vaiiaiion wuiks amounl and iriaz irie Adiiidieeioi ried denied ii irie iigrii to be mean: is uriloimded. [25] I ieiei id me case of Blna rim consimeiion sdn and v Hing Nyil Enierprise sdn. and. [2015] 3 cu 723 where K was siaied as lniiows “ Seaiori is has iardnded iiniiied gmnds on wnicn the decision or me Aflludicalor may be set awe Since an application under s is is not an upuea/, tn: decision of me Adludicufur cumin! be revtewzd an menls “ N uVduF EuC19§mw|1sM we s.ii.i numb]! M“ be used m mm ea nHfliruH|Y Minis nnnminril vn .;iniia win %§ [29] As such, whether we Adrudrcaror nad assessed the rssues versed cdrrecuy or not is no| up ro «hrs oaurl |D delerrmne as me decrsran oi the Adjudmalar canno| be revrewed on us rnerus. [an] Funnennore, s 250) or CIPAA 2012 provrdes the Adrudrcarar me power 10 indursnorially take me innramre Io asoerlam me fact and the Vaw required lor rne decision The Adrudicaror is rree to rdnn nis op mdependemly durum names and lo rely on miormallon wnrcn rs warned by her own rnvssugauon. I3‘! mlerim measure tn salve Issues relared In payments, any errars or srnce me aunrdrcarran proceedmgs pursuant to CIPAA 2012 rs an onnssron ansmg lrom «ms proceeding can be rerne d we a rrnex detenmnallon mmugh armrrauon or mud as provided lor under 513 or CIPAA 2012. (see Eeonpr/e (M) Sdn Ehd v. IRDK Ventures Sdn and a another use [2016] 5 cu M2) [32] Based on me loregmng‘ Turnpike has fafled |u drecnarge ws burden are show that me Adjudwcaknr nas breached me rules 01 natural rusuce puvsuanl In s.15-(b) ol CIPAA 2012 lll.s.15(c) orcIPAA 2012 [:31 An AD can he set asrue n can be es|abhshed pursuant In 5. 15¢) do CIPAA 2012 ir the Hamlifl drsenarges us |ega\ burden met me Adjudrcazor Vacked independence or impana y m conduamg Ihe amudlcalion proceedings and In dehvering the AD 12 sw uVduFuKEuC19§mw|1s\w -we Sum M... M“ be used m mm me numruulv mm; nnmmnrrl VII mum wrm [34] Even though they are genevally used synonymausly, ‘independence’ and '|mDMia y‘ are oonoems wnicn nave msnne: mnerenees In the wmext ol amumcauon pursuam to s 15(0) 0! CIPAA 2m2, lack nf Independence descnbes an adjuducamr who nas pnor or exwslmg nexanensrnps belween mmself and any one aune pames an we adlhdi non proceedings [35] In me book. consmmuon Adjudicl on Malaysia by Lam Wax Lacn ana wan v F L00 (Chapter 5 para 5.13)‘ the mllowmg was some m uennmg ‘impartiality. ‘As stated In Muslm 5 am Commsmal Arhmvahon mu Eamon/, rmpsma/My n the antonym al bras’ Eras can came In many ronns, As per Lard Pnmps «n as Msdrcamems and Related Classes or Guods ma 2» Eras .s an amlude of mmd whrch urevenls me Judge rm making an amenvve dslerrmnalrorl or ma Issues that ne nas to resolve A Judy: may be biased humus: ns nas reason :9 prefer one outcome aims case In anomer He may be imaged bscauss ns nas reason to ravw one party miner man another. He may be mam not In /avuur at one olnmmi at me ms»-ne am because af a nnamrsa In Isvaur 5/ or against . pamcular wrmess wmah prwems an mwamal assessment arms ewaenoe onna: wvmess Eta: can come In may runns n may Consist of rnslmnal we/udme or It may anse (mm msmcular circumstance: whrm for /ogrcal reasons uremsnnse a Judge towards a namcurarvrew onne ewaenca orrssues before mm ' [35] In «ms case‘ K \s Tump\ke‘s ccmenlwon mat me clanflcauun sessuon auowed by the Adwmcawv was unnecessary and that unlwke Kay Corp, Tumpwke was not allowed to Dress"! any evmence at me send u 3 nan. Sum Mn... wm be used m mm s. snnnnn suns nnmmnnl vn mum pm clavmcahon sessron and was a\sn not snowed in cross examme As suen, the Admdwcalor nas been \mp\ica|ed Io Vack independence or Imparllamy rn assessing the Issues bebre her [371 By me definmuns or whal cunsmule ‘Independence’ and ‘imparIia|I|y' as stated m me vuregoing paragraphs. aparl lrom me aHega\Ions made agamst me Adwdicalon Turnpike had nol adduced any cogem evidence or mad made any oarnpemng Vegal submission juslwfymg une Adjudlcalofls Vack ov mdepsndencs or impartiality In amvmg to her decxsxon As menuened m me above paragraphs deanng with s «sun 0! CIPAA‘ me Ad;udn:a|or had reasoned out every conclusion ma: she had reached m deliberating me Issues bl0ugh| berare ner [331 A1 «ms juncluve, 1 reverm me Hugh Courl case 01 Team: Wiramus sdn Bhd v. Thleu Sung Chan sdn Bhd [2017] 1 ms 519; [2017] 4 AMR 501 where Lee Swee Sang J (as he then was) hem as (allows -- 119) There rs arse no Dasrs /or the Respondent to anege that Ms Ad/udrcalar had lulled la 5:! rndependenfiy and rmpamslly The «ac: ma! me Ad/udrcamr ma nm agree mm me Resiiondevws posmun on the Yaw .5 na pmdr ma! he had rauea to act xnctspenaenrvy 3"” """”"a'Iy Such an afltgatrmv slvuuld rm! he launched wrthmn some evmencz Domrma mexorsbly to 5 lack or mdeuendence or rmnsma/W m the hsarmg and the denvery or (he Amudrcanon Dscrsron ‘ [391 Therelcve. not bemg me pany who lhe Adjudwcalov was m lavuur do cannoz consmule as evidence 10 «ms assenlcn made against Ihe Adruduceror. As such, I am nm convmoed mm me Turnpike has N araar sdcegrawuw. we Sam M... Mu be used m mm we nnmnaulv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm discharged the burden ol proving the allegation made against the Aaiuiticator under this ltrriti. iv. s.15(d) MCIFAA 2012 [401 it is Tiirnpike's eonlehtion ma| the Auiiioieator had acted in excess oi tier iurisoictioh because she had dealt and based her decision on the Agreement Confirmation which is akin |o a settterrient agreement As such, this does no| come within the ambit ol CIPAA 2t)t2 and theretarei the Aaiuaicator had acted in excess ot her iunstticticin [41] Szdlcln 27 at CIPAA 2ot2 prouioes the iurisaiatiurial boundaries in which the Adiudieator can act in adiudicahon Dlooeedlngs. s 21(3) particularly gives the Adjuttteatoi the ittscretieh to proceed and complete the aaiuaieation proceedings notwithstanding any iunsaietion challenge. without preiuttiee In the rights under e.t5 aria s 25 acoeraingly [421 in this case, nul at any time during the adjudication pruceedlngs aid Turnpike raise any ooiection against the Adiuaieator auiuaieatiiig the issue pertaining to the Agreement connrrnatien on the basis that this issue is not within her iurisuiotion in tact, the only issue which Turnpike had raised a iurieaictianal ooiectian against the Auiuaicator is on the ISSUE pertaining to Key Carp‘s etaiin lpr loss and expenses. [43] Be that as it may, the issue penalning to the value of the variation works is not alien to the construction contract oetweeh the parties which comes within the arntiit pt cll=AA 2012. ‘lliereiore. it is undeniable that is sin uVdl:F|KEuC19§mtII|1siw -we s.ii.i M... will be used M mitt Die nlVWuH|Y MW; flnmninrll vn AFVLING WM! fifi inis is an issue which arose ironi ine peyrneni eiaim by Kay corp and not one wnicn is independent irorn ii [441 Furlherrnare‘ s zsiii oi‘ CIPAA 2012 provides me Adiudicaiar iiie power in Inquisilonally rake me iniuarive ia asaenairi irie (act and irie law required for die decision Tne Adiudicaior is iree |o iorrri rierop ion irideperiderriiy oi ooiri panies and io rely on information which is oourined by her own Invesligaiion. [45] in my opinion, iiie Adiddicaior acted weii wimin her idnsdiciion. since ine adiudioaiion praoeedings pursuani |o CIPAA 2012 is an iriierirn measure in salve sues reiaied In payments, any errars or omission arising irorn iriis proceeding can be reme d via a iinai deierrninaiion iriraugn aroiiraiion or court as provided ior under s 13 oi CIPAA 2012 isee. Econpl/e (M) Sdn Ehd v. IRDK Ventures sdrr Bird & arroiirrrr use [2016] 5 cm 552) [46] Thereluve, nairirrg iaiied io esraoiisrr s 15(3), in), (:1) and (d) oi CIPAA 2012 againsi die Adiudicaior, Tumpike's apphcaiwn io sei aside ine AD is hereby dismissed wiin cosl oi RM5iooo 00. ll. siay or Exocrmon-Enci 2 in sun 41 [47] since, irie aooiiaairdn ior siay oi Execuliun oi iiie AD was pursuant to s,1611|1a) oi cii=AA 2012, having decided that me selling aside apoiicaiion is heveby dismissed, inere is no ionger me need no dehberale on me gmimds ior wnicn ihis apoiiceiion was med in (he firsl piaoe is sin uVduF|KEuCi9§idw|1siw -we s.ii.i rm... M“ r. used m mm Die nVWiruU|Y Minis nnmninnl VII AFMNG WM! [A8] Tlrerelore. me anplleacrorr lor stay ls hereby dlsmlssed aeeormngly Wllh no order as to cost. Ill. Errlorcemem as — Suil El (s.2B of CIFAA 2012) [49] As gulded by Her Ladyship Mary Llm Thlam Suan JCA (as she men was) lrr me com ol Appeal case ol lnni Kim Sdn Bhd v. Puuri Nuaamau sarr Elm [2019] 2 cu 229, me eoun may exerclse lle dlscrennn lo grant leave under 5. 25m and (2) cll=AA |a srrlorcs an adludlcallcm declslon rl the lollowrng lhree mndlhons (3 Cnndlllorls) are mel “Ifl me zd/udlcarlorl declslarl has been made rn Iavaur or me party aPP’ylIlg Yorlsave urlders 23 CVPMJ z2l me Iaarfy égalnsl whom an adllldlcauorl oeclslorl ls made, has rarlea In pay me ad/udlcated amormr on me dale specmsa lrl we ad/udmalllnn declslofl. ml gal mere 15 N7 Prolllblllorl an we mun‘: dlsclsmzrlary power to grant leave to enforce the aaruareamm dsctslon ~ [50] In one case, all 3 cundltluns have been sallsfled and srrrce me senrng Aside and the slay of Execuliun omre AD have been dismissed, Kay com‘: application to erllorce lhe AD is allowed wlor no order as to cns|s. N emu; Euclfiglnwnslw we s.rr.r M... MU be used m mm we mlnlrulllv MW; “Mm. VII .;rrr~e wrul 5. CONCLUSION [51] Prermsed on me above ewaences and reasons‘ 4‘) mm me Setung Aside as and Name uf Appllc are dismwssed. In) me Envcrcement 05 us snowed, and on) a (ma! ms! at RM5‘K)D0 no sub]ec| to auocamr shall be pend by Tumpwke to Kay Carp accnrdmgly. SUMAYHI AIP MURUGIAH Judwcwal Commwsswoner High Coun ol Malaya Shah Alam. Se\angor Daml Ehsan DATE: 1! JANUARY 2024 1; 5w um-zruxzuctfigruwtzsxw -ms Sum M... M“ be used m mm u. nvVWuH|Y mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm Counsel my Tumprks .- Ms. Valsala Ralnasabapalhy, Mr Khang Hang Kat & Ms Shalizah Muhamed Shrhab {Messrs Zam .4 co) Counse/ /or Kay Co/porslron: Mr Jason Ng Kau 3 Ms. sen Wong cma P91 (Messrs. Jason N9 .5 Partners) 1: sw uya.,r.xzuc«mwm. -ms Sum IHIWDIY WW be used m mm u. nvwhuflly mm; dun-mm VII nF\uNG pm %§ 3. BRIEF BACKGROUND [4] Tumpxke nad appomled Kay Corp as me mam odnuaaor Var nne Prqeci vla Letter 07 Award daled 25 03 2018 [or a propel known as me “Prupnsed Rebcallun and Ralsmg M 275kV K1 132kV Overhead Trsmsrmsswon Lmes at me Proposed Sungal ae um Kelang E\eva|ed Expressway (SUKE) from Sg Eesw aeund lo we Kelang Bound 1Loca|\on 2:" (me “Fro;ez:l“) [5] The Prmsct did not span me enme length cf the SUKE expressway mscead, me Pro]ec| mvolved rebcaung seyerax overhead cransnnssudn pyldns and assdcmed puwerhnes alung a cenaln sedmn do me expresswav suecmcany, Kay Corp was an relocate 6 (six) exxslmg Ivansrmsslon pylons man were m me pam uf me sum: expressway‘: p\anned angnrnem [51 Kay Corp was engaged by Tumpxke in dany em a specmd scape Dlwofk m relalmn «dune Prqect (‘wdrkswdr an angmax Cflnlrad sum dv RM4o,75u,oao on ('Ongma| Contracl Sum") u \s undwspuled met me scope of Works was men expanded to mdude me voudwmg me ¢s) nems ov yanauan works — under vanauon Order Nos. 1a, m. 2, 3 and 4 une “Vanahon WorKs“):» (a) v0 may Live line maIn|enance a. restmg plalfunn (bl V0 10.)) -cnange ACSR 2x Zebra Ia ACIR 2x INVAR (c) V0 2- slope prozecuorv stabilny a| 6 numbers at pylon Iocahons sw uVduFuKEuC19§mw|1s\w -nae Sum Mn... wm be used m any we mwvuulv mm; nnmmnnl vn mum Wm (4) vo 3 — Destructive lype test hr 2 numbers 01 mcnopmes zypes MF42 and MP43 at aeumg, China (e) vo 4 - suppny, ms|aH. testing a. commissioning a! cow system [7] The «nan cummauve cenified va\ue 0! me wnlran Includmg me vos of RMA4,650.113 14 and me ex-gralla paymenls lowards loss and expense ov 393314.00 ws RM84.9G4,263 54 ('Fmal Convact Sum") [31 The Cemficate ol Pracucal campleuan was wssued don 25 7.2019 [9] on 254 2022, Kay Corp served a Payment C\a\m (or me sum ul RM1 7202.421 33 bemg for a) RM10‘570.494 91, bemg me unoerlmed and/or under Cemfioatlon M Vananon workl WDFK done; 1)) RM50‘2BU 00‘ bemg |he clam [or Loss and Expense due to the pmlanganun ul Pnnsat, and c) RM6,AE1‘666 52, bemg me mlerest on aH overdue accounts [10] Turnpwke had mspuled the amount dawned by Kay Corp we Ks Payment Response and had made a cross clam M Rmasasmuo wmch had been paid by Tumpxke in Kay Com m a mu and nnax semement av Kay Corp’: clams lar luss and expense, on ma basis ma: Kay Corp had reneged on me ssmemem of the said claims by seekmg aaamonax V055 and expense m me sawd Aanmxca on sw uVduFuKEuC19«;mwus\w -ma Sam M... Mu be used m mm ua nflmrufllv mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm c. ADJUDICATION PROCEEDINGS [I1] Due to npn—paymerii pi lhe paymerii piaim made by Kay Corp, aayiiuipaiipn proceedings was imiiaiea by Kay Corp by Issuing a Ncilice pi Aayuaicaiien dated 1305 2u22 and an Adyuaicaiipri Claim followed suit on 15 7 2022, Turnpike had served an Adjudication Response on 27.7 2022 arid ine same was replied by Kay Corp on 4 5.2022. [I1] Upmi Wnclusinn at me adjudication proceedings‘ "19 Adiudicalor‘ Tan Swee lm aeciaeu m iavmir pi Kay Corp and Turnpike was to pay |o Kay Corp wilhin 30 calendar days irum me date ullhe AD as ipiipws — a) a sum ei RMs,31:i.ass 26‘ n) mieresi ai irre reie oi 5% sirnuie iriieresi per arrnum irom ii November 2019 imiii me aaie oi reaiisaiion oi the AD, and c) oasis pi adiudication proceedings in me sum ai RM13‘/‘S57 an [13] Being pissaiisiieu with me An, Turnpike had iiieu ip sei aside me same aria vending ims seiimg aside. a Siay oi Execuiion oi me AD was aisn mad (or which a decision was made by this CDLAI1 an 30.10.2023. Being dissatisfied WIU1 this oourfs decision, Turnpike had filed a Noiice 0! Appeal SIN uVdeFuKEuCi9§iuwnsiw -we s..i.i M... MU be used m mm we niwiruiilv sum; nnmmnrri via AFVLING WM! fifi D. OBJECT CIPAA 2012 [14] CIFAA 2012 \s a creature av the Veglsmllon Intended to (acIlIla|e speedy and regmar payments m we conslmclnon Industry. As cash new is the utmost Important lanur m we constmcmon mduslry, CIPAA provides Inlenm measures to dlspulmg pames Io so\ve payment wssues expedilloushr so as not to Aeupardise me conlmuance ol the constvucuon contract emerea mlo by mam (see Manage Sam and v. Arkilek Meor & Chew Sdn and and Another appeal [2019] 5 cu 433,- [2019] 5 AMR 516 F0, Eenam Development sun Ehd V. R84: Cergas Tegnh Sdn Ehd[2nI7]1 ms 222:) E. ISSUES [15] Tump\Ke‘s appnoauon m set asme me AD pursuant In 5.15 (at. (by (c) and (d)a1C\PAA 2U12|s premised on me followings. . that there was swear error oHac1 and that me decision was umuroneriy procured on me basis 0! a Agreement Cormrmahnn which ex\s|enoe was dwspmed by Turnpike‘ |ha( me Veamed Aamcanor had failed and/or refused |o |aKe cugmsance cl and/ur apprecIa|e Turnp\ke‘s cunlenlmns and me ewaence adduced at me aajumcauon relating to the variation works amount sw um-zruxzuctfigruxutzsxw -ms Sum M... M“ be used m wow u. nvwvufilv mm; “Mm. VII mum Wm that me danficallon sassron auowed by me Adwdlcalor was unnecessary. unnke Kay corp, Turnmke was nm aHowed Ia preseru any evwdenoe at the Sam clarificalwon session. Tumpwke was also not allowed to cross examme, and iv that me Agreement confinnauun wnrcn me Adjudwcamr had based her decision on Is a sememenl agreement, which lalls omsrae of the arntm or CIPAA and merelore rendenng une Admdwcslar In nave acted In axoess 0! nor junsmclwan us] Turnorxes appncauon (or a say 0! axecuuon or me AD pursuam Io s1e nf CVPAA 2012 Is premised as luflows i the Dendlng ol mis sun Le. Sun 41 to se¢ aside me AD pursuant |n 5.1611 )(a) of CIPAA 2012: n. that [here are clear and uneqmvocal errors m me An, ana mat Kay Corp rs nnancrauy weak and as sucn womd render me declsiun or urns ouurl shuuld wt be m lavuur or Turnprxa m we sening asrde apphgauon nugatory [11] Kay Cords apphoauon to enlorce me AD pursuant to 528 0! CIPAA 2012 Is premised as ¢oIIows: . mat the Adwdxcaled Amount Is not paid by Turnpike‘ u mat ma AD Is not sel aside ur stayed, and w. that mere Is no final delerlmnauun by Arouramon or com. sw uVduFuKEuC19§mwus\w -ma S-rm Mn... M11 as used m mm a. annnn-r mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm fifi F. FINDINGS OF THE COURT I. Sult 41 - selling Aside os (s.1s ol CIPAA 2n12) i. s.15(aleH:lPAA2ol2-Fraud [18] In addressing me issue el fraud 1s151a|ofC|PAA 2012)‘ ll rnusl be unaersloorl (ha| lne burden lo prove lraue lles on me one we srnee nere, Turrlplks nee allegee llrel Kay Corp nee lmproperly procured by way or [laud the AD rn lls lavaurr |he burden ls on Tumplke to prove so an a balance el pmbabllllles [see me Federal Cmlfl case or Sinnziyah ll. Sans Sdn Bhd v. narnal seua Sdn End [2015] 7 cu 534: [2015] 1 MLJ 1. at [4Bl‘[53]\] esserls ll. [19] In lnls case‘ N Is TIm|DIke'S eonlenllon lnal Kay Corp had by way el lrauaulenl means precuree lne AD In rls layour [ram me Adludlcator for yanalren works by usmg a document relerree la as me Agraernenl Cunfirrnallon wnrcn earnes only Kay corps slgrlalure and not Tl.lmplke‘s as well [20] Aooordlrlg |o Turnpike lne doclmlem relerrea m as me Agreemem conllnnellen by Kay Corp never s><ls|sd H1 llre rnanner ll was srrown by Kay Corp as mere exrsl only a documem wnlcn nas pmpclsals lml nor an egreemem as alleged by Kay Corp an lhe value el me yanalren works Thls document ls sald to be anaeneu Io Kay corps leller daled 26.3 2020 as Apnen x 9 l“Apl>enulx 9') SIN emeruxzuclfigluwuslw ‘Nuns s.n.r M... wn be we m mm we anrmrry mm; nnmmnnl vn -slum wrul [21] Anpenmx 9 wmcn conlents are srn-ilar um nut \den|Ica\ to me Agreement Conlxrmmion rs claimed by ‘rurnprke has only emerged at we appneeuan as n nae been reeenuy lound Now, I find rt slrange that aespue Kay Carp havmg produced me Agreement oarmrmanan nghl (rum me begmnlng 0! me adjudication pmceedmgs and havmg an me oppurlumty gwen mreugn the process and by me Adjuareamr mcluding a clanflcahon sessron, «or me enme duranon 0! me adludicallon pmceedmgs of almos| one (1; year‘ Appendix 9 ma nac emerge or even made msrmoned by Turnpike ac any ume mmprxe some have slapped une adjudication proceedings .1 rt reaHy had |houghl tha| Kay Carp was bnngmg Ms manms by way or rreuuulem means‘ which eleany n me not. [See Gumi As Elek zl Sdn am: v Dazzling Electrical (M) Sdn EM and anomercase [2020] MLJU 315) [221 The Adjumcator had on «ms Issue arrived at her findings based on EH the documents. evidence and clanlwcaucn filed at the pmceedmgs and or hrough| nevore her. “so ueweven on Me evmencs balms me r rm as a matrsroffacl, that an the Damned at probabr/mes more was agreement an en. vsluairon er en. I/snalwn Walks rn me sum oVRM5fl,95A Mo 00 ansma (mm the meelmga held an 15 my 2:219 and 23 My my and me Agreement Confirmalron Issued by me Respolndant n Is this sum winch caught 10 um Dun rncmm .n ma Fmal Accuurvl /ur \/unalrun Wurks ms“.-ad Dime M. er mm 650,113 74 51 n .5 not drsputed ma: Ihe sum or RM44,s50, 113 74 rnermyea rn me Fmal Accuum has almsdy Dean me by me Respondent and Ieaervcd by me cmmenr N emu; Eucflgrnwnsxw we S-rm Mn... Mu be used m mm we mm-r Mm; nnmmnrrl VII mum Wm 52 Amrmng/y, /find n Yavourolthe C/armam n ma sum oH?M6,a13 ass 25 Dewy me difference Between the amaurvl oIi'M5n,w64,om1 no wmclv I find as Max/my been agreed, and the amaunl 0.‘ mm, 55mm 74 Whmh has Dean harms and recerved Dyme Crarmaru - [231 Furlhermore, there us no evidence which shows that Turnpike had nemner chaHenged me aucnenucny of the Agveemem connnnauon nor mu m deny me preparation 0! me same by u. The omy evmsncs wmcn sx\s| .5 Turnp|ke's mama to the agreemem at the vams al nne vanalucm works as claimed by Kay Corp [24] In the upshot. il Is ems courrs iindmgs that Tumpxke had lailed |o move on a tmance of pmbamlmes mat Kay Corp nad procured me AD by fraudulent means. i. s. I5(h) MCIFAA 2012 [25] In exammmg whether s.15(b) or CIPAA 2012 Le mere has been a demal oi na\ura\ Juslwce, can be esta I maker to me case ov MRCE Builders Sdn Bhd v. Wazam vnmum Sdn arm and znolhel case mun] 1 LNS a51;[2o2o1 MLJU 20:, where Wong man Khecmg J (as he men was) held that .1 \s summenn |a msluage a cumpxann ul breach 0! na|ura| jusllce n ma Admdlcalur had gwen just one reasun to have arrived in ms decwswan [26] The prlnclme 0! natural Justice mm Is sam In nave been denied here ws Ina right to being nsam. sud! alteram paflem. Vn an Aamucanuon Proceedings, me Adwdxcator nas me my to award pmoeuurax iaurnsss to me parlies during me course av me pruneedmgs whereby me wssues m sw umuruxzuctfigrnwnsxw -ms Sum Mn... wm be used m mm u. mwn mm; nnmmnnl VII mum Wm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BB-B53F-8-07/2023

PLAINTIF IQBAL FEIRUZ KHAN BIN MOHAMED RAFIK DEFENDAN ADRIAN WONG SHIANG HOE

Aturan 18 kaedah 19 KKM 2012 - tuntutan fitnah oleh Defendan - pergaduhan antara Plaintif dan Defendan dalam Facebook - adakah hantaran tersebut membawa maksud fitnah atau sekadar interpretasi Plaintif - adakah memenuhi kriteria bagi satu tuntutan fitnah - adakah kes layak dibatalkan tanpa perlu didengar melalui perbicaraan

19/01/2024

Puan Sazlina binti Safie

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e30e5efe-77f2-43b3-a5dd-add4d1f26216&Inline=true

Microsoft Word - AP - BB-B53F-8-07-2023 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN PETALING JAYA DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN WRIT SAMAN NO – BB-B53F-8-07/2023 ANTARA IQBAL FEIRUZ KHAN BIN MOHAMED RAFIK [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 581021035359] [TETUAN M MANOHARAN & CO.] …PLAINTIF DAN ADRIAN WONG SHIANG HOE [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 000000000000] [TETUAN YAP LIEW & PARTNERS] …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (RAYUAN INTERLOKUTORI) LATARBELAKANG KES Ini adalah rayuan Perayu/Plaintif IQBAL FEIRUZ KHAN BIN MOHAMED RAFIK [IDENTITY CARD NO.: 581021035359], melalui Notis Rayuan di Lampiran 18 atas keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah selain keputusan 19/01/2024 12:17:26 BB-B53F-8-07/2023 Kand. 21 S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 yang diputuskan selepas perbicaraan yang diberi pada 14 haribulan Disember 2023, yang membenarkan Notis Permohonan di Lampiran 7 permohonan Defendan untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Perayu/Plaintif dengan kos RM4,000.00. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [1] Mahkamah telah meneliti Notis Permohonan, Afidavit-afidavit, hujahan bertulis dan otoriti kedua-dua pihak. Notis Permohonan Lampiran 7 adalah permohonan Defendan di bawah Aturan 18 kaedah 19 (1) (a) dan/atau (b), (c) dan (d) dan Aturan 92 kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 untuk perintah-perintah seperti berikut: a) Bahawa keseluruhan pengindorsan tuntutan dalam Writ bertarikh 21hb Julai 2023 dan Penyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 21hb Julai 2023 terhadap Defendan yang dinamakan di atas dibatalkan; b) Berikutan dengan perintah diperenggan (a) di atas, Writ bertarikh 21hb Julai 2023 tersebut diketepikan dan tindakan guaman Plaintif ini terhadap Defendan yang dinamakan di atas dibatalkan; c) Kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan; S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 d) Relif-relif lain dan/atau perintah yang berbangkit (consequential orders) yang Mahkamah yang Mulia ini anggap sesuai dan adil. [2] Alasan permohonan Defendan adalah dinyatakan dalam affidavit sokongan yang mana antara lain menyatakan bahawa: 1) Penyataan Tuntutan Plaintif tidak mewujudkan satu kausa tindakan di bawah undnag-undang fitnah sebaliknya merupakan satu perbualan tegas antara Plaintif dan Defendan di dalam Facebook mengenai samada Plaintif meletakkan kenderaan secara haram di parkir Kondominium Surian. 2) Kesemua kenyataan Plaintif adalah merupakan ulasan saksama dan dalam perbualan tersebut tidak mempunyai unsur-unsur fitnah. 3) Surat rasmi dari Perbadanan Pengurusan Kondominium Surian bertarikh 5/10/2023 (eksibit AWSH-1) telah memaklumkan bahawa Plaintif tidak memiliki sebarang unit di Kondominium Surian. 4) “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” yang didirikan oleh Defendan pada 11/7/2023 pada mulanya adalah bagi pihak Badan Pengurusan Kondominium Surian untuk kegunaan pemilik-pemilik dan penduduk. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 5) “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” tidak pernah digunakan sebagai halaman perhubungan rasmi kepada Badan Pengurusan atau Jawatankuasa Badan Pengurusan. 6) Plaintif telah seawal 23/5/2018 memberikan peringatan kepada pemilik-pemilik dan penduduk di kondominium bahawa “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” bukan suatu halaman perhubungan rasmi dengan Badan Pengurusan atau AJK Badan Pengurusan. 7) Plaintif selaku AJK Surian pernah membuat hantaran (posting) dalam “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” berkaitan urusan pentadbiran dan pengurusan Kondominium tersebut. 8) Melalui surat Eksibit “AWSH-1” mengesahkan bahawa Plaintif tidak mempunyai sebarang lot parkir di kondominium tersebut sebaliknya unit-unit yang diperuntukkan parkir adalah unit-unit isteri Plaintif. 9) Surat Eksibit “AWSH-1” tersebut juga mengesahkan bahawa pada 21/9/2022 kenderaan-kenderaan No. Pendaftaran JSS100, VT6313, AKP200, PKL910, WUC9963 dan WNA9813 diletak secara haram di parkir-parkir milikan rasmi Pengurusan Surian dan kenderaan No. Pendaftaran AHP9698 S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 telah diletak diparkir milik Unit C-02-12 tanpa kebenaran pemilik unit tersebut. 10) Badan Pengurusan Surian telah mengarahkan Pejabat Pengurusan Surian untuk memberi Notis 24jam kepada kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut yang telah diletakkan secara haram sebelum diapit dan didenda. 11) Hantaran Plaintif adalah secara ikhlas selaku AJK Surian yang memberi notis awal kepada pemilik-pemilik kenderaan tersebut. Kenyataan tersebut adalah satu kenyataan ikhlas, justifikasi dan bukan fitnah. 12) Gambar-gambar kenderaan yang dinyatakan adalah diambil oleh AJK Surian yang lain dan ia telah dinyatakan oleh Badan Pengurusan dalam perenggan 9 eksibit “AWSH-1”. 13) Plaintif sendiri telah memberikan jawapan melalui hantaran bertarikh 21/9/2022 di “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” secara sukarela mengemukakan namanya sebagai pemilik kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut serta telah memberikan nombor telefon bimbitnya dan mengumumkan pengenalannya kepada pengikut-pengikut “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” dan jua telah mengaku bahawa S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 beliau tidak meletakkan kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut diparkir yang diperuntukkan kepadanya. 14) Plaintif sendiri telah memplidkan satu pengakuan bahawa beliau memang tidak meletakkan kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut diparkir yang diperuntukkan khas untuk beliau dan telah memohon maaf sekiranya sesiapa telah mengalami kesulitan. 15) Kenyataan-kenyataan yang dikatakan Fitnah 1 hingga Fitnah 6 adalah kenyataan satu justifikasi (justification) dan ulasan saksama (fair comment) dalam satu pertengkaran antara Plaintif dan Defendan tanpa sebarang unsur niat jahat (malice). 16) Hantaran Defendan juga tidak kekal lama dan telah dipadamkan sejurus sahaja Plaintif mengalihkan kenderaan- kenderaan tersebut dan apabila Pengurusan Surian memutuskan perkara itu sudah selesai. 17) Defendan menyatakan bahawa Plaintif tidak mengalami sebarang kecederaan dari segi reputasi, kehilangan dan kerosakan sebaliknya, tindakan guaman Plaintif ini terhadap Defendan adalah mengaibkan, remeh dan/atau menyusahkan. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [3] Plaintif telah memfailkan pembelaan dan affidavit jawapan yang mana antaranya menyatakan seperti berikut: 1) Tuntutan Plaintif adalah untuk gantirugi bagi kenyataan- kenyataan fitnah yang diterbitkan oleh Defendan dalam laman Facebook. Tindakan ini membangkitkan banyak isu yang hanya boleh ditentukan secara adil melalui perbicaraan penuh. 2) Defendan sangat bergangtung kepada eksibit “” AWSH-1”. Plaintif tidak tahu samada surat tersebut menerima kelulusan majoriti ahli-ahli Perbadanan tersebut atau tidak. Walaubagaimanapun, surat tersebut adalah satu ulangan kata-kata fitnah yang diterbitkan oleh Defendan terhadap Plaintif. 3) Daniel Lim Hin Soon telah mengeluarkan surat tersebut dengan niat jahat kerana terdapat perselisihan faham antara Plaintif dengan Daniel Lim Hin Soon. Plaintif perlu menyoal balas Danial Lim Hin Soon dalam perbicaraan. 4) Plaintif adalah pemilik benefisial unit-unit kondominium yang dirujuk dalam affidavit. 5) Halaman Facebook tersebut adalah halaman rasmi pemilik dan penghuni Kondominium Surian. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 6) Pendapat Perbadanan atau Pengurusan Kondominium Surian atau Daniel Lim Hin Soon tidak relevan untuk menentusahkan jika kereta tersebut “Illegally parked” atau tidak dan ia perlu ditentukan oleh Mahkamah setelah menerima keterangan saksi-saksi. 7) Defendan telah menerbitkan gambar kenderaan-kenderaan tersebut dengan nombor pendaftaran dengan kata-kata fitnah. Penghuni Kondominium Surian yang mengenali Plaintif akan tahu kenderaan-kenderaan itu milik Plaintif dan Plaintif perlu menjawab siaran Facebook tersebut dan memberi penjelasan dan menafikan dakwaan fitnah. 8) Kenyataan-kenyataan yang dibuat mempunyai perkara yang dipertikaikan dan hanya boleh ditentukan secara adil selepas perbicaraan penuh dengan saksi. [4] Dalam menilai Notis Permohonan yang dikemukakan, Mahkamah merujuk semula kepada peruntukan undang-undang di mana Notis Permohonan ini disandarkan. Peruntukan yang dinyatakan adalah seperti berikut: Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18, r. 19) 19. (1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that— (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case maybe; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. Inherent powers of the Court (O. 92, r. 4) 4. For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. [5] Prinsip undnag-undang ini dapat dilihat dari kes BANDAR BUILDER SDN BHD & ORS v. UNITED MALAYAN BANKING CORPORATION BHD, SUPREME COURT, IPOH [1993] 4 CLJ 7 yang mana diputuskan: S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 “[1] The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules of the High Court 1980 are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule. This summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. [2] So long as the pleadings disclose some course of action or raise some question fit to be decided by the Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.” [6] Mahkamah merujuk kepada Penyataan Tuntutan Plaintif. Plaintif mendakwa terdapat 6 hantaran oleh Defendan melalui hantaran (posting) di “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” dan secara umumnya, Plaintif mendakwa setiap makna yang disenaraikan dalam perenggan 21 Penyataan Tuntutan adalah suatu fitnah terhadap Plaintif. [7] Mahkamah merujuk pula kepada hantaran-hantaran yang dinyatakan. Ia bermula dengan hantaran pertama yang dibuat oleh Plaintif pada 21/9/2022 di “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut”. Secara dasarnya, kenyataan tersebut tidak ditujukan secara terus kepada Plaintif tetapi Plaintif telah menjawab kepada kenyataan S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 tersebut dalam “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” yang sama menjelaskan situasi yang berkenaan. [8] Ekoran daripada itulah timbulnya hantaran-hantaran lain yang mana ia hanya melibatkan Plaintif dan Defendan. Dalam situasi ini, ia lebih kepada perselisihan faham antara 2 pihak. Plaintif langsung tidak menunjukkan apa-apa kenyataan bahawa “Halaman Facebook Kumpulan Tersebut” telah melibatkan komen-komen lain atau jawapan dari pihak ketiga atau pengikut halaman Facebook tersebut dan menyebabkan sebarang kecederaan kepada beliau. [9] Mahkamah akur bahawa apa yang Mahkamah nyatakan tersebut adalah perlu dibuktikan pada peringkat bicara. Walaupun begitu, pada dapatan Mahkamah, komen-komen seturusnya adalah perdebatan antara Plaintif dan Defendan. Perkara ini sepatutnya tidak perlu dipanjang-panjangkan dan berakhir dengan saman menyaman. [10] Walaupun pihak-pihak mempunyai kebebasan untuk memfailkan apa-apa tuntutan di Mahkamah termasuk tuntutan berdasarkan fitnah, Mahkamah tidak boleh dijadikan tempat dan medan pertelingkahan secara sewenang-wenangnya. Tindakan dan kausa tindakan perlulah jelas dan menepati sesuatu undang-undang yang digunapakai. Jika tidak, ia adalah satu proses penyalahgunaan S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 prosiding Mahkamah dan merugikan masa. Inilah intipati peruntukan dibawah Aturan 18 kaedah 19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012. [11] Oleh itu, Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan samada kes ini layak untuk dilupuskan melalui peruntukan di bawah aturan berkenaan. Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes THIAGARAJAN S RENGASAMY v. SRI GANES PALANIAPAN [2023] CLJU 2468 yang mana diputuskan: Law on defamation [15] Halsbury's Law of England (4th ed) gives the definition as to what amounts to a defamatory statement as follows: "A defamatory statement is a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to convey an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to his office, profession, calling, trade or business." [16] In Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152; 1 CLJ (Rep) 321; [1989] MLJ 315) (HC) His Lordship, Mohamed Dzaiddin J (later CJ) set out succinctly the elements of the tort of defamation as follows: S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 "In our law on libel, which is governed by the Defamation Act 1957, the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show (1) the words are defamatory; (2) the words refer to the plaintiff; and (3) the words were published." [12] Dalam kes SATHISH KUMAR AYYASWAMY & ANOR v. PEERAN SYED MOHAMED SYED MAHABOOB [2023] CLJU 1734 pula, YAH memutuskan: Background [6] During the said Unscheduled Meeting also, the 1st Plaintiff reiterated that he is not the authorised person nor does he have the mandate to discuss the payments on behalf of PCSB as well as to decide on the necessary procedures to be undertaken by PCSB. Hence, the 1st Plaintiff advised the Defendant to discuss the matters directly with the 2nd Plaintiff who is the Managing Director of PCSB. The 1st Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant, upon being informed of the above, acted in a threatening and aggressive manner which led to a heated argument. The 1st Plaintiff further alleged the Defendant then verbally assaulted and defamed the 1st Plaintiff and while disparaging the 2nd Plaintiff by using profanity words such as "bastard, big shot, periya pudinggi, fuck, fucker, your boss is a S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 bastard" ("Impugned Words") continuously and on multiple occasion during the said Unscheduled Meeting. [7] The 1st Plaintiff also stated that after he left the Unscheduled Meeting, the Defendant had followed him and continued uttering the Impugned Words to the 1st Plaintiff in the presence of PCSB's employees at a smoking shelter 10 meters away. [8] On 24.2.2022, the Plaintiffs filed an action against the Defendant for the tort of defamation alleging that the Impugned Words are defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning and by innuendo as the words attack upon the moral character, credibility and integrity of the Plaintiffs attributing to dishonesty, untruthfulness and unethical. [9] On 18.5.2022, the Defendant filed an application in Enclosure 9 to strike out the Plaintiffs' claim on the following grounds, inter alia: (a) the Plaintiffs failed to show any actionable claim based on the Impugned Words; (b) there are no particulars of publications to third party; and (c) the alleged third parties are not explicitly identified by the Plaintiffs. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [14] The issue before the court now is whether or not the Plaintiffs' claim against the Defendant is plainly and obviously unsustainable. Whether the Impugned Words are defamatory [15] It is trite that in any defamation suit, the plaintiff has the duty to prove that the alleged words are defamatory, refer to the plaintiff and are published (see Ayob Saud v. TS Sambanthamurthi [1989] 1 CLJ 152; [1989] 1 MLJ 315 and Khalid Abdul Samad v. Dato' Dr Hasan Haji Mohamed Ali [2016] 1 LNS 193). [16] In Chok Foo Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461 Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) explained what the court should do when dealing with a defamation suit as follows: "It cannot, I think, be doubted that the first task of a court, in action for defamation, is to determine whether the words complained of are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning. And it is beyond argument that this is in essence a question of law that turns upon the construction of the words published. Having decided whether the words complained of are capable of being a defamatory meaning, the next step in the enquiry is for a court to ascertain whether the words complained of are in fact defamatory. This is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of a particular case." S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [17] The Lordship further held that the alleged words must be assessed by their ordinary and natural meaning by saying - And it is beyond argument that this is in essence a question of law that turns upon the construction of the words published. As Lord Morris put it in Jones v. Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952 at p. 958: The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words (see Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 151). The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader, guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction, would draw from the words. The test of reasonableness guides and directs the court in its function of deciding whether it is open to a jury in any particular case to hold that reasonable persons would understand the words complained of in a defamatory sense. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural and ordinary meaning impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites an affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory. (See,JB Jeyaratnam v. Goh Chok Tong [1989] 1 LNS 34 [1985] 3 MLJ 334.) Richard Malanjum J, in an admirable judgment in Tun Datuk Patinggi Hj Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 LNS 304; [1996] 1 MLJ 393 collected and reviewed the relevant authorities upon this branch of the subject and I would, with respect, expressly approve the approach adopted by him. [18] The same principles were echoed in Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail & Anor v. Nurul Izzah Anwar & Anor [2021] 4 CLJ 327, where Harmindar Singh FCJ when delivering the judgment of the Federal Court had said that - [22] To ascertain the meaning of the statement or publication, the plaintiff can rely on the natural and ordinary meaning or the innuendo meaning. The consideration of the meaning of the offending words involves an objective test (see Jones v. Skelton, supra). The offending words must be considered in the context of the whole S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 article and not simply on isolated passages (seeLee Kuan Yew v. Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1990] 1 CLJ 583; [1990] 1 MLJ 390; Curistan v. Times Newspaper Ltd[2009] 2 WLR 149; Mirror Newspapers v. World Hosts Pty Ltd [1979] 141 CLR 632; Keluarga Communication Sdn Bhd v. Normala Samsudin & Another Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 46; [2006] 2 MLJ 700). In this context, Duncan & Neill on Defamation, 4th edn, described this principle at paras 5.25 to 5.28: In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements of which the claimant complains it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication... It follows from the principles set out above that a claimant cannot select an isolated passage in an article and complain of that alone if other parts of the article throw a different light on that passage. [19] Further, Mohd Azmi J (as the Lordship then was) underlined the following test when deciding whether the alleged words are defamatory or otherwise in Syed Husin Ali v. Syarikat Perchetakan Utusan Melayu Bhd & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146; [1973] 2 MLJ 56: S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Thus, the test of defamatory nature of a statement is its tendency to excite against the Plaintiff the adverse opinion of others, although no one believes the statement to be true. Another test is: would the words tend to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society generally? The typical type of defamation is an attack upon the moral character of the Plaintiff attributing crime, dishonesty, untruthfulness, ingratitude or cruelty. [20] In Dato' Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh Ismail (supra), the Federal Court explained the defamatory statements as follows - [19] The law in respect of what amounts to defamatory matter is well- settled. An imputation would be defamatory if its effect is to expose the plaintiff, in the eyes of the community, to hatred, ridicule or contempt or to lower him or her in their estimation or to cause him or her to be shunned and avoided by them (see Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim v. The New Straits Times Press (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2010] 5 CLJ 301; [2010] 3 AMR 514; Syed Husin Ali v. Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 1 LNS 146; [1973] 2 MLJ 56; JB Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Thong [1984] 1 LNS 139; [1985] 1 MLJ 334; Tun Datuk Patinggi Hj Abdul-Rahman Ya'kub v. Bre Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 LNS 304; [1996] 1 MLJ 393; Chok Foo S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Choo v. The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461; [1999] 1 MLJ 371). In order to prove a claim in defamation, it is also essential that the offending words are not only defamatory and that they are published but also that they identify the plaintiff as the person defamed. [20] The defamatory nature of the imputation is to be judged by the ordinary and reasonable members of the community or an appreciable and reputable section of the community (see Jones v. Skelton [1963] 3 All ER 952; Peak v. Tribune Co [1909] 214 US 185; Hepburn v. TCN Channel Nine Pty [1983] 2 NSWLR 682). The ordinary reasonable person has been held to be one of fair average intelligence (see Slayter v. Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] 6 CLR 1, who is not avid for scandal (see Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234) but who may engage in some degree of loose thinking (see Morgan v. Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 1156) and reading between the lines (see Farquhar v. Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 374), but who, at the same time, should not be unduly suspicious (see Keogh v. Incorporated Dental Hospital of Ireland [1910] 2 lr R. 577). [21] In our present case, after carefully scrutinizing the Impugned Words in their natural and ordinary meaning and I S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 find that the words "bastard, big shot, periya pudinggi, fuck, fucker and your boss is a bastard" allegedly uttered by the Defendant are clearly not defamatory albeit undeniably abusive. There is nothing in the Impugned Words that could be calculated to defame the Plaintiffs nor expose the Plaintiffs to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man. It is no doubt that the Impugned Words are amongst the nasty words more often than not uttered by a person in the midst of anger but not all nasty words are defamatory. As long as the nasty words do not defame or impute the moral character, credibility and integrity of the person whom the words are uttered to, they are not defamatory. [13] Mahkamah merujuk juga kepada KES HISHAM BIN TAN SRI HALIM V. TEH FARIDAH BT AHMAD NORIZAN & ANOR [2021] 6 CLJ 56; [2021] 10 MLJ 683, yang mana diputuskan: “…where it was explained that a statement is defamatory if it: (a) tends to lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, (b) causes the Plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; (c) exposes the Plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or (d) imputes to the plaintiff any dishonorable or discreditable conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [14] Adakah terlalu awal untuk Mahkamah tentukan samada kenyataan yang dirujuk oleh Plaintif adalah bukan satu kenyataan fitnah? Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa dalam kes ini ia adalah satu kes yang jelas dan terang (plain and obvious cases). [15] Mahkamah menggunapakai ujian (test) yang dinyatakan dalam kes yang telah dirujuk di atas. Dalam ertikata yang lazim, Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa kenyataan-kenyataan yang diterbitkan hanya bersifat ulasan saksama (fair comment) dan tanpa niat jahat (malice). [16] Keenam-enam hantaran (posting dan jawapan kepada posting tersebut) secara umumnya tidak menjurus kepada apa-apa maksud dan ia adalah dalam keadaan makna biasa (ordinary meaning), pertelingkahan mulut atau perdebatan antara 2 pihak. Perenggan 21 Penyataan Tuntutan Plaintif adalah terjemahan/tafsiran Plaintif. [17] Kedua-dua pihak saling jawab menjawab. Ia adalah satu ulasan saksama dan melibatkan satu pihak menjawab kepada kenyataan satu pihak yang lain. Bagi Mahkamah, ini adalah “fair comment” antara kedua-dua mereka tanpa memberi apa-apa kesan atau maksud tidak elok pada pihak lain. [18] Tambahan pula, jika dirujuk affidavit Plaintif sendiri, Plaintif mengaku bukan sahaja berselisih faham dengan Defendan bahkan dengan S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Daniel Lim Hin Soon iaitu pihak yang mengeluarkan surat dieksibit “AWSH-1”. Plaintif telah mengikrarkan affidavit menyatakan Daniel Lim Hin Soon ini juga telah berniat jahat terhadap beliau. [19] Dalam masa yang sama, Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa isu bagi menentusahkan jika kereta tersebut “Illegally parked” atau tidak hendaklah ditentukan oleh Mahkamah setelah menerima keterangan saksi-saksi. [20] Adalah tidak adil untuk meletakkan Mahkamah untuk menyelesaikan pertelingkahan dan pertikaian antara Plaintif dan Defendan disini sedangkan ini adalah hal dalaman ldan bukanlah satu tuntutan atau isu yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah di sini. [21] Mahkamah merujuk juga kes MESSRS ONG, RIC & PARTNERS & ORS v. MESSRS THOMAS, SHANKAR RAM & CO. ADVOCATES & ORS [2022] CLJU 2541 yang memutuskan: “[36] Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th Edition) provides that: "[2.4] Threshold of Seriousness In addition to the requirement that the imputation conveyed must have an effect identified in one of [the] definitions discussed above, the imputation must meet the necessary level of seriousness. As Tugendhat J explained in Thornton v. Telegraph Media Group: "Whatever definition of S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 'defamatory' is adopted, it must include a qualification or threshold of seriousness, so as to exclude trivial claims." [39] Based on the above reason, I find that the words complained of by the Plaintiffs are not prima facie defamatory. Therefore, it failed the test as propounded in Chok Foo Choo (supra). Since the crux of the Plaintiffs' claim for defamation revolved around the 1st Defendant's letter and no other, and the Defendants have successfully demonstrated to the Court that the words complained of by the Plaintiffs in the 1st Defendant's letter are not prima facie defamatory, I find that the Plaintiffs has failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants. By this reason alone, it is sufficient for me to allow the Application as per O. 18, r. 19(1)(c)(a) and (b). [22] Akhirnya, Mahkamah mengambilberat tentang peranan dan tugasan Mahkamah yang perlu dilaksanakan dengan betul dan sepatutnya. Merujuk kepada kes INDAH DESA SAUJANA CORPORATION SDN BHD & ORS v. JAMES FOONG [2008] 1 CLJ 651, Mahkamah harus berhati-hati dan mengelak daripada menggunakan medium Mahkamah sebagai satu cara penyalahgunaan proses dan prosiding undang-undang seperti dinyatakan berikut: "ABUSE OF THE PROCESS” S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [80] The court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process: Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors v. British- American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606; [1993] 3 MLJ 16 (SC). [81] Illustrations of an abuse of the process of the court include: (a) An intention to embarrass the defendants:Ansa Teknik (M) Sdn Bhd v. Cygal Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 LNS 26; [1989] 2 MLJ 423; or (b) Where the process of the court has not been used in a bona fide manner and has been abused: Hadi bin Hassan v. Suria Records Sdn Bhd [2004] 8 CLJ 225; [2005] 3 MLJ 522. [82] The categories of abuse of process of the court are never closed and will certainly proliferate pursuant to the myriad of circumstances available from the factual matrix found in each particular case. [83] In Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v. Wee Chong Jin [1988] 1 SLR 374, the Singapore Court of Appeal explained the scope of 'an abuse of the process of the court' under O 18 r. 19(1)(d) which is in pari materia with ours. The terms has been given a wide interpretation by the courts and includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. It signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 On the facts before us, the defendants have established an abuse of the process of the court." [23] Akhirnya, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa atas alasan yang dinyatakan, Notis Permohonan Defendan di Lampiran 7 dibenarkan dan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif dibatalkan dengan kos RM4,000.00. Sekian untuk pertimbangan YAH. Disediakan oleh: Sazlina Safie …………………………… Sazlina Bt Safie Hakim Sesyen, Mahkamah Sesyen 3 Sivil, Mahkamah Sesyen Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Tarikh :19/1/2024 PEGUAMCARA PLAINTIF: EN. MANOHARAN MALAYALAM [TETUAN M MANOHARAN & CO.] PEGUAMCARA DEFENDAN: EN. LIEW TZE HANN [TETUAN YAP LIEW & PARTNERS] S/N /l4O4/J3s0Ol3a3U0fJiFg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

33-95-03/2015

PEMPETISYEN ROPERT A/L VANATHIAH RESPONDEN THILAKAVATHY A/P CHURULIMALAI

Civil procedure/ Family law - Application for leave to issue writ of possession - Wife granted right to occupy matrimonial home 'tanpa sebarang gangguan' pursuant to consent order - Whether husband should vacate matrimonial home - Meaning of 'tanpa sebarang gangguan' - Whether practical for husband to remain in matrimonial home when wife was given right to occupy it.

18/01/2024

YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=888584a3-073e-4850-bb48-8dd2a3f92a97&Inline=true

33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA DIVORCE PETITION NO: 33-95-03/2015 In the matter of Sections 53, 54, 76, 77, 88, 89 and 92 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 BETWEEN ROPERT A/L VANATHIAH …PETITIONER AND THILAKAVATHY A/P CHURULIMALAI …RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 18/01/2024 14:22:31 33-95-03/2015 Kand. 30 S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Respondent Wife in enclosure 16, seeking leave to issue a writ of possession in respect of the matrimonial home, and for the Respondent and three out of the four children of the marriage to be allowed to live in the matrimonial home. The factual background [2] The Petitioner Husband and Respondent Wife (collectively, “the Parties”) were married in May 1996, and had four children, born in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 respectively. [3] The marriage deteriorated over time and in March 2015, the Petitioner filed a divorce petition (“the Divorce Petition”), while the Respondent responded in May 2015. [4] In August 2015, Parties entered into a consent order (“the Consent Order”), stipulating, inter alia, that the Respondent along with three children in her custody will live in the matrimonial home (“the Matrimonial Home”), ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’. The relevant terms read in verbatim: iii. Responden Isteri bersama dengan 3 orang anak di dalam kustodi Responden Isteri akan berpindah masuk ke dalam rumah di alamat ***** (“Hartanah tersebut”) dan Pempetisyen Suami akan membayar segala utiliti seperti Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Syabas, Indah Water, Cukai Tanah dan Cukai Taksiran bagi Hartanah tersebut dan Pempetisyen Suami akan terus membayar segala utiliti tersebut dimana Responden Isteri dan 3 orang dalam kustodi isteri S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 dibenarkan untuk tinggal di rumah tersebut tanpa sebarang gangguan; iv. Pempetisyen Suami akan membayar ansuran bulanan kepada pihak Bank bagi Hartanah tersebut dan Hartanah tersebut akan dipegang sebagai amanah dalam bahagian yang sama rata bagi 4 orang anak di dalam perkahwinan sehingga anak ke-empat mencapai umur 24 tahun; … [Emphasis added.] [5] The Petitioner had failed to adhere to the stipulated terms of the Consent Order, prompting the Respondent’s Counsel to issue a written notice in December 2020, urging compliance. The correspondence clearly communicated that failure to comply would necessitate additional legal measures. Despite this, the Petitioner had refused to adhere, subsequently obstructing the Respondent and the three children in her custody from relocating to the Matrimonial Home. [6] In August 2023, the Respondent filed this Application pursuant to Order 46 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”), and rules 56 and 72 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, all of which read: Rules of Court 2012 Order 46 – Writs of execution - General Rule 2 - When leave to issue any writ of execution is necessary (1) A writ of execution to enforce a judgment or order may not be issued without the leave of the Court in the following cases: S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 (a) where six years or more have lapsed since the date of the judgment or order; (b) where any change has taken place, whether by death or otherwise, in the parties entitled or liable to execution under the judgment or order; (c) where the judgment or order is against the assets of a deceased person coming to the hand of his executors or administrators after the date of the judgment or order, and it is sought to issue execution against such assets; (d) where under the judgment or order any person is entitled to relief subject to the fulfilment of any condition which it is alleged has been fulfilled; and (e) where any movable property sought to be seized under a writ of execution is in the hands of a receiver appointed by the Court. (2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to any written law or rule by which a person is required to obtain the leave of the Court for the issue of a writ of execution or to proceed to execution on or otherwise the enforcement of a judgment or order. (3) Where the Court grants leave, whether under this rule or otherwise, for the issue of a writ of execution and the writ is not issued within one year after the date of the order granting such leave, the order shall cease to have effect, without prejudice, however, to the making of a fresh order. ****** Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 Rule 56 – Application by petitioner or respondent for ancillary relief (1) Any application by a petitioner, or by a respondent who files an answer claiming relief, for — (a) an order for maintenance pending suit; S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 (b) a property division order, under section 76 of the Act; or (c) a maintenance order, under section 77 of the Act, shall be made in the petition or answer, as the case may be. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an application for ancillary relief which should have been made in the petition or answer may be made subsequently — (a) by leave of the court, either by notice in Form 11 or at the trial; or (b) where the parties are agreed upon the terms of the proposed order, without leave by notice in Form 11. (3) An application by a petitioner or respondent for ancillary relief, not being an application which is required to be made in the petition or answer shall be made by notice in Form 11. … Rule 72 – Enforcement of order for payment of money, etc (1) Before any process is issued for the enforcement of an order made in matrimonial proceedings for the payment of money to any person, an affidavit shall be filed verifying the amount due under the order and showing how that amount is arrived at. (2) Except with the leave of the registrar, no writ of fierifacias or warrant of execution shall be issued to enforce payment of any sum due under an order for ancillary relief where an application for a variation order is pending. (3) For the purpose of RHC Order 46 (issue of a writ of execution), the divorce registry shall be the appropriate office for the issue of a writ of execution to enforce an order made in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court which are proceedings in that registry. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 The Issues [7] The issues for consideration for this Court were as follows: (i) the inherent characteristics of a consent order; (ii) the validity of the Petitioner’s justification for refusing to vacate the Matrimonial Home; and (iii) the interpretation of ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in clause (iii) of the Consent Order. [8] This Application was allowed for the following reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings The nature of a consent order [9] At the outset, it was crucial to draw attention to the insights shared by Mary Lim JCA (as she then was) in Lee Heng Moy & Ors v. Pacific Trustees Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 368 regarding the nature of a consent order. Her observations, as articulated in the following passage, merit careful consideration: It is fairly settled and trite law that an order of the court reached by consent of the parties involved is in effect a contract between those parties:Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors And Another Appeal [1981] 2 MLJ 145. Such a consent order must therefore be given its full contractual effect - see Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301; [2004] 3 MLJ 465. Such an order remains valid, effective and binding on all the parties involved until and unless the order is set aside for some vitiating reason - see the Federal Court's decision in Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 1 LNS 143; [1971] 2 MLJ 75. In fact, until that happens, until and unless the consent order is set aside, the consent order operates as an estoppel disallowing the defendants today from departing from its terms. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [Emphasis added.] [10] A consent order is akin to a contract with the superadded command of the court: Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301; [2004] 3 MLJ 465. Reference was also made to a plethora of cases including Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors And Another Appeal [1981] 1 LNS 59; [1981] 2 MLJ 145; Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 1 LNS 143; [1971] 2 MLJ 75; and Kamil Azman Abdul Razak & Ors v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2019] 6 CLJ 419. Whether the Petitioner’s reasons for refusing to vacate the Matrimonial Home were relevant/ justified [11] The Petitioner put forth a multitude of arguments to justify his continued occupancy of the Matrimonial Home, deviating from the explicit directives outlined in the Consent Order. [12] Initially, he asserted that this Application was time-barred. This contention was followed by the claim that it was the Respondent who had voluntarily vacated the Matrimonial Home, without any coercion from him. Furthermore, he delved into the complexities of his personal circumstances, revealing his involvement in a new marital relationship and the challenges of caring for a child with autism. Alongside these personal challenges, the Petitioner highlighted his low-income status, arguing that financial constraints S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 prevented him from vacating the Matrimonial Home and securing alternative housing. [13] I found the entirety of the Petitioner’s argument untenable. The focal point for this Court centers on whether the Respondent should be granted the right to occupy the Matrimonial Home, in accordance with the terms of the Consent Order. [14] The assertion of a time limitation on the Respondent’s filing was bereft of merit, as this Application for leave falls outside any specified timeframe. Order 46 of the Rules of Court explicitly allows such applications, emphasising that a writ of execution to enforce a judgment or order may not be issued without the leave of the Court where six years or more had lapsed since the date of the judgment or order. Additionally, it was essential to highlight that the Respondent had, through her solicitors, communicated with the Petitioner regarding his non-compliance with the Consent Order. Despite these efforts, the Petitioner had failed to provide a positive response. Consequently, the Petitioner's argument regarding delay was unsustainable given the circumstances. [15] The justifications and excuses presented by the Petitioner in opposing the Respondent’s vacation of the Matrimonial Home were inconsequential and bore no relevance to the crux of this Application, and amounted to an endeavour to re-litigate the terms stipulated in the Consent Order. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [16] This Court could not entertain the Petitioner’s reasons and excuses for resisting the evacuation of the Matrimonial Home, particularly given that the pertinent Consent Order had resulted from a mutual agreement between the Parties. Interpretation of ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in clause iii of the Consent Order [17] The nucleus of the Petitioner’s argument revolved around the elucidation of clause iii of the Consent Order, in particular the term ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’. [18] The Petitioner contended that, although the Respondent and the three Children in her custody were granted the right to occupy the Matrimonial Home “tanpa sebarang gangguan”, pursuant to the Consent Order, there was no explicit order for the Petitioner to vacate the residence. [19] In fact, the Petitioner proposed for the Respondent and the three Children in her custody to relocate to the Matrimonial Home, specifically occupying one of the rooms. However, in this arrangement, the Petitioner insisted that both Parties mutually pledge not to ‘disturb’ each other. [20] I found the Petitioner’s argument to be lacking in merit. Firstly, the term ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ carries a broader significance than merely ‘without any disturbance’. [21] The Respondent cited pertinent landlord-tenant cases such as Lee Phak Kong v Bestway Fortune Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Cases [2023] MLRHU 463 and Kenny v Preen [1962] 3 ALL ER 814, which S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 delved into the notion of ‘quiet enjoyment’. Asserting her entitlement to quiet enjoyment of the Matrimonial Home, the Respondent implied that Petitioner was obliged to permanently vacate the Matrimonial home. [22] While I agreed and recognised the Respondent’s right to quiet enjoyment of the Matrimonial Home, I maintained the view that she deserved additional entitlements, considering the broader implications of the term tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in the Consent Order. [23] The expression ‘quiet enjoyment’ in Bahasa Malaysia is translated as ‘kenikmatan aman sentosa’ while ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ carries a broader connotation. Notably, the term gangguan’ is employed within the context of section 103 (Injunctions against molestation) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce Act 1976, as articulated in Bahasa Malaysia as follows: Seksyen 103 – Tegahan terhadap pengganguan Mahkamah adalah berkuasa dalam masa menanti keputusan sesuatu pembicaraan hal ehwal berkahwin atau pada atau selepas pemberian sesuatu dikri perceraian, perpisahan kehakiman atau pembatalan, memerintahkan seseorang supaya jangan memaksa suami isteri atau suami isterinya yang dahulu menerima kehadirannya dan supaya jangan melakukan lain-lain perbuatan gangguan. [Emphasis added.] [24] Given the term ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in the Consent Order carries a broader scope than the concept of ‘quiet enjoyment’, I S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 deemed it essential to reference legal precedents such as Chan Ah Moi @ Chan Kim Moy v Phang Wai Ann [1995] 3 CLJ 846, Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 3 All ER 449, and Lee Sook Kwan v Yap Woon [2010] 11 MLRH 167. [25] In the case of Chan Ah Moi @ Chan Kim Moy v Phang Wai Ann, where ‘gangguan’ or ‘molestation’ lacked a specific definition in the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, the presiding judge, in the absence of statutory guidance, turned to The Britannica World Language Edition of The Oxford Dictionary and referenced the English Court of Appeal case of Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 3 All ER 449 for elucidation. [26] According to the Britannica World Language Edition of The Oxford Dictionary, "molestation" is defined as “the action of molesting or condition of being molested; annoyance, disturbance, vexation”. In Vaughan v Vaughan, Davies LJ characterised ‘molestation’ as engaging hostilely or injuriously and causing trouble, vexation, annoyance, or inconvenience. [27] It became evident that when the Consent Order was granted, allowing the Respondent and the three Children in her custody to occupy the Matrimonial Home, it inherently implied the obligation for the Petitioner to vacate. Proposing that the Petitioner, his new family, or any of his family members should continue to reside in the Matrimonial Home, not only defied common sense but also contravened the very essence of the Consent Order. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 [28] Drawing guidance from the Federal Court case of Kesatuan Pekerja- Pekerja Bukan Eksekutif Maybank Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Anor [2018] 2 MLJ 590, despite its focus on a common-sense approach to interpreting statutes, the underlying principle can be extrapolated to the interpretation of consent orders. [29] Moreover, it was both demeaning and insulting for the Petitioner to suggest that the Respondent and the three Children in her custody should confine themselves to one room in the Matrimonial Home with the caveat that they refrain from interfering with or disturbing Petitioner and his family. Such a proposition undermines the fundamental purpose of the Consent Order and runs counter to the principles of fairness and equity. Conclusion [30] In conclusion, considering the aforementioned reasons and a meticulous examination of all evidence presented, including both oral and documentary, as well as the submissions of the Parties, this Application was allowed with costs. Dated: 18 January 2024 SIGNED S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner – Lalitha Nagamuthu; Messrs Lalitha & Co For the Respondent – Pramjit Kaur; Messrs Mann & Associates Cases referred to: ➢ Chan Ah Moi @ Chan Kim Moy v Phang Wai Ann [1995] 3 CLJ 846 ➢ Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors And Another Appeal [1981] 1 LNS 59; [1981] 2 MLJ 145 ➢ Johnson v. Walton [1990] FCR 568, 1 FLR 350 ➢ Kamil Azman Abdul Razak & Ors v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2019] 6 CLJ 419. ➢ Kenny v Preen [1962] 3 ALL ER 814 ➢ Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Bukan Eksekutif Maybank Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Anor [2018] 2 MLJ 590 ➢ Lee Heng Moy & Ors v. Pacific Trustees Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 368 ➢ Lee Phak Kong v Bestway Fortune Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Cases [2023] MLRHU 463 ➢ Lee Sook Kwan v Yap Woon [2010] 11 MLRH 167 ➢ Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301; [2004] 3 MLJ 465 ➢ Tee Bee Chin (P) v Goh Swee Por (L) [2018] 8 MLJ 590 S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 ➢ Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 1 LNS 143; [1971] 2 MLJ 75 ➢ Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 3 All ER 449 Legislation referred to: ➢ Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 – rules 56, 72 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 48, 96, 103 ➢ Rules of Court 2012 – Order 46 Other sources referred to: ➢ Britannica World Language Edition of The Oxford Dictionary S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

PA-22NCvC-11-01/2023

PLAINTIF 1. ) ARTISAN CUISINE SDN BHD 2. ) LIM LEE SHENG 3. ) LEONG KAR CHUN DEFENDAN 1. ) XI LIN GE SDN. BHD. 2. ) CH'NG POH CHYE 3. ) PHUAH SOON KEE 4. ) CH'NG CHIN KEAT 5. ) CH'NG JING WEN 6. ) CH'NG CHIN WEI

Striking out – Whether res judicata – An earlier suit filed – Similar claims, reliefs, issues, facts as the instant suit– Different parties – Whether judicial estoppel – Plaintiffs taking a different position from the earlier suit.

18/01/2024

YA Dato' Quay Chew Soon

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18/01/2024 10:30:22 PA-22NCvC-11-01/2023 Kand. 62 S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N mKJjeJDKdU2M9Ju8KaImTw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1>A—22m:vc—11—n1/2023 Kand. 62 13/alrznzu mv2l>:22 ln the Hlgn Courl cl Malaya lfl Penang In me Sla|e or Penang, Malaysla Clvll Sun No. PA-22NCvC-11-01/2023 Between Arllssrl cuisine sun Bhd Llm Lee sneng Leong Kar Chun . Flalnlifls uN_— And xu Ge Sdn Bhd Ch‘rlg Poh Chye Pnuan soon Kee cnng Chln Ksal cnng Jung wen cnng Chin We! Delendams manna»- Grounds ol Declslorl lnlrooucnon 1. The Delendams med a Home cl applicallcn daled 24 7 2023 was Enclosure M to strike am the Plninlms' clalm Enclosure 41 ls made under Order 13 rule 19(I)(b)or1d)oHhe Rules cl Ccurl 2012. 2. on an 10 2023 I alloweo Enclosure 4! arm slruok out me Plalnmls‘ actlun agalns| lne Detenoanls. Here are lne grmmds or my declslon. Th llonsm belween me a 3. The dlreclors and snarenoloers oHl1e 1- Flalnllfl (‘F company) are (T) me 2"“ l=lalnlll1(“Pz“), (II) me 3"’ Plalnllfl1“P:“) and (ml me 4"‘ nelendanl (‘rm 4. The 5*" De1endanl(“D5’)ls the sole direclur and shareholder more 1“ Delendanl (“D compnny). 5 The relahorlshlp ol me Delenaanls are as lollows- rn mKllalDKnl.l2MwuaK2lmYw “Nair s.n.r nurlhnrwlll .. med m my r... mn.u-y mm. dnuurlml Vfl nrlurm Wm! m Ihe 2m Defendant(“F|Ilw(}ws1he1n|her el(HDJ,1ujD5 and on me an Delendam1‘|)6‘j, my lhu aw DalsvIdin|(‘IlmhI 715 me momamm; m, (up as and mm as; (cl 0:. as and us are smug; 5. The Father. lhe Mulherand D6 are nomurenors or shalehulders or P company ar D company 7 In me Instant sml, |he Fla Us auega Ihal ma Dadendanls mu eslabhshsd D oampany IO undenake the huslile |aKe - over 07 the restaurant business of P company. The Earlier § a Dr: 93.2021, P wmpany had mmaled a civil suit against (V) D mmpany, (u) D4 and (. us vide Penang Hugh coun own Sui\ Nu PA— 22NcvCAe-us/2021 Enrliorsu -) 9 The EarIiarSuIl was ansucsed olvia an omermcounaaxed 2.3.2023 made by me Penang Hugh Courl. 10. The Earlier sun had suugm tor the vouowmg rebieis “m Dskhnsl Dahawa aehmang Perlanllen Juaman »=.m.ag.an4auamsa Sme Agusmem) nnlma P\a\nWl dengan x‘ Lm Ge Sdn am (Delenflan Kedua) p a n mmpany w my msllnl sun] Ida Van (flak am am xemauax mun and may an uamayau bahawa kesemua pendapalan (mu-nay olsh x. Lm Ge san am (Dalmdan Kadui) pnda masa yang ma|ana¥ ad: Tan .1. pggang seczva pemegarvq amanah (mm urnnm andlorconslmclwetmsnaleh newsman -Deflendan kepana Plawmt um Delendam navamm m manaaxx -mmx menuruukkan .1... manyevahknn akaun bu.-mu x. Lm Ge Sdll am kapada mamm dun /mu oevuamcara Flamhl dahm mass :4 Han danpadaiankh psnmah MY. my Deflendzn Penama m kahundakl meugamhfl keismua lmdakzn yang berwajaran umuk mungnkwkan akaun bank mama dahm ocac Bank (Malaysm) am qocac Amnunl No. 7301255145) d-hm masa 7 nan danplda um pennlah ml an nenuan. M Delenden — nacanaan handak Iah mermngauml (Indemnny) mam .1... Lemhaga Pengauh - Pengiuh Plalmfl kesemua xawan an 1 an... SIN mK4aIDK4u2MwuaK:ImTw 2 «mm. s.n.T...u..mm.,.T.....amy...mmmw.am.n._.n_.m W dscvsmn pr me ezmer anion pr promsdmg. In us wmr sum, :1 uncorvwassus muss, and mm ohcllnn that oouldlltsfly arm ralriy huvi boon lqrally ifl[udIcltod in r». urlhr sun er pracapdmg rnrs wider aperalton or me rlacfnrva rs wmalrmlx ulorvad to eonsuucrn». res /udnrsla‘ 1: house: rns Mm canmpts olrssue eslovoe/and cause ofaclmn snapper Lrke ms #99 orwh/cl! may term the orenswas, they are assigned to ensure Ina! mere rs mramy In rmguron - 39. \n cnee Pok cnoy (supra), rne coun 0! Appeal explained mar me doctrine M res pmlcala encompass several calegones or cases. In me narraw sense‘ .1 prevents the reassempn 0! a mailer which had peen delermmsd in a nnan rudgrnenr In lhe wider sense‘ rr peesnres an abuse of spun process to rarse In a supsequenr proceeding. mailers whvch spum nave been Illlgaled in me earner pwceedmg 4a. wnemer m a narrow sense or broad sense, I and was me pnncwwe or res ruaresra mes m the present case Tne marnrrws are parrea lmm inshlulmg the mslanlsun based an the same caused acucn, same Issues and same reliefs suughl VI amnun|s In a du ' ty D1 pmceedmgs and Is an abuse 0! process 0! me spun srnrrlar cause oi acrron rssues and facts 4!. The Plarnrrus argue that res yuduzala rs nal applicable because the presem case mvohtes rmerem facts and panres ms argunrenr appears at paragraphs 5 and 5 cl merr amdavil anrrnrea by P2 an 21 112112: lEneIusure 4:!) much reads- '15} Hakwkal Mir ra ada ran an snbabkan sepanagran dokuman ying dl luruukkan can;-spa Dapynuhonan penzamrsn dokumen gunman swul PA— 22N::\/(>43-03/2021 yang rnernw-skruran srausa rrnamn barn nlhnk P\aInml— marnrrr dnlam ks: Im dl mna m rnernpsngnrsrm lerdapal lehlh panm mdwldu y.ung|er1|bn|flan habellemlasuk oz. as man D6 dmzm kes was re» Amara nya zda Iah Delendan V Delenaan Ke— 2, xs. 3 can »<.. s dalam guaman sun ml an mane uersnaan Kc - 2 dan xa . 3 rnenrpskan nr..rsnn.n.r saranr samua peransa-pan iuwem Gan hushlu mm our Izmndav lynnkal marrrrn Pemm: rm dangan manggunaksn syankm bnmm mm: syankal m yang murvggunllun rmma D; a... rm (annk -armk 02 a my senses. ‘lmnunen" 42 I arsagree. Tne applrearron 01 me broader sense of res rudicata precludes rssuas and [ads which some nave peen r-arses but were not ' ed m we Earher sun, |o he raised In me rnsram suit. The nreners eoncernrng the Invclvemem or me Famer and the Mother should nave been rarsee m me Earner sun based on me ioHL7wmg: em nrxlreluxnuzmwuaxalnrtw “ “Nair s.n.r mmhnrwm s. med s may r... pflmruuly mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum war (3) me Pnsmms aummsn ms: lhey have lhe klwwisdga mu he Fnrher and me Mother In shadow dheclms a| an maternal hma 1x|ben|den\en by ms ustsnarmsy my me P\n\n|Ms rely on ma Wlchal mnvenmiun lumbxl LLS-I‘ Enclmute 43) Lo supporl their pullluzn om me Fnlher and ma wmsr ave shadow dhuclors Howevv, me ma WeCha1 mrwersauorr wan dnled 24 n 2019. V 5 mm ms commencement :2! Ina Eamsrsun. [C] We Purmws Nflmav my an m. palne Iepon leaned Dy P2 (axmbn LLS~3 Enclosure 43; to mutual‘ their pmmnn xhal me Deiendnnls um srsmasa F2 and P3Vmm an. -drmmsnulinn MP company mwmr, Ihe sum Dohce rspen was lodged an 2911 mm, La more ms mmmem:eme1\|uHh5 Eamar sun, 4.4; The Plamms a\su myun the bank amounl srammsm ul :2 uompav1y(!xhIh\| LL92, Endosuvu :3; Yhe Pmnmnls allege mm Me an Lam aoomml slatamsm wan ablmnea lhmugh me dlsouvevy arousal VII Ihe Earhav sum Hawever. rr rs nnlzd that me bank awuunl uaxsmsnr was ohlzmed balm: ms murrsxan nlme Eamer sum. (e) As flemonslrated abovo, an we documentary amsnu wmsm ms Pmnms My on m the Inalam mm was omamed and wnmn rm xmwxeage at me marmm‘ ewlhur belare me mmmencemsnl av ms Eamer sun or wars the wnsmsmrr mus Eamsr sum A3 The F\amMs mnnerargue |haI res judicala rs nor apnlicable because |he Order or own daled 2 3202: granted by me Penang High Cam In lhe Earher Suil was due Lo the defendants m me Earner Sui\ lie. u company‘ DA arm D5) nnl oorrrplymg mm me disouvery order And that the mems u1|he case were not adwdxcated In me Earner sun. 44 Hmvever. based on me swaerree. 1 acsem me lnllawingz (at u Vs rr-urspurams our me Eamer Sun has um wncmdsd Yhe omer .21 Conn am: 2 3 2023 is Ihe rm mgmsm Much msmea av me Hams 0! me name: rn Ihe Em1>erSuI|r (I1) me Order M Cowl dated 2 3 2:22: was granted aner mung mm smes m ms Eamur Sum n I: aaressly slaled m we orasroe Cour! asrea 2 a 2923 mm’ ‘Dan Jvlalah membaca hmahan - mqihan yang .1. (aflkan am 55101:?! mandlngarhufahan—Hu1zHanp9gusm-pugusmtsoubuli 1:) Ihe Order M cowl dabad 2 3 ma ms gramea aflev we own ma mam com sues and wnsmrsa me mems aims can, my save luraneumem Mdamagsi, au Inn mhsis swam Var \n ma Eamr Sun were gmnled by me Parting High Conn we order M court can 2 3 ma srarss — 'R-ur — mm yang at when men P/amlrl mam Pcrwggan 2: sm mKqrsIDKnu2MwuaK:ImYw *2 “Nana Snr1|\nunhnrwH\I>e L... It: may r... mm-r -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-max F-emyataan nmman oerlznkh 9 Mac 2:221 ad; an at bonart.-n mm msmmm kacualr garm Jug: flalam ramun M) pm 4. nkseskan men usmman -. and 1:) F mmnany ma nnnhed rm fl>ver.1mns mm respect la assessmem ov damages Dmarem games . I acknawledge that me pames m the muanc sun are duuerent (mm the (a) m we Eamavsmh ma Damn wave » m > company Ia: ma mamum and on u uumvani‘ D4 and as (a. nu dflendinlxfl us) .7. on mum sum. mere ‘s we addmnn at 4.: F2 and P3 (as me msmms) and nu the Father me Melnerami on (as lhe asvsnuanxsx and 10) an \s man man P2 and P3 are dlredovs or P company 46 That the Darlies are 7I0| quite the same huweven does nut precmde me apphcalion cl res mum. on lhis puim. I new on me Cnurl ac Appea\ case 07 Dalo’ S/vanalhan 6/V Shanmugam V Artisan Fokus Sdn EHd[2D15] 3 MLJ I22 wmch hem (ha! I Is not necessary '07 pames to be the same VI both actwons. 41 The Courl of Appeal said [at page 137;- 'I?5l In ms Pwunl SFPCSL svncu IN Waunlaciron would undoubted/y mvolve 90mg aver wuuery we same (ads as m m. prewou: HTF aml, and sampling m. bvundlrappmlnh and rm with! ms. omsmum. .s Me preierrid Ind mmmgu pashlan, me ha (ha! me pames to this sun In ammnz mun tn: HTF sun does not dlsemltle Me IPDIUIHI In mvnh MI doctrinc onssu sloppvl to bar the rsroondanl lmm Iulvlrganng a 5-ppafir: me that had basn Headed m Ina Pflol SBIJBIEIH nchon Tilt da:1rma a/so waits: to a new Dam’ fl rs lllsmlom not HOCISJIVY lo! Fwflu in D1 lhl sum: In barn acflans Wnsr m. docmns sluks to pawn! .s ... aims: of the process oi ms mm by sltemptvng m make 5 mm. Nam as we)! as almwrng the plamlm :9 rs/mgalo its cause m the xame relrei and based on the same subject mailer for wmm judgment had successfully been obta/Had m the H15 surf and :9 prom. ms same set of ram, the same w/masses and III: sama documents‘ 48. The Fkunlxffs admxlled thal at 5!! material \ime, they have knowledge av the Invch/emenl nllhe Falher, the Molherand as in the mailer (amen demed by me Defendants). Nevertheless. me Pkamms chose to weave lhe Father‘ ms Mother and D6 out no the Earher sun I consider that the P\aAnWs are esmpped «mm now clraggmg me Father, the Molher and us sm mxlwumuzmwuaxzlmtw ‘3 «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum Wm! into me lnslanl sull Te eeek ler srrnrlar rellels wnicn P eenrpany nae successlully ublalrled in me Earner sun. 49. ll Is my poncluslpn lnal lne Plarnlme have larled la brlrlg lprward lnerr whale eaee. Ineleed lney Dmughl pan pl 0181? case ln lne Earller sun And naw allernpl lo anng lne rest of men case ln the lnslanl sun, when lhe same should have been deall wn me Earlier suil The Plalnulls cannul sue by mslalrnenle. I find lnal lne Plalnulls are precluded lrern rellllgallng in me lnslanlsml, oernplarnls which should have been bmugmlorward In me EavherSui\ slnrilar relrels 5D The prayer ler loss pl prom was pleaded In lnlh lne Eamer Suil and in the lnelanl sun The Plalrllllfs allege lnal lne clarrn lor loss ol prom m the Earller sun was conlrned la me loss at profit in the months pl January and Febmary 2020 wnlle xne clalm lor loss or pmfll in me rnelenl eulr ls afier me nuslile lake — aver pl P company by me Delendanls 51 ms appears at paregrapn la owls Plam|ll1s‘aIfldavllalllrrrled by r=2 an 21.3 2023 lsnclesure 43; 'Bet1<anaan lass :71 pram. runluren Plalnlll Panama dalarn puarnan mu FA- zzucvc-osmrzazl hanya berdasaman keunlunqarl uua bulan Uilmnli den naruan znzol pede xellxe enml alm blirm mernnr Pnllzmn snhajl manakala rumuren guenren swll lru ada ran bevdasalkan Ian M prerlr rernpon panlarrq selepes neenle and luvcelul |ak5ovurInws(7u| “ 52. The allegalran Ihal me elelnl ler lpes pl prom ln me Earner sun war. only llrnrled Io lne nronlns pl January and Fsbmary zuzo Is rnlsleadlng laeeauee In me affidavlt In supppn (Enclosure 51 Penlexerran Garrll Rugi Am’) alfirmsd by F2 ln lne Earlrer suil lar direcllons wnn respect to assesemenl nldamsgesl F cornpany ls cla ing luss er prerrller 10 years In the sum er RM2|.6 rnrlllon ln lhe Earlier sun 53 Thls appears n are lellernng paragraphs 0! the aleresara affitiavll rn supnon: lay Pangraprl :3 pure see aflldnvll {ll suwml ‘Seklmnya neleneen I uerendan lrdak msnysbabkarl hosllle Iakeoven semesllr-lye pemlagaan reueran mislh deper fll lnlarlkan dalam keadaan pemlegaarl yang oegnu unggul dun mean dnpal nrelu ke ranap yang lehm tmgql sekuvang -kurlng Imluk rnese lo renun- srn nrxlleluwduzmwuawelnrtw " “Nana s.n.r nurlharwlll re HIGH m may he nflnlnallly mm: dnuurlarrl VII .nuua war tn) Parzuranh an ullhe sam amaavn WI suppon wsrnpon ‘W lamm ada Van 12n bulan nnnnsh nys dl man: kzunmngnn bemh yang .n. ma w1en.noa an sebulzm bmehdx mm umuk Denwrann kehllingzm keumungnn . Rmwnao on X120 = RM21,5(X).0l)D.l)l)‘ (c) In pariguph 42A who said amosw: -n suppen. ms msnnm; am daumng for “a) Gsntrwyl kemlinyin prom pmnmyaan floss cf busvness prom; RM2T,600.0GI7 Do‘ 54 Funher, the Mamnffs are clammng the fenowmg In lherr assessrnem of damages under the Earlier Suit Dewflnlxnn Amount mm Gnmlrugl kalvgmn uos_.snovssr_ _ «.1 59 519 19 earn-rum xemuanoan wane lunax wane dawn bank 739.007 59 s anka| ennuruur kemwan nmana pa elekmk xenumlgak w9.ws.1 1 Gamumgn keh|Lmg.nn pram pemiagnan 2: aaoma no Truss M lmsmes! p-mm sun-nag: keuedsvun rupuusw psnnsgun soanna (ms av business Tavmalmn)_ _ 55. I wvll not perm |he Fhlmlwfis to make a double clawm on the same subject matter Tn lwo separate suits. There musl be finalwy m Imgamn The De(endan\s cannol be vexed twice tor the same cause ov acnoh Ju al Esmggel 56. The Pkuntwfs are snernpcing to take a different pusifion in me insnam sun, Trorn that wmch they (oak W the Earhev sum Such cannot be parnnuea The pnnoapls cl judicial eslappel prevems a party from assemng a posmon m one mun. and me oppesue In anamer courl The mean o4 me pnncrme V510 protect me Inlegnty o! Jumclal process. 57 The com o1 Appeal m Leisure Farm Carp Sdn Bhd v Kabushrkr Karsha Nyu (ronneny known as our-«cm Shaker) a Ors [2017] 5 MLJ 53 at 74 - 75 held‘ ‘(my /1 :: clearlomrsmun Ihatme ohlictofludlcralostoabells mwwcnl . pm who nssumes . plrllcullr position In Wvnlon to can In rnonnsmnnrposmon In lakrmliarvon The aonmns panama: sstppp-1 npprm ap s party Mm has successfully and urlnqmvucully uuunad n pasvban In E 1:00! pmmsdmg, be u eslopped fmm sm mxa-Iumuzmwuaxzlmtw *5 «wn. Snr1I\nanhnrw\HI>e med n my r... nrW\n|H|Y mm. dnuamnl VI mum Wm! essenmg an mcansmenl pnamorr m a nlbssqunnl nmcaedtng Judmal usrpppe/, mmm rsrntsndsdlopvaladma mgmyameyuamerpmnss The essenosl nmmon or jumcul mapper is lo pnmn: Anluntrorvll mmnaneency, In: ub[n1u(ln-mlerstopmtedmejumaa/y‘ aun rnsltmtron‘ from [M perversion oijudrctnry machmsry ./mlrcrar esmupal addresses me mcungmrly pv allowing a pany xp aaean a posmon In on: mbunal and ma oppostla in number lnbunal. /I ma second moune/ amazes the party‘: mmnsulenl ppsupn, men at ram one cum! has pvooamy bssn mam: ' sa. smnzeny m Peguam Negala Malaysra y Nurul /zzah by Anwar 5 Ors [2017] 4 MLJ 556 6| 574. the Conn 07 Appea\ held: ‘[21]Vnanyev9nI,mfaw‘!haI1ov:tnrIu p/name; estoopelwrllnrwapplyloap-sfly wnare me sax! pany, mo aupellant vn this appeal, had mam/my and unaqwpcany pavsundad ma own an or assanea, a pusmon m ma Se/angal Govcmmant case so that men mal new man pm», me me/Aan: womd be Ostuppid lrom ussnnlnu an Inconsrslunl pasilion In . subuquom pmcnalng warm m (N: appear is me app/matron for ,uama/ ruvraw rne asavnrlal mneoon ouudtcral eszpppem m urevsnl /ntsnlronaltrmcnxrsruncy while me omecl pl me mo u m pmm (ha spun mm In: pcrvslsvon av/udlaal macmmry ./umaal esloopsl seeks lo aaomu mo irlcnnymiw alzllowlnn . pnnycuasam. pashlnn In um voufllndllraoppnsltl In nnollaei Mburm". 59 In me Eamer sun. the Plamzms had adopted the s|anee lhat u was D company, DA and D5 wne were Invowed In me name Oaks - ever oi P company we appears at me loflowwng paragvaphs at me affidavi in suppon afflrmed by P2 and mad by F company in the Earlier sun. ta) Paviguph a mme ma emaavn Wu suvpoll ~sepan.mena yang dw saeuuan d\ 315:, nevenaan I nevenaan ielah manyebabkan rmunnm - am Dermagaan vesloran ‘Arman Duwnidx mana ueoanaen - D-findnn menmunakan sumbsv 5511:: ad; lymkal P\aIrmY untuk menjamnkan pemwagaan vasloran \armuuk denqan name mmun yang aeme Man Man: eemue keumungan maemman kepada syinkn|Delem1an K9 7 2 dan /alau nu.n.1....uevenaen secara kolekm' my Pavagraph 13 ov me said ammn in support navenaen 7 Damon» hukan sanap murvnumh n p-mm-an vestovan Flamhl mam?! dana — pane dam ape! sylnkzl P\am|\l me an man can G1 amhH am: nlefv nacanaan. navena... Imluk keaunaan meveka' my Faliqraph 2o anna sand aflidavh In suppon ‘Dzkndnn V Delendan -new msnanggung kemamn Iersebm Kenna syankal PVAIHM nanya manguam. kemsmn V kemsakan den kumglan (ersecm aklbat cemvun «mam aleh Delendan I umnaan seems Vangsulvr am mkqatuwauzmwuawalmtw '6 “Nana Snr1|\nmhnrw\HI>e U... m my me nVW‘nlWY mm: dnuumnl Vfl mum v-NM so It was ptaaoeo tn the Eartrar sort that D4 and D5 were the mat" otrtpnts behtnd the hostrte take — over at P oompany Thts appears at paragraph 22 of the statement ot claim In the Eamer sot: whton read . 'Juqa hatdasarkan kenyataan . kanyaliart or am, marrrm jug: marwnlnknn panawa that knrpnml Dulandln xaooa nenoatttah dl |emhust (Mina the oarparata vttl) aahawa netarmn Ketrga secngat pengamh oar. pemegang saharn dnlam Delevman Kedua hendaklah trenanoaunarawaa seoara sanotnan xevaaa Ptatnnr atas sehab oetenoan V netenaan tetah oanrnoan some konsmrzsl pan r atan senate trpuan den r atan secaraItdakli-Mur(utihuttu1)¢un I alau becara mata roe dart r am sacala rnernoamo natanoan tzenanta menyebabkan batlakunya ksjadtan - kqadtan can I atau kmmlngi Denfltwa alpem yang tatah or nynlilun oatant pmnggan. petenggln t s 21 at mas’ 61 In the rnstant smt however, the Plamltfls have taken another posttton The Platnltfls now auege that it was me Father am: the Mother who are the masterrmno ufthe hosttte lake — over 0! P oompany This appears at paragraph 6 at the Platntttts‘ ialfldavtl amrmeo by F2 on 21 a 2023 (Enctosure 43): “Amara nya sdz tah Delendan V ueteman Ke V 2 K3 » 3 oan Kc » s oatarn auarnan amt ml or rnana nmnnan K. 2 can K mlruplkan mulumt mi oatarn aemua perancangan toroetat oan hoot. takn nv1r|amndiD ayan at Flitnltl Forum; tt>1t dnngan martggtmnknn syxnkati hnham tflllu syankat nt yang menggurtalmn narna D4 din no Aar\.ak- annk D2 5 na sehagat ‘lvohtmeh')‘ 62. tt rs ptam that the Pla ntrrts have taken an rnconarstent poslllon. on the one hand (VII the Eartrer suit), the Ptamtrtts otatmeo that rt was D company, D4 and D5 who are the rnasterm o behmd the hosltle take » overuf P company's restaurant business on the other hand trn the rnstant SIM), the Platntttts are now atteging that the Father ano the Mother are the maslermtnd behmd the very same hosttte take - over ot P ctJmpzny's restaurant bttsmess as Havmg pveviuusly adapted the postlton tha was D company, DA and D5 who were those who toroetutty look over F oompany, I oonstder that the Ptatntttts are estopped trorn now ta ‘ g a contrary stand by auegrng ti was the Father and the Mother who are the rnasterrntno in the sam hostile taxe - war at P company. Cgnclustgn 64 For the reasons above, I allowed the Devenoants‘ s|rtk 9 out appltcatron vtds Enclosure 41. I struck out the Ptatntms' ctairn aga st the srn mxlt-tuxnuzmwtraxalmtw '7 «war. s.n.t luvthnrwm a. .r.... a may r... atwtruflly ann. dnuavtml VI artuNa v-mat Devencenns. I ordered me Plairmffs Io pay casts a! RM5.DOD to me Defendants Daled 5 December 2023 Quay cnew Soon Judge High court at Makaya, Penang \ Dlwsinn NCVC 1 Cuumgig Jnhn mm and Marlm Km (Menu Vsmiu, Khan .: Anoaatesflovme mmm. Chew Xm vw {Messrs D09 5 Man-mmmm Ihe Delendenls sm mK1;eJDKduZMWuaK2ImYw 18 “Nana sew nmhnrwm e. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum v-ms! keruqlan bemanakll rcomequsruar uamaslu) dl ma danpida ram. penamalarl am! psnanllarl penyswaan Flalnlllr (vl) Gaml mgl un|uk kehllnngan "ma balk dun repulasl Plalrlfll seeanyak lwlz annmo 110' The slanl sun 11 AI paragraph 4 or their aflldavil alfirmea by F2 on 2l.a.2uza (Enclosure 43), the Plalnllfis admnled mat the Earlier sum ls almur ma hosllle lake - over ol P comnany The Psalm s lunher admllled lha! me Business Sale Agreement was declded upon m ore Earlrer sun Which held mal lrre Business sale Agreemenl was nan - exlslenl. or pedlaps mere accuralely, null and Vela, as prayad (or m me Earller sun 12 Pamgraph 4 onhe aloresald amdavll reads ‘Guzman mu FA—2ZNCVC~45-03/2021 hanya rslmr. umuk mum bahawa m, D4 dan D5 aaalan usual dun bsrsilah dalim mung-Imhll r. bllnln Pl-' - Pnnxmn ucnn mar. flan D-Ilunnn ar mans Dellanilan lualbell vemagaan yang msamxarm nleh DI, m «an as nlnh dlpntuskln ndnkuulura“ 13. Al suhsefluerll paragraphs el lhe same amdavn, Ihe Plalnllffs also aarmllea met me lrlslarll sull Is abnul lhe hosllle lake - over ol P company Namely: 4.; Parigmph s arm. lends “Amara r-ya aaa Ian Delendarl—De1em1an Ke V 2‘ K8 — 3 can Ka — 5 aalam wuaman slvll ml dl marl: Dalandan K9 7 2 dan Ks » : msrvvakan maslsrmmu dalam sarm psrnrvcangarl iureelul can huh Ixk -avlv lsmsaav iyankal Plamtfl Faflzm: (PH dsngin menggunakarl sy.In|m| mam ll rm lyivlkm D1 yang menggunikan nama D4dirl Dfl(.nmsk— anak oz 5. as selmgni vmmmen‘)’ lm Fzrfigravh 27 whlch reads -Am latapl, GI babkarl an kolusl Dslsndan - Delsndan yang menysbsbkun Imhll — uih mum F1 dam lw Derlgumsirl blsne! ynng lldak memunlkan linpllnn llu membawa kepnda penulupnn hlsnes vexlnumn F1 am menmggnlkan nnma yang husuk dnlam naselan F a. E" to) Purayravh 2: whlch reads ‘Auk ant iyarlka1P1 lugatelahdlbololdnndl lelnngkzn men .2 xk kellga aklbal darlpafla rmm. mu - owl blsnes P1 ole?! mm Dalundarl ~ Deleudin‘ am mxlr-luxnuzmwuaxalmtw 3 «me Smnl luvlhnrwlll .. HIGH a may he mm-r -mm: dnuavlml VI nFluNfl v-mal 14. In lhe lrrscanl sun. me Plamims allege that me Father and the Mother are shadow directors‘ who are me mastermind in planning and executing the hostile lake - over ol P company 15. This allegallorr appears al oaragraph 14 or me mainline’ aflldavll amrmed by P2 an 21 a 2023 lerrclosura 43) which reads 'Da|am kiln Mm Delendan Kn . 2 dan Kn - 1 Ida lav. pulnlnh . pang: h hnynnann (shldnw dlrmar-i yang marunam muklmlnd dalam melanaarlg dari malaksanakzvv luvvelul dzm meme LIKE V averlemaidap smial P1dan9an msrlggunakarl nama- nnma arlak meleka Ial|u nslsrrdarr - um-rider» K5 7 4 sehlngga Ka . 5 dl mans em. 7 will «emerge ieleh rnemulau >2 / P3 dinpad: aerma pemadhlrarl lelmasuk msrlgauh samwrg umuk menghalnu P2‘ 16. Also at paragraph 5 of me Plalntllls‘ aflidavll amrrriad by F2 on was 2023 (Enclosure 45; which reads ‘Dnhmhn KI . 2 dari K: :l in: mi muxtumlind yarla membuai pelarr din herkolusi derrgarr uelerrdan - Dxfsndnn yang lam unluk memwunakan nama ariax rlya url|uk mangumbll aim nemlngaan lesloran syarlkal Merrill veriama melalur 5yan|u| Dalendzn Panama - I7 ll IS srgmncarrl |o nn|s lhel lhe Plarrrlilis plaim lo have knowledge lrrai lhe Father and the Melher are me shadow direclors oi F cumpany at all material lime (which is denied by me Delerrdariis) This appears al paragraph 3 or mail affidavil alfirmed by P2 on 15.92023 (Enclosure 46) which reads. ‘Plalrlm I Plalntifl sumsmang nyn s an an. monullahul Vakla bahawa uelendarr Ka- 2 dar. «e .3 mempakan shadow dlledor syarlkzl Phlrllfl ylfln unlll rrr mlurhl kelana Dmemarl Ke - 2 selalu memo-enqeruslkan mesyunlm Lemhaga perlgarah den masyuaul pemrrrg syarrui Halrlllfdl maria Deierlflarl Ke — s juga akarl rvlarlghadln umuk mengamhll reknd rrresy-rarel- The similar claims 18. The Delendarrls produced the lolldwing table in show lhe elrmlarilies beiween the elelemerrl 01 claim in the Ezriler Suit, when camperad with the Statement cl claim In lhe lnslanl suil No me semr smi_ l The lrlslam rum 1 >2 lsa repulable mm and surved P2 .. . «arm. cruel and served as r as head anal M F company‘: me lace‘ MP oumnarly s mslaularll reslauvam i 4 sm mKllaIDKdLlZMwuaK2ImYw “Nana s.r.i mmhnrwm .. LAIQ4 m mm r... mm.u.y mm: dnuuvlnnl VII nFluNG puns! n4 neo mused P2 to be remnvsd «om P company an 317 map. No! Iona tnereaner, P3 was abs: mmuvld by m non. F mmvzmy [pnmgrnvhs 1 and a ct me sLuteme<\|ol::l.a\mI on 31 7 2:119, P2 was nnnmo ham P company ny D4. Subulluanlly =3 wu mac removed nom F compnny lharauvaphs 15 to ca ct tn. stetonrom at ctatml Do emerco mm tne aoetneee Sale Agmemem Mm a company wttnoot P company‘: apmuvah consent, emnonty or company mscmnon [plmguph 2 or tne etotemem M clmml The petenoents we D4 toamnerwnn us estentrsneo :2 company to take uvev tne no-tnm ct P wmplny wlmout conrentncm P2 and F3 on: company‘: mctonon [paragraph 2a or me Statement ot ctetml ‘ eoneete son EM tune Iandbutd). m uusod tn. con, tcrmrnencn at me tenancy agreement helween P company eno Kaunas‘ rnereaner m cameo e new tenancy agreemem to be enlered rmo balween tne xenotom end at company Iperapropns to and n of me s4a1amIm L71 atom.) 94 aimed rne cony tenntnenon :11 me renenoy awveemem belwean F company and Kemu sen-qua Itne tanmcra) ua ormpateo tne assets M 9‘ company |paIigvzph we 0! tn. Statement or cmm} DI company llalliad P ccmpany 5 ocst: Bank awounl to be masked and mlsflsrsd wtlh tne huunl uverahnns at P company lpenaarzpn t2 cnne statement at dawn] P company: cacao Bank nccmtm wax mmned and mocked ooe to cououon armng the oetenoents. tperaprapn zvtxnn ct tn. steumem ct Claim] , , 74 19. me Detenoante pornt out tnet the noettte take - over 0! P company‘ as euegea by the Plainltfls In the statement or ctetm meo VII the instant sun, relers to me same events wntcn F company neo ccrnptetneo at In tne Earlier suit 20. In pamnular. tne FWHIMS‘ auegaticn concermng the lullowmg 5 sm mK1tnIDKnu2MNuaK.ImYw «no. Snr1I\navthnrwH\I>e med c mm o. nflmnuflly MINI ooc.n.n. VI munc Wm! La) me emmisnmem cl u wmpany as a uemcue to undenaka the malls Ink: .mmu> wmpany: restaurant busmess (navagmph zuvm; 0! III: Smanenl M cum m me man: my an m. .s.......m. M Ihe x-15593 oi P wmvany and mnssvnruunsuan 0! the b..=.m. nl me Plswmms. tpnmgraph 241\><)m|hs smmm MC m Ihe mam um), ms 1:» me mnmx ul P2 1nd :3 «mm me managemennovw mmunny (paragraphs 15 m an and paragraph 244»-) mm Slilemeulal Clam m In msum my 21 The Defendants say lhal the crux 01 both the Eamev SLIi| and the Ins'anI Su 5 on the same issue, . e wnneming the aHeged has a lake e over of F mmpany. The swnuar re g1; 22 The Deiendams a\so produced Ihe vcnowmg came to show me smwannes between the vehefs sought m me Eanier sun, when compared wmh me rehels prayed for m the instant sun. ’ n. Eamersnm and me Oldev utcmm dated 2 3 2023 Na nu mm | 1 Sutlupqnnuh hnhawa Dmendan Dslsndan - Delendnn hendak VIII . Deiendan umuk mnmbayar muninggungmquflnflamrmy}Plamm am 359599 11 kapaua P\amM- dan Lembaaa Penglmh-F-ngamh , Phalnllv Flamnl xewm klmglan dnnlalau kenman barblngkfl 1v:mI5r9querma\ aamauasx m hm aanpaaa mum‘ panimalsn nwm pa-mun DenvewaanPIa1mn Tarmasuk kerugun yang ai nhflkan isczva xpumk m nerenggan wavy Fumyauan Yunlulanir m Kemguan amaun RM5n4,5m on ‘ ham ween» want and Hquvpmenl‘ my Ksruglan amaun R»m,ass.nn ‘ bag: ‘mvenInnes— raw mananavsx dan » Kemglan pandapahn ammm wM5a2,oe:« as 2 Sum: éenman bahawa semua ueklam? bahaw: kesemua pendapaljn / grufll berkenaan pem1apalan(Im3gme)n\ehX\LmGe em mm..:umuzMmm:mm ‘ «mm. smm ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI mum Wm! duvgln mum n...m« mam. Srfln mm (Delenflan Kedua) nan. vans dllenmz man Deiendxn ~ mm Yang maleflal admah Delendan an bayar mm mm; mpenenisecampernegangamanaru PVHIHM Panama denaan seqeva (mm on mm and / a conslmntm nusn 0|-h Dnfunuan - Ddeniin knpada Phmm lemmyuk amuzaea 35 yang a. pfidkan near: spesnfik m Derenguan «sun Pemyaxaan Tunlman J Sul|upIrInlih bahawi n.1.m.. Defendnn . mm... ai kehemm .n-mm." umukmeng.Iknunk.m menuruukkan den mznyerahkan semua mg ~ my yang ai akauan bevaudR)(ILmGn sansm lemma name. xx Lm Ge San ‘ kepadz Plamm flan / alau‘ and um dan Flamm s-enammpeguameara Plavmldalam mmm mum on nw cm Klat unnaan 1 Han dannada mum Pumuh m. ‘ cm: Jmn W97‘ um ilau apa-1 Iva mm bclknnasn o Kmusakan am Gum rugl (mu dwulsmun) mm havu u mrbcu for auwnumw wan /alau v-um awe dwechuns mm resoeu Io mu alau 393- spa amiun yang m assessment cl damages angglv aeaum dun mnmnal nlen Mahkamah mmia mu wnemn Ihe Plamlms am «or. at Garmruuv kermar-nan mpulasl mm Durmaslaazn Has: an rm...“ vnmn m2u,ma.uan no xemguan unmk Kemsakan P wmvany mama far ‘garmmgl gum1MI\danmpu|a0unRM51ula unluk kumlangan nami bank .1... Man ava - up: man» my ravllhu wummm sebnnyak ma-«way um. dun mmaan m2‘ann.nmna‘ ‘ meh Mnhkimahmulmnnv The vnamuns have rm 3 when «or dlmchoni w-m mined In um-mm L11 damages Whumn me Pmmms clam: Vor— e» Gnnhmgx kecederaan mpunam nemmeaan (loss ov rmmass mpmamm Rmsamuou on 23 The Defendants puimouunevauaw g‘ (at al Daraavavhs may no swma smamennovcxm mme mxLan|suH. me P\:In\Wk Ira chnmxng (or am 359.9091: which campuses oi:— m sm mm-Iuxnuzmamaxalmtw 7 “Nair sm-w nmhnrwm .. HIQG w my .. mm-y um. flnuamnl VI mum W RMl.2oo,uuu D0 in Iespeclclilxlures and flltlngs. and nil l2inme,9oe.n Ill vasp cr el kemglfln ms 7 kas (ail mar, my in me zanler sun. me Plzlmm had claimed lor— nl RM504‘510M rer prepeny. planiand equipment, on nMr,lss,5ls.1orcrrenuuanen cesi; and min RMWEBDV ll ler lass sulrered lor unlslzndlrlg balance ler elecvluly bin, (cl Du Plnlnllfls‘ claim luv nm,asa.aa9 ll in inc rnsrarn sult in ralvhct al nxiures and rrnrnga am ma aulsinmflng ma mllliy bill wue else claimed In rne sanrarsun (6) in me aaner Sun ine mainline nad acugrn and wns allowed by mu order at Cmm dared 23202:‘ a duclarairon mar all me Inoome made by n company is held onInls1¢avF mrnpany by D company‘ D4 and D5 24. As such. me Detendanls suhmll inaune principal reliefs in me rnslarri sun have been raised. prayed for and granted VI me Eamer SLAM. 25 Prernised on me above‘ me Detendanie ooniend lnai res yudioaie and esloppel is applicable In ihe present case. And that there is rnulllp cI|y bl proceedings Tire Plainmle are seeking a ‘second bne al ihe cherry‘, sa in Speak. Accordingly, me insiani sun ougrn to be einick oui as being lnvolous or vexallous and an abuse 01 |he preeess bl ddun. Decision 26 me law penalnlng Io striking out Ma panya pleadlng under order la rule 19 or me Rules cl Courl 2012 is well seiiled ii is only in a plain and obvlous 1253 me! recourse should be had In ihe eurnrnary process under inis rule This summary procedure can only be edepred wnen n can he clearly seen that a claim is on me leoe el ii oeyrdualy unsustainable ll cannoi be exercised by a rnrnuie exarnineuen M the docurnenis and facts dl the case, in order in see whelner me pany nas a cause of eciion. (see me Supreme coun case cl sender Bui/der sun and A ors v Urmed Malayan Banking corparalion BI-ld[1993] 3 MLJ as, [1993] 4 cu 7; [1993] 2 AMR 1969). 27 The men must be sa sfled inal were is no reasonable cause bl acliorl orrnanne claim is lnvalous clrvexallaus. The coun is nor concerned a| ihls slage with me rnenie oline claim se long as me pleadings disclose some cause or aalon nr r-alee some que ns M in be decided by me judge, me rnere lam met me case IS weak and nut llkely lo succeed aube inal n. no ground lenne pleadings lo be slmck om srn mK1laIDKduZMWulK2ImYw 5 «wee a.n.r mmhnrwm be mad e my r... bflmrrnflly MVMI dbuuvlnrrl Vfl .nuna vmul 23 In Raja zarrralAlm1rn hm me Hey Tacmk & 3 ors v Brmsn-Amerlcarr Lrie A. General Insurance larrulleeal 3 cu sue at 512, me supreme courl remarked me: are lower ocun should have scrullnlzed me evlderlce In order lo declde wrrelrrer lrre acllorl was bound lo lzll The supreme ceurl Sald lnel an acuon can he surnrrrarrly dlsposed ll mere Is an absence cl mnlllct at ma|erlal evldenoe or ol wnfllci M allldavlls on material puirrls So mar seemmgly rrlaule or urmeull reeuer. could be rsadlly aecrded lrr such a way as \o lead to me ooncluslon lrral me aclmn was bound lo larl 29 In a sun lrwolvlrrg complex queslions or law bulwheve me essenllal lecls are run ln mspule, me complexlly oi the quesllnns cl law should not he a reason ler reluslng rellel urrrler Order 18 rule 19 al |he Rules olcoun 2012. If sahsfied mar lhe quesllons of law are lmarguabls, me oaurl rs rm prevented lrorrr grarrllrrg summary rallel merely because ‘me question of law Is at flrsl blush 0! some cumplexlry and lrrerelere |akes a lrme longer lo undersland' [See the Ccurl of Appeal case of Krrarry Jamaluddm V Data‘ 591/ Arrwar bln Ibrahlm [2013] 4 MLJ 173 al 132) an. Applylng mess legal prlnclples, rl ls my llrralrrg mar me rrrslarrl s s lrlvoluus and vexalinus, and an abuse of H13 preeeee ol mun l corlslder me l=lalmnls' acllcm againslllle oelerrdanlsle be nhvmusly unsustainable And is bound lo larl ll ll was II.) proceed to lnal Hence, lms ls a plaln and cbvlous case lur slriklrlg cul. 31. The reason ls because we lrlslarll sull ls barred by res Judlcala and esloppel Here V3 my explarlahorl. lkummu 32. As demorrslralea earller, bolrr the Earlier s and me inslam sull revolved around me same lssue Namely, whether mere was a Ilusllle lake 7 over of me reslauranl buslness el P eempeny by the nelenaanls 33 The rellels suugm In mam me Earlier Sull and lhe lnslam eurl are also lhe same Namely, lo run back me Plairrlills in|cl lhe posmon as n lhe alleged hosllle lake - over 04 F company an rlul nawerr 34 The prlrlclple ol res judlcata was enunclaled by me supreme courl in /lsla Cammerclal Finance (M) arm V Kewel Tellu Sdrl and [1995] 3 MLJ 139 al 197 as lulluws ‘When a mam! nermerr rwo pm-as has om uuruuraelea by a court ur eomrlwenl/unwrcrran. um um; and Hrelrpflvles are no! llrmmedto llrlgare m mKlleIDKnl.l2MmuaK:lmYw 9 «mu. Smnl nuvlhnrwm .. UIQG e may r... uflmnnllly mm: dnuuvlml Vfl muua Wm! one. man me res1..r:rc.e1e Decausa me magmem becomes [he arm nerween such names, or in mm! words, me yarns: snow accapt r: as me mm, res ;m1n:ala pm velrlalo acaprmr rne numrcnahoy Mm Iawls mm, M: in me flubhc mlerasl Mal men mm./.1 be «ramp in Illlyulon -mlolusl rs! publmae ru 5!! Wm: Mrum n rs onlywsi me: no em menu to ba vuxld mm for me sum: em- or seven ' 35. Swmply put, when a subject manner has been many denuded m a own 07 cumpelem pmsd\c1\on, |he penies and their prmes are not pemmlsd to relmgme me same mansr once more Otherwise mere wm be nu and to Ivllgallon and me hindmg eflecl ollhe cums eemsuon would be V05! 36. in As/a Commerclm Flnancs (supm). the Supreme Court further new mat res judxcava is not eormnea to Issues wmch me mun .s aclually asked he deems am K also covers issues nr (acts wmch ave cueeny pan cnne subjec| mener allhe migemn, and coma have been re.sea m me prsvxous proceeding. 37 The supreme cam sand (at page zoo) w rs mrmr nezzssary at we 5159010 unausverru me rmpofl or me warns in me sard iumau: statement, rs em, paint wmen pmpmy bolonqnd to me Jubfinl e1 mlgallorv 'wmcn semerveu Ll explamsd m Gluanhalgh V Ma/lard 1194712411 E}? 255.1,: 257 as reams . rvnudr: :. rmmspurpase /5 notconflnud to me Issues which me court I: Ictullly esnea to aura.‘ nut ncavnrs Issues sums which in so clinriy nm :1! me Iubjod mm-r olme lmgatvovv srra so study could new been rersm ma! u wauld be an zbusv om. procus m‘ an com in lflow . new pmecndiny m M am-tedm mspsntollln-m‘ as. Vn cnee Pck Chay & ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn End [2001] A MLJ 346‘ the Court of Apnea! expkamed lhe doc1rme B7 rssmmcala i ' nalmw and broad sense by cmng the Enghsh case ev Henderson V Henderson (1543) 57 ER 313 The Courl e« Apnea! said (at page 357;- wnere e grvan mener becomes me subpci ol Mrgatron m, and of adjudrcalrun ey, 1: mm uimmoelvnljunsdrdmn me mm reqmrss me pen:-s to meumgsmm m bllng forward Ilroir whnh em and MN not [axaopl under wscull cm:ums1sr-mes) perrr-n my same pemes la upon me same sulysc! or Imgnhon rr. respeuarrnmer which might me Men nreugm Iurwm es pan orme sub/K1 in ¢antI:L em wmcn was me: areugm lurwufl, only because may havu, [mm negugenae, rnadwrlcrvca nraverv eemeru, wmtrad pen at me» me Thu dadrms may thus be uun Io nnmmnass aeverzlcalogonu In its narmwest sense, res /udrcala, I lmnk, refers to sslnppw by racwu n revere In Me aclua! em mxqetuwauzmwuawzlmtw W «we. ssrm nmhnrwm s. LAIQ4 m my r... nflmnnflly em. dnuumnl VII mum WM

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

W-09-281-11/2021

PERAYU NOR BADLI MUNAWIR BIN MOHAMAD ALIAS LAFTI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM)]

Section 23 of the Penal Code - “Wrongful gain” - “wrongful loss” - Section 24 of the Penal Code - “Dishonestly” - Section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code - “Alibi” - Section 405 of the Penal Code - Criminal breach of trust - Section 409 of the Penal Code - Criminal breach of trust by public servant or agent - Section 409B of the Penal Code - “Presumption” - Section 3 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 - "proceeds of an unlawful activity" - “unlawful activity" - “serious offence" - "money laundering" - Section 4 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 - The Law on Appellate Intervention - Judge erred in law and in fact - Courts below failed to recognize that the defence of the accused - Accused was having an uninterrupted meeting with DW5 - Accused’s defence that SP13 did not come to his office and didn’t give the accused the sum of alleged money - Evidence given and the entry in visitor log book (P163) supported the accused’s defence of alibi - There was a failure by the trial judge to judicially appreciate this crucial evidence - The version of the accused must be accepted as it remains unchallenged - Whether the failure of the learned trial judge to consider this unchallenged evidence, had occasioned a failure of justice and denied to accused to a fair trial? - Whether there has been a failure of justice or miscarriage of justice in the eye of the law arising from the failure of the prosecution to challenge the core assertion of defence? - Failure does not amount to an admission or acceptance of the accused’s testimony - Totality of the evidence and decision must be based on an examination of all the evidence presented and not evidence in isolation - Trial judge had directed on the issue of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and accepted their evidence - The appeal by the accused turns upon pure questions of fact - Findings of fact by the trial judge is therefore to remain undisturbed unless of course if the fact finding is plainly wrong - Trial judge had not erred and the findings were fully supported by the abundance by both oral and documentary evidence heaped against the accused - The accused had the opportunity and authority to make the request - The prior arrangement and the manner in which the payments were made is a relevant consideration - Did not reflect an innocent mind on the part of the accused - No substantial miscarriage of justice occurred to the accused by failure of the prosecution to challenge or put the essence of their case to the accused or his witnesses - Such failure does not go to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses nor does it amount to an acceptance of the defence witnesses’ evidence - The accused knew well what the case was against him when the prosecution closed its case and had been afforded all the opportunity to present his defence - The trial judge had carefully considered the accused defence and that advance payments had to be made as a result of the system migration - The defence raised by the accused was wholly untenable - Accused had failed to rebut the presumption of having acted dishonestly on the balance of probabilities - The defence of the accused that the advance payments for the project were mere bare denials and not true - Merely an excuse to cover up his unlawful activity - Wrong for the accused to make payments when payments were not due to the contractors - Ample evidence of corroboration of the testimony of the witnesses - Abundance of independent and compelling evidence confirming the evidence - To suggest that a distinction must be drawn between a property in cheque and property in cash is entirely fallacious - The intention of the drawer at the time for the cheques issued is the material test - The manner in which the money was demanded and received lend credence to the prosecution case - The accused has acted dishonestly, thus causing wrongful gain to himself and wr

18/01/2024

YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Datuk Vazeer Alam bin Mydin MeeraYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e0d15a7f-dddc-4f53-8a1f-fe67e1063266&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W -09 -281-11/2021 BETWEEN NOR BADLI MUNAWIR BIN MOHAMAD ALIAS LAFTI - APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR - RESPONDENT In The High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Criminal Appeal No : WA-42R-10-10/2019 Nor Badli Munawir Bin Mohamad Alias Lafti - Appellant And Public Prosecutor - Respondent 18/01/2024 16:21:17 W-09-281-11/2021 Kand. 66 S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORUM : VAZEER ALAM BIN MYDIN MEERA, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Appellant was tried in the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur with five (5) counts of criminal breach of trust ("CBT") under section 409 of the Penal Code and five (5) counts of money laundering under section 4(1)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 ("AMLATFA"). The Charges [2] Particulars of the first three (3CBT Charges (Case No: WA-WA-62R- 1-01/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“CBT 1”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan April 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif Syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 30/4/2013 bernombor 681488 berjumlah RM400,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." Second Charge: (“CBT 2”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan Jun 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 26/6/2013 bernombor 753749 berjumlah RM570,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." Third Charge: (“CBT 3”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan Jun 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 26/6/2013 bernombor 753760 berjumlah RM430,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [3] Particulars of the last two (2) CBT Charges (Case No: WA-WA-62R- 2-01/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“CBT 4”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan September 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 9/9/2013 bernombor 802984 berjumlah RM600,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." Second Charge: (“CBT 5”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan Oktober 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan.Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 30/10/2013 bernombor 834262 berjumlah RM575,800.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [4] Particulars of the first three (3) AMLATFA Charges (Case No: WA- 62R-7-03/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“AMLATFA 1”) “Bahawa kamu pada 2 Mei 2013 antara jam 6.00 petang dan 8.00 malam di Old Town White Coffee Ara Damansara, Oasis Square, No. 2, Jalan PJU 1A/7A, Petaling Jaya, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam Selangor, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerima wang tunai berjumlah RM400,000.00 daripada Murhasmee bin Mukhtar, Pengarah Syarikat Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 ( Akta 613 )”. Second Charge: (“AMLATFA 2”) Bahawa kamu pada 26 Jun 2013 antara jam 6.00 petang dan 8.00 malam di Old Town White Coffee Ara Damansara, Oasis Square, No. 2, Jalan PJU 1A/7A, Petaling Jaya, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam Selangor, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerima wang tunai berjumlah RM570,000.00 daripada Murhasmee bin Mukhtar, Pengarah Syarikat Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Third Charge: (“AMLATFA 3”) “Bahawa kamu pada 27 Jun 2013 antara jam 2.00 dan 4.00 petang di THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, B-23-1, Tower 8, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, 59200 Kuala Lumpur, dalam daerah Kuala Lumpur, dalam Kuala Lumpur, telah melibatkan diri dalarn penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerima wang tunai berjumlah RM430,000.00 daripada Mohd Razip bin Mohammad, Pengarah Syarikat Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” [5] Particulars of the last two (2) AMLATFA Charges (Case No: WA-62R- 8-03/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“AMLATFA 4”) “Bahawa kamu pada 11 September 2013 antara jam 6.00 petang dan 8.00 malam di Old Town White Coffee Ara Damansara, Oasis Square, No. 2, Jalan PJU 1A/7A, Petaling Jaya, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam Selangor, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerirna wang tunai berjumlah RM600,000.00 daripada Murhasmee bin Mukhtar, Pengarah Syarikat Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Second Charge: (“AMLATFA 5”) “Bahawa kamu pada 1 November 2013 antara jam 3.00 dan 4.00 petang di Restoran Leaf Dining, No. 5-1, Jalan Solaris 1, Solaris Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur, dalam daerah Kuala Lumpur, dalam Kuala Lumpur, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan rnenerima wang tunai berjumlah RM570,000.00 daripada Hanaffi bin Daud, Pengarah Syarikat RL Offshore Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktivitl haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” [6] The Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial to all the charges. At the close of the prosecution case, the learned Sessions Court Judge ordered the acquittal and discharged of the Appellant in respect of the First Charge (Case No:WA-62R-7-03/2017) under the AMLATFA and ordered him to enter upon his defence on the remaining nine (9) charges. There was no appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor against the said acquittal. [7] At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge held that there was no doubt as to his guilt and accordingly he was convicted of all the remaining 9 charges and sentenced. [8] For each of the CBT offence, the Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for the period of seven (7) years. This sentence of imprisonment was ordered to run concurrently. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [9] For each offence of money laundering, the Appellant was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently but to be served only after the completion of the sentence for the CBT charges. [10] Dissatisfied by the said decision, on 30/9/2019, the Appellant appealed to the High Court Kuala Lumpur against both the conviction and sentence. [11] On 2/11/2021, the learned High Court Judge affirmed the findings of the trial judge and dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against conviction. [12] However, the learned High Court Judge allowed the appeal against sentence and ordered as follows: (a) The sentence of 7 years imprisonment for each of the CBT charges was set aside and substituted with a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently; (b) The sentence of 4 years imprisonment for each of the AMLATFA charges was set aside and substituted with a sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment. The sentences were also ordered to be run concurrently; (c) Sentences for CBT charges and AMLATFA charges were ordered to run consecutively. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [13] Aggrieved by the decision of the learned High Court Judge, the Appellant mounted this appeal against conviction and sentence. [14] The Appellant will be referred to as the accused in this Judgment. The Prosecution’s Case [15] The facts of the case appear sufficiently and clearly in the grounds of judgment of the learned High Court Judge. To appreciate the charges it is necessary to give a narrative of the chronological events as established by the prosecution which led to the prosecution of the accused. [16] The accused was at all material times the Chief Executive Officer ('CEO') of TH Heavy Engineering Bhd (herein after known as “THHE”) and charged with the duties of managing and overseeing the affairs of the company and those of its active subsidiary companies which include THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd. ('THHE Fabricators'), OnG Works Sdn Berhad (“OnG”) and THHE Offshore (“THHEOF”). THHE is a company involved in diversified engineering activities including but not limited to major offshore fabrication, hook -up and commissioning of oil and gas facilities, maintenance and servicing of plants and equipment. [17] The charges against the accused on which he was convicted were connected with three (3) companies, namely, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd, Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd and RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [18] We propose to deal with the involvement of this three named companies in the order which we think they ought to be dealt with. The 1st CBT Charge and The 1st AMLATFA Charge Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [19] Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was one of the contractors for the PERMAS development project (“PERMAS project”) awarded by Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd (Murphy”) to THHE Fabricators on 1/4/2013. For this project, THHE appointed Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd as its sub-contractor. [20] Sometime around the end of April 2013, the accused told his General Manager of Finance Salahuddiin bin Rushdi @ Marco (PW20) to prepare a cheque for RM400,000.00 that need to be urgently paid to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. PW20 then directed Senior Finance Manager (Kumaresan a/l Ramasamy (PW18) and PW4 (Intan Farhannaz Binti Husin) Senior Executive from the Finance Department to prepare the payment voucher and cheque. On the payment voucher (Exhibit P12) the nature of payment was written down as “Advance Payment” as instructed by the accused. [21] PW20 then directed PW18 and PW4 to prepare a cheque for payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The cheque (Exhibit P15) was signed by PW20 and counter-signed by the accused. [22] PW20 then directed PW18 and PW4 to make immediate and direct payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd’s Maybank Islamic account, which was S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 done via Bank Remittance Form (Exhibit P35). PW18 and PW4 prepared Exhibit P35 and was approved by PW20 and the accused. [23] PW18 and PW4 testified that Exhibits P12, P15 and P35 were prepared without any claim invoice or supporting documents from Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd because the accused wanted it to be done urgently. [24] PW6 (Siti Zarwanie Binti Zakaria) a director of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and PW8 confirmed that she was asked to generate a sham invoice (Exhibit P20) for the payment received, on which it was written down on as “BEING CONSULTATION AND INSPECTION FEES ON PIPING WORKS FOR SHELL”. [25] After RM400,000 was credited into Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd account, on 2/5/2013, SP6 withdrew the RM400,000 from the company account. SP8 instructed her finance clerk SP5 (Nordahlia binti Ibrahim) to prepare a payment voucher (Exhibit P44) and cheque (Exhibit P46) on the pretexts as “BAYARAN BALIK PINJAMAN” to director. [26] After withdrawal of the monies at Maybank Kuala Terengganu, PW6 and PW8 (Murhasmee bin Mukthar) drove to Kuala Lumpur on the same day with the cash in hand to meet the accused. They met the accused at the Old Town White Coffee Cafe at Ara Damansara, Petaling Jaya and handed the cash to the accused. The 2nd CBT Charge and The 2nd AMLATFA Charge S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [27] In June 2013, the accused had again asked PW20 to prepare another payment of RM1 million divided into two separate cheques, one in the sum of RM570,000 payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and another in the sum of RM430,000.00 be made payable to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. The accused told PW20 to state it as payment for “Consultancy – Murphy” in the payment vouchers. PW20 then instructed PW18 and PW4 to prepare two (2) separate cheques. [28] Cheque of RM570,000.00 (Exhibit P27) and Payment Voucher (Exhibit P13) was for payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. A temporary payment voucher (Exhibit P9) and cheque of RM430,000.00 (Exhibit P26) was for payment to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. Exhibit P27 and P26 were signed by PW20 and accused without any claims document received from both the company. [29] After these cheques were prepared and signed, the accused later instructed PW20 to change the method of payment to bank remittance. PW18 and PW4 confirmed that they were asked to prepare a new cheque together with the Bank Remittance Forms. The new cheques of RM570,000.00 (Exhibit P16) were prepared to be paid to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and another new cheque of RM430,000.00 (Exhibit P10) were made payable to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. These two (2) replacements cheques were later signed by PW20 and counter-signed by another authorized officer, PW19 (John George Ritchie) because the accused was not in the office at that material time. [30] On 26/6/2013, PW8 said he received a telephone call from the accused to inform him that RM570,000 has been credited into Bicara Sepakat Sdn S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Bhd’s bank account. The accused told PW8 to withdraw the said amount and hand over the cash to him. PW8 directed PW6 to arrange the withdrawal of the monies from the company’s bank account. A payment voucher (Exhibit P45) and cheque of RM570,000.00 (Exhibit P47) were prepared by PW5. The purpose of the payment in Exhibit P45 were written as “REPAYMENT OF LOAN”. [31] PW6 went to Maybank Kuala Terengganu together with PW8 to withdraw the monies. On the same day, they went to Kuala Lumpur and met the accused at the Old Town White Cafe, Ara Damansara, Petaling Jaya and PW8 handed over the cash of RM570,000.00 directly to the accused. [32] PW8 and PW6 confirmed that a sham invoice (Exhibit P19) was prepared for the payment received by Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd where it was written in the invoice as “BEING CONSULTATION AND INSPECTION FEES ON PIPING WORKS FOR SHELL”. Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd [33] Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd was one of the contractors for THHE Fabricators for the Shell D12 - Laila project. The company was principally in the business of providing oil and gas advisory services in the areas of onshore fabrication, offshore hook-up and commissioning, retrofitting and transportation and installations as well as the trading of certain niche products. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [34] On 13/9/2012, THHE and Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd entered into a teaming agreement whereby both parties agreed to collaborate in the preparation and submission of tenders for works. [35] The executive director of Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd Datuk Mohd Razip bin Mohammad (PW13) testified that the accused had asked his favour to withdraw cash of RM430,000.00 to be given directly to him as he needed the money to pay the Murphy guys. PW13 was reluctant at first to do something which was not right, but finally agreed to the accused’s request solely because PW13 was more concerned about the continued business ties / joint venture that Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd had with THHE Fabricators. [36] On 18/6/2013, PW13 instructed the company’s Accounts Executive, Raja Ahmad Farhni bin Raja Sulaiman (PW12) to prepare a cheque of RM430,000.00 as preparation in case the company received the transfer fund of RM430,000.00 from THHE Fabricators. However, PW12 prepared a cheque (Exhibit P80) of RM431,028.00 because the additional sum of RM1,028.00 was for PW13's own use. [37] On 26/6/2013, PW13 received a cheque (Exhibit P26) dated 25/6/2013 amounting to RM430,000.00 from THHE Fabricators. PW13 handed over the cheque to PW12 to be deposited into the company’s bank account. PW12 prepared a false receipt (Exhibit P88) and invoice (Exhibit P18) for the money received from THHE Fabricators. On Exhibit P18 it was stated as “SUPPLY MANPOWER TO THHE AT YARD” whereas Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd had never supplied such services or work to THHE. However, the cheque (Exhibit P26) received from THHE was dishonored. Upon inquiry, PW13 was S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 informed that the bounced cheque (Exhibit P26) had been replaced with a new cheque (Exhibit P10) with the same amount and payment will be made by direct remittance / telegraphic transfer into the account of Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd. [38] On 27/6/2013, after having found that the money had been credited, PW13 went to Ambank to cash the cheque (Exhibit P80). That afternoon, on the same day, PW13 met the accused at his office located at Menara UOB Bangsar and handed over a bag containing the cash of RM430,000.00 directly to the accused. The accused thanked him and PW13 then left the accused’s office. The 4th CBT Charge and The 4th AMLATFA Charge [39] Sometime in September 2013, the accused instructed PW20 to prepare a cheque for RM600,000.00 made payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd to complete the RM2,000,000,00 allegedly to be given to some people at Murphy who the accused termed as the “Murphy guys”. PW20 then instructed PW18 and PW4 to prepare the payment voucher (Exhibit P14) and the cheque (Exhibit P17). The cheque was signed by PW20 and the accused. PW4 said that in the payment voucher it was stated that the purpose of the payment was for “MAN POWER SUPPLY”. However, PW4 confirmed that she did not received any invoice from Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd for the same. [40] The said cheque (Exhibit P17) was then deposited into the bank account of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The accused then informed PW8 that S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 the money was already in the account of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. After verifying the remittance, on 11/9/2013 PW8 and PW6 went to Maybank Kuala Terengganu and withdrew cash of RM600,000.00 via cheque (Exhibit P48). PW8 confirmed that Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd were forced to prepare a false invoice (Exhibit P21) to justify receipt of the RM600,000.00 from THHE Fabricators for the alleged work done. [41] PW6 gave the RM600,000.00 to PW8. Both of them later went to Kuala Lumpur and met the accused at Old Town White Coffee Cafe, Ara Damansara in Petaling Jaya. There, PW8 handed over the RM600,000.00 cash to the accused. [42] On 30/10/2023, PW20 met the accused at his office. Accused told PW20 that he required a final payment of RM575,800.00 to be paid to the Murphy guys. PW20 was quite reluctant to accede to the accused’s request because the full payment of RM2,000,000.00 supposed to have been paid to the Murphy guys had already been paid. PW20 said that the accused informed him that the actual amount to be paid to the Murphy guys was 1.5% of the PERMAS contract sum which amounted to RM2,575,833.00. The accused then directed PW20 to prepare the said payment and that it be made payable to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [43] PW20 then instructed PW18 and PW4 to prepare the payment voucher (Exhibit P5) and cheque (Exhibit P7) for the amount of RM575,800.00. Both the payment voucher and the cheque were signed by PW20 and counter- signed by the accused. The item in the payment invoice were written as “CONSULTATION FEE PERMAS”. PW18 and PW4 confirmed that the S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 payment was made without any supporting claims document from RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [44] RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was one of the contractors for THHE Fabricators. Sometime towards the end of July 2013, RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was awarded a project by THHE Fabricators. It was one of the packages in the PERMAS project. Payment for this project was based on milestone achievements. There were five milestones and for each milestone the payment was valued at RM1million. [45] On 30/10/2013, the Chief Executive Officer of RL Offshore Sdn Bhd Dato’ Hanaffi Bin Daud (PW11) testified that he met PW20 and the accused at the PJ Hilton Hotel. At the meeting, the cheque (Exhibit P7) for RM575,800.00 was given to PW11. The accused then asked PW11’s favour to encash the cheque and the cash sum of RM570,000.00 be given to him while the balance RM5,800.00 was to be kept by PW11. [46] On 31/10/2013, PW11 credited the RM575,800.00 cheque (Exhibit P7) into the account of RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [47] On 1/11/2013, PW11 withdrew cash of RM570,000.00 through 3 cheques (Exhibits P81A, P81B and P81C) from the account of RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. After that, PW11 met the accused at around 3.00 pm at Leaf Dining Restaurant at Mont Kiara and handed over the cash sum of RM570,000.00 to the accused. PW11 said he was constrained to agree with the demands S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 made by the accused because RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was tied-up to the PERMAS project and did not want to jeapordise it. [48] On 2/10/2013, RL Offshore Sdn Bhd made a claim of RM1 million to THHE Fabricators for the first milestone payment under the PERMAS project for work done in respect of the “PROVISION FOR THE SUPPLY OF CHEMICAL INJECTION PACKAGE FOR THE MURPHY’S SARAWAK SK13 PERMAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT” through vide invoice No. 039/13 (Exhibit P6). The said invoice was process by THHE on 31/10/2013. [49] Since THHE Fabricators had already paid the sum of RM575,800.00 to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd, there was the balance sum of RM424,200.00 due in December 2013 instead of the RM1 million claimed. Hence, only this sum of RM424,200.00 was paid to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [50] Dissatisfied with receiving only the amount of RM424,200.00, PW11 insisted the accused to pay for the full payment of the milestone claim of RM1,000,000,00. Due to the insistence by PW11, the accused turned to PW8 of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and asked PW8 to cover the amount of RM575,800.00 to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. Again, PW8 had no choice but to oblige. A cheque (Exhibit P49) for the said amount was later made out and encashed by PW6. Sometime in July 2014, PW6 gave the cash to PW8 to be given to PW11. The Defence [51] The accused elected to give evidence under oath. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [52] The accused further called eight (8) witnesses to testify on his behalf. The Accused’s Version. [53] He was at the material time the chief executive officer of THHE and one of the directors of THHE Fabricators. The accused version was essentially as follows. CBT Charge Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [54] The accused contended that there were problems caused by the migration of the management system from that of UBS System to ERP Microsoft Axapta, where the new system supplied limited descriptions for payments made to be made to contractors. To overcome this problem, the top management of THHE together with the Financial Division decided to use the general label of “consultancy” to speed up the payment process for work done by the contractors. [55] The system migration problem had affected THHE Fabricators’ ability to make speedy payment to the contractors. With limited financial resources, the contractors were unable to complete their contract works within stipulated time. The delay in completing the project would have seriously affected THHE’s reputation and would have exposed THHE Fabricators to very high liquidated ascertained damages. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [56] In order to speed up payment to the contractors, THHE management together with the Financial Division decided to give “advance payment” to certain contractors. [57] Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was a small scale company where the financial position of the company is very limited and depended on work demand. Hence, THHE needed to made advance payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd ahead of its normal schedule in order to finance the company’s preparation cost such as purchasing equipment and staff mobilisation so that the company be able to complete the contract works well within the timeline. [58] In 2013, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was awarded a piping works contract worth RM6.985 million in the Murphy Project by THHE Fabricators. At the same time, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was also involved in Shell D12 and Laila project where the delays in completion of the project were due to financial constraint faced by Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. To avoid and overcome the project delays, the accused and PW20 had signed a company cheque of RM400,000.00 as advance payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [59] A cheque (Exhibit P27) of RM570,000 was also made payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The said cheque was signed by PW20 and PW19. The accused testified that for both the cheques, there were no invoices attached with the cheques because they were advances payment. [60] Sometime in September 2013, the accused instructed PW20 to prepare a cheque (Exhibit P17) dated 9/9/2013 for RM600,000.00 made S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The cheque was signed by PW20 and the accused. The accused said that this was meant as advance payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [61] The accused said that the chief executive officer of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd, Murhasmee bin Mukthar (PW8) was aware of the advance payment arrangement made. This can be seen from the complaint PW8 make via e- mail send to the accused for THHE’s management to speed up Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd’s payment claims (see PW8 e-mails dated 26/11/2012, 9/1/2013, 1/2/2013, 14/2/2013, 21/3/2013 and 16/4/2013). Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. [62] There was a Teaming Agreement (Exhibit P43) dated 13/9/2012 between Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd and THHE. [63] THHE issued a Maybank cheque (Exhibit P10) of RM430,000.00 dated 26/6/2013 to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. The accused said that he had no knowledge of the purpose for the issuance of the cheque because it was not signed by him. PW20 and PW19 signed the cheque. [64] The accused only signed a THHE’s Maybank cheque (Exhibit P26) of RM430,000.00 made payable to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd as advance payment for claim made by Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [65] The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the payment voucher (Exhibit P9) which stated “Cash Advance - Payment for consultancy -Murphy”) because his signature does not appear in the voucher. RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [66] The company was one of THHE’s contractors under the PERMAS Project, and was awarded a supply work contract known as “Chemical Injection Package” worth RM 5million. [67] The company issued invoice (Exhibit P6) dated 1/10/2013 to THHE for milestone claim No.1 (“Provision for the supply of chemical injection package for Murphy’s Sarawak SK311 PERMAS Development Project”) amounting to RM1 million. [68] However, due to THHE’s financial difficulties, arrangement was made for the claim of RM1million be settled by way of two (2) payments i.e. a first payment of RM575,800.00 and followed by RM424,200.00. [69] On 1/11/2013, the accused together with PW20 met PW11 at the PJ Hilton Hotel to explain the financial difficulties faced by THHE at that point in time. At the same time, PW11 was given the RM575,800.00 cheque (Exhibit P7) dated 30/10/2013 by PW20 as part payment for the claim made by RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [70] Subsequently, THHE paid the balance sum of RM424,200.00 via Maybank cheque (Exhibit P30) dated 6/1/2014 to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Amlatfa Charges [71] All payments made to the contractors were valid and done in accordance with the law. [72] The accused denied receiving monies directly for himself or from PW8, PW11 and/or PW13. [73] The accused denied having demanded monies from PW8, PW11 and PW13. [74] No internal investigation was conducted by the Board of Directors against him and/or by the whistle blower committee of THHE and THHE Fabricators against him. [75] There were no proceeds of illegal activities derived from any criminal breach of trust on all the five (5) investigations against him. Hence, the accused and his family’s properties were returned without forfeiture. Alibi (3rd AMLATFA Charge) [76] On 27/9/2013, at about 3.00 pm, the accused attended an official meeting at the THHE meeting room with Mr. Ramon A. Chelva, an executive director of Pricewaterhouse Coopers Advisory Services Sdn Bhd (DW5). [77] The accused denied that he went out from the meeting room during his meeting with DW5 to meet PW13 (Mohd Razip bin Mohammad). He also S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 denied having received a bag containing cash of RM 430,000.00 from PW13. Allegation Made by PW20 Against Accused [78] The accused denied all the allegations made by PW20 against him. [79] On 15/2/2018, the accused filed a defamation suit at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court (KLSC Suit No. WA-B53F-2-02/2018) against PW20 for slandering him. [80] PW20 is not a credible or truthful witness. PW20 gave contradictory evidence in the defamation case and in the present criminal case. [81] On 21/12/2017, the accused’s wife, Datin Suraya binti Sharer (DW2) initiated a civil suit (WA-A53-13-12/2017) against PW20 for extortion. The accused alleged that PW20 had demanded money from DW2, and if not paid then PW20 threatened to give evidence against the accused in this criminal case. DW2 had paid the sum of RM80,000.00, and via the civil suit claimed for the return of the same. On 4/10/2018, the Sessions Court Judge in that civil suit found in favour of DW2 and ordered PW20 to repay the RM 80,000.00 in full. [82] PW20 was also charged in the Magistrate Court for extortion under section 384 Penal Code against DW2. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [83] The accused contended that PW20’s evidence was purely one of self -preservation and self-interest. Defence Witnesses Evidence [84] We shall now turn to the summary of evidence given by the defence witnesses. Suraya Binti Sharer @ Bahar (DW2) Evidence [85] She is the accused’s wife. [86] She was the Managing Director of Cekap Jati Sdn Bhd. [87] On 1/11/2015, PW20 was appointed as consultant of Cekap Jati Sdn Bhd. [88] Sometime in November 2016, the Malaysian Anti - Corruption Commission (“MACC”) investigated the accused. [89] On 24/1/2017, DW2 and her two (2) children were served with notices by the MACC for declaration of their assets. [90] On 19/4/2017, the Inland Revenue Board started investigation against DW2, Cekap Jati Sdn Bhd and its Group of Companies. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [91] The MACC froze DW2’s account and as well as his family members’ accounts for almost twelve (12) months. Freezing of the accounts were lifted on 15/11/2017. [92] Sometime in November 2018, Inland Revenue Board concluded their investigation and found that DW2 and her children’s assets were not derived from the accused’s funds or assets. [93] PW20 demanded RM1 million from DW2, failing which PW20 threatened to give unfavourable evidence against the accused in the criminal trial. [94] DW2 gave RM80,000.00 cash in three payments of RM20,000.00, RM30,000.00 and RM30,000.00 to PW20 after that threat. It took about two (2) months for her to settle the RM80,000.00. PW20 then further demanded from DW2 the balance of RM920,000.00. [95] On 5/10/2017, DW2 together with the accused went to Setapak police station and lodged a police report against PW20 for extortion. [96] On 6/10/2017, PW20 was arrested by the police. [97] On 2/12/2017, DW2 filed civil suit against PW20 to claim back the RM80,000.00 that she had given to PW20. [98] On 4/10/2018, the learned Sessions Court Judge gave judgment in favour of DW2. PW20 did not appeal against the said judgment. Until to-date, S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 PW20 failed to pay the judgment sum. Subsequently, DW2 filed bankruptcy proceeding against PW20. Siti Zulaikha Binti Mohd Sidek (DW3) Evidence [99] She was the Executive Secretary to the accused. [100] Her office desk was located outside the accused’s office. No one can enter the accused’s office without her permission. [101] On 27/ 6/2013 between 3.00 pm and 5.00 pm, the accused had scheduled an important / critical meeting with Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the THHE’s auditor. The accused told DW3 several times, even before the meeting started, that he did want to be disturbed during the meeting. [102] The meeting with Mr. Ramon A. Chelva (DW5) from Pricewaterhouse Coopers and his assistant started about 10 - 15 minutes before the scheduled time. From the Entry Log (Exhibit P163), the time DW5 entered the THHE building was 2.49 pm and exited at 3.54 pm. [103] To the best of DW3’s recollection, DW3 did not leave her desk between 2.00 pm to 4.00 pm on 27/6/2013. [104] The meeting was held in the accused’s office. As far as DW3 can recall, neither DW5 nor the accused left the meeting room during the course of the meeting. The meeting took an hour. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [105] Nobody entered the accused’s room during the course of the meeting. [106] DW3 said that from the time she clocked in and started work and until she left for the day, she may have gone to the washroom and for prayers for a few minutes. She never left her desk before and during the course of the meeting. [107] DW3 confirmed that she did not see Datuk Mohd Razip bin Mohammad (PW13) coming to see the accused on that day (27/8/2013). If he had come, DW3 would have known because she was at her desk from 1.00 pm to 2.00 pm and then between 2.00 pm to 4.00 pm. [108] DW3 pushed back on PW13’s testimony that PW13 was given an access card to the building that would permit him to enter THHE’s building as and when he wished. DW3 said she had never given PW13 an access card to allow him to access THHE building. [109] As far as she know, PW13 will have to register with the building security as a visitor just like any other visitor to the building. Inar Sawanis Binti Mustapa (DW4) Evidence [110] From 2/5/2012 until 14/9/2015, she served as the Internal Audit Executive of THHE. Later she left and joined Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd as Senior Executive Internal Audit. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [111] When she first started working at THHE, the company and its subsidiary companies were going through “migration of management system” proses from UBS System to ERP Microsoft Axapta system (ERP System). [112] Throughout the migration proses, THHEB and its subsidiary companies were having various problems. Financial Division and Subcontracting Department were among the division affected by this migration system. [113] Due to this migration, there could be delay in making timely payments to their contractor. This would affect the progress of the project. THHE may result high liquidated ascertained damages being impose by the suppliers/contractors if there was delay in the project. Compensation is a serious problem that will affect THHE’s reputation as a whole. [114] Internal Audit had not received any complaint or e-mail from Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd or RL Offshore Sdn Bhd that their demand for payment were irregular or that there was a breach of regulation. Ramon Albert Chelvarajasingam (DW5) Evidence [115] He was the Executive Director in Pricewaterhouse Coopers Malaysia (“PwC”). [116] Meeting between DW5 and the accused was scheduled on 27/6/2013 between 3.00 pm and 4.00 pm. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [117] The purpose of this meeting was for DW5 to present the scope of consultancy services that PwC could provide to THHE including potential pricing. Nothing specific. There were are other general matters such as about organisation, talent in organisation, cost level etc that were discussed. [118] DW5 arrived at THHE’s office, which was located at Menara UOA in Bangsar around 2.30 pm to 2.45 pm with his junior employee. [119] DW5 registered as a visitor at the security counter and went up to accused’s office. [120] DW5 and his colleague were shown to the accused’s office and the accused secretary informed the accused of their arrival. DW5 was then shown into the accused’s meeting room. [121] The meeting lasted approximately an hour and DW5 left the accused’s office at around 3.45 pm. [122] DW5 remembered that they were not interrupted by anyone during the course of the meeting and no one left the meeting at any time. Mohd Saiful Bin Mustapha (DW6) Evidence [123] From May 2013 to May 2014, DW6 served as Senior Manager Finance at THHE. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [124] When DW6 first started working at THHE, the company and its subsidiary companies were going through “migration of management system” proses from UBS System to ERP Microsoft Axapta (ERP System). [125] Throughout the migration prose, THHE and its subsidiary companies were having various problems. Financial Division and Subcontracting Department were among those affected by this migration system. [126] DW6 said that if the system did not function well and did not give accurate data, it will cause major problems to the company. When DW6 left THHE, the company was still having problems with the ERP Microsoft Axapta System (ERP System). Khairul Azam Bin Jaafar (DW7) Evidence [127] In the year 2012, he served as Finance Director at Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. [128] In 2012, Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd was awarded a work contract by THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd worth RM1.12million [129] In the middle of 2013, Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. was awarded another work contract by THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd worth RM1.80million [130] Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd received advance payment of RM 900,000.00 (50% from value of the contract) from THHE Fabricators on 26/6/2013 in order to help with its cash flow in the performance of the said contracts. The advance payment was necessary to ensure progress of the project and completion of S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 the contract works within time without imposition of any liquidated damages against Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. Zachary Ivan Scully (DW8) Evidence [131] Presently working as Legal Assistant at JK Lawyers in Melbourne, Australia. [132] In the year 2013, DW8 was working as the Head of Legal Department for THHE. [133] Joined THHE as the General Manager of Legal & Secretarial Department on or about 15/1/2012 and resigned from the same position on or about 30/9/2016. [134] At that time, there was migration of system from the UBS System to the new ERP software. [135] The migration of system had caused delay in the issuance of Purchase Orders. The delay was a problem to THHE because it affected payment claims by the subcontractors, causing delay to the project progress overall giving rise to potential claims for liquidated ascertained damages. Liquidated damages can wipe out the profits from a particular project. [136] To avoid delays, sometime advance payments were made to contractors even though they had not started works. Or sometime the work S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 would have started without Purchase Order and payment would then be made. [137] DW8 remembered at least two (2) contractors who were given advance payments. They are Soft Triangle Services Sdn Bhd and Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. [138] All payments require Purchase Order. Urgent scenario, the contractor started work without receiving a Purchase Order. [139] There was no report during his employment of any irregular payment made by THHE to Dato’ Mohd Razip (PW13), Dato Hanaffi Daud (PW11) and / or Murhasmee Mokhtar (PW8). The Relevant Provision of Law (a) Section 23 of the Penal Code defines ‘wrongful gain’ and ‘wrongful loss’ as follows: “Wrongful gain” and “wrongful loss” “23. “Wrongful gain” is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. “Wrongful loss” is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. A person is said to gain wrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquires wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 any property, as well as when such person is wrongfully deprived of property.” (b) Section 24 of the Penal Code defines ‘dishonestly” as follows: “Dishonestly” “24. Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person, or wrongful loss to another person, irrespective of whether the act causes actual wrongful loss or gain, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”. Explanation—In relation to the offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust it is immaterial whether there was an intention to defraud or to deceive any person.” (c) Section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as follows: “Alibi” “402A. (1) The Court shall, at the time the accused is being charged, inform the accused as to his right to put forward a defence of alibi. (2) Where the accused seeks to put forward a defence of alibi, he shall put forward a notice of his alibi during the case management process. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where the accused has not put forward a notice of his alibi during the case management process, he may adduce evidence in support of an alibi at any time during the trial subject to the following conditions: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 (a) the accused has given a written notice of the alibi to the Public Prosecutor; and (b) the Public Prosecutor is given a reasonable time to investigate the alibi before such evidence can be adduced. (4) The notice required under this section shall include particulars of the place where the accused claims to have been at the time of the commission of the offence with which he is charged, together with the names and addresses of any witnesses whom he intends to call for the purpose of establishing his alibi.” (d) Section 405 of the Penal Code reads as follows: 405. Criminal breach of trust. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property either solely or jointly with any other person, dishonestly misappropriates, or converts to his own use, that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that, dishonestly misappropriates, or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust". (e) Section 409 of the Penal Code reads as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant or agent Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, in his capacity of a public servant or an agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years and not more than twenty years and with whipping, and shall also be liable to fine. (f) Section 409B of the Penal Code reads as follows: “Presumption” “409B. (1) Where in any proceeding it is proved- (a) for any offence prescribed in sections 403 and 404, that any person had misappropriated any property; or (b) for any offence prescribed in sections 405, 406, 407, 408 and 409, that any person entrusted with property or with dominion over property had- (i) misappropriated that property; (ii) used or disposed of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 implied which he had made touching the discharge of such trust; or (iii) suffered any person to do any of the acts described in subparagraph (i) or (ii) above, it shall be presumed that he had acted dishonestly until the contrary is proved.” (g) Section 3 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 define: "proceeds of an unlawful activity" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of any unlawful activity;", “unlawful activity" means any activity which is related, directly or indirectly, to any serious offence or any foreign serious offence; “serious offence" means - (a) any of the offences specified in the Second Schedule; (b) an attempt to commit any of those offences; or (c) the abetment of any of those offences; (h) Section 3 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 defines money laundering as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 “Interpretation” “3(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires - "money laundering" means the act of a person who – (a) engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves proceeds of any unlawful activity; (b) acquires, receives, possesses, disguises, transfers, converts, exchanges, carries, disposes, uses, removes from or brings into Malaysia proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (c) conceals, disguises or impedes the establishment of the true nature, origin, location, movement, disposition, title of, rights with respect to, or ownership of, proceeds of any unlawful activity, where; (aa) as may be inferred from objective factual circumstance, the person knows or has reason to believe, that the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity; or (bb) in respect of the conduct of a natural person, the person without reasonable excuse fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether or not the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity;". (i) Section 4 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 reads as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 (1) Any person who - (a) engages in, or attempts to engage in; or (b) abets the commission of, money laundering, commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five million ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. (2) A person maybe convicted of an offence under subsection (1) irrespective of whether there is a conviction in respect of a serious offence or foreign serious offence or that a prosecution has been initiated for the commission of a serious offence or foreign serious offence." The Law on Appellate Intervention [140] The law on the appellate intervention is quite settled. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing the finding of facts arrived at by the trial judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding. [141] In Herchun Singh & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209, Ong Hock Thye CJ (as he then was) said as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 “An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding.” [142] In Yahaya bin Mohamad v. Chin Tuan Nam [1975] 1 LNS 195; [1975] 2 MLJ 117 the Privy Council held: (1) As in this case the learned trial judge had based his finding on the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness, his finding should not have been disturbed; (2) This was not one of those rare cases where an Appellate Court, lacking the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, was justified in coming to a different conclusion from the trial judge on the question of credibility. There was no reason to think that the trial judge had not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses. [143] In Ye Wei Gen v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 4 SLR 101, Yong Pung How CJ (as he then was) said: “It is trite law that an appellate court will be slow to overturn the trial judge 's finding of fact unless it can be shown that his decision was plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence before him... These cases thus stand for the principle that findings of fact by the trial judge S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 are prima facie correct unless there are very good grounds for disturbing them.” [144] In Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2004] 3 CLJ 737 the Federal Court held as follows: “Clearly, an appellate court does not and should not put a brake and not goinq any further the moment it sees that the trial judge says that is his finding of facts. It should go further and examine the evidence and the circumstances. under which that finding is made to see whether, to borrow the words of HT Ong (CJ Malaya) in Herchun Singh's case (supra) "there resubstantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding". Otherwise, no judgment would ever be reversed on question of fact and the provision of s. 87 CJA 1964 that an appeal may lie not only on a question of law but also on a question of fact or on a question of mixed fact and law would be meaningless" [145] In PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 2 MLRA 590, the Federal Court held as follows: “Now, it settled law that it is no part of the function of an appellate Court in a criminal case - or indeed any case - to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial Court. The reason is obvious an appellate Court is necessarily fettered because it lacks the audio-visual advantage enjoyed by the trial Court." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [146] In Che Omar Mohd Akhir v. Public Prosecutor [2007] 3 CLJ 281, the Federal Court speaking through Nik Hashim FCJ (as he then was) held as follows: “It is trite law that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing a finding of facts by the trial judge unless such finding is clearly against the weight of evidence which is not the case here". [147] In Wan Marzuki bin Wan Abdullah v. PP [2008] 1 MLRA 479, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “There is clear authority for the proposition that in an appeal of this nature which turns on questions of fact particularly in relation to issues of credibility, this court will be reluctant to interfere with the findings made by the primary trier of fact." [148] In UEM Group Bhd v. Genisy Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2018] Supp MLJ 363, Rauf Sharif FCJ (as he then was) said:- [26] ... the prime issue is whether the Court of Appeal had erred in interfering with the findings of facts of the trial judge. It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [149] In P'ng Hun Sun v. Yip Yee Foo [2013] 2 AMCR 350; [2013] 6 MLJ 523, Mohd Zawawi Salleh FCJ (as he then was) held as follows: “When the finding of the trial judge is factual, however, the fact finder's decision cannot be disturbed on appeal unless the decision of the fact finding is plainly wrong (see China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn (and Another Appeal) [1996] 2 AMR 2233; [1996] 2 MLJ 517; [1996] 3 CLJ 163; Zaharah bt A. Kadir v. Ramuna Bauxite Pte Ltd & Anor [2012] 1 AMR 209; [2011] 1 LNS · 1015; Kyros International Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2013] 4 AMR 55; [2013} 2 MLJ 650; [2013] 1 LNS 1). The findings of fact of the trial judge can only be reversed when it is positively demonstrated to the appellate court that: (a) by reason of some non-direction or mix-direction or otherwise the judge erred in accepting the evidence which he or she did accept; or (b) in assessing and evaluating the evidence the judge has taken into account some matter which he or she ought not to have taken into account, or failed to take into account some matter which he or she ought to have taken into account; or S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 (c) it unmistakenly appears from the evidence itself, or from the unsatisfactory reasons given by the judge for accepting it, that he or she cannot have taken proper advantage of his or her having seen and heard the witnesses; or (d) insofar aside judge has relied on manner and demeanour, there are other circumstances which indicate that the evidence of the witness which he or she accepted is not credible, as for instance. where those witnesses have on some collateral matter deliberately given an untrue answer." [penekanan ditambah] [150] In Amri Ibrahim & Anor v. PP [2017] 1 CLJ 617, the Federal Court held as follows: “[51] It is trite law that the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of a witness must be given proper weight and consideration. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there were substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing.” [12] In LCY v. TWY [2019) 7 CLJ 158, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[26] The principle of law on appellate intervention is settled. In Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 453, the Federal Court reiterated the principle as follows at p. 476: [60] It is now established that the principle on which an appellate court interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is "the plainly wrong test" principle; see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor (P) v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Anor [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2005] 1 MLJ 1 (at p. 10) per Steve Shim CJ SS. More recently, this principle of appellate intervention was affirmed by the Federal Court in UEM Group Berhad v Genisys lntergrated Engineers Pte Ltd /2010] 9 CLJ 785 where it was held at p. 800: It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence (See Chew Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978]1 LNS 32; Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484; and Chin v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 [151] In Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 12 MLJ 67, Zabariah FCJ when delivering the judgment of the court had said: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 [148] Given the aforesaid, we form the view that rather than adopting a rigid set of rules to demarcate the boundaries of appellate intervention insofar as findings of fact are concerned, the "plainly wrong" test as espoused in decisions of this court should be retained as a flexible guide for appellate courts. As long as the trial judge's conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts. [152] In a fairly recent case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Pentadbir Kepada Harta Pusaka Tan Ewe Kwang, Simati & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 12 MLJ 67 the Federal Court held that: “[33] It was a long-settled principle, stated and restated in domestic and wider common law jurisprudence, that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless satisfied that he was plainly wrong' (the Supreme Court of United Kingdom in McGraddie v. McGraddie and another [2013] 1 WLR 2477)." "[5] The 'plainly wrong' test operated on the principle that the trial court had had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses on their evidence as opposed to the appellate court that acted on S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 the printed records. The 'plainly wrong' test was not intended to be used by an appellate court as a means to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. As long as the trial court's conclusion could be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court felt like it might have decided differently was irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence was examined by the appellate courts (see paras 34, 76 & 148)." Petition of Appeal [153] Before us, the learned counsels for the accused raised twenty-six- grounds of appeal. (1) The Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and in fact when Her Honour convicted the accused in respect of all the 9 charges, namely 5 counts of offences under criminal breach of trust (s.409 charges) and 4 counts of offences under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (section 4(1)(a) AMLATFPUAA charges). The Learned High Court Judge erred when His Lordship affirmed all the convictions; (2) The Learned Sessions Court Judge erred when Her Honour failed to judicially appreciate the defence of the Appellant. Her S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 Honour failed to recognise that the core or basic defence of the Appellant was never challenged by the prosecution, hence ought to have been accepted. Her Honour further erred in law when Her Ladyship criticised the defence as a bare denial and ruled that the evidence of the other witnesses not relevant; (3) The Learned High Court Judge seriously erred when His Lordship erroneously interpreted the application of the case of Wong Swee Chin [1981] 1 MLJ 212 to the disadvantage and prejudice of the accused – see paragraphs 109-113 of the Written Judgment (4) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and in fact when they failed to appreciate the defence case. They ought to have asked themselves the following relevant questions: (a) Whether the non-challenge of the accused’s defence by the prosecution amounted to the accused raising a reasonable doubt to the prosecution’s case? and (b) Whether the non-challenge of the accused’s defence by the prosecution amounted to the accused having successfully rebutted the presumption under section 409B(1)(b)(i) of the Penal Code? This glaring omission is a serious non-direction amounting to an appealable error. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 (5) The Learned High Court Judge erred when His Lordship failed to consider the defence of the accused in respect of the five (5) section 409 charges. His Lordship only applied his mind to the section 4(1)(a) AMLATFPUAA charges as can be seen at paragraph 110 of the Written Judgment. This failure to consider is a serious misdirection warranting appellate intervention; (6) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in convicting the accused based upon evidence of witnesses whose credibility was clearly at stake; (7) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in finding that the accused had dominion and/or power of disposal over the subject matter of the charges under section 409 of the Penal Code, i.e., cheques of THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd; (8) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to rule that the accused’s defence has successfully rebutted the statutory presumption undersection 409B(1) of the Penal Code on a balance of probabilities ; (9) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to accord adequate and fair judicial appreciation to the accused defence; S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 (10) The Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate accused’s the Appellant’s alibi which was properly admitted under section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code; (11) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in meting out sentence which is manifestly excessive without taking into account the overall circumstances of the case; (12) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in facts in upholding the Learned Sessions Court Judge’s finding that there was no reason to refuse the evidence of PW20. The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge did not critically evaluate the credibility of PW20 and had failed to consider or sufficiently appreciate that: (a) PW20 was dishonest on multiple occasions during his cross examination; (b) PW20 was a self-serving witness and had motive to lie as a witness to implicate the Appellant; (c) PW20 was a self-serving witness and had motive to lie because he was trying to save himself for failing to properly discharge his duty as an employee of THHE (“the Company”); S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 (d) PW20’s allegation that he was told that the Appellant was required to pay a sum of 1.5% of the Permas Contract to Murphy was inconsistent with the documentary evidence showing the value of the Permas Contract; (e) PW20’s conduct during his employment at Cekap Jati showed that he was unworthy of credibility because it demonstrated his propensity to provide evidence in a manner that was most favourable to him; and (f) PW20 has an axe to grind against the Appellant and there was evidence that PW20 had subsequently defamed the Appellant and extorted the Appellant’s wife. (13) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law in failing to appreciate and consider that there is a difference between the property in a cheque and property in money in a bank account. The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the “property” described in the charges were cheques which has been paid to the named payees of the various cheques and accordingly, there was no misappropriation or conversion of the cheques within the meaning of section 405 of the Penal Code; (14) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in facts in finding that entrustment of property has been established when the Appellant exercised dominion and control over the payments which were made. The Learned High Court Judge failed to S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 appreciate or sufficiently consider that the approval authority matrix of THHE required each of the signatories to the cheques to exercise independent control when issuing any cheques; (15) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in upholding the conviction of the Appellant in relation to criminal breach of trust of the cheque dated 30/4/2013 for the sum of RM 400,000.00 despite the Appellant having been acquitted of the money laundering charge in respect of the same cheque. The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate or sufficiently consider that the alibi of the Appellant ought to have been accepted for both charges given that the evidence relied on by the prosecution to establish both the criminal breach of trust and the receipt of the sum of RM400,000.00 were identical. The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to consider or sufficiently appreciate that there was insufficient evidence for the Learned Sessions Court Judge to convict the Appellant of criminal breach of trust having accepted the defence of alibi; (16) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate or sufficiently consider that the sum of RM575,800.00 in relation to CBT 5 was for works done and therefore could not amount to any wrongful loss to the Company; (17) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in facts in finding that the Appellant had pocketed the cash for himself, amounting S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 to an act of misappropriation. The Learned High Court Judge failed to consider or sufficiently consider that save for the testimony of PW8, PW11 and PW13, there is no independent evidence to demonstrate that the Appellant had received the cash for himself; (18) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law when His Lordship failed to consider or sufficiently appreciate that the possibility that PW8, PW11 and PW13 had retained the monies for their own use; (19) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate or sufficiently consider the fact that there was a gap in the prosecution’s case as the investigating officer failed to investigate the possibility that PW8, PW11 and PW13 had retained the funds for their own personal use. The Learned High Court Judge failed to consider and appreciate that the Defence had established through concessions in cross examination that PW8, PW11 and PW13 had lifestyles and assets that far exceeded their incomes; (20) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when held that the evidence of PW 8 PW11 and PW 13 was credible and believable. The Learned High Court Judge failed to consider or sufficiently appreciate that the Defence had produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that PW8, PW11 and PW13 may have retained the monies that they withdrew for their own use; S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 (21) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law in failing to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge had used the particulars of one offence to support and corroborate the others; (22) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to sufficiently appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge had failed to apply the necessary warning when applying similar facts evidence; (23) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge failed to sufficiently warn herself when relying on the evidence of PW8 PW11 and PW13 to support and corroborate one another because they were accomplices; (24) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge failed to caution herself regarding the use of accomplice evidence without corroboration; and (25) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law in failing to consider or sufficiently appreciate the fact that there was no wrongful loss to to the Company as it remained indebted to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd; S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 (26) The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the prosecution had failed to prove that the Company had overpaid Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd Corail Intoil Sdn Bhd. and/or RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. Our Decision [154] We shall first deal with CBT Charge No.5 and AMLATFA No.5. The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, fairly, and quite properly, conceded to the appeal in respect of both CBT Charge 5 and AMLATFA 5 as it was clear from the evidence of PW 1 (Kamaruzaman bin Ahmad, the chief operating officer of THHE that the payment of RM575,800.00 made to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was pursuant to a valid and legitimate agreement with RL Offshore Sdn Bhd for work done under that contract. So we therefore allowed the appeal in respect of these two charges and set-aside the conviction and sentences in respect of the same. [156] We shall now deal with the remaining charges. One of the main ground argued by the learned counsel for the accused was that both the learned Sessions Judge and the learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when they failed to judicially appreciate the defence case. In particular, that both the Courts below failed to recognise that the defence of the accused in respect of all the 9 charges was not challenged by the prosecution. [157] It was strenuously contended for the accused that for the AMLATFA Charges No.2, No.4 and No.5 the learned Sessions Court Judge has misdirected herself in the following areas, namely: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 (i) in not appreciating that the defence of the accused was not challenged by the prosecution. Thus, it means the prosecution accepts the evidence of the accused; and (ii) consequently, unfairly and wrongly describing the defence of the appellant as a bare denial. The defence of AMLA Charge 5 was dismissed by the learned Sessions Court Judge in a one liner - see pg.110 (para 104 - Vol. 1). [158] As far as Charge CBT 5 and AMLATFA 5 is concerned, we have already decided that the conviction for both the charges could not stand, and the matter has been put to rest. [159] As for CBT Charge No. 3 and corresponding AMLATFA Charge No.3, the defence of the accused was one of alibi. The notice of alibi given by the accused under section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code states that the accused was having a meeting in his office with DW5 at the material date and time as stated in both the charges. [160] To support his alibi the accused called DW3 (Siti Zulaikha Binti Mohd Sidek) and DW5 (Ramon Albert Chelvarajasingham) essentially to prove that the accused was having an uninterrupted meeting with DW5. It was the accused’s defence that SP13 (Dato’ Mohd Razip bin Mohammad) did not come to his office and consequently he did not give the accused the sum of RM 430,000.00 as alleged. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 [161] Counsel for the accused strongly contended that there was in effect no challenge to the accused’s alibi evidence and by reason of the non challenge, the accused’s alibi was not negated by the prosecution. It was submitted that the learned Session Court Judge ought to have held that the prosecution by reason of the non-challenge had conceded to the defence alibi and further the evidence of SP13’s on this point was suspect when SP 13 said that he arrived at 3.30 pm and delivered the cash to the accused when the visitor log book of THHE which is exhibit P163 showed that DW5 came for the meeting with the accused at 2.49 pm and left at 3.54 pm. [162] In our view, we find that the evidence given by DW3 and DW5 and the entry in visitor log book (P163) supported the accused’s defence of alibi and that there was a failure by the trial judge to judicially appreciate this crucial evidence. In our considered view there were merits in this argument. Even though it was not disputed that the accused was at his office at the material time but the critical issue here is whether PW13 was present at the accused’s office at 3.30pm and delivered the money to the accused as stated in the charge. We are of the view that the finding of the trial judge in this regard went against the grain of evidence. It would be unsafe to sustain the conviction handed down by the learned Session Court Judge and the High Court Judge in respect of both these charges and thus appellate intervention is therefore warranted. Hence, we allowed the appeal in respect of CBT No. 3 and AMLATFA No. 3 charges and set aside the conviction and sentence handed down by the learned High Court Judge in respect to these two charges. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 [163] However, it is important to stress at this stage, that even though we were with the accused on the alibi issue in respect of the CBT No. 3 and AMLATFA No. 3 charges, it cannot be gainsaid that PW13 may have made an untruthful statement or wholly untrue testimony sufficient to destroy the credibility of PW3. There was some doubt in respect of the time stated in these two charges, and we gave the benefit of that doubt to the accused. This does not mean that PW13’s credibility as a whole was affected. The matter of credibility or veracity of PW13’s testimony in respect of the other remaining charges would have to be determined when dealing with these charges. We were of the view that in this regard the learned trial judge was in a better position to decide this since she was the one who saw and heard PW13’s testimony. Further, it is not appropriate at this stage for us to deal with the credibility issue of PW13. We will cross that bridge when we come to it. [164] Now we shall deal with the other main thrust of the submission by the learned counsel for the accused which revolved around the failure of the prosecution to challenge the narrative of the defence in cross-examination of the accused and his witnesses as regards all the remaining CBT and AMLATFA charges. [165] The evidence which the learned counsel sought to rely on essentially was as per the accused’s written statement [para 56 to para 60] which are reproduced herein: “56. Saya sesekali menegaskan bahawa kesemua pembayaran kepada kontraktor-kontraktor berkenaan melalui cek ditandatangani S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 oleh saya adalah sah disisi undang-undang dan sesuai bagi perkhidmatan dan/atau kerja yang dilaksanakan. 57. Saya menafikan segala tomahan penerimaan wang oleh saya, samada selaku CEO THHEB atau pengarah THHEFSB, daripada Encik Murhasmee Bin Mukhtar (SP-8), Dato Mohd Razip Bin Mohammad (SP-13) serta Dato' Hanaffi Bin Daud (SP11). 58. Saya juga menekan bahawa saya, samada selaku CEO THHEB atau pengarah THHEFSB, tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa membuat permintaan wang daripada Encik Murhasmee Bin Mukhtar (SP-8), Dato' Mohd Razip Bin Mohamad (SP-13) serta Dato' Hanaffi Bin Daud (SP-11). 59. Sepanjang tempoh perkhidmatan saya selaku CEO THHEB dan pengarah THHEFSB, saya tidak pernah menghadapi sebarang siasatan dalaman oleh pihak lembaga pengarah dan/atau pihak jawatankuasa pemberi maklumat ("Whistle Blower Committee") THHEB dan THHEFSB.” 60. Pada akhir siasatan berkenaan kelima-Iima (5) pertuduhan ini, harta-harta saya serta harta-harta ahli keluarga saya telah dipulangkan tanpa sebarang pelucuthakan ("return without forfeiture") memandangkan kesemua ini bukanlah hasil daripada aktiviti-aktiviti menyalahi undang undang mahupun hasil daripada pecah amanah dibawah S.409 KK." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 [166] The learned counsel for the accused contended that the above evidence which was contrary to that of the prosecution witnesses, namely SP8, SP13 and SP11, was not challenged by the prosecution during cross- examination. As such the learned counsel argued that the version of the accused must be accepted as it remains unchallenged. Learned counsel cited a long lists of authorities in support of that proposition, and in particular counsel relied on the dicta in Wong Swee Chin (supra) to further that argument. [167] Be that as it may, it is worthy of emphasis that the Federal Court in Wong Swee Chin also held that there is an exception to this general rule where: (i) the story (testimony) is itself of an incredible or romancing character, (ii) the abstention arises from mere motives of delicacy, (iii) when counsel indicates that he is merely abstaining for convenience to save time, (iv) where several witnesses are called to the same point, it is not always necessary to cross-examine them all. [168] In reply, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor referred to the case of Chan Chi Kong v. The Queen [1964] HKCU 94.1 where Hogan CJ of Hong Kong in this unreported judgment held that: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 "To say that failure to cross-examine amounts, in itself, to an admission does, I think go too far... " [169] So the essential contention by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor was that the non cross-examination by itself does not amount to an admission. Though the prosecution did not cross- examine the accused in respect of some of those evidence that does not mean it is tacit admission of the defence version. It must noted that in Wong Swee Chin itself the Federal Court spoke of an exception to the general rule on the failure to cross -examine and its consequences. Learned Deputy Public Prosecutor argued that even if there was failure to cross-examine it was not fatal to the prosecution case and that the court must still consider the totality of the evidence to ascertained if it conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. In this regards we were referred to a passage in Wong Swee Chin where the Federal Court held at page 213 as follows: “In our view, although there was a misdirection by the trial judge on this point it did not affect the correctness of the verdict as the totality of the evidence points conclusively to the guilt of the appellant”. [170] In addition, the learned Deputy further cited the Singapore case of Liza bte Ismail v. PP [1997] 2 SLR 454 where Yong Pung How CJ held as follows: "Although the general proposition is that testimony not subjected to contradiction in cross-examination may be treated as unchallenged S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 and thus accepted by the opposition party, the court is still entitled to reject such testimony: Patric v. John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505, per Samuels JA at p 507; see also Hunt J's observations at p 18 in Allied Pastoral Holdings. A careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence must still be undertaken to determine the cogency and weight of such testimony. In other words, it need not always follow that the whole of the appellant's testimony would have to be accepted by the court, nor that the conviction in respect of DAC 9796 would ineluctably be considered flaw." [171] In another Singapore decision of Awtar Singh s/o Mangar Singh v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 SLR 439, the Court held as follows: "I did not find it strictly necessary for the prosecution to put to the appellant that he saw the immigration offenders during his visits. It was apparent to the appellant what the prosecution's case was and it was that the immigration offenders saw him at the premises collecting rent and performing various other tasks pertaining to the upkeep of the premises. His defence was a complete denial that he had ever seen these immigration offenders. That being the case, in my view, it could not be said that the failure to put the question to the appellant resulted in any procedural unfairness to him, in the sense that he had been deprived of an opportunity to explain his evidence which would amount to nothing more than another denial that he had not seen them before." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 [172] In the Malaysian case of Public Prosecutor v. Radhakrishnam Syam & Ors and another case [2023] MLJU 1324, the Court held that: “[108] In my considered judgment, PP v. Cheah Leong Foo does not stand for a general proposition of law that a reasonable doubt must arise in all such circumstances where the prosecution has failed to cross examine the defence witness on the fact in dispute. Rather, the court must still proceed to weigh the relative merits of the competing assertions, mindful of the standard of proof that must be discharged by the respective parties. The ordinary principles would apply on evaluating the evidence of the witness of the defence: does the court believe the defence witness? If so, it must acquit. If it does not believe the witness, the court must proceed to ask itself a further question: has the testimony of the witness given rise to a reasonable doubt? If the answer is in the affirmative, then court must acquit.” [173] Now the issue before us is whether the failure of the learned trial judge to consider this unchallenged evidence, had occasioned a failure of justice and denied to accused to a fair trial. Did the accused know what he was being tried for and whether he had been given a full and fair chance to defend himself. If the answers are in the affirmative, then there has been no prejudice to the accused and no failure of justice. But if the answers are in the negative, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. [174] The duty of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal where misdirection has occurred is well settled by the Supreme Court in Lorensus S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 Tukan v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 MLJ 251, where the court held as follow: “Misdirection is not of itself a sufficient ground to justify interference with the verdict; the appellate court must proceed respectively to consider whether the verdict is erroneous owing to the misdirection or whether the misdirection has occasioned a failure of justice. If the court so finds, then it has a duty to interfere. In deciding whether there has been a failure of justice in consequence of a misdirection, the appellate court is entitled to take the whole case into consideration and determine for itself whether there has been a failure of justice in the sense that a guilty man has been acquitted or an innocent one convicted (see Abdul Rahim v. King Emperor (1945 - 46) 73 IA 77).” [175] The overriding concern now is whether there has been a failure of justice or miscarriage of justice in the eye of the law arising from the failure of the prosecution to challenge the core assertion of defence. [176] From our close scrutiny of the record and in particular the judgment of the learned trial judge and the learned High Court judge, we are of the considered view that failure of the prosecution to cross-examine the accused on a crucial part per se does not amount to an admission or acceptance of the accused’s testimony. We must consider the totality of the evidence and decision must be based on an examination of all the evidence presented and not evidence in isolation. Moreover, it is also apparent from the learned trial judge’s comprehensive judgment that she had directed herself on the issue of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and accepted their evidence. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 [177] For ease of reference, the findings of the learned trial judge on credibility can be clearly seen at Appeal Record Enclosure 13 Volume 2, pages 90-91 where she said: Kredibiliti saksi - saksi [64] Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan semua saksi dalam kes inl dan mendapati bahawa keterangan mereka adalah konsisten antara satu sama lain walaupun telah disoal balas secara bertubi-tubi oleh pihak pembelaan. Keterangan SP20 iaitu saksi utama dalam kes ini secara keseluruhannya boleh diterima dan tiada sebab untuk Mahkamah menolak keterangan SP20. Begitu juga dengan keterangan SP4 dan SP18. Ketiga-tiga mereka merupakan saksi penting yang menjelaskan secara terperinci mengenal kejadian yang telah berlaku, iaitu dari mula arahan diberi oleh OKT sehingga cek didepositkan ke akaun syarikat BSSB, CISB dan RL Offshore. Dalam melaksanakan arahan-arahan daripada OKT, SP20, SP18 dan SP4 tidak boleh dipersalahkan kerana mereka cuma menurut perintah OKT yang merupakan pegawai atasan mereka. Mereka juga tidak mendapat apa-apa manfaat atau keuntungan hasil dari perbuatan tersebut. [65] Begitu juga dengan keterangan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 yang merupakan pihak yang menerima dan menunaikan cek - cek yang diberi kepada syarikat mereka dan menyerahkan wang tersebut kepada OKT. Keterangan mereka bahawa cek - cek tersebut S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 bukan merupakan bayaran atas kerja-kerja yang dilaksanakan oleh syarikat mereka dan syarikat tidak membuat tuntutan untuk pembayaran tersebut hendaklah diterima. Sebagaimana SP20, SP18 dan SP4, mereka juga tidak mendapat sebarang keuntungan hasil pengeluaran wang THHE ini. Mereka menyatakan bahawa mereka dalam keadaan serba salah dan terpaksa menurut kehendak OKT memandangkan mereka mempunyai kontrak kerja dengan THHE.” [178] In short, in her grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of PW4, PW8, PW20, PW11 and PW13 after holding that there were no cogent reasons to disbelieve them. [179] Having made the above finding, the learned trial judge then went on to make the following conclusion at paragraph 68 and 69 of the judgment: [68] Keterangan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 dikuatkan lagi dengan keterangan SP20, SP18 dan SP4 yang merupakan pegawai - pegawai di bahagian kewangan THHE. Keterangan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 bahawa tiada tuntutan bayaran dibuat oleh pihak syarikat disokong oleh keterangan SP20, SP18 dan SP4 yang menyatakan bahawa OKT yang memberi arahan supaya pembayaran dibuat tanpa dokumen sokongan seperti invois dan pesanan belian (purchase order) yang dikemukakan oleh pihak syarikat. [69] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa saksi-saksi pendakwaan SP20, SP18 dan SP4, SP8, SP11 dan SP13 adalah merupakan saksi-saksi yang boleh dipercayai dan telah memberi keterangan yang konsisten S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 sepanjang perbicaraan. Tiada sebab untuk mereka memberikan keterangan palsu dan berkomplot untuk memfitnah OKT.” [180] In this respect, the learned High Court Judge accepted these findings when he held at paragraph 54-59 Appeal Record Enclosure 11 Volume 1 of his grounds judgment as follows: [54] In finding that the prosecution's witnesses were credible, the learned trial judge reasoned that the prosecution's witnesses were consistent in their evidence despite the rigorous cross examination. According to the learned trial judge, she had no reason to reject the evidence of PW20 despite the challenge by the defence that PW20 may be a self-serving witness and there were various contradictions in his testimony. [56] The learned counsel anchored the challenge on the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses on the following grounds: (a) that the learned trial judge failed to critically evaluate the conduct and behaviour of PW20 as a whole, (b) that the learned trial judge failed to consider the defence evidence which showed that PW8, PW11 and PW13 was not credible as they may have retained the monies they withdrew for their own purpose, and S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 (c) that the conviction was based on the evidence of PW8 and PW20 whose credibility was clearly at stake. [57] In my considered view, the learned trial judge had correctly considered and assessed the credibility of PW8, PW11, PW13 and PW20 in accordance with established legal principles. In her grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge had considered certain material facts. These facts are material as they may be used as a testbed in assessing the credibility of the relevant witnesses in the circumstances of present appeal. They are as follows: (a) instructions were given for cheques to be prepared even without any invoices or claims for payments; (b) sham invoices and sham receipts were made for the various payments; (c) certain cheques were encashed and the monies were personally delivered to the accused; (d) certain cheques were replaced pursuant to instructions for payments to be credited directly into the recipients' bank accounts despite no request for such direct remittances; (e) PW11 of RL Offshore went on to claim for the balance payment of RM575,800.00 in respect of the 1st milestone S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 claim despite a cheque for the same amount has been prepared and paid out; (f) at the request of the accused, PW8 had to make good the claim made by PW11 whereas the payment should be made by THHE instead; (g) at the material times, Bicara Sepakat, Coral lntoil and RL Offshore all had subsisting projects with THHE; and (h) as the finance executives of THHE, PW4 and PW18 were merely following instructions and had no authority of their own to prepare the cheques for the respective amounts without instructions. Both of them had not gained anything. [58] Had the payments were for valid reasons, there would not be questions about instructions for cheques being prepared without any claim for payments, there would not be sham invoices and receipts issued, there would not be similar claims made despite payment for the same amount having been "made", there would not be payments having had to be made by Bicara Sepakat to RL Offshore. [59] I am of the considered view that the findings of the learned trial judge in respect of credibility and assessment of the totality of the evidence accords with the probabilities of the case. They did ring true. ln assessing credibility of the witnesses, I am thus of the considered view that the learned trial judge had properly availed herself of the audio-visual advantage.” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 [181] Now, we at this court also find ourselves in agreement with the above finding made by both the learned trial judge and the learned High Court Judge. The appeal by the accused turns upon pure questions of fact. These were findings of fact made by the trial judge who had the audio and visual advantage of observing and assessing the demeanour of the prosecution’s material witnesses testifying before her, something which we do not possess. Such findings of fact by the trial judge is therefore to remain undisturbed unless of course if the fact finding is plainly wrong, which we find is not the case here. [182] On the evidence, we are fully satisfied that the learned trial judge had not erred and her findings were fully supported by the abundance by both oral and documentary evidence heaped against the accused. In our view, it leaves no leeway for appellate interference in the circumstances of this case. [183] It must be borne in mind that, Bicara Setakat Sdn Bhd, Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd and RL Offshore Sdn Bhd all had subsisting projects with THHE. Certainly, they do not want to lose their business deals with THHE. They were at the mercy of the accused. The accused took undue advantage of the business relationship that THHE had with these companies. PW8, PW11 and PW13 had no choice but reluctanty to follow the demands of the accused in order not to jeopardise their working relationship with the accused. They had but to follow all instructions of the accused. They were caught between the proverbial devil and the deep blue sea. Hence, they had S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 71 no reasons to lie or made up stories regarding the accused’s involvement in these act. [184] When all the evidence is considered even with an indulgent eye, it is impossible for any court to doubt that the request came from the accused. He had the opportunity and authority to make the request. The prior arrangement and the manner in which the payments were made is a relevant consideration in the present case and it certainly did not reflect an innocent mind on the part of the accused. It is in evidence that PW8, PW11 and PW13 were “coerced” to made payment in one lump sum, with no invoices. [185] To conclude, it is significant to emphasise that, we find no substantial miscarriage of justice to have occurred to the accused person in the present appeal before us by failure of the prosecution to challenge or put the essence of their case to the accused or his witnesses. It is apparent on our careful perusal of the notes of evidence, that such failure does not go to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses nor does it amount to an acceptance of the defence witnesses’ evidence. The accused knew well what the case was against him when the prosecution closed its case and had been afforded all the opportunity to present his defence. [186] Moving on, in considering the defence testimony for criminal breach of trust, the learned trial judge at pp. 93-95 Appeal Record Enclosure 13 Volume 2, had this to say: “Perpindahan sistem daripada Microsoft Axapta kepada sistem ERP” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 72 [70] Pihak pembelaan menyatakan bahawa penggunaan perkataan 'consultancy'di dalam invois adalah kerana masalah yang dihadapi oleh THHE akibat daripada perpindahan sistem Microsoft Axapta kepada ERP di mana sistem yang baharu hanya membekalkan deskripsi yang terhad. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, pengurusan atasan THHE terpaksa menggunakn label 'consultancy' untuk meluluskan pembayaran atas kerja-kerja yang dilaksanakan oleh kontraktor. Mengenai isu ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa sekiranya benar sekalipun masalah ini dihadapi oleh THHE, ia tiada kaitan dengan 5 pembayaran yang diarahkan o!eh OKT untuk dibayar kepada BSSB, CISB dan RL Offshore di mana pihak syarikat sendiri menafikan membuat apa-apa tuntutan kepada THHE. Tiada sebarang aduan dibuat kepada bank dan/atau dibawah polisi 'whistle blower' [71] Ketiadaan sebarang aduan dibuat dibuat oleh pihak syarikat, polis, dan/atau pihak SPRM kepada pihak bank bahawa transaksi berkaitan kelima-lima cek tersebut merupakan transaksi yang menyalahi undang undang1 tidak menafikan fakta bahawa OKT telah dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta THHE, iaitu 5 cek yang menjadi subjek pertuduhan dalam kes ini. Begitu juga kegagalan kakitangan dan/atau lembaga pengarah THHE membuat sebarang aduan di bawah polisi 'whistle blower’berkenaan lima pembayaran kepada ketiga-tiga syarikat tersebut tidak sama sekali menjejaskan kes pihak pendakwaan. Tiada aduan dibuat tidak bermakna kejadian tersebut tidak ·berlaku. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 73 [72] Berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dapatlah dirumuskan bahawa: i. OKT mengarahkan penyediaan kelima-lima cek dalam keadaan di mana tiada kerja dilakukan oleh kontraktor- kontraktor dan mereka juga tidak membuat tuntutan untuk pembayaran. ii. OKT dan SP20 telah menandatangani 3 daripada 5 cek tersebut. iii. 2 cek lagi (P16 dan P10) ditandatangani oleh SP20 dan SP19 bagi menggantikan cek P26 dan P27 yang telah ditandatangani oleh OKT dan SP20 sebelum itu. Penggantian cek - cek juga dibuat atas arahan OKT bagi menukar cara bayaran. iv. OKT memaklumkan pihak syarikat bahawa cek - cek pembayaran dari THHE telah dimasukkan ke dalam akaun syarikat. v. OKT mengarahkan penerima cek (SP8, SP11 dan SP13) supaya menunaikan cek - cek tersebut dan menyerahkan wang secara tunai kepada OKT. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 74 vi. Pihak syarikat menunaikan eek tersebut dan menyerahkan wang dalam bentuk tunai kepada OKT (kecuali bagi jumlah RM400,000.00 di mana penyerahan kepada OKT tidak dibuktikan berikutan alibi OKT yang tidak disangkal oleh pihak pendakwaan). vii. lnvois dikeluarkan selepas bayaran diterima daripada THHE bagi menjustifikasikan pembayaran yang telah dibuat. [73] Berdasarkan fakta yang dinyatakan di atas dapat dilihat modus operandi yang digunakan oleh OKT dalam melaksanakan atau merealisasikan hasratdan niat untuk menyalahgunakan wang syarikat THHE dengan mempergunakan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 yang mempunyai hubungan kerja dengan THHE. Adalah tidak logik pihak syarikat tidak mahu membuat sebarang tuntutan jika kerja-kerja tersebut telah sebenarnya dilakukan. Seterusnya, jika benar pembayaran tersebut untuk kerja-kerja yang sebenarnya dilakukan sebagaimana ditimbulkan oleh pihak pembelaan, mengapakah OKT mengarahkan supaya wang tersebut dikeluarkan dan diserahkan kepada OKT dalam bentuk tunai?. Tambahan pula bagaimana pembayaran untuk jumlah yang sebegitu besar boleh diluluskan oleh OKT tanpa sebarang dokumen sokongan.” [187] The learned trial judge had carefully considered the accused defence, and in particular that advance payments had to be made as a result of the system migration. Hence, for the CBT Charges, we see no reasons to S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 75 interfere with the findings made by the learned trial judge as well as the learned high court judge when they had safely concluded that the defence raised by the accused was wholly untenable and that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption of having acted dishonestly on the balance of probabilities. We were satisfied that both the learned judges had meticulously gone through and correctly appreciated the evidence before them and applied the law correctly. [188] The defence of the accused that the payments made to Corail lntoil Sdn Bhd and Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd were in fact advance payments for the project they were having with the company were mere bare denials and not true. It was merely an excuse to cover up his unlawful activity. [189] Additionally, it was also wrong for the accused to make payments when payments were not due to the contractors. What more when SP8 and SP13 had confirmed that the payments were not related to the work done and they did not make the claim to THHE. [190] The other issue advanced by the learned counsel for the accused is that PW8, PW13, PW20 were accomplices whose evidence was uncorroborated. Now, even if they were accomplices, we find that they there were ample evidence of corroboration of the testimony of these witnesses. [191] It is our considered view that the law on accomplices is well settled. In the case of Harchan Singh & Anor v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 11 Augustine Paul JCA (as he then was) had this to say: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 76 “In commenting on the significance of the need for corroboration with regard to the identity of the accused Sarkar on Evidence, 15th edn. Vol. 2 says at p.2105: "It is an established rule of practice that an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity of every person whom he impeaches. The accomplice may know every circumstances of the crime and while relating all the other facts truly, may in order to save a friend, or gratify an animosity, name some person as one of the criminals who was innocent of the crime (Rv. Krishna Bhat, 10B 319; see also R v. Malapa, 11 BHC 196; R v. BudhduNanku, 1B 475)." [192] In Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378, it was held that: “an accomplice is a person who participates in the commission of the actual crime charged against the accused. He is to be a particeps criminis. There are two cases, however, in which a person has been held to be an accomplice even if he is not a particeps criminis. Receivers of stolen property are taken to be accomplices of the thieves from whom they receive goods, on trial of theft. Accomplices in previous similar offences committed by the accused on trial are deemed to be accomplices in the offence for which the accused is on trial, when evidence of the accused having committed crimes of identical type on the occasions to be admissible to prove the system and intent of the accused in committing the offence charged". S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 77 [193] In Sabarudin bin Non [2005] 1 CLJ 466; [2005] 4 MLJ 37, the Court of Appeal held: “In our judgment, the correct test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is that laid down by Thomson CJ in Chao Chong v. PP [1959] 1 LNS 11; [1960] MLJ 238: The true question, however, was not the technical one of whether the witness could have been convicted for his participation in the offence if he had been prosecuted. The true question was whether, having regard to his participation in the offence and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, his evidence was to be regarded with suspicion and as possibly so tainted as to invite if not to demand corroboration before it was accepted". [194] In Farose Tamure Mohamad Khan v. PP & Other Appeals [2016] 9 CLJ 769; [2016] 6 MLJ 277, this court made the following observations at para. 108 of the judgment: [108] As a starting point, s 133 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person, and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) of s 114 of the same Act provides that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. In respect of the nature and extent of the corroboration, Raja Azlan Shah CJM (as His Majesty then was) in Yap Ee Kong & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 117; [1981] 1 MLJ 144 (at p 146) formulated the rules as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 78 (1) There should be some independent confirmation tending to connect the accused with the offence although it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance; (2) The independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that a crime was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material particulars the testimony of the accomplice; and (3) The corroboration must come from independent sources, thus bringing out the rule that ordinarily the testimony of an accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another. [195] In the case of Kurchang Singh v. PP [1989] 2 CLJ 442 the court said: “corroboration may come from the other prosecution witnesses or from the accused. Deliberate lies or incriminating conduct in a material particular can constitute corroboration." [196] In the case before us, there was in fact abundance of independent and compelling evidence confirming the evidence of PW6, PW8, PW11, PW13 and PW20 in material particulars. One such example is the evidence of PW4 and PW18 as to the non-compliance of the payment procedure which are S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 79 the corroborative evidence in support of PW20's testimony. The withdrawal of the monies from the company's respective bank accounts etc are all corroborated via oral and documentary evidence. In the end the cash eventually ended up with the accused. [197] Moving on to the next issue, learned counsel for the accused contended that, learned the High Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the trust property identified in the CBT charges were cheques issued to the respective contractors, namely RL Offshore Sdn Bhd Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd. The learned judge was said to have fallen into error in continuing to equate the property in the cheque with the property in the money or funds of the company. [198] It was further submitted that the money in THHE’s account is different from the property in a cheque of THHE. It was contended that it has long been understood that when a cheque is filled up by the drawer in favor of a payee, the property in the cheque belongs to the payee not the drawer. Council further contended that the property in the cheque properly understood as a right for the named payee to sue the drawer in the event of a default. In other words, it was contended that the property in a cheque is a chose in action. This, the counsel argued was critical to banking law because the property in a cheque is transferable and allows for a cheque to become a negotiable instrument. Hence, the argument was that there is no criminal breach of trust committed as stated in the charge. [199] In addition to that, it was contended that each of the named payees named payees of the cheques in fact received their respective cheques that S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 80 was issued by THHE. They also each received the sums stated in that cheque. These facts were not disputed by the prosecution. The property in these cheques according to the counsel has therefore been passed to the payee and accordingly, the property in the cheque, which was a chose in action, has been extinguished. In other words, counsel argued that misappropriation of a cheque can only be said to have occurred if the accused took the cheque and did not name the payee and the payee did not receive the cheque. [200] Hence, it was submitted that it is incorrect for the learned High Court Judge to hold that there was CBT of the cheques when the narrative and evidence presented by the prosecution was in fact the alleged misappropriation of the monies belonging to THHE. [201] Learned counsel further argued that from a reading of the grounds of judgment, the learned High Court Judge had wrongly equated the "trust property" in the cheque with the company’s cash. It was submitted that the property in a cheque and the property in the funds are two separate and distinct properties which cannot be used interchangeably and do not equate to one another. [202] With the greatest of respect, we beg to differ. We cannot accept this line of argument. To suggest that a distinction must be drawn between a property in cheque and property in cash is entirely fallacious. Such proposition of law is not in keeping with the language or spirit of section 405 of the Penal Code. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 81 [203] Here is a case where accused is the Chief Executive Officer of THHE. Being in that position he was entrusted with the property of the company including the cheques which are the subject matter of the instant appeal. The accused was one of the authorised signatories for the company’s account. The cheques issued had money value and was indeed a property within the meaning of section 405 of the Penal Code. The intention of the drawer at the time for the cheques issued is the material test. The cheque passes the property of THHE namely the money value stated on the cheque to the payee. [204] The emphasis here again is that these cheques were prepared and issued to the respective contractors without any invoices or claims for payment made upon instruction given by the accused to his officers. Since that is so, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused’s conduct or act was actuated by dishonest intention to subsequently misappropriate THHE‘s money/funds for his own use through the use of these cheques. [205] In Sathiadas v. Public Prosecutor [1970) 1 LNS 142;1970] 2 MLJ 241; [1970] 1 MLRH 166, His Royal Highness, the late Raja Azlan Shah J. (later LP) had this to say: “The gist of the offence of criminal breach of trust is entrustment and dishonest misappropriation or conversion to own use. Once the prosecution have succeeded in proving the receipt of the money for a particular purpose the case of entrustment is made out. Dishonest misappropriation or conversion to own use involves wrongful gain to the appellant or wrongful loss to his employers for the period of the S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 82 retention of the money. That must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. ·Criminal breach of trust is not an offence which counts as one of its factors, the loss that is the consequence of the act, it is the act itself, which in law, amounts to an offence. The offence is complete when there is dishonest misappropriation or conversion to one's own use, or when there is dishonest user in violation of a direction, express or implied, relating to the mode in which the trust is to be discharged.” [206] Seven (7) cheques were encashed. Two cheques were replaced pursuant to instructions for payment to be credited directly into the respective bank accounts of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd, despite there being no request for such direct remittances. PW8, PW11 and PW13 withdrew the monies and the cash was personally delivered to and received by the accused knowing fully well what they were for. The accused pocketed the company’s fund for himself. PW8, PW11 and PW13, had no choice but to agree with the accused’s special arrangement in order to protect the business interest of their respective companies. The manner in which the money was demanded and received, in our view, lend credence to the prosecution case that the accused has acted dishonestly, thus causing wrongful gain to himself and wrongful loss to THHE. Hence, we find no infirmity in the conviction on the remaining CBT charges. These convictions are safe. [207] For completeness, we shall now touch very briefly on the argument raised by the learned counsel for the accused that the evidence of PW20 was self-serving and there were various contradictions in his testimony. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 83 However, it is worth repeating that the learned trial had critically evaluated the conduct and behaviour of PW20 as a whole and she found no reason to reject the testimony of PW20 as set out in her judgment. This is not a case of one man’s word, PW20, against another’s, the accused. PW20’s evidence was supported by cogent independent evidence connecting the accused with the charges. Hence, it is reasonably safe for the learned trial judge to act upon PW20 evidence. We therefore find no reason to interfere with her findings. [208] On the issue of contradictions and discrepancies of witnesses’ evidence we can do no better than to quote the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No. 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 16 at p.19, where the court held as follows: “In this case different witnesses have testified to different parts of what had happened or what had been said and also there are, in the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, some discrepancies, as would be expected of witnesses giving their recollections of a series of events that took place in 1971-1973. In my opinion discrepancies there will always be, because in the circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every single thing that happened. It may be open to criticism, or it might be better if they took down a notebook and wrote down every single thing that happened and every single thing that was said. But they did not know that they are going to be witnesses at this trial. I shall be almost inclined to think that if there are no discrepancies, it might be suggested that they have S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 84 concocted their accounts of what had happened or what had been said because their versions are too consistent. The question is whether the existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize each evidence very carefully as this involves the question of weight to be given to certain evidence in particular circumstances." [209] This is also in line with the Federal Court decision in the case of Ong Teng For v. PP [2013] 1 CLJ 39 where Raus Sharif PCA (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court held as follows: “[33] It is settled law that the credibility of a particular witness and the weight to be given to his other evidence is manifestly within the province of a trial judge. In Andy Bagindah v. PP [2000] 3 CLJ 289, Shaik Daud JCA said that: There is no dearth of authorities to say that in every case, there are bound to be contradictions and discrepancies. The question to be decided by the trial judge is whether those contradictions and/or discrepancies are material ones so as to strike at the very root of the charge. It is for the trial judge to consider this since he was the one who saw and heard the evidence. In the present case the learned judge concluded that there were discrepancies S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 85 but those discrepancies were not material ones. Since this involved the credibility of witnesses, we held that the learned judge was in a better person to decide and an appellate court ought not to interfere with such findings.” [210] We, an appellate court do not have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and it is trite that an appellate court would be slow to disturb the findings of the subordinate court on the issue of credibility of witnesses unless the findings made were perverse. Here, we do not find any finding of the trial judge or the High Court Judge to be perverse. In this regard, we are reminded of the dicta in the case of Dato' Mokhtar Hashim & Anor v. PP [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 101; [1983] 2 MLJ 232, where the court held: “(7) the credibility of a witness is primarily a matter for the trial judge. The functions of an Appellate Court, when dealing with a question of fact in which questions of credibility are involved are limited in their character and scope and in an appeal from a decision of a trial judge based on his opinion of the trustworthiness of witnesses whom he has seen, an appellate court must in order to reverse not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right but be convinced that it is wrong. In this case the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of Atun, the prosecution witness, whom he found to be a consistent witness unshaken by very severe cross-examination and the Appeal Court could find no reason to interfere with his assessment. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 86 [211] Reference may also be made to the observation of Wan Yahya J (as His Lordship then was) in Pie Bin Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 MLJ 234: Discrepancies are no doubt present in this case, as they do ostensibly appear in most cases in evidence of witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defence. The transcripts of most evidence, when thoroughly tooth combed by any able lawyer, never failed to yield some form of inconsistencies, discrepancies or contradictions but these do not necessarily render the witness' entire evidence incredible. It is only when a witness's evidence on material and obvious matters in the case is so irreconcilable, ambivalent or negational that his whole evidence is to be disregarded. Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render other parts of his story unworthy of belief. Various persons are endowed with varying powers of cognition, attentiveness and perception, so that it is not uncommon for two witnesses to a common event to describe it in slightly differing versions. I agree with the learned President's findings on this not only because he, having seen and heard the witness is in a better position than I am to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but also because I accept that no witness of truth can account for the details of events which had transpired some months previously with precision.” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 87 The Defence Against the Charges for Money Laundering (Charges No.2 And No.4) [212] We will now touch on the defence raised by the accused in respect of the money laundering charges AMLATFA No.2 and No.4. Accused denied receiving the sum of RM570,000.00 and RM600,000.00 from PW8. [213] In the grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge had in paragraphs 104 and 106 at pages 110-111 Appeal Record Enclosure 13 Volume 2, made the following findings: “[104] Bagi pertuduhan 2 dan 4 AMLATFA, pembelaan OKT adalah merupakan penafian semata-mata disamping mendakwa bahawa keterangan SP8 adalah keterangan palsu dan pengeluaran wang RM400,000.00, RM570,000.00 dan RM600,000.00 oleh SP8 digunakan untuk membiayai kos gaya hidup mewah keluarga SP8 dan membayar Jabatan lnsolvensi untuk melepaskan SP8 dari status muflis. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa dakwaan pihak pembelaan terhadap SP8 adalah tidak berasas sama sekali. Tiada bukti bahawa SP8 memberi keterangan palsu dan menggunakan wang tersebut bagi tujuan seperti dikatakan oleh pihak pembelaan. Walaupun SP8 sememangnya seorang yang muflis, beliau hanya dilepaskan dari status muflis pada tahun 2015 sedangkan kejadian berlaku pada tahun 2013. [106] Walaupun hasil siasatan SP23 ke atas akaun OKT tidak menunjukkan apa-apa kemasukan wang yang mencurigakan dan/atau S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 88 sebarang transaksi yang boleh dikaitkan dengan pertuduhan- pertuduhan AMLATFA, ia tidak bermakna bahawa OKT tidak menerima wang tersebut. Apa yang penting pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan penerimaan wang oleh OKT. Apa berlaku kepada wang tersebut setelah diterima oleh OKT adalah tidak material. Begitu juga dengan pemulangan harta yang disita kepada OKT tidak menunjukkan bahawa OKT tidak menerima wang tersebut.” Conclusion [214] Having considered these findings and the rationale of the learned trial judge in doing so, we find no reasons whatsoever to disturb the factual findings made by the learned judge under the circumstances presented in this case. [215] Now, in conclusion, we find that the learned trial judge has not misdirected herself in law. She had considered the evidence of both the prosecution and for the defence very carefully and had given her reasons why she accepted or did not accepted certain evidence and had correctly come to the conclusion that she did. She had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. We see no reasons why we should interfere with her finding of facts or her final decision. Undoubtedly, the same goes to the judgment delivered by the learned High Court Judge where he had taken a detailed evaluation of the entire evidence, critically analysed witnesses evidence placed before the court with great care and at great length and made his findings. We do not find any infirmities in the decision of the learned High Court Judge. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 89 [216] For the reasons that we have given, we unanimously find that the conviction against the accused by the High Court for CBT Charges No.1, 2 and 4 and the AMLATFA Charges No.2 and No.4 are safe and we accordingly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the High Court. Date: 18 January 2024 - Sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 90 Counsel For the Appellant : 1. Datuk K. Kumaraendran 2. Datuk Hj. Hisyam Teh Poh Teik 3. Kitson Foong 4. Cheetan Jethwani 5. Kee Wei Lan 6. Low Wei Loke 7. Yaw Xinying 8. Ivy Shu 9. Chew Jee San 10. Vam Sher Mooi [Kit & Associates (Kuala Lumpur)] For the Respondant : 1. Nahra Binti Dollah (Deputy Public Prosecutor) 2. Parvin Hameedah Natchiar (Deputy Public Prosecutor) 3. Aida Khairuleen Binti Azli (Deputy Public Prosecutor) [Attorney General Chambers] S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022

PEMOHON Tetuan Chiong & Partners RESPONDEN Tetuan Kit & Associates

The Plaintiff obtained a final UAE Judgment against the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd – Abu Dhabi for AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49. After executing the UAE Judgment in Abu Dhabi, the Plaintiff realized part of the judgment sum leaving a balance of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the balance sum against the Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. The enforcement of the balance sum was done under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (‘REJA 1958) together with interest and also costs. The Court was moved under s 8 REJA 1958 and O.67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012). But, the Plaintiff sought under common law. The UAE Judgment was tendered as evidence but through an undated supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff enforced the UAE Judgment in Malaysia on the correct party or otherwise. Keywords: Reciprocal enforcement of Judgments, final judgment, common law, undated affidavit, identity of defendant

18/01/2024

YA Puan Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

DA-25-2-02/2023

PEMOHON BAJING ANAK LAYONG RESPONDEN 1. ) DATO SRI HJ MUSTAFAR BIN HJ ALI Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Sokongan No 1 Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia 2. ) LEMBAGA TATATERTIB KUMPULAN SOKONGAN NO 1 JABATAN IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA 3. ) LEMBAGA RAYUAN TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM 4. ) SURUHANJAYA PERKHIDMATAN AWAM MALAYSIA 5. ) KERAJAAN MALAYSIA

"A 53 KKM 2012 - Semakan Kehakiman - relif untuk membatalkan hukuman buang kerja - sama ada Responden telah mematuhi PPLTPA - sama ada Responden telah mematuhi PPA (K&T) - sama ada Ketua Jabatan seharusnya memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan."

18/01/2024

YA Datuk Mohamad Abazafree bin Mohd Abbas

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=79793036-d0a9-411e-8acb-ac2657b81745&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO : DA-25-2-02/2023 Dalam Perkara Mengenai Permohonan untuk suatu Perintah Certiorari untuk Membatalkan Hukuman Buang Kerja berkuatkuasa pada 24 Januari 2017; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA BAJING ANAK LAYONG (NO K/P: 931125-13-6629) … PEMOHON DAN 1. DATO’ SRI HJ MUSTAFAR BIN HJ ALI (Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib Kumpulan Sokongan No. 1, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia) 2. LEMBAGA TATATERTIB KUMPULAN SOKONGAN NO. 1 JABATAN IMIGRESEN MALAYSIA 3. LEMBAGA RAYUAN TATATERTIB PERKHIDMATAN AWAM 4. SURUHANJAYA PERKHIDMATAN AWAM MALAYSIA 5. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA … RESPONDEN- RESPONDEN 18/01/2024 11:15:16 DA-25-2-02/2023 Kand. 21 S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah merupakan satu Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman yang difailkan oleh Pemohon di bawah Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) bagi memohon satu relif untuk membatalkan hukuman buang kerja yang dibuat oleh Responden serta satu Perintah Mandamus untuk Pemohon dikembalikan semula kepada pekerjaannya serta relif-relif lain yang berkait. Fakta kes [2] Pemohon adalah merupakan bekas Pegawai Imigresen berjawatan Pegawai Imigresen Gred KP19 yang telah berkhidmat selama 3 tahun. Pada masa yang material, Pemohon berkhidmat di Pejabat Imigresen Lapangan Terbang KLIA. [3] Pada pertengahan tahun 2016, satu operasi besar-besaran dibawah Akta Kesalahan Keselamatan (Langkah-Langkah Khas) 2012 (SOSMA) dan Akta Pencegahan Jenayah 1959 (APJ) oleh Polis DiRaja Malaysia telah dilakukan ke atas pegawai-pegawai Jabatan Imigresen kerana disyaki terlibat di dalam sindiket penyeludupan warga asing di KLIA di mana Pemohon adalah salah seorang yang ditahan didalam operasi tersebut. Di dalam operasi tersebut, Pemohon telah ditangkap serta ditahan, namun tiada sebarang pertuduhan dikenakan ke atas Pemohon. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 [4] Sebaliknya, pada 21/6/2016, Pemohon telah diperintahkan menjalani Perintah Pengawasan Polis di Bawah Seksyen 15 Akta Pencegahan Jenayah 1959 (Akta 297) ("Perintah Pengawasan tersebut") selama 2 tahun bermula 21/12/2016 hingga 20/12/2018 di dalam daerah Bintulu, Bahagian Bintulu, negeri Sarawak tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat yang dikenakan. [5] Berikutan itu, Responden Pertama selaku Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib, telah membuat pengaduan kepada Responden Kedua. [6] Pada 23/2/2018, Pemohon telah menerima surat daripada Responden Pertama melalui Ketua Jabatannya iaitu Pengarah Imigresen KLIA yang memaklumkan bahawa Responden Kedua dalam Mesyuarat Bil 01/2017 pada 24/1/2017 setelah mempertimbangkan dengan teliti, memutuskan Pemohon bersalah setelah Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah membuat keputusan untuk meletakkan Pemohon di bawah Perintah Pengawasan tersebut. Responden Kedua turut mengenakan hukuman Buang Kerja mengikut Peraturan 38(g) Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan & Tatatertib) 1993 (PPA (K&T)) berkuatkuasa pada 24/11/2017. [7] Responden Pertama selaku Pengerusi Responden Kedua kemudiannya telah memberikan peluang kepada Pemohon di bawah Peraturan 14 & 15(1) Peraturan-Peraturan Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam 1993 (PPLTPA) untuk membuat rayuan kepada Responden Ketiga melalui Ketua Jabatan Pemohon dalam masa 14 hari dari tarikh terima surat keputusan Responden Kedua. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [8] Pada 27/2/2018 Pemohon telah mengemukakan rayuan kepada Responden Ketiga memohon agar tidak dikenakan hukuman buang kerja. [9] Berikutan itu, Responden Ketiga pada 4/3/2019 telah bersidang untuk mendengar rayuan Pemohon dan mendapati bahawa rayuan Pemohon tidak mempunyai asas yang kukuh. Oleh yang demikian, keputusan Responden Kedua adalah dikekalkan. Menurut Responden Ketiga, keputusan tersebut telah cuba diserahkan kepada Pemohon di alamat terakhir Pemohon, namun pada 6/9/2019, surat pemakluman tersebut dikembalikan sebagai tidak dituntut. [10] Namun menurut Pemohon, memandangkan tiada sebarang pemakluman diterima berkaitan rayuannya, maka pada 5/12/2022, Pemohon telah melantik peguamcara iaitu Tetuan Shaharuddin Hidayu & Marwaliz dan mengarahkan peguamcara tersebut menulis surat kepada Responden Ketiga melalui Ketua Jabatan Pemohon untuk memohon diberikan jawapan atau maklumbalas berkaitan status rayuan Pemohon. [11] Menerusi surat bertarikh 11/1/2023, Ketua Jabatan Pemohon telah memberikan maklumbalas dan telah melampir dan menyerahkan sesalinan surat keputusan Lembaga Rayuan kepada peguam Pemohon. [12] Berikutan itu, Pemohon telah menfailkan permohonan meminta kebenaran di bawah Aturan 53 kaedah 3 KKM 2012 pada 6/2/2023 S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 dan Mahkamah Tinggi Kota Bharu telah pada 19/3/2023 memberikan kebenaran untuk menfailkan Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman untuk satu certiorari bagi membatalkan keputusan Responden-responden. [13] Pemohon di dalam permohonannya memohon relif sebagaimana berikut; (a) suatu Perintah Certiorari bagi membatalkan hukuman buang kerja yang dibuat oleh Responden berkuatkuasa pada 24/1/2017; (b) suatu Perintah bahawa hukuman buang kerja ke atas Pemohon pada 24/1/2017 adalah batal, tidak sah dan tiada efek; (c) suatu Perintah Mandamus bahawa Pemohon, dengan kadar segera, dikembalikan ke pekerjaannya dengan pangkat asalnya sebelum pada hukuman buang kerja dikenakan oleh Responden; (d) suatu perintah bahawa pemohon layak menerima semula semua pembayaran gaji, elaun, emolumen, pampasan pencen, pencen bulanan dan segala bayaran yang beliau layak terima mengikut skim perkhidmatannya serta peluang kenaikan pangkat dan kekananan; dan S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 (e) suatu siasatan/inkuiri/prosiding pentaksiran oleh Penolong Kanan Pendaftar/Timbalan Pendaftar, Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Kota Bharu, Kelantan untuk menentukan semua tunggakan gaji, emolumen, elaun-elaun dan faedah-faedah lain yang Pemohon sepatutnya menerima dari tarikh Pemohon dibuang kerja daripada perkhidmatan (24/1/2017) sehingga penyelesaian penuh. Prinsip Undang-undang Berkaitan Semakan Kehakiman [14] Prinsip undang-undang di bawah Aturan 53 KKM 2012 adalah jelas dan mantap berkaitan kuasa Mahkamah ini di mana Mahkamah boleh menyemak keputusan Pihak Berkuasa Awam yang menjalankan tugas atau fungsi awam atas alasan sama ada sesuatu keputusan tersebut adalah “illegal, irrational or procedure impropriety”. [15] Mahkamah menegaskan bahawa permohonan Semakan Kehakiman bukan bertujuan untuk menyemak keputusan tetapi untuk menyemak proses keputusan itu dibuat, dan bahawa di dalam permohonan Semakan Kehakiman, Mahkamah tidak menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuan tetapi bidang kuasa penyeliaan. Adalah menjadi kewajipan Mahkamah untuk melihat sama ada keputusan yang dibuat oleh Lembaga Tatatertib itu telah mengikut prosedur yang ditetapkan di bawah PPA (U&T) dan PPPA. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 (rujuk; Wira Swire Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] 1 LNS 1026; Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow & Another Appeal [2019] 4 CLJ 561; [2019] MLJU 202; T Ganeswaran lwn. Suruhanjaya Polis Diraja Malaysia & Satu Lagi [2005] 3 CLJ 302 dan Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 390; [1988] 1 CLJ 559). Isu-isu yang berbangkit [16] Di dalam hujahannya, peguam Pemohon telah membangkitkan 5 isu utama iaitu: (a) kegagalan Responden-responden mematuhi Peraturan 15 dan 16 PPLTPA; (b) kelewatan di dalam pemberitahuan keputusan rayuan tatatertib ke atas Pemohon; (c) kegagalan Responden-responden mematuhi Peraturan 20 PPLTPA dan Peraturan 53 PPA (K&T); (d) kegagalan Responden-responden mematuhi prosedur tindakan tatatertib di bawah Peraturan 32 dan 33(2) PPA(K&T); dan S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 (e) kegagalan Ketua Jabatan untuk mendeposkan affidavit Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah Isu (a); kegagalan Responden-responden mematuhi Peraturan 15 dan 16 PPLTPA [17] Keterangan di dalam kes ini menunjukkan Pemohon telah mengemukakan rayuan melalui surat rayuan Pemohon bertarikh 27/2/2018 kepada Responden Ketiga melalui Ketua Jabatan Pemohon, selepas menerima surat daripada Responden Pertama pada 23/2/2018 di mana Pemohon dibuang kerja. Surat rayuan yang dikemukakan oleh Pemohon kepada Responden Ketiga adalah dalam tempoh 14 hari dari tarikh terima surat keputusan daripada Responden Pertama. [18] Perkara ini telah diakui sendiri oleh pihak Responden Ketiga melalui ekshibit HM-4 yang dilampirkan di dalam Afidavit Jawapan Responden-responden (1) di Kandungan 9 yang dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa rayuan Pemohon telah diterima pada 27/2/2018. [19] Peraturan 15 dan 16 PPLTPA adalah jelas menyatakan bahawa kesemua pihak berkaitan tatatertib sama ada Ketua Jabatan, Lembaga Tatatertib maupun Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib adalah secara mandatori perlu mematuhi tempoh masa yang ditetapkan. Perkara ini pernah dibincangkan oleh Mahkamah ini di dalam kes S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 Mohd Shukri Roslan Iwn. Dato' Sri Hj Mustafar Hj Ali & Yang Lain [2022] 6 CLJ 253; [2022] MLRHU 561 di mana Mahkamah ini menyatakan bahawa Peraturan 15(2) PPLTPA adalah jelas menyatakan Ketua Jabatan "hendaklah" tidak lewat dari 30 hari dari tarikh penerimaan rayuan mengemukakannya kepada Lembaga Tatatertib. Perkataan hendaklah ataupun di dalam Bahasa Inggerisnya adalah "shall" membawa konotasi keperluan mandatori. [20] Berkaitan perkataan “shall” ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Benjamin William Hawkes v. PP [2020] 8 CLJ 267; [2020] 5 MLJ 417 telah menjelaskan berkenaan tafsiran perkataan "shall" seperti berikut; "... Applying the principles as enunciated in the aforesaid cases, whether the word "shall" in a particular legislation is mandatory or directory depends upon the intention of the Legislature in question which is ascertained by looking at the whole scope of the statute to be construed. The use of the word "shall" would not by itself make a provision of the Act mandatory. It is to be construed with reference to the scheme of the statute and the context in which it is used. In Cheong Seok Leng v. PP [1988] 1 LNS 39; [1988] 2 MLJ 481 at 489 Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) explained the relevant rules of interpretation to be given to the word "shall" which appears in legislation as follows: ... S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [48] The purposive rule of interpretation must be adopted in interpreting s. 51A of the CPC, pursuant to s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which read as follows: 17A Regard to be had to the purpose of the Act In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. [49] It is clearly untenable in this case to allude to the word 'shall' as mandatory, thus stultifying the justice of the case, when a document was not delivered to the accused persons before the commencement of the trial." [21] Terbaru, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd v. Mohd Afrizan Husain [2022] 4 CLJ 657 melalui penghakiman Hakim Nallini Pathmanathan HMP telah menjelaskan tafsiran perkataan "shall" seperti berikut; "[76] Rule 2.06 which is of central importance, prescribes how the AMLR is to be interpreted namely "in accordance with their S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 spirit, intention and purpose". As well as in a way that "best promotes the principles on which they are based". [77] Regrettably, neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal undertook any sort of consideration of the purpose nor principles set out in the rules in order to ascertain the meaning to be accorded to the word "shall" in r. 16.11(2). This was explained on the basis that as there was no ambiguity and there was no necessity to consider anything other than the express words used. This was understood to amount to a literal reading of the relevant rule falling for consideration. In so doing, the Court of Appeal misunderstood the function and purpose of the literal rule of statutory construction. Reading the express words set out in a statute in vacuo and without taking into consideration the context in which those words are utilised, does not amount to a literal approach to statutory interpretation. That is a grammatical application of the meaning of words. Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 requires that the purpose and object of an Act and other instruments made under an Act must be undertaken when construing a statute. As s. 17A is a statutory provision, it must be complied with. Therefore, both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, in failing to undertake this task as provided for in s. 17A, committed an error of law." S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [22] Kedua-dua keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan ini menekankan kepentingan untuk Mahkamah di dalam menafsirkan perkataan "shall" untuk menimbangkan peruntukan tersebut secara keseluruhan dengan mengambilkira seksyen 17A Akta Tafsiran 1948/1967. [23] Mahkamah ini ingin mengulangi apa yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah ini di dalam kes Mohd Shukri Roslan (supra) seperti berikut; "[24] Peraturan-peraturan tersebut meletakkan tanggungjawab kepada Lembaga Tatatertib bukan sekadar menyampaikan rayuan yang dikemukakan malahan ia menetapkan tanggungjawab untuk mengemukakan salinan rekod prosiding tatatertib serta alasan yang dipertimbang oleh Lembaga Tatatertib semasa membuat keputusan mereka. [25] Keperluan untuk mengemukakan rayuan pemohon dalam tempoh 30 hari, tidak hanya dinyatakan di dalam peraturan 15(2) namun diulang semula di dalam peraturan 15(3) dan hanya apabila ianya diterima, barulah Lembaga Rayuan mempunyai budi bicara untuk mengadakan suatu mesyuarat Lembaga Rayuan. [26] Lembaga Rayuan sepertimana di bawah peraturan 16(2) PPLTPA hanya boleh memutuskan sesuatu rayuan semata-mata atas merit rayuan tanpa menerima apa-apa S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 pernyataan atau keterangan lanjut kecuali jika pada pendapatnya adalah patut untuk berbuat demikian. Oleh itu rayuan serta rekod prosiding dan alasan Lembaga Tatatertib adalah dokumen-dokumen asas yang penting bagi Lembaga Rayuan. [27] Apabila masa telah dinyatakan sebagai keperluan yang perlu dipatuhi bagi ianya dikemukakan, maka ianya perlu dipatuhi. Ia berkaitan dengan hak Pemohon untuk rayuannya didengari, bukan sahaja berdasarkan kepada rekod-rekod yang dikemukakan, malahan di dalam tempoh waktu yang telah dijamin oleh peraturan. Oleh itu, keperluan mematuhi tempoh masa ini adalah suatu yang mandatori dan kegagalan mematuhinya adalah bagi mahkamah satu ketidakaturan prosedur yang serius." [24] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa keperluan di bawah Peraturan 15 dan 16 PPLTPA tersebut adalah satu peraturan yang mandatori dan Mahkamah tidak nampak sebarang alasan bagi Mahkamah ini untuk mengubah pandangan Mahkamah ini yang telah diberikan di dalam kes Mohd Shukri Roslan (supra). [25] Jika diteliti kepada kedua-dua Afidavit Jawapan Responden I dan II tersebut, tiada sebarang keterangan atau penjelasan yang dibuat oleh Responden-responden berkaitan bilakah Ketua Jabatan atau Lembaga Tatatertib mengemukakan rayuan Pemohon tersebut. Mahkamah tidak dikemukakan sebarang keterangan berkaitan S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 berkaitan tarikh pengemukaan maupun penerimaan rayuan tersebut. [26] Peguam Persekutuan di dalam hujahannya berpendirian bahawa pendengaran rayuan Pemohon telah didengar sebaik kesemua dokumen yang diperlukan di bawah PPLTPA telah diterima. Bagi Peguam Persekutuan, keperluan memenuhi had masa tersebut bukanlah satu yang mandatori dan ianya tidak memprejudiskan Pemohon. Malahan ditekankan bahawa adalah tidak munasabah hanya kerana ketakpatuhan had masa boleh menjejaskan keputusan Responden 2 dan Responden 3. [27] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa hujahan Peguam Persekutuan adalah sukar untuk diterima. Ini kerana apabila masa telah dinyatakan sebagai keperluan yang perlu dipatuhi, maka ianya perlu dipatuhi. Ini kerana ia berkaitan dengan hak pemohon untuk rayuannya didengari, bukan sahaja berdasarkan kepada rekod- rekod yang dikemukakan, malahan di dalam tempoh waktu yang telah dijamin oleh peraturan. Oleh itu, keperluan mematuhi tempoh masa ini adalah suatu yang mandatori dan kegagalan mematuhinya adalah bagi mahkamah satu ketidakaturan prosedur yang serius. [28] Di dalam masa yang sama, Responden bukan sahaja gagal untuk memenuhi keperluan tersebut, malahan gagal untuk menyediakan alasan bagi Mahkamah ini mempertimbangkan sama ada kelewatan yang berlaku adalah wajar. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 [29] Sehubungan dengan itu, bagi isu ini, Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa telah wujud ketidakpatuhan keperluan prosedur yang mandatori apabila Responden gagal mematuhi Peraturan 15 dan 16 PPLTPA dan ia menjejaskan dengan secara langsungnya keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh Responden. Isu (b); kelewatan di dalam pemberitahuan keputusan rayuan tatatertib ke atas Pemohon [30] Isu ini berbangkit berikutan dakwaan Pemohon bahawa telah wujud kelewatan selama 4 tahun 10 bulan dan 29 hari oleh Responden Ketiga untuk memaklumkan keputusan rayuannya. Peguam Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa apabila wujud kelewatan dan ianya tidak diberi penjelasan, maka semakin lama penangguhan, semakin sukar bagi badan disiplin untuk mewajarkan prosiding terhadap Pemohon. Selanjutnya, kelewatan yang lama mungkin, apabila ditambah dengan beberapa keadaan lain, menjadi bukti kukuh pengampunan ("condonation") di pihak majikan atas salah laku pekerja. (rujuk; Public Services Commision Malaysia & anor v. Vickneswary RM Santhivelu [2008] 6 CLJ 573; [2008] 2 MLRA 273). S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 [31] Peguam Pemohon sekali lagi membawa perhatian Mahkamah ke atas keputusan Mahkamah ini di dalam isu yang sama di dalam kes Mohd Shukri Roslan (supra) apabila Mahkamah ini menyatakan; "[29] Selanjutnya Peguamcara Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa keputusan Lembaga Rayuan hanya dimaklumkan kepada Pemohon selepas 3 tahun dan 8 bulan melalui surat bertarikh 2 Februari 2021. Malahan pemakluman ini hanya dimaklumkan kepada Pemohon susulan daripada surat-surat yang telah dikemukakan oleh Peguamcara Pemohon kepada pihak Responden. [30] Mahkamah turut mendapati bahawa tiada penjelasan yang diberikan oleh Responden di atas kelewatan ini selain dari menyatakan bahawa surat telah dikemukakan kepada alamat terakhir Pemohon yang merupakan alamat semasa tindakan tatatertib dijalankan ke atas Pemohon. [31] Keperluan untuk memaklumkan Pemohon adalah jelas dinyatakan didalam Peraturan 20 PPLTPA yang mengkehendaki sesuatu keputusan Lembaga Rayuan diberitahu kepada Pemohon secara bertulis. Namun ia tidak pula menyatakan tempoh waktu yang perlu diambil bagi memaklumkannya." S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 [32] Peguam Persekutuan sebaliknya menghujahkan bahawa kelewatan tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh kegagalan Pemohon untuk memaklumkan Ketua Jabatannya alamat tempat tinggalnya sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Peraturan 52 PPPA (K&T). Oleh itu, apabila surat keputusan rayuannya telah diserahkan ke alamat terakhir yang diketahui oleh Responden 1, maka ianya telah dianggap sebagai telah diserahkan kepada Pemohon sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah Peraturan 52(2) PPPA (K&T) seperti berikut; “(2) Any notice, document or communication left at or posted to or sent by any other reasonable means to the address for service furnished under subregulation (1) shall be deemed to have been duly served on or communicated to the officer.” [33] Peguam Persekutuan telah menghujahkan bahawa Responden telah mematuhi keperluan penyerahan keputusan tersebut dan telah mengekshibitkan kad AR sepertimana di ekshibit "HM-7" dan menghujahkan bahawa beban kini berbalik kepada Pemohon untuk membuktikan sebaliknya. [34] Peguam Pemohon sebaliknya mempertikaikan ekshibit “HM-7” ini berdasarkan semakan ke atas nombor pengesanan EN330436870MY yang dibuat oleh Pemohon. Berdasarkan ekshibit “E” di Kandungan 11, Peguam Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa surat tersebut telah dialamatkan ke Nilai, Negeri Sembilan. Ini menimbulkan keraguan berkaitan siapakah dan kenapakah ianya di Nilai, Negeri Sembilan. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [35] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa hujahan peguam adalah agak janggal apabila hanya merujuk kepada semakan ke atas nombor pengesanan sahaja tanpa penjelasan oleh pihak Pos Malaysia. Ia tidak lain hanyalah merupakan andaian peguam Pemohon sahaja. Sedangkan ekshibit “HM-7” dengan jelas menunjukkan bahawa ia ditujukan kepada Pemohon dengan alamat di Rumah Sureng, Sungai Seremban, 97000 Bintulu, Sarawak. Ianya juga telah ditandakan sebagai “Tidak dituntut/unclaimed”. Alamat ini adalah disahkan sebagai alamat Pemohon. Oleh itu, bantahan peguam ini pada pandangan Mahkamah adalah tidak berasas. [36] Persoalan kedua yang berbangkit adalah dokumen apakah yang dikatakan dipos oleh Responden 3 kepada pemohon. Ini kerana di dalam Afidavit Jawapan Responden-responden (1), hanya dinyatakan; “pada 6/9/2019, Ketua Jabatan Pemohon telah menyerahkan sesalinan Surat Keputusan Responden Ketiga melalui serahan secara pos laju ke alamat kediaman terakhir Pemohon. Namun yang demikian, surat tersebut dikembalikan”. [37] Surat tersebut tidak diekshibitkan oleh pihak Responden namun ianya telah diekshibitkan oleh Pemohon sebagai sebahagian dari ekshibit “C” di dalam Afidavit Sokongan Pemohon di Kandungan 3. Oleh itu, tidak timbul apakah surat yang telah dipos kepada Pemohon. [38] Di atas pertimbangan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Responden-responden telah menjalankan tanggungjawab statutorinya secara munasabah untuk memaklumkan Pemohon. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa isu ini tidak memberi kesan ke atas keputusan Responden-responden ke atas Pemohon. Isu (c); kegagalan Responden-responden mematuhi Peraturan 20 PPLTPA dan Peraturan 53 PPA (K&T) [39] Bagi isu ini, asas hujahan peguam Pemohon adalah pemberitahuan keputusan Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib kepada Pemohon adalah cacat dan tidak sah kerana keputusan Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib sepatutnya dimaklumkan atau diberitahu oleh Pengerusi Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib kepada Pemohon dan bukannya diberitahu oleh Encik Ikhbal Hanam Bin Mukras bagi pihak Setiausaha. Bahkan keputusan Lembaga Rayuan Tatatertib ini juga tidak diberitahu kepada Pemohon sendiri dan hanya diberitahu kepada majikan Pemohon. Pemohon hanya mengetahui berkenaan status keputusan rayuan Pemohon apabila Pemohon hadir ke pejabat majikan pada 18/03/2022. [40] Asas hujahan peguam Pemohon adalah berdasarkan kepada Peraturan 20 PPLTPA dan Peraturan 53(1) PPA (K&T). [41] Isu ini telah turut menjadi sebahagian dari isu yang telah Mahkamah ini ulas di dalam kes Mohd Shukri Roslan (supra) di mana Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa Mahkamah ini terikat dengan 2 keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Marzuki Abdul Aziz v. Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2003] 3 CLJ 315 dan S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Dato' Saadon Othman v. Lembaga Tatatertib Awam Kumpulan Pengurusan (No 1) & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 980. Mahkamah ini telah memutuskan; "Di atas pertimbangan ini serta keterikatan Mahkamah ini ke atas keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut, Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa bagi isu ini ia tidak bermerit dan sekaligus tidak menjejaskan keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh responden ke atas Pemohon." [42] Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah ini menegaskan bahawa Mahkamah ini masih terikat dengan keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut. Sehubungan dengan itu, Mahkamah dengan ini memutuskan bahawa isu ini tidak bermerit. Isu (d); kegagalan Responden-responden mematuhi prosedur tindakan tatatertib di bawah Peraturan 32 dan 33(2) PPA(K&T) [43] Di dalam hujahannya, peguam Pemohon membawa perhatian Mahkamah ini ke atas Peraturan 32(1)(b) PPA (K&T) yang menyatakan apabila suatu Perintah Pengawasan telah dibuat terhadap seseorang pegawai di bawah mana-mana undang- undang berhubungan pencegahan jenayah, maka suatu kewajipan mandatori bagi Ketua Jabatannya hendaklah memohon bagi mendapatkan suatu salinan perintah terbabit. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 [44] Seterusnya Peraturan 32(2) (PPA (K&T) 1993) menyatakan apabila Perintah terbabit sudah diterima, Ketua Jabatan hendaklah mengemukakannya kepada Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib yang berkenaan berserta dengan rekod perkhidmatan pegawai itu dan perakuan Ketua Jabatan. [45] Kedua-dua Peraturan ini dihujahkan menjadi satu keperluan mandatori agar Ketua Jabatan membuat pengesyoran dan perakuan sama ada seseorang pegawai itu patut dibuang kerja ataupun alternatif yang lebih ringan iaitu diturunkan pangkat. Pertimbangan pihak Lembaga Tatatertib hanyalah untuk menimbang laporan, rekod perkhidmatan dan Perakuan Ketua Jabatan yang dikemukakan kepadanya seperti dinyatakan dalam Peraturan 33 (2) PPA (K&T), dan membuat dapatan bahawa pegawai itu patut dibuang kerja atau mengenakan suatu hukuman yang lebih ringan. Namun keputusan ini hanya boleh dibuat sekiranya kesemua dokumen sudah ada. [46] Isu yang sama turut berbangkit di dalam kes Mohd Shukri Roslan (supra) dan Mahkamah ini ingin mengulangi pendirian Mahkamah bahawa surat sepertimana di Ekshibit HM-4 tidak menyatakan apakah pertimbangan-pertimbangan Lembaga Tatatertib sebelum membuat keputusan ke atas kes Pemohon. Surat tersebut hanya menyatakan: "setelah menimbangkan dengan teliti memutuskan tuan bersalah". Tiada sebarang rujukan dibuat sama ada ke atas rekod perkhidmatan Pemohon mahupun perakuan Ketua Jabatan. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [47] Persoalan yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah adalah sama ada Peraturan 32 tersebut secara khususnya perakuan Ketua Jabatan adalah satu yang mandatori. Di dalam kes Subramanyam Sannasy v. SAC II Syed Alwi Syed Hamid & Anor [2010] 2 CLJ 677, Mahkamah Persekutuan berhadapan dengan isu sama ada surat pembuangan kerja di bawah prosiding disiplin yang dimulakan di bawah Peraturan 33 tanpa menyatakan yang sama di dalam surat pembuangan kerja, menyebabkan surat pembuangan kerja salah dan terbatal dan tidak mempunyai efek. Surat Lembaga Tatatertib tersebut menyatakan: "Pada menjalankan kuasa-kuasa tatatertib yang telah diwakilkan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib oleh Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis mengikut PU(B) 441 bertarikh 14 Disember 2000, saya SAC II Syed Alwi bin Syed Hamid, Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib setelah meneliti fakta sabitan bersama-sama Ahli Lembaga Tatatertib serta syor Ketua Polis Daerah Batu Pahat selaras dengan kehendak Peraturan 37, Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993 dengan ini memutuskan kamu dikenakan hukuman 'buang kerja' di atas sabitan Mahkamah tersebut selaras di bawah Peraturan 38 (g), Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993 ". [48] Di dalam keputusannya Mahkamah Persekutuan telah mengambil kira keseluruhan konteks surat dan menyatakan bahawa ianya telah dipatuhi dengan ketat kerana perakuan Ketua Jabatan telah menyatakan berkenaan syor sejajar dengan Peraturan 37. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 [49] Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah kini, Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib telah mendeposkan afidavit seperti berikut: "8.2. Pada 24.1.2017, setelah menerima sesalinan Perintah Tahanan Tersebut beserta rekod perkhidmatan Pemohon dan Perakuan Ketua Jabatan, Lembaga Tatatertib telah bersidang dan setelah mempertimbangkan dengan teliti, memutuskan bahawa Pemohon dikenakan hukuman buang kerja mengikut peraturan 38(g) PPPA (K&T) 1993 berkuatkuasa pada 24.1.2017” 8.3. Surat Keputusan bertarikh 7.3.2017 telah cuba diserahkan kepada pemohon secara pos berdaftar pada 17.4.2017 dan 12.1.2018 ke alamat kediaman terakhir Pemohon iaitu di alamat Rumah Sureng, Sungai Seremban, 97000 NBintulu, Sarawak, namun ianya dikembalikan kerana tidak dituntut. Sesalinan surat-surat yang dihantar pada 17.4.2017 dan 12.1.2018 yang dikembalikan tidak dituntut dilampirkan bersama-sama di sini dan ditanda sebagai ekshibit “HM-2”. 8.4 Keputusan tersebut akhirnya telah dimaklumkan kepada Pemohon pada 23.2.2018 dan telah diakui oleh Pemohon S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Sesalinan surat bertarikh 7.3.2017 tersebut beserta akuan penerimaan dilampirkan di sini dan ditanda sebagai ekshibit "HM-3" [50] Sehubungan dengan itu, bagi kes ini, Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa Responden-responden telah mematuhi Peraturan 32 dan 33(2) PPA (K&T) kerana Ketua Jabatan telahpun mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen yang perlu serta dipertimbangkan oleh Lembaga Tatatertib. [51] Peguam Pemohon selanjutnya menghujahkan bahawa keterangan afidavit Responden-responden sekadar menyatakan bahawa Lembaga Tatatertib telah menerima perakuan Ketua Jabatan tanpa menyatakan apakah perakuan tersebut serta tanpa merujuk kepada peraturan yang khusus. Ini dihujahkan sebagai tidak memadai. [52] Mahkamah ini telah dirujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Subramanyam Sannasy v. SAC II Syed Alwi Syed Hamid & Anor [2009] 3 MLRA 449 di mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan; "[3] Consequently, the appellant's head of department, pursuant to reg 33 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 ("the said Regulations"), submitted a report to the disciplinary authority and recommended that the appellant be dismissed. Regulation 33 of the said Regulations provides that where criminal S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 proceedings against an officer result in his conviction, his head of department shall send a copy of the court's decision and his record of service to the appropriate disciplinary authority that has the power to impose punishment of dismissal or reduction in rank and shall recommend whether the officer should, inter alia, be dismissed or reduced in rank "depending on the nature and seriousness of the offence committed in relation to the extent the officer has brought disrepute to the public service". [4] On 20 August 2002, after considering the recommendation of the appellant's head of department and owing to the seriousness of the offence, the disciplinary authority decided to dismiss the appellant. [5] By letter dated 26 August 2002, the disciplinary authority informed the appellant of its decision; that letter ("the said letter"), inter alia, reads: 2. Pada menjalankan kuasa-kuasa tatatertib yang telah diwakilkan kepada Lembaga Tatatertib oleh Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis mengikut PU(B) 441 bertarikh 14 December 2000, saya SAC II Syed Alwi bin Syed Hamid, Pengerusi Lembaga Tatatertib setelah meneliti fakta sabitan bersamasama Ahli Lembaga Tatatertib serta syor Ketua Polis Daerah Batu Pahat selaras dengan kehendak Peraturan 37, Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993 dengan ini memutuskan kamu dikenakan hukuman 'Buang Kerja' di atas sabitan Mahkamah tersebut selaras di bawah Peraturan 38 (g), Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 3. Hukuman buang kerja terhadap kamu berkuatkuasa mulai 20 August 2002 iaitu tarikh mesyuarat Lembaga Tatatertib, Kontinjen Johor di bawah Peraturan 38, Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan dan Tatatertib) 1993. ... [14] Only regs 33, 37 and 38 of the said Regulations are relevant in this appeal. The said letter clearly informed the appellant that the disciplinary authority received a report from his head of department stating that the appellant was convicted of an offence under s 222 of the Penal Code in the magistrate's court at Batu Pahat and the sentence imposed. This would denote that the procedure pursuant to reg 33 was religiously adhered to by the appellant's head of department..." [53] Peguam Pemohon menghujahkan bahawa surat tersebut hanyalah menyatakan bahawa "setelah mempertimbangkan dengan teliti memutuskan tuan bersalah..." tanpa menyatakan apa yang dipertimbangkan dan dokumen apa yang diterima untuk proses menimbang sebelum membuat keputusan pembuangan kerja Pemohon serat perakuan apakah yang dikemukakan oleh Ketua Jabatan. Oleh itu, adalah jelas bahawa pihak Lembaga Tatatertib telah gagal mematuhi peruntukan Peraturan 33 (2) PPPA (K&T) 1993 dengan tidak menyatakan secara terperinci dokumen yang telah diteliti sebelum mencapai keputusan yang telah diputuskan terhadap Pemohon yang mana menjadikan hukuman buang kerja Pemohon adalah terbatal dan tidak sah. S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [54] Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa kes Subramanyam Sannasy (supra) yang dirujuk oleh peguam Pemohon bukanlah nas yang mewajibkan pihak Ketua Jabatan menyatakan apakah perakuan yang telah dikemukakan kepada Responden 2. Apa yang menjadi keperluan di dalam peruntukan tersebut adalah dokumen- dokumen termasuk perakuan Ketua Jabatan telah dikemukakan. [55] Ini telah dilaksanakan oleh Responden 1 dan diakui oleh Responden 2. Ia bagi pandangan Mahkamah adalah mencukupi dan mematuhi Peraturan 32 dan 33 PPPA (K&T). [56] Isu yang sama telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Shuib bin Abdul Samad @ Zainal v Tan Sri Dato Seri Khalid bin Abu Bakar & ors [2017] 4 MLJ 476 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan; “[22] Regulation 33(1) provides for the consideration of Disciplinary Authority in cases of conviction and detention. Subregulation (1) specifically refers to 'report', 'records of service' and 'the Head of Department's recommendation' forwarded under sub-reg. 29(2). The fact that the second respondent averred in para. 5.6 of the affidavit to 'menerima perakuan tindakan tatatertib' under sub-reg. 33(1), in our view would necessarily have entailed the receipt of the documents forwarded pursuant to sub-reg. 29(2). We therefore found no error of law or fact in the learned Judicial Commissioner's finding on the issues concerning regs. 29(2) and 33(1) of the 1993 Regulations.” S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [57] Sehubungan itu, isu ini bagi pandangan Mahkamah adalah tidak bermerit. Isu (e); kegagalan Keua Jabatan untuk mendeposkan afidavit [58] Selanjutnya peguam Pemohon turut mengemukakan bantahan ke atas afidavit yang hanya difailkan oleh Dato' Sri Haji Mustafar bin Haji Ali di atas kapasitinya sebagai Pengerusi Responden 2. [59] Mahkamah walaubagaimanapun berpegang kepada keputusan di dalam kes Dominic Selvam a/l S Gnanaprogasam v. Kerajaan Malaysia & ors [2007] 2 MLJ 761 yang telah memutuskan seperti berikut; "[17] All the documents exhibited in the affidavit in enclosure 25 showed a series of events in the plaintiff's service history. All the documents were signed and issued by different personnel at different places. Allaudeen is presently in charge and he has access to all the records of service of the plaintiff. Indeed Allaudeen is a qualified person to affirm and depose to all the facts in the affidavit in enclosure 25. No facts in this case are within the knowledge of any particular individual or officer. All the facts pertaining to the plaintiff's matter are documented and they are available as records kept by the defendants. Allaudeen, in my judgment, is a qualified person and he is the right person to affirm the affidavit in enclosure 25. Allaudeen has signed the affidavit in enclosure 25 S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 (Anderson v. Slather [1845] 9 Jur. 1085) before the Commissioner for Oaths ( Ex p. Heymann [1872] L R 7 Ch 488) and that affidavit is certainly admissible in evidence." [60] Berdasarkan kepada kes ini, Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa isu yang terakhir ini adalah turut tidak bermerit. Kesimpulan [61] Bersandarkan kepada analisis yang telah dinyatakan, Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa telah terdapat satu kepincangan prosedur telah berlaku di dalam keputusan oleh Responden ke atas Pemohon. Oleh yang demikian, Mahkamah membenarkan permohonan ini dan memerintahkan perintah seperti dipohon di perenggan (a) hingga (e) di Kandungan 6 tanpa sebarang perintah berkaitan kos. Bertarikh : 17hb. Januari, 2024 (DATUK MOHAMAD ABAZAFREE BIN MOHD ABBAS) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 Pihak-Pihak: Bagi Pihak Pemohon : Shaharuddin bin Mohamed Tetuan Shaharuddin Hidayu & Marwarliz Lot 224, Tingkat 1, Seksyen 24 Jalan Sultan Yahya Petra, Lundang 15050 Kota Bharu Kelantan Bagi Pihak Responden : Ahmad Armi Najamuddin bin Azmi Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan Tingkat Bawah, Blok 5 Kota Darulnaim 15050 Kota Bharu Kelantan Tarikh Bicara : 23hb. November, 2023 Tarikh Keputusan : 23hb. November, 2023 S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 Undang-Undang Yang Dirujuk: ➢ Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ➢ Akta Kesalahan Keselamatan (Langkah-Langkah Khas) 2012 ➢ Akta Pencegahan Jenayah 1959 ➢ Peraturan-Peraturan Pegawai Awam (Kelakuan & Tatatertib) 1993 ➢ Peraturan-Peraturan Lembaga Tatatertib Perkhidmatan Awam 1993 Kes-Kes Yang Dirujuk: ➢ Wira Swire Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2019] 1 LNS 1026 ➢ Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow & Another Appeal [2019] 4 CLJ 561; [2019] MLJU 202 ➢ T Ganeswaran lwn. Suruhanjaya Polis Diraja Malaysia & Satu Lagi [2005] 3 CLJ 302 ➢ Rohana bte Ariffin & Anor v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1988] 2 CLJ (Rep) 390; [1988] 1 CLJ 559 ➢ Mohd Shukri Roslan Iwn. Dato' Sri Hj Mustafar Hj Ali & Yang Lain [2022] 6 CLJ 253; [2022] MLRHU 561 ➢ Benjamin William Hawkes v. PP [2020] 8 CLJ 267; [2020] 5 MLJ 417 ➢ Public Services Commision Malaysia & anor v. Vickneswary RM Santhivelu [2008] 6 CLJ 573; [2008] 2 MLRA 273 ➢ Marzuki Abdul Aziz v. Ketua Polis Negara & Anor [2003] 3 CLJ 315 ➢ Dato' Saadon Othman v. Lembaga Tatatertib Awam Kumpulan Pengurusan (No 1) & Ors [2019] 1 LNS 980 S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 ➢ Subramanyam Sannasy v. SAC II Syed Alwi Syed Hamid & Anor [2010] 2 CLJ 677 ➢ Shuib bin Abdul Samad @ Zainal v Tan Sri Dato Seri Khalid bin Abu Bakar & ors [2017] 4 MLJ 476 ➢ Dominic Selvam a/l S Gnanaprogasam v. Kerajaan Malaysia & ors [2007] 2 MLJ 761 S/N NjB5eanQHkGKy6wmV7gXRQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022

PEMOHON Tetuan Chiong & Partners RESPONDEN Tetuan Kit & Associates

The Plaintiff obtained a final UAE Judgment against the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd – Abu Dhabi for AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49. After executing the UAE Judgment in Abu Dhabi, the Plaintiff realized part of the judgment sum leaving a balance of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the balance sum against the Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. The enforcement of the balance sum was done under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (‘REJA 1958) together with interest and also costs. The Court was moved under s 8 REJA 1958 and O.67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012). But, the Plaintiff sought under common law. The UAE Judgment was tendered as evidence but through an undated supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff enforced the UAE Judgment in Malaysia on the correct party or otherwise. Keywords: Reciprocal enforcement of Judgments, final judgment, common law, undated affidavit, identity of defendant

18/01/2024

YA Puan Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

WA-24C-62-04/2023

PEMOHON CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD RESPONDEN AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD

Enclosure 1. CCSB’s application in OS 62 to enforce the AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA. In the matter of section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 and in the matter of Rule 7, Rule 28, and Rule 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, 2012 and Rule 69A Rule 5 of the Rules of Court (Amendment) 2018.

18/01/2024

YA Tuan Nadzarin Bin Wok Nordin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=011761bf-eda8-4684-8826-c5683764e135&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-62-04/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (Pihak Menuntut) dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (Pihak Responden) Dan Dalam perkara Adjudikasi di hadapan Mohd Norazman Zaini Dan Dalam perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 3-3-2023 Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 28 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan, 2012 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 7, Aturan 28, dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012 dan Aturan 69A Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah (Pindaan) 2018 18/01/2024 08:40:25 WA-24C-62-04/2023 Kand. 14 S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …PLAINTIF DAN AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-65-04/2023 Dalam Perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“Adjudikasi”) Dan Dalam Perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 3.3.2023 yang dibuat oleh S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 En Mohd Norazman Zaini (“Adjudikator”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 15 (b) & (d) Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 dan 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …PLAINTIF DAN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-66-04/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“Adjudikasi”) Dan Dalam perkara Penghakiman Adjudikasi bertarikh 3.3.2023 oleh En. Mohd Norazman Zaini (“Adjudikator”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 16 (b) Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 ANTARA AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …PLAINTIF DAN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …DEFENDAN S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) Introduction [1] OS 65 is AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“AWP”) application under s 15 (b) and (d) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA) to set aside the Adjudication Decision dated 3.3.2023 (“AD”) given in favor of Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (“CCSB”) whilst OS 66 is AWP’s application for a stay of the AD under section 16 CIPAA pending the disposal of the arbitration proceedings between the parties. [2] There is also CCSB’s application in OS 62 to enforce the AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA. [3] All the aforesaid matters were heard together as they contain the same set of facts and related to the same parties. Brief Back Ground Facts [4] Vide a Letter of Award dated 5-6-2018, Ace appointed Carlson as a Subcontractor to carry out construction work for a Project known as “Cadangan Membina Bangunan Kedai Pejabat yang mengandungi Fasa 1 a) 8 Unit Kedai Pejabat 3 Tingkat b) 20 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat c) 1 Unit Loji Rawatan Kumbahan d) 1 Unit Tangki Air yang mengandungi Rumah Pam & Tangki Sedutan e) 1 Unit Stesen Pam f) 1 Unit Pencawang Elektrik Fasa 2 a) 8 Unit Kedai Pejabat 3 Tingkat b) 24 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat c) 2 Unit Pencawang Elektrik di S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 aras Lot 31182, Mukim Gali, Daerah Raub, Pahang Darul Makmur untuk Tetuan Teratai Kilauan Sdn Bhd)” (“the Project”) ("the Subcontract"). [5] The price of the Subcontract was RM20,000,000.00. (“the Subcontract Sum”). [6] Throughout the said Project, Carlson has diligently carried out the Subcontract Work (“Works”) and from time to time had submitted claims or Invoices to Ace for payment. Upon receipt of Carlson’s Progress Claims, Ace issued the Certificates and paid Carlson for the Works done under the Subcontract. [7] The disputes arose between Carlson and Ace in relation to the Subcontract, including disputes over the payment of Carlson’s Progress Claim from Ace. [8] In and around February 2022, Carlson submitted its Progress Claim No. 34 for Ace’s certification. To this effect, Ace issued its Progress Certificate No. 34 acknowledging, certifying and verifying that Carlson had carried out works under the Subcontract amounting to RM18,007,003.11. [9] As at that date, a sum of RM15,785,157.74 had been paid by Ace to Carlson under the previous certificates leaving a balance of RM1,221,845,37 (after deduction of RM1,000,000.00 retention sum) still due and owing under Progress Certificate No. 34. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [10] Pursuant to Clause 6.0 of the Letter of Award, Ace is to make payment within 30 days from the date of the Progress Certificate. Carlson’s Progress Certificate No. 34 was issued to Ace on 20-2- 2022 and therefore, balance payment of RM1,221,845,37 was due and payable by 22-3-2022. [11] Notwithstanding the above, Carlson thereafter issued its Final Progress Claim No. 36 dated 15-4-2022 with all supporting documents for the sum of RM2,937,609.82 (including retention sum but less all previous certified amount) to the Project Architect for its certification. [12] Pursuant to Clause 30.1 of the Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contract 2006 (Without Quantities), the Project Architect shall issue a certificate within 21 days from the date of receipt of the progress claim, which is on 6-5-2022. However, to date, the Project Architect has not issued its certificate to Carlson. [13] Further, since the progress certificate ought to have been issued to Carlson on 6- 5-2022 and Ace is to make payment within 30 days from the date of the progress certificate, the balance sum of RM2,937,609.82 would be due and payable by the Ace to Carlson by 6-6-2022. [14] However, Ace failed and/or neglected to make the respective payments of RM1,221,845,37 and RM2,937,609.82 to Carlson which left them with no other choice but to pursue this Adjudication Claim against Ace. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Issues OS 65 [15] This Court will firstly deal with OS 65 as the decision on this application will eventually have an effect on the other 2 Originating Summons. LAD and Whether Time Was At Large [16] In support of OS 65, learned counsel for AWP had submitted that CCSB did not complete its Works with the original completion dates despite 3 Extensions of Time (“EOT”) granted by the Architect for Section 1 and 2 of the Works and thus AWP were entitled to a set off for the Liquidated Ascertained Damages (“LAD”) claims amounting to RM8 million and third party costs of RM417,000 but that the Learned Adjudicator had made a finding that time was at large and as such AWP was not entitled to its LAD claims. [17] AWP’s counsel had further argued that it was never part of CCSB’s Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Reply that time was at large and that they did not have nor were given the opportunity to submit on this point. [18] In the AD, I found that the Adjudicator had dealt with this issue of ‘time at large’ at paragraphs 12.20 to 12.24 after considering the Architect’s evaluation of the same where the latter determined that the issue of delay was not valid for an EOT and the Adjudicator then holding that the Architect was empowered under clause 23.8 (v) of S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 the PAM Contract 2006 to grant the EOT but that the Architect had not administered the correct provision by refusing to grant EOT and thus time was at large. [19] I also find from the AD that the Adjudicator had given the parties the opportunity to submit on the Certificates of EOT and thereafter the Adjudicator had tabulated the delay events in detail in the AD. [20] From my findings, it was also found by the Adjudicator inter alia that: 20.1 due to the above, the Architect had not issued the Certificate for EOT or the Certificate of Non-Completion (“CNC”) and thus AWP had loss their right to impose LAD. 20.2 they were delay events which were not duly assessed or were ignored. 20.3 CCSB had not argued that the LAD was unreasonable but that there were entitled to more EOT than what has been granted by the Architect. 20.4 AWP pursued assessing and granting of EOT, despite there being condition precedents for the granting of EOT, which the Adjudicator found as amounting to an act of waiver to such condition precedent requirements. [21] Following from this, the Arbitrator concluded that AWP was not entitled to impose LAD as ‘time was at large’ and that CCSB was entitled to RM1,221,845.37 being the outstanding payment up to Progress Certificate No.34. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [22] I have also had the opportunity to peruse CCSB’s Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Reply and did not find any reference to the issue of ‘time being at large’ referred to therein. This however does not mean that the Adjudicator could not come to a finding of there being ‘time at large’ in the matter before him. [23] It is my decision, that this point must be seen in the context of the Adjudicators decision in toto when reading the AD itself. Just because the word ‘time at large’ was not raised expressly by CCSB in its Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Reply does not mean that the Adjudicator could not have made a decision which led to his conclusion that ‘time was at large’ based on the facts and documents before him. [24] I further hold on this point of ‘time being at large’ at large and AWP’s contention of not having nor being given the opportunity to submit on this point, that the Adjudicator, from the above parts of the AD, had asked himself the correct question on this issue i.e whether EOT was to be granted in relation to the provisions of the Contract. The fact that the Adjudicator may have answered the same incorrectly or otherwise is not something which this Court may interfere with as it would be an issue which should be decided at the Arbitration Proceedings, see Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2020] 1 LNS 940. [25] Thus, there is no breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator did not give AWP the alleged right to be heard or submit on this point of ‘time at large’ especially so when, from the facts before me, neither S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 party was given the said right to be heard or submit thereto. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. [26] In any event, I did find that the Adjudicator had considered in some detail AWP’s Adjudication Reply on the issue of LAD and found from the documents before the Adjudicator that the issue of LAD was never raised in, nor deducted from the previous Progress Certificates. The Adjudicator had also held that such claim was an afterthought to justify non-payment of the full amount certified in the various relevant Progress Certificates and that there was no allowable reason and non-compliance with procedures for deduction of money due to CCSB. [27] As to another argument raised by AWP that the Adjudicator had erroneously held that there was no notification by AWP to CCSB on whether AWP would impose LAD, I have found after reading the AD, that the Adjudicator did state there was a letter from AWP to CCSB dated 12.12.2019 on this issue but found that ‘such letter is not what clause 22.1 envisage as the Contract specifically requires the employer to inform such deduction and just inform intention to deduct”. This contention by AWP is therefore clearly untenable and must be dismissed. [28] From all of the above, I hold that the Adjudicator had thus examined the documents provided to him in the Adjudication and duly considered the arguments of both sides before making his considered decision on the LAD. This issue is in fact a challenge as to the merits of and an appeal of the Adjudicator’s decision which is not permitted under s 15 of CIPAA. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Whether Termination Was Unlawful and Not Part of CCSB’s Case [29] On the issue of whether termination was unlawful and not part of CCSB’s case, I agree with learned counsel for AWP that CCSB had in its Adjudication Reply at paragraph 11 thereto stated that there was a mutual termination of the subcontract by the parties but that the Adjudicator had in the AD eventually found the termination as unlawful and the Notice of Default as being defective. To this I have noted that paragraph 69 of AWP’s Adjudication Reply did contend that AWSP was entitled to determine CCSB’s employment under clause 25.1 (c) of the PAM Contract. [30] I have observed from the AD that the conclusion arrived at by the Adjudicator that the termination was unlawful and the Notice of Default being defective was arrived at by scrutinizing the documents before him including the Notice of Default which was entitled ‘Mutual Termination Notice’ and which said Notice of Default only referred to the failure of not completing the Works by the agreed date. [31] The Adjudicator subsequently finds amongst others that: i. the performance of CCSB could not be measured nor could the Adjudicator determine whether CCSB had rectified its default. ii. CCSB had not challenged the said Notice of Default and claimed in the Adjudication Reply that it was mutual. iii. the Notice of Default was defective as there was an act of hindrance by AWP. iv. there was procedural non-compliance of clause 25.2 of the PAM 2006 Contract in issuing the Notice of Default. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [32] After due consideration of the argument put forth by AWP on this issue of the Adjudicator’s decision that the termination was unlawful and that it was not part of CCSB’s case, I agree with learned Counsel for AWP that this would be a ground under section 15 (d) of CIPAA that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction which would entitle this Court to set aside the Adjudication Decision i.e the AD. [33] Once it was CCSB’s case that there was a mutual termination of the subcontract by the parties in the Adjudication Reply, it is, with respect, not within the powers of the Adjudicator to go behind the said averment in the Adjudication Reply and come to his own finding that such termination was not lawful when no such issue as to the validity of the termination was raised by the parties in the Adjudication. Such conduct of the Adjudicator would result in his acting on a frolic of his own. [34] This decision of the Adjudicator has thus resulted in AWP being unentitled to its set off claim of RM417,000 being AWP’s cost to complete the Works. [35] This would thus be one of the rare cases where this Court finds that the ‘conscience of the Court’ has been pricked to such an extent that the AD is to be set aside. Decision For OS 65 S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [36] Consequently, I therefore allow prayers 1 and 2 of enclosure 1 in OS 65. For OS 62 & 66 [37] In the circumstances, I am hereby dismissing OS 62 for the enforcement of the AD with costs and hold that OS 66 for a Stay of the AD is now academic. I order no costs as to OS 66. Dated: 10th day of November 2023 sgd. NADZARIN WOK NORDIN HIGH COURT JUDGE CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF (suit 62) / DEFENDANT (suit 65 & 66): Dinesh Nandrajog [Messrs Nandrajog] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT (suit 62) / PLAINTIFF (suit 65 & 66): Rohan Arasoo a/l Jeyabalah, Ooi Hui Ying and Ng Suet Huey [Messrs Ng, Ho & Partners] S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

BA-42(R)(A)-3-01/2019

PERAYU Suhana Binti Samad RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Ini adalah rayuan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua iaitu dua orang penjawat awam yang bertugas di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, terhadap sabitan dan hukuman yang dijatuhi oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. Isu adalah :- Sejauh mana Mahkamah yang menjalankan kuasa rayuan boleh mengusik dapatan fakta yang dibuat oleh Hakim Bicara. Rayuan ditolak kerana dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara adalah selaras dengan rekod yang berada di hadapan Mahkamah.

18/01/2024

Puan Roszianayati Binti Ahmad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=db3d6075-2dc9-4719-a6db-93681923e179&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: BA-42(R)(A)-2-01/2019 BA-42(R)(A)-3-01/2019 ANTARA 1. SUHANA BINTI SAMAD 2. ZALITA BINTI HARON DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Ini adalah rayuan oleh kedua-dua Perayu yang tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Hakim Sesyen Shah Alam pada 29.11.2018 yang telah mensabitkan kedua-dua mereka atas 7 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan dan menjatuhi hukuman 2 tahun penjara kepada setiap seorang daripada mereka dan denda RM200 bagi setiap pertuduhan jika ingkar bayar - 6 bulan penjara. Untuk rujukan mudah Suhana binti Samad akan dirujuk sebagai Perayu Pertama, manakala Zalita Binti Haron akan dirujuk sebagai Perayu Kedua. [2] Pertuduhan terhadap mereka adalah seperti berikut:- 18/01/2024 10:45:58 BA-42(R)(A)-3-01/2019 Kand. 62 S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 a) Kes Jenayah No.: BA(1)-61R-10-03/2017 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 28.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam iaitu Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus (sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa ('PMA ') Oleh Muhaida binti Mohamed Zan telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 28.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Ooi Shih Xing telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 28.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Yamonaa Thevey Maniam telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 b) Kes Jenayah No.: BA4-61R-11-03- 2017 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 29.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Sun Tzu Hsiang telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 29.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Mimi Amalina Binti Abdullah telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 30.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Azrulhazizi Bin Azwarman telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 c) Kes Jenayah No.:BA-61R-12-03/2017 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 1.7.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Muhammad Fahmii bin Abu Bakar telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Fakta Kes [3] Perayu Pertama ialah Pegawai Imigresen gred KP19 manakala Perayu Kedua ialah Pegawai Imigresen gred KP22. Pada setiap masa mereka bekerja di Bahagian Pasport, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, Daerah Petaling, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia Selangor (JIMNS). Perayu Pertama antara tugasnya - telah diamanahkan untuk menerima dan menyemak secara ringkas borang S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa (PMA) dan Dokumen Perjalanan sebelum pengeluaran nombor giliran termasuk menerima dan memproses pembayaran serta mencetak resit pembayaran PMA dan Dokumen Perjalanan yang diluluskan. Dia juga bertanggungjawab menghantar kutipan hasil, mencetak laporan kutipan, laporan kutipan hasil dan laporan pembayaran dokumen perjalanan serta memperakukan kepada penyelia pada penghujung hari. [4] Perayu Kedua merupakan penyelia Perayu Pertama yang bertanggungjawab dan diamanahkan untuk menyemak PMA yang diterima oleh Pegawai Imigresen termasuk Perayu Pertama dan menjalankan proses pengesahan dalam sistem dan pengeluaran PMA yang telah diproses serta mencetak, merekod dan menandatangani senarai penyerahan yang ditetapkan. [5] Apabila PMA dibuat oleh individu tertentu, data permohonan akan dimasukkan ke dalam sistem MyImms. Setiap Pegawai Imigresen yang terlibat dengan MyImms mempunyai ID dan kata laluan mereka sendiri yang dirahsiakan dan tidak boleh digunakan oleh orang lain. ID yang digunakan oleh Perayu Pertama ialah SUHANA82 manakala ID Perayu Kedua ialah ZALITA. [6] Tujuh individu yang dinamakan dalam pertuduhan, telah memohon Pasport Malaysia dan permohonan mereka telah dikendalikan oleh S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Perayu Pertama. Kesemua mereka adalah individu biasa dan bukan Orang Kurang Upaya (OKU) dan masing-masing telah membayar RM200 untuk pasport mereka. Adalah ditetapkan oleh Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia (JIM) bahawa PMA untuk OKU adalah percuma (gratis). [7] Semasa naziran pematuhan oleh Siti Noor Julisa binti Jamud-din (SP3) seorang Pegawai Imigresen Gred KP29 dari Bahagian Penguatkuasaan dan Unit Integriti Selangor, terhadap sistem My Imms dan pematuhan cek di Bahagian Pasport, beliau mendapati terdapat "corak' gratis yang agak banyak dalam tempoh satu hari iaitu dengan kekerapan sebanyak 8 kali. Beliau telah memilih untuk membuat semakan terhadap laporan ini bagi 3 tempoh hari yang berbeza iaitu 27/6/2016 - 1/7/2016. SP3 mendapati bahawa setiap permohonan PMA yang diterima oleh Perayu Pertama adalah diluluskan oleh Perayu Kedua untuk tujuan gratis. [8] Terdapat keterangan daripada juruwang JIMNS iaitu Nik Mohd Erwan Bin Che Hamid (SP25) bahawa Perayu Pertama telah menghasilkan sendiri resit palsu di dalam bilik VIP dan wang yang diserahkan oleh pemohon-pemohon telah diambil dan disimpan sendiri oleh Perayu Pertama. Begitu juga keterangan daripada Muhamad Faiz Bin Mohamad Yunus (SP26) yang mengatakan bahawa Perayu Pertama telah memberikan wang sebanyak RM50 S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 kepadanya sebagai upah dan adakalanya tidak diberikan upah bagi setiap permohonan palsu yang diletakkan status gratis. SP25 dan SP26 bertugas sebagai juruwang dan diarahkan oleh Perayu Pertama untuk mengambil wang daripada pemohon-pemohon (normal) yang telah diluluskan sebagai pemohon OKU dengan menyerahkan resit palsu yang diserahkan oleh Perayu Pertama dan wang tersebut tidak dimasukkan ke dalam hasil kerajaan. [9] Pembelaan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua menafikan sama sekali telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah ini. Perayu Pertama mengatakan bahawa IDnya di sistem MyIMMS telah digunakan oleh orang lain kerana dia telah tidak log keluar dari sistem tersebut. Perayu Pertama juga menafikan bahawa dia yang telah cop dan menandatangani borang-borang dokumen-dokumen PMA kerana dia telah meninggalkan cop namanya di kaunter dan berkemungkinan pegawai Iain yang menggunakan cop namanya pada borang-borang permohonan pasport yang dikemukakan. Perayu Pertama juga menafikan dia tahu berkenaan fail dengan nama ‘hampagas’ dan bilik VIP. Perayu Pertama juga menuding jari kepada SP25 dan SP26 sebagai orang yang bertanggungjawab terhadap ‘projek gratis’ tersebut. Perayu Kedua pula mengatakan bahawa terdapat kemungkinan IDnya digunakan oleh orang lain kerana dia telah tidak log keluar daripada sistem MyIMMS S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 seterusnya menafikan tandatangannya sebagai pelulus status pemohon kepada ‘gratis’. ISU-ISU YANG YANG DITIMBULKAN [10] Di dalam Hujahan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua dan Hujahan Tambahan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua, telah dihujahkan bahawa terdapat beberapa isu yang perlu diteliti dan memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini yang menjalankan kuasa rayuannya bagi keseluruhan pertuduhan dan sabitan terhadap Perayu iaitu:- Isu Yang Ditimbulkan Di Dalam Hujahan Perayu Pertama a. Pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen di bawah pertuduhan kerana tiadanya elemen pengamanahan dan/atau kawalan. b. Kenyataan saksi-saksi yang berkepentingan di dalam kes ini adalah dicabar dan kebergantungan sabitan hanya pada SP25 dan SP26 adalah diragukan. c. Kegagalan pendakwaan membuktikan tandatangan dalam eksibit adalah milik Perayu Pertama. Terdapat kemungkinan bahawa cop Perayu Pertama telah digunakan oleh orang lain dan tandatangan Perayu Pertama juga telah dipalsukan. S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Isu Yang Ditimbulkan Di Dalam Hujahan Perayu Kedua a. Bahawa pihak pendakwaan tidak memenuhi elemen-elemen di bawah Seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan dan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah khilaf dalam menyabitkan Perayu Kedua b. Bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf dalam menumpukan dan menyabitkan Perayu Kedua bergantung kepada keterangan-keterangan saksi berkepentingan lebih- lebih lagi SP25 dan SP26. Isu Yang Ditimbulkan Di Dalam Hujahan Tambahan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua Pihak responden telah gagal untuk menyatakan di dalam ketujuh-tujuh pertuduhan cara bagaimana kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan itu telah dikatakan dilakukan oleh Perayu Pertama dan Kedua. KUASA MAHKAMAH UNTUK CAMPUR TANGAN [11] Undang-undang berkenaan kuasa mahkamah dalam bidang kuasa rayuannya untuk campur tangan berkenaan dapatan fakta hakim bicara adalah nyata dan matan. Mahkamah ini hanya boleh campur tangan sekiranya terdapat kekhilafan atau salah arah diri dari Hakim S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Bicara dalam menilai dan menentukan keterangan yang material setelah melalui perbicaraan penuh. Saya merujuk kepada kes Mohd Zulkifli Bin Md Ridwan v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 MLJ 257 dimana Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia telah memutuskan:- "Adalah di dalam tangan pencuba fakta untuk menilai kualiti keterangan untuk menentukan samada keterangan atas rekod menjustifikasikan sabitan. Jika Mahkamah memerintahkan pembebasan atau sabitan ia tidak dapat diketepikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan kecuali ia merekodkan dapatan bahawa pandangan yang diambil oleh Mahkamah Perbicaraan bukan pandangan yang munasabah terhadap keterangan atas rekod. Sekiranya Mahkamah Perbicaraan mencerminkan pandangan yang munasabah keterangan atas rekod maka Mahkamah Rayuan tidak wajar campur tangan dan Rayuan tidak mempunyai merit. [12] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 yang memutuskan:- "It is settled law that it is no part or function of an appelate Court in criminal case or indeed any case to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial court. An appelate court necessarily fettered S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 because it lacks the audio visual advantage enjoyed by the trial court [13] Di dalam kes Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor[1996]4 CLJ 545 telah memutuskan berkenaan peranan Mahkamah ini dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuannya seperti berikut: “It is trite law that this Court will not readily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Court of first instance to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. But we are under a duty to intervene in a case where, as here, the trial Court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may safely say that no reasonable Court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion.” [14] Berdasarkan kepada kes-kes yang telah diputuskan, dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuannya, Mahkamah ini hendaklah bertindak perlahan dalam mengusik apa-apa dapatan fakta oleh Hakim Bicara kecuali ia merekodkan dapatan bahawa pandangan yang diambil oleh Mahkamah Perbicaraan bukan pandangan yang munasabah terhadap keterangan atas rekod. [15] ISU 1:- Sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah memenuhi elemen- elemen di bawah Seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. Peguam Perayu- S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Perayu menghujahkan bahawa Hakim Bicara telah gagal menilai keterangan-keterangan dimana tiada bukti yang menunjukkan intipati-intipati di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan telah dipenuhi sebelum mensabitkan Perayu-Perayu. Menurut Perayu- Perayu elemen yang gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak responden adalah:- i) Tertuduh perlu diamanahkan dengan harta tersebut ii)Tertuduh telah menggunakan harta tersebut untuk kegunaan sendiri secara niat salah melanggari tujuan amanah tersebut. [16] Perayu Pertama dan Kedua mengatakan tiada sebarang dokumen atau keterangan yang membuktikan bahawa Perayu-Perayu telah menerima duit daripada pemohon-pemohon pasport. Menurut Perayu-Perayu, ini boleh dilihat melalui keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan. Ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa Perayu Pertama dan Kedua tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa telah diamanahkan untuk menerima apa-apa bayaran pasport oleh pemohon-pemohon. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa keterangan saksi-saksi menafikan bahawa Perayu Pertama ada menerima duit bagi permohonan PMA manakala Perayu Kedua telah menghujahkan bahawa tugas Perayu Kedua di dalam kes ini hanyalah sebagai seorang Pegawai Kanan Imigresen yang meluluskan permohonan S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 pasport. Justeru, tiada pengamanahan wang ringgit yang dipegang dan/atau diuruskan secara langsung dan/atau secara tidak langsung oleh Perayu Kedua. Perayu-Perayu juga mengatakan bahawa menerusi dokumen-dokumen dan keterangan-keterangan saksi, pengamanahan ini pada setiap masa adalah dipegang oleh juruwang. Hal ini dapat dilihat di mana pihak yang mengendalikan segala bayaran adalah merupakan juruwang yang mempunyai kod 818400, seperti mana di dalam keterangan SP3 Siti Noor Julisa binti Jumud’din. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa adalah tidak normal dan diragui berhubung dakwaan bahawa Perayu Pertama telah mencetak resit palsu di bilik VIP selepas mengambil resit asal di kaunter juruwang. Ini adalah kerana tiada keterangan CCTV dan terdapat kemungkinan bahawa cop Perayu Pertama telah digunakan oleh orang lain kerana cop nama Pegawai Imigresen adalah terletak di dalam laci di kaunter dan sesiapa sahaja boleh menggunakannya. Terdapat juga kemungkinan tandatangan Perayu Pertama telah dipalsukan. Perayu Kedua juga menghujahkan tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa Perayu Kedua yang telah menukar status permohonan pemohon- pemohon kepada ‘gratis’. Perayu Kedua juga menghujahkan bahawa sistem ini boleh diakses oleh pegawai lain memandangkan Perayu Kedua tidak pernah log keluar dari sistem MyImms. Justeru S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 terdapat beberapa pegawai lain yang telah log masuk dan menggunakan sistem tersebut selepas Perayu Kedua dan terdapat kebarangkalian untuk pegawai lain yang telah menukarkan status permohonan tersebut kepada gratis. [17] Responden menghujahkan bahawa kedua-dua Perayu bertugas untuk urusan pembayaran wang passport PMA dimana harta yang diamanahkan di dalam kes ini merupakan wang iaitu bayaran wang yang diterima bagi tujuan pembayaran passport PMA oleh pemohon-pemohon. Responden menghujahkan bahawa merujuk kepada prinsip dalam kes di atas jelas bahawa Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua telah diamanahkan bagi urusan melibatkan permohonan PMA dan ianya melibatkan harta yang diamanahkan. Perayu Pertama adalah orang pertama yang membuat semakan di kaunter penerimaan dan akan memasukkan data pemohon PMA ke dalam system My Imms manakala Perayu Kedua adalah Penyelia kepada Perayu Pertama yang antara tugasnya membuat semakan kali kedua dan meluluskan permohonan pemohon. Responden bergantung kepada Lampiran A yang dilampirkan bersama hujahannya mengenai jadual Permohonan pemohon-pemohon, data dalam system My Imms, data resit rasmi kerjaan asal dan resit rasmi yang dipalsukan itu. Kesemua keterangan dokumentar tersebut telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan menunjukkan S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 bahawa kelulusan bagi kesemua permohonan PMA pemohon- pemohon adalah dibuat oleh Perayu Kedua. Responden juga menghujahkan bahawa dari keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan jelas menunjukkan bahawa penerimaan permohonan PMA bermula dari Perayu Pertama dan sekiranya Perayu Kedua tidak meluluskan, tindakan jenayah ini tidak akan berlaku sama sekali. [18] Setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan rekod rayuan dan alasan penghakiman Hakim Bicara, Mahkamah mendapati dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara adalah berdasarkan keterangan yang telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah. Mahkamah tidak akan mengusik dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara yang telah memutuskan bahawa kesemua intipati pertuduhan terhadap Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua telah pun dipenuhi oleh pihak Responden. Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Responden dengan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya Lawan Tan Sri Mohd Isa Bin Abdul Samad [2021] 1 LNS 461 bahawa pengamanahan ke atas harta boleh juga berlaku secara tidak langsung. Kes tersebut memutuskan:- Konsep pengamanahan [172] Tiada pecah amanah jenayah melainkan seorang tertuduh dibuktikan ada pengamanahan ke atas harta. Tanpa elemen kesalahan penyalahgunaan jenayah (criminal S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 misappropriation) di bawah Seksyen 403 KK. Elemen peruntukan ini boleh diterangkan dalam situasi di mana sesuatu harta yang dimiliki oleh X diserah kepada Y untuk tujuan Y menjaganya, di mana pegamanahan ini adalah di bawah undang-undang difahami secara luas dan bukannya amanah dalam konteks ekuiti. Ini juga dapat dilihat pada kategori kumpulan orang yang diamanahkan dengan harta menurut Seksyen 407, 408 dan 409 KK. Pemerhatian relevan ini telah dibuat dalam satu kes yang dirujuk pihak pendakwaan, Rex v. Lee Siong Kiat [1935] MLJ 53, seperti berikut: • "But the word "trust" in the expression "criminal breach of “trust" as found in the Penal Code, is used in far wider and more popular sense. A reference to section 407, 408 and 409 makes this perfectly clear. In section 407 a person entrusted with property may be a carrier, wharfinger or warehouse keeper; in section 408 a clerk or servant; and in section 409, a public servant, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent. Not one of the people in these various categories could ordinarily be described as a trustee in chancery proceedings". Pengamanahan boleh berlaku secara tidak langsung S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [173] Di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Aisyah Mohd Rose & Anor v. PP [2016] 1 MLJ 840 Tengku Maimun JCA (sekarang CJ) menekankan bahawa Seksyen 405 menyebut "in any manner entrusted" yang oleh itu bermakna pengamanahan harta boleh berlaku secara tidak langsung. Petikan berikut adalah relevan: "Element of entrustment” [36] We note that s. 409 of the Penal Code states 'whoever being in any manner entrusted'. [37] We accept that the first appellant was not entrusted directly with the cheques by the companies but it cannot be denied that through the intermediaries, the cheques ended up with the second appellant and from the second appellant, to the first appellant. In our view 'in any manner entrusted' is wide enough go encompass not only the property being directly entrusted by the owner to the accused but also property entrusted by the owner to the accused indirectly, as in the instant appeal. entrusted to the first appellant by virtue of her position as an agent of the bank" [Penekanan ditambah] [19] Seperti mana di dalam kes ini, kedua-dua Perayu bertugas untuk urusan pembayaran wang passport. Perayu Pertama dan Perayu S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Kedua telah diamanahkan bagi urusan melibatkan permohonan PMA dan ianya melibatkan harta yang diamanahkan. Perayu Pertama adalah orang pertama yang membuat semakan di kaunter penerimaan dan akan memasukkan data pemohon PMA ke dalam system My Imms manakala Perayu Kedua adalah Penyelia kepada Perayu Pertama yang antara tugasnya membuat semakan kali kedua dan meluluskan permohonan pemohon PMA. Kesemua permohonan PMA yang telah ditukarkan kepada status ‘gratis’ diuruskan oleh Perayu Pertama (ID: SUHANA82) dan diluluskan oleh Perayu Kedua (ID:ZALITA) walaupun kesemua pemohon adalah orang normal dan telah membayar sejumlah RM200 bagi permohonan PMA mereka, namun begitu wang tersebut tidak masuk ke dalam hasil kerajaan. Keterangan ini bukan sahaja berdasarkan keterangan lisan pemohon-pemohon PMA dan pegawai Imigresen tetapi juga disokong oleh keterangan dokumentar iaitu data dalam system My Imms, data resit rasmi kerajaan asal dan resit rasmi yang dipalsukan. Ia menafikan hujahan Perayu-Perayu yang mengatakan tiada keterangan dokumentar yang telah membuktikan elemen ini. [20] Berkenaan dengan kod kewangan 818400, ia langsung tidak menjejaskan pembuktian intipati pertuduhan memandangkan Hakim Bicara dalam dapatannya mengatakan bahawa ID Perayu S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Pertama dan ID Perayu Kedua telah digunakan sejak awal dalam urusan pemohonan PMA pemohon-pemohon yang ditukarkan kepada status gratis. Melalui keterangan saksi-saksi, kod 818400 adalah kod urusniaga kewangan dengan menggunakan ID Juruwang yang berbeza. Namun kod ini tidak boleh menafikan bahawa sejak awal lagi permohonan-permohonan PMA ini dikendalikan oleh Perayu Pertama dan diluluskan kepada status gratis oleh Perayu Kedua walaupun pemohon-pemohon adalah normal dan bukan OKU. [21] Pecah amanah jenayah ini tidak mungkin akan berlaku tanpa penglibatan Perayu Kedua sebagai pegawai pelulus. Kedua-dua Perayu perlu bersekongkol bagi menjayakan jenayah pecah amanah ini kerana Perayu Pertama sebagai pegawai penyemak yang menerima permohonan PMA dengan menyemak permohonan dan dokumen pemohon dan menghantarnya kepada pegawai pelulus iaitu Perayu Kedua yang akan meluluskannya sebagai ‘gratis’. Ini membuktikan niat bersama mereka selaras dengan pembuktian intipati seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Apatah lagi menurut SP3 yang membuat pemeriksaan dan naziran mengatakan beliau telah membuat "sampling" terhadap Laporan Kutipan Terperinci Juruwang bagi tarikh 27/6/2016 sehingga 1/7/2016, 20/7/2016 dan 26/7/2016 dan mendapati terdapat corak ‘gratis’ S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 yang agak banyak dalam tempoh satu hari iaitu dengan kekerapan sebanyak 8 kali. Beliau juga mendapati bahawa setiap permohonan yang diekstrak telah diterima oleh Perayu Pertama yang menggunakan ID:SUHANA82 dan telah diluluskan oleh Perayu Kedua yang menggunakan ID:ZALITA. [22] Mahkamah juga mendapati Hakim Bicara telah meneliti kes pembelaan dan telah sampai kepada satu konklusi untuk lebih mempercayai keterangan pihak pendakwaan yang lebih kredibel dan disokong oleh keterangan-keterangan lain sama ada keterangan lisan atau dokumentar. Dapatan Hakim Bicara bahawa keterangan pembelaan bersifat penafian semata-mata serta gagal untuk menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan munasabah adalah selaras dengan rekod yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Justeru Mahkamah ini enggan untuk mengusik dapatan ini. [23] ISU 2: Kenyataan saksi-saksi yang berkepentingan di dalam kes ini adalah dicabar dan kebergantungan sabitan hanya pada SP25 dan SP26 adalah diragukan. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa keterangan SP25 dan SP26 perlu dibaca dengan berhati-hati sebagai rakan subahat yang mempunyai kepentingan dan merupakan saksi-saksi yang tidak berintegriti di mana peranan mereka di dalam “projek gratis” adalah sangat aktif dan bermotifkan S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 kepentingan peribadi mereka yang mana mereka sememangnya mempunyai mens rea dan actus reus dalam projek tersebut. Perayu-Perayu menghujahkan kredibiliti SP25 dan SP26 diragui apabila mereka pernah ditangkap oleh pihak SPRM untuk kes yang lain manakala SP25 pernah terlibat dengan pengambilan dadah yang dapat menjejaskan pertimbangannya dalam memberi keterangan. [24] Responden pula menghujahkan bahawa Hakim Bicara telah meneliti keterangan-keterangan SP25 dan SP26 dan telah menerima keterangan mereka. Ini menunjukkan bahawa keterangan SP25 dan SP26 adalah kredibel. Seterusnya keterangan kedua saksi ini tidak berdiri sendiri tetapi disokong oleh keterangan dokumentar. [25] Sekali lagi saya enggan untuk mengusik dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara terpelajar apabila beliau telah menerima keterangan SP25 dan SP26. Saya juga bersetuju dengan hujahan Responden setelah meneliti rekod rayuan bahawa dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara tidak bercanggah dengan keterangan yang dikemukakan di mahkamah. Alasan bahawa SP25 adalah bekas penagih ubat batuk bukan alasan yang menjejaskan kredibilitinya kerana selain dari keterangan lisan saksi ini, terdapat keterangan-keterangan lain S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 terutamanya dokumentar yang membuktikan intipati-intipati pertuduhan terhadap Perayu-Perayu. Terdapat juga keterangan daripada pemohon-pemohon PMA seperti di dalam pertuduhan yang mereka telah membayar RM200 kepada Perayu Pertama dan dalam keadaan wang yang dibayar kepada SP25 dan SP26, wang tersebut akan diberikan kepada Perayu Pertama dengan upah yang diberikan kepada saksi-saksi ini. [26] Peranan SP25 dan SP26 sebagai rakan subahat tidak menyebabkan keterangan mereka ditolak secara terus. Keterangan MyIMMS sepertimana Lampiran A Hujahan Responden dimana sistem ni menunjukkan ID Perayu Pertama dan ID Perayu Kedua adalah sebagai pegawai semakan dan pegawai yang meluluskan. Dapatan Hakim Bicara adalah selaras dengan keterangan saksi- saksi pendakwaan yang mengatakan ID dan kata laluan MyIMMS adalah rahsia untuk digunakan oleh individu itu sahaja. Dengan meneliti kepada rekod rayuan saya mendapati tiada kekhilafan apabila Hakim Bicara menerima keterangan SP25 dan SP26 setelah mengambil kira keterangan sokongan yang lain menyokong keterangan lisan SP25 dan SP26. [27] ISU 3:- Kegagalan pendakwaan membuktikan tandatangan dalam eksibit adalah milik Perayu Pertama. Terdapat kemungkinan S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 bahawa cop Perayu Pertama telah digunakan oleh orang lain dan tandatangan Perayu Pertama juga telah dipalsukan. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa terdapat kemungkinan bahawa tandatangan Perayu Pertama telah dipalsukan. Ini adalah kerana pakar tandatangan tidak pernah sama sekali dipanggil untuk mengesahkan tandatangan itu milik Perayu Pertama dan tandatangan yang tertera di dalam dokumen eksibit adalah ringkas (initial) dan bukan penuh yang mana sampel tandatangan ringkas juga tidak dihantar untuk dianalisa pakar tandatangan. Perayu Pertama juga menghujahkan ketiadaan CCTV di dalam bilik VIP untuk menunjukkan apa sebenarnya berlaku di dalam bilik VIP tersebut telah menyebabkan pendakwaan gagal dalam membuktikan dakwaannya. Perayu Pertama juga menghujahkan bahawa tidak ada sebarang CCTV ditempat duduk bagi membuktikan pergerakan Perayu Pertama kepada Perayu Kedua dan Juruwang untuk menguatkan kes pendakwaan. [28] Adalah undang-undang yang mantap, jika pun terdapat kegagalan oleh pihak Responden untuk menghantar tandatangan Perayu Pertama untuk tujuan perbandingan, keterangan itu jika pun ada hanyalah bersifat sokongan yang tidak menjejaskan kes pendakwaan. Apatah lagi di dalam kes ini terdapat keterangan yang banyak yang menuding kepada kebersalahan Perayu Pertama S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 dengan penggunaan ID Perayu Pertama sebagai pegawai penyemak dan kebersalahan Perayu Kedua dengan penggunaan ID Perayu Kedua sebagai pegawai pelulus. Hakim Bicara telah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan berkenaan isu ini dan saya dapati tiada kekhilafan dari segi fakta dan undang-undang berkenaan perkara tersebut. Menurut Hakim Bicara:- Berkenaan kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan keterangan berkaitan CCTV dan pemakaian s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap kes pendakwaan, saya berpendapat bahawa ia adalah tidak "fatal'. Saya merujuk dan menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Akbar Ali Abdul Rahman v PP [20171 1 LNS 710 di mana Mahkamah menyatakan: "In the same vein, we held that the CCTV recording was corroborative in nature and its non production did not create a serious gap in the narrative of the prosecution's case ..” Prinsip undang-undang yang sama juga boleh digunakan berkenaan ketiadaan keterangan pakar untuk perbandingan tandatangan Perayu Pertama. S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [29] ISU 4:- Pihak responden telah gagal untuk menyatakan di dalam ketujuh-tujuh pertuduhan cara bagaimana kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan itu telah dikatakan dilakukan oleh Perayu Pertama dan Kedua. Perayu-Perayu menghujahkan bahawa pertuduhan- pertuduhan yang dirangka adalah kabur kerana tidak menyatakan cara bagaimana pecah amanah itu dilakukan selaras dengan seksyen 154 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Ini menyebabkan Perayu- Perayu diprejudiskan, tersalah arah dan berada dalam teka teki apabila membuat persediaan pembelaannya. Responden pula menghujahkan bahawa ketidaknyatakan cara / kaedah bagaimana pecah amanah itu berlaku adalah tidak material memandangkan Perayu-Perayu tidak terkeliru ("misled") yang memprejudiskan Perayu-Perayu membuat pembelaan. Ini adalah kerana kesemua elemen pertuduhan telah dipenuhi oleh pihak Responden dan telah diterima serta diputuskan oleh Hakim Bicara iaitu:- a) Perayu-perayu adalah penjawat awam; b) Perayu-perayu telah diamanahkan dengan sesuatu harta iaitu wang bayaran passport PMA; dan c) Perayu-perayu telah melakukan pecah amanah terhadap pembayaran wang RM200 bagi permohonan PMA tersebut. S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [30] Mahkamah telah meneliti ketujuh-tujuh pertuduhan tersebut dan juga meneliti Rekod Rayuan serta undang-undang yang berkaitan dan Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada peruntukan undang-undang yang mewajibkan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan perlu menyatakan cara pecah amanah jenayah itu dilakukan. (Rujuk kes Ahmad Zahid Hamidi v Public Prosecutor [20201 1 LNS 1986 ). Melihat kepada setiap pertuduhan, ia telah menimbulkan dengan jelas intipati-intipati pertuduhan yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan ini adalah memadai. Justeru, tidak perlu untuk menyatakan bagaimana kesalahan pecah amanah itu dilakukan di dalam pertuduhan tersebut. Apatah lagi, Perayu-Perayu telah membela diri di dalam tindakan ini dan tiada rekod yang menunjukkan bahawa Perayu-Perayu telah diprejudiskan atau tersalah arah dalam membuat persediaan dan pengemukaan pembelaannya. KESIMPULAN [31] Mahkamah mendapati sabitan oleh Hakim Bicara adalah selamat dan betul selaras dengan keterangan dan rekod yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah serta dan undang-undang yang terpakai. Mahkamah juga mendapati hukuman yang dijatuhi oleh Hakim S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Bicara adalah adil dan saksama selaras dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Perayu-Perayu. Justeru Mahkamah ini tidak perlu untuk campur tangan terhadap dapatan dan keputusan Hakim Bicara. Rayuan Perayu-Perayu ditolak dan sabitan serta hukuman terhadap Perayu-Perayu dikekalkan. Bertarikh pada 23 November 2023 ROSZIANAYATI BIN AHMAD Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Peguam Perayu Pertama Tetuan Suzana lsmail & Partners Peguamcara dan Peguambela No. 26, Jalan Galena 7/24, Alam Villa, seksyen 7 40000, Shah Alam, serangor Darur Ehsan. Peguam Perayu Kedua Tetuan Salim Bashir, Ruswiza & Co Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 10-C, Tingkat 3, Blok 1 Worldwide Business Centre Jalan Tinju 13/50, Seksyen 13 406V5 Shah Alam. Responden / Pendakwa Raya Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia Bahagian Perundangan dan Pendakwaan Aras 18 & 19, Blok C NO. 2, Lebuh Wawasan , Presint 7 62250 Putrajaya S/N dWA928ktGUem25NoGSPheQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022

PEMOHON Messrs Chiong & Partners RESPONDEN Tetuan Kit & Associates

The Plaintiff obtained a final UAE Judgment against the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd – Abu Dhabi for AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49. After executing the UAE Judgment in Abu Dhabi, the Plaintiff realized part of the judgment sum leaving a balance of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the balance sum against the Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. The enforcement of the balance sum was done under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (‘REJA 1958) together with interest and also costs. The Court was moved under s 8 REJA 1958 and O.67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012). But, the Plaintiff sought under common law. The UAE Judgment was tendered as evidence but through an undated supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff enforced the UAE Judgment in Malaysia on the correct party or otherwise. Reciprocal enforcement of Judgments, final judgment, common law, undated affidavit.

18/01/2024

YA Puan Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

WA-24C-65-04/2023

PEMOHON AWP PROPERTIES SDN. BHD. RESPONDEN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN. BHD.

Enclosure 1. OS 65 is AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“AWP”) application under section 15 (b) and (d) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA) to set aside the Adjudication Decision dated 3.3.2023(“AD”) given in favor of Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (“CCSB”) whilst OS 66 is AWP’s application for a stay of the AD under section 16 CIPAA pending the disposal of the arbitration proceedings between the parties.

18/01/2024

YA Tuan Nadzarin Bin Wok Nordin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=16f2a6f6-0d90-4054-8306-5cac3437f840&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-62-04/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (Pihak Menuntut) dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (Pihak Responden) Dan Dalam perkara Adjudikasi di hadapan Mohd Norazman Zaini Dan Dalam perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 3-3-2023 Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 28 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan, 2012 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 7, Aturan 28, dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012 dan Aturan 69A Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah (Pindaan) 2018 18/01/2024 12:18:36 WA-24C-65-04/2023 Kand. 16 S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …PLAINTIF DAN AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-65-04/2023 Dalam Perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“Adjudikasi”) Dan Dalam Perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 3.3.2023 yang dibuat oleh S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 En Mohd Norazman Zaini (“Adjudikator”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 15 (b) & (d) Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 dan 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …PLAINTIF DAN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-66-04/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“Adjudikasi”) Dan Dalam perkara Penghakiman Adjudikasi bertarikh 3.3.2023 oleh En. Mohd Norazman Zaini (“Adjudikator”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 16 (b) Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 ANTARA AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …PLAINTIF DAN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …DEFENDAN S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) Introduction [1] OS 65 is AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“AWP”) application under s 15 (b) and (d) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA) to set aside the Adjudication Decision dated 3.3.2023 (“AD”) given in favor of Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (“CCSB”) whilst OS 66 is AWP’s application for a stay of the AD under section 16 CIPAA pending the disposal of the arbitration proceedings between the parties. [2] There is also CCSB’s application in OS 62 to enforce the AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA. [3] All the aforesaid matters were heard together as they contain the same set of facts and related to the same parties. Brief Back Ground Facts [4] Vide a Letter of Award dated 5-6-2018, Ace appointed Carlson as a Subcontractor to carry out construction work for a Project known as “Cadangan Membina Bangunan Kedai Pejabat yang mengandungi Fasa 1 a) 8 Unit Kedai Pejabat 3 Tingkat b) 20 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat c) 1 Unit Loji Rawatan Kumbahan d) 1 Unit Tangki Air yang mengandungi Rumah Pam & Tangki Sedutan e) 1 Unit Stesen Pam f) 1 Unit Pencawang Elektrik Fasa 2 a) 8 Unit Kedai Pejabat 3 Tingkat b) 24 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat c) 2 Unit Pencawang Elektrik di S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 aras Lot 31182, Mukim Gali, Daerah Raub, Pahang Darul Makmur untuk Tetuan Teratai Kilauan Sdn Bhd)” (“the Project”) ("the Subcontract"). [5] The price of the Subcontract was RM20,000,000.00. (“the Subcontract Sum”). [6] Throughout the said Project, Carlson has diligently carried out the Subcontract Work (“Works”) and from time to time had submitted claims or Invoices to Ace for payment. Upon receipt of Carlson’s Progress Claims, Ace issued the Certificates and paid Carlson for the Works done under the Subcontract. [7] The disputes arose between Carlson and Ace in relation to the Subcontract, including disputes over the payment of Carlson’s Progress Claim from Ace. [8] In and around February 2022, Carlson submitted its Progress Claim No. 34 for Ace’s certification. To this effect, Ace issued its Progress Certificate No. 34 acknowledging, certifying and verifying that Carlson had carried out works under the Subcontract amounting to RM18,007,003.11. [9] As at that date, a sum of RM15,785,157.74 had been paid by Ace to Carlson under the previous certificates leaving a balance of RM1,221,845,37 (after deduction of RM1,000,000.00 retention sum) still due and owing under Progress Certificate No. 34. S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [10] Pursuant to Clause 6.0 of the Letter of Award, Ace is to make payment within 30 days from the date of the Progress Certificate. Carlson’s Progress Certificate No. 34 was issued to Ace on 20-2- 2022 and therefore, balance payment of RM1,221,845,37 was due and payable by 22-3-2022. [11] Notwithstanding the above, Carlson thereafter issued its Final Progress Claim No. 36 dated 15-4-2022 with all supporting documents for the sum of RM2,937,609.82 (including retention sum but less all previous certified amount) to the Project Architect for its certification. [12] Pursuant to Clause 30.1 of the Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contract 2006 (Without Quantities), the Project Architect shall issue a certificate within 21 days from the date of receipt of the progress claim, which is on 6-5-2022. However, to date, the Project Architect has not issued its certificate to Carlson. [13] Further, since the progress certificate ought to have been issued to Carlson on 6-5-2022 and Ace is to make payment within 30 days from the date of the progress certificate, the balance sum of RM2,937,609.82 would be due and payable by the Ace to Carlson by 6-6-2022. [14] However, Ace failed and/or neglected to make the respective payments of RM1,221,845,37 and RM2,937,609.82 to Carlson which left them with no other choice but to pursue this Adjudication Claim against Ace. S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Issues OS 65 [15] This Court will firstly deal with OS 65 as the decision on this application will eventually have an effect on the other 2 Originating Summons. LAD and Whether Time Was At Large [16] In support of OS 65, learned counsel for AWP had submitted that CCSB did not complete its Works with the original completion dates despite 3 Extensions of Time (“EOT”) granted by the Architect for Section 1 and 2 of the Works and thus AWP were entitled to a set off for the Liquidated Ascertained Damages (“LAD”) claims amounting to RM8 million and third party costs of RM417,000 but that the Learned Adjudicator had made a finding that time was at large and as such AWP was not entitled to its LAD claims. [17] AWP’s counsel had further argued that it was never part of CCSB’s Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Reply that time was at large and that they did not have nor were given the opportunity to submit on this point. [18] In the AD, I found that the Adjudicator had dealt with this issue of ‘time at large’ at paragraphs 12.20 to 12.24 after considering the Architect’s evaluation of the same where the latter determined that the issue of delay was not valid for an EOT and the Adjudicator then holding that the Architect was empowered under clause 23.8 (v) of S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 the PAM Contract 2006 to grant the EOT but that the Architect had not administered the correct provision by refusing to grant EOT and thus time was at large. [19] I also find from the AD that the Adjudicator had given the parties the opportunity to submit on the Certificates of EOT and thereafter the Adjudicator had tabulated the delay events in detail in the AD. [20] From my findings, it was also found by the Adjudicator inter alia that: 20.1 due to the above, the Architect had not issued the Certificate for EOT or the Certificate of Non-Completion (“CNC”) and thus AWP had loss their right to impose LAD. 20.2 they were delay events which were not duly assessed or were ignored. 20.3 CCSB had not argued that the LAD was unreasonable but that there were entitled to more EOT than what has been granted by the Architect. 20.4 AWP pursued assessing and granting of EOT, despite there being condition precedents for the granting of EOT, which the Adjudicator found as amounting to an act of waiver to such condition precedent requirements. [21] Following from this, the Arbitrator concluded that AWP was not entitled to impose LAD as ‘time was at large’ and that CCSB was entitled to RM1,221,845.37 being the outstanding payment up to Progress Certificate No.34. S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [22] I have also had the opportunity to peruse CCSB’s Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Reply and did not find any reference to the issue of ‘time being at large’ referred to therein. This however does not mean that the Adjudicator could not come to a finding of there being ‘time at large’ in the matter before him. [23] It is my decision, that this point must be seen in the context of the Adjudicators decision in toto when reading the AD itself. Just because the word ‘time at large’ was not raised expressly by CCSB in its Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Reply does not mean that the Adjudicator could not have made a decision which led to his conclusion that ‘time was at large’ based on the facts and documents before him. [24] I further hold on this point of ‘time being at large’ at large and AWP’s contention of not having nor being given the opportunity to submit on this point, that the Adjudicator, from the above parts of the AD, had asked himself the correct question on this issue i.e whether EOT was to be granted in relation to the provisions of the Contract. The fact that the Adjudicator may have answered the same incorrectly or otherwise is not something which this Court may interfere with as it would be an issue which should be decided at the Arbitration Proceedings, see Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2020] 1 LNS 940. [25] Thus, there is no breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator did not give AWP the alleged right to be heard or submit on this point of ‘time at large’ especially so when, from the facts before me, neither S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 party was given the said right to be heard or submit thereto. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. [26] In any event, I did find that the Adjudicator had considered in some detail AWP’s Adjudication Reply on the issue of LAD and found from the documents before the Adjudicator that the issue of LAD was never raised in, nor deducted from the previous Progress Certificates. The Adjudicator had also held that such claim was an afterthought to justify non-payment of the full amount certified in the various relevant Progress Certificates and that there was no allowable reason and non-compliance with procedures for deduction of money due to CCSB. [27] As to another argument raised by AWP that the Adjudicator had erroneously held that there was no notification by AWP to CCSB on whether AWP would impose LAD, I have found after reading the AD, that the Adjudicator did state there was a letter from AWP to CCSB dated 12.12.2019 on this issue but found that ‘such letter is not what clause 22.1 envisage as the Contract specifically requires the employer to inform such deduction and just inform intention to deduct”. This contention by AWP is therefore clearly untenable and must be dismissed. [28] From all of the above, I hold that the Adjudicator had thus examined the documents provided to him in the Adjudication and duly considered the arguments of both sides before making his considered decision on the LAD. This issue is in fact a challenge as to the merits of and an appeal of the Adjudicator’s decision which is not permitted under s 15 of CIPAA. S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Whether Termination Was Unlawful and Not Part of CCSB’s Case [29] On the issue of whether termination was unlawful and not part of CCSB’s case, I agree with learned counsel for AWP that CCSB had in its Adjudication Reply at paragraph 11 thereto stated that there was a mutual termination of the subcontract by the parties but that the Adjudicator had in the AD eventually found the termination as unlawful and the Notice of Default as being defective. To this I have noted that paragraph 69 of AWP’s Adjudication Reply did contend that AWSP was entitled to determine CCSB’s employment under clause 25.1 (c) of the PAM Contract. [30] I have observed from the AD that the conclusion arrived at by the Adjudicator that the termination was unlawful and the Notice of Default being defective was arrived at by scrutinizing the documents before him including the Notice of Default which was entitled ‘Mutual Termination Notice’ and which said Notice of Default only referred to the failure of not completing the Works by the agreed date. [31] The Adjudicator subsequently finds amongst others that: i. the performance of CCSB could not be measured nor could the Adjudicator determine whether CCSB had rectified its default. ii. CCSB had not challenged the said Notice of Default and claimed in the Adjudication Reply that it was mutual. iii. the Notice of Default was defective as there was an act of hindrance by AWP. iv. there was procedural non-compliance of clause 25.2 of the PAM 2006 Contract in issuing the Notice of Default. S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [32] After due consideration of the argument put forth by AWP on this issue of the Adjudicator’s decision that the termination was unlawful and that it was not part of CCSB’s case, I agree with learned Counsel for AWP that this would be a ground under section 15 (d) of CIPAA that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction which would entitle this Court to set aside the Adjudication Decision i.e the AD. [33] Once it was CCSB’s case that there was a mutual termination of the subcontract by the parties in the Adjudication Reply, it is, with respect, not within the powers of the Adjudicator to go behind the said averment in the Adjudication Reply and come to his own finding that such termination was not lawful when no such issue as to the validity of the termination was raised by the parties in the Adjudication. Such conduct of the Adjudicator would result in his acting on a frolic of his own. [34] This decision of the Adjudicator has thus resulted in AWP being unentitled to its set off claim of RM417,000 being AWP’s cost to complete the Works. [35] This would thus be one of the rare cases where this Court finds that the ‘conscience of the Court’ has been pricked to such an extent that the AD is to be set aside. Decision For OS 65 S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [36] Consequently, I therefore allow prayers 1 and 2 of enclosure 1 in OS 65. For OS 62 & 66 [37] In the circumstances, I am hereby dismissing OS 62 for the enforcement of the AD with costs and hold that OS 66 for a Stay of the AD is now academic. I order no costs as to OS 66. Dated: 10th day of November 2023 sgd. NADZARIN WOK NORDIN HIGH COURT JUDGE CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF (suit 62) / DEFENDANT (suit 65 & 66): Dinesh Nandrajog [Messrs Nandrajog] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT (suit 62) / PLAINTIFF (suit 65 & 66): Rohan Arasoo a/l Jeyabalah, Ooi Hui Ying and Ng Suet Huey [Messrs Ng, Ho & Partners] S/N 9qbyFpANVECDBlysNDf4QA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AA-62-90-08/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH AIREL IRWIN SHAH BIN NORASLIN

Perayu/Orang Kena Tuduh (OKT), Atarel Irwin Shah bin Noraslin telah dituduh di Mahkamah ini dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut: -PERTUDUHAN:“BAHAWA KAMU PADA 18/8/2023, LEBIH KURANG JAM 1205 PAGI BERTEMPAT DI ALAMAT MAPS PERSIARAN MERU RAYA 3, BANDAR MERU RAYA, IPOH DI DALAM DAERAH KINTA, DI DALAM NEGERI PERAK TELAH MEMECAH MASUK STOR BENGKEL KENDERAAN DAN TELAH MENCURI (1) UNIT BLOWER BERWARNA OREN JENIS: SJ-S50 MILIK MAPS DI ALAMAT PERSIARAN MERU RAYA 3, BANDAR MERU RAYA 30020 IPOH PERAK. DENGAN ITU KAMU TELAH MELAKUKAN KESALAHAN YANG BOLEH DIHUKUM DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 457 KANUN KESEKSAAAN.

18/01/2024

Puan Hilmiah Bt Yusof

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a54bd08b-9d58-4958-9c85-ce5a9ce47f51&Inline=true

18/01/2024 16:33:58 AA-62-90-08/2023 Kand. 13 S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal n—s2-9n—na/2023 Kand. 13 mun/2224 16:33-SB DALAM MAHKAMAN SESYEN DI IFOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARLIL RIDZUAN genome JENAVAH) KES TANGKAP: AA-S2-9fl4)E/21.123 ANTARA PENDAKWA IIAVA FENDAKWA RAYA mm AIAREL IRWIN sum am NORASLIN . “onus KENA wuun A|.A§AN PEMQNAKIMAN 11} Psgruuumm Perayu/Ovang Ken: mum com Alaral hwm Shah bm Norashn lelah duludun m Mahkamah m. dengan penuduhan sepem benkul — m xw9lv\IndWEmm:5:n0R/U0 mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. 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Eksmnreksxbll berkenazn man dnunjnkkan kapadi on darl dlakm benavulah oKr Mahkamah kemudvamiya telah manaapam on bersalah sepem Fenuaunan Mahkamah selerusnya rnendengar Iayuan unluk mengumngxan hukuman can on an humnan pemheml don pmak pendakwaan on d\ dalam rayuan mengulangkan nukuman menyeuakan mam belnau memohon hukumzn pemara nngzn dan vankh |angkz|1 our lelah berkahwm dan mempunyal seorang anak on manyalakan ma sading max bekeua dan memanon dualuhkan Imkuman peruam dengan lempoh pemec-yarnn yang slngkll Pmak Pendakwaan pma memalmn agar Mzhkamah mengambll mm kepenhngan awlm dzn kadzr kekevapan kes Pendakwaan memohon agar Mahkamah membenkan nukuman yang dapa| member: pengayavan kepafla on Pandakwaan juga menya|akan hahawa on mnmpunym mm kzsalznan lampau dengan xesaranan himpvr serum dengan kesalahin u. hadapan Mallkamah mu kesalanan an bawan Iaksyan 379A KK Dnkumen menuvuukkin rekod lampau Manda aeoagm mm mz dzn dnuruukkan kepadn on on tslah mengaknl benav Iakod limpnu wsawl Akmmya Mahkamah telah merldapah on helsalah Gan msaxmxan dengan Perluduhan nan menmnhkan hukuman peruara 6 vamm nan lankh Kangkap okr Imak berpuas nan dengan hukuman yang d|;a|uhkan Mankamah dan mstayu lamadapnya ke Mahkamah Tmggl am malpv-nwzmmgarvow/U0 “Nan: san-1 ...ya.mm .. .1... a my a. nflwnlflly mum: flnunmnl m .HuNa WM >4 KY A) pnmsummmsnp mum MENJATUHKAI nuxumn Dmam meruatuhkan rmkuman‘ Mamcaman Ielah menuuk kepada pnnslp yang umyavaxan m ua\am kes»kes wvmasuk kes PP v sun: man a Ahmad 1:93:11 nu 14: 11] When dumzimg wma: ssnlsnce m Impose the gg ;g m ; hm ms alfsnce and ms crrcumslancas and the manner m mm. me nlfsnca was cammmm I21 An annslbte com wr(/ rrol mam wrm ma smmca rmvosod «mm .1 can no shown um m (M cmrumslancas. ma sinlarrw was mmvasny excessive or Inadequate nr ma: m /lxmg the senrunce the mommare mm had ram '0 avequmry consrdvr all IE/Evan! factors I.» w agamsv me offender 131 A plea argmy was 5 mmgalmg mm: mu mo oflondor was new to ho a h-rdsned crmlmal Kas m axas menyalakan nalam melumumkan rmxuman, Mnhknmah pellu mengamhll klrz caxnanaxna: sapem kepenlmgan nwam‘ pongnkuan -am. on, umuv on ksadaan kasmalnn on, Imglah um dln kullkuln man; my bahking on Mnnakala m unllm Re: 1 gag»... («gm 1 EH Q Mahk-mill rrunyif-kin pnrmp»p1m|Iv mum unmk mgunapuxu. semis: manjamhkan hukumm 121 71!: com snoum also have regard In csnam acoaplnd prmums ov mdslmes 50 as no! (0 have Ion glue! 5 aaspmy u. sm malpv-nwzmmwa “Nan: sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... w my .. mmuny mm: flnunmnl m mum WM 5 ssnlsnce lorlha same olfsrma These gmdslmes were; m r c an the I :1 an or I y : rv amongsv accused arson: and mmgrm facials pa/amt In the ‘ Manakala a. dzhm kes HARI mm seen» v PP mgmuujg pula‘ Mahkzmah manyalakan prlrmpapnllsvp mm unluk mqunaoaka. umasa nnnmuhkan hukuman ‘Our cams navc a long mm sauce prognsssa lrum we for an ayramy ‘Iuclh In: a Ioolh‘ lypn ouaam rm avawod am or mm 91:! n u y no I m a a n r magma. ma court was rm! 5!! new m mind out 10 vrcnms ur aggmswn um ‘pound a/flush’ nu: genmrry to ptulacl aacnzy by ervfumrnq/usflce’ B) ALASAN IIAHKAIIAN mun MEMBERIKAN HUKUIAN Mzhkamah lelah memaluhkan hukuman pemarz s tahun nan lankh langkap sexelan mangamw kw: laklov-Iakwr Wmngalmg’ am 'aggmvahng' benkul u Pengakuan aalan aaasan sa\aII salu faklur mmqasl 0 Lllzr bdaknng on my Kepenlmgin swam flan kepenlmgan on v) Rekod Iampau on sm malpvnwzmmwarvownm “Nan: san-1 ...mam .. U... a v-viymu mwny mm. flnunmnl m mum WM I) Ptnnalxunn nun swan um um «mo: mmgun DI dahm Isa Znlaon Slum! v vP(1na)A c: 441, Augustin: Pam JC (pad: mm mu lclah menyiilkan blhawu 5I|u perlglkuln snlnh pariu dlambnl bur: dzrl dman immmbungzn wwnpmyz da\am pious nunmunkan hukumln ‘A nmgancn plea mam ml be [ruled ss 3 nzuansuc mm to he sumnumy rupcled ms n-amen: »z .5 made I: .5 a mnsumem eoemenz of me seulencm graces: unenrs we eonmmno Manakala dw dalam kes PP v Iuvmaun (snprl) Mahkamah menyalakan bahzwa pengakuan salah aaamn salah salu ram: mung. - nukuman - 131 :1 IS an accepted rule ol main man an accused should be gwn email or dnsoaunl /mprsamng gwlry nu: rs Mcsuss puma (me and money wx/I be spsmd afar! accused admrl: ms gum The cram! oldrscourll ra as g/Von In an accused psrson .5 W! on ma msmmn sentence nnposed By law bu! lathe! an a sentence which would have been Imposed an the accused rlhe had claimed rm mal and found gmily ' D: dzlam kes m2 V Julnl um Lu Finn 5. Am [anon uuu 159. Mzhkamzh nuenymauan oanm pnunakuin salah akan menpmalkan mass kevsmua nmak .1. Mankzmah Kes Im mg: mnnyalakln kemasaannya sesuaiu pengukuan salah mu malayakkan peszlah berkenaan mendanalkan sesuku sehmgga saw pemga peogurangan danpada hukuman yang sepahllnya mxenma m bawan kesalahan sm xi wanna/U0 “Nan: sm-1 n-nwwm .. U... m mfly .. mm-y mum: flnunmnl m .HuNa Wm! Nonemslsss, our nouns have evaivsd a gnnmr Woxrbh rune nmoo-maea Ihlvugh numamus aemasa cases mar where an accused person pleads gum’ wrmoul comssnng the cnargs ar crmges «yams: mm m a mar winch nugm consume "any day: mvowing prosecutors, witnesses aocumems, pa/my aflicars and chsrmsls me man: Ben m I-vow olrmnosma a named sentence A "plea of guilty" mums me disposal L)! a cummal case wm hghlsnmg speed Every cams: and mm leads to a backlog nl undvspased cnrvunslcsses uoggmg me calms and me pnsons wm ramand wvsormr: /1 rs m 1». mm ml-res! (MI pfindrnw cnmmel cum: no dumua on us expemlmusly .5 passxbla and accused persons who plead guury be Imposed mm . mama sentence Namsly 1: in universal ab/Igahan ma 5 mama nnlemae encourages honesty when an amma phnds gmlly. me and mm mung ma! mom accused person: would wlllmgly admfl gum Milton! .1 ma/, mus ruducmq me workload ol me pmsocmrs oflm and mo clurince elm bocklov ovum A pisa ol gull! coum be rewarded mm a dlsllfllllfil on me senwncs men would arharw-as have been rmpmed upon a nnamg av gmll altar . lull Ina! Tlva mscounl In be gm". oauld be Delwssn one— quanvr ma one-nwa fofluwmg me than Supmmu Court‘: aocmnrv m Alormud Abdulluh Ana Swu Kong v PF am 1 ML: 1.11. m ms /udgmonl in mg! mg MoIcamadA1rm so! (.5 he [hen wul sm-a .s rouaws ‘M »s sue was led mat me even: or the rmmchon on accoum al ol . won a n r m omerwrsa wouldnava man (ha ssmamx“ sm malvv m “Mm: sm-1 nmmrmu .. undtx: v-viymu nr1n\nIV|Y mm. a....m m muua WM! on terah mtnguku salln an mm. mombumu mnnpmmkan mus: Mahkaman dan pmak penfllkwaln Nanum, ad: mlsanya pengakuan mm. Max memamm nukuman yang nngan auamnknn tammmanya apzhlla xepennmgan awarn mengndv vamhzn Kas pecan maluk sepam m Im ukwlnyl drbnarkun mm hedcluuu pm akin mevnrnbulknn kequsavun can kelzkmzn aw kalarvgan mnsyaukii my dzlam kes K-nun Blllurun v PP man] a cu 190 Gcpal Sn Ram JCA belch mnnytvakun mam benklfl - 'GensraW speak/ng 2 men of gm/ny .s s slmng mmgaluug ctrcumslance operating m favour ol an accused However, mere may as cases where me aflence cammmed ns :0 selvus and the cncumslanoas m men :1 was commmsd .5 so Serums and the cvrcumslzmaes m was comnvlrad ;s so namaus ma! a wee org-my need to be gmsn man or no vmgm ma nsed Io gmlecl (ha gubm IS another Iactgr mg; mg gm/ml over 4 g. :2! gum Mahkamah juga mendapau pengakuan salah juga max memamln rmkuman yang rmgan lennamanya apzhlla Iemapal buklw yang kual unluk meusahnkan on seknranya perbncavnn dqalznkan sepem m mam kn: um yang mana on man dnangkap ‘red-handed’ aemasa mellkukan keszlahan mu up Lalar bulzlung on OKT yang Iudzh mum 25 (shun upacumyu mempunyl kemalangan man an udak seharulnw l:rhba| dzlam ‘enayah ml on sepanunya berslkap mam oenanggungamn ka am men darn anaknyz dun bukena inE %?Mtammm:'as;:v.':r'AJHHaaa';'u‘aa"9'-"d-"9 9 om memuklumkan Mahkamah on mempunyau anak dan sslan umuk duaga namun aaram hzl ml Mahkzmah memguk kepada kes PP v AMIR HAMLAN [zoos] 3 Auk no Dv dalarn kee berkenaan, Mahkaman lean menyalakan sepem benkul — ‘Th: din‘! of the convlclrun on Ml lccuuds /IN!/I docs no! aulomalmaffy bsmmo .9 mmgalmg factor we nccusud cannol as E/(awed Io comlml ollnnces rm/y [0 Mia bumnd [be possible repvrcussrons al 8 lengthy cuslodul wenttnci on hrs Ilrmly In hglvlelv me ssnturrce Imposed me needs al me accused me my nulwerghed Dylssues olpubnc mmrssf )KlnInIingln um um knplnllngln om‘ Mahkamzh peflulah mengambll kna kepermngan mam den kepemmgun oxr dalam menjlluhkan hukuman Dv dnlam kes Ru v Kmmm John Bull 35 Cr Aup R 164. pnnslp berkenaan Kehh dlpuluskin sapem benkux 1.. ammmz ma awmprvam sentence a cam! mam afways be gurded by renew corvsrdevalmns The ms: and foremost .5 me public Intelusl me mmtnsl my rs publicly snfurmd ml only ml]! the cape! al numslmrg am, am mac m me hope av pmvannng u A pmuul servann pama m p-mm: um. um yubflc mruutul two win. I: my mm mm. Mm magm Bu umpm to lry mm. as svsmma R: oflev easy money on me wpposmun ma! n ma oflmam IS caught and brmqhl Io yuslrce ma numshmsnl M/I be negngmre Such a mum may also am ma puficutll cmmnal rmm comnmmg a trim: aqua, ollnduco Mm In mm (mm . can-mam an mnmm me pumps mlsresl rs mm: wrvcd, ma best served 1/ ms nllenrtav .5 mama m mm [mm cnrmrlal way: to Pianos! way Our law does not. sm malpvnwemmwarvofillifl “Mm: sm-1 nmwmu .. U...» vary .. mmuny mm. m...m m muua WM W

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

AB-22NCvC-10-03/2023

PLAINTIF JASWANT SINGH A/L J NASIB SINGH DEFENDAN MEGA-ACE AUTO SDN BHD

Civil Procedure - Interlocutory application - O.19 ROC - To set aside Judgment in Default of Counterclaim - Failure of Plaintiff to file Reply to Counterclaim within stipulated time - Whether cogent reasons given - Delay in filing admitted - Solicitor busy with other trials - Whether the Plaintiff's solicitor may affirm affidavit in support of application on contentious matter - Failure to file affidavit to reply to material assertion in the Defendant's affidavit - Application dismissed

18/01/2024

YA Puan Noor Ruwena binti Md Nurdin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=8bde963d-14a2-4721-ab5c-1945135757c0&Inline=true

18/01/2024 09:11:36 AB-22NCvC-10-03/2023 Kand. 43 S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N PZbei6IUIUerXBlFE1dXwA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 1:1 2o 25 1us—22ncvc—1o—u3/2023 ,s,a,,:n2a oar DALAM MAMKAMAM TINGGI MALAVA YAIFING DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARUL DZWAN JASWANT SINGH A/L J NASIB SINGH (No. KP: 370212-as-5169] ...FLAlNTIF DAN MEGA-ACE AUTO sou am: [No. sya ' at: 2a9s<u.u[ ...DEFENDAN GROUNDS or JUDGMENT Imkongcnou [1] Plsrnmv has med an apnea! 1o me Ccurl ol Anbeal against this Courfs demslcn dehvered on 27.11 2023 winch msrmssed its apphca' n in Encl. 12 made under 0.19 01 me Rmes ui Cnurl to set asme a Judgment in Default o1 the Delermanrs Cnunlsmanm omameu an 6.6.2023. ‘nus Grounds of Judgment contains my reasons «or dvsrmssmg End. 12. The names wm be rzverrea m as they were at the High Court. The [2] The P\a1n\iff filed «ms sun on 31332023 against me Defendant. cnaummg inter a/ra, the loHonMrIg: 1a) a aecmanon mm Ihe nevendam to hold a property under FN7507 Lol E527 Muklm Asa!!! Kumhang Daerah Larul A 1 5w Pzne1s1u1uurxa1FE1axwA -rm! 5.1.1 nawmv WW be used m mm u. nflmruflly mm; mm. VII nF\uNG wrm Kand. 43 [3] were as vouaws: Malang Negen Ferak ('|he Property‘) «or the nenam of ma Fkaimifl, and lb) that me Defendant to sign an dammenus panammg to the transfer of ma Progeny including appmval lur us Iransler to ma P\aIm.fl1wiII1IlI 14 days from the date vflhe order. The durunclugy av events in me filing or me suit and cause papers Nu. mm Evin! Runlnu 1. :n.a2n2: F1: m.nwmms«m.y...ms Dmysmv-ncnlhn mm": Slllanlmlvlfilmm m cm same Aa.z2m.w,uma/zoza » Enc\I.1undZ 2. u Azuzz Dflemdnm filad Nam: :71 fi\mouM4.2n2:una1:1.42n23 Nlvflar-nnm I am «A5 zu.2n2s“ Duiundum ma Ina Sinlsmanl A71 o.«.m.m wml m mum m. Dnluu>a:nd(‘Aamwc\::m mm rvqueslirw uma um: 7 End: 7 ...1 a a 5 ma In N: :2. Stntzmzm «:1 mm. 1 n 5 2n23 Hm can managcmenl mm ms nu ‘mm raquaiud fur ‘ mumh ta Devtfly R=§\s1var(DK}v\u-.-revtcw Nb my «a Dnlulca am Counlerdmm an n:tmc1~1\he mmmn Ia m. mm tn mm. and Doumarcluxm by zssms m D-I-mam in m. Hardy to new (a Deiuve ...a \ Omntemmm '5 uznza Delandun mun Jndnmsnl m mam awe run Ne RBDW vn DaInmo1cnunmrun\m[J\DC) Dekwe m Paurnnnhxm . End 2 s mama Scum: an mmgmm my. F!-lrvmflrvtarmsdlhanmlulmsy In: an WI :4ev1:w MU ms Rainy In Cmmlanimm and an awhcaluen m bet um: In: me m ox alm "man It: mmm to N: .n -puma” my .m.mm Mum In nu ma may lncounmnzl-sum 1 mm: PlMnMH\\sd:NnucenlIiFM\nnIm1 Thu Ms ms mm mm" um um umuvn m supnon man 0 m to son was In JIDC _ Ends 42 Ind13 Nada aIApp|\ulmn as par em 12 rwu:m=nm:..zm 12/13 1 sm Pznemu\uuvxmFE1axwA mm. saw ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 w may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! an 15 1:: Reply lo counlarclalrn. me Court would be seen to be oondonlng me praellce M eaunsele laking can more erlela «nan lney can manage A| me elner arm of ms speelrurn, ll wnuld be lneir ellems themselves llrar weule slrlle. lram such “ineql.liIies' Desplle clalming lnal the oppcrrenl would not be prelnuicen by such appllcaliorr. I am onne view lnal lrr me present case. overall lhe lzlelendanl had been alllgenl in answering llre clalms brough| agarnsl ll bu| me Plarnllw was run so. [21] Coming back tn lrre Issue of delay, are caurl .e1e.s lo me case ol Abdul llarrrld Mo!-ld. Amin .. Rar..aee.. Corporallull Sdn. Bhd. 120151 cl cu 111 where in ma. ease il was anlyfnv a penod ol 11 days The Hlgh Cuun mere slaled ml The apnellanll Malls eanrmlng mal ne was out alllrne rn nllna nls AR has merely prullerea a mule laaiorl lerlnle larlure or neulsa, namely. lnal rl was due In an ovelslyhlvftha an aeyllrne llmlflorfillnfi mlne ARw1Illsawal|lnu me me. nf elndelme and gmmvds el l..agn.enl In a. wppllad by me l..al mun The uuesrrae Ems: as re wnerrrer are sale gmund would ae..el.l..re a reasonable and luslwreele hasls ler rrre eelm la grarll an exlemlun ul Imle eesmle are clear nreaen er a mandamry rezulrenrenl llneer lrre Roc Illa! eallea luv me: numullarlae As rlamly cornennee by me nsvarldem an Inn a... win mu. rulrreu d by ullmers, who moula new la... well mu er nu relmrrl lam.» M M me me Hula-, lne rum. Ilvnn ler non- cnmylilnu plum ea 9.. nvnnighl whnlly Incknd ere Illy e..a van. lrureae, ....eer me e.ral.r..e....=ee, a nllemly lame em... ltm did no! meril aerleus conslderallon. [Emprlssls eaeeal [22] Where mere are blalam nreacnes ol rules and pmcsduve, panlcularly llrase ural are manda|ory and lenuarnenlal in nature, we appllcant needs to show slrurrg and eogenl grounds that are eensleered semelerrl ln order lo lrwuke me oourvs dlsclellonary powers lo gram an exlenslon ol llnre: Abdul Harrrr'd's Case (supra). u N P1bel5lUlUuvXElFE1dXwA Nana s.rl.l ...r..r M“ be la... a mm ea .rl.l..l.. MW; dun-vlnnl wa nFluNG rm... [23] Having cnnsideved the cause papers and suhmissiuns and ease laws men by me puma. the COM?! found max 019 reasons given by me Piainiirrs counsei in suppon ul Encl 12 were nut mgenl enough In anew iius applicauon. com:LusIoN [24] In the upshm, me Cuun did nut find any meni in me appiicaiian in Enci 12 Tnerevore, me app|ica\iun was dismissed min costs. order acooruingiy. Dated Ia Jan-my 2024 /4m_/ Muorkuwona ainxi Md, Nuvdln m Judicial Commlnlonu High Cuurl. Taiping 15 15 For me Plan in: Rnmncllnndrun A/L Nana Pulls Mosm N P Rnmncrundmn A Assw. Ipon. An For me nmndnni: Amlrjll singii GIII AIL nmrun singh Messrs. Darsnan, syed, Amlnll 1. Farmers, Ipoh. 11 SN P1bei5\U\U|vXE\FE1dXwA -we Sum IHIWDIY wn be HSQG M mm we niwirufllv sun; nnunmnl VII AFVLING we a 20 a 2023” ’»..mn«.a.«mmowme..en u.e..om.e...:...».....u-m mmefievfymcqum-vmnm Em: .5.“ <5 9 23621123 .T7c\:duseman-gomombwonthe n.munmm.a.y....».,y..». ox m. ..-mm mm R-ply m mm. and RM-W In Ceunlermwm (End 1|) Mm mm Em «z e g.. ...4. ... Jrucanazmw Yfihtrextnnxmnm (but u. nR wnsvuaad o.«.m.,.. m We a. mm Jawapan WA 1 am.“ mmm m me me mm em”. uy cszuza «n 213023 9.4%". mm: m. mm M Dmyismd an Ph\nIiW‘i1>uunie\ Rl$\ytnEnc\ 12 un:72n2:s , m .7 11 mm Fnlasamanagamamhdcrvlfi mmum given hr aw? .,.em WIMIVV submlnlnns we having .a..em End 12 me. >..nm.e 001 mu my mm H! mm...‘ at End «7 .2 «a tuna: n..mm:m. ‘2 P-mus mm m Dvnmm W. End 12 um mwsm am my wdl mm WM! nanny M Em: :s.e..m.......7 .3 2H12n23 ... End 12 m DJ-ndanfs counsel submmved Iwflcnmovu was dwsmwsud with link End. Is should use b- um: M RM5.noo m a. pan mums:-a as n .... x.. I-Mom Imlhmlhsubpefltouflvulur WYIIV em 1 n.m..m..x an n In m. mwennn .« m. com T71ECl1uflfl!lVIl9Bfi End 15mm noordtrinowttfi Theraxsnu IWu\IvIm11ms0mn1 HEARING or THE APPLICATION The cause papers tor um. appIl::a|\on In End. 12 were thelaflawmg. [41 un Sm 19 62o23(Er-c1. 13): and gh on 2.7.2023 1Enn:I. 17). 3 Nance Parmahanan dated 19.6.2023 (Encl. 12). Amuaw Sokungan eumed by Ramachandran a/I Nana Pufle Afidavfl Jnwapan alfirmed by Ninderpal Singh all Ba\wanI sm Pznem\u\uuvxmFE1axwA «we. smm ...m.mm .. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y mm: dnuumnl VII mum Wm! IS [5] A1 are commencement 07 are nearing an 15102023, learned counsel lorlne Delennanl raised an ublemlon Ihztlhe Plainmrs counsel nad lailed Io file any alrrdavil in reply lo the Afidavll Jawepan (Encl. 17h by lne deadline 15.2023. Therelore, aounsel urged me coun mar any aacumanls filed allar l.a.2u2:l rnusl be disregarded by the coun [e] Apan lrarn sxnimlrng ins prapasaa Reply to balance and Reply In counlerclarnr, cmmsel lar rne Plainiill VI Encl 12/13 only gave 3 reasons larine app lcallon in End 12, namely i. the nelendanl rnusl ruslily me figure ol RM253.13B.00 as stated in me counlerclalrn (reler Io crrww Chuw Khoon v Foo Loki Vlng [mini] 3 CLJ 49). aamrllsa lnsra was a delay In mrng me Reply lo counterclaim after receiving ins Slalamsntof Defence and counlanalarrn an l5.l-3.2023. counsel was busy allendlng lnals and aaulcl ncl| locus on preparations oi the Reply lo cuunlerclarn-: no Dlemdice in me uelendanl; and «here was a defence on me nreris and lhal lne cnunlemlairn was not lusnlieo. EVALUAYION AND F nmss or THE COURT m in respscl of lhe issue that he nirnsell had affirmed the Affidavll in Support :11 Encl. 12 wnerern munsel for me nelenaanl uhrscleu as were were eonlenrcus issufi In «re alliuavn. Mr Rarnasnanuran replied man it was nor an inordrnale delay and mere was oversight on his pen |o me the said pleadings He only realised ll wnen me Jim: was served on his firm mass were nal oanlanuous issues, he said, and acceptable as long as na am not file any aanlrsvarsial docurnsnls. Praying tor me order to be 4 SN l>znaraluluurxalFE1axwA Nuns s.n.r In-vlhnrwfll as used m mm s. nflmrufllli sun. dun-mm VI] .nnwe wnxl 15 In warned to set aslde the JIDC, he apologised tor the delay and submlned that the nelendsnt can be compensated by costs counsel urged the court to invoke lts powers under 0.92 M to allnw the apnllcatlon as mete was a delertce an the mel1Ls(ln respect of the countetclalnn. [8] he sympalhellc and aaoepl the reasnns given by the Plalntllf. They had The oaunsel let the Defendant suhmllled that the Court stnaula not been glven chanees by the Cowl and exlenslcn ol Ilrvle |o me the documents but talleu to do so. Moreover‘ there was no Afldavit Balasan lllea tn response to the disputed issues ratsed by the netendant In Encl. 17 Partlsa are bound by then atnaavlts and an alndavll may unly conlaln such lactt. as the aeponent VS able of hls own knowleage to arms: 0. 41 r 5 ROC. Although counsel lot the Ptalntltt clalmsd that he was pnvy to all the tntunnatlun .n ma case, however, the dlspuled amount was only privy In the Plaintifl and the oelendant. Therefore, the nalendant hnnsalt should have attlnnea Enel 12/13. siuananthan AIL Jagannlhnn v The Vac Fun 3. Anor mm] : AMR 553; Kzplands Sun and v Lu chln chnng Danqkll otl Palm Plnrluttlorls Sdn and [2001] 1 MLJ 29 Mllllon Group Crudlt Sdn Bhd v Lu sttoo Khoon 5 Or: [1936] I MLJ :15. [9] ln Million credittsupra), ltwas stated bylhe couri that the plasma at counsel deposing oantennnus athuaults ln pending appllcaticns shuuld be ' cluraged ln lha case n1 Bank Keliasam: Rakyal Malaysia Barhnd u Lu Kant Yong 5 Or: (ASEAMBANKERS (M) sun BHD A on, Third P-mu [mm to MLJ 73 Caunsel tar the Defendant also eomplalnetl that the Flatnttll hau nut responaatt an the lsaue at the RM25a,13B.U0 tn the oountanslatm and yet had talaect tt tn the submlsslons He urged the court to alszegam ttna as it was not pleaded. 5 an P1bel5lUlU|vXE\FE1dXwA -uaa Sum ...n.. M“ be used M mm ua nllmtuflly sun; dun-vlnttt VII muuc Wm! IS ll: [10] ll mas subnrirlea lunnerlnal me cburl rnusl exercise its uisersrrbn lumeleusly given me fact lnal the Flainlm nad been gmnled exlensions ol lime in me pasl in ms regent 0 IA allne ROG eannol be invoked wnere me party seeking lime in be enlarged had rnlanlronally orsrsgarueo me cburrs lnslrudlons Duli Vang Anral ulrrlia Tunku lbranirn lsmzil lbni sullan lskandar Al-Hai Tunku lllanlrbla Johor v caplain llarnaan Eln Mohd Nnor and Anonner Appeal man] 4 ML! 149 Otherwise, lne eouns wbuld be opening me lloudgales and «ms was not lecnnieal non- eonrplianea or slip rule because mere was nolmng nleo by me l>lainllll‘s eollcllor in suvpun ol me applreallon lnal could be considered by lire Court. There was no diary ollne Plalnllirs counsel allaeneo lo lnaamoavll in suppon in snow me busy schedule. in filing Encl is, seeking me exlansibn or inns in me me reply lo lire Cnunterclaim, P|aimifl's beunsel in Encl 16 nau avermd lnar ne lergel la lile me Reply mlhe Caunlerdaim He had cuntradlcled nnnsell In nrs reason given in End 12/13 Tharsfnrs, llwas submitted lire cburr should nbl allbwme appliearlbn as me neg-alive erliluue o1 lne Flarnlllrs counsel was clearly snown lherern and lne allernpl was an aflenhoughl and an abuse bl lhe oaun nrooess: Bulk unrna (Malayslal laorhao v cnal Koh snon A Son: Sdn Bhd [2on2] MLJU 52a The Caun shoulo nor be taken lorgranled. [11] counsel lor lne Delenoanl also suhmllled lne case cf Wukil Parlbadl kcpada Dasaralnam v AJa|h Lal A oviors (WM2ENCVC«126- 09/2022) wnere lne Kuala Lumpur Hrgn cburl had reluserl Io give exlenslon onlnre lo serve a Notice bl Appeal allnougn lne delay was only la days.1 reler in me case ol Loo Gual Eng v nn Liam Kim [less] 2 Ml..l I95 olleo by |l'le Flalnlrrl in supporl oi nla oonlanlron lnal lna Cnurl should allow me appllcallon. However, I am ol the view lnal lnal sass could be dl51lngulsIled on me (acts as ll was an applrcalren fur exlerlsinrl 5 SN Pzbel5luluurxalFE1axwA wane s.n.r ...na.r will he used M mm as nllmnaflly MIN; dun-mm vn mune wrul ta 10 at nine Io serve Ihe rrterttoranuuttt of appeal and reeerus ol appeal wnen areas had been filed wtrnin time in court unltlre trte case rtere [121 in rtis reply. trte Platntilrs cuunsel submitted tnan trte Defendant counsel ltad argued on the extension 01 rtrne issue wnereas Ihe appltcatiun tn Encl. 12 was to set aside the Jlnc, wrtetrter the tuagrnent was regular or net. He norllerlded mat the l=latrtml are rlo| reply to Encl 17 as rt was “all repeat and ertmnelegy at evettla trtal teak plaee ttetrting lactual wnlen I neeuett te reply‘ to ueny er re—s|a|e -. Murauver, rte stated tne delay wuld nappan lo anyette. it 31 With respect. tr ts trtte law on evaluattan ofaflldavlt evidence, where one party makes a postttve assemort upon a rttatertal tsstrs. trte letlure ol nts npaonertt re contradict it is usually treateu as an attnttsaten by ittttt pt lrte fact so asserted: Ng Hu Thong v Publll: aattlt Bo1hm1[1W5] 1 cu cos Trteretore, and unionurtalely, l eoulu not agree wttlt the Plalrttllrs slmmlssmn afnrasaid. End. 17 remained undlallenged. [14] Coming back In tne issue at a solicitor depusirlg an alfidavil, tne pruutsien oi Rule 23 ulllte Legal Pvofession (Pracltce and Etlqualle) Rules 1978 pruvides: ‘Rule 25. Advocate and eetsellar rlnno aunearttt a case where rte is a wllrlsls (at Art aautrcau and Iuliclbur tnall not awear tn Calm oi tn crrarrtnere tn any use tn mtten rte irttr reaaen In helluva tnat rte writ are a wrtness tn reetrect eta material ertu dlsvlllad uueetert emu rind Wwhlle applzmlg in a case it hammers apparent mm rte wtll ire e witness. rte shall rl-7| eertrinue to appear rt rte mu retire rrtttteut ieepettirne irta I:\Ien|‘s tnmrersls. (bl tn) "III rule am not pmvenl an atmeate ane telleltrorrrertt sweirlnn er ttnlrntltttt In -maavit II to fauna! in urtuuptnsa races in malhrs Whlch In em nrnppuuu‘ 7 N PZbellilulUuvxElFE1dXwA ure a.n.t luvlhnrwm re used a mm re uflmnallly ettrt. dun-mm wa aFlt.lNG wrul :5 2n 1; [15] in me case oi Malayan Banking Buhud v cnmmflold corn sun. and [2001] 3 MLJ 180 it was held man a saiiciwr may depose an alfldavit on behaPlaHhe1mgan| iimeioiiawing conditions are Miiiiea: (i) me iacis in be deposed must not be mnceniiaus or disputed qussuon 0! ram: the fads in be deposed must he imm his xnwiedga, and he V5 aulhullzed hylhe liuganl In depuss me affldavil (HI) [I6] Applying lhe prinoipiss above to the present case, the Cour! lound mai he has not iumuad the 3 condilians as slated in ma Cmnmflnld Corp Cnsc. it appeared from the provision a! Rule 23¢) above, ine F!aInlIfl's sohcnor was indeed precluded [rum alfirming the Enclasure 12/13 on his client's behalf because firs! INVIQ he mentioned in suppurl of the applicaimn to set aside "13 JIDC was Ina! the amount Df RM25CI,138.DD was dlspuled and no supporling ducumeni filed W rapes: 0! me amounl uispmaa. The proposed Repiy ip Counlerclaim allached therein wasjust a Mending and not evidenoe per se pi me amount man was disputed. Audnionany. no exnianauon was given as In why me i=iaimi« mmsefl could not aim. the aiiiaevix [17] I had to consider me issue oi me iengm of deiay and reasunatilenas because I! ma have a bearing on the apphcalion to set aside me JIDC The com in me case oisa-ad u Knnn v Lao Kok Hooi [znnn|1 cu 454, Faiza Thamby cnik J hand: -in axerusinw ns mseiausn under om smmiie mixes mme High Cam In: wan snuuia vaka mu: acooum cenam iaduls. such as- (am-a «sway -n makiny ma aphhcalmrli mi wnemai or not were In cugsm iaasans «or ma lmganl nu| in have made In: Jnphcalicn mm... me pieampaa lime. s SIN P1beiK\U\U|vXE\FE1dXwA -use s.n.i IIIVVDIVWW be flied M mm s. nflmruflly mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG pm 10 In mma Vikefihenfl anu degree olnreludicea asswefl aa ma iruuthvs In ma ovvuslm nany should the calm exerdse us msuamn Though nu nma lmm .a aaaamaa m cna Rmas at by any s1aMe in! ma Nllng 01 an apphmlmn far ma znhvgemenl nl hm: in ma a m7lu:5 of appeal, by nalunl Juslice such aaauman smuld be made wwlmn naaaanawa (Ime What .a naasanama wnmd depend an Ihe umumsrances A rvnuce av aaaaax may a. med Iwa days late hm ;n xaw n is sun 3 delecdva name what u enema! then is for me pafly wncerned to lake Immediate gaps In me an apancaaan (av emargsmem ar mna to me me name 01 appeal am of unna wn ma aaaa n(Ong Guan rack 5. ma v >«uaa[1ss21cu ;n;|19a211ML.Hu5, when the noun mu Inn: 3 may afluur mnmh: lilerlhe uxplry ufllva peflod to makz Ihe aw|Vml\nn was unrensaname A1 a ma, ma cmm mated n I: um um um the noun has an unfmgved aiaaaen-an in grain ar rulun an nxhntlon onnne. 1110 ms: vllnnlnle ls mm the rules of cum nnmprnna iacle can he one)/M an In anm mjuauw an amnauan oillmn. Imn mun bu -am mltulal on which ma com can lxlvchl In dllcnflml In ilvour nflh -Ippllclm. Furotmrwlu lhl pmy In lunch :11 Km mln would an. Imfnmnd nan: In nxnnslon mm. which would mm m. my puapau Ind nhjlcl ohm mm on llmluflon Mfime. In aanaaanna mama: «a gram or relusu extension at unne ma length at me Ihal has Vapsed we aways a -nananan ham to he consmanm ny ma mun exemvsmg ma dncrehon on We raammna use x was nu! ahlslu hnnasfly say mallheu was any vzhd gmumi let we may and lheveiare refused ma aanlntmton fur aaoanaxan 4% Mme" [emphasxa added] to me Ml merivs of the case, [19] Wuthcuulgnin Cnurt In mamins the reasnns my the de\ay in Illlng the Remy Io Cuunlerclaim as semen In Encl. 12/13. Upon perusal ov me masons gwsn as u Had oumnea eariier, \ found that, on a balance of prnbabmlles, it and necessary fur ma s an Pznaw1\u\uuvxa\FE1axwA ma sanaw n-nhnrwm be used m mm ms nflmnnflly mm: dun-mm wa mum wrm in an rim provide a delence oh lhe merits apan irorh siahrig ihe amoum In me counieiciairh was disputed. [19] Mureuver, in «he case 111 Khor chehg wah v Sungei way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1907] 1 cu ave, Gopai sri Ram JCA stated the tollowihgz -ii ma cahhhsi vnncmlauilawi malvmen a imgamssemhs -riisrvsmich om-s wun VI a malisr ihai aflans N5 nghti, he mun do so hmecusiy The vigi/sntrhux, mwi darvmurilibus, /mu suhvimuril, ihmigh having its ungml In ihe Cmm al Chnncely, is of mmeisai aDD|im|‘inn Even in cases where . righ| isetercisab/e ex deb¢lI21ustIHae,a mun may remse ieiiei In an imoieni Iignm In all us“ In whlnh may In approaching «he com is In Issu .IhI human It won um Iiuuamwhe nu «my-n In r-mar s mi-imory oxpiahaueh for in. whuhur uh. upiah-«ion in a arm can is umamry or mm.» dupuidu upnn Ihl kin: and nircumlunc-I M uch can In . mnlerwhich immim in exercise oi sci-nan. whnm me law vflmnfllv vesu me fl|sI:Ml|on.". [Emphnsis added] pm The Piairmii urged the court to exercise its discretion mmar 0.92 r. 4 in allow me appiicaiion in Ehci. 12. whether it is 0. 1A Dr 0. 92 r. A which ham provisions cohiain very we powers of iha Oourl. the uvsmding iriiarasi ol iuslice dues hoi jus| mean ma interest anhe pany which had breached the rules bul ihe Cuurl needs \u coriduci a balancing exercise with the interest of the party oomniaimrig oflhe breach. in is Irile iew ihai hon-compliance oi a mandatory provision oi ihe RDC which is iuhaameriiai in haiure wiH rioi be regarded as iechniaai hon-oampiiahce oi a me that may be remedied under 0 1A a! the R00, nor under 0. 92 r 4 is. me irmerehi powers or me come |a make any order as may be heoassah, la prevehi iniustioe urtu prevent an abuse unhe princess nhhe Cuufl, it me Cmm was to accept the reason given that counsel was so busy WWI (rials vial he did hoi have iimeicouid rI0| locus Io prepare me in N P1bei5\U\UuvXE\FE1dXwA we Sum ...m.r win as used M mm ea niwiruflly MIN; dun-mm VI] nF\uNG mm

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-A52NCvC-454-09/2020

PLAINTIF A.D. ROSEWELL A/L WILSON DEFENDAN MAHADEVA A/L RAMAIAH

the plaintiff filed this suit because he was unhappy with the delay on the completion of the restoration works, particularly on his Mercedes Benz W110 and claimed that he had suffered losses.

18/01/2024

Dato' Ishak Bin Bakri

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2f8e104d-3129-4a2f-9960-8cd2be527ba2&Inline=true

18/01/2024 10:45:37 BA-A52NCvC-454-09/2020 Kand. 37 S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N TRCOLykxL0qZYIzSvlJ7og **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal BA—A52NCvC—I5d—D9/2020 Kand. 37 12/on/mu 10: < IN THE SESSIONS scum 0: saw ALAM w THE STATE or ssuweoa DARUL EHSAN‘ MALAV5\A cu/IL sun NO.. BA-A52Ncvc4s4.mr2n2o BETWEEN A D. ROSEWELL A/L WILSON (Na. K/P 771l2}1L5177j ..PLAlNT\FF AND MAHADEVA A/L RAMNAH (No. KIP. 831221-14-SL739) [bermaga aras nama dsn gays M CUSTOMS ems] (No Pendnllar Psrvuagaan: 201503290355 [nozaeoveswqp . DEFENDANT JUDGMENI or THE count 1 Plamlnills s Msmyslan cmzan having an aaaress 0! games al No. 51 man Diamond 13, country Garden. Dlamnnd (My, 43500 semenym, Selangav 2. Delendanl us a Mmaysxan cmzen having an address oisennce al at No 15, Jalun NPT 7/1L, Nusantara mm, mm nummg, Selangav and traded under me name and sIy1e m M Customs Cars mm 2 business address ax a-12-as. Dsmav senza F45 1152, Felafina mama. oszoo Fetaflng Java. Salangor sw Wcolybumaulvwxswvav -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mmuny mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 3. Defendant mraugn M Cusmm Cars is invnlved In me business M speaahzinq in repair, mslnrallons Ind meumcanons aiciassro car. 4 Piairrmv is me owner olA ciassic orvlmage cars as fullows‘ (2) Meruades-Benz W110 nearing car regruramon no AH 2952 rmareeass-aenz W110"); (D7 Mewedes-Benz W105 baaring car veg1s|ra||un N: M 939 ('Memsdas-Eanz W108“). (2) Mer<;sdars»Een1 W111 bearing car regislmlinn nu AC 5999 1'Man:edes—Benz wit 1"): and 1a) voixswagerr Kam bearing cav rugisllahun nu wu me (‘Volkswagen Kambi“) 5 Piainmv iflenad man In: delendam had replesanlad lo mm man are aeiemam has a capamlm, and mid cany and ma rapair. restoration and madifimlicn of classic car based on ms experience and resource: max he had a in the year ms, the piairrriw enggaged Khu da1endan( la do restoration and modification works in his Mercedes Blnz wun In Its original wndifion includlnq me purchase ml brand new spam pan: for me malnmrs classic cars 7 The plai rm lunhav auagau our the uaiennanx win aumpIe«e me res1cran'on warks for his Meroeds: Benz w11o wnmn 3 momhs from Nnvember 2013 um January me me plammi aisa paid a depusil or RM15ruoo.uo as reques1ed by me aeisndam for ma delendam to slan the reslnrahon works sin wcolyiurmuzvixswvay -um smm ...m.mm .. used M van; .. mrmury MIN: dun-mm VIZ mum rm 49 The olhar reason stated by ma de1andan| lar me nnncumplalinn of me reatorauon work: Vs because me aeienasnvs servioas have been carmmacea Dmrlo me commeuon unis a! January 2020. so. me defendanl wt me mamas an me purpcrlad bad nnndiflun av Meroede5»Benz w11u due to me invalvsmsnlolwsvicus majaraocuienl and nence more «me was needed to reswe me our and man Ihe plaxnmr knew about m 51 Under cmss-exammsfion. me defendant conceded max na did nm me (N5 Issue to me plmnmlwhan me plainmv wus chasmg mm for I113 commenon mime resuxauan nu ma sewd WhatsApp Messages 52. The aecenaanx also agreed dunna uvss-examinahan than na nas never com me DV-ammi «nan n was me vlazmnrs prvwams met me uesmranun of MerL:edEs—Benz w 10 was run wmpieted. 53, The com finds that by way of uacumenxary evidence whrch whalssw massage daled 1310 2:219 where me Dlalnm! renunaea me dafsmiant M 3 ma months period «or cL7mp\9Iinn L71 ma leshxalion walks and ma conduct ov me nlanmw In chasmg for mmpl ' n as early as 3.9.2019. n \s mherenny probabxa manna complehon date for rssnoraxicn works (or Metbedes-Benl Wm) was agreed In be by end amanuary 2:119 as mnnanuea by me me plamuw. 54. The dehndant nowaver submmed ma: swan it (here was such a breach by devanaann on me nursed nme venue ar any exmnued amen wne penau cm the completion of Mercedes Benz wno restoration wnrtfi‘ na was led to behave man p4anm« waived any such agreed oomplencn da|a wnen |he delendam continued rsceivmg payments N Wcolykxmzlvwxswvav ma s.n.‘ n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. nnmmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm 55 The defendant turther submtllad thet the ptetntttt edmmed under mes exemtnetteh the he had amtsssed saltslarmon wtth the reetet-etten works done tn his Faoebook page and upon platntflfs subsequen| cnnduct or airasntenl to deter the eemptetteh [07 Mercedes Benz WHD teetoretton as. Ptetntth submmud |ha| ee the reetmtien heme te Mereedee aenz wtto PV°at'6ssedt ntetntttt made ctteneee Io destgn end spactficaltons. Iumtng ll mm e mete eustunt pmtscl. Thts tea the defendant to rettetn from pmvi ng a fixed timeheme 57 The detendent eutamttted that there was no prompt Dayment er that the ptetntm has deteyed tn the payment whtch caused the delays In the eemptetton at the teetmetien ter the Mereedee Benz W110. Easinally, the detendent 15 eawng the nletntitl hed htmeett to be htamed ter the nonmmpteflon ol the taetaretten M satd car. 55. However, the detendent In crass-axamtnation admtllad |ha| he has never eempletned about the purndned tete at non-payment by the platnllfl wtttch led te the detey end the nanmmpleuan ol the testeteueh works at Meroedes—Eenz W110. 59 There was an uttttnetum ntven by the etetntttt lo the detendant In eumptete the testetetton wants 0! Mercedes-Benz WHD via whetsma message on 8 10.2019 but the detendent the net menltcn anylhtng about the tete ur narrpaymam en reslnrafion by the ptemttvt end henee, the resloralmn works cannot be eempteted tneteed, the detendent agreed to the ntetntttre demend to eemntete the reetotetten. n WcolytuLrIulV\xsw7av nee e.n.t ...ne.tm be ts... e mm ms mh.t-y mm. dun-mm VI] mune Wm! so ll is unusual la say ma lean Ifla| Ihe uslernlam wmlld agree In ma pualnnm. ulllnulunl and nol all all rebuked lna plan an on lne paymenl lssues ll such was me problem (seed by me dalandanl In complete me rastnmdun The mnvelsa IS mat any purpunad paymanl lssues purpanauly caused by me plalmlllas allsgaa la alrnply unlrue sl. on 1119 Issue ol lallule la cmnplele ma reslnraocn walks ol the Mercedes-Benz wlm, them was a mesllng an lam 2019 belwsen lna plalnnw and la. daf9m1an| at lne plalnlllra restaurant. Sarmk al Plaza Amadis, me day when me delerlaanfs Sewlce was aennlnalsa by me vlalnull 52 The masllng on 1a.1a 2019 al the nlainlrfls reslauranl Sermk al Plaza Arkadla was attended by lne nlalnllll. me defendant and SDI me: all names ln lnel agreed to me same as The plalnlm durlng examlnanorvinvchief gave a aaullea aanuuns av auanls which nanspiraa [VI lna almaaaid mealing. ll la ma |:|aAnIM‘s avidsnua mal VI ml: lnaellng ma aelenuanl nau admllled In ms mlstaka and apologrzea lo me pla-nlmlor me delays ln me leslolallon worls 54. ma plalnnll had alw ounimnlaa ma aalendam via Wha|sApp message on 24.10.2019 on me aslenaanrs adnusslun M mlslske aunna (he nleeflng an 1810,2019 Durlng cmssexammlmn, lhe aelenuanl agreed lnal me Wha(SApp massage was referring la ma meeting an la la 2019 bul ha dlsagreed ma: na nad admlllad to mlsoaka causing lha delays on ma rastorallorl works. N Wcolykxwulvlxsullvav um s.n.l In-vlhnrwm be used m mm a. nflnlnnflly MIN: dun-mm VI] .nuuc wnxl as wlin regards in me meenrig between me plalnlil and me detendanr including SD1 en la 10 2019‘ me plalnlllv gave evidence en the aecounl e1 events where Ihe deiendeni edrnlded |o lnisieke causing lne delays all me reslorelidn mike and the elelnim was never cross—ex.ernlned or challenged In lnel regarding lne eceeunls at events given by me pleinml. 66. This account el events during lne meellng on1E.10.2D19|s cmcial since such (ads are rnalerial and me iallure le cnellenge by lil- delendam would mean eeceplanee ol lne eiarnlilrs avidsncs on me aeeounls el events where me deiendenl ednrmed Io his mistake in musing delays in lne leslomliun el Mercedes-Benz wlln 57. However, wlnle lne coun agree wlln lne delendanl lnel by eonducl dl me pleinlnl, he was led le believe anal plainlifl waived any sucn agreed cernpleuon dale when me delendanl cnnlinusd reeewing eeyrnenrs. The piarndll also admmsd under cross examinanon rnal ne rred expreeeed eellsleedon wrln me reslerauon works done in ms Fauebcok page and upon plelnulrs slmseeuerrl cundum er agreernenr la dam lne eorneielren ier Mercedes Benz wl in rescerarren. as Hovmvsv, ll canndl cnenge lne lens me: me deiendeni ned celled lo oernplele me usk wiln lne agreed es1lmaIed urne period e1 3 melna. Even iv me caun agree wiin lne deiendanl lnal he was led in believed lnal me ylainfifl had waived lne agreed hllle pened, II deilee common sense ier me deiendeni le clerrn lnel me exlensien ollrme would exlend le 1o-15 lnonlns or more ndicously a\l1anded(o1E—2d rnelns as Funher, lnere is evident mien canmfl he denied by all penies lnsl inere was a rneeling between «he penies er in: nlelnfiirs reslaurenl n YfiCOlybulLmz1V\xSvU7ay nee s.n.l n-vlhnrwm be used e van; me nflglnnllly enn. dun-mm VIZ erlum we SUIIDK ai Piaza Arkzdia an 15.102019 wriere lhe Issue oi iaiiure in oornpieie me mioraiidrr works oi iiie Meroedeeizariz W110 wax oiscusseo During mai Mfiflliflfli iris nsiemdariis service was sisd ieriiiiriaiad by irre Vlairimt 70. The piainiiii during eirairiinaiid iiasriiei aisd gave a daiaiiad acoounis oi everiu wriicri irarrspireo iri iiie aioiesaid meeting ii is me piaiiiiiirs evidence iriai Ill iriis meeling me deieridarii riad aoriimeo io rris iiiisiaiia arid avulogzad in ma piaiiimi idr me deiays In die mslurafiufl works. 71 in cdnciusidri, in IS irie finding or (his Court max ii is iririereriiiy probable iriai iris iiiiie period on aid iesidiaiidri Walks idi irie Memades E87\IW110 Is io be mriiri 3 mdiiiris as coiiieiided by irie diaiiiimr Whllhar nu pia aimed (or a lull ruiurrd ol rwiis4,4au.nn paid by are dia ine iris dlfendinfi 72. In inis case, mere was rid iorrrrai or wriiien sgieeirreric oeiweeri panres idr iidir aled damages dr iaiirrid disdrris paid idrme works done it me pi ‘mm is ndi saiisfied or dririavpv wiiri me deieridarirs iesioraiidn works. 73. irie piaiiiiiii subiriiiied iriai iris iaiiure oi the dE'1elIdalI\ |o ooiiipieie iris ias1nrahon di w11n iii iia aiiurery considered as a iiriidairiariiai meacri. In which irie piairiiiii is e d in iairri aie iris as ea 01 me deiendani iawiuiiy pursuaric ie section 40 o10onirsclMH950. 74 Hawever, in we case, crisis is rid edmeriiioii regarding Ihe iegaiiiy oi me iairiiiriaiidri as mm Dariies have irimdaiiy agreed In ii N YRCOly¥uiLUfllVixSvU7av More s.ii.i in-vihnrwm be used M mm i.. nflmrrniily MIME dnunvinrrl via nFiuNG WM! 75 we main rssua rs whslher ma uevenuam had eornrnmaa a llmdzmemal beach such that lhe plammv coma aurnana me MI mfund Mme sum paid to ma aavenaanz. 76 The pnncimes and me law relaxing m remsmn afconhuci Vs «ms. The Iailuru ac cansrdsrahan does not dzpend upon me qumon wnemer ms prumnee nas or has not renamed anylhmg under me wnlrad um ramar whether ms pmmis/Ar naa performed any pan mma onnIzacma\ dunes rn respectofwhrch ma payrnanc rs due. 17. The can Is nu! whenner me unnooem pany received anymmg under me camrad. rne |esl rs wnsmar ma pany In delaull nas faflad tn pervonned nis pmmlse in ils enmnaty. 75. \n he presanx case nelore W5 Court u canno« be disapulad man ma payment |erms for the dsfendznfs sanrroe were as progressive pnymems P\a\’n|\N had raoervad 12 invorces from the defendanl Vn relanon to ma rasloratnon works and me purmase «or me spare pans lnr an clawc cars oflhe plamuflln me amount at RMl5A,4flfl an. 79 While me mainlm‘ had made prngressive payments we. 12 Im/moss to ma dsvsnuanx, a testament max Ihe aerendam has penarrnea any pan 0! me contractual dunes Kn respecl cfwhich me paymem rs due and ma benem me plamnfl has gained, rx cannot be concluded mat ma dsfandam ty has varied to peflmmad nis pmrmsa ea. As slalad eamar. since me service 0! xna defendam was cmmsnaxsd by me plamhfl, me spare pans bought by me dslsndant were rammed «a me plaimm Yhe p\am|flf submillad «nan me plainnw has taken n wcolyumuzvwxswvay Nuns s.r1.\r..nn.rwmne used m van; .. mn.u.y mm: mmn wa mum puns! back me spam pun: under pmesn at me 2 s1ock»lake sessmns held on 21,10 mm and 6I1Zm9,I7wugh he had on 19.10 2019 directed man an spam pans to be dahvaved |a him 231 Nonemeless‘ In In email dated 2: 10.2019 mam ma defendant to me phsmhfl, me man did not wnlam any memes in me purpanau unjamiona raissd by me p\a\n|\ll. E2. The plammv vunnar uaumen max me dassic car vans smmm be new and/ar arimnally from Germany However. ms plalnuw had knowiadgs mat um all parts an brand new and/or angmally lrom Germany. There was nu amacuana «mm me plamfifl man me darandam nrowaea undalas on me Dara. Procurement precast‘ including ma Burmese M hams svarwans from Kemnlan as. Thus‘ 1: rs crear ma: me marnm am no\ at ma malanal «ma rzwsa any opiacnona in rewauon in Iha mire-Dans that are not new and/or ongmafly «mm Genmsny The plamun omy rawsefl ems aasue anar ma semnd slack lake on 541.2019. 84 The walnlfl Vs being unlmlhiul m aamng m have nu awareness that the aeaanaam searched for vanoua pans «mm mulllvle aupmism lrom (Maven! wumnes Iorlhe reswranon oma classic cars. as Based on me «am; of me case and Dnnclme cl >aw, me claim try me px mill mus1 «an slnoe me me p\a\mW is cmmmg damages on ma lailuve allhe defendanl Io Perform ‘ comlact m us anmery wh‘ ' m m caaa. N racomawuzmsmay ma Snr1n\nnnhnrwH\I>e used m mm me mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] .num wrm as Even me mamllfi wishes to man a Vessel sum. me puwnmv am not pmvlda any svidanca nr any suppamng aaoumam |u suhslanhale ma clalm ma mam or lest he has purpanaary suwaraa, as a rasml of ma auanea bad quauly Mme works. 57. II cannnt be damned that ma p\ain|\lf had benefilsd lmm me vusmranon works by me defendant mus var. m fact, ma plainfiff admmad undur ans: sximmallon mac he had expressed sallsfacflon mm me naaxamaon works aana in ms Faoebnak page as m me can at Snlv: Kumar an Murughll v muagmjan an R-mu-my [1995] 1 MLJ 517 me Federal court new man an Vrmnoanl party who Is uaunmg tor actual damages Vn an anion (or cream at cunnad must pmva zc|ual damages/loss ma reasonable cumnsnsauon m aecoruanca mm me pnncinlaa in Hamay v Baxendaka. nr (2; Huwvven xn. was n quasuon mun be wan a msumed nunsmmian Hence dsswla ma wards .n quasoun, a uunnnn Mn 1: ddmm vu exam! damages -n an aalun cu mus. av aenumn mun! mu WWI ma awn aanmgaa ur ma mauana wlvlpuuamm m wwldznoe with me semoa Mndwes M mew v Baxendala man) u Exch 341. {mun} AH ER Rap am My him: In vrwvn mm amigos wm resuh in the mxsa\ of the wan za mm sum damaws 44: In mslam aaaa ma ma me na|ew<>Iy ul ma. wnaa dnmlwes mum nu Wuved M was rules Tm: msponduu coma nava nvrwad me arms! was :11 Var axanma, use U1 mam: eumpmem In me am mu lmlud |n do so mama, ma comm aamd nm quanfliy any mm M uanuagaa Io mm aw wcomamzvummay “Nuns a.nn n-nhnrwm be used m mm was nrW\nnU|:I mm: dun-mm y.. nF\uNG Wm! 39. In me use of Sukllnn v Ln Sum K. [2009] 3 MLJ 305‘ the Conn aillppeel ne . [74] m ennui aapvom ha apamxse me mam. VI in lawn! nu «ma Mluvu has hsa\ wan dawn by m. noun m swanngam an Puusamyv Fmasamy smr [I995] 3 ML! ass Fm, me mar wage appears In ham comp\e1e\y mnmuaa ma lnhemllpmlmbi lies mm ma Evsd-nu: Ms no he nrvva mm was uammv was a person me has a n-my M Voflmdng mm gwm m him by mesa mm mm mm in mm mway, manning me am lmpamerfl man: 1715 anammv I-sum, wmnul mime. a: me film wnsequsuuss Ihil wnmd anlua Vmm dnwoadlanco. All In- mdenm Wu -nomy awapled by the deflmdnms. veg Ina defendants‘ ussa wax man on m ucclnm ma phmml nan wmmly mxahsym an «put: am: given xu him The question In ma am rage mm In hive nskefl mmsm rx man» u was mwanuy pvnblbinmlllha plalnlm, on «ma Vsolaled Insunoe. woum have mm auauayan exams: mdei given In Mm nulln cummm Inc r151 sup: Sn mm Jcmpeauzng Varlnsunun m Lbs mg Chm a on V Gin Vuuk Chm 5 Anal peas} 2 Mu 97, [Zena] 2 cm 19 npnka or we need be axsess Ihe ewdence and in my. cm. and my good vaisnns mum at ma mum xmnmmgly A mg: mm .a Iuqmvad m zdwdrcall upon a dhpute musl am -1 ms deunofl an an Issue M lam by assaumu, wamna Ind kl pond Ieasnns, eflher nxrvlmg m Maamg on vmole or any pan av live w-am» placed wait ‘in Ha muaL men am‘ my Maemu m meant nr nu ma ma avldsnca M a wuss‘ lss1h3ga\ns\mlsvan\ ml-an Thug he mus: rake mm amount ma pvesenue nr lineman so any muhva man a wmmsx may nava m pvmg ms evidence n me an oonzampwury dncumenls‘ men he musuasl ma uval mum. of . wwlmsus awn: was. No mus! alw Keel ma wmerm M a pamu/la! Mines: aaamx In: pmbemlmes mm can sm wcoLybuLuuZvIxw17nv «ma am n-nhnrwm a. LAIQ4 w my a. nrW\nnH|:I mm: dun-mm VII .mm v-vrm en Juslme Lee Swee seng [as he men was) m Accouuu Land sun Bhd v mu Rama mnm corpeanun Sdn End 5. on [2017] MLJU was held: (30) n u any up aubga in oral aomran mm is my nulhonfizs ma . p\en|y in am!!! me pnnama mm mam mm! a. xhwn wma wumnparaneoui ducumenrs m iunpon ma aubsunfinle me so cafled ma! mmmm m me mnlezd m Mum the names lound mmuves mam mal me ceun wculd he skepum is in ma smousness unhe Plainhfifx Chum: um wuum he oonslmnod «a sink: :1 cm 3: Drama Vrwulma and vemnuus am an euuee at me Own‘: moans [40] n Vs new -owpud and comma raaim III! e penyis vequlvad in Igndev aaeuuue mnlempnmneaus dummlnts in -suuwsh the mum at an arm wnt:-ad as can be stun \n the Cam oYAnpaul: muse m Sana Lee Co Sun and V Suhranunlam an Maymn a on (201115 MLJ an 91 Underms circumlsnnes or one case, me mzxmm is obligated m pay only 2: reasonable pnce for ma new-aanre services and me plainmv caumol redaun the MU amount it he believes lhal me resxureuon costs were unreasonable. The plaintifl has made payment tor me resmrauon works var N: massic cam upnn me detemanrs requ2s| wnhoul aqemmns n mdlwles (ha! Iha p\a\nIlH deemed me sum masunebte ramerman examwann. unnmt Iuricnmonl 92. In mus case. (he plamnn med «ms sun because he was unhapvy mm me aevey on may commeuon uf me res1nra(mn works‘ pamcularly on me Mercedes Benz W110 and dawned man he had snflared msses N Wcolykxunilvwxswvnv we sew n-nhnrwm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm s The nlaimm runner on separate occasions enasfled me derendam to do reslaraflon works «or me ame¢ 3 classrc cars oi ms, namely ma Memedes-Benz wms, Msrosdssfianz wnn and Vulkswagsn Kam r The rss1arun'on works were named am on the w11o and ma W108 For wm and vurkswagon Kambr mare were spars paru purchind rdr me rmoranm works mervanar. 9 Thmughom the resmrarran works, ma plarnofi had yaid from Mme |D time, on ma vsquesr or me derendam, a |oLaI ulRM154‘4D000 as paymern rcr me resmmran works and {mine purchase nlspale pans re The plainufl alleged mat dsspile paylllsms made k: we dererrdam, ma darandam railed ad onmvlete me resroranron wdrru ror ms Memedas Benz w11o sax-srammy wltmn me agreed lime penod Insread. me derendsrn |Bques1ed lnr more paymem (mm the prarrmrr kn cumprare the Ieskxranun vmrks. 11. The prarrmrr runner arrayed met me de6endan| also luHed lo comprare me resrdrarrun works 1a! the Amber 3 classrc cars, namery Mercedes Benz wma, Mercedes aanz wwro and vorkswaaon mum wnhin Ins hma perm as agreed Dy ma dersndanx 12 The pramrrn men terminated are service of ma defandarfl rm ms «arm In mmp|e|e me rsstmalmn works sausvamrrry wnmn me Irma psnnd Wilh me lemlrnalronr all 4 or m. crasarc car: Ind me spme pans were returned Io Ihe prarnmr and me pramnm demanded the derendam xo ralund me Mr amount oi RM¢54,4on no pard by me pramrru In the derendam sw Wcolyruwulvrxswvav wane s.r1.r ...m.mrr be used m mm .. mrmrr-y mm: dun-mm VI] murm pm ea iniie v\i\n|\fl's aaiiii is iiiiowee, irieie win bu iiiiiiisi eiiiiuviieiii of ihe piaiiiiiu siiiee me aeieiideni will simei lhe lass at hme ihfl eiion in ge| involved on me iesii given by me plainml |o mm 94 invoices were iseiiee and me piaimiw use not raise any onieciiaii at me iiieierivi nine and irie pieiiiiiii also um um adduce any ewdanca or lepun sriewing mat Ihe eiieiixy at weiii peflmmed by me aeiendam eii meieeeee eeiiz W110 and Mercedes EBVIZ wins an umriy eeiie or nose nei meei meiieiry siariaems. 95 L.-isiiy, on wriemer me pieiiiim is eiimiea (ix a full i-eiiind of RM15A,4Bfl.00 Hair! by vie pieimm to me dS7Bl1dal1l, me pieiiiiifl (ails ia brave man mi is smillad in it as. The ceim has no eve, In Coflsldar a lesser emeiim VI uie evanl mei me oieiiiim rails la prove damages iii me amoun| pleaded in me sieieiiierii in eiaim. me Is me pmicipin iris: i have stated iiiia iimmiea by "12 High Cmln In me case ei M: nerieieeiu (Asln aiiii) v siiiiiu Avaiig Keeiiik 1202:} 2 we 1. coiieiueii-in 97 Bassd on the reasons slakad abmrei the Court finds me: me Nainvfi‘ has Viiiad to discharge his burden D1 nrouf on the balance 01 probabilities, Therefiolei Ihe cialm W019 Dialnlifl against me deleoflsnl I: neieayaisiiiissea wnhcosls. ea. In aeiemiiiiiiig me oeeie ie be paid by me pieiiiiime me eeteiideiiii irie oaim (aka iiiio oonsiderafion iiie eoneun M me uaienuarii aim we em YfiCOly¥uLUfllV\xSvU7nV ‘Nata s.i.i In-vihnrwm be used M mm i.. nflmnnflly MIN: dnunvinnl v.. nF\uNG WM! vanure lo comD\a¢B |he resmanron works wwn me agrsea lime perlaa Vndudlng ma aelenaanrs adrmsslan to ms mlsmka and ms apology «o the p in vm me da\zy during a meeting an \a.1o.2m9 at me plammfs vasrauram Surmk at The mama 99. Thus‘ lakmn lnlu consxaemuon me above mars, me costs 04‘ «ms max L»: fixed a| me zmmml oi mama an on\y In be pawd by me plmnlifl to me cmenuam, The um: costs awarded In the dalsndanl under W5 mrwmtanoes‘ ancormnfi m me Oaurl‘ Vs Just, fair and masoname. Da|ed this 22"" day of November‘ 2023 ilsiim En} EAKRI) Judge Ssssiuns Coun Parlie Allan Tam Theng Wax and cm. ma Hui (Messrs o, My 5. Barry) lur Dlammi Tee vee Man and Mwchele Navmder Kaur (Messrs sun A Mlchelej var delendam sw Wcolybumaulvwxswvav -um smm ...m.mm be used m mm .. mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 13. In cm aiatamani ovasienoe, me aeienaani denied the claim byme piainun and denied inai mam was an agraed 3 manma period in mnigiaia ma rss|nran'on winks iar ina Meroedaz Eenz W110 insiaaai Ihe unis period for ma cammamon oi iasioraiion works was extended In aimna niainmrs rsquaai on ins scope aiiha rssliomllan works‘ 14 The defendanl Vunher aiiagsd that me asiay oi me nssioiaiion works was due in the (aims on the pan cf ins piainm in make payment as re-zuaai-a by the aeianaani lo eumpieis me raawaxion was 15. The uaiandani mnnar aiiagaa mac ma piaimiw was an aim; saiianaa wi|h ma rvslarahon wane by me ueienaani and than was no oomnlslril from me piainm. Tnereiue. me aeienaani siaiea mat ne is not aoiigea lo reuurn me sum :2! Rmisuunm as demanded by ma plain|iN 16. on 29.11 2019, the niainmi lhlmlgh its soiicimra Messrs cv Mg a. Barry demanded ins delendanl in pay |L7 ina plzinnfl ina sum of RMi54,4oo.on The delandanl however mused Io nay ins demanded sum. 17 By way oi mi and slatemenl a! claim datad s 2 2020 ma piainmw claims against the delandam the sum 01 RM154,4ao.ao iogemer mm inierssi and costs. 18. In lhis case. During the inai, A D Rasweii a/i wiisnn (SP1) iasiiiiaa as plaimifl SIN YRCOlyiuLUfllV\xSvU7nv -ma a.n.i ...aa.mn be used m mm a. nflflinnflly sun. dun-mm via arium wrui 19 The delendam called 3 wihmsses In hsfified lur ma dsfsndarfl, namaw, Mamsha Parveen Kaur Dha|lwiHSD1),Mahadevva AIL Ramalah (SD?) arm Mun-«az aim Bum Mona Khuvshawd (SP3) Flnlnllfh an 20. The mamm acamea mm II was agreed belween me pames that [he dslsndam ought «:7 have wmpmrau ms resnmanun works (or ms Mercedes Benz W110 apnmxunaxaly wmmn 3 months from Ihe «ma ma dafandarfl lock pnssassiun ama cars. 21. me u m iurlhar slated max since the same a! ma defendant had baen mam:-naxaa «or lanure Io commefls me resmanon works. me plmnum has me ngm lo demand ma dafandanllc mmm back me ammm cl RM154,4n0 no paid by lhe wainliflln ma dsfendanl. no naunvs cm 22 The usvenuam s1aled Ihal mm was no agreed 3 moMh‘s flmeline Io comnlele ma Vesta work: and me delays were caused by me p\ainW mmaew by vrsquenuy changmg reslnmxmn apecmcamon and mere was alsu a delay in payment. On the raslmahon walks, ma aavamam my inmcacad ma aammam ume [rams M 5 to 10 months depending an ma mdMdua\ car‘: oonamun. 23 The deviendams also stated that there was no ma casts fov ma teslnrahcn works and me n\aiN'n1 had knowledga of the worn. vmqrss: and parficulars «or me paymenls made to me aatanaam. sw Wcolykxwulvwxswvnv -ma saw ...m.mm be used m mm ma mm-y mm: dun-mm VI] muNG pm 24 The aevenaam lunhef staled mat me plamxm agreed on me nests ol resnaremn of ms Malcades Benz w11n bellman RMma,aoo.on lo RM2uo,uou no 25, The aevenaanz sucea met me defendant was unab\e In complete the wmks due tn me |errnIna(\on evme aerenuenrs services and dalay in payment lssuu to be mm 23 many Vssues to ma Court. However, ma ceun wm omy (ouch an the The Dames hava submmed wangmy wrmen submsssmns and raised Impenam Issues Vcrlhe delermlrmmn aims coun 1'7. awed on Meadwng and lads more case, ms issues In be med are as luHaws. (a) whalher the aeverraam (sued to oamulele me rsstarauon works for Mamades Benz w1w wumn 3 mnnlhl Denod worn November zma in Jan 2:119 as Agreed by pames” (c)whe|her me walnlllf Vs ermueu «er a mu rslund er RMI54,40O nu paw: by me p\aInfifHn the aevermarm DECISION or was com“ Whalher me flelendlm lulled to complete me reslovullon works {or Memadas BenxW1ID wmnn a mum: p od7 sw wcolykxwuzvwxswvav -we sew n-nhnrwm be used m mm e. enmruuly mm: dun-mm VI] .num wrm 2a. The plalnmv clenned that me reuoreuen work: our nu: dame car Mereeaes Benz who named on November anus and was to he completed wumn 3 manlhs 1mm me dene me defendant look me voeeessuon onne cars, Ihal was fmm November ms M: Jan zms as agreed by pams. 29 The defendant on me emer hand cleaned alhevwwse. The aelandanc dalmed mm me esurnaxed time panud for me Isslmannn and moamcanon walks far Mercedes Benz wmo was between 10 to 15 months Much I510 be eommelad Iilusl by Jenuery 21:20 so mas, them are 2 cenmuzmng versions of me time penoa «er me ras1nrauon wonu av Memedas Benz wuu When lheve are two ccrmlcflon vemons, me lesl :5 Much e1 mesa 2 varsmns am more nnneenxvy pmname or Improbable. 31. we move nie pow, the p<e\rm« tendered wnatsepp massages bemen me maxnlm and me delenflanl having nu inmeauen that me aeleneenn slaled in me p\am|flf the urne permd of 10 to 15 months for the resuevanon work: enne car. 32. me plamhfl suhtmlled mm ne nee been chasing me defendant my me mnplenon D! we classwc Meyeeeeeaenz w11n cnmgnem «ne malsnal nrne hum Apnl 219 unm: oexoner 2019 The defendant mmsefl (5:22) ounfirmed lhal me mainmf nae on 20.4 21119 demanded me reslmanon walks var me Memedesfienz wnn shumd be cumnlalsd wn Ann: 2019 N Wcolytumuzvwxswvey Mme e.nn n-nhnrwm be used m van; .. nrimnnflly MIME dun-mm VIZ eF\uNG we 3: The pmnun also submmsd man na had m 3 acasslans during one monm of May 2019 demanded lar ma ocmplallan nr ma ruslaraflun works unm u took one year reacmng mo 34. The malnllfl suhmllled mac N I! was (rue max me 10 lo 15 rnomns was me time period Indicated by ma defendant to ma piamlrffi them ws rm reason why me mammr continuously demanded (or me completion 01 me mstoralmn works mans una emry av me uma Vntflcalod by Ina nlammv as Tne D1ain|\lh\mseH‘|SP1Has|ifled man he has Ihrough WhabAup massage «awed 13.1u2u19 reminded lhl dehndanl av 3 monilu urns Danod lorlha resleramon alMamsflss—Bsnz WI m. as It .5 impoesvbla for me plamlw to have even referred to or mermonad abouk me 3 months Hm: panoa a: me mmeflal (Ame w mere was never such an unaerscana-ng or agreement Iegavdlng me 3 months we pennd :7 On the hue period «c comnlala any rapav M ear or even on moamceuon and restomllun warts at any car, n \s reasonable for me Caun m cnncmde ma: m lhis specific namre m service‘ mere mun be some diswsinns between me am: av‘ me car and me owner 01 a workshop on mu Isnmaled mne period In can-plaxe me ‘ob by ownev at the workshop as VI wumd be an absurd to conclude mac (hers Is no time penoa or esfimalad um period so wmmale xms nature of lab unaenake by me owner 51 womsr-op H is man reusonabie for me ooun IL: wncluae mat even me esnmaxed lime period cannot be mmued by me owner av ma N wcolyuwuzvwxswvav ma snn ...n.mm be used m mm .. nrW\nnU|Y mm: dun-mm VI] mum pm workshop In complete In cump\e|e me task, we axlensbn of me requlred must be reesoneme and eceepaeu by common sense :9. On znamsr Dmnl, me alscussmns mated m ume period and costs or Jab co he done by the owner cf workshup nurmeuy based on our agreement hetwesn me pames Any aispmes between me penzes, me Conn mus1 lake into Lxmsidsra on on me Dnn|empD{aneL7ns documents aveileme and me conduct oi panic: in suwon 09‘ any comenhons mm by them 1n me emance manual or wnnan agreement. to. The p\amnN sunmmea lhal me m In 15 munlhs rumnrafian nenud had never been raised or mermuned by me menus": at all marariil aims: The (allure on me pan aflha aetenuam xo mennen 10-15 months ume Denna when we pleumm was cnesmg lor me cnmplatinn of me resmration works way below me expiry of such ume permd is «suing and m 6251 runs cmm|ar |o me dlnales er reesen ena common sense. 41 The oomems olwhalsapp messages being me cnntempuraneous documems renecnmg me deeds and am or me pamss Ihen sxmllng a\ me |ima when the malls oi wmvlefion onne resuorsnon works arose 42 On me mhsr hand, me sxrstsnos ufma 1n—«5 months reslnvalmn works mmeereu by me aevsnuem ws unly his mal Isslimuny unsupported and unmrmmreusa by eny evidence 43 Most g\anrv9 m regards |o me detenuanrs version 4711045 rrmnms cl rsmrenan works liars m me aetenaanrs awn so mars‘ wener dated 10.12.2019 in reslswla the vlavnmrs wane: at demand It Ls stated merem men me aevenuam had mm me ulainmv than me Nmeframe our the N Wcolytumzzvwxswvnv Nuns em.‘ n-uhnrwm be used m mm .. mxmuuy mm: dun-mm VI] nfluNG wrm resiareuon ei ine said eiassie cars was belwesn 1 ‘/1 In 2 years which is 18~2A munms. 44 Thus, ihie is eviaehiiy ceniraaimory la |he aeiemianrs aiieganen mei he had inlalmed ine piaihmr and me 1045 mnnlhs rasmralion iirne period. The defendanfs sniicimre iaiter is me ieeiameni In ma umniih at me ueiehaahre Veflmrl ai in no 15 months ra:|orI(>an lime period 45 Likewise, ihie Lamar \mI'SIu7I of «$24 inunins mstoraliun lime period cannL7| be oansidarud al all simnly because ihis was never ine pieaaed ease nurevidencs led in trial by me aaienaahi. A6. When ooniimmea wiih his own su\ici|ms' ieiiei under cmss— examlllalmn, ine dalandznl admlllad on me incansisisncies heiwean ihe Wk: 15 nimihs and|h91B to 24 months ior Ihe restoration woiks ihai he said he had told ihe nlaimiiv. 47 Anew peiniing mi such mC0flSl$1enCia$, ii was pm In ma defendam in cmesexannhaiiun ihai he has never Vnfomlsd ihe vlinniiii av ine iimeireme M iii ie 15 rnenihs or IE to 24 muhms, ihe dsfendam somehow agreed A8 in his axaminatiomn-chiel. ins defaridanl ieeimed that me Mercedes Benz W110 was nu! completed wiihih ihe eshmalsd lime penoa because me pieinim had penoaieaiiy changed «he iienis ihai he had wahieu in change in Maroadas Eanz W111} This iesiimony is eieaiiy ah aaknewieugmehi ihai ii waa a ten mat ihe resioreiien of Mercedes aehz W110 was nai eamnieiea within an agreed eslima|ed rune Period N YRCOlykxLfIfllVixsvH7av we s.n.i In-vihnrwm be used m mm ms nflmhnflly mi. dnnnvinnl VI] .num WM!

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022

PEMOHON Messrs Chiong & Partners RESPONDEN Tetuan Kit & Associates

The Plaintiff obtained a final UAE Judgment against the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd – Abu Dhabi for AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49. After executing the UAE Judgment in Abu Dhabi, the Plaintiff realized part of the judgment sum leaving a balance of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the balance sum against the Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. The enforcement of the balance sum was done under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (‘REJA 1958) together with interest and also costs. The Court was moved under s 8 REJA 1958 and O.67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012). But, the Plaintiff sought under common law. The UAE Judgment was tendered as evidence but through an undated supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff enforced the UAE Judgment in Malaysia on the correct party or otherwise. Reciprocal enforcement of Judgments, final judgment, common law, undated affidavit.

18/01/2024

YA Puan Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

BA-42(R)(A)-2-01/2019

PERAYU Zalita Binti Haron RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Pendakwa Raya]

Ini adalah rayuan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua iaitu dua orang penjawat awam yang bertugas di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, terhadap sabitan dan hukuman yang dijatuhi oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. Isu adalah :- Sejauh mana Mahkamah yang menjalankan kuasa rayuan boleh mengusik dapatan fakta yang dibuat oleh Hakim Bicara. Rayuan ditolak kerana dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara adalah selaras dengan rekod yang berada di hadapan Mahkamah

18/01/2024

Puan Roszianayati Binti Ahmad

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d1d346c7-1105-461b-bb85-d7410252ae34&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: BA-42(R)(A)-2-01/2019 BA-42(R)(A)-3-01/2019 ANTARA 1. SUHANA BINTI SAMAD 2. ZALITA BINTI HARON DAN PENDAKWA RAYA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN [1] Ini adalah rayuan oleh kedua-dua Perayu yang tidak berpuas hati dengan keputusan Hakim Sesyen Shah Alam pada 29.11.2018 yang telah mensabitkan kedua-dua mereka atas 7 pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan dan menjatuhi hukuman 2 tahun penjara kepada setiap seorang daripada mereka dan denda RM200 bagi setiap pertuduhan jika ingkar bayar - 6 bulan penjara. Untuk rujukan mudah Suhana binti Samad akan dirujuk sebagai Perayu Pertama, manakala Zalita Binti Haron akan dirujuk sebagai Perayu Kedua. [2] Pertuduhan terhadap mereka adalah seperti berikut:- 18/01/2024 10:42:55 BA-42(R)(A)-2-01/2019 Kand. 84 S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 a) Kes Jenayah No.: BA(1)-61R-10-03/2017 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 28.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam iaitu Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus (sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa ('PMA ') Oleh Muhaida binti Mohamed Zan telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 28.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Ooi Shih Xing telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 28.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Yamonaa Thevey Maniam telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 b) Kes Jenayah No.: BA4-61R-11-03- 2017 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 29.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Sun Tzu Hsiang telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Kedua Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 29.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Mimi Amalina Binti Abdullah telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Pertuduhan Ketiga Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 30.6.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Azrulhazizi Bin Azwarman telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 c) Kes Jenayah No.:BA-61R-12-03/2017 Pertuduhan Pertama Bahawa kamu bersama-sama pada 1.7.2016 di Bahagian Pasport, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysian Negeri Selangor, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, di dalam Daerah Petaling, di dalam Negeri Selangor sebagai seorang Penjawat Awam, iaitu, Pegawai Imigresen Malaysia Negeri Selangor telah diamanahkan ke atas kamu berdua wang berjumlah RM200.00 Malaysia Dua Ratus Sahaja) iaitu wang bayaran permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa oleh Muhammad Fahmii bin Abu Bakar telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah terhadap wang itu, dengan itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang dibaca bersama seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) yang boleh dihukum di bawah Akta yang sama. Fakta Kes [3] Perayu Pertama ialah Pegawai Imigresen gred KP19 manakala Perayu Kedua ialah Pegawai Imigresen gred KP22. Pada setiap masa mereka bekerja di Bahagian Pasport, Tingkat 2, Kompleks PKNS, Daerah Petaling, Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia Selangor (JIMNS). Perayu Pertama antara tugasnya - telah diamanahkan untuk menerima dan menyemak secara ringkas borang S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Permohonan Pasport Malaysia Antarabangsa (PMA) dan Dokumen Perjalanan sebelum pengeluaran nombor giliran termasuk menerima dan memproses pembayaran serta mencetak resit pembayaran PMA dan Dokumen Perjalanan yang diluluskan. Dia juga bertanggungjawab menghantar kutipan hasil, mencetak laporan kutipan, laporan kutipan hasil dan laporan pembayaran dokumen perjalanan serta memperakukan kepada penyelia pada penghujung hari. [4] Perayu Kedua merupakan penyelia Perayu Pertama yang bertanggungjawab dan diamanahkan untuk menyemak PMA yang diterima oleh Pegawai Imigresen termasuk Perayu Pertama dan menjalankan proses pengesahan dalam sistem dan pengeluaran PMA yang telah diproses serta mencetak, merekod dan menandatangani senarai penyerahan yang ditetapkan. [5] Apabila PMA dibuat oleh individu tertentu, data permohonan akan dimasukkan ke dalam sistem MyImms. Setiap Pegawai Imigresen yang terlibat dengan MyImms mempunyai ID dan kata laluan mereka sendiri yang dirahsiakan dan tidak boleh digunakan oleh orang lain. ID yang digunakan oleh Perayu Pertama ialah SUHANA82 manakala ID Perayu Kedua ialah ZALITA. [6] Tujuh individu yang dinamakan dalam pertuduhan, telah memohon Pasport Malaysia dan permohonan mereka telah dikendalikan oleh S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Perayu Pertama. Kesemua mereka adalah individu biasa dan bukan Orang Kurang Upaya (OKU) dan masing-masing telah membayar RM200 untuk pasport mereka. Adalah ditetapkan oleh Jabatan Imigresen Malaysia (JIM) bahawa PMA untuk OKU adalah percuma (gratis). [7] Semasa naziran pematuhan oleh Siti Noor Julisa binti Jamud-din (SP3) seorang Pegawai Imigresen Gred KP29 dari Bahagian Penguatkuasaan dan Unit Integriti Selangor, terhadap sistem My Imms dan pematuhan cek di Bahagian Pasport, beliau mendapati terdapat "corak' gratis yang agak banyak dalam tempoh satu hari iaitu dengan kekerapan sebanyak 8 kali. Beliau telah memilih untuk membuat semakan terhadap laporan ini bagi 3 tempoh hari yang berbeza iaitu 27/6/2016 - 1/7/2016. SP3 mendapati bahawa setiap permohonan PMA yang diterima oleh Perayu Pertama adalah diluluskan oleh Perayu Kedua untuk tujuan gratis. [8] Terdapat keterangan daripada juruwang JIMNS iaitu Nik Mohd Erwan Bin Che Hamid (SP25) bahawa Perayu Pertama telah menghasilkan sendiri resit palsu di dalam bilik VIP dan wang yang diserahkan oleh pemohon-pemohon telah diambil dan disimpan sendiri oleh Perayu Pertama. Begitu juga keterangan daripada Muhamad Faiz Bin Mohamad Yunus (SP26) yang mengatakan bahawa Perayu Pertama telah memberikan wang sebanyak RM50 S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 kepadanya sebagai upah dan adakalanya tidak diberikan upah bagi setiap permohonan palsu yang diletakkan status gratis. SP25 dan SP26 bertugas sebagai juruwang dan diarahkan oleh Perayu Pertama untuk mengambil wang daripada pemohon-pemohon (normal) yang telah diluluskan sebagai pemohon OKU dengan menyerahkan resit palsu yang diserahkan oleh Perayu Pertama dan wang tersebut tidak dimasukkan ke dalam hasil kerajaan. [9] Pembelaan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua menafikan sama sekali telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah ini. Perayu Pertama mengatakan bahawa IDnya di sistem MyIMMS telah digunakan oleh orang lain kerana dia telah tidak log keluar dari sistem tersebut. Perayu Pertama juga menafikan bahawa dia yang telah cop dan menandatangani borang-borang dokumen-dokumen PMA kerana dia telah meninggalkan cop namanya di kaunter dan berkemungkinan pegawai Iain yang menggunakan cop namanya pada borang-borang permohonan pasport yang dikemukakan. Perayu Pertama juga menafikan dia tahu berkenaan fail dengan nama ‘hampagas’ dan bilik VIP. Perayu Pertama juga menuding jari kepada SP25 dan SP26 sebagai orang yang bertanggungjawab terhadap ‘projek gratis’ tersebut. Perayu Kedua pula mengatakan bahawa terdapat kemungkinan IDnya digunakan oleh orang lain kerana dia telah tidak log keluar daripada sistem MyIMMS S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 seterusnya menafikan tandatangannya sebagai pelulus status pemohon kepada ‘gratis’. ISU-ISU YANG YANG DITIMBULKAN [10] Di dalam Hujahan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua dan Hujahan Tambahan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua, telah dihujahkan bahawa terdapat beberapa isu yang perlu diteliti dan memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini yang menjalankan kuasa rayuannya bagi keseluruhan pertuduhan dan sabitan terhadap Perayu iaitu:- Isu Yang Ditimbulkan Di Dalam Hujahan Perayu Pertama a. Pihak pendakwaan gagal membuktikan elemen di bawah pertuduhan kerana tiadanya elemen pengamanahan dan/atau kawalan. b. Kenyataan saksi-saksi yang berkepentingan di dalam kes ini adalah dicabar dan kebergantungan sabitan hanya pada SP25 dan SP26 adalah diragukan. c. Kegagalan pendakwaan membuktikan tandatangan dalam eksibit adalah milik Perayu Pertama. Terdapat kemungkinan bahawa cop Perayu Pertama telah digunakan oleh orang lain dan tandatangan Perayu Pertama juga telah dipalsukan. S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 Isu Yang Ditimbulkan Di Dalam Hujahan Perayu Kedua a. Bahawa pihak pendakwaan tidak memenuhi elemen-elemen di bawah Seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan dan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah khilaf dalam menyabitkan Perayu Kedua b. Bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf dalam menumpukan dan menyabitkan Perayu Kedua bergantung kepada keterangan-keterangan saksi berkepentingan lebih- lebih lagi SP25 dan SP26. Isu Yang Ditimbulkan Di Dalam Hujahan Tambahan Perayu Pertama dan Kedua Pihak responden telah gagal untuk menyatakan di dalam ketujuh-tujuh pertuduhan cara bagaimana kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan itu telah dikatakan dilakukan oleh Perayu Pertama dan Kedua. KUASA MAHKAMAH UNTUK CAMPUR TANGAN [11] Undang-undang berkenaan kuasa mahkamah dalam bidang kuasa rayuannya untuk campur tangan berkenaan dapatan fakta hakim bicara adalah nyata dan matan. Mahkamah ini hanya boleh campur tangan sekiranya terdapat kekhilafan atau salah arah diri dari Hakim S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Bicara dalam menilai dan menentukan keterangan yang material setelah melalui perbicaraan penuh. Saya merujuk kepada kes Mohd Zulkifli Bin Md Ridwan v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 MLJ 257 dimana Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia telah memutuskan:- "Adalah di dalam tangan pencuba fakta untuk menilai kualiti keterangan untuk menentukan samada keterangan atas rekod menjustifikasikan sabitan. Jika Mahkamah memerintahkan pembebasan atau sabitan ia tidak dapat diketepikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan kecuali ia merekodkan dapatan bahawa pandangan yang diambil oleh Mahkamah Perbicaraan bukan pandangan yang munasabah terhadap keterangan atas rekod. Sekiranya Mahkamah Perbicaraan mencerminkan pandangan yang munasabah keterangan atas rekod maka Mahkamah Rayuan tidak wajar campur tangan dan Rayuan tidak mempunyai merit. [12] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Persekutuan PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457 yang memutuskan:- "It is settled law that it is no part or function of an appelate Court in criminal case or indeed any case to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial court. An appelate court necessarily fettered S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 because it lacks the audio visual advantage enjoyed by the trial court [13] Di dalam kes Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor[1996]4 CLJ 545 telah memutuskan berkenaan peranan Mahkamah ini dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuannya seperti berikut: “It is trite law that this Court will not readily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the Court of first instance to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. But we are under a duty to intervene in a case where, as here, the trial Court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may safely say that no reasonable Court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion.” [14] Berdasarkan kepada kes-kes yang telah diputuskan, dalam menjalankan bidang kuasa rayuannya, Mahkamah ini hendaklah bertindak perlahan dalam mengusik apa-apa dapatan fakta oleh Hakim Bicara kecuali ia merekodkan dapatan bahawa pandangan yang diambil oleh Mahkamah Perbicaraan bukan pandangan yang munasabah terhadap keterangan atas rekod. [15] ISU 1:- Sama ada pihak pendakwaan telah memenuhi elemen- elemen di bawah Seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan. Peguam Perayu- S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 Perayu menghujahkan bahawa Hakim Bicara telah gagal menilai keterangan-keterangan dimana tiada bukti yang menunjukkan intipati-intipati di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan telah dipenuhi sebelum mensabitkan Perayu-Perayu. Menurut Perayu- Perayu elemen yang gagal dibuktikan oleh pihak responden adalah:- i) Tertuduh perlu diamanahkan dengan harta tersebut ii)Tertuduh telah menggunakan harta tersebut untuk kegunaan sendiri secara niat salah melanggari tujuan amanah tersebut. [16] Perayu Pertama dan Kedua mengatakan tiada sebarang dokumen atau keterangan yang membuktikan bahawa Perayu-Perayu telah menerima duit daripada pemohon-pemohon pasport. Menurut Perayu-Perayu, ini boleh dilihat melalui keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan. Ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa Perayu Pertama dan Kedua tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa telah diamanahkan untuk menerima apa-apa bayaran pasport oleh pemohon-pemohon. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa keterangan saksi-saksi menafikan bahawa Perayu Pertama ada menerima duit bagi permohonan PMA manakala Perayu Kedua telah menghujahkan bahawa tugas Perayu Kedua di dalam kes ini hanyalah sebagai seorang Pegawai Kanan Imigresen yang meluluskan permohonan S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 pasport. Justeru, tiada pengamanahan wang ringgit yang dipegang dan/atau diuruskan secara langsung dan/atau secara tidak langsung oleh Perayu Kedua. Perayu-Perayu juga mengatakan bahawa menerusi dokumen-dokumen dan keterangan-keterangan saksi, pengamanahan ini pada setiap masa adalah dipegang oleh juruwang. Hal ini dapat dilihat di mana pihak yang mengendalikan segala bayaran adalah merupakan juruwang yang mempunyai kod 818400, seperti mana di dalam keterangan SP3 Siti Noor Julisa binti Jumud’din. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa adalah tidak normal dan diragui berhubung dakwaan bahawa Perayu Pertama telah mencetak resit palsu di bilik VIP selepas mengambil resit asal di kaunter juruwang. Ini adalah kerana tiada keterangan CCTV dan terdapat kemungkinan bahawa cop Perayu Pertama telah digunakan oleh orang lain kerana cop nama Pegawai Imigresen adalah terletak di dalam laci di kaunter dan sesiapa sahaja boleh menggunakannya. Terdapat juga kemungkinan tandatangan Perayu Pertama telah dipalsukan. Perayu Kedua juga menghujahkan tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa Perayu Kedua yang telah menukar status permohonan pemohon- pemohon kepada ‘gratis’. Perayu Kedua juga menghujahkan bahawa sistem ini boleh diakses oleh pegawai lain memandangkan Perayu Kedua tidak pernah log keluar dari sistem MyImms. Justeru S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 terdapat beberapa pegawai lain yang telah log masuk dan menggunakan sistem tersebut selepas Perayu Kedua dan terdapat kebarangkalian untuk pegawai lain yang telah menukarkan status permohonan tersebut kepada gratis. [17] Responden menghujahkan bahawa kedua-dua Perayu bertugas untuk urusan pembayaran wang passport PMA dimana harta yang diamanahkan di dalam kes ini merupakan wang iaitu bayaran wang yang diterima bagi tujuan pembayaran passport PMA oleh pemohon-pemohon. Responden menghujahkan bahawa merujuk kepada prinsip dalam kes di atas jelas bahawa Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua telah diamanahkan bagi urusan melibatkan permohonan PMA dan ianya melibatkan harta yang diamanahkan. Perayu Pertama adalah orang pertama yang membuat semakan di kaunter penerimaan dan akan memasukkan data pemohon PMA ke dalam system My Imms manakala Perayu Kedua adalah Penyelia kepada Perayu Pertama yang antara tugasnya membuat semakan kali kedua dan meluluskan permohonan pemohon. Responden bergantung kepada Lampiran A yang dilampirkan bersama hujahannya mengenai jadual Permohonan pemohon-pemohon, data dalam system My Imms, data resit rasmi kerjaan asal dan resit rasmi yang dipalsukan itu. Kesemua keterangan dokumentar tersebut telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah dan menunjukkan S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 bahawa kelulusan bagi kesemua permohonan PMA pemohon- pemohon adalah dibuat oleh Perayu Kedua. Responden juga menghujahkan bahawa dari keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan jelas menunjukkan bahawa penerimaan permohonan PMA bermula dari Perayu Pertama dan sekiranya Perayu Kedua tidak meluluskan, tindakan jenayah ini tidak akan berlaku sama sekali. [18] Setelah meneliti keseluruhan keterangan rekod rayuan dan alasan penghakiman Hakim Bicara, Mahkamah mendapati dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara adalah berdasarkan keterangan yang telah dikemukakan semasa perbicaraan di Mahkamah. Mahkamah tidak akan mengusik dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara yang telah memutuskan bahawa kesemua intipati pertuduhan terhadap Perayu Pertama dan Perayu Kedua telah pun dipenuhi oleh pihak Responden. Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan hujahan pihak Responden dengan merujuk kepada kes Pendakwa Raya Lawan Tan Sri Mohd Isa Bin Abdul Samad [2021] 1 LNS 461 bahawa pengamanahan ke atas harta boleh juga berlaku secara tidak langsung. Kes tersebut memutuskan:- Konsep pengamanahan [172] Tiada pecah amanah jenayah melainkan seorang tertuduh dibuktikan ada pengamanahan ke atas harta. Tanpa elemen kesalahan penyalahgunaan jenayah (criminal S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 misappropriation) di bawah Seksyen 403 KK. Elemen peruntukan ini boleh diterangkan dalam situasi di mana sesuatu harta yang dimiliki oleh X diserah kepada Y untuk tujuan Y menjaganya, di mana pegamanahan ini adalah di bawah undang-undang difahami secara luas dan bukannya amanah dalam konteks ekuiti. Ini juga dapat dilihat pada kategori kumpulan orang yang diamanahkan dengan harta menurut Seksyen 407, 408 dan 409 KK. Pemerhatian relevan ini telah dibuat dalam satu kes yang dirujuk pihak pendakwaan, Rex v. Lee Siong Kiat [1935] MLJ 53, seperti berikut: • "But the word "trust" in the expression "criminal breach of “trust" as found in the Penal Code, is used in far wider and more popular sense. A reference to section 407, 408 and 409 makes this perfectly clear. In section 407 a person entrusted with property may be a carrier, wharfinger or warehouse keeper; in section 408 a clerk or servant; and in section 409, a public servant, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent. Not one of the people in these various categories could ordinarily be described as a trustee in chancery proceedings". Pengamanahan boleh berlaku secara tidak langsung S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [173] Di dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Aisyah Mohd Rose & Anor v. PP [2016] 1 MLJ 840 Tengku Maimun JCA (sekarang CJ) menekankan bahawa Seksyen 405 menyebut "in any manner entrusted" yang oleh itu bermakna pengamanahan harta boleh berlaku secara tidak langsung. Petikan berikut adalah relevan: "Element of entrustment” [36] We note that s. 409 of the Penal Code states 'whoever being in any manner entrusted'. [37] We accept that the first appellant was not entrusted directly with the cheques by the companies but it cannot be denied that through the intermediaries, the cheques ended up with the second appellant and from the second appellant, to the first appellant. In our view 'in any manner entrusted' is wide enough go encompass not only the property being directly entrusted by the owner to the accused but also property entrusted by the owner to the accused indirectly, as in the instant appeal. entrusted to the first appellant by virtue of her position as an agent of the bank" [Penekanan ditambah] [19] Seperti mana di dalam kes ini, kedua-dua Perayu bertugas untuk urusan pembayaran wang passport. Perayu Pertama dan Perayu S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 Kedua telah diamanahkan bagi urusan melibatkan permohonan PMA dan ianya melibatkan harta yang diamanahkan. Perayu Pertama adalah orang pertama yang membuat semakan di kaunter penerimaan dan akan memasukkan data pemohon PMA ke dalam system My Imms manakala Perayu Kedua adalah Penyelia kepada Perayu Pertama yang antara tugasnya membuat semakan kali kedua dan meluluskan permohonan pemohon PMA. Kesemua permohonan PMA yang telah ditukarkan kepada status ‘gratis’ diuruskan oleh Perayu Pertama (ID: SUHANA82) dan diluluskan oleh Perayu Kedua (ID:ZALITA) walaupun kesemua pemohon adalah orang normal dan telah membayar sejumlah RM200 bagi permohonan PMA mereka, namun begitu wang tersebut tidak masuk ke dalam hasil kerajaan. Keterangan ini bukan sahaja berdasarkan keterangan lisan pemohon-pemohon PMA dan pegawai Imigresen tetapi juga disokong oleh keterangan dokumentar iaitu data dalam system My Imms, data resit rasmi kerajaan asal dan resit rasmi yang dipalsukan. Ia menafikan hujahan Perayu-Perayu yang mengatakan tiada keterangan dokumentar yang telah membuktikan elemen ini. [20] Berkenaan dengan kod kewangan 818400, ia langsung tidak menjejaskan pembuktian intipati pertuduhan memandangkan Hakim Bicara dalam dapatannya mengatakan bahawa ID Perayu S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 Pertama dan ID Perayu Kedua telah digunakan sejak awal dalam urusan pemohonan PMA pemohon-pemohon yang ditukarkan kepada status gratis. Melalui keterangan saksi-saksi, kod 818400 adalah kod urusniaga kewangan dengan menggunakan ID Juruwang yang berbeza. Namun kod ini tidak boleh menafikan bahawa sejak awal lagi permohonan-permohonan PMA ini dikendalikan oleh Perayu Pertama dan diluluskan kepada status gratis oleh Perayu Kedua walaupun pemohon-pemohon adalah normal dan bukan OKU. [21] Pecah amanah jenayah ini tidak mungkin akan berlaku tanpa penglibatan Perayu Kedua sebagai pegawai pelulus. Kedua-dua Perayu perlu bersekongkol bagi menjayakan jenayah pecah amanah ini kerana Perayu Pertama sebagai pegawai penyemak yang menerima permohonan PMA dengan menyemak permohonan dan dokumen pemohon dan menghantarnya kepada pegawai pelulus iaitu Perayu Kedua yang akan meluluskannya sebagai ‘gratis’. Ini membuktikan niat bersama mereka selaras dengan pembuktian intipati seksyen 34 Kanun Keseksaan. Apatah lagi menurut SP3 yang membuat pemeriksaan dan naziran mengatakan beliau telah membuat "sampling" terhadap Laporan Kutipan Terperinci Juruwang bagi tarikh 27/6/2016 sehingga 1/7/2016, 20/7/2016 dan 26/7/2016 dan mendapati terdapat corak ‘gratis’ S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 yang agak banyak dalam tempoh satu hari iaitu dengan kekerapan sebanyak 8 kali. Beliau juga mendapati bahawa setiap permohonan yang diekstrak telah diterima oleh Perayu Pertama yang menggunakan ID:SUHANA82 dan telah diluluskan oleh Perayu Kedua yang menggunakan ID:ZALITA. [22] Mahkamah juga mendapati Hakim Bicara telah meneliti kes pembelaan dan telah sampai kepada satu konklusi untuk lebih mempercayai keterangan pihak pendakwaan yang lebih kredibel dan disokong oleh keterangan-keterangan lain sama ada keterangan lisan atau dokumentar. Dapatan Hakim Bicara bahawa keterangan pembelaan bersifat penafian semata-mata serta gagal untuk menimbulkan apa-apa keraguan munasabah adalah selaras dengan rekod yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Justeru Mahkamah ini enggan untuk mengusik dapatan ini. [23] ISU 2: Kenyataan saksi-saksi yang berkepentingan di dalam kes ini adalah dicabar dan kebergantungan sabitan hanya pada SP25 dan SP26 adalah diragukan. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa keterangan SP25 dan SP26 perlu dibaca dengan berhati-hati sebagai rakan subahat yang mempunyai kepentingan dan merupakan saksi-saksi yang tidak berintegriti di mana peranan mereka di dalam “projek gratis” adalah sangat aktif dan bermotifkan S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 kepentingan peribadi mereka yang mana mereka sememangnya mempunyai mens rea dan actus reus dalam projek tersebut. Perayu-Perayu menghujahkan kredibiliti SP25 dan SP26 diragui apabila mereka pernah ditangkap oleh pihak SPRM untuk kes yang lain manakala SP25 pernah terlibat dengan pengambilan dadah yang dapat menjejaskan pertimbangannya dalam memberi keterangan. [24] Responden pula menghujahkan bahawa Hakim Bicara telah meneliti keterangan-keterangan SP25 dan SP26 dan telah menerima keterangan mereka. Ini menunjukkan bahawa keterangan SP25 dan SP26 adalah kredibel. Seterusnya keterangan kedua saksi ini tidak berdiri sendiri tetapi disokong oleh keterangan dokumentar. [25] Sekali lagi saya enggan untuk mengusik dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara terpelajar apabila beliau telah menerima keterangan SP25 dan SP26. Saya juga bersetuju dengan hujahan Responden setelah meneliti rekod rayuan bahawa dapatan fakta Hakim Bicara tidak bercanggah dengan keterangan yang dikemukakan di mahkamah. Alasan bahawa SP25 adalah bekas penagih ubat batuk bukan alasan yang menjejaskan kredibilitinya kerana selain dari keterangan lisan saksi ini, terdapat keterangan-keterangan lain S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 terutamanya dokumentar yang membuktikan intipati-intipati pertuduhan terhadap Perayu-Perayu. Terdapat juga keterangan daripada pemohon-pemohon PMA seperti di dalam pertuduhan yang mereka telah membayar RM200 kepada Perayu Pertama dan dalam keadaan wang yang dibayar kepada SP25 dan SP26, wang tersebut akan diberikan kepada Perayu Pertama dengan upah yang diberikan kepada saksi-saksi ini. [26] Peranan SP25 dan SP26 sebagai rakan subahat tidak menyebabkan keterangan mereka ditolak secara terus. Keterangan MyIMMS sepertimana Lampiran A Hujahan Responden dimana sistem ni menunjukkan ID Perayu Pertama dan ID Perayu Kedua adalah sebagai pegawai semakan dan pegawai yang meluluskan. Dapatan Hakim Bicara adalah selaras dengan keterangan saksi- saksi pendakwaan yang mengatakan ID dan kata laluan MyIMMS adalah rahsia untuk digunakan oleh individu itu sahaja. Dengan meneliti kepada rekod rayuan saya mendapati tiada kekhilafan apabila Hakim Bicara menerima keterangan SP25 dan SP26 setelah mengambil kira keterangan sokongan yang lain menyokong keterangan lisan SP25 dan SP26. [27] ISU 3:- Kegagalan pendakwaan membuktikan tandatangan dalam eksibit adalah milik Perayu Pertama. Terdapat kemungkinan S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 bahawa cop Perayu Pertama telah digunakan oleh orang lain dan tandatangan Perayu Pertama juga telah dipalsukan. Perayu Pertama menghujahkan bahawa terdapat kemungkinan bahawa tandatangan Perayu Pertama telah dipalsukan. Ini adalah kerana pakar tandatangan tidak pernah sama sekali dipanggil untuk mengesahkan tandatangan itu milik Perayu Pertama dan tandatangan yang tertera di dalam dokumen eksibit adalah ringkas (initial) dan bukan penuh yang mana sampel tandatangan ringkas juga tidak dihantar untuk dianalisa pakar tandatangan. Perayu Pertama juga menghujahkan ketiadaan CCTV di dalam bilik VIP untuk menunjukkan apa sebenarnya berlaku di dalam bilik VIP tersebut telah menyebabkan pendakwaan gagal dalam membuktikan dakwaannya. Perayu Pertama juga menghujahkan bahawa tidak ada sebarang CCTV ditempat duduk bagi membuktikan pergerakan Perayu Pertama kepada Perayu Kedua dan Juruwang untuk menguatkan kes pendakwaan. [28] Adalah undang-undang yang mantap, jika pun terdapat kegagalan oleh pihak Responden untuk menghantar tandatangan Perayu Pertama untuk tujuan perbandingan, keterangan itu jika pun ada hanyalah bersifat sokongan yang tidak menjejaskan kes pendakwaan. Apatah lagi di dalam kes ini terdapat keterangan yang banyak yang menuding kepada kebersalahan Perayu Pertama S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 dengan penggunaan ID Perayu Pertama sebagai pegawai penyemak dan kebersalahan Perayu Kedua dengan penggunaan ID Perayu Kedua sebagai pegawai pelulus. Hakim Bicara telah merujuk kepada kes Mahkamah Rayuan berkenaan isu ini dan saya dapati tiada kekhilafan dari segi fakta dan undang-undang berkenaan perkara tersebut. Menurut Hakim Bicara:- Berkenaan kegagalan pihak pendakwaan mengemukakan keterangan berkaitan CCTV dan pemakaian s.114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap kes pendakwaan, saya berpendapat bahawa ia adalah tidak "fatal'. Saya merujuk dan menggunapakai prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan dalam kes Mahkamah Rayuan Akbar Ali Abdul Rahman v PP [20171 1 LNS 710 di mana Mahkamah menyatakan: "In the same vein, we held that the CCTV recording was corroborative in nature and its non production did not create a serious gap in the narrative of the prosecution's case ..” Prinsip undang-undang yang sama juga boleh digunakan berkenaan ketiadaan keterangan pakar untuk perbandingan tandatangan Perayu Pertama. S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 [29] ISU 4:- Pihak responden telah gagal untuk menyatakan di dalam ketujuh-tujuh pertuduhan cara bagaimana kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan itu telah dikatakan dilakukan oleh Perayu Pertama dan Kedua. Perayu-Perayu menghujahkan bahawa pertuduhan- pertuduhan yang dirangka adalah kabur kerana tidak menyatakan cara bagaimana pecah amanah itu dilakukan selaras dengan seksyen 154 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah. Ini menyebabkan Perayu- Perayu diprejudiskan, tersalah arah dan berada dalam teka teki apabila membuat persediaan pembelaannya. Responden pula menghujahkan bahawa ketidaknyatakan cara / kaedah bagaimana pecah amanah itu berlaku adalah tidak material memandangkan Perayu-Perayu tidak terkeliru ("misled") yang memprejudiskan Perayu-Perayu membuat pembelaan. Ini adalah kerana kesemua elemen pertuduhan telah dipenuhi oleh pihak Responden dan telah diterima serta diputuskan oleh Hakim Bicara iaitu:- a) Perayu-perayu adalah penjawat awam; b) Perayu-perayu telah diamanahkan dengan sesuatu harta iaitu wang bayaran passport PMA; dan c) Perayu-perayu telah melakukan pecah amanah terhadap pembayaran wang RM200 bagi permohonan PMA tersebut. S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [30] Mahkamah telah meneliti ketujuh-tujuh pertuduhan tersebut dan juga meneliti Rekod Rayuan serta undang-undang yang berkaitan dan Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada peruntukan undang-undang yang mewajibkan pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan perlu menyatakan cara pecah amanah jenayah itu dilakukan. (Rujuk kes Ahmad Zahid Hamidi v Public Prosecutor [20201 1 LNS 1986 ). Melihat kepada setiap pertuduhan, ia telah menimbulkan dengan jelas intipati-intipati pertuduhan yang perlu dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan ini adalah memadai. Justeru, tidak perlu untuk menyatakan bagaimana kesalahan pecah amanah itu dilakukan di dalam pertuduhan tersebut. Apatah lagi, Perayu-Perayu telah membela diri di dalam tindakan ini dan tiada rekod yang menunjukkan bahawa Perayu-Perayu telah diprejudiskan atau tersalah arah dalam membuat persediaan dan pengemukaan pembelaannya. KESIMPULAN [31] Mahkamah mendapati sabitan oleh Hakim Bicara adalah selamat dan betul selaras dengan keterangan dan rekod yang ada di hadapan Mahkamah serta dan undang-undang yang terpakai. Mahkamah juga mendapati hukuman yang dijatuhi oleh Hakim S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 Bicara adalah adil dan saksama selaras dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Perayu-Perayu. Justeru Mahkamah ini tidak perlu untuk campur tangan terhadap dapatan dan keputusan Hakim Bicara. Rayuan Perayu-Perayu ditolak dan sabitan serta hukuman terhadap Perayu-Perayu dikekalkan. Bertarikh pada 23 November 2023 ROSZIANAYATI BIN AHMAD Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah 3 Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Peguam Perayu Pertama Tetuan Suzana lsmail & Partners Peguamcara dan Peguambela No. 26, Jalan Galena 7/24, Alam Villa, seksyen 7 40000, Shah Alam, serangor Darur Ehsan. Peguam Perayu Kedua Tetuan Salim Bashir, Ruswiza & Co Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 10-C, Tingkat 3, Blok 1 Worldwide Business Centre Jalan Tinju 13/50, Seksyen 13 406V5 Shah Alam. Responden / Pendakwa Raya Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia Bahagian Perundangan dan Pendakwaan Aras 18 & 19, Blok C NO. 2, Lebuh Wawasan , Presint 7 62250 Putrajaya S/N x0bT0QURG0a7hddBAlKuNA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022

The Plaintiff obtained a final UAE Judgment against the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd – Abu Dhabi for AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49. After executing the UAE Judgment in Abu Dhabi, the Plaintiff realized part of the judgment sum leaving a balance of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the balance sum against the Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. The enforcement of the balance sum was done under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (‘REJA 1958) together with interest and also costs. The Court was moved under s 8 REJA 1958 and O.67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012). But, the Plaintiff sought under common law. The UAE Judgment was tendered as evidence but through an undated supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff enforced the UAE Judgment in Malaysia on the correct party or otherwise. Keywords: Reciprocal enforcement of Judgments, final judgment, common law, undated affidavit, identity of defendant

18/01/2024

YA Puan Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6ee597a9-94b3-41a0-add5-f16b493b2dea&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA ORGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022 BETWEEN FLARE BUILDING MATERIALS LLC … PLAINTIFF AND PEMBINAAN SPK SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 122900-W) … DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION (1) The Plaintiff is a foreign company having its business in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (‘UAE’). As a specialist contractor of building materials, the Plaintiff supplied materials to the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd–Abu Dhabi (‘SPK–Abu Dhabi’). The company SPK-Abu Dhabi awarded 5 Letters of Awards to the Plaintiff for the supply of building materials in project development areas namely Al Reem Island, Al Raha Garden and Village 4 of Al Falah 2 Community all of which are situated in Abu Dhabi. The works were completed by the Plaintiff but progressive payments were inconsistent from SPK–Abu Dhabi. To secure the amount owing, the Plaintiff and SPK–Abu Dhabi signed a Settlement Statement of Account for the balance outstanding of AED7,600,000.00. (2) When SPK–Abu Dhabi failed to honour the settlement, the Plaintiff took to the courts in Abu Dhabi where a final judgment was obtained for the sum of AED7,719,567.00 and interest at 4% per annum calculated on the judgment sum from 22.1.2014 until full realization (‘The Judgment’). The Judgment was dated 22.6.2014. Again, SPK– Abu Dhabi did not pay towards the Judgment. Hence, the Plaintiff took execution proceedings at the Abu Dhabi Execution Department vide Execution No. 1982-2014-T Commercial-MR-T-AD (‘Execution Bond’). (3) The Plaintiff managed to recover a sum of AED6,890,452.00 from SPK–Abu Dhabi leaving an outstanding balance of the judgment sum of AED1,890,453.49. By this time, the Plaintiff found out that SPK-Abu Dhabi had left Abu Dhabi and abandoned its business there. Due to 3 this, the Plaintiff proceeded to make the claim against the Defendant on the same of cause of action as in the Judgment in the Malaysian jurisdiction. (4) Both the Abu Dhabi Judgment and the Execution Bond are collectively referred to as the ‘Abu Dhabi Judgment’. B. The Originating Summons (5) The Plaintiff filed the Originating Summons on 29 July 2022 (‘OS’) (Enclosure 1) with the Supporting Affidavit which was undated but filed on 11 August 2022 (Enclosure 3). The Plaintiff moved this Court on s 8 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (REJA 1958), O. 67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC’). In essence, the Plaintiff asks for an Order that judgment to be entered against the Defendant based on the Abu Dhabi Judgment on 22 June 2014 as follows: 4 a) The judgment sum of AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49 (based on exchange rate 1.21 on 29 July 2022); b) Defendant is required to pay the balance judgment sum of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06 (based on exchange rate 1.21 on 29 July 2022); c) Interest at 4% p.a. on the balance judgment sum of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06 (based on exchange rate 1.21 on 29 July 2022); and d) Costs. (6) As the Plaintiff was unable to obtain the balance of the judgment sum in the UAE, the Plaintiff intends to enforce the Abu Dhabi Judgment in Malaysia by way of common law. (7) The use of common law was not in the intitulement of the OS but stated in the body of the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit (paragraph 23 therein). 5 (8) Both parties exchanged affidavits namely the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit dated 8 March 2023 (Enclosure 22), Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit dated 28 March 2023 (Enclosure 27) and Defendant’s Reply II Affidavit dated 19 April 2023 (Enclosure 29). (9) In support to the OS, the Plaintiff contends that the Abu Dhabi Judgment is capable of registration pursuant to REJA 1958. It can be executed here in accordance with the procedure of the common law. (10) The Defendant vehemently objected to the OS. The grounds being: i) The OS is defective under O. 7 rule 3 (1) ROC 2012 as the Plaintiff cannot apply REJA 1958 because the UAE is not a reciprocating country in the First Schedule. Hence, s. 8 REJA 1958 is inapplicable. Also, O. 67 ROC 2012 has no application to the OS. ii) The OS is not supported by any affidavit. The undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit does not have the endorsement on the date it was affirmed. This runs contrary to O. 41 rule 9(2) ROC 2012. 6 iii) The Plaintiff has no case against the Defendant. This is because the Defendant has no knowledge of any of its business activities in Abu Dhabi. The Abu Dhabi Judgment is not against the Defendant but a different entity. The commercial licence was issued to SPK-Abu Dhabi and not the Defendant. iv) The Abu Dhabi Judgment was not against the Defendant, but SPK-Abu Dhabi. There was no privity between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. v) The Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. The Abu Dhabi Judgment was dated 22.6.2014. Based on s 6(1) Limitation Act 1953 (LA 1953), the limitation period is 6 years. (11) The Plaintiff argued that limitation does not set in under the LA 1953 because the Defendant made payments in 2021 of AED1,890, 453.49. As for the undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit, the Plaintiff argued that based on Exhibit KS-1 in the Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit, the emails showed the arrangements made for the affirmation of the said affidavit. The time frame being between 27 July 2022 until 10 August 2022. Although undated, the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit is not 7 defective because it was signed and sworn before the Counsellor/Head of Chancery/Consular Officer from the Embassy of Malaysia in Abu Dhabi. (12) The Defendant upon receiving the OS applied to this Court to strike out the OS under O. 18 rule 19(1) ROC 2012 on the grounds of a defective OS that had wrong intitulement, no supporting affidavit since the affidavit filed was undated and the OS is barred by limitation under REJA. The striking out application was dismissed on 8 February 2023. (13) Unfettered, the Defendant filed another application to convert the OS to a Writ (Enclosure 23) on the grounds that there exist issues to be ventilated properly through testimonies and not by affidavits This application was also dismissed on 29 August 2023. (14) The Defendant’s contention in opposing the OS is that the OS is defective as s 8 REJA 1958, O. 67 and O. 28 ROC 2012 do not confer any jurisdiction on this Court to grant the relief prayed. The other grounds in opposition are that the OS is not supported by any affidavit because the affidavit filed was undated although signed by the 8 deponent for the Plaintiff, the Abu Dhabi Judgment was obtained against SPK–Abu Dhabi and not the Defendant and also that the OS is barred by limitation period as the Judgment was dated 22 June 2014. (15) Despite asking for relief under s 8 REJA 1958 in the OS, the Plaintiff through its undated Supporting Affidavit and the Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit argued on common law and not s 8 REJA as basis of the application. The Plaintiff has departed from its intitulement thus creating a surprise to the Defendant. (16) The Plaintiff did not apply to seek leave to amend the OS to include common law as one of its avenues for relief. The Plaintiff also did not ask for leave to admit the unsigned Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit in Court. Save for the explanation in the Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit that emails were exchanged to show the unsigned Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit was actually signed before the Counsellor/ Head of Chancery of the Consular Office at the Embassy of Malaysia in Abu Dhabi. (17) The Court finds that the wrong laws stated caught the Defendant off guard when the Plaintiff departed from its intitulement to argue on 9 common law. The mistake is embarrassing. In the case of Cheow Chew Khoon @ Teoh Chew Khoon (T/A Cathay Hotel) v Abdul Johari bin Abdul Rahman [1995] 1 MLJ 457, the action was dismissed. The judgment of YA Gopal Sri Ram (as he then was) is echoed: “Now I think that that is not only wrong but plainly embarrassing. How, might one ask, is a defendant or the court to determine which rule of court the plaintiff is invoking unless he explicitly specifies it? If a defendant and the court should have to conduct a close examination of the supporting affidavit in each case in order to determine the particular jurisdiction or power that is being invoked by an originating summons or other originating process that requires an intitulement, then a plaintiff will be at liberty to shift from one rule to another or indeed from one statute to another as it pleases him without any warning whatsoever to his opponent or the court. It would make a mockery of the principle that there must be no surprise in civil litigation.” (18) While in the case of Doyenwest (M) Sdn Bhd v Penghuni-penghuni yang tidak dikenali [2022] MLJU 1306 the High Court did not strike out the OS therein. (19) I am bound by the earlier decision made on 8 February 2023 where the Defendant’s application to strike out the OS on the same ground was dismissed. 10 C. The undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit (20) While the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit embodied the reasons for the OS, the uncalled undated affidavit cannot be dealt with lightly. An undated affidavit is short of evidence and it leaves the Plaintiff with no supporting affidavit. The Plaintiff’s Reply Affidavit at paragraph 6.4 merely mentioned that leave can be craved from this Court for the undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit to be admitted. (21) There was no action taken to obtain such leave from Court to admit the undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit as evidence. (22) Reference to O. 41 rule 9(2) ROC 2012 provides that: “(2) Every affidavit must be indorsed with a note showing on whose behalf it is filed and the dates of swearing and filing, and an affidavit which is not so indorsed may not be filed or used without the leave of the court.” (23) In the case of Licvem Shipping & Trading Aps & Anor v JLM Logistics (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 10 MLJ 247, the undated affidavit was rejected because the Plaintiffs there intimated to the court that ‘for reasons unknown to us’ the affidavit was not dated. 11 (24) I find that the Plaintiff’s explanation justified on why the affidavit was undated. Based on the email correspondence, the undated affidavit was signed in the morning on 8 August 2002 and would be ready to be collected within the next 2 days. The filing of the undated affidavit was on 11 August 2002. I find the time duration was short and I accept the undated affidavit was indeed signed and deposed by the Plaintiff on 8 August 2002. The mistake in not dating the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit cannot lie on the Plaintiff. (25) In applying O. 2 rule 1(3) ROC 2012 on the non-compliance with the Rules of Court allows me to deal with the non-compliance as I think fit to enable this Court to deal with this case justly. The undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit is admissible as evidence of the Plaintiff. This Court proceeds to hear the merits of the OS. D. Abu Dhabi Judgment (26) The Plaintiff produced vide Exhibit P-2 of the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit the particulars of SPK-Abu Dhabi which Commercial Licence bears its Trade Name as “Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd–Abu Dhabi”. Its 12 legal form is stated as “Foreign Branch-Malaysia”. Exhibit P-3 in the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit shows that the company search on the Defendant does not bear any relation of SPK-Abu Dhabi with the Defendant. (27) The Abu Dhabi Judgment in Exhibit P-10 and Exhibit P-11 in the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit were never produced as original before this Court. (28) Nonetheless, s 78(1)(f) of the Evidence Act 1950 (EA 1950) states that public documents of any other class in a foreign country – by the original or by a copy certified by the lawful keeper thereof, with a certificate under the seal of a notary public or of a consular officer of Malaysia that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the lawful custody of the original and upon proof of the character of the documents according to the law of the foreign country. (29) The Abu Dhabi Judgment was produced as exhibit in an undated affidavit by the Plaintiff is visibly a photocopy with the Arabic to English translation by the licensed legal translator by the Ministry of Justice which certified that the translation is correct and identical to the 13 original text. The Malaysian Consular Officer of the Embassy of Malaysia certified the signature appeared on this document is that of Customer Happiness Center from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of International Cooperation–Abu Dhabi. The Embassy of Malaysia in Abu Dhabi is not responsible of the accuracy of the information contained therein. (30) The original copy of the Abu Dhabi Judgment was primary evidence to be proved under s 62 EA 1950. Although secondary evidence is acceptable under s 65 EA 1950, it must accord with the requirements of ss 74, 78 and 86 EA 1950. (31) A quick look at s 74 EA 1950 on public documents consist of documents forming the acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority; official bodies and tribunals; and public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether Federal or State or of any other part of the Commonwealth or of a foreign country; and also public records kept in Malaysia of private documents. (32) While s 86 EA 1950 is on presumption as to certified copies of foreign judicial records may be presumed as genuine and accurate if the 14 documents purports to be certified in any manner certified by any representative of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in or for such country to be the manner commonly in use in that country for the certification of copies of judicial records. (33) I find that the requirements of ss. 74, 78 and 86 EA 1950 are satisfied. E. REJA 1958 (34) A look at s 8 REJA 1958 states: “8. General effect of certain judgments (1) Subject to this section, a judgment to which Part II applies or would have applied if a sum of money had been payable thereunder, whether it can be registered or not, and whether, if it can be registered, it is registered or not, shall be recognized in any court in Malaysia as conclusive between the parties there to in all proceedings founded on the same cause of action and may be relied on by way of defence or counter-claim in any such proceedings. (2) This section shall not apply in the case of any judgment – (a) where the judgment has been registered and the registration thereof has been set aside on some ground other than- (i) that a sum of money was not payable under the judgment; (ii) that the judgment had been wholly or partly satisfied; or (iii) that at the date of the application the judgment could not be enforced by 15 execution in the country of the original court; or (b) where the judgment has not been registered, it is shown (whether it could have been registered or not) that if it had been registered the registration thereof would have been set aside on an application for that purpose on some ground other than one of the grounds specified in paragraph (a).” (35) REJA 1958 only applies to the countries listed as the reciprocating countries which the UAE is not. The First Schedule in REJA 1958 does not include UAE. As such, the Abu Dhabi Judgment cannot be enforced. The applicability of s 8 of REJA 1958 is none as the UAE is not a reciprocating country. This is the reason why the Plaintiff used the common law to support the OS. F. Common law (36) In arguing on the enforcement of the Abu Dhabi Judgment by using the common law, the Plaintiff relies on the case of PT Sandipala Arthaputra V Muehlbauer Technologies Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 1063. The salient points in the said case are the following: “[10] For the Malaysian court to recognise a foreign judgment under the common law rule, the foreign judgment which the plaintiff’s action is mounted on must be 16 for a definite sum and is final and conclusive (see PT Adhiyasa Saranamas v Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd & Ors [2014] 1 MLJevi 91, p. 95, HC; The University of British Columbia v Lim Siew Eng [2020] 1 LNS 710, HC). Upon satisfying these preconditions, the local court would enter judgment recognizing the foreign judgment, unless there is/are sustainable defences which have been raised opposing its recognition. [11] Our then Supreme Court in See Hua Daily News Bhd v Tan Thien Chin & Ors [1986] 2 MLJ 107, p. 109, has set out only four defences that avail to a defendant opposing the recognition of a foreign judgment under the common law. The apex court held as follows: “In an action on the judgment at common law, one or more of the following defences may be raised – (1) that the foreign court had no jurisdiction; (2) that the judgment was obtained by fraud; (3) that the judgment would be contrary to public policy, and (4) that the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were opposed to natural justice.” (37) The case of Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Conaire Engineering Sdn Bhd – LLC & Anor and another appeal [2023] 2 MLJ 324 brings light as the Federal Court dealt with the same issue of enforcement of foreign judgment under common law action. Although the Defendant succeeded in their appeal because of the Plaintiff’s failure to fulfil ss 78 or 86 EA 1950 due to the original of the Abu Dhabi Judgment was not tendered in evidence; nor a copy of the original certified in accordance with s 78(1)(f) EA 1950 tendered. 17 (38) Unlike here the Plaintiff had produced the Abu Dhabi Judgment properly to be admitted as secondary evidence under s 65 EA 1950 and the Abu Dhabi Judgment also accord with the requirements of ss 74, 78 and 86 EA 1950. (39) The said case held: “(1) Whilst REJA served to facilitate direct execution of foreign judgments, it was only in respect of those reciprocating countries listed in in the First Schedule to that Act. The right to sue in common law upon a judgment obtained in another jurisdiction nevertheless remained. At common law, a foreign judgment was treated as an implied obligation to pay a debt, that debt being the sum awarded by the foreign court. Sans REJA, that foreign judgment could not be enforced as a judgment. That foreign judgment only created a debt between the same parties and provided a cause of action upon which the debtor could be sued on our shores. It was the judgment that was obtained from our courts, and not the foreign judgment, that was enforceable as a judgment in this country. (2) In order to be enforceable, the foreign in personam judgment must be final and conclusive between the same parties and it must have been awarded by a court of competent jurisdiction. Consequently, it was imperative that the foreign judgment was produced to prove the claim. (3) The requirement to produce the original copy of the Abu Dhabi judgment was more acute in the present appeals as the original judgment was not in the National Language or even in the English language. Further, the translations of the judgment that were prepared by Conaire was substantially disputed at the trial. The original copy of the Abu Dhabi judgment was primary evidence which had to 18 be proven under s 62 of the Evidence Act 1950 (‘the EA’). Although secondary evidence of the same was acceptable under s 65, it had to accord with the provisions of ss 74, 78 and 86 of the EA.” (40) I am guided by the said case of Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Conaire Engineering Sdn Bhd (supra) as it is similar to this instant case. The respondent Conaire Engineering, a foreign-registered company, obtained a default money judgment against a joint-venture company, SPK-Bina Puri JV in the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance in the UAE. To avoid confusion, the said judgment is referred to as the “UAE Judgment”. (41) In the said case, the UAE Judgment was applied to be enforced against Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd, the same Defendant here. The respondent failed to enforce the UAE Judgment because the original of the UAE Judgment was never tendered in evidence. In fact, copy of the original certified UAE Judgment under s 78(1)(f) EA 1950 was also not produced. Only a copy of the UAE Judgment was exhibited as an attachment to the translations which were inadequate by themselves. 19 (42) The Federal Court further held that the admission of the translation did not ipso facto admit the copy of the UAE Judgment that remained intrinsically inadmissible due to the failure to comply with ss 78 or 86 EA 1950. (43) Unlike here, the Plaintiff satisfied the requirements under s 78(1)(f) EA 1950 where the ABU DHABI Judgment was produced as evidence in Exhibits P-10 and P-11 in the Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit. S 78(1)(f) EA 1950 lays down the conditions on proof official documents: (1) The following public documents may be proved as follows: (f) Public documents of any other class in a foreign country- By the original or by a copy certified by the lawful keeper thereof, with a certificate under the seal of a notary public or of a consular officer of Malaysia that the copy is duly certified by the officer having the lawful custody of the original and upon proof of the character of the document according to the law of the foreign country. (44) The UAE Judgment is therefore admitted as evidence. G. Limitation Period (45) The Defendant raised amongst others, the issue that the OS is barred by s 4(1) REJA 1958 as the OS was filed after 6 years has lapsed from the date the Abu Dhabi Judgment was entered on 22 June 2014. 20 (46) The Plaintiff defended by arguing that payments had been made subsequent to the Abu Dhabi Judgment dated 22 June 2014. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant made payments towards the judgment sum of AED6,890,452.00. As of 30 September 2021, the balance outstanding was AED1,890,453.49. Thus, it was the Plaintiff’s contention that the revised judgment sum of AED1,890,453.49 started only from 30 September 2021 and the OS is not caught by limitation period. (47) The Plaintiff is on the right footing based on s 26(2) of the Limitation Act 1953 (‘LA 1953’) that states: “26. Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment (2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefore acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment: Provided that a payment of a part of the rent or interest due at any time shall not extend the period for claiming the remainder of the rent or interest then due, but any payment of interest shall have effect, for the purposes of this subsection only, as if it were a payment in respect of the principal debt.” 21 (48) The judgment in the Federal Court case of Genisys Integrated Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] 3 MLJ 627 is relevant: “Such admission amounts to an acknowledgment that if the Limitation Act applies, and we will discuss this next, s 29 of the Limitation Act provides for a fresh accrual of action in which case, the claim is not time-barred.” (49) The Plaintiff admitted to receiving payments from the Defendant towards the judgment sum in 2021. This amounts to an admission to the judgment debt and it is a fresh accrual of action upon acknowledgment of the judgment debt in 2021. I find that the Abu Dhabi Judgment is not barred by LA 1953 based on the part payments received. H. SPK-Abu Dhabi (50) I now arrive at the crux of the matter on the issue of locus standi of the Plaintiff against the Defendant in terms of whether SPK-Abu Dhabi is in fact the Defendant. (51) The Abu Dhabi Judgment was applied to be enforced against Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd, the Defendant here. I noticed that in the Defendant’s application to strike out the OS, the issue of locus standi of the Plaintiff was not a ground to show there is no cause of action 22 by the Plaintiff. In the Defendant’s Reply Affidavit, the Defendant argued that the Abu Dhabi Judgment was not against the Defendant but against SPK-Abu Dhabi. There was no involvement of the Defendant with the Abu Dhabi Judgment and there was no privity between both parties. (52) The Plaintiff knew all along about this issue of privity but the Plaintiff did not tender any evidence to prove that SPK-Abu Dhabi and the Defendant are the same company. (53) When the Plaintiff contended that part payments were made by the Defendant towards the Judgment, no proof was tendered to ascertain it was the Defendant who made the part payments, and not SPK-Abu Dhabi. Even if SPK-Abu Dhabi is Defendant, the burden is on the Plaintiff to prove because the Defendant denies any relationship with the Plaintiff and/or SPK-Abu Dhabi in the Abu Dhabi projects mentioned. (54) It is not an agreed fact that the Defendant is SPK-Abu Dhabi for the requirement of admission to be excluded from proof under s 58 EA1950. 23 (55) Clearly, the Plaintiff failed to adduce evidence to prove the Defendant is indeed SPK-Abu Dhabi. (56) While the Plaintiff previously corresponded with SPK-Abu Dhabi in the Project and also in enforcing the Abu Dhabi Judgment by receiving part payment towards the Abu Dhabi Judgment, the Plaintiff would produce evidence to show their engagement with the Defendant who is SPK-Abu Dhabi. (57) There is no excuse for the Plaintiff in not being able to produce proof to show relationship because the Plaintiff was the party dealing with SPK-Abu Dhabi. If indeed SPK-Abu Dhabi is the Defendant, this Court must be shown with such evidence. Here, there is none. (58) At this juncture, I again refer to Genisys Integrated Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors (supra). In the said case, the Defendant who is the defendant there, admitted that SPK-Bina Puri JV is the defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. (59) Unlike in this case, the Defendant denied having knowledge of any 24 business activities in Abu Dhabi but most importantly, the Defendant denied having any relationship with the Plaintiff and SPK-Abu Dhabi. Since the Plaintiff failed to show proof such relationship exists, this Court is unable to find that SPK-Abu Dhabi in the Abu Dhabi Judgment is the Defendant. I. Decision (60) In careful analysis of the facts, arguments and the applicable laws put forward by parties and in taking heed of the Court orders that dismissed the Defendant’s applications to strike out the OS and to convert the OS to Writ Summons, I find that the Plaintiff failed to show locus standi against the Plaintiff. (61) Despite fulfilling the requirements under common law, the Plaintiff did not satisfy this Court on whether there is any cause of action against the Plaintiff. This is due to there being no iota of evidence to show any relationship between the Defendant and SPK-Abu Dhabi. (62) The Plaintiff has the burden to show proof of its case on the balance of probabilities which I find the Plaintiff failed to do. The OS is hereby dismissed with costs. 25 (63) As for costs, this Court is bound by O. 59 r. 7(2) ROC 2012. I have heard submissions from parties and took consideration of the manner in which the matter arose, the time and labour expended, the location and circumstances which the business took place together with the large amount involved. (64) Thus, I hereby award costs of RM20,000.00 to the Defendant, subject to allocator. Dated 18th January 2024 Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi Judicial Commissioner High Court Malaya Kuala Lumpur NCvC 8 Ain Nurawanis Ahmad Jais for the Plaintiff Messrs Chiong & Partners Advocates & Solicitors Nicholas Poon Qianfan for the Defendant Messrs. Kit & Associates Advocates & Solicitors ORGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION B. The Originating Summons C. The undated Plaintiff’s Supporting Affidavit D. Abu Dhabi Judgment E. REJA 1958 F. Common law G. Limitation Period H. SPK-Abu Dhabi I. Decision Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

Tika 2.6.0

BF-83D-1066-11/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH MUHAMMAD AMIR SHAUKAT BIN RAHMAT

Tertuduh telah dipertuduhkan dengan 1 kesalahan dibawah seksyen 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. Tertuduh telah mengaku salah dan telah dihukum penjara 9 bulan dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan 2 tahun pengawasan. Tidak berpuashati atas hukuman dan sabitan, tertuduh memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi.

18/01/2024

Puan Siti Fatimah Binti Talib

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=80435e29-dc1d-4e50-b284-d0d2b8a37320&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH MAJISTRET KUALA KUBU BHARU KES JENAYAH NO.: BF-83D-1066-11/2023 ANTARA PENDAKWA RAYA V MUHAMMAD AMIR SHAUKAT BIN RAHMAT (NO. K/P: 980226-06-5137) ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN 1. KRONOLOGI 1.1 Pada 27.11.2023, orang yang kena tuduh (“OKT”) di dalam kes ini telah dipertuduhkan dengan 1 pertuduhan di hadapan Mahkamah Majistret Kuala Kubu Bharu bagi 1 kesalahan di bawah Seksyen 15 (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang boleh dihukum dibawah AKTA yang sama. Pertuduhan telah dibacakan dan diterangkan kepada OKT dalam Bahasa Malaysia dan OKT telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan tersebut serta faham sifat dan akibat pengakuannya. Pada hari pertuduhan ini OKT tidak diwakili peguam dan pihak pendakwaan dikendalikan oleh TPR Puan Asmah Che Wan. 1.2 Pihak pendakwaan seterusnya telah mengemukakan fakta kes seperti mana di Lampiran A bersama dengan ekshibit-ekshibit yang kesemuanya telah ditandakan sebagai P1 sehingga P5A-C. Fakta kes telah dibacakan kepada OKT dalam Bahasa Melayu dan OKT mengakui fakta kes tersebut. Ekshibit P4A-d dan P5A-C telah ditunjukkan kepada OKT dan OKT akui benar. 18/01/2024 13:05:43 BF-83D-1066-11/2023 Kand. 11 S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 1.3 Atas pengakuan salah OKT tersebut, Mahkamah Majistret ini telah mendapati OKT bersalah dan disabitkan atas pertuduhan seterusnya menjatuhkan hukuman 9 bulan penjara dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan perintah pengawasan polis selama 2 tahun. 1.4 OKT telah tidak berpuashati atas hukuman tersebut dan pada 28.11.2023 memfailkan satu notis rayuan yang merayu atas sabitan dan hukuman agar dapat diringankan. 1.5 Sebelum itu, Mahkamah ini ingin menarik perhatian di bawah peruntukkan seksyen 305 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah yang mana bagi pengakuan salah yang dibuat, OKT adalah terhalang untuk merayu atas sabitan kecuali atas keesahan sesuatu hukuman sebagaimana dinyatakan yang berikut: “When an accused person has pleaded guilty and been convicted by a Magistrate on that plea, there shall be no appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.” 2. PERTUDUHAN 2.1 OKT telah dipertuduhkan dengan pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: Bahawa kamu pada 06/08/2023, jam lebih kurang 0340 HRS, bertempat di tandas Balai Polis Bukit Sentosa, IPD Hulu Selangor, Dalam Daerah Hulu Selangor, Di Dalam Negeri Selangor telah menggunakan dadah kepada diri sendiri dadah jenis 11-NOR-DELTA-9- TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL-9- CARBOXYLIC ACID dengan itu kamu S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 telah melakukan suatu kesalahan dibawah seksyen 15 (1) (a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 dan bersabit kesalahan boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen 15 AKTA yang sama. Hukuman: denda tidak lebih RM5000.00 atau penjara tidak lebih (2) tahun dan pengawasan polis tidak kurang (2) tahun dan tidak lebih daripada (3) tahun. 2.2 Seksyen 15 (1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: (1) Any person who – (a) consumes, administers to himself or suffers any other person, contrary to section 14 to administer to him any dangerous drug specified in Parts III and IV of the First Schedule; or (b) is found in any premises kept or used for any of the purposes specified in section 13 in order that any such dangerous drug may be administered to or smoked or otherwise consumed by him, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. 2.3 Seksyen 38B AKTA yang sama memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “38B. Powers of the Court in respect of persons found guilty under section 15 S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 (1) Where a person is found guilty of an offence under section 15, he shall, immediately after having undergone the punishment imposed upon him in respect thereof, undergo supervision by an officer as defined under section 2 of the Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983 for a period of not less than two and not more than three years as may be determined by the Court. (2) A person required to undergo supervision under subsection (1) shall be deemed to have been placed under such supervision under paragraph 6(1)(b) of the Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983.” 3. FAKTA KES Fakta kes OKT seperti mana ditandakan sebagai Lampiran A telah dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan diakui benar oleh OKT adalah seperti berikut; 3.1 Pada 6.8.2023 jam lebih kurang 0340 hrs, bertempat di Balai Polis Bukit Sentosa pengadu telah arahkan D/Kpl 175339, D/Kpl 185853, D/L/Kpl 198015 dan D/L/Kpl 204064 untuk mengiringi saspek ke tandas balai polis Bukit Sentosa untuk diambil sampel air kencing bagi tujuan ujian saringan awal polis dengan menggunakan botol saringan (B1: C0353675). Setelah sampel air kencing diperolehi dengan menggunakan alat test strip METH/AMPH/THC/KET/MOP/BENZO dapati air kencing saspek positif dadah jenis THC. S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 3.2 Pada 7.8.2023 pegawai pembawa specimen dari Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik, IPD Hulu Selangor, Kpl 151089 Mohd Fadzli bin Che Rosdi telah menghantar specimen air kencing ke Jabatan patologi Hospital Kuala Lumpur untuk dianalisa. Kemudian pada 25.9.2023, pegawai pembawa specimen Kpl 151089 Mohd fadzli Bin Che Rosdi telah terima laporan daripada Jabatan Patologi dan pegawai sains telah mengesahkan air kencung saspek mengandungi 11-NOR-DELTA-9TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL-9- CARBOXYLIC ACID. 11-NOR-DELTA-9TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL-9- CARBOXYLIC ACID adalah disenaraikan dalam Jadual Pertama Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. 3.3 Pihak pendakwaan telah mengemukakan ekshibit-ekshibit yang berikut: 3.3.1 P1 - Bukit Sentosa Report 5428/2023; 3.3.2 P2 - Laporan patologi 2396036858; 3.3.3 P3- borang Ujian Pengesanan Dadah; 3.3.4 P4A-D 4 keping gambar botol urine; dan 3.3.5 P5A-C 3 keping gambar tempat kejadian. 4. PENGAKUAN SALAH 4.1 OKT telah mengaku salah atas pertuduhan di bawah seksyen 15 (1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952. OKT juga faham sifat dan akibat pengakuan salahnya. Pengakuan salah OKT secara asasnya wajar diberikan pengurangan atau diskaun atas hukuman yang bakal dikenakan atas faktor pengakuan salah OKT tersebut bukan sahaja menjimatkan masa pihak mahkamah malah pihak S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 pendakwaan juga tidak perlu mengemukakan saksi-saksi pendakwaan untuk membuktikan pertuduhan ke atas OKT. 4.2 Walaubagaimanapun, pengurangan hukuman atau diskaun tersebut bukanlah sesuatu yang automatik memandangkan hukuman bagi sesuatu kesalahan itu masih atas budibicara Majistret yang mendengar pertuduhannya setelah menilai keseriusan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan serta faktor-faktor lain yang menjadi aras pertimbangannya. Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada PUBLIC PROSECUTOR V KAMARUZAMAN BIN MAHMUD & ANOR [2007] 1 MLJ 750 di mana mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: "[68] Ordinarily a plea of guilty has been treated as a mitigating factor since it saves judicial time in conducting a lengthy trial but it also saves time and inconvenience of many, particularly the witnesses (see Melvani v Public Prosecutor [1971] 1 MLJ 137, Sau Soo Kim v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 134, Loh Hock Seng & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 13, Public Prosecutor v Leo Say & 2 Ors [1985] 2 CLJ 155, Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 MLJ 167, Public Prosecutor v Ravindran a/l N Rethinam & 5 Ors [1992] 4 CLJ 2043, Tan Lay Chen v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 MLJ 135). The court has recognized that a plea of guilty is ordinarily a consideration to be taken into account in mitigation of punishment but it must be made clear that it is not the law that a sentencing judge must exercise a discretion to provide a non-custodial sentence in every case of plea of guilty as each case is dealt with on its own individual merits and should not be assumed mechanically that it S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 will be spared the custodial sentence. A plea advanced on counsel's advice late in the day because a conviction is almost inevitable, will be given less weight than one advanced from arrest or committal, on the first day he is charged in court to save witnesses from the trauma of a trial or to reduce court delays, (see R Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122,) Laurentiu [1992] 63 A Crim R 402)." 4.3 Selanjutnya Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada prinsip yang digariskan di dalam kes BACHIK BIN ABDUL RAHMAN V. PENDAKWA RAYA [2004] 2 MLJ 534, [2004] 2 CLJ 572, Augustine Paul, Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan pada masa itu telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “One of the principles in sentencing is that a convicted person should be given a discount for pleading guilty. A reduction of about one third of the sentence that would otherwise have been imposed is normally given. This, however, is not a strict rule and the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant any discount. The severity of the offence or the existence of a previous conviction may outweigh the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; so, may the demands of public interest for a deterrent sentence as well as the absence of a good defence or of other mitigating factors. The guilty plea does not automatically entitle the convict to a lesser punishment. In the instant case, the sessions judge had considered all these factors before deciding that the accused’s plea of guilty could not operate as a mitigating factor. Hence, the High Court ought not to have interfered and reduced the sentence of imprisonment from 18 years to 15 years. Nevertheless, it was not necessary for the S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 instant court to reinstate the sentence originally imposed by the sessions judge as it would not make a material difference to the consecutive terms the accused would already have to serve.” 4.3 Seterusnya, Mahkamah ini juga mengambil kira bahawa pengakuan salah OKT telah dibuat mengikut peruntukan seksyen 173 Kanun Tatacara Jenayah dan adalah teratur mengikut peruntukan undang-undang sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam kes Pham Van Thoung & Yang Lain lwn. PP (supra), Seah Ah Chiew v. PP [2006] 8 CLJ 585, Lee Weng Tuck & Anor v. PP [1989] 2 CLJ 120 dan Mohammad Hassan v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 1 CLJ SUPP 485, maka Mahkamah ini menerima pengakuan salah OKT, OKT didapati salah dan disabitkan bagi kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan sebagaimana telah dinyatakan di dalam PP V. NOR ZULIANA TAHIR & ANOR [2017] 1 LNS 1137 seperti berikut; “It is trite law that there are safeguards which must be complied with before a Court can accept a plea of guilt as valid and unequivocal. First, the Court must ensure that it is the accused himself who wishes to plead guilty and the accused must plead guilty by his own mouth, and not through his counsel. Secondly, the Court must ascertain that the accused understands the nature and consequences of his plea. Thirdly, the Court must ensure that the accused intends to admit without qualification the offence alleged against him. This is done by the prosecution tendering a statement of facts disclosing all the necessary elements of the offence.” S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 5. KESALAHAN SERIUS 5.1 Pertimbangan Mahkamah ini dalam memutuskan hukuman bukanlah hanya semata-mata untuk kepentingan OKT tetapi juga kepada faktor kepentingan awam serta keseriusan kesalahan yang dilakukan seperti mana pertuduhan. Mahkamah ini memandang serius atas kesalahan seperti mana pertuduhan. Kesalahan berkaitan memasukkan dadah dalam diri sendiri adalah suatu kesalahan yang serius dan sehingga kini walaupun pelbagai usaha giat dijalankan oleh pihak berkuasa, kesalahan berkaitan dadah masih berleluasa dan sukar dibendung. Mahkamah ini perlu mengambil serius atas kesalahan seumpama ini dan menjadi medan untuk mencegah penularan kes sebegini dan mencegah tindakan pengulangan oleh OKT sendiri kelak jika ianya dipandang ringan. 5.2 Selanjutnya Mahkamah ini merujuk dapatan HMT Azahar Mohamed di dalam kes PP LWN. TIU BOON KUI [2009] MLJU 516; [2009] 1 LNS 552 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “…Sudah menjadi pengetahuan umum bahawa kesalahan yang berkaitan dengan dadah berbahaya amat berleluasa. Kerajaan telah mengambil bermacam-macam langkah serius untuk mengawal ancaman kesalahan berkaitan dengan dadah berbahaya serta jenayah yang berkaitan dengannya. Mahkamah perlu memainkan peranan dan menjatuhkan hukuman yang setimpal untuk menunjukkan bahawa kesalahan ini adalah sesuatu yang setimpal demi kepentingan awam.” S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 5.3 Mahkamah ini juga merujuk dapatan Yang Arif Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan yang telah menekankan mengenai kesalahan berkaitan dadah berbahaya di dalam PENDAKWA RAYA V. ABDUL HALIM ISHAK & SATU LAGI [2013] 9 CLJ 559, seperti berikut: “[21] Tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa kesalahan yang berkaitan dengan dadah adalah merupakan satu kesalahan yang serius yang boleh mengancam keselamatan dan ketenteraman negara serta kesihatan umum. Dadah telah diisytiharkan sebagai musuh nombor satu negara oleh Kerajaan pada tahun 1983. Justeru, jika Mahkamah menjatuhkan hukuman yang ringan kepada satu kesalahan yang ditetapkan melalui Parlimen sebagai serius, sudah tentu perlindungan sewajarnya tidak dapat diberikan kepada orang ramai. Dalam kes Yusmarin Samsudin v. PP (supra) mahkamah menegaskan: The severity of sentence can only be to reflect Parliament's intention that conviction for being in possession of a large amount of any form of prohibited drugs must commensurate with the sentence to be passed on the peculiar facts of each case.” 5.4 Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes PP LWN. AMIR HAMZAH AMIR MYDIN [2003] 1 LNS 736 Augustine Paut HMT memutuskan seperti berikut: “Keseriusan kesalahan berkenaan dadah perlulah dizahirkan dalam hukuman yang dijatuhkan supaya ianya menjadi satu petunjuk yang jelas kepada semua anggota masyarakat tentang betapa seriusnya kesalahan jenis ini di mata undang-undang. Hukuman yang bersifat pencegahan juga memenuhi hasrat penggubal undang-undang yang S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 telah mengkaji semula dan menaikkan hukuman bagi kesalahan- kesalahan di bawah Akta tersebut beberapa kali dalam usaha mengekang merebaknya kesalahan yang melibatkan najis dadah.” 6. KEPENTINGAN AWAM 6.1 Mahkamah ini seterusnya perlu mengambil kira kepentingan awam melampaui kepentingan OKT selari dengan prinsip undang-undang berhubung pertimbangan yang perlu diambil kira oleh Mahkamah ini sebelum sesuatu hukuman dijatuhkan sebagaimana yang telah digariskan di dalam kes R V BALL (KENNETH JOHN) [1951] 35 CR APP R 164 seperti berikut: “In deciding the appropriate sentence, a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living.” S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 6.2 Selanjutnya, Yang Arif Hakim Augustine Paul di dalam TAN LAY CHEN V PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [2001] 1 MLJ 135; [2000] 4 CLJ 492, menyatakan seperti berikut “The phrase 'pass sentence according to law' in the subsection means that the sentence imposed must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles (see Re Chang Cheng Hoe & Ors [1966] 2 MLJ 252; Public Prosecutor v Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315; Philip Lau Chee Heng v Public Prosecutor [1988] 3 MLJ 107). The assessment of a sentence in accordance with judicial principles clearly contemplates, inter alia, a consideration of the mitigating circumstances in favour of the person to be sentenced. It is generally accepted that an accused person should be given credit or discount for pleading guilty (see Sau Soo Kim v Public Prosecutor [1975] 2 MLJ 134; Public Prosecutor v Sulaiman bin Ahmad [1993] 1 MLJ 74; Public Prosecutor v Ravindran & Ors [1993] 1 MLJ 45). However, this is not a strict rule as the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to grant any discount in an appropriate case (see Zaidon bin Shariff v Public Prosecutor [1996] MLJU 159; [1996] 4 CLJ 441; Lee Say & Ors v Public Prosecutor [1985] 2 CLJ 155). The severity of the offence committed may outweigh the mitigating effect of a guilty plea (see Loh Hock Seng v Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 13, Public Prosecutor v Oo Leng Swee & Ors [1981] 1 MLJ 247). Where public interest demands a deterrent sentence in the circumstances of a particular case, then the effect of a guilty plea must also give way (see Sim Gek Yong v Public S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR 537; R v Costen [1989] 11 Cr App R (S) 182). Thus, there can be no automatic rule that a guilty plea on its own entitles an accused to a lesser punishment (see Public Prosecutor v Govindnan a/l Chinden Nair [1998] 2 MLJ 181)....” 6.3 Hukuman yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini adalah suatu hukuman munasabah sebagai pengajaran kepada OKT secara khusus supaya tidak diulanginya lagi di masa hadapan dan juga sebagai suatu mesej kepada masyarakat secara umumnya agar tidak sesekali melakukan kesalahan berkaitan dadah berbahaya ini. 7. MITIGASI 7.1 OKT tidak diwakili peguam semasa pengakuan salah direkodkan. Antara rayuan mitigasi OKT yang dikemukakan sebelum hukuman diputuskan adalah OKT memohon agar hukuman dikurangkan dan OKT telah mengaku salah atas kesalahan ini. OKT juga menyatakan baru bekerja dikantin selama 2 minggun dan majikan telah tidak membayar gajinya sebelum ini selama 3 bulan. Pihak pendakwaan dalam hujahannya memohon agar hukuman setimpal berbentuk pengajaran diberikan ke atas OKT agar tidak diulangi di masa hadapan dan memohon agar perintah pengawasan diberikan selama 3 tahun. 7.2 Mahkamah ini merujuk dan mengguna pakai prinsip kes KESAVAN BASKARAN V. PP [2008] 6 CLJ 390 berhubung dengan pengakuan salah di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan: S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 "Generally speaking, a plea of guilty is a strong mitigating circumstance operating in favour of an accused. However, there may be cases where the offences committed is so serious and the circumstances in which it was committed so heinous that a plea of guilty need to be given little or no weight. The need to protect the public is another factor that may prevail over a plea of guilty." 8. KESIMPULAN 8.1 Mengambil kira faktor-faktor yang telah dinyatakan di atas, hukuman yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini ke atas OKT adalah selari dengan peruntukkan undang-undang serta setimpal atas kesalahan yang telah dilakukannya. Hukuman tersebut adalah suatu bentuk pengajaran dan pencegahan agar OKT tidak sewenangnya melakukan kesalahan yang sama atau apa-apa jua kesalahan jenayah lain pada masa akan datang. Disamping itu juga, bentuk hukuman seumpama ini memberikan gambaran bahawa Mahkamah ini memandang berat dan serius atas kesalahan jenayah melibatkan dadah yang patut dijauhi oleh masyarakat secara umum dan khasnya kepada OKT sendiri. 8.2 Kaedah yang wajar digunakan Mahkamah ini adalah membuat imbangan di antara kepentingan awam dan kepentingan OKT dalam menentukan hukuman yang berpatutan. Rujukan selanjutnya di dalam PP v. MD RASHID HARUN [2000] 3 CLJ 832 yang menggariskan seperti berikut: “Courts are duty bound to consider all these matters before deciding upon a suitable sentence ..… The sentence must be one appropriate to the gravity of the offence… Accordingly, the sentence should reflect the S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 seriousness of the offence… Mitigating factors are not to be disregarded, even if the offence calls for a deterrent sentence… That is not to say though, that “the circumstances of the individual offender are more important than the protection of innocent members of the community from injury to their persons, or from risk even to their lives”. Public interest must not be relegated to the background. “The correct approach is to strike a balance, so far as possible, between the interest of the public and the interest of the accused.” 8.3 Prinsip-prinsip lain berhubung dengan hukuman yang menjadi panduan Mahkamah ini dalam memutuskan sesuatu hukuman adalah seperti berikut: i) PP V. JAFA BIN DAUD [1981] 1 LNS 28; [1981] 1 MLJ 315; "......sentence according to law, means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section but it also be assessed and passed accordance with established judicial principles...." ii) R V. BALL [1951] 35 CR APP R 164: ".........our law does not therefore fix the sentence for a particular offence but it fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular, the court has the right and duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe....." S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 8.4 Oleh itu, atas imbangan dan pertimbangan faktor-faktor yang dinyatakan di atas, keputusan Mahkamah ini yang memutuskan OKT didapati salah dan disabitkan serta dihukum 9 bulan penjara dari tarikh jatuh hukum dan 2 tahun perintah pengawasan adalah setimpal, wajar dan selari dengan peruntukkan undang-undang. …………..fatimah………… (SITI FATIMAH BINTI TALIB) HAKIM MAHKAMAH SESYEN KUALA KUBU BHARU SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN Tarikh: 15 Januari 2024 S/N KV5DgB3cUE6yhNDSuKNzIA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

AA-62-90-08/2023

PENDAKWA RAYA Pendakwa Raya TERTUDUH AIREL IRWIN SHAH BIN NORASLIN

Perayu/Orang Kena Tuduh (OKT), Atarel Irwin Shah bin Noraslin telah dituduh di Mahkamah ini dengan pertuduhan seperti berikut: -PERTUDUHAN:“BAHAWA KAMU PADA 18/8/2023, LEBIH KURANG JAM 1205 PAGI BERTEMPAT DI ALAMAT MAPS PERSIARAN MERU RAYA 3, BANDAR MERU RAYA, IPOH DI DALAM DAERAH KINTA, DI DALAM NEGERI PERAK TELAH MEMECAH MASUK STOR BENGKEL KENDERAAN DAN TELAH MENCURI (1) UNIT BLOWER BERWARNA OREN JENIS: SJ-S50 MILIK MAPS DI ALAMAT PERSIARAN MERU RAYA 3, BANDAR MERU RAYA 30020 IPOH PERAK. DENGAN ITU KAMU TELAH MELAKUKAN KESALAHAN YANG BOLEH DIHUKUM DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 457 KANUN KESEKSAAAN.

18/01/2024

Puan Hilmiah Bt Yusof

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a54bd08b-9d58-4958-9c85-ce5a9ce47f51&Inline=true

18/01/2024 16:33:58 AA-62-90-08/2023 Kand. 13 S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N i9BLpVidWEmchc5anOR/UQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal n—s2-9n—na/2023 Kand. 13 mun/2224 16:33-SB DALAM MAHKAMAN SESYEN DI IFOH DALAM NEGERI PERAK DARLIL RIDZUAN genome JENAVAH) KES TANGKAP: AA-S2-9fl4)E/21.123 ANTARA PENDAKWA IIAVA FENDAKWA RAYA mm AIAREL IRWIN sum am NORASLIN . “onus KENA wuun A|.A§AN PEMQNAKIMAN 11} Psgruuumm Perayu/Ovang Ken: mum com Alaral hwm Shah bm Norashn lelah duludun m Mahkamah m. dengan penuduhan sepem benkul — m xw9lv\IndWEmm:5:n0R/U0 mm. sm-1 ...m.mm .. U... m may he mmuny -mm: dnuamnl VI nF\uNa Wm! EEBBLDALNAN ’BANAWA KAMU PADA 15/5/24723, LEBVH KL/FANG JAM 1205 PAGI BERTEMPAT 0/ ALAMAT MAPS PERS/ARAN MERU RAVA 1 BANDAR MERU RAYA, rPoH D! DALAM DAERAH KINTA DI DALAM NEGERI PERAK TELAH MEMECAH MASUK STOR ssmexa KENDERAAN DAN rsmn MENCURI (1; mm ELOWER BERWARNA OREN JENIS 5.1-$50 MIL/K MAPS m ALAMA1 PERSIARAN MERU RAVA 3, BANDAR MERU RAYA soazo /FOH PERAK DENGAN rm rowu TELAH MELAKUKAN KESALAHAN mvc amen omuxum DI BAWAH SEKSYEN 457 KANUN KESEKSAAAN nuxumrv pzmwu BOLEH SAMPAI 414; rmurv DAN BOLEH ./um DIKENAKAN DENDA - lZl.ENSIA.KE§ on (elm dluduh pan: 2: s 2023 Penuduhan mhacakan kepafla on namun on man monglku um um mamomn umuk uumcmm Walnu hagunlnapun‘ tarmac ubulan m unluk knh mg. pm 7 :1 2023, Pmuduhnn (ahh uuhncaknn ululn lag: am on man menuiku snlah umldav Perluduhln dangun mamlhzml . .2 am zklbal pengaxuannya nu man perldakwazn mengemukakan Fakla Kes dan memohon agn Fans K25 duhncakln Ieplda oxr. 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Mlhknmah dangan nu borpondopnl mush mm Mznkzmah mambenknn hukumlrl Dewar: 5 lahun flan Yankh Inngkup, memandangkan OKT mm sawing penpnayah ying berulang dun aaunn keidain Im on upanunya dmukurn dengan hukuman pvmava yang agak paniang supsya aapu membenkin on pengayaran agar on sank unluk rrsdakukzn kesaluhan yang mna m masa hadapan Wlbupun mhzk Penflakwann man rmngumukakan rakod Vamyau on melllul dokumun Rmgkasnn Mlklumnl Subpk yang mzna bukanlah salu vekod lampuu vasmn nlmun raked um Isiah dlkemukuhn 1199163 on mnasa pmsas Jaluh Hukum an on mangesahkinnyu senagau unar [4] xsslrpuuu Kesvmnmznnya Mahkinuh |eIah membua| penllilin yang manyalunm i£1;.‘E'§’3liP.£’.%£*.‘,” H ..:*2.'..,.;z.=.:*nan.nre,E.,')mv,.n.¢.sva29a:«|naes..y 1 (armasuk 11 pengakuin man on umur on ‘em: kesalanan kepenhngzn awamdan kapenlmqan. raked >an-pau uan hujahin plhak uandakwaan Mahkzmah dengzn Im nememapa hukuman name 6 nanun uan (ankh cangxap adalah salu lmkuman yang bersesualan‘ want an munasabah ke ass on Dludilkan nun: 4*Q~v (HILMIAH mun vusor; Ham Mahkamnh suyun Janayah 4. 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U... w my .. mmuny mm: flnunmnl m mum WM 5 ssnlsnce lorlha same olfsrma These gmdslmes were; m r c an the I :1 an or I y : rv amongsv accused arson: and mmgrm facials pa/amt In the ‘ Manakala a. dzhm kes HARI mm seen» v PP mgmuujg pula‘ Mahkzmah manyalakan prlrmpapnllsvp mm unluk mqunaoaka. umasa nnnmuhkan hukuman ‘Our cams navc a long mm sauce prognsssa lrum we for an ayramy ‘Iuclh In: a Ioolh‘ lypn ouaam rm avawod am or mm 91:! n u y no I m a a n r magma. ma court was rm! 5!! new m mind out 10 vrcnms ur aggmswn um ‘pound a/flush’ nu: genmrry to ptulacl aacnzy by ervfumrnq/usflce’ B) ALASAN IIAHKAIIAN mun MEMBERIKAN HUKUIAN Mzhkamah lelah memaluhkan hukuman pemarz s tahun nan lankh langkap sexelan mangamw kw: laklov-Iakwr Wmngalmg’ am 'aggmvahng' benkul u Pengakuan aalan aaasan sa\aII salu faklur mmqasl 0 Lllzr bdaknng on my Kepenlmgin swam flan kepenlmgan on v) Rekod Iampau on sm malpvnwzmmwarvownm “Nan: san-1 ...mam .. U... a v-viymu mwny mm. flnunmnl m mum WM I) Ptnnalxunn nun swan um um «mo: mmgun DI dahm Isa Znlaon Slum! v vP(1na)A c: 441, Augustin: Pam JC (pad: mm mu lclah menyiilkan blhawu 5I|u perlglkuln snlnh pariu dlambnl bur: dzrl dman immmbungzn wwnpmyz da\am pious nunmunkan hukumln ‘A nmgancn plea mam ml be [ruled ss 3 nzuansuc mm to he sumnumy rupcled ms n-amen: »z .5 made I: .5 a mnsumem eoemenz of me seulencm graces: unenrs we eonmmno Manakala dw dalam kes PP v Iuvmaun (snprl) Mahkamah menyalakan bahzwa pengakuan salah aaamn salah salu ram: mung. - nukuman - 131 :1 IS an accepted rule ol main man an accused should be gwn email or dnsoaunl /mprsamng gwlry nu: rs Mcsuss puma (me and money wx/I be spsmd afar! accused admrl: ms gum The cram! oldrscourll ra as g/Von In an accused psrson .5 W! on ma msmmn sentence nnposed By law bu! lathe! an a sentence which would have been Imposed an the accused rlhe had claimed rm mal and found gmily ' D: dzlam kes m2 V Julnl um Lu Finn 5. Am [anon uuu 159. Mzhkamzh nuenymauan oanm pnunakuin salah akan menpmalkan mass kevsmua nmak .1. Mankzmah Kes Im mg: mnnyalakln kemasaannya sesuaiu pengukuan salah mu malayakkan peszlah berkenaan mendanalkan sesuku sehmgga saw pemga peogurangan danpada hukuman yang sepahllnya mxenma m bawan kesalahan sm xi wanna/U0 “Nan: sm-1 n-nwwm .. U... m mfly .. mm-y mum: flnunmnl m .HuNa Wm! Nonemslsss, our nouns have evaivsd a gnnmr Woxrbh rune nmoo-maea Ihlvugh numamus aemasa cases mar where an accused person pleads gum’ wrmoul comssnng the cnargs ar crmges «yams: mm m a mar winch nugm consume "any day: mvowing prosecutors, witnesses aocumems, pa/my aflicars and chsrmsls me man: Ben m I-vow olrmnosma a named sentence A "plea of guilty" mums me disposal L)! a cummal case wm hghlsnmg speed Every cams: and mm leads to a backlog nl undvspased cnrvunslcsses uoggmg me calms and me pnsons wm ramand wvsormr: /1 rs m 1». mm ml-res! (MI pfindrnw cnmmel cum: no dumua on us expemlmusly .5 passxbla and accused persons who plead guury be Imposed mm . mama sentence Namsly 1: in universal ab/Igahan ma 5 mama nnlemae encourages honesty when an amma phnds gmlly. me and mm mung ma! mom accused person: would wlllmgly admfl gum Milton! .1 ma/, mus ruducmq me workload ol me pmsocmrs oflm and mo clurince elm bocklov ovum A pisa ol gull! coum be rewarded mm a dlsllfllllfil on me senwncs men would arharw-as have been rmpmed upon a nnamg av gmll altar . lull Ina! Tlva mscounl In be gm". oauld be Delwssn one— quanvr ma one-nwa fofluwmg me than Supmmu Court‘: aocmnrv m Alormud Abdulluh Ana Swu Kong v PF am 1 ML: 1.11. m ms /udgmonl in mg! mg MoIcamadA1rm so! (.5 he [hen wul sm-a .s rouaws ‘M »s sue was led mat me even: or the rmmchon on accoum al ol . won a n r m omerwrsa wouldnava man (ha ssmamx“ sm malvv m “Mm: sm-1 nmmrmu .. undtx: v-viymu nr1n\nIV|Y mm. a....m m muua WM! on terah mtnguku salln an mm. mombumu mnnpmmkan mus: Mahkaman dan pmak penfllkwaln Nanum, ad: mlsanya pengakuan mm. Max memamm nukuman yang nngan auamnknn tammmanya apzhlla xepennmgan awarn mengndv vamhzn Kas pecan maluk sepam m Im ukwlnyl drbnarkun mm hedcluuu pm akin mevnrnbulknn kequsavun can kelzkmzn aw kalarvgan mnsyaukii my dzlam kes K-nun Blllurun v PP man] a cu 190 Gcpal Sn Ram JCA belch mnnytvakun mam benklfl - 'GensraW speak/ng 2 men of gm/ny .s s slmng mmgaluug ctrcumslance operating m favour ol an accused However, mere may as cases where me aflence cammmed ns :0 selvus and the cncumslanoas m men :1 was commmsd .5 so Serums and the cvrcumslzmaes m was comnvlrad ;s so namaus ma! a wee org-my need to be gmsn man or no vmgm ma nsed Io gmlecl (ha gubm IS another Iactgr mg; mg gm/ml over 4 g. :2! gum Mahkamah juga mendapau pengakuan salah juga max memamln rmkuman yang rmgan lennamanya apzhlla Iemapal buklw yang kual unluk meusahnkan on seknranya perbncavnn dqalznkan sepem m mam kn: um yang mana on man dnangkap ‘red-handed’ aemasa mellkukan keszlahan mu up Lalar bulzlung on OKT yang Iudzh mum 25 (shun upacumyu mempunyl kemalangan man an udak seharulnw l:rhba| dzlam ‘enayah ml on sepanunya berslkap mam oenanggungamn ka am men darn anaknyz dun bukena inE %?Mtammm:'as;:v.':r'AJHHaaa';'u‘aa"9'-"d-"9 9 om memuklumkan Mahkamah on mempunyau anak dan sslan umuk duaga namun aaram hzl ml Mahkzmah memguk kepada kes PP v AMIR HAMLAN [zoos] 3 Auk no Dv dalarn kee berkenaan, Mahkaman lean menyalakan sepem benkul — ‘Th: din‘! of the convlclrun on Ml lccuuds /IN!/I docs no! aulomalmaffy bsmmo .9 mmgalmg factor we nccusud cannol as E/(awed Io comlml ollnnces rm/y [0 Mia bumnd [be possible repvrcussrons al 8 lengthy cuslodul wenttnci on hrs Ilrmly In hglvlelv me ssnturrce Imposed me needs al me accused me my nulwerghed Dylssues olpubnc mmrssf )KlnInIingln um um knplnllngln om‘ Mahkamzh peflulah mengambll kna kepermngan mam den kepemmgun oxr dalam menjlluhkan hukuman Dv dnlam kes Ru v Kmmm John Bull 35 Cr Aup R 164. pnnslp berkenaan Kehh dlpuluskin sapem benkux 1.. ammmz ma awmprvam sentence a cam! mam afways be gurded by renew corvsrdevalmns The ms: and foremost .5 me public Intelusl me mmtnsl my rs publicly snfurmd ml only ml]! the cape! al numslmrg am, am mac m me hope av pmvannng u A pmuul servann pama m p-mm: um. um yubflc mruutul two win. I: my mm mm. Mm magm Bu umpm to lry mm. as svsmma R: oflev easy money on me wpposmun ma! n ma oflmam IS caught and brmqhl Io yuslrce ma numshmsnl M/I be negngmre Such a mum may also am ma puficutll cmmnal rmm comnmmg a trim: aqua, ollnduco Mm In mm (mm . can-mam an mnmm me pumps mlsresl rs mm: wrvcd, ma best served 1/ ms nllenrtav .5 mama m mm [mm cnrmrlal way: to Pianos! way Our law does not. sm malpvnwemmwarvofillifl “Mm: sm-1 nmwmu .. U...» vary .. mmuny mm. m...m m muua WM W

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24NCVC-2478-08/2022

PEMOHON Tetuan Chiong & Partners RESPONDEN Tetuan Kit & Associates

The Plaintiff obtained a final UAE Judgment against the company Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd – Abu Dhabi for AED7,719,567.00 equivalent to RM9,375,659.49. After executing the UAE Judgment in Abu Dhabi, the Plaintiff realized part of the judgment sum leaving a balance of AED1,890,453.49 equivalent to RM2,294,896.06. The Plaintiff sought to enforce the balance sum against the Defendant, Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd. The enforcement of the balance sum was done under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (‘REJA 1958) together with interest and also costs. The Court was moved under s 8 REJA 1958 and O.67 and O. 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘ROC 2012). But, the Plaintiff sought under common law. The UAE Judgment was tendered as evidence but through an undated supporting affidavit of the Plaintiff. Whether the Plaintiff enforced the UAE Judgment in Malaysia on the correct party or otherwise. Keywords: Reciprocal enforcement of Judgments, final judgment, common law, undated affidavit, identity of defendant

18/01/2024

YA Puan Arziah binti Mohamed Apandi

WA-24-20-02/2016

PEMOHON 1. ) CHE AZUHARI BIN CHE YACOB 2. ) DATO HAJI SUHAIMI BIN DATO HAJI KAMARUDIN 3. ) HAJI MOHD ZAINAL ABIDIN BIN ABDUL MUTALIB 4. ) NURA BINTI NAWI 5. ) BAHARUDIN BIN ABDUL MAJID 6. ) HAJI ABDUL WAHID BIN MD SHAM 7. ) AHMAD ZUHDI BIN HAJI YAACOB 8. ) WAN AHMAD SAIFUDDIN BIN WAN ENDUT RESPONDEN 1. ) HAJI SAMAT BIN UDA GANTI 2. ) MOHD RUSNI BIN SAHUJI 3. ) ADUMAN BIN MD JELAS 4. ) SHAMSHUDIN BIN ABU DARDAK 5. ) ABU DOLLAH BIN HITAM 6. ) ISMAIL BIN MAARUF 7. ) SHEIKH ALLAUDIN BIN AHAMED IBRAHIM

Societies — Co-operative society — Elections — Whether null and void — Whether dispute on first election ought to be referred to Registrar General — Co-Operative Societies Act 1993 Civil Procedure — Appeal — Fact, finding of — Interference by appellate court — Judicial appreciation of evidence — Contemporaneous documentsCivil Procedure — Appeal — Originating Summons — Against decision of Co-operative Societies Tribunal — Whether appellate interference warranted

18/01/2024

YA Dato' Wan Ahmad Farid Bin Wan Salleh

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=20cd2459-5055-4073-8d02-99ad815015a5&Inline=true

18/01/2024 15:16:16 WA-24-20-02/2016 Kand. 132 S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal S/N WSTNIFVQc0CNApmtgVAVpQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal wA—24 2u—o2/2016 Kand. 132 12/nuznu 15:15-15 DALAM MANKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BANAGIAN KUASA-KUASA KHA5) SAMAN FEMULA NO ~ wA-24.2o—n2Izn1a Daiam Pemara mengena. undakan nleh Dam Suhllnu hm Dalu NI]! Knmumddm. ne mm 7;-nauom. amumu Mmahb. Nma aw. Nawi. nu. Mm Album mu Mohd Am-ev, aenamam bmAbdu\ MJ]Ifl.Ha]1Abd|A|WiNd hm Md sum Ahmad zum. bm Haj: Ynamb‘ Wan Ahnud Sufluddn hm Wnn smm .1... cm Azuhln hm one Yzmb mhaflapan mmmx Suluhannya Kupemx Manama damn Rmukan Pemkmnn kapada Tnbunal man mun 2:113 Dan Dnlam Damn manganl S-klyln as me KL1perasuI99.’!‘ Dan Dnlam pvalhm mungunll Punahlkmun TrIbunz\ Sunmanlari Kaverss Malays» ynng benmlm :11/I2/2015. Dan oanam psnura marvgenaw Paralumrvperzlumn Tnbund Kunlvuu ma‘ Dan Baum perum mungnna Saksyen an me Kw-nu.1m. Dun u-um puma mnnenex Akin Knvavasmssz. Dan Dahm Demara Pevaxuran 15, Penman- perumr-n Knpene. mm. Dun nezem perkma mengsml Pvaturinrplmurin Kc.-me. mm. sm wsm\FvQ«.0cmumIuvAvp0 mm. em ...m.mm e. LAIQ4 m may he mm-y Aw. dnuumnl VII mum Wm! Dan Dalam Dalkara mervgenaw Undang-undang KBCII Kunuvun Sigamm Eamam Dan Da\aIvI Demara Numn 55A Kaednh-Kaedah Mankamah TIH9§M10V2 ANTARA . DATO HAJI SUHAIMI BIN DATO HAJI KAMARUDDIN . HAJI MOHD ZAINAL AEIDIN BIN ABDUL MIIIALIB . NURA EINYI NAWI . BAHARUDIN BIN ABDUL NIAIID HAJI ABDUL WAHID BIN MD sum . AHMAD ZUNDI BIN HAJI vAAcooB WAN ANMAD SAIFUDDIN BIN WAN ENDUT . cu! AZUHARI BIN CHE VACOE ...PERAvu u_~4mg..¢....._. DAN . HAII sAuIA1 BIN um GANTI .MOHD RLISNI BIN sANu.II .AnuMAN BIN MD JELAS . SHAMSUDIN BIN ABIJ DARDAK . ABU DDLLAH BINTI NIIAM .IsuIAIL BIN MAARUF . SHEIKH ALLAUDIN BIN AHAMED IBRANIM ...RESPDNDEN ~I¢uIbuu— JUDGMENT sw wsYNIrvI2:ncNAamIIIvAvvQ § Nat! Sum mm. WW he HSQG M mm I. nvwhuflly 1M5 dun-mm VII .mm mm the necessity M individuai membership to be approved by the ALKi no other committee, intziuding any subcammiflee. is authorised under t<operasi‘s by—laws to apprcve the new membership through the Skim Tsbus saharrr [43] The Skim itseit was not approved by the ALK and iheretdre, had no legs to stand on. Even nthere was such an approval. oiwhieh no finding rs niade here, the repruitrnent process still has to go through individuai anprwai by the ALK To aitcw a subcommtlvee to approve new members Ihrmtgh the Sk/m reads seriarn wcuid oitend the maxim ct deiegarus non poles! delsgare The appetients have not shown any evidence that the ALK had approved the sirirn and resolved to deiegete the approval ctnew members through the impugned sutmornnnttee [44] In the etmumsllncesi i respecttutty agree with the finding at the tribunal that Skim Tebus saharn was untawiui and lhal no new nrernpers come be recruited under the skim uniess due process under the bylaws had been complied wnh. wit. The status ol Shari-tsuddm pin Daldak as a deiegare [45] The issue arose as to whether Encik Shamsuddin had Valldly resigned as a member 01 the ALK The appeilants‘ position is that Enctk sharnsuddin had resigned and, theretdre, ceased his right to become a delegate to the mm [46] The purported re ' almn pt Enctk shenisuddiri was deiiperated by the Tnpunai. Apparentiy. the l!:igna|ton|B||B1 was unsigned. in any event, the appeitants did not adduoe any minutes at the ALK meeting that accepted the purported resgnatrcn oi Encik sharrisuddrn Bu| then. how pouid the ALK deltberale on an unsigned letter M resignaticnv [47] In my respecllui view, an unsigned resignation ietter canna| he ponstnied as valid it any authority is needed for the aforesaid prcpcsitioni it can be tcund in Benterrq punt. sdn Bhd v Mohd Maar trirr 5- pl [1995] MLJU 7a. see aim‘ Aslln Shl-Id warehouse n EM voarurnaiirrgpern a/I Sinniah [2007] 4 MLJ see. ni wSYNiFVQ:.0CMIwm|uVAvvQ "Nair s.n.i nuvihnrwm be tiled m mm the pnpirniity Mihir dnuuvinhl n. .i-iuric pnnai [A8] [49] [59] [51] [52] [53] [54] rherelore, I respectlutly agree that the Tribunal was correct in ltndtng that Enclk shamsuddrn had not resigned as an ALK member. The attendant consequence at irndrng is thatzncrk shanrsuddrn was a lawful delegate at the AGM, in any event, at the heanng, Enclk shernauapin denied having Issued the resignation letter The role afErlr:lk Ayub at the AGM Erlclk Muhd Ayub was at the material time the Assistant Director at the SKM. wtleyah Persekutuan, Kuata Lurnpur. it was part at his duty to supervise the running at a pdpperattve soctety within wtleyah Persekutuan, which includes the Koperur, As alluded to earlier. Enutk Mchd Ayub tesllfled at the heanng nature the Tribunal As a supewislng etrtoer, the lunctrprr at Enclk Ayuh is to ensure that the AGM ot the Kopetast was conducted smoothly Ind In aooprdanoe with cosrx, Eefare the Tribunal, Hart Samal bin Uda earth. the t<eperasi's treasurer at the nratenal time and the 1" respondent herein, reslrrred that Enctk Mohd Ayub had never played the rate at an acltrlg chairman ot the AGM. Hrs rule was more at an admsor, Aotxtrdlrlg to Enclk Muhd Ayub. he was my a by the 1" appellant to attend the AGM, Enctk Mohd Ayub was ally reluctant to trtlervene In a manner that could pe construed as playing an aclrve rule 171 the prooeeutngs at the AGM However, the silualrorl at the AGM was heated in view ptthe dlspllle tn the list at delega|s e Iglble to attend and pamctpale at the AGM Enctk Mohd Ayubthen gave his advice as to how best to resotve me impasse. what is more lmpananl is that at all rnatenat times during the conduct at the AGM, the appellants dtd not otatect to his role on the pontrary, the appellants cooperated with him when he attempted to resalve the impasse. tn his evidence, Enak Mona Ayuh lesttfied IN wsmlFvQ:.1‘tcMIwmIuvAvp0 «me smut mrrlhnrwlll .. u... m my r... nflnlhallly Mn. dnuurlnht r.. srlurtc wrist 5- sepaniang Itamu bemndnk lnbugatwakii pihatt si<M oerkecuaii Uriluk hat ithias rnaiaraiiun xetegenpan yum tiirihiti sebeium MAY balmula, adairah Psittmhoit Fartmin tstthainiii dart PeitK:hon»Puviahot'i yang lain ritenibarilart tairiu berlindak sehagat uiafli berxeouaiiv 4 mar ssrna aetiaii Malari nata Hi stmaim. dun Fumuiiuri-Plmohon yin! iain membenkiri kerpsama yang Datk kepadu saye dalnni vlusal merentusahm itamivnlma perwatriiar. ierubul. It is thereiare evident that. Eneik Mohd Ayutfs role was more oi an advisory in nature He did not participate in the AGM. He was not even the acting chairmen oithe AGM. [55] The Trihuriat accepted Encik Mahd Ayah‘: testimony and (mind that he had rto| acted beyond his iurisdirman. In any ayerit, having invited Ericik Mohd Ayuh to the AGM. i ii itiiautt to accept that the 1“ appellant. who did not register h ahieatian to the ieie played by Erictk Mohd Ayllb, is new suggerslirtg that he had acted beyond his jurisdiction. x. The appomlmsnfalfilcik sharrisuctdiri as a msmbsrolALK [57] Another issue is an lhe validity of the appoinlmenl oi Encik Shamsuddin bin Dardak as a member oi the ALK [an] under cl 36 at Knperasrs by—iaws, the ALK is aiiowed to appoint a member oi the ALK in the event at any vacancy. [59] it is not in dispute that at 34 oi the by-laws was amended in 2005 to increase the composiltun oi the ALK Board [mm nine lo twelve The Kaperasis treasurer. Hajt samet am Llda Garm in his evidence ooriiirrned that the ALK had reapppinted Encik sharnsuddin as a member oi the ALK under cl 36(2) oi the Koperasrs by-iaws. [so] I thereiore respectiuiiy agree with the Tnbimal that Encik shamsitdttin was duty appointed as a member at the ALK under the t<opet-asis by-laws. IN wsrtiirvaaicmamiavtypa «uni. s.n.i mmhnrwm be LAIQ4 M mm the angimiiiy Qihi. dnuuvinril VII nFit.ING Wrui xi The vs/nmy ufthe apps/Ia/1!’: "Rngrslar o{Msmbers" [61] The appellants have their own set M Regiswr 0! Members‘ much‘ not sumrismgly‘ look mlo aomunl new members danved lmm the Skim Tehus Subaru. [62] Since 1 have agreed that the Snhems was unlawful, me new 'members“ ragisnarad Ihruugh SK/m Tabus sanam are also in question To begin wnn. may are no: property admilusd Inrougn Ins procedure staked in me by4aws. seconmy, no avmanoe was adduced lhal me appeuanrs “Regwsler of Members‘ had complied mm me relevant nnwisnms at COSA [63] There Is no evidence that valm receipts were Issued (or me membership smrance fees and su|>scnp|mn nnnimurn shares of RM200 mm the Koperasl [54] I am no! gomg (0 on the issua at the (act than the 1-‘ and 2"‘ appellants are subject lo unvesmgauiun by the SKM. That \s a separa|e issue. [551 Hawever. since the purported “Regis1er of Members” prepared by "Ia appellams has not been shown to have complied WIUI the COSA, I am enurely In agreement wllh the Tnbuna\ that Dnkuman 5 (P1) is invalid and merarme, not conclusive an the purpnse onne AGM. X" The resvuctunng smrcise by me Koperssr [661 On 1:: 3 2021, the Knpelas ssued a Vetterlc me I“appellant The letter svacas as (wows: [21 Sukzcwla mmak\umk.an hahawl Ma:yunm| Anggola Llmhaga yang bemlasyuaral pada zano Feb 2:211 menganmu xempan untuk mengunlkuaukzn uux umm menubuhkan Jawamrimau Nsgsn atau Klwusn nag» memamnkin dtngan sempumanya manamana amm- Knpevasx dun mawaxuxan kua5a kepidanya din mesa us semasa m wsmwamcmamuavma «um. sum nmhnrwm be mad m mm he anmmuny Mm. dnuumnl vu muNG p-max mlnqikul kapuluian Lemma, yang lalah mluluskan ole» Masyuarm Mung. ma 2: Jun mm a... dmxnunmn ureh sururrar-pm Kanévasl Malaym Asxm gum 4 Sapllmblv zoos. xepmm... lm hentualhnasl serbmenz :31 Sahubungan dengnn nu, semua J-wulnnkuna Nlgnn Ilnu Kswlnn yang arpmn ziau aaurmu dalam Mesyuanl lgung (Kawasan-Kawnsan alau men Llmhaga sehelum am adalah renew (D\hana\knn) [41 Arugula Lemhaga akan melanflk Jlwltsnkulu Kano:-:1 r:.w...g.n. Negen flan Kawsan yang ham setalah panyusunan semula Kawasan-Kawasan dubuat [en cu 44(2)(v) empowers |he ALK ro. Menuwhkan zpeepe uwalankuasa kawasan flu puflu. nee: Imam-Llnkan dungan sempumanya muremarra zklM|\ kaperan dam \~:kHl<:n Irunn xepemyn a... aemnn ka umasa menankul keounnan Lemnaga [em The Tnbunal. irs nndmg, was omre v ew lhal the ocnsaquenca of one letter was to drssows me oumminee members and not the branches at me KuperIs\. The branches remamed inlacl The Iuslmclunng exercise therefore‘ awarding lo the Tribunal‘ men 1 respeclfufly agree, am not have me eflect of me dissomlion oi the branches nu whemer the vale caunling exemvss 51 the AGM was valm [69] ‘there were five canmdalas who contested hr me three ALK Dusls at me election during me AGM. nu] Accurdmg to the rninmes omre AGM, me results ollhe elecuon were as follows sm wsm\FvQ«.ncMIwmIuvAvv0 “Nana sum nmhnrwm e. med m vuw he enmmuryfiw. dnuumrrl VI mum pm [71] [72] XIV [73] [74] [75] [79] (a) Erlctk Adunien bin Md Jelas 7 17 votes 0:) Hair Abdullah vuset — 14 votes (c) Ericik Moria Rosm seh 7 l2 votes (at Ertcik Ahmad zurioi vaaooo - 9 votes (et Eneilt aahariioin Abdul Malta. 9 votes Sinw the number 07 voles cast was 51, \ dn not see any lrregulenly with the eoiinting or the tally. The result ol the election was duly signed and approved by the appointed cornmttee on 28.11.2011. As to the alleged discrepancy in the names iztthe candidates in the grounds at iudgnierrt. the Tribunal had given a eterincation through on email. To my mind, the omission is so iinsutrstantial as to make the maxim at de rrlln/Ims non ciirat lax applicable. it was only a clerical mistake. which can be reclified under the slip nile whether Enci/< Moht1Ayub bin Ahmed, SR-7, a creuihle wlerress The appellants have raised the issue af Errcik Mohd Ayiitrs credibility as a witness The Federal court had the oppomlntty to reiterate the law recently in My Hoe Kul 5. Arror v werioy rerr Lee Perlg 5 Dis [2020] 12 mm in re it was held inter she held that in iiisliry an appellate intervention on the ground or the “plainly wrong test’, an appellate oouit must be able to speeirically identity ‘wily the learneo trial judge's hrioiiios were plainly wrong an the key issues". Again. the courtol Appeal in Leelrrg chin & or: v Gan Yook chin 5 Ana: [IBM] 2 ML! 97 CA held that eppellala inlertarenoe will take plaoe in cases where there has treen no or insumotent iuoiprat appreciation at the evidence Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJL in an instnictlve judgment in Lee my chin, rematketi as lallclws' it there are contemporary ooaiirnents, then he must test the oral evidence or a wthless agalnsl tlieiie. Ha mus| also test rn wSYNlFVQt.0CNMlm|aVAvvQ «wet. s.n.i n-vlhnrwlll be than M VCW he nflnlhhllly Hint. dnunvlnrrl vra ii-lime Wml [771 [79] xv. [791 [80] [51] [57] the evidence M a plmcular wi|rieG5 Bgainsl the probabilities of tire mse The issue arose on ltie witness statement oi Erlclk Mond Ayub dated 26.5.2015. He explained that he amirned the witness statement on two dlileient oocasions - on 5.5 2015 and 23 5.2015 beiore the commissioner oloatlis in Kedati Bolh oi ttie witness statements are similar in oontent i do not find any iriegulanly in ltiis in any evenl. tne Tribunal riad accepted tiis evidence and it has not been strewn to me that the Tnbunai was plainly wmng witnin ttie meaning at My Nob Kul. wnstnsr tne Award ol cosls RM50,000 is beyond me Tribunals jurisdivlfon Belore nie learned counsel lor tire appellants submitted lnat me posts ordered by the Tribunal are unreasonable and disproportionate Ari appellate ooun does not intertere in ttie question oi oasis wittiout reluctance Ttie noun below has absolute discretion in dealing with tne Irialleri Ari appsllala coun should not intiertere unless it can be snown ttrat tnere nas been an enoi oi law brine puiponed exercise or discretion by the lower court was based on grounds wtiolly unconnected wflh lne cause or action see Slguiull (sabrin) sdn Blvd v ‘franc Malaysia sales 5 services sun and [2014] 5 MLJ 535 CA Under 0 59 r23(1 i oitne Rules olcoun 2012, tire scale ditcosts tor trial in me subordinate courts is fixed up to a iudgrnent sum or RMSDUDOO where tne iudgment sum exceeds RM5<:a,oao, costs is discretionary but shall not exceed RM4u,ul)o Having said lnat. i do nnd lnat the costs imposed by tne Tribunal is excessive. IN wSYNiFVQI.flCMIium|uVAvvQ «um. s.n.i mmhnrwiii be tiled M mm the aitrimii-y¥Jiiii. dnuminril w. nFiuNG Wrui Findirlil [53] I do not find any appealahle errvr made by the Tribune! In ma xmpugned Award [54] The appeal I: dlsrmssed [as] Cos|s Is fixed rm RM40,D00 here and below. Tankn: 13 Janunc 2024 L4 (WAN AHMAD FARID BIN WAN SALLEH) Hakml Mahkamah Tmgg\ Kulla Lumpur Fmak-pmak. Bag Pmak Perzyu Da|o‘ Ha]: Suhlrm um Da1n‘H3jiKamamddm Suklulun Numnh M Ab Ram Tatuan Adlan a Mom Suhavrm sag. Pmak Rawondan - cmpmn. A/L s Ramaumy Abssbn a n. An-nan Kabn Tnuan A7 sm 1. Cu m wsm\FvQ:.ucmumIuvAvpQ «um. sum n-nhnrwm be mad M mm he .mmn.u-Mm. mmm VII muNG pm TM appallanw can [1] Yhis IS a dlspuls between members Ma cooperalive soc-aw. [2] The appellanle and respondents are members ol a moperalwe wclely known as Koperasl sugernal Bemad (“Koperasi“). [31 The subpcl mauer at dlspule ln (Ms appeal ls wllh respect to the valldily oi the Annual General Meeung |“AGM'] o1 lhe Koperasl, Mild! was held on 14.22011 [41 Subsequent |n me AGM, me appellanrs lodged a eamplaln1 to me Cooperative Soclelles Trlbunal (“the Trlhullal') The tribunal ls established under S 83 0! the Ca-Dpenlllve Soclmlss Act 1993 (‘COSA") [5] The Tribunal naa dlsmlssea [he appellenls' complaint and declared Ihal lhe AGM was valid and me Enard Members el lhe Kaperusl were duly eIec1ed. [6] Aggnarved by me Tnpunara Award. lhe appellants appealed no me High Cum. on 5.4.2017, me Hlgn Coun alluwed pan ollhe appeal lrom the aeelsion at the Tribunal ll held |ha| lne AGM was Invalld. Tne learned Judge, 1n her grounds L71judgmanl,madamelallawing omers: Bmdauman zlasan-aluan m alas viyuan Pemyu dlhenalkan smakal yang dl/Iyalaksn sapemaenxul 1.. Meiyuaml Mung Felweklan Ynhunan Kaperss Sagemal aemaa yang dnadakan paaa 14.2.2011 11. Hole! Kuale Lurnpur Inlemalmual zdulal-l lfl ssh dan hendaklah dladakarl bekah la 11.. Mill Jawzmnkunsa Audll nalemen adalah hukan pelwnldlnn ala. anal mereks sehagal nhll Jlwaunkuua Audll nalaman be Mnsyuzlal Agung Fulwikllarl ranunan xepuaal agemal Eelmdyarlgzkandladakznnu mwsmlrvqdlc M VAV mu. 5.1.1...l..,$fif‘.,.'t'.....a"‘1.~,....llln.1l.y3 . dnuuvlnnl vu arlum Wm! (71 The Htgh Cnurl held that the lhtemal audit memeete were net the nghtlul delegates at me AGM. Hence the decistonwehhul the AGM [3] Dlssallsfied wlth the dscislon of the High court, the respondents appealed to the court at Appeal. [9] On 19 3.2018, the Caun omopeel allcrwed the respondents‘ eppeel and set aetde the Hlgh courts declstoh. The court at Appeal upheltl the Trlbunal's Award that the AGM was validly held. The case was then remllled to this Caun ta hear the appeal on the remalnlng tssues. [1 0] The order at the cum ulAppaa|. as can be seen in lhe loner dated 20.11.2019 lrem the Conn ol Appears Deputy Registrar. states as lollows: Appse I5 attewea th van The men cums ovfler 1. eel ule the men com 1... la dul Mm all related lswts 10 M15 eopeat Na Drflar ii to costs Dewsll In b: ralundad [I I] In shorl. me Courl ol Appeal. In reverstrlg pen enhe deal n at the Hlgh court. held that the three tntemat Audll Members who voted al the AGM wete Villd delegates. [12] There are ftfleen temal ng and related lssues that this Counhas In address as per the dlredions ol the Cour! M Appeal They are as follows (i) Whether ‘small Muawl was a Ma|akaIJohDl delegale. tn) whether Wart Kemememn wan Mustata was a lawtwl delegate (mm Pehahg. (Ml) whether wen Ahmad sanuudth was a lawml delegate tmm Putretaya. (lv) whether the minu|e: at the board meetlhgs at the Koperasl held on 14 .2011 and 28 22011 were valtd. (v) whether Puah Nura Nawl was a valtd delegate lmm selangor (VI) The status of the Ptllrajaya branch m wsmlFvQ:.1‘lcMIwmIuvAvvQ “Nair 5.11.1 ...1e.m1t be .1... m my 1... nflmhallly A . dnuuvlnnl vu arluNG vtmxl (VII) Whether a smeme known is ‘Skim Tsbus Saham“ Var recruiting new members is valid. (vni) Whether sharnsuddin bin Dardak is a valid detegete a d whether he had resigned as a manner dtthe Beard (“AL ) belare the AGM. (ix) whether Mohd Ayuh bin Ahmad. the aficer trorn the Cooperative commission or Meieysra (‘SKM“) had acted beyond his jurisdiclton and whether the AGM sheutd have been postponed. lx) whether Enetk Shlmsuddtn bin DirdIk‘e appointment as a member btthe ALK was vaiid? (xi) whether the appellants -Register of Members“ which is M Dukunren 15) (F1), is vaiid (xii) Dld the restructuring exerdee reeutt W the Koperesr brlnches being dissolved? (XHI) whether the vote eeuntrng exercise at the AGM wls vahd. (XIV) whether Enctk Muhd Ayuh bin Ahmad, SR-7, is a credible witness (xv) Whslher the Awnrd or dusts RM50,ooo is beyond the Trthuna|‘s iurtsdrctten. r. The postlron ollsmsil Macro! [1 3] The Tribunal had rnade e finding that Enctk Ismail was a iawtui delegate at the AGM. In short, the Tnbunei agreed with the opinion made by Enctk Mehd Ayttb, who was acltng In his advisory capanfly as an bttieer at the SKM at the AGM. [14] There was no evidence that nnybody at the AGM abtecled to Enuk lsrnItI's pasihon as the detegete. mwsmtrvndic MIUVAVDQ "Nah! e.n.r...n..r%“..t....emw...tnnt.r-ya . dnumtnhl w. .nune vmui [151 [15] [VI [151 [19] [20] [21] [22] Al the Tribunal, the appellants otziected to the “decision” made by Enolk Mahd Ayub to allow Eiiiax Ismail Maaroltu be a delegate from Melaka/Juhur. Learned counsel tar the appellants submitted that there were only we delegates trorri Melakeuahov and they were Enclk Ahu nultah Hitain and Em:ikAdumah Md Jetaa Tlieieldre, the question alEnclk Ismail being a replacement delegate does nut arse. The penirtsrtl question is, who prepared the list at delegates? The short answer to the question is that it was prepared by the 1“ appellanl in his capacity as the chairman at the Knpeasi at the material time The list of delegates. marked as R2-36A. clearly states the name cl Ertcik leniail In any even|, Enclk Ismail was invited by the 1“ apaellarll through the secrewry at the Kaperasi to attend the AGM an 142 2011 I therelure nhd tt trtooncetvahle tor the appellants to now came to lhls Court and argue that Enclk lsrnail was not a valid delegate when it was the 1“ appellant who confirmed that Enizik Ismail was included in the list at delegates and extended the invitation tor him to attend the AGM My respeetlul view 15 that the appellants are eswpped ironi challenging the status 0! Eriax Ismail. l| is therelere rriy lindirig that Enex lsinail was the lawtul delegate at the AGM The status ol wan Kamaruddin The issue arose when some at the members unending the AGM disputed Enak wan Kaniamddina status as a delegate The AGM was inldrined by the secretary or the Kdperast that Encik wan Karnaruddin was not a member M the Keparaai at the Pahang branch. I do not respectfully think thI| this I! an issue IN wariiirvaaicmamuivma 5 «mi. s.r.i nurlharwm be u... M may i... nrtglrrallly . dnuuvlnhl VII aFlt.lNG Wm! [23] My reason ls this In its amended grounds ufAwarI1, the Tribunal alluded to the witness statements 01 vannus witnesses. which Include one lrern the 7'" respondent it states rrrrer alia as follaws: Erlclk Ayuh lme etrrcer trorn sxm tetan sekall lagl betlanya kapadln S-Al-uuhu den aendanan xsa sarnada penanra.penarrra lnl relnn msmbuI| bayararl dan tee dun aye: Sallalauha dan aerrdanart KSB Malt menyemak dnmar anlt dan reltod arrggotrs angaata dan [wish nlwngssahkml Enclk Wln Kamzmddln on war. ultntata jug: tldzk pernan memhaylr he nan syer d... buknntlh lnggota use From what IVIa| Iransplmd at the AGM. II is evident |hat Ertcik Wan Kamamtmin was not allowed to pamcroate as a delegate. I cannot, tneretore, hnd any rnyrne or reason why his status is challenged try me appellants wnen he was not even a delegate Ind rneretere could nave affected the outcome or tne AGM. [24] The Tribunal had made tnrs clear in its amended grounds or rudgrnent at p 25 when ll tound: eardauman >uateunganakl|erIrtqart yang dtkemukaltan Adalnh pets: wan Kamamddln trln wan Muilzla Mnlnn wlkll ylng r-tau uh bani Cawllwan Parlarlg with the greatest respect, I find it drsturtring when the appellants raised this as an lss to show that the Tribunal had purportedly lallen into error wnen it made it clear In its amended grounds that Encik wan Kamnruddtrt was never a delegate iii The status or wan Ahmad sairuddin [25] The same applies to the poamon o1 Erlcik wan Ahmad sartuddrn in its finding, the Tribunal raferrsd to the membership Ilsl of the Keperasi and took cognrsanoe mat from the record available‘ Enetk wen Ahmad serruddin was never a member oi tne Koperasl. [261 In tact, the mlnules oi the AGM speclflcally recorded that Enclk wan Ahmed sartuddin was not recognised as e urtdidala end that nts IN wsmlFvQ:.1‘icMIwmIuvAvp0 7 “None s.n.r nmlhnrwlll be tr... m my r... oflmnallly MVMI dnuurlnrrl r.. arluNG vtmxl name was removed slnca hls name was remaued. ‘ ls also clear that Enclk Wan salhmdin was not allowed to panlcipate tn the AGM. [27] The Tnhllnal was tnerelore eanect in comlrlg to a aoneluslon (hat Enclk wan salluddin is not a member otthe KODerasl‘s Pulmjaya Branch. rv rrla mmlllex ofllm Board rnaallngs [28] The appellants are of the view that lne two ALK meellngs held subsequent to the AGM were lnvalld. ll nae been estahllshed that the requlsite quonlm was melfur both the ALK meetings. [29] l do nnt. wllh respect. see any lawful gmunds pmllerad by the appellants ta cnallenge the validlly of the ALK meetings. on the norumry. the I" and 2" appellants even attended tne 2"‘ ALK meetmg held on 25.2.20tt {so} The 1-! and 2“ appellants eeula have tell me meellng rvlldway. am the reason for them leaving tn: ALK meeting was not due to the argument that lt was lllegally convened Awarding to me nnnules. me l-' and 2" appellants left the ALK meetlng slnce lhelr proposed agenda V07 dlscussion was mieded by Ina ALK. That hardly a good reason lur questtonlng lhe valiany oi a Imam me - [31] t theretole r-apecllully agree with lne finding at the Thelma! as lolloms: fidak all: maps Dnrlanwavan latmre Mesyualit yang anllnlmtan nletl Psmmon» Pemohun llnlllx menvlukan Malyuivll lt|l (zcel lmltlk Tnbunal rnempelsemlll. dakwaan Pemunorv-Penwhon V. we slzalus o(Puan Nura Nawi [32] The Issua ls wnalhav Puan Nura. wno is the 3" appellant. ls I valld delegate at the AGM reprutserlting the Selangar aranch The appellants tnslsted that Puan Nura ls a member and a lawlul delegate lor lha salengor arencn at lhe AGM. rn wSYNlFVQI.0CMIwm|uVAvvQ 3 “Nair s.n.l nuvlhnrwlll a. ll... w my l... nrtnlrlnllly Mthln dnuuvlnrll n. aFluNG vtmxl [331 Hewever, the valtdmy attne status at Puan Nura as a detegete was debated at the AGM and it was resnlvsd that she was not even a member ct the Knpetast Aooordtng tc the 2" respondent‘ Mohd Rusm btn sehuri, in para 3(d)o1his amdavtl in reply rn Encl 29 twa- 29'). there was no evtdence on the membership apphcaoen form of Puan Nura at any endorsement by the ALK that i| was duly approved D1 cerang keanggnuan nu Izaak tetum tartan keenmnlnn penema urrutusxen cteh ALK den botany pennehenen Psmohon buleh dinner .1. pt Lamyvran P [34] In any event. the 2'“ respondent challenged the authenticity ol Puan Nura's apphcatron lorm. xerepuan nrgn wuwd kn eras P1 rtetnmerr 45 can :7. Bomng Furmomnnn Panama mane Iluya tetas nemere dengan Canmh Enrnng Formahonan Keanawm-In Ksa at :25 Lamptvan In For the aloreeerd reespnsr I respecttulry agvee wrth the Tnbunal when rt concluded that Berdnsatkan kzlevangan-lttatarzngan yang dlksmukahant adeten pulas Puan rtrrre am New: bukan wekrt yang sen peer Clwlnfinn serengar w The status at trre Pulra/aya branch [35] It re the cnntencran ottheappettants that the Putrareya branch orthe Koparesr was valtdly lovmad and cunsmuled. [arr] According to cl 25m onhe Kuperasrs by-laws or Und ng—Undang Kurt, the power In estanush e branch etthe Kaperee vested rn the ALK No one member, not even a member of the ALKr has the power to establtsh e new trranch at the Keperasr [37] The Tribunal. in rte gmunds :71 Award, returned to Eksh s-14, where Haji senrat bun Uda Geno, the 1‘ respondent, amrmed that: rn wsmtFvQ:.0cMIwmIavAvp0 «ware s.n.r r..na.rwm be mad m mm the anrrn.ury an. dnuumnl w. murta prnar [us] say: ingin menreiemn hahlwa KSE Kawasan Pmraraya Mak dernan wujud Sly: mdin nururuk man. purl rm. 1:!) agenda 51. saya min meneqasksn hlhawa mssyunml knwuan wuiraraya mg konormya diadakarl pad: 10/‘Damn adalah dneka den adaian iidaknanar Hap samai lumier eormrmed Ihal mere wns no agenda on me alleged rormaiion of ma Punraiaya branch er me ALK mee|ing on 5.11.2010. [30] In any event, ii is rnugicai lor me Punraiaya 'branch“ in hold a maeirng nn 10102020 when me ALK had only purpdriediy approved iis Vormalion an 5 |1.2020.To my mind, rim is pdumg me can befuvs me horse. A branch cannoi passibiy mm a mad mg befare Il$ formation is appmved by me ALK, assummg for one rnomeni lhal ii was Indeed approved ei me ALK meeling on 5.11 2020, vfwhlch no finding is made nera. [391 imemiure respecivuuy agree wmi ine vindmg oniie Trinunai met me Putmaya branch o1 Ihe Kaperasi was nm validly consumed according w Kuperesvs |7y—\aws wi The valrdily ofme skim Tebus sanam [40] The M193 beirrnd the skim Tebus sanam is to remit new members by irsnsvemng membership and shares at Inlchve members [41] How are members dc a ooaperaiwe socie(y veoovded'7 s 15 oi co5A pnwides met any regvusr or mi cl members am by any 00- operative socia|y shah beprfma Iacie evidence 01 me name, address, rderriiiy card number. membership numberand occupalicn 0! El member and of lhe da|ss he became and ceased k: be a member [421 Asoufdlny wine 2"“ respondent, me of members oilhe Koperasi was GUVY kem ‘H the special mum at lhe KoparIsi's OM08 In Jaian semui Paeen Kuala Lumpuv The list Mmembevs did not mcmde me nurpdnsd memberships derived Iram me Skim Tsbus Saham, which was never sanctioned hy ina ALK. In any event. In View at rn wSYN\FVG4.flcMIwm|aVAvvQ «uni. s.n.i nmhnrwm is. 0...: M mm he nrW\nnH|Y Mm. dnuumnl VII muNG p-max

Tika 2.6.0 & Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24C-62-04/2023

PEMOHON CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD RESPONDEN AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD

Enclosure 1. CCSB’s application in OS 62 to enforce the AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA. In the matter of section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 and in the matter of Rule 7, Rule 28, and Rule 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, 2012 and Rule 69A Rule 5 of the Rules of Court (Amendment) 2018.

18/01/2024

YA Tuan Nadzarin Bin Wok Nordin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=011761bf-eda8-4684-8826-c5683764e135&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-62-04/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (Pihak Menuntut) dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (Pihak Responden) Dan Dalam perkara Adjudikasi di hadapan Mohd Norazman Zaini Dan Dalam perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 3-3-2023 Dan Dalam perkara seksyen 28 Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan, 2012 Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 7, Aturan 28, dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012 dan Aturan 69A Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah (Pindaan) 2018 18/01/2024 08:40:25 WA-24C-62-04/2023 Kand. 14 S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 ANTARA CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …PLAINTIF DAN AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-65-04/2023 Dalam Perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“Adjudikasi”) Dan Dalam Perkara Keputusan Adjudikasi bertarikh 3.3.2023 yang dibuat oleh S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 En Mohd Norazman Zaini (“Adjudikator”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 15 (b) & (d) Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 dan 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …PLAINTIF DAN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …DEFENDAN Di Dengar Bersama Dengan S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. WA-24C-66-04/2023 Dalam perkara Adjudikasi antara Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd dan AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“Adjudikasi”) Dan Dalam perkara Penghakiman Adjudikasi bertarikh 3.3.2023 oleh En. Mohd Norazman Zaini (“Adjudikator”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 16 (b) Akta Pembayaran dan Adjudikasi Industri Pembinaan 2012 ANTARA AWP PROPERTIES SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 1243700-K) …PLAINTIF DAN CARLSON CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 988833-P) …DEFENDAN S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) Introduction [1] OS 65 is AWP Properties Sdn Bhd (“AWP”) application under s 15 (b) and (d) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA) to set aside the Adjudication Decision dated 3.3.2023 (“AD”) given in favor of Carlson Construction Sdn Bhd (“CCSB”) whilst OS 66 is AWP’s application for a stay of the AD under section 16 CIPAA pending the disposal of the arbitration proceedings between the parties. [2] There is also CCSB’s application in OS 62 to enforce the AD pursuant to s 28 CIPAA. [3] All the aforesaid matters were heard together as they contain the same set of facts and related to the same parties. Brief Back Ground Facts [4] Vide a Letter of Award dated 5-6-2018, Ace appointed Carlson as a Subcontractor to carry out construction work for a Project known as “Cadangan Membina Bangunan Kedai Pejabat yang mengandungi Fasa 1 a) 8 Unit Kedai Pejabat 3 Tingkat b) 20 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat c) 1 Unit Loji Rawatan Kumbahan d) 1 Unit Tangki Air yang mengandungi Rumah Pam & Tangki Sedutan e) 1 Unit Stesen Pam f) 1 Unit Pencawang Elektrik Fasa 2 a) 8 Unit Kedai Pejabat 3 Tingkat b) 24 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat c) 2 Unit Pencawang Elektrik di S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 aras Lot 31182, Mukim Gali, Daerah Raub, Pahang Darul Makmur untuk Tetuan Teratai Kilauan Sdn Bhd)” (“the Project”) ("the Subcontract"). [5] The price of the Subcontract was RM20,000,000.00. (“the Subcontract Sum”). [6] Throughout the said Project, Carlson has diligently carried out the Subcontract Work (“Works”) and from time to time had submitted claims or Invoices to Ace for payment. Upon receipt of Carlson’s Progress Claims, Ace issued the Certificates and paid Carlson for the Works done under the Subcontract. [7] The disputes arose between Carlson and Ace in relation to the Subcontract, including disputes over the payment of Carlson’s Progress Claim from Ace. [8] In and around February 2022, Carlson submitted its Progress Claim No. 34 for Ace’s certification. To this effect, Ace issued its Progress Certificate No. 34 acknowledging, certifying and verifying that Carlson had carried out works under the Subcontract amounting to RM18,007,003.11. [9] As at that date, a sum of RM15,785,157.74 had been paid by Ace to Carlson under the previous certificates leaving a balance of RM1,221,845,37 (after deduction of RM1,000,000.00 retention sum) still due and owing under Progress Certificate No. 34. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 [10] Pursuant to Clause 6.0 of the Letter of Award, Ace is to make payment within 30 days from the date of the Progress Certificate. Carlson’s Progress Certificate No. 34 was issued to Ace on 20-2- 2022 and therefore, balance payment of RM1,221,845,37 was due and payable by 22-3-2022. [11] Notwithstanding the above, Carlson thereafter issued its Final Progress Claim No. 36 dated 15-4-2022 with all supporting documents for the sum of RM2,937,609.82 (including retention sum but less all previous certified amount) to the Project Architect for its certification. [12] Pursuant to Clause 30.1 of the Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contract 2006 (Without Quantities), the Project Architect shall issue a certificate within 21 days from the date of receipt of the progress claim, which is on 6-5-2022. However, to date, the Project Architect has not issued its certificate to Carlson. [13] Further, since the progress certificate ought to have been issued to Carlson on 6- 5-2022 and Ace is to make payment within 30 days from the date of the progress certificate, the balance sum of RM2,937,609.82 would be due and payable by the Ace to Carlson by 6-6-2022. [14] However, Ace failed and/or neglected to make the respective payments of RM1,221,845,37 and RM2,937,609.82 to Carlson which left them with no other choice but to pursue this Adjudication Claim against Ace. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 Issues OS 65 [15] This Court will firstly deal with OS 65 as the decision on this application will eventually have an effect on the other 2 Originating Summons. LAD and Whether Time Was At Large [16] In support of OS 65, learned counsel for AWP had submitted that CCSB did not complete its Works with the original completion dates despite 3 Extensions of Time (“EOT”) granted by the Architect for Section 1 and 2 of the Works and thus AWP were entitled to a set off for the Liquidated Ascertained Damages (“LAD”) claims amounting to RM8 million and third party costs of RM417,000 but that the Learned Adjudicator had made a finding that time was at large and as such AWP was not entitled to its LAD claims. [17] AWP’s counsel had further argued that it was never part of CCSB’s Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Reply that time was at large and that they did not have nor were given the opportunity to submit on this point. [18] In the AD, I found that the Adjudicator had dealt with this issue of ‘time at large’ at paragraphs 12.20 to 12.24 after considering the Architect’s evaluation of the same where the latter determined that the issue of delay was not valid for an EOT and the Adjudicator then holding that the Architect was empowered under clause 23.8 (v) of S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 the PAM Contract 2006 to grant the EOT but that the Architect had not administered the correct provision by refusing to grant EOT and thus time was at large. [19] I also find from the AD that the Adjudicator had given the parties the opportunity to submit on the Certificates of EOT and thereafter the Adjudicator had tabulated the delay events in detail in the AD. [20] From my findings, it was also found by the Adjudicator inter alia that: 20.1 due to the above, the Architect had not issued the Certificate for EOT or the Certificate of Non-Completion (“CNC”) and thus AWP had loss their right to impose LAD. 20.2 they were delay events which were not duly assessed or were ignored. 20.3 CCSB had not argued that the LAD was unreasonable but that there were entitled to more EOT than what has been granted by the Architect. 20.4 AWP pursued assessing and granting of EOT, despite there being condition precedents for the granting of EOT, which the Adjudicator found as amounting to an act of waiver to such condition precedent requirements. [21] Following from this, the Arbitrator concluded that AWP was not entitled to impose LAD as ‘time was at large’ and that CCSB was entitled to RM1,221,845.37 being the outstanding payment up to Progress Certificate No.34. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [22] I have also had the opportunity to peruse CCSB’s Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Reply and did not find any reference to the issue of ‘time being at large’ referred to therein. This however does not mean that the Adjudicator could not come to a finding of there being ‘time at large’ in the matter before him. [23] It is my decision, that this point must be seen in the context of the Adjudicators decision in toto when reading the AD itself. Just because the word ‘time at large’ was not raised expressly by CCSB in its Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Reply does not mean that the Adjudicator could not have made a decision which led to his conclusion that ‘time was at large’ based on the facts and documents before him. [24] I further hold on this point of ‘time being at large’ at large and AWP’s contention of not having nor being given the opportunity to submit on this point, that the Adjudicator, from the above parts of the AD, had asked himself the correct question on this issue i.e whether EOT was to be granted in relation to the provisions of the Contract. The fact that the Adjudicator may have answered the same incorrectly or otherwise is not something which this Court may interfere with as it would be an issue which should be decided at the Arbitration Proceedings, see Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd and other cases [2020] 1 LNS 940. [25] Thus, there is no breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator did not give AWP the alleged right to be heard or submit on this point of ‘time at large’ especially so when, from the facts before me, neither S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 party was given the said right to be heard or submit thereto. What is good for the goose is good for the gander. [26] In any event, I did find that the Adjudicator had considered in some detail AWP’s Adjudication Reply on the issue of LAD and found from the documents before the Adjudicator that the issue of LAD was never raised in, nor deducted from the previous Progress Certificates. The Adjudicator had also held that such claim was an afterthought to justify non-payment of the full amount certified in the various relevant Progress Certificates and that there was no allowable reason and non-compliance with procedures for deduction of money due to CCSB. [27] As to another argument raised by AWP that the Adjudicator had erroneously held that there was no notification by AWP to CCSB on whether AWP would impose LAD, I have found after reading the AD, that the Adjudicator did state there was a letter from AWP to CCSB dated 12.12.2019 on this issue but found that ‘such letter is not what clause 22.1 envisage as the Contract specifically requires the employer to inform such deduction and just inform intention to deduct”. This contention by AWP is therefore clearly untenable and must be dismissed. [28] From all of the above, I hold that the Adjudicator had thus examined the documents provided to him in the Adjudication and duly considered the arguments of both sides before making his considered decision on the LAD. This issue is in fact a challenge as to the merits of and an appeal of the Adjudicator’s decision which is not permitted under s 15 of CIPAA. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 Whether Termination Was Unlawful and Not Part of CCSB’s Case [29] On the issue of whether termination was unlawful and not part of CCSB’s case, I agree with learned counsel for AWP that CCSB had in its Adjudication Reply at paragraph 11 thereto stated that there was a mutual termination of the subcontract by the parties but that the Adjudicator had in the AD eventually found the termination as unlawful and the Notice of Default as being defective. To this I have noted that paragraph 69 of AWP’s Adjudication Reply did contend that AWSP was entitled to determine CCSB’s employment under clause 25.1 (c) of the PAM Contract. [30] I have observed from the AD that the conclusion arrived at by the Adjudicator that the termination was unlawful and the Notice of Default being defective was arrived at by scrutinizing the documents before him including the Notice of Default which was entitled ‘Mutual Termination Notice’ and which said Notice of Default only referred to the failure of not completing the Works by the agreed date. [31] The Adjudicator subsequently finds amongst others that: i. the performance of CCSB could not be measured nor could the Adjudicator determine whether CCSB had rectified its default. ii. CCSB had not challenged the said Notice of Default and claimed in the Adjudication Reply that it was mutual. iii. the Notice of Default was defective as there was an act of hindrance by AWP. iv. there was procedural non-compliance of clause 25.2 of the PAM 2006 Contract in issuing the Notice of Default. S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 [32] After due consideration of the argument put forth by AWP on this issue of the Adjudicator’s decision that the termination was unlawful and that it was not part of CCSB’s case, I agree with learned Counsel for AWP that this would be a ground under section 15 (d) of CIPAA that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction which would entitle this Court to set aside the Adjudication Decision i.e the AD. [33] Once it was CCSB’s case that there was a mutual termination of the subcontract by the parties in the Adjudication Reply, it is, with respect, not within the powers of the Adjudicator to go behind the said averment in the Adjudication Reply and come to his own finding that such termination was not lawful when no such issue as to the validity of the termination was raised by the parties in the Adjudication. Such conduct of the Adjudicator would result in his acting on a frolic of his own. [34] This decision of the Adjudicator has thus resulted in AWP being unentitled to its set off claim of RM417,000 being AWP’s cost to complete the Works. [35] This would thus be one of the rare cases where this Court finds that the ‘conscience of the Court’ has been pricked to such an extent that the AD is to be set aside. Decision For OS 65 S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [36] Consequently, I therefore allow prayers 1 and 2 of enclosure 1 in OS 65. For OS 62 & 66 [37] In the circumstances, I am hereby dismissing OS 62 for the enforcement of the AD with costs and hold that OS 66 for a Stay of the AD is now academic. I order no costs as to OS 66. Dated: 10th day of November 2023 sgd. NADZARIN WOK NORDIN HIGH COURT JUDGE CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF (suit 62) / DEFENDANT (suit 65 & 66): Dinesh Nandrajog [Messrs Nandrajog] COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT (suit 62) / PLAINTIFF (suit 65 & 66): Rohan Arasoo a/l Jeyabalah, Ooi Hui Ying and Ng Suet Huey [Messrs Ng, Ho & Partners] S/N v2EXAajthEaIJsVoN2ThNQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

33-95-03/2015

PEMPETISYEN ROPERT A/L VANATHIAH RESPONDEN THILAKAVATHY A/P CHURULIMALAI

Civil procedure/ Family law - Application for leave to issue writ of possession - Wife granted right to occupy matrimonial home 'tanpa sebarang gangguan' pursuant to consent order - Whether husband should vacate matrimonial home - Meaning of 'tanpa sebarang gangguan' - Whether practical for husband to remain in matrimonial home when wife was given right to occupy it.

18/01/2024

YA Puan Evrol Mariette Peters

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=888584a3-073e-4850-bb48-8dd2a3f92a97&Inline=true

33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA DIVORCE PETITION NO: 33-95-03/2015 In the matter of Sections 53, 54, 76, 77, 88, 89 and 92 of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 BETWEEN ROPERT A/L VANATHIAH …PETITIONER AND THILAKAVATHY A/P CHURULIMALAI …RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT 18/01/2024 14:22:31 33-95-03/2015 Kand. 30 S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 2 Introduction [1] This was an application (“this Application”) by the Respondent Wife in enclosure 16, seeking leave to issue a writ of possession in respect of the matrimonial home, and for the Respondent and three out of the four children of the marriage to be allowed to live in the matrimonial home. The factual background [2] The Petitioner Husband and Respondent Wife (collectively, “the Parties”) were married in May 1996, and had four children, born in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 respectively. [3] The marriage deteriorated over time and in March 2015, the Petitioner filed a divorce petition (“the Divorce Petition”), while the Respondent responded in May 2015. [4] In August 2015, Parties entered into a consent order (“the Consent Order”), stipulating, inter alia, that the Respondent along with three children in her custody will live in the matrimonial home (“the Matrimonial Home”), ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’. The relevant terms read in verbatim: iii. Responden Isteri bersama dengan 3 orang anak di dalam kustodi Responden Isteri akan berpindah masuk ke dalam rumah di alamat ***** (“Hartanah tersebut”) dan Pempetisyen Suami akan membayar segala utiliti seperti Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Syabas, Indah Water, Cukai Tanah dan Cukai Taksiran bagi Hartanah tersebut dan Pempetisyen Suami akan terus membayar segala utiliti tersebut dimana Responden Isteri dan 3 orang dalam kustodi isteri S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 dibenarkan untuk tinggal di rumah tersebut tanpa sebarang gangguan; iv. Pempetisyen Suami akan membayar ansuran bulanan kepada pihak Bank bagi Hartanah tersebut dan Hartanah tersebut akan dipegang sebagai amanah dalam bahagian yang sama rata bagi 4 orang anak di dalam perkahwinan sehingga anak ke-empat mencapai umur 24 tahun; … [Emphasis added.] [5] The Petitioner had failed to adhere to the stipulated terms of the Consent Order, prompting the Respondent’s Counsel to issue a written notice in December 2020, urging compliance. The correspondence clearly communicated that failure to comply would necessitate additional legal measures. Despite this, the Petitioner had refused to adhere, subsequently obstructing the Respondent and the three children in her custody from relocating to the Matrimonial Home. [6] In August 2023, the Respondent filed this Application pursuant to Order 46 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“Rules of Court”), and rules 56 and 72 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980, all of which read: Rules of Court 2012 Order 46 – Writs of execution - General Rule 2 - When leave to issue any writ of execution is necessary (1) A writ of execution to enforce a judgment or order may not be issued without the leave of the Court in the following cases: S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4 (a) where six years or more have lapsed since the date of the judgment or order; (b) where any change has taken place, whether by death or otherwise, in the parties entitled or liable to execution under the judgment or order; (c) where the judgment or order is against the assets of a deceased person coming to the hand of his executors or administrators after the date of the judgment or order, and it is sought to issue execution against such assets; (d) where under the judgment or order any person is entitled to relief subject to the fulfilment of any condition which it is alleged has been fulfilled; and (e) where any movable property sought to be seized under a writ of execution is in the hands of a receiver appointed by the Court. (2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to any written law or rule by which a person is required to obtain the leave of the Court for the issue of a writ of execution or to proceed to execution on or otherwise the enforcement of a judgment or order. (3) Where the Court grants leave, whether under this rule or otherwise, for the issue of a writ of execution and the writ is not issued within one year after the date of the order granting such leave, the order shall cease to have effect, without prejudice, however, to the making of a fresh order. ****** Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 Rule 56 – Application by petitioner or respondent for ancillary relief (1) Any application by a petitioner, or by a respondent who files an answer claiming relief, for — (a) an order for maintenance pending suit; S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 5 (b) a property division order, under section 76 of the Act; or (c) a maintenance order, under section 77 of the Act, shall be made in the petition or answer, as the case may be. (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an application for ancillary relief which should have been made in the petition or answer may be made subsequently — (a) by leave of the court, either by notice in Form 11 or at the trial; or (b) where the parties are agreed upon the terms of the proposed order, without leave by notice in Form 11. (3) An application by a petitioner or respondent for ancillary relief, not being an application which is required to be made in the petition or answer shall be made by notice in Form 11. … Rule 72 – Enforcement of order for payment of money, etc (1) Before any process is issued for the enforcement of an order made in matrimonial proceedings for the payment of money to any person, an affidavit shall be filed verifying the amount due under the order and showing how that amount is arrived at. (2) Except with the leave of the registrar, no writ of fierifacias or warrant of execution shall be issued to enforce payment of any sum due under an order for ancillary relief where an application for a variation order is pending. (3) For the purpose of RHC Order 46 (issue of a writ of execution), the divorce registry shall be the appropriate office for the issue of a writ of execution to enforce an order made in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court which are proceedings in that registry. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 6 The Issues [7] The issues for consideration for this Court were as follows: (i) the inherent characteristics of a consent order; (ii) the validity of the Petitioner’s justification for refusing to vacate the Matrimonial Home; and (iii) the interpretation of ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in clause (iii) of the Consent Order. [8] This Application was allowed for the following reasons. Contentions, evaluation, and findings The nature of a consent order [9] At the outset, it was crucial to draw attention to the insights shared by Mary Lim JCA (as she then was) in Lee Heng Moy & Ors v. Pacific Trustees Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 368 regarding the nature of a consent order. Her observations, as articulated in the following passage, merit careful consideration: It is fairly settled and trite law that an order of the court reached by consent of the parties involved is in effect a contract between those parties:Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors And Another Appeal [1981] 2 MLJ 145. Such a consent order must therefore be given its full contractual effect - see Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301; [2004] 3 MLJ 465. Such an order remains valid, effective and binding on all the parties involved until and unless the order is set aside for some vitiating reason - see the Federal Court's decision in Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 1 LNS 143; [1971] 2 MLJ 75. In fact, until that happens, until and unless the consent order is set aside, the consent order operates as an estoppel disallowing the defendants today from departing from its terms. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 7 [Emphasis added.] [10] A consent order is akin to a contract with the superadded command of the court: Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301; [2004] 3 MLJ 465. Reference was also made to a plethora of cases including Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors And Another Appeal [1981] 1 LNS 59; [1981] 2 MLJ 145; Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 1 LNS 143; [1971] 2 MLJ 75; and Kamil Azman Abdul Razak & Ors v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2019] 6 CLJ 419. Whether the Petitioner’s reasons for refusing to vacate the Matrimonial Home were relevant/ justified [11] The Petitioner put forth a multitude of arguments to justify his continued occupancy of the Matrimonial Home, deviating from the explicit directives outlined in the Consent Order. [12] Initially, he asserted that this Application was time-barred. This contention was followed by the claim that it was the Respondent who had voluntarily vacated the Matrimonial Home, without any coercion from him. Furthermore, he delved into the complexities of his personal circumstances, revealing his involvement in a new marital relationship and the challenges of caring for a child with autism. Alongside these personal challenges, the Petitioner highlighted his low-income status, arguing that financial constraints S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 8 prevented him from vacating the Matrimonial Home and securing alternative housing. [13] I found the entirety of the Petitioner’s argument untenable. The focal point for this Court centers on whether the Respondent should be granted the right to occupy the Matrimonial Home, in accordance with the terms of the Consent Order. [14] The assertion of a time limitation on the Respondent’s filing was bereft of merit, as this Application for leave falls outside any specified timeframe. Order 46 of the Rules of Court explicitly allows such applications, emphasising that a writ of execution to enforce a judgment or order may not be issued without the leave of the Court where six years or more had lapsed since the date of the judgment or order. Additionally, it was essential to highlight that the Respondent had, through her solicitors, communicated with the Petitioner regarding his non-compliance with the Consent Order. Despite these efforts, the Petitioner had failed to provide a positive response. Consequently, the Petitioner's argument regarding delay was unsustainable given the circumstances. [15] The justifications and excuses presented by the Petitioner in opposing the Respondent’s vacation of the Matrimonial Home were inconsequential and bore no relevance to the crux of this Application, and amounted to an endeavour to re-litigate the terms stipulated in the Consent Order. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 9 [16] This Court could not entertain the Petitioner’s reasons and excuses for resisting the evacuation of the Matrimonial Home, particularly given that the pertinent Consent Order had resulted from a mutual agreement between the Parties. Interpretation of ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in clause iii of the Consent Order [17] The nucleus of the Petitioner’s argument revolved around the elucidation of clause iii of the Consent Order, in particular the term ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’. [18] The Petitioner contended that, although the Respondent and the three Children in her custody were granted the right to occupy the Matrimonial Home “tanpa sebarang gangguan”, pursuant to the Consent Order, there was no explicit order for the Petitioner to vacate the residence. [19] In fact, the Petitioner proposed for the Respondent and the three Children in her custody to relocate to the Matrimonial Home, specifically occupying one of the rooms. However, in this arrangement, the Petitioner insisted that both Parties mutually pledge not to ‘disturb’ each other. [20] I found the Petitioner’s argument to be lacking in merit. Firstly, the term ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ carries a broader significance than merely ‘without any disturbance’. [21] The Respondent cited pertinent landlord-tenant cases such as Lee Phak Kong v Bestway Fortune Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Cases [2023] MLRHU 463 and Kenny v Preen [1962] 3 ALL ER 814, which S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10 delved into the notion of ‘quiet enjoyment’. Asserting her entitlement to quiet enjoyment of the Matrimonial Home, the Respondent implied that Petitioner was obliged to permanently vacate the Matrimonial home. [22] While I agreed and recognised the Respondent’s right to quiet enjoyment of the Matrimonial Home, I maintained the view that she deserved additional entitlements, considering the broader implications of the term tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in the Consent Order. [23] The expression ‘quiet enjoyment’ in Bahasa Malaysia is translated as ‘kenikmatan aman sentosa’ while ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ carries a broader connotation. Notably, the term gangguan’ is employed within the context of section 103 (Injunctions against molestation) of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce Act 1976, as articulated in Bahasa Malaysia as follows: Seksyen 103 – Tegahan terhadap pengganguan Mahkamah adalah berkuasa dalam masa menanti keputusan sesuatu pembicaraan hal ehwal berkahwin atau pada atau selepas pemberian sesuatu dikri perceraian, perpisahan kehakiman atau pembatalan, memerintahkan seseorang supaya jangan memaksa suami isteri atau suami isterinya yang dahulu menerima kehadirannya dan supaya jangan melakukan lain-lain perbuatan gangguan. [Emphasis added.] [24] Given the term ‘tanpa sebarang gangguan’ in the Consent Order carries a broader scope than the concept of ‘quiet enjoyment’, I S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 11 deemed it essential to reference legal precedents such as Chan Ah Moi @ Chan Kim Moy v Phang Wai Ann [1995] 3 CLJ 846, Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 3 All ER 449, and Lee Sook Kwan v Yap Woon [2010] 11 MLRH 167. [25] In the case of Chan Ah Moi @ Chan Kim Moy v Phang Wai Ann, where ‘gangguan’ or ‘molestation’ lacked a specific definition in the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act, the presiding judge, in the absence of statutory guidance, turned to The Britannica World Language Edition of The Oxford Dictionary and referenced the English Court of Appeal case of Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 3 All ER 449 for elucidation. [26] According to the Britannica World Language Edition of The Oxford Dictionary, "molestation" is defined as “the action of molesting or condition of being molested; annoyance, disturbance, vexation”. In Vaughan v Vaughan, Davies LJ characterised ‘molestation’ as engaging hostilely or injuriously and causing trouble, vexation, annoyance, or inconvenience. [27] It became evident that when the Consent Order was granted, allowing the Respondent and the three Children in her custody to occupy the Matrimonial Home, it inherently implied the obligation for the Petitioner to vacate. Proposing that the Petitioner, his new family, or any of his family members should continue to reside in the Matrimonial Home, not only defied common sense but also contravened the very essence of the Consent Order. S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 12 [28] Drawing guidance from the Federal Court case of Kesatuan Pekerja- Pekerja Bukan Eksekutif Maybank Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Anor [2018] 2 MLJ 590, despite its focus on a common-sense approach to interpreting statutes, the underlying principle can be extrapolated to the interpretation of consent orders. [29] Moreover, it was both demeaning and insulting for the Petitioner to suggest that the Respondent and the three Children in her custody should confine themselves to one room in the Matrimonial Home with the caveat that they refrain from interfering with or disturbing Petitioner and his family. Such a proposition undermines the fundamental purpose of the Consent Order and runs counter to the principles of fairness and equity. Conclusion [30] In conclusion, considering the aforementioned reasons and a meticulous examination of all evidence presented, including both oral and documentary, as well as the submissions of the Parties, this Application was allowed with costs. Dated: 18 January 2024 SIGNED S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 13 …………………………………………. (EVROL MARIETTE PETERS) Judge High Court, Kuala Lumpur Counsel: For the Petitioner – Lalitha Nagamuthu; Messrs Lalitha & Co For the Respondent – Pramjit Kaur; Messrs Mann & Associates Cases referred to: ➢ Chan Ah Moi @ Chan Kim Moy v Phang Wai Ann [1995] 3 CLJ 846 ➢ Ganapathy Chettiar v. Lum Kum Chum & Ors And Another Appeal [1981] 1 LNS 59; [1981] 2 MLJ 145 ➢ Johnson v. Walton [1990] FCR 568, 1 FLR 350 ➢ Kamil Azman Abdul Razak & Ors v. Amanah Raya Bhd & Ors [2019] 6 CLJ 419. ➢ Kenny v Preen [1962] 3 ALL ER 814 ➢ Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Bukan Eksekutif Maybank Bhd v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Anor [2018] 2 MLJ 590 ➢ Lee Heng Moy & Ors v. Pacific Trustees Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 368 ➢ Lee Phak Kong v Bestway Fortune Sdn Bhd & Anor and Other Cases [2023] MLRHU 463 ➢ Lee Sook Kwan v Yap Woon [2010] 11 MLRH 167 ➢ Tan Geok Lan v. La Kuan [2004] 2 CLJ 301; [2004] 3 MLJ 465 ➢ Tee Bee Chin (P) v Goh Swee Por (L) [2018] 8 MLJ 590 S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33-95-03/2015 18 January 2024 ……………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 14 ➢ Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v. Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 1 LNS 143; [1971] 2 MLJ 75 ➢ Vaughan v Vaughan [1973] 3 All ER 449 Legislation referred to: ➢ Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 – rules 56, 72 ➢ Law Reform (Marriage & Divorce) Act 1976 – sections 48, 96, 103 ➢ Rules of Court 2012 – Order 46 Other sources referred to: ➢ Britannica World Language Edition of The Oxford Dictionary S/N o4SFiD4HUEi7SI3So/kqlw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

Tika 2.6.0

W-09-281-11/2021

PERAYU NOR BADLI MUNAWIR BIN MOHAMAD ALIAS LAFTI RESPONDEN Pendakwa Raya [Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM)]

Section 23 of the Penal Code - “Wrongful gain” - “wrongful loss” - Section 24 of the Penal Code - “Dishonestly” - Section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code - “Alibi” - Section 405 of the Penal Code - Criminal breach of trust - Section 409 of the Penal Code - Criminal breach of trust by public servant or agent - Section 409B of the Penal Code - “Presumption” - Section 3 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 - "proceeds of an unlawful activity" - “unlawful activity" - “serious offence" - "money laundering" - Section 4 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 - The Law on Appellate Intervention - Judge erred in law and in fact - Courts below failed to recognize that the defence of the accused - Accused was having an uninterrupted meeting with DW5 - Accused’s defence that SP13 did not come to his office and didn’t give the accused the sum of alleged money - Evidence given and the entry in visitor log book (P163) supported the accused’s defence of alibi - There was a failure by the trial judge to judicially appreciate this crucial evidence - The version of the accused must be accepted as it remains unchallenged - Whether the failure of the learned trial judge to consider this unchallenged evidence, had occasioned a failure of justice and denied to accused to a fair trial? - Whether there has been a failure of justice or miscarriage of justice in the eye of the law arising from the failure of the prosecution to challenge the core assertion of defence? - Failure does not amount to an admission or acceptance of the accused’s testimony - Totality of the evidence and decision must be based on an examination of all the evidence presented and not evidence in isolation - Trial judge had directed on the issue of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and accepted their evidence - The appeal by the accused turns upon pure questions of fact - Findings of fact by the trial judge is therefore to remain undisturbed unless of course if the fact finding is plainly wrong - Trial judge had not erred and the findings were fully supported by the abundance by both oral and documentary evidence heaped against the accused - The accused had the opportunity and authority to make the request - The prior arrangement and the manner in which the payments were made is a relevant consideration - Did not reflect an innocent mind on the part of the accused - No substantial miscarriage of justice occurred to the accused by failure of the prosecution to challenge or put the essence of their case to the accused or his witnesses - Such failure does not go to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses nor does it amount to an acceptance of the defence witnesses’ evidence - The accused knew well what the case was against him when the prosecution closed its case and had been afforded all the opportunity to present his defence - The trial judge had carefully considered the accused defence and that advance payments had to be made as a result of the system migration - The defence raised by the accused was wholly untenable - Accused had failed to rebut the presumption of having acted dishonestly on the balance of probabilities - The defence of the accused that the advance payments for the project were mere bare denials and not true - Merely an excuse to cover up his unlawful activity - Wrong for the accused to make payments when payments were not due to the contractors - Ample evidence of corroboration of the testimony of the witnesses - Abundance of independent and compelling evidence confirming the evidence - To suggest that a distinction must be drawn between a property in cheque and property in cash is entirely fallacious - The intention of the drawer at the time for the cheques issued is the material test - The manner in which the money was demanded and received lend credence to the prosecution case - The accused has acted dishonestly, thus causing wrongful gain to himself and wr

18/01/2024

YA Dato' Azmi Bin AriffinKorumYA Datuk Vazeer Alam bin Mydin MeeraYA Dato' Ahmad Zaidi Bin IbrahimYA Dato' Azmi Bin Ariffin

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e0d15a7f-dddc-4f53-8a1f-fe67e1063266&Inline=true

1 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF MALAYSIA AT PUTRAJAYA (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: W -09 -281-11/2021 BETWEEN NOR BADLI MUNAWIR BIN MOHAMAD ALIAS LAFTI - APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR - RESPONDENT In The High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur Criminal Appeal No : WA-42R-10-10/2019 Nor Badli Munawir Bin Mohamad Alias Lafti - Appellant And Public Prosecutor - Respondent 18/01/2024 16:21:17 W-09-281-11/2021 Kand. 66 S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 2 CORUM : VAZEER ALAM BIN MYDIN MEERA, JCA AHMAD ZAIDI BIN IBRAHIM, JCA AZMI BIN ARIFFIN, JCA JUDGMENT Introduction [1] The Appellant was tried in the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur with five (5) counts of criminal breach of trust ("CBT") under section 409 of the Penal Code and five (5) counts of money laundering under section 4(1)(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 ("AMLATFA"). The Charges [2] Particulars of the first three (3CBT Charges (Case No: WA-WA-62R- 1-01/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“CBT 1”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan April 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif Syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3 dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 30/4/2013 bernombor 681488 berjumlah RM400,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." Second Charge: (“CBT 2”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan Jun 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 26/6/2013 bernombor 753749 berjumlah RM570,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." Third Charge: (“CBT 3”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan Jun 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 26/6/2013 bernombor 753760 berjumlah RM430,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 [3] Particulars of the last two (2) CBT Charges (Case No: WA-WA-62R- 2-01/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“CBT 4”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan September 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 9/9/2013 bernombor 802984 berjumlah RM600,000.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." Second Charge: (“CBT 5”) “Bahawa kamu di dalam bulan Oktober 2013, di Pejabat THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, Tingkat 23, Tower B, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan.Kuala Lumpur, sebagai Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif syarikat TH Heavy Engineering Bhd dan di dalam kapasiti tersebut, diamanahkan dengan suatu harta iaitu sekeping cek Maybank bertarikh 30/10/2013 bernombor 834262 berjumlah RM575,800.00 telah melakukan pecah amanah jenayah dan adalah dengan ini melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 409 Kanun Keseksaan." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 [4] Particulars of the first three (3) AMLATFA Charges (Case No: WA- 62R-7-03/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“AMLATFA 1”) “Bahawa kamu pada 2 Mei 2013 antara jam 6.00 petang dan 8.00 malam di Old Town White Coffee Ara Damansara, Oasis Square, No. 2, Jalan PJU 1A/7A, Petaling Jaya, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam Selangor, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerima wang tunai berjumlah RM400,000.00 daripada Murhasmee bin Mukhtar, Pengarah Syarikat Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 ( Akta 613 )”. Second Charge: (“AMLATFA 2”) Bahawa kamu pada 26 Jun 2013 antara jam 6.00 petang dan 8.00 malam di Old Town White Coffee Ara Damansara, Oasis Square, No. 2, Jalan PJU 1A/7A, Petaling Jaya, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam Selangor, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerima wang tunai berjumlah RM570,000.00 daripada Murhasmee bin Mukhtar, Pengarah Syarikat Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 Third Charge: (“AMLATFA 3”) “Bahawa kamu pada 27 Jun 2013 antara jam 2.00 dan 4.00 petang di THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd, B-23-1, Tower 8, Menara UOA Bangsar, No. 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1, 59200 Kuala Lumpur, dalam daerah Kuala Lumpur, dalam Kuala Lumpur, telah melibatkan diri dalarn penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerima wang tunai berjumlah RM430,000.00 daripada Mohd Razip bin Mohammad, Pengarah Syarikat Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” [5] Particulars of the last two (2) AMLATFA Charges (Case No: WA-62R- 8-03/2017) were as follows: First Charge: (“AMLATFA 4”) “Bahawa kamu pada 11 September 2013 antara jam 6.00 petang dan 8.00 malam di Old Town White Coffee Ara Damansara, Oasis Square, No. 2, Jalan PJU 1A/7A, Petaling Jaya, dalam daerah Petaling, dalam Selangor, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan menerirna wang tunai berjumlah RM600,000.00 daripada Murhasmee bin Mukhtar, Pengarah Syarikat Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktiviti haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7 Second Charge: (“AMLATFA 5”) “Bahawa kamu pada 1 November 2013 antara jam 3.00 dan 4.00 petang di Restoran Leaf Dining, No. 5-1, Jalan Solaris 1, Solaris Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur, dalam daerah Kuala Lumpur, dalam Kuala Lumpur, telah melibatkan diri dalam penggubahan wang haram, dengan rnenerima wang tunai berjumlah RM570,000.00 daripada Hanaffi bin Daud, Pengarah Syarikat RL Offshore Sdn Bhd yang merupakan hasil daripada suatu aktivitl haram dan oleh itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Penggubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (Akta 613).” [6] The Appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed trial to all the charges. At the close of the prosecution case, the learned Sessions Court Judge ordered the acquittal and discharged of the Appellant in respect of the First Charge (Case No:WA-62R-7-03/2017) under the AMLATFA and ordered him to enter upon his defence on the remaining nine (9) charges. There was no appeal filed by the Public Prosecutor against the said acquittal. [7] At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge held that there was no doubt as to his guilt and accordingly he was convicted of all the remaining 9 charges and sentenced. [8] For each of the CBT offence, the Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for the period of seven (7) years. This sentence of imprisonment was ordered to run concurrently. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 8 [9] For each offence of money laundering, the Appellant was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently but to be served only after the completion of the sentence for the CBT charges. [10] Dissatisfied by the said decision, on 30/9/2019, the Appellant appealed to the High Court Kuala Lumpur against both the conviction and sentence. [11] On 2/11/2021, the learned High Court Judge affirmed the findings of the trial judge and dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against conviction. [12] However, the learned High Court Judge allowed the appeal against sentence and ordered as follows: (a) The sentence of 7 years imprisonment for each of the CBT charges was set aside and substituted with a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently; (b) The sentence of 4 years imprisonment for each of the AMLATFA charges was set aside and substituted with a sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment. The sentences were also ordered to be run concurrently; (c) Sentences for CBT charges and AMLATFA charges were ordered to run consecutively. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 [13] Aggrieved by the decision of the learned High Court Judge, the Appellant mounted this appeal against conviction and sentence. [14] The Appellant will be referred to as the accused in this Judgment. The Prosecution’s Case [15] The facts of the case appear sufficiently and clearly in the grounds of judgment of the learned High Court Judge. To appreciate the charges it is necessary to give a narrative of the chronological events as established by the prosecution which led to the prosecution of the accused. [16] The accused was at all material times the Chief Executive Officer ('CEO') of TH Heavy Engineering Bhd (herein after known as “THHE”) and charged with the duties of managing and overseeing the affairs of the company and those of its active subsidiary companies which include THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd. ('THHE Fabricators'), OnG Works Sdn Berhad (“OnG”) and THHE Offshore (“THHEOF”). THHE is a company involved in diversified engineering activities including but not limited to major offshore fabrication, hook -up and commissioning of oil and gas facilities, maintenance and servicing of plants and equipment. [17] The charges against the accused on which he was convicted were connected with three (3) companies, namely, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd, Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd and RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 [18] We propose to deal with the involvement of this three named companies in the order which we think they ought to be dealt with. The 1st CBT Charge and The 1st AMLATFA Charge Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [19] Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was one of the contractors for the PERMAS development project (“PERMAS project”) awarded by Murphy Sarawak Oil Co. Ltd (Murphy”) to THHE Fabricators on 1/4/2013. For this project, THHE appointed Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd as its sub-contractor. [20] Sometime around the end of April 2013, the accused told his General Manager of Finance Salahuddiin bin Rushdi @ Marco (PW20) to prepare a cheque for RM400,000.00 that need to be urgently paid to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. PW20 then directed Senior Finance Manager (Kumaresan a/l Ramasamy (PW18) and PW4 (Intan Farhannaz Binti Husin) Senior Executive from the Finance Department to prepare the payment voucher and cheque. On the payment voucher (Exhibit P12) the nature of payment was written down as “Advance Payment” as instructed by the accused. [21] PW20 then directed PW18 and PW4 to prepare a cheque for payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The cheque (Exhibit P15) was signed by PW20 and counter-signed by the accused. [22] PW20 then directed PW18 and PW4 to make immediate and direct payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd’s Maybank Islamic account, which was S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11 done via Bank Remittance Form (Exhibit P35). PW18 and PW4 prepared Exhibit P35 and was approved by PW20 and the accused. [23] PW18 and PW4 testified that Exhibits P12, P15 and P35 were prepared without any claim invoice or supporting documents from Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd because the accused wanted it to be done urgently. [24] PW6 (Siti Zarwanie Binti Zakaria) a director of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and PW8 confirmed that she was asked to generate a sham invoice (Exhibit P20) for the payment received, on which it was written down on as “BEING CONSULTATION AND INSPECTION FEES ON PIPING WORKS FOR SHELL”. [25] After RM400,000 was credited into Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd account, on 2/5/2013, SP6 withdrew the RM400,000 from the company account. SP8 instructed her finance clerk SP5 (Nordahlia binti Ibrahim) to prepare a payment voucher (Exhibit P44) and cheque (Exhibit P46) on the pretexts as “BAYARAN BALIK PINJAMAN” to director. [26] After withdrawal of the monies at Maybank Kuala Terengganu, PW6 and PW8 (Murhasmee bin Mukthar) drove to Kuala Lumpur on the same day with the cash in hand to meet the accused. They met the accused at the Old Town White Coffee Cafe at Ara Damansara, Petaling Jaya and handed the cash to the accused. The 2nd CBT Charge and The 2nd AMLATFA Charge S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12 [27] In June 2013, the accused had again asked PW20 to prepare another payment of RM1 million divided into two separate cheques, one in the sum of RM570,000 payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and another in the sum of RM430,000.00 be made payable to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. The accused told PW20 to state it as payment for “Consultancy – Murphy” in the payment vouchers. PW20 then instructed PW18 and PW4 to prepare two (2) separate cheques. [28] Cheque of RM570,000.00 (Exhibit P27) and Payment Voucher (Exhibit P13) was for payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. A temporary payment voucher (Exhibit P9) and cheque of RM430,000.00 (Exhibit P26) was for payment to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. Exhibit P27 and P26 were signed by PW20 and accused without any claims document received from both the company. [29] After these cheques were prepared and signed, the accused later instructed PW20 to change the method of payment to bank remittance. PW18 and PW4 confirmed that they were asked to prepare a new cheque together with the Bank Remittance Forms. The new cheques of RM570,000.00 (Exhibit P16) were prepared to be paid to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and another new cheque of RM430,000.00 (Exhibit P10) were made payable to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. These two (2) replacements cheques were later signed by PW20 and counter-signed by another authorized officer, PW19 (John George Ritchie) because the accused was not in the office at that material time. [30] On 26/6/2013, PW8 said he received a telephone call from the accused to inform him that RM570,000 has been credited into Bicara Sepakat Sdn S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 13 Bhd’s bank account. The accused told PW8 to withdraw the said amount and hand over the cash to him. PW8 directed PW6 to arrange the withdrawal of the monies from the company’s bank account. A payment voucher (Exhibit P45) and cheque of RM570,000.00 (Exhibit P47) were prepared by PW5. The purpose of the payment in Exhibit P45 were written as “REPAYMENT OF LOAN”. [31] PW6 went to Maybank Kuala Terengganu together with PW8 to withdraw the monies. On the same day, they went to Kuala Lumpur and met the accused at the Old Town White Cafe, Ara Damansara, Petaling Jaya and PW8 handed over the cash of RM570,000.00 directly to the accused. [32] PW8 and PW6 confirmed that a sham invoice (Exhibit P19) was prepared for the payment received by Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd where it was written in the invoice as “BEING CONSULTATION AND INSPECTION FEES ON PIPING WORKS FOR SHELL”. Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd [33] Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd was one of the contractors for THHE Fabricators for the Shell D12 - Laila project. The company was principally in the business of providing oil and gas advisory services in the areas of onshore fabrication, offshore hook-up and commissioning, retrofitting and transportation and installations as well as the trading of certain niche products. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 [34] On 13/9/2012, THHE and Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd entered into a teaming agreement whereby both parties agreed to collaborate in the preparation and submission of tenders for works. [35] The executive director of Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd Datuk Mohd Razip bin Mohammad (PW13) testified that the accused had asked his favour to withdraw cash of RM430,000.00 to be given directly to him as he needed the money to pay the Murphy guys. PW13 was reluctant at first to do something which was not right, but finally agreed to the accused’s request solely because PW13 was more concerned about the continued business ties / joint venture that Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd had with THHE Fabricators. [36] On 18/6/2013, PW13 instructed the company’s Accounts Executive, Raja Ahmad Farhni bin Raja Sulaiman (PW12) to prepare a cheque of RM430,000.00 as preparation in case the company received the transfer fund of RM430,000.00 from THHE Fabricators. However, PW12 prepared a cheque (Exhibit P80) of RM431,028.00 because the additional sum of RM1,028.00 was for PW13's own use. [37] On 26/6/2013, PW13 received a cheque (Exhibit P26) dated 25/6/2013 amounting to RM430,000.00 from THHE Fabricators. PW13 handed over the cheque to PW12 to be deposited into the company’s bank account. PW12 prepared a false receipt (Exhibit P88) and invoice (Exhibit P18) for the money received from THHE Fabricators. On Exhibit P18 it was stated as “SUPPLY MANPOWER TO THHE AT YARD” whereas Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd had never supplied such services or work to THHE. However, the cheque (Exhibit P26) received from THHE was dishonored. Upon inquiry, PW13 was S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 informed that the bounced cheque (Exhibit P26) had been replaced with a new cheque (Exhibit P10) with the same amount and payment will be made by direct remittance / telegraphic transfer into the account of Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd. [38] On 27/6/2013, after having found that the money had been credited, PW13 went to Ambank to cash the cheque (Exhibit P80). That afternoon, on the same day, PW13 met the accused at his office located at Menara UOB Bangsar and handed over a bag containing the cash of RM430,000.00 directly to the accused. The accused thanked him and PW13 then left the accused’s office. The 4th CBT Charge and The 4th AMLATFA Charge [39] Sometime in September 2013, the accused instructed PW20 to prepare a cheque for RM600,000.00 made payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd to complete the RM2,000,000,00 allegedly to be given to some people at Murphy who the accused termed as the “Murphy guys”. PW20 then instructed PW18 and PW4 to prepare the payment voucher (Exhibit P14) and the cheque (Exhibit P17). The cheque was signed by PW20 and the accused. PW4 said that in the payment voucher it was stated that the purpose of the payment was for “MAN POWER SUPPLY”. However, PW4 confirmed that she did not received any invoice from Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd for the same. [40] The said cheque (Exhibit P17) was then deposited into the bank account of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The accused then informed PW8 that S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 the money was already in the account of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. After verifying the remittance, on 11/9/2013 PW8 and PW6 went to Maybank Kuala Terengganu and withdrew cash of RM600,000.00 via cheque (Exhibit P48). PW8 confirmed that Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd were forced to prepare a false invoice (Exhibit P21) to justify receipt of the RM600,000.00 from THHE Fabricators for the alleged work done. [41] PW6 gave the RM600,000.00 to PW8. Both of them later went to Kuala Lumpur and met the accused at Old Town White Coffee Cafe, Ara Damansara in Petaling Jaya. There, PW8 handed over the RM600,000.00 cash to the accused. [42] On 30/10/2023, PW20 met the accused at his office. Accused told PW20 that he required a final payment of RM575,800.00 to be paid to the Murphy guys. PW20 was quite reluctant to accede to the accused’s request because the full payment of RM2,000,000.00 supposed to have been paid to the Murphy guys had already been paid. PW20 said that the accused informed him that the actual amount to be paid to the Murphy guys was 1.5% of the PERMAS contract sum which amounted to RM2,575,833.00. The accused then directed PW20 to prepare the said payment and that it be made payable to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [43] PW20 then instructed PW18 and PW4 to prepare the payment voucher (Exhibit P5) and cheque (Exhibit P7) for the amount of RM575,800.00. Both the payment voucher and the cheque were signed by PW20 and counter- signed by the accused. The item in the payment invoice were written as “CONSULTATION FEE PERMAS”. PW18 and PW4 confirmed that the S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17 payment was made without any supporting claims document from RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [44] RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was one of the contractors for THHE Fabricators. Sometime towards the end of July 2013, RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was awarded a project by THHE Fabricators. It was one of the packages in the PERMAS project. Payment for this project was based on milestone achievements. There were five milestones and for each milestone the payment was valued at RM1million. [45] On 30/10/2013, the Chief Executive Officer of RL Offshore Sdn Bhd Dato’ Hanaffi Bin Daud (PW11) testified that he met PW20 and the accused at the PJ Hilton Hotel. At the meeting, the cheque (Exhibit P7) for RM575,800.00 was given to PW11. The accused then asked PW11’s favour to encash the cheque and the cash sum of RM570,000.00 be given to him while the balance RM5,800.00 was to be kept by PW11. [46] On 31/10/2013, PW11 credited the RM575,800.00 cheque (Exhibit P7) into the account of RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [47] On 1/11/2013, PW11 withdrew cash of RM570,000.00 through 3 cheques (Exhibits P81A, P81B and P81C) from the account of RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. After that, PW11 met the accused at around 3.00 pm at Leaf Dining Restaurant at Mont Kiara and handed over the cash sum of RM570,000.00 to the accused. PW11 said he was constrained to agree with the demands S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 made by the accused because RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was tied-up to the PERMAS project and did not want to jeapordise it. [48] On 2/10/2013, RL Offshore Sdn Bhd made a claim of RM1 million to THHE Fabricators for the first milestone payment under the PERMAS project for work done in respect of the “PROVISION FOR THE SUPPLY OF CHEMICAL INJECTION PACKAGE FOR THE MURPHY’S SARAWAK SK13 PERMAS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT” through vide invoice No. 039/13 (Exhibit P6). The said invoice was process by THHE on 31/10/2013. [49] Since THHE Fabricators had already paid the sum of RM575,800.00 to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd, there was the balance sum of RM424,200.00 due in December 2013 instead of the RM1 million claimed. Hence, only this sum of RM424,200.00 was paid to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [50] Dissatisfied with receiving only the amount of RM424,200.00, PW11 insisted the accused to pay for the full payment of the milestone claim of RM1,000,000,00. Due to the insistence by PW11, the accused turned to PW8 of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and asked PW8 to cover the amount of RM575,800.00 to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. Again, PW8 had no choice but to oblige. A cheque (Exhibit P49) for the said amount was later made out and encashed by PW6. Sometime in July 2014, PW6 gave the cash to PW8 to be given to PW11. The Defence [51] The accused elected to give evidence under oath. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19 [52] The accused further called eight (8) witnesses to testify on his behalf. The Accused’s Version. [53] He was at the material time the chief executive officer of THHE and one of the directors of THHE Fabricators. The accused version was essentially as follows. CBT Charge Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [54] The accused contended that there were problems caused by the migration of the management system from that of UBS System to ERP Microsoft Axapta, where the new system supplied limited descriptions for payments made to be made to contractors. To overcome this problem, the top management of THHE together with the Financial Division decided to use the general label of “consultancy” to speed up the payment process for work done by the contractors. [55] The system migration problem had affected THHE Fabricators’ ability to make speedy payment to the contractors. With limited financial resources, the contractors were unable to complete their contract works within stipulated time. The delay in completing the project would have seriously affected THHE’s reputation and would have exposed THHE Fabricators to very high liquidated ascertained damages. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 [56] In order to speed up payment to the contractors, THHE management together with the Financial Division decided to give “advance payment” to certain contractors. [57] Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was a small scale company where the financial position of the company is very limited and depended on work demand. Hence, THHE needed to made advance payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd ahead of its normal schedule in order to finance the company’s preparation cost such as purchasing equipment and staff mobilisation so that the company be able to complete the contract works well within the timeline. [58] In 2013, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was awarded a piping works contract worth RM6.985 million in the Murphy Project by THHE Fabricators. At the same time, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd was also involved in Shell D12 and Laila project where the delays in completion of the project were due to financial constraint faced by Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. To avoid and overcome the project delays, the accused and PW20 had signed a company cheque of RM400,000.00 as advance payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [59] A cheque (Exhibit P27) of RM570,000 was also made payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The said cheque was signed by PW20 and PW19. The accused testified that for both the cheques, there were no invoices attached with the cheques because they were advances payment. [60] Sometime in September 2013, the accused instructed PW20 to prepare a cheque (Exhibit P17) dated 9/9/2013 for RM600,000.00 made S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21 payable to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. The cheque was signed by PW20 and the accused. The accused said that this was meant as advance payment to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd. [61] The accused said that the chief executive officer of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd, Murhasmee bin Mukthar (PW8) was aware of the advance payment arrangement made. This can be seen from the complaint PW8 make via e- mail send to the accused for THHE’s management to speed up Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd’s payment claims (see PW8 e-mails dated 26/11/2012, 9/1/2013, 1/2/2013, 14/2/2013, 21/3/2013 and 16/4/2013). Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. [62] There was a Teaming Agreement (Exhibit P43) dated 13/9/2012 between Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd and THHE. [63] THHE issued a Maybank cheque (Exhibit P10) of RM430,000.00 dated 26/6/2013 to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. The accused said that he had no knowledge of the purpose for the issuance of the cheque because it was not signed by him. PW20 and PW19 signed the cheque. [64] The accused only signed a THHE’s Maybank cheque (Exhibit P26) of RM430,000.00 made payable to Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd as advance payment for claim made by Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 [65] The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the payment voucher (Exhibit P9) which stated “Cash Advance - Payment for consultancy -Murphy”) because his signature does not appear in the voucher. RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [66] The company was one of THHE’s contractors under the PERMAS Project, and was awarded a supply work contract known as “Chemical Injection Package” worth RM 5million. [67] The company issued invoice (Exhibit P6) dated 1/10/2013 to THHE for milestone claim No.1 (“Provision for the supply of chemical injection package for Murphy’s Sarawak SK311 PERMAS Development Project”) amounting to RM1 million. [68] However, due to THHE’s financial difficulties, arrangement was made for the claim of RM1million be settled by way of two (2) payments i.e. a first payment of RM575,800.00 and followed by RM424,200.00. [69] On 1/11/2013, the accused together with PW20 met PW11 at the PJ Hilton Hotel to explain the financial difficulties faced by THHE at that point in time. At the same time, PW11 was given the RM575,800.00 cheque (Exhibit P7) dated 30/10/2013 by PW20 as part payment for the claim made by RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. [70] Subsequently, THHE paid the balance sum of RM424,200.00 via Maybank cheque (Exhibit P30) dated 6/1/2014 to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 Amlatfa Charges [71] All payments made to the contractors were valid and done in accordance with the law. [72] The accused denied receiving monies directly for himself or from PW8, PW11 and/or PW13. [73] The accused denied having demanded monies from PW8, PW11 and PW13. [74] No internal investigation was conducted by the Board of Directors against him and/or by the whistle blower committee of THHE and THHE Fabricators against him. [75] There were no proceeds of illegal activities derived from any criminal breach of trust on all the five (5) investigations against him. Hence, the accused and his family’s properties were returned without forfeiture. Alibi (3rd AMLATFA Charge) [76] On 27/9/2013, at about 3.00 pm, the accused attended an official meeting at the THHE meeting room with Mr. Ramon A. Chelva, an executive director of Pricewaterhouse Coopers Advisory Services Sdn Bhd (DW5). [77] The accused denied that he went out from the meeting room during his meeting with DW5 to meet PW13 (Mohd Razip bin Mohammad). He also S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 denied having received a bag containing cash of RM 430,000.00 from PW13. Allegation Made by PW20 Against Accused [78] The accused denied all the allegations made by PW20 against him. [79] On 15/2/2018, the accused filed a defamation suit at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court (KLSC Suit No. WA-B53F-2-02/2018) against PW20 for slandering him. [80] PW20 is not a credible or truthful witness. PW20 gave contradictory evidence in the defamation case and in the present criminal case. [81] On 21/12/2017, the accused’s wife, Datin Suraya binti Sharer (DW2) initiated a civil suit (WA-A53-13-12/2017) against PW20 for extortion. The accused alleged that PW20 had demanded money from DW2, and if not paid then PW20 threatened to give evidence against the accused in this criminal case. DW2 had paid the sum of RM80,000.00, and via the civil suit claimed for the return of the same. On 4/10/2018, the Sessions Court Judge in that civil suit found in favour of DW2 and ordered PW20 to repay the RM 80,000.00 in full. [82] PW20 was also charged in the Magistrate Court for extortion under section 384 Penal Code against DW2. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 [83] The accused contended that PW20’s evidence was purely one of self -preservation and self-interest. Defence Witnesses Evidence [84] We shall now turn to the summary of evidence given by the defence witnesses. Suraya Binti Sharer @ Bahar (DW2) Evidence [85] She is the accused’s wife. [86] She was the Managing Director of Cekap Jati Sdn Bhd. [87] On 1/11/2015, PW20 was appointed as consultant of Cekap Jati Sdn Bhd. [88] Sometime in November 2016, the Malaysian Anti - Corruption Commission (“MACC”) investigated the accused. [89] On 24/1/2017, DW2 and her two (2) children were served with notices by the MACC for declaration of their assets. [90] On 19/4/2017, the Inland Revenue Board started investigation against DW2, Cekap Jati Sdn Bhd and its Group of Companies. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 [91] The MACC froze DW2’s account and as well as his family members’ accounts for almost twelve (12) months. Freezing of the accounts were lifted on 15/11/2017. [92] Sometime in November 2018, Inland Revenue Board concluded their investigation and found that DW2 and her children’s assets were not derived from the accused’s funds or assets. [93] PW20 demanded RM1 million from DW2, failing which PW20 threatened to give unfavourable evidence against the accused in the criminal trial. [94] DW2 gave RM80,000.00 cash in three payments of RM20,000.00, RM30,000.00 and RM30,000.00 to PW20 after that threat. It took about two (2) months for her to settle the RM80,000.00. PW20 then further demanded from DW2 the balance of RM920,000.00. [95] On 5/10/2017, DW2 together with the accused went to Setapak police station and lodged a police report against PW20 for extortion. [96] On 6/10/2017, PW20 was arrested by the police. [97] On 2/12/2017, DW2 filed civil suit against PW20 to claim back the RM80,000.00 that she had given to PW20. [98] On 4/10/2018, the learned Sessions Court Judge gave judgment in favour of DW2. PW20 did not appeal against the said judgment. Until to-date, S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 PW20 failed to pay the judgment sum. Subsequently, DW2 filed bankruptcy proceeding against PW20. Siti Zulaikha Binti Mohd Sidek (DW3) Evidence [99] She was the Executive Secretary to the accused. [100] Her office desk was located outside the accused’s office. No one can enter the accused’s office without her permission. [101] On 27/ 6/2013 between 3.00 pm and 5.00 pm, the accused had scheduled an important / critical meeting with Pricewaterhouse Coopers, the THHE’s auditor. The accused told DW3 several times, even before the meeting started, that he did want to be disturbed during the meeting. [102] The meeting with Mr. Ramon A. Chelva (DW5) from Pricewaterhouse Coopers and his assistant started about 10 - 15 minutes before the scheduled time. From the Entry Log (Exhibit P163), the time DW5 entered the THHE building was 2.49 pm and exited at 3.54 pm. [103] To the best of DW3’s recollection, DW3 did not leave her desk between 2.00 pm to 4.00 pm on 27/6/2013. [104] The meeting was held in the accused’s office. As far as DW3 can recall, neither DW5 nor the accused left the meeting room during the course of the meeting. The meeting took an hour. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 [105] Nobody entered the accused’s room during the course of the meeting. [106] DW3 said that from the time she clocked in and started work and until she left for the day, she may have gone to the washroom and for prayers for a few minutes. She never left her desk before and during the course of the meeting. [107] DW3 confirmed that she did not see Datuk Mohd Razip bin Mohammad (PW13) coming to see the accused on that day (27/8/2013). If he had come, DW3 would have known because she was at her desk from 1.00 pm to 2.00 pm and then between 2.00 pm to 4.00 pm. [108] DW3 pushed back on PW13’s testimony that PW13 was given an access card to the building that would permit him to enter THHE’s building as and when he wished. DW3 said she had never given PW13 an access card to allow him to access THHE building. [109] As far as she know, PW13 will have to register with the building security as a visitor just like any other visitor to the building. Inar Sawanis Binti Mustapa (DW4) Evidence [110] From 2/5/2012 until 14/9/2015, she served as the Internal Audit Executive of THHE. Later she left and joined Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd as Senior Executive Internal Audit. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 [111] When she first started working at THHE, the company and its subsidiary companies were going through “migration of management system” proses from UBS System to ERP Microsoft Axapta system (ERP System). [112] Throughout the migration proses, THHEB and its subsidiary companies were having various problems. Financial Division and Subcontracting Department were among the division affected by this migration system. [113] Due to this migration, there could be delay in making timely payments to their contractor. This would affect the progress of the project. THHE may result high liquidated ascertained damages being impose by the suppliers/contractors if there was delay in the project. Compensation is a serious problem that will affect THHE’s reputation as a whole. [114] Internal Audit had not received any complaint or e-mail from Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd, Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd or RL Offshore Sdn Bhd that their demand for payment were irregular or that there was a breach of regulation. Ramon Albert Chelvarajasingam (DW5) Evidence [115] He was the Executive Director in Pricewaterhouse Coopers Malaysia (“PwC”). [116] Meeting between DW5 and the accused was scheduled on 27/6/2013 between 3.00 pm and 4.00 pm. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [117] The purpose of this meeting was for DW5 to present the scope of consultancy services that PwC could provide to THHE including potential pricing. Nothing specific. There were are other general matters such as about organisation, talent in organisation, cost level etc that were discussed. [118] DW5 arrived at THHE’s office, which was located at Menara UOA in Bangsar around 2.30 pm to 2.45 pm with his junior employee. [119] DW5 registered as a visitor at the security counter and went up to accused’s office. [120] DW5 and his colleague were shown to the accused’s office and the accused secretary informed the accused of their arrival. DW5 was then shown into the accused’s meeting room. [121] The meeting lasted approximately an hour and DW5 left the accused’s office at around 3.45 pm. [122] DW5 remembered that they were not interrupted by anyone during the course of the meeting and no one left the meeting at any time. Mohd Saiful Bin Mustapha (DW6) Evidence [123] From May 2013 to May 2014, DW6 served as Senior Manager Finance at THHE. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 [124] When DW6 first started working at THHE, the company and its subsidiary companies were going through “migration of management system” proses from UBS System to ERP Microsoft Axapta (ERP System). [125] Throughout the migration prose, THHE and its subsidiary companies were having various problems. Financial Division and Subcontracting Department were among those affected by this migration system. [126] DW6 said that if the system did not function well and did not give accurate data, it will cause major problems to the company. When DW6 left THHE, the company was still having problems with the ERP Microsoft Axapta System (ERP System). Khairul Azam Bin Jaafar (DW7) Evidence [127] In the year 2012, he served as Finance Director at Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. [128] In 2012, Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd was awarded a work contract by THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd worth RM1.12million [129] In the middle of 2013, Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. was awarded another work contract by THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd worth RM1.80million [130] Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd received advance payment of RM 900,000.00 (50% from value of the contract) from THHE Fabricators on 26/6/2013 in order to help with its cash flow in the performance of the said contracts. The advance payment was necessary to ensure progress of the project and completion of S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 the contract works within time without imposition of any liquidated damages against Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. Zachary Ivan Scully (DW8) Evidence [131] Presently working as Legal Assistant at JK Lawyers in Melbourne, Australia. [132] In the year 2013, DW8 was working as the Head of Legal Department for THHE. [133] Joined THHE as the General Manager of Legal & Secretarial Department on or about 15/1/2012 and resigned from the same position on or about 30/9/2016. [134] At that time, there was migration of system from the UBS System to the new ERP software. [135] The migration of system had caused delay in the issuance of Purchase Orders. The delay was a problem to THHE because it affected payment claims by the subcontractors, causing delay to the project progress overall giving rise to potential claims for liquidated ascertained damages. Liquidated damages can wipe out the profits from a particular project. [136] To avoid delays, sometime advance payments were made to contractors even though they had not started works. Or sometime the work S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33 would have started without Purchase Order and payment would then be made. [137] DW8 remembered at least two (2) contractors who were given advance payments. They are Soft Triangle Services Sdn Bhd and Inai Kiara Sdn Bhd. [138] All payments require Purchase Order. Urgent scenario, the contractor started work without receiving a Purchase Order. [139] There was no report during his employment of any irregular payment made by THHE to Dato’ Mohd Razip (PW13), Dato Hanaffi Daud (PW11) and / or Murhasmee Mokhtar (PW8). The Relevant Provision of Law (a) Section 23 of the Penal Code defines ‘wrongful gain’ and ‘wrongful loss’ as follows: “Wrongful gain” and “wrongful loss” “23. “Wrongful gain” is gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. “Wrongful loss” is the loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. A person is said to gain wrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well as when such person acquires wrongfully. A person is said to lose wrongfully when such person is wrongfully kept out of S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 any property, as well as when such person is wrongfully deprived of property.” (b) Section 24 of the Penal Code defines ‘dishonestly” as follows: “Dishonestly” “24. Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person, or wrongful loss to another person, irrespective of whether the act causes actual wrongful loss or gain, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”. Explanation—In relation to the offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust it is immaterial whether there was an intention to defraud or to deceive any person.” (c) Section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as follows: “Alibi” “402A. (1) The Court shall, at the time the accused is being charged, inform the accused as to his right to put forward a defence of alibi. (2) Where the accused seeks to put forward a defence of alibi, he shall put forward a notice of his alibi during the case management process. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where the accused has not put forward a notice of his alibi during the case management process, he may adduce evidence in support of an alibi at any time during the trial subject to the following conditions: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 (a) the accused has given a written notice of the alibi to the Public Prosecutor; and (b) the Public Prosecutor is given a reasonable time to investigate the alibi before such evidence can be adduced. (4) The notice required under this section shall include particulars of the place where the accused claims to have been at the time of the commission of the offence with which he is charged, together with the names and addresses of any witnesses whom he intends to call for the purpose of establishing his alibi.” (d) Section 405 of the Penal Code reads as follows: 405. Criminal breach of trust. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property either solely or jointly with any other person, dishonestly misappropriates, or converts to his own use, that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that, dishonestly misappropriates, or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust". (e) Section 409 of the Penal Code reads as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 36 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant or agent Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, in his capacity of a public servant or an agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years and not more than twenty years and with whipping, and shall also be liable to fine. (f) Section 409B of the Penal Code reads as follows: “Presumption” “409B. (1) Where in any proceeding it is proved- (a) for any offence prescribed in sections 403 and 404, that any person had misappropriated any property; or (b) for any offence prescribed in sections 405, 406, 407, 408 and 409, that any person entrusted with property or with dominion over property had- (i) misappropriated that property; (ii) used or disposed of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 37 implied which he had made touching the discharge of such trust; or (iii) suffered any person to do any of the acts described in subparagraph (i) or (ii) above, it shall be presumed that he had acted dishonestly until the contrary is proved.” (g) Section 3 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 define: "proceeds of an unlawful activity" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of any unlawful activity;", “unlawful activity" means any activity which is related, directly or indirectly, to any serious offence or any foreign serious offence; “serious offence" means - (a) any of the offences specified in the Second Schedule; (b) an attempt to commit any of those offences; or (c) the abetment of any of those offences; (h) Section 3 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 defines money laundering as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 38 “Interpretation” “3(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires - "money laundering" means the act of a person who – (a) engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves proceeds of any unlawful activity; (b) acquires, receives, possesses, disguises, transfers, converts, exchanges, carries, disposes, uses, removes from or brings into Malaysia proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (c) conceals, disguises or impedes the establishment of the true nature, origin, location, movement, disposition, title of, rights with respect to, or ownership of, proceeds of any unlawful activity, where; (aa) as may be inferred from objective factual circumstance, the person knows or has reason to believe, that the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity; or (bb) in respect of the conduct of a natural person, the person without reasonable excuse fails to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether or not the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity;". (i) Section 4 of the Anti Money-Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001 reads as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 39 (1) Any person who - (a) engages in, or attempts to engage in; or (b) abets the commission of, money laundering, commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding five million ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. (2) A person maybe convicted of an offence under subsection (1) irrespective of whether there is a conviction in respect of a serious offence or foreign serious offence or that a prosecution has been initiated for the commission of a serious offence or foreign serious offence." The Law on Appellate Intervention [140] The law on the appellate intervention is quite settled. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing the finding of facts arrived at by the trial judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding. [141] In Herchun Singh & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1969] 2 MLJ 209, Ong Hock Thye CJ (as he then was) said as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 40 “An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there are substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding.” [142] In Yahaya bin Mohamad v. Chin Tuan Nam [1975] 1 LNS 195; [1975] 2 MLJ 117 the Privy Council held: (1) As in this case the learned trial judge had based his finding on the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness, his finding should not have been disturbed; (2) This was not one of those rare cases where an Appellate Court, lacking the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses, was justified in coming to a different conclusion from the trial judge on the question of credibility. There was no reason to think that the trial judge had not taken proper advantage of his having seen and heard the witnesses. [143] In Ye Wei Gen v. Public Prosecutor [1999] 4 SLR 101, Yong Pung How CJ (as he then was) said: “It is trite law that an appellate court will be slow to overturn the trial judge 's finding of fact unless it can be shown that his decision was plainly wrong or against the weight of the evidence before him... These cases thus stand for the principle that findings of fact by the trial judge S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 41 are prima facie correct unless there are very good grounds for disturbing them.” [144] In Dato' Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v. Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2004] 3 CLJ 737 the Federal Court held as follows: “Clearly, an appellate court does not and should not put a brake and not goinq any further the moment it sees that the trial judge says that is his finding of facts. It should go further and examine the evidence and the circumstances. under which that finding is made to see whether, to borrow the words of HT Ong (CJ Malaya) in Herchun Singh's case (supra) "there resubstantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing with the finding". Otherwise, no judgment would ever be reversed on question of fact and the provision of s. 87 CJA 1964 that an appeal may lie not only on a question of law but also on a question of fact or on a question of mixed fact and law would be meaningless" [145] In PP v. Mohd Radzi bin Abu Bakar [2005] 2 MLRA 590, the Federal Court held as follows: “Now, it settled law that it is no part of the function of an appellate Court in a criminal case - or indeed any case - to make its own findings of fact. That is a function exclusively reserved by the law to the trial Court. The reason is obvious an appellate Court is necessarily fettered because it lacks the audio-visual advantage enjoyed by the trial Court." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 42 [146] In Che Omar Mohd Akhir v. Public Prosecutor [2007] 3 CLJ 281, the Federal Court speaking through Nik Hashim FCJ (as he then was) held as follows: “It is trite law that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing a finding of facts by the trial judge unless such finding is clearly against the weight of evidence which is not the case here". [147] In Wan Marzuki bin Wan Abdullah v. PP [2008] 1 MLRA 479, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “There is clear authority for the proposition that in an appeal of this nature which turns on questions of fact particularly in relation to issues of credibility, this court will be reluctant to interfere with the findings made by the primary trier of fact." [148] In UEM Group Bhd v. Genisy Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor [2010] 9 CLJ 785; [2018] Supp MLJ 363, Rauf Sharif FCJ (as he then was) said:- [26] ... the prime issue is whether the Court of Appeal had erred in interfering with the findings of facts of the trial judge. It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking, intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 43 [149] In P'ng Hun Sun v. Yip Yee Foo [2013] 2 AMCR 350; [2013] 6 MLJ 523, Mohd Zawawi Salleh FCJ (as he then was) held as follows: “When the finding of the trial judge is factual, however, the fact finder's decision cannot be disturbed on appeal unless the decision of the fact finding is plainly wrong (see China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn (and Another Appeal) [1996] 2 AMR 2233; [1996] 2 MLJ 517; [1996] 3 CLJ 163; Zaharah bt A. Kadir v. Ramuna Bauxite Pte Ltd & Anor [2012] 1 AMR 209; [2011] 1 LNS · 1015; Kyros International Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri [2013] 4 AMR 55; [2013} 2 MLJ 650; [2013] 1 LNS 1). The findings of fact of the trial judge can only be reversed when it is positively demonstrated to the appellate court that: (a) by reason of some non-direction or mix-direction or otherwise the judge erred in accepting the evidence which he or she did accept; or (b) in assessing and evaluating the evidence the judge has taken into account some matter which he or she ought not to have taken into account, or failed to take into account some matter which he or she ought to have taken into account; or S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 44 (c) it unmistakenly appears from the evidence itself, or from the unsatisfactory reasons given by the judge for accepting it, that he or she cannot have taken proper advantage of his or her having seen and heard the witnesses; or (d) insofar aside judge has relied on manner and demeanour, there are other circumstances which indicate that the evidence of the witness which he or she accepted is not credible, as for instance. where those witnesses have on some collateral matter deliberately given an untrue answer." [penekanan ditambah] [150] In Amri Ibrahim & Anor v. PP [2017] 1 CLJ 617, the Federal Court held as follows: “[51] It is trite law that the view of the trial judge as to the credibility of a witness must be given proper weight and consideration. An appellate court should be slow in disturbing such finding of fact arrived at by the trial judge, who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witness, unless there were substantial and compelling reasons for disagreeing.” [12] In LCY v. TWY [2019) 7 CLJ 158, the Court of Appeal held as follows: “[26] The principle of law on appellate intervention is settled. In Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 45 Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 453, the Federal Court reiterated the principle as follows at p. 476: [60] It is now established that the principle on which an appellate court interfere with findings of fact by the trial court is "the plainly wrong test" principle; see the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin & Anor (P) v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Anor [2004] 4 CLJ 309; [2005] 1 MLJ 1 (at p. 10) per Steve Shim CJ SS. More recently, this principle of appellate intervention was affirmed by the Federal Court in UEM Group Berhad v Genisys lntergrated Engineers Pte Ltd /2010] 9 CLJ 785 where it was held at p. 800: It is well settled law that an appellate court will not generally speaking intervene with the decision of a trial court unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. A plainly wrong decision happens when the trial court is guilty of no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence (See Chew Yee Wah & Anor v Choo Ah Pat [1978]1 LNS 32; Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484; and Chin v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 [151] In Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 12 MLJ 67, Zabariah FCJ when delivering the judgment of the court had said: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 46 [148] Given the aforesaid, we form the view that rather than adopting a rigid set of rules to demarcate the boundaries of appellate intervention insofar as findings of fact are concerned, the "plainly wrong" test as espoused in decisions of this court should be retained as a flexible guide for appellate courts. As long as the trial judge's conclusion can be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts. [152] In a fairly recent case of Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Pentadbir Kepada Harta Pusaka Tan Ewe Kwang, Simati & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 12 MLJ 67 the Federal Court held that: “[33] It was a long-settled principle, stated and restated in domestic and wider common law jurisprudence, that an appellate court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless satisfied that he was plainly wrong' (the Supreme Court of United Kingdom in McGraddie v. McGraddie and another [2013] 1 WLR 2477)." "[5] The 'plainly wrong' test operated on the principle that the trial court had had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses on their evidence as opposed to the appellate court that acted on S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 47 the printed records. The 'plainly wrong' test was not intended to be used by an appellate court as a means to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. As long as the trial court's conclusion could be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court felt like it might have decided differently was irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence was examined by the appellate courts (see paras 34, 76 & 148)." Petition of Appeal [153] Before us, the learned counsels for the accused raised twenty-six- grounds of appeal. (1) The Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and in fact when Her Honour convicted the accused in respect of all the 9 charges, namely 5 counts of offences under criminal breach of trust (s.409 charges) and 4 counts of offences under the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (section 4(1)(a) AMLATFPUAA charges). The Learned High Court Judge erred when His Lordship affirmed all the convictions; (2) The Learned Sessions Court Judge erred when Her Honour failed to judicially appreciate the defence of the Appellant. Her S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 48 Honour failed to recognise that the core or basic defence of the Appellant was never challenged by the prosecution, hence ought to have been accepted. Her Honour further erred in law when Her Ladyship criticised the defence as a bare denial and ruled that the evidence of the other witnesses not relevant; (3) The Learned High Court Judge seriously erred when His Lordship erroneously interpreted the application of the case of Wong Swee Chin [1981] 1 MLJ 212 to the disadvantage and prejudice of the accused – see paragraphs 109-113 of the Written Judgment (4) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and in fact when they failed to appreciate the defence case. They ought to have asked themselves the following relevant questions: (a) Whether the non-challenge of the accused’s defence by the prosecution amounted to the accused raising a reasonable doubt to the prosecution’s case? and (b) Whether the non-challenge of the accused’s defence by the prosecution amounted to the accused having successfully rebutted the presumption under section 409B(1)(b)(i) of the Penal Code? This glaring omission is a serious non-direction amounting to an appealable error. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 49 (5) The Learned High Court Judge erred when His Lordship failed to consider the defence of the accused in respect of the five (5) section 409 charges. His Lordship only applied his mind to the section 4(1)(a) AMLATFPUAA charges as can be seen at paragraph 110 of the Written Judgment. This failure to consider is a serious misdirection warranting appellate intervention; (6) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in convicting the accused based upon evidence of witnesses whose credibility was clearly at stake; (7) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in finding that the accused had dominion and/or power of disposal over the subject matter of the charges under section 409 of the Penal Code, i.e., cheques of THHE Fabricators Sdn Bhd; (8) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to rule that the accused’s defence has successfully rebutted the statutory presumption undersection 409B(1) of the Penal Code on a balance of probabilities ; (9) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to accord adequate and fair judicial appreciation to the accused defence; S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 50 (10) The Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate accused’s the Appellant’s alibi which was properly admitted under section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code; (11) The Learned High Court Judge and the Learned Sessions Court Judge erred in law and fact in meting out sentence which is manifestly excessive without taking into account the overall circumstances of the case; (12) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in facts in upholding the Learned Sessions Court Judge’s finding that there was no reason to refuse the evidence of PW20. The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge did not critically evaluate the credibility of PW20 and had failed to consider or sufficiently appreciate that: (a) PW20 was dishonest on multiple occasions during his cross examination; (b) PW20 was a self-serving witness and had motive to lie as a witness to implicate the Appellant; (c) PW20 was a self-serving witness and had motive to lie because he was trying to save himself for failing to properly discharge his duty as an employee of THHE (“the Company”); S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 51 (d) PW20’s allegation that he was told that the Appellant was required to pay a sum of 1.5% of the Permas Contract to Murphy was inconsistent with the documentary evidence showing the value of the Permas Contract; (e) PW20’s conduct during his employment at Cekap Jati showed that he was unworthy of credibility because it demonstrated his propensity to provide evidence in a manner that was most favourable to him; and (f) PW20 has an axe to grind against the Appellant and there was evidence that PW20 had subsequently defamed the Appellant and extorted the Appellant’s wife. (13) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law in failing to appreciate and consider that there is a difference between the property in a cheque and property in money in a bank account. The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the “property” described in the charges were cheques which has been paid to the named payees of the various cheques and accordingly, there was no misappropriation or conversion of the cheques within the meaning of section 405 of the Penal Code; (14) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in facts in finding that entrustment of property has been established when the Appellant exercised dominion and control over the payments which were made. The Learned High Court Judge failed to S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 52 appreciate or sufficiently consider that the approval authority matrix of THHE required each of the signatories to the cheques to exercise independent control when issuing any cheques; (15) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in upholding the conviction of the Appellant in relation to criminal breach of trust of the cheque dated 30/4/2013 for the sum of RM 400,000.00 despite the Appellant having been acquitted of the money laundering charge in respect of the same cheque. The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate or sufficiently consider that the alibi of the Appellant ought to have been accepted for both charges given that the evidence relied on by the prosecution to establish both the criminal breach of trust and the receipt of the sum of RM400,000.00 were identical. The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to consider or sufficiently appreciate that there was insufficient evidence for the Learned Sessions Court Judge to convict the Appellant of criminal breach of trust having accepted the defence of alibi; (16) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate or sufficiently consider that the sum of RM575,800.00 in relation to CBT 5 was for works done and therefore could not amount to any wrongful loss to the Company; (17) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in facts in finding that the Appellant had pocketed the cash for himself, amounting S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 53 to an act of misappropriation. The Learned High Court Judge failed to consider or sufficiently consider that save for the testimony of PW8, PW11 and PW13, there is no independent evidence to demonstrate that the Appellant had received the cash for himself; (18) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law when His Lordship failed to consider or sufficiently appreciate that the possibility that PW8, PW11 and PW13 had retained the monies for their own use; (19) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate or sufficiently consider the fact that there was a gap in the prosecution’s case as the investigating officer failed to investigate the possibility that PW8, PW11 and PW13 had retained the funds for their own personal use. The Learned High Court Judge failed to consider and appreciate that the Defence had established through concessions in cross examination that PW8, PW11 and PW13 had lifestyles and assets that far exceeded their incomes; (20) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when held that the evidence of PW 8 PW11 and PW 13 was credible and believable. The Learned High Court Judge failed to consider or sufficiently appreciate that the Defence had produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that PW8, PW11 and PW13 may have retained the monies that they withdrew for their own use; S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 54 (21) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law in failing to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge had used the particulars of one offence to support and corroborate the others; (22) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to sufficiently appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge had failed to apply the necessary warning when applying similar facts evidence; (23) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge failed to sufficiently warn herself when relying on the evidence of PW8 PW11 and PW13 to support and corroborate one another because they were accomplices; (24) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact in failing to appreciate that the Learned Sessions Court Judge failed to caution herself regarding the use of accomplice evidence without corroboration; and (25) The Learned High Court Judge erred in law in failing to consider or sufficiently appreciate the fact that there was no wrongful loss to to the Company as it remained indebted to Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd; S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 55 (26) The Learned High Court Judge failed to appreciate that the prosecution had failed to prove that the Company had overpaid Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd Corail Intoil Sdn Bhd. and/or RL Offshore Sdn Bhd. Our Decision [154] We shall first deal with CBT Charge No.5 and AMLATFA No.5. The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor, fairly, and quite properly, conceded to the appeal in respect of both CBT Charge 5 and AMLATFA 5 as it was clear from the evidence of PW 1 (Kamaruzaman bin Ahmad, the chief operating officer of THHE that the payment of RM575,800.00 made to RL Offshore Sdn Bhd was pursuant to a valid and legitimate agreement with RL Offshore Sdn Bhd for work done under that contract. So we therefore allowed the appeal in respect of these two charges and set-aside the conviction and sentences in respect of the same. [156] We shall now deal with the remaining charges. One of the main ground argued by the learned counsel for the accused was that both the learned Sessions Judge and the learned High Court Judge erred in law and in fact when they failed to judicially appreciate the defence case. In particular, that both the Courts below failed to recognise that the defence of the accused in respect of all the 9 charges was not challenged by the prosecution. [157] It was strenuously contended for the accused that for the AMLATFA Charges No.2, No.4 and No.5 the learned Sessions Court Judge has misdirected herself in the following areas, namely: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 56 (i) in not appreciating that the defence of the accused was not challenged by the prosecution. Thus, it means the prosecution accepts the evidence of the accused; and (ii) consequently, unfairly and wrongly describing the defence of the appellant as a bare denial. The defence of AMLA Charge 5 was dismissed by the learned Sessions Court Judge in a one liner - see pg.110 (para 104 - Vol. 1). [158] As far as Charge CBT 5 and AMLATFA 5 is concerned, we have already decided that the conviction for both the charges could not stand, and the matter has been put to rest. [159] As for CBT Charge No. 3 and corresponding AMLATFA Charge No.3, the defence of the accused was one of alibi. The notice of alibi given by the accused under section 402A of the Criminal Procedure Code states that the accused was having a meeting in his office with DW5 at the material date and time as stated in both the charges. [160] To support his alibi the accused called DW3 (Siti Zulaikha Binti Mohd Sidek) and DW5 (Ramon Albert Chelvarajasingham) essentially to prove that the accused was having an uninterrupted meeting with DW5. It was the accused’s defence that SP13 (Dato’ Mohd Razip bin Mohammad) did not come to his office and consequently he did not give the accused the sum of RM 430,000.00 as alleged. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 57 [161] Counsel for the accused strongly contended that there was in effect no challenge to the accused’s alibi evidence and by reason of the non challenge, the accused’s alibi was not negated by the prosecution. It was submitted that the learned Session Court Judge ought to have held that the prosecution by reason of the non-challenge had conceded to the defence alibi and further the evidence of SP13’s on this point was suspect when SP 13 said that he arrived at 3.30 pm and delivered the cash to the accused when the visitor log book of THHE which is exhibit P163 showed that DW5 came for the meeting with the accused at 2.49 pm and left at 3.54 pm. [162] In our view, we find that the evidence given by DW3 and DW5 and the entry in visitor log book (P163) supported the accused’s defence of alibi and that there was a failure by the trial judge to judicially appreciate this crucial evidence. In our considered view there were merits in this argument. Even though it was not disputed that the accused was at his office at the material time but the critical issue here is whether PW13 was present at the accused’s office at 3.30pm and delivered the money to the accused as stated in the charge. We are of the view that the finding of the trial judge in this regard went against the grain of evidence. It would be unsafe to sustain the conviction handed down by the learned Session Court Judge and the High Court Judge in respect of both these charges and thus appellate intervention is therefore warranted. Hence, we allowed the appeal in respect of CBT No. 3 and AMLATFA No. 3 charges and set aside the conviction and sentence handed down by the learned High Court Judge in respect to these two charges. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 58 [163] However, it is important to stress at this stage, that even though we were with the accused on the alibi issue in respect of the CBT No. 3 and AMLATFA No. 3 charges, it cannot be gainsaid that PW13 may have made an untruthful statement or wholly untrue testimony sufficient to destroy the credibility of PW3. There was some doubt in respect of the time stated in these two charges, and we gave the benefit of that doubt to the accused. This does not mean that PW13’s credibility as a whole was affected. The matter of credibility or veracity of PW13’s testimony in respect of the other remaining charges would have to be determined when dealing with these charges. We were of the view that in this regard the learned trial judge was in a better position to decide this since she was the one who saw and heard PW13’s testimony. Further, it is not appropriate at this stage for us to deal with the credibility issue of PW13. We will cross that bridge when we come to it. [164] Now we shall deal with the other main thrust of the submission by the learned counsel for the accused which revolved around the failure of the prosecution to challenge the narrative of the defence in cross-examination of the accused and his witnesses as regards all the remaining CBT and AMLATFA charges. [165] The evidence which the learned counsel sought to rely on essentially was as per the accused’s written statement [para 56 to para 60] which are reproduced herein: “56. Saya sesekali menegaskan bahawa kesemua pembayaran kepada kontraktor-kontraktor berkenaan melalui cek ditandatangani S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 59 oleh saya adalah sah disisi undang-undang dan sesuai bagi perkhidmatan dan/atau kerja yang dilaksanakan. 57. Saya menafikan segala tomahan penerimaan wang oleh saya, samada selaku CEO THHEB atau pengarah THHEFSB, daripada Encik Murhasmee Bin Mukhtar (SP-8), Dato Mohd Razip Bin Mohammad (SP-13) serta Dato' Hanaffi Bin Daud (SP11). 58. Saya juga menekan bahawa saya, samada selaku CEO THHEB atau pengarah THHEFSB, tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa membuat permintaan wang daripada Encik Murhasmee Bin Mukhtar (SP-8), Dato' Mohd Razip Bin Mohamad (SP-13) serta Dato' Hanaffi Bin Daud (SP-11). 59. Sepanjang tempoh perkhidmatan saya selaku CEO THHEB dan pengarah THHEFSB, saya tidak pernah menghadapi sebarang siasatan dalaman oleh pihak lembaga pengarah dan/atau pihak jawatankuasa pemberi maklumat ("Whistle Blower Committee") THHEB dan THHEFSB.” 60. Pada akhir siasatan berkenaan kelima-Iima (5) pertuduhan ini, harta-harta saya serta harta-harta ahli keluarga saya telah dipulangkan tanpa sebarang pelucuthakan ("return without forfeiture") memandangkan kesemua ini bukanlah hasil daripada aktiviti-aktiviti menyalahi undang undang mahupun hasil daripada pecah amanah dibawah S.409 KK." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 60 [166] The learned counsel for the accused contended that the above evidence which was contrary to that of the prosecution witnesses, namely SP8, SP13 and SP11, was not challenged by the prosecution during cross- examination. As such the learned counsel argued that the version of the accused must be accepted as it remains unchallenged. Learned counsel cited a long lists of authorities in support of that proposition, and in particular counsel relied on the dicta in Wong Swee Chin (supra) to further that argument. [167] Be that as it may, it is worthy of emphasis that the Federal Court in Wong Swee Chin also held that there is an exception to this general rule where: (i) the story (testimony) is itself of an incredible or romancing character, (ii) the abstention arises from mere motives of delicacy, (iii) when counsel indicates that he is merely abstaining for convenience to save time, (iv) where several witnesses are called to the same point, it is not always necessary to cross-examine them all. [168] In reply, the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor referred to the case of Chan Chi Kong v. The Queen [1964] HKCU 94.1 where Hogan CJ of Hong Kong in this unreported judgment held that: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 61 "To say that failure to cross-examine amounts, in itself, to an admission does, I think go too far... " [169] So the essential contention by the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor was that the non cross-examination by itself does not amount to an admission. Though the prosecution did not cross- examine the accused in respect of some of those evidence that does not mean it is tacit admission of the defence version. It must noted that in Wong Swee Chin itself the Federal Court spoke of an exception to the general rule on the failure to cross -examine and its consequences. Learned Deputy Public Prosecutor argued that even if there was failure to cross-examine it was not fatal to the prosecution case and that the court must still consider the totality of the evidence to ascertained if it conclusively point to the guilt of the accused. In this regards we were referred to a passage in Wong Swee Chin where the Federal Court held at page 213 as follows: “In our view, although there was a misdirection by the trial judge on this point it did not affect the correctness of the verdict as the totality of the evidence points conclusively to the guilt of the appellant”. [170] In addition, the learned Deputy further cited the Singapore case of Liza bte Ismail v. PP [1997] 2 SLR 454 where Yong Pung How CJ held as follows: "Although the general proposition is that testimony not subjected to contradiction in cross-examination may be treated as unchallenged S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 62 and thus accepted by the opposition party, the court is still entitled to reject such testimony: Patric v. John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505, per Samuels JA at p 507; see also Hunt J's observations at p 18 in Allied Pastoral Holdings. A careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence must still be undertaken to determine the cogency and weight of such testimony. In other words, it need not always follow that the whole of the appellant's testimony would have to be accepted by the court, nor that the conviction in respect of DAC 9796 would ineluctably be considered flaw." [171] In another Singapore decision of Awtar Singh s/o Mangar Singh v. Public Prosecutor [2000] 3 SLR 439, the Court held as follows: "I did not find it strictly necessary for the prosecution to put to the appellant that he saw the immigration offenders during his visits. It was apparent to the appellant what the prosecution's case was and it was that the immigration offenders saw him at the premises collecting rent and performing various other tasks pertaining to the upkeep of the premises. His defence was a complete denial that he had ever seen these immigration offenders. That being the case, in my view, it could not be said that the failure to put the question to the appellant resulted in any procedural unfairness to him, in the sense that he had been deprived of an opportunity to explain his evidence which would amount to nothing more than another denial that he had not seen them before." S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 63 [172] In the Malaysian case of Public Prosecutor v. Radhakrishnam Syam & Ors and another case [2023] MLJU 1324, the Court held that: “[108] In my considered judgment, PP v. Cheah Leong Foo does not stand for a general proposition of law that a reasonable doubt must arise in all such circumstances where the prosecution has failed to cross examine the defence witness on the fact in dispute. Rather, the court must still proceed to weigh the relative merits of the competing assertions, mindful of the standard of proof that must be discharged by the respective parties. The ordinary principles would apply on evaluating the evidence of the witness of the defence: does the court believe the defence witness? If so, it must acquit. If it does not believe the witness, the court must proceed to ask itself a further question: has the testimony of the witness given rise to a reasonable doubt? If the answer is in the affirmative, then court must acquit.” [173] Now the issue before us is whether the failure of the learned trial judge to consider this unchallenged evidence, had occasioned a failure of justice and denied to accused to a fair trial. Did the accused know what he was being tried for and whether he had been given a full and fair chance to defend himself. If the answers are in the affirmative, then there has been no prejudice to the accused and no failure of justice. But if the answers are in the negative, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused. [174] The duty of an appellate court in dealing with an appeal where misdirection has occurred is well settled by the Supreme Court in Lorensus S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 64 Tukan v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 MLJ 251, where the court held as follow: “Misdirection is not of itself a sufficient ground to justify interference with the verdict; the appellate court must proceed respectively to consider whether the verdict is erroneous owing to the misdirection or whether the misdirection has occasioned a failure of justice. If the court so finds, then it has a duty to interfere. In deciding whether there has been a failure of justice in consequence of a misdirection, the appellate court is entitled to take the whole case into consideration and determine for itself whether there has been a failure of justice in the sense that a guilty man has been acquitted or an innocent one convicted (see Abdul Rahim v. King Emperor (1945 - 46) 73 IA 77).” [175] The overriding concern now is whether there has been a failure of justice or miscarriage of justice in the eye of the law arising from the failure of the prosecution to challenge the core assertion of defence. [176] From our close scrutiny of the record and in particular the judgment of the learned trial judge and the learned High Court judge, we are of the considered view that failure of the prosecution to cross-examine the accused on a crucial part per se does not amount to an admission or acceptance of the accused’s testimony. We must consider the totality of the evidence and decision must be based on an examination of all the evidence presented and not evidence in isolation. Moreover, it is also apparent from the learned trial judge’s comprehensive judgment that she had directed herself on the issue of credibility of the prosecution witnesses and accepted their evidence. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 65 [177] For ease of reference, the findings of the learned trial judge on credibility can be clearly seen at Appeal Record Enclosure 13 Volume 2, pages 90-91 where she said: Kredibiliti saksi - saksi [64] Mahkamah telah menilai keterangan semua saksi dalam kes inl dan mendapati bahawa keterangan mereka adalah konsisten antara satu sama lain walaupun telah disoal balas secara bertubi-tubi oleh pihak pembelaan. Keterangan SP20 iaitu saksi utama dalam kes ini secara keseluruhannya boleh diterima dan tiada sebab untuk Mahkamah menolak keterangan SP20. Begitu juga dengan keterangan SP4 dan SP18. Ketiga-tiga mereka merupakan saksi penting yang menjelaskan secara terperinci mengenal kejadian yang telah berlaku, iaitu dari mula arahan diberi oleh OKT sehingga cek didepositkan ke akaun syarikat BSSB, CISB dan RL Offshore. Dalam melaksanakan arahan-arahan daripada OKT, SP20, SP18 dan SP4 tidak boleh dipersalahkan kerana mereka cuma menurut perintah OKT yang merupakan pegawai atasan mereka. Mereka juga tidak mendapat apa-apa manfaat atau keuntungan hasil dari perbuatan tersebut. [65] Begitu juga dengan keterangan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 yang merupakan pihak yang menerima dan menunaikan cek - cek yang diberi kepada syarikat mereka dan menyerahkan wang tersebut kepada OKT. Keterangan mereka bahawa cek - cek tersebut S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 66 bukan merupakan bayaran atas kerja-kerja yang dilaksanakan oleh syarikat mereka dan syarikat tidak membuat tuntutan untuk pembayaran tersebut hendaklah diterima. Sebagaimana SP20, SP18 dan SP4, mereka juga tidak mendapat sebarang keuntungan hasil pengeluaran wang THHE ini. Mereka menyatakan bahawa mereka dalam keadaan serba salah dan terpaksa menurut kehendak OKT memandangkan mereka mempunyai kontrak kerja dengan THHE.” [178] In short, in her grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of PW4, PW8, PW20, PW11 and PW13 after holding that there were no cogent reasons to disbelieve them. [179] Having made the above finding, the learned trial judge then went on to make the following conclusion at paragraph 68 and 69 of the judgment: [68] Keterangan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 dikuatkan lagi dengan keterangan SP20, SP18 dan SP4 yang merupakan pegawai - pegawai di bahagian kewangan THHE. Keterangan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 bahawa tiada tuntutan bayaran dibuat oleh pihak syarikat disokong oleh keterangan SP20, SP18 dan SP4 yang menyatakan bahawa OKT yang memberi arahan supaya pembayaran dibuat tanpa dokumen sokongan seperti invois dan pesanan belian (purchase order) yang dikemukakan oleh pihak syarikat. [69] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa saksi-saksi pendakwaan SP20, SP18 dan SP4, SP8, SP11 dan SP13 adalah merupakan saksi-saksi yang boleh dipercayai dan telah memberi keterangan yang konsisten S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 67 sepanjang perbicaraan. Tiada sebab untuk mereka memberikan keterangan palsu dan berkomplot untuk memfitnah OKT.” [180] In this respect, the learned High Court Judge accepted these findings when he held at paragraph 54-59 Appeal Record Enclosure 11 Volume 1 of his grounds judgment as follows: [54] In finding that the prosecution's witnesses were credible, the learned trial judge reasoned that the prosecution's witnesses were consistent in their evidence despite the rigorous cross examination. According to the learned trial judge, she had no reason to reject the evidence of PW20 despite the challenge by the defence that PW20 may be a self-serving witness and there were various contradictions in his testimony. [56] The learned counsel anchored the challenge on the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses on the following grounds: (a) that the learned trial judge failed to critically evaluate the conduct and behaviour of PW20 as a whole, (b) that the learned trial judge failed to consider the defence evidence which showed that PW8, PW11 and PW13 was not credible as they may have retained the monies they withdrew for their own purpose, and S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 68 (c) that the conviction was based on the evidence of PW8 and PW20 whose credibility was clearly at stake. [57] In my considered view, the learned trial judge had correctly considered and assessed the credibility of PW8, PW11, PW13 and PW20 in accordance with established legal principles. In her grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge had considered certain material facts. These facts are material as they may be used as a testbed in assessing the credibility of the relevant witnesses in the circumstances of present appeal. They are as follows: (a) instructions were given for cheques to be prepared even without any invoices or claims for payments; (b) sham invoices and sham receipts were made for the various payments; (c) certain cheques were encashed and the monies were personally delivered to the accused; (d) certain cheques were replaced pursuant to instructions for payments to be credited directly into the recipients' bank accounts despite no request for such direct remittances; (e) PW11 of RL Offshore went on to claim for the balance payment of RM575,800.00 in respect of the 1st milestone S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 69 claim despite a cheque for the same amount has been prepared and paid out; (f) at the request of the accused, PW8 had to make good the claim made by PW11 whereas the payment should be made by THHE instead; (g) at the material times, Bicara Sepakat, Coral lntoil and RL Offshore all had subsisting projects with THHE; and (h) as the finance executives of THHE, PW4 and PW18 were merely following instructions and had no authority of their own to prepare the cheques for the respective amounts without instructions. Both of them had not gained anything. [58] Had the payments were for valid reasons, there would not be questions about instructions for cheques being prepared without any claim for payments, there would not be sham invoices and receipts issued, there would not be similar claims made despite payment for the same amount having been "made", there would not be payments having had to be made by Bicara Sepakat to RL Offshore. [59] I am of the considered view that the findings of the learned trial judge in respect of credibility and assessment of the totality of the evidence accords with the probabilities of the case. They did ring true. ln assessing credibility of the witnesses, I am thus of the considered view that the learned trial judge had properly availed herself of the audio-visual advantage.” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 70 [181] Now, we at this court also find ourselves in agreement with the above finding made by both the learned trial judge and the learned High Court Judge. The appeal by the accused turns upon pure questions of fact. These were findings of fact made by the trial judge who had the audio and visual advantage of observing and assessing the demeanour of the prosecution’s material witnesses testifying before her, something which we do not possess. Such findings of fact by the trial judge is therefore to remain undisturbed unless of course if the fact finding is plainly wrong, which we find is not the case here. [182] On the evidence, we are fully satisfied that the learned trial judge had not erred and her findings were fully supported by the abundance by both oral and documentary evidence heaped against the accused. In our view, it leaves no leeway for appellate interference in the circumstances of this case. [183] It must be borne in mind that, Bicara Setakat Sdn Bhd, Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd and RL Offshore Sdn Bhd all had subsisting projects with THHE. Certainly, they do not want to lose their business deals with THHE. They were at the mercy of the accused. The accused took undue advantage of the business relationship that THHE had with these companies. PW8, PW11 and PW13 had no choice but reluctanty to follow the demands of the accused in order not to jeopardise their working relationship with the accused. They had but to follow all instructions of the accused. They were caught between the proverbial devil and the deep blue sea. Hence, they had S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 71 no reasons to lie or made up stories regarding the accused’s involvement in these act. [184] When all the evidence is considered even with an indulgent eye, it is impossible for any court to doubt that the request came from the accused. He had the opportunity and authority to make the request. The prior arrangement and the manner in which the payments were made is a relevant consideration in the present case and it certainly did not reflect an innocent mind on the part of the accused. It is in evidence that PW8, PW11 and PW13 were “coerced” to made payment in one lump sum, with no invoices. [185] To conclude, it is significant to emphasise that, we find no substantial miscarriage of justice to have occurred to the accused person in the present appeal before us by failure of the prosecution to challenge or put the essence of their case to the accused or his witnesses. It is apparent on our careful perusal of the notes of evidence, that such failure does not go to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses nor does it amount to an acceptance of the defence witnesses’ evidence. The accused knew well what the case was against him when the prosecution closed its case and had been afforded all the opportunity to present his defence. [186] Moving on, in considering the defence testimony for criminal breach of trust, the learned trial judge at pp. 93-95 Appeal Record Enclosure 13 Volume 2, had this to say: “Perpindahan sistem daripada Microsoft Axapta kepada sistem ERP” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 72 [70] Pihak pembelaan menyatakan bahawa penggunaan perkataan 'consultancy'di dalam invois adalah kerana masalah yang dihadapi oleh THHE akibat daripada perpindahan sistem Microsoft Axapta kepada ERP di mana sistem yang baharu hanya membekalkan deskripsi yang terhad. Untuk mengatasi masalah ini, pengurusan atasan THHE terpaksa menggunakn label 'consultancy' untuk meluluskan pembayaran atas kerja-kerja yang dilaksanakan oleh kontraktor. Mengenai isu ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa sekiranya benar sekalipun masalah ini dihadapi oleh THHE, ia tiada kaitan dengan 5 pembayaran yang diarahkan o!eh OKT untuk dibayar kepada BSSB, CISB dan RL Offshore di mana pihak syarikat sendiri menafikan membuat apa-apa tuntutan kepada THHE. Tiada sebarang aduan dibuat kepada bank dan/atau dibawah polisi 'whistle blower' [71] Ketiadaan sebarang aduan dibuat dibuat oleh pihak syarikat, polis, dan/atau pihak SPRM kepada pihak bank bahawa transaksi berkaitan kelima-lima cek tersebut merupakan transaksi yang menyalahi undang undang1 tidak menafikan fakta bahawa OKT telah dengan curangnya menyalahgunakan harta THHE, iaitu 5 cek yang menjadi subjek pertuduhan dalam kes ini. Begitu juga kegagalan kakitangan dan/atau lembaga pengarah THHE membuat sebarang aduan di bawah polisi 'whistle blower’berkenaan lima pembayaran kepada ketiga-tiga syarikat tersebut tidak sama sekali menjejaskan kes pihak pendakwaan. Tiada aduan dibuat tidak bermakna kejadian tersebut tidak ·berlaku. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 73 [72] Berdasarkan keterangan saksi-saksi pendakwaan dapatlah dirumuskan bahawa: i. OKT mengarahkan penyediaan kelima-lima cek dalam keadaan di mana tiada kerja dilakukan oleh kontraktor- kontraktor dan mereka juga tidak membuat tuntutan untuk pembayaran. ii. OKT dan SP20 telah menandatangani 3 daripada 5 cek tersebut. iii. 2 cek lagi (P16 dan P10) ditandatangani oleh SP20 dan SP19 bagi menggantikan cek P26 dan P27 yang telah ditandatangani oleh OKT dan SP20 sebelum itu. Penggantian cek - cek juga dibuat atas arahan OKT bagi menukar cara bayaran. iv. OKT memaklumkan pihak syarikat bahawa cek - cek pembayaran dari THHE telah dimasukkan ke dalam akaun syarikat. v. OKT mengarahkan penerima cek (SP8, SP11 dan SP13) supaya menunaikan cek - cek tersebut dan menyerahkan wang secara tunai kepada OKT. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 74 vi. Pihak syarikat menunaikan eek tersebut dan menyerahkan wang dalam bentuk tunai kepada OKT (kecuali bagi jumlah RM400,000.00 di mana penyerahan kepada OKT tidak dibuktikan berikutan alibi OKT yang tidak disangkal oleh pihak pendakwaan). vii. lnvois dikeluarkan selepas bayaran diterima daripada THHE bagi menjustifikasikan pembayaran yang telah dibuat. [73] Berdasarkan fakta yang dinyatakan di atas dapat dilihat modus operandi yang digunakan oleh OKT dalam melaksanakan atau merealisasikan hasratdan niat untuk menyalahgunakan wang syarikat THHE dengan mempergunakan SP8, SP11 dan SP13 yang mempunyai hubungan kerja dengan THHE. Adalah tidak logik pihak syarikat tidak mahu membuat sebarang tuntutan jika kerja-kerja tersebut telah sebenarnya dilakukan. Seterusnya, jika benar pembayaran tersebut untuk kerja-kerja yang sebenarnya dilakukan sebagaimana ditimbulkan oleh pihak pembelaan, mengapakah OKT mengarahkan supaya wang tersebut dikeluarkan dan diserahkan kepada OKT dalam bentuk tunai?. Tambahan pula bagaimana pembayaran untuk jumlah yang sebegitu besar boleh diluluskan oleh OKT tanpa sebarang dokumen sokongan.” [187] The learned trial judge had carefully considered the accused defence, and in particular that advance payments had to be made as a result of the system migration. Hence, for the CBT Charges, we see no reasons to S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 75 interfere with the findings made by the learned trial judge as well as the learned high court judge when they had safely concluded that the defence raised by the accused was wholly untenable and that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption of having acted dishonestly on the balance of probabilities. We were satisfied that both the learned judges had meticulously gone through and correctly appreciated the evidence before them and applied the law correctly. [188] The defence of the accused that the payments made to Corail lntoil Sdn Bhd and Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd were in fact advance payments for the project they were having with the company were mere bare denials and not true. It was merely an excuse to cover up his unlawful activity. [189] Additionally, it was also wrong for the accused to make payments when payments were not due to the contractors. What more when SP8 and SP13 had confirmed that the payments were not related to the work done and they did not make the claim to THHE. [190] The other issue advanced by the learned counsel for the accused is that PW8, PW13, PW20 were accomplices whose evidence was uncorroborated. Now, even if they were accomplices, we find that they there were ample evidence of corroboration of the testimony of these witnesses. [191] It is our considered view that the law on accomplices is well settled. In the case of Harchan Singh & Anor v. PP [2005] 1 CLJ 11 Augustine Paul JCA (as he then was) had this to say: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 76 “In commenting on the significance of the need for corroboration with regard to the identity of the accused Sarkar on Evidence, 15th edn. Vol. 2 says at p.2105: "It is an established rule of practice that an accomplice must be corroborated by independent evidence as to the identity of every person whom he impeaches. The accomplice may know every circumstances of the crime and while relating all the other facts truly, may in order to save a friend, or gratify an animosity, name some person as one of the criminals who was innocent of the crime (Rv. Krishna Bhat, 10B 319; see also R v. Malapa, 11 BHC 196; R v. BudhduNanku, 1B 475)." [192] In Davies v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] AC 378, it was held that: “an accomplice is a person who participates in the commission of the actual crime charged against the accused. He is to be a particeps criminis. There are two cases, however, in which a person has been held to be an accomplice even if he is not a particeps criminis. Receivers of stolen property are taken to be accomplices of the thieves from whom they receive goods, on trial of theft. Accomplices in previous similar offences committed by the accused on trial are deemed to be accomplices in the offence for which the accused is on trial, when evidence of the accused having committed crimes of identical type on the occasions to be admissible to prove the system and intent of the accused in committing the offence charged". S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 77 [193] In Sabarudin bin Non [2005] 1 CLJ 466; [2005] 4 MLJ 37, the Court of Appeal held: “In our judgment, the correct test for determining whether a witness is an accomplice is that laid down by Thomson CJ in Chao Chong v. PP [1959] 1 LNS 11; [1960] MLJ 238: The true question, however, was not the technical one of whether the witness could have been convicted for his participation in the offence if he had been prosecuted. The true question was whether, having regard to his participation in the offence and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, his evidence was to be regarded with suspicion and as possibly so tainted as to invite if not to demand corroboration before it was accepted". [194] In Farose Tamure Mohamad Khan v. PP & Other Appeals [2016] 9 CLJ 769; [2016] 6 MLJ 277, this court made the following observations at para. 108 of the judgment: [108] As a starting point, s 133 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person, and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) of s 114 of the same Act provides that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars. In respect of the nature and extent of the corroboration, Raja Azlan Shah CJM (as His Majesty then was) in Yap Ee Kong & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 LNS 117; [1981] 1 MLJ 144 (at p 146) formulated the rules as follows: S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 78 (1) There should be some independent confirmation tending to connect the accused with the offence although it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance; (2) The independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that a crime was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material particulars the testimony of the accomplice; and (3) The corroboration must come from independent sources, thus bringing out the rule that ordinarily the testimony of an accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another. [195] In the case of Kurchang Singh v. PP [1989] 2 CLJ 442 the court said: “corroboration may come from the other prosecution witnesses or from the accused. Deliberate lies or incriminating conduct in a material particular can constitute corroboration." [196] In the case before us, there was in fact abundance of independent and compelling evidence confirming the evidence of PW6, PW8, PW11, PW13 and PW20 in material particulars. One such example is the evidence of PW4 and PW18 as to the non-compliance of the payment procedure which are S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 79 the corroborative evidence in support of PW20's testimony. The withdrawal of the monies from the company's respective bank accounts etc are all corroborated via oral and documentary evidence. In the end the cash eventually ended up with the accused. [197] Moving on to the next issue, learned counsel for the accused contended that, learned the High Court Judge erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the trust property identified in the CBT charges were cheques issued to the respective contractors, namely RL Offshore Sdn Bhd Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and Coral lntoil Sdn Bhd. The learned judge was said to have fallen into error in continuing to equate the property in the cheque with the property in the money or funds of the company. [198] It was further submitted that the money in THHE’s account is different from the property in a cheque of THHE. It was contended that it has long been understood that when a cheque is filled up by the drawer in favor of a payee, the property in the cheque belongs to the payee not the drawer. Council further contended that the property in the cheque properly understood as a right for the named payee to sue the drawer in the event of a default. In other words, it was contended that the property in a cheque is a chose in action. This, the counsel argued was critical to banking law because the property in a cheque is transferable and allows for a cheque to become a negotiable instrument. Hence, the argument was that there is no criminal breach of trust committed as stated in the charge. [199] In addition to that, it was contended that each of the named payees named payees of the cheques in fact received their respective cheques that S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 80 was issued by THHE. They also each received the sums stated in that cheque. These facts were not disputed by the prosecution. The property in these cheques according to the counsel has therefore been passed to the payee and accordingly, the property in the cheque, which was a chose in action, has been extinguished. In other words, counsel argued that misappropriation of a cheque can only be said to have occurred if the accused took the cheque and did not name the payee and the payee did not receive the cheque. [200] Hence, it was submitted that it is incorrect for the learned High Court Judge to hold that there was CBT of the cheques when the narrative and evidence presented by the prosecution was in fact the alleged misappropriation of the monies belonging to THHE. [201] Learned counsel further argued that from a reading of the grounds of judgment, the learned High Court Judge had wrongly equated the "trust property" in the cheque with the company’s cash. It was submitted that the property in a cheque and the property in the funds are two separate and distinct properties which cannot be used interchangeably and do not equate to one another. [202] With the greatest of respect, we beg to differ. We cannot accept this line of argument. To suggest that a distinction must be drawn between a property in cheque and property in cash is entirely fallacious. Such proposition of law is not in keeping with the language or spirit of section 405 of the Penal Code. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 81 [203] Here is a case where accused is the Chief Executive Officer of THHE. Being in that position he was entrusted with the property of the company including the cheques which are the subject matter of the instant appeal. The accused was one of the authorised signatories for the company’s account. The cheques issued had money value and was indeed a property within the meaning of section 405 of the Penal Code. The intention of the drawer at the time for the cheques issued is the material test. The cheque passes the property of THHE namely the money value stated on the cheque to the payee. [204] The emphasis here again is that these cheques were prepared and issued to the respective contractors without any invoices or claims for payment made upon instruction given by the accused to his officers. Since that is so, the irresistible conclusion is that the accused’s conduct or act was actuated by dishonest intention to subsequently misappropriate THHE‘s money/funds for his own use through the use of these cheques. [205] In Sathiadas v. Public Prosecutor [1970) 1 LNS 142;1970] 2 MLJ 241; [1970] 1 MLRH 166, His Royal Highness, the late Raja Azlan Shah J. (later LP) had this to say: “The gist of the offence of criminal breach of trust is entrustment and dishonest misappropriation or conversion to own use. Once the prosecution have succeeded in proving the receipt of the money for a particular purpose the case of entrustment is made out. Dishonest misappropriation or conversion to own use involves wrongful gain to the appellant or wrongful loss to his employers for the period of the S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 82 retention of the money. That must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. ·Criminal breach of trust is not an offence which counts as one of its factors, the loss that is the consequence of the act, it is the act itself, which in law, amounts to an offence. The offence is complete when there is dishonest misappropriation or conversion to one's own use, or when there is dishonest user in violation of a direction, express or implied, relating to the mode in which the trust is to be discharged.” [206] Seven (7) cheques were encashed. Two cheques were replaced pursuant to instructions for payment to be credited directly into the respective bank accounts of Bicara Sepakat Sdn Bhd and Coral Intoil Sdn Bhd, despite there being no request for such direct remittances. PW8, PW11 and PW13 withdrew the monies and the cash was personally delivered to and received by the accused knowing fully well what they were for. The accused pocketed the company’s fund for himself. PW8, PW11 and PW13, had no choice but to agree with the accused’s special arrangement in order to protect the business interest of their respective companies. The manner in which the money was demanded and received, in our view, lend credence to the prosecution case that the accused has acted dishonestly, thus causing wrongful gain to himself and wrongful loss to THHE. Hence, we find no infirmity in the conviction on the remaining CBT charges. These convictions are safe. [207] For completeness, we shall now touch very briefly on the argument raised by the learned counsel for the accused that the evidence of PW20 was self-serving and there were various contradictions in his testimony. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 83 However, it is worth repeating that the learned trial had critically evaluated the conduct and behaviour of PW20 as a whole and she found no reason to reject the testimony of PW20 as set out in her judgment. This is not a case of one man’s word, PW20, against another’s, the accused. PW20’s evidence was supported by cogent independent evidence connecting the accused with the charges. Hence, it is reasonably safe for the learned trial judge to act upon PW20 evidence. We therefore find no reason to interfere with her findings. [208] On the issue of contradictions and discrepancies of witnesses’ evidence we can do no better than to quote the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris (No. 2) [1977] 1 MLJ 16 at p.19, where the court held as follows: “In this case different witnesses have testified to different parts of what had happened or what had been said and also there are, in the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution, some discrepancies, as would be expected of witnesses giving their recollections of a series of events that took place in 1971-1973. In my opinion discrepancies there will always be, because in the circumstances in which the events happened, every witness does not remember the same thing and he does not remember accurately every single thing that happened. It may be open to criticism, or it might be better if they took down a notebook and wrote down every single thing that happened and every single thing that was said. But they did not know that they are going to be witnesses at this trial. I shall be almost inclined to think that if there are no discrepancies, it might be suggested that they have S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 84 concocted their accounts of what had happened or what had been said because their versions are too consistent. The question is whether the existence of certain discrepancies is sufficient to destroy their credibility. There is no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its entirety or not at all. A court is fully competent, for good and cogent reasons, to accept one part of the testimony of a witness and to reject the other. It is, therefore, necessary to scrutinize each evidence very carefully as this involves the question of weight to be given to certain evidence in particular circumstances." [209] This is also in line with the Federal Court decision in the case of Ong Teng For v. PP [2013] 1 CLJ 39 where Raus Sharif PCA (as he then was) delivering the judgment of the court held as follows: “[33] It is settled law that the credibility of a particular witness and the weight to be given to his other evidence is manifestly within the province of a trial judge. In Andy Bagindah v. PP [2000] 3 CLJ 289, Shaik Daud JCA said that: There is no dearth of authorities to say that in every case, there are bound to be contradictions and discrepancies. The question to be decided by the trial judge is whether those contradictions and/or discrepancies are material ones so as to strike at the very root of the charge. It is for the trial judge to consider this since he was the one who saw and heard the evidence. In the present case the learned judge concluded that there were discrepancies S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 85 but those discrepancies were not material ones. Since this involved the credibility of witnesses, we held that the learned judge was in a better person to decide and an appellate court ought not to interfere with such findings.” [210] We, an appellate court do not have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and it is trite that an appellate court would be slow to disturb the findings of the subordinate court on the issue of credibility of witnesses unless the findings made were perverse. Here, we do not find any finding of the trial judge or the High Court Judge to be perverse. In this regard, we are reminded of the dicta in the case of Dato' Mokhtar Hashim & Anor v. PP [1983] 2 CLJ 10; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 101; [1983] 2 MLJ 232, where the court held: “(7) the credibility of a witness is primarily a matter for the trial judge. The functions of an Appellate Court, when dealing with a question of fact in which questions of credibility are involved are limited in their character and scope and in an appeal from a decision of a trial judge based on his opinion of the trustworthiness of witnesses whom he has seen, an appellate court must in order to reverse not merely entertain doubts whether the decision below is right but be convinced that it is wrong. In this case the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of Atun, the prosecution witness, whom he found to be a consistent witness unshaken by very severe cross-examination and the Appeal Court could find no reason to interfere with his assessment. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 86 [211] Reference may also be made to the observation of Wan Yahya J (as His Lordship then was) in Pie Bin Chin v. Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 MLJ 234: Discrepancies are no doubt present in this case, as they do ostensibly appear in most cases in evidence of witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defence. The transcripts of most evidence, when thoroughly tooth combed by any able lawyer, never failed to yield some form of inconsistencies, discrepancies or contradictions but these do not necessarily render the witness' entire evidence incredible. It is only when a witness's evidence on material and obvious matters in the case is so irreconcilable, ambivalent or negational that his whole evidence is to be disregarded. Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render other parts of his story unworthy of belief. Various persons are endowed with varying powers of cognition, attentiveness and perception, so that it is not uncommon for two witnesses to a common event to describe it in slightly differing versions. I agree with the learned President's findings on this not only because he, having seen and heard the witness is in a better position than I am to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but also because I accept that no witness of truth can account for the details of events which had transpired some months previously with precision.” S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 87 The Defence Against the Charges for Money Laundering (Charges No.2 And No.4) [212] We will now touch on the defence raised by the accused in respect of the money laundering charges AMLATFA No.2 and No.4. Accused denied receiving the sum of RM570,000.00 and RM600,000.00 from PW8. [213] In the grounds of judgment, the learned trial judge had in paragraphs 104 and 106 at pages 110-111 Appeal Record Enclosure 13 Volume 2, made the following findings: “[104] Bagi pertuduhan 2 dan 4 AMLATFA, pembelaan OKT adalah merupakan penafian semata-mata disamping mendakwa bahawa keterangan SP8 adalah keterangan palsu dan pengeluaran wang RM400,000.00, RM570,000.00 dan RM600,000.00 oleh SP8 digunakan untuk membiayai kos gaya hidup mewah keluarga SP8 dan membayar Jabatan lnsolvensi untuk melepaskan SP8 dari status muflis. Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa dakwaan pihak pembelaan terhadap SP8 adalah tidak berasas sama sekali. Tiada bukti bahawa SP8 memberi keterangan palsu dan menggunakan wang tersebut bagi tujuan seperti dikatakan oleh pihak pembelaan. Walaupun SP8 sememangnya seorang yang muflis, beliau hanya dilepaskan dari status muflis pada tahun 2015 sedangkan kejadian berlaku pada tahun 2013. [106] Walaupun hasil siasatan SP23 ke atas akaun OKT tidak menunjukkan apa-apa kemasukan wang yang mencurigakan dan/atau S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 88 sebarang transaksi yang boleh dikaitkan dengan pertuduhan- pertuduhan AMLATFA, ia tidak bermakna bahawa OKT tidak menerima wang tersebut. Apa yang penting pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan penerimaan wang oleh OKT. Apa berlaku kepada wang tersebut setelah diterima oleh OKT adalah tidak material. Begitu juga dengan pemulangan harta yang disita kepada OKT tidak menunjukkan bahawa OKT tidak menerima wang tersebut.” Conclusion [214] Having considered these findings and the rationale of the learned trial judge in doing so, we find no reasons whatsoever to disturb the factual findings made by the learned judge under the circumstances presented in this case. [215] Now, in conclusion, we find that the learned trial judge has not misdirected herself in law. She had considered the evidence of both the prosecution and for the defence very carefully and had given her reasons why she accepted or did not accepted certain evidence and had correctly come to the conclusion that she did. She had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. We see no reasons why we should interfere with her finding of facts or her final decision. Undoubtedly, the same goes to the judgment delivered by the learned High Court Judge where he had taken a detailed evaluation of the entire evidence, critically analysed witnesses evidence placed before the court with great care and at great length and made his findings. We do not find any infirmities in the decision of the learned High Court Judge. S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 89 [216] For the reasons that we have given, we unanimously find that the conviction against the accused by the High Court for CBT Charges No.1, 2 and 4 and the AMLATFA Charges No.2 and No.4 are safe and we accordingly dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction and sentence of the High Court. Date: 18 January 2024 - Sgd - Azmi bin Ariffin Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 90 Counsel For the Appellant : 1. Datuk K. Kumaraendran 2. Datuk Hj. Hisyam Teh Poh Teik 3. Kitson Foong 4. Cheetan Jethwani 5. Kee Wei Lan 6. Low Wei Loke 7. Yaw Xinying 8. Ivy Shu 9. Chew Jee San 10. Vam Sher Mooi [Kit & Associates (Kuala Lumpur)] For the Respondant : 1. Nahra Binti Dollah (Deputy Public Prosecutor) 2. Parvin Hameedah Natchiar (Deputy Public Prosecutor) 3. Aida Khairuleen Binti Azli (Deputy Public Prosecutor) [Attorney General Chambers] S/N f1rR4NzdU0KH/5n4QYyZg **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal

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