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## Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield |
## MARCH 2019
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes ATP 2-01.3 /MCRP 2-3A , dated 10 November 2014. |
## Headquarters, Department of the Army
This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil), and the Central Army Registry site (https://atiam.train.army.mil/catalog/dashboard).
Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, DC 1 March 2019 |
## Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield |
## Contents
| Page | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... xi | PREFACE............................................................................................................. vii INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... xi |
| PART ONE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, PROCESS ACTIVITIES, AND | |
| Chapter 1 INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD FUNDAMENTALS1-1 | |
| Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Defined .................................... 1-1 | |
| IPB Process Activities ......................................................................................... 1-3 | |
| Staff Collaboration .............................................................................................. 1-5 | |
| Relationships ...................................................................................................... 1-8 | |
| Multi-Domain Understanding of the Operational Environment ......................... 1-12 | |
| IPB and the Army's Strategic Roles ................................................................. 1-15 | |
| Chapter 2 IPB SUPPORT TO PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING .............................. 2-1 | |
| IPB and Planning ................................................................................................ 2-1 | |
| IPB and Decision Making ................................................................................... 2-5 | |
| PART TWO FUNDAMENTAL TASK TECHNIQUES | |
| Chapter 3 STEP 1 -DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................... 3-1 | |
| What Is It?........................................................................................................... 3-1 | |
| So What? ............................................................................................................ 3-2 | |
| How to Do It: The Process.................................................................................. 3-2 | |
| Identify the Limits of the Commander's Area of Operations ............................... 3-3 | |
| Identify the Limits of the Commander's Area of Interest .................................... 3-3 | |
| Identify Significant Characteristics of the Area of Operations and Area of Interest for Further Analysis ............................................................................... 3-5 | |
| Evaluate Current Operations and Intelligence Holdings to Determine Additional Information Needed to Complete IPB ................................................ 3-8 | |
| Initiate Processes to Acquire the Information Needed to Complete IPB ............ 3-8 | |
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
| Chapter 4 | STEP 2 -DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS ........ 4-1 | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| | What Is It? ........................................................................................................... 4-1 | |
| | So What? ............................................................................................................ 4-1 | |
| | How to Do It: The Process .................................................................................. 4-2 | |
| | Describe How the Threat Can Affect Friendly Operations .................................. 4-2 | |
| | Describe How Terrain Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations .................... 4-5 | |
| | Describe How Weather Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations ................ 4-19 | |
| | Describe How Civil Considerations Can Affect Friendly and Threat Operations ......................................................................................................... 4-22 | |
| Chapter 5 | STEP 3 -EVALUATE THE THREAT ................................................................. 5-1 | |
| | What Is It? ........................................................................................................... 5-1 | |
| | So What? ............................................................................................................ 5-3 | |
| | How to Do It: The Process .................................................................................. 5-4 | |
| | Identify Threat Characteristics ............................................................................ 5-5 | |
| | Create or Refine Threat Models .......................................................................... 5-9 | |
| | Identify Threat Capabilities ............................................................................... 5-16 | |
| | Outputs from Step 3 of the IPB Process ........................................................... 5-18 | |
| Chapter 6 | STEP 4 -DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION ............................... 6-1 What Is It? ........................................................................................................... 6-1 | |
| | So What? ............................................................................................................ 6-1 | |
| | Develop Threat Courses of Action ...................................................................... 6-2 | |
| | Develop the Event Template and Matrix ........................................................... 6-20 | |
| PART THREE CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS | PART THREE CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS | PART THREE CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS |
| Chapter 7 | IPB FOR UNIFIED ACTION AND UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTS ......................... 7-1 | |
| | Section I - Unified Action ................................................................................. 7-1 | |
| | Offensive Tasks .................................................................................................. 7-1 | |
| | Defensive Tasks .................................................................................................. 7-4 | |
| | Stability Tasks ..................................................................................................... 7-6 | |
| | Section II - Unique Environments ................................................................. 7-16 | |
| | Littoral Environments ........................................................................................ 7-16 | |
| | Urban Environments ......................................................................................... 7-19 | |
| | Subterranean Environments ............................................................................. 7-34 | |
| Chapter 8 | ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS .. 8-1 | |
| | The Operational Environment ............................................................................. 8-1 | |
| | Air Domain .......................................................................................................... 8-1 | |
| | Land Domain ....................................................................................................... 8-1 | |
| | Maritime Domain ................................................................................................. 8-2 | |
| | Cyberspace Domain............................................................................................ 8-6 | |
| | The Information Environment .............................................................................. 8-6 | |
| | The Electromagnetic Spectrum ........................................................................... 8-7 | |
| Appendix A | INTELLIGENCE STAFF OFFICER IPB CHECKLIST ...................................... A-1 | |
| Appendix C | THREAT CHARACTERISTICS FOR REGULAR, IRREGULAR, AND HYBRID THREATS ........................................................................................................... C-1 |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Appendix D | IPB CYBERSPACE CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................... D-1 |
| | GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1 |
| | REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1 |
| | INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1 | |
## Figures
| Introductory figure. Products of the IPB process ....................................................................... xi |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Figure 2-1. IPB and the MDMP steps ..................................................................................... 2-2 |
| Figure 3-1. Substeps and outputs of step 1 of the IPB process ............................................. 3-2 |
| Figure 3-2. Area of operations examples ............................................................................... 3-3 |
| Figure 4-1. Substeps and outputs of step 2 of the IPB process ............................................. 4-2 |
| Figure 4-2. Threat overlay example ....................................................................................... 4-3 |
| Figure 4-3. The focus of natural and complex terrain analysis .............................................. 4-5 |
| Figure 4-4. Intervisibility line example .................................................................................... 4-6 |
| Figure 4-5. Observation and fields of fire (complex terrain) example .................................... 4-8 |
| Figure 4-6. Avenues of approach with mobility corridors (natural terrain) example ............... 4-9 |
| Figure 4-7. Key terrain (natural terrain) example ................................................................. 4-10 |
| Figure 4-8. Cover and concealment (natural terrain) and line of sight analysis examples ........................................................................................................... 4-13 |
| Figure 4-9. Modified combined obstacle overlay example ................................................... 4-14 |
| Figure 4-10. Modified combined obstacle overlay example for an urban area .................... 4-15 |
| Figure 4-11. Concentric ring technique example.................................................................. 4-17 |
| Figure 4-12. Belt technique example .................................................................................... 4-18 |
| Figure 4-13. Avenue-in-depth technique example ............................................................... 4-18 |
| Figure 4-14. Box technique example .................................................................................... 4-19 |
| Figure 5-1. Substeps and outputs of step 3 of the IPB process ............................................. 5-4 |
| Figure 5-2. Regular threat organizational chart example ....................................................... 5-5 |
| Figure 5-3. Irregular threat organizational chart example ...................................................... 5-6 |
| Figure 5-4. Threat model example ....................................................................................... 5-10 |
| Figure 5-5. Time event chart example .................................................................................. 5-15 |
| Figure 5-6. Threat template example ................................................................................... 5-19 |
| Figure 5-7. High-value target list developed during step 3 of IPB (example) ....................... 5-20 |
| Figure 5-8. Threat capability statement example (narrative format) .................................... 5-20 |
| Figure 5-9. Threat capability statement example (table format) ........................................... 5-21 |
| Figure 6-1. Substeps and outputs of step 4 of the IPB process ............................................. 6-2 |
| Figure 6-2. Developing a situation template ........................................................................... 6-9 |
| Figure 6-3. Completed situation template example .............................................................. 6-10 |
| Figure 6-4. Situation template in a matrix format example ................................................... 6-10 |
| Figure 6-5. Situation template as an overlay depicting the enemy in offensive tasks ......... 6-12 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Figure 6-6. Situation template as an overlay depicting the enemy defense ........................ 6-14 |
| Figure 6-7. Situation template as an overlay depicting irregular forces ............................... 6-15 |
| Figure 6-8. Threat course of action statement example ...................................................... 6-16 |
| Figure 6-9. High-value target list developed during step 4 of IPB (example) ...................... 6-17 |
| Figure 6-10. High-payoff target list developed during step 3 of the MDMP (example) ........ 6-17 |
| Figure 6-11. Developing an event template ......................................................................... 6-21 |
| Figure 6-12. Completed event template example ................................................................ 6-21 |
| Figure 6-13. Completed event template and its associated event matrix example ............. 6-22 |
| Figure 6-14. Decision support template and matrix example .............................................. 6-23 |
| Figure 6-15. Information collection matrix example ............................................................. 6-24 |
| Figure 7-1. Types of seas and land masses encompassing littoral areas ........................... 7-17 |
| Figure 7-2. Interaction among key components of the urban environment ......................... 7-19 |
| Figure 7-3. Urban environment surface area example ........................................................ 7-22 |
| Figure 7-4. Urban area modified combined obstacle overlay example ............................... 7-23 |
| Figure 7-5. Gridded reference graphic example .................................................................. 7-24 |
| Figure 7-6. Urban look-down angle example ....................................................................... 7-25 |
| Figure 7-7. Urban environment air and maritime avenues of approach .............................. 7-26 |
| Figure 7-8. Urban pattern examples .................................................................................... 7-27 |
| Figure 7-9. Street pattern and urban layout examples ........................................................ 7-27 |
| Figure 7-10. Urban environment obstacles to ground mobility ............................................ 7-28 |
| Figure 7-11. Urban environment cover and concealment examples ................................... 7-29 |
| Figure 7-12. Modification of urban infrastructure to permit ground mobility ........................ 7-31 |
| Figure 7-13. Use of supersurfaces for weapons employment ............................................. 7-32 |
| Figure 8-1. Layers of the Earth's atmosphere ....................................................................... 8-4 |
| Figure D-1. Single versus multiple cyber-personas ............................................................... D-3 |
| Figure D-2. Area of operations and area of influence example ............................................. D-4 |
| Figure D-3. Threat overlay with cyberspace components example ....................................... D-6 |
| Figure D-4. MCOO, physical network and cyber-persona layers example ............................ D-8 |
| Figure D-5. MCOO, physical network, logical network, and cyber-persona layers example .............................................................................................................. D-8 |
| Figure D-6. Threat template with cyberspace considerations example ............................... D-12 |
| Figure D-7. Threat situation template with cyberspace considerations, example 1 ............ D-15 |
| Figure D-8. Threat situation template with cyberspace considerations, example 2 ............ D-16 |
| Figure D-9. Event template with cyberspace considerations, example 1 ............................ D-17 |
| Figure D-10. Event template with cyberspace considerations, example 2 .......................... D-17 |
Tables
| Table 1-1. IPB and intelligence analysis support to operational framework considerations ................................................................................................... 1-14 |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Table 1-2. IPB and the Army's strategic roles ...................................................................... 1-16 |
| Table 4-1. Threat description table example .......................................................................... 4-4 |
| Table 4-2. Maximum distances between and typical widths of mobility corridors .................. 4-9 |
| Table 4-3. Tactical obstacle effects ...................................................................................... 4-11 |
| Table 4-4. Typical color control measures for modified combined obstacle overlays .......... 4-14 |
| Table 4-5. Terrain effects matrix example ............................................................................ 4-16 |
| Table 4-6. Crosswalk of civil considerations (ASCOPE) with operational variables (PMESII) ............................................................................................................ 4-23 |
| Table 5-1. High-value targets by threat element and cyberspace........................................ 5-12 |
| Table 5-2. CARVER matrix tool ............................................................................................ 5-16 |
| Table 6-1. Offensive indicators ............................................................................................. 6-18 |
| Table 6-2. Defensive indicators ............................................................................................ 6-19 |
| Table 7-1. Civil security intelligence requirements ................................................................. 7-7 |
| Table 7-2. Evaluating external threat organizations ............................................................... 7-8 |
| Table 7-3. Evaluating internal threat organizations .............................................................. 7-10 |
| Table 7-4. Evaluating the general population's role in a conflict .......................................... 7-11 |
| Table 7-5. Information sources for supporting economic developments ............................. 7-15 |
| Table 7-6. Framework for determining relevant aspects of littoral environments ................ 7-16 |
| Table 7-7. Example framework for identifying relevant aspects of urban environments...... 7-21 |
| Table 7-8. Subterranean environment categories ................................................................ 7-34 |
| Table 7-9. Subterranean terrain features ............................................................................. 7-35 |
| Table 7-10. Terrain effects matrix for a subterranean environment example ...................... 7-37 |
| Table 8-1. IPB considerations for the information environment ............................................. 8-7 |
| Table A-1. Intelligence staff officer IPB checklist ...................................................................A-1 |
| Table B-1. Height of eye versus horizon range ......................................................................B-1 |
| Table B-2. Terrain types for mechanized or armored forces ..................................................B-2 |
| Table B-3. Cover from flat trajectory weapons .......................................................................B-3 |
| Table B-4. Concealment from aerial detection and percentage of roof coverage ..................B-3 |
| Table B-5. Port categories ......................................................................................................B-3 |
| Table B-6. Minimum helipad and heliport requirements .........................................................B-3 |
| Table B-8. Unopposed movement planning speeds for U.S. and opposition forces ..............B-5 |
| Table B-9. Movement conversion ...........................................................................................B-5 |
| Table B-10. Example of typical Soviet style frontages and depths for units (defense) ..........B-6 Table B-11. Example of typical Soviet style frontages and depths of objectives |
| Table B-12. Environmental mission-limiting thresholds .........................................................B-6 |
| Table B-13. Maximum ranges for the identification of select targets .....................................B-8 |
| Table B-14. Minimum airfield requirements ........................................................................... B-8 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Table B-15. Typical planning force ratios............................................................................... B-9 |
| Table B-16. Traffic flow capability based on route width ....................................................... B-9 |
| Table B-17. Metric conversion chart ...................................................................................... B-9 |
| Table C-1. Description of potential irregular threats .............................................................. C-1 |
| Table D-1. Terrain analysis and corresponding cyberspace considerations ......................... D-5 |
| Table D-2. Threat description table with cyberspace considerations example...................... D-7 |
| Table D-3. Terrain effects matrix with cyberspace considerations example ......................... D-9 |
| Table D-4. Cyberspace considerations for the warfighting functions .................................. D-10 |
| Table D-5. Event matrix with cyberspace considerations example ..................................... D-18 | |
## Preface
ATP 2-01.3 constitutes current doctrine on how to systematically evaluate the effects of significant characteristics of the operational environment (OE) for specific missions. This publication-
- Describes how the commander and staff examine mission variables to understand how these variables may affect operations.
- Discusses intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as a critical component of the military decision-making process, how IPB supports decision making, and the integrating processes and continuing activities.
- Facilitates a common understanding, foundational concepts, and methods of the IPB process.
The principal audience for ATP 2-01.3 is tactical Army commanders and staffs. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or a multinational headquarters also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine related to IPB. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States (U.S.), international, and in some cases host-nation and other nation's laws and regulations when applicable. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
ATP 2-01.3 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 2-01.3 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 2-01.3 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
This manual applies to intelligence activities conducted outside the United States. Intelligence activities conducted inside the United States, as well as those that target U.S. persons and groups outside the United States, invoke additional requirements and intelligence oversight rules. To the extent any of the activities described in this publication are conducted inside the United States, or target U.S. persons or groups outside the United States, consult the judge advocate for assistance.
ATP 2-01.3 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of ATP 2-01.3 is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the Directorate of Doctrine and Intelligence System Training, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, Fort Huachuca, AZ. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 ( Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms ) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZS-DST-D (ATP 2-01.3), 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017; by e-mail to [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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## Acknowledgement
The term Cyber Kill Chain, including Cyber Kill Chain methodology, in paragraphs D-33 through D-37, has been used with permission from Lockheed Martin Corporation, www.lockheedmartin.com, Gaining the Advantage: Applying Cyber Kill Chain® Methodology to Network Defense, 2015 . The copyright owner has granted permission to reproduce material from its works. With Lockheed Martin Corporation's permission, some of the text has been paraphrased and adapted for military purposes.
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## Introduction
IPB is a collaborative staff effort led by the J-2/G-2/S-2 and the intelligence staff. IPB products developed and continuously updated facilitate situational understanding and assist commanders and staffs in identifying relevant aspects within the area of operations and area of interest that can affect mission accomplishment. The introductory figure lists and summarizes the relevant IPB products.
Introductory figure. Products of the IPB process
IMAGE:
This image depicts a structured overview of military operational planning using a series of steps and graphics. It illustrates the following stages:
1. **Area of Operations (Step 1):** Defined by the commander, it outlines operational boundaries, including areas of adjacent and subordinate units.
2. **Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (Step 2):** Focuses on the military aspects of the environment, such as avenues of approach, mobility corridors, and key terrains.
3. **Threat Overlay and Model (Step 3):** Identifies current threat locations and converts threat doctrines into graphical models, highlighting high-value targets and enemy strengths.
4. **Threat and Situation Templates (Step 4):** Develops templates based on threat operations, including time and distance assessments, and graphic control measures.
5. **Event Template and Matrix:** Offers guidance for planning, with time phase lines and threat indicators to determine the threat's actions.
The image is a guide to systematically analyze and plan military operations by visualizing and assessing potential threats and environmental factors.
The IPB process is unique-it impacts the range of military operations, is relevant across all echelons, and is the fundamental element used in all planning and decision making. IPB serves as the initial framework for analysis of the battlefield in all operations.
The revision of this publication addresses complex OE in which U.S. forces will operate across all domains (air, land, space, maritime, and cyberspace) and the information environment and worldwide. The goal of this revision is to-
- Highlight staff processes and products to assist commanders and staffs in identifying when and where to leverage friendly capabilities in the scope of an operation.
- Add some unique considerations for IPB supporting certain missions not addressed in the 2014 version of this publication.
ATP 2-01.3 updates and describes the fundamentals of IPB. It contains eight chapters and four appendixes:
- Chapter 1 provides the fundamentals of IPB and introduces topics such as the operational framework, peer threats, multi-domain operations, and identifying windows of opportunity.
- Chapter 2 discusses IPB support to decision making and the relationship between IPB and the military decision-making process.
- Chapter 3 , step 1 of the IPB process, discusses the analysis of the significant characteristics of or activities within the OE that may influence friendly and threat courses of action and command decisions, as well as the physical space the mission will occupy.
- Chapter 4 , step 2 of the IPB process, discusses how the significant characteristics of the OE can affect friendly and threat operations.
- Chapter 5 , step 3 of the IPB process, discusses threat force capabilities and the doctrinal principles and tactics, techniques, and procedures threat forces prefer to employ.
- Chapter 6 , step 4 of the IPB process, identifies and describes how threat courses of action can influence friendly operations.
- Chapter 7 discusses IPB support to offense, defense, and stability tasks and the unique characteristics of littoral, urban, and subterranean environments.
- Chapter 8 discusses unique aspects of each domain, the information environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum.
- Appendix A provides a checklist to the S-2 on the how to of IPB.
- Appendix B provides analysts with tools to use when performing IPB.
- Appendix C describes the threat characteristics for regular, irregular, and hybrid threats.
- Appendix D discusses the cyberspace domain and how to integrate cyberspace considerations into the IPB process. |
## This publication-
- Introduces acronyms at their first use in the front matter of this publication (preface and introduction), and again in the body of the publication (chapters and appendixes).
- Introduces GX and SX (such as G-2 and S-2) acronyms at their first use without defining them as it hinders readability. Definitions for these acronyms can be found in the glossary.
- Uses U.S. as a modifier (for example, U.S. forces) and United States as a noun (for example, the United States, a country in North America).
- Uses the term threat , which includes all enemies and adversaries that are part of the OE.
- Refers to staffs as the operations, intelligence, and other coordinating and special staff sections unless indicated otherwise.
- Uses holdings to annotate many different feeds (for example, biometrics). Holdings refer to information or data, such as data files and/or databases, that the command or its higher headquarters has or information that the command can access.
- Avoids discussing specific disciplines and complementary intelligence capabilities. |
## PART ONE |
## Fundamental Principles, Process Activities, and Relationships |
## Chapter 1 |
## Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Fundamentals |
## INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) DEFINED
- 1-1. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. IPB allows commanders and staffs to take a holistic approach to analyzing the operational environment (OE). A holistic approach-
- Describes the totality of relevant aspects of the OE that may impact friendly, threat, and neutral forces.
- Accounts for all relevant domains that may impact friendly and threat operations.
- Identifies windows of opportunity to leverage friendly capabilities against threat forces.
- Allows commanders to leverage positions of relative advantage at a time and place most advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available.
- 1-2. IPB results in intelligence products that are used during the military decision-making process (MDMP) to assist in developing friendly courses of action (COAs) and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products (which are included in the intelligence estimate) developed during IPB are critical to planning information collection and targeting operations. IPB products include-
- Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and high-value target (HVT) lists.
- Event templates and associated event matrices.
- Modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOOs), terrain effects matrices, and terrain assessments.
- Weather effects work aids-weather forecast charts, weather effects matrices, light and illumination tables, and weather estimates.
- Civil considerations overlays and assessments.
- 1-3. The J-2/G-2/S-2 leads the staff effort and begins preparing for IPB during generate intelligence knowledge, which is associated with the intelligence support to force generation task of the intelligence warfighting function and incorporated into the Army design methodology. (See FM 2-0 and ADRP 1-03 for intelligence warfighting function tasks and measures of performance, respectively.)
- 1-4. During generate intelligence knowledge, intelligence staffs create data files for their OE based on existing information and their evaluation of the information and intelligence related to the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time [PMESII-PT]). The intelligence staff can also access holdings maintained by the military intelligence brigade-theater (also called MIB-T). This theater-aligned unit processes, refines, and stores intelligence products daily, which benefit nonregionally aligned units.
- 1-5. When generating intelligence knowledge, the intelligence staff should begin by determining the information needed to collect on the OE. As the staff begins to collect data on the OE, the data should be organized into baseline data files in accordance with the commander's guidance. These files must be compatible with the unit's mission command information systems. Generally, tactical echelons create primary data files based on the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Strategic and operational echelons create data files based on the commander's operational requirements.
- 1-6. Given the limited time available to collect and evaluate information and intelligence on the operational variables, the information obtained from these data files may not be specific enough to support the IPB process and the MDMP. However, the commander and staff can use the information to assist in framing the OE during the Army design methodology.
- 1-7. Throughout the operations process, the commander and staff continually collect information and analyze the operational variables in order to provide increased situational understanding due to possible contingency operations. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decision making (ADP 5-0).
- 1-8. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, the commander and staff draw relevant information categorized by the operational variables and filter it into the mission variables used during mission analysis. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). During IPB, the staff focuses on the relevant aspects of the OE as they pertain to the staff's warfighting function. The staff focuses primarily on the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. However, depending on the staff's echelon, the type of OE, the type of operation, and changes in the OE, the staff may need to update its analysis to ensure the mission focus is both relevant and accurate.
- 1-9. To be effective, IPB must-
- Be a continuous process with all staff members providing input.
- Account for all domains, the information environment, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). (See chapter 8.)
- Define the commander's area of interest (AOI) by its geographic boundaries to focus collection and analysis within the AOI.
- Describe how the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations will affect friendly and threat operations.
- Include relevant aspects of the OE for decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. (See FM 3-0 for more on these operations.)
- Support each step of the MDMP with IPB products.
- Determine how the interactions of friendly forces, threat forces, and local populations affect each other to continually create outcomes that positively affect friendly operations. This aspect of IPB is not the sole responsibility of the intelligence staff. It involves the commander and the entire staff collaborating to determine these effects.
- Support the operational framework considerations-physical, temporal, cognitive, and virtual. (See paragraph 1-60.)
- Facilitate the commander's ability to visualize the desired end state and a broad concept of how to shape current conditions into that end state.
- Support the commander in directing the intelligence effort.
- Facilitate understanding threat characteristics and the threat's goals, objectives, and COAs.
- 1-10. IPB is most effective and best aids the commander's decision making when the intelligence staff integrates the expertise of the other staff sections and supporting elements into its analysis. (See paragraphs 127 through 1-33.) This is especially true when operating in environments where the effects of the operational and mission variables are complex, multidimensional, and not easily determined.
- 1-11. IPB assists commanders in reducing uncertainty by evaluating how the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations may affect operations and decision making. Most intelligence requirements are generated because of IPB and its interrelationship with decision making.
- 1-12. A key aspect of IPB is refinement. The conclusions and the products developed during IPB are continually refined throughout the operation. This information is incorporated into the running estimate as new information is obtained and further analysis is conducted during situation development. (See FM 6-0 for more information on the running estimate.) This refinement ensures the commander's decisions are based on the most current information and intelligence available. |
## IPB PROCESS ACTIVITIES
- 1-13. The IPB process consists of the following four steps:
- Define the OE.
- Describe environmental effects on operations.
- Evaluate the threat.
- Determine threat COAs.
Note. Although there are four steps to the IPB process, it is important to note that IPB is a continuous process. Continuous analysis and assessment are necessary to maintain situational understanding of an OE in constant flux. |
## STEP 1-DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
- 1-14. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). An OE for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (such as politics, economics) that affect OE conditions and operations. Thus, each commander's OE is part of a higher commander's OE. Defining the OE results in the identification of-
- Significant characteristics of the OE that can affect friendly and threat operations.
- Gaps in current intelligence holdings.
- 1-15. Step 1 is important because it assists the commander in defining relative aspects of the OE in time and space. This is equally important when considering characteristics of multi-domain OEs. Aspects of these OEs may act simultaneously across the battlefield but may only factor in friendly or threat operations at specific times and locations.
- 1-16. During step 1, the intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission. The intelligence staff evaluates significant characteristics to identify gaps and initiate information collection. The intelligence staff then justifies the analysis to the commander. Failure to identify or misidentifying the effect these variables may have on operations at a given time and place can hinder decision making and result in the development of an ineffective information collection strategy. During step 1, the area of operations (AO), AOI, and area of influence must also be identified and established. (Chapter 3 discusses step 1 fully.)
- 1-17. Understanding friendly and threat forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, languages, tribal affiliations, and operational and mission variables, can be equally important. Identifying the significant characteristics of the OE is essential in identifying the additional information needed to complete IPB. Once approved by the commander, this information becomes the commander's initial intelligence requirementswhich focus the commander's initial information collection efforts and the remaining steps of the IPB process.
- 1-18. Additionally, where a unit will be assigned and how its operations will synchronize with other associated operations must be considered. For example, the G-2/S-2 should be forming questions regarding where the unit will deploy within the entire theater of operations and the specific logistics requirements needed to handle the operation's contingency plans. |
## STEP 2-DESCRIBE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS
- 1-19. During step 2 of the IPB process, the intelligence staff describes how significant characteristics affect friendly operations. The intelligence staff also describes how terrain, weather, civil considerations, and friendly forces affect threat forces. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until the development of threat COAs in step 4 of IPB and friendly COAs later in the MDMP. The entire staff determines the effects of friendly and threat force actions on the population.
- 1-20. If the intelligence staff does not have the information required to form conclusions, it uses assumptions to fill information gaps-always careful to ensure the commander understands when assumptions are used in place of facts to form conclusions. (Chapter 4 discusses step 2 fully.) |
## STEP 3-EVALUATE THE THREAT
- 1-21. The purpose of evaluating the threat is to understand how a threat can affect friendly operations. Although threat forces may conform to some of the fundamental principles of warfare that guide Army operations, these forces will have obvious, as well as subtle, differences in how they approach situations and problem solving. Understanding these differences is essential to understanding how a threat force will react in a given situation.
- 1-22. Threat evaluation does not begin with IPB. The intelligence staff conducts threat evaluations and creates threat models during generate intelligence knowledge of the intelligence support to force generation task . Using this information, the intelligence staff refines threat models, as necessary, to support IPB. When analyzing a well-known threat, the intelligence staff may be able to rely on previously developed threat models. When analyzing a new or less well-known threat, the intelligence staff may need to evaluate the threat and develop threat models during the MDMP's mission analysis step. When this occurs, the intelligence staff relies heavily on the threat evaluation conducted by higher headquarters and other intelligence agencies.
- 1-23. In situations where there is no threat force, the intelligence analysis conducted and the products developed relating to terrain, weather, and civil considerations may be sufficient to support planning. An example of this type of situation is a natural disaster. (Chapter 5 discusses step 3 more fully.) |
## STEP 4-DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
- 1-24. During step 4, the intelligence staff identifies and develops possible threat COAs that can affect accomplishing the friendly mission. The staff uses the products associated with determining threat COAs to assist in developing and selecting friendly COAs during COA steps of the MDMP. Identifying and developing all valid threat COAs minimize the potential of surprise to the commander by an unanticipated threat action.
- 1-25. Failure to fully identify and develop all valid threat COAs may lead to the development of an information collection strategy that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the threat has taken and may result in friendly forces being surprised and possibly defeated. When needed, the staff should identify all significant civil considerations (this refers to those civil considerations identified as OE significant characteristics) to portray the interrelationship of the threat, friendly forces, and population activities.
- 1-26. The staff develops threat COAs in the same manner friendly COAs are developed. The COA development discussion in ADRP 5-0 is an excellent model for developing valid threat COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with threat doctrine or patterns of operation. Although the intelligence staff has the primary responsibility for developing threat COAs, it needs assistance from the rest of the staff to present the most accurate and complete analysis to the commander. (Chapter 6 discusses step 4 fully.) |
## STAFF COLLABORATION
- 1-27. Precise intelligence is critical to targeting threat capabilities at the right time and place to open windows of opportunity across domains. Commanders and staffs receive effective intelligence when they direct and participate in intelligence warfighting function activities. Close interaction between the commander, G-2/S-2, G-3/S-3, and the rest of the staff is essential, as the entire staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes and continuing activities.
- 1-28. From the perspective of fighting for intelligence, the first aspect of supporting operations is developing good information requirements and designating priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) resulting from IPB and the completion of the MDMP. Commanders and staffs must have detailed knowledge of threat strengths, vulnerabilities, organizations, equipment, capabilities, and tactics to plan for and execute friendly operations. Staff collaboration assists in developing this detailed knowledge and accounts for possible threat COAs.
- 1-29. Commanders drive intelligence, intelligence facilitates operations, and operations enable intelligence; this relationship is continuous. Commanders provide tactical and operational experience as it relates to various OEs and missions; they also provide an understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. Commanders assist in shaping the focus and scope of IPB to facilitate an effective MDMP.
- 1-30. G-2/S-2s facilitate the IPB effort; however, G-2/S-2s and their staffs cannot provide all of the information the commander requires for situational understanding. Other staff sections or supporting elements must assist the intelligence staff in producing and continuously refining all IPB products. Total staff integration ensures a holistic view of the OE, reduces the initial time required for IPB development, and assists the commander in timely decision making. This coordination also improves the quality and accuracy of IPB products.
- 1-31. Staff sections bring their expertise to IPB as follows:
- The chief of staff or executive officer-
- Ensures IPB is performed as a collaborative effort.
- Synchronizes staff activities during IPB.
- Using tools, such as the one-third to two-thirds planning rule as a guide, determines how long each step of the MDMP will take, how much time is allocated to mission analysis, and how much time within mission analysis can be suballocated to IPB.
- The G-1/S-1 assists in analyzing the OE to identify its relevant aspects and how they will impact the following, including but not limited to-
- Casualty assistance operations.
- Personnel accountability.
- Essential human resources services.
- Personnel support activities.
- The G-2/S-2 analyzes the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations and assists the commander in improving the understanding of how these variables can affect operations. The G-2/S-2 does this through the production of an intelligence assessment that supports the MDMP, the integrating processes of targeting and risk management, and the continuing activities of information collection and security operations. The rest of the staff assists the G-2/S-2 in this effort. The G-2/S-2 also informs the staff on intelligence capabilities, limitations, and operations. (Appendix A provides the 'how to' of IPB as a checklist for the S-2.) Additionally, the G-2/S-2-
- Facilitates generating intelligence knowledge.
- Continually coordinates with the staff, outside agencies, and organizations for input to situational understanding.
- Identifies AOIs and areas of influence.
- Assists the staff with threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intent.
- Conducts terrain analysis.
- Determines the threat's composition and disposition.
- Develops threat templates by warfighting function.
- With assistance from the other staff sections, determines threat missions, objectives, schemes of maneuver, and desired end states.
- Coordinates with the staff to identify HVTs and threat COAs.
- Determines named areas of interest (NAIs) with staff input.
- The G-3/S-3 provides subject matter expertise on the art and science of military operations and-
- Reviews the G-2/S-2's evaluation of threat COAs.
- Reviews the G-2/S-2's identification and evaluation of the threat's composition and disposition.
- Assists the G-2/S-2 with terrain and weather effects on friendly and threat operations.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and other staff members understand the AO and other friendly maneuver limitations and parameters specified by higher headquarters.
- Ensures the G-2/S-2 and other staff members understand available friendly maneuver forces.
- Assists in selecting high-payoff targets (HPTs), target areas of interest (TAIs), and decision points.
- Assists in developing the decision support template (DST).
- Evaluates threat COAs to ensure they are valid from an operational perspective.
- Evaluates threat situation templates, COA statements, HVT lists, and civil considerations overlays and assessments to ensure they contain the information necessary to support friendly COA development and analysis.
- Evaluates the event template and matrix to ensure they contain the information necessary to support friendly COA analysis and the development of the DST.
- The G-4/S-4 provides subject matter expertise on sustainment operations and assists the G-2/S-2 in-
- Identifying and evaluating threat and host-nation logistics capabilities.
- Potential supply routes and resupply points.
- Identifying and evaluating threat logistics capabilities.
- The G-5/S-5 is the principal staff officer for planning mid- to long-range operations. Coordination with the G-5/S-5 ensures the synchronization of IPB and information collection for future operations or the next phase of an operation. The G-5/S-5 also assists in developing branches and sequels as well as deception plans.
- The G-6/S-6 provides subject matter expertise on friendly communications systems and assists the G-2/S-2 in identifying and evaluating friendly communications systems' vulnerabilities to cyberspace and electronic attack. Additionally, the G-6/S-6 coordinates with the spectrum manager to determine friendly forces' vulnerabilities to known threat systems.
- The G-9/S-9 provides subject matter expertise on civil affairs operations. This staff assists the G-2/S-2 in-
- Identifying and evaluating civil considerations on military operations and evaluating the effect of military operations on civilian populations, in conjunction with the G-3/S-3.
- Identifying protected targets. (The civil affairs staff, along with the chief of fires or fire support officer, provides this assistance.)
- Creating and maintaining civil considerations overlay, assessments, and data files and/or databases.
- Providing information on the neutral population, and how it supports/opposes the host nation and friendly and threat forces.
- 1-32. The intelligence staff coordinates with key supporting elements, whose expertise supports IPB:
- The operations security officer, co-located with the S-3, provides subject matter expertise on friendly vulnerabilities during the phases of an operation. For example, friendly forces may be vulnerable to different threat capabilities; the operations security officer can assist in identifying by phase which threat assets and capabilities should be the focus of information collection and targeting.
- Information operations provide subject matter expertise on shaping operational activities in and through the information environment and cyberspace. (See FM 3-13.) The information operations officer is responsible for-
- Integrating information-related capabilities.
- Assisting the G-2/S-2 to identify and evaluate threat information capabilities and deception and denial capabilities, as well as the means to influence the population.
- Providing information on friendly, neutral, and threat key communicators to use as part of a nonlethal engagement strategy through various information-related capabilities.
- The chief of fires at division and above and the fire support officer at brigade and below provide subject matter expertise on fires. The fires (artillery and air defense) subject matter expert-
- Assists the G-2/S-2 in-
- Developing threat fires-related HVTs.
- Evaluating threat fire support operations, including identifying potential friendly HPTs from the threat perspective.
- Assessing potential threat artillery.
- Developing situation and event templates of probable threat employment of fire support assets.
- Positioning threat fire support assets on the situation template.
- Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 in identifying types of threat artillery and evaluating likely threat artillery and/or missile positions.
- Assists the staff in identifying and evaluating potential engagement areas and kill zones.
- Assists, in coordination with the G-2/S-2 and the staff weather officer, in determining what effect weather and terrain will have on threat artillery systems.
- Participates in the selection of HPTs, TAIs, and decision points.
- Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 in determining the fire support effort to the friendly information collection effort and in countering the threat information collection effort.
- Assists the staff on protection from threat air.
- The engineer coordinator provides subject matter expertise on mobility and countermobility and assists the G-2/S-2 in developing threat obstacle plans for the situation template. The engineer coordinator-
- Assists the staff in identifying and assessing obstacles along friendly and avenues of approach (AAs).
- Assists the G-2/S-2 with terrain analysis and those terrain analysis products that support IPB.
- Assists the G-2/S-2 in developing the MCOO.
- Provides staff input concerning threat mobility, countermobility, and survivability doctrine, tactics, and equipment capabilities.
- Assists in developing situation and event templates regarding the probable employment of threat engineer assets and obstacle emplacement.
- Coordinates with the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 in determining engineer support to the friendly information collection effort and in countering the threat information collection effort.
- Provides engineer reconnaissance input, including the military load-capacity of bridges. (See ATP 3-34.81.)
- The chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) officer provides subject matter expertise and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of CBRN assets, production, and storage facilities; the availability of precursor chemicals and materials; and the potential areas of CBRN employment. The CBRN officer-
- Provides input to the G-2/S-2 on threat CBRN doctrine, capabilities, and employment.
- Assists the staff in templating likely locations of threat CBRN assets.
- Advises the staff on threat doctrine concerning the use of obscurants, likely triggers for its employment, and types of obscurant-generating equipment.
- Assists the staff in locating water sources that friendly and threat forces could use for CBRN decontamination operations.
- Advises the G-2/S-2, in coordination with the staff weather officer, on the impact of the weather and terrain on friendly and threat CBRN operations.
- The air defense artillery (ADA) officer provides subject matter expertise on ADA and assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of ADA assets and potential areas of employment. The ADA officer-
- Advises the G-2/S-2, in coordination with the staff weather officer, on the impact of the weather and terrain on friendly and threat ADA operations.
- Provides input to the G-2/S-2 on threat ADA doctrine, capabilities, and employment.
- Assists the staff in templating likely locations of threat ADA assets.
- Assists the staff in determining weather and terrain effects on friendly and threat ADA operations.
- Provides staff input concerning threat ADA doctrine, tactics, capabilities, and equipment.
- Assists in developing threat HVTs.
- Assists in identifying threat air AAs and assessing threat fixed-wing and rotary-wing air defense capabilities. Note. An air AA refers to the air route of a threat aerial or tactical ballistic missile force of a given size leading to its objective or to the key terrain in its path. (See ATP 3-01.16.)
- The spectrum manager provides subject matter expertise on procedures for using the EMS and for avoiding communications interferences.
- The electronic warfare (EW) officer-
- Provides subject matter expertise on ground-based, airborne, and functional EW employment considerations.
- Assists in developing threat EW-, communications-, and radar-related HVTs.
- Has additional responsibilities as the cyberspace planner. (See FM 3-12.)
- Assists the G-2/S-2 in determining the locations of EW assets and potential areas and methods of employment.
- Assists in determining friendly forces' vulnerabilities to known threat systems.
- The surgeon provides subject matter expertise for the analysis and disposition of captured enemy medical materiel and for the analysis of any medications carried by captured or detained threat personnel.
- 1-33. External assets, such as the following, provide additional subject matter expertise for input to the IPB process: red teams, red cells, foreign-area officers, international affairs officers, cultural enablers, State Department officers, regional experts, psychological operations units, and other special operations units. |
## RELATIONSHIPS
- 1-34. As one of the integrating processes, IPB is integral to targeting, risk management, information collection, planning, and decision making. (See chapter 2.) IPB is also related to the generate intelligence knowledge and situation development tasks. |
## TARGETING
- 1-35. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). During steps 3 and 4 of IPB, the intelligence staff identifies HVTs associated with each threat capability or COA. This assists the fires cell in conducting target-value analysis. A high-value target is a target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission (JP 3-60).
- 1-36. The following techniques may be useful in identifying and evaluating HVTs:
- Identify HVTs from existing intelligence studies, database evaluations, patrol debriefs, and size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (also called SALUTE) reports. Reviewing threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and previous threat operations as well as understanding the threat task, purpose, method, and end state are useful.
- Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation, branches, or sequels.
- Determine how the threat might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the threat's ability to substitute other assets and adopt branches or sequels.
- Consider AO and AOI effects and potentially broader effects.
- Consider how the threat may use multiple capabilities to create the effects of one or more HVTs.
- Consider how the threat may use assets by phases of an operation, which may lead to classifying certain threat assets, functions, or systems as HVTs across all domains, the information environment, and the EMS.
- Consider the multi-domain nature of complex OEs and how threat forces may use assets to disrupt friendly operations at multiple echelons and locations.
- After identifying HVTs, place them in order of their relative worth to the threat's operation and record them as part of the threat model. The value of an HVT varies throughout an operation.
- 1-37. A high-payoff target is a target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action (JP 3-60). HPTs are those HVTs that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander's mission. The staff develops HPTs, which can include various threat considerations that can be detrimental to the friendly mission's success.
- 1-38. The intelligence staff, aided by other staff sections, also identifies indicators associated with those targets that can assist in determining their locations and activities. Identifying HVTs during IPB is essential to developing HPTs during the COA development step of the MDMP, and to refining those targets throughout the operations process, particularly during targeting boards and meetings. (Chapter 6 discusses the identification of HVTs and indicators.)
- 1-39. During targeting meetings, the intelligence officer, along with other staff sections or supporting elements, assesses friendly capabilities, friendly missions, and the effects of friendly actions on the civilian populace. As HPTs are developed, the analysis of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations conducted during IPB assists in developing intelligence target packages on those targets. (See ATP 3-60.) |
## RISK MANAGEMENT
1-40. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). IPB assists in identifying, quantifying, and mitigating risks. For example, a commander may consider attacking a target on the protected target list. However, because the entire staff performs IPB, which provides an understanding of the OE based on analysis of the mission variables, the true impact of attacking the target can be articulated (the reason the target is on the protected target list), and the commander can make an informed decision to balance risk with mission benefit. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs use risk management to mitigate risks associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill friendly and civilian personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. (See ATP 5-19 for additional information on risk management.) |
## INFORMATION COLLECTION
1-41. Information collection relies on IPB results. The staff's continuous input to IPB provides an analysis of the OE and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. It also provides the following information required to plan information collection activities:
- Characteristics of the AOI that will influence friendly and threat operations (including civil considerations).
- Threat event templates, including decision points and matrices critical to information collection planning.
- Information collection assets' sensitivities to weather and the effects of weather on planned or potential operations.
- Threat characteristics, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and behavior.
- Possible and likely threat COAs.
- HVTs.
- 1-42. The Army executes information collection through the operations and intelligence processes (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging national to tactical intelligence). Even if the mission is new, the intelligence staff can identify and tap into ongoing or existing information collection activities or joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (also called ISR) collection that may offer relevant information to fill gaps. These requirements identify the critical pieces of information the commander must know to successfully conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) operations.
- 1-43. Ideally, information collection should enable staffs to develop a perception of the threat and the situation on the battlefield that matches the actual threat and situation on the battlefield. In reality, information collection does not eliminate all information gaps that concern commanders and staffs. Intelligence staffs, in conjunction with the other staff sections, should be prepared to fill gaps with reasonable assumptions and continually send out additional requests for information to refine IPB.
- 1-44. There is a relationship between IPB and information collection-the IPB products that feed intelligence drive information collection requirements. This means that the IPB process identifies intelligence gaps that are translated into information requirements and PIRs, which are then answered through collection.
- 1-45. The staff collaborates on information considerations and integrates available resources into an integrated information collection plan. Well-stated information requirements assist the commander in accomplishing the mission by illustrating those key knowledge gaps and earmarking them for collection.
- 1-46. Developing requirements also supports the commander's decision making regarding targeting. To target the threat effectively, the staff develops NAIs and TAIs. A named area of interest is the geospatial area or systems node or link against which information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected, usually to capture indications of adversary courses of action (JP 2-01.3). A target area of interest is the geographical area where high-value targets can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces (JP 2-01.3). NAIs should not be tied to a specific terrain; rather, they should be based on threat locations or suspected locations. |
## NAI Example
Instead of focusing on an area surrounding a hilltop named 1631 where the enemy may have placed an air defense unit, analysts should focus NAIs on the enemy's unit or functional capability. For example, analysts should focus on the suspected locations where the enemy may place its combined arms reserve or subterranean locations to conduct a counterattack. To refine the locations, analysts should study the enemy's doctrinal or historical use of the combined arms reserve, the capabilities of the critical combat systems associated with the combined arms reserve, and the known rates of march for the terrain in which the combined arms reserve will be operating.
- 1-47. Units need to conduct information collection consistently and continuously. To be effective, information collection must be based on IPB results; it must be adjusted as IPB results are refined through the situation development process. Conversely, the results of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations-the primary means for information collection-drive the refinement of IPB results as appropriate. The staff must understand the roles and relationships of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations, and how the commander assesses ongoing operations as the unit develops the situation through action. |
## GENERATE INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE
1-48. Not all information required to conduct IPB will be readily available to intelligence staffs upon receipt of mission. Generate intelligence knowledge is critical for G-2/S-2s to maintain analytical proficiency and situational awareness of possible impending missions and contingencies. Generate intelligence knowledge begins before mission receipt and provides the relevant knowledge required about the OE for the conduct of operations. Once the intelligence officer and other staff sections collect data on the OE, they organize the data into databases. The information obtained is refined into knowledge for use in mission analysis through functional analysis. (See ATP 2-33.4 for more on functional analysis.) Information is obtained through intelligence reach; research; data mining; database access; academic studies, products, or materials; intelligence archives; open-source intelligence; reconnaissance and security operations; and other information sources. Sources for generating intelligence knowledge include but are not limited to-
- Internet:
- Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (also called NIPRNET).
- SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (also called SIPRNET).
- Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (also called JWICS).
- Intelligence databases.
- Other military Services or agencies:
- United States (U.S.) Air Force.
- U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Department.
- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (also called NGA).
- National Ground Intelligence Center (also called NGIC).
- Defense Intelligence Agency (also called DIA).
- Office of Naval Intelligence (also called ONI).
- U.S. Coast Guard.
- Army and other Service special operations forces.
- Outside agencies:
- Central Intelligence Agency (also called CIA).
- National Security Agency (also called NSA).
- U.S. Agency for International Development (also called USAID).
- Outside organizations:
- World Health Organization (also called WHO).
- International Committee of the Red Cross (also called ICRC).
- University research.
- Country studies.
- Area estimates.
- Intelligence summaries.
- Open-source information.
1-49. The types of useful information obtained from sources for generating intelligence knowledge include but are not limited to-
- Order of battle data files.
- Current situation.
- Geography.
- Economy.
- Population.
- Government and military leadership.
- Centers of gravity.
- Demographics.
- Regional partners.
- Threat systems and functions.
- Past conflicts.
- Rule of law status.
- Infrastructure development.
1-50. Information gained though generate intelligence knowledge can also be used to identify intelligence gaps for possible contingencies, therefore reducing the time needed for research in the event of mission receipt. Generate intelligence knowledge is the foundation for performing IPB and mission analysis. The primary product of the generate intelligence knowledge task is the initial data file, which is created based on the analysis of the operational variables (PMESII-PT). (See FM 2-0 for more information on the generate intelligence knowledge task.) |
## SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
- 1-51. Situation development is a process for analyzing information and producing current intelligence concerning the relevant aspects of the OE (the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations) within the AO before and during operations. The process assists the intelligence staff in recognizing and interpreting indicators of threat intentions and objectives. Situation development-
- Confirms or denies threat COAs.
- Provides threat locations.
- Explains what the threat is doing in relation to the friendly force commander's intent.
- Provides an estimate of threat combat effectiveness.
1-52. The locations and actions of noncombatant elements and nongovernmental and other civilian organizations in the AO that may impact operations should also be considered. Through situation development, the intelligence officer-
- Quickly identifies information gaps.
- Recommends new information requirements.
- Explains threat activities in relation to the unit's operations.
- Assists the commander in gaining and maintaining situational understanding.
- 1-53. Situation development assists commanders in their decision making, including when to execute branches and sequels. The intelligence staff uses the products developed during IPB as a baseline to begin situation development. |
## MULTI-DOMAIN UNDERSTANDING OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
- 1-54. The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains, the information environment (which includes cyberspace), and the EMS requires a multi-domain situational understanding of the OE. (See FM 3-0.) Seeing, understanding, and responding to windows of vulnerability or opportunity within each domain and the information environment can reduce risk to the force and enhance success in chaotic and high-tempo operations, such as large-scale combat operations. This makes situational understanding essential to managing risk.
- 1-55. When commanders and staffs seek to understand friendly and threat capabilities, they consider how, when, and why those capabilities are employed in each domain, the information environment, and the EMS. From this understanding, commanders can better identify windows of opportunity during operations. This allows a portion of the joint force to establish a decisive point for the multi-domain convergence of capabilities, which must be supported by continuous intelligence operations across the domains for the best effect. Since many friendly capabilities are not organic to Army forces, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other unified action partner capabilities in a multi-domain approach to operations.
Note. Decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0).
1-56. During large-scale combat operations against a peer threat, ground-force commanders may be required to conduct tactical activities, such as a deliberate attack, to shape the OE and gain a position of relative advantage for activities, such as joint fires, within the other domains. Once that position is achieved, operations would continue to increase the position of relative advantage in order to create a longer window of superiority to facilitate follow-on missions and operations across the domains.
Note. Position of relative advantage is a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage (ADRP 3-0).
1-57. Intelligence supports the commander by visualizing the threat and detecting possible threat COAs. Army forces must integrate and synchronize these actions across multiple domains to create opportunities to dislocate, isolate, disintegrate, and destroy enemy forces. (See FM 3-0 for more information on these defeat mechanisms.) Army forces strive to use intelligence, mobility, protection, and firepower to strike the enemy unexpectedly in multiple domains and from multiple directions, denying the enemy freedom to maneuver by creating multiple dilemmas that the enemy commander cannot effectively address. Intelligence supports these operations by facilitating situational understanding and supporting decision making. Intelligence assists commanders in seeing through the fog and friction of war. |
## 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War
Tensions between Israel and the Arab alliance of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Syria were heightened following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Closed to Israeli shipping since 1950 by Egypt, the Straits of Tiran, located in the Red Sea between the Sinai Peninsula and Tiran Island, were critical to the shipping of oil and other imports to Israel. The reopening of the straits was a chief Israeli objective. Egypt's blockade of the straits continued to cause strained relations between Egypt and Israel, leading up to May 1967 when Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasir deployed Egyptian forces along Egypt's border with Israel and banned Israeli ships from using the Gulf of Aqaba, the location of Israel's primary port in Eilat. Sensing further Egyptian and Arab military alliance actions, Israel Prime Minister Levi Eshkol ordered a preemptive strike against Egyptian Air Force assets still on the ground. The strike destroyed more than 90 percent of the Egyptian Air Force and facilitated Israeli freedom of action in the air domain to counter an overwhelming Egyptian force in the land domain. Without Egyptian Air Force availability to provide cover to mobilized Egyptian armored assets, Egyptian tank units were soundly defeated in less than 96 hours. |
## Window of Opportunity
Israeli Air Force superior to the Egyptian Air Force .
IMAGE:
This image depicts the phrase "Exploit the Window" with a curved arrow pointing downwards. The text is in a bold font, and the arrow suggests an action or emphasis related to the concept of exploiting a window of opportunity.
Israeli Air Force establishes freedom of action in the air domain. |
## Position of Relative Advantage
Israeli Air Force destroys mobilized Egyptian tank units. |
## IPB Products to Identify
Threat overlay, threat model, threat template, situation template, threat model, threat template, situation template, and event template and matrix
IMAGE:
This image depicts the icon for the "Enable" function often used in software and digital interfaces. It consists of a line with curved ends above the word "Enable," suggesting activation or turning on a feature.
- DST and matrix. Note. Although not IPB products, the DST and matrix assist in identifying friendly actions to counter threat COAs. (See figure 6-14 on page 6-23.)
- Information collection matrix. Note. Although not an IPB product, the information collection matrix can assist in answering information gaps and identifying indicators of threat intentions. (See figure 6-15 on page 6-24.) |
## IMPORTANCE OF DOMAIN INTERDEPENDENCE
- 1-58. Domain interdependence refers to the reliance on one or multiple domains to leverage effects or information. Domains provide a means of viewing the OE based on how capabilities are arrayed and employed. An OE does not comprise a single domain; a capability's effects are not limited to a single domain; and a capability is not employed in a single domain. For example, a satellite is launched from the ground and uses space as a medium for flight. The satellite may collect information from multiple domains and transmit that information using cyberspace as a medium to reach the ground, where the information can be processed, exploited, and disseminated. It is important for commanders and staffs to understand interdependence in order to visualize when and where capabilities can be leveraged by friendly, neutral, and threat forces.
- 1-59. Because a multitude of effects (including threat, terrain, and weather) can cross multiple domains, the interdependence of the domains, the information environment, and the EMS must be considered when performing IPB. To do this, the S-2, with assistance from other staff members and possibly outside organizations, must address the operational framework considerations and view the OE holistically. |
## OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK CONSIDERATIONS
1-60. A thorough IPB effort and intelligence analysis assist each echelon in focusing operations on all significant aspects of the OE in time and space across multiple domains. This prevents each echelon from focusing only on the close fight and current operations. A broad focus across the operational framework considerations assists commanders and staffs in better identifying friendly windows of opportunity and threat windows of vulnerability within and across each domain and the information environment. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Table 1-1 lists the operational framework considerations and how IPB and subsequent intelligence analysis support each consideration. (See FM 3-0 for details on operational framework considerations.)
Table 1-1. IPB and intelligence analysis support to operational framework considerations
| Operational framework considerations | Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and intelligence analysis support |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Physical considerations include geography, terrain, infrastructure, populations, distance, weapons ranges and effects, and known threat locations. | Intelligence support begins well before the deployment of forces, through generate intelligence knowledge, which addresses the operational variables. Information gained during generate intelligence knowledge is used by commanders and staffs to assist in framing the operational environment during the Army design methodology. IPB provides detailed analysis of the mission variables of threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations to determine effects on operations. IPB and intelligence analysis assist in determining relevant aspects within an area of operations (such as civil considerations characteristics) that are critical in determining how friendly operations may be impacted during the consolidation of gains. Intelligence analysis is critical to the designation of a deep area, the fire support |
| Temporal considerations are related to time, including when capabilities can be used, how long they take to generate and employ, and how long they must be used to achieve desired effects. | IPB is a process that is both geographically and temporally specific. Developing threat courses of action during IPB is based on identifying threat objectives, goals, timelines, and end states. IPB provides a temporal context using rates of movement, time phase lines, phases of threat fires, and other templates to capture threat timing. |
| Cognitive considerations relate to people and how they behave. They include information pertaining to threat decision making, threat will, the nation's will, and the population's behavior. | IPB accounts for aspects associated with the center of gravity and the threat's morale and willingness to continue operations. Intelligence support to continuous operational assessments considers many relevant aspects of the operational environment, including sociocultural factors. IPB also considers all significant aspects of the operational environment associated with the various civil considerations. |
| Virtual considerations pertain to activities and entities, both friendly and threat, residing in cyberspace. | IPB and intelligence analysis, in coordination with the cyberspace electromagnetic activities section, provide intelligence on the threat's likely activities within the information environment, which includes cyberspace. | |
## HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-61. During IPB, each staff section and supporting element provide input. This ensures a holistic view of the OE. Subsequently, the IPB effort assists in identifying domain windows of opportunity to exploit threat vulnerabilities. A holistic view of the OE assists the commander in understanding and visualizing the multidomain extended battlefield. Analysis of the five domains and where, how, and when information flows is required to understand how friendly and threat force capabilities may be impacted by aspects within each domain. Friendly, threat, and neutral capabilities often depend on a variety of aspects, such as nodes, systems, and subsystems across the five domains. Knowing how threat forces may use their capabilities throughout the five domains, the information environment, and the EMS is essential to understanding the threat's intent and desired end state as well assessing the impacts friendly and threat operations may have on the OE. The holistic view of the OE encompasses-
- The physical areas and factors of the five domains.
- The information environment. (See chapter 8 for a detailed discussion.)
- The systems perspective, which includes the relationships and interdependencies of friendly, threat, and neutral PMESII-PT systems, subsystems, objects, and affiliated attributes.
1-62. Analysts must also consider the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and the decisions of the commander. This includes understanding those considerations, both independently and as a composite, to apply combat power, protect the force, and complete a mission. Physical areas, nonphysical aspects, factors, and a systems perspective are means of identifying and understanding the conditions, circumstances, and influences within the OE. These means may be outcomes of IPB or identified before IPB-either way, each staff member participating in the IPB process must consider them. |
## Physical Areas and Factors
1-63. Within the OE, physical areas include the assigned operational area and the associated AOI and area of influence necessary to conduct operations within the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and the information environment. Factors, including but not limited to terrain, threat forces, weather, and the location of man-made obstacles and structures, can impact operations in a given physical area. The identification of physical areas and factors residing within the OE is critical to understanding effects on friendly and threat operations. (See JP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of physical areas and factors.) |
## Systems Perspective
1-64. A systems perspective focuses on a multitude of systems in the OE and their associated functions. The identification of which systems are associated with specific functions and their interdependence with other systems is critical to understanding when and where threats may decide to use them. A systems perspective generates understanding that facilitates identifying potential cues and warnings, lines of operations, centers of gravity, and decision points. No single staff section or capability attached to or organic to the commander can employ a systems perspective in isolation. Just as IPB is a staff process, so is employing a systems perspective to facilitate IPB. (For additional information on systems perspective, see JP 2-01.3 and JP 3-0.) |
## IPB AND THE ARMY'S STRATEGIC ROLES
1-65. Operations to shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains summarize the Army's strategic roles as part of a joint force. Each strategic role presents a unique set of intelligence requirements discussed fully in FM 2-0. Table 1-2 on page 1-16 discusses IPB throughout each strategic role.
Table 1-2. IPB and the Army's strategic roles
| Army strategic role | Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) support |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| Time is usually not a constraint. Each echelon performs generate intelligence knowledge, warning intelligence, and IPB to support operational planning, regionally aligned activities, and training focused on large-scale combat operations. IPB and other intelligence products are constantly refined. A large portion of the IPB products generated are pushed down from the joint level to military intelligence brigades-theater and then customized for each specific echelon. | Shape |
| Time is often a major constraint. When possible, the staff uses intelligence products developed before | Prevent |
| combat. At echelons corps and below, despite multi-domain considerations, the focus is on tactical considerations, especially threat characteristics (including the correlation of forces data), weather, terrain, and other significant characteristics of the operational environment. Each echelon must effectively perform IPB and quickly generate those products that drive the rest of the military decision- making process. | Conduct large- scale ground combat |
| Time is usually not a constraint. IPB products tend to flow both top down and bottom up. Often, the IPB focus shifts to address not only the threat but also stability tasks, the local environment, and the information environment. At echelons corps and below, more complexities within the operational environment become important considerations. | Consolidate gains | |
## Chapter 2 |
## IPB Support to Planning and Decision Making |
## IPB AND PLANNING
- 2-1. Commanders conduct planning to-
- Understand a problem or situation.
- Envision a desired future.
- Develop COAs, with assistance from their staffs, that can bring about that desired future.
- 2-2. During planning, commanders focus their activities on understanding, visualizing, and describing the OE, while directing and assessing operations. IPB is one of the processes commanders use to assist in planning. IPB supports the MDMP and troop leading procedures-two of the three methodologies that assist commanders and staffs in planning. |
## MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
- 2-3. The military decision-making process is an interactive planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order (ADP 5-0). (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the MDMP.) The MDMP is a seven-step planning process:
- Step 1-Receipt of mission.
- Step 2-Mission analysis.
- Step 3-COA development.
- Step 4-COA analysis (war game).
- Step 5-COA comparison.
- Step 6-COA approval.
- Step 7-Orders production, dissemination, and transition.
- 2-4. The MDMP methodology integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to-
- Understand the situation and mission.
- Develop and compare COAs.
- Decide on a COA that best accomplishes the mission.
- Produce an operation plan or operation order for execution.
- 2-5. Figure 2-1 shows the relationship between the IPB steps and the MDMP steps.
MCOO
modified combined obstacle overlay
MDMP
military decision-making process
OE
operational environment
OPORD operation order
Figure 2-1. IPB and the MDMP steps
IMAGE:
This image depicts a flowchart detailing the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) and the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The process begins with various inputs, such as intelligence data and commander’s guidance, and continues through multiple steps organized into two main sections: MDMP and IPB.
- **MDMP Steps**:
1. Receipt of Mission
2. Mission Analysis
3. Course of Action (COA) Development
4. COA Analysis (War Game)
5. COA Comparison
6. COA Approval
7. Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition
- **IPB Steps**:
1. Define the Operational Environment
2. Describe Environmental Effects on Operations
3. Evaluate the Threat
4. Determine Threat COAs
The outputs of this process include threat analyses, situation templates, high-value target lists, and various assessments important for reconnaissance and operational planning. The diagram emphasizes integration between intelligence data and decision-making to ensure effective military operations. |
## Understand the Situation and Mission
2-6. During the mission analysis step of the MDMP, the staff conducts IPB to understand the situation and mission. The IPB products developed during this step are discussed fully in chapters 3 through 6. The products listed below are critical to developing and comparing COAs, deciding on a COA, and producing an operation order:
- Intelligence gaps.
- Information requirements.
- Threat situation templates with associated COA statements and HVT lists.
- Event templates with associated event matrices.
- Relative combat power matrices for threat forces.
- Geospatial intelligence tactical decision aids required to support continual planning (terrain effects).
- Weather tactical decision aids required to support continued planning (operational climatology or weather forecast chart and weather effects matrix).
- Civil considerations tactical decision aids required to support continued planning (civil considerations effects).
- Estimates on how other significant variables may affect the mission.
- Reconnaissance objectives.
- The tempo and focus of reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations to answer PIRs and meet other requirements. |
## Develop and Compare Courses of Action
- 2-7. In the COA development step of the MDMP, friendly COAs are broad potential solutions to an identified problem. These solutions are based on conclusions reached during initial IPB and any refinement of those conclusions that occurs between the conclusion of mission analysis and the beginning of COA development. The primary IPB product required for COA development is the threat situation template with the associated COA statement. |
## Decide on a Course of Action that Best Accomplishes the Mission
- 2-8. In the COA analysis step of the MDMP, deciding on a COA enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties or coordination problems and probable consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered. The primary IPB products required for deciding a COA are-
- Threat situation templates with associated COA statements.
- Event templates with associated event matrices.
- Relative combat power matrices for threat forces.
- 2-9. During stability tasks, additional products may be required, such as civil considerations overlays and assessments. Information collection operations conducted during the mission analysis step of the MDMP provide pertinent combat information that informs COA development. This information confirms or denies the threat situation template and the associated COA statement. |
## Produce an Operation Plan or Operation Order for Execution
- 2-10. At the conclusion of the MDMP, the staff prepares the operation plan or order by turning the selected COA into a clear, concise concept of operations and required supporting material. The results of IPB are included within the base order and appropriate annexes. |
## TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES
- 2-11. The troop leading procedures extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. The MDMP and troop leading procedures are similar but not identical. Troop leading procedures is a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation.
2-12. The sequence of actions assists leaders in effectively using available time to issue orders and execute tactical operations. Troop leading procedures consist of eight steps. The sequence of the steps is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Some of the following steps may be performed concurrently while other steps may be performed continuously throughout the operation:
- Step 1-Receive the mission.
- Step 2-Issue a warning order.
- Step 3-Make a tentative plan.
- Step 4-Initiate movement.
- Step 5-Conduct reconnaissance.
- Step 6-Complete the plan.
- Step 7-Issue the order.
- Step 8-Supervise and refine.
- 2-13. The intelligence staff at the battalion intelligence cell develops and provides the IPB products required by the company commander to use troop leading procedures. Commanders should not need to do any other refinement of these products. The following includes standard IPB products provided by the battalion to assist the commander in using the troop leading procedures:
- Threat situation templates and COA statements.
- Terrain and weather products.
- Tactical decision aids (such as MCOOs and terrain effects evaluations, weather forecast charts, weather effects matrices, and light and illumination data tables).
- Civil considerations tools and products.
Note. Company commanders coordinate with the battalion intelligence cell for any IPB products or tools they may need.
2-14. Due to the lack of a staff and resources, as well as time constraints, the small-unit leader depends on the timely delivery of IPB products developed by higher headquarters tailored to support small-unit planning. Specifically, the components of IPB inform steps 2 through 5 and actions within the troop leading procedures. |
## Step 2-Issue a Warning Order
2-15. The battalion intelligence cell provides IPB products to the company commander on what to include in warning orders for areas such as but not limited to-
- Terrain analysis.
- Enemy forces.
- AOs and AOIs.
- Commander's critical information requirements and essential elements of friendly information.
- Risk guidance.
- Surveillance and reconnaissance to initiate.
- Security measures.
- Deception guidance.
- Mobility and countermobility.
- Guidance on rehearsals. |
## Step 3-Make a Tentative Plan
2-16. When developing a tentative plan, the company commander relies on the battalion intelligence cell to provide IPB tools as the leader conducts mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and COA comparison and selection. |
## Mission Analysis
2-17. The battalion intelligence cell provides IPB tools and products on mission analysis by evaluating enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. This includes providing information and analysis on the terrain and friendly and enemy forces that most affect tactical operations. |
## Course of Action Development
- 2-18. IPB products assist the leader in constructing a solid COA. The purpose of COA development is determining one or more ways to accomplish the mission that is consistent with the immediate higher commander's intent. A COA describes how the unit might generate the effects of overwhelming combat power against the enemy at the decisive point with the least friendly casualties. |
## Course of Action Analysis
2-19. The battalion intelligence cell provides IPB tools the leader can use to determine how the enemy will likely react during war gaming. War gaming assists the leader in synchronizing friendly actions while considering the enemy's likely reactions. COA analysis begins with both friendly and threat COAs and, using a method of action-reaction-counteraction war game, results in a synchronized friendly plan, identified strengths and vulnerabilities, and an updated risk assessment. After developing the COA, the leader analyzes it to determine its strengths and vulnerabilities and gains insights into actions at the decisive point of the mission. COA analysis (war game) unites friendly and enemy forces on the actual terrain to visualize how the operation will unfold. |
## Course of Action Comparison and Selection
- 2-20. The battalion intelligence cell provides products from IPB to leaders to determine PIRs, friendly force information requirements, and essential elements of friendly information. Although essential elements of friendly information are not part of the commander's critical information requirements, they still become priorities, and this information must be protected from enemy identification. |
## Step 4-Initiate Movement
2-21. The battalion intelligence cell provides IPB products to leaders on any movement necessary to continue mission preparation or to posture the unit for the start of the mission. |
## Step 5-Conduct Reconnaissance
- 2-22. If time permits, leaders verify intelligence from higher headquarters by reconnoitering to seek to confirm PIRs that support their tentative plans. These PIRs usually consist of assumptions or critical facts about the enemy (including strength and location). The PIRs can also include information on the terrain (to verify that a tentative support-by-fire position can suppress the enemy, or an AA is useable). |
## IPB AND DECISION MAKING
- 2-23. Decision making refers to selecting a COA as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission. Decision making is knowing whether to decide or not, then when and what to decide, and finally understanding the consequences. Commanders make decisions in part based on the intelligence developed during initial IPB and on the refinement of that intelligence throughout the operations process. (For more information on the operations process, see ADRP 5-0.)
- 2-24. Commanders require accurate and timely intelligence about the OE to make informed and good decisions. Through IPB, the staff aids the commander's understanding of how the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations influence the OE and affect operations. IPB also assists the commander in understanding how to influence, use, or employ these variables to achieve the desired conditions and end state. IPB is essential in assisting the commander to-
- Understand, visualize, and describe the OE:
- Understand. Understanding involves analyzing the mission variables in a given OE. IPB defines and describes the mission variables of enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations but more importantly, concludes how the interrelationships, dynamics, and interactions of these variables cause changes in the OE.
- Visualize. Visualization involves developing situational understanding, determining an end state, and envisioning the sequence of events the force must ensure to achieve the end state. Every product developed during IPB is essential in assisting the commander to visualize the situation. These products must be produced on time and in accordance with unit standard operating procedures.
- Describe. After commanders visualize an operation, they communicate their vision to the staffs and subordinate commands using staff products developed during IPB.
- Make and articulate decisions.
- Direct, lead, and assess military operations.
2-25. One technique commanders and staffs commonly use during execution is the rapid decision-making and synchronization process. Throughout mission execution, continuous information collection is conducted to answer information requirements and to close intelligence gaps. The process is usually conducted based on an existing operation order that includes the IPB products and estimates produced during the MDMP. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process has five steps:
- Compare the current situation to the order. During execution, the staff looks for indicators of change that may affect the overall operation. These changes must be identified for the commander to the make necessary modifications to the operation plan. The event template and event matrix (developed during step 4 of IPB) and the DST (a critical output of step 4 of the MDMP) are the primary staff tools used to identify variances and alert the commander to situations that require a decision. These products are updated as changes occur.
- Determine the type of decision required. When a variance is identified, the staff describes the variance and determines if it provides a significant opportunity to friendly forces or the enemy.
- Develop a COA. If the situation warrants the development of a new friendly COA, it may result in the creation of new or modified PIRs and HVTs. It may also require the creation of a new or modified event template and event matrix.
- Refine and validate the COA. The commander and staff conduct a mental war game of the new COA. At a minimum the enemy situation template and COA statement, along with the friendly operations graphics and COA statement, are required to focus the mental war game.
- Implement. The commander normally implements the new COA by issuing a fragmentary order. The following are issued as part of that fragmentary order:
- IPB products, including the enemy situation template with COA statement and HPT list, and terrain, weather, and civil considerations products.
- Updated PIRs.
2-26. See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the rapid decision-making and synchronization process. |
## PART TWO |
## Fundamental Task Techniques |
## Chapter 3 |
## Step 1-Define the Operational Environment |
## WHAT IS IT?
3-1. During step 1 of the IPB process, the intelligence staff identifies for further analysis the significant characteristics of or activities within the OE that may influence friendly and threat COAs and command decisions, as well as the physical space the mission will occupy. Within an OE, Army forces may face largescale combat operations, which simultaneously encompass multiple domains, military engagements, and populations. Examples 1 and 2 portray planning scenarios. |
## Example 1
During planning for a foreign humanitarian assistance mission, a brigade S-2 identifies five ethnic groups with armed militias that have attacked each other, as well as host-nation security forces, in the past 12 months. In the last month, a rocket-propelled grenade shot down a host-nation military helicopter. The militias have not attacked any of the nongovernmental aid organizations in the area. The brigade S-2 identifies each of these groups as a threat. There is no information about these groups in the command's intelligence data files nor in the higher headquarters' data files to assist the brigade S-2 in developing valid potential COAs these groups may adopt when U.S. forces enter their AOs.
The intelligence staff searches various organizations' data files within the intelligence community and discovers that, while little is known about the threat characteristics of these militias, some information is available. Each militia is a company-sized element with various types of small arms and crew-served weapons, mortars, demolitions, and antiarmor rockets. It is unknown whether these militias have any ADA.
The brigade S-2 initiates a request for collection on the current locations, dispositions, strengths, and capabilities of these militias. Since the information will not be available during IPB, the brigade S-2 determines possible threat COAs based on what the brigade S-2 knows and assumes about the threat, ensuring the commander and the rest of the staff understand what is known and assumed. As intelligence related to the request for collection arrives, the brigade S-2 updates threat COAs and informs the commander and the rest of the staff. |
## Example 2
During planning for an attack, a brigade S-2 identifies the enemy has an attack helicopter
squadron that could threaten the friendly mission. When developing the threat situation template, the brigade S-2 includes the reported location of the attack helicopter battalion, air attack corridors that could be used to support the enemy defense, and forward arming and refueling points. The brigade S-2 also generates requests for collection to locate and track these assets to support the command's targeting operations. |
## SO WHAT?
- 3-2. The 'so what' of step 1 is to clearly define for commanders the relevant characteristics of their AOIs:
- Outcome of success: Success results in time and effort saved by focusing only on those characteristics that influence friendly COAs and command decisions.
- Consequences of failure:
- Failure to focus on only the significant characteristics leads to wasted time and effort collecting and evaluating intelligence on OE characteristics that do not influence the operation.
- Staff failure to identify all significant characteristics in all domains relevant to the OE may lead to the command's surprise and unpreparedness when some overlooked feature of the OE affects the operation for which the commander did not plan. |
## HOW TO DO IT: THE PROCESS
- 3-3. Defining the OE consists of the substeps and outputs shown in figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1. Substeps and outputs of step 1 of the IPB process
IMAGE:
This image depicts a flowchart related to military operations, specifically focusing on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It outlines the substeps and outputs involved in identifying the limits of a commander's area of operations (AO) and area of interest. Key elements include:
1. **Identifying Limits**:
- The AO's limits are generally identified by higher headquarters.
- The area of interest's limits are examined by the S-2 officer, with recommendations, approvals, or disapprovals made by commanders and higher headquarters.
2. **Significant Characteristics for Analysis**:
- Terrain characteristics include enemy details (identity, location, size, disposition), natural features (rivers, caves, valleys, mountains), and man-made features (cities, subways, tunnels, bunkers, airfields, bridges).
- Weather factors involve visibility, wind, precipitation, cloud cover, temperature, and humidity.
- Civil considerations (ASCOPE) include areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.
3. **Evaluating Operations and Intelligence**:
- Staff identifies and develops assumptions about information gaps.
- Requests for information and collection are submitted by staff sections.
It aims to systematically gather and assess information vital for operational planning and execution. |
## IDENTIFY THE LIMITS OF THE COMMANDER'S AREA OF OPERATIONS
- 3-4. Area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). The AO comprises an external boundary that delineates adjacent units AOs and includes subordinate unit AOs. Subordinate unit AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous.
- 3-5. Within an AO, commanders conduct decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to articulate an operation in terms of purpose. Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish the shifting and prioritization of resources. The AO may be impacted due to political boundaries and/or other civil considerations. Once assigned, an AO can be subdivided by that command, as necessary, to support mission requirements. Figure 3-2 illustrates contiguous AOs. (See FM 3-0 for more information on AOs and decisive, shaping, and operational operations.)
Figure 3-2. Area of operations examples
IMAGE:
This image depicts a tactical map used for military operations. It highlights areas of operations (AO), identified as AO1, AO2, AO3, and AO4, each marked with different symbols representing brigade combat teams (BCTs). The map outlines contiguous BCT/AO boundaries and includes geographical features such as roads, bridges, an airfield, and a ferry. Key infrastructure, like buildings, a city hall, and a hospital, is marked for strategic relevance. An international border is also delineated, indicating the complex nature of operational planning in the area. |
## IDENTIFY THE LIMITS OF THE COMMANDER'S AREA OF INTEREST
- 3-6. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). The AOI also includes areas occupied by threat forces who could jeopardize mission accomplishment. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). The area of influence includes terrain inside and outside the AO and is determined by both the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3.
- 3-7. The AOI is-
- Established by the commander with input from the G-2/S-2 or G-3/S-3. The operational and mission variables must be considered.
- An area normally larger than or outside the area of influence that directly impacts the AO; therefore, possibly requiring more intelligence assets to monitor. It may include staging areas.
- An area that may be irregular in shape or noncontiguous and can overlap the areas of adjacent and subordinate unit AOs.
- An area that assists in determining NAIs during step 4 of the IPB process.
- 3-8. An AOI is the geographical area from which information is required to facilitate planning and the successful conduct of the command's operation. The area changes as the situation changes and as commanders determine new information requirements. It includes any threat forces or characteristics that significantly influence accomplishing the command's mission. In combat operations, the AOI extends into threat territory to the objectives of current or planned friendly operations if those objectives are located outside the assigned AO. In stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks, the AOI is typically much larger than that defined for combat operations.
- 3-9. In establishing the limits of an AOI, time is one of the primary considerations. Time limits should be based not only on the threat's mobility but also on the amount of time needed to accomplish the friendly mission. For example, if the command estimates that it will take two days to accomplish the friendly mission, the AOI must encompass all threat forces and activities that could influence accomplishing the command's mission within the two days. Additional considerations when establishing AOI limits include but are not limited to-
- Dividing the AOI into several components (for example, ground AOI, air AOI, subterranean AOI, and cyberspace AOI). Such a division accommodates the types of information relevant to each AOI as well as each AOI's different geographical limits. At some point, it may be necessary to integrate the various AOIs into a whole in order to present a holistic picture to the commander. One method of illustrating and articulating the AOI is the use of overlays to depict the relevant aspects of the AOI. For example, a threat force outside the AO may have capabilities that reside in or are employed in each of the domains. An overlay depicting this threat's capabilities (one relevant aspect of the AOI) can be layered with other relevant aspects to show a holistic view.
- Threats to mission accomplishment that may also cross into neutral terrain countries. For example, if political decisions in a neutral terrain country may influence the accomplishment of a unit's mission, include that country within the limits of the AOI. Likewise, if a segment of the population in a neutral terrain country provides a support base to forces that oppose the command's mission, include that country within the AOI.
- Technological advances. Due to technological advances in communications, such as social media and global media organizations, commanders are likely to witness increased visibility of friendly operations. This may lead to an increase in neutral and threat actions caused by friendly operations. Considering this, it is important to analyze how civil considerations and the dissemination of information may affect operations (see paragraphs 3-19 through 3-22). |
## Analyzing the AO Based on the AOI Effects
By analyzing the AO, as well as identifying and establishing an AOI, the commander and staff can determine how the relevant aspects of the AOI may impact the conduct of operations in the AO. This assists the commander in determining the required capabilities for mission accomplishment, identifying additional required capabilities, and requesting required capabilities in time to successfully impact operations. These required capabilities include the staff's ability to execute warfighting functions.
Commanders consider the extent of subordinates' areas of influence when defining subordinates' AOs. In identifying an AO, the staff should avoid making it substantially larger than the unit's area of influence. Ideally, the area of influence encompasses the entire AO. The area of influence is useful to the commander to focus information collection operations, shape the battlefield, and facilitate future operations. |
## IDENTIFY SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND AREA OF INTEREST FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
3-10. In order to focus IPB and what is important to the commander, the staff identifies and defines the characteristics of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations of the OE to determine the significance of each in relation to the mission-essentially building an environmental model as the framework for conducting and then presenting analysis to the commander. This prevents unnecessary analysis and allows the staff to dedicate and maximize resources in critical areas. The initial analysis that occurs in this substep determines the amount of time and resources the intelligence staff commits to the detailed analysis that occurs in step 2 of the IPB process.
- 3-11. When identifying significant characteristics of the OE, the staff may be faced with analyzing aspects that transcend the AO-for example, analyzing a threat located outside the AO (and potentially outside the geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility) who will likely use cyberspace capabilities to affect friendly operations in the AO across multiple domains. Accounting for these actors and their capabilities and determining their relationships and interdependencies with systems and other actors in the OE significantly increase the effectiveness of analysis in subsequent IPB steps and provide commanders with multiple options during the MDMP.
- 3-12. Additionally, the intelligence staff and other staff sections must consider threat forces and other aspects of the environment that may affect accomplishing the friendly mission. These include but are not limited to-
- The area's geography, terrain, and weather.
- Population demographics (ethnic groups, religious groups, age distribution, income groups).
- Political or socioeconomic factors, including the role of clans, tribes, religious organizations, criminal organizations, corruption, rule of law, gender, age, cultural groups, and ethnicity.
- Infrastructures such as transportation or telecommunications.
- Rules of engagement or legal restrictions such as international treaties, status of forces agreements, international sanctions, or United Nations charters.
- Threat force capabilities, including, military, other foreign security forces, as well as paramilitary forces, criminal and terrorist organizations (transnational and local), and antigovernment groups.
3-13. The intelligence staff should-
- Inspect each characteristic briefly to identify those of significance to the command and its mission.
- Further evaluate the effects of each characteristic in later steps of the IPB process.
- Analyze each characteristic that may impact decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
- Evaluate each threat's specific capabilities and determine probable COAs during later steps of the IPB process. |
## ENEMY
3-14. Analysis of the enemy includes not only the known enemy but also other threats to mission success, such as multiple threats posing with a wide array of political, economic, religious, and personal motivations. Additionally, threats may wear uniforms and be easily identifiable, blend into the population, and use either traditional threat capabilities (such as rifles or mortars) or nontraditional capabilities (such as computer networks and social media). To understand threat capabilities and vulnerabilities, commanders and staffs require detailed, timely, and accurate intelligence produced because of IPB. |
## TERRAIN AND WEATHER
3-15. It is important to identify the types of environments in which a unit will conduct operations. Terrain and weather are natural conditions of the environment that profoundly influence operations and the type of information collected. Terrain and weather favor neither the friendly nor the threat force, unless one is more familiar with or better prepared to operate in the physical environment. |
## Terrain
- 3-16. Terrain includes natural features (such as rivers, caves, valleys, and mountains) and man-made features (such as cities, subway tunnels, bunkers, airfields, and bridges). Terrain directly affects how commanders select objectives and locate, move, and control forces. Terrain also influences protective measures and the effectiveness of weapons and other systems.
- 3-17. The effective use of terrain reduces the effects of threat fires, increases the effects of friendly fires, and facilitates surprise. Terrain appreciation-the ability to predict its impact on operations-is an important skill for every leader. For tactical operations, commanders and staffs analyze terrain using the five military aspects of terrain (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment [OAKOC]), as performed during step 2 of the IPB process. |
## Weather
- 3-18. Climate refers to the average weather conditions of a location, area, or region for a specific time of the year as recorded for a period of years. Operational climatology is used to assess effects on weapon systems, collection systems, ground forces, tactics and procedures, threat TTP, and other capabilities based on specific weather sensitivity thresholds when operational planning occurs more than 10 days before the execution. Climatological data is important at both the operational and tactical levels. Actual weather forecasts and/or predictions, using weather models and other tools, are used to assess weather effects on weapon systems, collection systems, ground forces, TTP, and other capabilities when operations occur within 10 days of operational planning. (See chapter 4 for more information on weather effects.) |
## CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
- 3-19. Civil considerations is the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and activities of civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations (ADRP 5-0). Commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of these characteristics: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). (See chapter 4.)
- 3-20. Civil considerations assist commanders in refining their understanding of the operational and mission variables within the AO and effects on the mission. Understanding the relationship between military operations and populations is critical in conducting operations and essential in developing effective plans. Operations often involve stabilizing the situation, securing the peace, building partner capacity, and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat operations directly affect the populace, infrastructure, and the force's ability to transition to host-nation authority. The degree to which the populace is expected to support or resist U.S. and friendly forces also affects the offensive and defensive operational design.
- 3-21. Commanders and staffs use personal knowledge and running estimates to assess social, economic, and political factors. Commanders consider how these factors may relate to potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. Their goal is to develop an understanding to the level of cultural awareness. At this level, commanders can estimate the effects of friendly actions and direct subordinates with confidence. Cultural awareness improves how Soldiers interact with the populace and deters false or unrealistic expectations by both sides. Soldiers have more knowledge of the society's common practices, perceptions, assumptions, customs, and values, giving better insight into the intent of individuals and groups. This allows staffs to better understand how friendly actions may affect the OE and assist in planning for possible branches and sequels.
- 3-22. To improve commanders' sociocultural understanding, intelligence staffs can use sociocultural databases and repositories, when available, to aid the intelligence analysis conducted as part of assessing civil considerations. (See paragraphs 4-96 through 4-103.) Additionally, commanders and staffs should continually seek to improve cultural understanding to improve their roles in IPB. |
## SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS BRIEFING EXAMPLE
- 3-23. During step 1, the intelligence staff briefs the commander on the AO's significant characteristics. This brief should be concise and provide all significant characteristics pertaining to step 1 only; it should not include specifics, such as the MCOO and threat template statements, which pertain to steps 2 and 3,
respectively. The example provides a briefing used by intelligence analysts to inform the commander of the AO's significant characteristics. |
## Example Briefing: Identifying Significant Characteristics |
## Terrain:
- Wooded areas are primarily composed of pine trees.
- Most creeks require an armored vehicle-launched bridge to cross if there is no ford or road crossing.
- Major roadways can support four lanes of traffic.
- Marshes within the AO are restrictive most of the year; during heavy rains, they can become severely restrictive.
- The soil composition is loose dirt, and the water table is six to seven feet below ground except where the marshes are located.
- The highest point is located on the ridgeline in the northeastern sector of the AO. |
## Weather:
- The weather during this time of year consists of light rain with mild thunderstorms.
- The average rainfall is three to four inches.
- Precipitation affects potential river crossing sites.
- Strong gusts usually occur in early mornings and midafternoons, which can affect some aerial assets.
- Temperatures range from 65 to 80 degrees Fahrenheit. Fog occurs during the early morning hours and can last up to two hours after sunrise. |
## Civil considerations:
- Two major groups occupy the AO-the Regional Military Force and the National Liberation Group. A small group of the Russian-speaking population supports the National Liberation Group by providing sustainment and cache locations. The Russian-speaking population is sporadic through the AO and supported indirectly by the Regional Military Force.
- Apartments are usually several stories high and made of reinforced concrete; single-family homes are stone or brick with tile roofs.
- The population receives information primarily through television and social media sites.
- The major highway that runs through the AO is a hardball and all weather, but most of roads are dirt.
- The airfield is all weather and can support C-130 traffic.
- One potable water treatment plant operates in the AO and supports the whole region.
- The AO has two major cities where 40 percent of the population resides. |
## Enemy:
- Based on recent reporting and historical information, the staff expects to encounter a brigade- to division-sized element in the AO.
- The enemy likely has simple battle positions that are covered for dismounts and uncovered for vehicle fighting positions.
- Rudimentary tunnels link battle positions adjacent to mountainous terrain.
- Most simple battle positions have a tank ditch directly in front of them and a mine field about 50 to 100 meters in front of the tank ditch.
- C2 nodes consist of multiple hardened underground facilities.
- General support assets reside about 2 to 5 kilometers from the most forward battle positions.
- The staff expects to encounter ADA, artillery, T-90 tanks, and small arms weapons capabilities. |
## EVALUATE CURRENT OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE HOLDINGS TO DETERMINE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NEEDED TO COMPLETE IPB
3-24. Not all information needed to complete IPB will be in the command's or higher headquarters' data files and databases. Information gaps should be identified early and prioritized based on the commander's initial guidance and intent for intelligence and information collection. The staff should ensure the commander is aware of any information gaps that cannot be answered within the time allotted for IPB, develop reasonable assumptions to use in place of these answers, and explain to the commander how it arrived at these assumptions. |
## INITIATE PROCESSES TO ACQUIRE THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO COMPLETE IPB
3-25. After determining that the information necessary to complete IPB is not contained within local and searchable external data files and databases, staff sections submit requests for information or requests for collection to obtain the information necessary to complete IPB. As information is received, IPB products are updated and intelligence gaps eliminated. New intelligence gaps and information requirements may be developed as IPB continues. (See FM 3-55 for more information on information collection. See ATP 2-01 for more information on collection management.) |
## Chapter 4 |
## Step 2-Describe Environmental Effects on Operations |
## WHAT IS IT?
- 4-1. Step 2 of the IPB process determines how significant characteristics of the OE can affect friendly and threat operations. The staff begins evaluation by analyzing existing and projected conditions in the AO and AOI, and then determining effects on both friendly and threat operations. The example shows how significant characteristics of the OE (specifically the terrain) impact friendly operations. |
## Example
A brigade S-2 informs the commander that the terrain the brigade must attack through will canalize friendly forces into platoon-sized mobility corridors that will prevent the friendly forces from supporting each other. The brigade S-2 also informs the commander that the terrain favors enemy use of obstacles, small antitank ambushes, and indirect fire throughout its security zone. |
## SO WHAT?
- 4-2. The 'so what' of step 2 is to identify how relevant characteristics of the AOI affect friendly and threat operations:
- Outcome of success: Success results in the commander being able to quickly choose and exploit terrain, weather, and civil considerations to best support the mission during decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
- Consequences of failure:
- The commander may not have the information needed to exploit the opportunities the OE provides at a given time and place.
- The threat commander may have the information needed to exploit the opportunities the OE provides in a way the friendly commander did not anticipate. For example, the threat commander may use subterranean terrain to maneuver against friendly forces. If the friendly commander is unaware of the advantage that this terrain provides to the threat, all threat COAs will not be considered during this step. |
## HOW TO DO IT: THE PROCESS
- 4-3. Describing environmental effects on operations consists of the substeps and outputs shown in figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1. Substeps and outputs of step 2 of the IPB process
IMAGE:
This image depicts a workflow diagram designed to assess various operational factors in military contexts. It outlines four main substeps involving the analysis of threats, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Each substep leads to specific outputs:
1. **Threats**: Characterized as regular, irregular, or hybrid, leading to outputs like threat overlays and description tables.
2. **Terrain**: Analyzed using OAKOC (Observation and fields of fire, Avenues of approach, Key terrain, Obstacles, and Cover and concealment), resulting in modified obstacle overlays and terrain effects matrices.
3. **Weather**: Considerations include visibility, wind, precipitation, and other factors, producing outputs like weather forecast charts and effects matrices.
4. **Civil Considerations**: Analyzed using ASCOPE (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events), leading to data files, overlays, and assessments.
Additionally, it suggests considering operational variables (PMESII-PT) for enhanced situational understanding during the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). |
## DESCRIBE HOW THE THREAT CAN AFFECT FRIENDLY OPERATIONS
- 4-4. Threats are part of the OE; therefore, commanders need to understand all threats that can potentially affect operations within the AO and AOI. They may face one unified threat force or several disparate threat forces that must be engaged to accomplish the mission. Although detailed analysis of threat forces occurs during steps 3 and 4 of the IPB process, the type of threat force and its general capabilities must be defined during step 2. This places the threat force in context with other variables in order to understand its relative importance as a characteristic of the OE. For example-
- When facing a regular threat in combat operations, regardless of where the engagement occurs, that threat is likely the most important characteristic in that OE.
- When facing an irregular threat conducting operations as part of an insurgency in a failing nationstate, the state of governance and other civil considerations may be more significant than the threat posed by the irregular threat.
- When facing a hybrid threat in combat operations, the hybrid threat will likely be equipped with capabilities that can be used to exploit perceived friendly vulnerabilities. The mixture of regular and irregular threat capabilities expands threat COA possibilities and can create significant impacts outside friendly force decision cycles.
- 4-5. The threat overlay and the threat description table focus the analysis of the threat and assist in communicating that analysis to the commander. (See chapter 5 for descriptions of regular, irregular, and hybrid threats.) |
## THREAT OVERLAY
- 4-6. The threat overlay depicts the current physical location of all potential threats in the AO and the AOI. The overlay includes the identity, size, location, strength, and AO for each known threat location. The datetime group of the threat activity should be annotated on the threat overlay or maintained in intelligence reference files. Maintaining a threat overlay provides a reference to past threat activity and assists in determining patterns of threat movement and dispositions. During step 4 of the IPB process, this reference assists in determining threat COAs. Figure 4-2 illustrates an example of a threat overlay.
Figure 4-2. Threat overlay example
IMAGE:
This image depicts a tactical map illustrating various strategic locations and elements within a region. The map includes a Government Complex and a Military Complex, each marked with icons indicating their significance.
Key symbols indicate:
- Airfields, bridges, roads, and an international border within the area.
- Red circles highlighting specific operational zones, each measuring certain distances (e.g., 3,500 meters).
- Locations of interest include hospitals, city halls, and reserve areas.
- Labels such as "SOF," "SPT," "DRUG," and "GANG" mark specific spots, possibly designating the presence of military units or other forces.
- Minefields are indicated with green dashed lines, emphasizing cautionary zones.
- The date-time group is noted as 131500ZSEP16, signifying the map's reference time.
Overall, the map offers a detailed overview of the strategic and logistical layout for planning and operational purposes. |
## THREAT DESCRIPTION TABLE
4-7. The threat description table supports the threat overlay by classifying the types of threats identified on the overlay and describing the broad capabilities of each threat. Table 4-1 exemplifies a threat description table.
Table 4-1. Threat description table example
| Identity | Location | Disposition | Description |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2x special purpose forces companies | Northern coast | Companies are known to operate down to platoon and section echelons from sanctuary locations. | Companies conduct littoral reconnaissance to provide information on potential regional threat coastal invasion or border incursions. |
| Platoon(+) drug trafficking personnel | East and west international boundary | Platoons operate in 10-15 personnel teams. | Platoons oversee smuggling of methamphetamines and their precursor chemicals out of the country. Platoons are known to work with gangs for distribution of narcotics in urban areas. |
| 2x platoons riverine infantry | Eastern and western marsh areas | Normally maintain platoon integrity while patrolling rivers and littoral areas. | Key forces prevent regional threats from using riverine network to move south toward key terrain. |
| Gang personnel (assessed to be approximately 100 personnel) | Northeast urban center | Normally operate in cells of 7-10 personnel. | Gang personnel support the distribution of narcotics within urban areas. Gang personnel provide information on regional threats operating near the coast. |
| 2x special purpose forces companies | Vicinity main north- south highways | Companies operate down to section and team echelons from hasty defensive positions and hide sites. | checkpoints. Companies use population centers to collect information on regional threats. Companies also conduct |
| Battery (-) air defense artillery | Coastal and inland regions usually masked by terrain | SA-13 systems are positioned to protect air avenues of approach vicinity, the coast, and inland key terrain. | Air defense artillery assets conduct area denial in air avenues of approach vicinity leading to the Government Complex and Military Complex. |
| 72d Mechanized Battalion (BN) | Government Complex | BN is manned at 90% strength. Currently conducting training exercises for the next 15 days BN leadership has changed within the last 30 days. | regional threats have postured for attacks in the last five years. Retention of Government Complex and support of regional military partners are key strategies to maintain control of country. Nested with coastal special purpose forces to provide early warning of regional |
| 65th Mechanized BN | Military Complex | BN is manned at 75% strength. Will initiate training exercises in the next 30 | Trained mostly in defensive tasks as regional threats have postured for attacks over the last five years. Focuses on using obstacle belts and |
| 97th Mechanized BN and 10th Infantry BN (reserve forces) | Masked by terrain equidistant from Government Complex and Military Complex | Both BNs are manned at 60% strength. Both BNs completed training exercises within the last 90 days. Last training exercise focused on occupation of urban areas. | Trained in urban operations. Well-versed in deception and information warfare. | |
## DESCRIBE HOW TERRAIN CAN AFFECT FRIENDLY AND THREAT OPERATIONS
4-8. Terrain analysis is the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of geographic information on the natural and man-made features of the terrain, combined with other relevant factors, to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations (JP 2-03). It also involves the study and interpretation of natural and man-made features within an area, their effects on military operations, and the effects of weather and climate on these features. Terrain analysis is a continual process since changes in the OE may alter the analysis of terrain effects on operations.
- 4-9. A command may operate in two types of terrain-natural and complex-which are analyzed based on the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) (see figure 4-3):
- Natural terrain analysis focuses on airspace and surface and subsurface areas.
- Complex terrain analysis also focuses on airspace, surface and subsurface areas, but it must also consider internal, external, and supersurface areas.
Figure 4-3. The focus of natural and complex terrain analysis
IMAGE:
This image depicts a conceptual diagram illustrating various spatial dimensions related to physical and architectural environments. The diagram is divided into several sections:
1. **Airspace (External)**: The upper part of the image is labeled as airspace, indicating the space above the ground level structures.
2. **Stories or Levels**: Two vertical structures are shown, representing buildings with multiple stories or levels.
3. **Supersurface (External)**: Areas of the vertical structures above the ground yet outside are labeled as the supersurface.
4. **Surface Space**: This is the ground area where buildings and vegetation are positioned.
5. **Maritime Space (External)**: On one side, a water body represents maritime space, indicating spaces related to bodies of water.
6. **Subsurface**: Below ground level, the subsurface is depicted, indicating areas beneath the surface, such as basements or underground spaces.
7. **Spaces**: Arrows between subsurface and surface space, suggesting the connectivity or transition between these spaces.
The diagram uses trees and ground visual elements to provide context to the vertical spaces and various environments illustrated. |
## ANALYZE THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN
4-10. Geospatial intelligence cells generally conduct detailed terrain analysis. These cells are assigned to theater army, corps, and division headquarters and to brigade combat teams based on priorities established by the S-2. These cells have digital mapping tools and access to national-level support from agencies such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The geospatial intelligence cell, along with the G-2/S-2, collaborates with an Air Force staff weather officer to leverage the appropriate weather capabilities in order to incorporate the effects of current and future weather conditions into terrain analysis. Terrain analysis results in the evaluation of the military aspects of terrain (OAKOC) on operations.
4-11. Staff collaboration during terrain analysis can assist in identifying and addressing factors such as-
- Cross-country mobility.
- Canalizing terrain.
- Line of sight (LOS) impacts on weapon use.
- Terrain impacts on CBRN weapon use.
- Communications dead space.
- Lines of communications (LOCs) (transportation, communications, and power).
- Vegetation types and distribution.
- Natural and man-made surface and subsurface areas and materials.
- Natural and man-made obstacles.
- Significant infrastructure.
- Flood zones.
- Aircraft and amphibious sites.
Note. The discussion in this section provides broad aspects of the terrain analysis essential to intelligence analysts conducting terrain analysis to support threat analysis. (For more information on the military aspects of terrain, see ATP 3-34.80 and JP 2-03.) |
## Observation and Fields of Fire
4-12. Observation is the condition of weather and terrain that permits a force to see the friendly, enemy, and neutral personnel and systems, and key aspects of the environment (ADP 1-02). Commanders evaluate their observation capabilities for electronic and optical LOS surveillance systems, as well as for unaided visual observation. The highest terrain normally provides the best observation. (For LOS distances in nautical miles [height of eye] versus statute miles [horizon range], see appendix B.)
- 4-13. In natural terrain, there are limitations on observation caused by relative, localized, and often subtle variations in terrain elevations. These limitations are known as intervisibility lines. Intervisibility is the condition of being able to see one point from the other. Figure 4-4 shows how an observer at Position A can see up the slope to Position B, but the ridgeline prevents the observer from seeing Position D, and the valley prevents the observer from seeing Position C. Whatever the observer cannot see becomes a masked area. An observer at Position B can see Positions A, C, and D because this observer is on the intervisibility line.
Figure 4-4. Intervisibility line example
IMAGE:
This image depicts a topographic analysis of terrain visibility and intervisibility. The illustration is divided into two main sections:
1. **Top Section (Profile View):**
- Shows a side profile of the landscape with elevation lines labeled from 0 to 400.
- Points A, B, C, and D are marked, with A and B being the highest points.
- The areas marked as "Visible" indicate sections of terrain that can be seen from a specific observation point.
2. **Bottom Section (Map View):**
- A contour map with elevation lines marked as 0, 100, 200, 300, and 400.
- Observation outposts (triangles) are located at points C and D.
- The "Intervisibility Line" demonstrates the line of sight between different locations.
- Areas shaded in gray represent "dead space areas," which are obscured from the observer's view.
Overall, the diagram illustrates how the elevation and landscape features affect visibility and line of sight in a geographical area.
4-14. Observation can also be limited by adverse weather, smoke, the time of day, and the amount of illumination at night. In urban areas, observation is limited primarily by man-made structures as well as the activity and debris associated with human activity. Analyzing observation and fields of fire in urban areas is more complicated than it is for natural terrain; analysts must also consider surface, subsurface, supersurface, external, and internal areas (see figure 4-3 on page 4-5).
Note. Threat forces will seek to exploit observation advantages from areas that friendly forces may not consider. For example, threat forces may use a building protected under the rules of engagement (religious buildings, cultural monuments, places of worship, hospitals, medical clinics) to conduct observations on friendly forces. Threat forces may use subterranean terrain portals to identify friendly forces' movement routes. (See ATP 3-21.51.)
4-15. Field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively from a given position (FM 3-90-1). A unit's field of fire is directly related to its ability to observe. Evaluation of observation and fields of fire identifies-
- Potential engagement areas.
- Defensible terrain, which offers good observation and fields of fire.
- Specific equipment or equipment positions.
- Areas where forces are most vulnerable to observation and fires.
- Visual dead space.
- 4-16. Analysis of fields of fire includes an evaluation of all direct and indirect fire weapon systems in a command's inventory. An ideal field of fire for direct fire weapon systems is an open area where the threat can be seen and has no protection out to the maximum effective range of that weapon.
- 4-17. Both observation and fields of fire are based on LOSs . Line of sight is the unobstructed path from
- a Soldier's weapon, weapon sight, electronic sending and receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment from one point to another . In other words, a LOS is a straight line from one point to another.
- 4-18. There are two types of LOSs normally evaluated during terrain analysis:
- Horizontal LOS is an unobstructed path from a Soldier's weapon, weapon sight, laser designator, and electronic sending and receiving antennas.
- Oblique (or vertical) LOS assists in planning ADA system locations, selecting landing zones and drop zones, and selecting forward arming and refueling points.
4-19. Identifying areas vulnerable to threat aerial information collection systems assists in selecting friendly battle positions. Establishing LOSs and identifying intervisibility lines are critical to analyzing observation and fields of fire because they have a bearing on LOS direct fire weapons, antennas, reconnaissance, and some electro-optical systems. Essentially, identifying intervisibility lines can assist in identifying potential threat locations as well as those locations where friendly forces can evade detection from threat forces.
- 4-20. An effective technique for analyzing observation and fields of fire is the production of a map displaying observation and fields of fire. Computer-generated terrain applications can assist in producing observation and fields of fire graphics that depict expected ranges and locations of nonpresent, decreased, or increased observation and fields of fire. An ideal field of fire for direct fire weapons is an open field in which the threat can be seen and has no protection from fires. Analysts identify features of terrain that allow good observation for indirect fire weapons and determine if the terrain has any effect on fire support missions. Figure 4-5 on page 4-8 shows LOS analysis used to depict observation and fields of fire from a point on, or above, the ground. This depiction accounts for natural and man-made obstacles to observation. Rings can be added to accommodate for weapons ranges.
Figure 4-5. Observation and fields of fire (complex terrain) example
IMAGE:
This image depicts a tactical map illustrating an observation scenario. Key features include a hospital marked with an 'H,' serving as an observation post. Observations are made from the hospital roof, which has a parapet for cover, allowing visibility up to 1,500 meters. There's a bridge crossing a river, and a red observation boundary extends 920 meters from the hospital. Buildings, dead space areas, and roads, labeled as Route Limburg and Route Bikib, are also shown. The map note emphasizes accounting for dead space. |
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