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[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness’s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that the principal is liable for an agents acts committed within the scope of the agents employment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness’s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness’s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness’s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that an absent witnesss statements are admissible under the confrontation clause only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a lineup or photospread, but forgets, or changes, his testimony at trial.” Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Malley, 796 F.2d 891, 898-99 (7th Cir.1986) (allowing FBI agent to testify regarding witness’s prior identification of defendant after witness recanted at trial). The better course, obviously, is to provide the photo array or other evidence of the prior identification immediately, while the declarant is still on the witness stand. But events at trial sometimes make the better course impractical. In such circumstances, a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine a declarant regarding his prior identification is enough to satisfy the requirements of Rule 801, even if the defendant chooses not to use the opportunity. See United States v. Elemy, 656 F.2d 507, 508 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that the victims prior videotaped testimony from a preliminary hearing was admissible as testimony at trial where the victim was unavailable to testify" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates. The court held that if an alien’s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (“[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court’s conclusion.”). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that “immigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates. The court held that if an alien’s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (“[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court’s conclusion.”). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that “immigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (recognizing that immigration policy is the clear purview of the legislative branch", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates. The court held that if an alien’s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (“[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court’s conclusion.”). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that “immigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates. The court held that if an alien’s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (“[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court’s conclusion.”). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that “immigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (recognizing that citizens who exercise their rights under the initiative provisions act as and become in fact the legislative branch of the municipal government ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nStates. The court held that if an alien’s 1-212 application is granted, he is no longer subject to the reinstatement pro vision, because he is no longer an illegal entrant. Id. at 789. Here, Lino did not apply for a 1-212 application. Consequently, her reliance on Perez-Gonzalez is misplaced. In any event, courts have questioned the Perez-Gonzalez outcome. See, e.g., Lattab, 384 F.3d at 17 (“[W]e have grave doubts about the correctness of the Perez-Gonzalez court’s conclusion.”). Although we recognize the unfortunate circumstances of this case, we have consistently held that “immigration policy ... is traditionally [within] the province of the political branches.” Gomez-Chavez v. Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.2002); see also Sivaainkaran v. INS, 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that in the absence of a legislative invasion of constitutionallyprotected rights the judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the legislatures exclusive policy decisions" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThis order followed a noticed hearing on appellee’s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court’s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(holding that court lacked jurisdiction to modify visitation where it dismissed the modification petition", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThis order followed a noticed hearing on appellee’s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court’s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThis order followed a noticed hearing on appellee’s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court’s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(holding conclusory statements in visitation dispute were not adequate to support awarding visitation rights", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThis order followed a noticed hearing on appellee’s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court’s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(holding that uncertainty regarding amount of visitation ordered is fatal to the validity of a trial courts visitation award", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThis order followed a noticed hearing on appellee’s motion to hold appellant in contempt for allegedly disobeying the court’s order on visitation. No pleadings were filed requesting a change of custody nor was there any notice that any such change of custody would be heard or considered by the court. The trial court cannot modify a support order or other adjudicated right unless the court’s subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked by appropriate pleadings, and that invoked jurisdiction has been perfected by the proper service of process and due process notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue has been had. This succinctly states the requirements of due process in cases such as the instant case. See also, Fisher v. Whiteside, 541 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(holding that court in habeas petition has no authority to condition visitation right of parent upon payment for support and maintenance" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsection, referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), defines a “money transmitting business” as any business required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which in turn relates to “domestic financial institution[s].” Title 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(1) states that the term “domestic financial institution,” for purposes of that subchapter, “applies] to an action in the United States of a financial agency or institution.” Because Mazza-Alaluf raised his Title 31 argument in the district court only as it pertained to the government’s reliance on a § 1960(b)(1)(B) theory of guilt, we review his recasting of that claim to challenge his § 1960(b)(1)(A) conviction for plain error, and we identify none here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that even if a defendant is able to show that there was a plain error that affected his substantial rights a court of appeals is not required to reverse a conviction unless it finds that the error seriously affected the fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsection, referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), defines a “money transmitting business” as any business required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which in turn relates to “domestic financial institution[s].” Title 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(1) states that the term “domestic financial institution,” for purposes of that subchapter, “applies] to an action in the United States of a financial agency or institution.” Because Mazza-Alaluf raised his Title 31 argument in the district court only as it pertained to the government’s reliance on a § 1960(b)(1)(B) theory of guilt, we review his recasting of that claim to challenge his § 1960(b)(1)(A) conviction for plain error, and we identify none here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that a plain error did not seriously affect the fairness integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings even though the error was assumed to have affected substantial rights", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsection, referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), defines a “money transmitting business” as any business required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which in turn relates to “domestic financial institution[s].” Title 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(1) states that the term “domestic financial institution,” for purposes of that subchapter, “applies] to an action in the United States of a financial agency or institution.” Because Mazza-Alaluf raised his Title 31 argument in the district court only as it pertained to the government’s reliance on a § 1960(b)(1)(B) theory of guilt, we review his recasting of that claim to challenge his § 1960(b)(1)(A) conviction for plain error, and we identify none here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) (recognizing that plain error analysis requires 1 error 2 that is plain 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously affects fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsection, referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), defines a “money transmitting business” as any business required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which in turn relates to “domestic financial institution[s].” Title 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(1) states that the term “domestic financial institution,” for purposes of that subchapter, “applies] to an action in the United States of a financial agency or institution.” Because Mazza-Alaluf raised his Title 31 argument in the district court only as it pertained to the government’s reliance on a § 1960(b)(1)(B) theory of guilt, we review his recasting of that claim to challenge his § 1960(b)(1)(A) conviction for plain error, and we identify none here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that plain error will be identified only if 1 there is error 2 that is clear or obvious rather than subject to reasonable dispute 3 that affects defendants substantial rights and 4 that seriously impugns fairness integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nsection, referenced in 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(B), defines a “money transmitting business” as any business required to file reports under 31 U.S.C. § 5313, which in turn relates to “domestic financial institution[s].” Title 31 U.S.C. § 5312(b)(1) states that the term “domestic financial institution,” for purposes of that subchapter, “applies] to an action in the United States of a financial agency or institution.” Because Mazza-Alaluf raised his Title 31 argument in the district court only as it pertained to the government’s reliance on a § 1960(b)(1)(B) theory of guilt, we review his recasting of that claim to challenge his § 1960(b)(1)(A) conviction for plain error, and we identify none here. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment and submit it to the jury seriously affects the fairness integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings so that the court should exerciseits discretion to recognize the error" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nclock until August 21,2012. We further reject Eccleston’s challenge to the delay occurring between the original August 21, 2012 trial date and the actual start of trial on September 11, 2012. Ec-cleston apparently takes issue with government counsel’s request for this additional delay, even though government counsel indicated that he was willing to go forward with trial on August 21 if the court so ordered. The district court granted the government’s request due to counsel’s serious medical situation. Unavoidable health concerns are a valid reason for granting a reasonable delay. United States v. Trotman, 406 Fed.Appx. 799, 805 (4th Cir.2011) (unpublished); see also United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir.1987) (holding ends of justice provision was intended to enable plaintiffs to bring all members of nationwide rico conspiracy before a court in a single trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nclock until August 21,2012. We further reject Eccleston’s challenge to the delay occurring between the original August 21, 2012 trial date and the actual start of trial on September 11, 2012. Ec-cleston apparently takes issue with government counsel’s request for this additional delay, even though government counsel indicated that he was willing to go forward with trial on August 21 if the court so ordered. The district court granted the government’s request due to counsel’s serious medical situation. Unavoidable health concerns are a valid reason for granting a reasonable delay. United States v. Trotman, 406 Fed.Appx. 799, 805 (4th Cir.2011) (unpublished); see also United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that fivemonth openended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate speedy trial act", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nclock until August 21,2012. We further reject Eccleston’s challenge to the delay occurring between the original August 21, 2012 trial date and the actual start of trial on September 11, 2012. Ec-cleston apparently takes issue with government counsel’s request for this additional delay, even though government counsel indicated that he was willing to go forward with trial on August 21 if the court so ordered. The district court granted the government’s request due to counsel’s serious medical situation. Unavoidable health concerns are a valid reason for granting a reasonable delay. United States v. Trotman, 406 Fed.Appx. 799, 805 (4th Cir.2011) (unpublished); see also United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that a new trial was warranted where the prosecutor stated as the bible says and the murderer shall be put to death", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nclock until August 21,2012. We further reject Eccleston’s challenge to the delay occurring between the original August 21, 2012 trial date and the actual start of trial on September 11, 2012. Ec-cleston apparently takes issue with government counsel’s request for this additional delay, even though government counsel indicated that he was willing to go forward with trial on August 21 if the court so ordered. The district court granted the government’s request due to counsel’s serious medical situation. Unavoidable health concerns are a valid reason for granting a reasonable delay. United States v. Trotman, 406 Fed.Appx. 799, 805 (4th Cir.2011) (unpublished); see also United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that a seven week suspension of the speedy trial clock was warranted under the ends of justice provision where the chief prosecutor was ill and new assistant prosecutors required time to prepare for trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nclock until August 21,2012. We further reject Eccleston’s challenge to the delay occurring between the original August 21, 2012 trial date and the actual start of trial on September 11, 2012. Ec-cleston apparently takes issue with government counsel’s request for this additional delay, even though government counsel indicated that he was willing to go forward with trial on August 21 if the court so ordered. The district court granted the government’s request due to counsel’s serious medical situation. Unavoidable health concerns are a valid reason for granting a reasonable delay. United States v. Trotman, 406 Fed.Appx. 799, 805 (4th Cir.2011) (unpublished); see also United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir.2012); United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 210 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that speedy trial act requires that an ends of justice continuance be specifically limited in time" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee is performing work on the project,” as factors in selecting the winning bidder. See Cincinnati, OH., Code § 320-3(j)-(k) (2013). Thus, the Ordinance assesses bidders partially based on their compensation practices on non-City projects. Of course, the Ordinance only imposes this consideration on a select group of contractors: those contractors that affirmatively choose to bid on City projects. One district court that has considered this issue has held that the mere fact that the municipal ordinance applies only to contractors who affirmatively choose to bid on city projects dictates that the ordinance is “sufficiently tailored” to the municipality’s proprietary interests. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. New Castle County, 144 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2015) (holding that an ordinance requiring bidders on county projects to participate in an apprenticeship program was sufficiently tailored to the countys proprietary interest because it only applied to bidders on the countys projects", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee is performing work on the project,” as factors in selecting the winning bidder. See Cincinnati, OH., Code § 320-3(j)-(k) (2013). Thus, the Ordinance assesses bidders partially based on their compensation practices on non-City projects. Of course, the Ordinance only imposes this consideration on a select group of contractors: those contractors that affirmatively choose to bid on City projects. One district court that has considered this issue has held that the mere fact that the municipal ordinance applies only to contractors who affirmatively choose to bid on city projects dictates that the ordinance is “sufficiently tailored” to the municipality’s proprietary interests. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. New Castle County, 144 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2015) (recognizing that but for a provision in a countys charter allowing for appointment of the county manager for a fouryear term the countys legislators would be unable to appoint the county manager for a term extending into the term of the legislators successors", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee is performing work on the project,” as factors in selecting the winning bidder. See Cincinnati, OH., Code § 320-3(j)-(k) (2013). Thus, the Ordinance assesses bidders partially based on their compensation practices on non-City projects. Of course, the Ordinance only imposes this consideration on a select group of contractors: those contractors that affirmatively choose to bid on City projects. One district court that has considered this issue has held that the mere fact that the municipal ordinance applies only to contractors who affirmatively choose to bid on city projects dictates that the ordinance is “sufficiently tailored” to the municipality’s proprietary interests. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. New Castle County, 144 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2015) (holding that even though the defendant believed the real estate projects he misrepresented were viable his belief did not negate his intent to inflict a genuine harm on the victims by depriving them of material information necessary to determine for themselves whether to continue their development projects thereby continuing or increasing their exposure to the risk of the projects failure", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee is performing work on the project,” as factors in selecting the winning bidder. See Cincinnati, OH., Code § 320-3(j)-(k) (2013). Thus, the Ordinance assesses bidders partially based on their compensation practices on non-City projects. Of course, the Ordinance only imposes this consideration on a select group of contractors: those contractors that affirmatively choose to bid on City projects. One district court that has considered this issue has held that the mere fact that the municipal ordinance applies only to contractors who affirmatively choose to bid on city projects dictates that the ordinance is “sufficiently tailored” to the municipality’s proprietary interests. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. New Castle County, 144 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2015) (holding in a breach of contract action that a state statute established that employees have a right to rely on the layoff and termination procedures advanced by their employers and that to the extent that the government employer considered factors in addition to seniority ability and merit the countys termination of the plaintiffs employment was in violation of the county personnel management act", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe employee is performing work on the project,” as factors in selecting the winning bidder. See Cincinnati, OH., Code § 320-3(j)-(k) (2013). Thus, the Ordinance assesses bidders partially based on their compensation practices on non-City projects. Of course, the Ordinance only imposes this consideration on a select group of contractors: those contractors that affirmatively choose to bid on City projects. One district court that has considered this issue has held that the mere fact that the municipal ordinance applies only to contractors who affirmatively choose to bid on city projects dictates that the ordinance is “sufficiently tailored” to the municipality’s proprietary interests. See Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. New Castle County, 144 F.Supp.3d 633, 639 (D. Del. 2015) (holding a county taxpayer has standing to bring a declaratory decree and injunctive action against public officials of the county when the action seeks to enjoin the grant of certain tax exemptions given to other taxpayers in the county on the ground that such exemptions violate specific limitations on the countys authority to grant tax exemptions imposed by the florida constitution" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrecord accompanied by a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court’s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (holding that the question of substantial noncompliance with the requirements of a permanency plan was a question of law reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrecord accompanied by a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court’s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (holding in a termination of parental rights case that as a question of law the trial courts ruling that the facts of this case sufficiently support the termination ground of willful abandonment are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrecord accompanied by a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court’s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrecord accompanied by a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court’s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (holding that appellate review of hearsay issues is de novo with no presumption of correctness", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrecord accompanied by a presumption of correctness, “unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.” Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). If some of the trial court’s factual findings are based on its determinations of the credibility of the witnesses, then this Court will afford great weight to those credibility determinations, and will not reverse such determinations absent clear evidence to the contrary. See McCaleb v. Saturn Corp., 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn.1995). Whether the ultimate issues of dependency and neglect or severe child abuse have been established by clear and convincing evidence are questions of law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. See In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 810 (Tenn.2007) (recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the child’s mother, Procanik; for a child’s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child’s Down’s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor’s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority’s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (holding that to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on fear of contracting aids plaintiff must allege actual exposure to hiv", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the child’s mother, Procanik; for a child’s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child’s Down’s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor’s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority’s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (holding plaintiffs administrative complaint alleging negligent exposure to radiation established subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs civil claim alleging failure to warn of radiation exposure", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the child’s mother, Procanik; for a child’s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child’s Down’s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor’s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority’s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (holding that where plaintiffs emotional distress was the direct result of documented physical injury and was reasonably foreseeable in light of the fact that the plaintiff may have been exposed to hiv he was not required to prove actual exposure to the disease in order to state a viable cause of action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the child’s mother, Procanik; for a child’s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child’s Down’s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor’s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority’s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (holding that absent any proof that the plaintiff was in fact exposed to hiv he could not recover damages for his fear of contracting aids", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the child’s mother, Procanik; for a child’s cystic fibrosis on a doctor who failed to test a symptomatic sibling for that genetic disease, Sckroeder; or for a child’s Down’s Syndrome on a doctor who failed to warn a pregnant woman that her age put her at increased risk of delivering a child with that condition, Berman. It is quite another to impose liability for prescribing a drug that had no connection with a birth defect. In one ease, the condition is the foreseeable result of the doctor’s omission; in the other, it is not. The majority’s result is unprecedented in any jurisdiction. In every previous failure-to-warn case, the harm about which the doctors failed to warn was the harm that in fact occurred. See, e.g., Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., 824 F.Supp. 746 (M.D.Tenn.1993) (holding medical providers who failed to warn mother about danger of exposure to hiv liable when baby born with hiv" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nState was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because “the case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.” Appellee’s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row ¶ 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne’s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (holding the death penalty disproportionately cruel and unusual when imposed for the crime of rape", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nState was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because “the case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.” Appellee’s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row ¶ 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne’s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (holding that the carrying out of an execution after the first execution attempt had failed did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nState was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because “the case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.” Appellee’s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row ¶ 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne’s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (holding that twentythree years served on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nState was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because “the case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.” Appellee’s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row ¶ 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne’s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (holding that the fact that defendant spent years on death row awaiting execution does not render the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nState was of the view that a plea agreement with Langston was necessary because “the case against Langston was, at best, shaky, while the case against [Clabourne] was overwhelming, with much of the evidence coming from his own mouth.” Appellee’s Answering Briefi'Cross-Appellants Opening Brief at 51. c. Length of Time on Death Row ¶ 43 Clabourne has been sentenced to death for eighteen years. He claims this is mitigating because he has a mental illness and Langston and Carrico, who do not, have not had to face the prospect of execution for the same period. We find these facts altogether unrelated to Clabourne’s character or record and the circumstances of his offense and, therefore, reject this proffered mitigation. Cf. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 259, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997) (holding that twentythree years on death row is not cruel and unusual punishment" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court’s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez’s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review a legal claim not presented in administrative proceedings below", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court’s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez’s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding that district courts have jurisdiction to review a claim that a person received inadequate notice of completed administrative forfeiture proceedings", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court’s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez’s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding that inadequate notice did not trigger plans time bar for administrative review", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court’s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez’s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding that where notice was deficient in administrative forfeiture proceedings proper remedy was to grant claimant right to a hearing", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRico that portion of his motion which sou der is appropriate. Accordingly, we will vacate and remand in part so that, consistent with the District Court’s order of December 13, 2010, that portion of Rodriguez’s motion which seeks return of property seized in Puerto Rico may be transferred to the District of Puerto Rico. As explained below, however, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Rule 41(g) motion in all other respects. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir.1999). Rodriguez argued that he did not receive sufficient notice of the forfeiture of items 3, 4, and 5. United States v. McGlo-ry, 202 F.3d 664, 670 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc) (holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants’ § 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing this rule", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants’ § 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing rule", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants’ § 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing this as the general rule", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants’ § 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing foregoing rule as wellsettled", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non April 11, 2001, in the District of Maryland. In the context of the foregoing, we must assess whether any of the Convicted Offenses are barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. First, we assess whether the Defendants’ § 846 conspiracy convictions are barred under the applicable double jeopardy principles. We readily conclude they are not barred, because, put most simply, the conspiracy offenses previously charged and mistried in the District of Columbia and Maryland do not implicate a double jeopardy analysis. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing general rule" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, § 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); § 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); § 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (recognizing that inmates have no freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, § 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); § 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); § 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (holding that a prisoner has no first amendment right to provide legal assistance to other inmates and that therefore prison officials did not violate the prisoners constitutional rights when they intercepted a letter containing legal advice that he sent to another prisoner", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, § 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); § 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); § 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (holding that where parents have previously stipulated that the children should be adjudicated as being in need of aid ocs still has the burden of proving in the subsequent termination of parental rights proceeding by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of aid", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, § 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); § 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); § 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (recognizing special circumstances exception", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto have less capacity than adults to understand their rights and privileges. See, e.g., Colo. Const, art. VII, § 1 (person under eighteen has no right to vote); § 13-22-101, C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen does not have competence to enter into contracts, to manage estates, to sue and be sued, or to make decisions regarding his or her own body, such as donating blood or organs); § 14-2-106(l)(a)(I), C.R.S.2000 (person under eighteen needs to obtain parental consent before receiving marriage license); § 19-2-511(1), (juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation required to have parent or guardian present before waiving right to counsel); C.R.J.P. 3(a) (advisement for juveniles entering plea requires presence of a parent or guardian at initial appearance); Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1219 (recognizing that children have less capacity than adults to understand legal rights and therefore need special assistance" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwithout notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USCÍRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat’l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat’l Treasury Employees concern the definition of “adverse action” in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (holding that termination is an adverse employment action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwithout notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USCÍRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat’l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat’l Treasury Employees concern the definition of “adverse action” in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (holding that nonrenewal of an appointment is not a removal under 5 usc 7512 and thus not an adverse action as defined in 5 usc 7512", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwithout notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USCÍRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat’l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat’l Treasury Employees concern the definition of “adverse action” in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (holding for the purposes of 18 usc 924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc 924e2b", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwithout notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USCÍRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat’l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat’l Treasury Employees concern the definition of “adverse action” in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (holding that the expiration and nonrenewal of a term appointment is not an adverse action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwithout notice and explanation; (7) whether annual leave is afforded; (8) whether the work is an integral part of the business of the employer; (9) whether the worker accumulates retirement benefits; (10) whether the employer pays social security taxes; and (11) the intention of the parties. Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. 4 . USCÍRF cites two cases arising under civil service employment laws, Suzal v. Director, United States Info. Agency, 32 F.3d 574 (D.C.Cir.1994) and Nat’l Treasury Empls. Union v. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Bd., 743 F.2d 895 (D.C.Cir.1984). Suzal and Nat’l Treasury Employees concern the definition of “adverse action” in a collective bargaining agreement, as it bears on the question of which employment disputes can be sent to arbitration. See Suzal, 32 F.3d at 579-80 (holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nI believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of § 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads’ argument that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (recognizing that the rule of lenity only applies if after considering text structure history and purpose there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the court must simply guess as to what congress intended", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nI believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of § 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads’ argument that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (holding that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing guidelines", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nI believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of § 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads’ argument that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (recognizing that the rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions but also to the penalties they impose", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nI believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of § 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads’ argument that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (holding rule of lenity in the penal context to be a rule of last resort", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nI believe the obligation to prove a knowing and willful violation of Maryland's licensing law is clear from the plain language of § 1960(b)(1)(A) and the Maryland law it references, I reject the Talebnejads’ argument that § 1960(b)(1)(A) is void for vagueness. See United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that penal statutes define crimes so that ordinary people can understand the conduct prohibited and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is not encouraged.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the different scienter requirements made the statute ambiguous, I would reach the same result through applying the rule of lenity. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (holding that the rule of lenity ensures fair warning by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct clearly covered" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (recognizing that under the common law applications for writs of error coram nobis were civil in character", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (holding that district court had jurisdiction to consider claims under the all writs act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (recognizing the all writs act gives federal courts authority to issue writs of coram nobis to correct fundamental errors in criminal proceedings where the person is no longer in custody", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (holding that this court has authority in appropriate circumstances to issue writs under all writs act 28 usc 1651a", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvice and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Jamaica, where he has resided ever since—separated from much of his family, including his parents and his daughter, and from the country he had called home for most of his life. Then, in 2010, the Supreme Court offered Newman a ray of hope. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), it held that defense attorneys provide inadequate representation when they fail to advise their clients about the likely deportation consequences of pleading guilty. Armed with that decision, Newman filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis, which provides a means of collaterally attacking a conviction when the person is no longer in custody. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under all writs act" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndecision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (recognizing split within the circuit on whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary but not resolving the conflict", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndecision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (recognizing the open question", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndecision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (recognizing but not resolving this question", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndecision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (recognizing this rule", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndecision is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. While it may generally be possible to permit a party to call a witness without disclosing the fact of his or her prior engagement by the opposing party, there may be little reason to require this effort if other expert witnesses are readily available. See Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 461. 5 . One such situation may be if on cross examination, the party who had originally retained the witness seeks to attack the expert's qualifications. In such a situation, a court may well decide that the opposing party should be permitted to attempt to rehabilitate the witness by eliciting testimony from the witness that the party had thought highly enough of the witness to consult him or her originally. See Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242, & n. 4 (recognizing without resolving the split in authority on the meaning of the word" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the “incident to arrest” basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that while law enforcement officers properly separated and assumed possession of a cell phone from arrestees person during the search incident to arrest a warrant was required before the information data and content of the cell phone could be accessed and searched by law enforcement", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the “incident to arrest” basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (holding a warrantless search of cell phone contents did not exceed permissible scope of search incident to arrest", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the “incident to arrest” basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest includes the contents of a cell phone found on the arrestees person", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the “incident to arrest” basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (holding seizure of arrestees cell phone lawful but finding the fourth amendment requires a warrant to perform a forensic search of the lawfully seized cell phone", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nand later search at station); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 & n. 7 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1353, 127 S.Ct. 2065, 167 L.Ed.2d 790 (2007) (approving the retrieval of call records and text messages from the defendant’s cell phone incident to his arrest, and finding that the “incident to arrest” basis for this ruling was unaffected by the fact that the police transported the defendant a short distance before conducting this search); United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.2012) (upholding a search of a cell phone incident to an arrest for the limited purpose of obtaining the cell phone number, which in turn was used to subpoena call history records from the telephone company); Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 Fed.Appx. 216, 225 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that finley authorizes a police officer to search the electronic contents of a cell phone recovered from the area within an arrestees immediate control" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\na claim for or the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits or other payments arising from events unrelated to the ior injury is inadmissible because it is “clearly irrelevant to the issues being tried.” Leslie v. Higgason, 779 So.2d 470, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Evidence concerning a “[plaintiffs] previous injury” may, however, be relevant to the issue of the defendant’s liability or the amount of damages due. Id. There are also circumstances where evidence specifically concerning litigation or claims by a plaintiff for a prior injury will be considered relevant to matters at issue and therefore admissible. Thus, “a plaintiff may properly be questioned about prior lawsuits or claims for injuries similar to those complained of in the present laws 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that trial court erred in excluding from evidence the application for social security benefits that the plaintiff made eight months prior to the accident at issue in which he described in detail his inability to work which was probative in establishing the plaintiffs condition prior to the accident and stating that since the plaintiff was denied social security benefits there was no collateral source", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\na claim for or the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits or other payments arising from events unrelated to the ior injury is inadmissible because it is “clearly irrelevant to the issues being tried.” Leslie v. Higgason, 779 So.2d 470, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Evidence concerning a “[plaintiffs] previous injury” may, however, be relevant to the issue of the defendant’s liability or the amount of damages due. Id. There are also circumstances where evidence specifically concerning litigation or claims by a plaintiff for a prior injury will be considered relevant to matters at issue and therefore admissible. Thus, “a plaintiff may properly be questioned about prior lawsuits or claims for injuries similar to those complained of in the present laws 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that the claims court has no jurisdiction under the tucker act over claims to social security benefits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\na claim for or the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits or other payments arising from events unrelated to the ior injury is inadmissible because it is “clearly irrelevant to the issues being tried.” Leslie v. Higgason, 779 So.2d 470, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Evidence concerning a “[plaintiffs] previous injury” may, however, be relevant to the issue of the defendant’s liability or the amount of damages due. Id. There are also circumstances where evidence specifically concerning litigation or claims by a plaintiff for a prior injury will be considered relevant to matters at issue and therefore admissible. Thus, “a plaintiff may properly be questioned about prior lawsuits or claims for injuries similar to those complained of in the present laws 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\na claim for or the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits or other payments arising from events unrelated to the ior injury is inadmissible because it is “clearly irrelevant to the issues being tried.” Leslie v. Higgason, 779 So.2d 470, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Evidence concerning a “[plaintiffs] previous injury” may, however, be relevant to the issue of the defendant’s liability or the amount of damages due. Id. There are also circumstances where evidence specifically concerning litigation or claims by a plaintiff for a prior injury will be considered relevant to matters at issue and therefore admissible. Thus, “a plaintiff may properly be questioned about prior lawsuits or claims for injuries similar to those complained of in the present laws 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\na claim for or the receipt of workers’ compensation benefits or other payments arising from events unrelated to the ior injury is inadmissible because it is “clearly irrelevant to the issues being tried.” Leslie v. Higgason, 779 So.2d 470, 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Evidence concerning a “[plaintiffs] previous injury” may, however, be relevant to the issue of the defendant’s liability or the amount of damages due. Id. There are also circumstances where evidence specifically concerning litigation or claims by a plaintiff for a prior injury will be considered relevant to matters at issue and therefore admissible. Thus, “a plaintiff may properly be questioned about prior lawsuits or claims for injuries similar to those complained of in the present laws 2d 805, 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that use of social security benefits satisfied child support obligation" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nhe is either a donee or The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants are not parties to any contract that may exist between Vantage and SFWA. Appellants instead contend in their second issue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. To determine whether any Vantage and SFWA contract expressed a clear intent to directly benefit Appellants, we must interpret the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. See Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the assorted emails and attachments that Appellants claim constitute the contract between Vantage and SFWA nowhere identify Appellants by name as intended beneficiaries. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nhe is either a donee or The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants are not parties to any contract that may exist between Vantage and SFWA. Appellants instead contend in their second issue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. To determine whether any Vantage and SFWA contract expressed a clear intent to directly benefit Appellants, we must interpret the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. See Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the assorted emails and attachments that Appellants claim constitute the contract between Vantage and SFWA nowhere identify Appellants by name as intended beneficiaries. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (holding decrees failure to identify attorney by name was insufficient to confer thirdparty beneficiary status on him concerning decrees allocation of the payment of his fees", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nhe is either a donee or The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants are not parties to any contract that may exist between Vantage and SFWA. Appellants instead contend in their second issue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. To determine whether any Vantage and SFWA contract expressed a clear intent to directly benefit Appellants, we must interpret the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. See Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the assorted emails and attachments that Appellants claim constitute the contract between Vantage and SFWA nowhere identify Appellants by name as intended beneficiaries. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (holding that courts considering government contracts must take a more narrow view of thirdparty beneficiary status and apply a more stringent test to determine whether a third party qualifies for beneficiary status", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nhe is either a donee or The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants are not parties to any contract that may exist between Vantage and SFWA. Appellants instead contend in their second issue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. To determine whether any Vantage and SFWA contract expressed a clear intent to directly benefit Appellants, we must interpret the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. See Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the assorted emails and attachments that Appellants claim constitute the contract between Vantage and SFWA nowhere identify Appellants by name as intended beneficiaries. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (holding decrees identification of person by name was sufficiently specific for purposes of thirdparty beneficiary status", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nhe is either a donee or The summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that Appellants are not parties to any contract that may exist between Vantage and SFWA. Appellants instead contend in their second issue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. To determine whether any Vantage and SFWA contract expressed a clear intent to directly benefit Appellants, we must interpret the alleged contract between Vantage and SFWA. See Tawes, 340 S.W.3d at 425. Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the assorted emails and attachments that Appellants claim constitute the contract between Vantage and SFWA nowhere identify Appellants by name as intended beneficiaries. Compare Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 588 (holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbased on Feeder Fund property. B. The Objecting Claimants Did Not Entrust Cash or Securities With BLMIS for the Purpose of Trading or Investing in Securities Further, the Objecting Claimants failed to fulfill the “critical aspect of the customer definition” — they did not entrust cash or securities with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities. In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2006) (“The critical aspect of the customer definition is the entrustment of cash or securities to the broker-dealer for the purposes of trading securities.”) (quoting Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 420 B.R. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 766 (2d Cir.2010), (holding that claims alleging that the debtor fraudulently induced the claimants to retain securities they had purchased from the debtor arise from the purchase or sale of those securities for purposes of 510b", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbased on Feeder Fund property. B. The Objecting Claimants Did Not Entrust Cash or Securities With BLMIS for the Purpose of Trading or Investing in Securities Further, the Objecting Claimants failed to fulfill the “critical aspect of the customer definition” — they did not entrust cash or securities with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities. In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2006) (“The critical aspect of the customer definition is the entrustment of cash or securities to the broker-dealer for the purposes of trading securities.”) (quoting Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 420 B.R. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 766 (2d Cir.2010), (holding rosenman was a customer under sipa because he entrusted funds with the debtor blmis for the purpose of investing in securities", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbased on Feeder Fund property. B. The Objecting Claimants Did Not Entrust Cash or Securities With BLMIS for the Purpose of Trading or Investing in Securities Further, the Objecting Claimants failed to fulfill the “critical aspect of the customer definition” — they did not entrust cash or securities with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities. In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2006) (“The critical aspect of the customer definition is the entrustment of cash or securities to the broker-dealer for the purposes of trading securities.”) (quoting Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 420 B.R. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 766 (2d Cir.2010), (holding that companys president was trustee of trust funds because he had control and direction over the funds", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbased on Feeder Fund property. B. The Objecting Claimants Did Not Entrust Cash or Securities With BLMIS for the Purpose of Trading or Investing in Securities Further, the Objecting Claimants failed to fulfill the “critical aspect of the customer definition” — they did not entrust cash or securities with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities. In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2006) (“The critical aspect of the customer definition is the entrustment of cash or securities to the broker-dealer for the purposes of trading securities.”) (quoting Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 420 B.R. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 766 (2d Cir.2010), (holding that claims that debtor fraudulently induced claimants to retain debtors securities arise from the purchase or sale of those securities", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbased on Feeder Fund property. B. The Objecting Claimants Did Not Entrust Cash or Securities With BLMIS for the Purpose of Trading or Investing in Securities Further, the Objecting Claimants failed to fulfill the “critical aspect of the customer definition” — they did not entrust cash or securities with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities. In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 463 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir.2006) (“The critical aspect of the customer definition is the entrustment of cash or securities to the broker-dealer for the purposes of trading securities.”) (quoting Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995)); see also Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, 420 B.R. 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 395 Fed.Appx. 766 (2d Cir.2010), (holding that an investor who entrusts cash with the debtor for the purpose of trading or investing in securities has a fiduciary relationship with the brokerdealer" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA majority of the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. Cf. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the dissent, we have held that this rule of deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine its authority.” (citation omitted)) with id. at 386, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot, however, agree with Justice SCALIA’s conclusion that courts must defer to an agency’s statutory construction even where, as here, the statute is designed to confine the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.”); see also N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2002) (recognizing justice scalias concurrence in mississippi power stating that the supreme court has not definitively ruled on the issue and declining to grant deference to the agencys determination of its own jurisdiction", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA majority of the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. Cf. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the dissent, we have held that this rule of deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine its authority.” (citation omitted)) with id. at 386, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot, however, agree with Justice SCALIA’s conclusion that courts must defer to an agency’s statutory construction even where, as here, the statute is designed to confine the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.”); see also N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant rule 37 relief where petitioner herred was in custody at the time the court ruled on his motion", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA majority of the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. Cf. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the dissent, we have held that this rule of deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine its authority.” (citation omitted)) with id. at 386, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot, however, agree with Justice SCALIA’s conclusion that courts must defer to an agency’s statutory construction even where, as here, the statute is designed to confine the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.”); see also N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2002) (recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA majority of the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. Cf. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the dissent, we have held that this rule of deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine its authority.” (citation omitted)) with id. at 386, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot, however, agree with Justice SCALIA’s conclusion that courts must defer to an agency’s statutory construction even where, as here, the statute is designed to confine the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.”); see also N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply laches where the only prejudice shown by the government was attributable to its own delay rather than to that of the movant", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA majority of the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to this issue. Cf. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the dissent, we have held that this rule of deference applies to an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine its authority.” (citation omitted)) with id. at 386, 108 S.Ct. 2428 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I cannot, however, agree with Justice SCALIA’s conclusion that courts must defer to an agency’s statutory construction even where, as here, the statute is designed to confine the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.”); see also N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that the supreme court will not issue advisory opinion on issue not before the court" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas granted — that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds’ assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court’s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that appellant who properly filed an objection in accordance with the notice he received from the trial court had standing to appeal", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas granted — that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds’ assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court’s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that parties waived any choice of law objection by not raising an objection", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas granted — that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds’ assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court’s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding appellant waived his complaint that trial court gave him no notice of submission date for summaryjudgment motion by not raising the objection in the trial court", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas granted — that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds’ assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court’s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that once a trial court has set a date for a summaryjudgment hearing the court must allow the nonmoving party an opportunity to be heard", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas granted — that the submission date had been re-set to March 18 made it impossible for plaintiffs to file controverting evidence.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not re-set the submission date for the Motion to March 18 is contradicted by the Insureds themselves. In addition, the Insureds’ assertion in their motion for rehearing that they had insufficient notice of the trial court’s resetting of the submission date is not a basis for granting rehearing because it is well-established that, if the trial court did not give sufficient notice in this regard, the Insureds had to raise this complaint in the trial court. See Okonkwo v. Washington Mut. Bank, No. 14-05-00925-CV, 2007 WL 763821, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that if appellant preserves legal sufficiency complaint in motion for new trial new trial is all the relief appellate court can give because that is all the relief appellant requested in trial court" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nJudge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court’s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that a legal conclusion on a motion to suppress is reviewed de novo", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nJudge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court’s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that on review of a motion to suppress the appellate court is to give deference to a trial courts factual findings but legal conclusions are reviewed de novo", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nJudge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court’s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that trial courts determination of facts has a presumption of correctness but trial courts legal conclusions are subject to de novo review", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nJudge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court’s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding appellate court reviews legal conclusions de novo", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nJudge. John Wesley Felton pled nolo contende-re to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and to carrying a concealed weapon, reserving the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress a ,22-ealiber rifle. We disagree with the trial court’s determination that the facts were sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Felton was engaged in criminal activity and, accordingly, reverse. See Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that we review legal conclusions of the court of federal claims de novo" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthose state laws that specifically “regulate insurance.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” and is, therefore, saved from ERISA’s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) “be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance”; and (2) “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.” Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. “This does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.” Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (holding claims under the montana unfair trade practices statute were conflictpreempted because the montana law provided nonerisa damages for essentially claim processing causes of action", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthose state laws that specifically “regulate insurance.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” and is, therefore, saved from ERISA’s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) “be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance”; and (2) “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.” Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. “This does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.” Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that an action which seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of actionf clearly falls under the 1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthose state laws that specifically “regulate insurance.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” and is, therefore, saved from ERISA’s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) “be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance”; and (2) “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.” Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. “This does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.” Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that state law causes of action arising from improper processing of a claim for benefits are preempted", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthose state laws that specifically “regulate insurance.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” and is, therefore, saved from ERISA’s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) “be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance”; and (2) “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.” Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. “This does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.” Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that a complaint that seeks nonerisa damages for what are essentially claim processing causes of action clearly fall within the ambit of 1132 preemption exemplified by pilot life", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthose state laws that specifically “regulate insurance.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has recently set forth a new two-part test for determining whether a state law “regulates insurance” and is, therefore, saved from ERISA’s preemptive effect. This two-part test requires the state law to: (1) “be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance”; and (2) “substantially affect the risk pooling arrangements between the insurer and the insured.” Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, _ U.S. _, 123 S.Ct. 1471, 1479, 155 L.Ed.2d 468 (2003). If this two-part inquiry reveals that the state' law regulates insurance, then the state law is saved from preemption. “This does not, however, end [the] preemption analysis.” Cono Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that state common law causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan are removable to federal court" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nabuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney’s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nabuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney’s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction under the transitional rules of the iirira", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nabuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney’s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nabuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney’s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (holding under the predecessor to 1229bb that denials of suspension based on the element of extreme hardship are discretionary decisions", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nabuse of discretion. Celis-Castellano v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 888, 890 (9th Cir.2002). We deny the petition for review in part, and dismiss it in part. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez’s motion to reopen because Perez did not demonstrate that his prior attorney’s failure to apply for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility caused Perez any prejudice. See Iturribavria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2003) (petitioner must show prejudice in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel). We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary determination that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 212(h), Perez is prima facie ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because Perez failed to demonstrate the requisite hardship. Cf. Kalaw, 133 F.3d at 1152 (holding that judicial review is available over the determination of whether extreme hardship exists though no jurisdiction exists to review the ultimate decision of whether to grant a waiver under 1186ac4a" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe alternative method of demonstrating scienter— motive — has not been established. Plaintiffs contend that the Andersen defendants were motivated to participate in the fraud because of personal gain. However, they have alleged no gain other than the fact that the Andersen firm was compensated for its professional services. It would defy common sense to hold that the motive element of the Beck scienter analysis would be satisfied merely by alleging the receipt of normal compensation for professional services rendered, because to do so would effectively abolish the requirement, as against professional defendants in a securities fraud action, of pleading facts which support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that a professional owes no duty to third persons unless the professional had actual knowledge that those persons would rely on his rendering of professional services", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe alternative method of demonstrating scienter— motive — has not been established. Plaintiffs contend that the Andersen defendants were motivated to participate in the fraud because of personal gain. However, they have alleged no gain other than the fact that the Andersen firm was compensated for its professional services. It would defy common sense to hold that the motive element of the Beck scienter analysis would be satisfied merely by alleging the receipt of normal compensation for professional services rendered, because to do so would effectively abolish the requirement, as against professional defendants in a securities fraud action, of pleading facts which support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.1989) (holding professional malpractice claim not contractual", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe alternative method of demonstrating scienter— motive — has not been established. Plaintiffs contend that the Andersen defendants were motivated to participate in the fraud because of personal gain. However, they have alleged no gain other than the fact that the Andersen firm was compensated for its professional services. It would defy common sense to hold that the motive element of the Beck scienter analysis would be satisfied merely by alleging the receipt of normal compensation for professional services rendered, because to do so would effectively abolish the requirement, as against professional defendants in a securities fraud action, of pleading facts which support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that ijnsurance policies are contracts and as such they are to be enforced according to their provisions and ijnsurance companies must be able to rely on their statements of coverage exclusions disclaimers definitions and other provisions in order to receive the benefit of their bargain", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe alternative method of demonstrating scienter— motive — has not been established. Plaintiffs contend that the Andersen defendants were motivated to participate in the fraud because of personal gain. However, they have alleged no gain other than the fact that the Andersen firm was compensated for its professional services. It would defy common sense to hold that the motive element of the Beck scienter analysis would be satisfied merely by alleging the receipt of normal compensation for professional services rendered, because to do so would effectively abolish the requirement, as against professional defendants in a securities fraud action, of pleading facts which support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that professional defendants who merely perform their usual professional functions and receive their normal compensation are not liable under the draconian provisions of section 122", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe alternative method of demonstrating scienter— motive — has not been established. Plaintiffs contend that the Andersen defendants were motivated to participate in the fraud because of personal gain. However, they have alleged no gain other than the fact that the Andersen firm was compensated for its professional services. It would defy common sense to hold that the motive element of the Beck scienter analysis would be satisfied merely by alleging the receipt of normal compensation for professional services rendered, because to do so would effectively abolish the requirement, as against professional defendants in a securities fraud action, of pleading facts which support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Wilson v. Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that 1 principal shareholder and chief executive officer of chapter 11 debtor in liquidation is not entitled to compensation beyond normal salary for performing duties required of the debtor 2 professional is a term which is not narrowly construed but applies to anyone the nature of whose services meet the criteria of a professional person 3 a professional license is not dispositive and 4 factors include form of compensation time of retention pre or postpetition and whether employment is full time or parttime" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nId. at 1413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because “the prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case” and, further, because \"[s]uch a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b).” Id. at 1416. This case is readily distinguishable from Sullivan; here, the government explained the purposes for which the evidence was offered (e.g., knowledge and intent) and, as discussed in detail infra, the other-acts evidence offered is clearly relevant to the crimes charged. Cf. United States v. Maass, 153 F.3d 729, 1998 WL 458577, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (recognizing that in sullivan it was obvious that the mississippi cook evidence at issue was not related to the crime charged", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nId. at 1413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because “the prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case” and, further, because \"[s]uch a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b).” Id. at 1416. This case is readily distinguishable from Sullivan; here, the government explained the purposes for which the evidence was offered (e.g., knowledge and intent) and, as discussed in detail infra, the other-acts evidence offered is clearly relevant to the crimes charged. Cf. United States v. Maass, 153 F.3d 729, 1998 WL 458577, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (holding that agencys construction of statute it was charged with enforcing was entitled to deference because it was reasonable in line with the statutes meaning and related to its expertise", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nId. at 1413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because “the prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case” and, further, because \"[s]uch a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b).” Id. at 1416. This case is readily distinguishable from Sullivan; here, the government explained the purposes for which the evidence was offered (e.g., knowledge and intent) and, as discussed in detail infra, the other-acts evidence offered is clearly relevant to the crimes charged. Cf. United States v. Maass, 153 F.3d 729, 1998 WL 458577, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nId. at 1413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because “the prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case” and, further, because \"[s]uch a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b).” Id. at 1416. This case is readily distinguishable from Sullivan; here, the government explained the purposes for which the evidence was offered (e.g., knowledge and intent) and, as discussed in detail infra, the other-acts evidence offered is clearly relevant to the crimes charged. Cf. United States v. Maass, 153 F.3d 729, 1998 WL 458577, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (holding that improper use of a summary chart was harmless because the evidence was merely cumulative and there was overwhelming evidence of the charged crime", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nId. at 1413 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the district court erred in admitting the evidence because “the prosecutor made no effort to explain a probative purpose or connection of the earlier conduct in Mississippi to this case” and, further, because \"[s]uch a general assertion as a basis for introducing evidence of prior wrongs or conduct is not sufficient for purposes of Rules 403 or 404(b).” Id. at 1416. This case is readily distinguishable from Sullivan; here, the government explained the purposes for which the evidence was offered (e.g., knowledge and intent) and, as discussed in detail infra, the other-acts evidence offered is clearly relevant to the crimes charged. Cf. United States v. Maass, 153 F.3d 729, 1998 WL 458577, at *2 (10th Cir.1998) (unpublished) (holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhere there has been a complete denial of counsel or where the circumstances are such that any competent attorney would be unable to provide effective assistance, a defendant need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Id. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The presumed prejudice exception to Strickland has been found to apply where there was an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interfered with counsel’s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. See [Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ]. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1128. See also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 292-93 (Pa.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that such instances are rare. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. 551 (holding that a showing of actual prejudice was required where the defendant claimed that counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhere there has been a complete denial of counsel or where the circumstances are such that any competent attorney would be unable to provide effective assistance, a defendant need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Id. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The presumed prejudice exception to Strickland has been found to apply where there was an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interfered with counsel’s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. See [Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ]. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1128. See also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 292-93 (Pa.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that such instances are rare. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. 551 (holding that counsels failure to investigate the defendants personal and psychiatric history constituted ineffective assistance during the penalty phase but not during the guilt phase", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhere there has been a complete denial of counsel or where the circumstances are such that any competent attorney would be unable to provide effective assistance, a defendant need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Id. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The presumed prejudice exception to Strickland has been found to apply where there was an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interfered with counsel’s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. See [Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ]. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1128. See also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 292-93 (Pa.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that such instances are rare. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. 551 (holding that prejudice was not shown where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhere there has been a complete denial of counsel or where the circumstances are such that any competent attorney would be unable to provide effective assistance, a defendant need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Id. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The presumed prejudice exception to Strickland has been found to apply where there was an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interfered with counsel’s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. See [Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ]. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1128. See also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 292-93 (Pa.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that such instances are rare. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. 551 (holding that trial courts witness interrogation did not cause defendant prejudice when there was already overwhelming evidence showing defendants guilt", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwhere there has been a complete denial of counsel or where the circumstances are such that any competent attorney would be unable to provide effective assistance, a defendant need not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. Id. at 659-62, 104 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The presumed prejudice exception to Strickland has been found to apply where there was an actual or constructive denial of counsel, the state interfered with counsel’s assistance, or counsel had an actual conflict of interest. See [Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ]. Reaves, 923 A.2d at 1128. See also Commonwealth v. Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 292-93 (Pa.2008). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has emphasized that such instances are rare. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S.Ct. 551 (holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Mirza Azamali Baig and his wife, Yas-meen Baig, natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) order denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They argue that they are entitled to relief based on a showing of past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of their political opinions. To the extent that the Baigs argue that they were entitled to asylum, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because the couple did not submit an application for asylum before either the IJ or the BIA. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that claims not presented to the ij and bia should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Mirza Azamali Baig and his wife, Yas-meen Baig, natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) order denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They argue that they are entitled to relief based on a showing of past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of their political opinions. To the extent that the Baigs argue that they were entitled to asylum, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because the couple did not submit an application for asylum before either the IJ or the BIA. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Mirza Azamali Baig and his wife, Yas-meen Baig, natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) order denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They argue that they are entitled to relief based on a showing of past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of their political opinions. To the extent that the Baigs argue that they were entitled to asylum, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because the couple did not submit an application for asylum before either the IJ or the BIA. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that we will not review an issue or claim that was not presented to the bia in the petitioners notice of appeal or brief to the bia even if the bia considered the issue or claim sua sponte", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Mirza Azamali Baig and his wife, Yas-meen Baig, natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) order denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They argue that they are entitled to relief based on a showing of past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of their political opinions. To the extent that the Baigs argue that they were entitled to asylum, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because the couple did not submit an application for asylum before either the IJ or the BIA. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the petitioners failure to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the bia deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear the issue", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Mirza Azamali Baig and his wife, Yas-meen Baig, natives and citizens of Pakistan, petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s (IJ’s) order denying withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They argue that they are entitled to relief based on a showing of past persecution and a fear of future persecution on account of their political opinions. To the extent that the Baigs argue that they were entitled to asylum, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the issue because the couple did not submit an application for asylum before either the IJ or the BIA. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that failure to exhaust an issue before the bia strips us of jurisdiction" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndisorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists’ reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant’s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant’s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant’s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant’s competence. See United States v. O’Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the trial court need not hold a voluntariness hearing where the defendant did not object and no evidence presented raised the issue", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndisorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists’ reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant’s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant’s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant’s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant’s competence. See United States v. O’Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the district court did in effect hold a hearing when it gave the defense a chance to supplement a psychiatric report with further evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndisorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists’ reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant’s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant’s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant’s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant’s competence. See United States v. O’Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (holding after remand that where the opposing party thus raises a material dispute as to the admissibility of expert scientific evidence the district court must hold an in limine hearing a socalled daubert hearing to consider the conflicting evidence ", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndisorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists’ reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant’s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant’s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant’s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant’s competence. See United States v. O’Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndisorder, bipolar affective disorder, and recurrent major depressive disorder does not automatically entitle him to a competency hearing especially since his most recent evaluations attest to his competency. Given our evaluation of the weight due to the various psychiatrists’ reports, we find that the Court has sufficient evidence to make a determination regarding the defendant’s competence without further proceedings. The stipulations filed by the government and defense counsel regarding defendant’s competence provide a complete picture of the defendant’s mental state and demeanor. Here, both parties were given a chance to provide what evidence they deemed appropriate to determine the defendant’s competence. See United States v. O’Neal, 969 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that court did not have to hold a hearing to determine attorneys fees where detailed affidavit was provided" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. ¶15. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations’s attorney specifically stated: ‘Tour honor, we don’t have any opposition [to the State’s motion]. It’s either — she’s habitual or she’s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.” After Nations’s attorney’s statement, the trial judge granted the State’s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations’s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (holding that a noticebased objection to a motion to amend an indictment to charge the defendant as a habitual offender is waived if the defendant fails to make a specific and contemporaneous objection", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. ¶15. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations’s attorney specifically stated: ‘Tour honor, we don’t have any opposition [to the State’s motion]. It’s either — she’s habitual or she’s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.” After Nations’s attorney’s statement, the trial judge granted the State’s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations’s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (holding that an objection was adequate when the judge cut short the objection and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. ¶15. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations’s attorney specifically stated: ‘Tour honor, we don’t have any opposition [to the State’s motion]. It’s either — she’s habitual or she’s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.” After Nations’s attorney’s statement, the trial judge granted the State’s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations’s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. ¶15. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations’s attorney specifically stated: ‘Tour honor, we don’t have any opposition [to the State’s motion]. It’s either — she’s habitual or she’s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.” After Nations’s attorney’s statement, the trial judge granted the State’s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations’s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (holding that a party fails to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal not only by failing to make a specific objection but also by making the wrong specific objection", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nNations with ample notice of its intent to charge her as a habitual offender, and she had a fair opportunity to present any defense to that charge. ¶15. Moreover, at the March 23, 2014 hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment to charge her as a habitual offender, Nations’s attorney specifically stated: ‘Tour honor, we don’t have any opposition [to the State’s motion]. It’s either — she’s habitual or she’s not. I think that we had already talked and she is in that status.” After Nations’s attorney’s statement, the trial judge granted the State’s motion. It is difficult to imagine a clearer waiver of the issue. Thus, Nations’s claim of unfair surprise is not only without merit but also procedurally barred. Newberry v. State, 85 So.3d 884, 888 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (holding that defendant waived his objection to the prosecutors use of her peremptory challenges by failing to make a contemporaneous objection during jury selection" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the defects. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order “if he validly waived the right to appeal that order” during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be “considered and intelligent.” Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that iirira and aedpa are not applicable to criminal alien who entered a guilty plea at a time when alien was eligible for 212c relief", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the defects. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order “if he validly waived the right to appeal that order” during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be “considered and intelligent.” Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that failure to advise an alien of possible forms of relief may violate due process", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the defects. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order “if he validly waived the right to appeal that order” during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be “considered and intelligent.” Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the ijs failure to inform alien that he is eligible for relief from deportation constitutes due process violation where alien establishes prejudice", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the defects. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order “if he validly waived the right to appeal that order” during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be “considered and intelligent.” Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (recognizing burden is on alien when alien is removable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the defects. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Arrieta, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, an alien is barred from collaterally attacking the validity of an underlying deportation order “if he validly waived the right to appeal that order” during the deportation proceedings. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d at 1182 (citation omitted). Such a waiver must be “considered and intelligent.” Id. A waiver is not considered and intelligent when the record contains an inference that the petitioner is eligible for relief from deportation, but the IJ fails to advise the alien of this possibility and give him the opportunity to develop the issue. United States v. Ubaldo-Figueroa, 364 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that there is no due process violation where the ijs finding was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and fair opportunity to present his claims" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nofficer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.” Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nofficer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.” Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for a seatbelt violation under state law", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nofficer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.” Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for driving on a suspended license under state law", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nofficer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.” Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nofficer questions [the suspect], tries to identify him[,] and attempts to gather additional information to ... dispel or confirm his suspicions.” Id. at 279-80, 720 S.E.2d at 78. Probable cause for a warrantless arrest “exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008) (quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981)); cf. Heien v. North Carolina, — U.S.-,-,-, 135 S.Ct. 530, 535, 539-40, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014) (assessing whether the officer h 56 Va.App. 646, 658, 696 S.E.2d 237, 243 (2010) (holding that probable cause existed to arrest for trespassing under state law" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRecently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child’s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child’s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRecently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child’s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child’s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (holding child welfare worker entitled to qualified immunity where child removed on reasonable suspicion of abuse", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRecently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child’s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child’s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRecently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child’s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child’s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (holding the record does not show that the statement to the social worker was for medical treatment because the social worker testified that he questioned the child to determine whether he needed to notify child protective services of a case of suspected child abuse", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nRecently, the Third Circuit has held that to establish a due process violation, and overcome qualified immunity, regarding a claim of government interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must establish that a child welfare worker, in removing a child from parental custody, possessed no objectively reasonable basis for believing that parental custody threatened the child’s welfare or safety. Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123 (3d Cir.1997). See also Gottlieb v. County of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 517 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no due process violation where child welfare worker had objectively reasonable basis for believing parent represented threat to child’s welfare); Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Services, Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto dive, plaintiff was not relieved “of the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.” .Id. In Murphy v. D’Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. “[E]ven if the water level had been low, ‘[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because “by the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.” Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because whether the danger posed by a swimming pool was known or obvious was a fact question", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto dive, plaintiff was not relieved “of the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.” .Id. In Murphy v. D’Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. “[E]ven if the water level had been low, ‘[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because “by the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.” Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that the plaintiff could bring an action for negligent misrepresentation although the plaintiff could not sue on the contract because the contract was void", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto dive, plaintiff was not relieved “of the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.” .Id. In Murphy v. D’Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. “[E]ven if the water level had been low, ‘[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because “by the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.” Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (holding in dicta that plaintiff was eontributorily negligent by diving into a murky shallow pool without first determining that it was suitably deep for diving", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto dive, plaintiff was not relieved “of the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.” .Id. In Murphy v. D’Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. “[E]ven if the water level had been low, ‘[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because “by the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.” Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that allegation that plaintiff relied on defendants representation by entering into a lease with it stated valid cause of action for negligent misrepresentation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto dive, plaintiff was not relieved “of the duty to make this inquiry [as to the safety of diving] when diving for the first time into an unfamiliar pool.” .Id. In Murphy v. D’Youville Condominium Association, Inc., 175 Ga.App. 156, 333 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1985), the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that a factual dispute regarding the actual depth of the water prevented summary judgment on the issue of contributory negligence. “[E]ven if the water level had been low, ‘[a]ppellant ... was under a duty to use ... his sight to discover any defects or dangers.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). The plaintiff was not permitted to recover because “by the exercise of very slight care [appellant] could have avoided the injury.” Id. at 3; see also La Croix v. State, 477 So.2d 1246, 1251 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that defendant must have placed plaintiff in a situation where it was abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril for some specifically defined period of time for negligent infliction claim to be actionable" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsettlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer ‘may not gamble’ with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.”); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (“Georgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.”);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (holding that insured cannot bring an action against its insurer for bad faith failure to settle a claim in the absence of an excess verdict", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsettlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer ‘may not gamble’ with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.”); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (“Georgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.”);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (holding action by judgment creditor of insured against insurer for bad faith failure to settle claim against insured not a direct action within section 1332c proviso", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsettlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer ‘may not gamble’ with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.”); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (“Georgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.”);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsettlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer ‘may not gamble’ with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.”); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (“Georgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.”);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (holding that a negligence claim against an insured and a bad faith claim against the insurer are not separate as the first must be proved to prevail on the second", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsettlement, the insurer may be liable to the insured to pay the verdict rendered against the insured even though the verdict exceeds the policy limit of liability. The reason for this rule is that the insurer ‘may not gamble’ with the funds of its insured by refusing to settle within the policy limits.”); Delaney v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.1991) (“Georgia law is clear that in a case in which a liability insurer defending a claim brought against its insured refuses, in bad faith, an offer to settle within the policy limits, and an excess judgment is entered against the insured, the insured may recover the amount by which the judgment exceeds the policy limits.”);c/ Trinity Outdoor, LLC v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10, 13 (2009) (holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a “security” under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (holding that the statute of frauds found in chapter 8 of mississippis ucc applies to the sale of shares of stock in a corporation comprised of only twelve shareholders", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a “security” under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (holding that the statute of frauds of chapter 8 of kansass ucc applies to the sale of 50 of banks stock", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a “security” under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (holding that subrogation rights are not security interests under ucc article 9", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a “security” under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (holding that closelyheld stock is a security under chapter 8 of californias ucc", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin 1995 and 1997 and by the accompanying comments. Accordingly, we hold that the stock of closely-held corporations is a security within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (Supp.1998). Because this conclusion cannot be reconciled with our holding in Blasingame, that case is overruled to the extent that it stands for the proposition that closely-held stock is not a security within the meaning of the UCC. D. Other Jurisdictions Our holding brings Tennessee within the majority of states that have addressed this issue and have concluded that the stock of a closely-held corporation is a “security” under the UCC. See Giuffre Org., Ltd. v. Euromotorsport Racing, Inc., 141 F.3d 1216, 1218 (7th Cir.1998); In re Hryniewicz, 222 B.R. at 18; In re Turley, 213 B.R. 857, 861 (C.D.Cal.1997) (holding that chapter 8 of colorados ucc applied to the sale of shares in a corporation whose entire stock was held by one individual" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnon-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.” § 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute’s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that force exerted against an officer after an arrest is complete cannot be used as the basis for prosecuting one for resisting arrest", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnon-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.” § 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute’s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that it is equally wellestablished that a suspects mere flight to escape arrest does not violate the resisting arrest statute", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnon-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.” § 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute’s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding avoiding arrest is not the same as resisting arrest", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnon-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.” § 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute’s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that conviction for speeding did not preclude a malicious prosecution claim arising from acquittal on charges of resisting arrest and attempted escape", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnon-violent refusal to submit to arrest and such minor forms of resistance as running from a policeman or trying to shake free from his grasp. Such conduct is also excluded from Section 242.1[Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function] and thus is not criminal under any provision of the Model Code.” § 242.2 cmt 2. The American Law Institute’s decision not to recommend criminalization of this type of conduct reflected the considered judgment that the charge of r 38-39 (1980) (reiterating that “[o]nly the use or the threatened use of violence or physical force which creates a substantial risk of physical injury is prohibited; neither flight to avoid arrest nor passive resistance have been made crimes”); In re Woodford, 420 Pa.Super. 179, 616 A.2d 641, 644 (1992) (holding that resisting arrest is lesser offense of assault on an officer" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the close of the preliminary hearing that the court \"has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II,\" which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are \"transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over,\" regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (holding that a determination of probable cause does not bar a state law malicious prosecution claim where the claim is based on the police officers supplying false information to establish probable cause", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the close of the preliminary hearing that the court \"has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II,\" which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are \"transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over,\" regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the close of the preliminary hearing that the court \"has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II,\" which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are \"transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over,\" regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (holding that in a 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the close of the preliminary hearing that the court \"has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II,\" which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are \"transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over,\" regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the close of the preliminary hearing that the court \"has sufficient information based on the preliminary hearing to indicate that there's probable cause on Count II,\" which charged third-degree sexual assault, also a felony. Thus, there is no dispute that Powers was properly bound over for trial on at least one felony. See State v. (John) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 536, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). A prosecutor may include in an information any counts that are \"transactionally related to a count on which the defendant is bound over,\" regardless of whether the State established probable cause at the preliminary hearing to believe that the defendant committed the transactionally related felonies. Id. at 537; see also State v. (Scott) Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 544 N.W.2d 400 (1996) (holding that the state need only establish probable cause that a felony occurred as to one count in a set of transactionally related counts for there to be a valid bind over on that set and need not establish probable cause that the specific felony alleged in each count was committed" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nAfter discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli’s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli’s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli’s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (holding that the corroborating evidence need not be medical evidence if the appellant explains why medical evidence is not available", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nAfter discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli’s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli’s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli’s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (holding that an aljs own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nAfter discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli’s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli’s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli’s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (holding that review of medical history during an examination assisted doctors medical conclusions", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nAfter discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli’s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli’s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli’s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (recognizing that prison officials should defer to medical professionals on medical matters", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nAfter discussing these and other findings by Dr. Scardigli, the ALJ sweepingly concluded: In reviewing the record in its entirely, we find that the opinion of Dr. Scardigli that Mr. Schonewolf was unable to work is inconsistent with her narrative and clinical findings. (R. 16.) This is hardly an explanation as to why Dr. Scardigli’s opinion is unreliable, as the ALJ never even attempts to explain why Dr. Scardigli’s conclusions are inconsistent with her own findings. The ALJ has no basis for concluding that his interpretation of Dr. Scardigli’s findings is valid while her own conclusions are unreliable; or if he has such a basis, he never discusses it in his opinion. The ALJ, therefore, invalidly substitutes his medical conclusions for those of the physician. Kent, 710 F.2d at 115 (holding that plaintiffs claim that medical providers did not comply with baker act was not subject to medical malpractice statutes ajlthough a medical diagnosis is necessary in order to involuntarily commit a patient the process of complying with the statute does not require medical skill or judgment" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmorale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York’s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York’s regulations do not “plainly and palpably” infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmorale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York’s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York’s regulations do not “plainly and palpably” infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (holding that medicaid recipients do have enforceable rights under 1396aa23", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmorale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York’s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York’s regulations do not “plainly and palpably” infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (holding that new yorks welfare laws and regulations requiring welfare recipients in certain instances to repay the cost of assistance benefits if they are discovered to have property recover for injuries in a lawsuit or are entitled to insurance proceeds are not inconsistent with social security provisions which grant aid to families with dependent children to enable recipients of assistance to attain or retain capability for maximum selfsupport and personal independence 42 usc 601", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmorale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York’s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York’s regulations do not “plainly and palpably” infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (holding ambiguous provisions are to be interpreted so as to provide maximum coverage to the insured", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmorale, comfort, and dignity, it is not our province to take such action, which rests with the State Department of Social Services, its Board of Social Welfare, and the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Unlike Alabama’s “substitute father” regulation, which was struck down for inconsistency with the controlling federal statute in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), New York’s resources and income exemptions do not run contrary to the central purpose of the controlling federal statute. As New York’s regulations do not “plainly and palpably” infringe upon the policy of an Act of Congress, they must be allowed to stand. See Snell v. Wyman, 281 F.Supp. 853, 867-868 (S.D.N.Y.1968), affd., 393 U.S. 323, 89 S.Ct. 553, 21 L.Ed. 2d 511 (1969) (holding that assuming compliance with a standard form and the absence of conflict with statute the parties to a contract of insurance are free to incorporate such provisions and conditions as they desire" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1984); providing “ample room for mistaken judgments,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that transit authority director was entitled to immunity despite jury verdict for plaintiffs because law was not clearly established at the time that plaintiffs activities were constitutionally protected from employer retaliation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1984); providing “ample room for mistaken judgments,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that plaintiffs complaint stated a claim for a constitutional deprivation but that the contours of the right at issue were not clearly established and that official was therefore entitled to qualified immunity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1984); providing “ample room for mistaken judgments,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless at the time of the dismissal it was clearly established that employees in the particular positions at issue in light of the responsibilities inherent in those positions were constitutionally protected from patronage dismissal ", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1984); providing “ample room for mistaken judgments,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that prison clerks were entitled to immunity despite jury verdict against them because it was not clearly established at the time that mail from the courts was protected legal mail", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1984); providing “ample room for mistaken judgments,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 343, 106 S.Ct. 1092; shielding officers from liability when the law did not clearly proscribe the ac tions they took, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); and protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. The common theme of protecting reasonable judgment calls by officers, such as this one, exists throughout qualified immunity law. It is not inconsistent for an officer to have violated constitutional rights, as the jury found here, but still be entitled to immunity on the various prongs (described below) of the immunity test. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 871-72, 879-80 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff failed to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a “bulky exhibit” by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk’s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (holding that public meeting did not satisfy public participation requirement because public did not receive adequate notice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a “bulky exhibit” by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk’s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (holding that it may be decided as a matter of law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a “bulky exhibit” by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk’s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a “bulky exhibit” by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk’s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (holding that a notice because it was docketed should be considered a matter of public record", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe size of Plaintiff's Exhibit, the Exhibit was designated a “bulky exhibit” by the Clerk's Office such that it is available for public viewing and copying in the Clerk’s Office but is not available electronically on ECF. See Docket Entry [33], Attachment 2. 5 . The Court notes that both Plaintiff and Defendants have submitted the unsealed transcript of the proceedings in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Samuel L. Alexander (Civil Case No. 622-04) before Judge Gary S. Gasparovic in the District Court for Charles County, Maryland, on April 21, 2004; Plaintiff's various filings in that case; and related orders issued by both the district and appellate courts in that case, all of which may be considered matters of public record. See In re Thomas H., 381 Md. 174, 187 n. 4, 848 A.2d 652 (2004) (holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, an error is deemed harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 413. The government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the inquiry to determine prejudice is the same between plain error and harmless error, but that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error review); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, an error is deemed harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 413. The government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the inquiry to determine prejudice is the same between plain error and harmless error, but that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error review); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, an error is deemed harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 413. The government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the inquiry to determine prejudice is the same between plain error and harmless error, but that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error review); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding constitutional error may be harmless if court can declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt quoting state v napeahi 57 haw 365 373 556 p2d 569 574 1976", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, an error is deemed harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 413. The government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the inquiry to determine prejudice is the same between plain error and harmless error, but that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error review); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that before an error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendants conviction", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 413 (5th Cir.1998). Consequently, an error is deemed harmless if it did not affect the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770; Akpan, 407 F.3d at 377, 2005 WL 852416, at *12; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 413. The government bears the burden of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the inquiry to determine prejudice is the same between plain error and harmless error, but that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice under plain-error review); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that a constitutional error is harmless where it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurisdiction.” See id. at 1502. Quoting the Supreme Court, the panel instructed that: [I]n cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods. Id. at 1503 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (quotations omitted)). Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the Granfinanciera test and determined that a discharge 578746, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1997) (holding that under the hallahan progeny of cases parties are not afforded the right to jury trials in dischargeability proceedings", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurisdiction.” See id. at 1502. Quoting the Supreme Court, the panel instructed that: [I]n cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods. Id. at 1503 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (quotations omitted)). Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the Granfinanciera test and determined that a discharge 578746, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1997) (holding that juveniles are not entitled to jury trials", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurisdiction.” See id. at 1502. Quoting the Supreme Court, the panel instructed that: [I]n cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods. Id. at 1503 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (quotations omitted)). Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the Granfinanciera test and determined that a discharge 578746, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1997) (holding that claims under the vrra are equitable and a plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurisdiction.” See id. at 1502. Quoting the Supreme Court, the panel instructed that: [I]n cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods. Id. at 1503 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (quotations omitted)). Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the Granfinanciera test and determined that a discharge 578746, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1997) (holding that the bankruptcy court has constitutional and implied statutory authority to conduct jury trials in core proceedings", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurisdiction.” See id. at 1502. Quoting the Supreme Court, the panel instructed that: [I]n cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as belonging to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclusive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is investigated by chancery methods. Id. at 1503 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 337, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (quotations omitted)). Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the Granfinanciera test and determined that a discharge 578746, at *4 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1997) (holding that dischargeability proceedings are inherently equitable in nature and as such parties are not entitled to jury trials" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRiley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years’ imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley’s sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley’s sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana ■ conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)(holding that under habitual felony offender statute a sentence includes the sanction of probation", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRiley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years’ imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley’s sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley’s sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana ■ conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)(holding our habitual offender act does not limit enhancement to prior felony convictions within a certain time", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRiley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years’ imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley’s sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley’s sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana ■ conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)(holding that to constitute a prior conviction for purposes of the habitual felony offender act the defendant must have been adjudicated guilty before the present crime was committed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRiley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years’ imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley’s sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley’s sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana ■ conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)(holding that under the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute defendant could not receive habitual offender sentence for life felony", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nRiley was sentenced, as a habitual offender with two prior felony convictions, to life imprisonment. For the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana conviction, he was sentenced, without application of the HFOA, to five years’ imprisonment. The two felony convictions used to enhance Riley’s sentence for the assault conviction were April 6, 1999, guilty-plea convictions. The April 6, 1999, convictions were not used to enhance Riley’s sentences for the unlawful-possession-of-a-controlled-substance conviction and the unlawful-possession-of-marijuana ■ conviction because those crimes had occurred on January 30, 1999, before Riley had been adjudicated guilty on April 6, 1999. See, e.g., Craig v. State, (Ms. CR-02-0812, March 26, 2004)(holding that defendants habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nargues that it is not administratively feasible for a court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class. Because the class definition is not sufficient, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, AIMCO’s first and third issues are resolved in its favor. We need not address the other issues. Applicable Law The threshold inquiry in determining class certification must be into the class definition, i.e., the parameters of the proposed class. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.2000). Rule 42 implicitly requires the representative plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but that it is susceptible to precise definition. Id.; see DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (holding that putative class members are not parties to an action prior to class certification", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nargues that it is not administratively feasible for a court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class. Because the class definition is not sufficient, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, AIMCO’s first and third issues are resolved in its favor. We need not address the other issues. Applicable Law The threshold inquiry in determining class certification must be into the class definition, i.e., the parameters of the proposed class. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.2000). Rule 42 implicitly requires the representative plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but that it is susceptible to precise definition. Id.; see DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nargues that it is not administratively feasible for a court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class. Because the class definition is not sufficient, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, AIMCO’s first and third issues are resolved in its favor. We need not address the other issues. Applicable Law The threshold inquiry in determining class certification must be into the class definition, i.e., the parameters of the proposed class. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.2000). Rule 42 implicitly requires the representative plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but that it is susceptible to precise definition. Id.; see DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (holding that a class definition must be precise objective and presently ascertainable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nargues that it is not administratively feasible for a court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class. Because the class definition is not sufficient, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, AIMCO’s first and third issues are resolved in its favor. We need not address the other issues. Applicable Law The threshold inquiry in determining class certification must be into the class definition, i.e., the parameters of the proposed class. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.2000). Rule 42 implicitly requires the representative plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but that it is susceptible to precise definition. Id.; see DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (holding that for a class action to be maintained all class members must have a common and undivided interest in the property or matter involved", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nargues that it is not administratively feasible for a court to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class. Because the class definition is not sufficient, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Accordingly, AIMCO’s first and third issues are resolved in its favor. We need not address the other issues. Applicable Law The threshold inquiry in determining class certification must be into the class definition, i.e., the parameters of the proposed class. Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex.2000). Rule 42 implicitly requires the representative plaintiffs to demonstrate not only that an identifiable class exists, but that it is susceptible to precise definition. Id.; see DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (holding that it is elementary that in order to maintain a class action the class sought to be represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion ¶ 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (recognizing that where a party fails to provide any authority for an argument we will presume that none exists", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion ¶ 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion ¶ 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion ¶ 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto the First Complaint except for some minor additional language added to Count II. Majority Opinion ¶ 3. The modified claims were fully addressed by Judge Robinson and I agree with his analysis and the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Second Complaint under Rule 1-012(B)(6). The minor wording modification made to Count II did not establish an issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiffs’ individual loan under Count II was preempted under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with any authority to support their position that a personal loan impacting their business relationships and commercial credit avoids preemption under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. See Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, ¶ 7, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755 (holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language “based upon or attributable to” is awkward when used in conjunction with the language “any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” the court finds the FDIC’s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words “based upon or attributable to, ” it is clear that the insured’s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (holding that language almost identical to the language in the policy at issue in this case ie due proof conveys discretionary authority", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language “based upon or attributable to” is awkward when used in conjunction with the language “any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” the court finds the FDIC’s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words “based upon or attributable to, ” it is clear that the insured’s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (holding that a standard wcel policy with a maritime endorsement is an ocean marine policy", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language “based upon or attributable to” is awkward when used in conjunction with the language “any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” the court finds the FDIC’s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words “based upon or attributable to, ” it is clear that the insured’s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (holding that the language in an identical endorsement in an mgicissued 1983 d and o liability policy is not ambigu ous", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language “based upon or attributable to” is awkward when used in conjunction with the language “any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” the court finds the FDIC’s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words “based upon or attributable to, ” it is clear that the insured’s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nan identical regulatory exclusion under similar facts, the court stated: Although the language “based upon or attributable to” is awkward when used in conjunction with the language “any action or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” the court finds the FDIC’s construction of this exclusion to be strained and unreasonable. (Footnote omitted). Reading the endorsement as a whole, without placing undue emphasis on the words “based upon or attributable to, ” it is clear that the insured’s intent was to exclude coverage for any loss resulting from any action brought by or on behalf of the FDIC in any capacity against a bank director or officer. (Footnote omitted). Accord, Continental Casualty Company v. Allen, 710 F.Supp. 1088, 1097 (N.D.Tex.1987) (holding it is settled that in construing an endorsement to an insurance policy the endorsement and the policy must be read together and the words of the policy remain in full force and effect except as altered by the words of the endorsement" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock “have assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (holding nonmoving partys affidavit created genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an employment relationship", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock “have assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock “have assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (holding that nonmoving party need not produce evidence unless moving party first brings forth evidence either tending to prove lack of genuine issue of material fact or challenging existence of element of cause of action", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock “have assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (holding that when the moving party submits a properly supported summary judgment motion the nonmoving party must produce affirmative evidence to demonstrate genuine issue of fact and may not rely simply on denials or allegations in pleadings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe option. Rentrak would not have been prevented legally from selling Dixon registered stock. 6 . The purpose of the holding period prior to resale is to assure that purchasers of unregistered stock “have assumed the economic risks of investment, and therefore are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1999), Preliminary Note. 7 . Rentrak also argues that Dixon failed to meet his evidentiary burden in opposing summary judgment on his stock option claim. This argument fails. Rentrak identifies no evidence that it brought forth such that the burden would have shifted to Dixon to produce evidence in support of his claim. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996) (recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor’s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (holding that it was within the courts discretion to credit fathers arrearages for onehalf of the mortgage payments that he made", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor’s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (holding that fathers investment account with stock brokerage firm was not a multipleparty account available for payment of child support", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor’s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (holding that the insurer was entitled to credit against the owners claim in the amount paid to the mortgagee", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor’s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (holding that the court erred in failing to credit fathers child support account for the entire amount that he paid for the mothers mortgage", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand support of the child in accordance with their respective means. Until established by a court order, the minimum child support obligation of a parent who fails to furnish maintenance, education, and support for his child, following a continued absence from the home, is the obligor’s share of the amount shown in the support guidelines, commencing on the first day of the absence. 4 . See Shaughnessy v. Shaughnessy, 1999 WL 692085 (Del.Fam.Ct.1999) (affording father credit in the amount of $7,571.42 against back child support for mortgage payments made to the mother and/or the mortgage holder); Lynch v. Lynch, 422 So.2d 703, 706 (La.Ct.App.1982) (reversing a circuit court's deletion of father's credit for house payments); Lauria v. Lauria, 45 A.D.3d 535, 845 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (2007) (holding that mortgage payments should not be regarded as child support because it was a contractual legal obligation that built fathers equity" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel— namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (holding employer has burden of proving employee misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence when disputing a claim for unemployment compensation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel— namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (holding that defendants bear the burden of proving contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel— namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel— namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (holding that the party challenging the dischargeability of a debt bears the burden of proving the debt nondischargeable by a preponderance of the evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat a reasonable jury could have concluded that Officers Adams and Baxter acted with malice in initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt. Officers Adams and Baxter argue that they are protected from liability for malicious prosecution because they acted in reliance upon the advice of counsel— namely, the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney’s Office. “Proof that a person who institutes a criminal proceeding placed the facts fully and fairly before counsel and acted upon his advice is a good defense to the charge of want of probable cause.” Jarett v. Walker, 201 A.2d 523, 526 (D.C.1964). The burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to an affirmative defense. Cf. District of Columbia v. Sterling, 578 A.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C.1990) (holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants have failed to adhere to the requirements of nepa" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwhich are not clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court’s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court’s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwhich are not clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court’s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court’s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that stiffer penalties for cocaine base transactions are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and therefore do not violate eighth amendment", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwhich are not clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court’s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court’s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that the guidelines stiffer penalties for cocaine base do not violate equal protection", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwhich are not clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court’s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court’s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwhich are not clearly erroneous.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1398, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). To the extent that Diana Buchanan is attempting to contest the district court’s implicit decision not to depart from the guidelines, we have previously held that the district court’s decision not to depart is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir.1995). Diana Buchanan, along with John Buchanan, also urges that the vast disparity between the sentencing ranges for crack and powder cocaine, mandated by the guidelines, violates equal protection principles contained in the Fifth Amendment. We have repeatedly rejected this argument and do so again. See United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that the cap does not violate equal protection" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens’ behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr’s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens’ behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr’s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (recognizing the fourteenth amendment to the united state constitution embodies a right to familial integrity but stating the parameters of the right have never been clearly established and the right is not absolute or unqualified", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens’ behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr’s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (holding that expert report that sufficiently addressed certain claims against doctor employed by professional association was sufficient as to claims against professional association based on doctors negligence because the doctors negligence is imputed to the association under the professional association act", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens’ behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr’s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken in 1983 as any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it because njeither the supreme court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrights), and anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familjal relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit at the time of Stephens’ behavior in 1990. The Court therefore holds that Stephens is entitled to qualified immunity on McGarr’s familial association claim. See Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 107. n. 10 (noting, in context of abuse investigation, that there is a difference between evaluating the appropriateness of a case worker’s actions, which “depends on the facts and events of a particular case,” and “evaluating whether it was objectively reasonable for a case worker to believe” that his or her actions were lawful, which “depends on the clarity of existing law at the time of those events”); see also Reasonover, 447 F.3d at 585 (holding that defendants claiming qualified immunity to 1983 action were entitled to summary judgment where factual disputes were not material" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsavings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry’s argument ignores the fact that during the parties’ marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties’ marriage. Terry’s income which accumulated during the parties’ marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (holding that separate property may become marital property if spouse donates it to marital unit with intent at time of donation that property become marital", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsavings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry’s argument ignores the fact that during the parties’ marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties’ marriage. Terry’s income which accumulated during the parties’ marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (holding income tax liability incurred during marriage is one of accepted costs of producing marital income and should be treated as marital debt for purposes of determining equitable distribution of marital estate", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsavings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry’s argument ignores the fact that during the parties’ marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties’ marriage. Terry’s income which accumulated during the parties’ marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (holding that in determining whether a substantial change of circumstances has occurred trial court must consider income available to parents new marital community", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsavings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry’s argument ignores the fact that during the parties’ marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties’ marriage. Terry’s income which accumulated during the parties’ marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (holding trial court had no authority to award portion of the marital property to wifes children from another marriage even though money they received by way of social security benefits were commingled with the marital estate and used in part for the aequisition of marital property", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsavings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry’s argument ignores the fact that during the parties’ marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties’ marriage. Terry’s income which accumulated during the parties’ marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant’s residence could theoretically produce “the highest possible yield” of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, “Quantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.” 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating “the relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce”); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding record is viewed in light most favorable to verdict", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant’s residence could theoretically produce “the highest possible yield” of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, “Quantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.” 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating “the relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce”); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant’s residence could theoretically produce “the highest possible yield” of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, “Quantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.” 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating “the relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce”); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding courts cannot quantify yield figures without regard for a particular defendants capabilities when viewed in light of the drug laboratory involved", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant’s residence could theoretically produce “the highest possible yield” of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, “Quantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.” 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating “the relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce”); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a probable cause determination must be viewed in light of the observations knowledge and training of the law enforcement officers involved in the warrantless search", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nIowa Division of Criminal Investigation. 297 F.3d at 703. She testified the 27.6 grams of pseudoephedrine found at the defendant’s residence could theoretically produce “the highest possible yield” of 25.39 grams of methamphetamine. 297 F.3d at 703-04. The Eighth Circuit found this evidence insufficient, stating, “Quantity yield figures should not be calculated without regard for the particular capabilities of a defendant and the drug manufacturing site.” 297 F.3d at 705. See also United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating “the relevant inquiry is not what a theoretical maximum yield would be, or even what an average methamphetamine cook would produce, but what appellants themselves could produce”); United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that in ruling on a summaryjudgment motion record evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to nonmovant" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\naward of attorney’s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See § 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (“[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that removal of suit against physicians employed by a federally funded community health center to federal court by the defendants on the ground that they were covered under the public health service act was improper as the department of health and human services had not yet made a determination whether defendants should be deemed to be employees", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\naward of attorney’s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See § 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (“[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that a proper determination of the questions of law cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\naward of attorney’s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See § 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (“[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\naward of attorney’s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See § 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (“[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\naward of attorney’s fees against DOR in actions to determine paternity and support pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes (2010). See § 742.045, Fla. Stat. (2010) (“The Department of Revenue shall not be considered a party for purposes of this section; however, fees may be assessed against the department pursuant to s. 57.105(1).”); Fla. Admin. Code R. 12E-1.003(2)(b) (“[T]he department shall pay any fees assessed by the court pursuant to Section 57.105(1), F.S.”). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court is authorized to enter an award of attorney’s fees against DOR pursuant to section 57.105(1) if the facts support such an award. See State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. Office of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Cook v. Carr, 501 So.2d 30, 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (holding that section 57105 fees can be awarded against the department of health and rehabilitative services filing a paternity suit on behalf of the mother if there is a proper finding of a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could “hear them screaming in his head.” Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just “sitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell’s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa’s capital murder. 2. Factor Two — Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,” here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could “hear them screaming in his head.” Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just “sitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell’s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa’s capital murder. 2. Factor Two — Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,” here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding trial court abused its discretion under rule 403 by admitting despicable story written by defendant about sex enjoyed by men and women with both willing and unwilling young girls in prosecution for possession of child pornography", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could “hear them screaming in his head.” Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just “sitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell’s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa’s capital murder. 2. Factor Two — Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,” here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that the issue was more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could “hear them screaming in his head.” Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just “sitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell’s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa’s capital murder. 2. Factor Two — Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,” here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that the trial court did not exceed its discretion under rule 403 by allowing evidence that provided background for the crime charged", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim that Hill and Russell shot the other girl. Barnes stated he could “hear them screaming in his head.” Edwards testified that Russell was present when Barnes made these statements and that Russell did not say anything, but was just “sitting there lik ry factor weighs very slightly in favor of the admissibility of the Vogt Street extraneous offense to prove Russell’s intent as the primary actor or as a party to Chapa’s capital murder. 2. Factor Two — Irrational, Indelible Impression The second Montgomery factor, the potential of the extraneous offense evidence to impress the jury “in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way,” here weighs heavily in favor of exclusion of the Vogt Street offense. See Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 504, 506-07 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom the defendant’s wife regarding a previous felony conviction for attempted sexual battery which made it clear that the defendant not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery on the wife’s daughter. See id. at 406-07. On appeal, Anderson asserted that “since he pled to attempted sexual battery, it was error to permit [the wife] ... to describe the details of a completed crime.” Id. at 407. We denied Anderson’s claim holding that “[wjhether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding circumstances of the prior crime,” and, therefore, “the trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence regarding the details of the attempted sexual batteries.” Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6,12 (Fla.1982) (holding that where both firstdegree and felony murder were possible bases for a murder conviction a jury instruction that suggested the jury could rely on felony murder as the predicate offense for a conviction for conspiracy to commit murder was improper because under arizona law a conviction for conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder requires a specific intent to kill", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom the defendant’s wife regarding a previous felony conviction for attempted sexual battery which made it clear that the defendant not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery on the wife’s daughter. See id. at 406-07. On appeal, Anderson asserted that “since he pled to attempted sexual battery, it was error to permit [the wife] ... to describe the details of a completed crime.” Id. at 407. We denied Anderson’s claim holding that “[wjhether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding circumstances of the prior crime,” and, therefore, “the trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence regarding the details of the attempted sexual batteries.” Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6,12 (Fla.1982) (holding that although premeditation is outside the heartland of seconddegree murder guideline upward departure from seconddegree murder guideline based on premeditation was improper because commission considered the defendants state of mind in assigning a higher base offense level to firstdegree murder than to seconddegree murder", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom the defendant’s wife regarding a previous felony conviction for attempted sexual battery which made it clear that the defendant not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery on the wife’s daughter. See id. at 406-07. On appeal, Anderson asserted that “since he pled to attempted sexual battery, it was error to permit [the wife] ... to describe the details of a completed crime.” Id. at 407. We denied Anderson’s claim holding that “[wjhether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding circumstances of the prior crime,” and, therefore, “the trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence regarding the details of the attempted sexual batteries.” Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6,12 (Fla.1982) (holding that it was not error to allow the penalty phase jury to hear evidence that the defendants previous conviction of seconddegree murder was obtained pursuant to an indictment for firstdegree murder", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom the defendant’s wife regarding a previous felony conviction for attempted sexual battery which made it clear that the defendant not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery on the wife’s daughter. See id. at 406-07. On appeal, Anderson asserted that “since he pled to attempted sexual battery, it was error to permit [the wife] ... to describe the details of a completed crime.” Id. at 407. We denied Anderson’s claim holding that “[wjhether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding circumstances of the prior crime,” and, therefore, “the trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence regarding the details of the attempted sexual batteries.” Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6,12 (Fla.1982) (holding that conspiracy to commit murder is not lesserincluded offense of firstdegree murder", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom the defendant’s wife regarding a previous felony conviction for attempted sexual battery which made it clear that the defendant not only attempted, but actually completed the crime of sexual battery on the wife’s daughter. See id. at 406-07. On appeal, Anderson asserted that “since he pled to attempted sexual battery, it was error to permit [the wife] ... to describe the details of a completed crime.” Id. at 407. We denied Anderson’s claim holding that “[wjhether a crime constitutes a prior violent felony is determined by the surrounding circumstances of the prior crime,” and, therefore, “the trial court did not err in permitting the State to present evidence regarding the details of the attempted sexual batteries.” Id.; see also Morgan v. State, 415 So.2d 6,12 (Fla.1982) (holding that conviction for seconddegree murder operates as implied acquittal on firstdegree murder count" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof service, or disability not compensated under the workers’ compensation law. The remaining subsections of § 48-628 outline other behaviors or scenarios 2d 804 (Del. Super. 1982); Stafford v. Welltech, 867 P.2d 484 (Okla. App. 1993). The rationale in the cases for permitting recovery under both acts is that the statutory language does not prohibit a dual recovery and is further based upon the beneficent objectives of both workers’ compensation and employment security legislation. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra; Neuberger, supra; Mendez, supra; Stafford, supra. As noted by the defendants, other states deny or reduce unemployment benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation the claimant receives or vice versa. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Northland Steel, 226 Mont. 428, 736 P.2d 130 (1987) (holding that in absence of statute prohibiting recovery claimant may receive workers compensation and unemployment benefits simultaneously", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof service, or disability not compensated under the workers’ compensation law. The remaining subsections of § 48-628 outline other behaviors or scenarios 2d 804 (Del. Super. 1982); Stafford v. Welltech, 867 P.2d 484 (Okla. App. 1993). The rationale in the cases for permitting recovery under both acts is that the statutory language does not prohibit a dual recovery and is further based upon the beneficent objectives of both workers’ compensation and employment security legislation. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra; Neuberger, supra; Mendez, supra; Stafford, supra. As noted by the defendants, other states deny or reduce unemployment benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation the claimant receives or vice versa. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Northland Steel, 226 Mont. 428, 736 P.2d 130 (1987) (holding that district court had discretion to decline to offset severance and unemployment payments from damages award", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof service, or disability not compensated under the workers’ compensation law. The remaining subsections of § 48-628 outline other behaviors or scenarios 2d 804 (Del. Super. 1982); Stafford v. Welltech, 867 P.2d 484 (Okla. App. 1993). The rationale in the cases for permitting recovery under both acts is that the statutory language does not prohibit a dual recovery and is further based upon the beneficent objectives of both workers’ compensation and employment security legislation. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra; Neuberger, supra; Mendez, supra; Stafford, supra. As noted by the defendants, other states deny or reduce unemployment benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation the claimant receives or vice versa. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Northland Steel, 226 Mont. 428, 736 P.2d 130 (1987) (holding that legislature clearly intended that workers compensation act and unemployment security act be construed together thus prohibiting worker from receiving both unemployment compensation and workers compensation payments for same period", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof service, or disability not compensated under the workers’ compensation law. The remaining subsections of § 48-628 outline other behaviors or scenarios 2d 804 (Del. Super. 1982); Stafford v. Welltech, 867 P.2d 484 (Okla. App. 1993). The rationale in the cases for permitting recovery under both acts is that the statutory language does not prohibit a dual recovery and is further based upon the beneficent objectives of both workers’ compensation and employment security legislation. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra; Neuberger, supra; Mendez, supra; Stafford, supra. As noted by the defendants, other states deny or reduce unemployment benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation the claimant receives or vice versa. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Northland Steel, 226 Mont. 428, 736 P.2d 130 (1987) (holding that pursuant to statute unemployment benefits must be offset against workers compensation payments", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof service, or disability not compensated under the workers’ compensation law. The remaining subsections of § 48-628 outline other behaviors or scenarios 2d 804 (Del. Super. 1982); Stafford v. Welltech, 867 P.2d 484 (Okla. App. 1993). The rationale in the cases for permitting recovery under both acts is that the statutory language does not prohibit a dual recovery and is further based upon the beneficent objectives of both workers’ compensation and employment security legislation. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra; Neuberger, supra; Mendez, supra; Stafford, supra. As noted by the defendants, other states deny or reduce unemployment benefits by the amount of workers’ compensation the claimant receives or vice versa. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Northland Steel, 226 Mont. 428, 736 P.2d 130 (1987) (holding that claimant may simultaneously receive unemployment benefits and workers compensation for temporary partial disability where statute only precludes receipt of workers compensation for temporary total or permanent total disability if claimant is receiving unemployment benefits" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel). Specifically, a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel if he has \"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding{[ ] and ... has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\" Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. 117 If a trial court finds that a defendant fails to meet this standard, then the defendant may not waive the right to counsel. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399, 118 S.Ct. 2680. If the defendant satisfies the Dusky competency standard, however, he may waive the right to counsel if his waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (holding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel). Specifically, a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel if he has \"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding{[ ] and ... has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\" Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. 117 If a trial court finds that a defendant fails to meet this standard, then the defendant may not waive the right to counsel. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399, 118 S.Ct. 2680. If the defendant satisfies the Dusky competency standard, however, he may waive the right to counsel if his waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (holding that accused must competently and intelligently waive the right to counsel", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel). Specifically, a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel if he has \"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding{[ ] and ... has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\" Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. 117 If a trial court finds that a defendant fails to meet this standard, then the defendant may not waive the right to counsel. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399, 118 S.Ct. 2680. If the defendant satisfies the Dusky competency standard, however, he may waive the right to counsel if his waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (holding that one must voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel). Specifically, a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel if he has \"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding{[ ] and ... has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\" Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. 117 If a trial court finds that a defendant fails to meet this standard, then the defendant may not waive the right to counsel. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399, 118 S.Ct. 2680. If the defendant satisfies the Dusky competency standard, however, he may waive the right to counsel if his waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nto determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to counsel). Specifically, a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel if he has \"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding{[ ] and ... has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.\" Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. 117 If a trial court finds that a defendant fails to meet this standard, then the defendant may not waive the right to counsel. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399, 118 S.Ct. 2680. If the defendant satisfies the Dusky competency standard, however, he may waive the right to counsel if his waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Arguello, 772 P.2d at 94; see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (holding that the defendants guilty plea was entered into knowingly voluntarily and intelligently" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim to follow the proceeds into the hands of third parties, without regard to any settlement before or after judgment. The lien operates as security, and if the settlement entered into by the parties is in disregard of it and to the prejudice of plaintiffs attorney, by reason of the insolvency of his client, or for other sufficient cause, the court will interfere and protect its officer by vacating the satisfaction of judgment and permitting execution to issue for the enforcement of the judgment to the extent of the lien, or by following the proceeds in the hands of third parties, who received them before or after judgment impressed with the lien. Id. (Emphasis added.) An attorney’s lien follows the judgment into whatever form it may assume. See Porter v. Taylor, 36 Ark. 591 (1880) (holding that even though the complaint sought money damages and land was actually recovered the attorneys lien attached to the land", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim to follow the proceeds into the hands of third parties, without regard to any settlement before or after judgment. The lien operates as security, and if the settlement entered into by the parties is in disregard of it and to the prejudice of plaintiffs attorney, by reason of the insolvency of his client, or for other sufficient cause, the court will interfere and protect its officer by vacating the satisfaction of judgment and permitting execution to issue for the enforcement of the judgment to the extent of the lien, or by following the proceeds in the hands of third parties, who received them before or after judgment impressed with the lien. Id. (Emphasis added.) An attorney’s lien follows the judgment into whatever form it may assume. See Porter v. Taylor, 36 Ark. 591 (1880) (holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim to follow the proceeds into the hands of third parties, without regard to any settlement before or after judgment. The lien operates as security, and if the settlement entered into by the parties is in disregard of it and to the prejudice of plaintiffs attorney, by reason of the insolvency of his client, or for other sufficient cause, the court will interfere and protect its officer by vacating the satisfaction of judgment and permitting execution to issue for the enforcement of the judgment to the extent of the lien, or by following the proceeds in the hands of third parties, who received them before or after judgment impressed with the lien. Id. (Emphasis added.) An attorney’s lien follows the judgment into whatever form it may assume. See Porter v. Taylor, 36 Ark. 591 (1880) (holding that if respondents suit is one for permanent damages to the land the measure of damages is the decreased value of the land", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim to follow the proceeds into the hands of third parties, without regard to any settlement before or after judgment. The lien operates as security, and if the settlement entered into by the parties is in disregard of it and to the prejudice of plaintiffs attorney, by reason of the insolvency of his client, or for other sufficient cause, the court will interfere and protect its officer by vacating the satisfaction of judgment and permitting execution to issue for the enforcement of the judgment to the extent of the lien, or by following the proceeds in the hands of third parties, who received them before or after judgment impressed with the lien. Id. (Emphasis added.) An attorney’s lien follows the judgment into whatever form it may assume. See Porter v. Taylor, 36 Ark. 591 (1880) (holding that land sales contracts were not securities because they involved no investment in an enterprise even if land was bought on expectation that development of the area would increase the value of the land", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhim to follow the proceeds into the hands of third parties, without regard to any settlement before or after judgment. The lien operates as security, and if the settlement entered into by the parties is in disregard of it and to the prejudice of plaintiffs attorney, by reason of the insolvency of his client, or for other sufficient cause, the court will interfere and protect its officer by vacating the satisfaction of judgment and permitting execution to issue for the enforcement of the judgment to the extent of the lien, or by following the proceeds in the hands of third parties, who received them before or after judgment impressed with the lien. Id. (Emphasis added.) An attorney’s lien follows the judgment into whatever form it may assume. See Porter v. Taylor, 36 Ark. 591 (1880) (holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a \"violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.” Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas’ claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas’ claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (holding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the promise was made", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a \"violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.” Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas’ claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas’ claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (holding that where a patient is in possession of his faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult about his condition and where no emergency exists making it impracticable to confer with him his consent is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physician", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a \"violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.” Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas’ claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas’ claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (holding that the question presented is whether he adduced sufficient evidence from which a factfinder reasonably could conclude that the nature and severity of his injury significantly restricted his ability to walk as compared with an average person in the general population", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a \"violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.” Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas’ claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas’ claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (holding that an attorneys twentyeight years of experience appearing before courts should have served to heighten his knowledge as to the appropriateness of his representations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nto personalty is an injury to, or interference with, possession, unlawfully, with or without the exercise of physical force.' ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Vowell Constr. Co., 161 Tex. 432, 341 S.W.2d 148, 150 (1960) (quoting 87 C.J.S. Trespass §§ 8, 9). Thus the intentional entry of a scraper into a space lawfully occupied by a cable was held to be a \"violation of a property right which gave rise to a cause of action regardless of negligence.” Id. Because we focus on an element common to all of the Palmas’ claims, we need not determine whether the Palmas’ claim for negligent trespass differs from the type of trespass claim recognized in Mountain States. 3 . The cases on which the Palmas rely concerning lay opinion are Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 667-70 (Tex.2007) (holding that nonexpert evidence of the plaintiffs state of general health before the wreck as compared to his physical condition afterwards was sufficient to allow a layperson of common knowledge and experience to conclude that his wreck made it necessary to transport the plaintiff to an emergency room and be physically examined while there" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nit must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (holding that a defendants sister could consent to a search of only the common areas of their shared house and her own bedroom and explicitly stating that the sister could not consent to search the defendants bedroom because the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own bedroom", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nit must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (holding that appellants mother had the authority to consent to search of defendants bedroom defendant lived with parents rentfree for four years mother owned the house appellants bedroom door was open mother knocked whenever appellants door was locked and there were no restrictions placed on mothers right to enter bedroom", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nit must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (holding that child cannot consent to search of parents bedroom", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nit must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (holding that a mother had apparent authority to consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed vinyl bag found in the bedroom", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nit must be the latter. Any different approach would impose an impossible burden on the police. It would mean that they could never search closed containers within a dwelling ... without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they might encounter. We note that there is no possibility of such a rule for automobile searches, because the Supreme Court has already authorized this type of container search in that context. See Ross, supra; Houghton, supra. Our conclusion here rests in part on the discussion in Houghton that indicates that the container rule rests on general principles of Fourth Amendment law that do not depend on the special attributes of automobile searches. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis in original); see also Ladell, 127 F.3d at 624 (holding that a mother could consent to a search of her adult sons bedroom including a closed duffle bag stored in between the mattresses on the bed" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li’s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was “barren of reliable corroboration.” Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant’s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (holding that a claimants claim is barred when administrative remedies that are clearly required under an erisa plan are not exhausted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li’s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was “barren of reliable corroboration.” Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant’s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (holding that strict compliance is not required", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li’s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was “barren of reliable corroboration.” Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant’s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (holding that resentencing is required", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li’s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was “barren of reliable corroboration.” Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant’s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (holding that these steps are not required when the applicant is not otherwise credible", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave been raised in one of these conversa tions, particularly given Li’s testimony that she intended to let her mother know about her pregnancy. Further, the BIA and IJ appropriately faulted Li because the record was “barren of reliable corroboration.” Li failed to submit a statement from her father, aunt, sister, or mother. See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 164 (indicating that an applicant’s failure to corroborate her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question). In addition, the IJ was not required to show that this evidence was reasonably available to Li before relying on a lack of corroboration to support the adverse credibility finding. See id. at 164 (holding that it is not" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (holding that a deportation proceeding commenced after an order to show cause issued", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (recognizing that aliens whose proceedings are commenced with a notice to appear on or after april 1 1997 are subject to removal proceedings under iirira while aliens whose proceedings were commenced with an order to show cause before april 1 1997 were subject to deportation proceedings under prior law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (holding that summons issued nearly seven months after the show cause order was entered was not issued immediately as required by statute", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (holding that lawful domicile terminates when show cause order is issued", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding. See, e.g., San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1070 (11th Cir.1996). Even if that were a holding and the law of the circuit, it would not resolve this case, because here the INS never filed the order to show cause to commence removal proceedings. This case is about an order to show cause that was served on the alien but never filed with the immigration court. 14 . It appears that a few district courts have reached the same conclusion as the First Circuit in Wallace, that a removal proceeding has effectively begun when an order to show cause is served upon the alien. See Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999); Dunbar v. INS, 64 F.Supp.2d 47, 52 (D.Conn.1999); see also Mercado-Amador v. Reno, 47 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1224 (D.Or. 1999) (holding that because petitioners proceedings commenced after the enactment of iirira petitioner was statutorily ineligible for suspension of deportation" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAugust 2008 complaint regarding being written up for excessive idle time and absences from his desk. Although Gardner generally testified that Elliott regularly subjected him to more excessive scrutiny than other employees and regularly harassed him and that other employees agreed that Gardner was being harassed or “persecuted,” such conclusory statements and allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue: “If a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness’s testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.” Ortega v. Cach, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, J., dissenting); see also Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (holding affiants statement that certain conduct constituted intentional or willful misconduct by defendant was conelusory because it stated conclusion and did not provide supporting facts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAugust 2008 complaint regarding being written up for excessive idle time and absences from his desk. Although Gardner generally testified that Elliott regularly subjected him to more excessive scrutiny than other employees and regularly harassed him and that other employees agreed that Gardner was being harassed or “persecuted,” such conclusory statements and allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue: “If a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness’s testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.” Ortega v. Cach, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, J., dissenting); see also Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (holding that a refusal to make false statements that no misconduct occurred is a very different circumstance than an affirmative statement of misconduct", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAugust 2008 complaint regarding being written up for excessive idle time and absences from his desk. Although Gardner generally testified that Elliott regularly subjected him to more excessive scrutiny than other employees and regularly harassed him and that other employees agreed that Gardner was being harassed or “persecuted,” such conclusory statements and allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue: “If a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness’s testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.” Ortega v. Cach, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, J., dissenting); see also Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (holding that the affiants statement based upon his belief did not demonstrate the personal knowledge required by fedrcivp 56e", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAugust 2008 complaint regarding being written up for excessive idle time and absences from his desk. Although Gardner generally testified that Elliott regularly subjected him to more excessive scrutiny than other employees and regularly harassed him and that other employees agreed that Gardner was being harassed or “persecuted,” such conclusory statements and allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue: “If a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness’s testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.” Ortega v. Cach, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, J., dissenting); see also Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (holding that an employees purposeful violation of established safety rules despite instruction and warning constituted willful misconduct", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAugust 2008 complaint regarding being written up for excessive idle time and absences from his desk. Although Gardner generally testified that Elliott regularly subjected him to more excessive scrutiny than other employees and regularly harassed him and that other employees agreed that Gardner was being harassed or “persecuted,” such conclusory statements and allegations are insufficient to raise a fact issue: “If a witness provides a conclusion but does not provide underlying facts to support the conclusion, then the witness’s testimony is conclusory and legally insufficient to support a judgment.” Ortega v. Cach, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 637 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (Frost, J., dissenting); see also Ryland Group v. Hood, 924 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex.1996) (per curiam) (holding appellate argument that statement violated rule 404b was improper because it was the defendant who elicited the statement at trial" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould be strictly construed. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in awarding IOV2 percent interest on the judgment rather than the statutory rate, and reverse and remand this portion of the judgment with instructions to amend the award by applying the statutory rate. Prejudgment interest on costs Appellants maintain that the district court order can be read to require prejudgment interest on the award of costs since it provides that interest on the entire judgment should be awarded from the date of service of the complaint. First, appellants argue that interest should not be awarded on costs at all. See National Educators Life Insurance Company v. Apache Lanes, Inc., 555 P.2d 600, 602 (Okla. 1976) (recognizing general rule that prejudgment interest may be awarded in claims for liquidated amounts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould be strictly construed. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in awarding IOV2 percent interest on the judgment rather than the statutory rate, and reverse and remand this portion of the judgment with instructions to amend the award by applying the statutory rate. Prejudgment interest on costs Appellants maintain that the district court order can be read to require prejudgment interest on the award of costs since it provides that interest on the entire judgment should be awarded from the date of service of the complaint. First, appellants argue that interest should not be awarded on costs at all. See National Educators Life Insurance Company v. Apache Lanes, Inc., 555 P.2d 600, 602 (Okla. 1976) (holding that a proper determination of the questions of law cannot be made in the absence of suitable findings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould be strictly construed. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in awarding IOV2 percent interest on the judgment rather than the statutory rate, and reverse and remand this portion of the judgment with instructions to amend the award by applying the statutory rate. Prejudgment interest on costs Appellants maintain that the district court order can be read to require prejudgment interest on the award of costs since it provides that interest on the entire judgment should be awarded from the date of service of the complaint. First, appellants argue that interest should not be awarded on costs at all. See National Educators Life Insurance Company v. Apache Lanes, Inc., 555 P.2d 600, 602 (Okla. 1976) (holding that no interest is paid on benefits awarded based on a finding of cue", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould be strictly construed. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in awarding IOV2 percent interest on the judgment rather than the statutory rate, and reverse and remand this portion of the judgment with instructions to amend the award by applying the statutory rate. Prejudgment interest on costs Appellants maintain that the district court order can be read to require prejudgment interest on the award of costs since it provides that interest on the entire judgment should be awarded from the date of service of the complaint. First, appellants argue that interest should not be awarded on costs at all. See National Educators Life Insurance Company v. Apache Lanes, Inc., 555 P.2d 600, 602 (Okla. 1976) (holding that in the absence of statutory authorization interest cannot be awarded on costs", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshould be strictly construed. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in awarding IOV2 percent interest on the judgment rather than the statutory rate, and reverse and remand this portion of the judgment with instructions to amend the award by applying the statutory rate. Prejudgment interest on costs Appellants maintain that the district court order can be read to require prejudgment interest on the award of costs since it provides that interest on the entire judgment should be awarded from the date of service of the complaint. First, appellants argue that interest should not be awarded on costs at all. See National Educators Life Insurance Company v. Apache Lanes, Inc., 555 P.2d 600, 602 (Okla. 1976) (holding that credit cannot be awarded for time served on community control" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nconducting new NEPA analyses. See 668 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Although the Court determined that the USFS was not required to conduct new NEPA analyses, nothing in the Court’s decision prevents the USFS from exercising its discretion to conduct new NEPA analyses for five of the twenty-six chai lenged allotments to reach a favorable settlement pending appeal. The Court gave the NMCGA an opportunity to present evidence and have its objections heard at a hearing that the Court held on February 1, 2011. After careful consideration of the applicable authorities, the Court is not inclined to recognize a special right on intervenors’ behalf to participate in and/or approve all settlements negotiated during the pendency of the litigation. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d at 1189 (holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nconducting new NEPA analyses. See 668 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Although the Court determined that the USFS was not required to conduct new NEPA analyses, nothing in the Court’s decision prevents the USFS from exercising its discretion to conduct new NEPA analyses for five of the twenty-six chai lenged allotments to reach a favorable settlement pending appeal. The Court gave the NMCGA an opportunity to present evidence and have its objections heard at a hearing that the Court held on February 1, 2011. After careful consideration of the applicable authorities, the Court is not inclined to recognize a special right on intervenors’ behalf to participate in and/or approve all settlements negotiated during the pendency of the litigation. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d at 1189 (holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nconducting new NEPA analyses. See 668 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Although the Court determined that the USFS was not required to conduct new NEPA analyses, nothing in the Court’s decision prevents the USFS from exercising its discretion to conduct new NEPA analyses for five of the twenty-six chai lenged allotments to reach a favorable settlement pending appeal. The Court gave the NMCGA an opportunity to present evidence and have its objections heard at a hearing that the Court held on February 1, 2011. After careful consideration of the applicable authorities, the Court is not inclined to recognize a special right on intervenors’ behalf to participate in and/or approve all settlements negotiated during the pendency of the litigation. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d at 1189 (holding that a district court has the inherent power to summarily enforce settlement agreements in a pending case", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nconducting new NEPA analyses. See 668 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Although the Court determined that the USFS was not required to conduct new NEPA analyses, nothing in the Court’s decision prevents the USFS from exercising its discretion to conduct new NEPA analyses for five of the twenty-six chai lenged allotments to reach a favorable settlement pending appeal. The Court gave the NMCGA an opportunity to present evidence and have its objections heard at a hearing that the Court held on February 1, 2011. After careful consideration of the applicable authorities, the Court is not inclined to recognize a special right on intervenors’ behalf to participate in and/or approve all settlements negotiated during the pendency of the litigation. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d at 1189 (holding that an appellate court has discretion to consider an issue not argued by the parties", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nconducting new NEPA analyses. See 668 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Although the Court determined that the USFS was not required to conduct new NEPA analyses, nothing in the Court’s decision prevents the USFS from exercising its discretion to conduct new NEPA analyses for five of the twenty-six chai lenged allotments to reach a favorable settlement pending appeal. The Court gave the NMCGA an opportunity to present evidence and have its objections heard at a hearing that the Court held on February 1, 2011. After careful consideration of the applicable authorities, the Court is not inclined to recognize a special right on intervenors’ behalf to participate in and/or approve all settlements negotiated during the pendency of the litigation. See San Juan County, Utah v. United States, 503 F.3d at 1189 (holding that minor differences in opinion between the parties and proposed intervenor fail to demonstrate inadequacy of representation" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n(1986). While Burgunder is formally the employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on behalf of the plan sponsor. The conclusion that Burgunder performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the regulations. These provide that “[i]n discharging fiduciary responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on ... persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,” such as “advising participants of their rights and options under the plan.” DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, Employee Benefits Law: ERISA and Beyond § 12.06[4] (1993) (recognizing the dol opinion letter as the source of the nonstatutory factor", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n(1986). While Burgunder is formally the employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on behalf of the plan sponsor. The conclusion that Burgunder performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the regulations. These provide that “[i]n discharging fiduciary responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on ... persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,” such as “advising participants of their rights and options under the plan.” DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, Employee Benefits Law: ERISA and Beyond § 12.06[4] (1993) (recognizing cause of action for damages against federal agents acting under their authority who allegedly violated plaintiffs fourth amendment rights", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n(1986). While Burgunder is formally the employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on behalf of the plan sponsor. The conclusion that Burgunder performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the regulations. These provide that “[i]n discharging fiduciary responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on ... persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,” such as “advising participants of their rights and options under the plan.” DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, Employee Benefits Law: ERISA and Beyond § 12.06[4] (1993) (holding that when acting pursuant to a valid warrant the police did not violate the fourth amendment by acting outside their jurisdiction in violation of state law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n(1986). While Burgunder is formally the employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on behalf of the plan sponsor. The conclusion that Burgunder performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the regulations. These provide that “[i]n discharging fiduciary responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on ... persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,” such as “advising participants of their rights and options under the plan.” DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, Employee Benefits Law: ERISA and Beyond § 12.06[4] (1993) (recognizing that pursuant to dol reg 2509758 a committee acting as plan ad ministrator can select agents to perform ministerial functions", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n(1986). While Burgunder is formally the employee of plan sponsor PNG, he performed his activities for the plan on behalf of the plan administrator defendants, and not on behalf of the plan sponsor. The conclusion that Burgunder performed these tasks on behalf of the plan administrator, the named fiduciary with respect to the plan, is clear from the regulations. These provide that “[i]n discharging fiduciary responsibilities, a fiduciary with respect to a plan may rely on ... persons who perform purely ministerial functions for such plan,” such as “advising participants of their rights and options under the plan.” DOL Reg. § 2509.75-8, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, Q & A D-2 & FR-11 (emphasis added); see also 2 JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, Employee Benefits Law: ERISA and Beyond § 12.06[4] (1993) (holding that the bank trustee of a relevant plan was not a fiduciary in regard to real estate interests because it performed only administrative and ministerial functions" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat behavior. See 1414(d)(3)(B). Finally, an IEP team, “periodically, but not less than annually must determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.” See 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997). The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient specialized services to benefit from his education. Id. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA’S goal is “more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”). See also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir.1993) (recognizing that a school district must be a prevailing party in order to be entitled to attorneys fees under the idea", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat behavior. See 1414(d)(3)(B). Finally, an IEP team, “periodically, but not less than annually must determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.” See 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997). The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient specialized services to benefit from his education. Id. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA’S goal is “more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”). See also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir.1993) (holding idea requires transportation of disabled child only to address his educational needs and does not require school district to accommodate a parents unrelated noneducational preferences", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat behavior. See 1414(d)(3)(B). Finally, an IEP team, “periodically, but not less than annually must determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.” See 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997). The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient specialized services to benefit from his education. Id. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA’S goal is “more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”). See also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that the idea requires a school district to provide the educational equivalent of a serviceable chevrolet not a cadillac", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat behavior. See 1414(d)(3)(B). Finally, an IEP team, “periodically, but not less than annually must determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.” See 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997). The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient specialized services to benefit from his education. Id. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA’S goal is “more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”). See also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that a school district was not required to move a nurse to a students neighborhood school to comply with the idea", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthat behavior. See 1414(d)(3)(B). Finally, an IEP team, “periodically, but not less than annually must determine whether the annual goals for the child are being achieved.” See 1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IDEA does not require that a school either maximize a student’s potential or provide the best possible education at public expense. Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997). The Act requires only that a student receive sufficient specialized services to benefit from his education. Id. See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 195, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (IDEA’S goal is “more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside.”). See also Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that school districts provision of teaching materials in a tardy fashion had an educational source and educational consequences" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunnamed plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461, 100 S.Ct. 1779. A court may not consider a plaintiff-State a “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction purposes if the State is a real party in interest. Nuclear Eng’g Co., 660 F.2d at 250 (citing Ford, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347). A State is a real party in interest when it “articulate[s] an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also SDS West Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (recognizing that a narrow reading of missouri would suggest that the state is the real party in interest for diversity purposes only when the relief sought inures to the benefit of the state alone but noting that cases have only required a real interest pecuniary or otherwise in the outcome of the litigation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunnamed plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461, 100 S.Ct. 1779. A court may not consider a plaintiff-State a “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction purposes if the State is a real party in interest. Nuclear Eng’g Co., 660 F.2d at 250 (citing Ford, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347). A State is a real party in interest when it “articulate[s] an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also SDS West Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (recognizing as a quasisovereign interest that the state and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to flow fiom participation in the federal system", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunnamed plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461, 100 S.Ct. 1779. A court may not consider a plaintiff-State a “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction purposes if the State is a real party in interest. Nuclear Eng’g Co., 660 F.2d at 250 (citing Ford, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347). A State is a real party in interest when it “articulate[s] an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also SDS West Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (holding that when the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunnamed plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461, 100 S.Ct. 1779. A court may not consider a plaintiff-State a “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction purposes if the State is a real party in interest. Nuclear Eng’g Co., 660 F.2d at 250 (citing Ford, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347). A State is a real party in interest when it “articulate[s] an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also SDS West Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (holding that the state would be the real party in interest with respect to its claim for restitution even under the claimbyclaim approach because it has a quasisovereign interest in seeking recovery on behalf of a wide range of consumers and aiming to deter future antitrust conduct by corporations in the state", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunnamed plaintiffs are the real parties in interest. See Navarro, 446 U.S. at 461, 100 S.Ct. 1779. A court may not consider a plaintiff-State a “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction purposes if the State is a real party in interest. Nuclear Eng’g Co., 660 F.2d at 250 (citing Ford, 323 U.S. at 464, 65 S.Ct. 347). A State is a real party in interest when it “articulate[s] an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party. The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest.” Illinois v. Life of Mid-America Ins. Co., 805 F.2d 763, 766 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607, 102 S.Ct. 3260, 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also SDS West Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (holding that when a state sues on behalf of its residents without a sovereign or quasisovereign interest it is only a nominal party and thus not the real party in interest" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof $4,500.00 for “diminution in value”. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved for an award of $8,964.50 in attorney fees and $1,701.00 in costs. On 24 August 2004, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $500.00, but denied Plaintiff’s request for costs. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court failed to make findings to support the award of attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 under North Carolina General Statute section 6-21.1. We agree. Preliminarily, we note that the issue on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney fee award, not whether attorney fees should be awarded which the trial court in this case, in its discretion, elected to do after considering the factors under Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1999) (holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof $4,500.00 for “diminution in value”. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved for an award of $8,964.50 in attorney fees and $1,701.00 in costs. On 24 August 2004, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $500.00, but denied Plaintiff’s request for costs. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court failed to make findings to support the award of attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 under North Carolina General Statute section 6-21.1. We agree. Preliminarily, we note that the issue on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney fee award, not whether attorney fees should be awarded which the trial court in this case, in its discretion, elected to do after considering the factors under Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1999) (holding that the decision to allow attorney fees rests with the trial judge and that decision may only be reversed for an abuse of discretion", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof $4,500.00 for “diminution in value”. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved for an award of $8,964.50 in attorney fees and $1,701.00 in costs. On 24 August 2004, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $500.00, but denied Plaintiff’s request for costs. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court failed to make findings to support the award of attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 under North Carolina General Statute section 6-21.1. We agree. Preliminarily, we note that the issue on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney fee award, not whether attorney fees should be awarded which the trial court in this case, in its discretion, elected to do after considering the factors under Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1999) (holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof $4,500.00 for “diminution in value”. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved for an award of $8,964.50 in attorney fees and $1,701.00 in costs. On 24 August 2004, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $500.00, but denied Plaintiff’s request for costs. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court failed to make findings to support the award of attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 under North Carolina General Statute section 6-21.1. We agree. Preliminarily, we note that the issue on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney fee award, not whether attorney fees should be awarded which the trial court in this case, in its discretion, elected to do after considering the factors under Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1999) (holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof $4,500.00 for “diminution in value”. Following the jury verdict, Plaintiff moved for an award of $8,964.50 in attorney fees and $1,701.00 in costs. On 24 August 2004, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney fees in the amount of $500.00, but denied Plaintiff’s request for costs. Plaintiff first argues that the trial court failed to make findings to support the award of attorney fees in the amount of $500.00 under North Carolina General Statute section 6-21.1. We agree. Preliminarily, we note that the issue on appeal concerns the amount of the attorney fee award, not whether attorney fees should be awarded which the trial court in this case, in its discretion, elected to do after considering the factors under Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App. 347, 351, 513 S.E.2d 331, 334 (1999) (holding that the determination of whether statements are excited utterances is within the trial courts discretion and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,” neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when “Puerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.” Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,” neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when “Puerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.” Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,” neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when “Puerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.” Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,” neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when “Puerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.” Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (holding that constitutional error was waived even though petitioner repeatedly used the phrase full faith and credit because petitioner did not cite to the federal constitution or to any cases relying on the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits citizens the rights and privileges of United States citizenship. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F.Supp. at 1296; Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431, 434 (3d Cir.1966) (stating that Puerto Rican citizens are also citizens of t cognized that “Puerto Rico occupies a relationship to the United States that has no parallel,” neither the Court nor Congress has suggested that Puerto Rico should not be considered part of the United States for purposes of predicate offenses in our criminal justice system. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. 2264. In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has rejected the contention that when “Puerto Rico became a commonwealth its courts ceased to be within our system of government.” Americana, 368 F.2d at 438-39 (holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(Tex.1986). Those decisions — which do not involve mortgage assumptions — are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush’s assumption of her father’s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo’s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transféree’s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor’s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) § 5.1(b)(2) (“When mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.”); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine is only applicable if there is an unconditional sale and that private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(Tex.1986). Those decisions — which do not involve mortgage assumptions — are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush’s assumption of her father’s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo’s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transféree’s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor’s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) § 5.1(b)(2) (“When mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.”); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that an original obligor is personally liable if there is no unconditional acceptance of the assuming party as the sole principal obligor by the holder of the indebtedness nor was there any agreement to release the original obligors", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(Tex.1986). Those decisions — which do not involve mortgage assumptions — are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush’s assumption of her father’s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo’s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transféree’s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor’s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) § 5.1(b)(2) (“When mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.”); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(Tex.1986). Those decisions — which do not involve mortgage assumptions — are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush’s assumption of her father’s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo’s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transféree’s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor’s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) § 5.1(b)(2) (“When mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.”); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding there was no error in refusing to charge accessory after the fact because there is no exclusionary situation which eliminates one defendant or the other from having participated in the murder as a principal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(Tex.1986). Those decisions — which do not involve mortgage assumptions — are inapplicable here because Mrs. Brush’s assumption of her father’s mortgage was not a modification of Wells Fargo’s prior agreements with him. As Wells Fargo notes, a transféree’s agreement to assume a loan is a new promise and does not necessarily extinguish the transferor’s personal obligation under the loan. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgage) § 5.1(b)(2) (“When mortgaged real estate is transferred with assumption of liability ... the transferor remains personally liable for the covenants in the mortgage and for the obligation secured by the mortgage, to the extent such liability existed prior to the transfer.”); Shockey v. Page, 354 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that where the parties fail to reach an agreement as to the character nature or type of release to be used an essential element of the agreement is not established" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (holding that a federal court must enforce a state court judgment under the full faith and credit statute where diversity jurisdiction exists", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (holding that for federal court to grant full faith and credit to state court judgment state proceedings must satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the fourteenth amendments due process clause", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat Andrew breached his fiduciary duties. It rather, presents an issue for trial. IV. CONCLUSION The Arrearage Claim is a valid claim against the Estate. Otherwise, the competing motions for summary judgment are denied. This court will retain jurisdiction going forward. 1 . This decision refers to multiple members of the Farren family, so it uses their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 . See, e.g., Alexander Indus., Inc. v. Hill, 211 A.2d 917, 918-19 (Del.1965); Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-69 (Del.1962); Phillips v. Schifino, 2009 WL 5174328, at *1 (Del.Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 731660, at *3 (Del.Ch. Oct. 9, 1998). 3 . See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82 (1944) (holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the sale. Generally speaking, “[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.” Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.” Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty — and thus has no negligence HabiHty — to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (holding that if the trial court would have had no discretion to deny summary judgment on an alternative ground the appellate court can on that alternative ground sustain the order granting summary judgment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the sale. Generally speaking, “[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.” Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.” Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty — and thus has no negligence HabiHty — to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (holding that summary judgment against escrow agent to closing was properly granted when fraud was alleged basis of conspiracy and when nothing in the noevidence summary judgment record supports the borrowers claim that american title was a party to a plan to defraud them", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the sale. Generally speaking, “[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.” Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.” Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty — and thus has no negligence HabiHty — to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (holding that escrow agent owed duty only to parties to escrow agreement not to party to tangential contract further holding that trial court correctly rendered summary judgment on neghgence claim against escrow agent on this ground", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the sale. Generally speaking, “[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.” Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.” Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty — and thus has no negligence HabiHty — to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment on ground not presented by movant in writing", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor the sale. Generally speaking, “[a]n escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to [an escrow] contract.” Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[t]he title insurance agent may not inten-tionaHy or recklessly deceive the parties to a real estate transaction.” Zimmerman v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 790 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, writ denied) (emphasis added). An escrow agent and closer like HTC does not owe a duty — and thus has no negligence HabiHty — to the non-party creditor of a party to the escrow agreement. Cf. Rove v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. 05-96-01783-CV, 1998 WL 696880, at *4 (Tex.App.-DaHas Oct.8, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for pubHcation) (holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nUnited States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1024 (1st Cir.1992) (“[w]e decline to engage in a construction of the language of foreseeability that requires such a forced linguistic volte-face”). But Edwards ignored the language of the Guidelines- on “the scope of the agreement.” The Second Circuit picked up this language and wrote a gloss on it, holding that the latecomer to a conspiracy was liable for drugs earlier distributed, of which he “knew or reasonably should have known.” United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). This gloss introduces a kind of negligence standard into conspiracy law. It goes beyond the terms of the . Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that the district court made sufficient factual findings and adequately determined the scope of defendants participation in a conspiracy under 1b13 even though the district court did not expressly determine the scope of the defendants participation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nUnited States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1024 (1st Cir.1992) (“[w]e decline to engage in a construction of the language of foreseeability that requires such a forced linguistic volte-face”). But Edwards ignored the language of the Guidelines- on “the scope of the agreement.” The Second Circuit picked up this language and wrote a gloss on it, holding that the latecomer to a conspiracy was liable for drugs earlier distributed, of which he “knew or reasonably should have known.” United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). This gloss introduces a kind of negligence standard into conspiracy law. It goes beyond the terms of the . Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that the sentencing court erred in failing to make a factual determination as to the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant after his participation in the charged conspiracy", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nUnited States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1024 (1st Cir.1992) (“[w]e decline to engage in a construction of the language of foreseeability that requires such a forced linguistic volte-face”). But Edwards ignored the language of the Guidelines- on “the scope of the agreement.” The Second Circuit picked up this language and wrote a gloss on it, holding that the latecomer to a conspiracy was liable for drugs earlier distributed, of which he “knew or reasonably should have known.” United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). This gloss introduces a kind of negligence standard into conspiracy law. It goes beyond the terms of the . Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that defendant is liable for entire quantity of drugs attributable to conspiracy in circumstances where defendant is one of conspiracys central figures", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nUnited States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1024 (1st Cir.1992) (“[w]e decline to engage in a construction of the language of foreseeability that requires such a forced linguistic volte-face”). But Edwards ignored the language of the Guidelines- on “the scope of the agreement.” The Second Circuit picked up this language and wrote a gloss on it, holding that the latecomer to a conspiracy was liable for drugs earlier distributed, of which he “knew or reasonably should have known.” United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). This gloss introduces a kind of negligence standard into conspiracy law. It goes beyond the terms of the . Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that evidence tending to show knowing participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to sustain conspiracy conviction", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nUnited States v. O’Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1024 (1st Cir.1992) (“[w]e decline to engage in a construction of the language of foreseeability that requires such a forced linguistic volte-face”). But Edwards ignored the language of the Guidelines- on “the scope of the agreement.” The Second Circuit picked up this language and wrote a gloss on it, holding that the latecomer to a conspiracy was liable for drugs earlier distributed, of which he “knew or reasonably should have known.” United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). This gloss introduces a kind of negligence standard into conspiracy law. It goes beyond the terms of the . Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Navarro, 979 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that when a district court determines drug quantity for the purpose of sentencing a defendant convicted of participating in a drugtrafficking conspiracy the court is required to make an individualized finding as to drug amounts attributable to or foreseeable by that defendant" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninsufficient to justify reversal.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A.2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that mayfield was prejudiced by his defense counsels failure to present all the available mitigating evidence although the aggravating evidence against mayfield was strong and the mitigation evidence presented was substantial", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninsufficient to justify reversal.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A.2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninsufficient to justify reversal.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A.2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that mental health evidence could be mitigating at the penalty phase even though it is insufficient to establish a legal defense to conviction in the guilty phase", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninsufficient to justify reversal.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A.2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that defendant was prejudiced at sentencing phase by counsels failure to discover and present any available mitigating evidence concerning defendants impoverished childhood epileptic seizures and organic brain damage", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninsufficient to justify reversal.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 44, 519 A.2d 336. Only after evaluating the specific claims asserted at the PCR hearing may we determine whether counsel’s failure to introduce mitigating evidence prejudiced defendant. Although the lack of sufficient time to prepare for trial can support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant generally may support that claim with proof of specific evidence adduced at a post-conviction hearing, but not at the original trial. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1995) (finding prejudice in sentencing proceedings where counsel failed to present pertinent evidence of mental history and mental capacity discovered at post-sentencing hearing); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1501-02 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhas the right, and the ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client's control.\"); 7-34 James C. Francis & Robert M. Bloom, Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 84.14 (2011) (\"Documents in the possession of a party's attorney may be considered to be within the control of the party within the meaning of Rule 34.... In addition, 'if an attorney comes into possession of a document as attorney for that party his [or her] possession of the documents is the possession of the party'\" (footnotes and citations omitted)). Because this court has similarly defined \"control,\" see Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 454, 334 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1959) (holding that possession custody or control in crcp 26 and 34 requires the production of doeuments which are obtainable by the order or direction of the litigant", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhas the right, and the ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client's control.\"); 7-34 James C. Francis & Robert M. Bloom, Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 84.14 (2011) (\"Documents in the possession of a party's attorney may be considered to be within the control of the party within the meaning of Rule 34.... In addition, 'if an attorney comes into possession of a document as attorney for that party his [or her] possession of the documents is the possession of the party'\" (footnotes and citations omitted)). Because this court has similarly defined \"control,\" see Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 454, 334 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1959) (holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhas the right, and the ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client's control.\"); 7-34 James C. Francis & Robert M. Bloom, Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 84.14 (2011) (\"Documents in the possession of a party's attorney may be considered to be within the control of the party within the meaning of Rule 34.... In addition, 'if an attorney comes into possession of a document as attorney for that party his [or her] possession of the documents is the possession of the party'\" (footnotes and citations omitted)). Because this court has similarly defined \"control,\" see Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 454, 334 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1959) (holding that once the defendant has submitted to the control of the officer and the process of taking him or her to the police station has commenced his or her arrest is complete and he or she is in custody for the purposes of the escape statute", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhas the right, and the ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client's control.\"); 7-34 James C. Francis & Robert M. Bloom, Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 84.14 (2011) (\"Documents in the possession of a party's attorney may be considered to be within the control of the party within the meaning of Rule 34.... In addition, 'if an attorney comes into possession of a document as attorney for that party his [or her] possession of the documents is the possession of the party'\" (footnotes and citations omitted)). Because this court has similarly defined \"control,\" see Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 454, 334 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1959) (holding that the phrase possession or custody in 5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhas the right, and the ready ability, to obtain copies of documents gathered or created by its attorneys pursuant to their representation of that client, such documents are clearly within the client's control.\"); 7-34 James C. Francis & Robert M. Bloom, Moore's Federal Practice-Civil § 84.14 (2011) (\"Documents in the possession of a party's attorney may be considered to be within the control of the party within the meaning of Rule 34.... In addition, 'if an attorney comes into possession of a document as attorney for that party his [or her] possession of the documents is the possession of the party'\" (footnotes and citations omitted)). Because this court has similarly defined \"control,\" see Michael v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 Colo. 450, 454, 334 P.2d 1090, 1093 (1959) (holding that ownership or possession or actual control is needed" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Neither the newly submitted country reports nor Mehanna’s expert report are “quantitatively different” from the reports Mehanna submitted in 1998, when Mehanna originally appeared before an Immigration Judge. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that more recent country reports describing conditions similar to those found in previous report failed to show sufficient change in country conditions). The newly submitted evidence shows the continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but does not support Mehanna’s assertion that changed circumstances in Lebanon and his former membership in the Lebanese Special Forces “will imperil him upon his return to Lebanon.” See also Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that substantial evidence supported the bias determination that a lebanese petitioner persecuted in the late 1990s for antisyrian views had failed to show a probability he would be tortured if returned to lebanon after the syrian militarys withdrawal from lebanon and the emergence of an antihezbollah majority in the legislature", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Neither the newly submitted country reports nor Mehanna’s expert report are “quantitatively different” from the reports Mehanna submitted in 1998, when Mehanna originally appeared before an Immigration Judge. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that more recent country reports describing conditions similar to those found in previous report failed to show sufficient change in country conditions). The newly submitted evidence shows the continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but does not support Mehanna’s assertion that changed circumstances in Lebanon and his former membership in the Lebanese Special Forces “will imperil him upon his return to Lebanon.” See also Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that the state failed to meet its burden when the record failed to show that the jurors would or would not be available after a weeks continuance", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Neither the newly submitted country reports nor Mehanna’s expert report are “quantitatively different” from the reports Mehanna submitted in 1998, when Mehanna originally appeared before an Immigration Judge. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that more recent country reports describing conditions similar to those found in previous report failed to show sufficient change in country conditions). The newly submitted evidence shows the continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but does not support Mehanna’s assertion that changed circumstances in Lebanon and his former membership in the Lebanese Special Forces “will imperil him upon his return to Lebanon.” See also Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Neither the newly submitted country reports nor Mehanna’s expert report are “quantitatively different” from the reports Mehanna submitted in 1998, when Mehanna originally appeared before an Immigration Judge. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that more recent country reports describing conditions similar to those found in previous report failed to show sufficient change in country conditions). The newly submitted evidence shows the continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but does not support Mehanna’s assertion that changed circumstances in Lebanon and his former membership in the Lebanese Special Forces “will imperil him upon his return to Lebanon.” See also Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that substantial evidence supported determination that petitioners failed to show that fear of sterilization was objectively reasonable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Neither the newly submitted country reports nor Mehanna’s expert report are “quantitatively different” from the reports Mehanna submitted in 1998, when Mehanna originally appeared before an Immigration Judge. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir.2010) (finding that more recent country reports describing conditions similar to those found in previous report failed to show sufficient change in country conditions). The newly submitted evidence shows the continuing influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but does not support Mehanna’s assertion that changed circumstances in Lebanon and his former membership in the Lebanese Special Forces “will imperil him upon his return to Lebanon.” See also Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 386 (9th Cir.2012) (holding that to show prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the result of the proceeding would have been different" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nU.S.C. § 7425(b). 4 .\"We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999). Montana law makes clear that the purchaser under a land sales contract holds an equitable interest in real property, although legal title remains in the seller. Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 283, 12 P.2d 565, 567 (1932). Under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien may attach to \"all property and rights to property” belonging to a taxpayer in default. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 474 (holding that the right to disclaim property under state law does not defeat a federal tax lien because the taxpayer exercised control over the disposition of the property", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nU.S.C. § 7425(b). 4 .\"We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999). Montana law makes clear that the purchaser under a land sales contract holds an equitable interest in real property, although legal title remains in the seller. Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 283, 12 P.2d 565, 567 (1932). Under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien may attach to \"all property and rights to property” belonging to a taxpayer in default. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 474 (holding that a federal tax lien properly attached to a slatelawcreated right to property that had pecuniary value", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nU.S.C. § 7425(b). 4 .\"We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999). Montana law makes clear that the purchaser under a land sales contract holds an equitable interest in real property, although legal title remains in the seller. Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 283, 12 P.2d 565, 567 (1932). Under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien may attach to \"all property and rights to property” belonging to a taxpayer in default. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 474 (holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of 522f", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nU.S.C. § 7425(b). 4 .\"We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999). Montana law makes clear that the purchaser under a land sales contract holds an equitable interest in real property, although legal title remains in the seller. Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 283, 12 P.2d 565, 567 (1932). Under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien may attach to \"all property and rights to property” belonging to a taxpayer in default. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 474 (holding that 522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nU.S.C. § 7425(b). 4 .\"We look initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58, 120 S.Ct. 474, 145 L.Ed.2d 466 (1999). Montana law makes clear that the purchaser under a land sales contract holds an equitable interest in real property, although legal title remains in the seller. Kern v. Robertson, 92 Mont. 283, 12 P.2d 565, 567 (1932). Under 26 U.S.C. § 6321, a federal tax lien may attach to \"all property and rights to property” belonging to a taxpayer in default. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 58-60, 120 S.Ct. 474 (holding that a property right that comes into existence by court action such as a judgment lien does not relate back to some earlier date to destroy the priority of a federal tax lien" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nphase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A court may grant a Cir.1978) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s actions in “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state’s case ... even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts”); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (holding that a prosecutors decision whether or not to give defense counsel evidence alleged to be materially exculpatory which was either discovered after the 1983 plaintiffs arrest but before his conviction or while the prosecutor was still functioning as an advocate for the state in posttrial motions and preparations for appeal is clearly part of the presentation of the states case and therefore a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for failure to turn over evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nphase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A court may grant a Cir.1978) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s actions in “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state’s case ... even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts”); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune from suit for deciding to investigate and conspir ing to present false charges to the grand jury", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nphase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A court may grant a Cir.1978) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s actions in “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state’s case ... even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts”); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a suit claiming that he destroyed and falsified evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nphase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A court may grant a Cir.1978) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s actions in “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state’s case ... even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts”); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (holding that notwithstanding acts and omissions of state prosecutor in withholding certain information and in failing to prevent or correct deceptive and misleading testimony deprived the state defendant of her constitutional right to a fair trial prosecutor was absolutely immune", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nphase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). A prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity, however, if he or she is performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a police officer or detective. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). A court may grant a Cir.1978) (per curiam) (extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s actions in “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the state’s case ... even where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, deliberately withheld exculpatory information, or failed to make full disclosure of all facts”); Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (holding prosecutor absolutely immune for deciding to pursue criminal charges despite challenge to his motivation" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na defective pleading within the deadline, and where a plaintiff was prevented from bringing suit by war”). Here, Strong did not file her complaint only one minute late. She was not misled by the Secretary to miss the filing deadline, nor did war prevent her from bringing suit timely. Nor is Strong proceeding pro se; she is represented by Plitt. While Plitt regrettably suffered through a period of personal hardship, “a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Cf. also, Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that trial counsels failure to call defendants family members as witnesses during penalty phase was reasonable trial strategy and not ineffective assistance of counsel", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na defective pleading within the deadline, and where a plaintiff was prevented from bringing suit by war”). Here, Strong did not file her complaint only one minute late. She was not misled by the Secretary to miss the filing deadline, nor did war prevent her from bringing suit timely. Nor is Strong proceeding pro se; she is represented by Plitt. While Plitt regrettably suffered through a period of personal hardship, “a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Cf. also, Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na defective pleading within the deadline, and where a plaintiff was prevented from bringing suit by war”). Here, Strong did not file her complaint only one minute late. She was not misled by the Secretary to miss the filing deadline, nor did war prevent her from bringing suit timely. Nor is Strong proceeding pro se; she is represented by Plitt. While Plitt regrettably suffered through a period of personal hardship, “a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Cf. also, Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir.2006) (recognizing that defendant must show 1 that counsels performance was deficient and 2 that counsels errors prejudiced the defense", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na defective pleading within the deadline, and where a plaintiff was prevented from bringing suit by war”). Here, Strong did not file her complaint only one minute late. She was not misled by the Secretary to miss the filing deadline, nor did war prevent her from bringing suit timely. Nor is Strong proceeding pro se; she is represented by Plitt. While Plitt regrettably suffered through a period of personal hardship, “a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Cf. also, Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that counsels abandonment of the case during discovery cannot be excused by the deaths in his family", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na defective pleading within the deadline, and where a plaintiff was prevented from bringing suit by war”). Here, Strong did not file her complaint only one minute late. She was not misled by the Secretary to miss the filing deadline, nor did war prevent her from bringing suit timely. Nor is Strong proceeding pro se; she is represented by Plitt. While Plitt regrettably suffered through a period of personal hardship, “a lawyer’s duty of diligence transcends both upheaval at work and personal tragedy.” Davila-Alvarez v. Escuela de Medicina Universidad Cent. del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 398, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Cf. also, Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that the effects of the victims deaths upon the families is part of the circumstances of the crime and is properly presented to the jury at the penalty phase" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails to pay its employees promptly, see Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F.Supp. 774, 780 (E.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), any subsequent failure in this regard could not constitute an action taken under an objectively reasonable belief that the State was in compliance with the FLSA. An employer’s failure to heed administrative rulemaking or precedent with respect to the FLSA deprives the employer of the good faith defense. See, e.g., Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (in view of Department of Labor regulation, the City of Macon could not reasonably believe that its mass transit system employees were excluded from FLSA requirements); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.) (holding that defendants answer sufficiently encapsulated the elements of an affirmative defense to have put plaintiff on notice that defendant intended to rely on it", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails to pay its employees promptly, see Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F.Supp. 774, 780 (E.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), any subsequent failure in this regard could not constitute an action taken under an objectively reasonable belief that the State was in compliance with the FLSA. An employer’s failure to heed administrative rulemaking or precedent with respect to the FLSA deprives the employer of the good faith defense. See, e.g., Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (in view of Department of Labor regulation, the City of Macon could not reasonably believe that its mass transit system employees were excluded from FLSA requirements); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.) (holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails to pay its employees promptly, see Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F.Supp. 774, 780 (E.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), any subsequent failure in this regard could not constitute an action taken under an objectively reasonable belief that the State was in compliance with the FLSA. An employer’s failure to heed administrative rulemaking or precedent with respect to the FLSA deprives the employer of the good faith defense. See, e.g., Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (in view of Department of Labor regulation, the City of Macon could not reasonably believe that its mass transit system employees were excluded from FLSA requirements); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.) (holding that widely circulated 1974 opinion letter of the wage and hour administrator which apparently was not addressed specifically to defendant put defendant on notice of proper procedure for crediting tips against the minimum wage depriving defendant of ability to assert good faith defense to liquidated damages", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails to pay its employees promptly, see Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F.Supp. 774, 780 (E.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), any subsequent failure in this regard could not constitute an action taken under an objectively reasonable belief that the State was in compliance with the FLSA. An employer’s failure to heed administrative rulemaking or precedent with respect to the FLSA deprives the employer of the good faith defense. See, e.g., Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (in view of Department of Labor regulation, the City of Macon could not reasonably believe that its mass transit system employees were excluded from FLSA requirements); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.) (holding that jurys verdict for the defendant in a breach of contract action did not establish the absence of breach because the jury was instructed that it could find for the defendant if it concluded that the defendant had not breached the contract or if the defendant proved an affirmative defense", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails to pay its employees promptly, see Biggs v. Wilson, 828 F.Supp. 774, 780 (E.D.Cal.1991), aff'd, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 902, 127 L.Ed.2d 94 (1994), any subsequent failure in this regard could not constitute an action taken under an objectively reasonable belief that the State was in compliance with the FLSA. An employer’s failure to heed administrative rulemaking or precedent with respect to the FLSA deprives the employer of the good faith defense. See, e.g., Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (in view of Department of Labor regulation, the City of Macon could not reasonably believe that its mass transit system employees were excluded from FLSA requirements); Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.) (holding that filing of litigation against the same defendant put a plaintiff on inquiry notice of the probability of fraud with another transaction involving the defendant where the complaints in both lawsuits involved similar allegations that defendant failed to disclose its inadequate loss reserves and did not sufficiently monitor its operations" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nracial discrimination which justifies this classification”). Even when a classification is appropriately related to the regulation’s purpose, we must weigh and evaluate the state’s interest in accomplishing the regulation’s purpose. Under the current equal, protection jurisprudence, the adequacy of the state’s purpose varies with the nature of the classification. Thus, a classification based on race or national origin or which affects fundamental rights secured by the Constitution is examined most closely because the classification is deemed inherently suspect. Only a compelling state interest, advanced by the least restrictive means, will justify the classification on these bases. See, e.g., Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (holding that custody decision based on race is not justified", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nracial discrimination which justifies this classification”). Even when a classification is appropriately related to the regulation’s purpose, we must weigh and evaluate the state’s interest in accomplishing the regulation’s purpose. Under the current equal, protection jurisprudence, the adequacy of the state’s purpose varies with the nature of the classification. Thus, a classification based on race or national origin or which affects fundamental rights secured by the Constitution is examined most closely because the classification is deemed inherently suspect. Only a compelling state interest, advanced by the least restrictive means, will justify the classification on these bases. See, e.g., Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nracial discrimination which justifies this classification”). Even when a classification is appropriately related to the regulation’s purpose, we must weigh and evaluate the state’s interest in accomplishing the regulation’s purpose. Under the current equal, protection jurisprudence, the adequacy of the state’s purpose varies with the nature of the classification. Thus, a classification based on race or national origin or which affects fundamental rights secured by the Constitution is examined most closely because the classification is deemed inherently suspect. Only a compelling state interest, advanced by the least restrictive means, will justify the classification on these bases. See, e.g., Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (holding that an employers decision to terminate and individuals employment based on race is a violation of title vii regardless of whether that person is white or black", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nracial discrimination which justifies this classification”). Even when a classification is appropriately related to the regulation’s purpose, we must weigh and evaluate the state’s interest in accomplishing the regulation’s purpose. Under the current equal, protection jurisprudence, the adequacy of the state’s purpose varies with the nature of the classification. Thus, a classification based on race or national origin or which affects fundamental rights secured by the Constitution is examined most closely because the classification is deemed inherently suspect. Only a compelling state interest, advanced by the least restrictive means, will justify the classification on these bases. See, e.g., Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (holding that it is impermissible to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a potential juror based on race", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nracial discrimination which justifies this classification”). Even when a classification is appropriately related to the regulation’s purpose, we must weigh and evaluate the state’s interest in accomplishing the regulation’s purpose. Under the current equal, protection jurisprudence, the adequacy of the state’s purpose varies with the nature of the classification. Thus, a classification based on race or national origin or which affects fundamental rights secured by the Constitution is examined most closely because the classification is deemed inherently suspect. Only a compelling state interest, advanced by the least restrictive means, will justify the classification on these bases. See, e.g., Palamore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881-82, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto pursue a declaratory judgment action against an insurer. Id. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at 647. The intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule a decision by the supreme court. Mueller v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Principal Fin. Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn.App.1991) (Davies, J. concurring specially)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). b. Continental argues that it should not be liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred in this action to address the indemnity issues, because the jury did not find a breach of a duty to indemnify. Rather, Continental argues that it is solely liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred to establish a duty to defend. See Lanoue v. Fireman’s Fund Amer. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.1979) (holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto pursue a declaratory judgment action against an insurer. Id. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at 647. The intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule a decision by the supreme court. Mueller v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Principal Fin. Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn.App.1991) (Davies, J. concurring specially)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). b. Continental argues that it should not be liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred in this action to address the indemnity issues, because the jury did not find a breach of a duty to indemnify. Rather, Continental argues that it is solely liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred to establish a duty to defend. See Lanoue v. Fireman’s Fund Amer. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.1979) (holding that chapter 38 permits an insured to recover attorney fees from the insurer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto pursue a declaratory judgment action against an insurer. Id. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at 647. The intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule a decision by the supreme court. Mueller v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Principal Fin. Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn.App.1991) (Davies, J. concurring specially)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). b. Continental argues that it should not be liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred in this action to address the indemnity issues, because the jury did not find a breach of a duty to indemnify. Rather, Continental argues that it is solely liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred to establish a duty to defend. See Lanoue v. Fireman’s Fund Amer. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.1979) (holding that insured may recover from its insurer any attorney fees incurred in successfully attempting to force the insurer to defend an action against the insured", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto pursue a declaratory judgment action against an insurer. Id. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at 647. The intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule a decision by the supreme court. Mueller v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Principal Fin. Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn.App.1991) (Davies, J. concurring specially)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). b. Continental argues that it should not be liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred in this action to address the indemnity issues, because the jury did not find a breach of a duty to indemnify. Rather, Continental argues that it is solely liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred to establish a duty to defend. See Lanoue v. Fireman’s Fund Amer. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.1979) (holding that when the insured brings an action for a declaration of coverage and prevails absent a bad faith denial of coverage by the insurer attorneys fees incurred by the insured in the prosecution of that action are not incurred at the request of the insurer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto pursue a declaratory judgment action against an insurer. Id. at 137-38, 142 N.W.2d at 647. The intermediate appellate court has no authority to overrule a decision by the supreme court. Mueller v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn.App.1994) (citing Principal Fin. Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 472 N.W.2d 338, 343 (Minn.App.1991) (Davies, J. concurring specially)), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). b. Continental argues that it should not be liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred in this action to address the indemnity issues, because the jury did not find a breach of a duty to indemnify. Rather, Continental argues that it is solely liable for Domtar’s attorney fees incurred to establish a duty to defend. See Lanoue v. Fireman’s Fund Amer. Ins. Cos., 278 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn.1979) (holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napart from any procedural shortcoming, Mr. McPherson is not entitled to relief on the merits. Two claims from Mr. McPherson’s collective Issue D remain: 1) his allegation that the trial judge made remarks reflecting bias constituting misconduct under New Mexico’s Code of Judicial Conduct; and 2) his allegation that he was denied access to the courts by jail personnel, due to a one-time refusal to allow him use of the jail’s law library, as well as his related allegation challenging the general adequacy of the jail’s law library. With regard to Mr. McPherson’s judicial misconduct claim, the district court correctly ruled that alleged violations of state codes of conduct are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding that gardenvariety errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas relief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napart from any procedural shortcoming, Mr. McPherson is not entitled to relief on the merits. Two claims from Mr. McPherson’s collective Issue D remain: 1) his allegation that the trial judge made remarks reflecting bias constituting misconduct under New Mexico’s Code of Judicial Conduct; and 2) his allegation that he was denied access to the courts by jail personnel, due to a one-time refusal to allow him use of the jail’s law library, as well as his related allegation challenging the general adequacy of the jail’s law library. With regard to Mr. McPherson’s judicial misconduct claim, the district court correctly ruled that alleged violations of state codes of conduct are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding that federal habeas relief is not available to correct errors of state law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napart from any procedural shortcoming, Mr. McPherson is not entitled to relief on the merits. Two claims from Mr. McPherson’s collective Issue D remain: 1) his allegation that the trial judge made remarks reflecting bias constituting misconduct under New Mexico’s Code of Judicial Conduct; and 2) his allegation that he was denied access to the courts by jail personnel, due to a one-time refusal to allow him use of the jail’s law library, as well as his related allegation challenging the general adequacy of the jail’s law library. With regard to Mr. McPherson’s judicial misconduct claim, the district court correctly ruled that alleged violations of state codes of conduct are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napart from any procedural shortcoming, Mr. McPherson is not entitled to relief on the merits. Two claims from Mr. McPherson’s collective Issue D remain: 1) his allegation that the trial judge made remarks reflecting bias constituting misconduct under New Mexico’s Code of Judicial Conduct; and 2) his allegation that he was denied access to the courts by jail personnel, due to a one-time refusal to allow him use of the jail’s law library, as well as his related allegation challenging the general adequacy of the jail’s law library. With regard to Mr. McPherson’s judicial misconduct claim, the district court correctly ruled that alleged violations of state codes of conduct are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napart from any procedural shortcoming, Mr. McPherson is not entitled to relief on the merits. Two claims from Mr. McPherson’s collective Issue D remain: 1) his allegation that the trial judge made remarks reflecting bias constituting misconduct under New Mexico’s Code of Judicial Conduct; and 2) his allegation that he was denied access to the courts by jail personnel, due to a one-time refusal to allow him use of the jail’s law library, as well as his related allegation challenging the general adequacy of the jail’s law library. With regard to Mr. McPherson’s judicial misconduct claim, the district court correctly ruled that alleged violations of state codes of conduct are not cognizable in federal habeas. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim to resign. As such, Olmsted argues that his resignation is revocable. Under Minnesota law, it is “undisputed that duress is coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats which destroys the victim’s free will and compels him to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950). “As a rule, duress will not prevail to invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation and reflection.” Am. Nat’l. Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N.W. 20, 23 (1925) (quotation and citations omitted); see also St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a claim of duress will not be sustained when the claimant entered into the contract with full knowledge of all the facts advice from an attorney and ample time for reflection citing helling 202 nw at 23", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim to resign. As such, Olmsted argues that his resignation is revocable. Under Minnesota law, it is “undisputed that duress is coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats which destroys the victim’s free will and compels him to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950). “As a rule, duress will not prevail to invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation and reflection.” Am. Nat’l. Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N.W. 20, 23 (1925) (quotation and citations omitted); see also St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim to resign. As such, Olmsted argues that his resignation is revocable. Under Minnesota law, it is “undisputed that duress is coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats which destroys the victim’s free will and compels him to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950). “As a rule, duress will not prevail to invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation and reflection.” Am. Nat’l. Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N.W. 20, 23 (1925) (quotation and citations omitted); see also St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that duress or coercion would invalidate a contract if the coercion comes from the opposing party not the claimants attorney", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim to resign. As such, Olmsted argues that his resignation is revocable. Under Minnesota law, it is “undisputed that duress is coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats which destroys the victim’s free will and compels him to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950). “As a rule, duress will not prevail to invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation and reflection.” Am. Nat’l. Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N.W. 20, 23 (1925) (quotation and citations omitted); see also St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from an action arising from the states breach of that contract", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhim to resign. As such, Olmsted argues that his resignation is revocable. Under Minnesota law, it is “undisputed that duress is coercion by means of physical force or unlawful threats which destroys the victim’s free will and compels him to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950). “As a rule, duress will not prevail to invalidate a contract entered into with full knowledge of all the facts, with ample time and opportunity for investigation, consideration, consultation and reflection.” Am. Nat’l. Bank of Lake Crystal v. Helling, 161 Minn. 504, 202 N.W. 20, 23 (1925) (quotation and citations omitted); see also St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co., 411 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that retention of an attorney to investigate an insurance claim and make a coverage determination under a policy is a classic example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114 L.Ed.2d 122 (1991). The Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does not render it insufficient. Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 410, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). Furthermore, “[i]t is the province of the factfinder ... to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (recognizing great deference due district courts credibility findings because it alone can observe variations in demean or and voice bearing on witness veracity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114 L.Ed.2d 122 (1991). The Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does not render it insufficient. Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 410, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). Furthermore, “[i]t is the province of the factfinder ... to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (holding the resolution of questions regarding credibility and the weight given to testimony is a function of the family court judge who heard the testimony", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114 L.Ed.2d 122 (1991). The Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does not render it insufficient. Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 410, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). Furthermore, “[i]t is the province of the factfinder ... to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that the jurys resolution of questions of credibility and demean or is entitled to special deference ", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114 L.Ed.2d 122 (1991). The Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does not render it insufficient. Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 410, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). Furthermore, “[i]t is the province of the factfinder ... to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that the credibility determinations of hearing officers are afforded special deference", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2792, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114 L.Ed.2d 122 (1991). The Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if each element of the crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The fact that the evidence was circumstantial does not render it insufficient. Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 935, 107 S.Ct. 410, 93 L.Ed.2d 362 (1986). Furthermore, “[i]t is the province of the factfinder ... to weigh the probative value of the evidence and resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Neal v. Morris, 972 F.2d 675, 679 (6th Cir.1992); see also Brown v. Davis, 752 F.2d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir.1985) (recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 2 . 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 3 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 4 . Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 723 (1986). 5 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 240, 624 F.2d 1005 (1980) (Alyeska I). 6 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 7 . 30 U.S.C. § 185(l) (1976). 8 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1974). 9 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 10 . See Brant v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 65, 597 F.2d 716, 718 (1979); Carrier Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 678, 534 F.2d 244, 249 (1976). 11 . See Reid v. Department of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Fed.Cir.1986) (citing examples of literal statutory interpretation that lead to incongruous results); Barber v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 287, 676 F.2d 651, 655 (1982) (recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 2 . 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 3 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 4 . Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 723 (1986). 5 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 240, 624 F.2d 1005 (1980) (Alyeska I). 6 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 7 . 30 U.S.C. § 185(l) (1976). 8 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1974). 9 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 10 . See Brant v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 65, 597 F.2d 716, 718 (1979); Carrier Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 678, 534 F.2d 244, 249 (1976). 11 . See Reid v. Department of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Fed.Cir.1986) (citing examples of literal statutory interpretation that lead to incongruous results); Barber v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 287, 676 F.2d 651, 655 (1982) (recognizing that a court may turn to legislative history when literal statutory language is unclear", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 2 . 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 3 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 4 . Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 723 (1986). 5 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 240, 624 F.2d 1005 (1980) (Alyeska I). 6 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 7 . 30 U.S.C. § 185(l) (1976). 8 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1974). 9 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 10 . See Brant v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 65, 597 F.2d 716, 718 (1979); Carrier Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 678, 534 F.2d 244, 249 (1976). 11 . See Reid v. Department of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Fed.Cir.1986) (citing examples of literal statutory interpretation that lead to incongruous results); Barber v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 287, 676 F.2d 651, 655 (1982) (recognizing that courts can look beyond an unambiguous statute and consult legislative history to divine its meaning if the literal application of the statutory language produces an outcome that is demonstrably at odds with clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary or if the literal application of the statutory language results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd ie that is so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense ", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 2 . 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 3 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 4 . Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 723 (1986). 5 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 240, 624 F.2d 1005 (1980) (Alyeska I). 6 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 7 . 30 U.S.C. § 185(l) (1976). 8 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1974). 9 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 10 . See Brant v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 65, 597 F.2d 716, 718 (1979); Carrier Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 678, 534 F.2d 244, 249 (1976). 11 . See Reid v. Department of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Fed.Cir.1986) (citing examples of literal statutory interpretation that lead to incongruous results); Barber v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 287, 676 F.2d 651, 655 (1982) (recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nis affirmed. AFFIRMED. 1 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 2 . 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). 3 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 4 . Alaskan Arctic Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 9 Cl.Ct. 723 (1986). 5 . Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 224 Ct.Cl. 240, 624 F.2d 1005 (1980) (Alyeska I). 6 . 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). 7 . 30 U.S.C. § 185(l) (1976). 8 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1974). 9 . 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1976). 10 . See Brant v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 65, 597 F.2d 716, 718 (1979); Carrier Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 678, 534 F.2d 244, 249 (1976). 11 . See Reid v. Department of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281-82 (Fed.Cir.1986) (citing examples of literal statutory interpretation that lead to incongruous results); Barber v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 287, 676 F.2d 651, 655 (1982) (holding that even where there are contrary indications in the statutes legislative history we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthis case raises important issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Bank of New England, 986 F.2d at 602 n. 4.; see also Federal Reserve, 499 F.2d at 64 (emphasizing the federal nature of question being litigated). Defendant asserts that, even if the RTC/ FDIC itself could have brought suit in federal court, SN-1 is a private assignee of the RTC’s rights and interests, and does not inherit its federal instrumentality status. The Seventh Circuit, struggling with the interplay between FIRREA and the TIA, concluded that the TIA precluded federal jurisdiction over claims brought not by the RTC or a successor of the federal agency, but by a private party assignee of the federal government. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 169 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1999) (holding one who claims tax exemption has burden of showing entitlement to exemption", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthis case raises important issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Bank of New England, 986 F.2d at 602 n. 4.; see also Federal Reserve, 499 F.2d at 64 (emphasizing the federal nature of question being litigated). Defendant asserts that, even if the RTC/ FDIC itself could have brought suit in federal court, SN-1 is a private assignee of the RTC’s rights and interests, and does not inherit its federal instrumentality status. The Seventh Circuit, struggling with the interplay between FIRREA and the TIA, concluded that the TIA precluded federal jurisdiction over claims brought not by the RTC or a successor of the federal agency, but by a private party assignee of the federal government. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 169 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1999) (holding act qualifies as exemption statute under exemption 3", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthis case raises important issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Bank of New England, 986 F.2d at 602 n. 4.; see also Federal Reserve, 499 F.2d at 64 (emphasizing the federal nature of question being litigated). Defendant asserts that, even if the RTC/ FDIC itself could have brought suit in federal court, SN-1 is a private assignee of the RTC’s rights and interests, and does not inherit its federal instrumentality status. The Seventh Circuit, struggling with the interplay between FIRREA and the TIA, concluded that the TIA precluded federal jurisdiction over claims brought not by the RTC or a successor of the federal agency, but by a private party assignee of the federal government. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 169 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that assignee of rtc could not assert exemption from tia", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthis case raises important issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Bank of New England, 986 F.2d at 602 n. 4.; see also Federal Reserve, 499 F.2d at 64 (emphasizing the federal nature of question being litigated). Defendant asserts that, even if the RTC/ FDIC itself could have brought suit in federal court, SN-1 is a private assignee of the RTC’s rights and interests, and does not inherit its federal instrumentality status. The Seventh Circuit, struggling with the interplay between FIRREA and the TIA, concluded that the TIA precluded federal jurisdiction over claims brought not by the RTC or a successor of the federal agency, but by a private party assignee of the federal government. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 169 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that there is no need to consider exemption 6 separately if information was compiled for law enforcement purposes because exemption 7c constitutes broader protection so any information falling under exemption 6 is covered by exemption 7c", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthis case raises important issues of intergovernmental tax immunity. See Bank of New England, 986 F.2d at 602 n. 4.; see also Federal Reserve, 499 F.2d at 64 (emphasizing the federal nature of question being litigated). Defendant asserts that, even if the RTC/ FDIC itself could have brought suit in federal court, SN-1 is a private assignee of the RTC’s rights and interests, and does not inherit its federal instrumentality status. The Seventh Circuit, struggling with the interplay between FIRREA and the TIA, concluded that the TIA precluded federal jurisdiction over claims brought not by the RTC or a successor of the federal agency, but by a private party assignee of the federal government. See RTC Commercial Assets Trust v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 169 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1999) (holding a debtors claim for loss of consortium to be entitled to an exemption under the oklahoma exemption statute and collecting other bankruptcy decisions recognizing a debtor spouses loss of consortium as the basis for allowing an exemption under federal and various state exemption statutes" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMaine People’s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is “may” and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible “imminent and substantial” harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when “there is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.” Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief under 42 usc 1983 for denial of access to the courts", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMaine People’s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is “may” and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible “imminent and substantial” harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when “there is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.” Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (holding that 13611 authorizes an attorney fee award even when nominal damages are recovered", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMaine People’s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is “may” and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible “imminent and substantial” harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when “there is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.” Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (holding that 42 usc 1988 authorizes the grant of attorneys fees for services on appeal though statute does not specifically so provide", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMaine People’s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is “may” and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible “imminent and substantial” harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when “there is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.” Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (holding that 1132a3b authorizes the award of appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of erisa", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMaine People’s Alliance and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 287 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting S.Rep. no. 98-284, at 59 (1983)). Thus, the operative word in section 6972(a)(1)(B) is “may” and a plaintiff need not establish an incontrovertible “imminent and substantial” harm to health and the environment. The existence of a potential harm to health and the environment is enough, when “there is a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the environment exists.” Id. at 279. Other courts have determined that passive migration at an inactive disposal site constitutes an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA. See United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3rd Cir.1982) (holding that 42 usc 6972a authorizes relief restraining further leaking of waste from a landfill and noting that it also authorizes a general cleanup of even dormant waste sites if necessary to cure a present threat to public health or the environment" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as “fatigue, cognitive or memory problems (‘fibrofog’), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... ”). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (“[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.”); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (recognizing that one of fibromyalgias principal symptoms is pain all over", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as “fatigue, cognitive or memory problems (‘fibrofog’), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... ”). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (“[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.”); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (holding that the principal must have control and supervision over the details of the agents work", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as “fatigue, cognitive or memory problems (‘fibrofog’), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... ”). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (“[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.”); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (recognizing that one of the many symptoms of bipolar disorder is the denial that anything is wrong", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as “fatigue, cognitive or memory problems (‘fibrofog’), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... ”). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (“[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.”); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (holding that agency relationship existed where principal paid plaintiff directly and written agreement stated agent was signing on behalf of principal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npg. 21.) These symptoms were all noted by Dr. Rumore and are consistent with the Plaintiffs diagnosis of fibromyalgia. (AR at 267-69.) See also SSR 12-2p, 2012 WL 3104869 (July 25, 2012.) (noting that the symptoms of fibromyalgia can include widespread pain as well as “fatigue, cognitive or memory problems (‘fibrofog’), waking unre-pressed, depression, anxiety disorder, or irritable bowel syndrome ... ”). Moreover, numerous courts have agreed that fibromyalgia is a medical condition which can reasonably be expected to cause pain. See Green-Yownger, 335 F.3d at 108 (2d Cir.2003) (“[The plaintiffs] complaints of pain in her back, legs, and upper body, fatigue, and disturbed sleep are internally consistent and consistent with common symptoms of fibromyalgia.”); Sarchet, 78 F.3d at 306 (recognizing that the determination is an equitable one" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (\"Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous’ clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.”) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (holding that a preexisting or antecedent debt may constitute sufficient consideration to support a mortgage", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (\"Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous’ clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.”) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (holding mortgage lenders claim for a postdefault postacceleration prepayment premium pursuant to escape clause in mortgage documents that prohibited debtor from evading prepayment fee by tendering full amount of debt postforeclosure had to be disallowed because the debtor in proposing to pay mortgage debt over time in plan of reorganization was not tendering full amount of debt and was not attempting to prepay this accelerated debt", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (\"Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous’ clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.”) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (holding that a mortgagee could enforce mortgage covenants requiring the mortgagors to keep the property free of encumbrances even after it foreclosed by advertisement and purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt because the mortgage covenants concerned title to the mortgaged property rather than repayment of the debt", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (\"Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous’ clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.”) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nWL 1468435, at *3 (S.D.Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (\"Upon default and the acceleration of the loan, the maturity date advances and any subsequent payment is no longer considered a voluntary prepayment. The lender forfeits the collection of a prepayment premium in such a scenario unless the parties' agreement contains a 'clear and unambiguous’ clause requiring payment of the prepayment premium upon default and accel- ' eration. This general rule created the problem that a borrower might actually intentionally default to acquire the right to prepay without penalty, so lenders began including provisions in loan documents to ensure the prepayment penalty would be enforceable after default.”) (citations omitted)). 26 . S. Side House, 451 B.R. at 269 (citations omitted). 27 . Id. at 270. 28 . Id. (holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ngovernment agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement ¶ 5. Berkeley “does not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial” despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him — -that he “could be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison” up to a year early— was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley “cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that a mere allegation that the petitioner would have insisted on trial but for his counsels errors is ultimately insufficient to justify relief", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ngovernment agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement ¶ 5. Berkeley “does not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial” despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him — -that he “could be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison” up to a year early— was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley “cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that where defendant seeks to withdraw his plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel the prejudice prong of the strickland test is satisfied by demonstrating that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial alteration in original quoting hill v lockhart 474 us 52 58 106 sct 366 88 led2d 203 1985", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ngovernment agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement ¶ 5. Berkeley “does not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial” despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him — -that he “could be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison” up to a year early— was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley “cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that the defendant could not prove prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance because he has never claimed that but for counsels errors he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted upon going to trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ngovernment agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement ¶ 5. Berkeley “does not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial” despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him — -that he “could be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison” up to a year early— was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley “cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding in the context of a plea that the strickland prejudice prong requires a defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsels errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ngovernment agreed to ensure that Berkeley would not face charges in Maryland. Plea Agreement ¶ 5. Berkeley “does not affirmatively allege, much less establish to a reasonable probability, that he would have chosen to go to trial” despite the risks, United States v. Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. 781, 782 (D.C.Cir.2003), if only he had known that the advice the court found Wood gave him — -that he “could be placed in a Bureau of Prison[s] drug treatment program which, if completed successfully, could allow him to be released from prison” up to a year early— was incorrect. Berkeley, 515 F.Supp.2d at 165 (emphases added). Accordingly, Berkeley “cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Scott, 64 Fed.Appx. at 782; see United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835-36 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that to establish prejudice sufficient to warrant finding of ineffective assistance the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsels unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the precluded evidence” on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights and the “state’s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.” Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state’s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana’s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana’s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code § 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (holding that where defendant stipulates to prior felony conviction evidence of the nature of the prior crime is irrelevant and should be excluded", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the precluded evidence” on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights and the “state’s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.” Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state’s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana’s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana’s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code § 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (holding that evidence of prior molestation by a different person was the type which the legislature deemed should be excluded", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the precluded evidence” on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights and the “state’s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.” Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state’s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana’s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana’s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code § 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (holding that the legislature intends different meanings when it uses different terms in a statute", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the precluded evidence” on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights and the “state’s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.” Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state’s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana’s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana’s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code § 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the precluded evidence” on Oatts’s Sixth Amendment rights and the “state’s interests in excluding the evidence at issue.” Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137-1138. We first address the state’s interest in excluding the evidence by noting the policy of Indiana’s Rape Shield Rule. The Rule reflects a policy first embodied in Indiana’s Rape Shield Act, Indiana Code § 35-37-4^1, that inquiry into a victim’s prior sexual activity is sufficiently problematic that it should not be permitted to become a focus of the defense. Rule 412 is intended to prevent the victim from being put on trial, to protect the victim against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy, and, importantly, to remove obstacles to reporting sex crimes. Williams, 681 N.E.2d at 200. See also Baughman, 528 N.E.2d at 79 (holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), “[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor” in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court’s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because “as a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its ‘premises,’ rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work”). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep’t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (holding that civilian distributing leaflets on military base could not constitutionally be convicted of unlawfully entering the base where the military had abandoned any right to exclude civilian vehicular and pedestrian traffic from the avenue greer 424 us at 835 96 sct at 1216", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), “[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor” in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court’s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because “as a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its ‘premises,’ rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work”). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep’t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), “[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor” in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court’s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because “as a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its ‘premises,’ rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work”). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep’t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (holding that when an employee is injured by his employers tortious conduct his employer owes him damages and compensation under the act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), “[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor” in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court’s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because “as a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its ‘premises,’ rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work”). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep’t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (holding that whether the tortious act was committed during the time the employee was on duty and whether the tortious act was committed while the employee was on the employers premises were both factors weighing in favor of finding the activity within the scope of employment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nif needed. on v. Varney, 586 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), “[t]he payment of wages is the least important factor” in determining an employment relationship. Id. at 464. Because neither the law nor the record on appeal supports the trial court’s ruling, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment based on lack of an employment re B-2-00-3 (2001) (concluding that an employee injured while crossing a street to eat lunch at a restaurant also located on campus sustained a compensable injury, because “as a matter of law, the grounds of an entire college campus constitute its ‘premises,’ rather than simply the building or buildings in which an employee happens to regularly work”). See generally In the Matter of Anneliese Ross and Dep’t of the Army, 42 E.C.A.B. 371 (1991) (holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nencompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA’s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that due process required a hearing so the putative father would have an opportunity to present evidence to show as a factual matter that he could not reasonably have complied with utahs statutory requirements or deadlines because he could not reasonably have expected his baby to be born in utah", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nencompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA’s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (recognizing refund claim could be barred if there was any valid local limitations law in force when the claim was filed", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nencompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA’s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nencompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA’s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nencompasses not just consistency but also plausibility and sufficient detail. See, e.g., In re M-D-, 1998 WL 127881, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180, 1182 (BIA 1998). The B We decide instead to join the Second and Third Circuits in expressly approving the BIA’s corroboration rule. See Guam, Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285); Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554); see also Capric, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the rule and the Ninth Circuit’s disapproval of it but neither accepting nor rejecting it). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of corroborating evidence. See, e.g., Micakovic v. Ashcroft, 85 Fed.Appx. 424, 426 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that even if he was credible the applicant could be reasonably expected to corroborate his claim that government officials in kosovo attempted to force him into military service" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe claimed design by stating, “the broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.” Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with § 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not “hidden” and their appearance is a “matter of concern.” See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe claimed design by stating, “the broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.” Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with § 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not “hidden” and their appearance is a “matter of concern.” See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (holding that if there is only one construction that will permit all parts of the deed to be given effect it should be followed", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe claimed design by stating, “the broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.” Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with § 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not “hidden” and their appearance is a “matter of concern.” See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (holding that actual posses sion requires some visible means which gives notice of exclusion from the property to the true owner or to the public and of the adverse claimants dominion over it", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe claimed design by stating, “the broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.” Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with § 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not “hidden” and their appearance is a “matter of concern.” See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (holding that there is no hidden portion of a patented block even though it ceases to be visible as a block when incorporated in a wall because as a block all parts of it are visible", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe claimed design by stating, “the broken lines showing the door pull are for illustrative purposes only and form no part of the claimed design.” Similarly, the patentee could have shown the rear features in broken lines to comply with § 1.152 while excluding those features from the claimed design. Rather than doing so, the paten-tee included the rear features in the claimed design. In addition, the rear features are not generally concealed. After the door has been installed, the rear features may be temporarily hidden from view when the door is closed. The rear features are visible, however, before the door is installed and when the door is open during use. Accordingly, the rear features are not “hidden” and their appearance is a “matter of concern.” See KeyStone, 997 F.2d at 1451 (holding that the use of visible shackles is prohibited unless that use is justified by an essential state interest such as the interest in courtroom security specific to the defendant on trial" ]