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[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2011). “To determine whether a state conviction is a [CIMT], we ordinarily employ the categorical approach.” Id. Under that approach, “this court looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying facts of the conviction to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir.2011). “Moral tur 3) (“[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of W— , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (“It is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of S—L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1948) (holding that procuring a female inmate for a house of prostitution involves moral turpitude because 1 it is a crime in which assistance and aid is given to the carrying on of the business of prostitution and 2 it is so far contrary to moral law as interpreted by the general moral sense of the community that the offender is brought to public disgrace is no longer generally respected and is deprived of social recognition by the community", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2011). “To determine whether a state conviction is a [CIMT], we ordinarily employ the categorical approach.” Id. Under that approach, “this court looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying facts of the conviction to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir.2011). “Moral tur 3) (“[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of W— , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (“It is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of S—L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1948) (holding that an intentional battery that involves the use of a deadly weapon constitutes a crime of moral turpitude", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2011). “To determine whether a state conviction is a [CIMT], we ordinarily employ the categorical approach.” Id. Under that approach, “this court looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying facts of the conviction to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir.2011). “Moral tur 3) (“[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of W— , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (“It is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of S—L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1948) (holding that robbery under california law categorically qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude and noting precedent in this and other circuits that theft crimes are crimes involving moral turpitude", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2011). “To determine whether a state conviction is a [CIMT], we ordinarily employ the categorical approach.” Id. Under that approach, “this court looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying facts of the conviction to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir.2011). “Moral tur 3) (“[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of W— , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (“It is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of S—L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1948) (recognizing the longstanding rule that crimes that have fraud as an element are categorically crimes involving moral turpitude and a court may not apply the modified categorical approach if the statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n639 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.2011). “To determine whether a state conviction is a [CIMT], we ordinarily employ the categorical approach.” Id. Under that approach, “this court looks only to the statutory definition of the offense and not to the underlying facts of the conviction to determine whether the offense involves moral turpitude.” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir.2011). “Moral tur 3) (“[T]he conducting of a brothel is a form of commercial vice involving the practice of immorality for hire, which is accompanied by an evil intent and involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of W— , 4 I. & N. Dec. 401, 402 (BIA 1951) (“It is well established that the crime of practicing prostitution involves moral turpitude.”); Matter of S—L—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 396, 397, 398 (BIA 1948) (holding that involuntary manslaughter defined either as reckless or negligent was not a crime of moral turpitude because itwas based on unintentional conduct in contrast to those crimes involving some form of evil intent it is not an offense that is mala in se and thus does not fall within the definition of crimes involving moral turpitude" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence. Specifically, Olmos-Esparza argues that the government’s use of a certificate of nonexistence of record (“CNR”) and a warrant of deportation as evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The introduction of a CNR to prove that a defendant did not seek admission from the Attorney General to re-enter the United States does not constitute testimonial hearsay evidence prohibited by Crawford. Rather, it is properly admitted as a nontestimonial public record. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, —, — (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, introduction of a warrant of deportation does not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that letters addressing dispute that was subject of litigation and that were written in anticipation of litigation did not fall under business record exception under rule 8036 of the federal rules of evidence and noting that it is wellestablished that one who prepares a document in anticipation of litigation is not acting in the regular course of business", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence. Specifically, Olmos-Esparza argues that the government’s use of a certificate of nonexistence of record (“CNR”) and a warrant of deportation as evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The introduction of a CNR to prove that a defendant did not seek admission from the Attorney General to re-enter the United States does not constitute testimonial hearsay evidence prohibited by Crawford. Rather, it is properly admitted as a nontestimonial public record. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, —, — (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, introduction of a warrant of deportation does not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that it is not", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence. Specifically, Olmos-Esparza argues that the government’s use of a certificate of nonexistence of record (“CNR”) and a warrant of deportation as evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The introduction of a CNR to prove that a defendant did not seek admission from the Attorney General to re-enter the United States does not constitute testimonial hearsay evidence prohibited by Crawford. Rather, it is properly admitted as a nontestimonial public record. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, —, — (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, introduction of a warrant of deportation does not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence. Specifically, Olmos-Esparza argues that the government’s use of a certificate of nonexistence of record (“CNR”) and a warrant of deportation as evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The introduction of a CNR to prove that a defendant did not seek admission from the Attorney General to re-enter the United States does not constitute testimonial hearsay evidence prohibited by Crawford. Rather, it is properly admitted as a nontestimonial public record. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, —, — (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, introduction of a warrant of deportation does not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that driving record is nontestimonial as it is not accusatory and does not describe specific criminal wrongdoing of the defendant it contains no expression of opinion or conclusion requiring the exercise of discretion and it merely represents the objective result of a public records search", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence. Specifically, Olmos-Esparza argues that the government’s use of a certificate of nonexistence of record (“CNR”) and a warrant of deportation as evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The introduction of a CNR to prove that a defendant did not seek admission from the Attorney General to re-enter the United States does not constitute testimonial hearsay evidence prohibited by Crawford. Rather, it is properly admitted as a nontestimonial public record. United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825, —, — (9th Cir.2005). Similarly, introduction of a warrant of deportation does not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005) (holding a warrant of deportation nontestimonial because it was not made in anticipation of litigation and because it is simply a routine objective cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2012, no pet.); Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs questions regarding joinder. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.2004). Rule 39(a) concerns the joinder of “persons needed for just adjudication” and provides: A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding trial court has discretion to require joinder of royalty interest owners whose interests will be directly and possibly adversely affected by decree in trespass to try title action", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2012, no pet.); Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs questions regarding joinder. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.2004). Rule 39(a) concerns the joinder of “persons needed for just adjudication” and provides: A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to require joinder of owners of nonpossessory royalty interests and possibilities of reverter in partition suit between owners of mineral leasehold estate although it would be wise to join them", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2012, no pet.); Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs questions regarding joinder. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.2004). Rule 39(a) concerns the joinder of “persons needed for just adjudication” and provides: A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2012, no pet.); Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs questions regarding joinder. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.2004). Rule 39(a) concerns the joinder of “persons needed for just adjudication” and provides: A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the energy company defendants lessors the owners of royalty interests in the property at issue and the owners of the mineral estate in unleased part of the 9200 acres should be joined as parties if feasible", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2012, no pet.); Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 255 S.W.3d 174, 180 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39 governs questions regarding joinder. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex.2004). Rule 39(a) concerns the joinder of “persons needed for just adjudication” and provides: A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 234-35 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying a plea in abatement to obtain joinder of other royalty owners in a pooled unit on grounds that the presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court’s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding it permissible to increase a mandatory minimum sentence based solely on facts found by the sentencing judge", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court’s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding that the analysis in meritor sav bank fsb v vinson 477 us 57 64 106 sct 2399 2404 91 led2d 49 1986 applies to claims of sexual harassment under title ix", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court’s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding that an increase in the mandatory minimum sentence based on judicial factfinding does not evade the requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments and reaffirming mcmillan v pennsylvania 477 us 79 106 sct 2411 91 led2d 67 1986", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court’s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding that batson v kentucky 476 us 79 106 sct 1712 90 led2d 69 1986 does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay be taken into account at sentencing, as long as the government proves the acquitted conduct, and the sentencing court finds the same, by a preponderance of the evidence, and as long as the sentence falls within the prescribed statutory maximum. Because the sentenc ing judge in the instant case did find by a preponderance of the evidence that Poyato did in fact possess a firearm in connection with the offense, the district judge erred in concluding that he was precluded from denying the safety valve; the district court’s finding rendered Poyato ineligible for the safety valve. Accordingly, Poyato’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing. VACATED AND REMANDED. 1 . See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2420, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding on the authority of celotex v catrett 477 us 317 106 sct 2548 91 led2d 265 1986 that hearsay evidence produced in an affidavit opposing summary judgment may be considered if the outofcourt declarant could later present that evidence through direct testimony ie in a form that would be admissible at trial " ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state’s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (recognizing this substantial interest in context of termination of parental rights", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state’s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state’s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (holding that a respondent in a termination of parental rights proceeding may not file a counterclaim", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state’s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (holding that the due process clause of the alaska constitution guarantees the right to effective counsel in proceedings for the termination of parental rights", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it seems logical to conclude that the Texas Supreme Court would allow the filing of an Anders brief derived from this right in the parental-rights termination context. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has extended Anders to juvenile-delinquency proceedings based, in part, on the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings. See In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex.1998). Although it has not yet considered application of Anders procedures to parental-rights termination appeals, it has recognized that the state’s interest in protecting the best interests of children through judicial economy, certainty, and finality are not outweighed by a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 354 (Tex.2003) (holding due process does not mandate that appellate courts review unpreserved complaints of charge error in parental rights termination" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White’s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral’s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress’s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White’s “private” easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (holding takings clause protections did not apply to an innocent owners interest in a car seized under a state forfeiture statute", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White’s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral’s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress’s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White’s “private” easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (holding the takings clause inapplicable to the states of its own force", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White’s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral’s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress’s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White’s “private” easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (holding state statute forcing landlords to allow installation of cable television cables for nominal charge violates the takings clause", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White’s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral’s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress’s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White’s “private” easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (holding that temporary deprivations of use are compensable under the takings clause", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto use the private roads in St. Lucie West were designed to control access to the dedicated utility easements. Accordingly, White’s allowing FP & L and Southern Bell access to St. Lucie West's private roads while prohibiting Centel access to those roads is a private agreement in violation of the Cable Act. B. Constitutionality of the Cable Act White also argues that the Cable Act, as interpreted by the Admiral’s Cove Court, violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. White argues that under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982), Congress’s providing cable companies with a right of action to install cables in White’s “private” easements is a per se violation of the Takings Clause. See id. at 426, 102 S.Ct. at 3171 (holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). ■ All of plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA’s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs’ claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS’ failure to reinitiate consultation was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (holding that courts should review claims brought under the esa under the citizensuit provision of the esa or when the citizensuit provision is unavailable under the apa", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). ■ All of plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA’s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs’ claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS’ failure to reinitiate consultation was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (holding that courts of appeals should review the facts necessary to determine whether an exemption to the flsa applies in a particular under the clearly erroneous standard", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). ■ All of plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA’s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs’ claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS’ failure to reinitiate consultation was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (holding that judicial review under the apa is precluded when a remedy is available under a citizen suit provision of an environmental statute citations omitted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). ■ All of plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA’s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs’ claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS’ failure to reinitiate consultation was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (holding that when considering an agency action as to which the statute does not specify the standard of review the courts of appeals must proceed pursuant to the apas general standard of review for agency actions in 5 usc 7062a", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nAR016969. For each of these forms of take, NMFS set limits for that take and metrics designed to measure the take. AR016969-71. STANDARDS Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). ■ All of plaintiffs’ claims at issue in the present motions are gov n Kraayenbrink, the APA’s standard of review will be applied to plaintiffs’ claim and plaintiffs must prove that NMFS’ failure to reinitiate consultation was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (emphasis added); 632 F.3d at 481 (holding that irrespective of whether an esa claim is brought under the apa or the citizensuit provision the apas standard of review applies" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (holding that federal legislation with respect to indian tribes is not based upon impermissible racial classifications and noting that article i 8 of the constitution gives congress the power to regulate commerce with the indian tribes", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (holding states in exercising the federal trust power over indian tribes pursuant to a federal statute authorizing them to do so may enact legislation that would be an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of state power", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBecause of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power.”). Although responsibility for maintaining this trust relationship with Indian tribes has historically been the exclusive prerogative of the federal government, the Supreme Court has recognized states may exercise the federal trust authority when specifically authorized to do so by a federal statute. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740, 768 (1979) (recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (holding declaration or affidavit must support work product claim for documents listed solely as work product on privilege log", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (holding that not all of claims file was prepared in anticipation of litigation and noting that the majority of cases that have dealt with the issue of whether investigative materials prepared by insurance claims adjusters is workproduct prepared in anticipation of litigation have held that since insurance companies have a routine duty to investigate accidents such materials are not prepared in anticipation of litigation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (holding that the work product doctrine applied to a document prepared in anticipation of litigation and was therefore protected from disclosure under foia exemption 5", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (holding that a party failed in meeting its burden that documents were work product because the party resisting discovery failed to present affidavits or other evidentiary support for its contention that the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas lengthy discourse between the parties prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Plaintiff suggests that all documents prepared prior to this date were created in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, and the burden rests on Defendant to show otherwise. Based on this record, Defendant has not provided this Court with sufficient information to determine which documents dated prior to May 28, 2002 that were identified in its Privilege Log are protected by the work product doctrine. Defendant failed to provide this Court with evidentiary proof of objective facts, via affidavits or deposition testimony, that documents before May 28, 2002, the date coverage was expressly denied, were prepared in anticipation of litigation. See, e.g., Totaltape, 135 F.R.D. at 201 (holding that the moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence if the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCommc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). “Due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” Business Commc’ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (holding due process required an opportunity for crossexamination when the decision depended on the credibility of individual witness testimony", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCommc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). “Due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” Business Commc’ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCommc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). “Due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” Business Commc’ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCommc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). “Due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” Business Commc’ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (recognizing that extensive crossexamination of the witness alone is not enough if the crossexamination permitted did not include questions on the issue constitutionally required", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCommc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Educ., 739 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir.2013). “Due process prevents government actors from depriving persons of liberty or property interests without providing certain safeguards.” Id., citing Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Due process calls only for “protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due process does not always require “a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial____” Id. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893. This is not a case where “the evidence consists of testimony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy.” Business Commc’ns, 739 F.3d at 380 (holding that it was permissible for the state to test the credibility of appellants trial testimony by crossexamination" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof sentencing would, in effect, permit the Rule to read: “a determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.” We reject such a reading of the Rule. II We next address what the Rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the Rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. We hold that such a technical violation of the Rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. The technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. United States v. Knockum, 881 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raise in the rule 32 petition", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof sentencing would, in effect, permit the Rule to read: “a determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.” We reject such a reading of the Rule. II We next address what the Rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the Rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. We hold that such a technical violation of the Rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. The technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. United States v. Knockum, 881 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that appellate courts may not on appeal from the dismissal of a rule 32 petition consider claims not raised in the rule 32 petition", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof sentencing would, in effect, permit the Rule to read: “a determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.” We reject such a reading of the Rule. II We next address what the Rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the Rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. We hold that such a technical violation of the Rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. The technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. United States v. Knockum, 881 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof sentencing would, in effect, permit the Rule to read: “a determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.” We reject such a reading of the Rule. II We next address what the Rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the Rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. We hold that such a technical violation of the Rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. The technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. United States v. Knockum, 881 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof sentencing would, in effect, permit the Rule to read: “a determination that no such finding was necessary because the matter controverted was not taken into account in sentencing.” We reject such a reading of the Rule. II We next address what the Rule requires when a district court complies with the substantive requirements of the Rule, but fails to append to the presentence report the appropriate findings or determinations resolving the controverted matters. We hold that such a technical violation of the Rule is a ministerial error which does not require resentencing. The technical error must, however, be corrected by ordering the district court to append to the pre-sentence report the required findings or determinations. United States v. Knockum, 881 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that ministerial error of failing to append rule 32 findings or determinations will not permit habeas relief because the error may be remedied by ordering the district court to attach the sentencing transcript" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nact, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, § 397.” Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980). The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (holding that general verdicts failed to reveal whether defendant was convicted on accomplice liability theory and that evidence supported accomplice liability theory", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nact, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, § 397.” Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980). The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (holding that under the accomplice liability doctrine a nontriggerman accomplice may be convicted of double murder a capital offense under 13a540a10 alacode 1975 only if he had the particularized intent that both victims be killed", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nact, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, § 397.” Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980). The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nact, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, § 397.” Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980). The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (holding that in order to convict a defendant of firstdegree murder on a theory of accomplice liability proof of his own premeditation is required", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nact, not within the scope of the common purpose, but growpng] out of the individual malice of the perpetrator. 1 Wharton Crim.Law, § 397.” Keller v. State, 380 So.2d 926, 935 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), cert. denied, 380 So.2d 938 (Ala.1980). The capital offense of which this defendant was convicted, see § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala.Code 1975, requires (1) proof of an intentional murder and (2) proof that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, or pursuant to a contract, or for hire. Sockwell v. State, 675 So.2d 4, 24 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). We agree with the defendant that his intent that Pope kill Elmer Woodall pursuant to a contract could not supply the intent necessary to convict the defendant for the capital murder-for-hire of Clemer Woodall. Cf. Tomlin v. State, 591 So.2d 550 (Ala.Cr.App.1991) (holding that alabama appellate courts have repeatedly held that to be convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death a defendant must have had a particularized intent to kill" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFlorida Action The majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. In construing a statute, this Court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that “this Court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.”); State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (holding that statutes dealing with same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFlorida Action The majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. In construing a statute, this Court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that “this Court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.”); State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (holding the same", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFlorida Action The majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. In construing a statute, this Court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that “this Court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.”); State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (holding that a statute should not be construed so as to invalidate other parts of the same statute", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFlorida Action The majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. In construing a statute, this Court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that “this Court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.”); State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (holding that a statute should where possible be construed according to its plain meaning and as a whole giving meaning to all its parts", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFlorida Action The majority opinion holds that for an insurer to be bound by a judgment in an action between its insured and an uninsured motorist, all that is required is that the insurer be served with a copy of the summons and complaint, and that it is not necessary for the insurer to be a party to the action. In construing a statute, this Court is required to look at the entire statute, and construe it in pari materia, giving effect, if possible, to all provisions contained in the statute. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 188, 594 S.E.2d 1, 20 (2004) (noting that “this Court does not read segments of a statute in isolation. Rather, we construe statutes in pari materia giving effect, if possible, to every provision.”); State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1990) (holding that all parts of the same statute dealing with the same subject are to be construed together as a whole and individual expressions be accorded only that meaning which other modifying provisions and the clear intent and purpose of the act will permit internal citations omitted" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\noffer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. Sager v. Rogers, 1987 WL 6718, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (emphasis added) (citing Sports Premiums, Inc. v. Kaemmer, 595 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1979); Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 748, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977)). Thus, Tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. Defendant Bruno’s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, Tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc, 255 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D.Tenn.1964). See also Pinney v. Tarpley, 686 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (recognizing court must enforce unambiguous contract according to its terms", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\noffer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. Sager v. Rogers, 1987 WL 6718, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (emphasis added) (citing Sports Premiums, Inc. v. Kaemmer, 595 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1979); Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 748, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977)). Thus, Tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. Defendant Bruno’s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, Tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc, 255 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D.Tenn.1964). See also Pinney v. Tarpley, 686 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\noffer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. Sager v. Rogers, 1987 WL 6718, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (emphasis added) (citing Sports Premiums, Inc. v. Kaemmer, 595 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1979); Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 748, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977)). Thus, Tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. Defendant Bruno’s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, Tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc, 255 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D.Tenn.1964). See also Pinney v. Tarpley, 686 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (holding that acceptance of an option must be unqualified absolute unconditional unequivocal unambiguous positive without reservation and according to the terms of the option", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\noffer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. Sager v. Rogers, 1987 WL 6718, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (emphasis added) (citing Sports Premiums, Inc. v. Kaemmer, 595 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1979); Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 748, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977)). Thus, Tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. Defendant Bruno’s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, Tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc, 255 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D.Tenn.1964). See also Pinney v. Tarpley, 686 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (holding that under oregon law an acceptance of an offer must be positive unconditional unequivocal and unambiguous", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\noffer, the [right of first refusal] ripens into an option, governed, by the terms set gut in the initial agreement. Sager v. Rogers, 1987 WL 6718, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987) (emphasis added) (citing Sports Premiums, Inc. v. Kaemmer, 595 P.2d 696 (Colo.App.1979); Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976), aff'd 43 N.Y.2d 748, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 372 N.E.2d 797 (1977)). Thus, Tennessee law governing the exercise of options is applicable to the present case. Defendant Bruno’s is correct in pointing out that, absent any agreement to the contrary, Tennessee law requires the strict matching of terms in order to exercise an option. Bradford v. Crown-Bremson Indus., Inc, 255 F.Supp. 1009, 1012 (M.D.Tenn.1964). See also Pinney v. Tarpley, 686 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984) (holding that if the statutory terms are unambiguous a courts review ends and the statute is construed according to the plain meaning of its words" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndamages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (recognizing that even entry into contract with citizen of state does not necessarily subject party to jurisdiction in state", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndamages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of the company is a citizen", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndamages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndamages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (recognizing that a citizen can sue the state in state court to attempt to obtain a discharge of a student loan and allowing the debtor to refile in state court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndamages, costs and attorney’s fees become available remedies for non-payment of claims against any insurer that does business in Florida and also against any affiliated insurer. 3 . I reject the Commissioner’s assertion that plaintiffs cannot raise their federal constituJ tional claims in federal court. This is an action seeking injunctive relief against the Commissioner in his official capacity. The longstanding doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), squ act is a citizen of the state at issue at the time when the contract is entered, the state does not, for that reason alone, obtain jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising under the contract. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478-79, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (holding that state senator who was attorney for party to contract with state was in violation of 109" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuncertain guide to the meaning of “official of the United States.” In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes § 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General — not other government agencies — as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act,” as used in § 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (holding that where a public official takes discretionary action that the official knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official has concealed in violation of a state criminal law that official has deprived the public of his honest services under 1346", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuncertain guide to the meaning of “official of the United States.” In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes § 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General — not other government agencies — as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act,” as used in § 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (holding that the official charged with responsibility to act must be an official within the doj with the authority to act in the circumstances", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuncertain guide to the meaning of “official of the United States.” In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes § 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General — not other government agencies — as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act,” as used in § 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (holding without discussion that the official of the united states charged with responsibility could only have been the appropriate official of the civil division of the department of justice which alone has the authority to initiate litigation under the act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuncertain guide to the meaning of “official of the United States.” In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes § 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General — not other government agencies — as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act,” as used in § 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (holding that bribing a public official does not amount to a conspiracy with that official to extort the briber under the hobbs act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nuncertain guide to the meaning of “official of the United States.” In fact we need not look to the legislative history to determine the meaning of the term. The provision of the FCA that immediately precedes § 3731 makes it the duty of the Attorney General to diligently investigate violations of the statute and identifies only private relators and the Attorney General — not other government agencies — as parties who may sue under the statute. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b)(1). For this reason, we agree with those courts that have concluded that the term “official of the United States charged with responsibility to act,” as used in § 3731(b)(2), means pertinent Department of Justice officials. Accord, United States v. Incorporated Village of Island Park, 791 F.Supp. 354, 363 (E.D.N.Y.1992) (holding that the color of law element may be satisfied by the fact that an official gains access to the victim in the course of official duty" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof a plan...”); § 1121(b) (“...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief’). I find persuasive an additional reason why “under a plan confirmed” should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, “under a plan confirmed” embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of § 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of “under” and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that debtors cannot claim an exemption in a homestead after trustee avoided the transfer of the property as a fraudulent conveyance because the transfer by the debtors was voluntary", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof a plan...”); § 1121(b) (“...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief’). I find persuasive an additional reason why “under a plan confirmed” should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, “under a plan confirmed” embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of § 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of “under” and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that new yorks notice to judgment debtors satisfied due process by specifying that a procedure existed to adjudicate exemption claims and advising debtors to contact an attorney even though the notice did not inform judgment debtors of the specific steps to be taken to test exemption claims", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof a plan...”); § 1121(b) (“...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief’). I find persuasive an additional reason why “under a plan confirmed” should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, “under a plan confirmed” embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of § 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of “under” and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding it was irrelevant that irss collection of 100 section 6672 liability against responsible nondebtor debtors principal officer and major shareholder would affect the debtors reorganization although nondebtors financing was necessary for debtors reorganization bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the irs at debtors request on behalf of nondebtor", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof a plan...”); § 1121(b) (“...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief’). I find persuasive an additional reason why “under a plan confirmed” should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, “under a plan confirmed” embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of § 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of “under” and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that transfers between nondebtor third parties not subject to 1146c exemption even if transfer necessary to finance acquisition of debtors property", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof a plan...”); § 1121(b) (“...only the debtor may file a plan until after 120 days after the date of the order for relief’). I find persuasive an additional reason why “under a plan confirmed” should be construed to describe eligible transfers rather than to impose a temporal restriction on the transaction itself. As a description, “under a plan confirmed” embodies an intent to exclude ordinary course of business and non-debtor transactions from the scope of § 1146(c). These meanings lie within the definition of “under” and are necessary to apply the provision. If Congress intended to encourage plan confirmation, it follows that Congress would facilitate the process by providing tax relief for only those transfers necessary for the plan, rather th 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1995) (holding that grant or denial of debtors claim of property exemption is final appealable order" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwho had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers’ Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy — the state police’s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid — was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that an employees attempt to prove actual discrimination requires more substantial evidence than a prima facie case because evidence of pretext and discrimination is viewed in light of the employers justification", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwho had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers’ Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy — the state police’s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid — was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that such circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discrimination", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwho had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers’ Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy — the state police’s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid — was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwho had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers’ Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy — the state police’s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid — was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that in a discrimination case plaintiff must prove that firing was a result of intentional discrimination", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwho had committed similar or more severe offenses than those Molloy was accused of were either not disciplined or, if disciplined, were first afforded their rights under the Officers’ Bill of Rights, the jury was entitled to infer that the Chiefs proffered explanation for his more harsh treatment of Molloy — the state police’s advice that she was refusing to cooperate with them and the ostensible advice that the granting of rights was unnecessary where, although suspended, she was still being paid — was a pretext. Essentially the same evidence also allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that the plaintiff had carried her burden of proving that the Chief had discriminated against Molloy because of her gender in violation of Title VTI. See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants’ argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (holding that landowner who digs in such a way as to disturb natural state of neighboring land is strictly liable", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants’ argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (holding that permanent easement on land containing natural gas pipeline reduced value of directly encumbered land by 75", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants’ argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (holding that city may by ordinance require abutting landowner to repair sidewalk but that the abutting landowner is not liable in an action in tort for injuries", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants’ argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (holding unconstitutional a zoning law that purported to give landowners who were not bound by any official duty but wejre free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and could subject a neighboring landowner to their will or caprice authority to prevent a particular use on a neighbors land", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso strict liability should be imposed. Again, defendants’ argument is more persuasive. Massachusetts has not clearly recognized strict liability for the pumping of subterranean water, even if it results in damage to a plaintiffs land in its natural state. See Gamer, 346 Mass, at 620-21, 195 N.E.2d 65 (negligence); New York Cent. R. Co. v. Marinucci Bros. & Co., 337 Mass. 469, 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (1958) (negligence). The strict liability-cases on which plaintiff relies have to do with the removal of lateral support by excavation, not by pumping. See Marinucci Bros., 337 Mass, at 472, 149 N.E.2d 680 (restating rule on strict liability for excavating and holding that excavator who withdraws mixture of silt and water can be held liable for negligence); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (holding in case where railroad grant was an easement and not a right of way that title vested in abutting landowner once railroad abandoned land" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded,” Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). “In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (holding that where litigation involves more than one claim the origin of the claim test must be applied separately to each part", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded,” Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). “In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (holding that documents that are created in the ordinary course of business or would have been created irrespective of litigation are not protected by the work product doctrine", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded,” Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). “In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (holding with respect to another part of the plra that the court must determine the prisoners status on the date the suit or appeal is brought rather than at some other time", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded,” Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). “In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n“the trial court’s discretion is not unbounded,” Grimes v. Walton Cnty., 591 So.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Trial courts are required to consider whether the prospective inter-venor has an interest in the proceedings. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). “In order for a party to intervene, its interest must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” Omni Nat’l Bank v. Georgia Banking Co., 951 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, a party’s asserted interest must already be at issue in the proceedings when the party seeks to intervene. Carlisle, 593 So.2d at 507 (holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof which is the subject of litigation" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nactions, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (holding that an independent jurisdictional basis is not required in this case because intervenors do not seek to litigate a claim on the merits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nactions, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (holding that considering an amendment is not the time to address the merits of a case", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nactions, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (holding that a dismissal based on a jurisdictional statute of limitations does not constitute a judgmerit on the merits because a judgment on the merits can only be rendered after a court has jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nactions, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nactions, “the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction ... over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule ... 24 ..; or over claims by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 ... when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”). But in federal-question cases, the identity of the parties is irrelevant and the district court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the federal question(s) raised by the plaintiff. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jurisdictional requirement, therefore, prevents the enlargement of federal jurisdiction in such cases only where a proposed intervenor seeks to bring new state-law claims. See, e.g., Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 473 (holding that this time requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconverted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (holding that a court may consider materials outside the pleadings to determine its jurisdiction", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconverted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (holding that in ruling on a rule 12b1 motion the court may consider exhibits outside the pleadings to resolve factual disputes regarding jurisdiction", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconverted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (holding that on a rule 12b1 motion challenging subjectmatter jurisdiction the court has authority to consider matters outside the pleadings", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconverted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nconverted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment. This argument marries with Marrero’s contention that factual issues existed on the merits of her section 1983 claim. Marrero, consumed by her belief that such factual issues existed, concludes that the district judge must have converted the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment in order to dismiss the case. There is, however, no support that such a conversion occurred. The record shows that the district court properly considered the matter as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Defendants did not attach any documents or exhibits outside their pleadings, and the district court never allowed the parties to supplement the record. See Collier, 158 F.3d at 603 (holding that such a conversion is proper in order to consider materials outside the pleadings" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel § 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant’s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof \"defense” because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel § 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant’s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof \"defense” because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (holding that the state police is a state agency", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel § 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant’s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof \"defense” because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (holding that appellants fourteenth amendment due process claim did not require reversal where they failed to show that they were prejudiced", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel § 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant’s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof \"defense” because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (holding that it would offend due process to permit the state to sanction individuals from demonstrating in an area where police told them they could hold their demonstration", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe defendant knows to be otherwise illegal, while in the case of entrapment by estoppel, because of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his conduct constitutes no offense. See 53 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249 Proof of Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel § 20 (1999). Neither defense implicates the defendant’s mens rea, except in the rare case in which mistake of law negates the required mental state of the offense. In such case the defense of entrapment by estoppel also could constitute a failure of proof \"defense” because the government agent's misstatement of the law would lead the defendant to believe that there was nothing criminal about his conduct under any circumstances. See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (holding that the denial of the motions for summary judgment precludes a sanction on the ground that the claims against them were legally insufficient and that a sanction is generally improper where a successful motion could have avoided any additional legal expenses by defendants emphasis in original" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court’s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy’s challenge under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (holding that a state court cannot be said to have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under 2254d1 when there are no holdings from the supreme court addressing the issue raised by the petitioner", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court’s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy’s challenge under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (holding state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law given the lack of holdings from the supreme court regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators courtroom conduct", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court’s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy’s challenge under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court’s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy’s challenge under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear supreme court precedent existed", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). Murphy argues that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law when it dismissed the lone holdout juror during deliberations after the trial judge concluded that the juror refused to deliberate. Murphy, however, cites no Supreme Court case which holds that the dismissal of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. Indeed, there are no Supreme Court holdings addressing the issue of whether a trial court’s discharge of a juror for refusing to deliberate violates the Sixth Amendment. We therefore reject Murphy’s challenge under § 2254(d)(1). See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 654, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (holding that the language of 2254d1 expressly restricts the source of clearly established law to the supreme courts jurisprudence" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwould serve a significant public interest only where “there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,” and that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI’s and the EOUSA’s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that exemption 7c protects the privacy interests of all persons mentioned in law enforcement records whether they be investigators suspects witnesses or informants and their names are generally exempt from disclosure", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwould serve a significant public interest only where “there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,” and that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI’s and the EOUSA’s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are exempt from disclosure", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwould serve a significant public interest only where “there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,” and that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI’s and the EOUSA’s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding the governments prior disclosure of requested information could not waive individuals privacy interests under exemption 6 and collecting cases involving exemption 7c", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwould serve a significant public interest only where “there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,” and that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI’s and the EOUSA’s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nwould serve a significant public interest only where “there is compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity,” and that the information sought “is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.” Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282. The plaintiff demonstrates no such public interest with respect to the third parties described above, including those of investigative interest or those merely mentioned in responsive records. The FBI’s and the EOUSA’s decisions to withhold the names of and identifying information about third parties of investigative interest and about individuals who merely are mentioned in these law enforcement records are fully supported by the case law. See, e.g., Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that in light of the stigma potentially associated with law enforcement investigations exemption 7c affords broad privacy rights to suspects witnesses and investigators" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis equal to or greater than the amount of his debt, his right of possession ceases, and the grantor or his legal representatives, and, if none, his heirs, may bring an action to recover the land.”). “The right of the grantor to redeem by the payment of the debt is never barred, so long as the grantee recognizes a right to redeem, and equity would by analogy decree that the right to redeem would in no event be lost until after the expiration of 10 years from the date of the last recognition by the grantee of the right to redeem.” Gunter, 38 S.E. at 374. While the transaction in the case sub judice is a Security Deed and not a mortgage, the debtor still has a right of redemption. See Wynndam Court Apartment Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 501, 50 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (holding that the assignment of rents clause contained in the mortgage was enforceable during the period of redemption for the purpose of securing the 300000 deficiency existing after foreclosure of the mortgage", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis equal to or greater than the amount of his debt, his right of possession ceases, and the grantor or his legal representatives, and, if none, his heirs, may bring an action to recover the land.”). “The right of the grantor to redeem by the payment of the debt is never barred, so long as the grantee recognizes a right to redeem, and equity would by analogy decree that the right to redeem would in no event be lost until after the expiration of 10 years from the date of the last recognition by the grantee of the right to redeem.” Gunter, 38 S.E. at 374. While the transaction in the case sub judice is a Security Deed and not a mortgage, the debtor still has a right of redemption. See Wynndam Court Apartment Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 501, 50 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis equal to or greater than the amount of his debt, his right of possession ceases, and the grantor or his legal representatives, and, if none, his heirs, may bring an action to recover the land.”). “The right of the grantor to redeem by the payment of the debt is never barred, so long as the grantee recognizes a right to redeem, and equity would by analogy decree that the right to redeem would in no event be lost until after the expiration of 10 years from the date of the last recognition by the grantee of the right to redeem.” Gunter, 38 S.E. at 374. While the transaction in the case sub judice is a Security Deed and not a mortgage, the debtor still has a right of redemption. See Wynndam Court Apartment Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 501, 50 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (holding that a mortgage or modification of a mortgage is not a good or a service under the dtpa", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis equal to or greater than the amount of his debt, his right of possession ceases, and the grantor or his legal representatives, and, if none, his heirs, may bring an action to recover the land.”). “The right of the grantor to redeem by the payment of the debt is never barred, so long as the grantee recognizes a right to redeem, and equity would by analogy decree that the right to redeem would in no event be lost until after the expiration of 10 years from the date of the last recognition by the grantee of the right to redeem.” Gunter, 38 S.E. at 374. While the transaction in the case sub judice is a Security Deed and not a mortgage, the debtor still has a right of redemption. See Wynndam Court Apartment Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 501, 50 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (holding that the right of redemption is treated the same whether in a mortgage or security deed", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nis equal to or greater than the amount of his debt, his right of possession ceases, and the grantor or his legal representatives, and, if none, his heirs, may bring an action to recover the land.”). “The right of the grantor to redeem by the payment of the debt is never barred, so long as the grantee recognizes a right to redeem, and equity would by analogy decree that the right to redeem would in no event be lost until after the expiration of 10 years from the date of the last recognition by the grantee of the right to redeem.” Gunter, 38 S.E. at 374. While the transaction in the case sub judice is a Security Deed and not a mortgage, the debtor still has a right of redemption. See Wynndam Court Apartment Co. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 501, 50 S.E.2d 611 (1948) (holding that upon execution of the mortgage the mortgagor retains only an equity of redemption accompanied by a right to possession" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsupra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature’s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court’s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created: [This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v , 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsupra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature’s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court’s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created: [This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v , 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsupra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature’s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court’s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created: [This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v , 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (holding that the prohibition of section 35 article iii against the increase or diminution of compensation for public officers applied to the treasurer of calvert county and therefore even though the legislature retained the power to alter or abolish the office it could not change the treasurers salary while in office", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsupra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature’s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court’s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created: [This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v , 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (holding that the requirement that the county seek recommendations for appointments to a civil office from a private corporation was not constitutionally repugnant because where the office was created by the legislature the legislature retains the control over that offices method of appointment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nsupra, a case which the majority addresses peripherally, we answered the question of whether the Legislature’s delegation of the power to appoint commissioners serving on the Commission on Medical Discipline to a private organization, violated the gubernatorial power provisions of the Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine in the Declaration of Rights. Chief Judge Murphy, writing for this Court, summarized this Court’s jurisprudence and succinctly and clearly articulated that the power of appointment is not an intrinsic executive function, but rather, that the Legislature can modify, control, and abolish any office it has created: [This question] was considered by the Court in Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151 (1854), and Baltimore v , 164 Md. 101, 105-07, 164 A. 155, 156-57 (1933) (holding that the governor had no power to make the appointment of officer of the school commissioner for cecil county without the consent of the senate when the office was not vacant because the legislature which had created and therefore controlled the office had not delegated that power to the governor" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the detriment of defendants, but also had ex post facto implications. Fell, 209 Ariz. at 80-81 ¶¶ 10-12, 97 P.3d at 905-06. No such concerns exist here. ¶ 16 We also reject the State’s argument, raised for the first time in its supplemental brief, that SB 1449 unconstitutionally disturbs victims’ rights “in the finality of a defendant’s conviction.” The Arizona Constitution provides that “a victim of crime has a right ... [t]o a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of [a] case after the conviction and sentence.” Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10) (“Victims’ Bill of Rights”). But that provision does not give victims a vested right to sustaining a conviction on appeal. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, 209 ¶ 14, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (holding unconstitutional definition of criminal offense in 1344016 insofar as it narrowed definition of victim in effect when victims bill of rights adopted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the detriment of defendants, but also had ex post facto implications. Fell, 209 Ariz. at 80-81 ¶¶ 10-12, 97 P.3d at 905-06. No such concerns exist here. ¶ 16 We also reject the State’s argument, raised for the first time in its supplemental brief, that SB 1449 unconstitutionally disturbs victims’ rights “in the finality of a defendant’s conviction.” The Arizona Constitution provides that “a victim of crime has a right ... [t]o a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of [a] case after the conviction and sentence.” Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10) (“Victims’ Bill of Rights”). But that provision does not give victims a vested right to sustaining a conviction on appeal. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, 209 ¶ 14, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the detriment of defendants, but also had ex post facto implications. Fell, 209 Ariz. at 80-81 ¶¶ 10-12, 97 P.3d at 905-06. No such concerns exist here. ¶ 16 We also reject the State’s argument, raised for the first time in its supplemental brief, that SB 1449 unconstitutionally disturbs victims’ rights “in the finality of a defendant’s conviction.” The Arizona Constitution provides that “a victim of crime has a right ... [t]o a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of [a] case after the conviction and sentence.” Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10) (“Victims’ Bill of Rights”). But that provision does not give victims a vested right to sustaining a conviction on appeal. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, 209 ¶ 14, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the detriment of defendants, but also had ex post facto implications. Fell, 209 Ariz. at 80-81 ¶¶ 10-12, 97 P.3d at 905-06. No such concerns exist here. ¶ 16 We also reject the State’s argument, raised for the first time in its supplemental brief, that SB 1449 unconstitutionally disturbs victims’ rights “in the finality of a defendant’s conviction.” The Arizona Constitution provides that “a victim of crime has a right ... [t]o a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of [a] case after the conviction and sentence.” Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10) (“Victims’ Bill of Rights”). But that provision does not give victims a vested right to sustaining a conviction on appeal. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, 209 ¶ 14, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (recognizing that the legislature may effectively limit the scope of the victims bill of rights by decriminalizing certain conduct or redefining the type of conduct that qualifies as a criminal offense", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the detriment of defendants, but also had ex post facto implications. Fell, 209 Ariz. at 80-81 ¶¶ 10-12, 97 P.3d at 905-06. No such concerns exist here. ¶ 16 We also reject the State’s argument, raised for the first time in its supplemental brief, that SB 1449 unconstitutionally disturbs victims’ rights “in the finality of a defendant’s conviction.” The Arizona Constitution provides that “a victim of crime has a right ... [t]o a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of [a] case after the conviction and sentence.” Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10) (“Victims’ Bill of Rights”). But that provision does not give victims a vested right to sustaining a conviction on appeal. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, 209 ¶ 14, 150 P.3d 778, 782 (App.2007) (holding that a sentencing court may consider acquitted conduct or uncharged criminal conduct" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n[debtor] significantly increases his income, he would go to his grave either indebted to ECMC or, if not, indebted to the IRS on the tax obligation incurred when ECMC forgives the unpaid loan.”). Second, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning, consideration of the ICRP would not impermissibly diminish the authority of the Bankruptcy Court by precluding discharge based upon undue hardship whenever a debtor is eligible for, but did not participate in, the ICRP. See Bronsdon, 2009 WL 95038, at *4. (citing Denittis, 362 B.R. at 64-65). Applying the Brunner test, three circuit courts of appeals have concluded that eligibility for the ICRP should be considered as a component of the undue hardship analysis but is not necessarily dispositive. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir.2008)(holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n[debtor] significantly increases his income, he would go to his grave either indebted to ECMC or, if not, indebted to the IRS on the tax obligation incurred when ECMC forgives the unpaid loan.”). Second, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning, consideration of the ICRP would not impermissibly diminish the authority of the Bankruptcy Court by precluding discharge based upon undue hardship whenever a debtor is eligible for, but did not participate in, the ICRP. See Bronsdon, 2009 WL 95038, at *4. (citing Denittis, 362 B.R. at 64-65). Applying the Brunner test, three circuit courts of appeals have concluded that eligibility for the ICRP should be considered as a component of the undue hardship analysis but is not necessarily dispositive. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir.2008)(holding that the test for good faith is the actual belief of the party and not the reasonableness of that belief", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n[debtor] significantly increases his income, he would go to his grave either indebted to ECMC or, if not, indebted to the IRS on the tax obligation incurred when ECMC forgives the unpaid loan.”). Second, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning, consideration of the ICRP would not impermissibly diminish the authority of the Bankruptcy Court by precluding discharge based upon undue hardship whenever a debtor is eligible for, but did not participate in, the ICRP. See Bronsdon, 2009 WL 95038, at *4. (citing Denittis, 362 B.R. at 64-65). Applying the Brunner test, three circuit courts of appeals have concluded that eligibility for the ICRP should be considered as a component of the undue hardship analysis but is not necessarily dispositive. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir.2008)(holding that while the creditor has the initial burden to produce some evidence of lack of good faith the ultimate burden is on the debtor to prove his good faith", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n[debtor] significantly increases his income, he would go to his grave either indebted to ECMC or, if not, indebted to the IRS on the tax obligation incurred when ECMC forgives the unpaid loan.”). Second, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning, consideration of the ICRP would not impermissibly diminish the authority of the Bankruptcy Court by precluding discharge based upon undue hardship whenever a debtor is eligible for, but did not participate in, the ICRP. See Bronsdon, 2009 WL 95038, at *4. (citing Denittis, 362 B.R. at 64-65). Applying the Brunner test, three circuit courts of appeals have concluded that eligibility for the ICRP should be considered as a component of the undue hardship analysis but is not necessarily dispositive. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir.2008)(holding when applying the brunner test that while not a per se indication of a lack of good faith debtors decision not to take advantage of the icrp is probative of her intent to repay the loans", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n[debtor] significantly increases his income, he would go to his grave either indebted to ECMC or, if not, indebted to the IRS on the tax obligation incurred when ECMC forgives the unpaid loan.”). Second, contrary to the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning, consideration of the ICRP would not impermissibly diminish the authority of the Bankruptcy Court by precluding discharge based upon undue hardship whenever a debtor is eligible for, but did not participate in, the ICRP. See Bronsdon, 2009 WL 95038, at *4. (citing Denittis, 362 B.R. at 64-65). Applying the Brunner test, three circuit courts of appeals have concluded that eligibility for the ICRP should be considered as a component of the undue hardship analysis but is not necessarily dispositive. In re Mosko, 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir.2008)(holding that seeking out loan consolidation options such as the icrp is an important component of the good faith inquiry under the brunner test" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court’s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marré, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that “the government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys’ fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys”). Plaintiff’s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee ", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court’s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marré, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that “the government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys’ fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys”). Plaintiff’s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (holding that eaja fees may be awarded for fee litigation without a separate finding that the government was not substantially justified in its position as to the fee litigation as the single finding that the governments position lacks substantial justification operates as a onetime threshold for fee eligibility and presumptively encompasses all aspects of the civil action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court’s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marré, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that “the government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys’ fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys”). Plaintiff’s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court’s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marré, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that “the government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys’ fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys”). Plaintiff’s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (holding that awarded fees were reasonable and that proof that attorneys fees are necessary apart from testimony as to the reasonableness of the fee is not required", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof 1996, the time of the enactment of the legislation. See supra. In any event, under this Court’s holding that attorney fee awards are payable to the attorney, not the plaintiff, the awards are the property of the attorney and therefore not subject to offset for the plaintiffs debts. See Marré, 117 F.3d at 304 (finding that “the government cannot set off [the plaintiffs] tax obligations against the attorneys’ fee award, as no mutuality of debt exists between the government and [the plaintiffs] attorneys”). Plaintiff’s Counsel Is Entitled to an Additional Fee Award This Court further finds that the plaintiffs attorney is entitled to an additional fee award under the EAJA for his time spent litigating this issue. See Commissioner, 496 U.S. 154 at 160-161, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nparty-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court’s imposition of fifty-one months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that when a court miscalculates the guideline range yet imposes a sentence that falls within a properly calculated guideline range the sentence enjoys a presumption of reasonableness", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nparty-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court’s imposition of fifty-one months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guideline range is usually reasonable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nparty-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court’s imposition of fifty-one months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (holding sentence within properly calculated advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nparty-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court’s imposition of fifty-one months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nparty-opponent of his having assaulted the victim. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). 2. The district court did not err when it denied Jose’s motion to suppress statements made to Detective Rosales. Detective Rosales warned Jose that his statements could be used against him in court. She was not required to specifically warn Jose that his statements could be used against him in a federal prosecution. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 280 F.3d 1008, 1022-23 (9th Cir.2002). 3. The district court’s imposition of fifty-one months’ imprisonment was substantively reasonable. Considering the totality of circumstances, the district court imposed a sentence within the applicable sentencing range and adequately explained its reasoning. See United States v. Bendtzen, 542 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that imposition of a sentence within the properly calculated range is not reviewable" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhis position as an “ex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.” Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy’s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy’s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition — the appointment of a receiver — that permitted Wendy’s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that franchisor not only has valid interest in protecting good will it has developed but it also has an interest in being able to place a new franchisee at or near the same location where its goodwill has been created", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhis position as an “ex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.” Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy’s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy’s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition — the appointment of a receiver — that permitted Wendy’s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that a common law breach of contract action will lie for the insurers failure to comply with its obligation to act in good faith and with due care in representing the interests of the insured in its failure to settle with a third party", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhis position as an “ex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.” Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy’s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy’s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition — the appointment of a receiver — that permitted Wendy’s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that a lending institution does not violate a separate duty of good faith by adhering to its agreements with a borrower or enforcing its contractual rights as a creditor", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhis position as an “ex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.” Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy’s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy’s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition — the appointment of a receiver — that permitted Wendy’s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that franchisor has an interest in the goodwill its franchise has created", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhis position as an “ex-post facto attempt to add additional terms to the Forbearance Agreement.” Instead, Saverin asserts, he is alleging that Wendy’s bad-faith actions breached the existing terms of the Forbearance Agreement. Specifically, he posits that the very purpose of the Forbearance Agreement was frustrated when Wendy’s failed to prevent the occurrence of a condition — the appointment of a receiver — that permitted Wendy’s to prematurely terminate the Forbearance and Franchise Agreements. But this reasoning ignores the principle that the implied duty of good faith cannot be breached by acting as allowed by the specific terms of the contract. Ed Schory & Sons, 662 N.E.2d at 1083; see also Jim White Agency Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 126 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1997) (holding in a case decided under ohio law that a franchisor cannot be found liable for failure to act in good faith where it has done no more than to insist on enforcing its contract rights to the detriment of its franchisee" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, \"[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. § 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, \"[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. § 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding whether passenger was lawfully detained as witness to traffic violation when officer asked his name so that his false identification violated failuretoidentify statute not necessary to decide since other articulable facts justified continued detention", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, \"[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. § 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, \"[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. § 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that officer may order driver out of vehicle once lawfully detained for traffic violation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 54 . Under section 38.02 of the Penal Code, \"[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has ... lawfully detained the person.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.02(b)(2). The offense is elevated from a class B to a class A misdemeanor if the person was a fugitive at the time of the offense. Id. § 38.02(d). 55 .See Sims, 84 S.W.3d at 809-10 (when deputy initiated investigative detention, he did not know appellant had given him incorrect spelling of his name; thus, officer's further detention could not be based on reasonable suspicion of violation of failure-to-identify statute); cf. Farmer v. State, 47 S.W.3d 187, 190-91 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.” Ex parte Kelley, — So.3d at —. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn’s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State’s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant’s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. — So.3d — (holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.” Ex parte Kelley, — So.3d at —. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn’s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State’s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant’s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. — So.3d — (holding that the trial courts written order was not the entry of a sentence sufficient to support a determination that a judgment of conviction was entered", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.” Ex parte Kelley, — So.3d at —. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn’s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State’s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant’s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. — So.3d — (holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.” Ex parte Kelley, — So.3d at —. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn’s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State’s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant’s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. — So.3d — (holding that in the interest of judicial economy considering appeal from order denying posttrial motions and ordering entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff even though judgment was not actually entered", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof conviction, [and Benris] conviction[s] [are] not ripe for appeal.” Ex parte Kelley, — So.3d at —. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Benris appeal. The State appears to concede that the Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion in Kelley supports the position that no judgments of conviction have been entered in these cases but argues that this Court should nonetheless hold that the issuance of a sentencing order without the pronouncement in open court of a sentence is sufficient to enter Benn’s judgments of conviction. In Ex parte Kelley, the Alabama Supreme Court considered the State’s argument and rejected it, holding that nothing less than a pronouncement in open court of the defendant’s sentence will satisfy the sentencing element of a judgment of conviction. — So.3d — (holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (holding that the plain error and harmless error standards of review merge in the ease of jury instructions because the duty to properly instruct the jury lies with the trial court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (holding that the district courts failure to instruct the jury as to the proper standard of proof constituted plain error", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (holding that the proper standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe color of state law and the jury must return a verdict for the defendant. (App.308-09.) This error was reinforced by the verdict form, which forced the outcome of the case to be determined by a single finding of fact: whether Dombroski ordered the landlord to open the door. In Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Department, we held that the District Court failed to instruct the jury that punitive damages against the upper management of a company could only be awarded if upper management was involved in the violation. 174 F.3d 95, 122-24 (3d Cir.1999). We reversed the finding of punitive damages because the jury instructions “failed to provide proper guidance for the jury on a fundamental question.” Id. at 124; see also Beardshall v. Minuteman Press Int’l, 664 F.2d 23, 26 (3d Cir.1981) (holding that the failure to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof required a new trial" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin’s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin’s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge’s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (holding under georgia rule of professional conduct 37a that party seeking disqualification must demonstrate that the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and that there is no other evidence available to prove those facts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin’s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin’s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge’s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (recognizing that state agencies might require the lawyer to prove the truth of the fact stated by supplying copies of the court documents or material that led the lawyer to the fact", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin’s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin’s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge’s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness if his or her testimony is relevant material and unobtainable elsewhere", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin’s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin’s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge’s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (holding that a lawyer is a necessary witness where the lawyers testimony is relevant to disputed material questions of fact and where there is no other evidence available to prove those facts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncase; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7 (a). We begin by applying the actual words of the ethical rule to Martin’s case. First, we consider whether the presiding judge erred by viewing Martin’s original lawyers as necessary witnesses. There was no dispute that the lawyers were the only witnesses, other than the original trial judge whose integrity was already being disputed by the lawyers, who claimed to have any knowledge about what the judge might have said to the lawyers in chambers. Thus, as the parties agreed, the lawyers were necessary witnesses if the claim regarding the judge’s statements were to go forward. See Clough v. Richelo, 274 Ga. App. 129, 132 (1) (616 SE2d 888) (2005) (holding that evidence that defendant plaintiffs former client consistently failed to pay other lawyers was relevant to prove the element of intent to defraud" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny’s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (holding that defendant had the right to refuse to answer questions put to him by police officer who had called him", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny’s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny’s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (holding that defendant in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a thirddegree assault charge", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny’s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (holding that a defendant who sought to receive the death penalty had the right to refuse to present mitigation evidence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1342 (10th Cir.1981). While it is probably true that the police officer exerted some subtle psychological pressure on Nadworny (whether intentional or not), this Court, after a thorough and independent review of the written record, finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the police officer did not pressure Nadworny to the point that his will was overborne and his statements were involuntary. As both Nadworny and the Commonwealth agree, Nadworny was not in custody. In fact, because Nadworny called the police officer, the officer had no idea where petitioner was during their conversation. This was not a situation in which the police officer, knowing Nadworny’s location, had only to go there to arrest him. Cf Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 531-33, 159 N.E.2d 856 (1959) (holding that defendant was arrested when the police officer took physical custody of him by grabbing his arm and returned him to the hotel for detention there" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court’s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower’s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (“a claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.”). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (holding dismissal for failure to comply with rule 8 was dismissal of entire action which was appealable final order", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court’s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower’s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (“a claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.”). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (holding arbitration decision disallowing insurers coverage defense binding in subsequent personal injury action where the issue was actually litigated and decided in prior action", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court’s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower’s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (“a claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.”). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (holding that although the issue of coverage had not yet been decided appellants action under 8371 was a separate claim and the dismissal of that claim was instantly appealable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court’s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower’s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (“a claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.”). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nit be argued that the timeliness of appellants' bad faith claim depended upon our Supreme Court’s ruling that Miller was a permissive user of Madalyn Gower’s vehicle, which ruling required appellee to pay the policy limits. A bad faith action under section 8371 is neither related to nor dependent on the underlying contract claim against the insurer. See March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 435 Pa.Super. 597, 646 A.2d 1254 (1994) (“a claim brought under section 8371 is a cause of action which is separate and distinct from the underlying contract claim.”). As a result, Miller (and, by extension, appellants) were not required to wait until the merits of the contract claim were decided to file suit for bad faith. See Boring v. Erie Insurance Group, 434 Pa.Super. 40, 641 A.2d 1189 (1984) (holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that probation is not a sentence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nORDER OF THE COURT. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is d r citing Graham, which the trial court granted. The court resentenced Roman to forty years in prison for count one and a consecutive fifteen-year prison term for count two followed by twenty-five years of sexual offender probation. The court imposed a concurrent fifteen-year term in prison for count three. We affirm Roman’s fifty-five-year aggregate prison sentence on the basis of Williams v. State, 197 So.3d 569, 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncommenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis’. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.”); Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that it is proper to consider prelimitations period conduct in determining whether conduct within the limitations period violated the antitrust laws", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncommenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis’. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.”); Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that the property appraiser was estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the failure to bring the action within the limitations period was the direct result of the property appraisers failure to timely perform a related duty owed to plaintiff", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncommenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis’. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.”); Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncommenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis’. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.”); Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ncommenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 3. Plaintiffs rely heavily on statements made by the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Appeals to support their position that filing a complaint alone is sufficient for statute of limitations purposes. Pis’. Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 657 n. 2, 116 S.Ct. 1638, 134 L.Ed.2d 880 (1996) (“In a suit on a right created by federal law, filing a complaint suffices to satisfy the statute of limitations.”); Pis.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. for Partial Dismissal. While it is true that federal and District of Columbia law do not require service to be effected within the statute of limitations period, see Iran Air v. Kugelman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that the plaintiff filed suit within the statute of limitations even though he could not prove the time at which he mailed his petition" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money). ' Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that the defendant did not deprive the plaintiff of a property interest in his continued employment because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned when he refused to report to work after being transferred to a new position", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money). ' Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money). ' Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that former municipal judge did not have property interest in continued employment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money). ' Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (holding in an employment discrimination case that the continued employment of the plaintiffs rival in a position previously held by the plaintiff did not constitute a systemic violation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto Herrada, the property right at issue in this case is her right to retain possession of her money, subject only to lawful actions by the City that comport with due process. Herrada clearly has a property interest in her money. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that prisoners have a property interest in their money). ' Determining whether the City improperly interfered with or deprived her of this interest, however, presents a more difficult question. The City argues that because Herrada voluntarily paid her parking ticket, no government action interfered with her property interest. This position finds support, at least by way of analogy, in two decisions from the Tenth Circuit. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiff did not have dueprocessprotected property interest because he failed to sufficiently plead a rule or other mutually explicit understanding from the manual or otherwise bridling the reason for which he could be terminated and thereby creating a sufficient expectation of continued employment the critical component herewithout alleging such a bridle plaintiff was an atwill employee consequently he lacked a property interest in his continued employment" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstead, the plaintiff has received the benefit of her bargain where the defendant has substantially performed on the contract. See Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Sununu v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2009) (noting that “ ‘[substantial performance’ is generally considered to exist when a contracting party has failed to render full performance but any defects in performance are considered minor”). Thus, to sustain her claim that she has standing based on her overpayment for the AARP membership, Austin-Spearman must plausibly allege that Defendants failed to render substantial performance of the AARP membership contract. Compare, e.g., Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that state burdenofproof rule was not a mere incident of form of procedure and denied admiralty plaintiff the benefit of the full scope of federally created rights", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstead, the plaintiff has received the benefit of her bargain where the defendant has substantially performed on the contract. See Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Sununu v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2009) (noting that “ ‘[substantial performance’ is generally considered to exist when a contracting party has failed to render full performance but any defects in performance are considered minor”). Thus, to sustain her claim that she has standing based on her overpayment for the AARP membership, Austin-Spearman must plausibly allege that Defendants failed to render substantial performance of the AARP membership contract. Compare, e.g., Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that the plaintiff could not show surprise when the plaintiff had received the additional terms from the defendant prior to the agreement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstead, the plaintiff has received the benefit of her bargain where the defendant has substantially performed on the contract. See Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Sununu v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2009) (noting that “ ‘[substantial performance’ is generally considered to exist when a contracting party has failed to render full performance but any defects in performance are considered minor”). Thus, to sustain her claim that she has standing based on her overpayment for the AARP membership, Austin-Spearman must plausibly allege that Defendants failed to render substantial performance of the AARP membership contract. Compare, e.g., Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that the plaintiff was not denied the benefit of the bargain and therefore lacked standing where plaintiff had bought a prescription painkiller that was later withdrawn from the market but plaintiff found the painkiller to be effective and did notsuffer harmful side effects", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstead, the plaintiff has received the benefit of her bargain where the defendant has substantially performed on the contract. See Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Sununu v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2009) (noting that “ ‘[substantial performance’ is generally considered to exist when a contracting party has failed to render full performance but any defects in performance are considered minor”). Thus, to sustain her claim that she has standing based on her overpayment for the AARP membership, Austin-Spearman must plausibly allege that Defendants failed to render substantial performance of the AARP membership contract. Compare, e.g., Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir.2007) (holding so where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had colluded to claim falsely that the plaintiffs physician had informed the claims adjuster that the plaintiff had been released to work and where the plaintiff was later discharged from employment and denied workers compensation benefits", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstead, the plaintiff has received the benefit of her bargain where the defendant has substantially performed on the contract. See Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1013 (D.C.Cir.1985); see also Sununu v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 638 F.Supp.2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.2009) (noting that “ ‘[substantial performance’ is generally considered to exist when a contracting party has failed to render full performance but any defects in performance are considered minor”). Thus, to sustain her claim that she has standing based on her overpayment for the AARP membership, Austin-Spearman must plausibly allege that Defendants failed to render substantial performance of the AARP membership contract. Compare, e.g., Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that the plaintiff was denied the benefit of the bargain and therefore had standing where plaintiff did not receive the full number of agreedupon minutes he purchased in a wireless cellular phone service agreement" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Harline was a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court’s factual finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos’ negligent preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline’s bankruptcy dis L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling that debtors first attorney did not commit malpractice by failing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same claim in state court against different attorneys", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Harline was a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court’s factual finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos’ negligent preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline’s bankruptcy dis L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that the district court had bankruptcy jurisdiction over a professional malpractice action filed by a title 11 debtor against the law firm that represented him in his bankruptcy case under section 1334b because the malpractice claim arose in the bankruptcy case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Harline was a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court’s factual finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos’ negligent preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline’s bankruptcy dis L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that suit for professional malpractice was compulsory counterclaim to earlier award of fees in bankruptcy to debtors attorney", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Harline was a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court’s factual finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos’ negligent preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline’s bankruptcy dis L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that a corporate chapter 7 debt ors malpractice claim against its bankruptcy attorney was related to its bankruptcy case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Harline was a party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court’s factual finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos’ negligent preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. Thus, Harline has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused the denial of Harline’s bankruptcy dis L.Ed.2d 101 (1990); Falconer v. Meehan, 804 F.2d 72, 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court finding that attorney advised client of contents of dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C., 177 Ariz. 221, 866 P.2d 889, 895-96 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nA substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to “commit any criminal offense” in part because it applied “so broadly to threats of minor infractions” and “to threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out”); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding a substantially similar probation condition overbroad", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nA substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to “commit any criminal offense” in part because it applied “so broadly to threats of minor infractions” and “to threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out”); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding that an illinois intimidation statute was substantially overbroad because it made it an offense to threaten to commit any crime no matter how minor or insubstantial", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nA substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to “commit any criminal offense” in part because it applied “so broadly to threats of minor infractions” and “to threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out”); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding the language of the statute applicable to floating buffer zones was substantially overbroad and burdened substantially more speech than necessary to serve the states interest", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nA substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to “commit any criminal offense” in part because it applied “so broadly to threats of minor infractions” and “to threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out”); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nA substantial threat is one that is reasonably likely to induce a belief that it will be carried out and one that threatens significant confinement, restraint, injury, or damage. A threat meets the latter criterion if it threatens an act that would cause an average person to experience significant apprehension upon contemplation of the occurrence of the threatened act. See Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1488, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (invalidating on First Amendment overbreadth grounds a Montana intimidation statute that punished threats to “commit any criminal offense” in part because it applied “so broadly to threats of minor infractions” and “to threats not reasonably likely to induce a belief that they will be carried out”); U.S. ex rel. Holder v. Cir. Ct., 624 F.Supp. 68, 71 (N.D.Ill.1985) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over nonresident guarantor of equipment lease although payments were made to illinois bank the guaranty was accepted in illinois and it provided that it would be gov erned by illinois law" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court’s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (holding that the cause and prejudice standard applied to defendants failure to object to his career offender classification at sentencing", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court’s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (holding that an assertion of prejudice is not a showing of prejudice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court’s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court’s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (holding that when a district court fails to provide reasons for imposing special conditions and the defendant fails to object we review for plain error", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor having offered a race-neutral reason for the challenge, the trial court must evaluate the credibility of the parties in order to determine whether the reason articulated by the prosecutor is, indeed, legitimate and non-discriminatory, or if it is, in fact, pretextual. Based on the Supreme Court’s observation that the defendant in Batson had made a timely objection to the peremptory challenge, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that in order to preserve the Batson issue for subsequent review, a defendant must make an objection at the l exceptions to the procedural default are not applicable in a Batson claim. Wiley, 969 F.2d at 101 (holding that a showing of cause and prejudice fails to overcome a defendants initial failure to object" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez’s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of “aggravated felony,” Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition “applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],” IIRIRA § 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,” id. § 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress’s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (recognizing that 1996 amendment to definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez’s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of “aggravated felony,” Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition “applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],” IIRIRA § 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,” id. § 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress’s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that the expanded definition of aggravated felony applies retroactively in actions taken on or after september 30 1996", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez’s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of “aggravated felony,” Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition “applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],” IIRIRA § 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,” id. § 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress’s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (recognizing that 1996 amendment specifically applies regardless of date of prior conviction constituting aggravated felony", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez’s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of “aggravated felony,” Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition “applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],” IIRIRA § 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,” id. § 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress’s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that 212c applies to all applications for relief filed after november 29 1990 regardless of when conviction occurred for offenses within the original definition of aggravated felony", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nremedies available to him. Nevertheless, Jacquez-Perez’s petition must fail. In expanding the definition of “aggravated felony,” Congress explicitly stated that the expanded definition “applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before ... the date of enactment [September 30, 1996],” IIRIRA § 321(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)), and that the new definition “shall apply to actions taken on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, regardless of when the conviction occurred,” id. § 321(c). See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318-19 & n. 43, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (using these sections as an example of Congress’s unambiguous intent to apply the expanded definition retroactively); Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that an ij or bia decision that occurs after september 30 1996 is an action taken that triggers iiriras aggravated felony rules" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare “persons” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not “persons” because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are “persons.” “Person” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b), as follows: “[t]he term ‘person’, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (holding the lender hable when after borrower defaulted the lender took control of borrowers finances determined which creditors were paid and loaned the borrower money for the purpose of paying employees on condition that none of the money be used to pay withholding taxes", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare “persons” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not “persons” because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are “persons.” “Person” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b), as follows: “[t]he term ‘person’, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that it was not improper for a lender to halt the proposed settlement and discounted payment of plaintiffs loan when the lender believed the loan would otherwise be paid in full", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare “persons” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not “persons” because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are “persons.” “Person” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b), as follows: “[t]he term ‘person’, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that where lender financed collected and retained one years premium on credit life insurance for borrower it assumed a contractual obligation to obtain credit life insurance for such borrower and to apply the amounts so received to credit life insurance and it stood in a fiduciary capacity towards the borrower to see that the amount so charged collected and withheld were actually applied to obtaining and purchasing such insurance", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare “persons” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not “persons” because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are “persons.” “Person” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b), as follows: “[t]he term ‘person’, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the lender was subject to the dtpa because the borrowers purpose in obtaining the loan was the purchase of a house", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare “persons” under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Plaintiffs argue that they are not “persons” because: 1) they did not make the decision to stop paying tax funds or to prefer some creditors over the IRS; and 2) Manley had enough funds free and clear of any control by the bank to have paid the payroll taxes withheld to the United States. The United States argues that under the line of credit loan and security agreement, the bank has the power to control Manley in the event of default, plaintiffs are “persons.” “Person” is defined in 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b), as follows: “[t]he term ‘person’, as used in this subehapter, includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under it, Inc., 956 F.2d 703 (7th Cir.1992) (holding lender might be held responsible for buyers alleged damages where facts indicated lenders active participation in the sale of the residence or the existence of a special relationship between the lender and the borrower" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nan expectation of privacy is entitled to enhanced protection in a given circumstance.” Joye, supra, 176 N.J. at 613, 826 A.2d at 651. In essence, we conclude that, because the police did not suspect criminal wrongdoing and were not investigating criminal activity, the officers could ask defendant to step out of the car and, incident to their good faith performance of their “community caretaking” function, conduct a “pat down” incident to placing him in the police car for the limited period necessary to inquire about the “missing person” report. We are not dealing with a minor motor vehicle or traffic violation which precluded the placement of defendant in the police vehicle and the “pat down” incident thereto. See State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 525-526 (2001) (holding that during a routine traffic stop it is reasonable for an officer to search the driver for weapons before placing the driver in a patrol car if placing the driver in the patrol car during the investigation prevents officers or the driver from being subjected to a dangerous condition and placing the driver in the patrol car is the least intrusive means to avoid the dangerous condition", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nan expectation of privacy is entitled to enhanced protection in a given circumstance.” Joye, supra, 176 N.J. at 613, 826 A.2d at 651. In essence, we conclude that, because the police did not suspect criminal wrongdoing and were not investigating criminal activity, the officers could ask defendant to step out of the car and, incident to their good faith performance of their “community caretaking” function, conduct a “pat down” incident to placing him in the police car for the limited period necessary to inquire about the “missing person” report. We are not dealing with a minor motor vehicle or traffic violation which precluded the placement of defendant in the police vehicle and the “pat down” incident thereto. See State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 525-526 (2001) (holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nan expectation of privacy is entitled to enhanced protection in a given circumstance.” Joye, supra, 176 N.J. at 613, 826 A.2d at 651. In essence, we conclude that, because the police did not suspect criminal wrongdoing and were not investigating criminal activity, the officers could ask defendant to step out of the car and, incident to their good faith performance of their “community caretaking” function, conduct a “pat down” incident to placing him in the police car for the limited period necessary to inquire about the “missing person” report. We are not dealing with a minor motor vehicle or traffic violation which precluded the placement of defendant in the police vehicle and the “pat down” incident thereto. See State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 525-526 (2001) (holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nan expectation of privacy is entitled to enhanced protection in a given circumstance.” Joye, supra, 176 N.J. at 613, 826 A.2d at 651. In essence, we conclude that, because the police did not suspect criminal wrongdoing and were not investigating criminal activity, the officers could ask defendant to step out of the car and, incident to their good faith performance of their “community caretaking” function, conduct a “pat down” incident to placing him in the police car for the limited period necessary to inquire about the “missing person” report. We are not dealing with a minor motor vehicle or traffic violation which precluded the placement of defendant in the police vehicle and the “pat down” incident thereto. See State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 525-526 (2001) (holding that injury of plaintiff who was detained in negligently parked patrol car that along with another patrol car was struck by thirdparty vehicle did not arise out of use or operation of patrol car within meaning of ttcas motorvehicle waiver rather patrol car merely furnished condition that made injury possible", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nan expectation of privacy is entitled to enhanced protection in a given circumstance.” Joye, supra, 176 N.J. at 613, 826 A.2d at 651. In essence, we conclude that, because the police did not suspect criminal wrongdoing and were not investigating criminal activity, the officers could ask defendant to step out of the car and, incident to their good faith performance of their “community caretaking” function, conduct a “pat down” incident to placing him in the police car for the limited period necessary to inquire about the “missing person” report. We are not dealing with a minor motor vehicle or traffic violation which precluded the placement of defendant in the police vehicle and the “pat down” incident thereto. See State v. Lozada, 92 Ohio St.3d 74, 748 N.E.2d 520, 525-526 (2001) (holding that even a driver not listed as an authorized driver for a rental car could nevertheless have an expectation of privacy if given permission to use the car by an authorized driver" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity. 4. Official Capacity Suits Barrett has sued the defendants in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state agents working in their official capacities unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under § 1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 5.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state and its officers sued in their official capacity for damages are not persons suable under 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity. 4. Official Capacity Suits Barrett has sued the defendants in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state agents working in their official capacities unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under § 1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 5.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not persons under 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity. 4. Official Capacity Suits Barrett has sued the defendants in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state agents working in their official capacities unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under § 1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 5.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that under authority of will v michigan dept of state police 491 us 58 71 109 sct 2304 105 led2d 45 1989 neither the state nor state public service commission officials acting in their official capacities are persons subject to suit under 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity. 4. Official Capacity Suits Barrett has sued the defendants in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state agents working in their official capacities unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under § 1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 5.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntacitly approved the policy. Accordingly, I will allow the action to proceed against Stanley in his individual capacity. 4. Official Capacity Suits Barrett has sued the defendants in their official capacities. It is well-settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state entities and state agents working in their official capacities unless the state has expressly waived immunity, which has not been done by New Hampshire for actions brought under § 1983. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (absent waiver, neither a State nor agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 5.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPlaintiff, need not specifically reference the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave, she must put the University on notice that her request is for FMLA leave. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave in her letter dated March 21,' 2011, but only suggested that she might need to take leave. The purpose .of the letter was to request an extension of her review which Plaintiff was previously advised could be denied. Based on the undisputed facts of the record, no FMLA violation has been demonstrated, and certainly, no willful or reckless violation of the FMLA is presented. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Count V as well using either of the dates that Plaintiff submits. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends t (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the failure to object to the magistrate judges report releases the court from its duty to independently review the motion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPlaintiff, need not specifically reference the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave, she must put the University on notice that her request is for FMLA leave. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave in her letter dated March 21,' 2011, but only suggested that she might need to take leave. The purpose .of the letter was to request an extension of her review which Plaintiff was previously advised could be denied. Based on the undisputed facts of the record, no FMLA violation has been demonstrated, and certainly, no willful or reckless violation of the FMLA is presented. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Count V as well using either of the dates that Plaintiff submits. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends t (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that under current eleventh circuit rule the failure to object limits the scope of our appellate review to plain error review of the magistrate judges factual findings however failure to object to the magistrate judges legal conclusions does not preclude the party from challenging those conclusions on appeal", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPlaintiff, need not specifically reference the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave, she must put the University on notice that her request is for FMLA leave. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave in her letter dated March 21,' 2011, but only suggested that she might need to take leave. The purpose .of the letter was to request an extension of her review which Plaintiff was previously advised could be denied. Based on the undisputed facts of the record, no FMLA violation has been demonstrated, and certainly, no willful or reckless violation of the FMLA is presented. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Count V as well using either of the dates that Plaintiff submits. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends t (11th Cir. 2013) (holding failure to timely object to magistrate judges recommendation waives appellate review of factual and legal questions", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPlaintiff, need not specifically reference the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave, she must put the University on notice that her request is for FMLA leave. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave in her letter dated March 21,' 2011, but only suggested that she might need to take leave. The purpose .of the letter was to request an extension of her review which Plaintiff was previously advised could be denied. Based on the undisputed facts of the record, no FMLA violation has been demonstrated, and certainly, no willful or reckless violation of the FMLA is presented. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Count V as well using either of the dates that Plaintiff submits. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends t (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that under the firm waiver rule a party who fails to make a timely objection to the magistrate judges findings and recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nPlaintiff, need not specifically reference the FMLA when requesting FMLA leave, she must put the University on notice that her request is for FMLA leave. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff did not request FMLA leave in her letter dated March 21,' 2011, but only suggested that she might need to take leave. The purpose .of the letter was to request an extension of her review which Plaintiff was previously advised could be denied. Based on the undisputed facts of the record, no FMLA violation has been demonstrated, and certainly, no willful or reckless violation of the FMLA is presented. As such, summary judgment should be granted on Count V as well using either of the dates that Plaintiff submits. III. RECOMMENDATION Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends t (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that failure to object to magistrate judges recommendation waived issue on appeal" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1964). Thus, the State agencies return to their point, discussed above, that Congressional action is necessary to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. {45} We do not find the argument persuasive. It is Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the “just compensation” remedy found in the Takings Clause that abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 5 gives Congress the power to create remedies, if Congress decides any are necessary, to enforce the rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment, including those found in Section 1. An example of such legislation, protecting against the denial of due process is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1964). Thus, the State agencies return to their point, discussed above, that Congressional action is necessary to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. {45} We do not find the argument persuasive. It is Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the “just compensation” remedy found in the Takings Clause that abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 5 gives Congress the power to create remedies, if Congress decides any are necessary, to enforce the rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment, including those found in Section 1. An example of such legislation, protecting against the denial of due process is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (holding that title ii of the ada was a valid use of congress power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1964). Thus, the State agencies return to their point, discussed above, that Congressional action is necessary to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. {45} We do not find the argument persuasive. It is Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the “just compensation” remedy found in the Takings Clause that abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 5 gives Congress the power to create remedies, if Congress decides any are necessary, to enforce the rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment, including those found in Section 1. An example of such legislation, protecting against the denial of due process is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1964). Thus, the State agencies return to their point, discussed above, that Congressional action is necessary to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. {45} We do not find the argument persuasive. It is Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the “just compensation” remedy found in the Takings Clause that abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 5 gives Congress the power to create remedies, if Congress decides any are necessary, to enforce the rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment, including those found in Section 1. An example of such legislation, protecting against the denial of due process is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (holding that congress may abrogate a states immunity pursuant to its enforcement power under 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(1964). Thus, the State agencies return to their point, discussed above, that Congressional action is necessary to enforce the Takings Clause against the states. {45} We do not find the argument persuasive. It is Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in conjunction with the “just compensation” remedy found in the Takings Clause that abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 5 gives Congress the power to create remedies, if Congress decides any are necessary, to enforce the rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment, including those found in Section 1. An example of such legislation, protecting against the denial of due process is Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12101; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (holding that title ii does not apply to the states" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrelies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis’s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrelies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis’s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrelies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis’s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (holding that felony conviction for which imposition of sentence was stayed could be counted as prior felony conviction under sentencing guidelines", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrelies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis’s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (holding uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be sentence enhancer", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrelies, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), involved a status-offense statute. The defendant in Lewis was charged with the federal offense of possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony by a state court. He attempted to defend on the ground that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to counsel in connection with the predicate felony conviction. The United States Supreme Court rejected Lewis’s challenge, concluding that Congress had manifested no intent to permit collateral attacks upon prior state convictions in federal criminal proceedings. Id. at .60. The Court distinguished the status-offense statute in Lewis from cases that involved penalty-enhancement statutes where the sentence was overturned. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (holding that uncounseled conviction could not be considered by court in sentencing defendant after subsequent conviction" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford’s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an “end run around the clear intention of’ the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty’s allegation that Ford’s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court’s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that the imposition of sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford’s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an “end run around the clear intention of’ the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty’s allegation that Ford’s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court’s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford’s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an “end run around the clear intention of’ the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty’s allegation that Ford’s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court’s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that where party had reasonable grounds to believe conduct was in compliance with the district courts order imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted an abuse of discretion", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford’s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an “end run around the clear intention of’ the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty’s allegation that Ford’s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court’s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (holding sanctions order not final where the amount of sanctions had not yet been determined", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe September 19, 1996 order. The district court did not explain the procedural grounds upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford’s policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy. While it is unclear whether the district court intended the order as a sanction for what it perceived as an “end run around the clear intention of’ the March order, slip op. at 1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty’s allegation that Ford’s newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for noncompliance with the court’s March order because the policy which the court restricted in the September order did not violate any clear mandate set fort F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir.1985) (holding district courts dismissal following explicit and reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.’ ” (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (“ ‘The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.’ ” (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (recognizing that the child custody act required that the natural parent presumption must be seriously considered and heavily weighted in favor of the parent but that the presumption is rebutted if the clear and convincing evidence establishes that the best interest of the child is served by awarding custody to the third party", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.’ ” (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (“ ‘The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.’ ” (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.’ ” (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (“ ‘The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.’ ” (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the presumption is that the purchase was a gift to the child and thus no resulting trust arises", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.’ ” (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (“ ‘The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.’ ” (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc 523a5", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich he cannot in good conscience retain or withhold from another who is beneficially entitled to it as where money has been paid by accident, mistake of fact, or fraud, or has been acquired through a breach of trust or the violation of a fiduciary duty.’ ” (quoting SSI Med. Servs. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 500, 392 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1990))); see All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279, 308, 20 S.E.2d 741, 753 (1942) (“ ‘The law will not permit a party to deliberately put his property out of his control for a fraudulent purpose, and then, through intervention of a court of equity, regain the same after his fraudulent purpose has been accom plished.’ ” (quoting Jolly v. Graham, 222 Ill. 550, 78 N.E. 919, 920 (1906))). As to Issue III: Bowen v. Bowen, 352 S.C. 494, 499, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (2003) (holding when real estate is conveyed to a child and consideration is paid by the parent the parent has the burden of proving a gift was not intended" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiscrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC’s investigation into Milliren’s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (holding that an original eeoc charge is sufficient to support a civil suit under the act for any discrimination developed in the course of a reasonable investigation of that charge provided such discrimination was included in the reasonable cause determination of the eeoc", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiscrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC’s investigation into Milliren’s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (holding that statements made to internal investigator of employer were made in an investigation under this subchapter where investigation was pursuant to a charge filed with eeoc", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiscrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC’s investigation into Milliren’s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff stated a discrimination claim despite not including a discrimination heading in eeoc complaint because the facts included in eeoc complaint were sufficient to trigger an investigation into whether plaintiff suffered an adverse action because of his religion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiscrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC’s investigation into Milliren’s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (holding that general employment practices are relevant to eeoc investigation of individual disparate treatment claim", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndiscrimination charge were invalid, the information sought in the subpoena is nonetheless within the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority. During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Milliren additionally alleged that she would be one of only two female LGMs out of 500 LGMs nationwide if she had completed the GMDP and that a female applicant was rejected for a manager position because she had children. Because the EEOC’s investigation into Milliren’s charge of individual gender discrimination revealed potential systemic gender discrimination, the EEOC had the authority to subpoena information relevant to systemic gender discrimination even absent a valid systemic charge by Milliren. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 590 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (holding that the eeoc has authority to investigate a broader picture of discrimination that appears during the investigation of an individual charge" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (holding that act did not bar intentional infliction of emotional distress claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndistributed. Inasmuch as the Ohio Legislature has not expressly adopted a discovery rule in libel and/or invasion of privacy cases and because of the single publication rule, the cause of action as to the plaintiff in her libel and invasion-of-privacy claims accrued in December 1975. Therefore, this Court concludes the present case is not timely filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS The plaintiff Donda R. Morgan also contends that she has brought an independent action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that this cause of action did not accrue until the first time she was aware of the picture. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is a new and recognized theory of a tort action. See Yeager v. Local Union 20, supra (holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntravel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (holding that the judges restriction of the class was not an abuse of discretion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntravel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (holding that an ordinance exempting certain signs from a general sign ban was an unconstitutional contentbased restriction on speech", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntravel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (holding that the specific date restriction set forth in 541a5 controls and that 1306a1 does not eliminate that restriction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntravel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (holding unconstitutional a travel restriction on communist party members", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ntravel to Cuba); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984) (regulation banning most economic transactions in connection with travel to Cuba). 15 . Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 171-72, 99 S.Ct. 471, 58 L.Ed.2d 435 (1978) (statute denying Supplement Security Income benefits to persons outside of the United States for certain periods of time). 16 . Aznavorian, 439 U.S. at 177-78, 99 S.Ct. 471. 17 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14-16, 85 S.Ct. 1271; Agee, 453 U.S. at 306-308, 101 S.Ct. 2766; Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-243, 104 S.Ct. 3026. 18 . See Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 19 . Compare Aptheker at 514, 84 S.Ct. 1659 (holding that restriction on government employee speech was unconstitutionally vague" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nactivity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (holding reliance is still an element of a 10b5 action and that the fraud on the market theory subject to rebuttal is applicable to meet the reliance element in securities fraud cases where corporations make materially misleading statements in an impersonal and efficient market", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nactivity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (holding that a jury could find a nineteen month period of racketeering activity sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nactivity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (holding that three sales of used copy machines as new within approximately two years did not meet the continuity element", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nactivity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (holding that allegations of isolated acts of fraud occurring over an eighteenmonth period did not meet the continuity element", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nactivity in this case, and despite the invocation of other RICO language, the RICO claims must be dismissed because the complaint does not go beyond those labels and language to include sufficient factual allegations that raise a right to relief above a speculative level. This case arises out of a routine commercial dispute involving shippers (or sellers) of a specific and defined amount of paper materials (whether those materials are classified as solid waste or source-separated materials), railroad transporters of those materials, and buyers or potential recipients of the materials. It involves a specific number of railcars, a limited number of victims, and a closed, limited period of time. Moreover, although it appears that there on Ctrs., 863 F.Supp. 447, 460 (E.D.Mich.1994) (holding that a six month closedended period did not satisfy the continuity requirement" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 ¶ 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board’s determination that Mr. Young’s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding that a conviction for florida armed robbery is a crime of violence under the armed career criminal act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 ¶ 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board’s determination that Mr. Young’s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding defendant had no constitutional right to a mitigation specialist or a right to an effective one", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 ¶ 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board’s determination that Mr. Young’s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding a prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 ¶ 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board’s determination that Mr. Young’s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding that no serviceperson has a right to enlist or to reenlist in the armed forces unless specially granted one", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto sign the declination statement. As a result, on January 21, 2003, Military Personnel Flight officials properly executed the declination statement in his absence. See AFI 36-2110 ¶ 2.29.6.3.1. (If the career airman refuses to sign AF Form 964, the Military Personnel Flight will administer the form on behalf of the career airman with an accompanying statement signed by the person who counseled the airman.). Thus, substantial evidence supports the Correction Board’s determination that Mr. Young’s PCS declination statement and the corresponding decimation code were not erroneous or unjust. Because the assignment declination code was appropriate, Mr. Young was not entitled to reenlistment or a promotion prior to his date of separation on April 12, 2005. See Dodson, 988 F.2d at 1208 (holding a party has no standing to appeal unless he or she is an aggrieved party an individual who is not a parent in the eyes of the law has no legal interest in the child and therefore has no standing to appeal" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ncovenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp’s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ncovenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp’s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (holding that persons not parties to a contract did not have standing to seek declaratory judgment on contracts validity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ncovenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp’s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (holding that a licensee who continued paying royalties to the licensor did not have sufficient apprehension of suit giving rise to declaratory judgment subject matter jurisdiction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ncovenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp’s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ncovenant not to sue the licensee. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed.Cir.1995)). Accordingly, a licensor who has implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement. Moreover, in light of LabCorp’s continuing royalty payments on the panel test, Lab-Corp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for which it continues to pay royalties. Cf. Gen-Probe Inc., 359 F.3d at 1382 (holding that immunity applies to suit for declaratory judgment that plaintiff was entitled to continue paying for mudshell at the price specified in its contract with the government" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncouncil’s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant’s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncouncil’s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant’s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (holding that in granting summary judgment the trial courts disregard of the plaintiffs proffered expert testimony was not erroneous because that testimony would go not to the question of whether defendants decision took safety into account but rather would go to the question of the quality of the decision", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncouncil’s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant’s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for mistrial where the trial court sustained defendants objections to a question by the prosecutor containing improper information and instructed the jury to disregard the question", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncouncil’s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant’s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncouncil’s decisions were based on recommendations by the Bureau, those recommendations involved precisely the sort of delegated responsibility that earmarks the exercise of discretionary judgment. Plaintiffs alternative theory appears to be that defendant had a duty to succeed in executing a traffic management strategy that would prevent accidents. That assertion is incorrect. Immunity is not defeated merely because defendant’s choice of traffic management and control devices did not prevent the tragic loss of life in this case or, for that matter, because plaintiffs expert testified that another strategy likely would have been more effective in reducing the incidence of speeding. See Garrison v. Deschutes County, 162 Or App 160, 167-68, 986 P2d 62 (1999), rev allowed 329 Or 650 (2000) (holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.” Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the “same entity” for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a “mere continuation” of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. § 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that personal jurisdiction was lacking when the only contact by defendant with forum state was initiated by plaintiffs counsels paralegal for the sole purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.” Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the “same entity” for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a “mere continuation” of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. § 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.” Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the “same entity” for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a “mere continuation” of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. § 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that foreseeability of causing injury in texas though not determinative is important consideration in establishing minimum contacts", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.” Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the “same entity” for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a “mere continuation” of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. § 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that although an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose thus indicating that it is foreseeable that a particular automobile may cause injury in a forum state foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the due process clause", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nare the jurisdictional contacts of the other for the purposes of the International Shoe due process analysis.” Id. at 653 (emphasis in original). The Court has already determined that Biomeasure and Ipsen Pharma are not the “same entity” for jurisdictional purposes. Accordingly, Ipsen Pharma is not a “mere continuation” of Biomeasure, and it is not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction as a successor-in-interest to Biomeasure. In acquiring the '186 patent, Ipsen Pharma may have submitted to the jurisdiction of the District Court for the District of Columbia, see 35 U.S.C. § 293, but it did not submit to jurisdiction in Louisiana simply because the patent may have arisen out of research in Louisiana. See Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that foreseeability of causing injury in forum state is not sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (“Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (“Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.” (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term “sentence” is not synonymous with the term “jail.” State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that a sentence of incarceration would constitute deliberate indifference to defendants medical needs", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (“Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (“Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.” (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term “sentence” is not synonymous with the term “jail.” State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that the law is clear that when a defen dant is sentenced to a split sentence consisting of incarceration and probation the combined sanction cannot exceed the maximum period of incarceration provided by law", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (“Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (“Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.” (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term “sentence” is not synonymous with the term “jail.” State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that work release qualified as incarceration", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (“Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (“Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.” (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term “sentence” is not synonymous with the term “jail.” State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding a sentence is not limited to period of incarceration", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Keven Bennardo, Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause, 77 La. L. Rev. 21, 21 (2016) (“Restitution is an important component of a criminal offender’s sentence.” (Emphasis added.)); Cortney E. Lollar, What is Criminal Restitution?, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 93, 94 (Iowa 2014) (“Restitution imposed as part of a criminal sentence has become a core component of criminal punishment.” (Emphasis added.)). If the legislature intended the statute to apply narrowly, it could have used narrow language. It did not. As succinctly noted by an appellate court, the term “sentence” is not synonymous with the term “jail.” State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Smarr v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 748 A.2d 799, 801 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding a sentence of imprisonment is considered punitive and therefore criminal contempt if it is limited to a definite period" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States’ government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States’ government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (holding that federal common law allows ex parte interviews as discovery tool and controls even when state law supplies the rule of decision", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States’ government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (holding that ex parte young exception to states sovereign immunity applies only where violation of federal law is ongoing not where federal law was violated only in the past", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States’ government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (holding that minnesota law prohibiting ex parte interviews was not integral to its privilege law but was merely procedural rule and therefore not controlling in diversity action and the federal rules allow ex parte interviews as method of informal discovery", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat she provided to Plaintiff, and Plaintiffs multiple revision surgeries. By its motion in limine, Defendant seeks to interview Dr. Carman, an employee of the United States’ government, ex parte, in advance of her deposition. Plaintiff objects to this ex parte contact with her treating physician, and proposes that the parties interview Dr. Carman concurrently, before her deposition. II. Standard of Review There is no physician-patient privilege under federal statutes, rules or common law. See Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 1993). Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, state law dictates federal liability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “in civil actions and proceedings, with .1991) (holding that preservation of the integrity of maine privilege law limits defendant to formal mechanisms of discovery provided by federal rules which do not allow ex parte interviews absent consent" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the District Council, the Prince George’s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as \"County” interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: \"July 1991.” We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, \"July 1991,” was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant’s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (holding that the exercise of police power was valid where an owner was prohibited from operating a liveiy stable business that was not a nuisance per se", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the District Council, the Prince George’s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as \"County” interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: \"July 1991.” We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, \"July 1991,” was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant’s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (holding that an ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavating was a valid exercise of police power wherein it prevented the defendant from further excavation below the water table", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the District Council, the Prince George’s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as \"County” interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: \"July 1991.” We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, \"July 1991,” was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant’s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the District Council, the Prince George’s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as \"County” interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: \"July 1991.” We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, \"July 1991,” was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant’s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (recognizing a connection between surface and groundwater even where the water table falls below the stream bed", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto the District Council, the Prince George’s County Planning Board, and the County's Department of Environmental Services/Resources as \"County” interchangeably. 3 . The record extract is unclear as to when the sectional map was transmitted. The printed face sheet has a caption which reads: \"July 1991.” We assume that the sectional map is printed or prepared before it is transmitted. Thus, that date, \"July 1991,” was prior to transmittal. At oral argument, counsel for appellee was unable to furnish the actual date of transmittal. [4] 4. Neither party has directed us in their briefs to any provision of the zoning ordinance which would allow appellant’s project to qualify for a special exception or variance permitting the commercial use 94-95, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (holding that an ordinance passed for the health and comfort of the community that prohibited brickmaking in a designated area was a valid exercise of police power" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neasement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant’s permissive use of landowner’s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (recognizing that a temporary use of property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in that property", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neasement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant’s permissive use of landowner’s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neasement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant’s permissive use of landowner’s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (holding that the amendment was a use regulation which was in effect a condition on the use of property in the affected zone", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neasement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant’s permissive use of landowner’s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (holding that adverse inference rule is permissive", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\neasement, i.e., once permission is granted by the landowner there is no longer adverse use or use under a claim of right. Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals correctly cited Williamson as supporting authority for its decision. Rooted in Williamson, the law is well-established that evidence of permissive use defeats the establishment of a prescriptive easement because use that is permissive cannot also be adverse or under a claim of right. See Paine, 400 S.C. at 586, 735 S.E.2d at 538 (quoting Williamson and recognizing that a claimant’s permissive use of landowner’s property cannot begin to ripen into a prescriptive easement until the claimant makes a distinct and positive assertion of right hostile to the landowner); Horry Cnty. v. Laychur, 315 S.C. 364, 434 S.E.2d 259 (1993) (holding that allowing moderate use of the resources on the property was not inconsistent with exclusive use" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the record, she asked the Chancellor to intervene in Simmons’ retaliatory acts. She argues that the complaints -in her letter and the return phone call from System official Gomez suffice to fulfill the requirement to initiate an appeals process before filing suit. The record lacks information regarding the relationship between the System and Lamar, so it is unclear whether addressing an appeal to the Chancellor of the System suffices to comply with the requirement that the employee provide notice to the employer. Given that Simmons — the subject of Ward’s grievance — was president of Lamar, a letter to the System may have been the best informal avenue available to Ward to initiate a grievance. See Upton County, Tex. v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808, 813-14 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (holding in absence of formal procedure a county employees phone call to the county commissioner sufficed to fulfill whistleblower acts requirement to initiate a grievance procedure before filing suit", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the record, she asked the Chancellor to intervene in Simmons’ retaliatory acts. She argues that the complaints -in her letter and the return phone call from System official Gomez suffice to fulfill the requirement to initiate an appeals process before filing suit. The record lacks information regarding the relationship between the System and Lamar, so it is unclear whether addressing an appeal to the Chancellor of the System suffices to comply with the requirement that the employee provide notice to the employer. Given that Simmons — the subject of Ward’s grievance — was president of Lamar, a letter to the System may have been the best informal avenue available to Ward to initiate a grievance. See Upton County, Tex. v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808, 813-14 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (holding that because plaintiffs were reasonable in interpreting defendants grievance procedure to apply only to active employees plaintiffs did not act in bad faith when they alleged that no applicable grievance procedure existed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the record, she asked the Chancellor to intervene in Simmons’ retaliatory acts. She argues that the complaints -in her letter and the return phone call from System official Gomez suffice to fulfill the requirement to initiate an appeals process before filing suit. The record lacks information regarding the relationship between the System and Lamar, so it is unclear whether addressing an appeal to the Chancellor of the System suffices to comply with the requirement that the employee provide notice to the employer. Given that Simmons — the subject of Ward’s grievance — was president of Lamar, a letter to the System may have been the best informal avenue available to Ward to initiate a grievance. See Upton County, Tex. v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808, 813-14 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (holding that a claim based on statements made during a formal grievance procedure was preempted", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the record, she asked the Chancellor to intervene in Simmons’ retaliatory acts. She argues that the complaints -in her letter and the return phone call from System official Gomez suffice to fulfill the requirement to initiate an appeals process before filing suit. The record lacks information regarding the relationship between the System and Lamar, so it is unclear whether addressing an appeal to the Chancellor of the System suffices to comply with the requirement that the employee provide notice to the employer. Given that Simmons — the subject of Ward’s grievance — was president of Lamar, a letter to the System may have been the best informal avenue available to Ward to initiate a grievance. See Upton County, Tex. v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808, 813-14 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (holding that a jail inmate does not have a constitutional entitlement to an adequate grievance procedure and the ineffectiveness or even absence of a grievance procedure does not give rise to a constitutional claim", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the record, she asked the Chancellor to intervene in Simmons’ retaliatory acts. She argues that the complaints -in her letter and the return phone call from System official Gomez suffice to fulfill the requirement to initiate an appeals process before filing suit. The record lacks information regarding the relationship between the System and Lamar, so it is unclear whether addressing an appeal to the Chancellor of the System suffices to comply with the requirement that the employee provide notice to the employer. Given that Simmons — the subject of Ward’s grievance — was president of Lamar, a letter to the System may have been the best informal avenue available to Ward to initiate a grievance. See Upton County, Tex. v. Brown, 960 S.W.2d 808, 813-14 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (holding that an ineffective grievance procedure bars employers defense based on that procedure" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDissent to Order by Judge BEA; Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RESTANI. ORDER The majority opinion is amended as follows: 1. At slip op. 8168, n.15, [607 F.3d at 597 n. 15], the final sentence of the footnote is amended to read: < Furthermore, as discussed above, Malesko also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not seeking recovery against an individual officer. See id. at 73-74, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456. > 2. At s Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDissent to Order by Judge BEA; Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RESTANI. ORDER The majority opinion is amended as follows: 1. At slip op. 8168, n.15, [607 F.3d at 597 n. 15], the final sentence of the footnote is amended to read: < Furthermore, as discussed above, Malesko also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not seeking recovery against an individual officer. See id. at 73-74, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456. > 2. At s Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (recognizing a cause of action for damages against officials who violate constitutional or statutory rights under color of federal law", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDissent to Order by Judge BEA; Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RESTANI. ORDER The majority opinion is amended as follows: 1. At slip op. 8168, n.15, [607 F.3d at 597 n. 15], the final sentence of the footnote is amended to read: < Furthermore, as discussed above, Malesko also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not seeking recovery against an individual officer. See id. at 73-74, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456. > 2. At s Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDissent to Order by Judge BEA; Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RESTANI. ORDER The majority opinion is amended as follows: 1. At slip op. 8168, n.15, [607 F.3d at 597 n. 15], the final sentence of the footnote is amended to read: < Furthermore, as discussed above, Malesko also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not seeking recovery against an individual officer. See id. at 73-74, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456. > 2. At s Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDissent to Order by Judge BEA; Opinion by Judge PAEZ; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge RESTANI. ORDER The majority opinion is amended as follows: 1. At slip op. 8168, n.15, [607 F.3d at 597 n. 15], the final sentence of the footnote is amended to read: < Furthermore, as discussed above, Malesko also relied on the fact that the plaintiff was not seeking recovery against an individual officer. See id. at 73-74, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456. > 2. At s Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (holding that federal officials should enjoy no greater zone of protection when they violate federal constitutional rules than do state officers emphases removed" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailing to obtain a final ruling on the right to consul issue. We agree. In State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 369, 869 P.2d 43 (1994), the Court held that a defendant who does not seek a final ruling on a motion in limine after a court issues a tentative ruling waives any objection to the exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, in State v. Koloske, the Court noted that “[w]hen the trial court refuses to rule, or makes only a tentative ruling subject to evidence developed at trial, the parties are under a duty to raise the issue at the appropriate time with proper objections at trial.” 100 Wn.2d 889, 896, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998) (holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailing to obtain a final ruling on the right to consul issue. We agree. In State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 369, 869 P.2d 43 (1994), the Court held that a defendant who does not seek a final ruling on a motion in limine after a court issues a tentative ruling waives any objection to the exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, in State v. Koloske, the Court noted that “[w]hen the trial court refuses to rule, or makes only a tentative ruling subject to evidence developed at trial, the parties are under a duty to raise the issue at the appropriate time with proper objections at trial.” 100 Wn.2d 889, 896, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998) (holding that the vienna convention must be applied in conformity with the laws and regulations of the united states including the rules for federal habeas relief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailing to obtain a final ruling on the right to consul issue. We agree. In State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 369, 869 P.2d 43 (1994), the Court held that a defendant who does not seek a final ruling on a motion in limine after a court issues a tentative ruling waives any objection to the exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, in State v. Koloske, the Court noted that “[w]hen the trial court refuses to rule, or makes only a tentative ruling subject to evidence developed at trial, the parties are under a duty to raise the issue at the appropriate time with proper objections at trial.” 100 Wn.2d 889, 896, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998) (holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailing to obtain a final ruling on the right to consul issue. We agree. In State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 369, 869 P.2d 43 (1994), the Court held that a defendant who does not seek a final ruling on a motion in limine after a court issues a tentative ruling waives any objection to the exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, in State v. Koloske, the Court noted that “[w]hen the trial court refuses to rule, or makes only a tentative ruling subject to evidence developed at trial, the parties are under a duty to raise the issue at the appropriate time with proper objections at trial.” 100 Wn.2d 889, 896, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998) (holding that infirmities in state habeas proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfailing to obtain a final ruling on the right to consul issue. We agree. In State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 369, 869 P.2d 43 (1994), the Court held that a defendant who does not seek a final ruling on a motion in limine after a court issues a tentative ruling waives any objection to the exclusion of the evidence. Similarly, in State v. Koloske, the Court noted that “[w]hen the trial court refuses to rule, or makes only a tentative ruling subject to evidence developed at trial, the parties are under a duty to raise the issue at the appropriate time with proper objections at trial.” 100 Wn.2d 889, 896, 676 P.2d 456 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 111 Wn.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375-76, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1998) (holding that a petitioner should be permitted to seek habeas review in state court even if there were doubt that the states substantive law would permit a habeas petition" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbe held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another’s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbe held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another’s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (holding that public entities may be held vicariously hable for the negligent acts of their individual employees", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbe held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another’s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbe held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another’s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (holding despite defendants claim that it could not be held hable for infringing acts of thirdparties that defendant could be held liable for foreign third partys infringement if it knew or should have known that third party maru fungs copies of ms metzkes designs would be distributed by nonmay retailers in the united states", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbe held liable for acts of infringement if that defendant is either contribu-torily or vicariously liable for another’s direct act of infringement. Where those acts of infringement occur within the United States and a plaintiff seeks to hold a foreign defendant contributorily or vicariously liable for those acts, it has been held that subject matter jurisdiction may exist, and that the exercise thereof does not conflict with the doctrine of nonextraterri-toriality. See Blue Ribbon Pet Prods., Inc. v. Rolf C. Hagen (USA) Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 454, 461-68 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670(DLC), 1997 WL 218431, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.30, 1997); GB Marketing USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F.Supp. 763, 773 (W.D.N.Y.1991); c.f. Metzke, 878 F.Supp. at 760 (holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under 1981" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndate. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan “did not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play” in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndate. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan “did not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play” in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that a complaint under section 1983 must contain more than naked improbable unsubstantiated assertions without any specifics", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndate. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan “did not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play” in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that a person alleging a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights must do more than simply aver that a conspiracy existed", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndate. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan “did not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play” in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (holding that complaint alleging a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights cannot survive motion to dismiss based on conclusory allegations of conspiracy which are not supported by references to material facts", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndate. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal for a failure to state a conspiracy claim. The Walker court noted that Rule 9 was inapplicable, and held that “it is enough in pleading a conspiracy to merely indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Id. The Walker court also distinguished its holding from its earlier holding in Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 859-60 (7th Cir.1999), which Sanchez cites in support of his specificity argument, because the plaintiff in Ryan “did not so much as hint at what role he might have played or agreed to play” in the alleged conspiracy. Walker, 288 F.3d at 1007; see also, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir.2003) (recognizing that ryan cannot be read to require that a complaint alleging conspiracy under 1983 contain more than notice of time scope and parties involved" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nits end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “the determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.” Id. at 455 (holding that a trial court entered judgment on the pleadings where the decision did not depend on any document outside the pleadings", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nits end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “the determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.” Id. at 455 (holding that district court acted prematurely by dismissing case on the pleadings", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nits end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “the determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.” Id. at 455 (holding that district court erred in dismissing the indictment based on sufficiency of evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nits end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “the determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.” Id. at 455 (holding court must have evidence to support dismissal before dismissing a case for fraud on the court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nits end of their bargain and to deliver what was promised. The striking feature of a typical no-injury class is that the plaintiffs have either not yet experienced a malfunction because of the alleged defect or have experienced a malfunction but not been harmed by it. Therefore, the plaintiffs in a no-injury products liability case have not suffered any physical harm or out-of-pocket economic loss. Here, the damages sought by the Coghlans are not rooted in the alleged defect of the product as such, but in the fact that they did not receive the benefit of their bargain. Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001). The Fifth Circuit also noted that “the determination that there has been no injury in [cases like this] must be an evidentia-ry one.” Id. at 455 (holding that the trial court erred by dismissing the plaintiffs defamation claim" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (“Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.\"). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be \"theoretically\" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that general maritime law preempts state law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (“Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.\"). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be \"theoretically\" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding punitive damages not recoverable for retaliatory discharge claim under general maritime law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (“Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.\"). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be \"theoretically\" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (“Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.\"). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be \"theoretically\" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSee Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401-02, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (“Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts.\"). 3 . If this case were brought under general maritime law, and no cause of action were available under admiralty statutes, punitive damages would be \"theoretically\" available. Furka v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 755 F.2d 1085, 1091 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985). But see Boykin v. Bergesen D.Y. A/S, 822 F.Supp. 324, 326 (E.D.Va.1993) (recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the result of the original criminal case”). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code § 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (recognizing that an ohio court should apply local law unless a party meets the burden of showing that foreign law requires a different result", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the result of the original criminal case”). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code § 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (holding that conviction will not be reversed unless there is a reasonable likelihood that but for attorneys errors the result of the proceeding would have been different", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the result of the original criminal case”). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code § 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (holding section 8223 requires likelihood that result would be different", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the result of the original criminal case”). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code § 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (holding claim requires showing that additional evidence would have been produced that might have led to a different decision", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave changed the result of the original criminal case”). The State contends and the trial court apparently believed that the nexus test mirrors the requirements for a substantive claim for postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. See Iowa Code § 822.2(4). To succeed on such a claim an applicant must establish, among other things, that the newly discovered evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching, and would probably have changed the outcome of the trial. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991). Although our prior cases have never equated the requirements for the ground-of-fact exception with a newly-diseovered-evidence claim for relief, the language used in our cases dealing with both concepts is similar. Compare Dible, 557 N.W.2d at 884 (holding state law governs property interests in bankruptcy proceedings unless some federal interest requires a different result " ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) (\"Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue”); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (holding that the mechanical failure of the petitioners car on the way to the hearing did not constitute exceptional circumstances where petitioners returned home instead of finding transportation to the hearing and made only a cursory effort to contact the court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) (\"Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue”); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (holding that confusion as to a hearing time does not amount to exceptional circumstances", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) (\"Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue”); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (holding that the petitioners traffic difficulties did not constitute exceptional circumstances", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) (\"Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue”); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (holding that the exceptional circumstances test does not apply to declaratory judgment actions", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould be presented in a formal motion for a continuance or a change of venue. Cf. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) (\"Petitioner's argument for his absence is intertwined with his argument for a change of venue”); Patel v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.1986) (concluding that the petitioner did not establish reasonable cause for his absence and that the denial of his motion for a continuance was not an abuse of discretion). In an emergency situation such as existed here, however, at least a phone call explaining the circumstances was required to preserve a potential challenge to the IJ's authority to enter an in absentia order. We express no view regarding the existence vel non of reasonable cause under the facts of this case. 7 . Cf. Sharma, 89 F.3d at 547 (holding that petitioners divorce was a purely personal change in circumstances that does not constitute changed conditions or circumstances in jordan" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of § 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of § 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that the burden of proving lack of negligence is on the owner", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of § 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of § 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that the burden of proving that the employee did not make reasonable efforts is on the defendant", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of § 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of § 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that the silence of the class action fairness act regarding the burden of proving removal jurisdiction indicated congressional intent to leave intact the common law rule placing the burden on the defendant", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of § 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of § 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982) (interpreting the Commodity Exchange Act in light of preenactment case law). In 2002, the prevailing case law in the lower federal courts interpreted the language of § 9(e) to mean that the limitations period could be commenced upon some form of inquiry notice. By choosing language nearly identical to the language of § 9(e), Congress implicitly approved of that case law. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946 (interpreting Title IX to provide a private cause of action because Congress used language identical to that found in Title VI, which had already been interpreted by the courts to provide a private cause of action); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that the defendant bears the burden of proving outside contact with the jury" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that “essentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made” did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (holding that to meet his burden the plaintiff must show more than a few isolated incidents and that evidence solely of sporadic discrimination does not suffice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that “essentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made” did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (holding that to establish a hostile work environment plaintiff must prove more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity and cjasual comments or accidental or sporadic conversation will not trigger equitable relief pursuant to the statute", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that “essentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made” did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that “essentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made” did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (holding that a plaintiff does not make a sufficient showing of a pervasively hostile work environment with a few isolated incidents but must show a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\neither that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (citations omitted). Faced with facts very similar to those in the instant case, the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that “essentially three incidents of racial animosity by a co-worker spanning over 25 months, with each incident separated by a full year, during which time no racial slurs were made” did not raise a triable issue of hostile work environment harassment. Arroyo v. Westlb Admin., Inc., 2000 WL 562425, *2, No. 99-7942, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 9528, at *6 (2d Cir. May 9, 2000) ; see also Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d. Cir.1986) (holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nalso paying the defending party’s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer’s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer’s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (“[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror’s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]”); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nalso paying the defending party’s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer’s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer’s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (“[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror’s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]”); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nalso paying the defending party’s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer’s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer’s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (“[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror’s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]”); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that defendant has failed to provide any support for the novel argument that plaintiff should be denied fees because in defendants view plaintiffs counsel acted unreasonably in failing to accept defendants settlement offer and that consideration of settlement discussions on a motion for attorneys fees is barred by federal rule of evidence 408", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nalso paying the defending party’s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer’s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer’s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (“[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror’s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]”); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nalso paying the defending party’s post-offer costs. Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63. Because the Rule 68 offeree does not have the luxury of refusing the offer to assure that she has not bound herself to any terms that may later become unfavorable, she may construe the offer’s terms strictly, see id., and ambiguities in the offer are to be resolved against the offeror, Nordby, 199 F.3d at 393; Nusom v. Comh Woodbwm, Inc., 122 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir.1997). Evidence extrinsic to the offer’s terms should not be considered. See Chambers v. Manning, 169 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.Conn.1996) (citing cases); Said, 130 F.R.D. at 63 (“[Cjourts should be reluctant to allow the offeror’s extrinsic evidence to affect th[e] construction [of the Rule 68 offer.]”); see also Clark v. Sims, 28 F.3d 420, 424 (4th Cir.1994) (holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg’s policy manual. But the parties’ undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC”) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a \"failure to accommodate” claim is a claim for \"disparate treatment” and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a \"disparate treatment” claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (holding that to demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsels deficient performance that caused a defendant to forgo a favorable plea offer a defendant must show that he would have accepted the offer to plead and that there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accepted or implemented", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg’s policy manual. But the parties’ undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC”) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a \"failure to accommodate” claim is a claim for \"disparate treatment” and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a \"disparate treatment” claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (holding that it was reasonable that counsel would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible polygraph evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg’s policy manual. But the parties’ undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC”) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a \"failure to accommodate” claim is a claim for \"disparate treatment” and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a \"disparate treatment” claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (holding that to prove ineffectiveness where defendant rejected plea offer upon advice of counsel defendant must show he would have accepted the offer had counsel advised correctly the state would not have withdrawn its offer the court would have accepted the offer and the resulting sentence would have been less severe", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg’s policy manual. But the parties’ undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC”) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a \"failure to accommodate” claim is a claim for \"disparate treatment” and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a \"disparate treatment” claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (holding police departments offer for officer who objected for religious reasons to being assigned to guard abortion clinic to transfer to another district that would not require such duty was a reasonable accommodation because it would have eliminated conflict", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.. 1 . In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs assert that Tabura and Diaz each had 160 hours of paid time off, citing Kellogg’s policy manual. But the parties’ undisputed facts before the district court indicated, instead, that Diaz earned 200 hours paid time off annually. 2 . On appeal, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (\"EEOC”) filed an amicus brief on Plaintiffs' behalf and participated in oral argument. 3 . The Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2031-32, 192 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015), indicated that a \"failure to accommodate” claim is a claim for \"disparate treatment” and thus must ultimately satisfy the general elements of a \"disparate treatment” claim. 4 . McDonnell D r. 1998) (holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFirst, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. ¶ 17 (alleging that Groff “segregated” Plaintiff “[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion”). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (holding that a failure to make out a hostile work environment claim effectively disposes of the constructive discharge claim as well", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFirst, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. ¶ 17 (alleging that Groff “segregated” Plaintiff “[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion”). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (recognizing that a constructive discharge claim and a hostile work environment claim are not equivalent because a constructive discharge claim imposes a higher standard", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFirst, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. ¶ 17 (alleging that Groff “segregated” Plaintiff “[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion”). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (holding defendants belief that his work was unfairly criticized is not sufficient for constructive discharge", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFirst, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. ¶ 17 (alleging that Groff “segregated” Plaintiff “[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion”). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (holding that nonselection for a desirable position assignment to undesirable duties sharing a small office and being criticized did not make out a hostile work environment causing constructive discharge", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFirst, the proposed Second Amended Complaint makes clear that Plaintiff was separated from her colleagues before she brought her discrimination claim to HR. See id. ¶ 17 (alleging that Groff “segregated” Plaintiff “[s]hortly after denying [her] request for a promotion”). Accordingly, there can be no causal relationship between her complaint to HR and that conduct. Second, Plaintiff does not specify when Defendant reduced her break time or subjected her attendance to more scrutiny, so the court cannot infer that those actions arose in response to her protected activity. In any event, even if those acts did commence after Plaintiff first exercised her statutory rights, they do not support a hostile work environment claim. See Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 130-31 (D.G. Cir. 2006) (holding that a claim of constructive discharge requires a showing of harassment that is more severe and pervasive than that required to show a hostile work environment" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactor seven, the relative bargaining power of the parties, weighs against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of equal bargaining power does not meet Bank of America’s burden to produce prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In short, in the record before us, Bank of America produced no evidence showing that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional right to trial by a jury. No evidence exists that Martin and Powell’s waiver of their constitutional right to trial by a jury was an “intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” as required by In re Prudential. 148 S.W.3d at 132; RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 814 (holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactor seven, the relative bargaining power of the parties, weighs against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of equal bargaining power does not meet Bank of America’s burden to produce prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In short, in the record before us, Bank of America produced no evidence showing that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional right to trial by a jury. No evidence exists that Martin and Powell’s waiver of their constitutional right to trial by a jury was an “intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” as required by In re Prudential. 148 S.W.3d at 132; RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 814 (recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactor seven, the relative bargaining power of the parties, weighs against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of equal bargaining power does not meet Bank of America’s burden to produce prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In short, in the record before us, Bank of America produced no evidence showing that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional right to trial by a jury. No evidence exists that Martin and Powell’s waiver of their constitutional right to trial by a jury was an “intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” as required by In re Prudential. 148 S.W.3d at 132; RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 814 (holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactor seven, the relative bargaining power of the parties, weighs against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of equal bargaining power does not meet Bank of America’s burden to produce prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In short, in the record before us, Bank of America produced no evidence showing that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional right to trial by a jury. No evidence exists that Martin and Powell’s waiver of their constitutional right to trial by a jury was an “intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” as required by In re Prudential. 148 S.W.3d at 132; RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 814 (holding under similar facts as a matter of law that a knowing and voluntary waiver of powells right to a jury trial has not been demonstrated", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfactor seven, the relative bargaining power of the parties, weighs against a finding that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily made the waiver. An absence of evidence of equal bargaining power does not meet Bank of America’s burden to produce prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. In short, in the record before us, Bank of America produced no evidence showing that Martin and Powell knowingly and voluntarily waived their constitutional right to trial by a jury. No evidence exists that Martin and Powell’s waiver of their constitutional right to trial by a jury was an “intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences” as required by In re Prudential. 148 S.W.3d at 132; RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F.Supp.2d at 814 (holding waiver of right to counsel not voluntary and knowing when defendant terminated counsel and requested another attorney but the trial court would allow delay and appointment only upon waiver of speedy trial right" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWainwright v. Norris, No. 94-3525 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997) (order denying motion to recall mandate). We see nothing in the Board’s ruling foreclosing consideration of the merits of Wainwright’s request for mercy now, when the request is truly Wainwright’s last chance. In the second action, Wainwright asserts his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because the Governor of Arkansas and his executive clemency assistant have actual conflicts of interest. Wainwright also asserts he was denied his due proces k.) (rejecting civil rights claim that clemency decision by biased Governor violates due process or equal protection), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Joubert v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 87 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.) (holding no procedural or fundamental constitutional right creates a protected interest in standardless clemency statute absent a constitutionally protected interest clemency statute only provides a statecreated right to ask for mercy", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWainwright v. Norris, No. 94-3525 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997) (order denying motion to recall mandate). We see nothing in the Board’s ruling foreclosing consideration of the merits of Wainwright’s request for mercy now, when the request is truly Wainwright’s last chance. In the second action, Wainwright asserts his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because the Governor of Arkansas and his executive clemency assistant have actual conflicts of interest. Wainwright also asserts he was denied his due proces k.) (rejecting civil rights claim that clemency decision by biased Governor violates due process or equal protection), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Joubert v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 87 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.) (holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWainwright v. Norris, No. 94-3525 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997) (order denying motion to recall mandate). We see nothing in the Board’s ruling foreclosing consideration of the merits of Wainwright’s request for mercy now, when the request is truly Wainwright’s last chance. In the second action, Wainwright asserts his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because the Governor of Arkansas and his executive clemency assistant have actual conflicts of interest. Wainwright also asserts he was denied his due proces k.) (rejecting civil rights claim that clemency decision by biased Governor violates due process or equal protection), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Joubert v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 87 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.) (holding there is no constitutionally protected interest in how the nebraska board of pardons receives a clemency request or in having unbiased decisionmakers on the board right to consideration of clemency not violated when decisionmaker is predisposed", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWainwright v. Norris, No. 94-3525 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997) (order denying motion to recall mandate). We see nothing in the Board’s ruling foreclosing consideration of the merits of Wainwright’s request for mercy now, when the request is truly Wainwright’s last chance. In the second action, Wainwright asserts his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because the Governor of Arkansas and his executive clemency assistant have actual conflicts of interest. Wainwright also asserts he was denied his due proces k.) (rejecting civil rights claim that clemency decision by biased Governor violates due process or equal protection), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Joubert v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 87 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.) (holding that the board as constituted on the date that the original complaint was filed is the board for purposes of evaluating whether demand is required or excused", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWainwright v. Norris, No. 94-3525 (8th Cir. Jan. 2, 1997) (order denying motion to recall mandate). We see nothing in the Board’s ruling foreclosing consideration of the merits of Wainwright’s request for mercy now, when the request is truly Wainwright’s last chance. In the second action, Wainwright asserts his equal protection, due process, and Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because the Governor of Arkansas and his executive clemency assistant have actual conflicts of interest. Wainwright also asserts he was denied his due proces k.) (rejecting civil rights claim that clemency decision by biased Governor violates due process or equal protection), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Joubert v. Nebraska Bd. of Pardons, 87 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.) (holding the issue of use can be necessary to the adjudication by the board of adjustment of the underlying request for a variance when the issue is raised in the context of an issue the board of adjustment is required to decide" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproceeding, Plaintiff received more than adequate process in this case. Plaintiff admitted then and admits now that he engaged in the relevant conduct regarding the Big Splash account. He merely contended that his actions were implicitly authorized by Miller’s “off the radar” comments, and the Trustees were aware of this alleged authorization. During the executive session, Trustees heard from Plaintiff and Miller, the only two people privy to the alleged conversation during which Miller instructed Plaintiff to keep it “off the radar.” Under these circumstances, Plaintiff was not denied adequate procedural due process based on his inability to present and cross-examine witnesses. Cf. McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, Mayes Cnty., Okla., 228 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that the state courts factfinding procedure was adequate even though it did not hold an evidentiary hearing because hearing as used in 2254d does not require a trialtype hearing at which live testimony is presented and the accused has the opportunity to crossexamine witnesses", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproceeding, Plaintiff received more than adequate process in this case. Plaintiff admitted then and admits now that he engaged in the relevant conduct regarding the Big Splash account. He merely contended that his actions were implicitly authorized by Miller’s “off the radar” comments, and the Trustees were aware of this alleged authorization. During the executive session, Trustees heard from Plaintiff and Miller, the only two people privy to the alleged conversation during which Miller instructed Plaintiff to keep it “off the radar.” Under these circumstances, Plaintiff was not denied adequate procedural due process based on his inability to present and cross-examine witnesses. Cf. McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, Mayes Cnty., Okla., 228 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.2000) (holding a due process claim failed because the plaintiff did not seek to require a witnessess attendance at a posttermination grievance hearing and was not inhibited or restricted from doing so", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproceeding, Plaintiff received more than adequate process in this case. Plaintiff admitted then and admits now that he engaged in the relevant conduct regarding the Big Splash account. He merely contended that his actions were implicitly authorized by Miller’s “off the radar” comments, and the Trustees were aware of this alleged authorization. During the executive session, Trustees heard from Plaintiff and Miller, the only two people privy to the alleged conversation during which Miller instructed Plaintiff to keep it “off the radar.” Under these circumstances, Plaintiff was not denied adequate procedural due process based on his inability to present and cross-examine witnesses. Cf. McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, Mayes Cnty., Okla., 228 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiff did not receive adequate process during posttermination hearing because she was not given opportunity to crossexamine witnesses accusing her of drinking on the job and coming to school inebriated", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproceeding, Plaintiff received more than adequate process in this case. Plaintiff admitted then and admits now that he engaged in the relevant conduct regarding the Big Splash account. He merely contended that his actions were implicitly authorized by Miller’s “off the radar” comments, and the Trustees were aware of this alleged authorization. During the executive session, Trustees heard from Plaintiff and Miller, the only two people privy to the alleged conversation during which Miller instructed Plaintiff to keep it “off the radar.” Under these circumstances, Plaintiff was not denied adequate procedural due process based on his inability to present and cross-examine witnesses. Cf. McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, Mayes Cnty., Okla., 228 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that doctor who was suspected of drinking on the job posed a direct threat although she had not injured any patients", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nproceeding, Plaintiff received more than adequate process in this case. Plaintiff admitted then and admits now that he engaged in the relevant conduct regarding the Big Splash account. He merely contended that his actions were implicitly authorized by Miller’s “off the radar” comments, and the Trustees were aware of this alleged authorization. During the executive session, Trustees heard from Plaintiff and Miller, the only two people privy to the alleged conversation during which Miller instructed Plaintiff to keep it “off the radar.” Under these circumstances, Plaintiff was not denied adequate procedural due process based on his inability to present and cross-examine witnesses. Cf. McClure v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 16, Mayes Cnty., Okla., 228 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.2000) (holding that a nameclearing hearing for a terminated city attorney satisfied due process even though he was not allowed to crossexamine witnesses because he had ample opportunity to refute the charges against him" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ 107(a) of CERCLA. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424. Before a court may award contribution under § 113(f)(1), the court must first find that the defendant is liable under § 107(a). The court must then determine the proper allocation of response costs in an equitable manner. The burden of proof for both of these requirements rests with Durham, the party seeking contribution. Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 168. 33. A plaintiff need not prove that a specific defendant’s waste caused a specific incurrence of clean-up costs. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.1993). 34. CERCLA further permits a declaratory judgment allocating future response costs between PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2); see Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 91, 92 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that the proper remedy for future response costs is not a present lumpsum payment of anticipated expenses but instead a declaratory judgment award dividing future response costs among prps", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ 107(a) of CERCLA. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424. Before a court may award contribution under § 113(f)(1), the court must first find that the defendant is liable under § 107(a). The court must then determine the proper allocation of response costs in an equitable manner. The burden of proof for both of these requirements rests with Durham, the party seeking contribution. Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 168. 33. A plaintiff need not prove that a specific defendant’s waste caused a specific incurrence of clean-up costs. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.1993). 34. CERCLA further permits a declaratory judgment allocating future response costs between PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2); see Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 91, 92 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ 107(a) of CERCLA. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424. Before a court may award contribution under § 113(f)(1), the court must first find that the defendant is liable under § 107(a). The court must then determine the proper allocation of response costs in an equitable manner. The burden of proof for both of these requirements rests with Durham, the party seeking contribution. Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 168. 33. A plaintiff need not prove that a specific defendant’s waste caused a specific incurrence of clean-up costs. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.1993). 34. CERCLA further permits a declaratory judgment allocating future response costs between PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2); see Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 91, 92 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that declaratory relief only appropriate once some expenditure has been made toward necessary response costs", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ 107(a) of CERCLA. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424. Before a court may award contribution under § 113(f)(1), the court must first find that the defendant is liable under § 107(a). The court must then determine the proper allocation of response costs in an equitable manner. The burden of proof for both of these requirements rests with Durham, the party seeking contribution. Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 168. 33. A plaintiff need not prove that a specific defendant’s waste caused a specific incurrence of clean-up costs. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.1993). 34. CERCLA further permits a declaratory judgment allocating future response costs between PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2); see Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 91, 92 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that expenses refers to costs", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n§ 107(a) of CERCLA. Bedford Affiliates, 156 F.3d at 424. Before a court may award contribution under § 113(f)(1), the court must first find that the defendant is liable under § 107(a). The court must then determine the proper allocation of response costs in an equitable manner. The burden of proof for both of these requirements rests with Durham, the party seeking contribution. Goodrich Corp., 311 F.3d at 168. 33. A plaintiff need not prove that a specific defendant’s waste caused a specific incurrence of clean-up costs. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.1993). 34. CERCLA further permits a declaratory judgment allocating future response costs between PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2); see Gussack Realty Co. v. Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 91, 92 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that court of appeals statutory jurisdiction over final orders of removal extends to reinstatement orders", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing that both final and nonfinal orders may be the subject of motions for reconsideration", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that orders remanding an action to a federal agency are generally not considered final appealable orders", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nORDER Petitioner Beniamino Baldi, a native and citizen of Italy, seeks review of the June 7, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Beniamino Baldi, No. A012 099 608 (B.I.A. June 7, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case. While we generally lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal issued against an alien, such as Baldi, who was found removable by reason of having committed an aggravated felony, we retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims or questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing that orders denying motions to reopen are treated as final orders of removal" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFelipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O’Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a 2 claim", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFelipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O’Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that a defendants personal involvement in an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights is a necessary element of a 1983 complaint", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFelipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O’Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (recognizing such a claim under 1983", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFelipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O’Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (holding an allegation of damages is a necessary element of any claim under 2605", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFelipe Lugo, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action without leave to amend. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000), and we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1310 (9th Cir.1982). We affirm. The district court correctly dismissed Lugo’s complaint because he failed to allege that the defendants were acting under color of state law. See O’Guinn v. Lovel-ock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2007) (recognizing that allegation of state action is a necessary element of a 1983 claim" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens’ opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a “reasonableness” standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O’Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (holding the same under blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens’ opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a “reasonableness” standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O’Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531159 led2d 403 2004 did not overrule almendareztorres v united states 523 us 224 118 sct 1219 140 led2d 350 1998", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens’ opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a “reasonableness” standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O’Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (holding that after blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 statutory maximum is the maximum that this particular defendant can face in light of his criminal history and the facts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens’ opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a “reasonableness” standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O’Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (holding that blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004 and state v schofield 2005 me 82 895 a2d 927 do not retroactively apply to cases on collateral review", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment concern addressed in Justice Stevens’ opinion, see supra, the Court nevertheless believes that, under a “reasonableness” standard, it has the obligation to take any Sixth Amendment concerns it has into account in order to reconcile the holdings in both parts of the majorities of the Booker deci sion. In this case, while Defendant believed he was sending child pornography to a minor, he actually distributed such pornography to an adult undercover police officer. Under Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker, the Court would have held that the Government had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant distributed child pornography to a minor, as the police officer was not a minor. See United States v. O’Daniel, 328 F.Supp.2d 1168, 1183 (N.D.Okla.2004) (holding that the safety valve provision of 18 usc 3553f is not unconstitutional under apprendi 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 or blakely v washington 542 us 296 124 sct 2531 159 led2d 403 2004" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n. . . .” Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein — an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (recognizing right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n. . . .” Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein — an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n. . . .” Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein — an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (recognizing that state constitution provides mentally ill persons with certain fundamental liberty interests such as the right to be free from unjustified intrusion upon their personal security", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n. . . .” Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein — an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (holding that terminally ill patients do not have a fundamental liberty interest in committing suicide", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n. . . .” Rich, 39 N.H. at 336. In Little we said: [An act] mak[ing] the parties to pending suits, not excepted from its operation, competent witnesses on the trial thereof,... is not unconstitutional as being retrospective . . . inasmuch as it establishes no new rule for the decision of those causes, and violates no vested rights of the parties thereto, but is a mere regulation of the proceeding for enforcing remedies, by prescribing a rule for the admission of existing evidence therein — an exercise of the acknowledged powers of every government. Little, 39 N.H. at 509. Thus, we affirm our prior holdings and conclude that the statutory and other similar evidentiary privileges abrogated by RSA 135-E:10, I, are creatures of public policy and subject to retrospective alteration or e 3) (holding right to be fundamental" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na theory not authorized by law. This difference sufficiently distinguishes the opinion in Arteaga from the facts of this case and renders application of Bowen and its progeny inappropriate. In this case, the verdict rendered by the jury was a general one—meaning, we are unable to determine whether some or all of the jurors believed Appellant was guilty of murder based upon a theory authorized by law (intentional or knowing conduct) or upon a theory not authorized by law (reckless or criminally negligent conduct). Because the record supports both possibilities, the appropriate remedy is not to acquit or to reform the judgment of conviction. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (holding that a jury verdict will be sustained on any reasonable theory based on the evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na theory not authorized by law. This difference sufficiently distinguishes the opinion in Arteaga from the facts of this case and renders application of Bowen and its progeny inappropriate. In this case, the verdict rendered by the jury was a general one—meaning, we are unable to determine whether some or all of the jurors believed Appellant was guilty of murder based upon a theory authorized by law (intentional or knowing conduct) or upon a theory not authorized by law (reckless or criminally negligent conduct). Because the record supports both possibilities, the appropriate remedy is not to acquit or to reform the judgment of conviction. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (holding that remand for resentencing is appropriate when sentence for reversed conviction appears to have influenced trial courts sentence for the affirmed conviction", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na theory not authorized by law. This difference sufficiently distinguishes the opinion in Arteaga from the facts of this case and renders application of Bowen and its progeny inappropriate. In this case, the verdict rendered by the jury was a general one—meaning, we are unable to determine whether some or all of the jurors believed Appellant was guilty of murder based upon a theory authorized by law (intentional or knowing conduct) or upon a theory not authorized by law (reckless or criminally negligent conduct). Because the record supports both possibilities, the appropriate remedy is not to acquit or to reform the judgment of conviction. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (holding remand for a new trial to be the appropriate remedy when conviction was based on a general jury verdict encompassing both a constitutional and an unconstitutional theory of conviction", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na theory not authorized by law. This difference sufficiently distinguishes the opinion in Arteaga from the facts of this case and renders application of Bowen and its progeny inappropriate. In this case, the verdict rendered by the jury was a general one—meaning, we are unable to determine whether some or all of the jurors believed Appellant was guilty of murder based upon a theory authorized by law (intentional or knowing conduct) or upon a theory not authorized by law (reckless or criminally negligent conduct). Because the record supports both possibilities, the appropriate remedy is not to acquit or to reform the judgment of conviction. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\na theory not authorized by law. This difference sufficiently distinguishes the opinion in Arteaga from the facts of this case and renders application of Bowen and its progeny inappropriate. In this case, the verdict rendered by the jury was a general one—meaning, we are unable to determine whether some or all of the jurors believed Appellant was guilty of murder based upon a theory authorized by law (intentional or knowing conduct) or upon a theory not authorized by law (reckless or criminally negligent conduct). Because the record supports both possibilities, the appropriate remedy is not to acquit or to reform the judgment of conviction. The appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (holding that the appropriate remedy for a trial courts refusal to consider an indigent defendants request for new counsel is to remand for a hearing" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto alter or amend judgment did not fill the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court denied Experian’s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian’s motion if it still had jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and good cause existed for placing Experian’s documents under seal. Because the documents at issue here were attached to a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the proper standard. A determination by the district court that good cause exists for sealing Experian’s documents does not establish that there are “compelling reasons” to do so. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (holding that a good cause showing will not suffice to fulfill the compelling reasons standard that a party must meet to rebut the presumption of access to dispositive pleadings and attachments", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto alter or amend judgment did not fill the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court denied Experian’s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian’s motion if it still had jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and good cause existed for placing Experian’s documents under seal. Because the documents at issue here were attached to a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the proper standard. A determination by the district court that good cause exists for sealing Experian’s documents does not establish that there are “compelling reasons” to do so. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (holding that to gain a protective order the party must make particularized showing of good cause with respect to any individual document", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto alter or amend judgment did not fill the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court denied Experian’s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian’s motion if it still had jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and good cause existed for placing Experian’s documents under seal. Because the documents at issue here were attached to a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the proper standard. A determination by the district court that good cause exists for sealing Experian’s documents does not establish that there are “compelling reasons” to do so. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (holding that intervening conduct may be used to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto alter or amend judgment did not fill the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court denied Experian’s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian’s motion if it still had jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and good cause existed for placing Experian’s documents under seal. Because the documents at issue here were attached to a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the proper standard. A determination by the district court that good cause exists for sealing Experian’s documents does not establish that there are “compelling reasons” to do so. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (holding that once a court has found good cause to protect material from public disclosure there is no longer any commonlaw right of access to this material and the party seeking disclosure must present sufficiently compelling reasons why the sealed discovery document should be released", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto alter or amend judgment did not fill the gap. With the case already on appeal, the district court denied Experian’s motion on jurisdictional grounds but suggested that it would grant Experian’s motion if it still had jurisdiction, staying its prior order to file the documents in the public record pending our resolution of the appeal. According to the district court, Phillips would govern the motion and good cause existed for placing Experian’s documents under seal. Because the documents at issue here were attached to a dispositive motion, however, Phillips does not provide the proper standard. A determination by the district court that good cause exists for sealing Experian’s documents does not establish that there are “compelling reasons” to do so. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (holding that the burden of showing that a harm will result from disclosure is on the party that seeks nondisclosure rather than on the party that seeks access" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof showing insufficient service. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165. Here, whether Defendant had notice of the proceeding before default was entered is a disputed issue of fact. (See Hearing Transcript at 6:21-7:1.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has proven that notice was properly served, it need not determine whether Defendant had actual notice and should bear the burden of proof for this Motion. 7 . See, e.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding declarations of defendant and her co-habitant that process was not served properly insufficient to defeat presumption created by signed return of service); Holmes v. Plath, No. 1:01-cv-06359-AWI-GSAPC, 2011 WL 864301, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (holding that the presumption that rule 45 does not apply to the federal government can only be overcome by affirmative evidence", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof showing insufficient service. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165. Here, whether Defendant had notice of the proceeding before default was entered is a disputed issue of fact. (See Hearing Transcript at 6:21-7:1.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has proven that notice was properly served, it need not determine whether Defendant had actual notice and should bear the burden of proof for this Motion. 7 . See, e.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding declarations of defendant and her co-habitant that process was not served properly insufficient to defeat presumption created by signed return of service); Holmes v. Plath, No. 1:01-cv-06359-AWI-GSAPC, 2011 WL 864301, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (holding that the defendant cannot overcome this presumption of service merely by denying that he did not receive the complaint", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof showing insufficient service. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165. Here, whether Defendant had notice of the proceeding before default was entered is a disputed issue of fact. (See Hearing Transcript at 6:21-7:1.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has proven that notice was properly served, it need not determine whether Defendant had actual notice and should bear the burden of proof for this Motion. 7 . See, e.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding declarations of defendant and her co-habitant that process was not served properly insufficient to defeat presumption created by signed return of service); Holmes v. Plath, No. 1:01-cv-06359-AWI-GSAPC, 2011 WL 864301, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (recognizing this presumption", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof showing insufficient service. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165. Here, whether Defendant had notice of the proceeding before default was entered is a disputed issue of fact. (See Hearing Transcript at 6:21-7:1.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has proven that notice was properly served, it need not determine whether Defendant had actual notice and should bear the burden of proof for this Motion. 7 . See, e.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding declarations of defendant and her co-habitant that process was not served properly insufficient to defeat presumption created by signed return of service); Holmes v. Plath, No. 1:01-cv-06359-AWI-GSAPC, 2011 WL 864301, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (recognizing presumption and finding that it was overcome", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof showing insufficient service. Internet Solutions, 509 F.3d at 1165. Here, whether Defendant had notice of the proceeding before default was entered is a disputed issue of fact. (See Hearing Transcript at 6:21-7:1.) Because the Court finds that Plaintiff has proven that notice was properly served, it need not determine whether Defendant had actual notice and should bear the burden of proof for this Motion. 7 . See, e.g., Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357 EMC, 2008 WL 5170180, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) (finding declarations of defendant and her co-habitant that process was not served properly insufficient to defeat presumption created by signed return of service); Holmes v. Plath, No. 1:01-cv-06359-AWI-GSAPC, 2011 WL 864301, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 10, 2011) (holding evidence insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court “would have [had] to pile inference upon inference” to find a rational basis for concluding the statute “substantially affected] any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared § 922(q) unconstitutional. Id. In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez Court could not, by “evaluating] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court “would have [had] to pile inference upon inference” to find a rational basis for concluding the statute “substantially affected] any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared § 922(q) unconstitutional. Id. In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez Court could not, by “evaluating] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (recognizing the diminished importance of the state policy factor", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court “would have [had] to pile inference upon inference” to find a rational basis for concluding the statute “substantially affected] any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared § 922(q) unconstitutional. Id. In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez Court could not, by “evaluating] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (recognizing the importance of the employers knowledge of the disability", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court “would have [had] to pile inference upon inference” to find a rational basis for concluding the statute “substantially affected] any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared § 922(q) unconstitutional. Id. In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez Court could not, by “evaluating] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (recognizing prosecutors task to attempt to convince the court of the appropriateness of the recommendation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n514 U.S. at 561 and n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1630-31 and n. 3. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court “would have [had] to pile inference upon inference” to find a rational basis for concluding the statute “substantially affected] any sort of interstate commerce.” Id. at 567, 115 S.Ct. at 1634. This the Court declined to do, and so declared § 922(q) unconstitutional. Id. In contrast to the congressional silence in Lopez, Congress made voluminous findings when it enacted VAWA. Accordingly, we can begin where the Lopez Court could not, by “evaluating] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 115 S.Ct. at 1632; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2169-2170, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (recognizing the importance of congressional findings in determining the appropriateness of congresss remedial measures" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 through October 4. Bloate, 130 S.Ct. at 1358. On remand, this court ordered supplemental briefs on the periods (1) from September 25 through October 4, and (2) from February 23 through March 5. II. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial begin within 70 days from the indictment or the defendant’s initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). If not, the district court must, on the defendant’s motion, dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2016, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (holding subsection h1d stops the speedy trial act clock upon filing of a pretrial motion regardless of whether the motion has any impact on the trial setting", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 through October 4. Bloate, 130 S.Ct. at 1358. On remand, this court ordered supplemental briefs on the periods (1) from September 25 through October 4, and (2) from February 23 through March 5. II. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial begin within 70 days from the indictment or the defendant’s initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). If not, the district court must, on the defendant’s motion, dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2016, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (holding that the speedy trial provision is tolled when a defendants pretrial motion is pending", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 through October 4. Bloate, 130 S.Ct. at 1358. On remand, this court ordered supplemental briefs on the periods (1) from September 25 through October 4, and (2) from February 23 through March 5. II. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial begin within 70 days from the indictment or the defendant’s initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). If not, the district court must, on the defendant’s motion, dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2016, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (holding that a delay of 8 months is enough to provoke a speedy trial inquiry", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 through October 4. Bloate, 130 S.Ct. at 1358. On remand, this court ordered supplemental briefs on the periods (1) from September 25 through October 4, and (2) from February 23 through March 5. II. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial begin within 70 days from the indictment or the defendant’s initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). If not, the district court must, on the defendant’s motion, dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2016, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 through October 4. Bloate, 130 S.Ct. at 1358. On remand, this court ordered supplemental briefs on the periods (1) from September 25 through October 4, and (2) from February 23 through March 5. II. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant’s trial begin within 70 days from the indictment or the defendant’s initial appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). If not, the district court must, on the defendant’s motion, dismiss the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act automatically excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see United States v. Tinklenberg, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2016, 179 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2011) (holding that whether a pretrial motion actually caused or is expected to cause delay of trial is irrelevant to the speedy trial act" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncharacterization of southbound Route 13 as “a frequented corridor for illegal narcotics flowing from New York and other points north” equally hollow as a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion. First, the district court gave no indication that it accepted Trooper Wade’s testimony on this issue, and the government presented no statistics or other objective evidence regarding Route 13’s status as a “drug corridor.” Moreover, even if the factor was supportable, every southbound car that passed Trooper Wade on that corridor was, by the government’s logic, suspicious. Such a broad generalization does nothing to eliminate the overwhelming number of innocent travelers on that corridor. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752; United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncharacterization of southbound Route 13 as “a frequented corridor for illegal narcotics flowing from New York and other points north” equally hollow as a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion. First, the district court gave no indication that it accepted Trooper Wade’s testimony on this issue, and the government presented no statistics or other objective evidence regarding Route 13’s status as a “drug corridor.” Moreover, even if the factor was supportable, every southbound car that passed Trooper Wade on that corridor was, by the government’s logic, suspicious. Such a broad generalization does nothing to eliminate the overwhelming number of innocent travelers on that corridor. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752; United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle during a traffic stop conducted absent reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity did not violate the fourth amendment because it did not implicate any legitimate privacy interest", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncharacterization of southbound Route 13 as “a frequented corridor for illegal narcotics flowing from New York and other points north” equally hollow as a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion. First, the district court gave no indication that it accepted Trooper Wade’s testimony on this issue, and the government presented no statistics or other objective evidence regarding Route 13’s status as a “drug corridor.” Moreover, even if the factor was supportable, every southbound car that passed Trooper Wade on that corridor was, by the government’s logic, suspicious. Such a broad generalization does nothing to eliminate the overwhelming number of innocent travelers on that corridor. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752; United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that the facts that defendant had outofstate license plates and was traveling on a highway that was a known drug trafficking corridor alone cannot justify the stop", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncharacterization of southbound Route 13 as “a frequented corridor for illegal narcotics flowing from New York and other points north” equally hollow as a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion. First, the district court gave no indication that it accepted Trooper Wade’s testimony on this issue, and the government presented no statistics or other objective evidence regarding Route 13’s status as a “drug corridor.” Moreover, even if the factor was supportable, every southbound car that passed Trooper Wade on that corridor was, by the government’s logic, suspicious. Such a broad generalization does nothing to eliminate the overwhelming number of innocent travelers on that corridor. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752; United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that merely traveling with drug dealers did not create probable cause at time of defendants arrest", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncharacterization of southbound Route 13 as “a frequented corridor for illegal narcotics flowing from New York and other points north” equally hollow as a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion. First, the district court gave no indication that it accepted Trooper Wade’s testimony on this issue, and the government presented no statistics or other objective evidence regarding Route 13’s status as a “drug corridor.” Moreover, even if the factor was supportable, every southbound car that passed Trooper Wade on that corridor was, by the government’s logic, suspicious. Such a broad generalization does nothing to eliminate the overwhelming number of innocent travelers on that corridor. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752; United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th Cir.2003) (holding that travel on a known drug corridor did not create reasonable suspicion because the factor was one of several applicable to a considerable number of those traveling for perfectly legitimate purposes" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(18 U.S.C. § 1956), dealing in counterfeit goods and services (18 U.S.C. § 2320), and interstate transportation of misappropriated property (18 U.S.C. § 2314). While all three of these crimes connote some element of dishonesty, they do not necessarily involve fraud per se. So, as a general matter, they would be subject to the general notice pleading standard. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356 (3d Cir.1989) (“Thus, the suggestion that ‘[a] charge of racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make than accusations of fraud appears unwarranted.’ ”) For that reason, each would not be subjected to the higher pleading standard required of fraud. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (holding that charge of money laundering need not satisfy rule 9b", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(18 U.S.C. § 1956), dealing in counterfeit goods and services (18 U.S.C. § 2320), and interstate transportation of misappropriated property (18 U.S.C. § 2314). While all three of these crimes connote some element of dishonesty, they do not necessarily involve fraud per se. So, as a general matter, they would be subject to the general notice pleading standard. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356 (3d Cir.1989) (“Thus, the suggestion that ‘[a] charge of racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make than accusations of fraud appears unwarranted.’ ”) For that reason, each would not be subjected to the higher pleading standard required of fraud. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (holding a complaint failed to satisfy rule 9b where the allegations were lacking in detail", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(18 U.S.C. § 1956), dealing in counterfeit goods and services (18 U.S.C. § 2320), and interstate transportation of misappropriated property (18 U.S.C. § 2314). While all three of these crimes connote some element of dishonesty, they do not necessarily involve fraud per se. So, as a general matter, they would be subject to the general notice pleading standard. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356 (3d Cir.1989) (“Thus, the suggestion that ‘[a] charge of racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make than accusations of fraud appears unwarranted.’ ”) For that reason, each would not be subjected to the higher pleading standard required of fraud. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (holding plaintiffs speculations did not satisfy rule 9b requirements", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(18 U.S.C. § 1956), dealing in counterfeit goods and services (18 U.S.C. § 2320), and interstate transportation of misappropriated property (18 U.S.C. § 2314). While all three of these crimes connote some element of dishonesty, they do not necessarily involve fraud per se. So, as a general matter, they would be subject to the general notice pleading standard. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356 (3d Cir.1989) (“Thus, the suggestion that ‘[a] charge of racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make than accusations of fraud appears unwarranted.’ ”) For that reason, each would not be subjected to the higher pleading standard required of fraud. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (holding that specific details about time place and substance of the fraud satisfy rule 9b", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(18 U.S.C. § 1956), dealing in counterfeit goods and services (18 U.S.C. § 2320), and interstate transportation of misappropriated property (18 U.S.C. § 2314). While all three of these crimes connote some element of dishonesty, they do not necessarily involve fraud per se. So, as a general matter, they would be subject to the general notice pleading standard. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356 (3d Cir.1989) (“Thus, the suggestion that ‘[a] charge of racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make than accusations of fraud appears unwarranted.’ ”) For that reason, each would not be subjected to the higher pleading standard required of fraud. See Republic of Colombia v. Diageo North America, Inc., 531 F.Supp.2d 365, 382 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (holding a broad claim with no factual support was insufficient to satisfy rule 9b" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmake a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the “agreement” Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (holding that cooperation was insufficient where the defendants cooperation was based on his confession to the charged crimes", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmake a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the “agreement” Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (holding that confession was voluntary although agents had promised to inform prosecutor of defendants cooperation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmake a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the “agreement” Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (holding that county officers were neither agents of the united states nor did they have any duty to investigate federal consequences of actions before securing defendants cooperation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmake a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the “agreement” Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (holding that united states attorney was not required to abide by a secret service agents promise to a defendant to drop federal charges in exchange for defendants cooperation where the united states attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agents authority", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nmake a deal for her client, not that there was a fully integrated cooperation agreement on the table for acceptance. This is best illustrated by the paucity of detail regarding the terms of the “agreement” Bicknese allegedly reached with Meyer. Bicknese and Meyer never discussed such critical details as what level of cooperation would be required of Kozak in order for her to satisfy the purported cooperation agreement nor who would determine whether Kozak had fulfilled her part of the cooperation agreement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the court concludes that no meeting of the minds can be found to have existed between Meyer and Bicknese for a cooperation agreement for Kozak. Because the court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds necessary for the creation ir.1988) (holding that federal agents indication to defendant that his cooperation would be reported to the united states attorney did not make defendants confession involuntary" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things “wrongfully detain[ed],” Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or “gain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,” id. § 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal’s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal’s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (recognizing constructive trust as appropriate equitable remedy", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things “wrongfully detain[ed],” Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or “gain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,” id. § 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal’s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal’s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding plans suit against law firm for constructive trust was a suit for appropriate equitable relief", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things “wrongfully detain[ed],” Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or “gain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,” id. § 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal’s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal’s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that under california law a constructive trust may be sought only by the equitable owner of the trust res not by a creditor of the equitable owner", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things “wrongfully detain[ed],” Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or “gain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,” id. § 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal’s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal’s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that the statute of limitations cannot bar appellants claim that a constructive trust should be imposed because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy and therefore not subject to the statute", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrust Claims Under California state law, a constructive trust may be imposed on property as. a remedy for things “wrongfully detain[ed],” Cal. Civ.Code § 2223 (West Supp. 1996), or “gain[ed] ... by .fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act,” id. § 2224. Taylor advances two arguments for why its payments from Advent came from funds held. in constructive trust. r First, Taylor claims that the payments came from wrongfully diverted Coastal funds which Advent held in constructive trust for Coastal’s benefit. This claim is without merit. Under California law, Taylor has no right to seek the imposition of a constructive trust on Coastal’s behalf. Sobel Bldg. Dev. Partners v. Broach (In re Sexton), 166 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1994) (holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nA & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Among the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.”) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the united states corps of engineers publication of maps of navigable waters did not constitute affirmative misconduct for equitable estoppel purposes", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nA & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Among the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.”) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that it was unreasonable for a party to rely on maps drafted by the united states corps of engineers that bore the heading waters covered by section 10 of the 1899 rivers and harbors act under the jurisdiction of the st paul district corps of engineers and the caption that all other waters and wetlands not shown on this map should be considered to be covered by section 404 of the 1972 act to determine whether bodies of water outside the scope of the map were considered navigable", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nA & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Among the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.”) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the evident breadth of congressional coneern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems supported the army corps of engineers interpretation of waters of the united states to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nA & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Among the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.”) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nA & M Gregos, Inc., 607 F.2d 44, 48 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Among the more important requirements of estoppel are that the party to be estopped has misrepresented or wrongfully concealed some material fact and that this party acted with the intention that the asserting party rely to his detriment on his misunderstanding.”) (citing cases). Blake argues that because Farrington commissioned the Harrigan map, that map constituted a representation by Farrington. However, commissioning another to create a map is not in itself a representation for equitable estoppel purposes. Rather, a commissioned map or document constitutes a representation in equitable estoppel where a party uses the document to induce another party to act. See, e.g., Slagle v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Minn. 1992) (recognizing that the supreme court has indicated that affirmative misconduct is a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the united states" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCONST. art. I, § 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain \"purity and efficiency” of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, § 31 (\"The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... ”). 14 . See id. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VII, §§ 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation \"[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) (\"Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.”); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (\"There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (holding school board members had standing to complain that statute required them to distribute books in violation of constitution", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCONST. art. I, § 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain \"purity and efficiency” of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, § 31 (\"The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... ”). 14 . See id. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VII, §§ 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation \"[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) (\"Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.”); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (\"There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (holding that members of the board of trustees of an elementary school had standing to challenge the actions of the county board of education because they suffered an actual injury when the county board nullified their unanimous vote to reject a candidate for principal of the elementary school", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCONST. art. I, § 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain \"purity and efficiency” of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, § 31 (\"The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... ”). 14 . See id. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VII, §§ 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation \"[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) (\"Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.”); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (\"There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (holding that plaintiff had standing to sue a board even though board was far from sole participant in the application of the challenged statute", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCONST. art. I, § 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain \"purity and efficiency” of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, § 31 (\"The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... ”). 14 . See id. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VII, §§ 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation \"[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) (\"Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.”); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (\"There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCONST. art. I, § 15 (requiring the Legislature to maintain \"purity and efficiency” of right to trial by jury); id. art. V, § 31 (\"The Supreme Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch .... ”). 14 . See id. art. VII, § 1; id. art. VII, §§ 17(h), 18(h) (allowing legislation \"[t]o assure efficient use of construction funds and t p. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex.1995) (\"Because the other plaintiffs, except for Fuller, bring the same facial challenges and seek the same declaratory relief as the Texas AFL-CIO, we need not address their individual standing and we express no opinion thereon.”); Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (\"There being parties plaintiff who a 41 n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) (recognizing absolute immunity for attorneys and board members of the texas medical board" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas found to have retained any privacy in the room after his eviction, the degree of privacy retained would not be significant under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, while a hotel room may differ slightly from an in-home situation, Defendant and Nishimura still had the opportunity to hide weapons in the room just as they would have in a home. Because Nishimura was tasked with packing her belongings, the officers believed it necessary to secure the area from any danger posed to them. The Government argues that in the instant case, it would have been unreasonable for Special Agent Nutter to have left the drawer unsearched and jeopardized the safety of all present should Nishimura have gained access to a loaded gun. See United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (1991) (holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas found to have retained any privacy in the room after his eviction, the degree of privacy retained would not be significant under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, while a hotel room may differ slightly from an in-home situation, Defendant and Nishimura still had the opportunity to hide weapons in the room just as they would have in a home. Because Nishimura was tasked with packing her belongings, the officers believed it necessary to secure the area from any danger posed to them. The Government argues that in the instant case, it would have been unreasonable for Special Agent Nutter to have left the drawer unsearched and jeopardized the safety of all present should Nishimura have gained access to a loaded gun. See United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (1991) (holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas found to have retained any privacy in the room after his eviction, the degree of privacy retained would not be significant under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, while a hotel room may differ slightly from an in-home situation, Defendant and Nishimura still had the opportunity to hide weapons in the room just as they would have in a home. Because Nishimura was tasked with packing her belongings, the officers believed it necessary to secure the area from any danger posed to them. The Government argues that in the instant case, it would have been unreasonable for Special Agent Nutter to have left the drawer unsearched and jeopardized the safety of all present should Nishimura have gained access to a loaded gun. See United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (1991) (holding that when fleeing felon tossed a mesh bag weighing four or five pounds toward the officer the officer would have been justified if he fired at that moment out of fear that the bag might knock his firearm out of his hand but that he was not justified in firing after bag hit him and fell to the ground without injuring him and suspect turned and ran", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas found to have retained any privacy in the room after his eviction, the degree of privacy retained would not be significant under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, while a hotel room may differ slightly from an in-home situation, Defendant and Nishimura still had the opportunity to hide weapons in the room just as they would have in a home. Because Nishimura was tasked with packing her belongings, the officers believed it necessary to secure the area from any danger posed to them. The Government argues that in the instant case, it would have been unreasonable for Special Agent Nutter to have left the drawer unsearched and jeopardized the safety of all present should Nishimura have gained access to a loaded gun. See United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (1991) (holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwas found to have retained any privacy in the room after his eviction, the degree of privacy retained would not be significant under the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, while a hotel room may differ slightly from an in-home situation, Defendant and Nishimura still had the opportunity to hide weapons in the room just as they would have in a home. Because Nishimura was tasked with packing her belongings, the officers believed it necessary to secure the area from any danger posed to them. The Government argues that in the instant case, it would have been unreasonable for Special Agent Nutter to have left the drawer unsearched and jeopardized the safety of all present should Nishimura have gained access to a loaded gun. See United States v. Flippin, 924 F.2d 163 (1991) (holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag" ]