ccore/rhetoric-saint-thomas-aquinas · Datasets at Hugging Face

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could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate
to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between
the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a
cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it
seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

Contrary: The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.
1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be
demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we
must know of anything is whether it exists.

Response: Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through
the cause, and is called _a priori,_ and this is to argue from what is
prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration _a posteriori_; this is to argue from what is prior
relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its
cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And
from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be
demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because
since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the
cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is
not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects
which are known to us.

Reply Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about
God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,
but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes
something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to
prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of
faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically
known and demonstrated.

Reply Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated
from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the
cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case
in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of
anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of
the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows
on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are
derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence
of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning
of the word "God".

Reply Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no
perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect
the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can
demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we
cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]

Whether God Exists?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two
contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But
the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the
world. Therefore God does not exist.

Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be
accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it
seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by
other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things
can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary
things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.
Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

Contrary: It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.
3:14)

Response: The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is
certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are
in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for
nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards
which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.
For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from
potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of
actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which
is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes
it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in
actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different
respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be
potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is
therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a
thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.
Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If
that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this
also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another
again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be
no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that
subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the
first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by
the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in
motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate

to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between

the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a

cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it

seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

Contrary: The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are

clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom.

1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be

demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we

must know of anything is whether it exists.

Response: Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through

the cause, and is called _a priori,_ and this is to argue from what is

prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a

demonstration _a posteriori_; this is to argue from what is prior

relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its

cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And

from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be

demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because

since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the

cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is

not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects

which are known to us.

Reply Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about

God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,

but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural

knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes

something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to

prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of

faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically

known and demonstrated.

Reply Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated

from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the

cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case

in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of

anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of

the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows

on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are

derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence

of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning

of the word "God".

Reply Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no

perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect

the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can

demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we

cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]

Whether God Exists?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two

contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But

the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God

existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the

world. Therefore God does not exist.

Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be

accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it

seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by

other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things

can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary

things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.

Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

Contrary: It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex.

3:14)

Response: The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is

certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are

in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for

nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards

which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.

For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from

potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from

potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of

actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which

is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes

it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in

actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different

respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be

potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is

therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a

thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.

Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If

that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this

also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another

again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be

no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that

subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the

first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by

the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in

motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.