ccore/rhetoric-saint-thomas-aquinas · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Reply Objection 2: A slave who has been given his freedom is not brought
back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of ingratitude,
but only when this is grave.

Reply Objection 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on account of
subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the
measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his
subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.
_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 88, Art. 4]

Whether the Ingratitude Whereby a Subsequent Sin Causes the Return of
Previous Sins, Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent
sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin.
For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpassion which is a
necessary condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v,
5). But justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a
special sin.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving is a
special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving. Therefore
ingratitude is a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now
ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion,
of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

Contrary: That which is a sequel to every sin is not a
special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful
to God, as evidenced from what has been said (A. 1). Therefore
ingratitude is not a special sin.

Response: The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special
sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all
mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its
species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery in order
to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer."

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the
favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of
ingratitude, and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin.
If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or
adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt
of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn
to the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as
Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies
contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the
sinner's ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first
(three) objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin;
while the last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in
every sin, is not a special sin.
_______________________

QUESTION 89

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE
(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance,
under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance?

(2) Whether they are restored in equal measure?

(3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent?

(4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin?

(5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance?

(6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are
quickened by Penance?
_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 89, Art. 1]

Whether the Virtues Are Restored Through Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through
penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless
penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a
virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more,
since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and
charity, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 6). Therefore the virtues are not
restored through penance.

Objection 2: Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent.
But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours:
for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that "God forms
the virtues in us without us." Therefore it seems that the virtues
are not restored through Penance.

Reply Objection 2: A slave who has been given his freedom is not brought

back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of ingratitude,

but only when this is grave.

Reply Objection 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on account of

subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the

measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his

subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 88, Art. 4]

Whether the Ingratitude Whereby a Subsequent Sin Causes the Return of

Previous Sins, Is a Special Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent

sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin.

For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpassion which is a

necessary condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v,

5). But justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a

special sin.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving is a

special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving. Therefore

ingratitude is a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now

ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion,

of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

Contrary: That which is a sequel to every sin is not a

special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful

to God, as evidenced from what has been said (A. 1). Therefore

ingratitude is not a special sin.

Response: The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special

sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all

mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its

species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the

Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery in order

to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer."

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the

favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of

ingratitude, and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin.

If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or

adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt

of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn

to the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as

Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies

contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the

sinner's ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first

(three) objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin;

while the last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in

every sin, is not a special sin.

_______________________

QUESTION 89

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE

(In Six Articles)

We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance,

under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance?

(2) Whether they are restored in equal measure?

(3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent?

(4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin?

(5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance?

(6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are

quickened by Penance?

_______________________

FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 89, Art. 1]

Whether the Virtues Are Restored Through Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through

penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless

penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a

virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more,

since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and

charity, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 6). Therefore the virtues are not

restored through penance.

Objection 2: Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent.

But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours:

for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that "God forms

the virtues in us without us." Therefore it seems that the virtues

are not restored through Penance.