ccore/rhetoric-saint-thomas-aquinas · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Objection 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with
ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that
"a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds." Now many
penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore
the virtues are not restored through Penance.

Contrary: We read (Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his
penitent son to be clothed in "the first robe," which, according to
Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the "mantle of wisdom," from which
all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth
temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such
things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore
all the virtues are restored through Penance.

Response: Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above
(Q. 86, A. 1). But there can be no remission of sins except through
the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused
into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from
grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as
stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 110, A. 4, ad 1). Therefore all
the virtues are restored through Penance.

Reply Objection 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it
causes grace, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now it is a cause of
grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a
virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not
follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the
other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits
of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.

Reply Objection 2: In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter,
while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of
the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue
effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the
penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the
reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from
the grace and virtues which are already there.

Reply Objection 3: As stated above (Q. 86, A. 5), sometimes after the
first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin
remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being
that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue.
Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the
other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue
with pleasure and ease, even as a virtuous man may accidentally find
it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some
indisposition of the body.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 89, Art. 2]

Whether, After Penance, Man Rises Again to Equal Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to
equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:28): "To them that love
God all things work together unto good," whereupon a gloss of
Augustine says that "this is so true that, if any such man goes
astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his
good." But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue.
Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an anonymous
work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that "Penance is a very good
thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection." But
this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal
measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through Penance.

Objection 3: Further, on Gen. 1:5: "There was evening and morning, one
day," a gloss says: "The evening light is that from which we fall;
the morning light is that to which we rise again." Now the morning
light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to
greater grace or charity than that which he had before; which is
confirmed by the Apostle's words (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded,
grace did more abound."

Contrary: Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater
than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient
charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always
rises again to less virtue.

Response: As stated above (Q. 86, A. 6, ad 3; Q. 89, A. 1, ad
2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the
ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same
instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid
movement of the free-will, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q.
113, AA. 5, 7), which movement includes an act of penance, as stated
above (Q. 86, A. 2). But it is evident that forms which admit of
being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the
different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the Second Part
(I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; Q. 66, A. 1). Hence it is that, in Penance,
according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of
the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the
intensity of the penitent's movement may be proportionate sometimes
to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning,
sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the
penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had
before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the
same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.

Reply Objection 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of God by

Objection 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with

ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that

"a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds." Now many

penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore

the virtues are not restored through Penance.

Contrary: We read (Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his

penitent son to be clothed in "the first robe," which, according to

Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the "mantle of wisdom," from which

all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth

temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such

things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore

all the virtues are restored through Penance.

Response: Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above

(Q. 86, A. 1). But there can be no remission of sins except through

the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused

into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from

grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as

stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 110, A. 4, ad 1). Therefore all

the virtues are restored through Penance.

Reply Objection 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it

causes grace, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now it is a cause of

grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a

virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not

follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the

other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits

of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.

Reply Objection 2: In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter,

while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of

the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue

effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the

penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the

reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from

the grace and virtues which are already there.

Reply Objection 3: As stated above (Q. 86, A. 5), sometimes after the

first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin

remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being

that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue.

Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the

other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue

with pleasure and ease, even as a virtuous man may accidentally find

it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some

indisposition of the body.

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 89, Art. 2]

Whether, After Penance, Man Rises Again to Equal Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to

equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:28): "To them that love

God all things work together unto good," whereupon a gloss of

Augustine says that "this is so true that, if any such man goes

astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his

good." But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue.

Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an anonymous

work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that "Penance is a very good

thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection." But

this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal

measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through Penance.

Objection 3: Further, on Gen. 1:5: "There was evening and morning, one

day," a gloss says: "The evening light is that from which we fall;

the morning light is that to which we rise again." Now the morning

light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to

greater grace or charity than that which he had before; which is

confirmed by the Apostle's words (Rom. 5:20): "Where sin abounded,

grace did more abound."

Contrary: Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater

than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient

charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always

rises again to less virtue.

Response: As stated above (Q. 86, A. 6, ad 3; Q. 89, A. 1, ad

2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the

ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same

instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid

movement of the free-will, as stated in the Second Part (I-II, Q.

113, AA. 5, 7), which movement includes an act of penance, as stated

above (Q. 86, A. 2). But it is evident that forms which admit of

being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the

different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the Second Part

(I-II, Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; Q. 66, A. 1). Hence it is that, in Penance,

according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of

the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the

intensity of the penitent's movement may be proportionate sometimes

to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning,

sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the

penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had

before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the

same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.

Reply Objection 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of God by