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Florida v. Meyers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-1279

83-1279

1983

Florida

Meyers

<p>Meyers was charged with sexual battery. Police officers searched his automobile at the time of his arrest, and then impounded the vehicle at a private facility. Eight hours later, the police re-entered the facility, without a warrant, and searched the car a second time. A Florida court suppressed evidence obtained in the second search, arguing the warrantless search was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court denied review. The Supreme Court subsequently accepted the State's petition for certiorari.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Koehler v. Engle

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-1

83-1

1983

Koehler

Engle

<p>Tilden N. Engle was an employee of a plant owned and operated by the Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler dismissed him on December 4th, 1972. Engle suffered from alcoholism, and he drank heavily following his dismissal. On December 7th, he consumed four anti-anxiety Librium pills and large quantities of whiskey. That day, he returned to the plant and told his nephew Chrysler employee Renus Engle, that he was going to kill someone. Renus Engle testified that the Tilden had a nervous pitch to his voice and tears in his eyes. According to Renus Engle, the respondent had been drinking but was not drunk.</p> <p>Engle went to the office of Donald Ambrose, a clerk, and asked for Regis Lantzy, whom Engle believed was responsible for his termination. Ambrose said that Lantzy was not present, and later testified that Engle looked strange, as if something was troubling him. A short time later, Engle found Lantzy in the plant. Engle shot Lantzy with a pistol in front of several workers. Lantzy tried to flee, and Engle shot him several more times. He stood over the body briefly, then returned to Ambrose's office and surrendered to a security guard. The guard smelled alcohol on Engle's breath, but officers who arrived later on the scene did not detect the odor of alcohol. On December 8th, Engle gave a statement to the police. He admitted to purposefully shooting and killing Lantzy, albeit under the influence of alcohol.</p> <p>On trial for murder in July, 1973, Engle's sole defense was temporary insanity due to the effects of alcohol, Librium, and a dissociative reaction, a temporary mental disorder often accompanied by memory loss. He stated that he remembered nothing between drinking the morning of December 7th and the moment he awoke in jail. He did not remember making a statement to the police.</p> <p>The trial judge instructed the jury that malice --a necessary element for conviction-- is "implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another person." Regarding Engle's use of a pistol, the trial judge instructed the jury that "a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts." He also instructed the jury to consider the number and location of Lantzy's wounds when considering the issue of malice. Engle was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. He appealed, arguing the jury instructions constituted reversible error.</p> <p>A unanimous U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed. It rejected Koehler's argument that Engle's failure to make a timely objection prevented him from raising the issue of jury instruction on appeal, noting that Michigan courts do not enforce a contemporaneous objection rule. The court held that the jury could have inferred from the instructions that the burden of proving lack of malice and intent lay with Engle. He also argued that the jury could have presumed from the use of a deadly weapon and the number and location of Lantzy's wounds that these facts alone constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Engle's malice and intent. He held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing to conflicting evidence about Engle's state of mind at the time of the shooting.</p>

equally divided

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Yermian

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-346

83-346

1983

United States

Esmail Yermian

<p>In 1979, Esmail Yermian was hired by Gulton Industries, a company that contracts for the Department of Defense. Because Yermian would have access to classified materials in the course of his job, he had to fill out a security questionnaire. On the form, Yermian failed to note that he had been convicted of mail fraud in 1978. He also claimed to have worked at two companies where he had never been employed. He signed a certificate stating that his answers were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” Government investigators later discovered that Yermian’s statements were false. When the investigators confronted him with the statements, he admitted to knowingly providing false information. </p> <p>At his trial, Yermian requested a jury instruction requiring the government to prove that he had knowledge not only of the falseness of his statements, but also that he had knowledge that a federal agency had jurisdiction. The district court rejected the instruction, and Yermian was convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the district court had erred by not allowing the requested instruction. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-271

83-271

1983

NCAA

Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al.

<p>In 1981, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) entered into negotiations with ABC and CBS regarding televising the NCAA football games. Each of those companies had the rights to air 14 live games per season as well as to negotiate individually with the competing schools, and they were required to pay a “minimum aggregate compensation” to the participating schools. The goal of the plan was to televise games in such a way as to not drastically decrease live attendance at the games. The NCAA did not permit any of the schools to negotiate outside of this plan.</p> <p>The University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia are both members of the College Football Association (CFA), a group within the NCAA that was formed to represent and promote the interests of the major football schools. These schools, along with the other schools in the CFA, negotiated a separate contract with NBC that would allow for more televised games and greater revenues for the schools in question. The NCAA then announced that it would take disciplinary action against any school that complied with the CFA plan as opposed to the NCAA one. The respondent schools took the issue to the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which found that the NCAA contract violated the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals for Oklahoma affirmed the judgment of the lower court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Hishon v. King & Spalding

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-940

82-940

1983

Elizabeth Anderson Hishon

King & Spalding

<p>In 1972 Elizabeth Anderson Hishon accepted a position with King &amp; Spalding (Firm), a law firm in Atlanta, Georgia. During recruitment, Hishon had been told that after five or six years there was a possibility of promotion to partner; associates with “satisfactory evaluations” would be promoted to partner on a “fair and equal basis.” Hishon claimed to have relied on this information when making her decision to accept employment with the Firm. After six years of employment, Hishon was considered for admission to the partnership and was ultimately rejected. One year later Hishon was again considered for admission and again rejected. She was told to begin seeking new employment and was let go in December 1979.</p> <p>In November 1979, Hishon sued the Firm and filed her claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission. Hishon claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex and that this discrimination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and Hishon sued in federal district court. The district court dismissed her claim, and Hishon appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed that ruling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-276

83-276

1983

Selective Service System

Minnesota Public Interest Research Group

<p>Part of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983 denied federal financial aid to males between the ages of 18 and 26 who had failed to register for selective service. Applicants for financial aid were required to inform their universities that they had (or had not) registered for the draft.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1913

82-1913

1983

Garcia

San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority

<p>The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA), the main provider of transportation in the San Antonio metropolitan area, claimed it was exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. SAMTA argued that it was providing a "traditional" governmental function, which exempted it from federal controls according to the doctrine of federalism established in National League of Cities v. Usery (1976). Joe G. Garcia, an employee of SAMTA, brought suit for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Unions

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1005

82-1005

1983

Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. et al.

<p>The Clean Air Act (the Act) required states that had not yet achieved national air quality standards to establish a permit program regulating new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution, such as manufacturing plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) passed a regulation under the Act that allows states to treat all pollution-emitting devices in the same industrial grouping as though they were a single “bubble”. Using this bubble provision, plants may install or modify one piece of equipment without needing a permit if the alteration does not increase the total emissions of the plant. Several environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, challenged the bubble provision as contrary to the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit set aside the EPA regulation as inappropriate for a program enacted to improve air quality.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Michigan v. Clifford

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-357

82-357

1983

Michigan

Raymond Clifford and Emma Jean Clifford

<p>Early in the morning of October 18, 1980, a fire was reported at the Clifford residence in Detroit, Michigan. The Cliffords were out of town, so the Detroit Fire Department arrived, extinguished the fire, and left by around 7 a.m. An hour later, the fire investigator received a notice to inspect the house for evidence of arson. When he and his partner arrived on the scene at 1 p.m., they found a work crew from the Cliffords’ insurance company that the Cliffords had contacted to secure the house. When the work crew had cleared the basement, the fire investigators began to inspect it without obtaining either consent or a warrant. They determined that the fire had started in the basement, where they found several fuel cans and a crock pot attached to a timer, all of which was seized as evidence.</p> <p>Raymond and Emma Jean Clifford were arrested and charged with arson. At the preliminary examination held to determine probable cause, they moved to suppress the evidence as the products of an illegal search made without warrant or consent. The motion was denied. Prior to the trial, there was an evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence, and it was admitted because there were exigent circumstances surrounding the search. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that there were no exigent circumstances that justified the search.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1795

82-1795

1983

Capital Cities Cable, Inc.

Crisp

<p>In 1980, Oklahoma's Attorney General determined that the re-broadcasting of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by Oklahoma cable television stations violated the State's ban against advertising alcoholic beverages. Richard Crisp, the Director of Oklahoma's Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, warned the offending cable operators that their continued transmission of banned beverage commercials would result in criminal prosecution. In response, and on behalf of other cable operators, Capital Cities Cable challenged the constitutionality of Oklahoma's advertising ban. On appeal from the Tenth Circuit's reversal of a district court decision favoring Capital Cities Cable, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Federalism

Strickland v. Washington

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1554

82-1554

1983

Strickland

Washington

<p>David Washington pleaded guilty to murder in a Florida state court. At sentencing, his attorney did not seek out character witnesses or request a psychiatric evaluation. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Washington to death finding no mitigating circumstances to rule otherwise. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Washington sought habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his Sixth Amendment right was violated because he had ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the Sixth Amendment accorded criminal defendants a right to counsel rendering "reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances." It then remanded the case to the district court to apply this standard and determine whether Mr. Washington's counsel was sufficiently prejudicial to justify the reversal of his sentence.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-491

83-491

1983

INS

Lopez-Mendoza

<p>Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both Mexican citizens, were ordered deported by an immigration judge in separate proceedings. The orders were issued based upon each respondent's admission to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) officials that he had entered the country unlawfully. Lopez-Mendoza and Sandoval-Sanchez challenged the orders on grounds that their respective arrests by INS officials were illegal and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Sandoval-Sanchez further moved to have his admission suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest. (Lopez-Mendoza did not move to strike his admission from the record.) In each case, the presiding judge found the legality of the arrests irrelevant to the determination of the respondents' deportation status. On administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the orders noting that deportation proceedings are civil actions and "[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing." The BIA also found application of the exclusionary rule in a deportation proceeding inappropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding the respondents' arrests were illegal and the resulting admissions fruit of unlawful arrests.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1349

82-1349

1983

United States

S.A. Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines)

<p>The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directs the Secretary of Transportation to "promote the safety of civil aircraft" by establishing minimum standards of airworthiness. Pursuant to this directive, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), acting as the Secretary's designee, instituted a certification process for the design and manufacture of all private aircraft. Under FAA rules, manufacturers are required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the regulations. FAA engineers then conduct "spot-check" inspections of the manufacturer's work. This case arose out of two separate accidents in which commercial aircraft, certified by the FAA or its predecessor, caught fire mid-air, resulting in the deaths of most of the people on board one plane and all of the people on board the other. Each accident was found to have been caused by a faulty part a trash receptacle in one case; a gas burning cabin heater in the other which did not comply with FAA regulations. In both cases, plaintiffs sued the U.S. under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on the ground that the FAA or its predecessor negligently issued certificates for the respective aircraft. The district court in the first case granted summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that recovery against the U.S. was barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), which provides a discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the discretionary function exception did not apply, and that the U.S., just as a private party, could be held liable for negligent inspection under the California "Good Samaritan" rule. In the other case, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs under the California "Good Samaritan" rule, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-18

83-18

1983

Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.

Greenmoss Builders, Inc.

<p>Dun and Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, mistakenly reported to some of its subscribers that the construction contractor Greenmoss Builders had voluntarily filed for bankruptcy. The president of Greenmoss quickly learned about the erroneous report, requested Bradstreet to correct its error, and asked for the list of subscribers who received the report. Bradstreet refused to release the names on the list, but issued a correction to its five subscribers who received the original report. The correction stated that actually a former employee of Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy and that Greenmoss Builders "continued in business as usual." Greenmoss was dissatisfied with the correction and again asked for the list. When Bradstreet refused a second time, Greenmoss filed suit against it for defamation in a Vermont state court. The court discovered that a 17-year-old high student interning for Bradstreet had caused the error and the jury awarded $350,000 to Greenmoss in compensatory and punitive damages. Bradstreet claimed that contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in <em>Gertz v. Robert Welch</em>, the trial judge told the jury that it could award punitive damages even if Bradford did not make mistakes intentionally or out of recklessness. The court granted Bradstreet's motion for retrial, but the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that <em>Gertz</em> only applied to cases involving defamation by the media.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

New York v. Quarles

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1213

82-1213

1983

New York

Quarles

<p>After receiving the description of Quarles, an alleged assailant, a police officer entered a supermarket, spotted him, and ordered him to stop. Quarles stopped and was frisked by the officer. Upon detecting an empty shoulder holster, the officer asked Quarles where his gun was. Quarles responded. The officer then formally arrested Quarles and read him his Miranda rights.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Heckler v. Matthews

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1050

82-1050

1983

Heckler

Matthews

<p>Congress responded to the Court's decision in Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), which invalidated a gender-based dependency requirement in the allocation of Social Security payments, and to the necessity of preventing bankruptcy in the Social Security fund. It enacted amendments in 1977 to the Social Security Act. The 1977 amendments included a "pension offset" provision which reduced spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal and state pension funds that a Social Security applicant received. However, Congress exempted from this provision spouses who were eligible to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have qualified for unreduced spousal benefits prior to the Court's Califano decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-945

82-945

1983

Sure-Tan, Inc., et al.

National Labor Relations Board

<p>Sure-Tan Inc. and Surak Leather Company were two small leather processing firms in Chicago who were considered a single employer for the purposes of this case. Of the 11 laborers both companies employed, several were illegal immigrants. In July 1976, eight workers from both companies authorized the Chicago Leather Workers Union to act as their collective bargaining representative. On December 10, 1976, the Union prevailed in a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) election. The companies filed complaints with the NLRB and alleged that many of the voting members were illegal immigrants. When the NLRB certified the union anyway, the president of Surak Leather Company sent a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to request a check on the immigration status of the employees in question. INS agents discovered five employees were living and working illegally in the United States and deported them. </p> <p>The NLRB’s Acting Regional Director filed complaints alleging that the companies engaged in unfair labor practices, and the charges were heard by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s recommendation to order the petitioners to cease and desist the unfair labor practices and substituted backpay for the recommendation of reinstatement.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the first part of the Board’s order. However, the Court of Appeals held that, because backpay could only be given for periods of time when the employees were legally eligible but unable to work, the companies should be required to pay a minimum amount of six months worth of backpay.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1565

82-1565

1983

Bacchus Imports Ltd.

Dias

<p>The Hawaii Liquor Tax, enacted in 1939, imposed a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale liquor sales. Certain locally produced alcohol products, such as okolehao brandy and fruit wine, were exempt from the tax. Bacchus Imports, a liquor wholesaler, challenged the law's validity and sought a refund of $45 million from the state of Hawaii.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Nix v. Williams

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1651

82-1651

1983

Nix

Williams

<p>Williams was arrested for the murder of a ten-year-old girl who's body he disposed of along a gravel road. State law enforcement officials engaged in a massive search for the child's body. During the search, after responding to an officer's appeal for assistance, Williams made statements to the police (without an attorney present) which helped lead the searchers to the child's body. The defendant's Miranda rights were only read to him after his arrest.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1246

82-1246

1983

Bose Corporation

Consumers Union of United States, Inc.

<p>Bose Corporation, a loudspeaker manufacturer, brought a product disparagement action against Consumer Union for publishing a negative review of Bose products. Among other comments, Consumer Union's article mistakenly said that Bose loudspeakers caused sounds of individual musical instruments to wander "about the room" when they in fact merely wandered "along the wall[s]." Ruling in favor of Bose, the District Court found that the article's statements were factually wrong and made with "actual malice." On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed as it found the lower court's ruling to be clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court granted Bose certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

New Jersey v. T.L.O.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-712

83-712

1983

New Jersey

T.L.O.

<p>T.L.O. was a high school student. School officials searched her purse suspecting she had cigarettes. The officials discovered cigarettes, a small amount of marijuana, and a list containing the names of students who owed T.L.O. money. T.L.O. was charged with possession of marijuana. Before trial, T.L.O. moved to suppress evidence discovered in the search, but the Court denied her motion. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County found her guilty and sentenced her to probation for one year. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by school officials in public schools.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Massachusetts v. Sheppard

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-963

82-963

1983

Massachusetts

Osborne Sheppard

<p>Boston police sought to obtain a warrant to search the home of Osborne Sheppard, a suspected murderer. Detective Peter O'Malley prepared an affidavit listing the pieces of evidence he hoped to find at Sheppard's home. Since the local court was closed for the weekend and O'Malley could not find a new warrant form, he filled out a previously used form instead. He took this form and the affidavit to the residence of the presiding judge and told him the form required revision and approval. The judge returned the form with his approval, but he did not list the pieces of evidence from the affidavit on the warrant. Police found items from the affidavit in Sheppard's home and charged him with first-degree murder. During Sheppard's trial, the judge stated that the warrant did not conform to Fourth Amendment standards because it did not describe the items to be seized. Because the police acted in good faith upon what they believed was a valid warrant, the judge admitted the items as evidence and Sheppard was convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Sheppard successfully argued that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence since no "good-faith exception" existed for admitting evidence obtained on a faulty warrant.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Berkemer v. McCarty

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-710

83-710

1983

Harry J. Berkemer, Sheriff of Franklin County, Ohio

Richard N. McCarty

<p>On March 31, 1980, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper C.J. Williams observed Richard McCarty’s vehicle weaving back and forth on Interstate Highway 270. He followed the car, pulled McCarty over, and asked him to exit the vehicle. Williams noticed that McCarty had trouble standing, and thus determined that he would charge McCarty with a traffic offense and that McCarty was no longer free to leave the scene. McCarty failed a balancing test.</p> <p>Williams then asked McCarty whether he had been using intoxicants, and McCarty responded that he had consumed two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana a short time before. Williams placed McCarty under arrest. At the county jail, however, a breathalyzer test did not detect any alcohol in McCarty’s system. Williams resumed questioning McCarty, asking him if he was under the influence of alcohol and whether the marijuana had been treated with any chemicals. Williams responded, “I guess, barely,” to the first question, but denied that the marijuana he smoked had been treated. At no point did Williams or any other officer tell McCarty that he had a right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, or to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.</p> <p>McCarty was charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a first-degree misdemeanor under Ohio law punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to six months. McCarty moved to exclude the incriminating statements he made to Trooper Williams both on the scene of the arrest and in jail, on the grounds that he had not been informed of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation. The trial court denied the motion; McCarty pled ‘no contest’ and was found guilty. On appeal, the Franklin County Court of Appeals held that the Miranda rule does not apply to misdemeanors, relying on a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s appeal for failing to present a substantial constitutional question. The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed McCarty’s writ of habeas corpus, but the United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit reversed. It held that Miranda warnings must be given to all individuals accused of misdemeanor traffic offenses prior to custodial interrogation, but did not clearly apply this rule to McCarty’s statements made at the scene of his arrest.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Leon

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1771

82-1771

1983

United States

Alberto Leon

<p>The exclusionary rule requires that evidence illegally seized must be excluded from criminal trials. Leon was the target of police surveillance based on an anonymous informant's tip. The police applied to a judge for a search warrant of Leon's home based on the evidence from their surveillance. A judge issued the warrant and the police recovered large quantities of illegal drugs. Leon was indicted for violating federal drug laws. A judge concluded that the affidavit for the search warrant was insufficient; it did not establish the probable cause necessary to issue the warrant. Thus, the evidence obtained under the warrant could not be introduced at Leon's trial.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Engle

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-599

82-599

1983

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Philip D. Farmar, et al.

Fred L. Engle et ux., United States

<p>Fred and Mary Engle filed a joint federal income tax return in 1975. During that year, Fred Engle acquired two oil and gas leases covering a total of 240 acres in Wyoming. The Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction on advance royalties from the oil and gas leases, but the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rejected their claim because the deduction was not based on average daily production from the property’s oil and gas leases, as required by the Commissioner’s interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 613A of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, with one dissent. The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, reversed, holding that § 613A authorized depletion allowances on advance royalties so long as there was eventual production from the property.</p> <p>Also in 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg, joint owners of 46,515 acres of land in Irion County, Texas, leased their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under these leases, the Farmars and Suggs received royalties and annual cash bonuses from the lessees. The bonuses were payable even when the property produced no oil or gas. The Farmars and Suggs claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the royalties and bonuses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions on the royalties because they were not based on average daily production from the property. In a consolidated suit, the Court of Claims held that Congress only allowed for depletion deductions from actual production during the taxable year.</p> <p> In the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Congress eliminated percentage depletion deductions for major oil producers. § 613A(d), however, authorized any qualified independent gas or oil producer or royalty owner to compute the allowance for percentage depletion in accordance with gross income from the property. The act stipulated that the allowance was tied to the taxpayer’s average daily production so as not to exceed the taxpayer’s depletable quantity. The Farmars and Suggs and the Commissioner filed petitions for writs of certiorari; the Supreme Court of the United States granted their petitions and consolidated their cases.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federal Taxation

United States v. Karo

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-850

83-850

1983

United States

James Karo, et al.

<p>Defendants James Karo, Richard Horton, and William Harley ordered fifty gallons of ether from a government informant, to be used to extract cocaine from clothes imported into the United States. Carl Muehlenweg, the informant and owner of the ether, gave consent to the police to install a tracking device into one of the cans containing the ether before delivery to the defendants.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1998

82-1998

1983

Clark

Community for Creative Non-Violence

<p>In 1982, the National Park Service issued a renewable permit to the Community for Creative Non-Violence to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall in Washington, D.C. The C.C.N.V. demonstration was intended to represent the plight of the homeless, and the demonstrators wished to sleep in tent cities set up in the park. Citing anti-camping regulations, the Park Service denied the request.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Irving Independent School District v. Tatro

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-558

83-558

1983

Irving Independent School District

Henri Tatro, et ex.

<p>Henri and Mary Tatro’s three-and-a-half year old daughter Amber had spina bifida. As a result, Amber suffered from a neurogenic bladder, which required the use of a catheter every three or four hours each day to avoid kidney injury. The preferred method of catheterization was called clean intermittent catheterization (CIC). Amber was unable to perform this method herself because of her age, but a layperson could easily learn to perform the procedure.</p> <p>In 1979, Irving Independent School District agreed to provide special education for Amber as required by the federal Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This law required Texas to provide handicapped children with a free public education including ‘related services’. It only required ‘medical services’ for purposes of diagnosis or evaluation. Amber’s individualized education program provided that she would attend early childhood development classes and receive physical and occupational therapy. Her program, however, made no provision for school personnel to administer CIC. The Tatros unsuccessfully pursued administrative remedies to secure CIC services during school hours.</p> <p>In October 1979, the Tatros filed an action against the district, the Texas State Board of Education, and others. They sought an injunction requiring the district to provide Amber with CIC. They also sought damages and attorneys’ fees through the Rehabilitation Act (RA), which forbade programs receiving federal aid from excluding handicapped people from participation and allowed prevailing parties to recover attorneys’ fees. The district court denied the Tatros' request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that CIC was not a ‘related service’ under the EHA because it did not arise from an effort to educate. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that CIC was indeed a ‘related service’ under the EHA, and remanded the case to the district court. The district court then ruled that CIC was not a ‘medical service’ under the EHA because a doctor was not needed to administer the procedure. It found that CIC was a ‘related service’ and ordered the defendants to modify Amber’s individualized education program accordingly. It also held that the Tatros had proved a violation of the RA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both holdings.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Minnesota v. Murphy

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-827

82-827

1983

Minnesota

Marshall Donald Murphy

<p>In 1974, Marshall Murphy was questioned by Minneapolis police about the rape and murder of a teenage girl, but he was never charged. In 1980, Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in an unrelated criminal sexual conduct case and was sentenced to a 16-month suspended prison sentence and three years probation. During probation, Murphy was required to participate in a treatment program for sex offenders at Alpha House and to see a probation officer. While at Alpha House, Murphy admitted to the 1974 rape and murder. An Alpha House counselor contacted Murphy’s probation officer about the admission and the officer called Murphy in for a meeting. During the meeting Murphy became angry and said he “felt like calling a lawyer” but still admitted to the rape and murder. The probation officer relayed the information from the meeting to the police, and Murphy was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.</p> <p>At trial, Murphy tried to suppress testimony about the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession, and the confession was not compelled or involuntary. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the confession violated the Fifth Amendment because Murphy’s parole officer knew that Murphy’s answers were likely to be incriminating.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-912

82-912

1983

League of Women Voters of California

Federal Communications Commission

<p>The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to "engage in editorializing."</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Grove City College v. Bell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-792

82-792

1983

Grove City College

Bell

<p>Grove City College, a private, coeducational liberal arts school, sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. The College did, however, enroll a large number of students who received Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's) through a Department of Education-run program. The DOE concluded that this assistance to students qualified the College as a recipient of federal assistance and made it subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. When the College refused to comply with the requirements, the DOE attempted to terminate assistance to the student financial aid program. The College challenged the DOE's actions.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Palmore v. Sidoti

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1734

82-1734

1983

Palmore

Sidoti

<p>Anthony and Linda Sidoti, both Caucasians, were divorced and Linda was awarded custody of their daughter. One year later, Anthony sought custody of the child after Linda began cohabitating with Clarence Palmore, an African-American. The Florida courts awarded Mr. Sidoti custody of the child, arguing that the child would be more vulnerable to social stigmatization in a racially mixed household. No evidence was introduced that indicated Ms. Sidoti was unfit to continue the custody of the child.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Waller v. Georgia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-321

83-321

1983

Waller

Georgia

<p>Acting under court authorization, Georgia police placed wiretaps on a number of phones and conducted searches pursuant to an investigation of illegal gambling. A number of people were indicted as a result of the investigation. The defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and the evidence seized during the searches. Because the wiretap evidence related to alleged offenders not then on trial, Georgia moved to close to the public any hearing on the motion to suppress. A trial court upheld Georgia's move to close the hearing.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

California v. Trombetta

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-305

83-305

1983

California

Trombetta

<p>In 1980 and 1981, in separate incidents, each of four respondents were suspected of drunk driving on California highways and pulled over by police. Each agreed to an Intoxilyzer test (commonly known as a “breathalyzer test”) that registered a blood-alcohol level (BAL) substantially higher than .10, the legal BAL limit in California. Each was charged with drunk driving. Before trial, each defendant motioned to exclude the breathalyzer test results from evidence by arguing that the police had failed to preserve breath samples from the time of the stop. All of their motions to exclude were denied. Two of the defendants were tried and convicted by the municipal court of Sonoma County; the remaining two had not yet gone to trial. All defendants appealed to the California Court of Appeals of the First District, Division Four, which granted the convicted respondents a new trial and ordered that the test results be excluded from all the trials. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Hudson v. Palmer

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1630

82-1630

1983

Hudson

Palmer

<p>Russell Palmer, a prisoner in a Virginia prison, brought suit against Ted Hudson, an officer at the institution. Hudson had conducted a "shakedown" search of Palmer's locker and cell for contraband. Hudson and another officer also charged Palmer with destroying state property after they discovered a ripped pillowcase near Palmer's cell bunk. Palmer was then ordered to reimburse the State.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Jacobsen

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167

82-1167

1983

United States

Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen

<p>On May 1, 1981, pursuant to company procedure, employees at the FedEx office at the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport opened a package that had been damaged by a forklift. The package was an ordinary-looking cardboard box wrapped in brown paper. Inside, they found a tube that contained four plastic bags inside one another, and the innermost bag contained a white substance. They notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and replaced the contents of the box. When the DEA agents arrived, they removed a small amount of the white powder to conduct a field test that determined the powder was cocaine. The DEA agents obtained a warrant for the address on the package and searched the location, where they arrested Bradley Thomas Jacobsen and Donna Marie Jacobsen for possession of an illegal substance with intent to distribute.</p> <p>After they were indicted, the respondents filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the warrant was the product of an illegal search. The motion was denied, and the defendants were tried and convicted in district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision and held that the warrant was the product of the test of the powder, for which a warrant was required. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

McKaskle v. Wiggins

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1135

82-1135

1983

Dan V. McKaskle, Acting Director of the Texas Department of Corrections

Carl Edwin Wiggins

<p>On January 17, 1972, Carl Edwin Wiggins robbed a Piggly Wiggly store in San Antonio. He was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison, but his conviction was set aside due to a faulty indictment. At the first trial, Wiggins waived his right to counsel. On April 16, 1973, about two months before his second trial was set to begin, Wiggins filed a request for counsel and rescinded his earlier waiver. His feelings toward his standby counsel remained volatile throughout the trial. Wiggins was convicted in his second trial. He moved for a new trial and argued that his standby counsel interfered with his defense, but the court denied the motion. After he exhausted direct appellate and state habeas relief, Wiggins petitioned for federal habeas relief in district court. The district court denied his petition, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Lynch v. Donnelly

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1256

82-1256

1983

Lynch

Donnelly

<p>The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The creche had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Schall v. Martin

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1248

82-1248

1983

Ellen Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice

Gregory Martin, et al.

<p>In 1977, fourteen-year-old Gregory Martin was arrested for first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. While detained, Martin lied to the police about his address. He was held overnight. At his initial appearance in court, the prosecution cited the gun, the lie about his address, and his evident lack of supervision as reasons why he should remain in detention until his fact-finding hearing. The court granted the detention under the New York Family Court Act (FCA). Fellow appellees Luis Rosario and Kenneth Morgan were also detained prior to their fact-finding hearings. Both were fourteen at the time, and had other delinquency petitions pending when they appeared before the court. While held in pretrial detention, Martin began a habeas corpus class action, which Rosario, Morgan, and 31 others joined, against the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Martin argued that the pretrial detention amounted to punishment before a determination of guilt.</p> <p>The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that the pretrial detention was a violation of habeas corpus. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision and determined that the FCA was unconstitutional because it allowed detention of juveniles to serve as a punishment before the trial occurred. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Calder v. Jones

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1401

82-1401

1983

Ian Calder, John South

Shirley Jones

<p>Shirley Jones was a professional actress and California resident whose television career was also based in California. Marty Ingels, her husband, was also a professional entertainer. On October 9, 1979, the National Enquirer published an article about Jones. John South wrote the first draft of the article, and his byline appeared on it. Shortly before publication, South called Ingels to read him the article and elicit his comments on it. Ian Calder, the president and editor of the Enquirer, declined to print a retraction.</p> <p>National Enquirer, Inc. was a corporation that published a national newspaper with a total circulation of over five million, 600,000 copies of which were sold in California. John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. He was a resident of Florida, but frequently travelled to California on business. Ian Calder was a Florida resident and he exerted close control over the functions of the Enquirer; he had traveled to California only twice and had no other relevant contacts with that state.</p> <p>Jones filed an action in California state court against Calder and South, alleging that the article was untrue, libelous, and that it damaged their reputations and good names. The superior court ruled that although the injury occurred in California, it lacked personal jurisdiction over the claim because of the potential chilling effect from requiring editors and reporters to appear in remote jurisdictions. The California Court of Appeals reversed because the defendants intended to cause tortious injury to Jones and Ingels in California. A timely petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of California was denied, but the Supreme Court of the United States treated it as a petition for a writ of certiorari, granting review.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

Oliver v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-15

82-15

1983

Oliver

United States

<p>These are two consolidated cases involving the discovery of open marijuana fields as the result of unwarranted searches of privately owned land.</p> <p>In the first case, Kentucky State police searched Ray E. Oliver's farm, acting on reports that marijuana was grown there. A gate marked with a "No Trespassing" sign surrounded the field. Police found marijuana in the field about a mile from Oliver's home. Before trial, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky suppressed evidence found in the search on the ground that Oliver had a reasonable expectation that his field would remain private. This expectation triggered the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed under the open field doctrine. The open field doctrine states that a citizen's protection from unwarranted search does not extend to open fields.</p> <p>In the second case, police searched the woods behind Richard Thornton's property after an anonymous tip. Police found two marijuana patches on Thornton's land. The Maine Superior Court granted Thornton's motion to suppress evidence found in the search for the same reasons as the Oliver case. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Main affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Cronic

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-660

82-660

1983

United States

Harrison P. Cronic

<p>During a four-month period in 1975, Harrison P. Cronic, along with Carolyn Cummings and Wylie C. Merritt, participated in a mail fraud that involved transferring more than $9,400,000 in checks between a bank in Tampa, FL, and one in Norman, OK. The three were indicted on mail fraud charges. Shortly before trial, Cronic’s counsel withdrew and the court appointed a lawyer for him. The court appointed a lawyer who specialized in real estate law and only had 25 days to prepare for the trial, compared to the government’s almost five years. Cummings and Merritt agreed to testify for the government. The jury found Cronic guilty on and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. </p> <p>The Court of Appeals concluded that Cronic’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated and reversed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Pulliam v. Allen

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1432

82-1432

1983

Gladys Pulliam, Magistrate for the County of Culpeper, Virginia

Richmond Allen and Jesse Nicholson

<p>In January 1980, Richmond Allen was arrested for allegedly using abusive and insulting language, which is a Class 3 misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of $500. Gladys Pulliam, the state magistrate for Culpeper County, Virginia set bail at $250 and, when Allen was unable to make bail, Pulliam committed him to the Culpeper County Jail for 14 days. Allen was tried, found guilty, fined, and released. The trial judge reopened his case and reversed the judgment. Allen sued Pulliam in district court and sought declaratory and injunctive relief for incarcerating him while waiting for trial on non-jailable offenses.</p> <p>Jesse Nicholson was arrested four times in a two-month period for public intoxication, a Class 4 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $100 fine. Like Allen, Nicholson was incarcerated for failure to make bail, and he intervened in Allen’s suit as a party plaintiff.</p> <p>This district court held that Pulliam’s practice of incarcerating persons for not making bail on non-jailable offenses violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The district court enjoined the practice and found Allen and Nicholson entitled to costs, including attorneys’ fees. Pulliam appealed the finding regarding costs and argued that, as a judicial officer, she was granted judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the judicial immunity argument and affirmed the district court’s decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Block v. Rutherford

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/83-317

83-317

1983

Block

Rutherford

<p>Respondents were inmates being held in Los Angeles County Central Jail (Central Jail) prior to their trials. Central Jail did not allow inmates to have contact visits with spouses, children, or other guests. Central Jail also prohibited inmates from watching the irregularly-scheduled shakedown searches of their own cells. Respondents sued in district court and argued that these practices violated their civil rights under Section 1983 of the United States Code. The district court agreed with respondents' claim that an inmate's right to embrace his family is "a matter of great importance" and outweighs the minimal risks the contact visits posed. The district court held that low-risk detainees should be allowed contact visits if they are incarcerated for more than a month. The district court also held that inmates should be allowed to watch searches of their cells from a distance because the shakedowns often resulted in prison officials removing or destroying the inmates' personal property. The jail officials appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Due Process

Heckler v. Day

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1371

82-1371

1983

Heckler

Day

<p>Title II of the Social Security Act (Act) establishes a four-step review process of disputed disability benefit claims. First, a state agency determines if a claimant has a disability and when the condition began or ended. Second, state agencies' disability determinations can be reviewed upon the claimant's request. Third, if upon review the claimant suffers an adverse finding he or she may demand an evidentiary hearing by an administrative law judge. Fourth, if a claimant is dissatisfied with the administrative law judge's decision, they may appeal to the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Claiming delays in excess of 90 days, during steps two and three, Leon Day sued on behalf of several similarly aggrieved Vermont claimants alleging a violation of the "reasonable time" hearing limitation. On appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling upholding a district court's imposition of disability hearing deadlines, the Supreme Court granted HHS Secretary Margaret Heckler certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

United States v. Stauffer Chemical Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1448

82-1448

1983

United States

Stauffer Chemical Company

<p>In 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and a private firm planned to inspect a plant owned by Stauffer Chemical Co. (Stauffer) in Tennessee. Before granting entry, Stauffer requested that the employees of the private firm sign an agreement promising not to disclose any trade secrets they might learn during the inspection. The employees refused, and Stauffer denied them entry. The EPA and private firm returned with a warrant to enter the premises, but Stauffer again denied them entry.</p> <p>The EPA began a civil contempt proceeding against Stauffer to gain entry. The district court ruled in favor of the EPA and Stauffer appealed. On appeal, Stauffer argued that the employees of the private firm did not qualify as “authorized representatives” under the Clean Air Act, and therefore Stauffer was not required to grant them entry. Stauffer had used this argument before in a similar case from Wyoming, which involved the same parties. Stauffer argued that this previous case precluded the government from re-litigating this issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed with Stauffer and reversed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-485

82-485

1983

Keeton

Hustler Magazine, Inc.

<p>Kathy Keeton (Keeton) sued Hustler Magazine, Inc. (Hustler) and several other defendants for libel in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Keeton alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship since she was a resident of New York and Hustler was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in California. Hustler sold 10 to 15 thousand copies of its magazine in New Hampshire each month but Keeton's only connection to New Hampshire was the circulation there of copies of a magazine that she assisted in producing. She chose to sue in New Hampshire because it was the only state in which the statute of limitation for libel six years, the longest in the United States had not run. The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The First Circuit affirmed, finding that Keeton's contacts with New Hampshire were too attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over Hustler. The Court of Appeals also found the application of the "single publication rule," which would require the court to award Keeton damages caused in all states should she prevail, unfair since most of Keeton's alleged injuries occurred outside of New Hampshire.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Allen v. Wright

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1983/81-757

81-757

1983

Allen

Wright

<p>In an effort to curb racially discriminatory practices in private schools, the Internal Revenue Code denies tax-exempt status to schools which promote such practices. The Code also prohibits individuals from making tax-deductible donations to private schools which racially discriminate. Inez Wright and others filed a nationwide class action suit arguing that the IRS had not fulfilled its obligations in enforcing these provisions of the Code, and thus, that government was subsidizing and encouraging the expansion of segregated education in private schools. This case was decided together with Reagan v. Wright.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Wallace v. Jaffree

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-812

83-812

1984

Wallace

Jaffree

<p>An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-468

84-468

1984

City of Cleburne, Texas

Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

<p>In 1980, Cleburne Living Center, Inc. submitted a permit application to operate a home for the mentally retarded. The city council of Cleburne voted to deny the special use permit, acting pursuant to a municipal zoning ordinance.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part

Economic Activity

United States v. Miller

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1750

83-1750

1984

United States

James Rual Miller

<p>An indictment issued by a grand jury charged James Miller with fraud. The indictment alleged he conspired with a burglar and overstated the value of the stolen items so his insurer would pay him more in damages recovery. The prosecution presented evidence proving that Miller had overstated the value of the items but did not try to establish that he had conspired with the burglar. The jury found his overstatement of value sufficient to convict him of fraud. Miller argued that by convicting him despite the fact that the prosecutors only addressed part of the indictment, the jury violated his Fifth Amendment right to be tried only on a grand jury indictment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

California v. Carney

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-859

83-859

1984

California

Charles R. Carney

<p>On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency officers observed Charles Carney approach a youth who followed him into a motor home parked in a lot in downtown San Diego. Having previously received a tip that Carney was using the motor home to sell marijuana in exchange for sexual favors, the officers kept the motor home under surveillance while the two were inside. When the youth exited, the officers contacted him, and he confirmed that Carney gave him marijuana in exchange for receiving Carney’s sexual advances. The officers knocked on the door of the mobile home, identified themselves, and entered without a warrant or consent. They found marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale on the table. The officers arrested Carney for possession of marijuana with intent to sell. <p>Carney moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search of the motor home, and the trial court denied the motion. Carney pleaded no contest, was convicted, and placed on probation. He appealed, and the California Court of Appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds that the motor home fell under the vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of California reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Wilson v. Garcia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-2146

83-2146

1984

Wilson

Garcia

<p>Gary Garcia alleged that in 1979 he was unlawfully arrested, beaten, and tear-gassed by the petitioner, Richard Wilson, who was a New Mexico State Police officer. Garcia also alleged that Martin Vigil, the Chief of the State Police, knew Wilson had attacked citizens on several occasions but had failed to take action. Garcia sued for a violation of Section 1983 of the United State Code, a civil rights statute that creates a civil cause of action for the deprivation of rights. The petitioners argued that this Section 1983 claim should be subject to the two-year statute of limitations that applied to a similar cause of action found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (Act). If that statute of limitations were applied, this case could not proceed because the complaint was not filed until two years and nine months after the alleged beating. The district court held that the two-year statute of limitations recommended by petitioners did not apply because it was not sufficiently related to the nature of the right being enforced by Garcia's claim. Instead, the district court held that a different cause of action in the Act was more closely related to this Section 1983 claim and applied that cause of action's four-year statute of limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling but held that actions brought under Section 1983 are essentially an injury to personal rights; therefore, the three-year statute of limitations that applies to all personal injury actions in New Mexico should apply to Section 1983 claims.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Heckler v. Chaney

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1878

83-1878

1984

Heckler

Chaney

<p>Several prison inmates convicted of capital offenses and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) alleging that the drugs to be used for their executions were not approved for use in human executions and therefore violated the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). When the FDA denied enforcement, the inmates brought suit claiming violations of the FDCA and requesting that the FDA be required to take enforcement actions. The district court granted summary judgment to the FDA holding that decisions declining to initiate enforcement proceedings were not judicially reviewable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding that the decision not to begin an enforcement action was judicially reviewable under 5 U.S.C. Section 701(a)(2) and an abuse of discretion.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Wayte v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1292

83-1292

1984

Wayte

United States

<p>Mr. Wayte was required by a 1980 Presidential Proclamation to register with the Selective Service system. Instead, he wrote letters to various government officials stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Wayte's letters were added to a file kept by the Selective Service of men who had informed the government that they were not complying with the proclamation.</p> <p>The Selective Service later adopted a policy of passive enforcement, in which it would prosecute only men who had either reported to the government that they were not registering or whom other people had reported to the government for not registering. After a long series of requests by the government that Wayte register (all of which he failed to respond to), the government eventually indicted Wayte in federal district court for violating the Military Selective Service Act.</p> <p>The district court, however, dismissed the indictment, holding that the government's passive enforcement policy was unconstitutional because it amounted to selective prosecution of only those men who took an outspoken stance against the Selective Service. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wayte had failed to show that the government focused its attention on him because of his protest activities.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

United States v. Bagley

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-48

84-48

1984

United States

Hughes Anderson Bagley

<p>In October 1977, Hughes Anderson Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. The government’s two principal witnesses were James F. O’Connor and Donald E. Mitchell, private security guards. Between April and June 1977, they assisted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) in conducting an undercover investigation of Bagley. In response to a discovery request for information about any deals, promises or inducements made to O’Connor or Mitchell, the government produced only affidavits from each man stating that each spoke without any threats or rewards, or promises of reward. Bagley waived his right to a jury trial. At trial, O’Connor and Mitchell testified about the firearms and narcotics charges. On December 23, 1977, the court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges, but not the firearms charges.</p> <p>In mid-1980, Bagley filed requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Privacy Act of 1974. He received copies of ATF form contracts, each entitled, “Contract for Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.” These contracts indicated that O’Connor and Mitchell provided information to the ATF and promised a future payment of $300 to each informer. Bagley moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that the government’s failure to disclose the contracts violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>The motion came before the same district judge who presided at Bagley’s trial. At an evidentiary hearing, a magistrate found that neither informant expected payment for his testimony. In contrast, the district judge found that O’Connor and Mitchell probably expected to receive compensation for their assistance, and that the government suppressed evidence favorable to Bagley. He also concluded, however, that the disclosure would not have had an effect on the court’s verdict. He emphasized that Bagley’s counsel did not seek to discredit O’Connor or Mitchell on cross-examination. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed, reasoning that the government’s failure to disclose required automatic reversal because it impaired Bagley’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses through effective cross-examination.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1158

83-1158

1984

Estate of Thornton

Caldor, Inc.

<p>Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton's estate (Thornton died in 1982) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

McDonald v. Smith

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-476

84-476

1984

Robert McDonald

David I. Smith

<p>In July 1981, David Smith sued Robert McDonald in state court. Smith alleged that, while he was being considered for the position of U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina, McDonald sent two letters to President Ronald Reagan that contained libelous falsehoods about him. Smith claimed that McDonald knew the accusations in the letters were false and that he mailed the letters with malicious intent to undermine the prospect of Smith’s appointment as U.S. Attorney. Smith’s complaint alleged that the letters had their intended effect—he was not appointed to the position, and he suffered damage to his career and reputation—so he sought compensatory damages.</p> <p>McDonald removed the case to the district court on the basis of diverse citizenship and moved for judgment on the pleadings by arguing that the Petition Clause granted him absolute immunity. The district court held that the Petition Clause granted general immunity but not absolute immunity from liability for libel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Aguilar v. Felton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-237

84-237

1984

Aguilar

Felton

<p>Part of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorized local institutions to receive funds to assist educationally deprived children from low-income families. Since 1966, New York City had used portions of its Title I funding to pay salaries of employees who teach in parochial schools.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1632

83-1632

1984

Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Nation Enterprises

<p>In 1977, former President Gerald Ford contracted with Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, Inc. to publish his memoirs. Harper &amp; Row negotiated a prepublication agreement with Time Magazine for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Ford's account of his pardon of former President Richard Nixon. Before Time released its article, an unauthorized source provided The Nation Magazine with the unpublished Ford manuscript. Subsequently, The Nation, using approximately 300 words from the manuscript, scooped Time. Harper &amp; Row sued The Nation, alleging violations of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976. The District Court held that The Nation's use of the copyrighted material constituted infringement. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Nation's use of the copyrighted material was sanctioned as a fair use.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Board of Ed. of Oklahoma City v. National Gay Task Force

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-2030

83-2030

1984

Board of Education of Oklahoma City

National Gay Task Force

<p>The National Gay Task Force filed a facial constitutional challenge to an Oklahoma Statute that allowed schools to fire teachers who engage in “public homosexual activity” or “public homosexual conduct”. Public homosexual activity encompassed physical sexual acts while public homosexual conduct included advocating for or encouraging public or private homosexual activity. The district court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, holding that the statute did not inhibit First Amendment freedoms, and the right of privacy did not include the activities prohibited by the statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed in part, holding that the part of the statute that prohibited public homosexual conduct was unconstitutionally broad and attempted to regulate speech. The court upheld that part of the statute prohibiting public homosexual activity.</p>

equally divided

affirmed

First Amendment

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-755

84-755

1984

United States

Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez

<p>Customs officials stopped Rosa Elvira Montoya de Hernandez at the Los Angeles Airport, where she arrived after a flight from Bogota, Columbia. Montoya de Hernandez’s passport revealed eight recent trips from Bogota to Miami or Los Angeles. After further questioning, officials detained Montoya de Hernandez under suspicion that she was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. After 16 hours of detention where Montoya de Hernandez did not speak or use the bathroom, officials obtained a court order for an x-ray and other tests. At the hospital, a doctor removed a balloon filled with cocaine from her rectum. Over the next four days, Montoya de Hernandez passed 88 balloons filled with cocaine, totaling 528 grams. At trial, the district court admitted the cocaine into evidence and convicted Montoya de Hernandez on federal drug charges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Montoya de Hernandez’s detention violated the Fourth Amendment because customs officials did not have a “clear indication” that she was smuggling drugs.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1569

83-1569

1984

Mitsubishi Motors Corporation

Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.

<p>These are two consolidated cases involving claims and counterclaims between the same parties. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Mitsubishi Motors, a Japanese corporation that manufactures automobiles in Japan. The sales agreement provided for arbitration by the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association of all disputes arising out of certain articles of the agreement. A dispute did arise from slowing automobile sales. When the dispute could not be resolved, Mitsubishi sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order to compel arbitration. Soler filed counterclaims, including Sherman Act antitrust violations. The district court ordered arbitration of all claims, holding that the international nature of the dispute required enforcement of the arbitration clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed as to the antitrust claims.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Economic Activity

Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-363

84-363

1984

Northeast Bancorp, Inc.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

<p>Certain bank holding companies located principally in either Connecticut or Massachusetts applied to the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to obtain approval for acquisitions of banks or bank holding companies (banks) in the other state. If a bank from one state seeks to acquire a bank, or substantially all of a bank's assets, from another state, the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. Section 1842(d), allows the Board to approve the acquisition only if it "is specifically authorized by the statute laws of the State in which such [acquired] bank is located." Massachusetts and Connecticut have substantially similar laws allowing out-of-state banks to buy in-state banks only if the out-of-state banks (1) have their principal place of business in another New England State, and (2) the other New England State accords equivalent reciprocal privileges. Certain banks from outside of New England opposed the acquisitions, but the Board found that the Douglas Amendment did not prevent their authorization, and approved them.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-433

84-433

1984

School Committee of Burlington, Massachusetts, et al.

Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al.

<p>Under the provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act, state and local education agencies must provide handicapped children and their parents or guardians with access to the appropriate safeguards to ensure free and appropriate public education. Such safeguards include the right of the parents and guardians to participate in the development of an individual education program (IEP) and a procedure for the review of a proposed IEP if there is disagreement.</p> <p>In the spring of 1979, Michael Panico, who was considered to be “handicapped” under the meaning of the Act, was attending Memorial School, a public school in Burlington. His continued poor performance and the school’s inability to handle his needs led to a discussion between the school district and Michael’s parents about what changes needed to be made to his IEP. In June of 1979, the town presented the Panicos with an IEP that called for Michael to be placed at Pine Glen School. In the meantime, the Panicos had met with specialists at the Massachusetts General Hospital who recommended that Michael’s needs could best be served at the Carroll School in Lincoln, Massachusetts. The Panicos enrolled Michael at the Carroll School at their own expense.</p> <p>The Massachusetts Department of Education’s Bureau of Special Education Appeals (BSEA) held several hearings on the issue and determined that the town’s proposed placement was inappropriate and that the Carroll School was most adequately equipped to meet Michael’s needs. The BSEA ordered the town to pay for Michael’s tuition and transportation, as well as reimburse the Panicos for money already spent. The town sought judicial review in district court under federal and state statutes. The district court granted summary judgment against the town on the state law claim and set a date for trial on the federal claim. Because the town had refused to comply with the BSEA order, the Panicos and the state moved for preliminary injunctive relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the judgment in regards to the state law claim and held that none of the parties were entitled to preliminary injunctive relief because none could show irreparable injury. On remand, the district court found in favor of the town that the proposed IEP was appropriate and that the town should not be required to compensate the Panicos. The case was transferred to a different district judge to rule on the issue of whether or not the town should be required to pay the Panicos for costs incurred while the case was pending. The district court held that the Panicos’ decision to place Michael in the Carroll School without the town’s consent absolved the town of financial responsibility while the case was pending and ordered the Panicos to reimburse the town. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the district court erred in conducting an entirely new trial, gave insufficient weight to the BSEA findings, and did not properly evaluate the IEP in question.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-4

84-4

1984

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City

<p>Hamilton Bank of Johnson City owned of a tract of land in Williamson County Tennessee and intended to develop it into a residential subdivision. When Hamilton Bank attempted to get a layout of the subdivision approved, the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission denied it because the layout violated certain zoning regulations. Hamilton Bank sued the Commission alleging that the zoning laws constituted a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. At trial, the jury awarded Hamilton Bank $350,000 as compensation for the taking. The court issued an injunction against the Commission and awarded judgment notwithstanding the verdict denying money damages because the "taking" was only temporary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the zoning laws denied Hamilton Bank all "economically viable" use of the land and that damages were required to compensate for the temporary taking.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/84-261

84-261

1984

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Gary Weintraub, Frank H. McGhee, Andrew McGhee

<p>The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the Commission) filed a complaint against the Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers (CDCB), alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. CDCB was going through bankruptcy at the time and a trustee was appointed At a deposition related to the Commission's lawsuit, Gary Weintraub, CDCB's former counsel, refused to answer certain questions, citing attorney-client privilege. The Commission obtained a waiver of attorney-client privilege from the CDCB's bankruptcy trustee. The district court directed Weintraub to answer the questions, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the power to waive attorney-client privilege for communications that occurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1362

83-1362

1984

Cleveland Board of Education

James Loudermill

<p>James Loudermill stated on his application for employment with the Cleveland Board of Education that he had never been convicted for a felony. After hiring him as a security guard, the board discovered that he had been convicted for grand larceny and without further consideration fired him for providing false information on his application. Since Loudermill qualified as a "classified civil servant" under Ohio law, he obtained a property right to his employment. This meant he could only be dismissed for cause and could obtain an administrative review of the causes for his termination. The Cleveland Civil Service Commission granted him an administrative review after his termination and found it valid. Loudermill filed suit in District Court alleging that the review system was unconstitutional because it only allowed him to respond to the charges against him after his termination. He argued that the board removed his property without giving him a chance to defend himself in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court agreed that the Ohio statute gave Loudermill a property right to his job, but ruled that the board did not violate his due process rights because it followed the procedures specified by the same statute for removing the property right. In a similar case, Richard Donnelly alleged that post-dismissal hearings violated his due process rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard both cases together and ruled that the board violated both defendants' due process rights by removing their property rights to employment before providing an opportunity for them to respond to charges against them.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Committee

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1032

83-1032

1984

Federal Election Commission

National Conservative Political Action Committee

<p>In 1975, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) was accused by both the Democratic Party of the United States and the Federal Election Commission of violating the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Act stipulated that independent political action committees could not spend more than $1,000 to support the election of a presidential candidate. This case was decided together with Democratic Party v. NCPAC.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Tennessee v. Garner

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1035

83-1035

1984

Tennessee

Garner

<p>These are two consolidated cases against different defendants involving the same incident. During a chase, police officer Elton Hymon shot 15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner with a hollow tip bullet to prevent Garner from escaping over a fence. Garner was suspected of burglarizing a nearby house. Hymon admitted that before he shot he saw no evidence that Garner was armed and "figured" he was unarmed. The bullet hit Garner in the back of the head. Garner was taken to the hospital where he died a short time later.</p> <p>Garner's father sued seeking damages for violations of Garner's constitutional rights. The district court entered judgment for the defendants because Tennessee law authorized Hymon's actions. The court also felt that Garner had assumed the risk of being shot by recklessly attempting to escape. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that killing a fleeing suspect is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and such a seizure would only be reasonable if the suspect posed a threat to the safety of police officers or the community at large.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Ake v. Oklahoma

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-5424

83-5424

1984

Glen Burton Ake

Oklahoma

<p>In 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with murder for killing a couple in Oklahoma. At trial, his behavior was so abnormal that the court ordered a prolonged mental examination to determine his competency to stand trial. After six months of examination, a state psychiatrist declared Ake unfit for trial and in need of a “maximum security facility.” Six weeks after this declaration, the same psychiatrist found that, when Ake was on his anti-psychotic medication, he was stable and competent to stand trial; the state resumed proceedings.</p> <p>Ake intended to assert the insanity defense, so a psychiatrist had to determine Ake’s mental state at the time of the killings. Because Ake could not afford to hire a psychiatrist, his attorney requested that the state provide him one. The court refused and rejected Ake’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the government to provide indigent defendants with a psychiatrist to allow them to raise a meaningful insanity defense. Without a psychiatrist, Ake was unable to provide any evidence as to his mental state at the time of the offense. Absent this evidence, jurors were instructed that Ake was to be presumed sane at the time of the offense. The jury subsequently rejected Ake’s insanity defense and convicted him on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, Ake—still unable to afford a psychiatrist—could not provide expert testimony to mitigate his offense and was sentenced to death. Ake appealed to the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals, which affirmed and held that the government was not responsible for providing psychiatric help to indigent defendants charged with capital crimes.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1919

83-1919

1984

City of Oklahoma City

Rose Marie Tuttle, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Tuttle

<p>On October 10, 1980, an Oklahoma City police officer shot and killed Albert Tuttle outside a bar. Rose Marie Tuttle, Albert’s widow, sued the police officer and the city in district court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows an individual to recover damages against a party who “acting under color of state law” deprives another of his constitutional rights. The district court instructed the jury that the city could be held liable only if the incident had been caused by a municipal “policy,” but a single, unusually excessive use of force could support a finding that the city was grossly negligent or deliberately indifferent in the training or supervision of its police force and was therefore liable under Section 1983. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the police officer but against the city and awarded Tuttle’s estate $1.5 million in damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

United States v. Abel

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-935

83-935

1984

United States

John Clyde Abel

<p>In 1981, John Abel was indicted for robbing a bank in California. During Abel’s trial, the prosecution called one of his accomplices, Kurt Ehle, to testify that Abel had participated in the robbery. To counter Ehle’s testimony, Abel called a mutual friend, Robert Mills, to the stand. Mills, Abel, and Ehle knew each other from the time they spent in prison together and their involvement in a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Mills testified that, in prison, Ehle had talked about his plans to rob the bank and blame it on Abel. To discredit Mills, the prosecution re-called Ehle to the stand to expose the three men’s involvement in the Brotherhood and the gang’s strict code of protection, which required members to lie, cheat, steal, and kill to protect a fellow member. Ehle testified that this code of conduct explained why Mills testified in defense of Abel. Abel’s counsel argued that this testimony was irrelevant, but the district court allowed it into evidence because the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect it may have on Abel. Abel lost and appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed because admitting evidence that Mills belonged to a perjurious organization, to suggest he was committing perjury this time, unfairly prejudiced him by association absent any evidence of his individual willingness to lie. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Oregon v. Elstad

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-773

83-773

1984

Oregon

Elstad

<p>Michael James Elstad was suspected of committing a burglary and was picked up by police officers in his home. Before officers had given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, Elstad made an incriminating statement. Once at the Sheriff's headquarters, Elstad was advised of his rights. Elstad then voluntarily executed a written confession.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1466

83-1466

1984

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Piper

<p>Kathryn Piper was a resident of Lower Waterford, Vermont, which is about 400 yards away from the New Hampshire border. In 1979, she applied to take the 1980 New Hampshire Bar Examination and submitted her statement of intent to become a New Hampshire resident. Piper passed the New Hampshire Bar and was informed she would have to establish a home address in New Hampshire before being sworn in. In May 1980, Piper requested a dispensation from the residency requirement due to special circumstances and the fact that she met all of the other requirements. When her request was denied, she formally petitioned the New Hampshire Supreme Court to become a member of the bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied her petition on December 31, 1980.</p> <p>On March 22, 1982, Piper sued the New Hampshire Supreme Court in district court and argued that the residency requirement violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court granted Piper’s motion for summary judgment and found that the requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-990

83-990

1984

School District of the City of Grand Rapids, et al.

Phyllis Ball, et al.

<p>In the 1976-1977 school year, the school district of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs, Shared Time and Community Education, that provided secular classes to private school students at public expense. The Shared Time program offered classes during the school day that were intended to “supplement the core curriculum” of the private schools. The Shared Time teachers were full-time public school teachers, and many had previously worked in private schools. The Community Education program was offered for children and adults at many different sites, but the classes at issue took place after the school day in private elementary schools. The Community Education teachers were part-time public school employees, and many also held jobs at private schools. The classrooms for both programs were leased from the private schools. The vast majority of the participating private schools were religious, and there was no evidence that a public school student ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class held in a private school.</p> <p> Six taxpayers filed suit against the school district and state officials and alleged that they violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by using public funds to pay for private (and religious) education. The district court applied the Lemon test and determined that, although the aim was secular, the effect of the programs conferred benefits to religious institutions and entangled the affairs of church and state. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Winston v. Lee

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1984/83-1334

83-1334

1984

Andrew J. Winston, Sheriff, et al.

Rudolph Lee, Jr.

<p>Around 1 a.m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph Watkinson was locking up his shop when he saw a figure with a gun approaching him. Watkinson drew his own weapon, and the two fired at each other. Watkinson was hit in the legs, and the other shooter was wounded on his left side and managed to run away. About 20 minutes later, the police found Rudolph Lee, Jr., bleeding from his left side, eight blocks away from Watkinson’s shop. The police took Lee to the same hospital Watkinson was in, and Watkinson identified Lee as his shooter. Lee was charged with attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. </p> <p>The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion in state court to compel Lee to submit to surgery to recover the bullet still lodged in his side. The court granted the motion based on testimony that the surgery would be relatively noninvasive and accomplished without use of general anesthetic. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the appeal. Lee sued in district court on the ground that the surgery constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction. After presenting evidence that the surgery would be much more serious than the court originally thought, Lee asked for a rehearing in the state court, which was denied. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Lee brought the case back to the district court, which ruled against the surgery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1360

84-1360

1985

City of Renton

Playtime Theatres, Inc.

<p>The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of "any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school." Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a permanent injunction against its enforcement.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667

84-1667

1985

Bethel School District No. 403

Matthew N. Fraser, a minor, and E.L. Fraser, Guardian Ad Litem

<p>At a school assembly of approximately 600 high school students, Matthew Fraser made a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office. In his speech, Fraser used what some observers believed was a graphic sexual metaphor to promote the candidacy of his friend. As part of its disciplinary code, Bethel High School enforced a rule prohibiting conduct which "substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures." Fraser was suspended from school for two days.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Dow Chemical Company v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1259

84-1259

1985

Dow Chemical Company

United States

<p>Dow Chemical Company denied the Environmental Protection Agency a follow-up on-site inspection of its facilities in Midland, Michigan. In response, EPA conducted an unannounced aerial inspection. When Dow became aware EPA had taken aerial photographs of its facilities, it filed suit in District Court alleging that EPA conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court ruled that the aerial inspection violated Dow's "expectation of privacy" from searches. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling on the ground that Dow only expected pivacy with respect to its indoor property.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1273

84-1273

1985

Regents of the University of Michigan

Ewing

<p>Scott Ewing was enrolled in a medical program, and in the spring of 1981, he took and failed the NBME Part 1 (Exam), which is an exam his program required. After reviewing the status of several students in the program, the Promotion and Review Board (Board) voted unanimously to drop Ewing from the program. The Board took into account his recent failure as well as the totality of his academic record when making their decision. Ewing appealed the Board’s decision four times and argued that, because every student before him who had failed the Exam had been allowed to retake it, he should be afforded the same opportunity. All of his appeals were unsuccessful.</p> <p>In August of the following year, Ewing sued in federal district court and alleged a breach of contract as well as a violation of his right to due process. The district court sided with the University and Ewing appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that Ewing’s right to enrollment qualified as a property right that deserved protection from arbitrary state interference under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1979

84-1979

1985

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB

Vinson

<p>After being dismissed from her job at a Meritor Savings Bank, Mechelle Vinson sued Sidney Taylor, the Vice President of the bank. Vinson charged that she had constantly been subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor over her four years at the bank. She argued such harassment created a "hostile working environment" and was covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Vinson sought injunctive relief along with compensatory and punitive damages against Taylor and the bank.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Batson v. Kentucky

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-6263

84-6263

1985

Batson

Kentucky

<p>Batson, a black man, was on trial charged with second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. During the jury selection, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike the four black persons on the venire, resulting in a jury composed of all whites. Batson was convicted on both of the charges against him.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-495

84-495

1985

Thornburgh

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

<p>In 1982, the state of Pennsylvania enacted legislation that placed a number of restrictions on abortion. The law required the following: "informed consent" of the woman, the dissemination of information concerning the risks of abortion, reporting procedures, the use of certain medical techniques after viability, and the presence of a second physician for post-viability abortions. The initial suit was brought against Richard Thornburgh, the Governor of Pennsylvania.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Privacy

California v. Ciraolo

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1513

84-1513

1985

California

Ciraolo

<p>The Santa Clara Police received an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his back yard. Unable to observe the yard from the ground due to a high fence which encircled it, the police secured a private plane and flew over Ciraolo's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. The fly-over confirmed the presence of marijuana. The police then obtained a search warrant, seized 73 plants on the next day, and arrested Ciraolo who then pleaded guilty to the cultivation of marijuana. The California Court of Appeals, however, found that the aerial observation was illegal and reversed Ciraolo's conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Lockhart v. McCree

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1865

84-1865

1985

Lockhart

McCree

<p>During the capital trial of Ardia McCree, a judge removed prospective jurors who stated that under no circumstances would they be able to impose the death penalty. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the judge's actions violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. A.L. Lockhart, the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction, appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-5

85-5

1985

Pennsylvania

Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

<p>In April of 1973, pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (Penn DER) submitted a plan for meeting federal air quality standards. This plan included a provision requiring the implementation of a program for the inspection and maintenance of automobile emissions systems (I/M program) by May 1, 1975. By mid-1976, Pennsylvania had not implemented any I/M program.</p> <p>In response, the Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (DVCCCA) brought suit against Pennsylvania and the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA filed a separate action against Pennsylvania and DVCCCA dropped its charges against the EPA. On August 29, 1978, Pennsylvania, Penn DER and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (Penn DOT) agreed to a final consent decree, terminating the DVCCCA and EPA actions.</p> <p>On January 2, 1982 and after more than five years of intermittent litigation -- during which Pennsylvania consistently resisted or ignored the consent decree -- the district court declared Pennsylvania, the Secretaries of the Penn DOT and Penn DER to be in civil contempt. On May 3, 1983, the Pennsylvania legislature authorized the Secretary of Penn DOT to implement an I/M program following several years of consistently denying Pennsylvania the requisite funding.</p> <p>The CAA provided that in issuing a final order in any action brought under the CAA, the court may award the costs of litigation to any party whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate. The DVCCCA and the EPA consequently sought attorneys’ fees and costs for all activity performed after the court issued the consent decree on August 29, 1978. The district court awarded attorneys’ fees that included time spent by plaintiffs’ attorneys monitoring Pennsylvania’s performance under the consent decree, an award for “superior quality” while opposing the state’s motion to stay the consent decree, and work performed for hearings held before the EPA. It also awarded a multiplier for the arguably small likelihood of plaintiffs’ success in three phases of the litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the attorneys’ fees awarded by the district court.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Attorneys

Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1656

84-1656

1985

Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

<p>In 1975, a federal district court found the Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court established a 29 percent minority membership goal and ordered the union to implement procedures to meet the goal. In 1982 and 1983, the union was found guilty of civil contempt for disobeying the court orders. The court then established a 29.23 percent nonwhite membership goal to be met by August 1987.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Murray v. Carrier

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1554

84-1554

1985

Murray

Carrier

<p>Clifford Carrier was arrested on charges of rape and abduction in 1977. Before his trial, Carrier's attorney filed a motion asking the court to give him access to the victim's statements about her assailants, their vehicle, and the location of the rape. The court rejected the motion. Carrier was subsequently convicted, and his attorney filed an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. The appeal did not mention the trial judge's decision about the victim's statements. That appeal was rejected.</p> <p>A year later, Carrier filed a new appeal in state court claiming that he had been denied his 14th Amendment right to Due Process by the trial judge's refusal to grant him access to the victim's statements. The court dismissed his case, however, citing Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:21, which states that claims left out of an initial appeal cannot be raised in later appeals. Because Carrier's attorney had not mentioned the victim's statements in the first appeal, Carrier could not raise them in the second.</p> <p>Carrier then filed a similar appeal in federal district court, again citing the 14th Amendment Due Process claims. The state argued that the appeal was procedural barred because it dealt with issues not raised during the initial appeal. Carrier countered that the omission of the claim had been his attorney's mistake (rather than a tactical decision), and that it should therefore not be held against him. The federal district court rejected the argument, dismissing the case. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed the decision, finding that the omission had been the attorney's mistake and therefore represented a failure of the attorney to provide effective counsel in that particular part of the case (though the representation as a whole was not unconstitutionally poor). The panel stated that because the omission resulted from ineffective counsel, it should not be held against Carrier.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1560

84-1560

1985

Press-Enterprise Co.

Superior Court of California for the County of Riverside

<p>A nurse in California was charged with killing 12 patients by administering massive doses of heart medication. During a preliminary hearing in the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, the nurse moved to exclude the public. California law requires preliminary hearings to be open to the public unless a closed hearing is necessary to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial. The judge granted the motion because of the the national publicity surrounding the case. After the hearing, Press-Enterprise Co. requested a transcript of the proceedings. The court denied the request because the transcript might prejudice the nurse’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Press-Enterprise filed a preemptory writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal, but the court denied the writ. The California Supreme Court also denied the writ, holding that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to preliminary hearings. The court also held that once the accused establishes a “reasonable likelihood of substantial prejudice”, the burden shifts to Press-Enterprise to show there is no reasonable probability of prejudice.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Goldman v. Weinberger

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1097

84-1097

1985

Goldman

Weinberger

<p>Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Michigan v. Jackson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1531

84-1531

1985

Michigan

Robert Bernard Jackson

<p>Robert Bernard Jackson was charged with second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. During his arraignment, Jackson requested that the court appoint him counsel. The next day, Jackson was interrogated again before he was able to communicate with his attorney. Jackson confessed during that interrogation.</p> <p>In December 1978, Rudy Bladel killed three railroad employees in Michigan. Bladel was arrested shortly thereafter, the police questioned him twice but released him. Two months later, he was arrested again and agreed to talk to the police without an attorney present. During his arraignment the following day, Bladel requested counsel, and the court assigned a firm to his case. The next day, the police questioned Bladel again before the firm was able to contact him and before he was aware he had been assigned counsel. During this questioning, Bladel confessed.</p> <p>In both cases, the trial courts held that the confessions, which were obtained after arraignment and before the defendants were able to meet with counsel, were properly received into evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson’s conviction, and he appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court consolidated Jackson and Bladel’s cases and ruled that both confessions should not have been admitted into evidence.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. American College of Physicians

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1737

84-1737

1985

United States

American College of Physicians

<p>The American College of Physicians, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization, published a monthly medical journal. Within the journal were paid advertisements for products useful in the field of medicine specifically covered by the journal. Section 511(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on "unrelated business taxable income" of tax-exempt organizations. The IRS asserted that the advertising income from the medical journal fell under this category. The American College of Physicians countered that the advertisements were "substantially related" to its tax-exempt purpose of maintaining high standards in medicine, and that they were therefore tax-exempt. When the IRS refused to give the organization a tax refund, it filed suit in United States Claims Court.</p> <p>The Claims Court held that the advertisements were not substantially related to the organization's tax-exempt purpose and that the income was therefore taxable. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that the advertisements helped to educate the journal's readers and was therefore substantially related.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Federal Taxation

Vasquez v. Hillery

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-836

84-836

1985

Vasquez

Hillery

<p>In 1962, an all-white grand jury indicted Booker T. Hillery—a black man—for the murder of a 15-year-old girl. After Hillery was tried and convicted, he appealed his conviction and claimed that black potential jurors were systematically excluded from the grand jury that indicted him, which violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hillery pursued remedy in state courts until the California Supreme Court finally denied him relief in 1978. Shortly after, Hillery filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court requested and received statistical evidence regarding the probability of having an all-white grand jury in Kings County, California, where Hillery was indicted and subsequently ruled in favor of Hillery. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

United States v. City of Fulton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1725

84-1725

1985

United States

City of Fulton

<p>In 1979, the Southwestern Power Administration, a federal regulatory body acting on behalf of the Secretary of Energy, increased the cost of electricity generated by federally owned dams under its control. The price hike was initially implemented on an interim basis, and three years later, after furher review, the new rates were made permanent. A group of cities that purchased power from the dams filed suit to recover the extra fees it had paid before the interim rates were made final, claiming that Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 prohibited the imposition of interim fees. The Act stated that new rates would "become effective upon confirmation and approval by the Secretary (of Energy)." The cities asserted that the rates, while in their interim phase, had not yet received "confirmation and approval" from the Secretary and could therefore not be legally implemented.</p> <p>The Court of Claims sided with the cities, holding that the new rates could only be charged once they received final approval from the Secretary. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Heath v. Alabama

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-5555

84-5555

1985

Larry Gene Heath

Alabama

<p>In August of 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired two men to kidnap and murder his pregnant wife. Heath met the men in Georgia, just across the state line from the Heath residence in Alabama, led them back to the house, and left. Rebecca Heath’s body was later found on the side of a road in Georgia. Both Georgia and Alabama authorities pursued investigations in which there was a degree of cooperation.</p> <p>On September 4, 1981, Georgia authorities arrested Heath, and he waived his Miranda rights and confessed. He was indicted by a grand jury in Troop County, Georgia, and pled guilty in February 10, 1982. On May 5, 1982, Heath was indicted by a grand jury in Russell County, Alabama. Prior to the trial, Heath argued that his conviction and sentencing in Georgia barred any prosecution in Alabama and that Alabama lacked jurisdiction. The trial court rejected both claims, and Heath was convicted. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the Alabama Supreme Court.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Bowers v. Hardwick

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-140

85-140

1985

Bowers

Hardwick

<p>Michael Hardwick was observed by a Georgia police officer while engaging in the act of consensual homosexual sodomy with another adult in the bedroom of his home. After being charged with violating a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy, Hardwick challenged the statute's constitutionality in Federal District Court. Following a ruling that Hardwick failed to state a claim, the court dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Georgia's statute was unconstitutional. Georgia's Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Privacy

McLaughlin v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-5189

85-5189

1985

McLaughlin

United States

<p>In the morning of July 26, 1984, Lamont McLaughlin and a companion, both wearing stocking masks, entered a bank in Baltimore. McLaughlin displayed a handgun and ordered everyone in the bank to put his hands up and not to move. While McLaughlin remained in the lobby area holding the gun, his companion placed about $3,400 in a brown paper bag. A police officer apprehended the two as they left the bank. The police then found that McLaughlin's gun was not loaded. Ultimately, McLaughlin pleaded guilty to charges of bank robbery and bank larceny and was found guilty of assault during a bank robbery "by the use of a dangerous weapon." The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Turner v. Murray

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-6646

84-6646

1985

Turner

Murray

<p>In July 1978, Willie Lloyd Turner entered a jewelry store and killed the proprietor. Turner was disarmed, arrested, and charged with capital murder. During the jury selection process, Turner's counsel requested that the trial judge ask potential jurors if they would be biased by the fact that Turner was black while the victim was white. The judge declined to ask the question regarding racial prejudice and instead asked the prospective jurors if they thought that they would be able to be impartial and fair. Turner was convicted and sentenced to death.</p> <p>After exhausting his appellate options at the state level, Turner filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. Because the facts of the case "did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might [have] infect[ed the defendant's] trial," the district court held that the trial judge's refusal to question potential jurors about racial prejudice was not unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1985/85-554

85-554

1985

United States

Hughes Properties, Inc.

<p>Hughes Properties owned a casino called Harold’s Club in Reno, Nevada. This casino operated slot machines that featured “progressive” jackpots. This jackpot increased as gamblers played and only paid out when the machine hit a certain combination. State gaming regulations prohibited lowering the jackpot until someone won. At the end of each fiscal year, Hughes took the year’s total progressive jackpots and subtracted the amount of last year’s jackpots to claim that amount as a business expense deduction. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, reasoning that until a patron won the jackpot, the liability was contingent.</p> <p>The IRS determined a tax deficiency amount, which Hughes paid before suing for a refund. The United States Claims Court granted summary judgment to Hughes on the ground that the jackpot amount was contingent until someone won it. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the casino’s liability was not contingent because state regulations barred a decrease in the amount.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federal Taxation