lit/21915958.txt

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--- 21915958
What is a "category of categories" and what would be its implication for metaphysics? 

I was reading an essay about how the early Heidegger during his Scholastics phase was influenced by Emil Lask and his "category of categories" concept:
>In the same vein, Heidegger, in his dissertation (I916) on the doctrine of the categories of being and of signification in Thomas of Erfurt alias Duns Scotus, identifies ens commune as the 'category of categories' and sees in the medieval doctrine of the transcendental properties of being - the one, true, good, and beautiful - a reflection of the philosophical categories by excellence. This line of development is destined to expand into a concern for the existential categories in Being and Time (Heidegger-I) and to Heidegger-Il's penchant to seek out the fundamental concepts of the West emerging from their pre-Socratic roots, in particular the topoi of logos, aletheia, and physis, which. as basic names for being, display a peculiar convergence akin to the 'convertibility' of the medieval transcendentals.
>More in the mainstream of the argument of the habilitation, which applies the insights of modern logic to a Scotian theory of categories and speech significations, is the repeated Laskian insistence (GA Rd. 1, 211, 263, 287f), reinforcing Scotus, that Aristotle's categories do not constitute the totality of categories but only a particular class of a particular domain of actuality, that of the real; that the meaning-giving acts of a speaker (especially if they are taken to be 'real') as well as his signifying intentions (either thought or spoken) as opposed to the 'valid' ideal objects of such intentions belong to different domains, each with its own governing regional category (especially validity versus reality) differing in meaning from other such region- constituting forms; if these different domains have their own logic, then there must be a logic which unifies and differentiates them, and this 'logic of logic' (GA Bd. 1, 288) will in turn have its own categories. What then is the master 'category of categories,' 'the ultimate and the highest, behind which we cannot inquire any further' (GA Bd. 1, 215: a formula that recalls Dilthey's regarding life!), the moment that pervades any cognizable object, 'objectness as such' (GABd. 1, 216)? Fusing the insights of his neoscholastic and transcendentalist mentors, the young Heidegger answers with ens commune "ut maxime scibile" (214f), the primary transcendental which is convertible with unum, verum, bonum (216), the 'something in general' (217) 'which is the condition of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever' (215), in short, the matter of a reflexive category!
>Theodore Kisiel, Heidegger's Way of Thought
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--- 21915960
We already have Aristotle's categories, which seem to classify the function of language. Then we have Kant's categories, which undergo an evolution with Kant's reorganization to describe judgment in general. Finally, we have Peirce's categories, which collapse the categories into three types meaning to describe the connectivity between ideas in general, a phenomenological science. How far is this going to go, and what is the endgame of categorial investigations?
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>>21915958 (OP)
>>21915960
Very interesting. This gives a lot of credence to Bowden describing Heidegger's whole philosophical orientation as scholastic.
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>Perhaps Heidegger's first precedent for the prereflective understanding-of-being constitutive of Dasein was the scholastic intellectus principiorum, the prior understanding of the transcendentals of being, one, true, and good serving as a 'natural light' to guide every human intellect. 3 In addition to Husserl's categorial intuition and Lask's dedicative submission, the Young Heidegger encountered other versions of this 'knowledge' that precedes overt knowledge, a knowledge that is one with life itself: Adolf Reinach's 'experi-entially immanent knowledge,' Schleiermacher's 'felt intuition,' Eckhart's 'naked intuition of the first truth,' the Lutheran sense of truth as trust, the Scotian modus essendi aetivus (Genesis, 115). The Eckhartian notes of letting be and receptive listening might also be added to underscore Heidegger's attempts, halting and difficult in view of the massive weight of a long tradition, to get beyond the metaphors of Lichtmetaphysik.
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>>21915958 (OP)
Categories of Categories means capital B Being. The reason why Being as such is not named in scholastics is because in Heideggerian interpretation it belongs to the period of forgetfulness of Being. I believe this is why the man youre quoting relates it to Heidegger's ideas regarding pre-Socratics. My advice would be to read Heidegger's primary texts instead of others' analysis of him. There is no Heidegger I and II as Martin himself explicitly says all his early work already included his later work, and the attempt to understand his reading of a past philosopher without bearing in mind Heidegger's vision of history of Being is flawed.
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>>21915958 (OP)
>category of categories
Refuted by Russel (pbuh).
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When will /lit/ grow out of Heidegger?
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>>21920236
When he has been overcome.
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>>21915958 (OP)
Yeah it's called Eleatic metaphysics. There's no need to sift through subpar medieval and/or german "philosophers'.
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>>21921467
How does Eleatic metaphysics do it?
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>>21921472
In the Eleatic account, reality is one perfect whole. Whatever way you describe or categorise it, it's ultimately one unified, perfect thing, "Being", that subsumes all of us and everything we might mention.