commit_msg
stringlengths 1
24.2k
| commit_hash
stringlengths 2
84
⌀ | project
stringlengths 2
40
| source
stringclasses 4
values | labels
int64 0
1
| repo_url
stringlengths 26
70
⌀ | commit_url
stringlengths 74
118
⌀ | commit_date
stringlengths 25
25
⌀ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 256df2f3879efdb2e9808bdb1b54b16fbb11fa38 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> | dab6cf55f81a6e16b8147aed9a843e1691dcd318 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Add missing check offset test (Francisco Alonso, Jan Kaluza at RedHat) | 93e063ee374b6a75729df9e7201fb511e47e259d | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix incorrect bounds check for sector count. (Francisco Alonso and Jan Kaluza
at RedHat) | 40bade80cbe2af1d0b2cd0420cebd5d5905a2382 | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Use the proper sector size when checking stream offsets (Francisco Alonso and
Jan Kaluza at RedHat) | 36fadd29849b8087af9f4586f89dbf74ea45be67 | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Correctly compute the truncated pascal string size (Francisco Alonso and
Jan Kaluza at RedHat) | 27a14bc7ba285a0a5ebfdb55e54001aa11932b08 | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | 844817e47eef14141cf59b8d5ac08dd11c0a9189 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | 6817ae225cd650fb1c3295d769298c38b1eba818 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | 4ab25786c87eb20857bbb715c3ae34ec8fd6a214 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
HID: logitech: fix bounds checking on LED report size
The check on report size for REPORT_TYPE_LEDS in logi_dj_ll_raw_request()
is wrong; the current check doesn't make any sense -- the report allocated
by HID core in hid_hw_raw_request() can be much larger than
DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH, and currently logi_dj_ll_raw_request() doesn't
handle this properly at all.
Fix the check by actually trimming down the report size properly if it is
too large.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | 51217e69697fba92a06e07e16f55c9a52d8e8945 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
HID: logitech: perform bounds checking on device_id early enough
device_index is a char type and the size of paired_dj_deivces is 7
elements, therefore proper bounds checking has to be applied to
device_index before it is used.
We are currently performing the bounds checking in
logi_dj_recv_add_djhid_device(), which is too late, as malicious device
could send REPORT_TYPE_NOTIF_DEVICE_UNPAIRED early enough and trigger the
problem in one of the report forwarding functions called from
logi_dj_raw_event().
Fix this by performing the check at the earliest possible ocasion in
logi_dj_raw_event().
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | ad3e14d7c5268c2e24477c6ef54bbdf88add5d36 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | c54def7bd64d7c0b6993336abcffb8444795bf38 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]> | 7658e8257183f062dc01f87969c140707c7e52cb | ppp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | e9c243a5a6de0be8e584c604d353412584b592f8 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 05ab8f2647e4221cbdb3856dd7d32bd5407316b3 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 57e68e9cd65b4b8eb4045a1e0d0746458502554c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump target
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6
bytes.
In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump
target is one byte past the start of target instruction.
Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | a03ffcf873fe0f2565386ca8ef832144c42e67fa | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]> | b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]> | 1d147bfa64293b2723c4fec50922168658e613ba | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]> | 621b5060e823301d0cba4cb52a7ee3491922d291 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <[email protected]> | 21f8aaee0c62708654988ce092838aa7df4d25d8 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | 31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a | postgres | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
IMAP: refuse to work when STARTTLS is required but server sends PREAUTH
Oops, we cannot send STARTTLS when the connection is already authenticated.
This is serious enough to warrant an error; an attacker might be going after a
plaintext of a message we're going to APPEND, etc.
Thanks to Arnt Gulbrandsen on the imap-protocol ML for asking what happens when
we're configured to request STARTTLS and a PREAUTH is received, and to Michael M
Slusarz for starting that discussion.
Hope the error message is readable enough.
CVE: CVE-2014-2567 | 25fffa3e25cbad85bbca804193ad336b090a9ce1 | trojita | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
netfilter: nf_conntrack_dccp: fix skb_header_pointer API usages
Some occurences in the netfilter tree use skb_header_pointer() in
the following way ...
struct dccp_hdr _dh, *dh;
...
skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &dh);
... where dh itself is a pointer that is being passed as the copy
buffer. Instead, we need to use &_dh as the forth argument so that
we're copying the data into an actual buffer that sits on the stack.
Currently, we probably could overwrite memory on the stack (e.g.
with a possibly mal-formed DCCP packet), but unintentionally, as
we only want the buffer to be placed into _dh variable.
Fixes: 2bc780499aa3 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: add DCCP protocol support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | b22f5126a24b3b2f15448c3f2a254fc10cbc2b92 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset. | 447558595a3650db2886cd2f416ad0beba965801 | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Drop supplementary groups when changing to non-root
Summary: When running HHVM as a non-root user, UID and GID are updated correctly but supplementary groups are not dropped properly. This runs initgroups inside main thread and lightprocess threads to reset groups to those of the specified non-root user.
Reviewed By: @markw65
Differential Revision: D1193229 | 851fff90a9b7461df2393af32239ba217bc25946 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix escaping in LightProcess protocol
The LightProcess mechanism sends newline terminated commands
over a pipe, but didn't escape newlines contained in the payload.
Reviewed By: otto
Differential Revision: D1184482 | 506a44194a9016406c752ad8e010c01aeffc18cc | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
s390: fix kernel crash due to linkage stack instructions
The kernel currently crashes with a low-address-protection exception
if a user space process executes an instruction that tries to use the
linkage stack. Set the base-ASTE origin and the subspace-ASTE origin
of the dispatchable-unit-control-table to point to a dummy ASTE.
Set up control register 15 to point to an empty linkage stack with no
room left.
A user space process with a linkage stack instruction will still crash
but with a different exception which is correctly translated to a
segmentation fault instead of a kernel oops.
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]> | 8d7f6690cedb83456edd41c9bd583783f0703bf0 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | 263b4509ec4d47e0da3e753f85a39ea12d1eff24 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls | 2938329ce19cb8c4197dec146c3ec887c6f61d01 | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> | 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | e6a623460e5fc960ac3ee9f946d3106233fd28d8 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 2145e15e0557a01b9195d1c7199a1b92cb9be81f | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
floppy: ignore kernel-only members in FDRAWCMD ioctl input
Always clear out these floppy_raw_cmd struct members after copying the
entire structure from userspace so that the in-kernel version is always
valid and never left in an interdeterminate state.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | ef87dbe7614341c2e7bfe8d32fcb7028cc97442c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
netfilter: nf_nat: fix access to uninitialized buffer in IRC NAT helper
Commit 5901b6be885e attempted to introduce IPv6 support into
IRC NAT helper. By doing so, the following code seemed to be removed
by accident:
ip = ntohl(exp->master->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple.dst.u3.ip);
sprintf(buffer, "%u %u", ip, port);
pr_debug("nf_nat_irc: inserting '%s' == %pI4, port %u\n", buffer, &ip, port);
This leads to the fact that buffer[] was left uninitialized and
contained some stack value. When we call nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet(),
we call strlen(buffer) on excatly this uninitialized buffer. If we
are unlucky and the skb has enough tailroom, we overwrite resp. leak
contents with values that sit on our stack into the packet and send
that out to the receiver.
Since the rather informal DCC spec [1] does not seem to specify
IPv6 support right now, we log such occurences so that admins can
act accordingly, and drop the packet. I've looked into XChat source,
and IPv6 is not supported there: addresses are in u32 and print
via %u format string.
Therefore, restore old behaviour as in IPv4, use snprintf(). The
IRC helper does not support IPv6 by now. By this, we can safely use
strlen(buffer) in nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet() and prevent a buffer
overflow. Also simplify some code as we now have ct variable anyway.
[1] http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/rfc/ctcpspec.html
Fixes: 5901b6be885e ("netfilter: nf_nat: support IPv6 in IRC NAT helper")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Harald Welte <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | 2690d97ade05c5325cbf7c72b94b90d265659886 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 8e3fbf870481eb53b2d3a322d1fc395ad8b367ed | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 2b13d06c9584b4eb773f1e80bbaedab9a1c344e1 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 96b340406724d87e4621284ebac5e059d67b2194 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix libxml_disable_entity_loader()
This wasn't calling requestInit and setting the libxml handler no null.
So the first time an error came along it would reset the handler from
no-op to reading again.
This is a much better fix, we set our custom handler in requestInit and
when libxml_disable_entity_loader we store that state as a member bool
ensuring requestInit is always called to set our own handler.
If the handler isn't inserted then the behavious is as before. The only
time this could go pear shaped is say we wanted to make the default be
off. In that case we'd need a global requestInit that is always called
since there are libxml references everywhere.
Reviewed By: @jdelong
Differential Revision: D1116686 | 95f96e7287effe2fcdfb9a5338d1a7e4f55b083b | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
x86, fpu, amd: Clear exceptions in AMD FXSAVE workaround
Before we do an EMMS in the AMD FXSAVE information leak workaround we
need to clear any pending exceptions, otherwise we trap with a
floating-point exception inside this code.
Reported-by: halfdog <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFxQnY_PCG_n4=0w-VG=YLXL-yr7oMxyy0WU2gCBAf3ydg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> | 26bef1318adc1b3a530ecc807ef99346db2aa8b0 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix possible buffer overflow problem in chkNum of scanner. | 1d1bdec6318746f6f19f245db589eddc887ae8ff | graphviz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix buffer overflow problem when reporting a syntax error with a very long
input line | 7aaddf52cd98589fb0c3ab72a393f8411838438a | graphviz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list() | e2745807c4c3e0a590c0f69a9b655dc74ebaa03e | freerdp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Merge pull request #171 into 2.5-fixes. | 3ed749263abe3d69fa3626d142a5789dcb5a5684 | torque | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CVE-2014-0207: Prevent 0 element vectors and vectors longer than the number
of properties from accessing random memory. | f97486ef5dc3e8735440edc4fc8808c63e1a3ef0 | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Remove loop that kept reading the same offset (Jan Kaluza) | b8acc83781d5a24cc5101e525d15efe0482c280d | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions) | 6d209c1c489457397a5763bca4b28e43aac90391 | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
aio: fix kernel memory disclosure in io_getevents() introduced in v3.10
A kernel memory disclosure was introduced in aio_read_events_ring() in v3.10
by commit a31ad380bed817aa25f8830ad23e1a0480fef797. The changes made to
aio_read_events_ring() failed to correctly limit the index into
ctx->ring_pages[], allowing an attacked to cause the subsequent kmap() of
an arbitrary page with a copy_to_user() to copy the contents into userspace.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-0206. Thanks to Mateusz and
Petr for disclosing this issue.
This patch applies to v3.12+. A separate backport is needed for 3.10/3.11.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | edfbbf388f293d70bf4b7c0bc38774d05e6f711a | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<[email protected]>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: John Kacur <[email protected]>
Cc: Rusty Russell <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | 7ada876a8703f23befbb20a7465a702ee39b1704 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | 86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | 4291086b1f081b869c6d79e5b7441633dc3ace00 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix bug #67060: use default mode of 660 | 35ceea928b12373a3b1e3eecdc32ed323223a40d | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 1fd819ecb90cc9b822cd84d3056ddba315d3340f | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:
The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]
When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
from the existing association to authenticate the
COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]
Commit bbd0d59809f9 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.
Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.
The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.
Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.
Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809f9 created a skb clone in that case.
I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Cc: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | ec0223ec48a90cb605244b45f7c62de856403729 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | d8316f3991d207fe32881a9ac20241be8fa2bad0 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> | 5d81de8e8667da7135d3a32a964087c0faf5483f | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix handling of wide datetime input/output.
Many server functions use the MAXDATELEN constant to size a buffer for
parsing or displaying a datetime value. It was much too small for the
longest possible interval output and slightly too small for certain
valid timestamp input, particularly input with a long timezone name.
The long input was rejected needlessly; the long output caused
interval_out() to overrun its buffer. ECPG's pgtypes library has a copy
of the vulnerable functions, which bore the same vulnerabilities along
with some of its own. In contrast to the server, certain long inputs
caused stack overflow rather than failing cleanly. Back-patch to 8.4
(all supported versions).
Reported by Daniel Schüssler, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0063 | 4318daecc959886d001a6e79c6ea853e8b1dfb4b | postgres | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
kvm: x86: fix emulator buffer overflow (CVE-2014-0049)
The problem occurs when the guest performs a pusha with the stack
address pointing to an mmio address (or an invalid guest physical
address) to start with, but then extending into an ordinary guest
physical address. When doing repeated emulated pushes
emulator_read_write sets mmio_needed to 1 on the first one. On a
later push when the stack points to regular memory,
mmio_nr_fragments is set to 0, but mmio_is_needed is not set to 0.
As a result, KVM exits to userspace, and then returns to
complete_emulated_mmio. In complete_emulated_mmio
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment is incremented. The termination condition of
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments is never achieved.
The code bounces back and fourth to userspace incrementing
mmio_cur_fragment past it's buffer. If the guest does nothing else it
eventually leads to a a crash on a memcpy from invalid memory address.
However if a guest code can cause the vm to be destroyed in another
vcpu with excellent timing, then kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue
can be used by the guest to control the data that's pointed to by the
call to cancel_work_item, which can be used to gain execution.
Fixes: f78146b0f9230765c6315b2e14f56112513389ad
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] (3.5+)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | a08d3b3b99efd509133946056531cdf8f3a0c09b | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 2def2ef2ae5f3990aabdbe8a755911902707d268 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <[email protected]> | d558023207e008a4476a3b7bb8706b2a2bf5d84f | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
limit to 100 repetitions to avoid excessive backtracking Carsten Wolff | ef2329cf71acb59204dd981e2c6cce6c81fe467c | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix possible information leak | 9bd3b14042e12d84f39ea9f55731705ba516f525 | tntnet | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload | 2899351224fe2940aec37d7656e1e392c0fe07f0 | libreswan | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
packaging: SECURITY, insecure temp files on rpm package installation | ef2d756e73a188401c36133c2e2f7ce4f3c6ae55 | libreswan | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834) | 3a10f6b829297dae63492a8c63385044bc6953ed | mapserver | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
sshd: Don't bind-mount /sbin/init read-write
lxc-sshd was mounting itself (the template script) as /sbin/init in the
container using a writable bind-mount.
This shouldn't be needed and could lead to quite a few problems should
one of those containers overwrite /sbin/init for some reason.
Instead simply move to a read-only bind-mount which should prevent any
accidental dammage.
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]> | f4d5cc8e1f39d132b61e110674528cac727ae0e2 | lxc | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. | 8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4 | jansson | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int | 64e36901a0614bf64a19bc3396469c66dcd0b015 | json-c | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix Chunked string case sensitive issue - CVE-2013-5705 | f8d441cd25172fdfe5b613442fedfc0da3cc333d | modsecurity | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Non happy-path fixes | 91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9 | little-cms | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Mandril: check decoded URI (fix #92)
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Silva <[email protected]> | 15f72c1ee5e0afad20232bdf0fcecab8d62a5d89 | monkey | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix NULL pointer dereference in webadmin.
Triggerable by any non-admin, if webadmin is loaded.
The only affected version is 1.0
Thanks to ChauffeR (Simone Esposito) for reporting this. | 2bd410ee5570cea127233f1133ea22f25174eb28 | znc | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <[email protected]> | b3f456a8ceefac6e9f2e9acc2ea0c159d412b595 | corosync | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 3e10986d1d698140747fcfc2761ec9cb64c1d582 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> | 6f7b0a2a5c0fb03be7c25bd1745baa50582348ef | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | fdf5af0daf8019cec2396cdef8fb042d80fe71fa | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
set_interface_var() doesn't check interface name and blindly does
fopen(path "/" ifname, "w") on it. As "ifname" is an untrusted input, it
should be checked for ".." and/or "/" in it. Otherwise, an infected
unprivileged daemon may overwrite contents of file named "mtu",
"hoplimit", etc. in arbitrary location with arbitrary 32-bit value in
decimal representation ("%d"). If an attacker has a local account or
may create arbitrary symlinks with these names in any location (e.g.
/tmp), any file may be overwritten with a decimal value. | 92e22ca23e52066da2258df8c76a2dca8a428bcc | radvd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> | 7285477ab11831b1cf56e45878a89170dd06d9b9 | qemu | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | 819cbb120eaec7e014e5abd029260db1ca8c5735 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> | fc3a9157d3148ab91039c75423da8ef97be3e105 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | acff81ec2c79492b180fade3c2894425cd35a545 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 09ccfd238e5a0e670d8178cf50180ea81ae09ae1 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> | 0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 77751427a1ff25b27d47a4c36b12c3c8667855ac | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 8c7188b23474cca017b3ef354c4a58456f68303a | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
staging/dgnc: fix info leak in ioctl
The dgnc_mgmt_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct digi_dinfo after the ->dinfo_nboards member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | 4b6184336ebb5c8dc1eae7f7ab46ee608a748b05 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> | eda98796aff0d9bf41094b06811f5def3b4c333c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring | ce1fad2740c648a4340f6f6c391a8a83769d2e8c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | b9a532277938798b53178d5a66af6e2915cb27cf | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> | c9b92530a723ac5ef8e352885a1862b18f31b2f5 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection
There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating
a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr.
It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to
send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref:
[135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN
[135546.051270] Modules linked in:
[135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527
[135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000
[135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194)
[135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000
[135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038
[135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000
[135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000
[135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[135546.064723] Stack:
[135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008
[135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342
[135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00
[135546.068629] Call Trace:
[135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134)
[135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298)
[135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278)
[135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058)
[135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38)
[135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298)
[135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976)
[135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795)
[135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795)
[135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976)
[135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620)
[135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657)
[135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628)
[135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926)
[135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674)
[135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749)
[135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16)
[135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16)
[135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749)
[135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 74e98eb085889b0d2d4908f59f6e00026063014f | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ | 5e75f5198769056089fb06c4d738ab0e5abc66f7 | openssh-portable | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@ | d4697fe9a28dab7255c60433e4dd23cf7fce8a8b | openssh-portable | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> | 9a5cbce421a283e6aea3c4007f141735bf9da8c3 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally. | 46844402bca7a38fc224483ba6f0a93c4613203f | ippusbxd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |