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bigvul_devign_cvefixes_neuralsentry_commits

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5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <[email protected]> Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <[email protected]> Approved by: Dan McDonald <[email protected]>

d65686849024838243515b5c40ae2c479460b4b5

illumos-gate

bigvul

batman-adv: Calculate extra tail size based on queued fragments The fragmentation code was replaced in 610bfc6bc99bc83680d190ebc69359a05fc7f605 ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge"). The new code provided a mostly unused parameter skb for the merging function. It is used inside the function to calculate the additionally needed skb tailroom. But instead of increasing its own tailroom, it is only increasing the tailroom of the first queued skb. This is not correct in some situations because the first queued entry can be a different one than the parameter. An observed problem was: 1. packet with size 104, total_size 1464, fragno 1 was received - packet is queued 2. packet with size 1400, total_size 1464, fragno 0 was received - packet is queued at the end of the list 3. enough data was received and can be given to the merge function (1464 == (1400 - 20) + (104 - 20)) - merge functions gets 1400 byte large packet as skb argument 4. merge function gets first entry in queue (104 byte) - stored as skb_out 5. merge function calculates the required extra tail as total_size - skb->len - pskb_expand_head tail of skb_out with 64 bytes 6. merge function tries to squeeze the extra 1380 bytes from the second queued skb (1400 byte aka skb parameter) in the 64 extra tail bytes of skb_out Instead calculate the extra required tail bytes for skb_out also using skb_out instead of using the parameter skb. The skb parameter is only used to get the total_size from the last received packet. This is also the total_size used to decide that all fragments were received. Reported-by: Philipp Psurek <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Martin Hundebøll <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

5b6698b0e4a37053de35cc24ee695b98a7eb712b

linux

bigvul

Fix gssrpc data leakage [CVE-2014-9423] [MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In svcauth_gss_accept_sec_context(), do not copy bytes from the union context into the handle field we send to the client. We do not use this handle field, so just supply a fixed string of "xxxx". In gss_union_ctx_id_struct, remove the unused "interposer" field which was causing part of the union context to remain uninitialized. ticket: 8058 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

5bb8a6b9c9eb8dd22bc9526751610aaa255ead9c

krb5

bigvul

Fix kadmind server validation [CVE-2014-9422] [MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In kadmind's check_rpcsec_auth(), use data_eq_string() instead of strncmp() to check components of the server principal, so that we don't erroneously match left substrings of "kadmin", "history", or the realm. ticket: 8057 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

6609658db0799053fbef0d7d0aa2f1fd68ef32d8

krb5

bigvul

Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421] [MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing the results twice. In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and xdr_string(). ticket: 8056 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

a197e92349a4aa2141b5dff12e9dd44c2a2166e3

krb5

bigvul

use correct function name Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>

cb62ab4b17818fe66d2fed0a7fe71969131c811b

openssl

bigvul

Free up s->d1->buffered_app_data.q properly. PR#3286

470990fee0182566d439ef7e82d1abf18b7085d7

openssl

bigvul

mm: Fix NULL pointer dereference in madvise(MADV_WILLNEED) support Sasha Levin found a NULL pointer dereference that is due to a missing page table lock, which in turn is due to the pmd entry in question being a transparent huge-table entry. The code - introduced in commit 1998cc048901 ("mm: make madvise(MADV_WILLNEED) support swap file prefetch") - correctly checks for this situation using pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(), but it turns out that that function doesn't work correctly. pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() expected that pmd_bad() would trigger if the transparent hugepage bit was set, but it doesn't do that if pmd_numa() is also set. Note that the NUMA bit only gets set on real NUMA machines, so people trying to reproduce this on most normal development systems would never actually trigger this. Fix it by removing the very subtle (and subtly incorrect) expectation, and instead just checking pmd_trans_huge() explicitly. Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]> [ Additionally remove the now stale test for pmd_trans_huge() inside the pmd_bad() case - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

ee53664bda169f519ce3c6a22d378f0b946c8178

linux

bigvul

get rid of s_files and files_lock The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o) and these days we can do just as well without going through the list of files. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87

linux

bigvul

netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols Given following iptables ruleset: -P FORWARD DROP -A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT -A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80. Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows *all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT, which we think is a security issue. This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy "generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information). All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the 'generic' entry. Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction information will still be preserved for others. [1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html Joint work with Daniel Borkmann. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

db29a9508a9246e77087c5531e45b2c88ec6988b

linux

bigvul

->splice_write() via ->write_iter() iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that... [AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958

linux

bigvul

Fix krb5_read_message handling [CVE-2014-5355] In recvauth_common, do not use strcmp against the data fields of krb5_data objects populated by krb5_read_message(), as there is no guarantee that they are C strings. Instead, create an expected krb5_data value and use data_eq(). In the sample user-to-user server application, check that the received client principal name is null-terminated before using it with printf and krb5_parse_name. CVE-2014-5355: In MIT krb5, when a server process uses the krb5_recvauth function, an unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference by sending a zero-byte version string, or a read beyond the end of allocated storage by sending a non-null-terminated version string. The example user-to-user server application (uuserver) is similarly vulnerable to a zero-length or non-null-terminated principal name string. The krb5_recvauth function reads two version strings from the client using krb5_read_message(), which produces a krb5_data structure containing a length and a pointer to an octet sequence. krb5_recvauth assumes that the data pointer is a valid C string and passes it to strcmp() to verify the versions. If the client sends an empty octet sequence, the data pointer will be NULL and strcmp() will dereference a NULL pointer, causing the process to crash. If the client sends a non-null-terminated octet sequence, strcmp() will read beyond the end of the allocated storage, possibly causing the process to crash. uuserver similarly uses krb5_read_message() to read a client principal name, and then passes it to printf() and krb5_parse_name() without verifying that it is a valid C string. The krb5_recvauth function is used by kpropd and the Kerberized versions of the BSD rlogin and rsh daemons. These daemons are usually run out of inetd or in a mode which forks before processing incoming connections, so a process crash will generally not result in a complete denial of service. Thanks to Tim Uglow for discovering this issue. CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C [[email protected]: CVSS score] ticket: 8050 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

102bb6ebf20f9174130c85c3b052ae104e5073ec

krb5

bigvul

Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352] [MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the pseudo_random check. ticket: 8055 (new) target_version: 1.13.1 tags: pullup

82dc33da50338ac84c7b4102dc6513d897d0506a

krb5

bigvul

ECDH downgrade bug fix. Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. CVE-2014-3572 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>

b15f8769644b00ef7283521593360b7b2135cb63

openssl

bigvul

Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane. Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <[email protected]>

248385c606620b29ecc96ca9d3603463f879652b

openssl

bigvul

Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp). Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <[email protected]>

a7a44ba55cb4f884c6bc9ceac90072dea38e66d0

openssl

bigvul

Escape error page content Credit to Kenneth F. Belva (https://twitter.com/infosecmaverick) https://hackerone.com/reports/3317

e9bedb644d106a043e33e1058bedd1c2c0b2e2e0

okws

bigvul

Fix a symlink-related security vulnerability. The fix in commit 34b10878 and contained a small attack time window in between two filesystem operations. This has been fixed.

94428057c602da3d6d34ef75c78091066ecac5c0

passenger

bigvul

Fix low-urgency security vulnerability: writing files to arbitrary directory by hijacking temp directories.

34b1087870c2

passenger

bigvul

unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> writes: An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a wait queue with epoll. Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring that no blocked writer sleeps forever. Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <[email protected]> Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets") Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

7d267278a9ece963d77eefec61630223fce08c6c

linux

bigvul

nbd-server: handle modern-style negotiation in a child process Previously, the modern style negotiation was carried out in the root server (listener) process before forking the actual client handler. This made it possible for a malfunctioning or evil client to terminate the root process simply by querying a non-existent export or aborting in the middle of the negotation process (caused SIGPIPE in the server). This commit moves the negotiation process to the child to keep the root process up and running no matter what happens during the negotiation. See http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=30410146 Signed-off-by: Tuomas Räsänen <[email protected]>

741495cb08503fd32a9d22648e63b64390c601f4

nbd

bigvul

crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-" This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API, as demonstrated by Mathias Krause: https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b

linux

bigvul

sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload; worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS. Bail out early if that happens. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835

linux

bigvul

net: handle no dst on skb in icmp6_send Andrey reported the following while fuzzing the kernel with syzkaller: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3859 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6+ #429 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff8800666d4200 task.stack: ffff880067348000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff833617ec>] [<ffffffff833617ec>] icmp6_send+0x5fc/0x1e30 net/ipv6/icmp.c:451 RSP: 0018:ffff88006734f2c0 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8800666d4200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 0000000000000018 RBP: ffff88006734f630 R08: ffff880064138418 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffffff84e7e200 R14: ffff880064138484 R15: ffff8800641383c0 FS: 00007fb3887a07c0(0000) GS:ffff88006cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 000000006b040000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Stack: ffff8800666d4200 ffff8800666d49f8 ffff8800666d4200 ffffffff84c02460 ffff8800666d4a1a 1ffff1000ccdaa2f ffff88006734f498 0000000000000046 ffff88006734f440 ffffffff832f4269 ffff880064ba7456 0000000000000000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff83364ddc>] icmpv6_param_prob+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/icmp.c:557 [< inline >] ip6_tlvopt_unknown net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:88 [<ffffffff83394405>] ip6_parse_tlv+0x555/0x670 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:157 [<ffffffff8339a759>] ipv6_parse_hopopts+0x199/0x460 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:663 [<ffffffff832ee773>] ipv6_rcv+0xfa3/0x1dc0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:191 ... icmp6_send / icmpv6_send is invoked for both rx and tx paths. In both cases the dst->dev should be preferred for determining the L3 domain if the dst has been set on the skb. Fallback to the skb->dev if it has not. This covers the case reported here where icmp6_send is invoked on Rx before the route lookup. Fixes: 5d41ce29e ("net: icmp6_send should use dst dev to determine L3 domain") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Ahern <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

79dc7e3f1cd323be4c81aa1a94faa1b3ed987fb2

linux

bigvul

tar: fix crash on broken tar file.

95a8351a75758cf10b3bf6abae0b6b461f90d9e5

libgsf

bigvul

netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours. This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free the right memory. Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.") Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Acked-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

92964c79b357efd980812c4de5c1fd2ec8bb5520

linux

bigvul

ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is detached, as recently reported by KASAN. As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a big impact from the performance POV. Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most cases, so far. Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

3aa02cb664c5fb1042958c8d1aa8c35055a2ebc4

linux

bigvul

net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory corruptions, crashes, OOM... Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable. This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels. Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290

linux

bigvul

KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds accesses of rtc_eoi map KVM was using arrays of size KVM_MAX_VCPUS with vcpu_id, but ID can be bigger that the maximal number of VCPUs, resulting in out-of-bounds access. Found by syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 at addr [...] Write of size 1 by task a.out/27101 CPU: 1 PID: 27101 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [...] Call Trace: [...] __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:905 [...] kvm_apic_set_irq+0x10e/0x180 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:495 [...] kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0x732/0xc10 arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c:86 [...] ioapic_service+0x41d/0x760 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:360 [...] ioapic_set_irq+0x275/0x6c0 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:222 [...] kvm_ioapic_inject_all arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:235 [...] kvm_set_ioapic+0x223/0x310 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:670 [...] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3668 [...] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x1a08/0x23c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3999 [...] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x1fa/0x1a70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3099 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: af1bae5497b9 ("KVM: x86: bump KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID to 1023") Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>

81cdb259fb6d8c1c4ecfeea389ff5a73c07f5755

linux

bigvul

KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64 bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees). Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack. We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator for this. Found by syzkaller: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [...] Call Trace: [...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51 [...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179 [...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542 [...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585 [...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 [...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227 [...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294 [...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545 [...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116 [...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870 [...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934 [...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978 [...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557 [...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43 [...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679 [...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694 [...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685 [...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps") Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>

2117d5398c81554fbf803f5fd1dc55eb78216c0c

linux

bigvul

netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue(). Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled. Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down the line. netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on. So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments. Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems preferrable to just drop them. Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram. Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations") Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

9b57da0630c9fd36ed7a20fc0f98dc82cc0777fa

linux

bigvul

xfs: fix two memory leaks in xfs_attr_list.c error paths This plugs 2 trivial leaks in xfs_attr_shortform_list and xfs_attr3_leaf_list_int. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>

2e83b79b2d6c78bf1b4aa227938a214dcbddc83f

linux

bigvul

kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF) When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions (#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions were forwarded to L1. Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

ef85b67385436ddc1998f45f1d6a210f935b3388

linux

bigvul

Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just confuses it. Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

a0ac402cfcdc904f9772e1762b3fda112dcc56a0

linux

bigvul

Merge branch 'maint'

c29557dec91eba2306f5fb11b8da4474ba63f8c4

nagioscore

bigvul

sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the 2nd and subsequent ones. The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the 1st chunk. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <[email protected]> Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

bf911e985d6bbaa328c20c3e05f4eb03de11fdd6

linux

bigvul

* tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103 by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.

5ad9d8016fbb60109302d558f7edb2cb2a3bb8e3

libtiff

bigvul

* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.

ae9365db1b271b62b35ce018eac8799b1d5e8a53

libtiff

bigvul

* tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100. * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.

43c0b81a818640429317c80fea1e66771e85024b#diff-c8b4b355f9b5c06d585b23138e1c185f

libtiff

bigvul

* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093, MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. * tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR 35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. * libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1() that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough. Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan & Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.

83a4b92815ea04969d494416eaae3d4c6b338e4a#diff-c8b4b355f9b5c06d585b23138e1c185f

libtiff

bigvul

* libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c: Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105 by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.

3ca657a8793dd011bf869695d72ad31c779c3cc1

libtiff

bigvul

Merge pull request #27 from kcwu/fix-strgrow Fix potential heap buffer corruption due to Strgrow

d43527cfa0dbb3ccefec4a6f7b32c1434739aa29

w3m

bigvul

KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Peter Hlavaty <[email protected]> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <[email protected]> cc: Artem Savkov <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

7df3e59c3d1df4f87fe874c7956ef7a3d2f4d5fb

linux

bigvul

sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will wait forever. The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191: [ 5535.960522] Call Trace: [ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0 [ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0 [ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130 [ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130 [ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80 [ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0 [ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0 [ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0 [ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0 [ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40 [ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450 [ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0 [ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0 [ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210 [ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450 [ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60 [ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450 [ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220 [ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60 [ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220 [ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710 [ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710 [ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0 [ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 [ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120 [ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 [ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230 One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently is not happening." The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset offline path will wait here forever. See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13 Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs") Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]> Tested-by: Yang Shukui <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <[email protected]> Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

93362fa47fe98b62e4a34ab408c4a418432e7939

linux

bigvul

fix minor infoleak in get_user_ex() get_user_ex(x, ptr) should zero x on failure. It's not a lot of a leak (at most we are leaking uninitialized 64bit value off the kernel stack, and in a fairly constrained situation, at that), but the fix is trivial, so... Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> [ This sat in different branch from the uaccess fixes since mid-August ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

1c109fabbd51863475cd12ac206bdd249aee35af

linux

bigvul

staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver. This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl() function. A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously. cpu 0 cpu 1 ------------------------------------------------------- ion_handle_get_by_id() (ref == 2) ion_handle_get_by_id() (ref == 3) ion_free() (ref == 2) ion_handle_put() (ref == 1) ion_free() (ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is called and the handle is freed.) ion_handle_put() is called and it decreases the slub's next free pointer The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other hard-to-debug problems. This symptom is caused since the first member in the ion_handle structure is the reference count and the ion driver decrements the reference after it has been freed. To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended to protect all the codes that uses the handle. Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7

linux

bigvul

vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set. VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl(). Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow and should prevent a similar occurrence. Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>

05692d7005a364add85c6e25a6c4447ce08f913a

linux

bigvul

upstream commit Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by shilei-c at 360.cn Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05

ec165c392ca54317dbe3064a8c200de6531e89ad

openssh-portable

bigvul

SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740 mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory. Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <[email protected]> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68

29c63b786ae028d82405421585e91283c8fa0da3

httpd

bigvul

tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation. When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation. Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum, more IP length fields and they are unaware of this. No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them. UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking that would cause problems. Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack") Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

fac8e0f579695a3ecbc4d3cac369139d7f819971

linux

bigvul

brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap() User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be corrupted and used as exploit. Cc: [email protected] # v4.7 Reported-by: Daxing Guo <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>

ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c

linux

bigvul

packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished. This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously initialized timer will not be deleted. The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start of packet_set_ring. Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.") Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

84ac7260236a49c79eede91617700174c2c19b0c

linux

bigvul

mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver #3] This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

f5527fffff3f002b0a6b376163613b82f69de073

linux

bigvul

crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes. This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on sockets that have received data. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Harsh Jain <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>

4afa5f9617927453ac04b24b584f6c718dfb4f45

linux

bigvul

tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter() With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack, crashing in tcp_collapse() Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb, but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen. It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior. We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed. Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]> Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

ac6e780070e30e4c35bd395acfe9191e6268bdd3

linux

bigvul

firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the datagram buffer. So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger than datagram_size. In addition, ensure that - GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment encapsulation header actually exists before we access it, - the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size. Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]> Fixes: CVE 2016-8633 Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <[email protected]>

667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac

linux

bigvul

kvm: x86: Check memopp before dereference (CVE-2016-8630) Commit 41061cdb98 ("KVM: emulate: do not initialize memopp") removes a check for non-NULL under incorrect assumptions. An undefined instruction with a ModR/M byte with Mod=0 and R/M-5 (e.g. 0xc7 0x15) will attempt to dereference a null pointer here. Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5 Message-Id: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Owen Hofmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

d9092f52d7e61dd1557f2db2400ddb430e85937e

linux

bigvul

Security: CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit overflow fixed. This commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis of Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference. CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class "master" which is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The "master" class has ID 3. What happens is that the global structure: server.client_obuf_limits[class] Is accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing the 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory *after* the end of the array, since the structure is defined as: typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig { unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes; unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes; time_t soft_limit_seconds; } clientBufferLimitsConfig; EVALUATION OF IMPACT: Checking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global 'server' structure, we find AOF state fields: clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT]; /* AOF persistence */ int aof_state; /* AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */ int aof_fsync; /* Kind of fsync() policy */ char *aof_filename; /* Name of the AOF file */ int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite; /* Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. */ int aof_rewrite_perc; /* Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... */ off_t aof_rewrite_min_size; /* the AOF file is at least N bytes. */ off_t aof_rewrite_base_size; /* AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. */ off_t aof_current_size; /* AOF current size. */ Writing to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in Redis persistence that should not escalate to security problems. However unfortunately writing to "aof_filename" could be potentially a security issue depending on the access pattern. Searching for "aof.filename" accesses in the source code returns many different usages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the Redis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall. It looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations disclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the attacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that, it looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used to mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF data (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here: http://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the AOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded in order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed with untrusted input (no known issue known currently). The fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf in order to access configuration data structures, and return an error in this cases. WHO IS AT RISK? The "master" client class was introduced in Redis in Jul 28 2015. Every Redis instance released past this date is not vulnerable while all the releases after this date are. Notably: Redis 3.0.x is NOT vunlerable. Redis 3.2.x IS vulnerable. Redis unstable is vulnerable. In order for the instance to be at risk, at least one of the following conditions must be true: 1. The attacker can access Redis remotely and is able to send the CONFIG SET command (often banned in managed Redis instances). 2. The attacker is able to control the "redis.conf" file and can wait or trigger a server restart. The problem was fixed 26th September 2016 in all the releases affected.

6d9f8e2462fc2c426d48c941edeb78e5df7d2977

redis

bigvul

netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because 'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes. The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later trigger an out-of-bound read. If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in netlink_ack: [ 41.455421] ================================================================== [ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340 [ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987 [ 41.456431] ============================================================================= [ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected [ 41.456431] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ... [ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................ [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............... [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3... [ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................ ^^ start of batch nlmsg with nlmsg_len=4294967280 ... [ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 41.456431] ^ [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 41.456431] ================================================================== Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation. CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs. Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch") Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

c58d6c93680f28ac58984af61d0a7ebf4319c241

linux

bigvul

proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written. Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables(). This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when env_end is still zero. The expected consequence is that userland trying to access /proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment variables. Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363 Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461 Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]> Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]> Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]> Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]> Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3

linux

bigvul

HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of out-of-bound readings. The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do not have enough fields to fit the incoming values. Add checks and silence KASAN. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>

50220dead1650609206efe91f0cc116132d59b3f

linux

bigvul

assoc_array: don't call compare_object() on a node Changes since V1: fixed the description and added KASan warning. In assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(), we call the compare_object() method on all non-empty slots, even when they're not leaves, passing a pointer to an unexpected structure to compare_object(). Currently it causes an out-of-bound read access in keyring_compare_object detected by KASan (see below). The issue is easily reproduced with keyutils testsuite. Only call compare_object() when the slot is a leave. KASan warning: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 at addr ffff880060a6f838 Read of size 8 by task keyctl/1655 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-192 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 age=69 cpu=1 pid=1647 ___slab_alloc+0x563/0x5c0 __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x263/0x300 assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270 key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0 SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001829b80 objects=16 used=8 fp=0xffff880060a6f550 flags=0x3fff8000004080 INFO: Object 0xffff880060a6f740 @offset=5952 fp=0xffff880060a6e5d1 Bytes b4 ffff880060a6f730: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f740: d1 e5 a6 60 00 88 ff ff 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...`............ Object ffff880060a6f750: 02 cf 8e 60 00 88 ff ff 02 c0 8e 60 00 88 ff ff ...`.......`.... Object ffff880060a6f760: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f770: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f790: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7d0: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ CPU: 0 PID: 1655 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.5.0-rc4-kasan+ #291 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 000000001b2800b4 ffff880060a179e0 ffffffff81b60491 ffff88006c802900 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a17a10 ffffffff815e2969 ffff88006c802900 ffffea0001829b80 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a6e650 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81b60491>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [<ffffffff815e2969>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [<ffffffff815e9454>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [<ffffffff815ebe50>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [<ffffffff819949be>] ? keyring_get_key_chunk+0x13e/0x210 [<ffffffff815ec62d>] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x5d/0x70 [<ffffffff81994cc3>] ? keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 [<ffffffff81994cc3>] keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 [<ffffffff81bc238c>] assoc_array_insert+0x86c/0x3a60 [<ffffffff81bc1b20>] ? assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff8199797d>] ? __key_link_begin+0x20d/0x270 [<ffffffff8199786c>] __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270 [<ffffffff81993389>] key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0 [<ffffffff8128ce0d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff81992f30>] ? key_type_lookup+0xc0/0xc0 [<ffffffff8199e19d>] ? lookup_user_key+0x13d/0xcd0 [<ffffffff81534763>] ? memdup_user+0x53/0x80 [<ffffffff819983ea>] SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350 [<ffffffff81998230>] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff828bcf4e>] ? retint_user+0x18/0x23 [<ffffffff8128cc7e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3fe/0x580 [<ffffffff81004017>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x17/0x19 [<ffffffff828bc432>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880060a6f700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc >ffff880060a6f800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff880060a6f880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff880060a6f900: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> cc: [email protected]

8d4a2ec1e0b41b0cf9a0c5cd4511da7f8e4f3de2

linux

bigvul

[media] xc2028: avoid use after free If struct xc2028_config is passed without a firmware name, the following trouble may happen: [11009.907205] xc2028 5-0061: type set to XCeive xc2028/xc3028 tuner [11009.907491] ================================================================== [11009.907750] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 at addr ffff8803bd78ab40 [11009.907992] Read of size 1 by task modprobe/28992 [11009.907994] ============================================================================= [11009.907997] BUG kmalloc-16 (Tainted: G W ): kasan: bad access detected [11009.907999] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [11009.908008] INFO: Allocated in xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] age=0 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908012] ___slab_alloc+0x581/0x5b0 [11009.908014] __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 [11009.908017] __kmalloc+0x27b/0x350 [11009.908022] xhci_urb_enqueue+0x214/0x14c0 [xhci_hcd] [11009.908026] usb_hcd_submit_urb+0x1e8/0x1c60 [11009.908029] usb_submit_urb+0xb0e/0x1200 [11009.908032] usb_serial_generic_write_start+0xb6/0x4c0 [11009.908035] usb_serial_generic_write+0x92/0xc0 [11009.908039] usb_console_write+0x38a/0x560 [11009.908045] call_console_drivers.constprop.14+0x1ee/0x2c0 [11009.908051] console_unlock+0x40d/0x900 [11009.908056] vprintk_emit+0x4b4/0x830 [11009.908061] vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [11009.908064] printk+0x99/0xb5 [11009.908067] kasan_report_error+0x10a/0x550 [11009.908070] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908074] INFO: Freed in xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] age=1 cpu=3 pid=28992 [11009.908077] __slab_free+0x2ec/0x460 [11009.908080] kfree+0x266/0x280 [11009.908083] xc2028_set_config+0x90/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908086] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908090] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908094] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908098] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908101] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908105] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908108] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908111] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908114] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908117] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908120] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908123] INFO: Slab 0xffffea000ef5e280 objects=25 used=25 fp=0x (null) flags=0x2ffff8000004080 [11009.908126] INFO: Object 0xffff8803bd78ab40 @offset=2880 fp=0x0000000000000001 [11009.908130] Bytes b4 ffff8803bd78ab30: 01 00 00 00 2a 07 00 00 9d 28 00 00 01 00 00 00 ....*....(...... [11009.908133] Object ffff8803bd78ab40: 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 1d c3 6a 00 88 ff ff ...........j.... [11009.908137] CPU: 3 PID: 28992 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G B W 4.5.0-rc1+ #43 [11009.908140] Hardware name: /NUC5i7RYB, BIOS RYBDWi35.86A.0350.2015.0812.1722 08/12/2015 [11009.908142] ffff8803bd78a000 ffff8802c273f1b8 ffffffff81932007 ffff8803c6407a80 [11009.908148] ffff8802c273f1e8 ffffffff81556759 ffff8803c6407a80 ffffea000ef5e280 [11009.908153] ffff8803bd78ab40 dffffc0000000000 ffff8802c273f210 ffffffff8155ccb4 [11009.908158] Call Trace: [11009.908162] [<ffffffff81932007>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x64 [11009.908165] [<ffffffff81556759>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [11009.908168] [<ffffffff8155ccb4>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [11009.908171] [<ffffffff8155f260>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [11009.908175] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908179] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908182] [<ffffffff8155f5c3>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x43/0x50 [11009.908185] [<ffffffff8155ea00>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x50/0xa0 [11009.908189] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] ? strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908192] [<ffffffff8194cea6>] strcmp+0x96/0xb0 [11009.908196] [<ffffffffa13ba4ac>] xc2028_set_config+0x15c/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908200] [<ffffffffa13bac90>] xc2028_attach+0x310/0x8a0 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908203] [<ffffffff8155ea78>] ? memset+0x28/0x30 [11009.908206] [<ffffffffa13ba980>] ? xc2028_set_config+0x630/0x630 [tuner_xc2028] [11009.908211] [<ffffffffa157a59a>] em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x1f9/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908215] [<ffffffffa157aa2a>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x37c/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908219] [<ffffffffa157a3a1>] ? hauppauge_hvr930c_init+0x487/0x487 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908222] [<ffffffffa01795ac>] ? lgdt330x_attach+0x1cc/0x370 [lgdt330x] [11009.908226] [<ffffffffa01793e0>] ? i2c_read_demod_bytes.isra.2+0x210/0x210 [lgdt330x] [11009.908230] [<ffffffff812e87d0>] ? ref_module.part.15+0x10/0x10 [11009.908233] [<ffffffff812e56e0>] ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x80/0x80 [11009.908238] [<ffffffffa157af92>] em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x8e4/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908242] [<ffffffffa157a6ae>] ? em28xx_attach_xc3028.constprop.7+0x30d/0x30d [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908245] [<ffffffff8195222d>] ? string+0x14d/0x1f0 [11009.908249] [<ffffffff8195381f>] ? symbol_string+0xff/0x1a0 [11009.908253] [<ffffffff81953720>] ? uuid_string+0x6f0/0x6f0 [11009.908257] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908260] [<ffffffff8104b02f>] ? print_context_stack+0x7f/0xf0 [11009.908264] [<ffffffff812e9846>] ? __module_address+0xb6/0x360 [11009.908268] [<ffffffff8137fdc9>] ? is_ftrace_trampoline+0x99/0xe0 [11009.908271] [<ffffffff811a775e>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x7e/0xa0 [11009.908275] [<ffffffff81240a70>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 [11009.908278] [<ffffffff8104a24b>] ? dump_trace+0x11b/0x300 [11009.908282] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908285] [<ffffffff81237d71>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x21/0x290 [11009.908289] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908292] [<ffffffff812404dd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [11009.908296] [<ffffffffa13e8143>] ? em28xx_register_extension+0x23/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908299] [<ffffffff822dcbb0>] ? mutex_trylock+0x400/0x400 [11009.908302] [<ffffffff810021a1>] ? do_one_initcall+0x131/0x300 [11009.908306] [<ffffffff81296dc7>] ? call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20 [11009.908309] [<ffffffff8159e708>] ? put_object+0x48/0x70 [11009.908314] [<ffffffffa1579f11>] em28xx_dvb_init+0x81/0x8a [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908317] [<ffffffffa13e81f9>] em28xx_register_extension+0xd9/0x190 [em28xx] [11009.908320] [<ffffffffa0150000>] ? 0xffffffffa0150000 [11009.908324] [<ffffffffa0150010>] em28xx_dvb_register+0x10/0x1000 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908327] [<ffffffff810021b1>] do_one_initcall+0x141/0x300 [11009.908330] [<ffffffff81002070>] ? try_to_run_init_process+0x40/0x40 [11009.908333] [<ffffffff8123ff56>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x16/0x590 [11009.908337] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908340] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908343] [<ffffffff8155e926>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x36/0x50 [11009.908346] [<ffffffff8155ea37>] ? __asan_register_globals+0x87/0xa0 [11009.908350] [<ffffffff8144da7b>] do_init_module+0x1d0/0x5ad [11009.908353] [<ffffffff812f2626>] load_module+0x6666/0x9ba0 [11009.908356] [<ffffffff812e9c90>] ? symbol_put_addr+0x50/0x50 [11009.908361] [<ffffffffa1580037>] ? em28xx_dvb_init.part.3+0x5989/0x5cf4 [em28xx_dvb] [11009.908366] [<ffffffff812ebfc0>] ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20 [11009.908369] [<ffffffff815bc940>] ? open_exec+0x50/0x50 [11009.908374] [<ffffffff811671bb>] ? ns_capable+0x5b/0xd0 [11009.908377] [<ffffffff812f5e58>] SyS_finit_module+0x108/0x130 [11009.908379] [<ffffffff812f5d50>] ? SyS_init_module+0x1f0/0x1f0 [11009.908383] [<ffffffff81004044>] ? lockdep_sys_exit_thunk+0x12/0x14 [11009.908394] [<ffffffff822e6936>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x76 [11009.908396] Memory state around the buggy address: [11009.908398] ffff8803bd78aa00: 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908401] ffff8803bd78aa80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908403] >ffff8803bd78ab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908405] ^ [11009.908407] ffff8803bd78ab80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908409] ffff8803bd78ac00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [11009.908411] ================================================================== In order to avoid it, let's set the cached value of the firmware name to NULL after freeing it. While here, return an error if the memory allocation fails. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

8dfbcc4351a0b6d2f2d77f367552f48ffefafe18

linux

bigvul

usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed. Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined behaviour might occur. Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support") Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.15+ Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>

38740a5b87d53ceb89eb2c970150f6e94e00373a

linux

bigvul

block: fix use-after-free in sys_ioprio_get() get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on my 4-core QEMU VM: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <assert.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t pid, child; long nproc, i; /* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */ syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000); nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) { pid = fork(); assert(pid != -1); if (pid == 0) { for (;;) { pid = fork(); assert(pid != -1); if (pid == 0) { _exit(0); } else { child = wait(NULL); assert(child == pid); } } } pid = fork(); assert(pid != -1); if (pid == 0) { for (;;) { /* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */ syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0); } } } for (;;) { /* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */ syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0); } return 0; } This gets us KASAN dumps like this: [ 35.526914] ================================================================== [ 35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c [ 35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363 [ 35.530009] ============================================================================= [ 35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected [ 35.530009] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360 [ 35.530009] ___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0 [ 35.530009] __slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40 [ 35.530009] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200 [ 35.530009] create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 [ 35.530009] get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0 [ 35.530009] copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660 [ 35.530009] _do_fork+0x155/0x7e0 [ 35.530009] SyS_clone+0x19/0x20 [ 35.530009] do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0 [ 35.530009] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a [ 35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060 [ 35.530009] __slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0 [ 35.530009] kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220 [ 35.530009] put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 [ 35.530009] put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380 [ 35.530009] exit_io_context+0x66/0x80 [ 35.530009] do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90 [ 35.530009] do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0 [ 35.530009] SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20 [ 35.530009] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 [ 35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080 [ 35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001 [ 35.530009] ================================================================== Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

8ba8682107ee2ca3347354e018865d8e1967c5f4

linux

bigvul

block: fix use-after-free in seq file I got a KASAN report of use-after-free: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508 Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315 ___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520 __slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0 disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 traverse+0x176/0x860 seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0 proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 do_preadv+0x126/0x170 SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315 __slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0 kfree+0x20a/0x220 disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 traverse+0x3b5/0x860 seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0 proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 do_preadv+0x126/0x170 SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480 ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480 ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84 [<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0 [<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 [<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520 [<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 [<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 [<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50 [<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0 [<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180 [<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210 [<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660 [<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0 [<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170 [<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10 This problem can occur in the following situation: open() - pread() - .seq_start() - iter = kmalloc() // succeeds - seqf->private = iter - .seq_stop() - kfree(seqf->private) - pread() - .seq_start() - iter = kmalloc() // fails - .seq_stop() - class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq iteration stops. An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails. Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

77da160530dd1dc94f6ae15a981f24e5f0021e84

linux

bigvul

Merge branch 'pull-request/296'

40bec0f38f50e8510f5bb71a82f516d46facde03

libgd

bigvul

scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer() We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't overflow. Cc: <[email protected]> Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

7bc2b55a5c030685b399bb65b6baa9ccc3d1f167

linux

bigvul

Update README and INSTALL with -DNDEBUG requirement for production software (thanks FW)

553049ba297d89d9e8fbf2204acb40a8a53f5cd6

cryptopp

bigvul

Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c

c4cca4c20e75359c9a13a1f9a36cb7b4e9601d29?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray

ecb7f58a069be0dec4a6131b6351a761f808f22e?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #73007: add locale length check

6d55ba265637d6adf0ba7e9c9ef11187d1ec2f5b?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile (cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)

0bfb970f43acd1e81d11be1154805f86655f15d5?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72860: wddx_deserialize use-after-free

b88393f08a558eec14964a55d3c680fe67407712?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields

28f80baf3c53e267c9ce46a2a0fadbb981585132?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction

6a7cc8ff85827fa9ac715b3a83c2d9147f33cd43?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov: It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines: $ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz $ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz) bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also be a problem for other applications using libarchive.

6e06b1c89dd0d16f74894eac4cfc1327a06ee4a0

libarchive

bigvul

Fix an integer overflow issue (#809) Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of pi.c.

c16bc057ba3f125051c9966cf1f5b68a05681de4

openjpeg

bigvul

SASL: Disallow beginning : and space anywhere in AUTHENTICATE parameter This is a FIX FOR A SECURITY VULNERABILITY. All Charybdis users must apply this fix if you support SASL on your servers, or unload m_sasl.so in the meantime.

818a3fda944b26d4814132cee14cfda4ea4aa824

charybdis

bigvul

m_sasl: don't allow AUTHENTICATE with mechanisms with a space

74fafb7f11b06747f69f182ad5e3769b665eea7a

inspircd

bigvul

nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file ... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file

curl-7_50_2~32

curl

bigvul

Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape

72dbb7f416160f490c4e9987040989a10ad431c7?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72742 - memory allocator fails to realloc small block to large one

c2a13ced4272f2e65d2773e2ea6ca11c1ce4a911?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799

a14fdb9746262549bbbb96abb87338bacd147e1b?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72750: wddx_deserialize null dereference

698a691724c0a949295991e5df091ce16f899e02?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72749: wddx_deserialize allows illegal memory access

426aeb2808955ee3d3f52e0cfb102834cdb836a5?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fixed bug #72627: Memory Leakage In exif_process_IFD_in_TIFF

6dbb1ee46b5f4725cc6519abf91e512a2a10dfed?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access

1bd103df00f49cf4d4ade2cfe3f456ac058a4eae?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds

b6f13a5ef9d6280cf984826a5de012a32c396cd4?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72681 - consume data even if we're not storing them

8763c6090d627d8bb0ee1d030c30e58f406be9ce?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix bug #72663 - destroy broken object when unserializing (cherry picked from commit 448c9be157f4147e121f1a2a524536c75c9c6059)

20ce2fe8e3c211a42fee05a461a5881be9a8790e?w=1

php-src

bigvul

net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free: Call Trace: [<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295 [<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261 [< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281 [<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270 [<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it. Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]> Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <[email protected]> Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall") http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

34b88a68f26a75e4fded796f1a49c40f82234b7d

linux

bigvul

Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master 2nd round security fixes from eyalitki

b69d11727d4f0f8cf719c79e3fb700f55ca03e9a

mac-telnet

bigvul

posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that. References: CVE-2016-7097 Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>

073931017b49d9458aa351605b43a7e34598caef

linux

bigvul

Proper fix for #248

01c61f8ab110a77ae64b5ca67c244c728c506f03

libgd

bigvul

tcp: fix use after free in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail() Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb. If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb. Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb) Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped, this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy, returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel. This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller. Fixes: 6859d49475d4 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb") Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]> Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

bb1fceca22492109be12640d49f5ea5a544c6bb4

linux

bigvul

perf: Fix event->ctx locking There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those. It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please give it some thought in review. What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b

linux

bigvul

don't use my_copystat in the server it was supposed to be used in command-line tools only. Different fix for 4e5473862e: Bug#24388746: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION AND RACE CONDITION USING CREATE TABLE

347eeefbfc658c8531878218487d729f4e020805

server

bigvul

Evaluate lazy pixel cache morphology to prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim M. El-Sayed)

76401e172ea3a55182be2b8e2aca4d07270f6da6

imagemagick

bigvul

vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an undersized allocation and heap overflow. Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs") Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

10eec60ce79187686e052092e5383c99b4420a20

linux

bigvul