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bigvul_devign_cvefixes_neuralsentry_commits

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USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This patch checks for the existence of a second port. CVE-2016-3136 Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]> CC: [email protected] [johan: add error message ] Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

4e9a0b05257f29cf4b75f3209243ed71614d062e

linux

bigvul

netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow Ben Hawkes says: integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap corruption. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

d157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1

linux

bigvul

netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309

linux

bigvul

Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet

28a6ed9f9a36b9c517e4a8a429baf4dd382fc5d5?w=1

php-src

bigvul

Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt, use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when validating S4U2Self requests. CVE-2016-3120: In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8458 (new) target_version: 1.14-next target_version: 1.13-next

93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7

krb5

bigvul

Fix LDAP null deref on empty arg [CVE-2016-3119] In the LDAP KDB module's process_db_args(), strtok_r() may return NULL if there is an empty string in the db_args array. Check for this case and avoid dereferencing a null pointer. CVE-2016-3119: In MIT krb5 1.6 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer by supplying an empty DB argument to the modify_principal command, if kadmind is configured to use the LDAP KDB module. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:ND ticket: 8383 (new) target_version: 1.14-next target_version: 1.13-next tags: pullup

08c642c09c38a9c6454ab43a9b53b2a89b9eef99

krb5

bigvul

Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*

3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c?w=1

php-src

bigvul

gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074) Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks. Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <[email protected]> for indepth report and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).

2bb97f407c1145c850416a3bfbcc8cf124e68a19

libgd

bigvul

mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty() which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to __set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too. No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag, and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another. It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway). Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible: bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe). But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping(). Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]> Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]> Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

42cb14b110a5698ccf26ce59c4441722605a3743

linux

bigvul

mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent. This fixes a potential crash. Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>

689e59b7ffed34eba6159dcc78e87133862e3746

ffmpeg

bigvul

pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to prevent this from happening. This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing pipes to work correctly though with less data at once. The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024) to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB = 1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use of pipes (eg: for splicing). Reported-by: [email protected] Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

759c01142a5d0f364a462346168a56de28a80f52

linux

bigvul

USB: visor: fix null-deref at probe Fix null-pointer dereference at probe should a (malicious) Treo device lack the expected endpoints. Specifically, the Treo port-setup hack was dereferencing the bulk-in and interrupt-in urbs without first making sure they had been allocated by core. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

cac9b50b0d75a1d50d6c056ff65c005f3224c8e0

linux

bigvul

unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should be credited. To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds. Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets") Reported-by: David Herrmann <[email protected]> Cc: David Herrmann <[email protected]> Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6

linux

bigvul

ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel() hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit [fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it. However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback. Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer. This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be enough. Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

2ba1fe7a06d3624f9a7586d672b55f08f7c670f3

linux

bigvul

ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected accesses. This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock. Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close(). Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop() at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch. Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and this hopefully fixes these issues. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

b5a663aa426f4884c71cd8580adae73f33570f0d

linux

bigvul

ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl. The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to serialize there. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

af368027a49a751d6ff4ee9e3f9961f35bb4fede

linux

bigvul

ALSA: timer: Fix double unlink of active_list ALSA timer instance object has a couple of linked lists and they are unlinked unconditionally at snd_timer_stop(). Meanwhile snd_timer_interrupt() unlinks it, but it calls list_del() which leaves the element list itself unchanged. This ends up with unlinking twice, and it was caught by syzkaller fuzzer. The fix is to use list_del_init() variant properly there, too. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

ee8413b01045c74340aa13ad5bdf905de32be736

linux

bigvul

ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and a use-after-free was caught there as a result. This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

3567eb6af614dac436c4b16a8d426f9faed639b3

linux

bigvul

ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear() unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL check. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

030e2c78d3a91dd0d27fef37e91950dde333eba1

linux

bigvul

seas: safety check for target buffer size before copying message in encode_msg() - avoid buffer overflow for large SIP messages - reported by Stelios Tsampas

f50c9c853e7809810099c970780c30b0765b0643

kamailio

bigvul

ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free() when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface. Found by KASAN. Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7

linux

bigvul

bpf: fix branch offset adjustment on backjumps after patching ctx expansion When ctx access is used, the kernel often needs to expand/rewrite instructions, so after that patching, branch offsets have to be adjusted for both forward and backward jumps in the new eBPF program, but for backward jumps it fails to account the delta. Meaning, for example, if the expansion happens exactly on the insn that sits at the jump target, it doesn't fix up the back jump offset. Analysis on what the check in adjust_branches() is currently doing: /* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */ if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos) insn->off += delta; else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos) insn->off -= delta; First condition (forward jumps): Before: After: insns[0] insns[0] insns[1] <--- i/insn insns[1] <--- i/insn insns[2] <--- pos insns[P] <--- pos insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta insns[4] <--- target_X insns[P] `-----| insns[5] insns[3] insns[4] <--- target_X insns[5] First case is if we cross pos-boundary and the jump instruction was before pos. This is handeled correctly. I.e. if i == pos, then this would mean our jump that we currently check was the patchlet itself that we just injected. Since such patchlets are self-contained and have no awareness of any insns before or after the patched one, the delta is correctly not adjusted. Also, for the second condition in case of i + insn->off + 1 == pos, means we jump to that newly patched instruction, so no offset adjustment are needed. That part is correct. Second condition (backward jumps): Before: After: insns[0] insns[0] insns[1] <--- target_X insns[1] <--- target_X insns[2] <--- pos <-- target_Y insns[P] <--- pos <-- target_Y insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta insns[4] <--- i/insn insns[P] `-----| insns[5] insns[3] insns[4] <--- i/insn insns[5] Second interesting case is where we cross pos-boundary and the jump instruction was after pos. Backward jump with i == pos would be impossible and pose a bug somewhere in the patchlet, so the first condition checking i > pos is okay only by itself. However, i + insn->off + 1 < pos does not always work as intended to trigger the adjustment. It works when jump targets would be far off where the delta wouldn't matter. But, for example, where the fixed insn->off before pointed to pos (target_Y), it now points to pos + delta, so that additional room needs to be taken into account for the check. This means that i) both tests here need to be adjusted into pos + delta, and ii) for the second condition, the test needs to be <= as pos itself can be a target in the backjump, too. Fixes: 9bac3d6d548e ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

a1b14d27ed0965838350f1377ff97c93ee383492

linux

bigvul

list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and "c". Callbacks which want the full value then call path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the length, without creating a new copy. So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can also notice that no callback actually cares about the broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to the strbuf. This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks would not bother to format the final path component. But in practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60

git

bigvul

prefer memcpy to strcpy When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the size in the allocation). This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing the code base harder. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>

34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305

git

bigvul

USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface before using it. The full report of this issue can be found here: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

4ec0ef3a82125efc36173062a50624550a900ae0

linux

bigvul

Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface before using it. Also let's fix a minor coding style issue. The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public Red Hat Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

162f98dea487206d9ab79fc12ed64700667a894d

linux

bigvul

Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of endpoints on the interface before using them. The full report for this issue can be found here: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]> Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

9c6ba456711687b794dcf285856fc14e2c76074f

linux

bigvul

Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each interface before using it. The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90 Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

950336ba3e4a1ffd2ca60d29f6ef386dd2c7351d

linux

bigvul

ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk() create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed USB descriptor is used. This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints before the accesses. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125 Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

0f886ca12765d20124bd06291c82951fd49a33be

linux

bigvul

Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio(). TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of data written. CVE-2016-2180 Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>

0ed26acce328ec16a3aa635f1ca37365e8c7403a

openssl

bigvul

s390/mm: four page table levels vs. fork The fork of a process with four page table levels is broken since git commit 6252d702c5311ce9 "[S390] dynamic page tables." All new mm contexts are created with three page table levels and an asce limit of 4TB. If the parent has four levels dup_mmap will add vmas to the new context which are outside of the asce limit. The subsequent call to copy_page_range will walk the three level page table structure of the new process with non-zero pgd and pud indexes. This leads to memory clobbers as the pgd_index *and* the pud_index is added to the mm->pgd pointer without a pgd_deref in between. The init_new_context() function is selecting the number of page table levels for a new context. The function is used by mm_init() which in turn is called by dup_mm() and mm_alloc(). These two are used by fork() and exec(). The init_new_context() function can distinguish the two cases by looking at mm->context.asce_limit, for fork() the mm struct has been copied and the number of page table levels may not change. For exec() the mm_alloc() function set the new mm structure to zero, in this case a three-level page table is created as the temporary stack space is located at STACK_TOP_MAX = 4TB. This fixes CVE-2016-2143. Reported-by: Marcin Kościelnicki <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>

3446c13b268af86391d06611327006b059b8bab1

linux

bigvul

atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to be a requirement for SG. Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117. Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]> Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8

linux

bigvul

EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1

linux

bigvul

tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in tcp_init_cwnd_reduction(). To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh is positive: 1) The proportional reduction mode inflight > ssthresh > 0 2) The reduction bound mode a) inflight == ssthresh > 0 b) inflight < ssthresh sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0. We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs. In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost, but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data packets from other end which acks nothing. Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally") Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

8b8a321ff72c785ed5e8b4cf6eda20b35d427390

linux

bigvul

x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore starting to fill the local TLB. Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add a couple that were missing. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]> Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

71b3c126e61177eb693423f2e18a1914205b165e

linux

bigvul

ASN.1: Fix non-match detection failure on data overrun If the ASN.1 decoder is asked to parse a sequence of objects, non-optional matches get skipped if there's no more data to be had rather than a data-overrun error being reported. This is due to the code segment that decides whether to skip optional matches (ie. matches that could get ignored because an element is marked OPTIONAL in the grammar) due to a lack of data also skips non-optional elements if the data pointer has reached the end of the buffer. This can be tested with the data decoder for the new RSA akcipher algorithm that takes three non-optional integers. Currently, it skips the last integer if there is insufficient data. Without the fix, #defining DEBUG in asn1_decoder.c will show something like: next_op: pc=0/13 dp=0/270 C=0 J=0 - match? 30 30 00 - TAG: 30 266 CONS next_op: pc=2/13 dp=4/270 C=1 J=0 - match? 02 02 00 - TAG: 02 257 - LEAF: 257 next_op: pc=5/13 dp=265/270 C=1 J=0 - match? 02 02 00 - TAG: 02 3 - LEAF: 3 next_op: pc=8/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0 next_op: pc=11/13 dp=270/270 C=1 J=0 - end cons t=4 dp=270 l=270/270 The next_op line for pc=8/13 should be followed by a match line. This is not exploitable for X.509 certificates by means of shortening the message and fixing up the ASN.1 CONS tags because: (1) The relevant records being built up are cleared before use. (2) If the message is shortened sufficiently to remove the public key, the ASN.1 parse of the RSA key will fail quickly due to a lack of data. (3) Extracted signature data is either turned into MPIs (which cope with a 0 length) or is simpler integers specifying algoritms and suchlike (which can validly be 0); and (4) The AKID and SKID extensions are optional and their removal is handled without risking passing a NULL to asymmetric_key_generate_id(). (5) If the certificate is truncated sufficiently to remove the subject, issuer or serialNumber then the ASN.1 decoder will fail with a 'Cons stack underflow' return. This is not exploitable for PKCS#7 messages by means of removal of elements from such a message from the tail end of a sequence: (1) Any shortened X.509 certs embedded in the PKCS#7 message are survivable as detailed above. (2) The message digest content isn't used if it shows a NULL pointer, similarly, the authattrs aren't used if that shows a NULL pointer. (3) A missing signature results in a NULL MPI - which the MPI routines deal with. (4) If data is NULL, it is expected that the message has detached content and that is handled appropriately. (5) If the serialNumber is excised, the unconditional action associated with it will pick up the containing SEQUENCE instead, so no NULL pointer will be seen here. If both the issuer and the serialNumber are excised, the ASN.1 decode will fail with an 'Unexpected tag' return. In either case, there's no way to get to asymmetric_key_generate_id() with a NULL pointer. (6) Other fields are decoded to simple integers. Shortening the message to omit an algorithm ID field will cause checks on this to fail early in the verification process. This can also be tested by snipping objects off of the end of the ASN.1 stream such that mandatory tags are removed - or even from the end of internal SEQUENCEs. If any mandatory tag is missing, the error EBADMSG *should* be produced. Without this patch ERANGE or ENOPKG might be produced or the parse may apparently succeed, perhaps with ENOKEY or EKEYREJECTED being produced later, depending on what gets snipped. Just snipping off the final BIT_STRING or OCTET_STRING from either sample should be a start since both are mandatory and neither will cause an EBADMSG without the patches Reported-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

0d62e9dd6da45bbf0f33a8617afc5fe774c8f45f

linux

bigvul

[ot-font] Fix hmtx wrong table length check Discovered by libFuzzer. Ouch! https://github.com/behdad/harfbuzz/issues/139#issuecomment-148289957

63ef0b41dc48d6112d1918c1b1de9de8ea90adb5

harfbuzz

bigvul

Patch for Heap Buffer Overflow in EscapeShell Proposed patch for bug #71270

2871c70efaaaa0f102557a17c727fd4d5204dd4b

php-src

bigvul

Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann) Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn. * emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>: sched: panic on corrupted stack end ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top

f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d

linux

bigvul

Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384 When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself, an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond the end of the allocated buffer. This fix provides three new checks to guard against such manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when handling this type of entry: 1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression, abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed data sizes do not match. 2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry, abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed size is larger than 4MB. 3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed entry size.

d0331e8e5b05b475f20b1f3101fe1ad772d7e7e7

libarchive

bigvul

nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL. Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl. (Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I suspect this may fix other races.) This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by posix_acl_valid. The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit 4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly instead of going through xattr handlers. Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]> [[email protected]: use set_posix_acl] Fixes: 4ac7249e Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>

999653786df6954a31044528ac3f7a5dadca08f4

linux

bigvul

Merge pull request #2976 from atom/node_modules_paths Prevent Node from adding paths outside the app to search paths

9a2e2b365d061ec10cd861391fd5b1344af7194d

electron

bigvul

pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection, /proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do attacks. This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap. [1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html [ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now this is the simple model. - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]> Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Seaborn <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce

linux

bigvul

include/linux/poison.h: fix LIST_POISON{1,2} offset Poison pointer values should be small enough to find a room in non-mmap'able/hardly-mmap'able space. E.g. on x86 "poison pointer space" is located starting from 0x0. Given unprivileged users cannot mmap anything below mmap_min_addr, it should be safe to use poison pointers lower than mmap_min_addr. The current poison pointer values of LIST_POISON{1,2} might be too big for mmap_min_addr values equal or less than 1 MB (common case, e.g. Ubuntu uses only 0x10000). There is little point to use such a big value given the "poison pointer space" below 1 MB is not yet exhausted. Changing it to a smaller value solves the problem for small mmap_min_addr setups. The values are suggested by Solar Designer: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/02/6 Signed-off-by: Vasily Kulikov <[email protected]> Cc: Solar Designer <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

8a5e5e02fc83aaf67053ab53b359af08c6c49aaf

linux

bigvul

KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsing This fixes CVE-2016-0758. In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted, it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added to the cursor. With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check: datalen - dp < 2 may then fail due to integer overflow. Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining data in both places a definite length is determined. Whilst we're at it, make the following changes: (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that variable is assumed to be (size_t). (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the integer 0. (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of: for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) { since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n. Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]>

23c8a812dc3c621009e4f0e5342aa4e2ede1ceaa

linux

bigvul

KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring() This fixes CVE-2016-0728. If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already set as its session, we leak a keyring reference. This can be tested with the following program: #include <stddef.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> int main(int argc, const char *argv[]) { int i = 0; key_serial_t serial; serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial, KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) { serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING, "leaked-keyring"); if (serial < 0) { perror("keyctl"); return -1; } } return 0; } If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in /proc/keys: 3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run, then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed. Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Acked-by: Don Zickus <[email protected]> Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <[email protected]> Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

23567fd052a9abb6d67fe8e7a9ccdd9800a540f2

linux

bigvul

tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD) ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy; userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD). However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup. Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write()) to retrieve the "current" line discipline id. Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439

linux

bigvul

Bug#21973610: BUFFER OVERFLOW ISSUES Description : Incorrect usage of sprintf/strcpy caused possible buffer overflow issues at various places. Solution : - Fixed mysql_plugin and mysqlshow - Fixed regex library issues Reviewed-By : Georgi Kodinov <[email protected]> Reviewed-By : Venkata S Murthy Sidagam <[email protected]>

0dbd5a8797ed4bd18e8b883988fb62177eb0f73f

mysql-server

bigvul

crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2) Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been done on the socket yet. Cc: [email protected] Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>

dd504589577d8e8e70f51f997ad487a4cb6c026f

linux

bigvul

arm64: make sys_call_table const As with x86, mark the sys_call_table const such that it will be placed in the .rodata section. This will cause attempts to modify the table (accidental or deliberate) to fail when strict page permissions are in place. In the absence of strict page permissions, there should be no functional change. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>

c623b33b4e9599c6ac5076f7db7369eb9869aa04

linux

bigvul

[PATCH] arm: fix handling of F_OFD_... in oabi_fcntl64() Cc: [email protected] # 3.15+ Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>

76cc404bfdc0d419c720de4daaf2584542734f42

linux

bigvul

tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1]. Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous line discipline's already-freed private data [2]. Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant tty fields before instancing the new line discipline. [1] commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c Author: Tilman Schmidt <[email protected]> Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200 isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset [2] Report from Sasha Levin <[email protected]> [ 634.336761] ================================================================== [ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0 [ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981 [ 634.340359] ============================================================================= [ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ... [ 634.405018] Call Trace: [ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52) [ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655) [ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662) [ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236) [ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279) [ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1)) [ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447) [ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567) [ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879) [ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607) [ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613) [ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188) Cc: Tilman Schmidt <[email protected]> Cc: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

dd42bf1197144ede075a9d4793123f7689e164bc

linux

bigvul

perf: Fix race in swevent hash There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array while it can still have events on. This will result in a use-after-free which is BAD. Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing around and no use-after-free takes place. When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage will occur. Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>

12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373

linux

bigvul

sg: Fix double-free when drives detach during SG_IO In sg_common_write(), we free the block request and return -ENODEV if the device is detached in the middle of the SG_IO ioctl(). Unfortunately, sg_finish_rem_req() also tries to free srp->rq, so we end up freeing rq->cmd in the already free rq object, and then free the object itself out from under the current user. This ends up corrupting random memory via the list_head on the rq object. The most common crash trace I saw is this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at block/blk-core.c:1420! Call Trace: [<ffffffff81281eab>] blk_put_request+0x5b/0x80 [<ffffffffa0069e5b>] sg_finish_rem_req+0x6b/0x120 [sg] [<ffffffffa006bcb9>] sg_common_write.isra.14+0x459/0x5a0 [sg] [<ffffffff8125b328>] ? selinux_file_alloc_security+0x48/0x70 [<ffffffffa006bf95>] sg_new_write.isra.17+0x195/0x2d0 [sg] [<ffffffffa006cef4>] sg_ioctl+0x644/0xdb0 [sg] [<ffffffff81170f80>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x90/0x520 [<ffffffff81258967>] ? file_has_perm+0x97/0xb0 [<ffffffff811714a1>] SyS_ioctl+0x91/0xb0 [<ffffffff81602afb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 RIP [<ffffffff81281e04>] __blk_put_request+0x154/0x1a0 The solution is straightforward: just set srp->rq to NULL in the failure branch so that sg_finish_rem_req() doesn't attempt to re-free it. Additionally, since sg_rq_end_io() will never be called on the object when this happens, we need to free memory backing ->cmd if it isn't embedded in the object itself. KASAN was extremely helpful in finding the root cause of this bug. Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <[email protected]> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>

f3951a3709ff50990bf3e188c27d346792103432

linux

bigvul

ext4: fix potential use after free in __ext4_journal_stop There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 and it is wrong. Fix it by storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing potentially freed handle. Fixes: 9705acd63b125dee8b15c705216d7186daea4625 Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected]

6934da9238da947628be83635e365df41064b09b

linux

bigvul

Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking. Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>

951b6a0717db97ce420547222647bcc40bf1eacd

linux

bigvul

arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a different HW PMU. The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage. This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with a CCI PMU present: Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL) CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249 Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT) task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 PC is at 0x0 LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8 pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145 sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0 [< (null)>] (null) [<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc [<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70 [<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c [<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358 [<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c Code: bad PC value Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know that we are dealing with an arm pmu event. Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

8fff105e13041e49b82f92eef034f363a6b1c071

linux

bigvul

ovl: fix dentry reference leak In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't actually release the ref on newdentry. The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught given the catch of newdentry. Without this fix, something like the following is seen: BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs] BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs] when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup. An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with something like: dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000)) to create a large file (4.1G). Overlay an upper layer that is too small (on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably. Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.18+

ab79efab0a0ba01a74df782eb7fa44b044dae8b5

linux

bigvul

mbcache2: reimplement mbcache Original mbcache was designed to have more features than what ext? filesystems ended up using. It supported entry being in more hashes, it had a home-grown rwlocking of each entry, and one cache could cache entries from multiple filesystems. This genericity also resulted in more complex locking, larger cache entries, and generally more code complexity. This is reimplementation of the mbcache functionality to exactly fit the purpose ext? filesystems use it for. Cache entries are now considerably smaller (7 instead of 13 longs), the code is considerably smaller as well (414 vs 913 lines of code), and IMO also simpler. The new code is also much more lightweight. I have measured the speed using artificial xattr-bench benchmark, which spawns P processes, each process sets xattr for F different files, and the value of xattr is randomly chosen from a pool of V values. Averages of runtimes for 5 runs for various combinations of parameters are below. The first value in each cell is old mbache, the second value is the new mbcache. V=10 F\P 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 10 0.158,0.157 0.208,0.196 0.500,0.277 0.798,0.400 3.258,0.584 13.807,1.047 61.339,2.803 100 0.172,0.167 0.279,0.222 0.520,0.275 0.825,0.341 2.981,0.505 12.022,1.202 44.641,2.943 1000 0.185,0.174 0.297,0.239 0.445,0.283 0.767,0.340 2.329,0.480 6.342,1.198 16.440,3.888 V=100 F\P 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 10 0.162,0.153 0.200,0.186 0.362,0.257 0.671,0.496 1.433,0.943 3.801,1.345 7.938,2.501 100 0.153,0.160 0.221,0.199 0.404,0.264 0.945,0.379 1.556,0.485 3.761,1.156 7.901,2.484 1000 0.215,0.191 0.303,0.246 0.471,0.288 0.960,0.347 1.647,0.479 3.916,1.176 8.058,3.160 V=1000 F\P 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 10 0.151,0.129 0.210,0.163 0.326,0.245 0.685,0.521 1.284,0.859 3.087,2.251 6.451,4.801 100 0.154,0.153 0.211,0.191 0.276,0.282 0.687,0.506 1.202,0.877 3.259,1.954 8.738,2.887 1000 0.145,0.179 0.202,0.222 0.449,0.319 0.899,0.333 1.577,0.524 4.221,1.240 9.782,3.579 V=10000 F\P 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 10 0.161,0.154 0.198,0.190 0.296,0.256 0.662,0.480 1.192,0.818 2.989,2.200 6.362,4.746 100 0.176,0.174 0.236,0.203 0.326,0.255 0.696,0.511 1.183,0.855 4.205,3.444 19.510,17.760 1000 0.199,0.183 0.240,0.227 1.159,1.014 2.286,2.154 6.023,6.039 ---,10.933 ---,36.620 V=100000 F\P 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 10 0.171,0.162 0.204,0.198 0.285,0.230 0.692,0.500 1.225,0.881 2.990,2.243 6.379,4.771 100 0.151,0.171 0.220,0.210 0.295,0.255 0.720,0.518 1.226,0.844 3.423,2.831 19.234,17.544 1000 0.192,0.189 0.249,0.225 1.162,1.043 2.257,2.093 5.853,4.997 ---,10.399 ---,32.198 We see that the new code is faster in pretty much all the cases and starting from 4 processes there are significant gains with the new code resulting in upto 20-times shorter runtimes. Also for large numbers of cached entries all values for the old code could not be measured as the kernel started hitting softlockups and died before the test completed. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

f9a61eb4e2471c56a63cd804c7474128138c38ac

linux

bigvul

arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha, ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures. It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64 architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing allocated buffer. Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.14+ Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>

6829e274a623187c24f7cfc0e3d35f25d087fcc5

linux

bigvul

Fix another memory access issue discovered by libFuzzer Fixes https://github.com/behdad/harfbuzz/issues/139#issuecomment-146984679

f96664974774bfeb237a7274f512f64aaafb201e

harfbuzz

bigvul

Update header handling to RFC 7230

996faf964bba1aec06b153b370a7f20d3dd2bb8b?w=1

php-src

bigvul

gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix. Fixes #173.

4751b606fa38edc456d627140898a7ec679fcc24

libgd

bigvul

set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12 In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is not the last one. Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test triggered two clusters early. If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted. This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later. Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix. Reported-by: Hanno Böck Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <[email protected]>

07908124838afcc99c577d1d3e84cef2dbd39cb7

dosfstools

bigvul

Fix potential use-after-free in opj_j2k_write_mco function Fixes #563

940100c28ae28931722290794889cf84a92c5f6f

openjpeg

bigvul

PR/454: Fix memory corruption when the continuation level jumps by more than 20 in a single step.

6713ca45e7757297381f4b4cdb9cf5e624a9ad36

file

bigvul

Heap buffer overflow in tokenadd() (fix #105) This was an off-by one: the NUL terminator byte was not allocated on resize. This was triggered by JSON-encoded numbers longer than 256 bytes.

8eb1367ca44e772963e704a700ef72ae2e12babd

jq

bigvul

Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a 400 (Bad Request) Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would not fail because of that.

29870c8fe95e4e8a672f6f28c5fbe692bea09e9c

varnish-cache

bigvul

powerpc/tm: Check for already reclaimed tasks Currently we can hit a scenario where we'll tm_reclaim() twice. This results in a TM bad thing exception because the second reclaim occurs when not in suspend mode. The scenario in which this can happen is the following. We attempt to deliver a signal to userspace. To do this we need obtain the stack pointer to write the signal context. To get this stack pointer we must tm_reclaim() in case we need to use the checkpointed stack pointer (see get_tm_stackpointer()). Normally we'd then return directly to userspace to deliver the signal without going through __switch_to(). Unfortunatley, if at this point we get an error (such as a bad userspace stack pointer), we need to exit the process. The exit will result in a __switch_to(). __switch_to() will attempt to save the process state which results in another tm_reclaim(). This tm_reclaim() now causes a TM Bad Thing exception as this state has already been saved and the processor is no longer in TM suspend mode. Whee! This patch checks the state of the MSR to ensure we are TM suspended before we attempt the tm_reclaim(). If we've already saved the state away, we should no longer be in TM suspend mode. This has the additional advantage of checking for a potential TM Bad Thing exception. Found using syscall fuzzer. Fixes: fb09692e71f1 ("powerpc: Add reclaim and recheckpoint functions for context switching transactional memory processes") Cc: [email protected] # v3.9+ Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>

7f821fc9c77a9b01fe7b1d6e72717b33d8d64142

linux

bigvul

powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid). This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid. Found using a syscall fuzzer. Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: [email protected] # v3.9+ Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>

d2b9d2a5ad5ef04ff978c9923d19730cb05efd55

linux

bigvul

tmpfiles: set acls on system.journal explicitly https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/1397

afae249efa4774c6676738ac5de6aeb4daf4889f

systemd

bigvul

ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized. This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes. Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault could have created pages with stale mapping information. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

ea3d7209ca01da209cda6f0dea8be9cc4b7a933b

linux

bigvul

AIO: properly check iovec sizes In Linus's tree, the iovec code has been reworked massively, but in older kernels the AIO layer should be checking this before passing the request on to other layers. Many thanks to Ben Hawkes of Google Project Zero for pointing out the issue. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]> Acked-by: Benjamin LaHaise <[email protected]> Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

c4f4b82694fe48b02f7a881a1797131a6dad1364

linux

bigvul

USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate() Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use. This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be done. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]> Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]> Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <[email protected]> Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work") CC: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

e50293ef9775c5f1cf3fcc093037dd6a8c5684ea

linux

bigvul

iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values as an error. Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>

67f1aee6f45059fd6b0f5b0ecb2c97ad0451f6b3

linux

bigvul

KaxBlockInternal: check EBML lace sizes against available buffer space

0a2d3e3644a7453b6513db2f9bc270f77943573f

libmatroska

bigvul

EbmlElement: don't read beyond end of buffer when reading variable length integers

24e5cd7c666b1ddd85619d60486db0a5481c1b90

libebml

bigvul

EbmlUnicodeString: don't read beyond end of string The conversion from an UTF-8 encoded string into a wchar_t one was reading from beyond the end of the source buffer if the length indicated by a UTF-8 character's first byte exceeds the number of bytes actually present afterwards. Fixes the issue reported as Cisco TALOS-CAN-0036.

ababb64e0c792ad2a314245233db0833ba12036b

libebml

bigvul

EbmlMaster: propagate upper level element after infinite sized one correctly When the parser encountered a deeply nested element with an infinite size then a following element of an upper level was not propagated correctly. Instead the element with the infinite size was added into the EBML element tree a second time resulting in memory access after freeing it and multiple attempts to free the same memory address during destruction. Fixes the issue reported as Cisco TALOS-CAN-0037.

88409e2a94dd3b40ff81d08bf6d92f486d036b24

libebml

bigvul

netfilter: nf_nat_redirect: add missing NULL pointer check Commit 8b13eddfdf04cbfa561725cfc42d6868fe896f56 ("netfilter: refactor NAT redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables") has introduced a trivial logic change which can result in the following crash. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030 IP: [<ffffffffa033002d>] nf_nat_redirect_ipv4+0x2d/0xa0 [nf_nat_redirect] PGD 3ba662067 PUD 3ba661067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ipv6(E) xt_REDIRECT(E) nf_nat_redirect(E) xt_tcpudp(E) iptable_nat(E) nf_conntrack_ipv4(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_nat_ipv4(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) ip_tables(E) x_tables(E) binfmt_misc(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) evbug(E) evdev(E) psmouse(E) i2c_piix4(E) i2c_core(E) acpi_cpufreq(E) button(E) ext4(E) crc16(E) jbd2(E) mbcache(E) dm_mirror(E) dm_region_hash(E) dm_log(E) dm_mod(E) CPU: 0 PID: 2536 Comm: ip Tainted: G E 4.1.7-15.23.amzn1.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.2.amazon 05/06/2015 task: ffff8800eb438000 ti: ffff8803ba664000 task.ti: ffff8803ba664000 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa0334065>] redirect_tg4+0x15/0x20 [xt_REDIRECT] [<ffffffffa02e2e99>] ipt_do_table+0x2b9/0x5e1 [ip_tables] [<ffffffffa0328045>] iptable_nat_do_chain+0x25/0x30 [iptable_nat] [<ffffffffa031777d>] nf_nat_ipv4_fn+0x13d/0x1f0 [nf_nat_ipv4] [<ffffffffa0328020>] ? iptable_nat_ipv4_fn+0x20/0x20 [iptable_nat] [<ffffffffa031785e>] nf_nat_ipv4_in+0x2e/0x90 [nf_nat_ipv4] [<ffffffffa03280a5>] iptable_nat_ipv4_in+0x15/0x20 [iptable_nat] [<ffffffff81449137>] nf_iterate+0x57/0x80 [<ffffffff814491f7>] nf_hook_slow+0x97/0x100 [<ffffffff814504d4>] ip_rcv+0x314/0x400 unsigned int nf_nat_redirect_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, ... { ... rcu_read_lock(); indev = __in_dev_get_rcu(skb->dev); if (indev != NULL) { ifa = indev->ifa_list; newdst = ifa->ifa_local; <--- } rcu_read_unlock(); ... } Before the commit, 'ifa' had been always checked before access. After the commit, however, it could be accessed even if it's NULL. Interestingly, this was once fixed in 2003. http://marc.info/?l=netfilter-devel&m=106668497403047&w=2 In addition to the original one, we have seen the crash when packets that need to be redirected somehow arrive on an interface which hasn't been yet fully configured. This change just reverts the logic to the old behavior to avoid the crash. Fixes: 8b13eddfdf04 ("netfilter: refactor NAT redirect IPv4 to use it from nf_tables") Signed-off-by: Munehisa Kamata <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

94f9cd81436c85d8c3a318ba92e236ede73752fc

linux

bigvul

fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages() I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages() function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call. Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to copy data from userspace. A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend is followed by segment with invalid address, iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length), iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment. Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect invalid address. Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit description. Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]> Cc: Maxim Patlasov <[email protected]> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]> Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write") Cc: <[email protected]>

3ca8138f014a913f98e6ef40e939868e1e9ea876

linux

bigvul

* libtiff/tif_next.c: fix potential out-of-bound write in NeXTDecode() triggered by http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/vulns/libtiff5.tif (bugzilla #2508)

b18012dae552f85dcc5c57d3bf4e997a15b1cc1c

libtiff

bigvul

sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with the listening socket but released with the new association socket. The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening socket lock. Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called. BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0] ... RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30 RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48 RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0 R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0) Stack: ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000 <d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00 <d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 ... With lockdep debugging: ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] ------------------------------------- CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at: [<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp] but there are no more locks to release! other info that might help us debug this: 2 locks held by CslRx/12087: #0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0 #1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp] Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event critical section. Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

635682a14427d241bab7bbdeebb48a7d7b91638e

linux

bigvul

NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client ---Steps to Reproduce-- <nfs-server> # cat /etc/exports /nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt) /nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt) <nfs-client> # mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/ # ll /mnt/*/ <nfs-server> # cat /etc/exports /nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server) /nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt) # service nfs restart <nfs-client> # ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here [ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4] [ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0 [ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1] [ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd] [ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214 [ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014 [ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000 [ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4] [ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240 [ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908 [ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800 [ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240 [ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 [ 5123.112888] Stack: [ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000 [ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6 [ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800 [ 5123.115264] Call Trace: [ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4] [ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4] [ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4] [ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0 [ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160 [ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160 [ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33 [ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4] [ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8> [ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops") Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+ Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

18e3b739fdc826481c6a1335ce0c5b19b3d415da

linux

bigvul

Reject replies to DNS PTR requests that contain invalid characters Fixes issue #1033 reported by @ping86

6058483d9fbc1b904d5ae7cfea47bfcde5c5b559

inspircd

bigvul

Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631] In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce. CVE-2015-8631: In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause kadmind to exhaust all available memory. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8343 (new) target_version: 1.14-next target_version: 1.13-next tags: pullup

83ed75feba32e46f736fcce0d96a0445f29b96c2

krb5

bigvul

Check for null kadm5 policy name [CVE-2015-8630] In kadm5_create_principal_3() and kadm5_modify_principal(), check for entry->policy being null when KADM5_POLICY is included in the mask. CVE-2015-8630: In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, an authenticated attacker with permission to modify a principal entry can cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer by supplying a null policy value but including KADM5_POLICY in the mask. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8342 (new) target_version: 1.14-next target_version: 1.13-next tags: pullup

b863de7fbf080b15e347a736fdda0a82d42f4f6b

krb5

bigvul

Verify decoded kadmin C strings [CVE-2015-8629] In xdr_nullstring(), check that the decoded string is terminated with a zero byte and does not contain any internal zero bytes. CVE-2015-8629: In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause kadmind to read beyond the end of allocated memory by sending a string without a terminating zero byte. Information leakage may be possible for an attacker with permission to modify the database. CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C ticket: 8341 (new) target_version: 1.14-next target_version: 1.13-next tags: pullup

df17a1224a3406f57477bcd372c61e04c0e5a5bb

krb5

bigvul

Use format string

b101a6bbd4f2181c360bd38e7683df4a03cba83e

php-src

bigvul

bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind(). Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>

5233252fce714053f0151680933571a2da9cbfb4

linux

bigvul

Merge pull request #153 from elxa/fix-op-command-crashing-core Fixes a crash of the core when executing "/op *" in a query.

b8edbda019eeb99da8663193e224efc9d1265dc7

quassel

bigvul

KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key type method must be aware that the error code may be there. The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type: keyctl request2 user user "" @u keyctl add user user "a" @u which manifests itself as: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046 RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82 RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82 R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700 FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82 ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5 ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136 [<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129 [< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730 [<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908 [< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125 [<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60 [<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185 Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX. A similar bug can be tripped by: keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u keyctl add trusted user "a" @u This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that will crashes. Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

096fe9eaea40a17e125569f9e657e34cdb6d73bd

linux

bigvul

ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and convert the extent to initialized after io completes. The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked initialized after it has been written with new data so we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO read performance on high-speed disks. Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now. Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>

744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11

linux

bigvul

USB: serial: visor: fix crash on detecting device without write_urbs The visor driver crashes in clie_5_attach() when a specially crafted USB device without bulk-out endpoint is detected. This fix adds a check that the device has proper configuration expected by the driver. Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Fixes: cfb8da8f69b8 ("USB: visor: fix initialisation of UX50/TH55 devices") Cc: stable <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

cb3232138e37129e88240a98a1d2aba2187ff57c

linux

bigvul

KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke This fixes CVE-2015-7550. There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key. This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key and doesn't check for a NULL pointer. Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking semaphore instead of before. I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code. This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller (http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version: #include <sys/types.h> #include <keyutils.h> #include <pthread.h> void *thr0(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; keyctl_revoke(key); return 0; } void *thr1(void *arg) { key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg; char buffer[16]; keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16); return 0; } int main() { key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING); pthread_t th[5]; pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key); pthread_join(th[0], 0); pthread_join(th[1], 0); pthread_join(th[2], 0); pthread_join(th[3], 0); return 0; } Build as: cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread Run as: while keyctl-race; do :; done as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be summarised as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3 ... Call Trace: [<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7 [<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0 [<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>

b4a1b4f5047e4f54e194681125c74c0aa64d637d

linux

bigvul

Fix CVE-2015-7519 header collision vulnerability

ddb8ecc4ebf260e4967f57f271d4f5761abeac3e

passenger

bigvul

Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths. Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96

linux

bigvul

KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0 on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec. This is CVE-2015-7513. Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>

0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8

linux

bigvul

fs_pin: Allow for the possibility that m_list or s_list go unused. This is needed to support lazily umounting locked mounts. Because the entire unmounted subtree needs to stay together until there are no users with references to any part of the subtree. To support this guarantee that the fs_pin m_list and s_list nodes are initialized by initializing them in init_fs_pin allowing for the possibility that pin_insert_group does not touch them. Further use hlist_del_init in pin_remove so that there is a hlist_unhashed test before the list we attempt to update the previous list item. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

820f9f147dcce2602eefd9b575bbbd9ea14f0953

linux

bigvul

mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts it is reasonable to fail early. The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears reasonable. Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts that appear in the mount tree. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

cd4a40174b71acd021877341684d8bb1dc8ea4ae

linux

bigvul