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ayaḥśalākākalpā hi kramasaṅgatamūrtayaḥ / dṛśyante vyaktayaḥ sarvāḥ kalpanāmiśritātmikāḥ // | All ‘manifested things’ are found to be like iron-bars; as having their forms associated with an order of sequence and their essence mixed up with fancies. |
yathā hyayomayyaḥ śalākāḥ parasparamasaṅgatās tadvadimāḥ śabdādivyaktayaḥsvasvabhāvavyavasthitatayā deśakālaśaktipratibhāsādibhedān na parasparamanvāviśanti / | Just as bars made of Iron stand apart from each other, so these ‘Manifested Entities’, as they appear in their own forms, are found to be diverse and separate, due to diversities of place, time, potencies, appearances and so forth; and they do not enter into each other’s essence (or constitution). |
etenānekatvaṃ pratipāditaṃ / | This proves the multiplicity (of Manifested Entities). |
anityatvapratipādanāyāha kramasaṅgatamūrtaya iti / | In order to prove their non-eternality, it is added Having their forms, etc. etc.; |
utpādakrameṇa saṅgatā samāliṅgitā mūrtiryāsām iti vigrahaḥ / | the compound is to be analysed as ‘have their forms associated with embraced, affected by an order of sequence’. |
kathaṃ tarhi kṣityādinaikena rūpeṇa tathā sa evāyam iti ca sthireṇa svabhāvenānugatā vyavasīyante bhāvā ity āha kalpanāmiśritātmikā iti / | Question “If this is so, then how is it that Entities are conceived of as units, in the form of ‘Earth’ and the like, and also as lasting, in such notions as ‘this is that same thing’?” Answer Their essence mixed, up with fancies; |
mithyāvikalpo 'yamartheṣvekātmatāgraha ity arthaḥ / | that is to say, the conception of ‘unity’ in regard to things is a ‘fancy’, a wrong assumption. |
etac ca paścāt pratipādayiṣyate kṣaṇabhaṅgādau // | This is going to be established later on, under the sections dealing with the doctrine of the ‘Perpetual Flux’, (42) |
evaṃ tāvat samanvayādityasya hetor asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikatvaṃ pratipāditaṃ adhunā kuṭādibhedavad iti dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyasādhanadharmānvayatvaṃ pratipādayannāha mṛdvikārādaya ityādi / mṛdvikārādayo bhedā naikajātyanvitāstathā / | It has thus been shown that the Reason ‘Because of Homogeneity’ (as propounded by the Sāṃkhya in support of his doctrine of all things being the product of one ‘Primordial Matter’) is open to the three fallacies of being ‘Unproven, Inadmissible’, ‘Contradictory’ and ‘Too Wide, Inconclusive’, The Author now proceeds to show that the corroborative instance cited (by the Sāṃkhya in Text 15, above) in the words ‘Just as in the case of the Jar and other things’ deos not fulfil the conditions of, and is not possessed of the properties of the Probans and the Probandum [and as such cannot serve as a ‘corroborative instance’]: [see verse 43 above] |
ādiśabdena kanakādivikārāṇāṃ ca grahaṇaṃ / | The phrase ‘and other things’ is meant to include the products of suchngs as Gold and the like. |
tatheti dūṣaṇāntarasamuccaye sādṛśye vā / | The term ‘so also’ may be taken as cumulative, adding one further defect in the Opponent’s reasoning, or as indicating similarity (to other defects already pointed oat). |
naikajātyanvitā ityanena sādhanadharmavaikalyaṃ darśitaṃ / | The phrase ‘not imbued with any single Generic Character’ serves to show that the Instance cited (Jar, etc.) is devoid of the property of what has been cited (by the Sāṃkhya) as the Probans of his reasoning. |
naikanimittāśceti / siddha iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ / | The phrase ‘Nor as the effects of any single Cause’, has to be construed with ‘recognised’; |
anena sādhyadharmānanvayo darśitaḥ / | and it serves to show that the property of the (Sāṃkhya’s) Probandum also is not present in the instance cited. |
nanu caikaṃ mṛtpiṇḍakanakādi kāraṇaṃ teṣāṃ siddham eva tathā mṛtsuvarṇatvādijātiścaiṣām eṣānugāminī dṛṣṭā tat katham ubhayavaikalyam ity āha mṛtpiṇḍāder vibhedata iti / | Objection “As a matter of fact, single Causes of all such things, are actually found in the form of the Lump of Clay or of Gold and other things; and every one of these is also found to be imbued with the Generic Character of ‘Clay’, ‘Gold’ and the like. In what way then is our Instance devoid of both the properties of the Probans and the Probandum?” Answer As all such things as the ‘Lump of Clay’ are diverse; |
nahyeko 'vayavī mṛtpiṇḍādirasti ekadeśāvṛttau sarvāvaraṇaprasaṅgāt / | if there were, then (since Generic Characters are all-pervading ex hypothesi), if it covered one point in space, the entire space would become covered. |
nāpyekā jātiḥ prativyaktiḥ pratibhāsabhedāt // | Nor is any ‘Generic Character’ found to appear in each individual thing, every one of which is perceived as distinct by itself. |
punar api samanvayādityasya hetoḥ svato 'naikāntikatvam iti pratipādayannāha caitanyetyādi / caitanyādyanvitatve 'pi naikapūrvatvamiṣyate / | In the case of ‘spirits’, even though they are endowed with ‘sentience’ and other qualities, they are not regarded (by the sāṃkhya) as preceded (produced) by a single entity (as their cause). it might be said that “the said qualities are attributed (to the spirits) only secondarily (indirectly, figuratively)”; |
puruṣāṇām amukhyaṃ cet tadihāpi samaṃ na kiṃ // | then why cannot the same be the case in regard to the matter under discussion also? (44) |
tathā hi cetanatvabhoktṛtvādibhir aparimitair dharmair anvitāḥ pumāṃso 'bhīṣṭāḥ na ca te tathāvidhaikakāraṇapūrvakā bhavadbhir iṣyante / | For instance, the Spirits are regarded (by the Sāṃkhya) to be endowed with endless such properties as being ‘sentient’, ‘enjoyer’ and the like; and yet they are not regarded by yon as having a single Cause endowed with the same properties. |
gauṇaṃ yato 'caitanyādivyāvṛttāḥ sarva eva pumāṃsastenārthāntaravyāvṛttirūpā caitanyaṃ jātistadanugāminī kalpyate natvekā tātvikī sāstīti / | and the reason for this lies in the fact that, all Spirits are found to be excluded from ‘insentience’ and other such qualities, and hence they are placed under the genus ‘Sentient’, which stands for the ‘negation or exclusion of Insentience’, which is assumed to meet their case; |
yadyevaṃ tadamukhyaṃ sukhādyanvitatvamasatyapi tathābhūtaikakāraṇapūrvatve puruṣavadihāpi vyakte kimiti samam tulyaṃ na kalpyate / tasmād anaikāntiko hetuḥ / | though in reality there is no such genus”, If then, it is only indirect and figurative, then, in regard to the ‘Manifest’ also, as in the case of Spirits, why is the presence of Pleasure, etc. not taken as ‘assumed’ in the same way, without their being preceded and produced by any single Cause endowed with the same qualities? Thus the Probans (Reason) is found to be Inconclusive. |
puruṣāṇām ityupalakṣaṇaṃ / | The mention of ‘Spirits’ is only by way of illustration. |
tathā sukhādayo mūlaprakṛtyavasthābhāvino guṇatvācetanatvābhoktṛtvādibhir anvitāḥ pradhānapuruṣāś ca nityatvādibhir yuktāḥ na ca te tathābhūtaikakāraṇapūrvakā ityanenaikāntika eva // | In the same manner, Pleasure, etc., being so many modifications of Primordial Matter, are endowed with such qualities as being ‘attributes’, ‘insentient’, ‘non-enjoyer’ and so forth, and Primordial Matter and the Spirits are endowed with such qualities as ‘Eternality’ and the like, and yet none of these are preceded and produced by any single such Cause. |
evaṃ tāvat samanvayādityayaṃ hetuḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ / | Thus the Reason (put forward by the Sāṃkhya) “Because of homogeneity”, has been refuted. |
sāmprataṃ nigamanavyājena pariśiṣṭahetudūṣaṇārthaṃ diṅmātram āha pradhānahetvabhāve 'pītyādi / | Now tinder the pretext of Re-affirming his conclusion, the Author proceeds briefly to point out defects in the other reasons (put forward by the Sāṃkhya): [see verse 45 above] |
pradhānahetvabhāve 'pi tataḥ sarvaṃ prakalpate / śakter bhedena vaicitryaṃ kāryakāraṇatādikaṃ // tatra yattāvaduktaṃ parimāṇācchaktitaḥ pravṛtteḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvāccāsti pradhānam iti / ete trayo 'pi hetavo 'naikāntikāḥ sādhyaviparyaye / | It has been asserted (in Sāṃkhyakārikā, 15) that “Primordial Matter exists as the Cause, (a) because of the finite character of specific objects, (b) because Activity is due to Potency, and (c) because there is differentiation between ‘Cause’ and ‘Effect’”, As a matter of fact, all these three Reasons are inconclusive, as no reason is provided to preclude a conclusion contrary to the one set forth. For instance, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the three facts set forth that of objects having a finite character, etc. |
pradhānākhyasya hetor abhāve 'pyeṣāṃ parimāṇādīnām avirodhāt / tathā hi yadi tāvat kāraṇamātrasyāstitvaṃ sādhayte tadā siddhasādhyatāna hyasmākaṃ kāraṇamantareṇa kāryasyotpādo 'bhīṣṭaḥ kāraṇamātrasya ca pradhānam iti saṃjñākaraṇe na kiñcid bādhyate / | For instance, if what is sought to be proved is only the existence of a Cause, then the argument is superfluous, ‘proving what is already proved’; we also do not admit of any Effect being produced without a Cause; so that if the name ‘Primordial Matter’ were given in general to ail Causes, then there would be nothing to quarrel about. |
athaivaṃ sādhyate asti prekṣāvat kāraṇaṃ yadetanniyataparimāṇaṃ vyaktimutpādayati śaktitaś ca pravartata iti / tadānaikāntikatā vināpi hi prekṣāvatā kartrā svahetusāmarthyapratiniyamāt pratiniyataparimāṇādiyuktasyotpattyavirodhāt / | On the other hand, if what is sought to be proved is that ‘there is an intelligent Cause, which produces an effect of certain finite dimensions, and acts according to its potencies’, then the Reason adduced becomes invalidated by ‘inconclusiveness’; as even in the absence of an intelligent actor, there is nothing incongruous in the production of a particular effect with well” defined dimensions determined by the potencies of its own Cause. |
na cāpi pradhānaṃ prekṣāvadyuktaṃ tasyācetanatvāt / prekṣāyāś ca caitanyaparyāyatvāt / | Further, it is not right to regard Primordial Matter as intelligent, as it is, ex hypothesis insentient’, and ‘intelligence’ is synonymous with ‘sentience’. |
kiṃ ca śaktitaḥ pravṛtter ityanena yadyavyatiriktaśaktiyogi kāraṇamātraṃ sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā / | Further, if by means of the Reason ‘Because Activity is due to Potency’, it is meant to prove the existence of a mere Cause possessed of potencies not different (from those just needed for the particular effect), then it is superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties. |
atha vyatiriktavicitraśaktiyuktam ekaṃ nityaṃ kāraṇam tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / [p.40] tathābhūtena kvacid anvayāsiddher asiddhaś ca hetuḥ na hi vyatiriktaśaktivaśāt kasyacit kāraṇasya kvacit kārye pravṛttiḥ siddhā śaktīnāṃ svātmabhūtatvāt / | If, on the other hand, the Cause meant to be proved is some one Eternal Cause possessed of distinct and diverse potencies, then the Reason becomes invalidated by ‘inconclusiveness’, Further, as concomitance with any such Reason is not cognised anywhere, the Reason becomes invalidated as being ‘Unknown’ and ‘Inadmissible’ also; because as a matter, nowhere has any activity of the Cause towards the producing of an Effect been found to have been due to extraneous and additional potencies; |
yaccoktaṃ avibhāgād vaiśvarūpasyeti tadasiddhaṃ / | This Reason is absolutely ‘unknown, Inadmissible’. |
niranvayavināśadharmatvāt sarvabhāvānāṃ kvacidapi layāsiddheḥ / | No such ‘merging’ of things is known of, all things being liable to such absolute destruction as leave behind no traces at all. |
tathā hi layo bhavan pūrvasvabhāvapracyutau vā satyāṃ bhaved apracyutau vā yadi tāvat pracyutau tadā niranvayavināśaprasaṅgaḥ / | If there were such ‘merging’, it would come about either on the disappearance of the previous condition of the thing concerned, or without such disappearance. If it comes on the disappearance of the previous condition, then it involves the absolute destruction (without leaving any traces) [which the Sāṃkhya does not admit]. |
athāpracyutay tadā layānupapattiḥ na hyavikalamātmatatvamanubhavataḥ kasyacillayo yukto 'tiprasaṅgāt / | If, on the other hand, it comes without the said disappearance, then there can be no ‘merging’ at all; because no ‘merging’ is possible for any entity so long as it retains its own untrammelled essence. |
tasmāt parasparaviruddhamidam avibhāgo vaiśvarūpaṃ ceti / | Hence the statement ‘because of the merging of the whole world5 involves a self-contradiction. |
tadevaṃ pradhānahetvabhāve 'pi kāraṇasya śaktibhedena hetunā kāryasya parimāṇādirūpeṇa vaicitryaṃ kāryakāraṇavibhāgādiścotpadyata ityanaikāntikatā hetūnāṃ / | Thus, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the diversity relating to the Effect, in the shape of its being ‘finite’ and the rest, and the differentiation also into Cause and Effect become explicable, on the basis of the diversity of potencies. |
ādiśabdena śaktitaḥ pravṛtter ityetasya grahaṇaṃ / | The phrase ‘and other things’ is meant to include the argument (of the Sāṃkhya) “Because all activity is due to Potency”. |
athavā pradhānahetvabhāve 'pītyapiśabdo 'vadhāraṇe / | Or, the particle ‘apt’, ‘even’, in the phrase ‘even in the absence, etc. etc.’, may be meant to be restrictive; |
tenāyam artho bhavati / | hence the meaning comes to be this; |
pradhānahetvabhāva eva kāraṇaśaktibhedena hetunā kāryasya parimāṇādirūpeṇa vaicitryaṃ{tryasha} kāryakāraṇatādeścopāpdyamānatvād viruddhatā hetūnām iti / tathā hi yadi pradhānaṃ vyaktasya kāraṇaṃ syāt tadā tadātmatvena sarvam eva viśvaṃ tat svarūpavadekam eva dravyaṃ syāt / | It is only when there is no Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter that there can be diversity in the Effect due to the diverse potencies of the Cause; and also because it is only thus that the relation of Cause and Effect would be possible; hence the Reasons put forward (by the Sāṃkhya) are ‘contradictory’, For instance, if Primordial Matter were the Cause of the ‘Manifest’, then the whole universe, as being (ex hypothesi) of the same essence as that Matter, would be a single substance having the same character and form as that Matter; |
tataścaikā buddhirahaṅkārapañcatanmātrāṇītyādiparimāṇavibhāgo na syāt / | so that there could be no such distinction among Products as ‘Cosmic Intelligence’, ‘I-principle’, ‘Five Rudimentary Substances’ and so forth; |
tathā ca sati niṣparimāṇam eva jagat syāt / | Thus the Reason (put forward by the Sāṃkhya) “Because of homogeneity”, has been refuted. |
tathā kulālādīnāṃ ghaṭādikaraṇe śaktitaḥ pravṛttiḥ pradhānahetvabhāva upapadyate na tu tadbhāve / | because as a matter, nowhere has any activity of the Cause towards the producing of an Effect been found to have been due to extraneous and additional potencies; as all potencies subsist in the essence of theng itself. |
yathoktaṃ prāk na ca śaktir na ca kriye"ti / | This Reason is absolutely ‘unknown, Inadmissible’. |
kāryakāraṇavibhāgo 'pi pradhānahetvabhāva eva sati yuktaḥ / pūrvamevāditaṃ vaiśvarūpyaṃ ca pradhāne sati nopapadyata eva / | Thus, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the diversity relating to the Effect, in the shape of its being ‘finite’ and the rest, and the differentiation also into Cause and Effect become explicable, on the basis of the diversity of potencies. |
tanmayatvena sarvasya jagataḥ tat svarūpavadekatvaprasaṅgādityuktaṃ / | it has also been pointed out that if Primordial Matter were the Cause, then the whole world would be of the same essence as that Matter, which would lead to the absurdity that the entire world is a single substance (without any diversities); |
tataś ca vaiśvarūpyamādita eva nāstīti kutastasyāvibhāgaḥ syād iti // | and under the circumstances, as there would be no ‘diversity of forms’ at the very outsat, how could there be any ‘merging’ of it (as declared in the Sāṃkhyakārikā, 15)? (45) |
iti prakṛtiparīkṣā // | Thus ends the Section on the Examination of the Doctrine of ‘Primordial Matter’. |
KAPITEL Áśvaraparīkṣā idānīm īśavyāpārarahitatvaṃ pratipādayann āha sarvotpattimatām ityādi | The next Chapter, beginning with the Text (46), proceeds to prove that there can be no operation of any such Being as the ‘Supreme Lord’, ‘God’ |
sarvotpattimatāmīśamanye hetuṃ pracakṣate / | Other philosophers declare the ‘lord’ to be the cause of all things produced; |
nācetanaṃ svakāryāṇi kila prārabhate svayaṃ // | on the ground that no insentient thing, by itself, can produce its effects. |
anutpattimatāmaṇvākāśādīnāṃ nityatvān na kiñcitkāraṇam astītyata utpattimatām ityuktaṃ / | Inasmuch as things that are not produced, such as the Atom, Ākāśa and so forth, are eternal, they have no Cause, hence the Text has added the qualification ‘things produced’. |
īśam iti śīśvaram / | The term ‘Lord’ stands for God. |
anya iti naiyāyikādayaḥ / | ‘Others’ i.e. the Naiyāyika and other (Theists). |
tatra viśiṣṭaguṇamātmāntarameva sarvasya jagataḥ kartṛ sarvajñam īśvaram iti kecit / | Some of these Theists hold that “the creator of the whole world is a distinct Soul or Spirit with special qualities, the omniscient God”; |
ātmavyatiriktaṃ nityaikasarvārthaviṣayabuddhyupetatayā bhinnaguṅatvād dravyāntaram evetyapare / [p.41] nanu dharmādharmaparamāṇvādi jagataḥ kāraṇam asty eva tat kim artham īśvaram aparaṃ kāraṇatvena kalpayantītyata āha nācetanamityādi / | others hold that “the creator is a Substance (Being) distinct from the ‘Soul’ or ‘Spirit’, because He is eternal, one and equipped with the knowledge of all things, and as such having qualities different from those of the ‘Spirit’ or ‘Soul’”. Question “Where there are already such Causes of the world as Merit and Demerit, Atoms and so forth, why do these philosophers postulate another Cause in the shape of God?” |
yadyapi dharmādi kāraṇaṃ tathāpi tadacetanatvādadhiṣṭhāyakamantareṇa na svayam svakāryamārabdhumutsahata ityatastadadhiṣṭhāyakena kenacit kartrā bhavitavyam na hi kiñcid cetanam svatantramadhiṣṭhāyakam dṛṣṭam iti / | Though Merit and the rest may be the Cause, yet all these, being devoid of sentience or intelligence, cannot, by themselves, without an Operator or Supervisor, produce their effects; hence there must be a Creator (who is intelligent), as nothing that is devoid of intelligence is ever found to be the Operator. This argument is formulated as follows: What is devoid of Intelligence cannot produce its Effect, without an Operator; |
prayogaḥ yadacetanaṃ tadadhiṣṭhātāram antareṇa na svakāryamārabhate yatha amṛtpiṇḍasalilasūtrādayaḥ kumbhakārarahitāḥ kumbham acetanam ca dharmādīniti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | e.g. such things as Clay-lump, Stick, Water, String and the rest (all which are required for the making of the Jar) cannot produce the Jar, without the Potter; Merit and the rest (which are regarded as the Cause of the World) are all devoid of Intelligence; hence the idea that (these are enough to produce the World) would be contrary to the universal Proposition stated. |
tasmādyosāvadhiṣṭhātā{sa} īśvara iti siddham / | Thus it becomes established that there is an Operator and that is God. |
na caivam sati dharmādharmādīnām vaiyarthyam nimittakāraṇatvādīśvarasyeti / syādetadyadātmasamavetau dharmādharmau sa evātmādhiṣṭhātā bhaviṣyati / | because God is only the ‘Efficient Cause’ (Guide, Supervisor) [and Atoms and Merit, etc. would still be needed as the ‘Constituent’ and ‘Contributory’ Causes], The following objection might be urged: “Those Merit and Demerit that are held to subsist in the Soul or Spirit (of Man) may be the required Operator; |
tat kim īśvareṇa parikalpiteneti / | why should one assume a God?” |
tadasamyak / | Answer That cannot be right; |
tasyātmanastadānīm ajñatvāt yāvaddhi tasya śarīrendriyādiḥ kāryakāraṇasaṃghāto notpadyate tāvadayamajña upalabhyānapi rūpādīnviṣayānnopalabhate kuto 'nupalabhyau dharmādharmāvupalapsyata iti / | the particular Spirit at that time (of Creation) would be wholly unconscious so long as his Body, Sense-organs and other aggregates of Causes and Effects are not produced, the Spirit remains unconscious, not perceiving even such Colour, etc. as are quite perceptible; under the circumstances, how could it perceive Merit and Demerit, which are entirely imperceptible? To this end, there is the following declaration ‘The ignorant Creature, not master of his own pleasure and pain, may go to Heaven or to the Nethermost Hole, only as he is urged by God’ [quoted in Nyāyavārtika 4. |
yathoktam | 1.21, where the Tātparya speaks of it as ‘Smṛti’ ]. |
ajño jantur anīśoyam ātmanaḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ / | on the ground that no insentient thing, by itself, can produce its effects. |
īśvaraprerito gacchet svargaṃ vā śvabhram eva vā // | The term ‘Lord’ stands for God. ‘Others’ i.e. the Naiyāyika and other (Theists). |
iti // | Answer No insentient thing, etc. |
tatrāviruddhakarṇopanyastam īśvarasādhane pramāṇadvayam āha yatsvārambhaketyādi / | hence the idea that (these are enough to produce the World) would be contrary to the universal Proposition stated. Thus it becomes established that there is an Operator and that is God. |
yat svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśeṣavat / buddhimaddhetugamyaṃ tat tadyathā kalaśādikam // | “(A) that which is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its own component parts is subject to a cause that is endowed with intelligence, for instance, the jar and other objects. |
dvīndriyagrāhyamagrāhyaṃ vivādapadamīdṛśam / buddhimatpūrvakam tena vaidharmyeṇāṇavo matāḥ // | the thing in dispute, which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs and also imperceptible, must be preceded (and produced) by a cause endowed with intelligence, atoms supplying the corroborative instance ‘per dissimilarity’.” (48) |
taduktam dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyam vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt, ghaṭādivat, vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava iti / tatra dvābhyāṃ darśanasparśanendriyābhyāṃ grāhyaṃ mahadanekadravyavattvarūpādyupalabdhikāraṇopetaṃ pṛthivyudakajvalanasaṃjñitaṃ trividhaṃ dravyaṃ dvīndriyagrāhyam / | The argument has been thus formally stated: “The thing under dispute, which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs or not perceptible at all, must be regarded as produced by an Intelligent Cause, because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts, like the Jar, and unlike the Atoms [the Jar being the Corroborative Instance per Similarity, and the Atoms being so per Dissimilarity].” Now in this formulated argument ‘What is perceptible by means of two Sense-organs’ stands for the three kinds of Substance, Earth, Water and Fire which are perceptible by means of the two organs of Vision and of Touch, because they fulfil such conditions of perceptibility as being large, being composed of several substances, being coloured and so forth; |
agrāhyaṃ vāyvādi yasmān mahatvam anekadravyavatvaṃ rūpasamavāyādiścopalabdhikāraṇamiṣyate tac ca vāyvādau nāsti / | the ‘imperceptible’ are Air and the rest, simply because the conditions of perceptibility are ‘being large’, ‘being composed of several substances’, ‘being coloured’ and so forth, and all these conditions are absent in Air and other things; |
yathoktam mahattvādanekadravyatvād rūpāccopalabdhiḥ / | as has been declared in the following passage “Perception follows from Largeness, Presence of several Substances and Presence of Colour; |
adravyavattvātparamāṇavāva{dha---}nupalabdhiḥ / | the Atom is imperceptible because it contains no other substances; |
rūpasaṃskārābhāvād vāyoranupalabdhiḥ / | Air is imperceptible because it is devoid of the presence of Colour; |
rūpasaṃskāro rūpasamavāyaḥ / | the term ‘Saṃskāra’ stands for subsistence, presence in composition; |
dvyaṇukādīnāṃ tvanulabdhiramahattvā"diti / | and the Diad (Two-Atom-Compound) and other things are imperceptible because of the absence of largeness.” |
atra sāmānyena dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyasya buddhimatkāraṇapūrvatvasādhane siddhasādhyatā doṣo ghaṭādiṣu / ubhayasiddheḥ / | Now, in this argument, if the Probandum to be proved were stated in the general (unqualified) form that ‘Things perceptible by two sense-organs and those imperceptible are produced by intelligent causes’, then it would be superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties, in regard to such things as the Jar and the like, over which there is no dispute at all. |
vivādābhāvāt / [p.42] abhyupetabādhā ca aṇvākāśādīnāṃ tathānabhyupagamāt / | It would involve the fallacy of ‘contradicting one’s own doctrine’, because the Naiyāyika does not admit such imperceptible things as the Atom, Ākāśa, and the like to be ‘produced by an Intelligent Cause’; |
teṣāṃ ca nityatvāpratyakṣādibādhā / | and also because these latter are eternal (hence not produced at all), the said assertion would involve that contradiction of a perceived (well-recognised) fact. |
atas tadarthaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannagrahaṇam / | It is for the purpose of avoiding all these difficulties that the qualifying term ‘under dispute’ has been added; |
vividhā matir vimatir vipratipattir iti yāvat asyā adhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ vivādāspadībhūtam ity arthaḥ / | the term ‘Vipratipatti’ standing for different opinions, and that which forms the subject of diverse opinions is said to be the matter under dispute. |
evaṃvidhe sati śarīrendriyabhuvanādaya eva pakṣīkṛtā iti nāṇvādiṣu prasaṅgaḥ / | With this qualification, what become the ‘subject’ of the argument are only the Body, Sense-organs, the various Regions and so forth; |
kāraṇamātrapūrvatve 'pi sādhye siddhasādhyatā mābhūd iti buddhimatkāraṇagrahaṇaṃ / | Similarly, if the Probandum (to be proved) were stated in the form that ‘the things under dispute are produced by a Cause’, then the argument would be futile proving what is already accepted by both parties. |
sāṃkhyaṃ prati buddhisattvānupapatter na siddhasādhyatā avyatiriktā hi buddhiḥ pradhānāt sāṃkhyair iṣyate / | This argument, thus stated, cannot be futile as addressed to the Sāṃkhya, as there is no Intelligence (Buddhi) for the Sāṃkhya apart from Primordial Matter; |
na ca tenaiva tadeva tadvadbhavati / | and certainly a thing cannot be produced by itself. |
svārambhakāṇām avayavānāṃ saṃniveśaḥ pracayātmakaḥ saṃyogaḥ / | ‘Arrangement of component parts’; the ‘arrangement’, i.e. conjunction in the form of ‘aggregation’, of the parts that go to make up the Things; |
tena viśiṣṭaṃ vyavacchinnaṃ tadbhāvas tasmāt / | by this the Things in question are characterised differentiated; consequently they must be as asserted. |
avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvaṃ gotvādibhir vyabhicārītyataḥ svārambhakagrahaṇam / | Mere ‘characterisation by components’ would include the universals ‘Cow’ and the like (which also are held to be consisted of components in the shape of the individual animals) and thus render the Reason ‘too wide’; |
gotvādīni tu dravyārambhakāvayavasanniveśena viśeṣyante natu svārambhakāvayavasanniveśeneti / | what the universal ‘Cow’ and the rest are differentiated by is the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Substance, not by the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Cow itself. |
tena ye 'sau buddhimān sa īśvara iti / | The ‘Intelligent Cause’ thus proved is ‘God’. |
tadetat pramāṇaṃ yadityādiślokadvayena nirdiṣṭaṃ / | It is this proof that has been stated in these two Texts. |
svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśa eva viśeṣo viśeṣaṇaṃ so 'syāstīti tat tathoktam / tena viśiṣṭam ity arthaḥ / etena hetor vyāptir darśitā / | The compound ‘Svārambhaka, etc.’ is to be analysed as meaning ‘that which has for its Viśeṣana differentia the peculiar, characteristic, arrangement, disposition of its own component parts’, This indicates the invariable concomitance of the Reason (Middle Term) [with the Probandum]. |
pakṣadharmatvādi darśayannāha dvīndriyetyādi / vivādapadam iti / vivādādhikaraṇāpannam ity arthaḥ //47- | The presence of the Reason in the Subject is indicated by the words ‘which is perceptible by means of two organs, etc. etc.’ The expression ‘vivādapadam’ stands for ‘what forms the matter under dispute’. |
dvitīyaṃ ca taduktaṃ pramāṇaṃ bodhayann āha tattvādīnām ityādi / | The second argument propounded (by Aviddhakarṇa) is next explained: [see verse 49 above] |
tattvādīnām upādānaṃ cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitaṃ / rūpādimattvāt tantvādi yathā dṛṣṭaṃ svakāryakṛt // | Of the Body and other things, the material Came, in the shape of Atoms and such things can bring about their effects only when controlled by an Intelligent Cause; |
rūpādimattvād iti hetuḥ / | The Reason (Probans) stated is ‘because they are endowed with Colour, etc.’. |
tantvādīti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / | The ‘Yarn, etc.’ are cited as the Corroborative Instance. |