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yathoktam tanubhuvanakaraṇopādānāni cetanāvadadhiṣṭhitāni svakāramārabhanta iti pratijānīmahe / rūpādimattvāt tantvādivad iti // | This has been thus declared ‘The material causes of the Body, the World and other things produce their effects only when controlled by an Intelligent Being, this is what we assert, on the ground that they are endowed with Colour, etc., like suchngs as the yarn and the like’. |
udyotakāras tu pramāṇayati bhuvanahetavaḥ pradhānaparamāṇvadṛṣṭāḥ svakāryopattāvatiśayabuddhimantamadhiṣṭhātāram apekṣante sthitvā pravṛttes tantuturyādivad iti / | Uddyotakara however has formulated the argument as follows: “The Causes of the Work, in the shape of ‘Primordial Matter’, ‘Atoms’ and ‘Destiny’ (Unseen Force) need a Controller with Superior Intelligence, in the producing of their Effects, because their activity is intermittent, like the Yarn, the Shuttle and such other causes (of the Cloth)”.[1] |
etadeva darśayati dharmādharmāṇava ityādi / | This is the argument set forth in the following Text. |
dharmādharmāṇavassarve cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitāḥ / | [see verse 50 above] The meaning of this is quite clear. |
svakāryārambhakāḥ sthitvā pravṛttesturitantuvat // | These words are not found in Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārtika. This idea is there (under Sūtra 4. 21, p. 463, lines 11 et seq. |
subodhaṃ // | Bib. |
[p.43] | Ind. Edn.); |
praśastamatistvāha sargādau puruṣāṇāṃ vyavahāro 'nyopadeśapūrvakaḥ uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvāt / aprasiddhavāgvyavahārāṇāṃ kumārāṇāṃ gavādiṣu pratyarthaniyato vāgvyavahāro yathā mātrādyopadeśapūrvaka iti / | Praśastamati argues as follows: “All the usages of men, at the beginning of creation must have been preceded by (dependent upon) the teaching of other persons, because later on, the usage of enlightened men is found to be restricted to particular things, as for instance, in the case of little boys who have not yet learnt the use of words, it is found that their usage of words as restricted to particular things is always preceded (and brought about) by the teaching of their mother or other persons; |
prabuddhānāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvād iti / prabuddhānāṃ satāṃ pratyarthaniyatatvād ity arthaḥ / | the phrase ‘the usages of enlightened men are restricted to particular things’ means that the usage of men after enlightenment is found to be so restricted; |
yadupadeśapūrvakaḥ sargādau vyavahāraḥ sa īśvaraḥ pralayakālepyaluptajñānātiśaya iti siddhaṃ darśayati sargādāvityādi / | that Person to whose teaching usages at the beginning of Creation are due is God, whose superior knowledge does not disappear even at the time of Universal Dissolution”. It is this view that is shown as fully established, by the Author in the following Text: [see verse 51 above] |
śeṣaṃ tu tubodhaṃ // | There are other arguments also put forward by Uddyotakara; |
tathā aparaṇūdyotakāroktāni pramāṇāni buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitaṃ mahābhutādikaṃ vyaktaṃ sukhaduḥkhanimittaṃ bhavati / acetanatvāt kāryatvād vināśitvād rūpādimattvāt vāśyādivad iti / | these are the following: “The Manifested World, consisting of the Primary Elemental Substances and the rest, are productive of Pleasure and Pain, only when controlled by an intelligent Cause, (a) because it is, by itself, insentient, (b) because it is a Product, (c) because it is perishable, and (d) because it is endowed with Colour (or Form) and other qualities, like the Axe and other things”.[1] |
etāni darśayati mahābhūtādikam ityādi / | These are the arguments that are set forth in the following two Texts: |
mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktaṃ buddhimaddhetvadhiṣṭhitaṃ / yāti sarvasya lokasya sukhaduḥkhanimittatāṃ // acetanatvakāryatvavināśitādihetutaḥ / | “The manifested world, consisting of the primary elemental substances and the rest, becomes the source of pleasure and pain to all people, only when controlled by an intelligent cause, because it is insentient, itself a product, evanescent and so forth, like the axe and other things; |
vāsyādivadataspaṣṭaṃ tasya sarvaṃ pratīyate // | thus everything is clearly believed to be his.” (52-53) |
{buddhimaddhetvadhiṣṭhitam ---} cetanāvatādhiṣṭitam / | Controlled by an Intelligent Cause, i.e. controlled by a Cause which is endowed with sentience. |
ata iti / yathoktāddhetukadambakāt / | Thus i.e. for the said series of reasons; |
īśvarasya sarvajagaddhetoḥ //52- | ‘His’, i.e. of God, the Cause of the entire world. |
atha sarvajñatvaṃ kathaṃ tasya siddhaṃ yenāsau niḥśreyasābhyudayakāmānāṃ bhaktiviṣayatāṃ yāyādityāha sarvakartṛtvasiddhau cetyādi / sarvakartṛtvasiddhau ca sarvajñatvamayatnataḥ / | “The fact of his being the creator of all things having been established, his omniscience is proved without effort; because the creator must be one who knows the form and all other details regarding what he has created.” (54) Question In what way is God’s omniscience proved, by virtue of which He should become an object of devotion for people seeking for Prosperity and the Highest Good? |
siddham asya yataḥ kartā kāryarūpādivedakaḥ // | The answer to tins is supplied by the following Text [see verse 54 above] |
tathācāhuḥ praśastamatiprabhṛtayaḥ sakalabhuvanahetutvād evāsya sarvajñatvaṃ siddhaṃ / | This has been thus explained by Prashastamati and others: “The omniscience of God is proved by the fact of His being the Cause (Creator) of the entire World; |
kartuḥ kāryopādānopakaraṇaprayojanasampradānaparijñānāt / | because the Creator must possess full knowledge of all such details regarding what he creates as its material and contributory causes, its use, its receiver and so forth. |
iha hi yo yasya kartā bhavati sa tasyopādānād iti jānīte / | In the world, when a man makes anything, he knows its material cause, etc.; |
yathā kulālaḥ kumbhādīnāṃ kartā tadupādānaṃ mṛtpiṇḍamupakaraṇāni ca cakrādīni prayojanamudakāharaṇādi kuṭumbinaṃ ca sampradānaṃ jānīta ityetat prasiddham tatheśvaraḥ sakalabhuvanānāṃ kartā sa tadupādānāni paramāṇvādilakṣaṇāni tadupakaraṇāni dharmādharmadikkālādīni vyavahāropakaraṇāni sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyalakṣaṇāni prayojanamupabhogaṃ sampradānasaṃjñākāṃś ca puruṣān jānīta iti / | e.g. it is well known that the Potter who makes the Jar and such things, knows its material cause, in the shape of Clay-lump, its contributory causes, in the shape of the Wheel, etc., its purpose, in the shape of Fetching Water and the like, and its receiver, in the shape of the Householder (who uses it); similarly God, who creates all the worlds, knows their material causes, in the shape of the Atom, etc., their contributory causes, in the shape of Merit, Demerit, Space, Time and so-forth, also the auxiliaries to their operation, in the shape of the Universal the Particular and Inherence, their purpose, in the shape of the Experience (of Men), and receivers in the shape of Men. |
[p.44] ataḥ siddhamasya sarvajñatvam iti / | This shows that He is omniscient. |
kāryarūpādivedaka iti / kāryasya ye rūpādayaḥ svabhāvādayaḥ ādiśabdenopādānādīnāṃ grahaṇam teṣāṃ vedaka iti samāsaḥ / | One who knows the form and other details regarding what he has created; ‘Form and other details’, ‘Form’ stands for character: ‘other details’ stands for the Material Cause and the rest; the ‘Vedaka’ of these is one who knows. Such is the sense of the compound. |
yājakāderākṛtigaṇatvāt karmaṇyaṇaṃ vā vidhāya svārthikaṃ ko vidheyaḥ / | The word ‘vedaka’ is to be grammatically explained either as included under the group of words beginning with ‘yājaka’, or as formed with the affix ‘aṇa’ in the passive sense with the reflexive ‘ka’ added to it. |
śeṣaṃ subodham // | The rest is easily intelligible. |
tathā aparaṃ pramāṇakadambakaṃ tairuktaṃ / | There is yet another series of arguments set forth by these persons: |
vicitrodayapraspandāspadānāspadaṃ vimatyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ dvitīyādipramāṇapañcakavyatiriktapramāṇāntarāvacchedyaṃ / vastutvādibhyo rūpādivat / | (A) “That which is the substratum of the variegated and the mobile, and that which is not the substratum of these which is the thing under dispute, is cognised through a means of cognition other than the five beginning with the second, just as Colour, etc. are cognised as distinguished from the character of ‘being an entity’ and so forth, the ‘Hair of the Tortoise’ (a non-entity) being the corroborative instance per dissimilarity”. |
vaidharmyeṇa kūrmaromādaya iti / | the term ‘prasyanda’ stands for the category of Mobility; |
tatra vicitrodayo guṇapadārtha ucyate vicitra uadayo 'syeti kṛtvā prasyandaḥ karmapadārthaḥ tayorāspadaṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ dravyam anāspadaṃ guṇādayaḥ pañca samavāyaparyantāḥ dvitīyādipramāṇapañcakamanumānamārabhyābhāvaparyantaṃ tadvyatiriktaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ pratyakṣaṃ śeṣaṃ subodham / | the ‘āspada’, substratum, of these two is the category of Substance; that which is not the substratum of these two (Quality and Mobility) stands for the five categories of Quality, Action, Universal, Particular and Inherence; such a thing is cognised through a Means of Cognition other than the five beginning loith the second, i.e. other than Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension; i.e. through Sense-per caption. |
ayam aparo hetus tairuktaḥ / | The rest is easily intelligible. |
sadādyaviśeṣāskanditānāskanditaṃ vimatyādhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṃ kasyacit pratyakṣaṃ sattvād rūpādivad iti / | (B) The other argument propounded by them is in the following form: “The Thing under dispute, which is (1) what is embraced by the Particulars of such Universals as ‘Being’ and the like, and also (2) what is not so embraced, is perceptible to some one, because they exist, like Colour and the rest”. |
tatra sadādayaḥ ṣaḍaviśeṣāḥ sadanityaṃ dravyavat kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣavad iti dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ viśeṣāḥ tairāskanditamākrāntaṃ yathāsambhavaṃ dravyaguṇakarmātmakaṃ padārthatrayamanāskanditaṃ sāmānyād iti / | In this statement, the term ‘Being and the like’ stands for the six non-specific (general) entities, ‘Being’, ‘Evanescent’, ‘Material Product’, ‘Cause’, ‘Universal’, ‘Particular’; the ‘particulars’ of these go to specify Substance, Quality and Action; hence what is ‘embraced’ by these particulars are these three categories of Substance Quality and Action; ‘what is not so embraced’ consists of the Universal and the rest. |
śeṣaṃ sugamam / | The rest is easily intelligible. |
vimaterāspadaṃ vastu pratyakṣaṃ kasyacit sphuṭam / | [And the Person who has the perception of all thesengs is God.] |
tadatrāsiddhatetyādinottarapakṣamārabhate / | This series of arguments is set forth in the following Text: [see verse 55 above] |
tadatrāsiddhatā hetoḥ prathame sādhane yataḥ / | The first argument (propounded by the naiyāyika) is open to the fallacy of being ‘unproven, inadmissible’; |
sanniveśo na yogākhyaḥ siddho nāvayavī tathā // | because the existence of any such ‘arrangement’ as ‘conjunction’ is not proven, nor that of the ‘composite (56) |
tatra yadacetanaṃ tadadhiṣṭhātāramantareṇa na svakāryamārabhata ityādau prayoge sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatayā hetor anaikāntikateti bhāvaḥ / | In the arguments set forth (under Text 47) in the form ‘What is insentient cannot produce its effect without a controller’, the Probans (‘because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts’) is one which, without any valid objection, could be cited as proving the contrary of the Probandum (for proving which it has been put forward); and thus its presence in the contrary of the Probandum being suspected, it becomes ‘inconclusive’; |
yaccāyaṃ svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvāditihetuḥ prathame sādhanaprayoge so 'siddhaḥ katham ity āha yata ityādi / | Then again, the Probans that has been put forward in the first argument ‘Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts’, is ‘unproven’ and Inadmissible also. How this is so is explained in the next sentence Because, etc.; |
avayavasaṃniveśaśabdena hi saṃyogaviśeṣo 'bhipretaḥ tadviśiṣṭatvaṃ cāvayavyākhyasya dravyasya tayor api viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor asiddhatvād dvidha hetvasiddhiḥ // | what is meant by the expression ‘arrangement of component parts’ is a particular kind of Conjunction; and the character of being characterised by this Conjunction is attributed to the substance called ‘Composite’; now both these, the said Conjunction and also the Composite that it characterises, are yet ‘unproven’, ‘unknown’ (to at least one of party to the Discussion, the Buddhist, who denies:both); |
kathaṃ punar dvayamasiddhatvam ity āha dṛśyatvenetyādi / | hence the Probans cited is doubly ‘unproven Inadmissible (56) Question “In what way are the two unproven?” |
[p.45] | The Answer is supplied by the following Text: [see verse 57 next] |
dṛśyatvenābhyupetasya dvayasyānupalambhanāt / | Because both the facts that have been assumed (and put forward) are such as are not actually apprehended; |
tatra saṃkṣepeṇa svabhāvānupalambhākhyam eva pramāṇaṃ bādhakamāha / | and for the same reason the corroborative instance also that has been cited has no connection with the probans cited. |
vistareṇa ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣāyām anayor dūṣaṇamabhidhāsyate dvayasyāpīti / saṃniveśāvayavisaṃmatasya / | In brief, the Author for the present states his reason only in the form of ‘Non-apprehension’, which annuls the Naiyāyika’s argument, a detailed objection to these two arguments will be provided under the Chapters (10-15) dealing with the Six Categories. |
tathā hi saṃniveśo dṛśyatvenābhyupetaḥ saṃkhyāparimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpasamavāyāccākṣuṣāṇi iti vacanāt / avayavī ca dṛśyatveneṣṭaḥ mahatyanekadravyavattvādrūpāccopalabdhir iti vacanāt / na rūpādivyatirekeṇāparaḥ saṃyogo 'vayavī ca dṛśyatveneṣṭo buddhau pratibhāsata iti / ata upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ śaśaviṣāṇavad asadvyavahāraviṣayatā / na ca paramāṇūnām atīndriyatvād rūpādīnām anupalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ viśiṣṭānām indriyatvābhyupagamād atīndriyatvāsiddheḥ / | Both the facts, i.e. that have been put forward as the ‘Arrangement’ and the ‘Composite’, [Both of these are not apprehended] because the ‘Arrangement’ has been regarded as something visible, in such statements (by the Naiyāyika) as ‘Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Higher Universal, the Lower Universal and Action are visible, as inhering in coloured substances’, The ‘Composite’ also has been regarded as visible, in the statement ‘There is perception of it because it is large, is made up of several component substances and is coloured As a matter of fact however, apart from Colour, etc., no other ‘Conjunction’ or ‘Composite’ such as is accepted by the Naiyāyika, ever appears in Consciousness, Thus, while fulfilling the conditions of ‘perceptibility’, if it is not perceived, it must be regarded as non-existent, like the ‘Hare’s Horns’, It will not be right to argue that “inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the Senses, [if there were no suchng as the Composite composed of the Atoms], the perception of Colour and other qualities would be impossible”; |
ata eva saṃyogāvayavinorabhāvāt sādharmyadṛṣṭānto ghaṭaḥ sādhanadharmavikala iti darśayati sādhanānanvitam ityādi // evaṃ tāvad viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyāsiddhyā svarūpato 'siddhatvaṃ hetoḥ pratipāditam idānīm āśrayaikadeśāsiddhyāpyasiddhatvam iti darśayati cakṣur ityādi / | because it is admitted that qualified Atoms are apprehensible by the Senses, and hence they are not ‘beyond the reach of the Senses Thus then, both ‘Conjunction’ and ‘Composite’ being non-existent, the Jar that has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity is found to be devoid of that character which has been set up as the Probans; this is what is meant by the Text in the words ‘has no connection with the Probans, etc,’ (57) |
cakṣuḥsparśanavijñānaṃ bhinnābhamupajāyate / | Visual cognition and tactile cognition always appear differently; |
ekālambanatā nāsti tayor ganchādivittivat // | they cannot therefore have one and the same substratum, just like the cognition of odour and other things. |
atra hi dvividho dharmī nirdiṣṭo dvīndriyagrāhyamagrāhyaṃ ca / | In the argument (put forward by the Naiyāyika, under verse 48, above) two kinds of things have been mentioned as the ‘Subject’ ‘what is perceptible by two Sense-organs’ and ‘what is imperceptible’. |
tatra dvīndriyagrāho na kaścid dharmī siddhaḥ / | Now as a matter of fact, there is no object that is known (accepted by all parties) to be ‘perceptible by two Sense-organs’; |
tathā hi cakṣurjñānaṃ sparśajñānaṃ cobhayaṃ yathākramaṃ nīlādirūpamātrapratibhāsitvāt karkaśādispraṣṭavyabhedamātraprasiddhatvāc ca bhinnamupajāyate / | for instance, both Visual Cognition and Tactile Cognition, are known to appear in different forms, respectively as manifesting the Blue and other Colours and as manifesting Hardness, Softness, etc. of the things touched; |
tataś ca tayoścakṣuḥsparśanavijñānayor ekaviṣayatā nāsti bhinnābhatvād gandharasādivittivat / | thus both these cognitions cannot have the same objective, because they appear as different, like the Cognitions of Odour, Taste and other things. |
prayogo 'yam bhinnapratibhāse jñāne te naikaviṣaye yathā gandharasavijñāne bhinnābhe ca cakṣuḥsparśanavijñāne iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | The argument may be formulated thus: Any two cognitions appearing in different forms cannot have the same objective, like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste, the Visual and Tactile Cognitions do appear in different forms; |
ābhāsabhedepyekaviṣayatve rūpaśabdādivittīnām apyekaviṣayatvaprasaṅgaḥ ityetad atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ // yadi tarhi naikaviṣayatānayostatkathamidaṃ pratisandhānajñānaṃ bhavati / | hence the attributing of both to a single object would be a direct contravention of the said universal proposition. If, even when appearing in different forms, Cognitions were to have the same objective, then the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and such diverse things also might be regarded as having the same objective; |
[p.46] | this is the reason that annuls the argument of the Naiyāyika. |
tat sāmarthasamudbhūtakalpanānugatātmakaṃ / pratisandhānavijñānaṃ samudāyaṃ vyavasyati // | As a matter of fact, what brings about the joint cognition (involved in recognition) is the fact that recognition consists in an assumption arising out of the potencies of the two cognitions concerned. |
jalānalādi naivedaṃ dvīndriyagrāhyamastyataḥ / | thus, such things as water, fire and the like are not ‘perceptible by two sense-organs ’; |
āśrayāsiddhatāsiddher yathābhihitadharmiṇaḥ // | and hence the probans (of the naiyāyika) is found to have its substratum ‘unproven, inadmissible’, as is indicated by the ‘ un-proven ’ character of the object itself. |
tayoḥ varṇaspraṣṭavyamātrapratibhāsinoścakṣuḥsparśanavijñānayoḥ sāmarthyam śaktiḥ tataḥ samudbhūtaḥ kalpanānugata ātmāsyeti vigrahaḥ / | The Inference has been formulated by Uddyotakara in the following form ‘The two Cognitions under dispute, the Visual Cognition and the Tactile Cognition, have the same object, because it is recalled (recognised), like the Cognition of the Blue Lotus’.”[2] |
tadanena pratisandhānapratyayasyāpratyakṣatvaṃ pratipāditaṃ bhavati / | out of that capacity arises the assumption, which constitutes forms the essence of the ‘Recognition’ (in question). |
anekasminnekatvādhyavasāyitvenāsya bhrāntitvāt kalpanānugatātmatvāc ca / | firstly, because it is an essentially wrong cognition, apprehending as one what is really not one, and secondly, because its very essence lies in an assumption. |
nāpi pramāṇāntaram pūrvajñānaparicchinnaviṣayāvasāyitvena gṛhītaprahaṇāt bhrāntatvāc ca / | Nor is there any other Means of Cognition (available for bringing about a valid notion of Recognition); firstly, because it apprehends what has been already covered by previous Cognitions, and as such it apprehends what has been already apprehended (and as such, is not of the nature of a Direct Valid Cognition); |
tasmātpratisaṃdhīyamānatvādityanaikāntiko hetuḥ / yadi hi pratisandhānapratyayasya prāmāṇyaṃ siddhaṃ bhavet tadā na syāddhetor anaikāntikatā yāvatā yeṣu rūpādiṣu sādhāraṇaḥ sāmarthyaprakāśanāya ghaṭādiprajñaptayaḥ kutās teṣu yathāstvaṃ cakṣuḥsparśanābhyām anubhūteṣūttarakālaṃ yathāparidṛṣṭaviṣayamanurūpasaṅketāhitasaṃskārabhedamekatvādhyavasāyi prakṛtibhrāntaṃ smārttamidaṃ jñānam utpadyate / | From all this it follows that the Reason put forward (by the Naiyāyika) “Because there is Recognition” is ‘inconclusive’, If the validity of Recognition had been established and admitted, then the Reason would not be open to the charge of being ‘inconclusive’; because in cases where notions of such things as the Jar and the like have appeared, taking in, in accordance with the capacity ofngs, a common idea of its Colour and other details, if the Colour and the Touch have been duly apprehended, each by itself, by the organs of Vision and of Touch, then, at some future time, if the impressions of the things perceived present themselves accompanied by signs indicative of those things, there appears the notion of ‘unity’, ‘sameness’, which is essentially wrong, and is of the nature of ‘Remembrance’ (not Direct Cognition). |
tathā hi tathā samanvāhāre tatra varṇo 'pi nīlādiḥ pratibhāsate / | It is for this reason that in this joint notion, the Colour Blue, also presents itself; |
na ca sparśanavijñāne varṇapratibhāsanaṃ yuktaṃ tasya cakṣurvijñānaviṣayatvāt / | though it is not right that the notion, of Colour should appear in the notion of Touch; as Colour is perceptible by the Organ of Vision (not of Touch). |
tasmād yad etad ācāryair uktam cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ yathāsvaṃ bhinnaṃ viṣayamupalabhyānyadeva tat sahacaraṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ smārttabhedajñānam utpadyata <PSV on PS I 23'b> iti tad eva nyāyyyaṃ / | For these reasons, the only reasonable view is what the Teachers have stated in the following words: ‘After one has perceived by the Visual and Tactile Organs, each in its own way, there appears, subsequently, a notion, joining the two perceptions and apprehending the two objects conjointly as one unit; and this notion is of the nature of Remembrance’, |
nanu yadi samudāyaḥ prāgānubhūtaḥ syāt tadā smārttamidam yuktam yāvatā na rūpādivyatiriktaḥ samudāyo bhavatām abhīṣṭo yenāsāv anubhūyeta rūpādiṣu cānubhūteṣu rūpādiriti syāt na ghaṭa iti na cānanubhūte smṛtir yuktā tat katham idaṃ samudāyaviṣayaṃ smārttaṃ jñānam utpadyate / | but, you (Buddhists) do not admit of any joint entity, apart from the individual things, Colour and the rest, which could have been thus previously perceived; and if Colour and the rest were only individually perceived, then the Remembrance could only be one of ‘Colour’ only, or of ‘Touch’ only and so forth, and not of the ‘Jar’; and in regard to things that have not been previously cognised, there can be no Remembrance; then how could any Remembrance arise in regard to the joint entity (as asserted by your Teachers)?” |
naitad asti / | This is not right, we reply. |
na hi rūpādibhyo 'nyaḥ samudāyaḥ prāganubhūta ity ucyate yenaitat syāt kiṃ tu ta eva rūpādayaḥ salilādidhāraṇārthakriyākāriṇaḥ samudāyo ghaṭa iti vyapadiśyante / teṣu ca pratyekamindriyajñānānubhūteṣu yathāsaṅketāhitamidaṃ ghaṭa iti smaraṇamutpadyata ityabhidhīyate / | It is not asserted that the joint entity that is previously perceived is something distinct from Colour and the rest; your objection would hold only if the assertion of our Teachers meant this; what is meant however is that those same Colour and the rest, when serving the fruitful purpose of holding water and the like, come to be collectively called the ‘Jar’; and what happens is that after each of those Colour and the rest, has been perceived by means of each of their pertinent sense-organs, there appears, at some future time, the Remembrance of these under the appellation of ‘Jar’, which bears the impressions of the said perceptions. |
athavā kalpitaḥ samudāyaḥ kalpanājñānātmakatvāt svasaṃvidānubhūyata eveti kimiti tasya smaraṇaṃ notpadyata iti / | Or the ‘Joint Entity’ may be regarded as ‘conceptual’, and being of the nature of a ‘conceptual entity’, as apprehended by its own cognition; under the circumstances, why cannot Remembrance of such a Joint Entity be possible? |
ataḥ svārambhakāvayavasaṃniveśaviśiṣṭatvād ityasya hetor āśrayāsiddhatā kasmād ity āha asiddher yathābhihitadharmiṇi iti / | From all this it is clear that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika), “Because of the peculiar arrangements of its component parts”, has its substratum ‘unproven’, “Why so?” The Answer is By the ‘unproven’ character of the object itself; |
yathābhihitasya dvīndriyagrāhyadharmiṇo 'siddheḥ kāraṇādāśrayaikadeśāsiddhyā hetor asiddhiḥ //59- [p.47] | that is, the object as stated by the Naiyāyika in the form ‘perceptible by two sense-organs’ is not proven, unknown; |
tadevaṃ viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇāśrayāṇām asiddhestrividhā hetor asiddhatoktā caturthamapyācāryanirdiṣṭam asiddhaprakāramāha sanniveśetyādi / | and thus the Reason having its substratum ‘unproven’, becomes itself open to the fallacy of being ‘unproven’, ‘unknown, Inadmissible (59-60) This discussion is a clear reference to Nyāya-Sūtra 3.1.1 ‘Darśanasparśanābhyāmekārthagrahaṇāt’. This is a reference to Nyāya Vārtika, 3.1.1, page 350, Bib. |
sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvaṃ yādṛgdevakulādiṣu / kartaryanupalbdhe 'pi yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatiḥ // | In the case of temples and such things, the presence of a peculiar arrangement (of component parts) is distinctly perceived, from which perception follows the cognition (inferential) of an intelligent builder, even when no such builder is actually seen; |
tādṛgeva yadīkṣyeta tanvagādiṣu dharmiṣu / yuktaṃ tatsādhanādasmād yathābhīṣṭasya sādhanaṃ // | if, in the case of such objects as the body, the mountain and the like, a similar peculiar arrangement of parts were distinctly perceived, then it would be correct to deduce from this perception as the reason, the conclusion that is desired (by the Naiyāyika). |
yo hi saṃniveśaviśeṣo buddhimatpuruṣavyāpārapūrvakatvena devakulādiṣvanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ loke prasiddho yasya darśanādadṛṣṭatatkartṛkasyāpi buddhimatkāraṇāvagatir bhavati tathābhūto yadi tanutarugiriprabhṛtiṣu sādhyadharmiṣu hetutvenopādīyate tadā syād bhavatāmabhimatasādhyasiddhiḥ / | That ‘peculiar arrangement of parts’ which is known, through affirmative and negative concomitance, as produced by the operations of an intelligent builder, in the case of such things as the Temple and the like; on the perception of such a peculiar arrangement of parts, the notion is deduced that the Temple has had an intelligent builder, even though no such Builder is actually seen at the time; if a similar ‘arrangement of parts’ were put forward in connection with such ‘subjects’ as the Body, the Mountain and so forth, then your desired conclusion might have been proved. |
nahyanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ suvivecitaṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ vyabhicarati tasyāhetukatvaprasaṃgāt / | Because when the affirmative and negative concomitance between a Cause and an Effect has been duly discussed, that Effect can never fail to be produced by that Cause; |
na ca tathābhūtasanniveśaviśeṣastarugiriprabhṛtiṣu prasiddhaḥ kevalaṃ saṃniveśa iti pralāpamātraṃ prasiddham / na ca prakṛtyā parasparam arthāntaratvena vyavasthito 'pi dharmaḥ śabdamātreṇābhedī hetutvenopādīyamāno 'bhimatasādhyasiddhaye paryāpto bhavati / | for if it did, it would cease to be the Cause, As a matter of fact however, no such ‘peculiar arrangement of parts’ is so well known as regards the Tree, the Mountain and such things; all that is known is only the bare babbling that ‘there is an arrangement A certain character which, by its very nature, stands as something distinct, does not cease to be so distinct by mere assertion; and if brought forward as a Reason or ‘Probans’, such a character cannot he sufficient to prove the desired conclusion; |
sādhyaviparyaye 'pi tasya bhāvāvirodhāt / | as the presence of such a character would not be incompatible even with the contrary of that conclusion. |
yathā valmīke dharmiṇi kumbhakārakṛtatvasiddhaye mṛdvikāramātraṃ hetutvenopādīyamānam iti samudāyārthaḥ / | As for example, when the character of ‘being a product of Olay’ is brought forward as a Reason for proving that the Anthill has been ‘built by the Potter Such is the meaning of the Text taken as a whole. |
yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatiriti / yasya sanniveśasya dṛṣṭau satyāṃ buddhimataḥ kāraṇasya gatiranumitir bhavatītyarthaḥ / | The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained: From which perception follows the cognition of an intelligent builder, i.e. from the perception of which ‘peculiar arrangement’ there would follow the inference of an intelligent cause. |
tanvagādiṣviti / | ‘Tanu’ is Body; |
tanuḥ śarīram agāḥ parvatā vṛkṣā vā ādiśabdena sāgarādayo gṛhyante / | ‘Aga’ is mountain, or Tree; the phrase ‘and the like’ includes such things as the Ocean and so forth. |
yathābhīṣṭasyeti / buddhimat pūrvakatvasya / | The conclusion that is desired, i.e. the fact of being the work of an intelligent maker. |
sādhanam iti siddhiḥ //61- | ‘Sādhana’ is proof. |
kathaṃ yuktamityāha anvayetyādi / | Question “In what way would it be correct” (to draw the desired conclusion)? |
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ yatkāryaṃ yasya niścitaṃ / niścayas tasya taddṛṣṭāviti nyāyo vyavasthitaḥ // | When a certain thing is definitely recognised, through affirmative and negative concomitance, as the effect of a certain cause, then, the perception of that effect must prove that cause; such is the standing law. |
sanniveśaviśeṣas tu naivāmīṣu tathāvidhaḥ / na tu tarvādibhedeṣu śabda eva tu kevalaḥ // | the ‘peculiar arrangement of parts’ in such diverse things as the body, the mountain and the like however is not an effect of this kind; there is a mere assertion to that effect. |
tādṛśaḥ procyamānastu sandigdhavyatirekatām / āsādayati valmīke kumbhakārakṛtādiṣu // | such a reason, when put forward, renders the conclusion open to doubt and denial, as it does when put forward for proving that ‘the anthill is the work of the potter (63-65) |
yatkāryam iti dhūmādi. | The Effect, e.g. smoke; |
niścayas tasyety analāder eva. | definitely recognised, in regard to Fire, etc.; |
[p.48] taddṛṣṭāv iti dhūmādikāryadṛṣṭau satyām. | the perception of that effect when the effect in the shape of Smoke is seen. |
yady evam ihāpi tathaiva bhaviṣyatītyāha sanniveśaviśeṣas tv ityādi. | “If that is so, then the same may be the case with the matter under dispute also.” |
yas tarhi śabdasāmānyataḥ siddhaḥ sanniveśaḥ, sa eva hetur bhaviṣyatīti ced, āha tādṛśa ityādi. | The answer is The peculiar arrangement however, etc. “If the peculiar arrangement is proved by the general assertion, then, it can very well be put forward as the Reason.” Answer Such a reason, etc. |
tādṛśaḥ śabdamātreṇābhedī. | Such i.e. based on mere assertion. |
kumbhakārakṛtāviveti. | Work of the Potter, etc.; |