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pralaye luptavijñānasmṛtayaḥ puruṣā na naḥ / | According to us, at dissolution, persons do not continue to remain with all consciousness and memory completely lost; |
ābhāsvarādisambhūtes tata eveha sambhavāt // | because they are born in effulgent regions, and from these latter they are born again in this world. |
uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānāmityetadviśeṣaṇamasiddham tathā hi nāsmanmatena pralayakāle praluptajñānasmṛtayo vitanukaraṇāḥ puruṣāḥ santiṣṭhante kintvābhāsvarādiṣu spaṣṭajñānātiśayayogiṣu devanikāyeṣūtpadyante ye tu pratiniyatanirayādivipākasaṃvartanīyakarmāṇas te lokadhātvantareṣūtpadyanta iti vivarttakāle 'pi tata evābhāsvaradeścyutvehāluptajñānasmṛtaya eva sambhavanti / | Because under our theory, it is not true that at Dissolution, there remain Persons with all consciousness and memory lost and with all organs enfeebled; what happens is that they are born in Luminous Regions, in celestial bodies, endowed with superior forms of clear consciousness; those however who have still got to expiate their Karmic residue through the fruition of particularly sinful and other deeds become born in other material regions; so that even at the time of the future evolution of the world (following after Dissolution), those same persons fall down from the Luminous and other regions and become born in this world, without losing all consciousness and memory. |
tasmād uttarakālaṃ prabuddhānām iti viśeṣaṇamasiddham / | Hence any such qualification as ‘when they become subsequently awakened to consciousness’ is absurd. |
anekāntikaś ca hetuḥ sandigdhavipakṣāvyāvṛttikatvāt / | Further, the Reason put forward is also ‘inconclusive’, because its absence from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful. |
kiñcānyopadeśapūrvakatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyam anāder vyāvahārasya sarveṣām evānyopadeśapūrvakatvasyeṣṭatvāt / | And if all that is meant to be proved is the fact of ‘being preceded by the teaching of other persons’, then the argument is ‘Futile’, as all parties are agreed that in the matter of usage, which is beginningless, dependence on mutual teaching is inevitable. |
atheśvaralakṣaṇapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvaṃ sādhyate tadānaikāntikatvam / anyathāpi vyavahārasambhavāddṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā / | If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being ‘preceded by the teaching of the particular person called God’, then the Reason put forward is ‘Inconclusive’, because as a matter of fact, it is actually possible in other ways also (without such teaching). |
etac ca pūrvam eva sāmānyaṃ dūṣaṇamuktam // | This has already been urged before as a general defect (in the Theist’s argument). |
vimukhasyopadeṣṭṛtvaṃ śraddhāgamyaṃ paraṃ yadi / | Then again, the ‘teachership’ of a mouthless person can only be a matter of blind faith; |
vaimukhyaṃ vitanutvena dharmādharmavivekataḥ // yadīśvaropadeśapūrvakatvaṃ vyavahārasya sambhavet tadā syād aviruddhatā hetoḥ yāvatāsau vimatamukhatvād upadeṣṭā na yuktaḥ / | god’s ‘mouthlessness’ is proved by his having no body, on account of the absence in him of merit and demerit. The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason put forward is also ‘Contradictory’ and the Conclusion is contrary to the Theist’s own doctrines: [see verse 85 above] If it were possible for usage to be preceded by (due to) God’s teaching, then the Reason might not be ‘Contradictory’; |
tac ca nimukhatvaṃ vitanutvena śarīravirahādity arthaḥ / | and the fact of His having no mouth is proved by His having no body, i.e. because He is devoid of a body. |
tac ca vimutatanutvamasya kathaṃ siddham ity āha dharmādharmavivekata iti / | Question “But how do you know that He has no body?” Answer On account of the absence in Him of Merit and Demerit; |
śarīrakāraṇadharmādharmavirahād ity arthaḥ / | that is, in God there is no Merit and Demerit, which are the causes of Souls having bodies. |
tathācodyotakāreṇoktaṃ / yathā buddhisattāyāmīśvarasya pramāṇasambhavo naivaṃ dharmādisattve pramāṇamasti iti tasmād īśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvāsambhavāt tadupadeśakatvaṃ vyavahārasya na sidhyati kiṃ tvīśvaravyatiriktānyapuruṣopadeśapūrvakatvamata iṣṭavighātakāritvād viruddho hetuḥ / | This has been thus declared by Uddyotakara: ‘Proof is available for the presence of Intelligence in God, but there is no proof for the presence of such qualities as Merit and the rest’.[1] Thus the ‘teachership’ of God being impossible, usage cannot be attributed to His teaching; what is indicated is only the fact of its being due to the teaching of some persons other than God; and thus by discarding what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes ‘Contradictory’. Even if God’s ‘teachership’ is admitted, the doctrine that He is ‘mouthless’ becomes abandoned; |
atheśvarasyopadeṣṭṛtvamaṅgīkriyate tadā vimukhatvamabhyupetaṃ hīyata ityabhyupetabādhā / | and in this way the conclusion becomes contrary to the Theist’s own doctrine. As regards the argument ‘The manifest consisting of the Primary Elements and the rest being controlled by an Intelligent Controller, etc. etc.” (put forward by Uddyotakara, in Nyāyavārtika, p. |
mahābhūtādikaṃ vyaktam ityādau tu prayoge hetūnāṃ pūrvavadanekāntikatvaṃvipakṣe bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt sāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalateti yojanīyam // | 463, and quoted in the Text 52), it can be shown that the Reasons cited there also, as before, are (a) ‘inconclusive’, as there is no proof against a contrary conclusion, (b) ‘futile’, if the reason is meant to be stated generally, and (c) if it is meant to be particular, then the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum. This is an exact quotation from the Nyāyavārtika, p. 12 et. |
[p.54] | seq., Bib. |
evaṃ vistareṇeśvarasādhakāni pramāṇāni nirākṛtya sāmprataṃ vyāptidoṣodbhāvanamukhena tadbādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ svapakṣasiddhyarthamupadarśayitumāha anumānavirodhetyādi / | Ind. Ed., with this slight difference that for ‘Sattve’ in the present context, Nyāyavārtika has ‘Sambhave’. |
anumānavirodhaś ca vyāpteḥ sarvatra sādhane / | In all the arguments, the invariable concomitance (premiss) is contrary to inference; |
na viruddhena dharmeṇa vyāptir hetoḥ prakalpate // | and there can be no invariable concomitance of the probans on the basis of a contrary (false) character. |
sarvatra yathokte sādhane sādhyena vā hetor vyāptis tasyā anumānavirodho vakṣyamāṇaḥ / | In every one of the arguments put forward (by the Theist), the Invariable Concomitance that has been cited as between the Probans and the Probandum, is contrary to Inference, as is going to be explained later on. |
atha pratijñāyāḥ kasmād anumānavirodho nodbhāvyate / | Question “Why is not this contrariness to Inference urged against the conclusion (of the Theist)?” |
yadi pratijñā sādhanāṅgaṃ syāt tadā taddoṣodbhāvanaṃ syāt yāvatā sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vāsau na sādhyasiddher aṅgabhāvaṃ pratipadyate tataś ca sādhanadoṣābhidhāne prastute yatpratijñādodbhāvanaṃ tadadoṣodbhāvanaṃ vādino nigrahasthānaṃ syāt tasmān na sādhanaprayogeṣu pratijñādoṣo vācyaḥ /yatra tu kvacit pratijñāvirodha udbhāvyate tatra tanmukhena vyāptereva tadvighaṭanaṃ kriyata iti grahītavyam / | Answer It would be so urged if the conclusion formed part of the Proof (Reasoning). As a matter of fact however, the Conclusion does not, either directly or indirectly, form part of the proving of the Probandum; hence when what is going to be done is the urging of objections against the proof of the Probandum, if the party urged the defects in the Conclusion, he would become subject to the Clincher of ‘Urging what is not a defect’, It is for this reason that in connection with the statement of proofs, the defects of the Conclusion should not be urged. If in some cases, a defect in the Conclusion is actually urged, there also it should be taken as having been urged only for the purpose of demolishing the Invariable Concomitance. |
yadvā sādhanaprayogādanyatra taddraṣṭavyam / | Or such instances may be regarded as possible only in cases where the Conclusion:alone has been asserted (without any reasoning in support of it). |
atha vyāptikāle 'pi katham anumānavirodho bhavatītyāha na viruddhenetyādi / | Question “Even at the time that the Invariable Concomitance is put forward, how can there be contrariness to Inference?” Answer There can be no invariable concomitance, etc. |
viruddheneti / | ‘Contrary character’ is that which is opposed to all Means of Valid Cognition, false; |
pramāṇavyāhatena tasyāsambhavād eva na yuktā vyāptiḥ na hyasatā vyāptiravakalpyata iti yāvatā // | as such a character would be impossible (non est), an invariable concomitance with it would be impossible; certainly there can be no invariable concomitance with what does not exist. |
neśvaro janmitāṃ heturutpattivikalatvataḥ / gaganāmbhojavatsarvamanyathā yugapad bhavet // | God cannot be the cause of born things, because he is hlmsele devoid of birth, like the ‘sky-lotus’, otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously. |
yadutpattvikalaṃ na tatkasyacit kāraṇam yathā gaganāmbhojam utpattivikalaśceśvara iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ / | That which is itself devoid of birth cannot be the cause of anything; as the ‘Sky-lotus’, God is devoid of birth; hence the proposition that He is the cause would be contrary’ to the Universal Premiss. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedam tenāśrayāsiddhatā na codanīyā / | hence it is not open to the objection that the substratum of its Reason (Probans) is ‘unproven’. |
sarvam anyathā yugapad bhaved iti / | Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously; |
apratibaddhasāmarthyakāraṇatvād ekakālābhimatakāryagrāmavatsarvaṃ yugapadbhaved ity arthaḥ / | what is meant is that, if the Cause were one whose efficiency is never obstructed, then all things would come into existence simultaneously, exactly like things which are admitted to be produced at one and the same time. |
etadatrabādhakaṃ pramāṇam athavārthakathanamātrametat / evaṃ tu prasaṅgasādhanaṃ kartavyam / yadavikalakāraṇaṃ tadbhavatyeva / | Or this may be taken merely as stating the sense of what has been said before. The absurdity (involved in the Theist’s position) is to be shown in this manner: When the Cause is present, in its complete form, then the Effect must appear as a matter of course; |
yathāntyāvasthāprāptāyāṃ sāmagryāmavikalakāraṇo bhavannaṅkuraḥ / | just as it is found in the case of the Sprout which appears as soon as the final stage has been reached by the causal conditions conducive to it; |
avikalakāraṇaṃ ca sarvamīśvarahetukaṃ jagaditi yugapadbhavet / | now under the doctrine of the Theist, as God, the cause of all things, would always be there and free from defects, all things, the whole world, should come into existence at once. |
syād etat neśvara eva kevalaṃ kāraṇam api tu dharmādisahakārikāraṇāntaramapekṣya keroti nimittakāraṇatvādīśvarasya tena dharmādeḥ kāraṇāntarasya vaikalyādavikalakāraṇatvam asiddham iti / | The following argument might be urged: “God is not the only Cause (of all things); in fact what He does He does through the help of such auxiliary causes as Merit and the rest, God Himself being only the Efficient (Controlling) Cause. So that so long as Merit and the rest are not there, the ‘Cause’ of things cannot be said to be present there in its efficient form.” |
tadetad asamyak / | This is not right; |
yadi hi tasya sahakāribhiḥ kaścid upakāribhiḥ kaścid upakāraḥ kartavyo bhavet tadā tasya sahakāriṇi vyapekṣā yāvatā nityatvāt parairanādheyātiśayasya na kiñcit tasya sahakāribhyaḥ prāptavyam astīti kimiti tāṃstathābhūtananupakāriṇaḥ sahakāriṇo 'pekṣeta / | if there is help that has got to be rendered to God by the Auxiliary Causes, then alone could He be regarded as dependent upon their aid; as a matter of fact however, God is eternal and as nothing can introduce into Him any efficiency that is not there already, there can be no help that He should receive from the Auxiliary Causes; |
[p.55] kiṃ ca ye 'pi te sahakāriṇaste 'pi sarva eveśvarasyāyattajanmatayā nityaṃ samavahatā eveti katham asiddhatā hetoḥ / | why then, should He need such auxiliaries as are of no use to Him? Further, even these Auxiliary Causes, all of them should have their birth subject to God and as such, they should be always near Him. |
n cānaikāntikatā avikalakāraṇatvahāniprasaṅgāt avikalakāraṇasyāpyanutpattau sarvadaivānutpattiprasaṅgo 'viśeṣāt / | for if that were so (doubtful), then there would be no ‘Perfect (defectless) Cause’ at all (of things). If then, the Perfect Cause itself never came into existence, then there would be no birth (production) of anything, as the ‘absence of Perfect Cause’ would always be there. |
udyotakaratvāha yadyapi nityamīśvarākhyaṃ kāraṇam avikalaṃ bhāvānāṃ saṃnihitaṃ / tathāpi na yugapad utpattirīśvarasya buddhipūrvakāritvāt / | Uddyotakara has argued as follows[1] “Though the Cause of Things named ‘God’ is eternal and perfect and always present, yet the producing of things is not simultaneous, because God always acts intelligently and purposely; |
yadīśvarasattāmātreṇaivābuddhipūrvaṃ bhāvānām utpādakaḥ syāt tadā syād etaccodyam / | if God had produced things by His mere presence, without intelligence (or purpose), then the objection urged would have applied to our doctrine. |
yadā tu buddhipūrvakaṃ karoti tadā na doṣaḥ tasya sveddhayā kāryeṣu pravṛtteḥ / | As a matter of fact however, God acts intelligently; hence the objection is not applicable; specially as God operates towards Products solely by His own wish. |
ato 'naikāntikataiva hetor iti / | Thus our Reason is not Inconclusive |
tadetad ayuktam / | This is not right. |
na hi kāryāṇāṃ kāraṇasyecchābhāvābhāvāpekṣayā pravṛttinivṛttī bhavataḥ yenāpratibaddhasāmarthye 'pīśvarākhye kāraṇe sadā sannihite tadīyecchābhāvān na pravartanta iti syāt / | The activity and inactivity of things are not dependent upon the wish of the Cause y only if it were so that the appearance of all Effects would not be possible, even in the constant presence of the untrammelled Cause in the shape of God, simply on account of His wish being absent. |
kāraṇagatasāmarthyabhāvābhāvānuvidhāyino bhāvāḥ / | The fact of the matter is that the appearance and non-appearance of things are dependent upon the presence and absence of due efficiency in the Cause. |
tathā hi icchāvato 'pi kartur asamarthān notpadyante samarthāc ca bījāderanicchāvato 'pi samutpadyante / | For instance, even though a man may have the wish, things do not appear, if he has not the efficiency or power to produce them; and when the Cause in the form of Seeds has the efficiency or faculty to produce the Sprout, the Sprout does appear, even though the Seed has no wish at all. |
tatra yadīśvarākhyaṃ kāraṇaṃ kāryotpādakālavad apratihataśakti sadaivāvasthitam bhāvās tatkimiti tadīyāmanupakāriṇīṃ tāmicchāmapekṣante yenotpādakālavadyugapatta utpadyeran / | If then the Cause called ‘God’ is always there fully endowed with the due -untrammelled efficiency, as He is at the time of the producing of a particularng, then why should Things stand in need of His wish, which can serve no purpose at all? And the result of this should be that all things should appear simultaneously, at the same time as the appearance of any one thing. |
evaṃ hi tairavikalakāraṇatvam ātmano darśitaṃ bhavet yadi yugapad bhaveyuḥ / | Thus alone could the untrammelled causal efficiency of God be shown, if things were produced simultaneously. |
na cāpīśvarasya parai anupakāryasya kācid apekṣāsti yenecchāmapekṣeta / | Nor can God, who cannot be helped by otherngs, stand in need of anything, for which He would need His wish. |
api ca buddhivyatirekeṇa nānyecchāsti buddhiśceśvarasya bhavadbhir nityaikarūpābhīṣṭā tataś ca buddhipūrvakāritve 'pīśvarasya kimiti bhāvānāṃ yugad utpādo na bhavati / īśvaravattadbuddher api sadā sannihitatvāt / | Further, in the absence of Intelligence, there can be no desire for anything else, and the Intelligence of God you hold to be eternally uniform; so that, even if God acted intelligently, why should not there be a simultaneous production of things? Because like God Himself, His Intelligence also is always there. |
athāpyanityā tasya buddhiraṅgīkriyate tathāpīśvarasattāmātrabhāvitvāttasyā īśvaravat sadābhāva eveti sa eva doṣaḥ / | If then, His Intelligence be regarded as evanescent, even so, it must co-exist with God, and its presence must be as constant as God Himself; so that the objection on that score remains in force. |
tasmād buddhimatvād iti viśeṣaṇamakiñcitkarameveti nānaikāntikatā hetoḥ / | Thus the addition of the qualification, in the form ‘because of God’s Intelligence’, turns out to be futile; |
na cāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt na caivaṃ bhavati tasmād viparyayaḥ / | and our Reason is not ‘Inconclusive Nor is the Reason ‘Contradictory’, because the Probans is present in all cases of the Probandum. |
prayogaḥ yadyadā na bhavati na tat tadānīm avikalakāraṇam yathā kuśūlasthitabījāvasthāyām anutpadyamāno 'ṅkuraḥ / | The argument may be formulated as follows: ‘When a certain thing is not found to be produced at a certain time, it must be taken to be one whose Cause at that time is not untrammelled in its efficiency, as is found in the case of the Sprout not appearing while the Seed is still in the granary; |
na bhavati caikapadārthotpādakāle sarvaṃ viśvam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / na ca siddhasadhyatā īśvarasya kāraṇatve sati vikalakāraṇatvānupapatteḥ prasādhitatvāt // aparam api pramāṇam āha ye vā krameṇetyādi / | it is found that at the time of the appearance of one thing, the whole World is not produced, hence what has been stated (by the Opponent) as a universal proposition is not found to be true. This argument cannot be regarded as ‘futile’, because it has been shown that if God were the Cause of things, then it would be impossible to regard the Cause of things to be trammelled in any way. |
ye vā krameṇa jāyante te naiveśvarahetukāḥ / | These are not the exact words of the Nyāyavārtika; |
yathoktasādhanodbhūtā jaḍānāṃ pratyayā iva // | it is a paraphrase of what has been there said under Sutra 4.1.21, p. |
[p.56] | seq., Bib. |
teṣām api tadudbhūtau viphalā sādhanābhidhā / | if those (notions) also are produced by cod, then the adducing of proofs (in support of them) should be useless; |
nityatvād acikitsyasya naiva sā sahakāriṇī // | because of (his) eternality; and as he would be beyond remedy, the said statement could render no help. |
yathoktebhyaḥ svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvādibhyaḥ sādhanebhya udbhūtā iṣṭasādhyadharmiviṣayā jaḍānāmīśvarakāraṇābhiniveśināṃ pratyayāḥ niścayā ivetyarthaḥ / | The following Text sets forth another argument (against Theism): [see verse 88-89 above] The ‘notions’ i.e. the definite conclusions derived from such reasonings as ‘because characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts’ and the rest, relating to the object sought to be proved, appearing in the minds of those foolish persons who are keen on proving Cod as the Cause of the World. |
nanu yathoktadoṣaduṣṭatvānnaitebhya iṣṭe sādhye pratyayāḥ samutpadyanta iti na dṛṣṭāntadharmisiddhiḥ / | and hence no conclusive notions could be derived from them, regarding what is desired to be proved; and under the circumstances, there could be no Corroborative Instance in support of the reasoning here set forth (by you).” |
satyametat / | That is true; |
ata eva jaḍānām ityuktam / | that is why the Text has used the term ‘foolish persons’; |
jaḍānāṃ hi sādhanāvivekākṣamatayā sādhanābhāsebhyo 'pi teṣāṃ pratyayāḥsamutpadyanta eva / nanvevam api sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ teṣām api jaḍapratyayānām īśvarasya nimittakāraṇatveneṣṭatvādityata āha teṣām apītyādi / | foolish people are not capable of discriminating the validity of Proofs, and hence they derive their notions from invalid premisses also, “Even so, the Corroborative Instance would remain devoid of the Probandum; because ‘the notions of foolish persons’ also are accepted by us as having God for their efficient Cause.” Answer If these notions also, etc. |
teṣām api jaḍapratyayānām tadudbhūtāv iti / | if these also are held to be produced by Cod, then the adducing of proofs should be useless; |
īśvarādudbhūtāviṣyamāṇāyām viphalā sādhanābhidhā sādhanābhidhānaṃ vyarthaṃ syāt / | the putting forward of reasons would be entirely useless; |
īśvarādeva teṣām utpatter iti bhāvaḥ / | i.e. because they would all be produced from Cod Himself. |
nanu sādhanābhidhāṃ sahakāriṇīmapekṣya teṣām īśvaro janako bhaviṣyati na kevalas tenāsau viphalā na bhaviṣyatītyata āha nityatvād ityādi / | “Cod would be the producer of the said notions, through the help of the statement of proofs, and not by Himself alone; so that the said statement would not be useless.” Answer Became of His eternality; |
yadyasau sādhanābhidhā tasyeśvarasyāsamarthaṃ svabhāvamapanīya samarthamādadhīta tadā syāt sā tasya sahakāriṇī yāvatā nityatvādīśvaro 'nutpādyānivartyasvabhāvatayā na kenacitkiñcitsanīyata iti na sādhanābhidhā tasyāsau sahakāriṇī yuktā //88- | if the statement of proofs served to remove God’s inefficient character and render it efficient, then it could be helpful to Him; but inasmuch as God is eternal and hence His character cannot be liable to removal or production, He could not be helped by anything; so that the statement of the proof cannot be of any use to Him. |
api ca yathā paridṛṣṭasāmarthyasādhanādikāraṇavyatirekeṇāparidṛṣṭasāmarthyasyāpīśvarasya kāraṇabhāve kalpyamāne 'tiprasaṅgo bhavatāṃ prāpnoti yatas tamapīśvaraṃ parikalpyāparamapi ḍeṭkaṣakādikaṃ{---} kalpanīyam eva viśeṣābhāvād iti darśayann āha yeṣv ityādi / | When you have seen that a certain thing exists only when certain other things exist, and never when these do not exist, then, if you assume a cause for the former, other than these latter, how can you avoid falling into an infinite regress? (90) Further, even in the absence of Causes with perceptible efficiency, you postulate the causal character of God, whose efficiency is never perceived; |
ye tu satsu bhavaddṛṣṭamasatsu na kadācana / tasyānyahetutāklṛptāvanavasthā kathaṃ na te // | because even after having assumed such a God, you might as well assume even such (absurd) things as the Ḍheṭkaṣaka and the like (?), as there would be no difference between such things and God. |
bhavaddṛṣṭaṃ yadityupaskāraḥ / | A ‘yat’ has to be added after ‘bhavaddṛṣṭam’, ‘seen by you’. |
anyahetutāklṛptāviti / | If you assume a Cause other than these; |
yathā paridṛṣṭasāmarthyebhyo hetubhyo 'nyo hetustadbhāvo 'nyahetutā tasyāḥ klṛptiḥ kalpaneti vigrahaḥ // | i.e. a Cause other than those whose efficiency has been perceived (by the positive and negative concomitance spoken of). By the refutation of god’s creatorship, his omniscience also is understood to be set aside by the same; |
yaduktaṃ sarvakartṛtvasiddhau cetyādi tatrāha kartṛtvetyādi / kartṛtvapratiṣedhāc ca sarvajñatvaṃ nirākṛtaṃ / boddhavyaṃ tadbalenaiva sarvajñatvopapādanāt // | as it is on the strength of ‘creatorship’ that the argument for ‘omniscience’ has been based. It has been argued (in Text 54) that “the fact of His being the creator of all things having been established, His omniscience is proved without effort The answer to this is provided by the following Text: [see verse 91 above] |
sarvakartṛtvabalenāsau sarvajño bhavadbhir iṣyate tena tannirākaraṇāt sarvajñatvam api tasyāyatnato nirākṛtam eva // | You regard God to be omniscient only on the strength of His being the Creator of all things; hence by the refutation of His Creator ship, His omniscience also becomes set aside ‘without effort (91) |
yathoktadoṣaduṣṭāni mābhūvan sādhanāni vā / | Your reasonings may not be beset with the defects urged above; |
tathāpi karturnaikatvaṃ vyabhicāropadarśanāt // | and yet the creator cannot be one, because the falsity of such a proposition has been shown above; |
ekakartur asiddhau ca sarvajñatvaṃ kimāśrayam / | and when the oneness of the creator is not proved, wherein could ‘omniscience’ subsist? (92-93a) |
yathoktā doṣā anumānavirodhaparyantāḥ. | The defects urged above ending with ‘being contrary to Inference’ (Text 86). |
ayam atra samudāyārthaḥ yady api tanugiriprabhṛtīnām ebhyaḥ sādhanebhyo buddhimān kartā siddhyati, tathāpy asau ya evaikasya hetuḥ, sa evānyasyāpīti na niścita eveti prati kāryaṃ bhinnasyāpi kartuḥ sambhāvyamānatvāt saudhāheścaikasyāpi bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇādato naikaḥ kartā pratipādayituṃ śakyate yāvaccaikaḥ kartā na siddhas tāvat kutaḥ sarvajñatvasiddhir iti / | The upshot of the whole is as follows: Though it may be true that the reasonings put forward succeed in establishing an Intelligent Creator of such things as the Body, Mountains and so forth, yet it is by no means certain that the Creator of one particular thing is the same as that of another thing; because it is quite possible that each effect may have its own separate Cause (Creator); in fact, in the case of such things as the House and the like, it is found that they are made by many persons; hence it is not possible to establish that there is only one Creator for all things. And under the circumstances, how can ‘omniscience’ be regarded as proved? |
atra praśastamatir ekakartṛtvasiddhaye pramāṇayati ekādhiṣṭhānā brahmādayaḥ piśācāntāḥ parasparātiśayavṛttitvāt iha yeṣāṃ parasparātiśayavṛttitvaṃ teṣām ekāyattatā dṛṣṭā yatheha loke gṛhyagrāmanagaradeśādhipatīnām ekasmin sārvabhaume narapatau tathā ca bhujagarakṣoyakṣaprabhṛtīnāṃ parasparātiśayavṛttitvam tena manyāmahe teṣām apyekasminnīśvare pāratantryam iti / | Praśastamati has put forward the following argument for proving a single Creator: All beings, from Brahmā down to the Piśāca must have over them a single All-Superior Being, because among themselves there are found to be of varying grades of superiority; in the ordinary world it is found that where there are several persons of varying grades of superiority, they are always under the sway of one Superior Being; e.g. the controllers of the House, the village, the city and the province are all under one Sovereign Emperor of the entire world; and all such beings as serpents, Rākṣasas, Yakṣas and such other beings are possessed of varying grades of superiority among themselves; from these facts we are led to think that all these also are under one Controller in the shape of God |
tatra yadyeta īśvarākhyenādhiṣṭhitā ityayam arthaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭas tadānaikāntikatā / | If what is meant to be proved is that all these Beings are ‘controlled’ by God, then the Reason put forward is ‘Inconclusive’; |
viparyaye bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt / | as there is no valid reason for precluding the contrary conclusion; |
pratibandhāsiddheḥ / | specially as no Invariable Concomitance is admitted. |
dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalatā / | The Corroborative Instance also is found to be devoid of the Probandum. |
athādhiṣṭhāyakamātreṇa sādhiṣṭhāneti sādhyate tadā siddhasādhyatā yata iṣyata evāsmābhir bhagavatā sambuddhena sakalalokacūḍāmaṇinā sarvam eva jagatkāruṇyavaśādadhiṣṭhitaṃ / | If from the mere fact of there being a Controller, it is meant to prove that the Control is actually there, then the argument is futile; as we also accept the fact that the ‘Enlightened One’ (Buddha), who was the crest-jewel of the entire universe, did actually control the entire world, through His mercy; |
yatprabhāvādadyābyabhyudayaniḥśreyasasampadamāsādayanti sādhavaḥ / | by virtue of which all good men of the present day also attain prosperity and Ultimate Good. |
idaṃ cāparaṃ tenaiva sādhanam uktam / saptabhuvanānyekabuddhinirmitāni ekavastvantargatatvāt / ekāvasathāntargatāpavarakavat / | The same writer (Praśastamati) has adduced the following further argument: “All the Seven Worlds must have been created by the intelligence of a single Being, because they are all included under one ‘Entity’, just like the several rooms of a House; |
yathaikāvasathāntargatānām apavarakāṇāṃ sūtradhāraikabuddhinirmitattvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tathaikkasminneva bhuvate 'ntargatāni saptabhuvanāni / | we find that all the rooms of a House are built by the intelligence of a single architect; in the same way all the seven worlds are included under the one universe; |
tasmāt teṣām apyekabuddhinirmitatvaṃ niścīyate / | hence it is concluded that these must be the creation of the Intelligence of a single Creator; |
yadbuddhinirmitāni caitāni sa bhagavān maheśvaraḥ sakalabhuvanaikasūtradhāra iti / | and the one Being by whose intelligence all these have been created is the Blessed Lord, the one Architect of the whole universe |
tadatra hetur asiddhaḥ naikaṃ bhuvanamāvasathādi vāsti vyavahāralāghavārthaṃ bahuṣviyaṃ saṃjñā kṛtā / | The Probans of this reasoning is ‘unproven’ (not admitted); there is no such thing as a ‘single universe’ or a ‘single house’; such names have been given to certain things only for the purpose of simplifying business-transactions. |
ata eva dṛṣṭānte 'pi sādhanavikalaḥ / | For this same reason the Corroborative Instance that has been cited is devoid of the Probans. |
ekasaudhāntargatānām apavarakādīnām anekasūtradhāraghaṭitatvadarśanāccanaikāntiko hetuḥ / | Further, as a matter of fact, the several rooms in a house are actually found to be built by several architects (and masons); |
evam anyeṣvapi sādhaneṣu yathayogaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam // | hence the Probans is ‘inconclusive’ (Doubtful) also. Objections to other Theistic arguments also may be set forth in the aforesaid manner. |
yaccoktaṃ vimaterāspadaṃ vastvityādi / | It has been argued (under Text 55) that “The theory under dispute must be perceptible to someone, etc. etc.”. |