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mṛdvikāratvamātram iti śeṣaḥ. | the reason being ‘the fact of its being a product of Clay’, |
tad evaṃ sanniveśiviśeṣasyāsiddhiḥ. sanniveśamātrasya tv anaikāntikatvam iti pratipāditaṃ bhavati //63- | Thus then, the conclusion arrived at is that the ‘peculiar arrangement’ in question is ‘unproven’, and as for mere ‘arrangement’, that is ‘inconclusive (63-65) |
ad 66 | while what has been put forward (by us, the naiyāyika) is only the general character of ‘effects’.” (66) |
nanv ityādinā paro jātyuttaram udbhāvayati --- | In the following Text the Opponent urges that what the Buddhist has put forward is only a ‘Futile Rejoinder’: |
sāmānyam eva kāryādi sādhanaṃ pratipāditaṃ // kāryasādhanaṃ jātyuttaram etat / tathā hi kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabda ity ukte jātivādī codayati kim idaṃ ghaṭādigataṃ kṛtakatvaṃ hetutvanopādīyate, kiṃ vā śabdagatam athobhayagatam iti. ādye pakṣe hetor asiddhiḥ. | “What you have urged is only a ‘Futile Rejoinder’, that particular form of it which is put forward ‘per parity of the character of effect’, For instance, when it is argued that ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced’, the man putting forward the Futile Rejoinder says ‘The character of being produced that you put forward as the Reason, do you mean this character as; (1) subsisting in such things as the Jar? (2) Or as subsisting in Sound? Or (3) as subsisting in both (Jar and Sound)? The first alternative is not possible, as the subsistence of this Reason in the subject (of your syllogism, Sound) would be ‘unproven’; |
na hy anyadharmo 'nyatra vidyate. | in fact the character of one thing (the Jar) cannot subsist in another thing (Sound). |
dvitīye 'pi sādhanavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ. | The second alternative also cannot be accepted, as there would be no Corroborative Instance fulfilling the conditions of the Reason. |
tṛtīye 'py etāv eva doṣāv iti. | The third alternative also would be open to both these objections. |
etac ca kāryasamaṃ nāma jātyuttaram iti pratipāditam. | This has been explained to be an example of that Futile Rejoinder which is named ‘Per Parity of the character of the effect’; |
kāryatvānyatvaleśena yatsādhyāsiddhidarśanaṃ tatkāryasamamAA iti. | as stated in the following words: ‘When the Conclusion is shown to be not-proved on the basis of even the slightest deviation from the character of the Effect, it is Futile Rejoinder’. |
yataḥ kāryatvasāmānyam eva gṛhītvānityatvānumānam iṣyate, na viśeṣam. | “In the case under consideration the inference of non-eternality is sought to be proved on the basis of the generic character of the ‘Effect’, not on any particular aspect of it. |
tena sāmānyena sādhane 'bhīṣṭe dharmaviśeṣavikalpena yad uttaram, tat kāryasamaṃ jātyuttaram iti vyavasthitam. etac ca dharmebhedena vikalpanam ato jātyuttaram iti // | Hence if a Rejoinder is put forward on the basis of the assumption of a particular character (or aspect), when the Reason or Probans has been put forward by the other party on the basis of its general character, this is a Futile Rejoinder, named ‘per Parity of the character of Effect’, In short, this is based upon the assumption of a different character and hence is a Futile Rejoinder.” (66) |
ad 67 atadrūpetyādinā pariharati / | The above is answered by the following Text: [see verse 67 next] |
atadrūpaparāvṛttaṃ vastumātramanityatām / tādātmyātsādhayatyeṣa na nyāyo 'stīha sādhane // | [In the example of futile rejoinder cited] the mere thing (effect in general), as excluded from all that is not that thing (not-effect), does really prove non-eternality, on account of its being of the same essence as that. |
{=PVin zit. in PVA(Ono)} yuktam etat / | The argument put forward above (against which the example of Futile Rejoinder has been cited) is quite right and proper; |
yataḥ kṛtakatvamātram anityatāṃ sādhayati / | because the mere fact of being an effect (Product) in General does prove non-eternality (Evanescence); |
tasya tādātmyalakṣaṇapratibandhasadbhāvād iti / | because between these two there is that invariable concomitance which consists in being of the same essence. |
iha tu svārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśeiṣṭatvamātrasādhane nāyaṃ nyāyo 'sti / | In the case of the reasoning put forward (by the Naiyāyika) however, there is no such reason behind the Probans as put forward by the Naiyāyika viz. |
sanniveśasāmānyasya viparyaye bādhakābhāvāt pratibandhāsiddheḥ yasya tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ yadupalambhādakriyādarśino 'pi kṛtabuddhir bhavati tasyāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ // | “Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts”; specially as ‘arrangement of parts’ in general is a factor the contrary of which is not precluded by any incongruity; hence the requisite ‘invariable concomitance’ is not available. |
atha tadutpattyāpratibandhaviśeṣaṃ parityajya sāmānyam eva liṅgam ucyate tadā vyabhicāriteti darśayann āha dhūmetyādi / | In fact any such concomitance in the form of ‘being produced from it’ on the cognition of which the consequent conclusion could become accepted even when one does not actually perceive the actual operation of the Cause, is absolutely unknown, inadmissible. |
dhūmātmā dhavalo dṛṣṭaḥ pāvakāvyabhicāravān / | As a matter of fact, the smoke that has been seen to be invariably concomitant with fire is white; |
sitābhidheyatāmātrān na himādapi tadgatiḥ // | and yet the mention of mere ‘whiteness’ could not prove the existence of fire; |
ad 69 | [see verse 68 above] |
[p.49] kathaṃ tarhi kāryasamaṃ jātyuttaram udāhṛtam ity āha sāmānyetyādi / | “How is it then that the Futile Rejoinder is cited?” The answer is given in the following Text. |
sāmānyapratibandhe tu viśeṣāśrayaṇī yadā / codanā kriyate tatra jātyuttaram udāhṛtam // | When the invariable concomitance (premiss) is stated in the general form, and the objection urged against it is on the basis of a particular aspect of it, then this is said to be a futile rejoinder. |
sādhyena saha sāmānyena sādhanadharmasya vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇavṛttyā pratibandhe siddhe 'pi sati yatra dharmaviśeṣam āśritya codanā kriyate, taj jātyuttaram. na ceha sāmānyena pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ yasya tu sanniveśaviśeṣapratibandho 'sti so 'siddha iti na jātyuttaram etat // | In a case where the invariable concomitance of the Probandum with the Probans is definitely known to be in a general way, specially by means of the right cognition of its absence in the contrary of the ‘Subject’, and yet the objection that is urged against it is on the basis of a particular aspect or character (of the Probans), then such an objection constitutes a ‘Futile Rejoinder’, In. the ease of the reasoning (put forward by the Naiyāyika) however, the invariable concomitance cited is not known to be in the general form; |
ad 70 | hence this objection is not of the nature of a ‘Futile Rejoinder’, (69) |
athāpratibaddham api sāmānyaṃ gamakaṃ syāt tadātiprasaṅgaḥ syād iti darśayannāha gośabdetyādi / gośabdavācyatāmātrād digādīnāṃ viṣāṇitā / | The mere character of ‘being denoted by the term go’ (as a general character) might prove the ‘presence of horns’ in the quarters and other things (which are all denoted by the term ‘go’), ip the reasoning were not adopted in a different form. |
saṃsiddhyedanyathā hyeṣa nyāyo nāśrīyate yadi // | If a general character could bring about the cognition of a thing even without being invariably concomitant with it, then absurdity could result; |
evaṃ hi svargadigvacanalocanakiraṇakuliśabhūpayasām api gośabdābhidheyatāmātrād bāhuleyādivadviṣāṇavattānumānaprasaṅgaḥ // | As a matter of fact, Heaven, Quarters, Speech, Eyes, Bays, Thunderbolt, Earth and Water, all these things are ‘denoted by the term Go’; if, on the basis of this general character of ‘being denoted by the term Go’, it were sought to be proved that a particular Cow of variegated colour has horns, then on the basis of the same character, it would be possible to infer the presence of Horns in Heaven, etc. also. |
syād etat kṛtakatvādivadasyāpi sanniveśaviśeiṣṭa buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakatvameva pratibandho 'styevety āha yadi tv ityādi / yadi tu pratibandho 'smin pramāṇe nopapadyate / tadatra yuktitaḥ siddhe na vivādo 'sti kasyacit // | If it were proved by some valid means of cognition that there is an invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum (cited by the naiyāyika), then, the conclusion would be fully established by reasoning, and no one could have anything to say against it. The following might be urged (by the Naiyāyika): “As a matter of fact, there is invariable concomitance between the character of ‘having a peculiar arrangement of component parts’ and that of ‘being produced by an intelligent Cause’, just as there is between this latter and the character of ‘being a Product (Effect) |
kiṃ tu sa eva pratibandho na siddha iti darśayann āha kiṃ tv ityādi / | The answer to this is provided in the following Text: [see verse 71 above] But, as a matter of fact, no such Invariable Concomitance is proved; |
kin tu nityaikasarvajñanityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ / | But the existence of a being who is eternal, one, and the substratum of eternal all-embracing consciousness, can never be proved; |
sādhyavaikalyato 'vyāpter na siddhimupagacchati // | as the invariable concomitance (premiss) that may be cited would be devoid of the probandum. |
na hi bhavatāṃ buddhimatpūrvakatvamātraṃ sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ kiṃ tu nitya ekaḥ sarvajñāyā buddher nityāyā āśrayaḥ sakalabhuvacanahetur buddhimānīśvarābhidhāno yaḥ padārthaḥ tatpūrvakatvamasya sādhayitumiṣṭaṃ / | What you (Navyāyika) desire to prove is, not only that the World has been created by an Intelligent Maker, but that it is preceded (produced) by the intelligent Entity known as God, who is the Cause of the whole World, being himself one, eternal and the substratum of an eternal all-embracing Consciousness. |
tasyaiva vivādāspadībhūtatvāt sa ca tathābhūto na siddhimupagacchati / | In fact, it is this entity that forms the subject of dispute. The existence of such a Being cannot be proved; |
kasmāt / sādhyavaikalyato 'vyāpteḥ / | why? because the Invariable Concomitance (that might be put forward to prove Its existence) will be devoid of the Probandum (the character to be proved); |
ghaṭādeḥ sādharmyadṣṭāntasya yathoktasādharmyavaikalyāt tathābhūtena sādhyadharmeṇa hetor vyāptyasiddheḥ / | for the simple reason that any positive Corroborative Instance that might be cited in the form of the Jar and such things would be lacking in the element of similarity that is essential [the maker of the Jar not having all the character that is predicated of God], and this would make it impossible to prove the necessary Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; |
na hi yathoktasādhyadharmeṇa kvacid dṛṣṭānte hetoḥ pratibandho 'stīti yāvat // | as in no particular Instance (of any Product) is there any invariable concomitance between the Pro bans and the character of the Probandum as postulated (by the Naiyāyika). |
[p.50] tadeva darśayann āha tathāhītyādi / | With a view to showing the same, the following Text proceeds to add the following: [see verse 73 next] |
tathā hi saudhasopānagopurāṭṭālakādayaḥ / anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ // | For instance, all such products as houses, steps, gateways, towers and the like are definitely known to have been made by makers who have been many, and with fleeting ideas. |
kiṃ ca na kevalamasiddho 'naikāntikaśca hetuḥ api tu viruddho 'pīti darśayati ata evetyādi / | Further, the Probans is not only ‘Unproven’ and ‘Inconclusive’; it is also ‘Contradictory’; this is what is shown by the Author in the following Text: [see verse 74 next] |
ata evāyamiṣṭasya vighātakṛdapīcya{sha} te / | For the same reason, the probans is also detrimental to what is desired; |
anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvaprasādhanāt // | inasmuch as what it establishes is [a cause] that is many, and the substratum of fleeting ideas. |
ata eveti sādhyaviparītadharmavyāptitaḥ / | For the same reason, i.e. because the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss) is contrary to the Probandum (which is desired to be proved). |
na kevalaṃ pūrvoktena vidhināsiddho 'naikāntikaścetyapiśabdenāha // | What the term ‘also’ indicates is that the Probans is not only ‘unproven’ and ‘inconclusive’, as shown above [but it is also ‘Contradictory’ ]. |
nanu ca viparyaye pratibandhasadbhāve sati viruddhaḥ syāt / | [Says the Naiyāyika] “The Probans would be ‘Contradictory’ only if it were invariably concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum; |
asya ca buddhimatpūrvakamātre 'pi na pratibandho 'sti tatkathaṃ tadviśeṣe syād ity āha buddhimaddhetumātre hītyādi / buddhimaddhetumātre hi pratibandhastvayoditaḥ / | in the case in question however, there is (as you say) no invariable concomitance even with the mere character of ‘having an intelligent Cause’; how then could there be any such concomitance with any particular form of that character (which alone could be contrary to the desired conclusion)?” |
dvitīye punarasmābhir vispaṣṭamabhidhīyate // | The answer to this is provided in the following Text: [see verse 75 above] |
tvayeśvaravādinā buddhimaddhetumātre pratibandho varṇitaḥ / | You, Theist, in asserting the existence of God, have set forth an Invariable Concomitance in reference to the Probandum in the shape of ‘the character of having an Intelligent Cause’; |
anyathā sāmānyenāpi pratibandhāsiddhau kathamīśvarahetukatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ siddhyet / tasmād bhavadabhiprāyato buddhimatpūrvakatvamātrasya siddhasya siddhatvam abhyupetya bhavadabhimatāt sādhyaviśeṣāsyadetadvitīyamanityānekavijñānapūrvakatvalakṣaṇamiṣṭaviparītasādhyaṃ tasmin dvitīye sādhyaviśeṣe 'smābhir hetor vispaṣṭaṃ pratibandho 'bhidhīyate // | if that were not so, and if this general proposition (premiss) also were not admitted, then how could it have been possible to prove that all things have God for their Creator? Thus then, we admit (for the sake of Argument) the premiss from your view-point that ‘Things have an Intelligent Cause’, and then proceed to show clearly that your Probans is invariably concomitant with a particular Probandum which is ‘Second’ contrary to that particular Probandum which you desire to prove; this ‘Second’ Probandum being ‘the character of being preceded (produced) by a person of evanescent and many Cognitions (Ideas)’. |
katham asau vispaṣṭamabhidhīyata ity āha kramākrametyādi / | Question “How are you going to show this clearly?” The answer is provided in the following Text: [see verse 76 next] |
kramākramavirodhena nityā no kāryakāriṇaḥ / | For us, eternal things cannot produce any effects, because ‘consecutive’ and ‘concurrent’ action are mutually contradictory; |
viṣayāṇāṃ kramitvena tajjñāneṣvapi ca kramaḥ // | and if objects are consecutive, there must be the same consecutiveness in their cognitions also. |
na hīśvarādayo nityabhāvāḥ kāryakāriṇaḥ nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyāmarthakriyāvirodhāt / | Any such eternal things as God and the like cannot produce any effects; because in any productive activity of an Eternal Thing, there is incompatibility between ‘Consecutiveness’ and ‘Concurrence’; |
tasmād anityā evārthākriyākāriṇaḥ / | hence only non-eternal things can be productive causes; |
te ca pratikṣaṇamaparāparasvabhāvā bhavantīti siddhamanityatvamanekatvaṃ ca buddhimataḥ kartuḥ / | as it is these alone which go on unceasingly changing their sequential character of being present now and past at the next moment. |
yadapīśvarasya nityaikabuddhyupetatvaṃ pratijñātaṃ tadapyanumānaviruddham iti darśayann āha viṣayāṇām ityādi // kramabhāvītyādinā pramāṇayati / | As regards' the assertion (of the Naiyāyika) that “God is endowed with eternal and one Consciousness”, this is contrary to all reason; this is what is indicated by the words ‘If objects are consecutive, etc.’ [Objects being fleeting, evanescent, according to the Naiyāyika also, their cognitions also must be evanescent; |
kramabhāvīśvarajñānaṃ kramivijñeyasaṅgateḥ / | God’s cognition must be consecutive, because it is related to consecutive cognisable things; |
devadattādivijñānaṃ yathā jvālādigocaraṃ // | just like the cognition of devadatta and other persons, relating to flame and other things. |
[p.51] yatkramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tatkramabhāvi yathā devadattādivijñānaṃ jvālādigocaram kramivijñeyaviṣayaṃ ceśvarajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / | That Cognition of which the object is consecutive must itself be consecutive; just as we find in the case of the cognition of Devadatta and other men pertaining to such things as Flame and the like; and God’s Cognition has for its object only such things as are consecutive. |
prasaṅgasādhanaṃ cedam / | This is a Reason based upon the nature of things. |
tenāśrayāsiddhatā hetor nāśaṅkanīyā / | And as this reasoning is put forward only by way of exposing the incongruity involved (in the Theist’s position), [and not as a formal Inferential Argument], it will not be right to urge against it the fact of the Probans being ‘unproven’ (not admitted by both parties). |
sāmānyādipadārthaviṣayaṃ devadattādivijñānaṃ sādhanadharmavikalam iti jvālādigocaramudāgṛtam / | Inasmuch as the Cognition of Dëvadatta and others relating to such things as ‘Universal’ and the rest (which are held to be eternal) would be devoid of the main characteristic of the Probans (evanescence of the Object), the instance cited is that of things like the Flame (which all parties admit to be evanescent). |
kiṃ punar atra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam / | Question “What is the actual proof (argument) which annuls (the Theist’s reasonings)?” |
ucyate yadi kramavatā viṣayeṇa tadīśvarajñānaṃ svanirbhāsamupajanyeta tadā siddham eva kramitvam / | Answer If God’s Cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object which is consecutive, then it becomes proved that it must be consecutive; |
atha na janyate tadā pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvān na tajjānīyāt / | if it is not so produced, then, as there would be no proximate contact (with the Object and the Cognition), God could not cognise the Object at all. |
viṣayamantareṇāpi bhavataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vābhyupagataṃ hīyeta / naṣṭājāte ca viṣaye nirviṣayatvaprasaṅgaḥ syād iti / | And the result of this would be either that Cognitions would have to be held as valid even in the absence of their object, or you would have to renounce your doctrine (regarding the omniscience of God). There would be a further absurdity that, in regard to such objects as have been destroyed, or have not yet been produced, the Cognition (of God) would be objectless. |
idamatra bādhakaṃ pramāṇam // | This is the argument that annuls the Theist’s reasonings. |
aṇusaṃhatimātraṃ ca ghaṭādyasmābhiriṣyate / | The jar and other things are regarded by us as mere aggregates of atoms; |
tat kārakaḥ kulālādir aṇūnām eva kārakaḥ // | and the potter and other men who make those things are only makers of the atoms; |
na vyāvṛttas tato dharmaḥ sādhyatvenābhivāñchitaḥ / aṇūdāharaṇādasmādvaidharmyeṇa prakāśitāt // | hence the character that you mean to prove (i.e. your probandum) is not excluded (absent) erom the atom which has been cited (by you) as a corroborative instance per dissimilarity. |
avayavino vistareṇa pratiṣetsyamānatvāt pratiṣiddhatvāccetyataḥ kulālāder aṇūnām eva kārakatvaṃ prasiddham / | It has been asserted (by the Naiyāyika, under Text 48 above) that “Atoms supply the corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity [in support of the reasoning that ‘the World must have an Intelligent Cause, because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts’]”. |
ato buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ sādhyadharmo 'ṇubhyo vaidharmyeṇa prakāśitebhyo na vyāvṛtta ityavyāvṛttasādhyadharmatā doṣo vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntasya //78- | and thus the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity that has been cited (by the Theist, in support of his reasoning) is found to be open to the defect that the character of the Probandum is not absent from it [and hence it cannot serve as an instance per dissimilarity]. |
syād etat yadyasmābhir viśeṣaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ syāt tadā sādhyavikalatāsādharmyadṛṣṭāntasya pūrvoktā syāt yāvatā sāmānyena buddhimatpūrvakatvamātraṃ sādhyate tasmiṃś ca siddhe tadrvādīnāṃ sāmarthyādīśvaraḥ kartā siddhyati na hi ghaṭādivatteṣāṃ kulālādiḥ kartā sambhavati tena sāmānyasya viśeṣaviśiṣṭatvāt tarvādiṣu cānyasya karturasambhāvyamānatvāt sāmarthyād viśeṣaparigrahamantareṇāpīśvara eva kartāmīṣāṃ sidhyatītyāha buddhimatpūrvakatvetyādi / | The following might be urged: “If what we had desired to prove were the particular phase of any character, then the Corroborative Instance per Similarity cited by us (in the form of the Jar) might have been open to the defect of being devoid of the character sought to be proved (Probandum); as it is however, what we are seeking to prove is only the general character of ‘being produced by an Intelligent Cause’; and when that General thesis has been proved, then, by implication, God becomes proved as the Cause (Maker) of the Tree and other things. Potter, etc. cannot be the maker of these things, as they are of the Jar and such other things; |
buddhimatpūrvakatvaṃ ca sāmānyena yadīṣyate / | because the General character is further specified by a particular characteristic. |
tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṃ hi karmajam // | For instance, in the case of such things as the Tree and the like, it is not possible that there should be any other Maker; |
evaṃ hi siddhasādhyatādoṣaḥ / | The answer to this is supplied in the following Text: [see verse 80 above] |
kasmād ity āha vaiśvarūpyaṃ hītyādi vaiśvarūpyam satvabhājanalokasya vaicitryam karmajam iti / | “How so?” Because all diversity, i.e. the diverse character of the world that exists, is due to Actions, i.e. brought about by common and uncommon,, good and bad, deeds. |
ataḥ śubhāśubhakarmakāriṇaḥ puruṣā buddhimanto 'sya kāraṇatām āpadyanta iti siddhasādhyatā // | Hence men performing the good and bad actions, who are all intelligent beings, become the cause of all this. And (in this form we also accept the general proposition that ‘Things are produced by Intelligent Causes’); |
[p.52] | so your argument becomes ‘futile’, (80) |
viśeṣeṇa tarhi sādhyata iti cedāha nityetyādi / nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā / | If what you seek to prove is the fact that the world is created by a cause who is one and whose consciousness is eternal, then there is absence of the probandum (in the instance); |
vyabhicārāś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karaṇekṣaṇāt // | and it is ‘inconclusive’ also, since such things as the house and the like are found to be made by several makers. |
etac ca pūrvam uktam api nigamanārthaṃ punar abhihitam / | Though this has been already explained under Text 73 above, yet it is asserted again with a view to clinching the argument. |
ekā buddhirasyetyekabuddhiḥ nityaścāsāvekabuddhiśceti vigrahaḥ / yadvā nityaikā buddhir asyeti samāsaḥ / sādhyaśūnyateti / | The compound ‘Nityaikabuddhipūrvatvam’ may be taken to mean either ‘produced by one who is eternal and has a single Consciousness’, or ‘produced by one whose Consciousness is eternal and one’, Absence of the Probandum; |
sādharmyadṛṣṭānta syeti śeṣaḥ / vyabhicāraśceti / hetor ityadhyāhāraḥ / | i.e. in what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity; also ‘inconclusiveness’, i.e. of the Probans (this has to be supplied). |
kathamityāha saudhetyādi // | “How?” The answer is Since such things as the Home, etc. etc. |
yac coktaṃ tarvadīnām ityādi tatrāha etad evetyādi / etadeva yathāyogyamavaśiṣṭeṣu hetuṣu / yojyaṃ dūṣaṇamanyac ca kiñcinmātraṃ prakāśyate // | Against the other reasonings (of the theist) also, this same criticism may be urged mutatis mutandis; some other criticism also is now being briefly set forth. It has been asserted (by the Theist, above, under Text 49) that “The material Cause of the Tree and other things is controlled by an Intelligent Being, etc. etc.” |
tatrāpi hi rūpādimattvādityādisādhaneṣvetad eva hi yathāsambhavaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vācyam / | As against the reason ‘Because they have colour, etc.’, this same criticism may be urged: This same, as follows: (a) It is Unproven; |
asiddhatvaṃ pratibandhābhāvād vyabhicāraḥ sati pratibandhe viruddhatvaṃ sādhyavaikalyam sāmānyena siddhasādhyatetyādi / | (b) as there is no Invariable Concomitance, it is Inconclusive; (c) if there is Invariable Concomitance, it is Contradictory; (d) the Instance is devoid of the Probandum; (e) if the Conclusion is meant to be genera’, it is futile, and so forth. |
tathā hi tatrāpi yādṛśaṃ rūpādimattvaṃ cetanāvad adhiṣṭhitaṃ tādṛśaṃ tarvādiṣu na siddham rūpādimattvamātrasya pratibandhāsiddher vyabhicāraḥ pratibandhābhyupagame sati iṣṭaviparītasādhanād viruddhatvam sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatā nityaikacetanādhiṣṭhitatvena sādhyadharmeṇānvayāsiddheḥsāmānyena siddhasādhyatā viśeṣeṇa vyabhicāro ghaṭādiṣvanyathādarśanād iti / | For instance, that presence of Colour, etc. which is controlled by an Intelligent Controller is not admitted as being present in the Tree, etc.; mere ‘presence of Colour’ by itself is not invariably concomitant (with the Probandum); hence the Probans is Inconclusive; if there is invariable concomitance, then, it becomes contradictory, as proving a conclusion contrary to the one desired; the Corroborative Instance per similarity is devoid of the Probandum, as no concomitance is admitted with the character of ‘being controlled by an eternal and one Intelligent Being’; |
evam anyeṣvapi hetuṣu yojyam // | In this same manner, the criticism may be applied to the other reasonings also. |
sthitvā pravṛttiraṇvāder na siddhā kṣaṇabhaṅgataḥ / | ‘Intermittent action’ of atoms and other causes is not proven (admitted); |
vyabhicāraś ca tenaiva tasyāpi kramavṛttitā // | it is also ‘inconclusive’ in reference to that same (god), as hls activity also is consecutive (hence intermittent). |
sarvabhāvānāmudayasamanantarāpavargitayā kṣaṇamātram api na sthitir astīti kutaḥ sthitvā pravṛttir bhaviṣyati tasmāt prativādyasiddho hetuḥ / | As a matter of fact, all things (according to us) disappear immediately on appearance, and they do not remain in existence even for a: single moment; how then can the action of these be ‘intermittent’? This Reason therefore is one that is ‘unproven, inadmissible’, for your Opponent. |
anaikāntikaśca tenaiveśvareṇa yata īśvaraḥ kramavat su kāryeṣu sthitvā pravartate / | It is also ‘inconclusive’, in reference to the same God; as God also operates only intermittently over things which appear consecutively; |
atha ca nāsua cetanāvadadhiṣṭhito 'navasthāprasaṅgāt / | and yet He is not controlled by an Intelligent Being; for if He were, then there would be no need to posit such Intelligent Controllers. |
athācetanatve satīti saviśeṣaṇo hetuḥ kriyate yathā praśastamatinā kṛtaḥ tathāpi saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatayānaikāntikatvamanivāryam eva / | If the Reason be meant to be qualified by the qualifying phrase ‘being insentient’, as has been actually done by Praśastamati, even so the ‘inconclusiveness’ remains unavoidable; as the exclusion of the contrary of the Probandum remains doubtful. |
yadeva hi viśeṣaṇaṃ vipakṣāddhetuṃ nivartayati tadeva nyayyam yatpunarvipakṣe sandehaṃ na vyāvartayati tadupāttamapyasatkalpameva / | That Reason alone can be regarded as logical which serves to exclude the Probans from the contrary of the Probandum; that however which does not entirely set aside all doubt of the presence of the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum, even if put forward, is as good as not there (i.e. ineffective). |
pūrvoktaścāsiddhatādidoṣaḥ saviśeṣaṇatve 'pi tadavastha eva // | Further, even with the said qualification, the Reason remains open to the aforesaid defects of being ‘unproven’ and the rest. |