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villages and from dawn to dusk recorded the statements of
peasants, interrogating them to make sure that they were giving
correct information.
Meanwhile, the Government appointed a Commission of
Inquiry to go into the whole issue, and nominated Gandhiji as
one of its members. Armed with evidence collected from 8,000
peasants, he had little difficulty in convincing the Commission | <s>[INST]villages and from dawn to dusk recorded the statements of
peasants, interrogating them to make sure that they were giving
correct information.
Meanwhile, the Government appointed a Commission of
Inquiry to go into the whole issue, and nominated Gandhiji as
one of its members. Armed with evidence collected from 8,000
peasants, he had little difficulty in convincing the Commission[/INST] |
162 | India’s Struggle For Independence
that the tinkathia system needed to be abolished and that the
peasant s should be compensated for the illegal enhancement of
their dues. As a compromise with the planters, he agreed that
they refund only twenty -five per cent of the money they had
taken illegally from the peasants. Answering critics who asked
why he did not a sk for a full refund, Gandhiji explained that even
this refund had done enough damage to the planters’ prestige
and position. As was often the case, Gandhiji’s assessment was
correct and, within a decade, the planters left the district
altogether.
*
Gandh iji then turned his attention to the workers of
Ahmedabad. A dispute was brewing between them and the mill
owners over the question of a ‘plague bonus’ the employers
wanted to withdraw once the epidemic had passed but the
workers insisted it stay, since th e enhancement hardly
compensated for the rise in the cost of living during the War. The
British Collector, who feared a showdown, asked Gandhiji to
bring pressure on the mill owners and work out a compromise.
Ambalal Sarabhai, one of the leading mill owner s of the town,
was a friend of Gandhiji, and had just saved the Sabarmati
Ashram from extinction by a generous donation. Gandhiji
persuaded the mill owners and the workers to agree to arbitration
by a tribunal, but the mill owners, taking advantage of a st ray
strike, withdrew from the agreement. They offered a twenty per
cent bonus and threatened to dismiss those who did not accept
it.
The breach of agreement was treated by Gandhiji as a very
serious affair, and he advised the workers to go on strike. He
further suggested, on the basis of a thorough study of the
production costs and profits of the industry as well as the cost of
living, that they would be justified in demanding a thirty -five per
cent increase, in wages.
The strike began and Gandhiji address ed the workers every
day on the banks of the Sabarmati River. He brought out a daily | <s>[INST]162 | India’s Struggle For Independence
that the tinkathia system needed to be abolished and that the
peasant s should be compensated for the illegal enhancement of
their dues. As a compromise with the planters, he agreed that
they refund only twenty -five per cent of the money they had
taken illegally from the peasants. Answering critics who asked
why he did not a sk for a full refund, Gandhiji explained that even
this refund had done enough damage to the planters’ prestige
and position. As was often the case, Gandhiji’s assessment was
correct and, within a decade, the planters left the district
altogether.
*
Gandh iji then turned his attention to the workers of
Ahmedabad. A dispute was brewing between them and the mill
owners over the question of a ‘plague bonus’ the employers
wanted to withdraw once the epidemic had passed but the
workers insisted it stay, since th e enhancement hardly
compensated for the rise in the cost of living during the War. The
British Collector, who feared a showdown, asked Gandhiji to
bring pressure on the mill owners and work out a compromise.
Ambalal Sarabhai, one of the leading mill owner s of the town,
was a friend of Gandhiji, and had just saved the Sabarmati
Ashram from extinction by a generous donation. Gandhiji
persuaded the mill owners and the workers to agree to arbitration
by a tribunal, but the mill owners, taking advantage of a st ray
strike, withdrew from the agreement. They offered a twenty per
cent bonus and threatened to dismiss those who did not accept
it.
The breach of agreement was treated by Gandhiji as a very
serious affair, and he advised the workers to go on strike. He
further suggested, on the basis of a thorough study of the
production costs and profits of the industry as well as the cost of
living, that they would be justified in demanding a thirty -five per
cent increase, in wages.
The strike began and Gandhiji address ed the workers every
day on the banks of the Sabarmati River. He brought out a daily[/INST] |
news bulletin, and insisted that no violence be used against
employers or blacklegs. Ambalal Sarabhai’s sister, Anasuya
Behn, was one of the main lieutenants of Gandhiji i n this | <s>[INST]news bulletin, and insisted that no violence be used against
employers or blacklegs. Ambalal Sarabhai’s sister, Anasuya
Behn, was one of the main lieutenants of Gandhiji i n this[/INST] |
163 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
struggle in which her brother, and Gandhiji’s friend, was one of
the main adversaries.
After some days, the workers began to exhibit signs of
weariness. The attendance at the daily meetings began to decline
and the attitude towards blacklegs began to harden. In this
situation, Gandhiji decided to go on a fast, to rally the workers
and strengthen their resolve to continue. Also, he had promised
that if the strike led to starvation he would be the first to starve,
and the fast was a fulfillment of tha t promise. The fast, however,
also had the effect of putting pressure on the mill owners and
they agreed to submit the whole issue to a tribunal. The strike
was withdrawn and the tribunal later awarded the thirty -five per
cent increase the workers had dema nded
*
The dispute in Ahmedabad had not yet ended when
Gandhiji learnt that the peasants of Kheda district were in
extreme distress due to a failure of crops, and that their appeals
for the remission of land revenue were being ignored by the
Government. E nquiries by members of the Servants of India
Society, Vithalbhai Patel and Gandhiji confirmed the validity of
the peasants’ case. This was that as the crops were less than
one-fourth of the normal yield, they were entitled under the
revenue code to a total remission of the land revenue.
The Gujarat Sabha, of which Gandhiji was the President,
played a leading role in the agitation. Appeals and petitions
having failed, Gandhiji advised the withholding of revenue, and
asked the peasants to ‘fight unto death ag ainst such a spirit of
vindictiveness and tyranny,’ and show that ‘it is impossible to
govern men without their consent.’ Vallabhbhai Patel, a young
lawyer and a native of Kheda district, and other young men,
including Indulal Yagnik, joined Gandhiji in to uring the villages
and urging the peasants to stand firm in the face of increasing
Government repression which included the seizing of cattle and | <s>[INST]163 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
struggle in which her brother, and Gandhiji’s friend, was one of
the main adversaries.
After some days, the workers began to exhibit signs of
weariness. The attendance at the daily meetings began to decline
and the attitude towards blacklegs began to harden. In this
situation, Gandhiji decided to go on a fast, to rally the workers
and strengthen their resolve to continue. Also, he had promised
that if the strike led to starvation he would be the first to starve,
and the fast was a fulfillment of tha t promise. The fast, however,
also had the effect of putting pressure on the mill owners and
they agreed to submit the whole issue to a tribunal. The strike
was withdrawn and the tribunal later awarded the thirty -five per
cent increase the workers had dema nded
*
The dispute in Ahmedabad had not yet ended when
Gandhiji learnt that the peasants of Kheda district were in
extreme distress due to a failure of crops, and that their appeals
for the remission of land revenue were being ignored by the
Government. E nquiries by members of the Servants of India
Society, Vithalbhai Patel and Gandhiji confirmed the validity of
the peasants’ case. This was that as the crops were less than
one-fourth of the normal yield, they were entitled under the
revenue code to a total remission of the land revenue.
The Gujarat Sabha, of which Gandhiji was the President,
played a leading role in the agitation. Appeals and petitions
having failed, Gandhiji advised the withholding of revenue, and
asked the peasants to ‘fight unto death ag ainst such a spirit of
vindictiveness and tyranny,’ and show that ‘it is impossible to
govern men without their consent.’ Vallabhbhai Patel, a young
lawyer and a native of Kheda district, and other young men,
including Indulal Yagnik, joined Gandhiji in to uring the villages
and urging the peasants to stand firm in the face of increasing
Government repression which included the seizing of cattle and[/INST] |
Government repression which included the seizing of cattle and
household goods and the attachment of standing crops. The
cultivators were asked to take a solemn pledge that they would
not pay; those who could afford to pay were to take a vow that | <s>[INST]Government repression which included the seizing of cattle and
household goods and the attachment of standing crops. The
cultivators were asked to take a solemn pledge that they would
not pay; those who could afford to pay were to take a vow that[/INST] |
164 | India’s Struggle For Independence
they would not pay in the interests of the poorer ryots who would
otherwise panic and sell off their belongings or incur deb4s in
order to pay the revenue. However, if the Government agreed to
suspend collection of land revenue, the ones who could afford to
do so could pay the whole amount.
The peasants of Kheda, already hard pressed because of
plague, high prices arid drought, were beginning to show signs of
weakness when Gandhiji c ame to know that the Government had
issued secret instructions directing that revenue should be
recovered only from those peasants who could pay. A public
declaration of this decision would have meant a blow to
Government prestige, since this was exactly w hat Gandhiji had
been demanding. In these circumstances, the movement was
withdrawn. Gandhiji later recalled that by this time ‘the people
were exhausted’ and he was actually ‘casting about for some
graceful way of terminating the struggle.
Champaran, Ahme dabad and Kheda served as
demonstrations of Gandhiji’s style and method of politics to the
country at large. They also helped him find his feet among the
people of India and study their problems at close quarters. He
came to possess, as a result of these struggles, a surer
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the masses, as
well as of the viability of his own political style. He also earned
the respect and commitment of many political workers, especially
the younger ones, who were impressed by h is identification with
the problems of ordinary Indians, and his willingness to take up
their cause.
*
It was this reservoir of goodwill, and of experience, that
encouraged Gandhiji, in February 1919, to call for a nation -wide
protest against the unpopula r legislation that the British were
threatening to introduce. Two bills, popularly known as the
Rowlatt Bills after the man who chaired the Committee that
suggested their introduction, aimed at severely curtailing the civil | <s>[INST]164 | India’s Struggle For Independence
they would not pay in the interests of the poorer ryots who would
otherwise panic and sell off their belongings or incur deb4s in
order to pay the revenue. However, if the Government agreed to
suspend collection of land revenue, the ones who could afford to
do so could pay the whole amount.
The peasants of Kheda, already hard pressed because of
plague, high prices arid drought, were beginning to show signs of
weakness when Gandhiji c ame to know that the Government had
issued secret instructions directing that revenue should be
recovered only from those peasants who could pay. A public
declaration of this decision would have meant a blow to
Government prestige, since this was exactly w hat Gandhiji had
been demanding. In these circumstances, the movement was
withdrawn. Gandhiji later recalled that by this time ‘the people
were exhausted’ and he was actually ‘casting about for some
graceful way of terminating the struggle.
Champaran, Ahme dabad and Kheda served as
demonstrations of Gandhiji’s style and method of politics to the
country at large. They also helped him find his feet among the
people of India and study their problems at close quarters. He
came to possess, as a result of these struggles, a surer
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the masses, as
well as of the viability of his own political style. He also earned
the respect and commitment of many political workers, especially
the younger ones, who were impressed by h is identification with
the problems of ordinary Indians, and his willingness to take up
their cause.
*
It was this reservoir of goodwill, and of experience, that
encouraged Gandhiji, in February 1919, to call for a nation -wide
protest against the unpopula r legislation that the British were
threatening to introduce. Two bills, popularly known as the
Rowlatt Bills after the man who chaired the Committee that
suggested their introduction, aimed at severely curtailing the civil[/INST] |
liberties of Indians in the name of curbing terrorist violence, were
introduced in the Legislative Council. One of them was actually
pushed through in indecent haste in the face of opposition from
all the elected Indian members. This act of the Government was | <s>[INST]liberties of Indians in the name of curbing terrorist violence, were
introduced in the Legislative Council. One of them was actually
pushed through in indecent haste in the face of opposition from
all the elected Indian members. This act of the Government was[/INST] |
165 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
treated by the whole of poli tical India as a grievous insult,
especially as it came at the end of the War when substantial
constitutional concessions were expected.
Constitutional protest having failed, Gandhiji stepped in
and suggested that a Satyagraha be launched. A Satyagraha
Sabha was formed, and the younger members of the Home Rule
Leagues who were more than keen to express their
disenchantment with the Government flocked to join it. The old
lists of the addresses of Home Rule Leagues and their members
were taken out, contacts established and propaganda begun. The
form of p rotest finally decided upon was the observance of a
nation -wide hartal (strike) accompanied by fasting and prayer. In
addition, it was decided that civil disobedience would be offered
against specific laws.
The sixth of April was fixed as the date on which the
Satyagraha would be launched. The movement that emerged was
very different from the one that had been anticipated or planned.
Delhi observed the hartal on 30 March because of some
confusion about dates, and there was considerable violence in
the streets. This seemed to set the pattern in most other areas
that responded to the call; protest was generally accompanied by
violen 4ce and disorder. Punjab, which was suffering from the
after effects of severe war -time repression, forcible recruitment,
and the ravages of disease, reacted particularly strongly and both
in Amritsar and Lahore the situation became very dangerous for
the Government. Gandhiji tried to go to Punjab to help quieten
the people, but the Gove rnment deported him to Bombay. He
found that Bombay and even his native Gujarat, Including
Ahmedabad, were up in flames and he decided to stay and try
and pacify the people.
Events in Punjab were moving in a particularly tragic
direction. In Amritsar, the arrest of two local leaders on 10 April
led to an attack on the town hail and the post office: telegraph | <s>[INST]165 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
treated by the whole of poli tical India as a grievous insult,
especially as it came at the end of the War when substantial
constitutional concessions were expected.
Constitutional protest having failed, Gandhiji stepped in
and suggested that a Satyagraha be launched. A Satyagraha
Sabha was formed, and the younger members of the Home Rule
Leagues who were more than keen to express their
disenchantment with the Government flocked to join it. The old
lists of the addresses of Home Rule Leagues and their members
were taken out, contacts established and propaganda begun. The
form of p rotest finally decided upon was the observance of a
nation -wide hartal (strike) accompanied by fasting and prayer. In
addition, it was decided that civil disobedience would be offered
against specific laws.
The sixth of April was fixed as the date on which the
Satyagraha would be launched. The movement that emerged was
very different from the one that had been anticipated or planned.
Delhi observed the hartal on 30 March because of some
confusion about dates, and there was considerable violence in
the streets. This seemed to set the pattern in most other areas
that responded to the call; protest was generally accompanied by
violen 4ce and disorder. Punjab, which was suffering from the
after effects of severe war -time repression, forcible recruitment,
and the ravages of disease, reacted particularly strongly and both
in Amritsar and Lahore the situation became very dangerous for
the Government. Gandhiji tried to go to Punjab to help quieten
the people, but the Gove rnment deported him to Bombay. He
found that Bombay and even his native Gujarat, Including
Ahmedabad, were up in flames and he decided to stay and try
and pacify the people.
Events in Punjab were moving in a particularly tragic
direction. In Amritsar, the arrest of two local leaders on 10 April
led to an attack on the town hail and the post office: telegraph[/INST] |
wires were cut and Europeans including women were attacked.
The army was called in and the city handed over to General Dyer,
who issued an order prohi biting public meetings and assemblies.
On 13 April, Baisakhi day, a large crowd of people, many of
whom were visitors from neighbouring villages who had come to | <s>[INST]wires were cut and Europeans including women were attacked.
The army was called in and the city handed over to General Dyer,
who issued an order prohi biting public meetings and assemblies.
On 13 April, Baisakhi day, a large crowd of people, many of
whom were visitors from neighbouring villages who had come to[/INST] |
166 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the town to attend the Baisakhi celebrations, collected in the
Jallianwala Bagh to attend a public meeting. General Dyer,
incensed that his orders were disobeyed, ordered his troops to
fire upon the unarmed crowd. The shooting continued for ten
minutes. General Dyer had not thought It necessary to issue any
warning to the people nor was he deterred by the fact that the
ground was totally hemmed in from all sides by high walls which
left little chance for escape. The Government estimate was 379
dead, other estimates were considerably higher.
The brutality at Jallianwala Bagh stunned the entire nation .
The response would come, not immediately, but a little later. For
the moment, repression was intensified, Punjab placed under
martial law and the people of Amritsar forced into indignities
such as crawling on their bellies before Europeans Gandhiji,
overwhelmed by the total atmosphere of violence, withdrew the
movement on 18 April.
That did not mean, however, that Gandhiji had lost faith
either in his non -violent Satyagraha or in the capacity of the
Indian people to adopt it as a method of struggle. A ye ar later, he
launched another nation -wide struggle, on a scale bigger than
that of the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The wrong Inflicted on Punjab
was one of the major reasons for launching it.
The Mahatma’s ‘Indian Experiment’ had begun. | <s>[INST]166 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the town to attend the Baisakhi celebrations, collected in the
Jallianwala Bagh to attend a public meeting. General Dyer,
incensed that his orders were disobeyed, ordered his troops to
fire upon the unarmed crowd. The shooting continued for ten
minutes. General Dyer had not thought It necessary to issue any
warning to the people nor was he deterred by the fact that the
ground was totally hemmed in from all sides by high walls which
left little chance for escape. The Government estimate was 379
dead, other estimates were considerably higher.
The brutality at Jallianwala Bagh stunned the entire nation .
The response would come, not immediately, but a little later. For
the moment, repression was intensified, Punjab placed under
martial law and the people of Amritsar forced into indignities
such as crawling on their bellies before Europeans Gandhiji,
overwhelmed by the total atmosphere of violence, withdrew the
movement on 18 April.
That did not mean, however, that Gandhiji had lost faith
either in his non -violent Satyagraha or in the capacity of the
Indian people to adopt it as a method of struggle. A ye ar later, he
launched another nation -wide struggle, on a scale bigger than
that of the Rowlatt Satyagraha. The wrong Inflicted on Punjab
was one of the major reasons for launching it.
The Mahatma’s ‘Indian Experiment’ had begun.[/INST] |
167 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
CHAPTER 15. THE NON -COOP ERATION
MOVEMENT — 1920 -22
The last year of the second decade of the twentieth century
found India highly discontented. With much cause, The Rowlatt
Act, the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and martial law in Punjab
had belied all the generous wartime promises of the British. The
Montague -Chelmsford Reforms announced towards the end of
1919, with their ill -considered scheme of dyarchy satisfied few.
The Indian Muslims were incensed when they discovered that
their loyalty had been purcha sed during the War by assurances
of generous treatment of Turkey after the War — a promise
British statesman had no intention of fulfilling. The Muslims
regarded the Caliph of Turkey as their spiritual head and were
naturally upset when they found that he would retain no control
over the holy places it was his duty as Caliph to protect. Even
those who were willing to treat the happenings at Jallianwala
Bagh and other places in Punjab as aberrations, that would soon
be ‘corrected’, were disillusioned when th ey discovered that the
Hunter Committee appointed by the Government to enquire into
the Punjab disturbances was an eye wash and that the House of
Lords had voted in favour of General Dyer’s action and that the
British public had demonstrated its support by helping the
Morning Post collect 30,000 pounds for General Dyer.
By the end of the first quarter of 1920, all the excuses in
favour of the British Government were fast running out. The
Khilafat leaders were told quite clearly that they should not
expect anything more and the Treaty of Sevres signed with
Turkey in May 1920 made it amply clear that the
dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was complete. Gandhiji,
who had been in close touch with the Khilafat leaders for quite
some time, and was a special invi tee to the Khilafat Conference in
November 1919, had all along been very sympathetic to their | <s>[INST]167 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
CHAPTER 15. THE NON -COOP ERATION
MOVEMENT — 1920 -22
The last year of the second decade of the twentieth century
found India highly discontented. With much cause, The Rowlatt
Act, the Jallianwala Bagh massacre and martial law in Punjab
had belied all the generous wartime promises of the British. The
Montague -Chelmsford Reforms announced towards the end of
1919, with their ill -considered scheme of dyarchy satisfied few.
The Indian Muslims were incensed when they discovered that
their loyalty had been purcha sed during the War by assurances
of generous treatment of Turkey after the War — a promise
British statesman had no intention of fulfilling. The Muslims
regarded the Caliph of Turkey as their spiritual head and were
naturally upset when they found that he would retain no control
over the holy places it was his duty as Caliph to protect. Even
those who were willing to treat the happenings at Jallianwala
Bagh and other places in Punjab as aberrations, that would soon
be ‘corrected’, were disillusioned when th ey discovered that the
Hunter Committee appointed by the Government to enquire into
the Punjab disturbances was an eye wash and that the House of
Lords had voted in favour of General Dyer’s action and that the
British public had demonstrated its support by helping the
Morning Post collect 30,000 pounds for General Dyer.
By the end of the first quarter of 1920, all the excuses in
favour of the British Government were fast running out. The
Khilafat leaders were told quite clearly that they should not
expect anything more and the Treaty of Sevres signed with
Turkey in May 1920 made it amply clear that the
dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was complete. Gandhiji,
who had been in close touch with the Khilafat leaders for quite
some time, and was a special invi tee to the Khilafat Conference in
November 1919, had all along been very sympathetic to their[/INST] |
November 1919, had all along been very sympathetic to their
cause, especially because he felt the British had committed a
breach of faith by making promises that they had no intention of
keeping. In February 1920, he sugge sted to the Khilafat
Committee that it adopt a programme of non -violent non - | <s>[INST]November 1919, had all along been very sympathetic to their
cause, especially because he felt the British had committed a
breach of faith by making promises that they had no intention of
keeping. In February 1920, he sugge sted to the Khilafat
Committee that it adopt a programme of non -violent non -[/INST] |
168 | India’s Struggle For Independence
cooperation to protest the Government’s behavior . On 9 June
1920, the Khilafat Committee at Allahabad unanimously
accepted the suggestion of non -cooperation and asked Gandhiji
to lead the movement.
Meanwhile, the Congress was becoming skeptical of any
possibility of political advance through constitutional means. It
was disgusted with the Hunter Committee Report especially since
it was appraised of brutalities in Punjab by its own enquiry
committee. In the circumstances, it agreed to consider non -
cooperation. The AICC met in May 1920 and decided to convene a
special session in September to enable the Congress to decide on
its course of action.
It was apparent they had to work out s omething soon for it
was clear that the people were chafing for action. Large numbers
of them, who had been awakened to political consciousness by
the incessant propaganda efforts that the nationalist leadership
had been making for the previous four decade s or more, were
thoroughly outraged by what they perceived as insults by the
British government. To swallow these insults appeared
dishonourable and cowardly. Also many sections of Indian society
suffered considerable economic distress. In the towns, the
workers and artisans, the lower middle class and the middle
class had been hit by high prices, and shortage of food and
essential commodities. The rural poor and peasants were in
addition victims of widespread drought and epidemics.
*
The movement was launched formally on 1 August 192O,
after the expiry of the notice that Gandhiji had given to the
Viceroy in his letter of 22 June. in which he had asserted the
right recognized ‘from time immemorial of the subject to refuse to
assist a ruler who misrules.’ Lokamanya Tilak passed away in the
early hours of 1 August, and the day of mourning and of
launching of the movement merged as people all over the country
observed hartal and took out processions. Many kept a fast and
offered prayers. | <s>[INST]168 | India’s Struggle For Independence
cooperation to protest the Government’s behavior . On 9 June
1920, the Khilafat Committee at Allahabad unanimously
accepted the suggestion of non -cooperation and asked Gandhiji
to lead the movement.
Meanwhile, the Congress was becoming skeptical of any
possibility of political advance through constitutional means. It
was disgusted with the Hunter Committee Report especially since
it was appraised of brutalities in Punjab by its own enquiry
committee. In the circumstances, it agreed to consider non -
cooperation. The AICC met in May 1920 and decided to convene a
special session in September to enable the Congress to decide on
its course of action.
It was apparent they had to work out s omething soon for it
was clear that the people were chafing for action. Large numbers
of them, who had been awakened to political consciousness by
the incessant propaganda efforts that the nationalist leadership
had been making for the previous four decade s or more, were
thoroughly outraged by what they perceived as insults by the
British government. To swallow these insults appeared
dishonourable and cowardly. Also many sections of Indian society
suffered considerable economic distress. In the towns, the
workers and artisans, the lower middle class and the middle
class had been hit by high prices, and shortage of food and
essential commodities. The rural poor and peasants were in
addition victims of widespread drought and epidemics.
*
The movement was launched formally on 1 August 192O,
after the expiry of the notice that Gandhiji had given to the
Viceroy in his letter of 22 June. in which he had asserted the
right recognized ‘from time immemorial of the subject to refuse to
assist a ruler who misrules.’ Lokamanya Tilak passed away in the
early hours of 1 August, and the day of mourning and of
launching of the movement merged as people all over the country
observed hartal and took out processions. Many kept a fast and
offered prayers.[/INST] |
offered prayers.
The Congress met in S eptember at Calcutta and accepted
non-cooperation as its own. The main opposition, led by C.R. | <s>[INST]offered prayers.
The Congress met in S eptember at Calcutta and accepted
non-cooperation as its own. The main opposition, led by C.R.[/INST] |
169 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
Das, was to the boycott of legislative councils, elections to which
were to be held very soon. But even those who disagreed with the
idea of boycott accepted the Congress discipline and withdrew
from the elections. The voters, too, largely stayed away.
By December, when the Congress met for its annual session
at Nagpur, the opposition had melted away; the elections were
over and, therefore, the boycott of council s was a non -issue, and
it was CR. Das who moved the main resolution on non -
cooperation. The programme of non -cooperation included within
its ambit the surrender of titles and honours, boycott of
government affiliated schools and colleges, law courts, forei gn
cloth, and could be extended to include resignation from
government service and mass civil disobedience including the
non-payment of taxes. National schools and colleges were to be
set up, panchayats were to be established for settling disputes,
hand -spinning and weaving was to be encouraged and people
were asked to maintain Hindu - Muslim unity, give up
untouchability and observe strict non -violence. Gandhiji
promised that if the programme was fully implemented, Swaraj
would be ushered in within a year. The Nagpur session, thus,
committed the Congress to a programme of extra -constitutional
mass action. Many groups of revolutionary terrorists, especially
in Bengal, also pledged support to the movement.
To enable the Congress to fulfil its new commitment,
significant changes were introduced in its creed as well as in its
organizational structure. The goal of the Congress was changed
from the attainment of self -government by constitutional and
legal means to the attainment of Swaraj by peaceful and
legitimat e means. The new constitution of the Congress, the
handiwork of Gandhiji, introduced other important changes.
The Congress was now to have a Working Committee of
fifteen members to look after its day -to-day affairs. This proposal, | <s>[INST]169 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
Das, was to the boycott of legislative councils, elections to which
were to be held very soon. But even those who disagreed with the
idea of boycott accepted the Congress discipline and withdrew
from the elections. The voters, too, largely stayed away.
By December, when the Congress met for its annual session
at Nagpur, the opposition had melted away; the elections were
over and, therefore, the boycott of council s was a non -issue, and
it was CR. Das who moved the main resolution on non -
cooperation. The programme of non -cooperation included within
its ambit the surrender of titles and honours, boycott of
government affiliated schools and colleges, law courts, forei gn
cloth, and could be extended to include resignation from
government service and mass civil disobedience including the
non-payment of taxes. National schools and colleges were to be
set up, panchayats were to be established for settling disputes,
hand -spinning and weaving was to be encouraged and people
were asked to maintain Hindu - Muslim unity, give up
untouchability and observe strict non -violence. Gandhiji
promised that if the programme was fully implemented, Swaraj
would be ushered in within a year. The Nagpur session, thus,
committed the Congress to a programme of extra -constitutional
mass action. Many groups of revolutionary terrorists, especially
in Bengal, also pledged support to the movement.
To enable the Congress to fulfil its new commitment,
significant changes were introduced in its creed as well as in its
organizational structure. The goal of the Congress was changed
from the attainment of self -government by constitutional and
legal means to the attainment of Swaraj by peaceful and
legitimat e means. The new constitution of the Congress, the
handiwork of Gandhiji, introduced other important changes.
The Congress was now to have a Working Committee of
fifteen members to look after its day -to-day affairs. This proposal,[/INST] |
when first made by Tilak in 1916, had been shot down by the
Moderate opposition. Gandhiji, too, knew that the Congress could
not guide a sustained movement unless it had a compact body
that worked round the year. Provincial Congress Committees
were now to be organized on a lingui stic basis, so that they could
keep in touch with the people by using the local language. The | <s>[INST]when first made by Tilak in 1916, had been shot down by the
Moderate opposition. Gandhiji, too, knew that the Congress could
not guide a sustained movement unless it had a compact body
that worked round the year. Provincial Congress Committees
were now to be organized on a lingui stic basis, so that they could
keep in touch with the people by using the local language. The[/INST] |
170 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Congress organization was to reach down to the village and the
mohalla level by the formation of village and mohalla or ward
committees. The membership fee was re duced to four annas per
year to enable the poor to become members. Mass involvement
would also enable the Congress to have a regular source of
income. In other ways, too, the organization structure was both
streamlined and democratized. The Congress was to use Hindi as
far as possible.
*
The adoption of the Non -Cooperation Movement (initiated
earlier by the Khilafat Conference) by the Congress gave it a new
energy and, from January 1921, it began to register considerable
success all over the country. Gandh iji, along with the Ali brothers
(who were the foremost Khilafat leaders), undertook a nation -
wide tour/during which he addressed hundreds of meetings and
met a large number of political workers. In the first month itself,
thousands of students (90,000 acc ording to one estimate) left
schools and colleges and joined more than 800 national schools
and colleges that had sprung up all over the country. The
educational boycott was particularly successful in Bengal, where
the students in Calcutta triggered off a province -wide strike to
force the managements of their institutions to disaffiliate
themselves from the Government. C.R. Das played a major role in
promoting the movement and Subhas Bose became the principal
of the National Congress in Calcutta. The Swades hi spirit was
revived with new vigour, this time as part of a nation -wide
struggle. Punjab, too, responded to the educational boycott and
was second only to Bengal, Lala Lajpat Rai playing a leading part
here despite his initial reservations about this ite m of the
programme. Others areas that were active were Bombay, U.P.,
Bihar, Orissa and Assam, Madras remained lukewarm.
The boycott of law courts by lawyers was not as successful
as the educational boycott, but it was very dramatic and | <s>[INST]170 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Congress organization was to reach down to the village and the
mohalla level by the formation of village and mohalla or ward
committees. The membership fee was re duced to four annas per
year to enable the poor to become members. Mass involvement
would also enable the Congress to have a regular source of
income. In other ways, too, the organization structure was both
streamlined and democratized. The Congress was to use Hindi as
far as possible.
*
The adoption of the Non -Cooperation Movement (initiated
earlier by the Khilafat Conference) by the Congress gave it a new
energy and, from January 1921, it began to register considerable
success all over the country. Gandh iji, along with the Ali brothers
(who were the foremost Khilafat leaders), undertook a nation -
wide tour/during which he addressed hundreds of meetings and
met a large number of political workers. In the first month itself,
thousands of students (90,000 acc ording to one estimate) left
schools and colleges and joined more than 800 national schools
and colleges that had sprung up all over the country. The
educational boycott was particularly successful in Bengal, where
the students in Calcutta triggered off a province -wide strike to
force the managements of their institutions to disaffiliate
themselves from the Government. C.R. Das played a major role in
promoting the movement and Subhas Bose became the principal
of the National Congress in Calcutta. The Swades hi spirit was
revived with new vigour, this time as part of a nation -wide
struggle. Punjab, too, responded to the educational boycott and
was second only to Bengal, Lala Lajpat Rai playing a leading part
here despite his initial reservations about this ite m of the
programme. Others areas that were active were Bombay, U.P.,
Bihar, Orissa and Assam, Madras remained lukewarm.
The boycott of law courts by lawyers was not as successful
as the educational boycott, but it was very dramatic and[/INST] |
as the educational boycott, but it was very dramatic and
spectacular. Many l eading lawyers of the country, like C.R. Das,
Motilal Nehru, M.R. Jayakar, Saifuddin Kitchlew, Vallabhbhai
Patel, C. Rajagopalachari, T. Prakasam and Asaf Ali gave up
lucrative practices, and their sacrifice became a source of | <s>[INST]as the educational boycott, but it was very dramatic and
spectacular. Many l eading lawyers of the country, like C.R. Das,
Motilal Nehru, M.R. Jayakar, Saifuddin Kitchlew, Vallabhbhai
Patel, C. Rajagopalachari, T. Prakasam and Asaf Ali gave up
lucrative practices, and their sacrifice became a source of[/INST] |
171 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
inspiration for many. In numb ers again Bengal led, followed by
Andhra Pradesh, U.P., Karnataka and Punjab.
But, perhaps, the most successful item of the programme
was the boycott of foreign cloth. Volunteers would go from house
to house collecting clothes made of foreign cloth, and t he entire
community would collect to light a bonfire of the goods.
Prabhudas Gandhi, who accompanied Mahatma Gandhi on his
nation -wide tour in the first part of 1921, recalls how at small
way-side stations where their train would stop for a few minutes.
Gandhiji would persuade the crowd, assembled to greet him, to
at least discard their head dress on the spot. Immediately, a pile
of caps, dupattas, and turbans would form and as the train
moved out they would see the flames leaping upwards.2 Picketing
of sho ps selling foreign cloth was also a major form of the
boycott. The value of imports of foreign cloth fell from Rs. 102
crore in 1920 -21 to Rs. 57 crore in 1921 -22. Another feature of
the movement which acquired great popularity in many parts of
the country , even though it was not part of the original plan, was
the picketing of toddy shops. Government revenues showed
considerable decline on this count and the Government was
forced to actually carry on propaganda to bring home to the
people the healthy effect s of a good drink.
The Government of Bihar and Orissa even compiled and
circulated a list of all the great men in history (which included
Moses, Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Shakespeare,
Gladstone, Tennyson and Bismarck) who enjoyed their liquor.
The AICC, at its session at Vijayawada in March 1921,
directed that for the next three months Congressmen should
concentrate on collection of funds, enrolment of members and
distribution of charkhas. As a result, a vigorous membership
drive was launched an d though the target of one crore members
was not achieved, Congress membership reached a figure roughly | <s>[INST]171 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
inspiration for many. In numb ers again Bengal led, followed by
Andhra Pradesh, U.P., Karnataka and Punjab.
But, perhaps, the most successful item of the programme
was the boycott of foreign cloth. Volunteers would go from house
to house collecting clothes made of foreign cloth, and t he entire
community would collect to light a bonfire of the goods.
Prabhudas Gandhi, who accompanied Mahatma Gandhi on his
nation -wide tour in the first part of 1921, recalls how at small
way-side stations where their train would stop for a few minutes.
Gandhiji would persuade the crowd, assembled to greet him, to
at least discard their head dress on the spot. Immediately, a pile
of caps, dupattas, and turbans would form and as the train
moved out they would see the flames leaping upwards.2 Picketing
of sho ps selling foreign cloth was also a major form of the
boycott. The value of imports of foreign cloth fell from Rs. 102
crore in 1920 -21 to Rs. 57 crore in 1921 -22. Another feature of
the movement which acquired great popularity in many parts of
the country , even though it was not part of the original plan, was
the picketing of toddy shops. Government revenues showed
considerable decline on this count and the Government was
forced to actually carry on propaganda to bring home to the
people the healthy effect s of a good drink.
The Government of Bihar and Orissa even compiled and
circulated a list of all the great men in history (which included
Moses, Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Shakespeare,
Gladstone, Tennyson and Bismarck) who enjoyed their liquor.
The AICC, at its session at Vijayawada in March 1921,
directed that for the next three months Congressmen should
concentrate on collection of funds, enrolment of members and
distribution of charkhas. As a result, a vigorous membership
drive was launched an d though the target of one crore members
was not achieved, Congress membership reached a figure roughly[/INST] |
was not achieved, Congress membership reached a figure roughly
of 50 lakhs. The Tilak Swaraj Fund was oversubscribed,
exceeding the target of rupees one crore. Charkhas were
popularized on a wide scale and khadi became the uniform of the
national movement. There was a complaint at a students meeting
Gandhiji addressed in Madurai that khadi was too costly.
Gandhiji retorted that the answer lay in wearing less clothes and, | <s>[INST]was not achieved, Congress membership reached a figure roughly
of 50 lakhs. The Tilak Swaraj Fund was oversubscribed,
exceeding the target of rupees one crore. Charkhas were
popularized on a wide scale and khadi became the uniform of the
national movement. There was a complaint at a students meeting
Gandhiji addressed in Madurai that khadi was too costly.
Gandhiji retorted that the answer lay in wearing less clothes and,[/INST] |
172 | India’s Struggle For Independence
from that day, discarded his dhoti and kurta in favour of a 1ango
For the rest of his life, he remained a ‘half -naked fakir.’
In July 1921, a new challenge was thrown to the
Government. Mohammed Ali, at the All India Khilafat Conference
held at Karachi on 8 July, declared that it was ‘religiously
unlawful for the Muslims to continue in the British Army’ and
asked that this be conveyed to every Muslim in the Army. As a
result, Mohammed Ali, along with other leaders, was immediately
arrested. In protest, the speech was repeated at innumerable
meetings a ll over the country. On 4 October, forty -seven leading
Congressmen, including Gandhiji, issued a manifesto repeating
whatever Mohammed Ali had said and added that every civilian
and member of the armed forces should sever connections with
the repressive Go vernment. The next day, the Congress Working
Committee passed a similar resolution, and on 16 October,
Congress committees all over the country held meetings at which
the same resolution was adopted. The Government was forced to
ignore the whole incident, and accept the blow to its prestige.
The next dramatic event was the visit of the Prince of Wales
which began on 17 November, 1921. The day the Prince landed in
Bombay was observed as a day of hartal all over the country. In
Bombay, Gandhiji himself addre ssed a mammoth meeting in the
compound of the Elphinstone Mill owned by the nationalist Umar
Shobhani, and lighted a huge bonfire of foreign cloth.
Unfortunately, however, clashes occurred between those who had
gone to attend the welcome function and the c rowd returning
from Gandhiji’s meeting. Riots followed, in which Parsis,
Christians, Anglo -Indians became special targets of attack as
identifiable loyalists. There was police firing, and the three -day
turmoil resulted in fifty -nine dead. Peace returned on ly after
Gandhiji had been on fast for three days. The whole sequence of | <s>[INST]172 | India’s Struggle For Independence
from that day, discarded his dhoti and kurta in favour of a 1ango
For the rest of his life, he remained a ‘half -naked fakir.’
In July 1921, a new challenge was thrown to the
Government. Mohammed Ali, at the All India Khilafat Conference
held at Karachi on 8 July, declared that it was ‘religiously
unlawful for the Muslims to continue in the British Army’ and
asked that this be conveyed to every Muslim in the Army. As a
result, Mohammed Ali, along with other leaders, was immediately
arrested. In protest, the speech was repeated at innumerable
meetings a ll over the country. On 4 October, forty -seven leading
Congressmen, including Gandhiji, issued a manifesto repeating
whatever Mohammed Ali had said and added that every civilian
and member of the armed forces should sever connections with
the repressive Go vernment. The next day, the Congress Working
Committee passed a similar resolution, and on 16 October,
Congress committees all over the country held meetings at which
the same resolution was adopted. The Government was forced to
ignore the whole incident, and accept the blow to its prestige.
The next dramatic event was the visit of the Prince of Wales
which began on 17 November, 1921. The day the Prince landed in
Bombay was observed as a day of hartal all over the country. In
Bombay, Gandhiji himself addre ssed a mammoth meeting in the
compound of the Elphinstone Mill owned by the nationalist Umar
Shobhani, and lighted a huge bonfire of foreign cloth.
Unfortunately, however, clashes occurred between those who had
gone to attend the welcome function and the c rowd returning
from Gandhiji’s meeting. Riots followed, in which Parsis,
Christians, Anglo -Indians became special targets of attack as
identifiable loyalists. There was police firing, and the three -day
turmoil resulted in fifty -nine dead. Peace returned on ly after
Gandhiji had been on fast for three days. The whole sequence of[/INST] |
events left Gandhiji profoundly disturbed and worried about the
likelihood of recurrence of violence once mass civil disobedience
was sanctioned.
The Prince of Wales was greeted with empty streets and
downed shutters wherever he went. Emboldened by their
successful defiance of the Government, non -cooperators became
more and more aggressive. The Congress Volunteer Corps
emerged as a powerful parallel police, and the sight of its | <s>[INST]events left Gandhiji profoundly disturbed and worried about the
likelihood of recurrence of violence once mass civil disobedience
was sanctioned.
The Prince of Wales was greeted with empty streets and
downed shutters wherever he went. Emboldened by their
successful defiance of the Government, non -cooperators became
more and more aggressive. The Congress Volunteer Corps
emerged as a powerful parallel police, and the sight of its[/INST] |
173 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
member s marching in formation and dressed in uniform was
hardly one that warmed the Government’s heart. The Congress
had already granted permission to the PCCs to sanction mass
civil disobedience wherever they thought the people were ready
and in some areas, suc h as Midnapur district in Bengal, which
had started a movement against Union Board Taxes and Chirala -
Pirala and Pedanandipadu taluqa in Guntur district of Andhra,
no-tax movements were already in the offing.’
The Non -Cooperation Movement had other indirec t effects
as well. In the Avadh area of U.P., where kisan sabhas and a
kisan movement had been gathering strength since 1918, Non -
cooperation propaganda, carried on among others by Jawaharlal
Nehru, helped to fan the already existing ferment, and soon it
became difficult to distinguish between a Non cooperation
meeting and a kisan meeting.’ In Malabar in Kerala, Non
cooperation and Khilafat propaganda helped to arouse the
Muslims tenants against their landlords, but the movement here,
unfortunately, at tune s took on a communal colour.’
In Assam, labourers on tea plantations went on strike.
When the fleeing workers were fired upon, there were strikes on
the steamer service, and on the Assam -Bengal Railway as well.
J.M. Sengupta, the Bengali nationalist leade r, played a leading
role in these developments. In Midnapur, a cultivators’ strike
against a White zamindari company was led by a Calcutta
medical student. Defiance of forest laws became popular in
Andhra. Peasants and tribals in some of the Rajasthan stat es
began movements for securing better conditions of life. In Punjab,
the Akali Movement for ‘Test1ng control of the gurudwaras from
the corrupt mahants (priests) was a part of the general movement
of Non -cooperation, and the Akalis observed strict non -violence in
the face of tremendous repression? The examples could be
multiplied, but the point is that the spirit of unrest and defiance | <s>[INST]173 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
member s marching in formation and dressed in uniform was
hardly one that warmed the Government’s heart. The Congress
had already granted permission to the PCCs to sanction mass
civil disobedience wherever they thought the people were ready
and in some areas, suc h as Midnapur district in Bengal, which
had started a movement against Union Board Taxes and Chirala -
Pirala and Pedanandipadu taluqa in Guntur district of Andhra,
no-tax movements were already in the offing.’
The Non -Cooperation Movement had other indirec t effects
as well. In the Avadh area of U.P., where kisan sabhas and a
kisan movement had been gathering strength since 1918, Non -
cooperation propaganda, carried on among others by Jawaharlal
Nehru, helped to fan the already existing ferment, and soon it
became difficult to distinguish between a Non cooperation
meeting and a kisan meeting.’ In Malabar in Kerala, Non
cooperation and Khilafat propaganda helped to arouse the
Muslims tenants against their landlords, but the movement here,
unfortunately, at tune s took on a communal colour.’
In Assam, labourers on tea plantations went on strike.
When the fleeing workers were fired upon, there were strikes on
the steamer service, and on the Assam -Bengal Railway as well.
J.M. Sengupta, the Bengali nationalist leade r, played a leading
role in these developments. In Midnapur, a cultivators’ strike
against a White zamindari company was led by a Calcutta
medical student. Defiance of forest laws became popular in
Andhra. Peasants and tribals in some of the Rajasthan stat es
began movements for securing better conditions of life. In Punjab,
the Akali Movement for ‘Test1ng control of the gurudwaras from
the corrupt mahants (priests) was a part of the general movement
of Non -cooperation, and the Akalis observed strict non -violence in
the face of tremendous repression? The examples could be
multiplied, but the point is that the spirit of unrest and defiance[/INST] |
of authority engendered by the Non -Cooperation Movement
contributed to the rise of many local movements in different parts
of the country, movements which did not often adhere strictly
either to the programme of the Non -Cooperation Movement or
even to the policy of non -violence. | <s>[INST]of authority engendered by the Non -Cooperation Movement
contributed to the rise of many local movements in different parts
of the country, movements which did not often adhere strictly
either to the programme of the Non -Cooperation Movement or
even to the policy of non -violence.[/INST] |
174 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
In this situation, it was hardly surprising that the
Government came to the conclusion that its earlier policy had not
met with success and that the time to strike had arrived. In
September 1920, at the beginning of the movement, the
Government had thought it best to leave it alone as repression
would only make martyrs of the nationalists and fan th e spirit of
revolt. In May 1921, it had tried, through the Gandhi -Reading
talks, to persuade Gandhiji to ask the Ali brothers to withdraw
from their speeches those passage that contained suggestions of
violence; this was an attempt to drive a wedge between the
Khilafat leaders and Gandhiji, but it failed. By December, the
Government felt that things were really going too far and
announced a change of policy by declaring the Volunteer Corps
illegal and arresting all those who claimed to be its members.
C.R. Das was among the first be arrested, followed by his
wife Basanti Debi, whose arrest so incensed the youth of Bengal
that thousands came forward to court arrest. In the next two
months, over 30,000 people were arrested from all over the
country, and soon only Gandhiji out of the top leadership
remained out of jail. In mid -December, there was an abortive
attempt at negotiations, initiated by Malaviya, but the conditions
offered were such that it meant sacrificing the Khilafat leaders, a
course that Gandhiji would not accept. In any case, the Home
Government had already decided against a settlement and
ordered the Viceroy, Lord Reading, to withdraw from the
negotiations. Repression continued, public meetings and
assemblies were banned, newspapers gagged, and midnight raids
on Congress and Khilafat offices became common.
Gandhiji had been under considerable pressure from the
Congress rank and file as well as the leadership to start the
phase of mass civil disobedience. The Ahmedabad session of the
Congress in December 1921 had appointed him the sole | <s>[INST]174 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
In this situation, it was hardly surprising that the
Government came to the conclusion that its earlier policy had not
met with success and that the time to strike had arrived. In
September 1920, at the beginning of the movement, the
Government had thought it best to leave it alone as repression
would only make martyrs of the nationalists and fan th e spirit of
revolt. In May 1921, it had tried, through the Gandhi -Reading
talks, to persuade Gandhiji to ask the Ali brothers to withdraw
from their speeches those passage that contained suggestions of
violence; this was an attempt to drive a wedge between the
Khilafat leaders and Gandhiji, but it failed. By December, the
Government felt that things were really going too far and
announced a change of policy by declaring the Volunteer Corps
illegal and arresting all those who claimed to be its members.
C.R. Das was among the first be arrested, followed by his
wife Basanti Debi, whose arrest so incensed the youth of Bengal
that thousands came forward to court arrest. In the next two
months, over 30,000 people were arrested from all over the
country, and soon only Gandhiji out of the top leadership
remained out of jail. In mid -December, there was an abortive
attempt at negotiations, initiated by Malaviya, but the conditions
offered were such that it meant sacrificing the Khilafat leaders, a
course that Gandhiji would not accept. In any case, the Home
Government had already decided against a settlement and
ordered the Viceroy, Lord Reading, to withdraw from the
negotiations. Repression continued, public meetings and
assemblies were banned, newspapers gagged, and midnight raids
on Congress and Khilafat offices became common.
Gandhiji had been under considerable pressure from the
Congress rank and file as well as the leadership to start the
phase of mass civil disobedience. The Ahmedabad session of the
Congress in December 1921 had appointed him the sole[/INST] |
Congress in December 1921 had appointed him the sole
authority on the issue. The Government showed no signs of
relenting and had ignored both the appeal of the All - Parties
Conference held in mid -January 1922 as well as Gandhiji’s letter
to the Viceroy announcing that , unless the Government lifted the
ban on civil liberties and released political prisoners, he would be | <s>[INST]Congress in December 1921 had appointed him the sole
authority on the issue. The Government showed no signs of
relenting and had ignored both the appeal of the All - Parties
Conference held in mid -January 1922 as well as Gandhiji’s letter
to the Viceroy announcing that , unless the Government lifted the
ban on civil liberties and released political prisoners, he would be[/INST] |
175 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
forced to go ahead with mass civil disobedience. The Viceroy was
unmoved and, left with no choice, Gandhiji announced that mass
civil disobedience would begin in Bardoli taluqa of Surat district,
and that all other parts of the country should cooperate by
maintaining total discipline and quiet so that the entire attention
of the movement could be concentrated on Bardoli. But Bardoli
was destined to Wait f or another six years before it could launch
a no -tax movement. Its fate was decided by the action of
members of a Congress and Khilafat procession in Chauri -
Chaura in Gorakhpur district of U.P. on 5 February 1922.
Irritated by the behavior of some policeme n, a section of the
crowd attacked them. The police opened fire. At this, the entire
procession attacked the police and when the latter hid inside the
police station, set fire to the building. Policemen who tried to
escape were hacked to pieces and thrown into the fire. In all
twenty -two policemen were done to dead. On hearing of the
incident, Gandhiji decided to withdraw the movement. He also
persuaded the Congress Working Committee to ratify his decision
and thus, on 12 February 1922, the Non -Cooperation Movement
came to an end.
Gandhiji’s, decision to withdraw the movement in response
to the violence at Chauri Chaura raised a Controversy whose
heat can still be felt in staid academic seminars and sober
volumes of history. Motilal Nehru, C.R. Das, Jawahar lal Nehru,
Subhas Bose, and many others have recorded their utter
bewilderment on hearing the news. They could not understand
why the whole country had to pay the price for the crazy behavior
of some people in a remote village. Many in the country thought
that the Mahatma had failed miserably as a leader and that his
days of glory were over.
Many later commentators, following, the tradition
established by R. Palme Dutt in India Today, have continued to | <s>[INST]175 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
forced to go ahead with mass civil disobedience. The Viceroy was
unmoved and, left with no choice, Gandhiji announced that mass
civil disobedience would begin in Bardoli taluqa of Surat district,
and that all other parts of the country should cooperate by
maintaining total discipline and quiet so that the entire attention
of the movement could be concentrated on Bardoli. But Bardoli
was destined to Wait f or another six years before it could launch
a no -tax movement. Its fate was decided by the action of
members of a Congress and Khilafat procession in Chauri -
Chaura in Gorakhpur district of U.P. on 5 February 1922.
Irritated by the behavior of some policeme n, a section of the
crowd attacked them. The police opened fire. At this, the entire
procession attacked the police and when the latter hid inside the
police station, set fire to the building. Policemen who tried to
escape were hacked to pieces and thrown into the fire. In all
twenty -two policemen were done to dead. On hearing of the
incident, Gandhiji decided to withdraw the movement. He also
persuaded the Congress Working Committee to ratify his decision
and thus, on 12 February 1922, the Non -Cooperation Movement
came to an end.
Gandhiji’s, decision to withdraw the movement in response
to the violence at Chauri Chaura raised a Controversy whose
heat can still be felt in staid academic seminars and sober
volumes of history. Motilal Nehru, C.R. Das, Jawahar lal Nehru,
Subhas Bose, and many others have recorded their utter
bewilderment on hearing the news. They could not understand
why the whole country had to pay the price for the crazy behavior
of some people in a remote village. Many in the country thought
that the Mahatma had failed miserably as a leader and that his
days of glory were over.
Many later commentators, following, the tradition
established by R. Palme Dutt in India Today, have continued to[/INST] |
condemn the decision taken by Gandhiji, and seen in i t proof of
the Mahatma’s concern for the propertied classes of Indian
society. Their argument is that Gandhiji did not withdraw the
movement simply because of his belief in the necessity of non -
violence. He withdrew it because the action at Chauri Chaura
was a symbol and an indication of the growing militancy of the
Indian masses, of their growing radicalization, of their willingness | <s>[INST]condemn the decision taken by Gandhiji, and seen in i t proof of
the Mahatma’s concern for the propertied classes of Indian
society. Their argument is that Gandhiji did not withdraw the
movement simply because of his belief in the necessity of non -
violence. He withdrew it because the action at Chauri Chaura
was a symbol and an indication of the growing militancy of the
Indian masses, of their growing radicalization, of their willingness[/INST] |
176 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to launch an attack on the status quo of property relations.
Frightened by this radical possibility and by the prospect of th e
movement going out of his hands and into the hids of radical
forces, and in order to protect the interests of landlords and
capitalists who would inevitably be at the receiving end of this
violence, Gandhiji cried halt to the movement. They have found
supportive proof in the resolution of the Congress Working
Committee of 12 February 1922 popularly known as the Bardoli
resolution which while announcing the withdrawal, asked the
peasants to pay taxes and tenants to pay rents. This, they say,
was the real t hough hidden motive behind the historic decision of
February 1922.
It seems, however, that Gandhiji’s critics have been less
than fair to him. First, the argument that violence in a remote
village could not be a sufficient cause for the decision is in its elf a
weak one. Gandhiji had repeatedly warned that he did not even
want any non -violent movement in y other part of the country
while he was conducting mass civil disobedience in Bardoli, and
in fact had asked the Andhra PCC to withdraw the permission
that it had granted to some of the District Congress Committees
to start civil disobedience. One obvious reason for this was that,
in such a situation of mass ferment and activity, the movement
might easily take a violent turn, either due to its own volatile
nature or because of provocation by the authorities concerned (as
had actually happened in Bombay in November 1921 and later in
Chauri Chaura); also if violence occurred anywhere it could easily
be made the excuse by the Government to launch a massive
attack on the movement as a whole. The Government could
always cite the actual violence in one part as proof of the
likelihood of violence in another part of the country, and thus
justify its repression. This would upset the whole strategy of non
violent civil disobedience which was based on the principle that | <s>[INST]176 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to launch an attack on the status quo of property relations.
Frightened by this radical possibility and by the prospect of th e
movement going out of his hands and into the hids of radical
forces, and in order to protect the interests of landlords and
capitalists who would inevitably be at the receiving end of this
violence, Gandhiji cried halt to the movement. They have found
supportive proof in the resolution of the Congress Working
Committee of 12 February 1922 popularly known as the Bardoli
resolution which while announcing the withdrawal, asked the
peasants to pay taxes and tenants to pay rents. This, they say,
was the real t hough hidden motive behind the historic decision of
February 1922.
It seems, however, that Gandhiji’s critics have been less
than fair to him. First, the argument that violence in a remote
village could not be a sufficient cause for the decision is in its elf a
weak one. Gandhiji had repeatedly warned that he did not even
want any non -violent movement in y other part of the country
while he was conducting mass civil disobedience in Bardoli, and
in fact had asked the Andhra PCC to withdraw the permission
that it had granted to some of the District Congress Committees
to start civil disobedience. One obvious reason for this was that,
in such a situation of mass ferment and activity, the movement
might easily take a violent turn, either due to its own volatile
nature or because of provocation by the authorities concerned (as
had actually happened in Bombay in November 1921 and later in
Chauri Chaura); also if violence occurred anywhere it could easily
be made the excuse by the Government to launch a massive
attack on the movement as a whole. The Government could
always cite the actual violence in one part as proof of the
likelihood of violence in another part of the country, and thus
justify its repression. This would upset the whole strategy of non
violent civil disobedience which was based on the principle that[/INST] |
the forces of repression would always stand exposed since they
would be using armed force against peaceful civil resisters. It
was, therefore, not enough to assert that there was no connection
between Cha uri Chaura and Bardoli.
It is entirely possible that in Gandhiji’s assessment the
chances of his being allowed to conduct a mass civil disobedience
campaign in Bardoli had receded further after Chauri Chaura.
The Government would have had excuse to remove him and other | <s>[INST]the forces of repression would always stand exposed since they
would be using armed force against peaceful civil resisters. It
was, therefore, not enough to assert that there was no connection
between Cha uri Chaura and Bardoli.
It is entirely possible that in Gandhiji’s assessment the
chances of his being allowed to conduct a mass civil disobedience
campaign in Bardoli had receded further after Chauri Chaura.
The Government would have had excuse to remove him and other[/INST] |
177 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
activists from the scene and use force to cow down the people.
Mass civil disobedience would be defeated even before it was
given a fair trail. By taking the onus of withdrawal on himself and
on the Working Committee, Gandhiji was protecting the
movement from likely repression, and the people from
demoralization. True, the withdrawal itself led to considerable
demoralization, especially of the active political workers, but it is
likely that the repression and crushing of the movement (as
happ ened in 1932) would have led to even greater demoralization.
Perhaps, in the long run, it was better to have felt that, if only
Gandhiji had not withdrawn the movement, it would have surged
forward, than to see it crushed and come to the conclusion that it
was not possible for a mass movement to succeed in the face of
government repression. It is necessary to remember that, after
all, the Non Cooperation Movement was the first attempt at an
all-India mass struggle against the British, and a serious reverse
at this elementary stage could have led to a prolonged period of
demoralization and passivity.
The other argument that the real motive for withdrawal was
the fear of the growth of radical forces and that Chauri Chaura
was proof of the’ emergence of precis ely such a radical sentiment
is on even thinner ground. The crowd at Chauri Chaura had not
demonstrated any intention of attacking landlords or overturning
the structure of property relations, they were merely angered by
the overbearing behavior of police men and vented their wrath by
attacking them. Peasant unrest in most of Avadh and Malabar
had died out long before this time, and the Eka movement that
was on in some of the rural areas of Avadh showed no signs of
wanting to abolish the zamindari system; i t only wanted
zamindars to stop ‘illegal’ cesses an d arbitrary rent
enhancements. In fact, one of the items of the oath that was | <s>[INST]177 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
activists from the scene and use force to cow down the people.
Mass civil disobedience would be defeated even before it was
given a fair trail. By taking the onus of withdrawal on himself and
on the Working Committee, Gandhiji was protecting the
movement from likely repression, and the people from
demoralization. True, the withdrawal itself led to considerable
demoralization, especially of the active political workers, but it is
likely that the repression and crushing of the movement (as
happ ened in 1932) would have led to even greater demoralization.
Perhaps, in the long run, it was better to have felt that, if only
Gandhiji had not withdrawn the movement, it would have surged
forward, than to see it crushed and come to the conclusion that it
was not possible for a mass movement to succeed in the face of
government repression. It is necessary to remember that, after
all, the Non Cooperation Movement was the first attempt at an
all-India mass struggle against the British, and a serious reverse
at this elementary stage could have led to a prolonged period of
demoralization and passivity.
The other argument that the real motive for withdrawal was
the fear of the growth of radical forces and that Chauri Chaura
was proof of the’ emergence of precis ely such a radical sentiment
is on even thinner ground. The crowd at Chauri Chaura had not
demonstrated any intention of attacking landlords or overturning
the structure of property relations, they were merely angered by
the overbearing behavior of police men and vented their wrath by
attacking them. Peasant unrest in most of Avadh and Malabar
had died out long before this time, and the Eka movement that
was on in some of the rural areas of Avadh showed no signs of
wanting to abolish the zamindari system; i t only wanted
zamindars to stop ‘illegal’ cesses an d arbitrary rent
enhancements. In fact, one of the items of the oath that was[/INST] |
enhancements. In fact, one of the items of the oath that was
taken by peasants who joined the Eka movement was that they
would ‘pay rent regularly at Kharif and Rabi.” The no-tax
movement m Guntur was very much within the framework of the
Non-Cooperation Movement; it was directed against the
government and remained totally peaceful. Moreover, it was
already on the decline before February 1922. It is difficult to
discern where the threat from radical tendencies is actually
located. | <s>[INST]enhancements. In fact, one of the items of the oath that was
taken by peasants who joined the Eka movement was that they
would ‘pay rent regularly at Kharif and Rabi.” The no-tax
movement m Guntur was very much within the framework of the
Non-Cooperation Movement; it was directed against the
government and remained totally peaceful. Moreover, it was
already on the decline before February 1922. It is difficult to
discern where the threat from radical tendencies is actually
located.[/INST] |
178 | India’s Struggle For Independence
That the Bardoli resolution which announced the
withdrawal also contained clauses which asked peasants to pay
up taxes and tenants to pay up rents, and assured zamindars
that the Congress had no intention of depri ving them of their
rights, is also no proof of hidden motives. The Congress had at no
stage during the movement sanctioned non -payment of rent or
questioned the rights of zamindars; the resolution was merely a
reiteration of its position on this issue. Non -payment of taxes was
obviously to cease if the movement as a whole was being
withdrawn.
There are also some indications that Gandhiji’s decision
may have been prompted by the fact that in many parts of the
country, by the second half of 1921, the movemen t had shown
clear signs of being on the ebb. Students had started drifting
back to schools and colleges, lawyers and litigants to law courts,
the commercial classes showed signs of weariness and worry at
the accumulating stocks of foreign cloth, attendance at meetings
and rallies had dwindled, both in the urban and rural areas. This
does not mean that in some pockets, like Bardoli in Gujarat or
Guntur in Andhra, where intensive political work had been done,
the masses were not ready to carry on the struggle . But the mass
enthusiasm that was evident all over the country in the first part
of 1921 had, perhaps, receded. The cadre and the active political
workers were willing to carry on the fight, but a mass movement
of such a nature required the active partici pation of the masses,
and not only of the highly motivated among them. However, at
the present stage of research, it is not possible to argue this
position with great force; we only wish to urge the possibility that
this too was among the factors that led to the decision to
withdraw.
Gandhiji’s critics often fail to recognize that mass
movements have an inherent tendency to ebb after reaching a
certain height, that the capacity of the masses to withstand | <s>[INST]178 | India’s Struggle For Independence
That the Bardoli resolution which announced the
withdrawal also contained clauses which asked peasants to pay
up taxes and tenants to pay up rents, and assured zamindars
that the Congress had no intention of depri ving them of their
rights, is also no proof of hidden motives. The Congress had at no
stage during the movement sanctioned non -payment of rent or
questioned the rights of zamindars; the resolution was merely a
reiteration of its position on this issue. Non -payment of taxes was
obviously to cease if the movement as a whole was being
withdrawn.
There are also some indications that Gandhiji’s decision
may have been prompted by the fact that in many parts of the
country, by the second half of 1921, the movemen t had shown
clear signs of being on the ebb. Students had started drifting
back to schools and colleges, lawyers and litigants to law courts,
the commercial classes showed signs of weariness and worry at
the accumulating stocks of foreign cloth, attendance at meetings
and rallies had dwindled, both in the urban and rural areas. This
does not mean that in some pockets, like Bardoli in Gujarat or
Guntur in Andhra, where intensive political work had been done,
the masses were not ready to carry on the struggle . But the mass
enthusiasm that was evident all over the country in the first part
of 1921 had, perhaps, receded. The cadre and the active political
workers were willing to carry on the fight, but a mass movement
of such a nature required the active partici pation of the masses,
and not only of the highly motivated among them. However, at
the present stage of research, it is not possible to argue this
position with great force; we only wish to urge the possibility that
this too was among the factors that led to the decision to
withdraw.
Gandhiji’s critics often fail to recognize that mass
movements have an inherent tendency to ebb after reaching a
certain height, that the capacity of the masses to withstand[/INST] |
certain height, that the capacity of the masses to withstand
repression, endure suffering and make sacrifices is not unlimited,
that a time comes when breathing space is required to
consolidate, recuperate, and gather strength for the next round of
struggle, and that, therefore, withdrawal or a shift to a phase of
non-confrontation is an inherent part of a strategy of political
action that is based on the masses. Withdrawal is not | <s>[INST]certain height, that the capacity of the masses to withstand
repression, endure suffering and make sacrifices is not unlimited,
that a time comes when breathing space is required to
consolidate, recuperate, and gather strength for the next round of
struggle, and that, therefore, withdrawal or a shift to a phase of
non-confrontation is an inherent part of a strategy of political
action that is based on the masses. Withdrawal is not[/INST] |
179 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
tantamount to betrayal; it is an inevitable part of the strategy
itself.
Of course, whether or not the withdrawal was made at the
correct time can always be a matter open to debate. But per haps
Gandhiji had enough reasons to believe that the moment he
chose was the right one. The movement had already gone on for
over a year, the Government was in no mood for negotiations,
and Chauri Chaura presented an opportunity to retreat with
honour, bef ore the internal weaknesses of the movement became
apparent enough to force a surrender or make the retreat look
like a rout.
*
Gandhiji had promised Swaraj within a year if his
programme was adopted. But the year was long over, the
movement was withdrawn , and there was no sign of Swaraj or
even of any tangible concessions. Had it all been in vain? Was the
movement a failure?
One could hardly answer in the affirmative. The Non -
Cooperation Movement had in fact succeeded on many counts. It
certainly demonst rated that it commanded the support and
sympathy of vast sections of the Indian people. After Non -
cooperation, the charge of representing a ‘microscopic minority,’
made by the Viceroy, Dufferin, in 1888,’ could never again be
hurled at the Indian National Congress. Its reach among many
sections of Indian peasants, workers, artisans, shopkeepers,
traders, professionals, white -collar employees, had been
demonstrated. The spatial spread of the movement was also
nation -wide. Some areas were more active than others, but there
were few that showed no signs of activity at all.
The capacity of the ‘poor dumb millions’ of India to take part
in modem nationalist politics was also demonstrated. By their
courage, sacrifice, and fortitude i n the face of adversity and
repression, they dispelled the notion that the desire for national
freedom was the preserve of the educated and the rich and
showed that it was an elemental urge common to all members of | <s>[INST]179 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
tantamount to betrayal; it is an inevitable part of the strategy
itself.
Of course, whether or not the withdrawal was made at the
correct time can always be a matter open to debate. But per haps
Gandhiji had enough reasons to believe that the moment he
chose was the right one. The movement had already gone on for
over a year, the Government was in no mood for negotiations,
and Chauri Chaura presented an opportunity to retreat with
honour, bef ore the internal weaknesses of the movement became
apparent enough to force a surrender or make the retreat look
like a rout.
*
Gandhiji had promised Swaraj within a year if his
programme was adopted. But the year was long over, the
movement was withdrawn , and there was no sign of Swaraj or
even of any tangible concessions. Had it all been in vain? Was the
movement a failure?
One could hardly answer in the affirmative. The Non -
Cooperation Movement had in fact succeeded on many counts. It
certainly demonst rated that it commanded the support and
sympathy of vast sections of the Indian people. After Non -
cooperation, the charge of representing a ‘microscopic minority,’
made by the Viceroy, Dufferin, in 1888,’ could never again be
hurled at the Indian National Congress. Its reach among many
sections of Indian peasants, workers, artisans, shopkeepers,
traders, professionals, white -collar employees, had been
demonstrated. The spatial spread of the movement was also
nation -wide. Some areas were more active than others, but there
were few that showed no signs of activity at all.
The capacity of the ‘poor dumb millions’ of India to take part
in modem nationalist politics was also demonstrated. By their
courage, sacrifice, and fortitude i n the face of adversity and
repression, they dispelled the notion that the desire for national
freedom was the preserve of the educated and the rich and
showed that it was an elemental urge common to all members of[/INST] |
180 | India’s Struggle For Independence
a subject nation. They may not as yet have fully comprehended
all its implications, understood all the arguments put forth in its
favour or observed all the discipline that the movement
demanded for its successful conduct. This was, after all, for many
of them, first contact with the modem world of nationalist politics
and the modern ideology of nationalism. This was the first time
that nationalists from the towns, students from schools and
colleges or even the educated and politically aware in the villages
had made a serious attempt to bring the ideology and the
movement into their midst. Its success was bound to be limited,
the weaknesses many. There were vast sections of the masses
that even then remained outside the ambit of the new awakening.
But this was only the beginning and more serious and consistent
efforts were yet in the offing. But the change was striking.
The tremendous participation of Muslims in the movement, and
the maintenance of communal unity, despite the Malabar
developments, was in itself no mean achievement. There is hardly
any doubt that it was Muslim p articipation that gave the
movement its truly mass character in many areas, at some places
two-thirds of those arrested were Muslims. And it was, indeed,
unfortunate that this most positive feature of the movement was
not to be repeated in later years once communalism began to
take its toll. The fraternization that was witnessed between
Hindus and Muslims, with Gandhiji and other Congress leaders
speaking from mosques, Gandhiji being allowed to address
meetings of Muslim women in which he was the only male who
was not blind -folded, all these began to look like romantic
dreams in later years.
*
The retreat that was ordered on 12 February, 1922 was only
a temporary one. The battle was over, but the war would
continue. To the challenge thrown by Montague and B irkenhead
that ‘India would not challenge with success the most determined | <s>[INST]180 | India’s Struggle For Independence
a subject nation. They may not as yet have fully comprehended
all its implications, understood all the arguments put forth in its
favour or observed all the discipline that the movement
demanded for its successful conduct. This was, after all, for many
of them, first contact with the modem world of nationalist politics
and the modern ideology of nationalism. This was the first time
that nationalists from the towns, students from schools and
colleges or even the educated and politically aware in the villages
had made a serious attempt to bring the ideology and the
movement into their midst. Its success was bound to be limited,
the weaknesses many. There were vast sections of the masses
that even then remained outside the ambit of the new awakening.
But this was only the beginning and more serious and consistent
efforts were yet in the offing. But the change was striking.
The tremendous participation of Muslims in the movement, and
the maintenance of communal unity, despite the Malabar
developments, was in itself no mean achievement. There is hardly
any doubt that it was Muslim p articipation that gave the
movement its truly mass character in many areas, at some places
two-thirds of those arrested were Muslims. And it was, indeed,
unfortunate that this most positive feature of the movement was
not to be repeated in later years once communalism began to
take its toll. The fraternization that was witnessed between
Hindus and Muslims, with Gandhiji and other Congress leaders
speaking from mosques, Gandhiji being allowed to address
meetings of Muslim women in which he was the only male who
was not blind -folded, all these began to look like romantic
dreams in later years.
*
The retreat that was ordered on 12 February, 1922 was only
a temporary one. The battle was over, but the war would
continue. To the challenge thrown by Montague and B irkenhead
that ‘India would not challenge with success the most determined[/INST] |
people in the world, who would once again answer the challenge
with all the vigour and determination at its command,’ Gandhiji,
in an article written in Young India on 23 February 1 922 after the
withdrawal of the movement, replied: ‘It is high time that the
British people were made to realize that the fight that was
commenced in 1920 is a fight to the finish, whether it lasts one | <s>[INST]people in the world, who would once again answer the challenge
with all the vigour and determination at its command,’ Gandhiji,
in an article written in Young India on 23 February 1 922 after the
withdrawal of the movement, replied: ‘It is high time that the
British people were made to realize that the fight that was
commenced in 1920 is a fight to the finish, whether it lasts one[/INST] |
181 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
month or one year or many months or many years and whe ther
the representatives of Britain re enact all the indescribable orgies
of the Mutiny days with redoubled force or whether they do not.” | <s>[INST]181 | The Non-Cooperat ion Movement — 1920 -22
month or one year or many months or many years and whe ther
the representatives of Britain re enact all the indescribable orgies
of the Mutiny days with redoubled force or whether they do not.”[/INST] |
182 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 16. PEASANT MOVEMENTS
AND NATIONALISM
IN THE1920S
Peasant discontent against e stablished authority was a
familiar feature of the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth
century, the movements that emerged out of this discontent were
marked by a new feature: they were deeply influenced by and in
their turn had a marked impact on the ongoing struggle for
national freedom. To illustrate the complex nature of this
relationship, we will recount the story of three important peasant
struggles that emerged in the second and third decade of the
country: The Kisan Sabha and Eka movements in A vadh in U.P.,
the Mappila rebellion in Malabar and the Bardoli Satyagraha in
Gujarat.
*
Following the annexation of Avadh in 1856, the second half
of the nineteenth century had seen the strengthening of the hold
of the taluqdars or big landlords over the agrarian society of the
province. This had led to a situation in which exorbitant rents,
illegal levies, renewal fees or nazrana, and arbitrary ejectments or
bedakhli had made life miserable for the majority of the
cultivators. The high price of food and other necessities that
accompanied and followed World War I made the oppression all
the more difficult to bear, and the tenants of Avadh were ripe for
a message of resistance.
It was the more active members of the Home Rule League in
U.P. who initiated th e process of the organization of the peasants
of the province on modem lines into kisan sabhas. The U.P. Kisan
Sabha was s et up in February 1918 through the efforts of Gauri
Shankar Misra and lndra Narain Dwivedi, and with the support
of Madan Mohan Malavi ya. The U.P. Kisan Sabha demonstrated | <s>[INST]182 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 16. PEASANT MOVEMENTS
AND NATIONALISM
IN THE1920S
Peasant discontent against e stablished authority was a
familiar feature of the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth
century, the movements that emerged out of this discontent were
marked by a new feature: they were deeply influenced by and in
their turn had a marked impact on the ongoing struggle for
national freedom. To illustrate the complex nature of this
relationship, we will recount the story of three important peasant
struggles that emerged in the second and third decade of the
country: The Kisan Sabha and Eka movements in A vadh in U.P.,
the Mappila rebellion in Malabar and the Bardoli Satyagraha in
Gujarat.
*
Following the annexation of Avadh in 1856, the second half
of the nineteenth century had seen the strengthening of the hold
of the taluqdars or big landlords over the agrarian society of the
province. This had led to a situation in which exorbitant rents,
illegal levies, renewal fees or nazrana, and arbitrary ejectments or
bedakhli had made life miserable for the majority of the
cultivators. The high price of food and other necessities that
accompanied and followed World War I made the oppression all
the more difficult to bear, and the tenants of Avadh were ripe for
a message of resistance.
It was the more active members of the Home Rule League in
U.P. who initiated th e process of the organization of the peasants
of the province on modem lines into kisan sabhas. The U.P. Kisan
Sabha was s et up in February 1918 through the efforts of Gauri
Shankar Misra and lndra Narain Dwivedi, and with the support
of Madan Mohan Malavi ya. The U.P. Kisan Sabha demonstrated[/INST] |
183 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
considerable activity, and by June 1919 had established at least
450 branches in 173 tehsils of the province.
A consequence of this activity was that a large number of
kisan delegates from U.P. attended the Delhi and Amritsar
sessions of the Indian National Congress in December 1918 and
1919.
Towards the end of 1919, the first signs of grass -roots
peasant activity were evident in the reports of a nai-dhobi band (a
form of social boycott) on an estate in Pratapgarh district. By the
summer of 1920, in the villages of taluqdari Avadh, kisan
meetings called by village panchayats became frequent. The
names of Thinguri Singh and Durgapal Singh were associated
with this development. But soon another leader, who became
famous by the name of Baba Ramchandra, emerged as the
rallying point. Baba Ramchandra, a Brahmin from Maharashtra,
was a wanderer who had left home at the age of thirteen, done a
stint as an indentured labourer in Fiji and finally turned up in
Faizabad in U.P. in 1909. Till 1920, he had wandered around as
a sadhu, carrying a copy of Tulsidas’ Ramavan on his back, from
which he would often recite verses to rural audiences. In the
middle of 1920, however, he emerged as a leader of the peasants
of Avadh, and soon demonstrated considerable leadership and
organizational capacities.
In June 1920, Baba Ramchandra led a few hundred tenants
from the Jaunpur and Pratapgarh districts to Allahabad. There
he met Gauri Shankar Misra and Jawaharlal Nehru and asked
them to visit the villages to see for themselves the living
conditions of the tenants. The result was that, between June and
August, Jawaharlal Nehru made several visits to the rural areas
and developed close contacts with the Kisan Sabha movement.
*
Meanwhile, the kis ans found sympathy in Mehta, the
Deputy Commissioner of Pratapgarh, who promised to investigate
complaints forwarded to him. The Kisan Sabha at village Roor in | <s>[INST]183 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
considerable activity, and by June 1919 had established at least
450 branches in 173 tehsils of the province.
A consequence of this activity was that a large number of
kisan delegates from U.P. attended the Delhi and Amritsar
sessions of the Indian National Congress in December 1918 and
1919.
Towards the end of 1919, the first signs of grass -roots
peasant activity were evident in the reports of a nai-dhobi band (a
form of social boycott) on an estate in Pratapgarh district. By the
summer of 1920, in the villages of taluqdari Avadh, kisan
meetings called by village panchayats became frequent. The
names of Thinguri Singh and Durgapal Singh were associated
with this development. But soon another leader, who became
famous by the name of Baba Ramchandra, emerged as the
rallying point. Baba Ramchandra, a Brahmin from Maharashtra,
was a wanderer who had left home at the age of thirteen, done a
stint as an indentured labourer in Fiji and finally turned up in
Faizabad in U.P. in 1909. Till 1920, he had wandered around as
a sadhu, carrying a copy of Tulsidas’ Ramavan on his back, from
which he would often recite verses to rural audiences. In the
middle of 1920, however, he emerged as a leader of the peasants
of Avadh, and soon demonstrated considerable leadership and
organizational capacities.
In June 1920, Baba Ramchandra led a few hundred tenants
from the Jaunpur and Pratapgarh districts to Allahabad. There
he met Gauri Shankar Misra and Jawaharlal Nehru and asked
them to visit the villages to see for themselves the living
conditions of the tenants. The result was that, between June and
August, Jawaharlal Nehru made several visits to the rural areas
and developed close contacts with the Kisan Sabha movement.
*
Meanwhile, the kis ans found sympathy in Mehta, the
Deputy Commissioner of Pratapgarh, who promised to investigate
complaints forwarded to him. The Kisan Sabha at village Roor in[/INST] |
Pratapgarh district became the centre of activity and about one
lakh tenants were reported to ha ve registered their complaints
with this Sabha on the payment of one anna each. Gauri | <s>[INST]Pratapgarh district became the centre of activity and about one
lakh tenants were reported to ha ve registered their complaints
with this Sabha on the payment of one anna each. Gauri[/INST] |
184 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Shankar Mia was also very active in Pratapgarh during this
period, and was in the process of working out an agreement with
Mehta over some of the crucial tenant complaint s such as
bedakhli and nazrana.
But, in August 1920, Mehta went on leave and the taluqdars
used the opportunity to strike at the growing kisan movement.
They succeeded in getting Ramchandra and thirty -two kisans
arrested on a trumped -up charge of theft on 28 August 1920.
Incensed at this, 4,000 to 5,000 kisans collected at Pratapgarh to
see their leaders in jail and were dispersed after a great deal of
persuasion.
Ten days later, a rumour that Gandhiji was coming to
secure the release of Baba Ramchandra b rought ten to twenty
thousand kisans to Pratapgarh, and this time they returned to
their homes only after Baba Ramchandra gave them darshan
from atop a tree in a sugar -cane field. By now, their numbers had
swelled to sixty thousand. Mehta was called back f rom leave to
deal with the situation and he quickly withdrew the case of theft
and attempted to bring pressure on the landlords to change their
ways This easy victory, however, gave a new confidence to the
movement and it burgeoned forth.
Meanwhile, the C ongress at Calcutta had chosen the path of
non cooperation and many nationalists of U.P. had committed
themselves to the new political path. But there were others,
including Madan Mohan Malaviya, who preferred to stick to
constitutional agitation. These di fferences were reflected in the
U.P. Kisan Sabha as well, and soon the Non -cooperators set up
an alternative Oudh Kisan Sabha at Pratapgarh on 17 October
1920. This new body succeeded in integrating under its banner
all the grassroots kisan sabhas that had emerged in the districts
of Avadh in the past few months; through the efforts of Misra,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mata Badal Pande, Baba Ramchandra, Deo
Narayan Pande and Kedar Nath, the new organization brought | <s>[INST]184 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Shankar Mia was also very active in Pratapgarh during this
period, and was in the process of working out an agreement with
Mehta over some of the crucial tenant complaint s such as
bedakhli and nazrana.
But, in August 1920, Mehta went on leave and the taluqdars
used the opportunity to strike at the growing kisan movement.
They succeeded in getting Ramchandra and thirty -two kisans
arrested on a trumped -up charge of theft on 28 August 1920.
Incensed at this, 4,000 to 5,000 kisans collected at Pratapgarh to
see their leaders in jail and were dispersed after a great deal of
persuasion.
Ten days later, a rumour that Gandhiji was coming to
secure the release of Baba Ramchandra b rought ten to twenty
thousand kisans to Pratapgarh, and this time they returned to
their homes only after Baba Ramchandra gave them darshan
from atop a tree in a sugar -cane field. By now, their numbers had
swelled to sixty thousand. Mehta was called back f rom leave to
deal with the situation and he quickly withdrew the case of theft
and attempted to bring pressure on the landlords to change their
ways This easy victory, however, gave a new confidence to the
movement and it burgeoned forth.
Meanwhile, the C ongress at Calcutta had chosen the path of
non cooperation and many nationalists of U.P. had committed
themselves to the new political path. But there were others,
including Madan Mohan Malaviya, who preferred to stick to
constitutional agitation. These di fferences were reflected in the
U.P. Kisan Sabha as well, and soon the Non -cooperators set up
an alternative Oudh Kisan Sabha at Pratapgarh on 17 October
1920. This new body succeeded in integrating under its banner
all the grassroots kisan sabhas that had emerged in the districts
of Avadh in the past few months; through the efforts of Misra,
Jawaharlal Nehru, Mata Badal Pande, Baba Ramchandra, Deo
Narayan Pande and Kedar Nath, the new organization brought[/INST] |
Narayan Pande and Kedar Nath, the new organization brought
under its wing, by the end of October, over 330 kisan sabhas.
The Oudh Kisan Sabha asked the kisans to refuse to till bedakhli
land, not to offer hari and begar (forms of unpaid labour), to
boycott those who did not accept these conditions and to solve
their disputes through panchayats. The first big show of strength
of the Sabba was the rally held at Ayodhya, near Faizabad town, | <s>[INST]Narayan Pande and Kedar Nath, the new organization brought
under its wing, by the end of October, over 330 kisan sabhas.
The Oudh Kisan Sabha asked the kisans to refuse to till bedakhli
land, not to offer hari and begar (forms of unpaid labour), to
boycott those who did not accept these conditions and to solve
their disputes through panchayats. The first big show of strength
of the Sabba was the rally held at Ayodhya, near Faizabad town,[/INST] |
185 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
on 20 and 21 D ecember which was attended by roughly 100,000
peasants. At this rally, Baba Ramchandra turned up bound in
ropes to symbolize the oppression of the kisans. A marked
feature of the Kisan Sabha movement was that kisans belonging
to the high as well as the low castes were to be found in its
ranks.
In January 1921, however, the nature of the peasant
activity underwent a marked change. The centres of activity were
primaril y the districts of Rae Bareli, Faizabad and, to a lesser
extent, Sultanpur. The pattern of activity was the looting of
bazaars, houses, granaries, and clashes with the police. A series
of incidents, small an d big, but similar in character . Some, suc h
as the ones at Munshiganj and Karhaiya Bazaar in Rae Bareli,
were sparked off by the arrests or rumours of arrest of leaders.
The lead was often taken not by recognized Kisan Sabha activists,
but by loc al figures -- sadhus, holy men, and disinherited ex -
proprietors.
The Government, however, had little difficulty in
suppressing these outbreaks of violence. Crowds were fired upon
and dispersed, leaders and activists arrested, cases launched
and, except for a couple of incidents in February and March, the
movement was over by the end of January itself. In March, the
Seditious Meetings Act was brought in to cover the affected
districts and all political activity came to a standstill. Nationalists
continued to defend the cases of the tenants in the courts, but
could do little else. The Government, meanwhile, pushed through
the Oudh Rent (Amendment) Act, and though it brought little
relief to the tenants, it helped to rouse hopes and in its own way
assisted in the decline of the movement.
*
Towards the end of th e year, peasant discontent surfaced
again in Avadh, hut this time the centres were the districts of
Hardoi, Bahraich, and Sitapur in the northern part of the
province. The initial thrust here was provided by Congress and | <s>[INST]185 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
on 20 and 21 D ecember which was attended by roughly 100,000
peasants. At this rally, Baba Ramchandra turned up bound in
ropes to symbolize the oppression of the kisans. A marked
feature of the Kisan Sabha movement was that kisans belonging
to the high as well as the low castes were to be found in its
ranks.
In January 1921, however, the nature of the peasant
activity underwent a marked change. The centres of activity were
primaril y the districts of Rae Bareli, Faizabad and, to a lesser
extent, Sultanpur. The pattern of activity was the looting of
bazaars, houses, granaries, and clashes with the police. A series
of incidents, small an d big, but similar in character . Some, suc h
as the ones at Munshiganj and Karhaiya Bazaar in Rae Bareli,
were sparked off by the arrests or rumours of arrest of leaders.
The lead was often taken not by recognized Kisan Sabha activists,
but by loc al figures -- sadhus, holy men, and disinherited ex -
proprietors.
The Government, however, had little difficulty in
suppressing these outbreaks of violence. Crowds were fired upon
and dispersed, leaders and activists arrested, cases launched
and, except for a couple of incidents in February and March, the
movement was over by the end of January itself. In March, the
Seditious Meetings Act was brought in to cover the affected
districts and all political activity came to a standstill. Nationalists
continued to defend the cases of the tenants in the courts, but
could do little else. The Government, meanwhile, pushed through
the Oudh Rent (Amendment) Act, and though it brought little
relief to the tenants, it helped to rouse hopes and in its own way
assisted in the decline of the movement.
*
Towards the end of th e year, peasant discontent surfaced
again in Avadh, hut this time the centres were the districts of
Hardoi, Bahraich, and Sitapur in the northern part of the
province. The initial thrust here was provided by Congress and[/INST] |
province. The initial thrust here was provided by Congress and
Khilafat leaders and the movement grew under the name of the
Eka or unity movement. The main grievances here related to the
extraction of a rent that was generally fifty per cent higher than | <s>[INST]province. The initial thrust here was provided by Congress and
Khilafat leaders and the movement grew under the name of the
Eka or unity movement. The main grievances here related to the
extraction of a rent that was generally fifty per cent higher than[/INST] |
186 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the recorded rent, the oppression of thekedars to whom the work
of rent- collection was farmed out a nd the practice of share -rents.
The Eka meetings were marked by a religious ritual in
which a hole that represented the river Ganges was dug in the
ground and filled with water, a priest was brought in to preside
and the assembled peasants ‘owed that they would pay only the
recorded rent but pay it on time, would not leave when ejected,
would refuse to do forced labour, would give no help to criminals
and abide by the panchayat decisions.
The Eka Movement, however, soon developed its own grass -
roots leade rship in the form of Madari Pasi and other low -caste
leaders who were no particularly inclined to accept the discipline
of non -violence that the Congress and Khilafat leaders urged. As
a result, the movement’s contact wi th the nationalists diminished
and it went its own way. However, unlike the earlier Kisan Sabha
movement that was based almost solely on tenants, the Eka
Movement included in its ranks many small zamindars who
found themselves disenchanted with the Government because of
its heavy land revenu e demand. By March 1922, however, severe
repression on the part of the authorities succeeded in bringing
the Eka Movement to its end.
*
In August 1921, peasant discontent erupted in the Malabar
district of Kerala. Here Mappila (Muslim) tenants rebelled. Th eir
grievances related to lack of any security of tenure, renewal fees,
high rents, and other oppressive landlord exactions. In the
nineteenth century as well, there had been cases of Mappila
resistance to landlord oppression but what erupted in 1921 was
on a different scale together.
The impetus for resistance had first come from the Malabar
District Congress Conference held at Manjeri in April 1920. This
conference supported the tenants’ cause and demanded
legislation to regulate landlord - tenant relatio ns. The change was | <s>[INST]186 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the recorded rent, the oppression of thekedars to whom the work
of rent- collection was farmed out a nd the practice of share -rents.
The Eka meetings were marked by a religious ritual in
which a hole that represented the river Ganges was dug in the
ground and filled with water, a priest was brought in to preside
and the assembled peasants ‘owed that they would pay only the
recorded rent but pay it on time, would not leave when ejected,
would refuse to do forced labour, would give no help to criminals
and abide by the panchayat decisions.
The Eka Movement, however, soon developed its own grass -
roots leade rship in the form of Madari Pasi and other low -caste
leaders who were no particularly inclined to accept the discipline
of non -violence that the Congress and Khilafat leaders urged. As
a result, the movement’s contact wi th the nationalists diminished
and it went its own way. However, unlike the earlier Kisan Sabha
movement that was based almost solely on tenants, the Eka
Movement included in its ranks many small zamindars who
found themselves disenchanted with the Government because of
its heavy land revenu e demand. By March 1922, however, severe
repression on the part of the authorities succeeded in bringing
the Eka Movement to its end.
*
In August 1921, peasant discontent erupted in the Malabar
district of Kerala. Here Mappila (Muslim) tenants rebelled. Th eir
grievances related to lack of any security of tenure, renewal fees,
high rents, and other oppressive landlord exactions. In the
nineteenth century as well, there had been cases of Mappila
resistance to landlord oppression but what erupted in 1921 was
on a different scale together.
The impetus for resistance had first come from the Malabar
District Congress Conference held at Manjeri in April 1920. This
conference supported the tenants’ cause and demanded
legislation to regulate landlord - tenant relatio ns. The change was[/INST] |
significant because earlier the landlords had successfully
prevented the Congress from committing itself to the tenants’
cause. The Manjeri conference was followed by the formation of a | <s>[INST]significant because earlier the landlords had successfully
prevented the Congress from committing itself to the tenants’
cause. The Manjeri conference was followed by the formation of a[/INST] |
187 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
tenants’ association at Kozhikode, and soon tenants ’ associations
were set up in other parts of the district.
Simultaneously, the Khilafat Movement was also extending
its sweep. In fact, there was hardly any way one could distinguish
between Khilafat and tenants’ meetings, the leaders and the
audience wer e the same, and the two movements were
inextricably merged into one. The social base of the movement
was primarily among the Mappila tenants, and Hindus were quite
conspicuous by their absence, though the movement could count
on a number of Hindu leaders.
Disturbed by the growing popularity of the Khilafat -cum-
tenant agitation, which had received considerable impetus from
the visits of Gandhiji, Shaukat Au, and Maulana Azad, the
Government issued prohibitory notices on all Khilafat meetings
on 5 February 1921. On 18 February, all the prominent Khilafat
and Congress leaders, Yakub Hasan, U. Gopala Menon, P.
Moideen Koya and K. Madhavan Nair, were arrested. This
resulted in the leadership passing into the hands of the local
Mappila leaders.
Angered by repres sion and encouraged by rumours that the
British, weakened as a result of the World War, were no longer in
a position to take strong military action, the Mappilas began to
exhibit increasing signs of turbulence and defiance of authority.
But the final break came only when the District Magistrate of
Eranad taluq. E.F. Thomas, on 20 August 1921, accompanied by
a contingent of police and troops, raided the mosque at
Tirurangadi to arrest Ali Musaliar, a Khilafat leader and a highly
respected priest. They found only three fairly insignificant
Khilafat volunteers and arrested them. However the news that
spread was that the famous Mambrath mosque, of which Au
Musaliar was the priest, had been raided and destroyed by the
British army. Soon Mappilas from Kottakkal, T anur and
Parappanagadi converged at Tirurangadi and their leaders met | <s>[INST]187 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
tenants’ association at Kozhikode, and soon tenants ’ associations
were set up in other parts of the district.
Simultaneously, the Khilafat Movement was also extending
its sweep. In fact, there was hardly any way one could distinguish
between Khilafat and tenants’ meetings, the leaders and the
audience wer e the same, and the two movements were
inextricably merged into one. The social base of the movement
was primarily among the Mappila tenants, and Hindus were quite
conspicuous by their absence, though the movement could count
on a number of Hindu leaders.
Disturbed by the growing popularity of the Khilafat -cum-
tenant agitation, which had received considerable impetus from
the visits of Gandhiji, Shaukat Au, and Maulana Azad, the
Government issued prohibitory notices on all Khilafat meetings
on 5 February 1921. On 18 February, all the prominent Khilafat
and Congress leaders, Yakub Hasan, U. Gopala Menon, P.
Moideen Koya and K. Madhavan Nair, were arrested. This
resulted in the leadership passing into the hands of the local
Mappila leaders.
Angered by repres sion and encouraged by rumours that the
British, weakened as a result of the World War, were no longer in
a position to take strong military action, the Mappilas began to
exhibit increasing signs of turbulence and defiance of authority.
But the final break came only when the District Magistrate of
Eranad taluq. E.F. Thomas, on 20 August 1921, accompanied by
a contingent of police and troops, raided the mosque at
Tirurangadi to arrest Ali Musaliar, a Khilafat leader and a highly
respected priest. They found only three fairly insignificant
Khilafat volunteers and arrested them. However the news that
spread was that the famous Mambrath mosque, of which Au
Musaliar was the priest, had been raided and destroyed by the
British army. Soon Mappilas from Kottakkal, T anur and
Parappanagadi converged at Tirurangadi and their leaders met[/INST] |
Parappanagadi converged at Tirurangadi and their leaders met
the British officers to secure the release of the arrested
volunteers. The people were quiet and peaceful, but the police
opened fire on the unarmed crowd and many were killed. A clash
ensued, and Government offices were destroyed, records burnt
and the treasury looted. The rebellion soon spread into the | <s>[INST]Parappanagadi converged at Tirurangadi and their leaders met
the British officers to secure the release of the arrested
volunteers. The people were quiet and peaceful, but the police
opened fire on the unarmed crowd and many were killed. A clash
ensued, and Government offices were destroyed, records burnt
and the treasury looted. The rebellion soon spread into the[/INST] |
188 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Eranad, Walluvanad and Ponnani taluqs, all Mappila
strongholds.
In the first stage of the rebellion, the targets of attack were
the unp opular jenmies (landlords), mostly Hindu, the symbols of
Government authority’s such as kutcheris (courts), police
stations, treasuries and offices, and British planters. Lenient
landlords and poor Hindus were rarely touched. Rebels would
travel many miles through territory populated by Hindus and
attack only the landlords and burn their records. Some of the
rebel leaders, like Kunhammed Haji, took special care to see that
Hindus were not molested or looted and even punished those
among the rebels who attac ked the Hindus. Kunhammed Haji
also did not discriminate in favour of Muslims: he ordered the
execution and punishment of a number of pro -government
Mappilas as well.
But once the British declared martial law and repression•
began in earnest, the characte r of the rebellion underwent a
definite change. Many Hindus were either pressurized into
helping the authorities or voluntarily gave assistance and this
helped to strengthen the already existing anti - Hindu sentiment
among the poor illiterate Mappilas who in any case were
motivated by a strong religious ideology. Forced conversions,
attacks on and murders of Hindus increased as the sense of
desperation mounted. What had been largely an anti -government
and anti -landlord affair acquired strong communal overto nes.
The Mappilas’ recourse to violence had in any case driven a
wedge between them and the Non -Cooperation Movement which
was based on the principle of non -violence. The communalization
of the rebellion completed the isolation of the Mappilas. British
repression did the rest and by December 1921 all resistance had
come to a stop. The toll was heavy indeed: 2,337 Mappilas had
lost their lives. Unofficial estimates placed the number at above
10,000. A total of 45,404 rebels were captured or had | <s>[INST]188 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Eranad, Walluvanad and Ponnani taluqs, all Mappila
strongholds.
In the first stage of the rebellion, the targets of attack were
the unp opular jenmies (landlords), mostly Hindu, the symbols of
Government authority’s such as kutcheris (courts), police
stations, treasuries and offices, and British planters. Lenient
landlords and poor Hindus were rarely touched. Rebels would
travel many miles through territory populated by Hindus and
attack only the landlords and burn their records. Some of the
rebel leaders, like Kunhammed Haji, took special care to see that
Hindus were not molested or looted and even punished those
among the rebels who attac ked the Hindus. Kunhammed Haji
also did not discriminate in favour of Muslims: he ordered the
execution and punishment of a number of pro -government
Mappilas as well.
But once the British declared martial law and repression•
began in earnest, the characte r of the rebellion underwent a
definite change. Many Hindus were either pressurized into
helping the authorities or voluntarily gave assistance and this
helped to strengthen the already existing anti - Hindu sentiment
among the poor illiterate Mappilas who in any case were
motivated by a strong religious ideology. Forced conversions,
attacks on and murders of Hindus increased as the sense of
desperation mounted. What had been largely an anti -government
and anti -landlord affair acquired strong communal overto nes.
The Mappilas’ recourse to violence had in any case driven a
wedge between them and the Non -Cooperation Movement which
was based on the principle of non -violence. The communalization
of the rebellion completed the isolation of the Mappilas. British
repression did the rest and by December 1921 all resistance had
come to a stop. The toll was heavy indeed: 2,337 Mappilas had
lost their lives. Unofficial estimates placed the number at above
10,000. A total of 45,404 rebels were captured or had[/INST] |
10,000. A total of 45,404 rebels were captured or had
surrendered. But the toll was in fact even heavier, though in a
very different way. From then onwards, the militant Mappilas
were so completely crushed and demoralized that till
independence their participation in any form of politics was
almost nil. They neither join ed the national movement nor the | <s>[INST]10,000. A total of 45,404 rebels were captured or had
surrendered. But the toll was in fact even heavier, though in a
very different way. From then onwards, the militant Mappilas
were so completely crushed and demoralized that till
independence their participation in any form of politics was
almost nil. They neither join ed the national movement nor the[/INST] |
189 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
peasant movement that was to grow in Kerala in later years
under the Left leadership.
*
The peasant movements in U.P. and Malabar were thus
closely linked with the politics at the national level. In UP., the
impetus had co me from the Home Rule Leagues and, later, from
the Non -Cooperation and Khilafat movement. In Avadh, in the
early months of 1921 when peasant activity was at its peak, it
was difficult to distinguish between a Non cooperation meeting
and a peasant rally. A similar situation arose in Malabar, where
Khilafat and tenants’ meetings merged into one. But in both
places, the recourse to violence by the peasants created a
distance between them and the national movement and led to
appeals by the nationalist leaders t o the peasants that they
should not indulge in violence. Often, the national leaders,
especially Gandhiji, also asked the peasants to desist from taking
extreme action like stopping the payment of rent to landlords.
This divergence between the actions and perceptions of
peasants and local leaders and the understanding of the national
leaders had often been interpreted as a sign of the fear of the
middle class or bourgeois leadership that the movement would go
out of its own ‘safe’ hands into that of suppos edly more radical
and militant leaders of the people. The call for restraint, both in
the demands as well as in the methods used, is seen as proof of
concern for the landlords and propertied classes of Indian
society. It is possible, however, that the advi ce of the national
leadership was prompted by the desire to protect the peasants
from the consequences of violent revolt, consequences which did
not remain hidden for long as both in U.P. and Malabar the
Government launched heavy repression in order to cru sh the
movements. Their advice that peasants should not push things
too far with the landlords by refusing to pay rent could also stem | <s>[INST]189 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
peasant movement that was to grow in Kerala in later years
under the Left leadership.
*
The peasant movements in U.P. and Malabar were thus
closely linked with the politics at the national level. In UP., the
impetus had co me from the Home Rule Leagues and, later, from
the Non -Cooperation and Khilafat movement. In Avadh, in the
early months of 1921 when peasant activity was at its peak, it
was difficult to distinguish between a Non cooperation meeting
and a peasant rally. A similar situation arose in Malabar, where
Khilafat and tenants’ meetings merged into one. But in both
places, the recourse to violence by the peasants created a
distance between them and the national movement and led to
appeals by the nationalist leaders t o the peasants that they
should not indulge in violence. Often, the national leaders,
especially Gandhiji, also asked the peasants to desist from taking
extreme action like stopping the payment of rent to landlords.
This divergence between the actions and perceptions of
peasants and local leaders and the understanding of the national
leaders had often been interpreted as a sign of the fear of the
middle class or bourgeois leadership that the movement would go
out of its own ‘safe’ hands into that of suppos edly more radical
and militant leaders of the people. The call for restraint, both in
the demands as well as in the methods used, is seen as proof of
concern for the landlords and propertied classes of Indian
society. It is possible, however, that the advi ce of the national
leadership was prompted by the desire to protect the peasants
from the consequences of violent revolt, consequences which did
not remain hidden for long as both in U.P. and Malabar the
Government launched heavy repression in order to cru sh the
movements. Their advice that peasants should not push things
too far with the landlords by refusing to pay rent could also stem[/INST] |
from other considerations. The peasants themselves were not
demanding abolition of rent or landlordism, they only wanted an
end to ejectments, illegal levies, and exorbitant rents — demands
which the national leadership supported. The recourse to extreme
measures like refusal to pay rent was likely to push even the | <s>[INST]from other considerations. The peasants themselves were not
demanding abolition of rent or landlordism, they only wanted an
end to ejectments, illegal levies, and exorbitant rents — demands
which the national leadership supported. The recourse to extreme
measures like refusal to pay rent was likely to push even the[/INST] |
190 | India’s Struggle For Independence
small landlords further into the lap of the government and
destroy any chances of their maintaining a neutrality towards the
on-going conflict between the government and the national
movement.
*
The no-tax movement that was launched in Bardoli taluq of
Surat district in Gujarat in 1928 was also in many ways a chi ld
of the Non -cooperation days.’ Bardoli taluq had been selected in
1922 as the place from where Gandhiji would launch the civil
disobedience campaign, but events in Chauri Chaura had
changed all that and the campaign never took off. However, a
marked change had taken place in the area because of the
various preparations for the civil disobedience movement and the
end result was that Bardoli had undergone a process of intense
politicization and awareness of the political scene. The local
leaders such as th e brothers Kalyanji and Kunverji Mehta, and
Dayalji Desai, had worked hard to spread the message of the
Non-Cooperation Movement. These leaders, who had been
working in the district as social reformers and political activists
for at least a decade prior to Non-cooperation, had set up many
national schools, persuaded students to leave government
schools, carried out the boycott of foreign cloth and liquor, and
had captured the Surat municipality.
After the withdrawal of the Non -Cooperation Movement, the
Bardoli Congressmen had settled down to intense constructive
work.
Stung by Gandhiji’s rebuke in 1922 that they had done
nothing for the upliftment of the low -caste untouchable and
tribal inhabitants — who were known by the name of Kaliparaj
(dark people) to distinguish them from the high caste or
Ujaliparaj (fair people) and who formed sixty per cent of the
population of the taluq — these men, who belonged to high castes
started work among the Kaliparaj through a network of six
ashrams that were spread out over the taluq. These ashrams,
many of which survive to this day as living institutions working | <s>[INST]190 | India’s Struggle For Independence
small landlords further into the lap of the government and
destroy any chances of their maintaining a neutrality towards the
on-going conflict between the government and the national
movement.
*
The no-tax movement that was launched in Bardoli taluq of
Surat district in Gujarat in 1928 was also in many ways a chi ld
of the Non -cooperation days.’ Bardoli taluq had been selected in
1922 as the place from where Gandhiji would launch the civil
disobedience campaign, but events in Chauri Chaura had
changed all that and the campaign never took off. However, a
marked change had taken place in the area because of the
various preparations for the civil disobedience movement and the
end result was that Bardoli had undergone a process of intense
politicization and awareness of the political scene. The local
leaders such as th e brothers Kalyanji and Kunverji Mehta, and
Dayalji Desai, had worked hard to spread the message of the
Non-Cooperation Movement. These leaders, who had been
working in the district as social reformers and political activists
for at least a decade prior to Non-cooperation, had set up many
national schools, persuaded students to leave government
schools, carried out the boycott of foreign cloth and liquor, and
had captured the Surat municipality.
After the withdrawal of the Non -Cooperation Movement, the
Bardoli Congressmen had settled down to intense constructive
work.
Stung by Gandhiji’s rebuke in 1922 that they had done
nothing for the upliftment of the low -caste untouchable and
tribal inhabitants — who were known by the name of Kaliparaj
(dark people) to distinguish them from the high caste or
Ujaliparaj (fair people) and who formed sixty per cent of the
population of the taluq — these men, who belonged to high castes
started work among the Kaliparaj through a network of six
ashrams that were spread out over the taluq. These ashrams,
many of which survive to this day as living institutions working[/INST] |
for the education of the tribals, did much to lift the taluq out of
the demoralization that had followed the withdrawal of 1922.
Kunverji Mehta and Keshavji Gan eshji learnt the tribal dialect, | <s>[INST]for the education of the tribals, did much to lift the taluq out of
the demoralization that had followed the withdrawal of 1922.
Kunverji Mehta and Keshavji Gan eshji learnt the tribal dialect,[/INST] |
191 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
and developed a ‘Kaliparaj literature’ with the assistance of the
educated members of the Kaliparaj community, which contained
poems and prose that aroused the Kaliparaj against the Hali
system under which they laboured as hereditary labourers for
upper -caste landowners, and exhorted them to abjure
intoxicating drinks and high marriage expenses which led to
financial ruin. Bhajan mandalis consisting of Kaliparaj and
Ujaliparaj members were used to spread the message. Night
schools were started to educate the Kaliparaj and in 1927 a
school for the education of Kaliparaj children was set up in
Bardoli town. Ashram workers had to often tce the hostility of
upper -caste landowners who feared that all this would ‘spoil’
their labou r. Annual Kallparaj conferences were held in 1922
and, in 1927, Gandhiji, who presided over the annual conference,
initiated an enquiry into the conditions of the Kaliparaj , who he
also now renamed as Raniparaf or the inhabitants of the forest in
preferen ce to the derogatory term Kaliparaj or dark people. Many
leading figures of Gujarat including Narhari Parikh and Jugatram
Dave conducted the inquiry which turned into a severe
indictment of the Hall system, exploitation by money lenders and
sexual exploita tion of women by upper -castes. As a result of this,
the Congress had built up a considerable’ base among the
Kaliparaj , and could count on their support in the future.
Simultaneously, of course, the Ashram workers had
continued to work among the landownin g peasants as well, and
had to an extent regained their influence among them. Therefore,
when in January 1926 it became known that Jayakar, the officer
charged with the duty of reassessment of the land revenue
demand of the taluq, had recommended a thirty percent increase
over the existing assessment, the Congress leaders were quick to
protest against the increase and set up the Bardoli Inquiry | <s>[INST]191 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
and developed a ‘Kaliparaj literature’ with the assistance of the
educated members of the Kaliparaj community, which contained
poems and prose that aroused the Kaliparaj against the Hali
system under which they laboured as hereditary labourers for
upper -caste landowners, and exhorted them to abjure
intoxicating drinks and high marriage expenses which led to
financial ruin. Bhajan mandalis consisting of Kaliparaj and
Ujaliparaj members were used to spread the message. Night
schools were started to educate the Kaliparaj and in 1927 a
school for the education of Kaliparaj children was set up in
Bardoli town. Ashram workers had to often tce the hostility of
upper -caste landowners who feared that all this would ‘spoil’
their labou r. Annual Kallparaj conferences were held in 1922
and, in 1927, Gandhiji, who presided over the annual conference,
initiated an enquiry into the conditions of the Kaliparaj , who he
also now renamed as Raniparaf or the inhabitants of the forest in
preferen ce to the derogatory term Kaliparaj or dark people. Many
leading figures of Gujarat including Narhari Parikh and Jugatram
Dave conducted the inquiry which turned into a severe
indictment of the Hall system, exploitation by money lenders and
sexual exploita tion of women by upper -castes. As a result of this,
the Congress had built up a considerable’ base among the
Kaliparaj , and could count on their support in the future.
Simultaneously, of course, the Ashram workers had
continued to work among the landownin g peasants as well, and
had to an extent regained their influence among them. Therefore,
when in January 1926 it became known that Jayakar, the officer
charged with the duty of reassessment of the land revenue
demand of the taluq, had recommended a thirty percent increase
over the existing assessment, the Congress leaders were quick to
protest against the increase and set up the Bardoli Inquiry[/INST] |
protest against the increase and set up the Bardoli Inquiry
Committee to go into the issue. Its report, published in July
1926, came to the conclusion that the increase was unjustified.
This was followed by a campaign in the Press, the lead being
taken by Young India and Navjivan edited by Gandhiji. The
constitutionalist leaders of the area, including the members of
the Legislative Council, also took up the issue. In July 1927 , the
Government reduced the enhancement to 21.97 per cent.
But the concessions were too meagre and came too late to
satisfy anybody. The constitutionalist leaders now began to | <s>[INST]protest against the increase and set up the Bardoli Inquiry
Committee to go into the issue. Its report, published in July
1926, came to the conclusion that the increase was unjustified.
This was followed by a campaign in the Press, the lead being
taken by Young India and Navjivan edited by Gandhiji. The
constitutionalist leaders of the area, including the members of
the Legislative Council, also took up the issue. In July 1927 , the
Government reduced the enhancement to 21.97 per cent.
But the concessions were too meagre and came too late to
satisfy anybody. The constitutionalist leaders now began to[/INST] |
192 | India’s Struggle For Independence
advise the peasants to resist by paying only the current amount
and withholdin g the enhanced amount. The ‘Ashram’ group, on
the other hand, argued that the entire amount must be withheld
if it was to have any effect on the Government. However, at this
stage, the peasants seemed more inclined to heed the advice of
the moderate leader s.
Gradually, however, as the limitations of the constitutional
leadership became more apparent, and their unwillingness to
lead even a movement based on the refusal of the enhanced
amount was clear, the peasants began to move towards the
‘Ashram’ group of Congress leaders. The latter, on their pan had
in the meanwhile contacted Vallabhbhai Patel and were
persuading him to take on the leadership of the movement A
meeting of representatives of sixty villages at Bamni in Kadod
division formally invited Valla bhbhai to lead the campaign. The
local leaders also met Gandhiji and after having assured him that
the peasants were fully aware of the implications of such a
campaign, secured his approval.
Patel reached Bardoli on 4 February and immediately had a
series of meetings with the representatives of the peasants and
the constitutionalist leaders. At one such meeting, the moderate
leaders frankly told the audience that their methods had failed
and they should now try Vallabhbhai’s methods. Vallabhbhai
explained to the peasants the consequences of their proposed
plan of action and advised them to give the matter a week’s
thought. He then returned to Ahmedabad and wrote a letter to
the Governor of Bombay explaining the miscalculations in the
settlement report and r equesting him to appoint an independent
enquiry; else, he wrote, he would have to advise the peasants to
refuse to pay the Land revenue and suffer the consequences.
On 12 February, Patel returned to Bardoli and explained the
situation, including the Gover nment’s curt reply, to the peasants’ | <s>[INST]192 | India’s Struggle For Independence
advise the peasants to resist by paying only the current amount
and withholdin g the enhanced amount. The ‘Ashram’ group, on
the other hand, argued that the entire amount must be withheld
if it was to have any effect on the Government. However, at this
stage, the peasants seemed more inclined to heed the advice of
the moderate leader s.
Gradually, however, as the limitations of the constitutional
leadership became more apparent, and their unwillingness to
lead even a movement based on the refusal of the enhanced
amount was clear, the peasants began to move towards the
‘Ashram’ group of Congress leaders. The latter, on their pan had
in the meanwhile contacted Vallabhbhai Patel and were
persuading him to take on the leadership of the movement A
meeting of representatives of sixty villages at Bamni in Kadod
division formally invited Valla bhbhai to lead the campaign. The
local leaders also met Gandhiji and after having assured him that
the peasants were fully aware of the implications of such a
campaign, secured his approval.
Patel reached Bardoli on 4 February and immediately had a
series of meetings with the representatives of the peasants and
the constitutionalist leaders. At one such meeting, the moderate
leaders frankly told the audience that their methods had failed
and they should now try Vallabhbhai’s methods. Vallabhbhai
explained to the peasants the consequences of their proposed
plan of action and advised them to give the matter a week’s
thought. He then returned to Ahmedabad and wrote a letter to
the Governor of Bombay explaining the miscalculations in the
settlement report and r equesting him to appoint an independent
enquiry; else, he wrote, he would have to advise the peasants to
refuse to pay the Land revenue and suffer the consequences.
On 12 February, Patel returned to Bardoli and explained the
situation, including the Gover nment’s curt reply, to the peasants’[/INST] |
representatives, following this, a meeting of the occupants of
Bardoli taluq passed a resolution advising all occupants of land
to refuse payment of the revised assessment until the
Government appointed an independent t ribunal or accepted the
current amount as full payment. Peasants were asked to take
oaths in the name of Prabhu (the Hindu name for god) and Khuda
(the Muslim name for god) that they would not pay the land | <s>[INST]representatives, following this, a meeting of the occupants of
Bardoli taluq passed a resolution advising all occupants of land
to refuse payment of the revised assessment until the
Government appointed an independent t ribunal or accepted the
current amount as full payment. Peasants were asked to take
oaths in the name of Prabhu (the Hindu name for god) and Khuda
(the Muslim name for god) that they would not pay the land[/INST] |
193 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
revenue. The resolution was followed by the recita tion of sacred
texts from the Gita and the Koran and songs from Kabir, who
symbolized Hindu -Muslim unity. The Satyagraha had begun.
Vallabhbhai Paid was ideally suited for leading the
campaign. A veteran of the Kheda Satyagraha, the Nagpur Flag
Satyagraha , and the Borsad Punitive Tax Satyagraha, he had
emerged as a leader of Gujarat who was second only to Gandhiji.
His capacities as an organizer, speaker, indefatigable
campaigner, inspirer of ordinary men and women were already
known, but it was the women of Bardoli who gave him the title of
Sardar. The residents of Bardoli to this day recall the stirring
effect of the Sardar’s speeches which he delivered in an idiom and
style that was close to the peasant’s heart.
The Sardar divided the taluq into thirtee n workers’ camps or
Chhavanis each under the charge of an experienced leader. One
hundred political workers drawn from all over the province,
assisted by 1,500 volunteers, many of whom were students,
formed the army of the movement. A publications bureau t hat
brought out the daily Bardoli Satyagraha Patrika was set up. This
Patrika contained reports about the movement, speeches of the
leaders, pictures of the jabti or confiscation proceedings and
other news. An army of volunteers distributed this to the far thest
corners of the taluq. The movement also had its own intelligence
wing, whose job was to find out who the indecisive peasants
were. The members of the intelligence wing would shadow them
night and day to see that they did not pay their dues, secure
information about Government moves, especially of the likelihood
of jabti (confiscation) and then warn the villagers to lock up their
houses or flee to neighbouring Baroda.
The main mobilization was done through extensive
propaganda via meetings, speeches, pamphlets, and door to door
persuasion. Special emphasis was placed on the mobilization of | <s>[INST]193 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
revenue. The resolution was followed by the recita tion of sacred
texts from the Gita and the Koran and songs from Kabir, who
symbolized Hindu -Muslim unity. The Satyagraha had begun.
Vallabhbhai Paid was ideally suited for leading the
campaign. A veteran of the Kheda Satyagraha, the Nagpur Flag
Satyagraha , and the Borsad Punitive Tax Satyagraha, he had
emerged as a leader of Gujarat who was second only to Gandhiji.
His capacities as an organizer, speaker, indefatigable
campaigner, inspirer of ordinary men and women were already
known, but it was the women of Bardoli who gave him the title of
Sardar. The residents of Bardoli to this day recall the stirring
effect of the Sardar’s speeches which he delivered in an idiom and
style that was close to the peasant’s heart.
The Sardar divided the taluq into thirtee n workers’ camps or
Chhavanis each under the charge of an experienced leader. One
hundred political workers drawn from all over the province,
assisted by 1,500 volunteers, many of whom were students,
formed the army of the movement. A publications bureau t hat
brought out the daily Bardoli Satyagraha Patrika was set up. This
Patrika contained reports about the movement, speeches of the
leaders, pictures of the jabti or confiscation proceedings and
other news. An army of volunteers distributed this to the far thest
corners of the taluq. The movement also had its own intelligence
wing, whose job was to find out who the indecisive peasants
were. The members of the intelligence wing would shadow them
night and day to see that they did not pay their dues, secure
information about Government moves, especially of the likelihood
of jabti (confiscation) and then warn the villagers to lock up their
houses or flee to neighbouring Baroda.
The main mobilization was done through extensive
propaganda via meetings, speeches, pamphlets, and door to door
persuasion. Special emphasis was placed on the mobilization of[/INST] |
persuasion. Special emphasis was placed on the mobilization of
women and many women activists like Mithuben Petit, a Parsi
lady from Bombay, Bhaktiba, the wife of Darbar Gopaldas,
Maniben Patel, the Sardar’ s daughter, Shardaben Shah and
Sharda Mehta were recruited for the purpose. As a result, women
often outnumbered men at the meetings and stood firm in their
resolve not to submit to Government threats. Students were | <s>[INST]persuasion. Special emphasis was placed on the mobilization of
women and many women activists like Mithuben Petit, a Parsi
lady from Bombay, Bhaktiba, the wife of Darbar Gopaldas,
Maniben Patel, the Sardar’ s daughter, Shardaben Shah and
Sharda Mehta were recruited for the purpose. As a result, women
often outnumbered men at the meetings and stood firm in their
resolve not to submit to Government threats. Students were[/INST] |
194 | India’s Struggle For Independence
another special target and they were asked to persuade their
families to remain thin.
Those who showed signs of weakness were brought into line
by means of social pressure and threats of social boycott. Caste
and village panchayats were used effectively for this purpose and
those who opposed the movement had to face the prospect of
being refused essential services from sweepers, barbers,
washermen, agricultural labourers, and of being socially
boycotted by their kinsmen and neighbours. These threats were
usually sufficient to prevent any weakening. Government officia ls
faced the worst of this form of pressure. They were refused
supplies, services, transport and found it almost impossible to
carry out their official duties. The work that the Congress leaders
had done among the Kaliparaj people also paid dividends durin g
this movement and the Government was totally unsuccessful in
its attempts to use them against the upper caste peasants.
Sardar Patel and his colleagues also made constant efforts
to see that they carried the constitutionalist and moderate
leadership, as well as public opinion, with them on all important
issues. The result of this was that very soon the Government
found even its supporters and sympathizers, as well as impartial
men, deserting its side. Many members of the Bombay Legislative
Council like K.M. Munshi and Laiji Naranji, the representatives of
the Indian Merchants Chamber, who were not hot -headed
extremists, resigned their seats. By July 1928, the Viceroy, Lord
Irwin, himself began to doubt the correctness of the Bombay
Government’s stand and put pressure on Governor Wilson to find
a way out. Uncomfortable questions had started appearing in the
British Parliament as well.
Public opinion in the country was getting more and more
restive and anti -Government. Peasants in many parts of Bombay
Presidency were threatening to agitate for revision of the revenue | <s>[INST]194 | India’s Struggle For Independence
another special target and they were asked to persuade their
families to remain thin.
Those who showed signs of weakness were brought into line
by means of social pressure and threats of social boycott. Caste
and village panchayats were used effectively for this purpose and
those who opposed the movement had to face the prospect of
being refused essential services from sweepers, barbers,
washermen, agricultural labourers, and of being socially
boycotted by their kinsmen and neighbours. These threats were
usually sufficient to prevent any weakening. Government officia ls
faced the worst of this form of pressure. They were refused
supplies, services, transport and found it almost impossible to
carry out their official duties. The work that the Congress leaders
had done among the Kaliparaj people also paid dividends durin g
this movement and the Government was totally unsuccessful in
its attempts to use them against the upper caste peasants.
Sardar Patel and his colleagues also made constant efforts
to see that they carried the constitutionalist and moderate
leadership, as well as public opinion, with them on all important
issues. The result of this was that very soon the Government
found even its supporters and sympathizers, as well as impartial
men, deserting its side. Many members of the Bombay Legislative
Council like K.M. Munshi and Laiji Naranji, the representatives of
the Indian Merchants Chamber, who were not hot -headed
extremists, resigned their seats. By July 1928, the Viceroy, Lord
Irwin, himself began to doubt the correctness of the Bombay
Government’s stand and put pressure on Governor Wilson to find
a way out. Uncomfortable questions had started appearing in the
British Parliament as well.
Public opinion in the country was getting more and more
restive and anti -Government. Peasants in many parts of Bombay
Presidency were threatening to agitate for revision of the revenue[/INST] |
assessments in their areas. Workers in Bombay textile mills were
on strike and there was a threat that Patel and the Bombay
Communists would combine in bringing about a railway strike
that would make movement of troops and supplies to Bardoli
impossible. The Bombay Youth League and other organizations
had mobilized the people of Bombay for huge public meetings
and demonstrations. Punjab was offering to send jathas on foot | <s>[INST]assessments in their areas. Workers in Bombay textile mills were
on strike and there was a threat that Patel and the Bombay
Communists would combine in bringing about a railway strike
that would make movement of troops and supplies to Bardoli
impossible. The Bombay Youth League and other organizations
had mobilized the people of Bombay for huge public meetings
and demonstrations. Punjab was offering to send jathas on foot[/INST] |
195 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
to Bardoli. Gandhiji had shifted to Bardoli on 2 August, 1928, in
order to take over the reins of the movement if Patel was arrested.
All told, a retreat, if it could be covered up by a face saving
device, seemed the best way out for the Government.
The face -saving device was pr ovided by the Legislative
Council members from Surat who wrote a letter to the Governor
assuring him that his pre -condition for an enquiry would be
satisfied. The letter contained no reference to what the pre -
condition was (though everyone knew that it was full payment of
the enhanced rent) because an understanding had already been
reached that the full enhanced rent would not be paid. Nobody
took the Governor seriously when he declared that he had
secured an ‘unconditional surrender.” It was the Bardoli
peasants who had won.
The enquiry, conducted by a judicial officer, Broomfield, and
a revenue officer, Maxwell, came to the conclusion that the
increase had been unjustified, and reduced the enhancement to
6.03 per cent. The New statesman of London summed u p the
whole affair on 5 May 1929: ‘The report of the Committee
constitutes the worst rebuff which any local government in India
has received for many years and may have far- reaching results...
It would be difficult to find an incident quite comparable wit h this
in the long and controversial annals of Indian Land Revenue. ‘
The relationship of Bardoli and other peasant struggles with
the struggle for freedom can best be described in Gandhiji’s pithy
words: ‘Whatever the Bardoli struggle may be, it clearly i s not a
struggle for the direct attainment of Swaraj. That every such
awakening, every such effort as that of Bardoli will bring Swaraj
nearer and may bring it nearer even than any direct effort is
undoubtedly true.’ | <s>[INST]195 |Peasant Movements and Nationalism in the 1920s
to Bardoli. Gandhiji had shifted to Bardoli on 2 August, 1928, in
order to take over the reins of the movement if Patel was arrested.
All told, a retreat, if it could be covered up by a face saving
device, seemed the best way out for the Government.
The face -saving device was pr ovided by the Legislative
Council members from Surat who wrote a letter to the Governor
assuring him that his pre -condition for an enquiry would be
satisfied. The letter contained no reference to what the pre -
condition was (though everyone knew that it was full payment of
the enhanced rent) because an understanding had already been
reached that the full enhanced rent would not be paid. Nobody
took the Governor seriously when he declared that he had
secured an ‘unconditional surrender.” It was the Bardoli
peasants who had won.
The enquiry, conducted by a judicial officer, Broomfield, and
a revenue officer, Maxwell, came to the conclusion that the
increase had been unjustified, and reduced the enhancement to
6.03 per cent. The New statesman of London summed u p the
whole affair on 5 May 1929: ‘The report of the Committee
constitutes the worst rebuff which any local government in India
has received for many years and may have far- reaching results...
It would be difficult to find an incident quite comparable wit h this
in the long and controversial annals of Indian Land Revenue. ‘
The relationship of Bardoli and other peasant struggles with
the struggle for freedom can best be described in Gandhiji’s pithy
words: ‘Whatever the Bardoli struggle may be, it clearly i s not a
struggle for the direct attainment of Swaraj. That every such
awakening, every such effort as that of Bardoli will bring Swaraj
nearer and may bring it nearer even than any direct effort is
undoubtedly true.’[/INST] |
196 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 17. THE INDIAN WORKING
CLASS AND THE
NATIONAL MOVEMENT
The modem worker makes his appearance in India in the
second half of the 19th century with the slow beginnings of
modem industry and the growth of utilities like the railways and
the post and the telegraph network The process of the disparate
groups of workers in various parts of country emerging as an
organized, self-conscious, all India class is inextricably linked
with the growth of the Indian national movement and the process
of the Indian ‘nation -in-the-making’ because the notion of the
Indian working class could not exist before the notion of the
Indian ‘people’ had begun to take root.
*
Before the Indian nationalist intelligentsia began to
associate itself with working class agitations towards the end of
the 19th century, there were several agitations, including strikes
by workers in the textile mills of Bombay, Calcutta, Ahmedabad,
Surat, Madras, Coimbatore, Wardha, and so on, in the railways
and in the plantations. However, they were mostly sporadic,
spontaneous and unorganized revolts based on immediate
economic grievances, and had hardly any wider political
implications.
There were also some early attempts at organized efforts to
improve the condition of the workers. These efforts were made as
early as the 1870s by philanthropists. In 1878, Sorabjee
Shapoorji Bengalee tried unsuccessfully to introduce a Bill in the
Bombay Legislative Council to limit the working hours for labour.
In Bengal, Sasipada Banerjea, a Brahmo Social reformer, set up a
Workingmen’s Club in 1870 and brought out a monthly journal
called Bharat Sramjeebi (Indian Labour), with the primary idea of | <s>[INST]196 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 17. THE INDIAN WORKING
CLASS AND THE
NATIONAL MOVEMENT
The modem worker makes his appearance in India in the
second half of the 19th century with the slow beginnings of
modem industry and the growth of utilities like the railways and
the post and the telegraph network The process of the disparate
groups of workers in various parts of country emerging as an
organized, self-conscious, all India class is inextricably linked
with the growth of the Indian national movement and the process
of the Indian ‘nation -in-the-making’ because the notion of the
Indian working class could not exist before the notion of the
Indian ‘people’ had begun to take root.
*
Before the Indian nationalist intelligentsia began to
associate itself with working class agitations towards the end of
the 19th century, there were several agitations, including strikes
by workers in the textile mills of Bombay, Calcutta, Ahmedabad,
Surat, Madras, Coimbatore, Wardha, and so on, in the railways
and in the plantations. However, they were mostly sporadic,
spontaneous and unorganized revolts based on immediate
economic grievances, and had hardly any wider political
implications.
There were also some early attempts at organized efforts to
improve the condition of the workers. These efforts were made as
early as the 1870s by philanthropists. In 1878, Sorabjee
Shapoorji Bengalee tried unsuccessfully to introduce a Bill in the
Bombay Legislative Council to limit the working hours for labour.
In Bengal, Sasipada Banerjea, a Brahmo Social reformer, set up a
Workingmen’s Club in 1870 and brought out a monthly journal
called Bharat Sramjeebi (Indian Labour), with the primary idea of[/INST] |
197 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
educating the workers. In Bombay, Narayan Meghajee Lokhanday
brought out an Anglo -Marathi weekly called DinaBa ndhu (Friend
of the Poor) in 1880, and started the Bombay Mill and Millhands’
Association in 1890. Lokhanday held meetings of workers and in
one instance sent a memorial signed by 5,500 mill workers, to
the Bombay Factory Commission, putting forward some
minimum workers’ demands. All these efforts were admittedly of
a philanthropic nature and did not represent the beginnings of
an organized working class movement. Moreover, these
philanthropists did not belong to the mainstream of the
contemporary national movement.
The mainstream nationalist movement in fact was as yet, by
and large, indifferent to the question of labour. The early
nationalists in the beginning paid relatively little attention to the
question of workers despite the truly wretched condition s under
which they existed at that time. Also, they had a strikingly,
though perhaps understandably, differential attitude towards the
workers employed in Europeans enterprises and those employed
in Indian enterprises.
One major reason for the relatively lukewarm attitude of the
early that, at this time, when the anti -imperialist movement was
in its very infancy, the nationalists did not wish to, in any way,
weaken the common struggle against British rule — the primary
task to be achieved in a colonial sit uation — by creating any
divisions within the ranks of the Indian people. Dadabhai
Naoroji, in the very second session of the Indian National
Congress (1886), made it clear that the Congress ‘must confine
itself to questions in which the entire nation has a direct
participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social reforms
and other class questions to class Congresses.” Later, with the
national movement gaining in strength, and the emergence
within the nationalist ranks of ideological trends with less | <s>[INST]197 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
educating the workers. In Bombay, Narayan Meghajee Lokhanday
brought out an Anglo -Marathi weekly called DinaBa ndhu (Friend
of the Poor) in 1880, and started the Bombay Mill and Millhands’
Association in 1890. Lokhanday held meetings of workers and in
one instance sent a memorial signed by 5,500 mill workers, to
the Bombay Factory Commission, putting forward some
minimum workers’ demands. All these efforts were admittedly of
a philanthropic nature and did not represent the beginnings of
an organized working class movement. Moreover, these
philanthropists did not belong to the mainstream of the
contemporary national movement.
The mainstream nationalist movement in fact was as yet, by
and large, indifferent to the question of labour. The early
nationalists in the beginning paid relatively little attention to the
question of workers despite the truly wretched condition s under
which they existed at that time. Also, they had a strikingly,
though perhaps understandably, differential attitude towards the
workers employed in Europeans enterprises and those employed
in Indian enterprises.
One major reason for the relatively lukewarm attitude of the
early that, at this time, when the anti -imperialist movement was
in its very infancy, the nationalists did not wish to, in any way,
weaken the common struggle against British rule — the primary
task to be achieved in a colonial sit uation — by creating any
divisions within the ranks of the Indian people. Dadabhai
Naoroji, in the very second session of the Indian National
Congress (1886), made it clear that the Congress ‘must confine
itself to questions in which the entire nation has a direct
participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social reforms
and other class questions to class Congresses.” Later, with the
national movement gaining in strength, and the emergence
within the nationalist ranks of ideological trends with less[/INST] |
within the nationalist ranks of ideological trends with less
inhibitions towards labour and increasingly with an actively pro -
labour orientation, efforts were made to organize labour and
secure for it a better bargaining position vis -a -vis the more
powerful classes in the common anti -imperialist front. While still
endeavouring to maintain an anti-imperialist united front, unity
was no longer sought at the unilateral cost of the worker and the
oppressed but was to be secured through sacrifices or | <s>[INST]within the nationalist ranks of ideological trends with less
inhibitions towards labour and increasingly with an actively pro -
labour orientation, efforts were made to organize labour and
secure for it a better bargaining position vis -a -vis the more
powerful classes in the common anti -imperialist front. While still
endeavouring to maintain an anti-imperialist united front, unity
was no longer sought at the unilateral cost of the worker and the
oppressed but was to be secured through sacrifices or[/INST] |
198 | India’s Struggle For Independence
concessions from all classes including the powerful propertied
class.
At this stage, however, the nationalists were unwilling to
take up the question of labour versus the indigenous employer.
Most of the nationalist newspapers, in fact, denied the need for
any Government legislation to regulate working conditions and
active ly opposed the Factories Act of 1881 and 1891. Similarly,
strikes in Indian textiles mills were generally not supported.
Apart from the desire not to create any divisions in the fledgling
anti-imperialist movement, there were other reasons for the
national ist stance. The nationalists correctly saw the Government
initiative on labour legislation as dictated by British
manufacturing interests which, when faced with growing Indian
competition and a shrinking market in India, lobbied for factor
legislation in I ndia which would, for example, by reducing the
working hours for labour, reduce the competitive edge enjoyed by
Indian industry. Further, the early nationalists saw rapid
industrialisation as the panacea for the problems of Indian
poverty and degradation a nd were unwilling to countenance any
measure which would impede this process. Labour legislation
which would adversely affect the infant industry in India, they
said, was like killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. But
there was also the nationalist newspaper, Mahratta, then under
the influence of the radical thinker, G.S. Agarkar, which even at
this stage supported the workers’ cause and asked the mill
owners to make concessions to them. This trend was, however,
still a very minor one.
The scenario completely altered when the question was of
Indian labour employed in British -owned enterprises. Here the
nationalists had no hesitation in giving full support to the
workers. This was partially because the employer and the
employed, in the words of P. Ana nda Charlu, the Congress
president in 1891, were not ‘part and parcel of the same nation.’ | <s>[INST]198 | India’s Struggle For Independence
concessions from all classes including the powerful propertied
class.
At this stage, however, the nationalists were unwilling to
take up the question of labour versus the indigenous employer.
Most of the nationalist newspapers, in fact, denied the need for
any Government legislation to regulate working conditions and
active ly opposed the Factories Act of 1881 and 1891. Similarly,
strikes in Indian textiles mills were generally not supported.
Apart from the desire not to create any divisions in the fledgling
anti-imperialist movement, there were other reasons for the
national ist stance. The nationalists correctly saw the Government
initiative on labour legislation as dictated by British
manufacturing interests which, when faced with growing Indian
competition and a shrinking market in India, lobbied for factor
legislation in I ndia which would, for example, by reducing the
working hours for labour, reduce the competitive edge enjoyed by
Indian industry. Further, the early nationalists saw rapid
industrialisation as the panacea for the problems of Indian
poverty and degradation a nd were unwilling to countenance any
measure which would impede this process. Labour legislation
which would adversely affect the infant industry in India, they
said, was like killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. But
there was also the nationalist newspaper, Mahratta, then under
the influence of the radical thinker, G.S. Agarkar, which even at
this stage supported the workers’ cause and asked the mill
owners to make concessions to them. This trend was, however,
still a very minor one.
The scenario completely altered when the question was of
Indian labour employed in British -owned enterprises. Here the
nationalists had no hesitation in giving full support to the
workers. This was partially because the employer and the
employed, in the words of P. Ana nda Charlu, the Congress
president in 1891, were not ‘part and parcel of the same nation.’[/INST] |
The Indian National Congress and the nationalist
newspapers began a campaign against the manner in which the
tea plantation workers in Assam were reduced to virtual slavery,
with European planters being given powers, through legislation
to arrest, punish and prevent the running away of labour. An
appeal was made to national honour and dignity to protest | <s>[INST]The Indian National Congress and the nationalist
newspapers began a campaign against the manner in which the
tea plantation workers in Assam were reduced to virtual slavery,
with European planters being given powers, through legislation
to arrest, punish and prevent the running away of labour. An
appeal was made to national honour and dignity to protest[/INST] |
199 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
against this unbridled exploitation by foreign capitalists aided by
the colonial state.
It was not fortuitous, then, that perhaps the first organized
strike by any section of the working class should occur ma
British -owned and managed railway. This was the signallers’
strike in May 1899 in the Great Indian Peninsular ( GIP) Railway
and the demands related to wages, hours of work and other
conditions of service. Almost all nationalist newspapers came out
fully in support of the strike, with Tilak’s newspapers Mahratta
and Kesari campaigning for it for months. Public meeti ngs and
fund collections in aid of the strikers were organized in Bombay
and Bengal by prominent nationalists like Pherozeshah Mehta,
D.E. Wacha and Surendranath Tagore. The fact that the exploiter
in these cases was foreign was enough to take agitation ag ainst it
a national issue and an integral part of national movement.
At the turn of the century, with the growth of the working class,
there emerged a new tendency among the nationalist
intelligentsia. B.C. Pal and G. Subramania Iyer, for example,
began t o talk of the need for legislation to protect the workers,
the weaker section, against the powerful capitalists. In 1 903, G.
Subramania I yer urged that workers should combine and
organize themselves into unions to fight for their rights and the
public must give every help to the workers in achieving this task.
The Swadeshi upsurge of 1903 -8 was a distinct landmark in
the history of the labour movement. An official survey pinpointed
the rise of the ‘professional agitator’ and the ‘power of
organization’ of l abour into industrial strikes as the two distinct
features of this period.4 The number of strikes rose sharply and
many Swadeshi leaders enthusiastically threw themselves into
the tasks of organizing stable trade unions, strikes, legal aid, and
fund collec tion drives. Public meetings in support of striking | <s>[INST]199 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
against this unbridled exploitation by foreign capitalists aided by
the colonial state.
It was not fortuitous, then, that perhaps the first organized
strike by any section of the working class should occur ma
British -owned and managed railway. This was the signallers’
strike in May 1899 in the Great Indian Peninsular ( GIP) Railway
and the demands related to wages, hours of work and other
conditions of service. Almost all nationalist newspapers came out
fully in support of the strike, with Tilak’s newspapers Mahratta
and Kesari campaigning for it for months. Public meeti ngs and
fund collections in aid of the strikers were organized in Bombay
and Bengal by prominent nationalists like Pherozeshah Mehta,
D.E. Wacha and Surendranath Tagore. The fact that the exploiter
in these cases was foreign was enough to take agitation ag ainst it
a national issue and an integral part of national movement.
At the turn of the century, with the growth of the working class,
there emerged a new tendency among the nationalist
intelligentsia. B.C. Pal and G. Subramania Iyer, for example,
began t o talk of the need for legislation to protect the workers,
the weaker section, against the powerful capitalists. In 1 903, G.
Subramania I yer urged that workers should combine and
organize themselves into unions to fight for their rights and the
public must give every help to the workers in achieving this task.
The Swadeshi upsurge of 1903 -8 was a distinct landmark in
the history of the labour movement. An official survey pinpointed
the rise of the ‘professional agitator’ and the ‘power of
organization’ of l abour into industrial strikes as the two distinct
features of this period.4 The number of strikes rose sharply and
many Swadeshi leaders enthusiastically threw themselves into
the tasks of organizing stable trade unions, strikes, legal aid, and
fund collec tion drives. Public meetings in support of striking[/INST] |
workers were addressed by national leaders like B.C. Pal, C.R.
Das and Liaqat Hussain. Four prominent names among the
Swadeshi leaders who dedicated themselves labour struggles
were Aswinicoomar Banerjea, Prabhat Kumar Roy Chowdhuri,
Premtosh Bose and Apurba Kumar Ghose were active in a large
number of strikes but their greatest success, both in setting up
workers’ organizations and in terms of popular support, was
among workers in the Government Press, Ra ilways and the jute | <s>[INST]workers were addressed by national leaders like B.C. Pal, C.R.
Das and Liaqat Hussain. Four prominent names among the
Swadeshi leaders who dedicated themselves labour struggles
were Aswinicoomar Banerjea, Prabhat Kumar Roy Chowdhuri,
Premtosh Bose and Apurba Kumar Ghose were active in a large
number of strikes but their greatest success, both in setting up
workers’ organizations and in terms of popular support, was
among workers in the Government Press, Ra ilways and the jute[/INST] |
200 | India’s Struggle For Independence
industry — significantly all areas in which either foreign capital
or the colonial state held sway.
Frequent processions in support of the strikers were taken
out in the Streets of Calcutta. People fed the processionists on
the way. La rge numbers including women and even police
constables made contributions of money, rice, potatoes, and
green vegetables. The first tentative attempts to form all-India
unions were also made at this timer but these were unsuccessful.
The differential attit ude towards workers employed in European
enterprises and those in Indian ones, however, persisted
throughout this period.
Perhaps the most important feature of the labour movement
during the Swadeshi days was the shift from agitations and
struggles on pur ely economic questions to the involvement of the
worker with the wider political issues of the day. The labour
movement had graduated from relatively unorganized and
spontaneous strikes on economic issues to organized strikes on
economic issues with the su pport of the nationalists and then on
to working class involvement in wider political movements.
The national upsurge on 16 October 1905, the day the partition
of Bengal came into effect, included a spurt of working class
strikes and hartals in Bengal. Workers in several jute mills and
jute press factories, railway coolies and carters, all struck work.
Workers numbering 12,000 in the Bum Company shipyard in
Howrah struck work on being refused leave to attend the
Federation Hall meeting called by the Calcut ta Swadeshi leaders.
Workers also went on strike when the management objected to
their singing Bande Mataram or tying rakhis on each others’
wrists as a symbol of unity.
In Tuticorin, in Tamil Nadu, Subramania Siva campaigned
for a strike in February -Marc h 1908 in a foreign -owned cotton
mill saying that strikes for higher wages would lead to the demise
of foreign mills. When Siva and the famous Swadeshi leader | <s>[INST]200 | India’s Struggle For Independence
industry — significantly all areas in which either foreign capital
or the colonial state held sway.
Frequent processions in support of the strikers were taken
out in the Streets of Calcutta. People fed the processionists on
the way. La rge numbers including women and even police
constables made contributions of money, rice, potatoes, and
green vegetables. The first tentative attempts to form all-India
unions were also made at this timer but these were unsuccessful.
The differential attit ude towards workers employed in European
enterprises and those in Indian ones, however, persisted
throughout this period.
Perhaps the most important feature of the labour movement
during the Swadeshi days was the shift from agitations and
struggles on pur ely economic questions to the involvement of the
worker with the wider political issues of the day. The labour
movement had graduated from relatively unorganized and
spontaneous strikes on economic issues to organized strikes on
economic issues with the su pport of the nationalists and then on
to working class involvement in wider political movements.
The national upsurge on 16 October 1905, the day the partition
of Bengal came into effect, included a spurt of working class
strikes and hartals in Bengal. Workers in several jute mills and
jute press factories, railway coolies and carters, all struck work.
Workers numbering 12,000 in the Bum Company shipyard in
Howrah struck work on being refused leave to attend the
Federation Hall meeting called by the Calcut ta Swadeshi leaders.
Workers also went on strike when the management objected to
their singing Bande Mataram or tying rakhis on each others’
wrists as a symbol of unity.
In Tuticorin, in Tamil Nadu, Subramania Siva campaigned
for a strike in February -Marc h 1908 in a foreign -owned cotton
mill saying that strikes for higher wages would lead to the demise
of foreign mills. When Siva and the famous Swadeshi leader[/INST] |
of foreign mills. When Siva and the famous Swadeshi leader
Chidambaram Pillai were arrested, there were widespread strikes
and riots in Tuticorin and Tirune lveli. In Rawalpindi, in Punjab,
the arsenal and railway engineering workers went on strike as
part of the 1907 upsurge in the Punjab which had led to the
deportation of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. Perhaps the biggest
political demonstration by the working class in this period | <s>[INST]of foreign mills. When Siva and the famous Swadeshi leader
Chidambaram Pillai were arrested, there were widespread strikes
and riots in Tuticorin and Tirune lveli. In Rawalpindi, in Punjab,
the arsenal and railway engineering workers went on strike as
part of the 1907 upsurge in the Punjab which had led to the
deportation of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh. Perhaps the biggest
political demonstration by the working class in this period[/INST] |
201 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
occurred during Tilak’s trial and subsequent conviction as has
already been discussed earlier.
The Swadeshi period was also to see the faint beginnings of
a socialist tinge among some of the radical nationalist leaders
who were expose d to the contemporary Marxist and social
democratic forces in Europe. The example of the working class
movement in Russia as a mechanism of effective political protest
began to be urged for emulation in India.
With the decline in the nationalist mass upsur ge after 1908,
the labour movement also suffered an eclipse. It was only with
the coming of the next nationalist upsurge in the immediate post
World -War I years that the working class movement was to regain
its élan, though now on a qualitatively higher pl ane.
*
Beginning with the Home Rule Leagues in 1915 and
continuing through the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 1919, the national
movement once again reached a crescendo in the Non -
Cooperation and Khilafat Movement in 1920 -22. It was in this
context that there oc curred a resurgence of working class activity
in the years from 1919 to 1922. The working class now created
its own national level organisation to defend its class rights. It
was in this period that the working class also got involved in the
mainstream of nationalist politics to a significant extent.
The most important development was the formation of the
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) in 1920 Lokamanya
Tilak, who had developed a close association with Bombay work.,
was one of the moving spirits in the formation of the AITUC,
which had Lala Lajpat Rai, the famous Extremist leader from
Punjab, as its first president and Dewan Chaman Lal, who was to
become a major name in the Indian labour movement, as its
General Secretary. In his presidential addres s to the first AITUC,
Lala Lajpat Rai emphasized that, ‘...Indian labour should lose no
time to organize itself on a national scale... the greatest need in | <s>[INST]201 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
occurred during Tilak’s trial and subsequent conviction as has
already been discussed earlier.
The Swadeshi period was also to see the faint beginnings of
a socialist tinge among some of the radical nationalist leaders
who were expose d to the contemporary Marxist and social
democratic forces in Europe. The example of the working class
movement in Russia as a mechanism of effective political protest
began to be urged for emulation in India.
With the decline in the nationalist mass upsur ge after 1908,
the labour movement also suffered an eclipse. It was only with
the coming of the next nationalist upsurge in the immediate post
World -War I years that the working class movement was to regain
its élan, though now on a qualitatively higher pl ane.
*
Beginning with the Home Rule Leagues in 1915 and
continuing through the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 1919, the national
movement once again reached a crescendo in the Non -
Cooperation and Khilafat Movement in 1920 -22. It was in this
context that there oc curred a resurgence of working class activity
in the years from 1919 to 1922. The working class now created
its own national level organisation to defend its class rights. It
was in this period that the working class also got involved in the
mainstream of nationalist politics to a significant extent.
The most important development was the formation of the
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) in 1920 Lokamanya
Tilak, who had developed a close association with Bombay work.,
was one of the moving spirits in the formation of the AITUC,
which had Lala Lajpat Rai, the famous Extremist leader from
Punjab, as its first president and Dewan Chaman Lal, who was to
become a major name in the Indian labour movement, as its
General Secretary. In his presidential addres s to the first AITUC,
Lala Lajpat Rai emphasized that, ‘...Indian labour should lose no
time to organize itself on a national scale... the greatest need in[/INST] |
this Country is to organize, agitate, and educate. We must
organize our workers, make them class conscious... ‘ While aware | <s>[INST]this Country is to organize, agitate, and educate. We must
organize our workers, make them class conscious... ‘ While aware[/INST] |
202 | India’s Struggle For Independence
that ‘for some time to come’ the workers will need all the help and
guidance and cooperation they can get from such among the
intellectuals as are prepared to espouse their cause, he
maintained that ‘eventually labour shall find its leaders from
among its own ranks.’
The manifesto issued to the workers by the AITUC urged
them not only to organize themselves but also to intervene in
nationalist politics: ‘Workers of India! . . . Your nation’s leaders
ask for Swaraj, you must not let them, leave you out of the
reckoning. Political freedom to you is of no worth without
economic freedom. You cannot therefore afford to neglect the
movement for national freedom. You are part and parcel of that
movement. You will neglect it only at the peril of your liberty.”
Lajpat Rai was among the first in India to link capitalism
with imperialism and emphasize the crucial of the working class
in fighting this combination. He said on 7 November, 1920:
‘India... has... been bled by the forces of organized capital and is
today lying prostrate at its feet. Militarism and Imperialism are
the twin -children of capitalism; they are one in three and three in
one. Their shadow, their fruit and their bark all are poisonous. It
is only lately that an antidote has been discovered and that
antidote is organized labour.’
Reflecting the emerging change in nationalist attitudes
towards labour employed in Indian enterprise, Lajpat Rai said.
‘We are often told that in order successfully to compete with
Manchester and Japan, capital in India should be allowed a high
rate of profit and cheap labour is a necessity for that purpose . . .
We are not prepared to admit the validity of this plea... An appeal
to patriotism must affect the rich and the poor alike, in fact, the
rich mor e than the poor . . . Surely . . . the way to develop Indian
industries... is to be... (not) at the expense of labour alone... The
Indian capitalist must meet labour half way and must come to an | <s>[INST]202 | India’s Struggle For Independence
that ‘for some time to come’ the workers will need all the help and
guidance and cooperation they can get from such among the
intellectuals as are prepared to espouse their cause, he
maintained that ‘eventually labour shall find its leaders from
among its own ranks.’
The manifesto issued to the workers by the AITUC urged
them not only to organize themselves but also to intervene in
nationalist politics: ‘Workers of India! . . . Your nation’s leaders
ask for Swaraj, you must not let them, leave you out of the
reckoning. Political freedom to you is of no worth without
economic freedom. You cannot therefore afford to neglect the
movement for national freedom. You are part and parcel of that
movement. You will neglect it only at the peril of your liberty.”
Lajpat Rai was among the first in India to link capitalism
with imperialism and emphasize the crucial of the working class
in fighting this combination. He said on 7 November, 1920:
‘India... has... been bled by the forces of organized capital and is
today lying prostrate at its feet. Militarism and Imperialism are
the twin -children of capitalism; they are one in three and three in
one. Their shadow, their fruit and their bark all are poisonous. It
is only lately that an antidote has been discovered and that
antidote is organized labour.’
Reflecting the emerging change in nationalist attitudes
towards labour employed in Indian enterprise, Lajpat Rai said.
‘We are often told that in order successfully to compete with
Manchester and Japan, capital in India should be allowed a high
rate of profit and cheap labour is a necessity for that purpose . . .
We are not prepared to admit the validity of this plea... An appeal
to patriotism must affect the rich and the poor alike, in fact, the
rich mor e than the poor . . . Surely . . . the way to develop Indian
industries... is to be... (not) at the expense of labour alone... The
Indian capitalist must meet labour half way and must come to an[/INST] |
understanding with it on the basis of sharing the profits in a
reasonable arid just proportion... If, however, Indian capital
wants to ignore the needs of labour and can think only of its
huge profits, it should expect no response from labour and no
sympathy from the general public.’ | <s>[INST]understanding with it on the basis of sharing the profits in a
reasonable arid just proportion... If, however, Indian capital
wants to ignore the needs of labour and can think only of its
huge profits, it should expect no response from labour and no
sympathy from the general public.’[/INST] |
203 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
Similarly second -session -of the AITUC, Dewan Chaman Lal
while moving a resolution in favour of Swaraj pointed out that it
was to be a Swaraj, not for the capitalists but for the workers.
Apart from Lajpat Rai, several of the lead ing nationalists of
the time became closely associated wit h the AITUC. C.R. Das
presided over its third and fourth sessions, and among the other
prominent names were th of C.F. Andrews, J.M. Sengupta,
Subhas Bose, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Satyamurti. The Indian
National Congress at its Gaya session in 1922 welcomed the
formation of the AITUC and formed a committee consisting of
prominent Congressmen to assist its work.
C.R. Das, in his presidential address to the Gaya Congress,
said that the Congress must ‘take labour and the peasantry in
hand. .. and organize them b oth from the point of view of their
own special interests and also from the point of view of the higher
ideal which demands satisfaction of their special interests and
the devotion of such interests to the cause of Swaraj.’ If this was
not done, he warned, organization of workers arid peasants
would come up ‘dissociated from the cause of Swaraj’ and
pursuing ‘class struggles and the war of special interest.’
The workings responded to the changed political
atmosphere in a magnificent manner. In 1920, there were 125
unions with a total membership of 250,000, and large proportion
of these had been formed during 1919 -20. The workers’
participation in the major national political events was also very
significant. In April 1919, following the repression in Punjab and
Gandhiji’s arrest, the working class in Ahmedabad and other
parts of Gujarat resorted to strikes, agitations and
demonstrations. In Ahmedabad, Government buildings were set
on fire, trains derailed, and telegraph wires snapped.
Suppression led to at l east twenty -eight people being killed and
123 wounded. Waves of working class protest rocked Bombay
and Calcutta. | <s>[INST]203 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
Similarly second -session -of the AITUC, Dewan Chaman Lal
while moving a resolution in favour of Swaraj pointed out that it
was to be a Swaraj, not for the capitalists but for the workers.
Apart from Lajpat Rai, several of the lead ing nationalists of
the time became closely associated wit h the AITUC. C.R. Das
presided over its third and fourth sessions, and among the other
prominent names were th of C.F. Andrews, J.M. Sengupta,
Subhas Bose, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Satyamurti. The Indian
National Congress at its Gaya session in 1922 welcomed the
formation of the AITUC and formed a committee consisting of
prominent Congressmen to assist its work.
C.R. Das, in his presidential address to the Gaya Congress,
said that the Congress must ‘take labour and the peasantry in
hand. .. and organize them b oth from the point of view of their
own special interests and also from the point of view of the higher
ideal which demands satisfaction of their special interests and
the devotion of such interests to the cause of Swaraj.’ If this was
not done, he warned, organization of workers arid peasants
would come up ‘dissociated from the cause of Swaraj’ and
pursuing ‘class struggles and the war of special interest.’
The workings responded to the changed political
atmosphere in a magnificent manner. In 1920, there were 125
unions with a total membership of 250,000, and large proportion
of these had been formed during 1919 -20. The workers’
participation in the major national political events was also very
significant. In April 1919, following the repression in Punjab and
Gandhiji’s arrest, the working class in Ahmedabad and other
parts of Gujarat resorted to strikes, agitations and
demonstrations. In Ahmedabad, Government buildings were set
on fire, trains derailed, and telegraph wires snapped.
Suppression led to at l east twenty -eight people being killed and
123 wounded. Waves of working class protest rocked Bombay
and Calcutta.[/INST] |
and Calcutta.
Railway workers’ agitations for economic demands and
against racial discrimination also coincided with the general anti -
colonial mass struggl e. Between 1919 and 1921, on several
occasions railway work ers struck in support of the Rowlatt | <s>[INST]and Calcutta.
Railway workers’ agitations for economic demands and
against racial discrimination also coincided with the general anti -
colonial mass struggl e. Between 1919 and 1921, on several
occasions railway work ers struck in support of the Rowlatt[/INST] |
204 | India’s Struggle For Independence
agitation and the Non -Cooperation and Khilafat Movement. The
call for an All-India general strike given by the North Western
Railway workers in April l919 got a fter enthusiastic response in
the northern region. Lajpat Jagga has shown that for railwaymen
in large parts of the country Gandhiji came to symbolize
resistance to colonial rule and exploitation, just as the Indian
Railways symbolized the British Empire, ‘the political and
commercial will of the Raj.”
In November 1921, at the time of the visit of the Prince of
Wales , the workers responded to the Congress call of a boycott by
a countrywide general strike. In Bombay, the textile factories
were closed and about 1,40,000 workers were on the streets
participating in the rioting and attacks on Europeans and Parsis
who had gone to welcome the Prince of Wales. The spirit and the
urges that moved the workers in these eventful years, the
relationship seen between the nationalist upsurge and the
workers’ own aspirations, s best expressed in the words of Arjun
Atmaram Alwe, an illiterate worker in a Bombay textile mill, who
was later to become a major figure in the working class
movement: ‘While our struggle . . . was g oing on in this manner,
the drum of political agitation was being beaten in the country.
The Congress started a great agitation demanding rights for India
to conduct her own administration. At that time we workers
understood the meaning of this demand for Swaraj to be only
this, that our indebtedness would disappear, the oppression of
the moneylender would stop, our wages would increase, and the
oppression of the owner on the worker, the kicks and blows with
which they belabour us, would stop by legislation , and that as a
result of it, the persecution of us workers would come to an end.
These and other thoughts came into the minds of us workers,
and a good many workers from among us, and I myself, enlisted
ourselves as volunteers in the Non -Cooperation movement.” | <s>[INST]204 | India’s Struggle For Independence
agitation and the Non -Cooperation and Khilafat Movement. The
call for an All-India general strike given by the North Western
Railway workers in April l919 got a fter enthusiastic response in
the northern region. Lajpat Jagga has shown that for railwaymen
in large parts of the country Gandhiji came to symbolize
resistance to colonial rule and exploitation, just as the Indian
Railways symbolized the British Empire, ‘the political and
commercial will of the Raj.”
In November 1921, at the time of the visit of the Prince of
Wales , the workers responded to the Congress call of a boycott by
a countrywide general strike. In Bombay, the textile factories
were closed and about 1,40,000 workers were on the streets
participating in the rioting and attacks on Europeans and Parsis
who had gone to welcome the Prince of Wales. The spirit and the
urges that moved the workers in these eventful years, the
relationship seen between the nationalist upsurge and the
workers’ own aspirations, s best expressed in the words of Arjun
Atmaram Alwe, an illiterate worker in a Bombay textile mill, who
was later to become a major figure in the working class
movement: ‘While our struggle . . . was g oing on in this manner,
the drum of political agitation was being beaten in the country.
The Congress started a great agitation demanding rights for India
to conduct her own administration. At that time we workers
understood the meaning of this demand for Swaraj to be only
this, that our indebtedness would disappear, the oppression of
the moneylender would stop, our wages would increase, and the
oppression of the owner on the worker, the kicks and blows with
which they belabour us, would stop by legislation , and that as a
result of it, the persecution of us workers would come to an end.
These and other thoughts came into the minds of us workers,
and a good many workers from among us, and I myself, enlisted
ourselves as volunteers in the Non -Cooperation movement.”[/INST] |
ourselves as volunteers in the Non -Cooperation movement.”
Any discussion of these years would remain incomplete
without mentioning the founding in 1918 by Gandhiji of the
Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association (TLA) which, with 14,000
workers on its rolls, was perhaps the largest single trade union of
the time. Too often and too casually had Gandhiji’s experiment
based on the principle of trusteeship (the capitalist being the
trustee of the workers’ interest) and arbitration been dismissed
as class collaborationist and against the interests of the workers. | <s>[INST]ourselves as volunteers in the Non -Cooperation movement.”
Any discussion of these years would remain incomplete
without mentioning the founding in 1918 by Gandhiji of the
Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association (TLA) which, with 14,000
workers on its rolls, was perhaps the largest single trade union of
the time. Too often and too casually had Gandhiji’s experiment
based on the principle of trusteeship (the capitalist being the
trustee of the workers’ interest) and arbitration been dismissed
as class collaborationist and against the interests of the workers.[/INST] |
205 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
Apart from the fact that the TLA secured one of the highest hikes
in wages (27 1t2 per cent) during a dispute in 1918, Gandhiji’s
conception of trusteeship also had a radical potential which is
usually missed. As Acharya J.B. Kripalani, one of Gandhiji’s
staunchest followers, explained: ‘The Trustee by the very term
used means that he is not the owner. The owner is one whose
interest he is called upon to protect,’ i.e., the worker. Gandhiji
himself told the textile workers of Ahmedabad ‘that they were the
real masters of the mills and if the trustee, the mill owner, did
not act in the interest of the real owners, then the workers
should offer Satyagraha to assert their rights.” Gandhiji’s
philosophy for labour, with its emphasis on arbitration and
trusteeship, also reflected the needs of the anti - imperialist
movement which could ill -afford an all -out class war between the
constituent classes of the emerging nation.
After 1922, there was again a lull in the working class
movement, and a reversion to purely eco nomic struggles, that is,
to corporatism. The next wave of working class activity came
towards the end of the 1920s, this time spurred by the
emergence of a powerful and clearly defined Left Bloc in the
national movement.
*
It was in the second half of th e l920s that a consolidation of
various Left ideological trends occurred and began to have a
significant impact on the national movement. Various
Communist groups in different parts of India had by early 1927
organized themselves into the Workers’ and Peas ants’ Parties
(WPP), under the leadership of people like S.A. Dange, Muzaffar
Ahmed, P.C. Joshi and Sohan Singh J osh. The WPPs, functioning
as a left-wing within the Congress, rapidly gained in strength
within the Congress organization at the provincial and the all -
India levels.
Also, by working within a broad Left from under the WPPs,
Communist influence in the trade union movement, marginal till | <s>[INST]205 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
Apart from the fact that the TLA secured one of the highest hikes
in wages (27 1t2 per cent) during a dispute in 1918, Gandhiji’s
conception of trusteeship also had a radical potential which is
usually missed. As Acharya J.B. Kripalani, one of Gandhiji’s
staunchest followers, explained: ‘The Trustee by the very term
used means that he is not the owner. The owner is one whose
interest he is called upon to protect,’ i.e., the worker. Gandhiji
himself told the textile workers of Ahmedabad ‘that they were the
real masters of the mills and if the trustee, the mill owner, did
not act in the interest of the real owners, then the workers
should offer Satyagraha to assert their rights.” Gandhiji’s
philosophy for labour, with its emphasis on arbitration and
trusteeship, also reflected the needs of the anti - imperialist
movement which could ill -afford an all -out class war between the
constituent classes of the emerging nation.
After 1922, there was again a lull in the working class
movement, and a reversion to purely eco nomic struggles, that is,
to corporatism. The next wave of working class activity came
towards the end of the 1920s, this time spurred by the
emergence of a powerful and clearly defined Left Bloc in the
national movement.
*
It was in the second half of th e l920s that a consolidation of
various Left ideological trends occurred and began to have a
significant impact on the national movement. Various
Communist groups in different parts of India had by early 1927
organized themselves into the Workers’ and Peas ants’ Parties
(WPP), under the leadership of people like S.A. Dange, Muzaffar
Ahmed, P.C. Joshi and Sohan Singh J osh. The WPPs, functioning
as a left-wing within the Congress, rapidly gained in strength
within the Congress organization at the provincial and the all -
India levels.
Also, by working within a broad Left from under the WPPs,
Communist influence in the trade union movement, marginal till[/INST] |
Communist influence in the trade union movement, marginal till
early 1927, had become very strong indeed, by the end of 1928.
In Bombay, following the historic six -month -long general strike | <s>[INST]Communist influence in the trade union movement, marginal till
early 1927, had become very strong indeed, by the end of 1928.
In Bombay, following the historic six -month -long general strike[/INST] |
206 | India’s Struggle For Independence
by the textile workers (April -September 1928), the Communist -
led Gimi Kamgar Union (KU) acquired a pre -eminent position. Its
membership rose from 324 to 54,000 by the end of 1928.
Communist influence also spread to workers in the railways, jute
mills, municipalities, paper mills etc., in Bengal and Bombay and
in the Burma Oil Company in Madras. In the A ITUC too, by the
time of the 1928 Jharia session, the broad Left including the
Communists had acquired a dominating position. This resulted
in the corporatist trend led by people like N.M. Joshi splitting
away from the AITUC at the subsequent session presided over by
Jawaharlal Nehru. By the end of 1928, the Government was
anxiously reporting that ‘there was hardly a single public utility
service or industry which had not been affected in whole or in
part, by the wave of communism which swept the country.”
The workers under Communist and radical nationalist
influence participated in a large number of strikes and
demonstrations all over the coun try between 1922 and 1929. The
AITU C in November 1927 took a decision to boycott the Simon
Commission and many workers participated in the massive
Simon boycott demonstrations. There were also numerous
workers’ meetings organized on May Day, Lenin Day, the
anniversary of the Russian Revolution, and so on.
The Government, nervous the growing militancy and
political involvement o f the working class, and especially at the
coming together or the nationalist and the Left trends, launched
a-two-pronged attack on the labour movement. On the one hands
it enacted repressive laws like the Public Safety Act and T rade
Disputes Acts and arrest ed in one swoop vir tually the entire
radical leadership of the labour movement and launched the
famous Meerut Conspiracy Case aga inst them. On the other
hand, it attempted , not without some success, to wean away
through concessions (for example the appointment of the Royal | <s>[INST]206 | India’s Struggle For Independence
by the textile workers (April -September 1928), the Communist -
led Gimi Kamgar Union (KU) acquired a pre -eminent position. Its
membership rose from 324 to 54,000 by the end of 1928.
Communist influence also spread to workers in the railways, jute
mills, municipalities, paper mills etc., in Bengal and Bombay and
in the Burma Oil Company in Madras. In the A ITUC too, by the
time of the 1928 Jharia session, the broad Left including the
Communists had acquired a dominating position. This resulted
in the corporatist trend led by people like N.M. Joshi splitting
away from the AITUC at the subsequent session presided over by
Jawaharlal Nehru. By the end of 1928, the Government was
anxiously reporting that ‘there was hardly a single public utility
service or industry which had not been affected in whole or in
part, by the wave of communism which swept the country.”
The workers under Communist and radical nationalist
influence participated in a large number of strikes and
demonstrations all over the coun try between 1922 and 1929. The
AITU C in November 1927 took a decision to boycott the Simon
Commission and many workers participated in the massive
Simon boycott demonstrations. There were also numerous
workers’ meetings organized on May Day, Lenin Day, the
anniversary of the Russian Revolution, and so on.
The Government, nervous the growing militancy and
political involvement o f the working class, and especially at the
coming together or the nationalist and the Left trends, launched
a-two-pronged attack on the labour movement. On the one hands
it enacted repressive laws like the Public Safety Act and T rade
Disputes Acts and arrest ed in one swoop vir tually the entire
radical leadership of the labour movement and launched the
famous Meerut Conspiracy Case aga inst them. On the other
hand, it attempted , not without some success, to wean away
through concessions (for example the appointment of the Royal[/INST] |
through concessions (for example the appointment of the Royal
Commission on Labour in 1929) a substantial section of the
labour movement and commit it to the constitutionali st and
corporatist mould.
The labour movement suffered a major setback partially due
to this Government offensive and partially due to a shift in
Stance of the Communist -led wing of the movement. We shall
look at this aspect in more detail later on; suffi ce it to say that | <s>[INST]through concessions (for example the appointment of the Royal
Commission on Labour in 1929) a substantial section of the
labour movement and commit it to the constitutionali st and
corporatist mould.
The labour movement suffered a major setback partially due
to this Government offensive and partially due to a shift in
Stance of the Communist -led wing of the movement. We shall
look at this aspect in more detail later on; suffi ce it to say that[/INST] |
207 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
from about the end of 1928, the Communists reversed their
policy of aligni ng themselves with and working within the
mainstream of the national movement. This led to the isolation of
the Communists from the national movement and greatly
reduced their hold over even the working class. The membership
of the GKU fell from 54,000 in December 1928 to about 800 by
the end of 1929. Similarly, the Communists got isolated within
the AITUC and were thrown out in the split of 1931.
A CPI document of 1930 clearly brings out the impact of
this dissociation from the Civil Disobedience Movement on the
workers of Bombay: ’ . . . we actually withdrew from the struggle
(civil disobedience) and left the field entirely to the Congress. We
limited our role to th at of a small group. The result was . . . that
in the minds of workers there grew an opinion that we are doing
nothing and that the Congress is the only organization which is
carrying on the fight against imperialism and therefore the
workers began to foll ow the lead of the Congress.”
Nevertheless, workers participated in the Civil Disobedience
Movement all over the country. The textile workers of Sholapur,
dock labourers of Karachi, transport and mill owners of Calcutta,
and the mill workers of Madras heroically clashed with the
Government during the movement. In Sholapur, between the 7th
and the 16th of May, the textile workers went on a rampage after
the police fired to stop an anti -British procession. Government
offices, law courts, police stations and railway stations were
attacked and rebels virtually took over the city administration for
some days. The national flag was hoisted over the town. The
Government had to declare martial law to crush the insurgents.
Several workers were hanged or sentenced to long-terms of
imprisonment.
In Bombay, where the Congress slogan during civil
disobedience was that the ‘workers and peasants are the hands | <s>[INST]207 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
from about the end of 1928, the Communists reversed their
policy of aligni ng themselves with and working within the
mainstream of the national movement. This led to the isolation of
the Communists from the national movement and greatly
reduced their hold over even the working class. The membership
of the GKU fell from 54,000 in December 1928 to about 800 by
the end of 1929. Similarly, the Communists got isolated within
the AITUC and were thrown out in the split of 1931.
A CPI document of 1930 clearly brings out the impact of
this dissociation from the Civil Disobedience Movement on the
workers of Bombay: ’ . . . we actually withdrew from the struggle
(civil disobedience) and left the field entirely to the Congress. We
limited our role to th at of a small group. The result was . . . that
in the minds of workers there grew an opinion that we are doing
nothing and that the Congress is the only organization which is
carrying on the fight against imperialism and therefore the
workers began to foll ow the lead of the Congress.”
Nevertheless, workers participated in the Civil Disobedience
Movement all over the country. The textile workers of Sholapur,
dock labourers of Karachi, transport and mill owners of Calcutta,
and the mill workers of Madras heroically clashed with the
Government during the movement. In Sholapur, between the 7th
and the 16th of May, the textile workers went on a rampage after
the police fired to stop an anti -British procession. Government
offices, law courts, police stations and railway stations were
attacked and rebels virtually took over the city administration for
some days. The national flag was hoisted over the town. The
Government had to declare martial law to crush the insurgents.
Several workers were hanged or sentenced to long-terms of
imprisonment.
In Bombay, where the Congress slogan during civil
disobedience was that the ‘workers and peasants are the hands[/INST] |
disobedience was that the ‘workers and peasants are the hands
and the feet of the Congress, ’ about 20,000 workers mostly from
the GIP Railway struck work on 4 February 1930. The day
Gandhiji breached the salt law, 6 April, a novel form of
Satyagraha was launched by the workers of GIP Railwaymen’s
Union. Batches of workers went to the suburban stations of
North Bombay and prostrated themselves on the tracks with red | <s>[INST]disobedience was that the ‘workers and peasants are the hands
and the feet of the Congress, ’ about 20,000 workers mostly from
the GIP Railway struck work on 4 February 1930. The day
Gandhiji breached the salt law, 6 April, a novel form of
Satyagraha was launched by the workers of GIP Railwaymen’s
Union. Batches of workers went to the suburban stations of
North Bombay and prostrated themselves on the tracks with red[/INST] |
208 | India’s Struggle For Independence
flags posted i n front of them. The police had to open fire to clear
the tracks. On 6 July, Gandhi Day was declared by the Congress
Working Committee to protest against large scale arrests, and
about 50,0O0 people took part in the hartal that day with
workers from forty -nine factories downing their tools.
*
There was a dip in the working class movement between
1931 and 1936. Neither did the workers take an active part in the
Civil Disobedience Movement of 1932 -34. The next wave of
working class activity came with provinc ial autonomy and the
formation of popular ministries during 1937 -l939.
The Communists had, in the meantime, abandoned their
suicidal sectarian policies and since 1934 re -enacted the
mainstream of nationalist politics. They also rejoined the AITUC
in 1935. Left influence in nationalist politics and the trade union
movement once again began to grow rapidly. The Communists,
the Congress Socialists and the Left nationalists led by
Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose now formed a powerful Left
consolidation within the Co ngress and other mass organizations.
When the campaign for the 1937 elections began, the
AITUC, barring a few centres, gave its support to the Congress
candidates. The Congress election manifesto declared that the
Congress would take steps for the settlement of labour disputes
and take effective measures for securing the rig1ts to form
unions and go on strike. During the tenure of the Congress
Provincial Governments the trade union movement showed a
phenomenal rise. Between 1937 and 1939 the number of trade
unions increased from 271 to 362 and the total membership of
these unions increased from 261,047 to 399,159. The number of
strikes also increased considerably.
One of the principal factors which gave a fillip to the trade
union movement in this period was the increased civil liberties
under the Congress Governments and the pro-labour attitude of | <s>[INST]208 | India’s Struggle For Independence
flags posted i n front of them. The police had to open fire to clear
the tracks. On 6 July, Gandhi Day was declared by the Congress
Working Committee to protest against large scale arrests, and
about 50,0O0 people took part in the hartal that day with
workers from forty -nine factories downing their tools.
*
There was a dip in the working class movement between
1931 and 1936. Neither did the workers take an active part in the
Civil Disobedience Movement of 1932 -34. The next wave of
working class activity came with provinc ial autonomy and the
formation of popular ministries during 1937 -l939.
The Communists had, in the meantime, abandoned their
suicidal sectarian policies and since 1934 re -enacted the
mainstream of nationalist politics. They also rejoined the AITUC
in 1935. Left influence in nationalist politics and the trade union
movement once again began to grow rapidly. The Communists,
the Congress Socialists and the Left nationalists led by
Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose now formed a powerful Left
consolidation within the Co ngress and other mass organizations.
When the campaign for the 1937 elections began, the
AITUC, barring a few centres, gave its support to the Congress
candidates. The Congress election manifesto declared that the
Congress would take steps for the settlement of labour disputes
and take effective measures for securing the rig1ts to form
unions and go on strike. During the tenure of the Congress
Provincial Governments the trade union movement showed a
phenomenal rise. Between 1937 and 1939 the number of trade
unions increased from 271 to 362 and the total membership of
these unions increased from 261,047 to 399,159. The number of
strikes also increased considerably.
One of the principal factors which gave a fillip to the trade
union movement in this period was the increased civil liberties
under the Congress Governments and the pro-labour attitude of[/INST] |
under the Congress Governments and the pro-labour attitude of
many of the Congress ministries. It is significant that a peculiar
feature of the strikes in this period was that a majority of them
ended successfully, with full or partial victory for the workers.’ | <s>[INST]under the Congress Governments and the pro-labour attitude of
many of the Congress ministries. It is significant that a peculiar
feature of the strikes in this period was that a majority of them
ended successfully, with full or partial victory for the workers.’[/INST] |
209 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
World War II began on 3 September 1939 and the working
class of Bombay was amongst the first in the world to hold an
anti-war strike on 2 October, 1939. About 90,000 workers
participated in the strike. There were several strikes on economic
issues all over the country despite the severe repression let loose
by a government keen to prevent any disruption of the war effort.
However, with the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941,
the Communists argued that the character of the War had
changed from an imperialist war to a people’s war. It was now the
duty of the working class to support the Allied powers to defeat
Fascism which threatened the socialist fatherland. Because of
this shift in policy, the Communist party dissociated itself from
the Quit India Movement launched by Gandhiji in August 1942.
They also successfully followed a policy of industrial peace with
employers so that production and war -effort would not be
hampered.
The Quit India Movement, however , did not leave the
working class untouched, despite the Communist indifference or
opposition to it immediately after the arrest of Gandhiji and other
leaders on 9 August 1942, following the Quit India Resolution,
there were strikes and hartals all over th e country, lasting for
about a week, by workers in Delhi, Lucknow, Kanpur, Bombay,
Nagpur, Ahmedabad, Jamshedpur, Madras, Indore and
Bangalore. The Tata Steel Plant was closed for thirteen days with
the strikers’ slogan being that they would not resume work till a
national government was formed. In Ahmedabad, the textile
strike lasted for about three -and-a-half months with the mill
owners in their nationalist euphoria actually cooperating! The
participation of workers was, however, low in pockets of
Communi st influence though in many areas the Communist rank
and file, actively joined the call of Quit India despite the party
line.
*
There was a tremendous resurgence in working class | <s>[INST]209 | The Indian Working Class And The National Movement
World War II began on 3 September 1939 and the working
class of Bombay was amongst the first in the world to hold an
anti-war strike on 2 October, 1939. About 90,000 workers
participated in the strike. There were several strikes on economic
issues all over the country despite the severe repression let loose
by a government keen to prevent any disruption of the war effort.
However, with the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union in 1941,
the Communists argued that the character of the War had
changed from an imperialist war to a people’s war. It was now the
duty of the working class to support the Allied powers to defeat
Fascism which threatened the socialist fatherland. Because of
this shift in policy, the Communist party dissociated itself from
the Quit India Movement launched by Gandhiji in August 1942.
They also successfully followed a policy of industrial peace with
employers so that production and war -effort would not be
hampered.
The Quit India Movement, however , did not leave the
working class untouched, despite the Communist indifference or
opposition to it immediately after the arrest of Gandhiji and other
leaders on 9 August 1942, following the Quit India Resolution,
there were strikes and hartals all over th e country, lasting for
about a week, by workers in Delhi, Lucknow, Kanpur, Bombay,
Nagpur, Ahmedabad, Jamshedpur, Madras, Indore and
Bangalore. The Tata Steel Plant was closed for thirteen days with
the strikers’ slogan being that they would not resume work till a
national government was formed. In Ahmedabad, the textile
strike lasted for about three -and-a-half months with the mill
owners in their nationalist euphoria actually cooperating! The
participation of workers was, however, low in pockets of
Communi st influence though in many areas the Communist rank
and file, actively joined the call of Quit India despite the party
line.
*
There was a tremendous resurgence in working class[/INST] |
line.
*
There was a tremendous resurgence in working class
activity between 1945 -47. The workers in large numbers
participated in the post-war political upsurge. They were part of | <s>[INST]line.
*
There was a tremendous resurgence in working class
activity between 1945 -47. The workers in large numbers
participated in the post-war political upsurge. They were part of[/INST] |
210 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the numerous meetings and demonstrations organized in towns
and cities (especially in Calcutta) on the issue of the INA trials.
Towards the end of 1945, the Bombay and Calcutta dock workers
refused to load ships going to Indonesia with supplies for troops
meant to suppress the national liberation struggles of South -East
Asia.
Perhaps the most spectacular action by the workers in this
period was the strike and harta l by the Bombay workers in
solidarity with the m utiny of the naval ratings in 1946. On 22
February, two to three hundred thousand workers downed their
tools, responding to a call given by the Communist Party and
supported by the Socialists. Peaceful meetings and
demonstrations developed into violent cla shes as the police
intervened. Barricades were set up on the streets which were the
scene of pitched battles with the police and the army. Two army
battalions were needed to restore order in the city; nearly 250
agitators laid down their lives.
The last y ears of colonial rule also saw a remarkably sharp
increase in strikes on economic issues all over the country — the
all-India strike of the Post and Telegraph Department employees
being the most well known among them. The pent -up economic
grievances during the War, coupled with the problems due to
post-war demobilization and the continuation of high prices,
scarcity of food and other essentials, and a drop in real wages, all
combined to drive the working class to the limits of its tolerance.
Also, the mood in anticipation of freedom was pregnant with
expectation. Independence was seen by all sections of the Indian
people as signalling an end to their miseries. The workers were
no exception. They too were now struggling for what they hoped
freedom would brin g them as a matter of right. | <s>[INST]210 | India’s Struggle For Independence
the numerous meetings and demonstrations organized in towns
and cities (especially in Calcutta) on the issue of the INA trials.
Towards the end of 1945, the Bombay and Calcutta dock workers
refused to load ships going to Indonesia with supplies for troops
meant to suppress the national liberation struggles of South -East
Asia.
Perhaps the most spectacular action by the workers in this
period was the strike and harta l by the Bombay workers in
solidarity with the m utiny of the naval ratings in 1946. On 22
February, two to three hundred thousand workers downed their
tools, responding to a call given by the Communist Party and
supported by the Socialists. Peaceful meetings and
demonstrations developed into violent cla shes as the police
intervened. Barricades were set up on the streets which were the
scene of pitched battles with the police and the army. Two army
battalions were needed to restore order in the city; nearly 250
agitators laid down their lives.
The last y ears of colonial rule also saw a remarkably sharp
increase in strikes on economic issues all over the country — the
all-India strike of the Post and Telegraph Department employees
being the most well known among them. The pent -up economic
grievances during the War, coupled with the problems due to
post-war demobilization and the continuation of high prices,
scarcity of food and other essentials, and a drop in real wages, all
combined to drive the working class to the limits of its tolerance.
Also, the mood in anticipation of freedom was pregnant with
expectation. Independence was seen by all sections of the Indian
people as signalling an end to their miseries. The workers were
no exception. They too were now struggling for what they hoped
freedom would brin g them as a matter of right.[/INST] |
211 | The Struggles For Gurdwara Reform And Temple Entry
CHAPTER 18. THE STRUGGLES FOR
GURDWARA REFORM
AND TEMPLE ENTRY
The rising tide of nationalism and democracy inevitably
began to overflow from the political to the religious and social
fields affecting the downtrodden castes and classes. And many
nationalists began to apply the newly discovered technique of
non-violent Satyagraha and mobili zation of public opinion to
issues which affected the internal structure of Indian society.
Quite often this struggle to reform Indian social and religious
institutions and practices led the reformers to clash with the
colonial authorities. Thus, the struggle to reform Indian society
tended to merge with the anti-imperialist struggle. This was in
part the result of the fact that as the national movement
advanced, the social base of colonialism was narrowed and the
colonial authorities began to seek the support of the socially,
culturally and economically reactionary sections of Indian
society. This aspect of the national movement is well illustrated
by the Akali Movement in Punjab and the Temple Entry
Movement in Kerala.
*
The Akali Movement developed on a purely religious issue
but ended up as a powerful episode of India’s freedom struggle.
From 1920 to 1925 more than 30,000 men and women
underwent imprisonment, nearly 400 died and over 2,000 were
wounded. The movement arose with the objective of freeing the
Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) from the control of ignorant and
corrupt mahan ts (priests). The Gu rdwaras had been heavily
endowed with revenue -free land and money by Maharaja Ranjit
Singh, Sikh chieftains and other devout Sikhs during the 18th
and 19th centuries. These shrines came to be managed during
the 18th century by Udasi Sikh mahants who escape d the wrath
of Mughal authorities because they did not wear their hair long.
(Many ignorant people therefore believe that these mahan ts were | <s>[INST]211 | The Struggles For Gurdwara Reform And Temple Entry
CHAPTER 18. THE STRUGGLES FOR
GURDWARA REFORM
AND TEMPLE ENTRY
The rising tide of nationalism and democracy inevitably
began to overflow from the political to the religious and social
fields affecting the downtrodden castes and classes. And many
nationalists began to apply the newly discovered technique of
non-violent Satyagraha and mobili zation of public opinion to
issues which affected the internal structure of Indian society.
Quite often this struggle to reform Indian social and religious
institutions and practices led the reformers to clash with the
colonial authorities. Thus, the struggle to reform Indian society
tended to merge with the anti-imperialist struggle. This was in
part the result of the fact that as the national movement
advanced, the social base of colonialism was narrowed and the
colonial authorities began to seek the support of the socially,
culturally and economically reactionary sections of Indian
society. This aspect of the national movement is well illustrated
by the Akali Movement in Punjab and the Temple Entry
Movement in Kerala.
*
The Akali Movement developed on a purely religious issue
but ended up as a powerful episode of India’s freedom struggle.
From 1920 to 1925 more than 30,000 men and women
underwent imprisonment, nearly 400 died and over 2,000 were
wounded. The movement arose with the objective of freeing the
Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) from the control of ignorant and
corrupt mahan ts (priests). The Gu rdwaras had been heavily
endowed with revenue -free land and money by Maharaja Ranjit
Singh, Sikh chieftains and other devout Sikhs during the 18th
and 19th centuries. These shrines came to be managed during
the 18th century by Udasi Sikh mahants who escape d the wrath
of Mughal authorities because they did not wear their hair long.
(Many ignorant people therefore believe that these mahan ts were[/INST] |
212 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Hindus. This is, of course, not true at all). In time corruption
spread among these mahants and they began to treat the
offerings and other income of the Gurdwaras as their personal
income. Many of them began to live a life of luxury and
dissipation. Apart from the mahants, after the British annexation
of Punjab in 1849, some control over the Gurdwaras was
exercised by Government - nominated managers and custodians,
who often collaborated with mahants.
The Government gave full support to the mahants. It used
them and the managers to preach loyalism to the Sikhs and to
keep them away from the rising nationalist movement. The Sikh
reformers and nationalists, on the other hand, wanted a
thorough reformation of the Gurdwaras by taking them out of the
control of the mahants and agents of the colonial regime. The
nationalists were especially horrified by two incidents - - when
the priests of the Golden Temple at Amritsar issued a
Hukamnama (directive from the Gums or the holy seats of the
Sikh authority) against the Ghadarites, declaring them
renegades, and then honoured General Dyer, the butcher of
Jallianwala massacre, with a saropa (robe of honour) and
declared him to be a Sikh.
A popular agitation for the reform of Gurdwaras developed
rapidly during 1920 when the reformers organi zed groups of
volunteers known as jathas to compel the mahants and the
Government -appointed mana gers to hand over control of the
Gurdwaras to the local devotees. The reformers won easy
victories in the beginning with tens of Gurdwaras being liberated
in the course of the year. Symbolic of this early success was the
case of the Golden Temple and the A kal Takht. The reformers
demanded that this foremost seat of Sikh faith should be placed
in the hands of a representative body of the Sikhs,’ and organized
a series of public meetings in support of their demand. The
Government did n want to antagonize the reformers at this stage | <s>[INST]212 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Hindus. This is, of course, not true at all). In time corruption
spread among these mahants and they began to treat the
offerings and other income of the Gurdwaras as their personal
income. Many of them began to live a life of luxury and
dissipation. Apart from the mahants, after the British annexation
of Punjab in 1849, some control over the Gurdwaras was
exercised by Government - nominated managers and custodians,
who often collaborated with mahants.
The Government gave full support to the mahants. It used
them and the managers to preach loyalism to the Sikhs and to
keep them away from the rising nationalist movement. The Sikh
reformers and nationalists, on the other hand, wanted a
thorough reformation of the Gurdwaras by taking them out of the
control of the mahants and agents of the colonial regime. The
nationalists were especially horrified by two incidents - - when
the priests of the Golden Temple at Amritsar issued a
Hukamnama (directive from the Gums or the holy seats of the
Sikh authority) against the Ghadarites, declaring them
renegades, and then honoured General Dyer, the butcher of
Jallianwala massacre, with a saropa (robe of honour) and
declared him to be a Sikh.
A popular agitation for the reform of Gurdwaras developed
rapidly during 1920 when the reformers organi zed groups of
volunteers known as jathas to compel the mahants and the
Government -appointed mana gers to hand over control of the
Gurdwaras to the local devotees. The reformers won easy
victories in the beginning with tens of Gurdwaras being liberated
in the course of the year. Symbolic of this early success was the
case of the Golden Temple and the A kal Takht. The reformers
demanded that this foremost seat of Sikh faith should be placed
in the hands of a representative body of the Sikhs,’ and organized
a series of public meetings in support of their demand. The
Government did n want to antagonize the reformers at this stage[/INST] |
and decided to stem the rising tide of discontent on such an
emotional religious issue by appeasing the popular sentiment. It,
therefore, permitted the Governm ent-appointed manager to
resign and, thus, let the control of the Temple pass effectively
into the reformers’ hands. | <s>[INST]and decided to stem the rising tide of discontent on such an
emotional religious issue by appeasing the popular sentiment. It,
therefore, permitted the Governm ent-appointed manager to
resign and, thus, let the control of the Temple pass effectively
into the reformers’ hands.[/INST] |
213 | The Struggles For Gurdwara Reform And Temple Entry
To control and manage the Golden Temple, the Akal Takht
and other Gurdwaras, a representative assembly of nearly 10,000
reformers met in November 1920 and elected a committee of 175
to be known as the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee
(SGPC). At the same time, the need was felt for a central body
which would organize the struggle on a more systematic basis.
The Shiromani Akali Da l was established in December for this
purpose. It was to be the chief organize r of the Akali jathos whose
backbone was provided by Jat peasantry while their leadership
was in the hands of the nationalist intellectuals. Under the
influence of the contemporary Non -Cooperation Movement — and
many of the leaders were common to both the movements — the
Akali Dal and the SGPC accepted complete non -violence as their
creed.
*
The Akali movement faced its first baptism by blood at
Nankana, the birth place of Guru Nanak, in February 1921. The
mahant of the Gurdwara there, Narain Das, was not willing to
peacefully surrender his control to the Akalis. He gathered a force
of nearly 500 mercenaries and armed them with guns, swords,
lathis and other lethal weapons to meet the challenge of the
peaceful Akali volunteers. On 20 February, an Akali jatha entered
the Gurdwara to pray. Immediately, the mahant‘s men opened
fire on them and attacked them with other weapons. Nearly 100
Akalis were killed and a large number of jathas under Kartar
Singh Jhabbar’s command marched into the Gurdwara and took
compl ete control despite dire warnings by the Deputy
Commissioner. The mahant had already been arrested. The
Government policy was still of vacillation. On the one hand, it did
not want to earn the ire of the Sikhs, and, on the other, it did not
want to lose co ntrol over the Gurdwaras.
The Nankana tragedy was a landmark in the Akali struggle.
As Kartar Singh Jhabbar, the liberator of the Nankana Gurdwara | <s>[INST]213 | The Struggles For Gurdwara Reform And Temple Entry
To control and manage the Golden Temple, the Akal Takht
and other Gurdwaras, a representative assembly of nearly 10,000
reformers met in November 1920 and elected a committee of 175
to be known as the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee
(SGPC). At the same time, the need was felt for a central body
which would organize the struggle on a more systematic basis.
The Shiromani Akali Da l was established in December for this
purpose. It was to be the chief organize r of the Akali jathos whose
backbone was provided by Jat peasantry while their leadership
was in the hands of the nationalist intellectuals. Under the
influence of the contemporary Non -Cooperation Movement — and
many of the leaders were common to both the movements — the
Akali Dal and the SGPC accepted complete non -violence as their
creed.
*
The Akali movement faced its first baptism by blood at
Nankana, the birth place of Guru Nanak, in February 1921. The
mahant of the Gurdwara there, Narain Das, was not willing to
peacefully surrender his control to the Akalis. He gathered a force
of nearly 500 mercenaries and armed them with guns, swords,
lathis and other lethal weapons to meet the challenge of the
peaceful Akali volunteers. On 20 February, an Akali jatha entered
the Gurdwara to pray. Immediately, the mahant‘s men opened
fire on them and attacked them with other weapons. Nearly 100
Akalis were killed and a large number of jathas under Kartar
Singh Jhabbar’s command marched into the Gurdwara and took
compl ete control despite dire warnings by the Deputy
Commissioner. The mahant had already been arrested. The
Government policy was still of vacillation. On the one hand, it did
not want to earn the ire of the Sikhs, and, on the other, it did not
want to lose co ntrol over the Gurdwaras.
The Nankana tragedy was a landmark in the Akali struggle.
As Kartar Singh Jhabbar, the liberator of the Nankana Gurdwara[/INST] |
As Kartar Singh Jhabbar, the liberator of the Nankana Gurdwara
put it, ‘the happening had awakened the Sikhs from their
slumber and the march towards Swaraj had been quick ened.’
The tragedy aroused the conscience of the entire country.
Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Lala Lajpat Rai and | <s>[INST]As Kartar Singh Jhabbar, the liberator of the Nankana Gurdwara
put it, ‘the happening had awakened the Sikhs from their
slumber and the march towards Swaraj had been quick ened.’
The tragedy aroused the conscience of the entire country.
Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Lala Lajpat Rai and[/INST] |
214 | India’s Struggle For Independence
other national leaders visited Nankana to show their solidarity.
The Government now changed its policy. Seeing the emerging
integrati on of the Akali movement with the national movement, it
decided to follow a two -pronged policy. To win over or neutralize
the Moderates and those concerned purely with religious reforms,
it promised and started working for legislation which would
satisfy t hem. It decided to suppress the extremist or the anti -
imperialist section of the Akalis in the name of maintaining law
and order.
The Akalis, too, changed their policy. Heartened by the
support of nationalist forces in the country, they extended the
scope of their movement to completely root out Government
interference in their religious places. They began to see their
movement as an integral part of the national struggle.
Consequently, within the SGPC, too, the non -cooperator
nationalist section took cont rol. In May 1921, the SGPC passed a
resolution in favour of non -cooperation, for the boycott of foreign
goods and liquor, and for the substitution of panchayats for the
British courts of law. The Akali leaders, arrested for the breaking
of law, also refuse d to defend themselves, denying the jurisdiction
of foreign -imposed courts.
A major victory was won by the Akalis in the Keys Affair’ in
October 1921. The Government made an effort to keep
possession of the keys of the Toshakhana of the Golden Temple.
The Akalis immediately reacted, and organized massive protest
meetings; tens of Akali jathas reached Amritsar immediately. The
SGPC advised Sikhs to join the hartal on the day of the arrival of
the Prince of Wales in India. The Government retaliated by
arrest ing the prominent, militant nationalist leaders of the SGPC
like Baba Kharak Singh and Master Tara Singh. But, instead of
dying down, the movement began to spread to the remotest rural
areas and the army. The Non -Cooperation Movement was at its | <s>[INST]214 | India’s Struggle For Independence
other national leaders visited Nankana to show their solidarity.
The Government now changed its policy. Seeing the emerging
integrati on of the Akali movement with the national movement, it
decided to follow a two -pronged policy. To win over or neutralize
the Moderates and those concerned purely with religious reforms,
it promised and started working for legislation which would
satisfy t hem. It decided to suppress the extremist or the anti -
imperialist section of the Akalis in the name of maintaining law
and order.
The Akalis, too, changed their policy. Heartened by the
support of nationalist forces in the country, they extended the
scope of their movement to completely root out Government
interference in their religious places. They began to see their
movement as an integral part of the national struggle.
Consequently, within the SGPC, too, the non -cooperator
nationalist section took cont rol. In May 1921, the SGPC passed a
resolution in favour of non -cooperation, for the boycott of foreign
goods and liquor, and for the substitution of panchayats for the
British courts of law. The Akali leaders, arrested for the breaking
of law, also refuse d to defend themselves, denying the jurisdiction
of foreign -imposed courts.
A major victory was won by the Akalis in the Keys Affair’ in
October 1921. The Government made an effort to keep
possession of the keys of the Toshakhana of the Golden Temple.
The Akalis immediately reacted, and organized massive protest
meetings; tens of Akali jathas reached Amritsar immediately. The
SGPC advised Sikhs to join the hartal on the day of the arrival of
the Prince of Wales in India. The Government retaliated by
arrest ing the prominent, militant nationalist leaders of the SGPC
like Baba Kharak Singh and Master Tara Singh. But, instead of
dying down, the movement began to spread to the remotest rural
areas and the army. The Non -Cooperation Movement was at its[/INST] |
areas and the army. The Non -Cooperation Movement was at its
height in t he rest of the country. The Government once again
decided not to confront Sikhs on a religious issue. It released all
those arrested in the ‘Keys Affair’ and surrendered the keys of the
Toshakhana to Baba Kharak Singh, head of the SGPC. Mahatma
Gandhi imme diately sent a telegram to the Baba:
‘First battle for India’s freedom won. Co ngratulations.’ | <s>[INST]areas and the army. The Non -Cooperation Movement was at its
height in t he rest of the country. The Government once again
decided not to confront Sikhs on a religious issue. It released all
those arrested in the ‘Keys Affair’ and surrendered the keys of the
Toshakhana to Baba Kharak Singh, head of the SGPC. Mahatma
Gandhi imme diately sent a telegram to the Baba:
‘First battle for India’s freedom won. Co ngratulations.’[/INST] |
215 | The Struggles For Gurdwara Reform And Temple Entry
*
The culmination of the movement to liberate the Gurdwaras
came with the heroic non -violent struggle around Guru -Ka-Bagh
Gurdwara which shook the whole of India . Smarting under its
defeat in the ‘Keys Affair,’ the Punjab bureaucracy was looking
for an opportunity to teach the Akalis a lesson and to recover its
lost prestige. It was further emboldened by the fact that the Non -
Cooperation Movement had been withdraw n in February 1922. It
began to look for a pretext.
The pretext was provided by events at a little known village,
Ghokewala, about 20 kilometres from Amritsar. The mahant of
the Gurdwara Guru -Ka-Bagh had handed over the Gurdwara to
the SGPC in August 1921 , but claimed personal possession of the
attached land. When the Akalis cut a dry kikkar tree on the land
for use in the community kitchen, he complained to the police ‘of
the theft of his property from his land.’ The officials seized this
opportunity to p rovoke the Akalis. On 9 August 1922 , five Akalis
were arrested and put on trial. The Akali Dal reacted immediately
to the new challenge. Akali jathas began to arrive and cut trees
from the disputed Land. The Government started arresting all of
them on charges of theft and rioting. By 28 August more than
4,000 Akalis had been arrested.
The authorities once again changed their tactics. Instead of
arresting the Akali volunteers they began to beat them
mercilessly with lathis. But the Akalis stood their ground and
would not yield till felled to the ground with broken bones and
lacerated bodies. C.F. Andrews described the official action as
inhuman, brutal, foul, cowardly and incredible to an Englishman
and a moral defeat of England. The entire country was outra ged.
National leaders and journalists converged on Guru -Ka-Bagh .
Massive protest meetings were organized all over Punjab. A
massive Akali gathering at Amritsar on io September was
attended by Swami Shraddhaflafld, Hakim Ajmal Khan and | <s>[INST]215 | The Struggles For Gurdwara Reform And Temple Entry
*
The culmination of the movement to liberate the Gurdwaras
came with the heroic non -violent struggle around Guru -Ka-Bagh
Gurdwara which shook the whole of India . Smarting under its
defeat in the ‘Keys Affair,’ the Punjab bureaucracy was looking
for an opportunity to teach the Akalis a lesson and to recover its
lost prestige. It was further emboldened by the fact that the Non -
Cooperation Movement had been withdraw n in February 1922. It
began to look for a pretext.
The pretext was provided by events at a little known village,
Ghokewala, about 20 kilometres from Amritsar. The mahant of
the Gurdwara Guru -Ka-Bagh had handed over the Gurdwara to
the SGPC in August 1921 , but claimed personal possession of the
attached land. When the Akalis cut a dry kikkar tree on the land
for use in the community kitchen, he complained to the police ‘of
the theft of his property from his land.’ The officials seized this
opportunity to p rovoke the Akalis. On 9 August 1922 , five Akalis
were arrested and put on trial. The Akali Dal reacted immediately
to the new challenge. Akali jathas began to arrive and cut trees
from the disputed Land. The Government started arresting all of
them on charges of theft and rioting. By 28 August more than
4,000 Akalis had been arrested.
The authorities once again changed their tactics. Instead of
arresting the Akali volunteers they began to beat them
mercilessly with lathis. But the Akalis stood their ground and
would not yield till felled to the ground with broken bones and
lacerated bodies. C.F. Andrews described the official action as
inhuman, brutal, foul, cowardly and incredible to an Englishman
and a moral defeat of England. The entire country was outra ged.
National leaders and journalists converged on Guru -Ka-Bagh .
Massive protest meetings were organized all over Punjab. A
massive Akali gathering at Amritsar on io September was
attended by Swami Shraddhaflafld, Hakim Ajmal Khan and[/INST] |