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269 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
The liquor boycott brought Government revenu es from
excise duties crashing down; it also soon assumed a new popular
form, that of cutting off the heads of toddy trees. The success of
the liquor and drugs boycott was obviously connected with the
popular tradition of regarding abstinence as a virtue a nd as a
symbol of respectability. The depth of this tradition is shown by
the fact that lower castes trying to move up in the caste hierarchy
invariably tried to establish their upper caste status by giving up
liquor and eating of meat.
*
Eastern India became the scene of a new kind of no -tax
campaign — refusal to pay the chowk idara tax. Chowkidars, paid
out of the tax levied specially on the villages, were guards who
supplemented the small police force in the rural areas in this
region. They were partic ularly hated because they acted as spies
for the Government and often also as retainers for the local
landlords. The movement against this tax and calling for the
resignation of Chowkidars, and of the influential members of
chowkidari panchayats who appoin ted the Chowkidars,, first
started in Bihar in May itself, as salt agitation had not much
scope due to the land -locked nature of the province. In the
Monghyr, Saran and Bhagalpur districts, for example, the tax
was refused, Chowkidars induced to resign, an d social boycott
used against those who resisted. The Government retaliated by
confiscation of property worth hundreds and thousands in lieu of
a few rupees of tax, and by beatings and torture. Matters came to
a head in Bihpur in Bhagalpur on May 31 when t he police,
desperate to assert its fast -eroding authority, occupied the
Congress ashram which was the headquarters of nationalist
activity in the area. The occupation triggered off daily
demonstrations outside the ashram, and a visit by Rajendra
Prasad and Abdul Ban from Patna became the occasion for, a
huge mass rally, which was broken up by a lathi charge in which | <s>[INST]269 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
The liquor boycott brought Government revenu es from
excise duties crashing down; it also soon assumed a new popular
form, that of cutting off the heads of toddy trees. The success of
the liquor and drugs boycott was obviously connected with the
popular tradition of regarding abstinence as a virtue a nd as a
symbol of respectability. The depth of this tradition is shown by
the fact that lower castes trying to move up in the caste hierarchy
invariably tried to establish their upper caste status by giving up
liquor and eating of meat.
*
Eastern India became the scene of a new kind of no -tax
campaign — refusal to pay the chowk idara tax. Chowkidars, paid
out of the tax levied specially on the villages, were guards who
supplemented the small police force in the rural areas in this
region. They were partic ularly hated because they acted as spies
for the Government and often also as retainers for the local
landlords. The movement against this tax and calling for the
resignation of Chowkidars, and of the influential members of
chowkidari panchayats who appoin ted the Chowkidars,, first
started in Bihar in May itself, as salt agitation had not much
scope due to the land -locked nature of the province. In the
Monghyr, Saran and Bhagalpur districts, for example, the tax
was refused, Chowkidars induced to resign, an d social boycott
used against those who resisted. The Government retaliated by
confiscation of property worth hundreds and thousands in lieu of
a few rupees of tax, and by beatings and torture. Matters came to
a head in Bihpur in Bhagalpur on May 31 when t he police,
desperate to assert its fast -eroding authority, occupied the
Congress ashram which was the headquarters of nationalist
activity in the area. The occupation triggered off daily
demonstrations outside the ashram, and a visit by Rajendra
Prasad and Abdul Ban from Patna became the occasion for, a
huge mass rally, which was broken up by a lathi charge in which[/INST] |
Rajendra Prasad was injured. As elsewhere, repression further
increased the nationalists’ strength, and the police just could not
enter the rur al areas.
In Bengal, the onset of the monsoon, which made it difficult
to make salt, brought about a shift to anti-chowkidara and anti - | <s>[INST]Rajendra Prasad was injured. As elsewhere, repression further
increased the nationalists’ strength, and the police just could not
enter the rur al areas.
In Bengal, the onset of the monsoon, which made it difficult
to make salt, brought about a shift to anti-chowkidara and anti -[/INST] |
270 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Union Board agitation. Here too, villagers withstood severe
repression, losing thousands of rupees worth of property thr ough
confiscation and destruction, and having to hide for days in
forests to escape the wrath of the police.
In Gujarat, in Kheda district, in Bardoli taluqa in Surat
district, and in Jambusar in Broach, a determined no -tax
movement was in progress — the tax refused here was the land
revenue. Villagers in their thousands, with family, cattle and
household goods, crossed the border from British India into the
neighbouring princely states such as Baroda and camped for
months together in the open fields. Thei r houses were broken
into, their belongings destroyed, their lands confiscated. The
police did not even spare Vallabhbhai Patel’s eighty -year-old
mother, who sat cooking in her village house in Karamsad; her
cooking utensils were kicked about and filled wi th kerosene and
stone. Vallabhbhai, on his brief sojourns out of jail throughout
1930, continued to provide encouragement and solace to the
hard-pressed peasants of his native land. Though their meagre
resources were soon exhausted, and weariness set in, t hey stuck
it out in the wilderness till the truce in March 1931 made it
possible for them to return to their homes.
Defiance of forest Jaws assumed a mass character in
Maharashtra, Karnataka and the Central Provinces, especially in
areas with large tribal populations who had been the most
seriously affected by the colonial Government’s restrictions on
the use of the forest. At some places the size of the crowd that
broke the forest laws swelled to 70,000 and above.
In Assam, a powerful agitation led by st udents was launched
against the infamous ‘Cunn ingham circular’ which forced
students and their guardians to furnish assurances of good
behaviour.
The people seemed to have taken to heart Jawaharlal
Nehru’s message when he unfurled the national flag at Lah ore in | <s>[INST]270 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Union Board agitation. Here too, villagers withstood severe
repression, losing thousands of rupees worth of property thr ough
confiscation and destruction, and having to hide for days in
forests to escape the wrath of the police.
In Gujarat, in Kheda district, in Bardoli taluqa in Surat
district, and in Jambusar in Broach, a determined no -tax
movement was in progress — the tax refused here was the land
revenue. Villagers in their thousands, with family, cattle and
household goods, crossed the border from British India into the
neighbouring princely states such as Baroda and camped for
months together in the open fields. Thei r houses were broken
into, their belongings destroyed, their lands confiscated. The
police did not even spare Vallabhbhai Patel’s eighty -year-old
mother, who sat cooking in her village house in Karamsad; her
cooking utensils were kicked about and filled wi th kerosene and
stone. Vallabhbhai, on his brief sojourns out of jail throughout
1930, continued to provide encouragement and solace to the
hard-pressed peasants of his native land. Though their meagre
resources were soon exhausted, and weariness set in, t hey stuck
it out in the wilderness till the truce in March 1931 made it
possible for them to return to their homes.
Defiance of forest Jaws assumed a mass character in
Maharashtra, Karnataka and the Central Provinces, especially in
areas with large tribal populations who had been the most
seriously affected by the colonial Government’s restrictions on
the use of the forest. At some places the size of the crowd that
broke the forest laws swelled to 70,000 and above.
In Assam, a powerful agitation led by st udents was launched
against the infamous ‘Cunn ingham circular’ which forced
students and their guardians to furnish assurances of good
behaviour.
The people seemed to have taken to heart Jawaharlal
Nehru’s message when he unfurled the national flag at Lah ore in[/INST] |
December 1929: ‘Remember once again, now that this flag is
unfurled, it must not be lowered as long as a single Indian, man,
woman, or child lives in India.” Attempts to defend the honour of
the national flag in the face of severe brutalities often turned into
heroism of the most spectacular variety. At Bundur , on the
Andhra Coast, Tota Narasaiah Naidu preferred to be beaten | <s>[INST]December 1929: ‘Remember once again, now that this flag is
unfurled, it must not be lowered as long as a single Indian, man,
woman, or child lives in India.” Attempts to defend the honour of
the national flag in the face of severe brutalities often turned into
heroism of the most spectacular variety. At Bundur , on the
Andhra Coast, Tota Narasaiah Naidu preferred to be beaten[/INST] |
271 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
unconscious by a fifteen -member police force rather than give up
the .national flag. In Calicut, P. Krishna Pillai, who later b ecame
a major Communist leader, suffered lathi blows with the same
determination. In Surat, a group of children used their ingenuity
to defy the police. Frustrated by the repeated snatching of the
national flag from their hands, they came up with the idea of
stitching khadi dresses in the three colours of the national flag,
and thereafter these little, ‘living flags’ triumphantly paraded the
streets and defied the police to take away the national flag!’6 The
national flag, the symbol of the new spirit, now became a
common sight even in remote villag es.
U.P. was the setting of another kind of movement — a no-
revenue, no -rent campaign. The no -revenue part was a call to the
zamindars to refuse to pay revenue to the Government, the no -
rent a call to the tenants not to pay rent to the zamindars. In
effect, since the zamindars were largely loyal to the Government,
this became a no-rent struggle. The civil Disobedience Movement
had taken a fi rm hold in the province iii the initial months, but
repression had led to a relative quiet, and though no - rent was in
the air, it was only in October that activity picked up again when
Jawaharlal Nehru, out of jail for a brief period, got the U.P.
Congress Committee to sanction the no -rent campaign. Two
months of preparation and intensive propaganda led to the
launching of the campaign in December; by January, severe
repression had forced many peasants to flee the villages. Among
the important centres of this campaign were the districts of Agra
and Rae Bareli.
The movement also popularized a variety of forms of
mobilization. Prabhatpheris, in which bands of men, women and
children went around at dawn singing nationalist songs, became
the rule in villages and towns. Patrikas, or illegal news -sheets,
sometimes written by hand and sometimes cyclostyled, were part | <s>[INST]271 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
unconscious by a fifteen -member police force rather than give up
the .national flag. In Calicut, P. Krishna Pillai, who later b ecame
a major Communist leader, suffered lathi blows with the same
determination. In Surat, a group of children used their ingenuity
to defy the police. Frustrated by the repeated snatching of the
national flag from their hands, they came up with the idea of
stitching khadi dresses in the three colours of the national flag,
and thereafter these little, ‘living flags’ triumphantly paraded the
streets and defied the police to take away the national flag!’6 The
national flag, the symbol of the new spirit, now became a
common sight even in remote villag es.
U.P. was the setting of another kind of movement — a no-
revenue, no -rent campaign. The no -revenue part was a call to the
zamindars to refuse to pay revenue to the Government, the no -
rent a call to the tenants not to pay rent to the zamindars. In
effect, since the zamindars were largely loyal to the Government,
this became a no-rent struggle. The civil Disobedience Movement
had taken a fi rm hold in the province iii the initial months, but
repression had led to a relative quiet, and though no - rent was in
the air, it was only in October that activity picked up again when
Jawaharlal Nehru, out of jail for a brief period, got the U.P.
Congress Committee to sanction the no -rent campaign. Two
months of preparation and intensive propaganda led to the
launching of the campaign in December; by January, severe
repression had forced many peasants to flee the villages. Among
the important centres of this campaign were the districts of Agra
and Rae Bareli.
The movement also popularized a variety of forms of
mobilization. Prabhatpheris, in which bands of men, women and
children went around at dawn singing nationalist songs, became
the rule in villages and towns. Patrikas, or illegal news -sheets,
sometimes written by hand and sometimes cyclostyled, were part[/INST] |
sometimes written by hand and sometimes cyclostyled, were part
of the strategy to defy the hated Press Act, and they flooded the
country. Magic lanterns were used to take the nationalist
message to the villages. And, as before, incessant tours by
individual leaders and workers, and by groups of men and
women, and the holding of public meetings, big and small,
remained the staple of the movement. Children were organized
into vanar senas or monkey armies and at least at one place the | <s>[INST]sometimes written by hand and sometimes cyclostyled, were part
of the strategy to defy the hated Press Act, and they flooded the
country. Magic lanterns were used to take the nationalist
message to the villages. And, as before, incessant tours by
individual leaders and workers, and by groups of men and
women, and the holding of public meetings, big and small,
remained the staple of the movement. Children were organized
into vanar senas or monkey armies and at least at one place the[/INST] |
272 | India’s Struggle For Independence
girls decided they wanted their own separate manjari se na or cat
army!
*
The Government’s attitude throughout 1930 was marked by
ambivalence. Gandhiji’s arrest itself had come after much
vacillation. After that, ordinances curbing the civil liberties of the
people were freely issued and provincial governments were given
the freedom to ban civil disobedience organizations. But the
Congress Working Committee was not declared unlawful till the
end of June and Motilal Nehru, who was functioning as the
Congress President, also remained free till that date. Many local
Congress Committees were not banned till August. Meanwhile,
the publication of the report of the Simon Commission, which
contained no mention of Dominion Status and was in other ways
also a regressive document, combined with the repressive policy,
furthe r upset even moderate political opinion. Madan Mohan
Malaviya and M.S. Aney courted arrest. In a conciliatory gesture,
the Viceroy on 9 July suggested a Round Table Conference and
reiterated the goal of Dominion Status. He also accepted the
suggestion, mad e by forty members of the Central Legislature,
that Tej Bahadur Sapru and M.R. Jayakar be allowed to explore
the possibilities of peace between the Congress and the
Government. In pursuance of this, the Nehrus, father and son,
were taken in August to Yerav ada jail to meet Gandhiji and
discuss the possibilities of a settlement. Nothing came of the
talks, but the gesture did ensure that some sections of political
opinion would attend the Round Table Conference in London in
November. The proceedings in London, the first ever conducted
between the British and Indians as equals, at which virtually
every delegate reiterated that a constitutional discussion to which
the Congress was not a party was a meaningless exercise, made
it clear that if the Government’s stra tegy of survival was to be
based on constitutional advance, then an olive branch to the | <s>[INST]272 | India’s Struggle For Independence
girls decided they wanted their own separate manjari se na or cat
army!
*
The Government’s attitude throughout 1930 was marked by
ambivalence. Gandhiji’s arrest itself had come after much
vacillation. After that, ordinances curbing the civil liberties of the
people were freely issued and provincial governments were given
the freedom to ban civil disobedience organizations. But the
Congress Working Committee was not declared unlawful till the
end of June and Motilal Nehru, who was functioning as the
Congress President, also remained free till that date. Many local
Congress Committees were not banned till August. Meanwhile,
the publication of the report of the Simon Commission, which
contained no mention of Dominion Status and was in other ways
also a regressive document, combined with the repressive policy,
furthe r upset even moderate political opinion. Madan Mohan
Malaviya and M.S. Aney courted arrest. In a conciliatory gesture,
the Viceroy on 9 July suggested a Round Table Conference and
reiterated the goal of Dominion Status. He also accepted the
suggestion, mad e by forty members of the Central Legislature,
that Tej Bahadur Sapru and M.R. Jayakar be allowed to explore
the possibilities of peace between the Congress and the
Government. In pursuance of this, the Nehrus, father and son,
were taken in August to Yerav ada jail to meet Gandhiji and
discuss the possibilities of a settlement. Nothing came of the
talks, but the gesture did ensure that some sections of political
opinion would attend the Round Table Conference in London in
November. The proceedings in London, the first ever conducted
between the British and Indians as equals, at which virtually
every delegate reiterated that a constitutional discussion to which
the Congress was not a party was a meaningless exercise, made
it clear that if the Government’s stra tegy of survival was to be
based on constitutional advance, then an olive branch to the[/INST] |
based on constitutional advance, then an olive branch to the
Congress was imperative. The 1ritish Prime Minister hinted this
possibility in his statement at the conclusion of the Round Table
Conference. He also expressed the hope that the Congress would
participate in the next round of deliberations to be held later in
the year. On 25 January, the Viceroy announced the
unconditional release of Gandh iji and all the other members of | <s>[INST]based on constitutional advance, then an olive branch to the
Congress was imperative. The 1ritish Prime Minister hinted this
possibility in his statement at the conclusion of the Round Table
Conference. He also expressed the hope that the Congress would
participate in the next round of deliberations to be held later in
the year. On 25 January, the Viceroy announced the
unconditional release of Gandh iji and all the other members of[/INST] |
273 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
the Congress Working Committee, so that might be t o respond to
the Prime Minister’s statement ‘ freely and fearlessly.’
After deliberating amongst itself for close to three weeks,
and after long discussions with delegates who had returned from
London, and with other leaders representing a cross -section of
political opinion, the Congress Working Committee authorized
Gandhiji to initiate discussions with the Viceroy. The fortnight -
long discussions culminated on 5 March 1931 in the Gandhi -
Irwin Pact, which was variously described as a ‘truce’ and a
‘provision al settlement.’
The Pact was signed by Gandhiji on behalf of the Congress
and by Lord Irwin on behalf of the Government, a procedure that
was hardly popular with officialdom as it placed the Congress on
an equal footing with the Government. The terms of t he
agreement included the immediate release of all political
prisoners not convicted for violence, the remission of all fines not
yet collected, the retu rn of confiscated lands not yet sold to third
parties, and lenient treatment for those government emplo yees
who had resigned. The Government also conceded the right to
make salt for consumption to villages along the coast, as also the
right to peaceful and non -aggressive picketing. The Congress
demand for a public inquiry into police excesses was not
accept ed, but Gandhiji’s insistent request for an inquiry was
recorded in the agreement. The Congress, on its part, agreed to
discontinue the Civil Disobedience Movement. It was also
understood that the Congress would participate in the next
Round Table Conferen ce.
*
The terms on which the Pact was signed, its timing, the
motives of Gandhiji in signing the Pact, his refusal to make the
Pact conditional on the commutation of the death -sentences of
Bhagat Singh and his comrades, (even though he had tried his
best to persuade the Viceroy to do so), have generated
considerable controversy and debate among contemporaries and | <s>[INST]273 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
the Congress Working Committee, so that might be t o respond to
the Prime Minister’s statement ‘ freely and fearlessly.’
After deliberating amongst itself for close to three weeks,
and after long discussions with delegates who had returned from
London, and with other leaders representing a cross -section of
political opinion, the Congress Working Committee authorized
Gandhiji to initiate discussions with the Viceroy. The fortnight -
long discussions culminated on 5 March 1931 in the Gandhi -
Irwin Pact, which was variously described as a ‘truce’ and a
‘provision al settlement.’
The Pact was signed by Gandhiji on behalf of the Congress
and by Lord Irwin on behalf of the Government, a procedure that
was hardly popular with officialdom as it placed the Congress on
an equal footing with the Government. The terms of t he
agreement included the immediate release of all political
prisoners not convicted for violence, the remission of all fines not
yet collected, the retu rn of confiscated lands not yet sold to third
parties, and lenient treatment for those government emplo yees
who had resigned. The Government also conceded the right to
make salt for consumption to villages along the coast, as also the
right to peaceful and non -aggressive picketing. The Congress
demand for a public inquiry into police excesses was not
accept ed, but Gandhiji’s insistent request for an inquiry was
recorded in the agreement. The Congress, on its part, agreed to
discontinue the Civil Disobedience Movement. It was also
understood that the Congress would participate in the next
Round Table Conferen ce.
*
The terms on which the Pact was signed, its timing, the
motives of Gandhiji in signing the Pact, his refusal to make the
Pact conditional on the commutation of the death -sentences of
Bhagat Singh and his comrades, (even though he had tried his
best to persuade the Viceroy to do so), have generated
considerable controversy and debate among contemporaries and[/INST] |
considerable controversy and debate among contemporaries and
historians alike. The Pact has been variously seen as a betrayal,
as proof of the vacillating nature of the Indian bourgeoisie and of | <s>[INST]considerable controversy and debate among contemporaries and
historians alike. The Pact has been variously seen as a betrayal,
as proof of the vacillating nature of the Indian bourgeoisie and of[/INST] |
274 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Gandhiji su ccumbing to bourgeois pressure. It has been cited as
evidence of Gandhiji’s and the Indian bourgeoisie’s fear of the
mass movement taking a radical turn; a betrayal of peasants’
interests because it did not immediately restore confiscated land,
already sol d to a third party, and so on.
However, as with arguments relatin g to the withdrawal of
the Non C ooperation Movement in 1922 after Chauri Chaura,
these perceptions are based on an understanding which fails to
grasp the basic strategy and character of the Indian national
movement. For one, this understanding ignores the fact which
has been stressed earlier — that mass movements are necessarily
short -lived they cannot go on for ever, the people’s capacity to
sacrifice, unlike that of the activists’,, is not endless. And signs of
exhaustion there certainly were, in large and important sectors of
the movement. In the towns, while the students and other young
people still had energy to spare, shopkeepers and merchants
were finding it difficult to bear any more l osses and the support
from these sections, so crucial in making the boycott a success,
had begun to decline by September of 1930. In rural India as
well, those areas that had begun their resistance early in the year
were fairly quiet in the second half. Th rough sporadic incidents of
resistance and attacks on and clashes with police continued, this
was as true of Bengal and Bihar as it was of Andhra and Gujarat.
Those areas like U.P., which began their no -rent campaigns only
at the end of 1930, still had mor e fight left in them, but the few
instances of militant resistance that carried on and the ability of
one or two regions to sustain activity can hardly be cited as proof
of the existence of vast reserves of energy all over the country.
And what was the gua rantee that when those reserves were
exhausted, as they were bound to be sooner rather than later, the | <s>[INST]274 | India’s Struggle For Independence
Gandhiji su ccumbing to bourgeois pressure. It has been cited as
evidence of Gandhiji’s and the Indian bourgeoisie’s fear of the
mass movement taking a radical turn; a betrayal of peasants’
interests because it did not immediately restore confiscated land,
already sol d to a third party, and so on.
However, as with arguments relatin g to the withdrawal of
the Non C ooperation Movement in 1922 after Chauri Chaura,
these perceptions are based on an understanding which fails to
grasp the basic strategy and character of the Indian national
movement. For one, this understanding ignores the fact which
has been stressed earlier — that mass movements are necessarily
short -lived they cannot go on for ever, the people’s capacity to
sacrifice, unlike that of the activists’,, is not endless. And signs of
exhaustion there certainly were, in large and important sectors of
the movement. In the towns, while the students and other young
people still had energy to spare, shopkeepers and merchants
were finding it difficult to bear any more l osses and the support
from these sections, so crucial in making the boycott a success,
had begun to decline by September of 1930. In rural India as
well, those areas that had begun their resistance early in the year
were fairly quiet in the second half. Th rough sporadic incidents of
resistance and attacks on and clashes with police continued, this
was as true of Bengal and Bihar as it was of Andhra and Gujarat.
Those areas like U.P., which began their no -rent campaigns only
at the end of 1930, still had mor e fight left in them, but the few
instances of militant resistance that carried on and the ability of
one or two regions to sustain activity can hardly be cited as proof
of the existence of vast reserves of energy all over the country.
And what was the gua rantee that when those reserves were
exhausted, as they were bound to be sooner rather than later, the[/INST] |
Government would still be willing to talk? 1931 was not 1946;
and as 1932 was to show, the Government could change tack
and suppress with a ferocity that could effectively crush the
movement. No doubt the youth were disappointed, for they would
have preferred their world to end with a bang’ rather than with a
whimper’ and surely the peasants of Gujarat were not happy that
some of their lands did not come b ack to them immediately (they
were returned after the Congress Ministry assumed office in
Bombay in 1937). But the vast mass of the people were
undoubtedly impres sed that the mighty British Gov ernment had
had to treat their movement and their leader as an equal and | <s>[INST]Government would still be willing to talk? 1931 was not 1946;
and as 1932 was to show, the Government could change tack
and suppress with a ferocity that could effectively crush the
movement. No doubt the youth were disappointed, for they would
have preferred their world to end with a bang’ rather than with a
whimper’ and surely the peasants of Gujarat were not happy that
some of their lands did not come b ack to them immediately (they
were returned after the Congress Ministry assumed office in
Bombay in 1937). But the vast mass of the people were
undoubtedly impres sed that the mighty British Gov ernment had
had to treat their movement and their leader as an equal and[/INST] |
275 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
sign a pact with him. They saw this as a recognition of their own
strength, and as their victory over the Govemment.ihe thousands
who flocked out of the jails as a result of the pact were treated as
soldiers returning from a victorious battle and not as prisoners of
war returning from a humiliating defeat. They knew that a truce
was not a surrender, and that the battle could be joined again, if
the enemy so wanted. Meanwhile, their soldiers could rest and
they could all prepare for the next round: they retained their faith
in their General, and in themselves.
*
The Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 -31, then, marked
a critically important stage in the progress of the anti -imperialist
struggle. The number of people who went to jail was estimated a t
over 90,000 — more than three times the figure for the Non -
Cooperation Movement of 1920 - 22. Imports of cloth from Britain
had fallen by half; other imports like cigarettes had suffered a
similar fate. Government income from liquor excise and land
revenu e had been affected. Elections to the Legislative Assembly
had been effectively boycotted. A vast variety of social groups had
been politicized on the side of Indian nationalism — if urban
elements like merchants and shopkeepers and students were
more acti ve in Tamil Nadu and Punjab, and in cities in general,
peasants had come to the forefront in Gujarat, U.P., Bengal,
Andhra, and Bihar, and tribals in the Central Provinces,
Maharashtra, Ka rnataka and Bengal. Workers had not been
missing from the battle eit her — they joined numerous mass
demonstrations in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras and were in
the forefront in Sholapur.
The participation of Muslims in the Civil Disobedience
Movement was certainly nowhere near that in 1920 -22. The
appeals of communal leade rs to stay away, combined with active
Government encouragement of communal dissension to counter
the forces of nationalism, had their effect. Still, the participation | <s>[INST]275 | Civil Disobedience 1930 -31
sign a pact with him. They saw this as a recognition of their own
strength, and as their victory over the Govemment.ihe thousands
who flocked out of the jails as a result of the pact were treated as
soldiers returning from a victorious battle and not as prisoners of
war returning from a humiliating defeat. They knew that a truce
was not a surrender, and that the battle could be joined again, if
the enemy so wanted. Meanwhile, their soldiers could rest and
they could all prepare for the next round: they retained their faith
in their General, and in themselves.
*
The Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 -31, then, marked
a critically important stage in the progress of the anti -imperialist
struggle. The number of people who went to jail was estimated a t
over 90,000 — more than three times the figure for the Non -
Cooperation Movement of 1920 - 22. Imports of cloth from Britain
had fallen by half; other imports like cigarettes had suffered a
similar fate. Government income from liquor excise and land
revenu e had been affected. Elections to the Legislative Assembly
had been effectively boycotted. A vast variety of social groups had
been politicized on the side of Indian nationalism — if urban
elements like merchants and shopkeepers and students were
more acti ve in Tamil Nadu and Punjab, and in cities in general,
peasants had come to the forefront in Gujarat, U.P., Bengal,
Andhra, and Bihar, and tribals in the Central Provinces,
Maharashtra, Ka rnataka and Bengal. Workers had not been
missing from the battle eit her — they joined numerous mass
demonstrations in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras and were in
the forefront in Sholapur.
The participation of Muslims in the Civil Disobedience
Movement was certainly nowhere near that in 1920 -22. The
appeals of communal leade rs to stay away, combined with active
Government encouragement of communal dissension to counter
the forces of nationalism, had their effect. Still, the participation[/INST] |
of Muslims was not insignificant, either. Their participation in the
North -West Frontier Province was, as is well known,
overwhelming. In Bengal, middle class Muslim participation was
quite important in Senhatta, Tripura, Gaibandha, Bagura and
Noakhali, and. in Dacca, Muslim students and shopkeepers as | <s>[INST]of Muslims was not insignificant, either. Their participation in the
North -West Frontier Province was, as is well known,
overwhelming. In Bengal, middle class Muslim participation was
quite important in Senhatta, Tripura, Gaibandha, Bagura and
Noakhali, and. in Dacca, Muslim students and shopkeepers as[/INST] |
276 | India’s Struggle For Independence
well as people belonging to the lower cla sses extended support to
the movement. Middle and upper class Muslim women were also
active.’ The Muslim weaving community in Bihar and in Delhi
and Lucknow the lower classes of Muslims were effectively
mobilized as were many others in different parts of t he country.
The support that the movement had garnered from the poor
and the illiterate, both in the town and in the country, was
remarkable indeed. Their participation was reflected even in the
government statistics of jail goers — and jail -going was onl y one
of the many forms of participation. The Inspector -General of
Police in Bengal, E.J. Lowman, expressed the general official
bewilderment when he noted: ‘I had no idea that the Congress
organization could enlist the sympathy and support of such
ignoran t and uncultivated people. . . For Indian women, the
movement was the most liberating experience to date and can
truly be said to have marked their entry into the public space. | <s>[INST]276 | India’s Struggle For Independence
well as people belonging to the lower cla sses extended support to
the movement. Middle and upper class Muslim women were also
active.’ The Muslim weaving community in Bihar and in Delhi
and Lucknow the lower classes of Muslims were effectively
mobilized as were many others in different parts of t he country.
The support that the movement had garnered from the poor
and the illiterate, both in the town and in the country, was
remarkable indeed. Their participation was reflected even in the
government statistics of jail goers — and jail -going was onl y one
of the many forms of participation. The Inspector -General of
Police in Bengal, E.J. Lowman, expressed the general official
bewilderment when he noted: ‘I had no idea that the Congress
organization could enlist the sympathy and support of such
ignoran t and uncultivated people. . . For Indian women, the
movement was the most liberating experience to date and can
truly be said to have marked their entry into the public space.[/INST] |
277 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
CHAPTER 23. FROM KARACHI TO
WARDHA: THE YEARS
FROM 1932 -34
The Congress met at Karachi on 29 Ma rch 1931 to endorse
the Gandhi -Irwin or Delhi Pact . Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and
Rajguru had been executed six days earlier. Even though
Gandhiji had made every attempt to save their lives, there was
anger among the people, especially the youth, as to why he had
not refused to sign the Pact on this question. All along Gandhiji’s
route to Karachi he was greeted with black flag demonstrations.
The Congress passed a resolution drafted by Gandhij i by which
it, ‘while dissociating itself from and disapproving of political
violence in any shape or form,’ admired ‘the bravery and sacrifice’
of the three martyrs.’ The Congress endorsed the Delhi Pact and
reiterated the goal of Poorna Swaraj.
The Kara chi session became memorable for its resolution on
Fundamental Rights and the National Economic Programme.
Even though the Congress had from its inception fought for the
economic interests, civil liberties and political rights of the
people, this was the f irst time that the Congress defined what
Swaraj would mean for the masses. It also declared that, ‘in
order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom
must include real economic freedom of the starving millions.’ The
resolution guaranteed the basic civil rights of free speech, free
press, free assembly, and freedom of association; equality before
the law irrespective of caste, creed or sex; neutrality of the state
in regard to all religions; elections on the basis of universal adult
franchise; and free and compulsory primary education. It
promised substantial reduction in rent and revenue, exemption
from rent in case of uneconomic holdings, and relief of
agricultural indebtedness and control of usury; better conditions
for workers including a l iving wage, limited hours of work and | <s>[INST]277 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
CHAPTER 23. FROM KARACHI TO
WARDHA: THE YEARS
FROM 1932 -34
The Congress met at Karachi on 29 Ma rch 1931 to endorse
the Gandhi -Irwin or Delhi Pact . Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev and
Rajguru had been executed six days earlier. Even though
Gandhiji had made every attempt to save their lives, there was
anger among the people, especially the youth, as to why he had
not refused to sign the Pact on this question. All along Gandhiji’s
route to Karachi he was greeted with black flag demonstrations.
The Congress passed a resolution drafted by Gandhij i by which
it, ‘while dissociating itself from and disapproving of political
violence in any shape or form,’ admired ‘the bravery and sacrifice’
of the three martyrs.’ The Congress endorsed the Delhi Pact and
reiterated the goal of Poorna Swaraj.
The Kara chi session became memorable for its resolution on
Fundamental Rights and the National Economic Programme.
Even though the Congress had from its inception fought for the
economic interests, civil liberties and political rights of the
people, this was the f irst time that the Congress defined what
Swaraj would mean for the masses. It also declared that, ‘in
order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom
must include real economic freedom of the starving millions.’ The
resolution guaranteed the basic civil rights of free speech, free
press, free assembly, and freedom of association; equality before
the law irrespective of caste, creed or sex; neutrality of the state
in regard to all religions; elections on the basis of universal adult
franchise; and free and compulsory primary education. It
promised substantial reduction in rent and revenue, exemption
from rent in case of uneconomic holdings, and relief of
agricultural indebtedness and control of usury; better conditions
for workers including a l iving wage, limited hours of work and[/INST] |
protection of women workers; the right to organize and form
unions to workers and peasants; and state ownership or control
of key industries, mines and means of transport. It also | <s>[INST]protection of women workers; the right to organize and form
unions to workers and peasants; and state ownership or control
of key industries, mines and means of transport. It also[/INST] |
278 | India’s Struggle For Independence
maintained that ‘the culture, language and script of the
minorities and of the different linguistic areas shall be protected.’
The Karachi resolution was to remain in essence the basic
political and economic programme of the Congress in later years.
*
Gandhiji sa iled for London on 29 August 1931 to attend the
Second Round Tab le Conference. Nothing much was expected
from the Conference for the imperialist political and financial
forces, which ultimately controlled the British Government in
London, were opposed to any political or economic conc essions
being given to India which could lead to its independence from
their control. Winston Churchill, leader of the virulent right -wing,
had strongly objected to the British Government negotiating on
terms of equality with the ‘seditious fakir’ and dema nded strong
government in India. The Conservative Daily Mail declared that
‘Without India, the British Commonwealth would fall to pieces.
Commercially, economically, politically and geographically it is
our greatest imperial asset. To imperil our hold on i t would be the
worst treason a ny Briton could commit.’ In India, Irwin was
replaced by Willingdon as the Viceroy. In Britain, after December
1931, the Laborite Ramsay MacDonald headed a Conservative -
dominated Cabinet with the weak and reactionary Samuel Ho are
as the Secretary of State for India. Apart from a few able
individuals, the overwhelming majority of Indian delegates to the
Round Table Conference (RTC), hand -picked by the Government,
were loyalists, communalists, careerists, and place -hunters, big
landlords and representatives of the princes. They were used by
the Government to claim that the Congress did not represent the
interests of all Indians vi s-a-vis imperialism, and to neutralize
Gandhiji and all his efforts to confront the imperialist rulers with
the basic question of freedom.
The great Gujarati poet, Meghani, in a famous poem gave | <s>[INST]278 | India’s Struggle For Independence
maintained that ‘the culture, language and script of the
minorities and of the different linguistic areas shall be protected.’
The Karachi resolution was to remain in essence the basic
political and economic programme of the Congress in later years.
*
Gandhiji sa iled for London on 29 August 1931 to attend the
Second Round Tab le Conference. Nothing much was expected
from the Conference for the imperialist political and financial
forces, which ultimately controlled the British Government in
London, were opposed to any political or economic conc essions
being given to India which could lead to its independence from
their control. Winston Churchill, leader of the virulent right -wing,
had strongly objected to the British Government negotiating on
terms of equality with the ‘seditious fakir’ and dema nded strong
government in India. The Conservative Daily Mail declared that
‘Without India, the British Commonwealth would fall to pieces.
Commercially, economically, politically and geographically it is
our greatest imperial asset. To imperil our hold on i t would be the
worst treason a ny Briton could commit.’ In India, Irwin was
replaced by Willingdon as the Viceroy. In Britain, after December
1931, the Laborite Ramsay MacDonald headed a Conservative -
dominated Cabinet with the weak and reactionary Samuel Ho are
as the Secretary of State for India. Apart from a few able
individuals, the overwhelming majority of Indian delegates to the
Round Table Conference (RTC), hand -picked by the Government,
were loyalists, communalists, careerists, and place -hunters, big
landlords and representatives of the princes. They were used by
the Government to claim that the Congress did not represent the
interests of all Indians vi s-a-vis imperialism, and to neutralize
Gandhiji and all his efforts to confront the imperialist rulers with
the basic question of freedom.
The great Gujarati poet, Meghani, in a famous poem gave[/INST] |
The great Gujarati poet, Meghani, in a famous poem gave
expression to the nationalist misgivings regarding the RTC.
Addressing Gandhiji on the eve of his departure for London, he
sang in the first line: ‘Chchello Kator o Jerno Aa: P i Jayo Bapu!’
(Even this last cup of poison, you must drink, Bapu!) Gandhiji
himself said: ‘When I think of the prospects in London, when I | <s>[INST]The great Gujarati poet, Meghani, in a famous poem gave
expression to the nationalist misgivings regarding the RTC.
Addressing Gandhiji on the eve of his departure for London, he
sang in the first line: ‘Chchello Kator o Jerno Aa: P i Jayo Bapu!’
(Even this last cup of poison, you must drink, Bapu!) Gandhiji
himself said: ‘When I think of the prospects in London, when I[/INST] |
279 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
know that all is not well in India . . . there is nothing wanting to
fill me with utter despair. . . There is every chance of my
returning empty -handed’ . That is exactly what happened in
London. The B ritish Government refused to concede the basic
Indian demand for freedom. Gandhiji came back at the end of
December 1931 to a changed political situation.
The higher British officials in India had drawn their own
lessons from the political impact of the Delhi Pact which had
raised the political prestige of the Congress and the political
morale of the people and undermined and lowered British
prestige. They, a s well as the new Viceroy, believed that the
Government had made a major error in negotiating and signing a
truce with the Congress, as if between two equal powers. They
were now determined to reverse it all. No pact, no truce, no
Gandhi -Viceroy meetings, no ‘quarter for the enemy’ became the
watchwords of Government policy.
The British policy was now dominated by three major
considerations: (a) Gandhiji must not be permitted to build up
the tempo for a massive and protracted mass movement, as he
had done in 1919, 1920 -1 and 1930. (b) The Government
functionaries — village officials, police and higher bureaucrats —
and the loyalists — ‘our friends’ — must not feel disheartened
that Gandhiji was being ‘res urrected as a rival authority to the
Government of I ndia,’ and that the Government was losing the
will to rule. As the Home Member, H.G. Haig, put it: ‘We can, in
my view, do without the goodwill of the Congress, and in fact I do
not believe for a moment that we shall ever have it, but we
cannot afford to d o without the confidence of those who have
supported us in the long struggle against the Congress. ’ (c) In
particular, the nationalist movement must not be pe rmitted to
gather force and consolidate itself in rural areas, as it was doing
all over India, esp ecially in U.P., Gujarat, Andhra, Bihar, Bengal | <s>[INST]279 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
know that all is not well in India . . . there is nothing wanting to
fill me with utter despair. . . There is every chance of my
returning empty -handed’ . That is exactly what happened in
London. The B ritish Government refused to concede the basic
Indian demand for freedom. Gandhiji came back at the end of
December 1931 to a changed political situation.
The higher British officials in India had drawn their own
lessons from the political impact of the Delhi Pact which had
raised the political prestige of the Congress and the political
morale of the people and undermined and lowered British
prestige. They, a s well as the new Viceroy, believed that the
Government had made a major error in negotiating and signing a
truce with the Congress, as if between two equal powers. They
were now determined to reverse it all. No pact, no truce, no
Gandhi -Viceroy meetings, no ‘quarter for the enemy’ became the
watchwords of Government policy.
The British policy was now dominated by three major
considerations: (a) Gandhiji must not be permitted to build up
the tempo for a massive and protracted mass movement, as he
had done in 1919, 1920 -1 and 1930. (b) The Government
functionaries — village officials, police and higher bureaucrats —
and the loyalists — ‘our friends’ — must not feel disheartened
that Gandhiji was being ‘res urrected as a rival authority to the
Government of I ndia,’ and that the Government was losing the
will to rule. As the Home Member, H.G. Haig, put it: ‘We can, in
my view, do without the goodwill of the Congress, and in fact I do
not believe for a moment that we shall ever have it, but we
cannot afford to d o without the confidence of those who have
supported us in the long struggle against the Congress. ’ (c) In
particular, the nationalist movement must not be pe rmitted to
gather force and consolidate itself in rural areas, as it was doing
all over India, esp ecially in U.P., Gujarat, Andhra, Bihar, Bengal[/INST] |
and NWFP.
While Gandhiji was in London, the Government of India
prepared, in secret, plain fo r the coming showdown with the
nationalist forces. It decided to launch ‘a hard and immediate
blow’ against any re vival of the movement and to arrest Gandhiji
at the very outset. It drafted a series of ordinances which would
usher in virtual martial law, though under civilian control. | <s>[INST]and NWFP.
While Gandhiji was in London, the Government of India
prepared, in secret, plain fo r the coming showdown with the
nationalist forces. It decided to launch ‘a hard and immediate
blow’ against any re vival of the movement and to arrest Gandhiji
at the very outset. It drafted a series of ordinances which would
usher in virtual martial law, though under civilian control.[/INST] |
280 | India’s Struggle For Independence
The shape of things to come had been overshadowed by
what happened in U.P., NWFP an d Bengal during the truce
period, hi U.P. the Congress was leading a campaign for
reduction of rent, remission of arrears of rent and prevention of
eviction of tenants for non -payment of rents. By the first week of
December, the Congress had launched a no -rent, no -revenue
campaign in five districts. The Government’s response was to
arrest Jawaharlal on 26 December when he was going to Bombay
to meet Gandhiji. In the North -Western Frontier Province, the
Government continued its severe repression against the non-
violent Khudai Khidmatgars (servants of God), also known as Red
Shirts because of the colour of their shirts, and the peasants they
led against the Government’s policy of extracting revenue
through cruel methods and torture. On 24 December, their
leade r, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was arrested and Peshawar district
was occupied by the army. In Bengal, the Government was ruling
through draconian ordinances and detaining thousands of
political workers in the name of fighting terrorism. In September,
the police f ired upon political prisoners in H ijli jail, killing two.
Gandhiji landed in Bombay on 28 December. The Congress
Working Committee met the next day and decided to resume civil
disobedience. On the 31st, Gandhiji asked the Viceroy for a
meeting, offering to suspend the decision on civil disobedience till
such a meeting. The Viceroy refused to see Gandhiji — the first of
many such refusals during the next five years. On 4 January
1932, the Government launched its pre -emptive strike against
the national mov ement by arresting Gandhiji, promulgating
ordinances which gave the authorities unlimited power — thus
initiating what a historian has described as ‘Civil Martial Law.’
Civil liberties no longer existed and the authorities could seize
people and property a t will. Within a week, leading Congressmen
all over the country were behind bars. | <s>[INST]280 | India’s Struggle For Independence
The shape of things to come had been overshadowed by
what happened in U.P., NWFP an d Bengal during the truce
period, hi U.P. the Congress was leading a campaign for
reduction of rent, remission of arrears of rent and prevention of
eviction of tenants for non -payment of rents. By the first week of
December, the Congress had launched a no -rent, no -revenue
campaign in five districts. The Government’s response was to
arrest Jawaharlal on 26 December when he was going to Bombay
to meet Gandhiji. In the North -Western Frontier Province, the
Government continued its severe repression against the non-
violent Khudai Khidmatgars (servants of God), also known as Red
Shirts because of the colour of their shirts, and the peasants they
led against the Government’s policy of extracting revenue
through cruel methods and torture. On 24 December, their
leade r, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was arrested and Peshawar district
was occupied by the army. In Bengal, the Government was ruling
through draconian ordinances and detaining thousands of
political workers in the name of fighting terrorism. In September,
the police f ired upon political prisoners in H ijli jail, killing two.
Gandhiji landed in Bombay on 28 December. The Congress
Working Committee met the next day and decided to resume civil
disobedience. On the 31st, Gandhiji asked the Viceroy for a
meeting, offering to suspend the decision on civil disobedience till
such a meeting. The Viceroy refused to see Gandhiji — the first of
many such refusals during the next five years. On 4 January
1932, the Government launched its pre -emptive strike against
the national mov ement by arresting Gandhiji, promulgating
ordinances which gave the authorities unlimited power — thus
initiating what a historian has described as ‘Civil Martial Law.’
Civil liberties no longer existed and the authorities could seize
people and property a t will. Within a week, leading Congressmen
all over the country were behind bars.[/INST] |
all over the country were behind bars.
The Indian people responded with anger. Even though the
Congress entered the battle rather unprepared, the popular
response was massive. In the first four months, over 80,00 0
Satyagrahis, most of them urban and rural poor, were jailed,
while lakhs took to the picketing of shops selling liquor and
foreign cloth. Illegal gatherings, non -violent demonstrations,
celebrations of various national days, and other forms of defiance
of the ordinances were the rule of the day. | <s>[INST]all over the country were behind bars.
The Indian people responded with anger. Even though the
Congress entered the battle rather unprepared, the popular
response was massive. In the first four months, over 80,00 0
Satyagrahis, most of them urban and rural poor, were jailed,
while lakhs took to the picketing of shops selling liquor and
foreign cloth. Illegal gatherings, non -violent demonstrations,
celebrations of various national days, and other forms of defiance
of the ordinances were the rule of the day.[/INST] |
281 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
The non -violent movement was met by relentless repression.
The Congress and its allied organizations were declared illegal
and their offices and funds seized. Nearly all the Gandhi Ashrams
were occupied by the po lice. Peaceful picketers, Satyagrahis and
processionists were lathi -charged , beaten and often awarded
rigorous imprisonment and heavy fines, which were realized by
selling their lands and property at throw away prices. Prisoners
in jail were barbarously tr eated. Whipping as punishment
became frequent. The no -tax campaigns in different parts of rural
India were treated with great severity. Lands, houses, cattle,
agricultural implements, and other property were freely
confiscated. The police indulged in naked terror and committed
innumerable atrocities. At Ras, a village in Gujarat, the non -tax
paying peasants were stripped naked, publicly whipped and given
electric shocks. The wrath of the Government fell with particular
harshness on women. Conditions in jail s were made
extraordinarily severe with the idea of scaring away women from
the Satyagraha. The freedom of the Press to report or comment
on the movement, or even to print pictures of national leaders or
Satyagrahis, was curtailed. Within the first six mon ths of 1932
action was taken against 109 journalists and ninety -eight
printing presses. Nationalist literature — poems, stories and
novels — was banned on a large scale.
The people fought back. But Gandhiji and other leaders had
no. time to build up the t empo of the movement and it could not
be sustained for long. The movement was effectively crushed
within a few months. In August 1932, the number of those
convicted came down to 3,047 and by August 1933 only 4,500
Satyagrahis were in jail. However, the mov ement continued to
linger till early April 1934 when the inevitable decision to
withdraw it was taken by Gandhiji.
Political activists despaired at the turn the movement had | <s>[INST]281 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
The non -violent movement was met by relentless repression.
The Congress and its allied organizations were declared illegal
and their offices and funds seized. Nearly all the Gandhi Ashrams
were occupied by the po lice. Peaceful picketers, Satyagrahis and
processionists were lathi -charged , beaten and often awarded
rigorous imprisonment and heavy fines, which were realized by
selling their lands and property at throw away prices. Prisoners
in jail were barbarously tr eated. Whipping as punishment
became frequent. The no -tax campaigns in different parts of rural
India were treated with great severity. Lands, houses, cattle,
agricultural implements, and other property were freely
confiscated. The police indulged in naked terror and committed
innumerable atrocities. At Ras, a village in Gujarat, the non -tax
paying peasants were stripped naked, publicly whipped and given
electric shocks. The wrath of the Government fell with particular
harshness on women. Conditions in jail s were made
extraordinarily severe with the idea of scaring away women from
the Satyagraha. The freedom of the Press to report or comment
on the movement, or even to print pictures of national leaders or
Satyagrahis, was curtailed. Within the first six mon ths of 1932
action was taken against 109 journalists and ninety -eight
printing presses. Nationalist literature — poems, stories and
novels — was banned on a large scale.
The people fought back. But Gandhiji and other leaders had
no. time to build up the t empo of the movement and it could not
be sustained for long. The movement was effectively crushed
within a few months. In August 1932, the number of those
convicted came down to 3,047 and by August 1933 only 4,500
Satyagrahis were in jail. However, the mov ement continued to
linger till early April 1934 when the inevitable decision to
withdraw it was taken by Gandhiji.
Political activists despaired at the turn the movement had[/INST] |
Political activists despaired at the turn the movement had
taken. What have we achieved, many asked? Even a buoyant and
active person like Jawaharlal gave voice to this sense of despair
— accentuated by his separation from his sick wife — by copying
a verse in his jail diary in June 1935: ‘Sad winds where your
voice was; Tears, tears where my heart was; and ever with me,
Child, ever with me, Silence where hope was.’7 Earlier, when
Gandhiji had withdrawn the movement, Jawaharlal had felt ‘with
a stab of pain’ that his long association with Gandhiji was about | <s>[INST]Political activists despaired at the turn the movement had
taken. What have we achieved, many asked? Even a buoyant and
active person like Jawaharlal gave voice to this sense of despair
— accentuated by his separation from his sick wife — by copying
a verse in his jail diary in June 1935: ‘Sad winds where your
voice was; Tears, tears where my heart was; and ever with me,
Child, ever with me, Silence where hope was.’7 Earlier, when
Gandhiji had withdrawn the movement, Jawaharlal had felt ‘with
a stab of pain’ that his long association with Gandhiji was about[/INST] |
282 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to come to an end. Subhas Chandra Bose and Vithalbhai Patel
had been much more critica l of Gandhiji’s leadership. In a strong
statement from Europe they had said in 1933 that ‘Mr. Gandhi
as a political leader has failed’ and called for ‘a radical
reorganization of the Congress on a new principle with a new
method, for wh ich a new leader is essential.’
The enemies of Indian nationalism gloated over the
frustration among the nationalists — and grossly misread it.
Willingdon declared in early 1933: ‘The Congress is in a definitely
less favourable position than in 1930, and has lost its hold on
the public.” But Willingdon and company had completely failed to
understand the nature and strategy of the Indian national
movement — it was basically a struggle for the minds of men and
women. Seen in this light, if the colonial policy of negotiations by
Irwin had failed earlier, so had the policy of ruthless suppression
by Willingdon. People had been cowed down by superior force;
they had not lost faith in the Congress. Though the movement
from 1930 to 1934 had not achieved independence and had been
tempo rarily crushed, the Indian people had been further
transformed. The will to fight had been further strengthened;
faith in British rule had been completely shattered. H.N.
Brailsford, Laborite journalist, wrote, assessing the results of the
nationalists’ mo st recent struggle, that the Indians ‘had freed
their own minds, they had won independence in their hearts. ’
And, as we have seen earlier, this hiatus in the movement
too was primarily to rest and regroup. Withdrawal of the
movement did not mean defeat or loss of mass support; it only
meant, as Dr. Ansari put it, ‘having fought long enough we
prepare to rest,’ to fight another day a bigger battle with greater
and better organized force.’ Symbolic of the real outcome, the real
impact of the civil disobedienc e, was the heroes’ welcome given to | <s>[INST]282 | India’s Struggle For Independence
to come to an end. Subhas Chandra Bose and Vithalbhai Patel
had been much more critica l of Gandhiji’s leadership. In a strong
statement from Europe they had said in 1933 that ‘Mr. Gandhi
as a political leader has failed’ and called for ‘a radical
reorganization of the Congress on a new principle with a new
method, for wh ich a new leader is essential.’
The enemies of Indian nationalism gloated over the
frustration among the nationalists — and grossly misread it.
Willingdon declared in early 1933: ‘The Congress is in a definitely
less favourable position than in 1930, and has lost its hold on
the public.” But Willingdon and company had completely failed to
understand the nature and strategy of the Indian national
movement — it was basically a struggle for the minds of men and
women. Seen in this light, if the colonial policy of negotiations by
Irwin had failed earlier, so had the policy of ruthless suppression
by Willingdon. People had been cowed down by superior force;
they had not lost faith in the Congress. Though the movement
from 1930 to 1934 had not achieved independence and had been
tempo rarily crushed, the Indian people had been further
transformed. The will to fight had been further strengthened;
faith in British rule had been completely shattered. H.N.
Brailsford, Laborite journalist, wrote, assessing the results of the
nationalists’ mo st recent struggle, that the Indians ‘had freed
their own minds, they had won independence in their hearts. ’
And, as we have seen earlier, this hiatus in the movement
too was primarily to rest and regroup. Withdrawal of the
movement did not mean defeat or loss of mass support; it only
meant, as Dr. Ansari put it, ‘having fought long enough we
prepare to rest,’ to fight another day a bigger battle with greater
and better organized force.’ Symbolic of the real outcome, the real
impact of the civil disobedienc e, was the heroes’ welcome given to[/INST] |
prisoners on their release in 1934. And this became evident to all
when the Congress captured a majority in six out of eleven
provinces in the elections in 1937 despite the restricted nature of
the franchise.
Alone amon g his contemporaries, Gandhiji understood the
true nature and outcome of the Civil Disobedience Movement. To
Nehru, he wrote in September 1933: ‘ I have no sense of defeat in
me and the hope in me that this country of ours is fast marching | <s>[INST]prisoners on their release in 1934. And this became evident to all
when the Congress captured a majority in six out of eleven
provinces in the elections in 1937 despite the restricted nature of
the franchise.
Alone amon g his contemporaries, Gandhiji understood the
true nature and outcome of the Civil Disobedience Movement. To
Nehru, he wrote in September 1933: ‘ I have no sense of defeat in
me and the hope in me that this country of ours is fast marching[/INST] |
283 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
towards its goal is burning as bright as it did in 1920.” He
reiterated this view to a group of Congress leaders in April 1934:
‘I feel no despondency in me. .. I am not feeling helpless. . . The
nation has got energy of which you have no conception but I
have.” He had, of course, an advantage over most other leaders.
While they needed a movement to sustain their sense of political
activism, he had always available the alternative of constructive
work.
*
The British policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ found another
expression in t he announcement of the Communal Award in
August 1932. The Award allotted to each minority a number of
seats in the legislatures to be elected on the basis of a separate
electorate that is Muslims would be elected only by Muslims and
Sikhs only by Sikhs, an d so on. Muslims, Sikhs and Christians
had already been treated as minorities. The Award declared the
Depressed Classes (Scheduled Castes of today) also to be a
minority community entitled to separate electorate and thus
separated them from the rest of the Hindus.
The Congress was opposed to a separate electorate for
Muslims, Sikhs and ‘Christians as it encouraged the communal
notion that they formed separate groups or communities having
interests different from the general body of Indians. The
inevitable result was to divide the Indian people and prevent the
growth of a common national consciousness. But the idea of a
separate electorate for Muslims had been accepted by the
Congress as far back as 1916 as a part of the compromise with
the Muslim League. He nce, the Congress took the position that
though it was opposed to separate electorates, it was not in
favour of changing the Award without the consent of the
minorities. Consequently, though strongly disagreeing with the
Communal Award, it decided neither to accept it nor to reject it.
But the effort to separate the Depressed Classes from the | <s>[INST]283 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
towards its goal is burning as bright as it did in 1920.” He
reiterated this view to a group of Congress leaders in April 1934:
‘I feel no despondency in me. .. I am not feeling helpless. . . The
nation has got energy of which you have no conception but I
have.” He had, of course, an advantage over most other leaders.
While they needed a movement to sustain their sense of political
activism, he had always available the alternative of constructive
work.
*
The British policy of ‘Divide and Rule’ found another
expression in t he announcement of the Communal Award in
August 1932. The Award allotted to each minority a number of
seats in the legislatures to be elected on the basis of a separate
electorate that is Muslims would be elected only by Muslims and
Sikhs only by Sikhs, an d so on. Muslims, Sikhs and Christians
had already been treated as minorities. The Award declared the
Depressed Classes (Scheduled Castes of today) also to be a
minority community entitled to separate electorate and thus
separated them from the rest of the Hindus.
The Congress was opposed to a separate electorate for
Muslims, Sikhs and ‘Christians as it encouraged the communal
notion that they formed separate groups or communities having
interests different from the general body of Indians. The
inevitable result was to divide the Indian people and prevent the
growth of a common national consciousness. But the idea of a
separate electorate for Muslims had been accepted by the
Congress as far back as 1916 as a part of the compromise with
the Muslim League. He nce, the Congress took the position that
though it was opposed to separate electorates, it was not in
favour of changing the Award without the consent of the
minorities. Consequently, though strongly disagreeing with the
Communal Award, it decided neither to accept it nor to reject it.
But the effort to separate the Depressed Classes from the[/INST] |
But the effort to separate the Depressed Classes from the
rest of Hindus by treating them as separate political entities was
vehemently opposed by all the nationalists. Gandhiji, in Yeravada
jail at the time, in part icular, reacted very strongly.’ He saw the
Award as an attack on Indian unity and nationalism, harmful to | <s>[INST]But the effort to separate the Depressed Classes from the
rest of Hindus by treating them as separate political entities was
vehemently opposed by all the nationalists. Gandhiji, in Yeravada
jail at the time, in part icular, reacted very strongly.’ He saw the
Award as an attack on Indian unity and nationalism, harmful to[/INST] |
284 | India’s Struggle For Independence
both Hinduism and the Depressed Classes, for it provided no
answers to the socially degraded position of the latter. Once the
Depressed Classes were treated a s a separate community, the
question of abolishing untouchability would not arise, and the
work of Hindu social reform in this respect would come to a halt.
Gandhiji argued that whatever harm separate electorates
might do to Muslims or Sikhs, it did not a ffect the fact that they
would remain Muslims or Sikhs. But while reformers like himself
were working for the total eradication of untouchability, separate
electorates would ensure that ‘untouchables remain
untouchables in perpetuity.’ What was needed was not the
protection of the so -called interests of the Depressed Classes in
terms of seats in the legislatures or jobs but the ‘root arid branch’
eradication of untouchability.
Gandhiji demanded that the representatives of the
Depressed Classes should be el ected by the general electorate
under a wide, if possible universal, common franchise. At the
same time he did not object to the demand for a larger number of
the reserved seats for the Depressed Classes. He went on a fast
unto death on 20 September 1932 t o enforce his demand. In a
statement to the Press, he said: ‘My life, I count of no
consequence. One hundred lives given for this noble cause
would, in my opinion, be poor penance done by Hindus for the
atrocious wrongs they have heaped upon helpless men a nd
women of their own faith.’
While many political Indians saw the fast as a diversion
from the ongoing political movement, all were deeply concerned
and emotionally shaken. Mass meetings took place almost
everywhere. The 20th of September was observed as a day of
fasting and prayer. Temples, wells, etc., were thrown open to the
Depressed Classes all over the country. Rabindranath Tagore
sent a telegraphic message to Gandhiji: ‘It is worth sacrificing | <s>[INST]284 | India’s Struggle For Independence
both Hinduism and the Depressed Classes, for it provided no
answers to the socially degraded position of the latter. Once the
Depressed Classes were treated a s a separate community, the
question of abolishing untouchability would not arise, and the
work of Hindu social reform in this respect would come to a halt.
Gandhiji argued that whatever harm separate electorates
might do to Muslims or Sikhs, it did not a ffect the fact that they
would remain Muslims or Sikhs. But while reformers like himself
were working for the total eradication of untouchability, separate
electorates would ensure that ‘untouchables remain
untouchables in perpetuity.’ What was needed was not the
protection of the so -called interests of the Depressed Classes in
terms of seats in the legislatures or jobs but the ‘root arid branch’
eradication of untouchability.
Gandhiji demanded that the representatives of the
Depressed Classes should be el ected by the general electorate
under a wide, if possible universal, common franchise. At the
same time he did not object to the demand for a larger number of
the reserved seats for the Depressed Classes. He went on a fast
unto death on 20 September 1932 t o enforce his demand. In a
statement to the Press, he said: ‘My life, I count of no
consequence. One hundred lives given for this noble cause
would, in my opinion, be poor penance done by Hindus for the
atrocious wrongs they have heaped upon helpless men a nd
women of their own faith.’
While many political Indians saw the fast as a diversion
from the ongoing political movement, all were deeply concerned
and emotionally shaken. Mass meetings took place almost
everywhere. The 20th of September was observed as a day of
fasting and prayer. Temples, wells, etc., were thrown open to the
Depressed Classes all over the country. Rabindranath Tagore
sent a telegraphic message to Gandhiji: ‘It is worth sacrificing[/INST] |
precious life for the sake of India’s unity and her soc ial integrity. .
. Our sorrowing hearts will follow your sublime penance with
reverence and love.’ Political leaders of different political
persuasions, including Madan Mohan Malaviya, M.C. Rajah and
B.R. Ambedkar, now became active. In the end they succee ded in
hammering out an agreement, known as the Poona Pact,
according to which the idea of separate electorates for the | <s>[INST]precious life for the sake of India’s unity and her soc ial integrity. .
. Our sorrowing hearts will follow your sublime penance with
reverence and love.’ Political leaders of different political
persuasions, including Madan Mohan Malaviya, M.C. Rajah and
B.R. Ambedkar, now became active. In the end they succee ded in
hammering out an agreement, known as the Poona Pact,
according to which the idea of separate electorates for the[/INST] |
285 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
Depressed Classes was abandoned but the seats reserved for
them in the provincial legislatures were increased from seventy -
one in the Aw ard to 147 and in the Central Legislature to
eighteen per cent of the total.
*
Regarding the Poona agreement, Gandhiji declared after
breaking his fast: ‘I would like to assure my Harijan friends . . .
that they may hold my life as a hostage for its due fulfilment.’ He
now set out to redeem his pledge. First from jail and then from
outside, for nearly two years he gave up all other pre-occupations
and earned on a whirlwind campaign against untouchability.
After his release from prison, he had shifted to Satyagraha
Ashram at Wardha after abandoning Sabarmati Ashram at
Ahmedabad for he had vowed in 1930 not to return to Sabarm ati
till Swaraj was won. Starting from Wardha on 7 November 1933
and until 29 July 1934, for nearly nine months, he conducted an
inten sive ‘Harijan tour’ of the country travelling over 20,000
kilometres by train, car, bullock cart, and on foot. collecting
money for the recently founded Harijan Sewak Sangh,
propagating the removal of untouchability in all its forms and
practices, and urging social workers to leave all and go to the
villages for the social, economic, cultural and political uplift of
the Harijans — his name for the Depressed Classes.
In the course of his Harijan campaign, Gandhiji undertook
two major fasts on 8 May and 16 A ugust 1933 to convince his
followers of the importance of the issue and the seriousness of
his effort. ‘They must either remove untouchability or remove me
from their midst.’ He justified these fasts as answers to his ‘inner
voice,’ which, he said, could a lso be described as ‘dictates of
reason.’ These fasts created consternation in the ranks of the
nationalists, throwing many of them into an emotional crisis. The
fast of 8 May 1933 was opposed even by Kasturba, his wife. As | <s>[INST]285 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
Depressed Classes was abandoned but the seats reserved for
them in the provincial legislatures were increased from seventy -
one in the Aw ard to 147 and in the Central Legislature to
eighteen per cent of the total.
*
Regarding the Poona agreement, Gandhiji declared after
breaking his fast: ‘I would like to assure my Harijan friends . . .
that they may hold my life as a hostage for its due fulfilment.’ He
now set out to redeem his pledge. First from jail and then from
outside, for nearly two years he gave up all other pre-occupations
and earned on a whirlwind campaign against untouchability.
After his release from prison, he had shifted to Satyagraha
Ashram at Wardha after abandoning Sabarmati Ashram at
Ahmedabad for he had vowed in 1930 not to return to Sabarm ati
till Swaraj was won. Starting from Wardha on 7 November 1933
and until 29 July 1934, for nearly nine months, he conducted an
inten sive ‘Harijan tour’ of the country travelling over 20,000
kilometres by train, car, bullock cart, and on foot. collecting
money for the recently founded Harijan Sewak Sangh,
propagating the removal of untouchability in all its forms and
practices, and urging social workers to leave all and go to the
villages for the social, economic, cultural and political uplift of
the Harijans — his name for the Depressed Classes.
In the course of his Harijan campaign, Gandhiji undertook
two major fasts on 8 May and 16 A ugust 1933 to convince his
followers of the importance of the issue and the seriousness of
his effort. ‘They must either remove untouchability or remove me
from their midst.’ He justified these fasts as answers to his ‘inner
voice,’ which, he said, could a lso be described as ‘dictates of
reason.’ These fasts created consternation in the ranks of the
nationalists, throwing many of them into an emotional crisis. The
fast of 8 May 1933 was opposed even by Kasturba, his wife. As[/INST] |
fast of 8 May 1933 was opposed even by Kasturba, his wife. As
the hour of the fast approached, Miraben sent a telegram: ‘Ba
wishes me to say she is greatly shocked. Feels the decision very
wrong but you have not listened to any others and so will not
hear her. She sends her heartfelt prayers.’ Gandhiji’s reply was
characteristic: ‘Tell Ba her fathe r imposed on her a companion | <s>[INST]fast of 8 May 1933 was opposed even by Kasturba, his wife. As
the hour of the fast approached, Miraben sent a telegram: ‘Ba
wishes me to say she is greatly shocked. Feels the decision very
wrong but you have not listened to any others and so will not
hear her. She sends her heartfelt prayers.’ Gandhiji’s reply was
characteristic: ‘Tell Ba her fathe r imposed on her a companion[/INST] |
286 | India’s Struggle For Independence
whose weight would have killed any other woman. I treasure her
love. She must remain courageous to the end.’
Throughout Gandhiji’s Harijan campaign, he was attacked
by orthodox and social reactionaries. They met him with black
flag demonstrations and disrupted his meetings. They brought
out scurrilous and inflammatory leaflets again st him, putting
fantastic utterances in his mouth. They accused him of attacking
Hinduism. They publicly burnt his portraits. On 25 June 1934,
at Poona, a bomb was thrown on a car believed to be carrying
Gandhiji, injuring its seven occupants. The protesters offered the
Government full support against the Congress and the Civil
Disobedience Movement if it would not support the anti -
untouchability camp aign. The Government obliged by defeating
the Temple Entry Bill in the Legislative Assembly in August 1934.
Throughout his fast, Harijan work and Harijan tour, Gandhiji
stressed on certain themes. One was the degree of oppression
practised on the Harijans ; in fact, day after day he put forward a
damning indictment of Hindu society: ‘Socially they are lepers.
Economically they are worse. Religiously they are denied
entrance to places we miscall houses of God. They are denied the
use, on the same terms as Hi ndus, of public roads, public
schools, public hospitals, public wells, public taps, public parks
and the like. . . They are relegated for their residence to the worst
quarters of cities and villages where they get no social services.’ A
second theme was that of the ‘root and branch removal of
untouchability.’ Symbolic or rather the entering wedge in this
respect was to be the throwing open of all temples to Harijans.
Gandhiji’s entire campaign was based on the grounds of
humanism and reason. But he also ar gued that untouchability,
as practised at present, had no sanction in the Hindu Shastras.
But even if this was not so, the Harijan worker should not feel | <s>[INST]286 | India’s Struggle For Independence
whose weight would have killed any other woman. I treasure her
love. She must remain courageous to the end.’
Throughout Gandhiji’s Harijan campaign, he was attacked
by orthodox and social reactionaries. They met him with black
flag demonstrations and disrupted his meetings. They brought
out scurrilous and inflammatory leaflets again st him, putting
fantastic utterances in his mouth. They accused him of attacking
Hinduism. They publicly burnt his portraits. On 25 June 1934,
at Poona, a bomb was thrown on a car believed to be carrying
Gandhiji, injuring its seven occupants. The protesters offered the
Government full support against the Congress and the Civil
Disobedience Movement if it would not support the anti -
untouchability camp aign. The Government obliged by defeating
the Temple Entry Bill in the Legislative Assembly in August 1934.
Throughout his fast, Harijan work and Harijan tour, Gandhiji
stressed on certain themes. One was the degree of oppression
practised on the Harijans ; in fact, day after day he put forward a
damning indictment of Hindu society: ‘Socially they are lepers.
Economically they are worse. Religiously they are denied
entrance to places we miscall houses of God. They are denied the
use, on the same terms as Hi ndus, of public roads, public
schools, public hospitals, public wells, public taps, public parks
and the like. . . They are relegated for their residence to the worst
quarters of cities and villages where they get no social services.’ A
second theme was that of the ‘root and branch removal of
untouchability.’ Symbolic or rather the entering wedge in this
respect was to be the throwing open of all temples to Harijans.
Gandhiji’s entire campaign was based on the grounds of
humanism and reason. But he also ar gued that untouchability,
as practised at present, had no sanction in the Hindu Shastras.
But even if this was not so, the Harijan worker should not feel[/INST] |
daunted. Truth could -not be confined within the covers of a
book. The Shastras should be ignored if t hey went against
human dignity.
A major running theme in Gandhiji’s writings and speeches
was the need for caste Hindus to do ‘penance’ and ‘make
reparations . . . for the untold hardships to which we have
subjected them (the Hari jans) for centuries.’ For this reason, he
was not hostile to Dr. Ambedkar and other Harijans who | <s>[INST]daunted. Truth could -not be confined within the covers of a
book. The Shastras should be ignored if t hey went against
human dignity.
A major running theme in Gandhiji’s writings and speeches
was the need for caste Hindus to do ‘penance’ and ‘make
reparations . . . for the untold hardships to which we have
subjected them (the Hari jans) for centuries.’ For this reason, he
was not hostile to Dr. Ambedkar and other Harijans who[/INST] |
287 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
criticized and distrusted him. ‘They have every right to distrust
me,’ he wrote. ‘Do I not belong to the Hindu section miscalled
superior class or caste Hindus, who have ground down to powder
the so called untouchables?’ At the same time, he repeatedly
warned caste Hindus that if this atonement was not made,
Hinduism would perish: ‘Hinduism dies if untouchability lives,
and untouchability has to die if Hinduism is to live.’ (This stron g
theme of ‘penance’ largely explains why caste Hindus born and
brought up in pre -1947 India so readily accepted large scale
reservations in jobs, enrolment in professional colleges and so on
for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes after
independence ).
Gandhiji was not in favour of mixing up the issue of the
removal of untouchability with the issues of inter -dining and
inter-marriage. Restriction on the latter should certainly go, for
‘dining and marriage restrictions stunt Hindu society.’ But they
were also practised by caste Hindus among themselves as also
the Harijans among themselves. The present All-India campaign,
he said, had to be directed against the disabilities which were
specific to the Harijans. Similarly, he distinguished between the
abolition of caste system and the abolition of untouchability. He
disagreed with Dr. Ambedkar when the latter asserted that ‘the
outcaste is a by -product of the caste system. There will be
outcastes as long as there are castes. And nothing can
emancipate the outcaste except the destruction of the caste
system. On the contrary, Gandhiji said that whatever the
‘limitations and defects’ of the Vamashram, ‘there is nothing
sinful about it, as there is about untouchability.’ He believed that
purged of untouchabilit y, itself a product of ‘the distinction of
high and low’ and not of the caste system, this system could
function in a manner that would make each caste
‘complementary of the other and none inferior or superior to any | <s>[INST]287 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
criticized and distrusted him. ‘They have every right to distrust
me,’ he wrote. ‘Do I not belong to the Hindu section miscalled
superior class or caste Hindus, who have ground down to powder
the so called untouchables?’ At the same time, he repeatedly
warned caste Hindus that if this atonement was not made,
Hinduism would perish: ‘Hinduism dies if untouchability lives,
and untouchability has to die if Hinduism is to live.’ (This stron g
theme of ‘penance’ largely explains why caste Hindus born and
brought up in pre -1947 India so readily accepted large scale
reservations in jobs, enrolment in professional colleges and so on
for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes after
independence ).
Gandhiji was not in favour of mixing up the issue of the
removal of untouchability with the issues of inter -dining and
inter-marriage. Restriction on the latter should certainly go, for
‘dining and marriage restrictions stunt Hindu society.’ But they
were also practised by caste Hindus among themselves as also
the Harijans among themselves. The present All-India campaign,
he said, had to be directed against the disabilities which were
specific to the Harijans. Similarly, he distinguished between the
abolition of caste system and the abolition of untouchability. He
disagreed with Dr. Ambedkar when the latter asserted that ‘the
outcaste is a by -product of the caste system. There will be
outcastes as long as there are castes. And nothing can
emancipate the outcaste except the destruction of the caste
system. On the contrary, Gandhiji said that whatever the
‘limitations and defects’ of the Vamashram, ‘there is nothing
sinful about it, as there is about untouchability.’ He believed that
purged of untouchabilit y, itself a product of ‘the distinction of
high and low’ and not of the caste system, this system could
function in a manner that would make each caste
‘complementary of the other and none inferior or superior to any[/INST] |
other.’ In any case, he said, both the believers and the critics of
the Varna system should join hands in fighting untouchability,
for opposition to the latter was common to both.
Gandhiji also stressed the positive impact that the struggles
against untouchability would have on the communal and other
questions. Non - Hindus were treated by Hindus as untouchables
‘in some way or the oth er,’ especially in matters of food and
drink, and non-Hindus certainly took note of this fact. Hence, ‘if | <s>[INST]other.’ In any case, he said, both the believers and the critics of
the Varna system should join hands in fighting untouchability,
for opposition to the latter was common to both.
Gandhiji also stressed the positive impact that the struggles
against untouchability would have on the communal and other
questions. Non - Hindus were treated by Hindus as untouchables
‘in some way or the oth er,’ especially in matters of food and
drink, and non-Hindus certainly took note of this fact. Hence, ‘if[/INST] |
288 | India’s Struggle For Independence
untouchability is removed, it must result in bringing all Indians
together.’ Increasingly, he also began to point out that
untouchability was only one form of the distinctions that society
made between man and man; it was a product of the grading of
society into high and low. To attack untouchability was to oppose
‘this high -and-lowness.’ That is why ‘the phase we are now
dealing with does not exhaust all the possibilities of struggle.’
In keeping with his basic philosophy of non -violence, and being
basically a 19th century liberal and believer in rational
discu ssion, Gandhiji was opposed to exercising compulsion even
on the orthodox supporters of untouchability, whom he described
as the Sanatanists. Even they had to be tolerated and converted
and won over by persuasion, ‘by appealing to their reason and
their he arts.’ His fasts, he said, were not directed against his
opponents or meant to coerce them into opening temples and
wells etc.; they were directed towards friends and followers to
goad them and inspire them to redouble their anti -untouchability
work.
Gand hiji’s Harijan campaign included a programme of
internal reform by Harijans: promotion of education, cleanliness
and hygiene, giving up the eating of carrion and beef, giving up
liquor and the abolition of untouchability among themselves. But
it did not in clude a militant struggle by the Harijans themselves
through Satyagraha, breaking of caste taboos, mass
demonstrations, picketing, and other forms of protests. At the
same time, he was aware that his Harijan movement ‘must cause
daily increasing awakening among the Harijans’ and that in time
‘whether the savarna Hindus like it or not, the Harijans would
make good their position.’
Gandhiji repeatedly stressed that the Harijan movement
was not a political movement but a movement to purify Hinduism
and Hindu society. But he was also aware that the movement
‘will produce great political consequences,’ just as untouchability | <s>[INST]288 | India’s Struggle For Independence
untouchability is removed, it must result in bringing all Indians
together.’ Increasingly, he also began to point out that
untouchability was only one form of the distinctions that society
made between man and man; it was a product of the grading of
society into high and low. To attack untouchability was to oppose
‘this high -and-lowness.’ That is why ‘the phase we are now
dealing with does not exhaust all the possibilities of struggle.’
In keeping with his basic philosophy of non -violence, and being
basically a 19th century liberal and believer in rational
discu ssion, Gandhiji was opposed to exercising compulsion even
on the orthodox supporters of untouchability, whom he described
as the Sanatanists. Even they had to be tolerated and converted
and won over by persuasion, ‘by appealing to their reason and
their he arts.’ His fasts, he said, were not directed against his
opponents or meant to coerce them into opening temples and
wells etc.; they were directed towards friends and followers to
goad them and inspire them to redouble their anti -untouchability
work.
Gand hiji’s Harijan campaign included a programme of
internal reform by Harijans: promotion of education, cleanliness
and hygiene, giving up the eating of carrion and beef, giving up
liquor and the abolition of untouchability among themselves. But
it did not in clude a militant struggle by the Harijans themselves
through Satyagraha, breaking of caste taboos, mass
demonstrations, picketing, and other forms of protests. At the
same time, he was aware that his Harijan movement ‘must cause
daily increasing awakening among the Harijans’ and that in time
‘whether the savarna Hindus like it or not, the Harijans would
make good their position.’
Gandhiji repeatedly stressed that the Harijan movement
was not a political movement but a movement to purify Hinduism
and Hindu society. But he was also aware that the movement
‘will produce great political consequences,’ just as untouchability[/INST] |
poisoned ‘our entire social and political fabric.’ In fact, not only
did Harijan work, along with other items of constructive work,
enable the Congress cadre to keep busy in its non-mass
movement phases, it also gradually carried the message of
nationalism to the Harijans, who also happened to be
agricultural labourers in most parts of the country, leading to | <s>[INST]poisoned ‘our entire social and political fabric.’ In fact, not only
did Harijan work, along with other items of constructive work,
enable the Congress cadre to keep busy in its non-mass
movement phases, it also gradually carried the message of
nationalism to the Harijans, who also happened to be
agricultural labourers in most parts of the country, leading to[/INST] |
289 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
their increasing participation in the national as well as peasant
movements. | <s>[INST]289 | From Karachi to Wardha: The Years from 1932 -34
their increasing participation in the national as well as peasant
movements.[/INST] |
290 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 24. THE RISE OF THE LEFT -
WING
A powerful left -wing group developed in India in the late
1920s and 1930s contributing to the radicalization of the
national mov ement. The goal of political independence acquired a
clearer and sharper social and economic content. The stream of
national struggle for independence and the stream of the struggle
for social and economic emancipation of the suppressed and the
exploited began to come together . Socialist ideas acquired roots
in the Indian soil; and socialism became the accepted creed of
Indian youth whose urges came to be symbolized by Jawaharlal
Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. Gradually there emerged two
powerful parties of the Left, the Commun ist Party of India (CPI)
and the Congress Socialist Party (CSP).
*
Seminal in this respect was the impact of the Russian
Revolution. On 7 November 1917, the Bolshevik (Communist)
party, led by V. I. Lenin, overthrew the despotic Czarist regime
and declared the formation of the first socialist state. The new
Soviet regime electrified the colonial world by unilaterally
renouncing its imperialist rights in China and other parts of Asia.
Another lesson was driven home: If the common people — the
workers and peasants and the intelligentsia — could unite and
overthrow the mighty Czarist empire arid establish a social order
where there was no exploitation of one human being by another,
then the Indian people battling against British imperialism could
also do so. Socialist doctrines, especially Marxism, the guiding
theory of the Bolshevik Party, acquired a sudden attraction,
especially for the people of Asia. Bipin Chandra Pal, the famous
Extremist leader, wrote in 1919: ‘Today after the downfall of
German militarism , after the destruction of the autocracy of the
Czar, there has grown up all over the world a new power, the
power of the people determined to rescue their legitimate rights | <s>[INST]290 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 24. THE RISE OF THE LEFT -
WING
A powerful left -wing group developed in India in the late
1920s and 1930s contributing to the radicalization of the
national mov ement. The goal of political independence acquired a
clearer and sharper social and economic content. The stream of
national struggle for independence and the stream of the struggle
for social and economic emancipation of the suppressed and the
exploited began to come together . Socialist ideas acquired roots
in the Indian soil; and socialism became the accepted creed of
Indian youth whose urges came to be symbolized by Jawaharlal
Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. Gradually there emerged two
powerful parties of the Left, the Commun ist Party of India (CPI)
and the Congress Socialist Party (CSP).
*
Seminal in this respect was the impact of the Russian
Revolution. On 7 November 1917, the Bolshevik (Communist)
party, led by V. I. Lenin, overthrew the despotic Czarist regime
and declared the formation of the first socialist state. The new
Soviet regime electrified the colonial world by unilaterally
renouncing its imperialist rights in China and other parts of Asia.
Another lesson was driven home: If the common people — the
workers and peasants and the intelligentsia — could unite and
overthrow the mighty Czarist empire arid establish a social order
where there was no exploitation of one human being by another,
then the Indian people battling against British imperialism could
also do so. Socialist doctrines, especially Marxism, the guiding
theory of the Bolshevik Party, acquired a sudden attraction,
especially for the people of Asia. Bipin Chandra Pal, the famous
Extremist leader, wrote in 1919: ‘Today after the downfall of
German militarism , after the destruction of the autocracy of the
Czar, there has grown up all over the world a new power, the
power of the people determined to rescue their legitimate rights[/INST] |
— the right to live freely and happily without being exploited and | <s>[INST]— the right to live freely and happily without being exploited and[/INST] |
291 | The rise of the Left- Wing
victimized by t he wealthier and the so -called higher classes. ’
Socialist ideas now began to spread rapidly especially because
many young persons who had participated actively in the Non -
Cooperation Movement were unhappy with its outcome and were
dissatisfied with Gandhia n policies and ideas as well as the
alternative Swarajist programme. Several socialist and
communist groups came into existence all over the country. In
Bombay, S.A. Dange published a pamphlet Gandhi and Lenin and
started the first socialist weekly, The So cialist; in Bengal,
Muzaffar Ahmed brought out Navayug and later founded the
Langal in cooperation with the poet Nazr uI Islam; in Punjab,
Ghulam Hussain and others published Inquilab; and in Madras,
M. Singaravelu founded the Labour -Kisan Gazette.
Student and youth associations were organized all over the
country from 1927 onwards. Hundreds of youth conferences were
organized all over the country during 1928 and 1929 with
speakers advocating radical solutions for the political, economic
and social ills fro m which the country was suffering. Jawaharlal
Nehru and Subhas Bose toured the country attacking
imperialism, capitalism, and landlordism and preaching the
ideology of socialism. The Revoluti onary Terrorists led by
Chandra sekhar Azad and Bhagat Singh also turned to socialism.
Trade union and peasant movements grew rapidly throughout
the 1920s. Socialist ideas became even more popular during the
1930s as the world was engulfed by the great economic
depression. Unemployment soared all over the capitalist worl d.
The world depression brought the capitalist system into disrepute
and drew attention towards Marxism and socialism. Within the
Congress the left -wing tendency found reflection in the election of
Jawaharlal Nehru as president for 1936 and 1937 and of Sub has
Bose for 1938 and 1939 and in the formation of the Congress
Socialist Party.
*
It was above all Jawaharlal Nehru who imparted a socialist | <s>[INST]291 | The rise of the Left- Wing
victimized by t he wealthier and the so -called higher classes. ’
Socialist ideas now began to spread rapidly especially because
many young persons who had participated actively in the Non -
Cooperation Movement were unhappy with its outcome and were
dissatisfied with Gandhia n policies and ideas as well as the
alternative Swarajist programme. Several socialist and
communist groups came into existence all over the country. In
Bombay, S.A. Dange published a pamphlet Gandhi and Lenin and
started the first socialist weekly, The So cialist; in Bengal,
Muzaffar Ahmed brought out Navayug and later founded the
Langal in cooperation with the poet Nazr uI Islam; in Punjab,
Ghulam Hussain and others published Inquilab; and in Madras,
M. Singaravelu founded the Labour -Kisan Gazette.
Student and youth associations were organized all over the
country from 1927 onwards. Hundreds of youth conferences were
organized all over the country during 1928 and 1929 with
speakers advocating radical solutions for the political, economic
and social ills fro m which the country was suffering. Jawaharlal
Nehru and Subhas Bose toured the country attacking
imperialism, capitalism, and landlordism and preaching the
ideology of socialism. The Revoluti onary Terrorists led by
Chandra sekhar Azad and Bhagat Singh also turned to socialism.
Trade union and peasant movements grew rapidly throughout
the 1920s. Socialist ideas became even more popular during the
1930s as the world was engulfed by the great economic
depression. Unemployment soared all over the capitalist worl d.
The world depression brought the capitalist system into disrepute
and drew attention towards Marxism and socialism. Within the
Congress the left -wing tendency found reflection in the election of
Jawaharlal Nehru as president for 1936 and 1937 and of Sub has
Bose for 1938 and 1939 and in the formation of the Congress
Socialist Party.
*
It was above all Jawaharlal Nehru who imparted a socialist[/INST] |
*
It was above all Jawaharlal Nehru who imparted a socialist
vision to the natio nal movement and who became the symbol of
socialism and socialist ideas in India after 1929. T he notion that
freedom could not be defined only m political terms but must | <s>[INST]*
It was above all Jawaharlal Nehru who imparted a socialist
vision to the natio nal movement and who became the symbol of
socialism and socialist ideas in India after 1929. T he notion that
freedom could not be defined only m political terms but must[/INST] |
292 | India’s Struggle For Independence
have a socioeconomic content began increasingly to be associated
with his name.
Nehru became the president of the historic Lahore Congress
of 1929 at a youthful forty. He was elec ted to the post again in
1936 and 1937. As president of the Congress and as the most
popular leader of the national movement after Gandhiji, Nehru
repeatedly toured the country, travelling thousands of miles and
addressing millions of people. In his books (Autobiography and
Glimpses of World History), articles and speeches, Nehru
propagated the ideas of socialism and declared that political
freedom would become meaningful only if it led to the economic
emancipation of the masses; it had to, therefore, be fo llowed by
the establishment of a socialist society, Nehru thus moulded a
whole generation of young nationalists and helped them accept a
socialist orientation.
Nehru developed an interest in economic questions when he
came in touch with the peasant moveme nt in eastern U.P. in
1920 -21. He then used his enforced leisure in jail, during 1922 -
23, to read widely on the history of the Russian and other
revolutions. In 1927, he attended the international Congress
against Colonial Oppression and imperialism, held at Brussels,
and came into contact with communists and anti -colonial
fighters from all over the world. By now he had begun to accept
Marxism in its broad contours. The same year he visited the
Soviet Union and was deeply impressed by the new socialist
society. On his return he published a book on the Soviet Union
on whose title page he wrote Wordsworth’s famous lines on
French Revolution: ‘Bliss was it in that drawn to be alive, but to
be young was very heaven.’ Jawaharlal returned to India, in the
words of his biographer S. Gopal, ‘a self -conscious revolutionary
radical.’
In 1928, Jawaharlal joined hands with Subhas to organize
the Independence for India League to fight for complete
independence and ‘a socialist revision of the economic structure | <s>[INST]292 | India’s Struggle For Independence
have a socioeconomic content began increasingly to be associated
with his name.
Nehru became the president of the historic Lahore Congress
of 1929 at a youthful forty. He was elec ted to the post again in
1936 and 1937. As president of the Congress and as the most
popular leader of the national movement after Gandhiji, Nehru
repeatedly toured the country, travelling thousands of miles and
addressing millions of people. In his books (Autobiography and
Glimpses of World History), articles and speeches, Nehru
propagated the ideas of socialism and declared that political
freedom would become meaningful only if it led to the economic
emancipation of the masses; it had to, therefore, be fo llowed by
the establishment of a socialist society, Nehru thus moulded a
whole generation of young nationalists and helped them accept a
socialist orientation.
Nehru developed an interest in economic questions when he
came in touch with the peasant moveme nt in eastern U.P. in
1920 -21. He then used his enforced leisure in jail, during 1922 -
23, to read widely on the history of the Russian and other
revolutions. In 1927, he attended the international Congress
against Colonial Oppression and imperialism, held at Brussels,
and came into contact with communists and anti -colonial
fighters from all over the world. By now he had begun to accept
Marxism in its broad contours. The same year he visited the
Soviet Union and was deeply impressed by the new socialist
society. On his return he published a book on the Soviet Union
on whose title page he wrote Wordsworth’s famous lines on
French Revolution: ‘Bliss was it in that drawn to be alive, but to
be young was very heaven.’ Jawaharlal returned to India, in the
words of his biographer S. Gopal, ‘a self -conscious revolutionary
radical.’
In 1928, Jawaharlal joined hands with Subhas to organize
the Independence for India League to fight for complete
independence and ‘a socialist revision of the economic structure[/INST] |
of society .’ At the Lahore session of the Congress in 1929, Nehru
proclaimed: ‘I am a socialist and a republican, and am no believer
in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modem
kings of industry, who have a greater power over the lives and
fortune s of men than even the kings of old, and whose methods | <s>[INST]of society .’ At the Lahore session of the Congress in 1929, Nehru
proclaimed: ‘I am a socialist and a republican, and am no believer
in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modem
kings of industry, who have a greater power over the lives and
fortune s of men than even the kings of old, and whose methods[/INST] |
293 | The rise of the Left- Wing
are as predatory as those of the old feudal aristocracy.’ India, he
said, would have to adopt a full ‘socialist programme’ if she was
‘to end her poverty and inequality.’ It was also not possible for
the Congress to hold the balance between capital and labour and
landlord and tenant, for the existing balance was ‘terribly
weighted’ in favour of the capitalists and landlords.
Nehru’s commitment to socialism found a clearer and
sharper expression during 1 933-36. Answering the question
Whither India’ in October 1933, he wrote: ‘Surely to the great
human goal of social and economic equality, to the ending of all
exploitation of nation by nation and class by class.’ And in
December 1933 he wrote: ‘The true civic ideal is the sociali st
ideal, the communist ideal.’ He put his commitment to socialism
in clear, unequivocal and passionate words in his presidential
address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936: ‘ I am convinced
that the only key to the solution of th e world’s problems and of
India’s problems lies in socialism, and when I use this world I do
so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific,
economic sense. . . I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast
unemployment, the degradation, and the s ubjection of the Indian
people except through socialism. That involves vast and
revolutionary changes in our political and social structure . That
means the ending of private property, except in a restricted
sense, and the replacement of the present profit system by a
higher ideal of cooperative service. During these years, Nehru
also emphasized the role of class analysis and class struggle.
Nehru developed a complex relationship with Gandhiji
during this period. He criticized Gandhiji for refusing to recog nize
the conflict of classes, for preaching harmony among the
exploiters and the exploited, and for putting forward the theories
of trusteeship by, and conversion of, the capitalists and | <s>[INST]293 | The rise of the Left- Wing
are as predatory as those of the old feudal aristocracy.’ India, he
said, would have to adopt a full ‘socialist programme’ if she was
‘to end her poverty and inequality.’ It was also not possible for
the Congress to hold the balance between capital and labour and
landlord and tenant, for the existing balance was ‘terribly
weighted’ in favour of the capitalists and landlords.
Nehru’s commitment to socialism found a clearer and
sharper expression during 1 933-36. Answering the question
Whither India’ in October 1933, he wrote: ‘Surely to the great
human goal of social and economic equality, to the ending of all
exploitation of nation by nation and class by class.’ And in
December 1933 he wrote: ‘The true civic ideal is the sociali st
ideal, the communist ideal.’ He put his commitment to socialism
in clear, unequivocal and passionate words in his presidential
address to the Lucknow Congress in April 1936: ‘ I am convinced
that the only key to the solution of th e world’s problems and of
India’s problems lies in socialism, and when I use this world I do
so not in a vague humanitarian way but in the scientific,
economic sense. . . I see no way of ending the poverty, the vast
unemployment, the degradation, and the s ubjection of the Indian
people except through socialism. That involves vast and
revolutionary changes in our political and social structure . That
means the ending of private property, except in a restricted
sense, and the replacement of the present profit system by a
higher ideal of cooperative service. During these years, Nehru
also emphasized the role of class analysis and class struggle.
Nehru developed a complex relationship with Gandhiji
during this period. He criticized Gandhiji for refusing to recog nize
the conflict of classes, for preaching harmony among the
exploiters and the exploited, and for putting forward the theories
of trusteeship by, and conversion of, the capitalists and[/INST] |
of trusteeship by, and conversion of, the capitalists and
landlords. In fact, Nehru devoted a whole chapter in his
Autobiograph y to gently combating some of the basic aspects of
Gandhian ideology. At the same time, he fully appreciated the
radical role that Gandhiji had played and was playing in Indian
society. Defending Gandhiji against his left -wing critics,
Jawaharlal contended in an article written in January 1936 that
‘Gandhi has played a revolutionary role in India of the greatest
importance because he knew how to make the most of the
objective conditions and could reach the heart of the masses; | <s>[INST]of trusteeship by, and conversion of, the capitalists and
landlords. In fact, Nehru devoted a whole chapter in his
Autobiograph y to gently combating some of the basic aspects of
Gandhian ideology. At the same time, he fully appreciated the
radical role that Gandhiji had played and was playing in Indian
society. Defending Gandhiji against his left -wing critics,
Jawaharlal contended in an article written in January 1936 that
‘Gandhi has played a revolutionary role in India of the greatest
importance because he knew how to make the most of the
objective conditions and could reach the heart of the masses;[/INST] |
294 | India’s Struggle For Independence
while groups with a more advan ced ideology functioned largely in
the air.’ Moreover, Gandhiji’s actions and teachings had
‘inevitably raised mass consciousness tremendously and made
social issues vital. And his insistence on the raising of the
masses at the cost, wherever necessary, of vested interests has
given a strong orientation to the national movement in favour of
the masses. ’ Nehru’s advice to other Leftists in 1939 regarding
the approach to be adopted towards Gandhiji and the Congress
has been well summed up by Mohit Sen: Nehru believed that ‘the
overwhelming bulk of the Congress was composed of amorphous
centrists, that Gandhiji not only represented them but was also
essential for any genuinely widespread mass movement, that on
no account should the L eft be at loggerheads with h im or the
centrists, but their strategy should rather be to pull the centre to
the left — possibilities for which existed, especially as far as
Gandhiji was concerned. ’
But Nehru’s commitment to socialism was given within a
framework that recognized the pr imacy of the political, anti -
imperialist struggle so long as India was ruled by the foreigner. In
fact the task was to bring the two commitments together without
undermining the latter. Thus, he told the Socialists in 1936 that
the two basic urges that mov ed him were ‘nationalism and
political freedom as represented by the Congress and social
freedom as represented by socialism’; and that ‘to continue these
two outlooks and make them an organic whole is the problem of
the Indian socialist.’
Nehru, therefor e, did not favour the creation of an
organization independent of or separate from the Congress or
making a break with Gandhiji and the right -wing of the Congress.
The task was to influence and transform the Congress as a whole
in a socialist direction. And this could be best achieved by
working under its banner and bringing its workers and peasants | <s>[INST]294 | India’s Struggle For Independence
while groups with a more advan ced ideology functioned largely in
the air.’ Moreover, Gandhiji’s actions and teachings had
‘inevitably raised mass consciousness tremendously and made
social issues vital. And his insistence on the raising of the
masses at the cost, wherever necessary, of vested interests has
given a strong orientation to the national movement in favour of
the masses. ’ Nehru’s advice to other Leftists in 1939 regarding
the approach to be adopted towards Gandhiji and the Congress
has been well summed up by Mohit Sen: Nehru believed that ‘the
overwhelming bulk of the Congress was composed of amorphous
centrists, that Gandhiji not only represented them but was also
essential for any genuinely widespread mass movement, that on
no account should the L eft be at loggerheads with h im or the
centrists, but their strategy should rather be to pull the centre to
the left — possibilities for which existed, especially as far as
Gandhiji was concerned. ’
But Nehru’s commitment to socialism was given within a
framework that recognized the pr imacy of the political, anti -
imperialist struggle so long as India was ruled by the foreigner. In
fact the task was to bring the two commitments together without
undermining the latter. Thus, he told the Socialists in 1936 that
the two basic urges that mov ed him were ‘nationalism and
political freedom as represented by the Congress and social
freedom as represented by socialism’; and that ‘to continue these
two outlooks and make them an organic whole is the problem of
the Indian socialist.’
Nehru, therefor e, did not favour the creation of an
organization independent of or separate from the Congress or
making a break with Gandhiji and the right -wing of the Congress.
The task was to influence and transform the Congress as a whole
in a socialist direction. And this could be best achieved by
working under its banner and bringing its workers and peasants[/INST] |
working under its banner and bringing its workers and peasants
to play a greater role in its organization. And in no case, he felt,
should the Left become a mere sect apart from the mainstream of
the national movement.
*
Attracted by the Soviet Union and its revolutionary
commitment, a large number of Indian revolutionaries and exiles | <s>[INST]working under its banner and bringing its workers and peasants
to play a greater role in its organization. And in no case, he felt,
should the Left become a mere sect apart from the mainstream of
the national movement.
*
Attracted by the Soviet Union and its revolutionary
commitment, a large number of Indian revolutionaries and exiles[/INST] |
295 | The rise of the Left- Wing
abroad made their way there. The most well -known and the
tallest of them was M.N. Roy, who along with Lenin, helped evolve
the Communist Intern ational’s policy towards the colonies. Seven
such Indians, headed by Roy, met at Tashkent in October 1920
and set up a Communist Party of India. Independently of this
effort, as we have seen, a number of left -wing and communist
groups and organizations had begun to come into existence in
India after 1920. Most of these groups came together at Kanpur
in December 1925 and founded an all -India organization under
the name the Communist Party of India (CPI). After some time,
S.V. Ghate emerged as the general sec retary of the party. The CPI
called upon all its members to enroll themselves as members of
the Congress, form a strong left -wing in all its organs, cooperate
with all other radical nationalists, and make an effort to
transform the Congress into a more rad ical mass -based
organization.
The main form of political work by the early Communists
was to organize peasants’ and workers’ parties and work through
them. The first such organization was the Labour -Swaraj Party of
the Indian National Congress organized by Muzaffar Ahmed, Qazi
Nazrul I slam, Hemanta Kumar Sarkar, and others in Bengal in
November 1925. In late 1926, a Congress Labour Party was
formed in Bombay and a Kirti -Kisan Party in Punjab. A Labour
Kisan Party of Hindustan had been functioning in Madras since
1923. By 1928 all of these provincial organizations had been
renamed the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (WPP) and knit into an
All India party, whose units were also set up in Rajasthan, UP
and Delhi. All Communists were members of this party. The bas ic
objective of the WPPs was to work within the Congress to give it a
more radical orientation and make it ‘the party of the people’ and
independently organize workers and peasants in class
organizations, to enable first the achievement of complete | <s>[INST]295 | The rise of the Left- Wing
abroad made their way there. The most well -known and the
tallest of them was M.N. Roy, who along with Lenin, helped evolve
the Communist Intern ational’s policy towards the colonies. Seven
such Indians, headed by Roy, met at Tashkent in October 1920
and set up a Communist Party of India. Independently of this
effort, as we have seen, a number of left -wing and communist
groups and organizations had begun to come into existence in
India after 1920. Most of these groups came together at Kanpur
in December 1925 and founded an all -India organization under
the name the Communist Party of India (CPI). After some time,
S.V. Ghate emerged as the general sec retary of the party. The CPI
called upon all its members to enroll themselves as members of
the Congress, form a strong left -wing in all its organs, cooperate
with all other radical nationalists, and make an effort to
transform the Congress into a more rad ical mass -based
organization.
The main form of political work by the early Communists
was to organize peasants’ and workers’ parties and work through
them. The first such organization was the Labour -Swaraj Party of
the Indian National Congress organized by Muzaffar Ahmed, Qazi
Nazrul I slam, Hemanta Kumar Sarkar, and others in Bengal in
November 1925. In late 1926, a Congress Labour Party was
formed in Bombay and a Kirti -Kisan Party in Punjab. A Labour
Kisan Party of Hindustan had been functioning in Madras since
1923. By 1928 all of these provincial organizations had been
renamed the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (WPP) and knit into an
All India party, whose units were also set up in Rajasthan, UP
and Delhi. All Communists were members of this party. The bas ic
objective of the WPPs was to work within the Congress to give it a
more radical orientation and make it ‘the party of the people’ and
independently organize workers and peasants in class
organizations, to enable first the achievement of complete[/INST] |
organizations, to enable first the achievement of complete
indepen dence and ultimately of socialism. The WPPs grew rapidly
and within a short period the communist influence in the
Congress began to grow rapidly, especially in Bombay. Moreover,
Jawaharlal Nehru and other radical Congressmen welcomed the
WPPs’ efforts to r adicalize the Congress. Along with Jawaharlal
and Subhas Bose, the youth leagues and other Left forces, the
WPPs played an important role in creating a strong left -wing
within the Congress and in giving the Indian national movement
a leftward direction. Th e WPPs also made rapid progress on the | <s>[INST]organizations, to enable first the achievement of complete
indepen dence and ultimately of socialism. The WPPs grew rapidly
and within a short period the communist influence in the
Congress began to grow rapidly, especially in Bombay. Moreover,
Jawaharlal Nehru and other radical Congressmen welcomed the
WPPs’ efforts to r adicalize the Congress. Along with Jawaharlal
and Subhas Bose, the youth leagues and other Left forces, the
WPPs played an important role in creating a strong left -wing
within the Congress and in giving the Indian national movement
a leftward direction. Th e WPPs also made rapid progress on the[/INST] |
296 | India’s Struggle For Independence
trade union front and played a decisive role in the resurgence of
working class struggles during 1927 -29 as also in enabling in
Communists to gain a strong position in the working class.
The rapid growth of communist and WPP influence over the
national movement was, however, checked and virtually wiped
out during 1929 and after by two developments. One was the
severe repression to which Communists were subjected by the
Government. Already in 1922 -24, Communists trying to enter
India from the Soviet Union had been tried in a series of
conspiracy cases at Peshawar and sentenced to long periods of
imprisonment. In 1924, the Government had tried to cripple the
nascent communist movement by trying S.A. Dange, Muzaffar
Ahmed , Nalini Gupa and Shaukat Usmani in the Kanpur
Bolshevik Conspiracy Case. All four were sentenced to four years
of imprisonment.
By 1929, the Government was deeply worried about the
rapidly growing communist influence in the national and trade
union movem ents. It decided to strike hard. In a sudden swoop,
in March 1929, it arrested thirty -two radical political and trade
union activists, including three British Communists — Philip
Spratt, Ben Bradley and Lester Hutchinson — who had come to
India to help org anize the trade union movement. The basic aim
of the Government was to behead the trade union movement and
to isolate the Communists from the national movement. The
thirty -two accused were put up for trial at Meerut. The Meerut
Conspiracy Case was soon to become a cause celebre. The
defence of the prisoners was to be taken up by many nationalists
including Jawaharlal Nehru, M.A. Ansari and M.C. Chagla.
Gandhiji visited the Meerut prisoners in jail to show his solidarity
with them and t0 seek their cooperati on in the coming struggle.
Speeches of defence made in the court by the prisoners were
carried by all the nationalist newspapers thus familiarizing lakhs
of people for the first time with communist ideas. The | <s>[INST]296 | India’s Struggle For Independence
trade union front and played a decisive role in the resurgence of
working class struggles during 1927 -29 as also in enabling in
Communists to gain a strong position in the working class.
The rapid growth of communist and WPP influence over the
national movement was, however, checked and virtually wiped
out during 1929 and after by two developments. One was the
severe repression to which Communists were subjected by the
Government. Already in 1922 -24, Communists trying to enter
India from the Soviet Union had been tried in a series of
conspiracy cases at Peshawar and sentenced to long periods of
imprisonment. In 1924, the Government had tried to cripple the
nascent communist movement by trying S.A. Dange, Muzaffar
Ahmed , Nalini Gupa and Shaukat Usmani in the Kanpur
Bolshevik Conspiracy Case. All four were sentenced to four years
of imprisonment.
By 1929, the Government was deeply worried about the
rapidly growing communist influence in the national and trade
union movem ents. It decided to strike hard. In a sudden swoop,
in March 1929, it arrested thirty -two radical political and trade
union activists, including three British Communists — Philip
Spratt, Ben Bradley and Lester Hutchinson — who had come to
India to help org anize the trade union movement. The basic aim
of the Government was to behead the trade union movement and
to isolate the Communists from the national movement. The
thirty -two accused were put up for trial at Meerut. The Meerut
Conspiracy Case was soon to become a cause celebre. The
defence of the prisoners was to be taken up by many nationalists
including Jawaharlal Nehru, M.A. Ansari and M.C. Chagla.
Gandhiji visited the Meerut prisoners in jail to show his solidarity
with them and t0 seek their cooperati on in the coming struggle.
Speeches of defence made in the court by the prisoners were
carried by all the nationalist newspapers thus familiarizing lakhs
of people for the first time with communist ideas. The[/INST] |
of people for the first time with communist ideas. The
Government design to isolate the Communists fro m the
mainstream of the national movement, not only miscarried but
had the very opposite consequence. It did, however, succeed in
one respect. The growing working class movement was deprived
of its leadership. At this early stage, it was not easy to replac e it
with a new leadership. | <s>[INST]of people for the first time with communist ideas. The
Government design to isolate the Communists fro m the
mainstream of the national movement, not only miscarried but
had the very opposite consequence. It did, however, succeed in
one respect. The growing working class movement was deprived
of its leadership. At this early stage, it was not easy to replac e it
with a new leadership.[/INST] |
297 | The rise of the Left- Wing
As if the Government blow was not enough, the
Communists inflicted a more deadly blow on themselves by
taking a sudden lurch towards what is described in leftist
terminology as sectarian politics or ‘leftist deviation’.
Guided by the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the
Communist International, the Communists broke their
connection with the National Congress and declared it to be a
class party of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Congress and the
bourgeoisie it supposedly repr esented were declared to have
become supporters of imperialism. Congress plans to organize a
mass movement around the slogan of Poorn a Swaraj were seen
as sham efforts to gain influence over the masses by bourgeois
leaders who were working for a compromise with British
imperialism. Congress left leaders, such as Nehru and Bose, were
described as ‘agents of the bourgeoisie within the national
movement who were out to ‘bamboozle the mass of workers’ and
keep the masses under bourgeois influence. The Communist s
were now out to ‘expose’ all talk of non -violent struggle and
advance the slogan of armed struggle against imperialism, in
1931, the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was described as a proof of the
Congress betrayal of nationalism.
Finally, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party was also dissolved
on the ground that it was unadvisable to form a two -class
(workers’ and peasants’) party for it was likely to fall prey to petty
bourgeois influences. The Communists were to concentrate,
instead, on the formation of an ‘illegal, in dependent and
centralized’ communist party. The result of this sudden shift in
the Communists’ political position was their isolation from the
national movement at the very moment when it was gearing up
for its greatest mass struggle and conditions were ri pe for
massive growth in the influence of the Left over it. Further, the
Communists split into several splinter groups. The Government
took further advantage of this situation and, in 1934 , declared | <s>[INST]297 | The rise of the Left- Wing
As if the Government blow was not enough, the
Communists inflicted a more deadly blow on themselves by
taking a sudden lurch towards what is described in leftist
terminology as sectarian politics or ‘leftist deviation’.
Guided by the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the
Communist International, the Communists broke their
connection with the National Congress and declared it to be a
class party of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Congress and the
bourgeoisie it supposedly repr esented were declared to have
become supporters of imperialism. Congress plans to organize a
mass movement around the slogan of Poorn a Swaraj were seen
as sham efforts to gain influence over the masses by bourgeois
leaders who were working for a compromise with British
imperialism. Congress left leaders, such as Nehru and Bose, were
described as ‘agents of the bourgeoisie within the national
movement who were out to ‘bamboozle the mass of workers’ and
keep the masses under bourgeois influence. The Communist s
were now out to ‘expose’ all talk of non -violent struggle and
advance the slogan of armed struggle against imperialism, in
1931, the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was described as a proof of the
Congress betrayal of nationalism.
Finally, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party was also dissolved
on the ground that it was unadvisable to form a two -class
(workers’ and peasants’) party for it was likely to fall prey to petty
bourgeois influences. The Communists were to concentrate,
instead, on the formation of an ‘illegal, in dependent and
centralized’ communist party. The result of this sudden shift in
the Communists’ political position was their isolation from the
national movement at the very moment when it was gearing up
for its greatest mass struggle and conditions were ri pe for
massive growth in the influence of the Left over it. Further, the
Communists split into several splinter groups. The Government
took further advantage of this situation and, in 1934 , declared[/INST] |
the CPI illegal.
The Communist movement was, however, sa ved from
disaster because, on the one hand, many of the Communists
refused to stand apart from the Civil Disobedience Movement
(CDM) and participated actively in it, and, on the other hand,
socialist and communist ideas continued to spread in the | <s>[INST]the CPI illegal.
The Communist movement was, however, sa ved from
disaster because, on the one hand, many of the Communists
refused to stand apart from the Civil Disobedience Movement
(CDM) and participated actively in it, and, on the other hand,
socialist and communist ideas continued to spread in the[/INST] |
298 | India’s Struggle For Independence
country. Consequently, many young persons who participated in
the CDM or in Revolutionary Terrorist organizations were
attracted by socialism, Marxism and the Soviet Union, and joined
the CPI after 1934.
The situation underwent a radical change in 1935 when the
Communist Party was reorganized under the leadership of P.C.
Joshi. Faced with the threat of fascism the Seventh Congress of
the Communist International, meeting at Moscow in August
1935, radically changed its earlier position and advocated the
formation of a united front with socialists and other anti -fascists
in the capitalist Countries and with bourgeois -led nationalist
movements in colonial countries. The Indian Communists were to
once again participate in the activities of the mainstream of the
national movement led by the National Congress. The theoretical
and political basis for the change in communist politics in India
was laid in early 1936 by a document popularly known as the
Dun-Bradley Thesis. According to this thesis, the National
Congress could p lay ‘a great part and a foremost part in the work
of realizing the an ti-imperialist people’s front.’
The Communist Party now began to call upon its members
to join the Congress and enrol the masses under their influence
to the Congress. In 1938, it went fu rther and accepted that the
Congress was ‘the central mass political organization of the
Indian people ranged against imperialism.” And, in 1939, P.C.
Joshi wrote in the party weekly, National Front, that the greatest
class struggle today is our national s truggle’ of which Congress
was the ‘main organ.”2 At the same time, the party remained
committed to the objective of bringing the national movement
under the hegemony of the working class, that is, the Communist
Party. Communists now worked hard inside the Congress. Many
occupied official positions inside the Congress district and
provincial committees; nearly twenty were members of the All - | <s>[INST]298 | India’s Struggle For Independence
country. Consequently, many young persons who participated in
the CDM or in Revolutionary Terrorist organizations were
attracted by socialism, Marxism and the Soviet Union, and joined
the CPI after 1934.
The situation underwent a radical change in 1935 when the
Communist Party was reorganized under the leadership of P.C.
Joshi. Faced with the threat of fascism the Seventh Congress of
the Communist International, meeting at Moscow in August
1935, radically changed its earlier position and advocated the
formation of a united front with socialists and other anti -fascists
in the capitalist Countries and with bourgeois -led nationalist
movements in colonial countries. The Indian Communists were to
once again participate in the activities of the mainstream of the
national movement led by the National Congress. The theoretical
and political basis for the change in communist politics in India
was laid in early 1936 by a document popularly known as the
Dun-Bradley Thesis. According to this thesis, the National
Congress could p lay ‘a great part and a foremost part in the work
of realizing the an ti-imperialist people’s front.’
The Communist Party now began to call upon its members
to join the Congress and enrol the masses under their influence
to the Congress. In 1938, it went fu rther and accepted that the
Congress was ‘the central mass political organization of the
Indian people ranged against imperialism.” And, in 1939, P.C.
Joshi wrote in the party weekly, National Front, that the greatest
class struggle today is our national s truggle’ of which Congress
was the ‘main organ.”2 At the same time, the party remained
committed to the objective of bringing the national movement
under the hegemony of the working class, that is, the Communist
Party. Communists now worked hard inside the Congress. Many
occupied official positions inside the Congress district and
provincial committees; nearly twenty were members of the All -[/INST] |
provincial committees; nearly twenty were members of the All -
India Congress Committee. During 1936 -42, they bui lt up
powerful peasant movements in Kerala, Andhra, Bengal and
Punjab. What is more important, they once again recovered their
popular image of being the most militant of anti -imperialists.
* | <s>[INST]provincial committees; nearly twenty were members of the All -
India Congress Committee. During 1936 -42, they bui lt up
powerful peasant movements in Kerala, Andhra, Bengal and
Punjab. What is more important, they once again recovered their
popular image of being the most militant of anti -imperialists.
*[/INST] |
299 | The rise of the Left- Wing
The move towards the formation of a socialist party was
made in the jails during 1930 -31 and 1932 -34 by a group of
young Congressme n who were disenchanted with Gandhian
strategy and leadership and attracted by socialist ideology. Many
of them were active in the youth movement of the late 1920s . In
the jails they studied and discussed Marxian and other socialist
ideas. Attracted by Mar xism, communism and Soviet Union, they
did not find themselves in agreement with the prevalent political
line of the CPI. Many of them were groping towards an
alternative. Ultimately they came together and formed the
Congress Socialist Party (CSP) at Bomba y in October 1934 under
the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev
and Minoo Masani. From the beginning, all the Congress
socialists were agreed upon four basic propositions: that the
primary struggle in India was the national struggle for freedom
and that nationalism w..s a necessary stage on the way to
socialism; that socialists must work inside the National Congress
because it was the primary body leading the national struggle
and, as Acharya Narendra Dev put it in 1934, It would be a
suicidal policy for us to cut ourselves 3ff from the national
movement that the Congress undoubtedly represents; that they
must give the Congress and the national movement a socialist
direction; and that to achieve this objective they must organize
the worke rs and peasants in their class organizations, wage
struggles for their economic demands and make them the social
base of the national struggle.”
The CSP from the beginning assigned itself the task of both
transforming the Congress and of strengthening it. The task of
transforming the Congress was understood in two senses. One
was the ideological sense. Congressmen were to be gradually
persuaded to adopt a socialist vision of independent India and a
more radical pro -labour and pro -peasant stand on current | <s>[INST]299 | The rise of the Left- Wing
The move towards the formation of a socialist party was
made in the jails during 1930 -31 and 1932 -34 by a group of
young Congressme n who were disenchanted with Gandhian
strategy and leadership and attracted by socialist ideology. Many
of them were active in the youth movement of the late 1920s . In
the jails they studied and discussed Marxian and other socialist
ideas. Attracted by Mar xism, communism and Soviet Union, they
did not find themselves in agreement with the prevalent political
line of the CPI. Many of them were groping towards an
alternative. Ultimately they came together and formed the
Congress Socialist Party (CSP) at Bomba y in October 1934 under
the leadership of Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Narendra Dev
and Minoo Masani. From the beginning, all the Congress
socialists were agreed upon four basic propositions: that the
primary struggle in India was the national struggle for freedom
and that nationalism w..s a necessary stage on the way to
socialism; that socialists must work inside the National Congress
because it was the primary body leading the national struggle
and, as Acharya Narendra Dev put it in 1934, It would be a
suicidal policy for us to cut ourselves 3ff from the national
movement that the Congress undoubtedly represents; that they
must give the Congress and the national movement a socialist
direction; and that to achieve this objective they must organize
the worke rs and peasants in their class organizations, wage
struggles for their economic demands and make them the social
base of the national struggle.”
The CSP from the beginning assigned itself the task of both
transforming the Congress and of strengthening it. The task of
transforming the Congress was understood in two senses. One
was the ideological sense. Congressmen were to be gradually
persuaded to adopt a socialist vision of independent India and a
more radical pro -labour and pro -peasant stand on current[/INST] |
more radical pro -labour and pro -peasant stand on current
economic issues. This ideological and programmatic
transformation was, however, to be seen not as an event but as a
process. As Jayaprakash Narayan repeatedly told his followers in
1934: ‘We are placing before the Congress a programme and we
want the Congres s to accept it. If the Congress does not accept it,
we do not say we are going out of the Congress. If today we fail,
tomorrow we will try and if tomorrow we fail, we will try again.” | <s>[INST]more radical pro -labour and pro -peasant stand on current
economic issues. This ideological and programmatic
transformation was, however, to be seen not as an event but as a
process. As Jayaprakash Narayan repeatedly told his followers in
1934: ‘We are placing before the Congress a programme and we
want the Congres s to accept it. If the Congress does not accept it,
we do not say we are going out of the Congress. If today we fail,
tomorrow we will try and if tomorrow we fail, we will try again.”[/INST] |
300 | India’s Struggle For Independence
The transformation of the Congress was also seen in an
organizational se nse, that is, in terms of changes in its leadership
at the top. Initially, the task was interpreted as the displacement
of the existing leadership, which was declared to be incapable of
developing the struggle of the masses to a higher level. The CSP
was t o develop as the nucleus of the alternative socialist
leadership of the Congress. As the Meerut Thesis of the CSP put
it in 1935, the task was to ‘wean the anti -imperialist elements in
the Congress away from its present bourgeois leadership and to
bring th em under the leadership of revolutionary socialism.”
This perspective was, however, soon found to be unrealistic
and was abandoned in favour of a ‘composite’ leadership in which
socialists would be taken into the leadership at all levels. The
notion of alt ernate Left leadership of the Congress and the
national movement came up for realization twice at Tripuri in
1939 and at Ramgarh in 1940. But when it came to splitting the
Congress on a Left -Right basis and giving the Congress an
executive left -wing leader ship, the CSP (as also the CPI) shied
away. Its leadership (as also CPI’s) realized that such an effort
would not only weaken the national movement but isolate the
Left from the mainstream, that the Indian people could be
mobilized into a movement only und er Gandhiji’s leadership and
that, in fact, there was at the time no alternative to Gandhiji’s
leadership. However, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru, the leadership of
the CSP, as also of other Left groups and parties, was not able to
fully theorize or internalize this understanding and so it went
back aga in and again to the notion of alternative leadership.
The CSP was, however, firmly well grounded in the reality of
the Indian situation. Therefore, it never carried its opposition to
the existing leadership of the Congress to breaking point.
Whenever it came to the crunch, it gave up its theoretical | <s>[INST]300 | India’s Struggle For Independence
The transformation of the Congress was also seen in an
organizational se nse, that is, in terms of changes in its leadership
at the top. Initially, the task was interpreted as the displacement
of the existing leadership, which was declared to be incapable of
developing the struggle of the masses to a higher level. The CSP
was t o develop as the nucleus of the alternative socialist
leadership of the Congress. As the Meerut Thesis of the CSP put
it in 1935, the task was to ‘wean the anti -imperialist elements in
the Congress away from its present bourgeois leadership and to
bring th em under the leadership of revolutionary socialism.”
This perspective was, however, soon found to be unrealistic
and was abandoned in favour of a ‘composite’ leadership in which
socialists would be taken into the leadership at all levels. The
notion of alt ernate Left leadership of the Congress and the
national movement came up for realization twice at Tripuri in
1939 and at Ramgarh in 1940. But when it came to splitting the
Congress on a Left -Right basis and giving the Congress an
executive left -wing leader ship, the CSP (as also the CPI) shied
away. Its leadership (as also CPI’s) realized that such an effort
would not only weaken the national movement but isolate the
Left from the mainstream, that the Indian people could be
mobilized into a movement only und er Gandhiji’s leadership and
that, in fact, there was at the time no alternative to Gandhiji’s
leadership. However, unlike Jawaharlal Nehru, the leadership of
the CSP, as also of other Left groups and parties, was not able to
fully theorize or internalize this understanding and so it went
back aga in and again to the notion of alternative leadership.
The CSP was, however, firmly well grounded in the reality of
the Indian situation. Therefore, it never carried its opposition to
the existing leadership of the Congress to breaking point.
Whenever it came to the crunch, it gave up its theoretical[/INST] |
Whenever it came to the crunch, it gave up its theoretical
position and adopted a realistic approach close to that of
Jawaharlal Nehru’s. This earned it the condemnation of the other
left-wing groups and parties — for example, in 1939, they were
chastised for their refusal to support Subhas Bose in his
confrontation with Gandhiji and the Right wing of the Congress.
At such moments, the socialists defended themselves and
revealed flashes of an empiricist understanding of Indian r eality.
Jayaprakash Narayan, for example, said in 1939 after Tripuri:
‘We Socialists do not want to create factions in the Congress nor | <s>[INST]Whenever it came to the crunch, it gave up its theoretical
position and adopted a realistic approach close to that of
Jawaharlal Nehru’s. This earned it the condemnation of the other
left-wing groups and parties — for example, in 1939, they were
chastised for their refusal to support Subhas Bose in his
confrontation with Gandhiji and the Right wing of the Congress.
At such moments, the socialists defended themselves and
revealed flashes of an empiricist understanding of Indian r eality.
Jayaprakash Narayan, for example, said in 1939 after Tripuri:
‘We Socialists do not want to create factions in the Congress nor[/INST] |
301 | The rise of the Left- Wing
do we desire to displace the old leadership of the Congress and to
establish rival leadership. We are only concerned wit h the policy
and programme of the Congress. We only want to influence the
Congress decisions. Whatever our differences with the old
leaders, we do not want to quarrel with them. We all want to
march shoulder to shoulder in our common fight against
imperial ism.”
From the beginning the CSP leaders were divided into three
broad ideological currents: the Marxian, the Fabian and the
current influenced by Gandhiji. This would not have been a
major weakness — in fact it might have been a source of strength
— for a broad socialist party which was a movement. But the CSP
was already a part, and a cadre -based party at that, within a
movement that was the National Congress. Moreover, the
Marxism of the 1930s was incapable of accepting as legitimate
such diversity of po litical currents on the Left. The result was a
confusion which plagued the CSP till the very end. The party’s
basic ideological differences were papered over for a long time
because of the personal bonds of friendship and a sense of
comradeship among most of the founding leaders of the party,
the acceptance of Acharya Narendra D ev and Jayaprakash
Narayan as its senior leaders, and its commitment to nationalism
and socialism.
*
Despite the ideological diversity among the leaders, the CSP
as a whole accepted a basic identification of socialism with
Marxism. Jayaprakash Narayan, for example, observed in his
book Why Socialism? that ‘today more than ever before it is
possible to say that there is only one type, one theory of
Socialism — Marxism.” Gradually, how ever as Gandhiji’s politics
began to be more positively evaluated, large doses of Gandhian
and liberal democratic thought were to become basic elements of
the CSP leadership’s thinking.
Several other groups and currents developed on the Left in
the I 930s . M.N. Roy came back to India in 1930 and organized a | <s>[INST]301 | The rise of the Left- Wing
do we desire to displace the old leadership of the Congress and to
establish rival leadership. We are only concerned wit h the policy
and programme of the Congress. We only want to influence the
Congress decisions. Whatever our differences with the old
leaders, we do not want to quarrel with them. We all want to
march shoulder to shoulder in our common fight against
imperial ism.”
From the beginning the CSP leaders were divided into three
broad ideological currents: the Marxian, the Fabian and the
current influenced by Gandhiji. This would not have been a
major weakness — in fact it might have been a source of strength
— for a broad socialist party which was a movement. But the CSP
was already a part, and a cadre -based party at that, within a
movement that was the National Congress. Moreover, the
Marxism of the 1930s was incapable of accepting as legitimate
such diversity of po litical currents on the Left. The result was a
confusion which plagued the CSP till the very end. The party’s
basic ideological differences were papered over for a long time
because of the personal bonds of friendship and a sense of
comradeship among most of the founding leaders of the party,
the acceptance of Acharya Narendra D ev and Jayaprakash
Narayan as its senior leaders, and its commitment to nationalism
and socialism.
*
Despite the ideological diversity among the leaders, the CSP
as a whole accepted a basic identification of socialism with
Marxism. Jayaprakash Narayan, for example, observed in his
book Why Socialism? that ‘today more than ever before it is
possible to say that there is only one type, one theory of
Socialism — Marxism.” Gradually, how ever as Gandhiji’s politics
began to be more positively evaluated, large doses of Gandhian
and liberal democratic thought were to become basic elements of
the CSP leadership’s thinking.
Several other groups and currents developed on the Left in
the I 930s . M.N. Roy came back to India in 1930 and organized a[/INST] |
strong group of Royists who underwent several political and
ideological transformations over the years. Subhas Bose and his | <s>[INST]strong group of Royists who underwent several political and
ideological transformations over the years. Subhas Bose and his[/INST] |
302 | India’s Struggle For Independence
left-wing followers founded the Forward Bloc in 1939 after Bose
was compelled to resign from the Presidentship of the Congress.
The Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, the
Revolutionary Socialist Party, and various Trotskyist groups also
functioned during the 193Os. There were also certain prestigious
left-wing individuals, such as Swami Sahajanand Saraswati,
Professor N.G. Ranga, and Indulal Yagnik, who worked outside
the framework of any organized left -wing party.
The CPI, the CSP and Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose and
other Left groups and leaders all shared a common polit ical
programme which enabled them, despite ideological and
organizational differences, to work together after 1935 and make
socialism a strong current in Indian politics. The basic features of
this programme were: consistent and militant anti -imperialism,
anti-landlordism, the organization of workers and peasants in
trade unions and kisan sabhas, the acceptance of a socialist
vision of independent India and of the socialist programme of the
economic and social transformation of society, and an anti -
fascist, anti-colonial and anti -war foreign policy.
Despite the fact that the Left cadres were among the most
courageous, militant and sacrificing of freedom fighters, the Left
failed in the basic task it had taken upon itself — to establish the
hegemony of social ist ideas and parties over the national
movement. It also failed to make good the promise it held out in
the l930s. This is, in fact, a major enigma for the historian.
Several explanations for this complex phenomenon suggest
themselves. The Left invariabl y fought the dominant Congress
leadership on wrong issues and, when it came to the crunch, was
either forced to trail behind that leadership or was isolated from
the national movement. Unlike the Congress right -wing, the Left
failed to show ideological and tactical flexibility. It sought to | <s>[INST]302 | India’s Struggle For Independence
left-wing followers founded the Forward Bloc in 1939 after Bose
was compelled to resign from the Presidentship of the Congress.
The Hindustan Socialist Republican Association, the
Revolutionary Socialist Party, and various Trotskyist groups also
functioned during the 193Os. There were also certain prestigious
left-wing individuals, such as Swami Sahajanand Saraswati,
Professor N.G. Ranga, and Indulal Yagnik, who worked outside
the framework of any organized left -wing party.
The CPI, the CSP and Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose and
other Left groups and leaders all shared a common polit ical
programme which enabled them, despite ideological and
organizational differences, to work together after 1935 and make
socialism a strong current in Indian politics. The basic features of
this programme were: consistent and militant anti -imperialism,
anti-landlordism, the organization of workers and peasants in
trade unions and kisan sabhas, the acceptance of a socialist
vision of independent India and of the socialist programme of the
economic and social transformation of society, and an anti -
fascist, anti-colonial and anti -war foreign policy.
Despite the fact that the Left cadres were among the most
courageous, militant and sacrificing of freedom fighters, the Left
failed in the basic task it had taken upon itself — to establish the
hegemony of social ist ideas and parties over the national
movement. It also failed to make good the promise it held out in
the l930s. This is, in fact, a major enigma for the historian.
Several explanations for this complex phenomenon suggest
themselves. The Left invariabl y fought the dominant Congress
leadership on wrong issues and, when it came to the crunch, was
either forced to trail behind that leadership or was isolated from
the national movement. Unlike the Congress right -wing, the Left
failed to show ideological and tactical flexibility. It sought to[/INST] |
oppose the right -wing with simplistic formulae and radical
rhetoric. It fought the right -wing on slippery and wrong grounds.
It chose to tight not on questions of ideology but on methods of
struggle and on tactics. For e xample, its most serious charge
against the Congress right -wing was that it wanted to
compromise with imperialism, that it was frightened of mass
struggle, that its anti -imperialism was not wholehe arted because
of bourgeois influence over it. The right -wing had little difficulty | <s>[INST]oppose the right -wing with simplistic formulae and radical
rhetoric. It fought the right -wing on slippery and wrong grounds.
It chose to tight not on questions of ideology but on methods of
struggle and on tactics. For e xample, its most serious charge
against the Congress right -wing was that it wanted to
compromise with imperialism, that it was frightened of mass
struggle, that its anti -imperialism was not wholehe arted because
of bourgeois influence over it. The right -wing had little difficulty[/INST] |
303 | The rise of the Left- Wing
in disposing of such charges. The people rightly believed it and
not the Left. Three important occasions may be cited as
examples. In 1936 -37, the Left fought the Right within the
Congress on the issue of elections and of fice accept ance which
was seen as a compromise with imperialism . In 1939 -42, the
tight was waged on the issue of the initiation of a mass
movement, when Gandhiji’s reluctance was seen as an aspect of
his soft attitude towards imperialism and as the missing of a
golde n opportunity And, in 1945 -47, the Left confronted the
dominant Congress leadership, including Jawaharlal Nehru and
Maulana Azad, on the question of negotiations for the transfer of
power, which were seen as British imperialism’s last ditch effort
to prolo ng their domination and the tired Congress leadership’s
hunger for power or even betrayal.
The Left also failed to make a deep study of Indian reality.
With the exception of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Left saw the
dominant Congress leaders hip as bourgeois its policy of
negotiations as working towards a compromise with imperialism
any resort to constitutional work as a step towards the
‘abando nment of the struggle for independence’ . It took recourse
to a simplistic model of analysing Indian social classes and th eir
political behaviour. It saw all efforts to guide the nation al
movement in a disciplined man ner as imposing restrictions on
the movement. It constantly counter posed armed struggle to non -
violence as a superior form and method of struggle, rather than
concentrating on the nature of mass involvement and
mobilization and ideology . It was Convinced that the masses were
ever ready for struggles in any form if only the leaders were
willing to initiate them. It constantly overestimated its support
among the peo ple. Above all, the Left failed to grasp the
Gandhian strategy of struggle.
A major weakness of the Left was the failure of the different | <s>[INST]303 | The rise of the Left- Wing
in disposing of such charges. The people rightly believed it and
not the Left. Three important occasions may be cited as
examples. In 1936 -37, the Left fought the Right within the
Congress on the issue of elections and of fice accept ance which
was seen as a compromise with imperialism . In 1939 -42, the
tight was waged on the issue of the initiation of a mass
movement, when Gandhiji’s reluctance was seen as an aspect of
his soft attitude towards imperialism and as the missing of a
golde n opportunity And, in 1945 -47, the Left confronted the
dominant Congress leadership, including Jawaharlal Nehru and
Maulana Azad, on the question of negotiations for the transfer of
power, which were seen as British imperialism’s last ditch effort
to prolo ng their domination and the tired Congress leadership’s
hunger for power or even betrayal.
The Left also failed to make a deep study of Indian reality.
With the exception of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Left saw the
dominant Congress leaders hip as bourgeois its policy of
negotiations as working towards a compromise with imperialism
any resort to constitutional work as a step towards the
‘abando nment of the struggle for independence’ . It took recourse
to a simplistic model of analysing Indian social classes and th eir
political behaviour. It saw all efforts to guide the nation al
movement in a disciplined man ner as imposing restrictions on
the movement. It constantly counter posed armed struggle to non -
violence as a superior form and method of struggle, rather than
concentrating on the nature of mass involvement and
mobilization and ideology . It was Convinced that the masses were
ever ready for struggles in any form if only the leaders were
willing to initiate them. It constantly overestimated its support
among the peo ple. Above all, the Left failed to grasp the
Gandhian strategy of struggle.
A major weakness of the Left was the failure of the different[/INST] |
A major weakness of the Left was the failure of the different
Left pa rties, groups and individuals to work unitedly except for
short periods. All efforts at forging a united front of left -wing
elements ended in frustration . Their doctrinal disputes and
differences were too many and too passionately held, and the
temperament al differences among the leaders overpowering.
Nehru and Bose could not work together for long and bickered
publicly in 1939. Nehru and the Socialists could not coordinate
their politics. Bose and Socialists drifted apart after 1939. The | <s>[INST]A major weakness of the Left was the failure of the different
Left pa rties, groups and individuals to work unitedly except for
short periods. All efforts at forging a united front of left -wing
elements ended in frustration . Their doctrinal disputes and
differences were too many and too passionately held, and the
temperament al differences among the leaders overpowering.
Nehru and Bose could not work together for long and bickered
publicly in 1939. Nehru and the Socialists could not coordinate
their politics. Bose and Socialists drifted apart after 1939. The[/INST] |
304 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CSP and the Communists made herculean efforts to work
together from 1935 to 1940: The CSP opened its doors to
Communists and Roy ists in 1935 so that the illegal Communist
Party could have legal avenues for political work. But the
Socialists and Communists soon drifted apart and became sworn
enemies. The inevitable result was a long -term schism between
the Socialists who suffered from an anti -Communist phobia and
Communists who saw every Socialist leader as a potential
bourgeois or (after 1947) American agent.
*
The Left did succeed in making a basic impact on Indian
society and politics. The organization of workers and peasants,
discussed elsewhere, was one of its greatest achievements.
Equally important was its impact on the Congress.
Organizationally, the Left was able to command influence over
nearly one -third of the votes in t he All -India Congress Committee
on important issues. Nehru and Bose were elected Congress
presidents from 1936 to 1939. Nehru was able to nominate three
prominent Socialists, Acharya Narendra Dev, Jayaprakash
Narayan and Achyut Patwardhan, to his Working Committee. In
1939, Subhas Bose, as a candidate of the Left, was able to defeat
Pattabhi Sitaramayya in the presidential election by a majority of
1580 to 1377.
Politically and ideologically, the Congress as a whole was
given a strong Left orientation. As Nehru put it, Indian
nationalism had been powerfully pushed ‘towards vital social
changes, and today it hovers, somewhat undecided, on the brink
of a new social ideology.” The Congress, including its right-wing,
accepted that the poverty and misery of the Indian people was
the result not only of colonial do mination but also of the internal
socio -economic structure of Indian society which had, therefore,
to be drastically trans formed. The impact of the Left o n the
national movement was reflected in the resolution on
Fundamental Rights and Economic Policy pass ed by the Karachi | <s>[INST]304 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CSP and the Communists made herculean efforts to work
together from 1935 to 1940: The CSP opened its doors to
Communists and Roy ists in 1935 so that the illegal Communist
Party could have legal avenues for political work. But the
Socialists and Communists soon drifted apart and became sworn
enemies. The inevitable result was a long -term schism between
the Socialists who suffered from an anti -Communist phobia and
Communists who saw every Socialist leader as a potential
bourgeois or (after 1947) American agent.
*
The Left did succeed in making a basic impact on Indian
society and politics. The organization of workers and peasants,
discussed elsewhere, was one of its greatest achievements.
Equally important was its impact on the Congress.
Organizationally, the Left was able to command influence over
nearly one -third of the votes in t he All -India Congress Committee
on important issues. Nehru and Bose were elected Congress
presidents from 1936 to 1939. Nehru was able to nominate three
prominent Socialists, Acharya Narendra Dev, Jayaprakash
Narayan and Achyut Patwardhan, to his Working Committee. In
1939, Subhas Bose, as a candidate of the Left, was able to defeat
Pattabhi Sitaramayya in the presidential election by a majority of
1580 to 1377.
Politically and ideologically, the Congress as a whole was
given a strong Left orientation. As Nehru put it, Indian
nationalism had been powerfully pushed ‘towards vital social
changes, and today it hovers, somewhat undecided, on the brink
of a new social ideology.” The Congress, including its right-wing,
accepted that the poverty and misery of the Indian people was
the result not only of colonial do mination but also of the internal
socio -economic structure of Indian society which had, therefore,
to be drastically trans formed. The impact of the Left o n the
national movement was reflected in the resolution on
Fundamental Rights and Economic Policy pass ed by the Karachi[/INST] |
Fundamental Rights and Economic Policy pass ed by the Karachi
session of the Congress in 1931, the resolutions on economic
policy passed at the Faizpur session in 1936, the Election
Manifesto of the Congress in 1936, the setting up of a National
Planning Committee in 1938, and the increasing shift o f Gandhiji | <s>[INST]Fundamental Rights and Economic Policy pass ed by the Karachi
session of the Congress in 1931, the resolutions on economic
policy passed at the Faizpur session in 1936, the Election
Manifesto of the Congress in 1936, the setting up of a National
Planning Committee in 1938, and the increasing shift o f Gandhiji[/INST] |
305 | The rise of the Left- Wing
towards radical positions on economic and class issues. * The
found ation of the All -India Students’ Federation and the
Progressive Writers’ Association and the convening of the first All -
India States’ People’s Conference in 1936 were some of th e other
major achievements of the Left The Left was also very active in
the All -India Women’s Confe rence. Above all, two major parties of
the Left, the Communist P arty and the Congress Socialist Party,
had been formed, and were being bui lt up.
* Discussed in Chapters 23, 25 and 39. | <s>[INST]305 | The rise of the Left- Wing
towards radical positions on economic and class issues. * The
found ation of the All -India Students’ Federation and the
Progressive Writers’ Association and the convening of the first All -
India States’ People’s Conference in 1936 were some of th e other
major achievements of the Left The Left was also very active in
the All -India Women’s Confe rence. Above all, two major parties of
the Left, the Communist P arty and the Congress Socialist Party,
had been formed, and were being bui lt up.
* Discussed in Chapters 23, 25 and 39.[/INST] |
306 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 25. THE STRATEGIC
DEBATE 1935 -37
A major debate on strategy occurred among the nationalists in
the period following the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience
Movement. In the first stage of the debate, during 1934 -35, the
issue was what course the national movement should take in the
immediate future, that is, during its phase of non -mass struggle.
How was the political paralysis that it had sunk into to be
overcome? There were two traditional r esponses. Gandhiji
emphasized constructive work in the villages, especially the
revival of village crafts. Constructive work, said Gandhiji, would
lead to the consolidation of people’s power, and open the way to
the mobilization of millions in the next pha se of mass struggle.’
Another section of Congressmen advocated the revival of the
constitutional method of struggle and participation in the
elections to the Central Legislative Assembly to be held in 1934.
Led this time by Dr. M.A. Ansari, Asaf A li, Saty amurthy,
Bhulabhai Desai and B.C. Roy, the new Swarajists argued that in
a period of political apathy and depression, when the Congress
was no longer in a position to sustain a mass movement, it was
necessary to utilize elections and work in the legislativ e councils
to keep up the political interest and morale of the people. This
did not amount, they said, to having faith in the capacity of
constitutional politics to achieve freedom. It only meant opening
up another political front which would help build up the
Congress, organizationally extend its influence, and prepare the
people for the next mass struggle. C. Rajagopalachari, an
erstwhile no -changer , recommended the Swarajist approach to
Gandhiji with the additional proviso that the Congress should
itself, directly, undertake parliamentary work. A properly
organized parliamentary party, he said, would enable the
Congress to develop a certain amount of prestige and confidence | <s>[INST]306 | India’s Struggle For Independence
CHAPTER 25. THE STRATEGIC
DEBATE 1935 -37
A major debate on strategy occurred among the nationalists in
the period following the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience
Movement. In the first stage of the debate, during 1934 -35, the
issue was what course the national movement should take in the
immediate future, that is, during its phase of non -mass struggle.
How was the political paralysis that it had sunk into to be
overcome? There were two traditional r esponses. Gandhiji
emphasized constructive work in the villages, especially the
revival of village crafts. Constructive work, said Gandhiji, would
lead to the consolidation of people’s power, and open the way to
the mobilization of millions in the next pha se of mass struggle.’
Another section of Congressmen advocated the revival of the
constitutional method of struggle and participation in the
elections to the Central Legislative Assembly to be held in 1934.
Led this time by Dr. M.A. Ansari, Asaf A li, Saty amurthy,
Bhulabhai Desai and B.C. Roy, the new Swarajists argued that in
a period of political apathy and depression, when the Congress
was no longer in a position to sustain a mass movement, it was
necessary to utilize elections and work in the legislativ e councils
to keep up the political interest and morale of the people. This
did not amount, they said, to having faith in the capacity of
constitutional politics to achieve freedom. It only meant opening
up another political front which would help build up the
Congress, organizationally extend its influence, and prepare the
people for the next mass struggle. C. Rajagopalachari, an
erstwhile no -changer , recommended the Swarajist approach to
Gandhiji with the additional proviso that the Congress should
itself, directly, undertake parliamentary work. A properly
organized parliamentary party, he said, would enable the
Congress to develop a certain amount of prestige and confidence[/INST] |
among the masses even as (happened) during the short period
when the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was in force. Since the Government
was opposed to a similar pact, a strong Congress presence in the
legislatures would serve the movement as ‘its equivalent .’] | <s>[INST]among the masses even as (happened) during the short period
when the Gandhi -Irwin Pact was in force. Since the Government
was opposed to a similar pact, a strong Congress presence in the
legislatures would serve the movement as ‘its equivalent .’][/INST] |
307 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
*
But unlike in the 1920s, a third tactical perspective, based
on an alternative strategy , made its appearance at this time. The
strong Left trend that had developed in the early l930s was
critical of both the council -entry programme and the suspension
of civil disobedience and its replacement b the constructive
programme. Both of them, the left ists said, would sidetrack direct
mass action and political work among the masses and divert
attention from the basic issue of struggle against colonial rule.
The leftists instead favoured the continuation or resumption of
the non - constitutional mass move ment since they felt that the
situation continued to be revolutionary because of the continuing
economic crisis and the readiness of the masses to fight.
It was Jawaharlal Nehru who represented at this time at its
most cogent and coherent this New Leftist alternative to the
Gandhian anti - imperialist programme and strategy. Accepting
the basic analytical framework of Marxism, Nehru put forward
the Left paradigm in a series of speeches, letters, articles and
books and his Presidential addresses to the Luckn ow and
Faizpur sessions of the Congress in 1936. The basic goal before
the Indian people, as also before the people of the world, he said,
had to be the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of
socialism. While we’ve already looked at the pragmatic aspect of
Nehru’s challenge two of its other aspects have to be understood.
To Nehru, the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience
Movement and council -entry and the recourse to constructive
programmes represented a ‘spiritual defeat’ and a surrender of
ideals, a retreat from the revolutionary to the reformist mentality,
and a going back to the pre -1919 moderate phase What was
worse, it seemed that the Congress was giving up all social
radicalism and ‘expressing a tender solicitude for every vested
interest.’ Many Congress leaders, he said, ‘preferred to break | <s>[INST]307 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
*
But unlike in the 1920s, a third tactical perspective, based
on an alternative strategy , made its appearance at this time. The
strong Left trend that had developed in the early l930s was
critical of both the council -entry programme and the suspension
of civil disobedience and its replacement b the constructive
programme. Both of them, the left ists said, would sidetrack direct
mass action and political work among the masses and divert
attention from the basic issue of struggle against colonial rule.
The leftists instead favoured the continuation or resumption of
the non - constitutional mass move ment since they felt that the
situation continued to be revolutionary because of the continuing
economic crisis and the readiness of the masses to fight.
It was Jawaharlal Nehru who represented at this time at its
most cogent and coherent this New Leftist alternative to the
Gandhian anti - imperialist programme and strategy. Accepting
the basic analytical framework of Marxism, Nehru put forward
the Left paradigm in a series of speeches, letters, articles and
books and his Presidential addresses to the Luckn ow and
Faizpur sessions of the Congress in 1936. The basic goal before
the Indian people, as also before the people of the world, he said,
had to be the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of
socialism. While we’ve already looked at the pragmatic aspect of
Nehru’s challenge two of its other aspects have to be understood.
To Nehru, the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience
Movement and council -entry and the recourse to constructive
programmes represented a ‘spiritual defeat’ and a surrender of
ideals, a retreat from the revolutionary to the reformist mentality,
and a going back to the pre -1919 moderate phase What was
worse, it seemed that the Congress was giving up all social
radicalism and ‘expressing a tender solicitude for every vested
interest.’ Many Congress leaders, he said, ‘preferred to break[/INST] |
some people’s hearts rather than touch others’ pockets. Pockets
are, indeed, more valuable and more cherished than hearts and
brains and bodies and human justice and dignity .” His alienation
from Gandhij i also seemed to be complete. He wrote in his jail
diary in April 1934: ‘Our objectives are different, our ideals are | <s>[INST]some people’s hearts rather than touch others’ pockets. Pockets
are, indeed, more valuable and more cherished than hearts and
brains and bodies and human justice and dignity .” His alienation
from Gandhij i also seemed to be complete. He wrote in his jail
diary in April 1934: ‘Our objectives are different, our ideals are[/INST] |
308 | India’s Struggle For Independence
different, our spiritual outlook is different and our methods are
likely to be different.’
The way out, said Nehru , lay in grasping the c lass basis of
society and the role of class struggle and in ‘revising vested
interests in favour of the masses.’ This meant taking up or
encouraging the day -to-day class, economic demands of the
peasants and workers against the landlords and capitalists,
organizing the former in their class organizations — kisan sabhas
and trade unions — and permitting them to affiliate with the
Congress and, thus, influence and direct its policies and
activities. There could be , said Nehru, no genuine anti -imperialist
struggle which did not i ncorporate the class struggle of t he
masses.
Throughout these years, Nehru pointed to the inadequacy of
the existing nationalist ideology and stressed the need to
inculcate a new, socialist or Marxist ideology, which would enable
the p eople to study their social condition scientifically. Several
chapters of his Autobiography, published in 1935, were an
ideological polemic against Gandhiji even though conducted in a
friendly tone.
Jawaharlal also challenged the basic Gandhian strategy o f
struggle.4 Under the Gandhian strategy. which may be described
as Struggle — Truce — Struggle (S -T-S’), phases of a vigorous
extra -legal mass movement and confrontation with colonial
authority alternate with phases, during which direct
confrontation is w ithdrawn, political concessions or reforms, if
any, wrested from the colonial regime, are willy -nilly worked and
silent political work carried on among the masses within the
existing legal framework, which, in turn, provides scope for such
work. Both phase s of the movement are to he utilized, each in its
own way, to undermine the twin ideological notions on which the
colonial regime rested — that British rule benefits Indians and
that it is too powerful to be challenged and overthrown and to | <s>[INST]308 | India’s Struggle For Independence
different, our spiritual outlook is different and our methods are
likely to be different.’
The way out, said Nehru , lay in grasping the c lass basis of
society and the role of class struggle and in ‘revising vested
interests in favour of the masses.’ This meant taking up or
encouraging the day -to-day class, economic demands of the
peasants and workers against the landlords and capitalists,
organizing the former in their class organizations — kisan sabhas
and trade unions — and permitting them to affiliate with the
Congress and, thus, influence and direct its policies and
activities. There could be , said Nehru, no genuine anti -imperialist
struggle which did not i ncorporate the class struggle of t he
masses.
Throughout these years, Nehru pointed to the inadequacy of
the existing nationalist ideology and stressed the need to
inculcate a new, socialist or Marxist ideology, which would enable
the p eople to study their social condition scientifically. Several
chapters of his Autobiography, published in 1935, were an
ideological polemic against Gandhiji even though conducted in a
friendly tone.
Jawaharlal also challenged the basic Gandhian strategy o f
struggle.4 Under the Gandhian strategy. which may be described
as Struggle — Truce — Struggle (S -T-S’), phases of a vigorous
extra -legal mass movement and confrontation with colonial
authority alternate with phases, during which direct
confrontation is w ithdrawn, political concessions or reforms, if
any, wrested from the colonial regime, are willy -nilly worked and
silent political work carried on among the masses within the
existing legal framework, which, in turn, provides scope for such
work. Both phase s of the movement are to he utilized, each in its
own way, to undermine the twin ideological notions on which the
colonial regime rested — that British rule benefits Indians and
that it is too powerful to be challenged and overthrown and to[/INST] |
that it is too powerful to be challenged and overthrown and to
recruit and tra in cadres and to build up the people’s capacity to
struggle. The entire political process of S -T-S’ was an upward
spiralling one, which also assumed that the freedom struggle
would pass through several stages, ending with the transfer of
power by the colon ial regime itself. | <s>[INST]that it is too powerful to be challenged and overthrown and to
recruit and tra in cadres and to build up the people’s capacity to
struggle. The entire political process of S -T-S’ was an upward
spiralling one, which also assumed that the freedom struggle
would pass through several stages, ending with the transfer of
power by the colon ial regime itself.[/INST] |
309 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
Nehru did not subscribe to this strategy and believed that,
whatever might have been the case in the past, the Indian
national movement had now reached a stage where there should
be a permanent confrontation and conflict with imperialis m till it
was overthrown. He accepted that the struggle had to go through
setbacks and phases of upswing and downswing; but these
should not lead to a passive phase or a stage of compromise or
‘cooperation’ with the colonial framework towards which
permane nt hostile and non-cooperation had to be maintained.
The Congress, said Nehru, must maintain ‘an aggressive direct
action policy.’ This meant that even if the mass movement was at
a low ebb or remained at a symbolic p lane, it should be
continued. T here cou ld be no interposition of a constitutional
phase when the existing constitutional framework was worked;
nor could there be a diversion from political and economic class
issues to the constructive programme. Furthermore, said Nehru,
every moment sooner or l ater reached a stage when it endangered
the existing order. The struggle then became perpetual and could
go forward only through unconstitutional and illegal means. This
also happened when the masses entered politics. No compromise
or half -way house was th en left. This stage had been reached in
India with the Lahore Resolution for Poorna Sw araj. There was
now no alternative to permanent continuation of the struggle. For
this reason, Nehru attacked all moves towards the withdrawal of
the Civil Disobedience M ovement. This would lead, he warned, to
‘some form of compromise with imperialism’ which ‘would be a
betrayal of the cause.’ Hence, ‘the only way out is to struggle for
freedom without compromise or going back or faltering.’ Nehru
also attacked the notion of winning freedom through stages. Real
power could not be won gradually ‘bit by bit’ or by ‘two annas
and four annas.’ ‘The citadel’ — State power | <s>[INST]309 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
Nehru did not subscribe to this strategy and believed that,
whatever might have been the case in the past, the Indian
national movement had now reached a stage where there should
be a permanent confrontation and conflict with imperialis m till it
was overthrown. He accepted that the struggle had to go through
setbacks and phases of upswing and downswing; but these
should not lead to a passive phase or a stage of compromise or
‘cooperation’ with the colonial framework towards which
permane nt hostile and non-cooperation had to be maintained.
The Congress, said Nehru, must maintain ‘an aggressive direct
action policy.’ This meant that even if the mass movement was at
a low ebb or remained at a symbolic p lane, it should be
continued. T here cou ld be no interposition of a constitutional
phase when the existing constitutional framework was worked;
nor could there be a diversion from political and economic class
issues to the constructive programme. Furthermore, said Nehru,
every moment sooner or l ater reached a stage when it endangered
the existing order. The struggle then became perpetual and could
go forward only through unconstitutional and illegal means. This
also happened when the masses entered politics. No compromise
or half -way house was th en left. This stage had been reached in
India with the Lahore Resolution for Poorna Sw araj. There was
now no alternative to permanent continuation of the struggle. For
this reason, Nehru attacked all moves towards the withdrawal of
the Civil Disobedience M ovement. This would lead, he warned, to
‘some form of compromise with imperialism’ which ‘would be a
betrayal of the cause.’ Hence, ‘the only way out is to struggle for
freedom without compromise or going back or faltering.’ Nehru
also attacked the notion of winning freedom through stages. Real
power could not be won gradually ‘bit by bit’ or by ‘two annas
and four annas.’ ‘The citadel’ — State power[/INST] |
and four annas.’ ‘The citadel’ — State power
— had to be seized, though through a non -violent mass struggle.
Thus, to S -T-S’ he counterposed the strateg y of S -V (‘V’ standing
for victory) or the permanent waging of mass struggle till victory
was won.
*
So sharp were the differences between Nehru and the
leftists on the one side and proponents of council -entry on the
other that many — the nationalists wit h apprehension and the | <s>[INST]and four annas.’ ‘The citadel’ — State power
— had to be seized, though through a non -violent mass struggle.
Thus, to S -T-S’ he counterposed the strateg y of S -V (‘V’ standing
for victory) or the permanent waging of mass struggle till victory
was won.
*
So sharp were the differences between Nehru and the
leftists on the one side and proponents of council -entry on the
other that many — the nationalists wit h apprehension and the[/INST] |
310 | India’s Struggle For Independence
British officials with hope — expected a split sooner or later. But
Gandhiji once again moved into the breach and diffused the
situation. Though believing that Satyagraha alone was capable of
winning freedom, he conciliated the propo nents of council - entry
by acceding to their basic demand that they should be permitted
to enter the legislatures. He also defended them from accusations
of being lesser patriots Parliamentary politics, he said, could not
lead to freedom but those large nu mber of Congressmen who
could not for some reason or the other offer Satyagraha or devote
themselves to constructive work should not remain unoccupied.
They could give expression to their patriotic energies through
council work in a period when there was n o mass movement,
provided they were not sucked into constitutionalism or self -
serving. As he put it in a letter to Sardar Patel on 23 April 1934:
‘Realities cannot be wished away. At the most we can improve
them a little. We may exercise control. We can d o neither more
nor less.’
Consequently, under Gandhiji’s guidance, the AICC meeting
at Patna decided in May 1934 to set up a parliamentary board to
fight elections under the aegis of the Congress itself. To the Left -
wing critics of the resolution, Gandhij i replied: ‘I hope that the
majority will always remain untouched by the glamour of council
work. . . Swaraj will never come that way. Swaraj can only come
through an all -round consciousness of the masses. ’
At the same time, he assured Nehru and the leftis ts that the
withdrawal of the civil disobedience was dictated by the reality of
the political situation. But this did not mean following a policy of
drift or bowing down before political opportunists or
compromising with imperialism. Only civil disobedienc e had been
discontinued, the war continued. The new policy, he said, ‘is
founded upon one central idea — that of consolidating the power | <s>[INST]310 | India’s Struggle For Independence
British officials with hope — expected a split sooner or later. But
Gandhiji once again moved into the breach and diffused the
situation. Though believing that Satyagraha alone was capable of
winning freedom, he conciliated the propo nents of council - entry
by acceding to their basic demand that they should be permitted
to enter the legislatures. He also defended them from accusations
of being lesser patriots Parliamentary politics, he said, could not
lead to freedom but those large nu mber of Congressmen who
could not for some reason or the other offer Satyagraha or devote
themselves to constructive work should not remain unoccupied.
They could give expression to their patriotic energies through
council work in a period when there was n o mass movement,
provided they were not sucked into constitutionalism or self -
serving. As he put it in a letter to Sardar Patel on 23 April 1934:
‘Realities cannot be wished away. At the most we can improve
them a little. We may exercise control. We can d o neither more
nor less.’
Consequently, under Gandhiji’s guidance, the AICC meeting
at Patna decided in May 1934 to set up a parliamentary board to
fight elections under the aegis of the Congress itself. To the Left -
wing critics of the resolution, Gandhij i replied: ‘I hope that the
majority will always remain untouched by the glamour of council
work. . . Swaraj will never come that way. Swaraj can only come
through an all -round consciousness of the masses. ’
At the same time, he assured Nehru and the leftis ts that the
withdrawal of the civil disobedience was dictated by the reality of
the political situation. But this did not mean following a policy of
drift or bowing down before political opportunists or
compromising with imperialism. Only civil disobedienc e had been
discontinued, the war continued. The new policy, he said, ‘is
founded upon one central idea — that of consolidating the power[/INST] |
of the people with a view to peaceful action.’ Moreover, he told
Nehru in August 1934: ‘1 fancy that I have the knack f or knowing
the need of the time.’ He also appeased the Left by strongly
backing Nehru for the Presidentship of the Lucknow Congress
despite contrary pressure from C. Rajagopalachari and other
right-wing leaders.
Gandhiji was at the same time convinced tha t he was out of
tune with powerful trends in the Congress. He felt that a large | <s>[INST]of the people with a view to peaceful action.’ Moreover, he told
Nehru in August 1934: ‘1 fancy that I have the knack f or knowing
the need of the time.’ He also appeased the Left by strongly
backing Nehru for the Presidentship of the Lucknow Congress
despite contrary pressure from C. Rajagopalachari and other
right-wing leaders.
Gandhiji was at the same time convinced tha t he was out of
tune with powerful trends in the Congress. He felt that a large[/INST] |
311 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
section of the intelligentsia favoured parliamentary politics with
which he was in fundamental disagreement. Another section of
the intelligentsia felt estranged from the Congr ess because of his
emphasis on the spinning wheel as ‘the second lung of the
nation,’ on Harijan work based on a moral and religious
approach, and on other items of the constructive programme.
Similarly, the socialist group, whose leader was Jawaharlal, wa s
growing in influence and importance but he had fundamental
differences with it. Yet the Socialists felt constrained by the
weight of his personality. As he put it: ‘But I would not, by reason
of the moral pressure I may be able to exert, suppress the spr ead
of the ideas propounded in their literature.’ Thus , vis-a-vis both
groups, ‘for me to dominate the Congress in spite of these
fundamental differences is almost a species of violence which I
must refrain from.’ Hence, in October 1934, he announced his
resignation from the Congress ‘only to serve it better in thought,
word and deed.
Nehru and the Socialists responded with no less a patriotic
spirit. While enemies of the Congress hoped that their radicalism
would lead to their breaking away from the Congr ess, they had
their priorities clearly worked out. The British must first be
expelled before the struggle for socialism could be waged. And in
the anti -imperialist struggle, national unity around the Congress,
still the only anti -imperialist mass organizat ion, was
indispensable. Even from the socialist point of view, argued
Nehru and other leftists, it was far better to gradually radicalize
the Congress, where millions upon millions of the people were,
than to get isolated from these millions in the name of political or
ideological purity. Nehru, for example, wrote: ‘I do not see why I
should walk out of the Congress leaving the field clear to social
reactionaries. Therefore, I think it is up to us to remain there and | <s>[INST]311 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
section of the intelligentsia favoured parliamentary politics with
which he was in fundamental disagreement. Another section of
the intelligentsia felt estranged from the Congr ess because of his
emphasis on the spinning wheel as ‘the second lung of the
nation,’ on Harijan work based on a moral and religious
approach, and on other items of the constructive programme.
Similarly, the socialist group, whose leader was Jawaharlal, wa s
growing in influence and importance but he had fundamental
differences with it. Yet the Socialists felt constrained by the
weight of his personality. As he put it: ‘But I would not, by reason
of the moral pressure I may be able to exert, suppress the spr ead
of the ideas propounded in their literature.’ Thus , vis-a-vis both
groups, ‘for me to dominate the Congress in spite of these
fundamental differences is almost a species of violence which I
must refrain from.’ Hence, in October 1934, he announced his
resignation from the Congress ‘only to serve it better in thought,
word and deed.
Nehru and the Socialists responded with no less a patriotic
spirit. While enemies of the Congress hoped that their radicalism
would lead to their breaking away from the Congr ess, they had
their priorities clearly worked out. The British must first be
expelled before the struggle for socialism could be waged. And in
the anti -imperialist struggle, national unity around the Congress,
still the only anti -imperialist mass organizat ion, was
indispensable. Even from the socialist point of view, argued
Nehru and other leftists, it was far better to gradually radicalize
the Congress, where millions upon millions of the people were,
than to get isolated from these millions in the name of political or
ideological purity. Nehru, for example, wrote: ‘I do not see why I
should walk out of the Congress leaving the field clear to social
reactionaries. Therefore, I think it is up to us to remain there and[/INST] |
try to force the pace, thereby either co nverting others or making
them depart.” The Right was no less accommodating. C
Rajagopalachari wrote: ‘The British, perhaps, hope for a quarrel
among Congressmen over this (socialism). But we hope to
disappoint them.”
Elections to the Central Legislative A ssembly were held in
November 1934. Of the seventy -five elected seats for Indians, the
Congress captured forty -five. ‘Singularly unfortunate; a great
triumph for little Gandhi,’ wailed the Viceroy, Willingdon.’ | <s>[INST]try to force the pace, thereby either co nverting others or making
them depart.” The Right was no less accommodating. C
Rajagopalachari wrote: ‘The British, perhaps, hope for a quarrel
among Congressmen over this (socialism). But we hope to
disappoint them.”
Elections to the Central Legislative A ssembly were held in
November 1934. Of the seventy -five elected seats for Indians, the
Congress captured forty -five. ‘Singularly unfortunate; a great
triumph for little Gandhi,’ wailed the Viceroy, Willingdon.’[/INST] |
312 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
Even though the Government had successfully suppressed
the mass movement during 1932 -33, it was aware that
suppression could only be a short -term tactic. it could not
prevent the resurgence of another powerful movement in the
years to come. For that it was necessary to permanently weaken
the moveme nt. This could be achieved if the Congress was
internally divided and large segments of it co -opted or integrated
into the colonial constitutional and administrative structure. The
phase of naked suppression should, therefore, be followed,
decided the colo nial policy makers, by another phase of
constitutional reforms.
In August 1935, the British Parliament passed the
Government of India Act of 1935. The Act provided for the
establishment of an All -India Federation to be based on the union
of the British In dian provinces and P rincely States. The
representatives of the States to the federal legislature were to be
appointed directly by the Princes who were to be used to check
and counter the nationalists. The franchise was limited to about
one-sixth of the adu lts. Defence and foreign affairs would remain
outside the control of the federal legislature, while the Viceroy
would retain special control over other subjects.
The provinces were to be governed under a new system
based on provincial autonomy under which elected ministers
controlled all provincial departments. Once again, the Governors,
appointed by the British Government, retained special powers.
They could veto legislative and administrative measures,
especially those concerning minorities, the rights o f civil servants,
law and order and British business interests. The Governor also
had the power to take over and indefinitely run the
administration of a province. Thus both political and economic
power remained concentrated in British hands; colonialism
remained intact. As Linlithgow, Chairman of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on the Act of 1935 and the Viceroy of | <s>[INST]312 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
Even though the Government had successfully suppressed
the mass movement during 1932 -33, it was aware that
suppression could only be a short -term tactic. it could not
prevent the resurgence of another powerful movement in the
years to come. For that it was necessary to permanently weaken
the moveme nt. This could be achieved if the Congress was
internally divided and large segments of it co -opted or integrated
into the colonial constitutional and administrative structure. The
phase of naked suppression should, therefore, be followed,
decided the colo nial policy makers, by another phase of
constitutional reforms.
In August 1935, the British Parliament passed the
Government of India Act of 1935. The Act provided for the
establishment of an All -India Federation to be based on the union
of the British In dian provinces and P rincely States. The
representatives of the States to the federal legislature were to be
appointed directly by the Princes who were to be used to check
and counter the nationalists. The franchise was limited to about
one-sixth of the adu lts. Defence and foreign affairs would remain
outside the control of the federal legislature, while the Viceroy
would retain special control over other subjects.
The provinces were to be governed under a new system
based on provincial autonomy under which elected ministers
controlled all provincial departments. Once again, the Governors,
appointed by the British Government, retained special powers.
They could veto legislative and administrative measures,
especially those concerning minorities, the rights o f civil servants,
law and order and British business interests. The Governor also
had the power to take over and indefinitely run the
administration of a province. Thus both political and economic
power remained concentrated in British hands; colonialism
remained intact. As Linlithgow, Chairman of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on the Act of 1935 and the Viceroy of[/INST] |
Parliamentary Committee on the Act of 1935 and the Viceroy of
India from 1936, stated later, the Act had been framed ‘because
we thought that was the best way . . . of maintaining British
influence in In dia. It is no part of our policy, I take it, to expedite
in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously | <s>[INST]Parliamentary Committee on the Act of 1935 and the Viceroy of
India from 1936, stated later, the Act had been framed ‘because
we thought that was the best way . . . of maintaining British
influence in In dia. It is no part of our policy, I take it, to expedite
in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously[/INST] |
313 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
to hurry the handing over of the controls to Indian hands at any
pace faster than that which we regard as best calculated, on a
long view, to hold India to the Empire.”
The long -term strategy, followed by the British Government
from 1935 to 1939, had several major components. Reforms, it
was hoped, would revive the political standing of the Liberals and
other moderates who believed in the constitutional path, and who
had lost public favour during the Civil Disobedience Movement.
Simultaneously, in view of the severe repression of the
movement, large sections of Congressmen would be convinced of
the ineffectiveness of extra -legal means and the efficacy of
constitutionalism. They would be weaned away from mass
politics and guided towards constitutional politics. It was also
hoped that once the Congressmen in office had tasted power and
dispensed patronage they would be most reluctant to g o back to
the politics of sacrifice.
Another aspect of the colonial strategy was equally complex
and masterly. Reforms could be used to promote dissensions and
a split within the demoralized Congress ranks on the basis of
constitutionalist vs. non constit utionalist and Right vs. Left. The
constitutionalists and the right - wing were to be placated through
constitutional and other concessions lured into the parliamentary
game, encouraged to gradually give up agitationa l politics and
coalesce with the moderat e Liberals and landlords and other
loyalists in working the constitution, and enabled to increase
their weight in the nationalist ranks. The Left and radical
elements, it was hoped , would see all this as a compromise with
imperialism and abandonment of mas s politics and would,
therefore, become even more strident. Then, either the leftists
(radicals) would break away from the Congress or their aggressive
anti-Right politics and accent on socialism would lead the right -
wing to kick them out. Either way, the Congress would be split | <s>[INST]313 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
to hurry the handing over of the controls to Indian hands at any
pace faster than that which we regard as best calculated, on a
long view, to hold India to the Empire.”
The long -term strategy, followed by the British Government
from 1935 to 1939, had several major components. Reforms, it
was hoped, would revive the political standing of the Liberals and
other moderates who believed in the constitutional path, and who
had lost public favour during the Civil Disobedience Movement.
Simultaneously, in view of the severe repression of the
movement, large sections of Congressmen would be convinced of
the ineffectiveness of extra -legal means and the efficacy of
constitutionalism. They would be weaned away from mass
politics and guided towards constitutional politics. It was also
hoped that once the Congressmen in office had tasted power and
dispensed patronage they would be most reluctant to g o back to
the politics of sacrifice.
Another aspect of the colonial strategy was equally complex
and masterly. Reforms could be used to promote dissensions and
a split within the demoralized Congress ranks on the basis of
constitutionalist vs. non constit utionalist and Right vs. Left. The
constitutionalists and the right - wing were to be placated through
constitutional and other concessions lured into the parliamentary
game, encouraged to gradually give up agitationa l politics and
coalesce with the moderat e Liberals and landlords and other
loyalists in working the constitution, and enabled to increase
their weight in the nationalist ranks. The Left and radical
elements, it was hoped , would see all this as a compromise with
imperialism and abandonment of mas s politics and would,
therefore, become even more strident. Then, either the leftists
(radicals) would break away from the Congress or their aggressive
anti-Right politics and accent on socialism would lead the right -
wing to kick them out. Either way, the Congress would be split[/INST] |
wing to kick them out. Either way, the Congress would be split
and weakened. Moreover, isolated from the right -wing and devoid
of the protection that a united national movement gave them, the
leftist (radical) elements could be crushed through police
measures.
It was as a part of this strategy that the Government
reversed its policy, followed during 1933 -34, of suppressing the
anti-constitutionalists in order to weaken the opposition to | <s>[INST]wing to kick them out. Either way, the Congress would be split
and weakened. Moreover, isolated from the right -wing and devoid
of the protection that a united national movement gave them, the
leftist (radical) elements could be crushed through police
measures.
It was as a part of this strategy that the Government
reversed its policy, followed during 1933 -34, of suppressing the
anti-constitutionalists in order to weaken the opposition to[/INST] |
314 | India’s Struggle For Independence
constitutionalism. Once division between the Left and the Right
began to grow within the Congress, the Govern ment refrained
from taking strong action against revolutionary agitation by left -
wing Congressmen. This happened from 1935 onwards. Above all
the Government banked on Nehru’s strong attacks on the
constitutionalists and the right -wing and his powerful advo cacy
of socialism and revolutionary overthrow of colonial rule to
produce a fissure in the nationalist ranks. Officials believed that
Nehru and his followers had gone so far in their radicalism that
they would not retreat when defeated by the right -wing in the
AICC and at the Lucknow Congress. It was for this reason that
nearly all the senior officials advised the Viceroy during 1935 - 36
not to arrest him. Erskine, the Governor of Madras, for example,
advised: ‘The more speeches of this type that Nehru make s the
better, as his attitude will undoubtedly cause the Congress to
split. Indeed, we should keep him in cotton wool and pamper
him, for he is unwittingly smashing the Congress organization
from inside.”
Provincial autonomy, it was further hoped, would cr eate
powerful provincial leaders in the Congress who would wield
administrative power in their own right, gradually learn to
safeguard their administrative prerogatives, and would, therefore,
gradually become autonomous centres of political power. The
Cong ress would, thus, be provincialize ; the authority of the
central all -India leadership would be weakened if n destroyed. As
Linlithgow wrote in 1936, ‘our best hope of avoiding a direct
clash is in the potency of Provincial Autonomy to destroy the
effective ness of Congress as an All -India instrument of
revolution.”
The Act of 1935 was condemned by nearly all sections of
Indian opinion and was unanimously rejected by the Congress.
The Congress demanded instead, the convening of a Constituent
Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise to frame a | <s>[INST]314 | India’s Struggle For Independence
constitutionalism. Once division between the Left and the Right
began to grow within the Congress, the Govern ment refrained
from taking strong action against revolutionary agitation by left -
wing Congressmen. This happened from 1935 onwards. Above all
the Government banked on Nehru’s strong attacks on the
constitutionalists and the right -wing and his powerful advo cacy
of socialism and revolutionary overthrow of colonial rule to
produce a fissure in the nationalist ranks. Officials believed that
Nehru and his followers had gone so far in their radicalism that
they would not retreat when defeated by the right -wing in the
AICC and at the Lucknow Congress. It was for this reason that
nearly all the senior officials advised the Viceroy during 1935 - 36
not to arrest him. Erskine, the Governor of Madras, for example,
advised: ‘The more speeches of this type that Nehru make s the
better, as his attitude will undoubtedly cause the Congress to
split. Indeed, we should keep him in cotton wool and pamper
him, for he is unwittingly smashing the Congress organization
from inside.”
Provincial autonomy, it was further hoped, would cr eate
powerful provincial leaders in the Congress who would wield
administrative power in their own right, gradually learn to
safeguard their administrative prerogatives, and would, therefore,
gradually become autonomous centres of political power. The
Cong ress would, thus, be provincialize ; the authority of the
central all -India leadership would be weakened if n destroyed. As
Linlithgow wrote in 1936, ‘our best hope of avoiding a direct
clash is in the potency of Provincial Autonomy to destroy the
effective ness of Congress as an All -India instrument of
revolution.”
The Act of 1935 was condemned by nearly all sections of
Indian opinion and was unanimously rejected by the Congress.
The Congress demanded instead, the convening of a Constituent
Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise to frame a[/INST] |
Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise to frame a
constitution for an independent India.
*
The second stage of the debate over strategy occurred
among Congressmen over the question of office acceptance. ‘The
British, after imposing the Act of 1935, decided to | <s>[INST]Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise to frame a
constitution for an independent India.
*
The second stage of the debate over strategy occurred
among Congressmen over the question of office acceptance. ‘The
British, after imposing the Act of 1935, decided to[/INST] |
315 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
immediately/put into practice provincial autonomy, and
announced the holding of elections to provincial legislatures in
early 1937. Their strategy of co -option or absorption into the
colonial constitutional framework was underway. The
nationalists were faced with a new political reality. All of them
agreed that the 1935 Act must be opposed root and branch; but
the question was how to do so in a period when a mass
movement was not yet possible.
Very sharp differences once again emerged in the ranks of
the Con gress leaders. There was, of course, full agreement that
the Congress should fight the coming elections on the basis of a
detailed political and economic programme, thus deepening the
anti-imperialist consciousness of the people. But what was to be
done af ter the elections? If the Congress got a majority in a
province, should it agree to form the Government or not? Basic
question of the strategy of the national movement and divergent
perceptions of the prevailing political situation were involved.
Moreover, the two sides to the debate soon got identified with the
emerging ideological divide along Left and Right lines.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose, the Congress Socialists
and the Communists were totally opposed to office acceptance
and thereby working the 1 935 Act. The Left case was presented
effectively and passionately by Nehru, especially in his
Presidential Address at Lucknow in early 1936. Firstly, to accept
office, was ‘to negate our rejection of it (the 1935 Act) and to
stand self -condemned.’ It would mean assuming responsibility
without power, since the basic state structure would remain the
same. While the Congress would be able to do little for the
people, it would be cooperating ‘in some measure with the
repressive apparatus of imperialism, and we would become
partners in this repression and in the exploitation of our people.’
Secondly, office acceptance would take away the | <s>[INST]315 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
immediately/put into practice provincial autonomy, and
announced the holding of elections to provincial legislatures in
early 1937. Their strategy of co -option or absorption into the
colonial constitutional framework was underway. The
nationalists were faced with a new political reality. All of them
agreed that the 1935 Act must be opposed root and branch; but
the question was how to do so in a period when a mass
movement was not yet possible.
Very sharp differences once again emerged in the ranks of
the Con gress leaders. There was, of course, full agreement that
the Congress should fight the coming elections on the basis of a
detailed political and economic programme, thus deepening the
anti-imperialist consciousness of the people. But what was to be
done af ter the elections? If the Congress got a majority in a
province, should it agree to form the Government or not? Basic
question of the strategy of the national movement and divergent
perceptions of the prevailing political situation were involved.
Moreover, the two sides to the debate soon got identified with the
emerging ideological divide along Left and Right lines.
Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose, the Congress Socialists
and the Communists were totally opposed to office acceptance
and thereby working the 1 935 Act. The Left case was presented
effectively and passionately by Nehru, especially in his
Presidential Address at Lucknow in early 1936. Firstly, to accept
office, was ‘to negate our rejection of it (the 1935 Act) and to
stand self -condemned.’ It would mean assuming responsibility
without power, since the basic state structure would remain the
same. While the Congress would be able to do little for the
people, it would be cooperating ‘in some measure with the
repressive apparatus of imperialism, and we would become
partners in this repression and in the exploitation of our people.’
Secondly, office acceptance would take away the[/INST] |
Secondly, office acceptance would take away the
revolutionary character of the movement imbibed since 1919.
Behind this issue, said Nehru. lay the question ‘whether we seek
revolutionary changes in India or (whether we) are working for
petty reforms under the aegis of British imperialism.’ Office
acceptance would mean, in practice, ‘a surrender’ before
imperialism. The Congress would get sucked into parliamentary
activity with in the colonial framework and would forget the main | <s>[INST]Secondly, office acceptance would take away the
revolutionary character of the movement imbibed since 1919.
Behind this issue, said Nehru. lay the question ‘whether we seek
revolutionary changes in India or (whether we) are working for
petty reforms under the aegis of British imperialism.’ Office
acceptance would mean, in practice, ‘a surrender’ before
imperialism. The Congress would get sucked into parliamentary
activity with in the colonial framework and would forget the main[/INST] |
316 | India’s Struggle For Independence
issues of freedom, economic and social justice, and removal of
poverty. It would be co -opted and deradicalized. It would fall into
‘a pit from which it would be difficult for us to come out.”
The counter -strategy that Nehru and the leftists
recommended was the older, Swarajist one: enter the assemblies
with a view to creating deadlocks and making the working of the
Act impossible. As a long term strategy, they put forward the
policy of increasing reliance on workers and peasants and their
class organizations, integration of these class organizations with
the Congress, imparting a socialist direction to the Congress, and
preparing for the resumption of a mass movement.
Those who favoured office acceptance s aid that they were
equally committed to combating the 1935 Act. They denied that
they were constitutionalists; they also believed that ‘real ‘work
lies outside the legislature’ and that work in the legislatures had
to be a short -term tactic, for it could n ot lead to freedom — for
that a mass struggle outside the legal framework was needed.
But, they said, the objective political situation made it necessary
to go through a constitutional phase, for the option of a mass
movement was not available at the time. The Congress should,
therefore, combine mass politics with work in the legislatures
and ministries in order to alter an unfavourable political
situation. In other words, what was involved was not a choice
between principles but a choice between the two al ternative
strategies of S -T-S’ and S -V. The case of the right -wing was put
with disarming simplicity by Rajendra Prasad in a letter to Nehru
in December 1935: ‘So far as I can judge, no one wants to accept
offices for their own sake. No one wants to work t he constitution
as the Government would like it to be worked. The questions for
us are altogether different. What are we to do with this
Constitution? Are we to ignore it altogether and go our way? Is it | <s>[INST]316 | India’s Struggle For Independence
issues of freedom, economic and social justice, and removal of
poverty. It would be co -opted and deradicalized. It would fall into
‘a pit from which it would be difficult for us to come out.”
The counter -strategy that Nehru and the leftists
recommended was the older, Swarajist one: enter the assemblies
with a view to creating deadlocks and making the working of the
Act impossible. As a long term strategy, they put forward the
policy of increasing reliance on workers and peasants and their
class organizations, integration of these class organizations with
the Congress, imparting a socialist direction to the Congress, and
preparing for the resumption of a mass movement.
Those who favoured office acceptance s aid that they were
equally committed to combating the 1935 Act. They denied that
they were constitutionalists; they also believed that ‘real ‘work
lies outside the legislature’ and that work in the legislatures had
to be a short -term tactic, for it could n ot lead to freedom — for
that a mass struggle outside the legal framework was needed.
But, they said, the objective political situation made it necessary
to go through a constitutional phase, for the option of a mass
movement was not available at the time. The Congress should,
therefore, combine mass politics with work in the legislatures
and ministries in order to alter an unfavourable political
situation. In other words, what was involved was not a choice
between principles but a choice between the two al ternative
strategies of S -T-S’ and S -V. The case of the right -wing was put
with disarming simplicity by Rajendra Prasad in a letter to Nehru
in December 1935: ‘So far as I can judge, no one wants to accept
offices for their own sake. No one wants to work t he constitution
as the Government would like it to be worked. The questions for
us are altogether different. What are we to do with this
Constitution? Are we to ignore it altogether and go our way? Is it[/INST] |
possible to do so? Are we to capture it and use it a s we would like
to use it and to the extent it lends itself to be used in that way. . .
It is not a question to be answered a priori on the basis of pre -
conceived notions of a so -called pro -changer or no -changer,
cooperator or obstructionist.’ And he assur ed Nehru that ‘1 do
not believe that anyone has gone back to pre non -cooperation
mentality. I do not think that we have gone back to 1923 -28. We
are in 1928 -29 mentality and I have no doubt that better days
will soon come.’ Similarly, speaking at the Luckn ow Session of | <s>[INST]possible to do so? Are we to capture it and use it a s we would like
to use it and to the extent it lends itself to be used in that way. . .
It is not a question to be answered a priori on the basis of pre -
conceived notions of a so -called pro -changer or no -changer,
cooperator or obstructionist.’ And he assur ed Nehru that ‘1 do
not believe that anyone has gone back to pre non -cooperation
mentality. I do not think that we have gone back to 1923 -28. We
are in 1928 -29 mentality and I have no doubt that better days
will soon come.’ Similarly, speaking at the Luckn ow Session of[/INST] |
317 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
the Congress, J.B. Kriplani said: ‘Even in a revolutionary
movement there may be a time of comparative depression and
inactivity. At such times, whatever programmes are devised have
necessarily an appearance of reformatory activity but they a re a
necessary part of all revolutionary strategy.”9 Nor was the issue
of socialism involved in the debate. As T. Vishwanathan of
Andhra put it: ‘To my socialist comrades, I would say, capture or
rejection of office is not a matter of socialism. I would as k them to
realize that it is a m atter of strategy.’
The pro -office acceptance leaders agreed that there were
pitfalls involved and that Congressmen in office could give way to
wrong tendencies. But the answer, they said, was to fight these
wrong tendencies and not abandon offices. Moreover, the
administrative field should not be left clear to pro -Government
forces. Even if the Congress rejected office, there were other
groups and parties who would readily form ministries and use
them to weaken nationalism a nd encourage reactionary and
communal policies and politics. Lastly, despite their limited
powers, the provincial ministries could be used to promote
constructive work especially in respect of village and Harijan
uplift, khadi, prohibition, education and r eduction of burden of
debt, taxes and rent on the peasants.
The basic question that the ministe rialists posed was
whether office acceptance invariably led to co -option by the
colonial state or whether ministries could be used to defeat the
colonial strate gy. The answer, in the words of Vishwanatha n was:
‘There is no office and there is no acceptance. . . Do not look
upon ministries as offices, but as ce ntres and fortresses from
which British imperialism is radiated. . . The Councils cannot
lead us to const itutionalism, for we are not babies; we will lead
the Councils and use them for Revolution.’
Though Gandhiji wrote little on the subject, it appears that | <s>[INST]317 |The Strategic Debate 1935 -37
the Congress, J.B. Kriplani said: ‘Even in a revolutionary
movement there may be a time of comparative depression and
inactivity. At such times, whatever programmes are devised have
necessarily an appearance of reformatory activity but they a re a
necessary part of all revolutionary strategy.”9 Nor was the issue
of socialism involved in the debate. As T. Vishwanathan of
Andhra put it: ‘To my socialist comrades, I would say, capture or
rejection of office is not a matter of socialism. I would as k them to
realize that it is a m atter of strategy.’
The pro -office acceptance leaders agreed that there were
pitfalls involved and that Congressmen in office could give way to
wrong tendencies. But the answer, they said, was to fight these
wrong tendencies and not abandon offices. Moreover, the
administrative field should not be left clear to pro -Government
forces. Even if the Congress rejected office, there were other
groups and parties who would readily form ministries and use
them to weaken nationalism a nd encourage reactionary and
communal policies and politics. Lastly, despite their limited
powers, the provincial ministries could be used to promote
constructive work especially in respect of village and Harijan
uplift, khadi, prohibition, education and r eduction of burden of
debt, taxes and rent on the peasants.
The basic question that the ministe rialists posed was
whether office acceptance invariably led to co -option by the
colonial state or whether ministries could be used to defeat the
colonial strate gy. The answer, in the words of Vishwanatha n was:
‘There is no office and there is no acceptance. . . Do not look
upon ministries as offices, but as ce ntres and fortresses from
which British imperialism is radiated. . . The Councils cannot
lead us to const itutionalism, for we are not babies; we will lead
the Councils and use them for Revolution.’
Though Gandhiji wrote little on the subject, it appears that[/INST] |
Though Gandhiji wrote little on the subject, it appears that
in the Working Committee discussions he opposed office
acceptance and posed the alternative of quiet p reparation in the
villages for the resumption of civil disobedience. But by the
beginning of 1936 he felt that the latter was still not feasible; he
was, therefore, willing to give a trial to the formation of Congress
ministries, especially as the overwhel ming mood of the party
favoured this course. | <s>[INST]Though Gandhiji wrote little on the subject, it appears that
in the Working Committee discussions he opposed office
acceptance and posed the alternative of quiet p reparation in the
villages for the resumption of civil disobedience. But by the
beginning of 1936 he felt that the latter was still not feasible; he
was, therefore, willing to give a trial to the formation of Congress
ministries, especially as the overwhel ming mood of the party
favoured this course.[/INST] |
318 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
The Congress decided at Lucknow in early 1936 and at
Faizpur in late 1936 to fight the elections and postpone the
decision on office acceptance to the post -election period. Once
again, as in 1922 -24 and 1934, both wings of the Congress,
having mutual respect and trust in their commitment to the anti -
imperialist struggle and aware of the damage to the movement
that a split would cause, desisted from dividing the party.
Though often out -voted, the Left fought ev ery inch of the way for
acceptance of their approach but would not go to breaking point.
The Congress went all out to win the elections to the
provincial assemblies held in February 1937. Its election
manifesto reaffirmed its total rejection of the 1935 A ct. It
promised the restoration of civil liberties, the release of political
prisoners, the removal of disabilities on grounds of sex and
untouchability, the radical transformation of the agrarian
system, substantial reduction in rent and revenue, scaling down
of the rural debts, provision of cheap credit, the right to form
trade unions and the right to strike.
The Congress election campaign received massive response
and once again aroused the political consciousness and energy of
the people. Nehru’s count ry-wide election tour was to acquire
legendary proportions. He travelled nearly 80,000 kilometres in
less than five months and addressed more than ten million
people, familiarizing them with the basic political issues of the
time. Gandhiji did not address a single election meeting though
he was very much present in the minds of the voters.
The Congress won a massive mandate at the polls despite
the narrow franchise. It won 716 out of 1,161 seats it contested.
It had a majority in most of the provinces. The exceptions were
Bengal, Assam, the NWPF, Punjab and Sind; and in the first
three, it was the largest single party. The prestige of the Congress
as the alternative to the colonial state rose even higher. The | <s>[INST]318 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
The Congress decided at Lucknow in early 1936 and at
Faizpur in late 1936 to fight the elections and postpone the
decision on office acceptance to the post -election period. Once
again, as in 1922 -24 and 1934, both wings of the Congress,
having mutual respect and trust in their commitment to the anti -
imperialist struggle and aware of the damage to the movement
that a split would cause, desisted from dividing the party.
Though often out -voted, the Left fought ev ery inch of the way for
acceptance of their approach but would not go to breaking point.
The Congress went all out to win the elections to the
provincial assemblies held in February 1937. Its election
manifesto reaffirmed its total rejection of the 1935 A ct. It
promised the restoration of civil liberties, the release of political
prisoners, the removal of disabilities on grounds of sex and
untouchability, the radical transformation of the agrarian
system, substantial reduction in rent and revenue, scaling down
of the rural debts, provision of cheap credit, the right to form
trade unions and the right to strike.
The Congress election campaign received massive response
and once again aroused the political consciousness and energy of
the people. Nehru’s count ry-wide election tour was to acquire
legendary proportions. He travelled nearly 80,000 kilometres in
less than five months and addressed more than ten million
people, familiarizing them with the basic political issues of the
time. Gandhiji did not address a single election meeting though
he was very much present in the minds of the voters.
The Congress won a massive mandate at the polls despite
the narrow franchise. It won 716 out of 1,161 seats it contested.
It had a majority in most of the provinces. The exceptions were
Bengal, Assam, the NWPF, Punjab and Sind; and in the first
three, it was the largest single party. The prestige of the Congress
as the alternative to the colonial state rose even higher. The[/INST] |
as the alternative to the colonial state rose even higher. The
election tour and election results heartened Neh ru, lifted him
from the slough of despondency, and made him reconcile to the
dominant strategy of S -T-S’. | <s>[INST]as the alternative to the colonial state rose even higher. The
election tour and election results heartened Neh ru, lifted him
from the slough of despondency, and made him reconcile to the
dominant strategy of S -T-S’.[/INST] |
319 | Twenty -Eight Months Of Congress Rule
CHAPTER 26. TWENTY -EIGHT MONTHS
OF CONGRESS RULE
After a few months’ tussle with the Government, the
Congress Working Com mittee decided to accept office under the
Act of 1935. During July, it formed Ministries in six provinces:
Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, Orissa, Bihar and U.P.
Later , Congress Ministries were also formed in the North -West
Frontier Province and Assam. To guide and coordinate their
activities and to ensure that the British hopes of the
provincialization of the Congress did not materialize, a central
control board known as the Parliamentary Sub -Committee was
formed, with Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam A zad and
Rajendra Prasad as members. Thus began a novel experiment —
a party which was committed to liquidate British rule took charge
of administration under a constitution which was framed by the
British and which yielded only partial state power to the I ndians;
this power could moreover be taken away from the Indians
whenever the imperial power so desired. The Congress was now
to function both as a government in the provinces and as the
opposition vis -a-vis the Central Government where effective state
power lay. It was to bring about social reforms through the
legislature and administration in the provinces and at the same
time carry on the struggle for independence and prepare the
people for the next phase of mass struggle. Thus the Congress
had to implem ent its strategy of Struggle -Truce -Struggle (S -T-S’)
in a historically unique situation.’
As Gandhiji wrote on the meaning of office acceptance in
Harijan on 7 August 1937: ‘These offices have to be held lightly,
not tightly. They are or should be crowns of thorns, never of
renown. Offices have been taken in order to see if they enable us
to quicken the pace at which we are moving towards our goal.’
Earlier he had advised Congressmen to use the Act of 1935 ‘in a | <s>[INST]319 | Twenty -Eight Months Of Congress Rule
CHAPTER 26. TWENTY -EIGHT MONTHS
OF CONGRESS RULE
After a few months’ tussle with the Government, the
Congress Working Com mittee decided to accept office under the
Act of 1935. During July, it formed Ministries in six provinces:
Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, Orissa, Bihar and U.P.
Later , Congress Ministries were also formed in the North -West
Frontier Province and Assam. To guide and coordinate their
activities and to ensure that the British hopes of the
provincialization of the Congress did not materialize, a central
control board known as the Parliamentary Sub -Committee was
formed, with Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam A zad and
Rajendra Prasad as members. Thus began a novel experiment —
a party which was committed to liquidate British rule took charge
of administration under a constitution which was framed by the
British and which yielded only partial state power to the I ndians;
this power could moreover be taken away from the Indians
whenever the imperial power so desired. The Congress was now
to function both as a government in the provinces and as the
opposition vis -a-vis the Central Government where effective state
power lay. It was to bring about social reforms through the
legislature and administration in the provinces and at the same
time carry on the struggle for independence and prepare the
people for the next phase of mass struggle. Thus the Congress
had to implem ent its strategy of Struggle -Truce -Struggle (S -T-S’)
in a historically unique situation.’
As Gandhiji wrote on the meaning of office acceptance in
Harijan on 7 August 1937: ‘These offices have to be held lightly,
not tightly. They are or should be crowns of thorns, never of
renown. Offices have been taken in order to see if they enable us
to quicken the pace at which we are moving towards our goal.’
Earlier he had advised Congressmen to use the Act of 1935 ‘in a[/INST] |
manner not expected by them (the British) an d by refraining from
using it in the way intended by them.’ | <s>[INST]manner not expected by them (the British) an d by refraining from
using it in the way intended by them.’[/INST] |
320 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
The formation of the Ministries by the Congress changed the
entire psychological atmosphere in the country. People felt as if
they were breathing the very air of victory and people’s power, for
was it not a great achievement that khadi clad men and women
who had been in prison until just the other day were now ruling
in the secretariat and the officials who were used to putting
Congressmen in jail would now be taking orders from them? The
exhilar ating atmosphere of the times is, perhaps, best brought
out by the following passage from Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery
of India: ‘There was a sense of immense relief as of the lifting of a
weight which had been oppressing the people; there was a release
of long- suppressed mass energy which was evident everywhere .
. . At the headquarters of the Provincial Governments, in the very
citadels of the old bureaucracy, many a symbolic scene was
witnessed. . . Now, suddenly, hordes of people, from the city and
the village, entered these sacred precincts and roamed about
almost at will. They were interested in anything; they went into
the Assembly Chamber, where the sessions used to be held; they
even peeped into the Ministers’ rooms. It was difficult to stop
them f or they no longer felt as outsiders; they had a sense of
ownership in all this . . . The policemen and the orderlies with
shining daggers were paralyzed; the old standards had fallen;
European dress, symbol of position and authority, no longer
counted. It was difficult to distinguish between members of the
Legislatures and the peasants and townsmen who came in such
large numbers.’
There was an immense increase in the prestige of the
Congress as an alternative power that would look after the
interests of the masses, especially of the peasants. At the same
time, the Congress had got an opportunity to demonstrate that it
could not only lead the people in mass struggles but also use
state power for their benefit. | <s>[INST]320 | India’s Struggle For Independence
*
The formation of the Ministries by the Congress changed the
entire psychological atmosphere in the country. People felt as if
they were breathing the very air of victory and people’s power, for
was it not a great achievement that khadi clad men and women
who had been in prison until just the other day were now ruling
in the secretariat and the officials who were used to putting
Congressmen in jail would now be taking orders from them? The
exhilar ating atmosphere of the times is, perhaps, best brought
out by the following passage from Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery
of India: ‘There was a sense of immense relief as of the lifting of a
weight which had been oppressing the people; there was a release
of long- suppressed mass energy which was evident everywhere .
. . At the headquarters of the Provincial Governments, in the very
citadels of the old bureaucracy, many a symbolic scene was
witnessed. . . Now, suddenly, hordes of people, from the city and
the village, entered these sacred precincts and roamed about
almost at will. They were interested in anything; they went into
the Assembly Chamber, where the sessions used to be held; they
even peeped into the Ministers’ rooms. It was difficult to stop
them f or they no longer felt as outsiders; they had a sense of
ownership in all this . . . The policemen and the orderlies with
shining daggers were paralyzed; the old standards had fallen;
European dress, symbol of position and authority, no longer
counted. It was difficult to distinguish between members of the
Legislatures and the peasants and townsmen who came in such
large numbers.’
There was an immense increase in the prestige of the
Congress as an alternative power that would look after the
interests of the masses, especially of the peasants. At the same
time, the Congress had got an opportunity to demonstrate that it
could not only lead the people in mass struggles but also use
state power for their benefit.[/INST] |