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Roman v. Sincock

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/307

307

1963

Roman

Sincock

<p>Following the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186) Richard Sincock and several other New Castle County residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters, challenged the constitutionality of Delaware's apportionment scheme. The suit alleged that under Delaware's 1897 state constitution, no provisions existed for reapportionment that would reflect the changing demographic face of New Castle County and the City of Wilmington. On a appeal from a three-judge district court ruling against the state of Delaware, the Supreme Court granted Mabel Roman, Delaware's elections clerk, certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

New York Times Company v. Sullivan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/39

39

1963

New York Times Company

Sullivan

<p>During the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, the <em>New York Times</em> published an ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr., on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies. The city Public Safety Commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the <em>Times</em> to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law. </p> <p>When the <em>Times</em> refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed a libel action against the <em>Times</em> and a group of African American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. The state supreme court affirmed and the <em>Times</em> appealed. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Garrison v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/4

4

1964

Jim Garrison

Louisiana

<p>On November 2, 1962, Jim Garrison, the District Attorney for the Parish of New Orleans, held a press conference in which he issued a statement disparaging the judicial conduct of the eight judges of the Parish’s Criminal District Court. He attributed the backlog of pending cases to the judges’ inefficiency, laziness, and excessive vacations. Based on these statements, Garrison was tried and convicted of defamation under the Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Garrison appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and argued that the statute impermissibly infringed on his First Amendment rights to freedom of expression.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/508

508

1963

Lucas

Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado

<p>Acting on behalf of several voters in the Denver area, Andres Lucas sued various officials connected with Colorado's elections challenging the apportionment of seats in both houses of the Colorado General Assembly. Under Colorado's apportionment plan, the House of Representatives was apportioned on the basis of population but the apportionment of the Senate was based on a combination of population and other factors (geography, compactness and contiguity, accessibility, natural boundaries, and conformity to historical divisions). Consequently, counties with only about one-third of the State's total population would elect a majority of the Senate; the maximum population-variance ratio would be about 3.6-to-1; and the chief metropolitan areas, with over two-thirds of the State's population, could elect only a bare majority of the Senate. When a three-judge District Court upheld the plan, stressing its recent approval by the electorate, the Supreme Court granted Lucas certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Gotthilf v. Sills

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/50

50

1963

Morris Gotthilf

Benjamin Sills, Morton Sills, Sills of Cambridge Inc.

<p>The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, granted an order to arrest debtor, Morris Gotthilf. Gotthilf appealed the decision, arguing that the statute authorizing arrest to enforce collection of debts violated the New York State and U.S. Constitutions. The Supreme Court of New York dismissed the appeal, because the original order was not final. Gotthilf did not file for leave to appeal certified questions before appealing the the U.S. Supreme Court as is required by New York law for non-final orders.</p>

per curiam

Judicial Power

Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/592

592

1963

Cocheyse J. Griffin, et al.

County School Board of Prince Edward County, et al.

<p>In 1951, a group of African American students in Prince Edward County, Virginia filed a complaint in district court alleging that the Virginia laws requiring segregated schools denied them their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law. When the Supreme Court decided <i>Brown v. Board of Education in 1954</i>, this case and others like it were remanded to the lower courts to order desegregation. Prince Edward County resisted desegregation by refusing to levy and collect the school taxes for the 1959-1960 school year, which forced the public schools in the county to close. The Prince Edward School Foundation formed to ensure private education for the white students. African American students did not receive formal education from 1959 until 1963, when federal, state, and county authorities collaborated to hold desegregated classes in county-owned buildings. In 1960, the Prince Edward Board of Supervisors passed an ordinance providing tuition grants for the children attending the private schools of the Prince Edward School Foundation. </p> <p>In 1961, the petitioners amended their original complaint to include new respondents and the elements of failing to provide public free schools in the county and using public funds to pay for segregated private schools. The district court held that the county could not pay the tuition grants as long as the public school remained closed, but the court refrained from making a decision regarding the closed public schools until the Virginia courts ruled on the issue. Later, without waiting for the decision of the Virginia courts, the district court held that the public schools must reopen. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decisions on the grounds that the district court should have waited until the state courts determined the validity of the tuition grants and the closing of the public schools.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Escobedo v. Illinois

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/615

615

1963

Danny Escobedo

Illinois

<p>Danny Escobedo was arrested and taken to a police station for questioning. Over several hours, the police refused his repeated requests to see his lawyer. Escobedo subsequently confessed to murder. Escobedo appealed the affirmation of his conviction of murder by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held that petitioner's confession had been admissible even though it was obtained after he had requested and been denied the assistance of counsel.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Jackson v. Denno

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/62

62

1963

Nathan Jackson

Wilfred Denno, Warden

<p>On June 14, 1960 at around 1 a.m., Nathan Jackson and Nora Elliot entered a Brooklyn hotel and registered for a room. Jackson drew a gun and took money from the clerk, then ordered the clerk and others upstairs before leaving the hotel. Outside, Jackson encountered a policeman. Both men drew their guns, and in the ensuing altercation, the policeman was fatally wounded and Jackson was shot twice. When a police detective questioned Jackson at the hospital around 2 a.m., he admitted to the robbery and to shooting the police officer. Jackson received pain medication and was questioned again around 4 a.m. He again admitted to the robbery and the shooting. An hour later, Jackson was taken into the operating room.</p> <p>Jackson and Elliot were indicted and tried together. His two confessions were admitted into evidence without objection. In his testimony, Jackson testified to being pressured into answering questions in the hospital, which the state denied. Consistent with New York practice, the question of the validity of the confession was submitted to the jury along with the other issues. The jury found Jackson guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.</p> <p>Jackson submitted a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confession was unconstitutional and that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied the petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Davis v. Mann

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/69

69

1963

Davis

Mann

<p>Acting on behalf of residents, taxpayers, and qualified voters in Arlington and Fairfax County, Virginia, Harrison Mann challenged Virginia's 1962 amended statutory apportionment scheme as unrepresentative. Harrison called for a redistribution of legislative representation among the counties and independent cities of the state "substantially in proportion to their respective populations." When Levin Davis appealed an adverse three-judge district court ruling on behalf of Virginia's Secretary and State Board of Elections, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Barr v. City of Columbia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/9

9

1963

Charles F. Barr, et al.

City of Columbia

<p>The Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia, South Carolina, allowed both black and white customers to buy goods and purchase food, but only the white customers were allowed to sit and eat at the lunch counter. On March 15, 1960, the petitioners, five black college students, sat at the counter and waited to be served. The previous day, the store manager arranged for police officers to be present in case of such a situation. After announcing that he would not serve the students and requesting that they leave, the store manager and one of the officers spoke individually to each petitioner. When they would not leave, the petitioners were arrested and charged criminal trespass and breach of the peace. The Recorder’s Court convicted the petitioners, and the County Court affirmed, as did the Supreme Court of South Carolina.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Hanna v. Plumer

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/171

171

1964

Hanna

Plumer

<p>After a car accident in South Carolina, Hanna brought a claim against Plumer, the executor of the estate of the driver who hit him. Since Hanna was a resident of Ohio, and Plumer was a resident of Massachusetts, the case was heard by a federal court in Massachusetts sitting in diversity jurisdiction. Plumer was served by leaving copies of the summons with his wife, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Plumer successfully sought summary judgment at trial because Massachusetts law requires service to be delivered by hand.</p> <p>The parties argued on appeal over how the Erie doctrine applied to this case. Plumer asserted that it would find a question to be substantive rather than procedural under the outcome-determinative test when applying federal law would alter the outcome of the case. He pointed out that applying federal law would change the outcome of the case, which otherwise would be dismissed, so the state procedural requirements and the grant of summary judgment should be upheld. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Hamm v. City of Rock Hill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/2

2

1964

Arthur Hamm, Jr., Frank James Lupper

City of Rock Hill, Arkansas

<p>On June 7, 1960, Arthur Hamm, Jr. and Reverend C. A. Ivory, both black, entered McCrory’s Five and Ten Cent Store in Rock Hill, South Carolina. They made several purchases, then tried unsuccessfully to purchase food at the lunch counter. The store manager asked Hamm and Ivory to leave, but they refused to do so. The manager called the police, who again asked Hamm and Ivory to leave before finally arresting them.</p> <p>The city of Rock Hill charged Hamm with willfully and unlawfully trespassing at McCrory’s, in violation of city and state laws. He was tried in district court without a jury, found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars or serve thirty days in jail. The Court of General Sessions and the Supreme Court of South Carolina both affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court of South Carolina cited other South Carolina cases involving sit-down demonstrations, noting that those defendants consistently and unsuccessfully invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.</p> <p>The Civil Rights Act, passed in 1964 while his appeal was pending, declared that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.</p>

majority opinion

vacated

Civil Rights

Cox v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/24

24

1964

Cox

Louisiana

<p>On December 14, 1961, the Baton Rouge police arrested 23 members of the Congress of Racial Equality ("CORE") on a charge of illegal picketing. In response B. Elton Cox, a leading member of CORE, and others planned to march through parts of Baton Rouge, LA, ending with a demonstration at the courthouse. An estimated 1,500 to 3,800 protesters demonstrated during the hearings of the 23 jailed members.</p> <p>Baton Rouge Police Chief Wingate White confronted the protestors when they arrived at the courthouse, telling them that they must confine the demonstration "to the west side of the street" within a designated period of time. After the group began their demonstration, a sheriff ordered them to disperse. Officers then forcibly dispersed the demonstration and arrested several demonstrators, including Cox.</p> <p>Cox was charged with four offenses under Louisiana law: criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse. He was acquitted of criminal conspiracy but convicted of the other three offenses. In accordance with Louisiana procedure, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed his "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" convictions on certiorari, and the "courthouse picketing" conviction on appeal, and the court affirmed all three convictions. Cox appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that all three statutes were unconstitutionally vague. This case (No. 24) addresses the "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public passages" statutes, while the second case (No. 49) addresses the "courthouse picketing" statute. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

City of El Paso v. Simmons

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/38

38

1964

City of El Paso

Simmons

<p>Since the late 19th century, Texas sold land to facilitate settlement in the state and construction of schools. If, however, a purchaser missed an interest payment on the property, the land was immediately forfeited back to the state unless the owner made the payment before the land could be re-sold. Under this program, Greenbury Simmons purchased and then forfeited some land in 1947. Just over five years later he offered to pay the interest to re-acquire the property. The state refused to comply with his wishes citing a 1941 amendment to its law which gave individuals five years to claim their forfeited land. Simmons's land was sold to the City of El Paso in 1955.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

United States v. Brown

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/399

399

1964

United States

Brown

<p>Section 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959 forbids any member of the Communist Party from serving as an executive officer of a labor union, with the goal of preventing politically-motivated strikes that would pose a danger to the national economy. Archie Brown, a San Francisco longshoreman and admitted member of the Communist Party, was three times elected to the executive board of the local International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union from 1959 through 1961. On May 24, 1961, Brown was charged with violating section 504 of the LMRDA. No evidence was presented at trial suggesting that Brown was involved in any other illegal activity or plotting a political strike. Brown was found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting <em>en banc</em>, reversed the conviction and found that section 504 violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. In response to appeal by the United States to the Supreme Court, Brown also argued that section 504 constitutes a bill of attainder, a law that targets a single individual or group, and therefore violates Article I, Section 9.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

United States v. Seeger

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/50

50

1964

United States

Seeger

<p>Seeger was convicted for refusing to be inducted into the armed forces. He argued that he was subject to the exemption under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, which provides that conscientious objectors need not serve in the armed forces if they have a specific religious training or belief that is related to a Supreme Being. Seeger was a genuine pacifist who made his objection in good faith, but he was denied the exemption because he did not believe in a Supreme Being, since he was agnostic about the existence of God. On the other hand, the root of his objection was based on religious study and faith rather than his personal morals. He argued that the provision containing the exemption was unconstitutional because it required proof of a belief in a Supreme Being.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Griswold v. Connecticut

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/496

496

1964

Estelle T. Griswold, et al.

State of Connecticut

<p>In 1879, Connecticut passed a law that banned the use of any drug, medical device, or other instrument in furthering contraception. A gynecologist at the Yale School of Medicine, C. Lee Buxton, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven in conjunction with Estelle Griswold, who was the head of Planned Parenthood in Connecticut. They were arrested and convicted of violating the law, and their convictions were affirmed by higher state courts. Their plan was to use the clinic to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment before the Supreme Court. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Privacy

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/515

515

1964

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.

United States

<p>Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans. The government sought to enjoin the motel from discriminating on the basis of race under Title II.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Katzenbach v. McClung

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/543

543

1964

Katzenbach

McClung

<p>Ollie McClung argued that his restaurant could not be prohibited from discriminating against African Americans because Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His restaurant, Ollie's Barbecue, was located on a major road in Birmingham, Alabama and was close to an interstate highway. Half of its food came from outside Alabama, although its suppliers were local. It served a meaningful number of customers from outside the state.</p> <p>He argued that his business was small and had no impact on interstate commerce, and that he did provide limited services to African Americans. McClung prevailed in federal district court and received an injunction barring the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act against Ollie's Barbecue. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Pointer v. Texas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/577

577

1964

Pointer

Texas

<p>On the night of June 16, 1962, a man later identified by a witness as Bob Granville Pointer entered a 7-11 Food Store and robbed the manager, Kenneth W. Phillips, of more than $300. The man then fled the store, and Phillips observed him talking to another man at a nearby intersection. A police dog led officers across the street from the 7-11 store to the front yard of a nearby residence, where Pointer was standing. A search of Pointer's person revealed eighty-one dollars in his billfold, and a later search revealed sixty-five dollars hidden in a discarded shoe.</p> <p>The police arrested Pointer and Lloyd Earl Dillard and took them before a state judge for a preliminary hearing; the state charged them with robbing Phillips of $375 by assault, violence, or by putting in fear of life or bodily injury, in violation of Texas law. An assistant attorney general conducted the prosecution and examined witnesses, but neither of the defendants had a lawyer. Dillard tried to cross-examine Phillips, but Pointer did not.</p> <p>Pointer was indicted on the robbery charge. At trial, Pointer testified on his own behalf, denying his alleged role in the robbery and swearing he had never been in the 7-11 store. The state offered a transcript of Phillips' testimony as evidence because Phillips had since moved out of Texas and did not intend to return. The defense objected to the use of the transcript as a denial of Pointer's right to confront a witness. The trial judge overruled because Pointer was present at the preliminary hearing, and Pointer was convicted. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction, rejecting Pointer's claim that the use of the transcript violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Henry v. Mississippi

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/6

6

1964

Aaron Henry

Mississippi

<p>During Aaron Henry’s trial for disturbing the peace, the State of Mississippi introduced testimony of a police officer who conducted an unlawful search of Henry’s car. Henry allegedly made indecent proposals and offensive contact when he gave a ride to a hitchhiker. Henry’s counsel failed to object to the testimony when it was entered into evidence as required by local rules. Henry’s counsel later objected to the testimony in a motion for directed verdict, but the court denied the motion and the jury found him guilty. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the testimony was improperly admitted, and excused Henry’s lack of objection because he was represented by out-of-state counsel, who were unfamiliar with the local rules of criminal procedure. After this judgment, Mississippi filed a Suggestion of Error pointing out that Henry was represented by competent in state counsel as well as out of state counsel. As a result, the Mississippi Supreme Court withdrew its first opinion and affirmed the conviction, holding that even honest mistakes are binding.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

United States v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/5_orig

5-orig

1964

United States

California

<p>In <em>United States v. California</em> (1947), the Court ruled that the federal government owned rights to the undersea land off the California coast, an area with rich oil and mineral deposits. The Court held that California's rights were limited to low and inland waters and appointed a special master to better define the limits of California's land rights. In a report filed in 1952, the special master based his definition on the one used by the federal government in foreign relations. In 1953, before the Court considered the special master's report, Congress passed the Submerged Land Act, granting to the states' ownership of underwater land within their borders "as they existed at the time such State became a member of the Union." The act limited states' seaward rights, however, to no more than three miles from the coastline. The act also acknowledged states' ownership of land beneath inland waters. The act gave no specific definition of either "coastline" or "inland waters" and did not address bodies of water adjoining the sea, such as bays.</p>

majority opinion

Louisiana v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/67

67

1964

Louisiana

United States

<p>The Attorney General on behalf of the United States sued Louisiana in a Louisiana federal district court alleging that the state had denied and would continue to deny African-Americans the right to vote. In 1898 Louisiana adopted a constitutional amendment that imposed burdensome requirements for voter registration, but which had a clause exempting those people registered to vote as of January 1, 1867 and the son or grandson of such people. African- Americans were not entitled to vote as of January 1, 1867. The district court agreed with the United States and held that Louisiana's requirements were unconstitutional.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Freedman v. Maryland

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/69

69

1964

Freedman

Maryland

<p>Maryland required that all films be submitted to a board of censors before being exhibited. The board could disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted morals, or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman challenged the law as unconstitutional due to the procedures to obtain approval. He did not suggest that prior approval itself was unconstitutional.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Abernathy v. Alabama

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/9

9

1964

Ralph D. Abernathy, et al.

Alabama

<p>In 1961, the city of Montgomery, Alabama, was under martial law as a result of the riots that started when groups of Freedom Riders arrived at the Greyhound Bus Station. On May 25, 1961, a military convoy escorted Ralph D. Abernathy, an African-American pastor from Montgomery, and 10 others (both African-American and white) to the bus terminal. The group purchased tickets, and all 11 went to sit at the lunch counter. There were at least 30 people in the station and several hundred people outside who could see through the plate-glass windows to the lunch counter. Given the tense atmosphere in the city and particularly at the bus station, Colonel Poarch of the National Guard directed the Sheriff of Montgomery County to arrest the eleven men. In his opinion, their actions seemed “calculated to provoke a breach of the peace.”</p> <p>Abernathy was convicted in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County on charges of disturbing the peace and unlawful assembly. He appealed the case and argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court of Appeals of the State of Alabama affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. </p>

per curiam

reversed

Civil Rights

Linkletter v. Walker

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1964/95

95

1964

Linkletter

Walker

<p>Victor Linkletter was convicted in state court on evidence illegally obtained by police prior to the Supreme Court decision concerning the Fourth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio. Mapp applied the exclusionary rule to state criminal proceedings, denying the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial. Linkletter argued for a retrial based on the Mapp decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Yazell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/10

10

1965

United States

Yazell

<p>After a flood, the Small Business Administration made a disaster loan to Ethel May Yazzel and her husband to cover damages to their shop. The mortgage securing the loan referred to Texas law. When the Yazzel's defaulted on the loan, the U.S. Government sued to collect the balance due. Mrs. Yazzel moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Texas law of coverture meant the contract was not enforceable against her personally. Under the law of coverture, a woman's legal rights are subsumed by her husband upon marriage. The Government argued that federal law, which would not recognize coverture, applied because there was an overwhelming federal interest. The district court granted summary judgment and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federalism

Kent v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/104

104

1965

Kent

United States

<p>Morris A. Kent Jr., a 16-year-old boy, was detained and interrogated by the police in connection with several incidents involving robbery and rape. After Kent admitted some involvement, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction. This allowed Kent to be tried as an adult. Kent was indicted in district court. Kent moved to dismiss the indictment because the juvenile court did not conduct a "full investigation" before waiving jurisdiction, as required by the Juvenile Court Act. A jury found Kent guilty and sentenced him to serve 30-90 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, although it noted that the juvenile court judge provided no reason for the waiver.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Graham v. John Deere Company of Kansas City

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/11

11

1965

Graham

John Deere Company of Kansas City

<p>Graham v. John Deere Co. was a suit for the infringement of a patent that consisted of a combination of old mechanical elements for a device designed to absorb shock from plow shanks in rocky soil in order to prevent damage to the plow. In 1955, the Fifth Circuit held the patent valid, ruling that a combination is patentable when it produces an "old result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way." Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held that, since there was no new result in the combination, the patent was invalid. The parties in Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 37) and Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chemical Co. (No. 43) sought a declaration of invalidity and noninfringement of a patent on finger-operated sprayers with a "hold-down" cap issued to Cook Chemical. The District Court and the Court of Appeals sustained the patent.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

United States v. Romano

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/2

2

1965

United States

Romano

<p>On the night of October 10, 1960, Internal Revenue Service agents, along with a state patrol officer, went to the site of the "Apinook Mill" in Jarrett City, Connecticut. Agents gained entrance to the grounds, smelled the distinctive odor of ground mash indicating the presence of a still, and visually confirmed the presence of a column still in building 9A. The federal agents then applied for a warrant, after noting that the Treasury Department had not registered the still in question. The warrant was granted on October 11th.</p> <p>On October 13th, federal agents entered building 9A by force after demanding entry and hearing no reply. They discovered an operating still inside, and found Frank Romano and John Ottiano standing nearby. Ottiano had the key to the facility on his person. Romano stated that he had been at the site for four days and claimed not to know how long the operation had existed.</p> <p>Section 5601(b)(1) of the Excise Tax Technical Changes Act of 1958 ("ETTCA"), established a presumption of guilt for anyone shown to be at the place or site of an unregistered still. Section 5601(b)(1) was an amendment to Section 5601(a)(1), which defines the crime of possessing an unregistered still.</p> <p>The United States charged Romano and Ottiano with three counts: possession of an illegal still, the illegal production of distilled spirits, and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Judge T. Emmet Clarie instructed the jury with a verbatim reading of the relevant provisions of the ETTCA. The jury found both men guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Romano and Ottiano to concurrent sentences on all three counts and fined them for possession of the unregistered still.</p> <p>Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed the sentences for possession and illegal production of spirits. He held that the trial court's application of Section 5601(b)(1) was an unconstitutional violation of Romano and Ottiano's Fifth Amendment due process rights. He reasoned that the inference of possession did not necessarily follow from a defendant's presence, given that the defendant could be a purchaser of the product or simply a visitor to the site.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

Time, Inc. v. Hill

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/22

22

1965

Time Inc.

James J. Hill

<p>In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

South Carolina v. Katzenbach

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/22_orig

22-orig

1965

South Carolina

Katzenbach

<p>The Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented states from using a "test or device" (such as literacy tests) to deny citizens the right to vote. Under the Attorney General's jurisdiction, federal examiners were empowered to intervene to investigate election irregularities.</p>

majority opinion

United States v. Standard Oil Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/291

291

1965

United States

Standard Oil Company

<p>Standard Oil of Kentucky was charged with violating the Rivers and Harbors Act after discharging 100-octane aviation gasoline into the St. Johns River. The gasoline was commercially valuable and was discharged into the St. Johns River because a dockside shut-off valve had been accidentally left open. Standard Oil moved for dismissal by arguing that the word “refuse” meant “rejected matter,” which the accidentally discharged gasoline was not. The district court agreed and granted dismissal. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

United States v. Ewell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/29

29

1965

United States

Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis

<p>Clarence Ewell and Ronald K. Dennis were indicted on federal narcotics charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The men pleaded guilty and were sentenced, but the court vacated the convictions based on an unrelated Seventh Circuit decision that held that an indictment that does not allege the drug purchasers name is invalid. A few months later Ewell and Dennis were rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. The complaints contained the same allegations from the original indictment, but named the drug purchasers. Ewell and Dennis moved to dismiss, arguing that their Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and their Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy were violated. The district court rejected the double jeopardy argument, but granted dismissal based on the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/3

3

1965

William Albertson, Roscoe Quincy Proctor

Subversive Activities Control Board

<p>On November 22, 1950, the Attorney General petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board for an order requiring the Communist Party to register under Section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (SACA) as a Communist-action organization. The Court sustained this order in <i>Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board</i>. On May 31, 1962, the Attorney General separately required William Albertson and Roscoe Quincy Proctor, as alleged members of the Communist Party, to fill out two registration forms each. Neither registration form was specifically mandated by the SACA.</p> <p>Albertson and Proctor did not provide personal information required by the forms, instead asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the board and denying that the Communist Party was a Communist-action organization. The Attorney General presented the testimony of paid Federal Bureau of Investigation informers that Albertson and Proctor participated in meetings of the Party and had been elected to Party offices. The board took official note of the proceedings and issued a final order stipulating that petitioners had not properly registered as members of the Communist Party. On appeal, the court held that Albertson and Proctor’s claims of privilege were premature in part because they had not yet been prosecuted for a criminal activity.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/368

368

1965

A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"

Attorney General of Massachusetts

<p>A special provision of Massachusetts law allowed the Attorney General to initiate legal proceedings against an "obscene" book, Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure. The book, also known as Fanny Hill, was written by John Cleland in about 1750. Massachusetts courts, despite the defenses put forward by the book's publisher and copyright holder, judged the work to be obscene.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Rosenblatt v. Baer

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/38

38

1965

Alfred D. Rosenblatt

Frank P. Baer

<p>Frank Baer sued Alfred Rosenblatt for libel based on allegedly defamatory statements Rosenblatt made in his editorial for the Laconia Evening Citizen regarding Baer’s performance as Supervisor of the Belknap County Recreation Area. The article questioned the ways that Baer, and the County Commissioners to whom he reported, failed to develop the Area to its full potential. A jury in New Hampshire Superior Court awarded Baer damages. In the time between the outcome of the trial and Rosenblatt’s appeal, the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan, where it held that a state cannot award damages to a public official for a defamatory falsehood unless the official proves that there was actual malice—knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The New Hampshire Supreme affirmed the award and found that New York Times v. Sullivan had no impact.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Leh v. General Petroleum Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/4

4

1965

Leh

General Petroleum Corporation

<p>The Clayton Antitrust Act ("Clayton Act") was enacted by Congress in 1914 to prevent anticompetitive practices in business. Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act halted the running of the statute of limitations on pending claims arising from the act. It also specified a four-year statute of limitations for these causes of action.</p> <p>On September 28, 1956, Marc D Leh brought an action against General Petroleum Corportation and five other petroleum manufacturers alleging injury to his business caused by a conspiracy or combination to exclude Leh from engaging in wholesale distribution of gasoline in Southern California. He alleged that this conspiracy began in 1948; all parties agreed that Leh's right to initiate a cause of action began in February of 1954. Leh anticipated a statute of limitations problem under California law, as California's Code of Civil Procedure specified a one-year statute of limitations for penal causes of action, in contrast to the Clayton Act's four-year limit. Hence, Leh cited to <em>United States v. Standard Oil</em>, in which the United States alleged a conspiracy to control prices among a nearly identical set of defendants and successfully applied the Clayton Act's longer limit.</p> <p>District court Judge William Mathes ruled in favor of General Petroleum, holding that the tripling of damages was a penalty, and was thus barred by the statute of limitations under California law. The court also held that the Clayton Act did not apply to the claim --distinguishing on the facts from <em>Standard Oil</em> -- primarily because Leh did not allege that the defendants combined to control prices, did not name the same set of defendants, and did not allege a similar period of conspiracy. Judge Stanley Barnes of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed. Judge Barnes affirmed the lower court's interpretation of California law, and that the application of the Clayton Act used in <em>Standard Oil</em> did not apply here because the facts were not similar enough to justify collateral estoppel.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Brown v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/41

41

1965

Brown

Louisiana

<p>The Audubon Regional library operated three branches and two bookmobiles. Blacks were not allowed to enter any of the branch libraries. The bookmobiles were segregated: a red one served only whites and a blue one served blacks. Brown was a black man who entered a library branch with four other blacks and requested a book, The Story of the Negro. The librarian informed Brown that the book was not available, but that she would request it through the state library, and he could pick it up or have it mailed to him. After the conversation, the men sat down (making no noise or disturbance) and refused to leave. They were arrested "for not leaving a public building when asked to do so by an officer."</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Ginzburg v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/42

42

1965

Ginzburg

United States

<p>Ralph Ginzburg and several of his associates were charged with violating a federal obscenity statute for mailing circulars about how and where three different obscene publications could be obtained. Ginzburg challenged his conviction as unconstitutional since the circulars themselves were not obscene. On appeal from an adverse ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding an unfavorable lower court finding, the Supreme Court granted Ginzburg certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/48

48

1965

Harper

Virginia Board of Elections

<p>Virginia resident Annie Harper could not pay the state-imposed poll tax of $1.50. She filed suit, alleging the poll tax deprived indigent Virginia residents of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The federal district court dismissed her claim, based in part on a 1937 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that had ruled poll taxes to be within the powers of the states. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Mishkin v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/49

49

1965

Edward Mishkin

New York

<p>On December 29, 1959, New York City police officers entered the Publishers Outlet, where they seized a number of books and magazines. On January 12, 1960, the police raided the basement below a printing shop belonging to Norman Levenberg. The police discovered, through Levenberg, that a number of books were kept for Edward Mishkin in a storage room. Also that day, officers entered Midget Book Shop, where they seized an additional number of books and magazines. On February 10, 1960, the police confiscated three books from the Main Stern Book Store. Levenberg later testified that Mishkin controlled all of the books, and that he operated both the Publishers’ Outlet and the Main Stern Book Store; officers indeed encountered Mishkin at both stores. In all, the police seized fifty books allegedly possessed by Mishkin.</p> <p>The seized books were paper-bound “pulps,” and most had jackets with illustrations relating to the fictional subject matter within. The covers of nineteen of the books displayed illustrations of women being whipped, beaten, tortured or abused. Most of the book jackets depicted symbols associated with fetishism, such as leather boots, excessively tight clothing, black gloves, whips, masks and corsets. Some presented incidents of sexual seduction, transvestism, sodomy, rape and masturbation.</p> <p>The state of New York charged Mishkin with multiple counts of possessing obscene books, of hiring others to prepare obscene books, and of publishing obscene books. At trial, authors who worked under Mishkin for several years testified that he instructed them to fill the books with strong sexual material. Mishkin was convicted before a three-judge panel of the Court of Special Sessions. He was sentenced to a three-year prison term and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines. The appellate court affirmed Mishkin’s sentence, modifying the judgment to remove charges related to Mishkin’s failure to print the name and address of the publisher or printer on the books; the court held the statute requiring this action to be unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment, holding that the New York law forbidding obscene material itself did not violate Mishkin’s constitutional rights and was not unconstitutionally vague.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Sheppard v. Maxwell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/490

490

1965

Sheppard

Maxwell

<p>After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. On appeal from an Ohio district court ruling supporting his claim, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. When Sheppard appealed again, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/5

5

1965

Fred L. Shuttlesworth

City of Birmingham

<p>On April 4, 1962, black citizens of Birmingham, Alabama were engaged in a boycott of downtown department stores; the Birmingham police -- including Patrolman Byars -- were aware of the boycott. At about 10:30 A.M., Byars observed a group of four to six people including noted activist Fred L. Shuttlesworth walking toward the intersection of 19th Street and Second Avenue, the location of the front entrance of Newberry’s Department Store. Byars walked through Newberry’s and through the front entrance, where he observed a group of ten or twelve people congregated in one area. They were standing and talking with Shuttlesworth apparently at the center of the conversation.</p> <p>Byars observed the group for a minute or so from inside Newberry’s, then left the store and told the group to move on and clear the sidewalk. Some of the group began to leave. Byars repeated his command, and Shuttlesworth asked, “You mean to say we can’t stand here on the sidewalk?” Three more officers arrived on the scene, and Byars told the group that they would have to clear the sidewalk or he would arrest them for obstructing its use. By this point, only Shuttlesworth remained at the scene. Shuttlesworth repeated his question, and Byars told him he was under arrest. Shuttlesworth then attempted to walk into Newberry’s, but Byars followed him in and arrested him. Shuttlesworth offered no resistence.</p> <p>On April 5, Shuttlesworth was tried in the recorder’s court of the city of Birmingham. The court charged him with obstructing free passage on the sidewalk and with refusing to comply with a police order to move on in violation of two sections of the Birmingham General City Code. He was sentenced to 180 days of hard labor and $100 fine and costs. He appealed for a trial de novo in the district court. Byars’ initially testified that the group’s presence impeded pedestrian traffic, but on cross-examination he testified that the group only blocked off about half the sidewalk. The court affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, rejecting his assertions that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, that the prosecution’s case was not supported by evidence, and that Shuttleworth’s conduct was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed Shuttlesworth’s conviction, holding the evidence sufficient to support the verdict. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Shuttlesworth’s applications for <i>certiorari</i> and rehearing.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Dennis v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/502

502

1965

Raymond Dennis et al.

United States

<p>Raymond Dennis and others were members of the Communist Party; they were also officers and members of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers. They filed false affidavits between 1949 and 1955 to satisfy the stipulations of 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which required all union officers to submit non-Communist affidavits. The union officials retained their Communist Party affiliations, filed the affidavits, and enabled the union to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board. The union officers were indicted by the United States District Court for conspiracy to fraudulently obtain the services of the National Labor Relations Board.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

United States v. Price

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/59

59

1965

United States

Cecil Ray Price

<p>On June 21, 1964 Cecil Ray Price, a sheriff’s deputy, detained three civil rights workers, Michael Henry Schwerner, James Earl Chaney, and Andrew Goodman, in the Neshoba County Jail, in Philadelphia, Mississippi. That night, Price released all three men from custody, and then drove his police cruiser to intercept them on Mississippi Highway 19. Price accosted the three men, placed them in his police car, and then drove them down an unpaved road. There Price and seventeen other men, including both local citizens and members of the Philadelphia, Mississippi Police Department, executed the three men and dumped their bodies in a construction site. All eighteen defendants were subsequently arrested and were indicted by a Grand Jury on January 15, 1965 for violating federal statutes. The first statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 241, dealt with criminal conspiracies. The second statute, 18 U.S.C.S. 242, criminalized anyone acting under the color of law from depriving any of the rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the charges for violating 18 U.S.C.S. 242 against the non-police officer defendants, claiming that the indictment did not state an actual offense against the United States. This appeal followed. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Harris v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/6

6

1965

Harris

United States

<p>Al Harris refused to answer questions before a grand jury on grounds of self-incrimination. Harris and the grand jury went before the District Court for the Southern District of New York where the judge told Harris he would receive immunity from prosecution that might arise from his statements. Harris again refused to answer, citing privilege. The judge then held Harris guilty of criminal contempt committed in the court's presence under rule 42(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Evans v. Newton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/61

61

1965

E. S. Evans, et al.

Charles E. Newton, et al.

<p>In his will, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon left a piece of real estate to the city of Macon in Georgia. He intended the land to be used as a park that only whites could access. The city, as the named trustee, created a board of managers to operate the park, and it eventually allowed African Americans to use it. Trying to effectuate the Senator's will, individual managers of the park sued to remove the city as trustee because it was constitutionally unable to enforce the racially restrictive component of the will. After the city complied and resigned as trustee, private trustees appointed by a state court resumed excluding African Americans. A group of African Americans then brought an action on the grounds that the racial exclusion still violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The state courts upheld the appointment of the private trustees. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

United States v. Guest

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/65

65

1965

United States

Herbert Guest et al.

<p>On July 11, 1964 Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn was shot and killed by three members of the Ku Klux Klan while driving home from Washington, D.C. The alleged shooters, James Lackey, Cecil Myers, and Howard Sims, were indicted but acquitted by an all-white jury. Following the acquittal, the three defendants were indicted on charges of conspiracy to threaten, abuse, and kill African Americans. Three alleged co-conspirators, Denver Phillips, George Turner, and Herbert Guest, were also charged. The U.S. Code defines criminal conspiracy as two or more individuals conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States." The indictment filed against the six alleged conspirators accused them of acting to deny African Americans full and equal enjoyment and utilization of goods and services, including access to state highways and free travel to and from Georgia on public streets. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that it did not allege a specific denial of rights under U.S. law. The district court agreed, and dismissed the indictment. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the indictment alleged, in part, a denial of rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Schmerber v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/658

658

1965

Schmerber

California

<p>Schmerber had been arrested for drunk driving while receiving treatment for injuries in a hospital. During his treatment, a police officer ordered a doctor to take a blood sample which indicated that Schmerber had been drunk while driving. The blood test was introduced as evidence in court and Schmerber was convicted.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Hanna Mining Company v. District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/7

7

1965

Hanna Mining Company

District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO

<p>Hanna Mining Company owned and operated a fleet of cargo vessels. While in negotiations for a new collecting bargaining agreement, several Hanna marine engineers expressed that they no longer wanted their union to represent them. Negotiations broke down, and the union picketed one of Hanna's ships. This made it impossible for workers to unload the ship. Hanna petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to stop the picketing. The NLRB dismissed the petition because the engineers were "supervisors" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and could therefore not be "employees." The NLRA does not protect supervisors. Hanna then filed charges with the NLRB under the NLRA, alleging that the union induced a work stoppage through improper secondary pressure and engaged in improper organizational picketing. The NLRB dismissed the charges because the NLRA did not apply to unions that represent supervisors, and the union's conduct did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing.</p> <p>Hanna sybsequently filed suit in the Wisconsin Circuit Court for Douglas County, requesting injunctive relief against further picketing and against any attempts by the union to force representation on Hanna's engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision because that while the picketing was illegal under Wisconsin State law, it arguably violated the NLRA and so fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federalism

United States v. Huck Manufacturing Co.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/8

8

1965

United States

Huck Manufacturing Co. and Townsend Co.

<p>Huck Manufacturing Company owned the patent for a certain type of lock bolt. Huck granted a license to Townsend Company to manufacture the lock bolt on the condition that Townsend sell those bolts at a price set by Huck. Huck granted no other licenses to manufacture its lock bolt patents. The United States filed a complaint against Huck and Townsend, alleging Sherman Act violations of conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade and monopolize interstate commerce in lock bolts. The district court ruled in favor of Huck and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p>

equally divided

affirmed

Miranda v. Arizona

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/759

759

1965

Miranda

Arizona

<p>This case represents the consolidation of four cases, in each of which the defendant confessed guilt after being subjected to a variety of interrogation techniques without being informed of his Fifth Amendment rights during an interrogation.</p> <p>On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested in his house and brought to the police station where he was questioned by police officers in connection with a kidnapping and rape. After two hours of interrogation, the police obtained a written confession from Miranda. The written confession was admitted into evidence at trial despite the objection of the defense attorney and the fact that the police officers admitted that they had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. The jury found Miranda guilty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed and held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated because he did not specifically request counsel.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Katzenbach v. Morgan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1965/847

847

1965

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General et al.

Morgan, et ux

<p>New York voters sought declaratory judgment in a New York federal district court to prevent compliance with Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That section provided that no person who successfully completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English. The plaintiffs argued that Section 4(e) prevented the enforcement of New York election laws which required an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court granted declaratory judgment and prevented enforcement of Section 4(e). It held that Congress exceeded its constitutionally designated powers in enacting Section 4(e) and usurped the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Klopfer v. North Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/100

100

1966

Peter H. Klopfer

North Carolina

<p>The State of North Carolina charged Peter Klopfer with criminal trespass when he participated in a civil rights demonstration at a restaurant. At trial, the jury could not reach a verdict. The Superior Court judge continued the case twice when the state moved for a nolle prosequi with leave. This would allow the state to suspend their prosecution indefinitely and return the case to the docket in the future. Klopfer objected, arguing that the motion violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, but the judge granted the state’s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, holding that the right to a speedy trial does not include the right to compel the state to prosecute.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/105

105

1966

Henry Keyishian, et al.

Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, et al.

<p>Harry Keyishian and other faculty of the University of Buffalo became state employees in 1962, when the University of Buffalo was merged into the State University of New York system. As state employees, Keyishian and the other faculty members were subject to statutes and administrative regulations meant to prevent the appointment and continued employment of “subversive persons.” Because the appellants refused to sign a statement declaring that they were not Communists and had never been Communists, they were subject to dismissal and/or non-renewal of contract. The appellants sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and argued that the program of statutes and regulations violate the Constitution. A three-judge federal court upheld the constitutionality of the program.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Canada Packers, Ltd. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/11

11

1966

Canada Packers, Ltd.

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., et al.

<p>Several American railroad companies delivered 131 cars of potash from New Mexico to Canada Packers’ plants in Canada. Canada Packers agreed to, and paid, a joint through international rate for the shipment. Later, Canada Packers’ sued the railroads for reparations citing the international rate as unreasonable. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) ordered the railroads to pay reparations to make up for the unreasonably low original payment. The railroads refused to pay for the part of the journey that took place in Canada, arguing that the ICC had no authority to regulate shipping rates outside the U.S.A. The district court ruled in favor of Canada Packers and the court of appeals reversed.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Judicial Power

In re Gault

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/116

116

1966

Gault

Arizona

<p>Gerald Francis Gault, fifteen years old, was taken into custody for allegedly making an obscene phone call. Gault had previously been placed on probation. The police did not leave notice with Gault's parents, who were at work, when the youth was arrested. After proceedings before a juvenile court judge, Gault was committed to the State Industrial School until he reached the age of 21.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Garrity v. New Jersey

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/13

13

1966

Edward J. Garrity, et al.

State of New Jersey

<p>The Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the Attorney General to investigate alleged irregularities in the handling of cases in the municipal courts of certain boroughs. As part of that investigation, police officers were brought in for questioning. They were told that anything they said might be used against them in a state criminal proceeding and that they could refuse to answer, but such refusal might be grounds for dismissal. The appellants represent a group of police officers who answered the questions and were charged with conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants were convicted and they appealed by arguing that their statements were coerced by the threat of the loss of employment. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the convictions.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Adderley v. Florida

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/19

19

1966

Adderley

Florida

<p>Harriet Louise Adderley and a group of approximately 200 others assembled in a non-public jail driveway to protest the arrests of fellow students and the state and local policies of racial segregation which included segregation in jails. Adderley and thirty-one others were convicted in a Florida court on a charge of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent" for their refusal to leave the driveway when requested to do so.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Gilbert v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/223

223

1966

Jesse James Gilbert

California

<p>Jesse James Gilbert was charged with armed robbery and the murder of a police officer in Alhambra, California. Gilbert refused to answer questions about the robbery charge without the advice of counsel, but later answered questions about a robbery in which the robber, allegedly Gilbert, used a handwritten note demanding the money. He gave the police handwriting exemplars, which were later admitted into evidence. The police also had eyewitnesses identify Gilbert in a line-up that was conducted without notice to his counsel. During the trial, several witnesses identified Gilbert in the courtroom as being a part of multiple robberies, including the Alhambra robbery. No distinction was made as to whether the in-court identifications were independent of the illegal line-ups that occurred before the trial. The jury rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed. </p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Walker v. City of Birmingham

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/249

249

1966

Walker

City of Birmingham

<p>Civil rights activists who planned to march on Good Friday and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated their intention to march anyway, Birmingham obtained an injunction from a state court which ordered them to refrain from demonstrating. Marchers who defied the order, including Martin Luther King, Jr. and Ralph Abernathy, were arrested.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/25

25

1966

United States

Arnold Schwinn & Co., Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association

<p>The United States brought an antitrust action against Arnold, Schwinn &amp; Co. and its distributor Schwinn Cycle Distributors Association. Arnold only allowed distributors to sell its products to approved dealers. The United States complaint attached this practice as an unlawful restraint on trade. The district court held that this practice was unlawful as to sales from distributors to dealers, but allowed for sales directly from Arnold to dealers. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Stovall v. Denno

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/254

254

1966

Theodore Stovall

Wilfred Denno, Warden

<p>On August 23, 1961, Dr. Paul Berheldt was stabbed to death in the kitchen of his home. His wife was also injured in the attack. The next day, Theodore Stovall was arrested for the murder and promptly arraigned, but he did not yet have counsel. On August 25, although Stovall had still not retained counsel, police brought him to the hospital room where Mrs. Berheldt’s was recovering from surgery to see if she could identify him. Stovall was the only African-American man in the room and was handcuffed to a police officer. Mrs. Berheldt positively identified him after he was directed to say a few words for voice identification purposes. The prosecution used this identification as evidence in the trial, and Mrs. Berheldt again identified Stovall in court.</p> <p>Stovall was convicted, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Stovall sought habeas corpus relief in district court on the grounds that Mrs. Berheldt’s identification was inadmissible. The district court dismissed after hearing argument on an unrelated issue. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. </p> <p>In 1967, the Court issued rulings in <i>United States v. Wade</i> and <i>Gilbert v. California</i> that excluded identification evidence from trial when identification came from a tainted lineup — one at which the defendants did not have counsel present.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Osborn v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/29

29

1966

Z. T. Osborn

United States

<p>At attorney Z.T. Osborn’s trial for attempting to bribe a juror in a federal criminal trial, the judge admitted a tape recording of an incriminating conversation between Osborn and a local police officer. The officer recorded the conversation secretly under authorization of the court. Osborn argued that the recording violated his right to privacy and he was entrapped. A jury convicted Osborn and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Redrup v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/3

3

1966

Redrup

New York

<p>Robert Redrup was a newsstand clerk at Times Square in New York, New York. In 1965, he sold copies of two pulp sex novels to a plainclothes police officer. New York City's criminal court tried and convicted Redrup for selling obscene material under New York Penal Law. The Supreme Court of New York affirmed. Harlan Publishing, the producers of the allegedly obscene material, supported Redrup throughout his appeal.</p> <p>William Austin owned a retail bookstore and newsstand in Paducah, Kentucky. A woman purchased two magazines from a salesperson in Austin's store, asking for them by name –High Heels and Spree. Austin was tried and convicted of distributing obscene materials under Kentucky law. In a <em>per curiam</em> decision with one dissent, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled Austin's appeal, finding no error in the trial.</p> <p>Gent, Swank, Modern Man, Bachelor, Cavalcade, Gentleman, Ace and Sir, were allegedly obscene magazines distributed by W.E. Burnham in Jefferson County, Arkansas. The Jefferson chancery court found the magazines to be obscene under an Arkansas anti-obscenity law and enjoined their distribution. The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld this ruling despite admitting error in jury selection and instruction. Writing for the majority with two dissents, Chief Justice Carleton Harris argued that the magazines violated the contemporary community values of Jefferson County, but that one magazine was entitled to appeal the ruling."</p>

per curiam

reversed

First Amendment

Hoffa v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/32

32

1966

James R. Hoffa

United States

<p>These are several consolidated cases involving similar circumstances. In the lead case, a district court in Tennessee tried and convicted James Hoffa, the president of a labor union, for attempting to bribe members of a jury in an earlier trial. A paid government informer provided substantial evidence in the bribery trial. The informer was another local union officer who met with Hoffa on several occasions during the first trial. At that time, the government had not hired the officer as an informant. Hoffa alleged that the evidence gathered from this informer violated his Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Wade

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/334

334

1966

United States

Billy Joe Wade

<p>Billy Joe Wade was arrested and indicted for robbing a federally-insured bank. Without giving notice to Wade’s counsel, an FBI officer set up a lineup for two bank employees including Wade and several other prisoners. The officer had each prisoner put strips of tape on their face and say, “Put the money in the bag,” like the robbers did. The employees identified Wade as the robber. At trial, the employees identified him again. Wade’s counsel moved to strike the identifications because the lineup violated Wade’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/37

37

1966

Curtis Publishing Company

Wallace Butts

<p>In <em>New York Times Co. v. Sullivan</em> (1964) the Court held that public officials in libel cases must show that a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." These two cases concern libel as it pertains to public figures who are not public officials. <em>Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts</em> concerns an article published in the March 23, 1963 edition of <em>The Saturday Evening Post</em> alleging that former University of Georgia football coach Wallace Butts conspired with University of Alabama coach Paul "Bear" Bryant to fix a 1962 football game in Alabama's favor. The article's source was George Burnett, an Atlanta insurance salesman who had allegedly overheard a telephone conversation between the coaches. Butts brought and won a libel suit against Curtis Publishing, owner of the periodical. Soon after the Court's ruling in <em>New York Times</em>, Curtis moved for a new trial. The trial judge rejected the argument because Butts was not a public official. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision on the basis that Curtis had waived any constitutional challenges by not raising such questions at trial. <em>Associated Press v. Walker</em> concerns dispatch reports of rioting that occurred on the campus of the University of Mississippi on September 30, 1962. The dispatches, authored by a correspondent on the scene, reported that Edwin A. Walker, a private citizen and political activist, had personally led a violent crowd attempting to prevent federal marshals from enforcing the court-ordered enrollment of an African-American. Walker denied the report, and filed a libel suit in the state courts of Texas. A jury found in Walker's favor, but the judge in the case refused to award punitive damages, finding that there was no malicious intent. The judge also specifically noted that <em>New York Times</em> was inapplicable. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court of Texas declined to hear the case.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/39

39

1966

Abbott Laboratories

Gardner

<p>In 1962, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA") to require manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the "established name" of the drug "prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designation for such drug," on labels and other printed material. The purpose of this amendment was to alert doctors and patients about identical drugs that sold under separate names at different prices.</p> <p>The act delegated authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to publish proposed regulations designed to implement the statute. The Commissioner, George P. Larrick, published regulations mandating that drug manufacturers print the established drug name every time its corresponding proprietary name is used.</p> <p>Abbott Laboratories brought suit against Anthony J. Celebrezze, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and Larrick under the Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA") and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Abbott Laboratories argued that the "every time" rule was outside of the scope of the authority given to the commissioner by Congress.</p> <p>Chief Judge Caleb M. Wright of the district court granted the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by Abbott Labs, finding that the FFDCA did not permit the Commissioner's "every time" interpretation. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, reversed without touching upon the interpretation question. District court Judge Weber, writing for a unanimous court, held that Abbott Labs could not challenge the commissioner's rule under the DJA or APA. Abbott Laboratories and 37 other drug manufacturers appealed the decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Loving v. Virginia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/395

395

1966

Loving et ux.

Virginia

<p>In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/4

4

1966

Cascade Natural Gas Corporation

El Paso National Gas Co., United States, Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp.

<p>In an antitrust suit, the U.S. Supreme Court directed the district court to order El Paso National Gas Co. to divest itself of all Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. stock. Several competing gas companies attempted to intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but the district court denied the motions. The district court approved El Paso’s divestiture plan, under which El Paso would create a new company to receive all of the Pacific Northwest assets. The gas companies again attempted to intervene, arguing that the divestiture plan would not create a valid competitor. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Afroyim v. Rusk

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/456

456

1966

Afroyim

Rusk

<p>After immigrating to the United States from Poland in 1912, Beys Afroyim became a naturalized American citizen in 1926. In 1950, Afroyim went to Israel where he voted in that country's 1951 governmental elections. In 1960, Afroyim applied for renewal a of his American passport. The State Department informed him that he had forfeited his American citizenship by virtue of Section 401(e) of the 1940 Nationality Act which stipulates that citizens of the United States shall "lose" their citizenship upon voting in a foreign state's political elections. Afroyim challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(e). On appeal from a district court's summary judgment favoring Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Afroyim certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Warden v. Hayden

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/480

480

1966

Warden, Maryland Penitentiary

Bennie Joe Hayden

<p>Around 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber took $363 from the premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland and fled on foot. Two cab drivers were attracted by the yelling and followed the suspect onto Cocoa Lane. One of the cab drivers radioed the company dispatcher a description of the suspect including clothes, which the dispatcher passed on to the police. When the police arrived at the Hayden residence, Mrs. Hayden allowed them to search the house without a warrant. The police found Bennie Joe Hayden in an upstairs bedroom and no one else in the house. They also found a set of clothes matching the description given by the cab driver in the washing machine, as well as a shotgun and a pistol in a flush tank. Ammunition for both weapons was discovered in Hayden’s room.</p> <p>Hayden was charged with armed robbery and tried in front of a court sitting without a jury. The clothing and the weapons were admitted into evidence at trial without objection, and Hayden was convicted. Hayden sought habeas corpus relief in district court, which was denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas corpus and held that the search was valid but that the clothing had “evidential value only” and was improperly admitted into evidence at trial.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Spevack v. Klein

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/62

62

1966

Samuel Spevack

Solomon A. Klein

<p>The New York Bar charged Samuel Spevack, an attorney from New York, with professional misconduct because he refused to produce financial records and testify at a judicial inquiry. In his defense, Spevack claimed his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and stated that the records and testimony would tend to incriminate him. The New York appellate court rejected Spevack's defense and ordered Spevack disbarred, holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not available to attorneys against states.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Washington v. Texas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/649

649

1966

Jackie Washington

Texas

<p>Following a jury trial, Jackie Washington was convicted of murder and sentenced to 50 years in prison. At trial, Washington alleged that Charles Fuller, already convicted for the same murder, actually shot the victim while Washington attempted to stop the shooting. Washington claimed that Fuller would testify to these facts, but the prosecution objected based on a state statute that prevented persons charged in the same crime from testifying on behalf of one another. Washington argued that refusing to allow Fuller to testify violated his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining a witness in his favor. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Berenyi v. Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/66

66

1966

Kalman J. Berenyi

District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service

<p>Kalman Berenyi applied for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. After a hearing, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the application, finding that Berenyi gave false testimony to facilitate his naturalization, so he was not a person of “good moral character.” In Berenyi’s application, he denied membership in the Communist Party, but two witnesses testified that Berenyi often spoke of his Party membership and lead a study group on Marxist-Leninist ideology. Berenyi appealed, arguing that the government failed to show that he had a “meaningful association” with the Communist Party. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Travis v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/67

67

1966

Helen Maxine Levi Travis

United States

<p>This is a companion case to <em>United States v. Laub</em>, 385 U.S. 475. Helen Travis was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California of traveling to Cuba on two occasions without a valid passport in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Travis’ passport admittedly was not endorsed for travel to Cuba, the U.S. government did not allege, or provide proof, that she did not have a valid passport for general international travel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

United States v. Robel

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/8

8

1967

United States

Eugene Frank Robel

<p>Eugene Robel, a member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he remained an employee at the Todd Pacific Shipyards. Under the Act, it was illegal for a member of the Party to remain employed at a location that the Secretary of Defense names as a “defense facility”. The district court dismissed the indictment because it did not allege that Robel was an active member of the Communist Party. The district court felt that this provision of the Act violated the First Amendment right to association if it applied to inactive Party members. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified the case for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Parker v. Gladden

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/81

81

1966

Lee E. A. Parker

Clarence T. Gladden

<p>On May 19, 1961, the Multnomah County Circuit Court convicted Lee E. A. Parker of second-degree murder and sentenced him to the Oregon State Penitentiary for a potential maximum of the remainder of his life. The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed his conviction, and denied a rehearing on October 8, 1963. During the trial, the bailiff stated to Mrs. Gattman, an alternate juror, “Oh, that wicked fellow, he is guilty.” Misses Inwards and Drake, both regular jurors, overheard this statement. Parker was not aware of these statements during the trial, and consequently did not bring them to the attention of the court.</p> <p>After the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, Parker gave his wife a tape recording and asked her to contact members of the jury to find new grounds for setting aside his conviction. Mrs. Parker secured the names of the jurors and contacted three, Misses Inwards, Drake and Gattman. Mrs. Gattman was an alternate juror who expressed her displeasure with the verdict to Mrs. Parker. Mrs. Inwards gave conflicting testimony in an affidavit; she initially testified that the bailiffs’ statements did not influence her testimony, but later stated that the remarks could have affected her decision. Mrs. Gattman was the only juror who was sure of the bailiffs’ statements, and later admitted that she was disturbed by the verdict. Mrs. Drake gave an account of the bailiff’s statements that conflicted with Mrs. Gattman’s.</p> <p>Parker filed for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction trial court held that the trial court would have granted a new trial if it had been aware of the bailiff’s statements. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erroneously applied the statutory standard for judging a motion for a new trial under the Oregon Post Conviction Act. It also held that the bailiff’s statements did not violate Parker’s state or federal constitutional rights.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Sealy, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/9

9

1966

United States

Sealy, Inc.

<p>Until about 1920, the Sealy Mattress Company was the sole manufacturer of Sealy products at its four factories in the Midwest and Southwest. By 1923, however, some 19 independent factories operated under Sealy licenses. Soon thereafter, these licensees and new owner E. E. Edwards formed the Sealy Corporation. Sealy continued to license the use of the Sealy mark to independent stock-holding bedding manufacturers.</p> <p>In 1925, the licensees agreed on a system of allocating exclusive territories to market Sealy products. Each manufacturer had an exclusive territory in his license contract; this contract prohibited each manufacturer from selling outside of that territory. Around this time, the licensee-stockholders and Sealy began collaborating to fix and police the minimum and maximum prices charged by retailers of Sealy products, the advertised prices of Sealy products, and the means of inducing retailers to adhere to these prices. In 1933, Sealy Corporation reorganized into Sealy, Incorporated. Sealy, Inc. made a new provision that any new manufacturers coming into the organization must purchase Sealy stock. In the 1940’s, Sealy’s business increased and many new licensees joined to cover previously open territories.</p> <p>The Sherman Act provided that every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce was illegal. The United States brought a civil action against Sealy, Inc. charging that it violated the Sherman Act by setting minimum retail prices and by forcing retailers to adhere to those prices. It also alleged that Sealy, Inc.’s exclusive territorial arrangements violated the Sherman Act. The district court held that Sealy, Inc.’s price fixing violated the Sherman Act, but that its territorial arrangements did not. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on the legality of Sealy, Inc.’s licensing structure.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/92

92

1966

Roland Camara

Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco

<p>An inspector from the Department of Public Health of San Francisco asked Roland Camara to be allowed to search his residence. The inspector claimed that the occupancy permit for the property did not allow residential use of the first floor. The search was a routine annual inspection. Camara refused to let the inspector enter the building without a warrant. The inspector returned two more times without a warrant, and Camara turned him away. About a month after the first visit, Camara was arrested and charged with violation of the San Francisco Housing Code (SFHC) for refusing to allow the inspection. Camara sought a writ of prohibition, arguing that the section of the SFHC that authorized the inspection violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Superior Court of California denied the writ, the District Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Witherspoon v. Illinois

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/1015

1015

1967

Witherspoon

Illinois

<p>Witherspoon was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a jury in Illinois. An Illinois statute provides grounds for the dismissal of any juror with "conscientious scruples" against capital punishment. At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment. The prosecution did not find out if most of the jurors dismissed would necessarily vote against capital punishment.</p> <p>Witherspoon appealed, alleging that the dismissal of prospective jurors with qualms about capital punishment violated his Sixth Amendment right to an "impartial jury" and 14th Amendment right to due process. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that no constitutional violation took place.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Chapman v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1966/95

95

1966

Ruth Elizabeth Chapman, Thomas LeRoy Teale

California

<p>On October 17, 1962, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale registered at a motel in Fresno, California. At approximately 2:00 A.M. the following day, Chapman and Teale appeared at the Spot Club in Lodi. The only persons at the bar were Teale, Chapman, and the club’s bartender, Billy Dean Adcock. A short time later, a witness observed three persons in front of the Spot Club: a woman of Chapman’s general description and Adcock stood in front of the club’s door, while a man resembling Teale stood behind Adcock while he apparently locked the door.</p> <p>The next day, the Spot Club’s owner found the club in disarray; someone had broken into the cash register and approximately $260 was missing. Routine housekeeping tasks normally performed by Adcock were left undone. Later, Adcock body’s was found in a remote area north of Lodi, half buried in an open roadside ditch. The time of death was approximately 3:00 AM on October 18th. Adcock was shot three times in the head. The bullets were fired from a .22 caliber weapon similar to one purchased by Chapman while with Teale in Reno, Nevada, six days before the killing. The gun was not found.</p> <p>Officers arrested Teale in New Orleans on November 2, 1962. He carried a gun purchased the same day as Chapman’s .22 caliber weapon. An agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Chapman in St. Joseph, Missouri on October 26, 1962. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts on October 17 and 18, but a registration card from October 18 for occupancy of a motel room in Woodland, California was made out in her handwriting.</p> <p>Chapman and Teale were charged with the first degree murder of Adcock. A prisoner locked up with Teale testified that Teale did not plan on killing Adcock, but when Chapman and Teale released Adcock from their car outside of Lodi, Chapman shot him once in the back of the head and twice more when he was on the ground. Neither defendant appeared as a witness, but Chapman’s conflicting testimony was introduced by direct examination of the FBI agent. The trial court instructed the jury that they could draw adverse conclusions from the defendants’ failure to testify. The jury convicted both defendants of first degree murder. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court held in <i>Griffin v. State of California</i> that California’s practice of allowing prosecutors to use defendants’ silence against them violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, however, the California Supreme Court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction was a harmless error because it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Bumper v. North Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/1016

1016

1967

Wayne Darnell Bumper

North Carolina

<p>Wayne Darnell Bumper was investigated and eventually arrested on charges of rape and felonious assault. During the investigation, police officials searched the home of Mrs. Hattie Leath, Bumper’s grandmother, with whom he was living at the time. Leath consented to a search of her home, but only after the police officials informed her they had a warrant, which they did not actually have. The officers found a rifle that was later introduced into evidence at Bumper’s trial. The trial court allowed the rifle to be entered into evidence because it held that Leath had consented to the search. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Wainwright v. City of New Orleans

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/13

13

1967

Wainwright

City of New Orleans

<p>On October 12, 1964, Wainwright, a student at Tulane University Law School, was out walking around midnight. Two New Orleans Police Department officers stopped him because, in their opinion, he fitted the description of a man suspected of murder. Wainwright told the officers he had identification at home, but not on his person. The officers then asked Wainwright to remove this jacket so that they could search him for a tattoo that the suspected murdered had on his left arm. Wainwright ultimately refused to do so after trying to walk away and some mild verbal sparing. The officers then arrested him on a charge of vagrancy by loitering and frisked him. After Wainwright continued to refuse to remove his jacket at the police station, officers used force to remove it and discovered that he had no tattoo.</p>

per curiam

Criminal Procedure

Alderman v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/133

133

1967

Willie Israel Alderman

United States

<p>The petitioners were convicted of illegally passing national defense information to the Soviet Union; their cases were affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a petition for rehearing, the petitioners claimed that the government had relied on illegally obtained eavesdropping evidence to convict. The Court granted a rehearing and in a per curiam opinion vacated the appellate court judgment and remanded the case to the federal trial court for a rehearing.</p> <p>The United States sought to modify the Supreme Court's order, urging that the eavesdropping evidence should be reviewed <em>in camera</em> by the trial judge who would then transmit only relevant evidence to the parties. The petitioners argued their opposition to the motion in the 1967 Term. The matter was reargued in the 1968 Term.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Mempa v. Rhay

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/16

16

1967

Jerry Douglas Mempa

B. J. Rhay

<p>Jerry Douglas Mempa pleaded guilty to joyriding, and he was placed on probation for two years and the imposition of his sentence was deferred. Four months later, the county prosecutor moved to revoke Mempa’s probation based on his involvement in a burglary. During the revocation hearing, Mempa was not represented by counsel, nor was he asked if he wished to have counsel appointed for him. Mempa pled guilty to the burglary charge, and the court revoked Mempa’s probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. Mempa petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus and claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the proceedings revoking his probation. The Washington Supreme Court denied his petition.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Marchetti v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/2

2

1967

James Marchetti

United States

<p>A Connecticut district court convicted James Marchetti of willfully failing to register and pay an occupational tax for accepting wagers. Gambling and accepting wagers was illegal in Connecticut. Marchetti unsuccessfully attempted to arrest the judgment. He argued that the requirements to register and pay the tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/23

23

1967

First National Bank of Arizona

Cities Service Company

<p>Gerald Waldron filed an anti-trust action against Cities Service Co. and six other large oil companies. Waldron sought treble damages alleging a conspiracy by the oil companies to boycott Iranian oil. The trial judge limited Waldron’s discovery to depositions of certain Cities employees. After an extended period of depositions, the trial judge granted Cities summary judgment because there was no material evidence that Cities took any part in the conspiracy. The court denied Waldron’s motion of additional discovery because the court felt it would be a fishing expedition and constitute harassment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

United States v. O'Brien

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/232

232

1967

United States

O'Brien

<p>David O'Brien burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse. He said he was expressing his opposition to war. He was convicted under a federal law that made the destruction or mutilation of drafts card a crime.</p>

majority opinion

vacated

First Amendment

Watts v. Seward School Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/325

325

1967

James A. Watts, et al.

Seward School Board, et al.

<p>James A. Watts, a schoolteacher in Alaska, held private conversations with other teachers to obtain their support to remove the superintendent from his position. His further language included words to the effect of ‘we are unable to get rid of the superintendent, so let’s get rid of the school board.’ The Seward School Board considered Watts' conduct to be “immoral,” defined as “conduct of the person tending to bring the individual concerned or the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect” under the relevant Alaska statute, so Watts was dismissed from his teaching job.</p> <p>Watts' dismissal was upheld in both the Alaska Superior Court and the Alaska Supreme Court. The Alaska Supreme Court held that Watts' conduct “had a tendency to bring the teaching profession into public disgrace or disrespect.” Watts then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and argued that his dismissal violated his First Amendment right because the school board was attempting to limit his freedom of political speech. He also argued a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right because he should have the same equal protection for expression as any other private individual. After Watts filed his petition, Alaska amended the relevant state statute to reflect the rights of teachers to comment and criticize school administrators just as any private individual would have the right to do. Under the amended statute, Watts would not have been dismissed from his job.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Katz v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/35

35

1967

Katz

United States

<p>Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting gambling information over the phone to clients in other states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the phone booth itself. The Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/40

40

1967

Edward J. Hardin, Mayor of Tazewell, Tennessee, Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, Tennessee Valley Authority

Kentucky Utilities Company

<p>Dixie Power and Light Company provided service to several locations in Claiborne County, Tennesee, including the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell. Kentucky Utilities Company (KU) held a non-exclusive county franchise to occupy county roads. In 1954, Dixie Power and Light transferred its assets to KU and dissolved, giving KU control over the vast majority of the market in Tazewell and New Tazewell.</p> <p>The Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as amended in 1959, barred the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from expanding its sales outside the area for which the TVA or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957. On that date, the area of Claiborne County had 3,564 users of TVA power compared to 1,839 users of KU power; the towns of Tazewell and New Tazewell, however, had 28 TVA users and 561 KU users. KU’s retail rates for electricity in the towns were approximately two-and-one-half times higher than those offered by TVA. Citizens in Tazewell and New Tazewell responded to this rate disparity by demanding access to the TVA’s cheaper power. After three years of complaints, planning and consultations, the towns’ governments contracted to hook up a new municipal system to TVA’s power grid.</p> <p>KU filed suit against TVA, the mayors of Tazewell and New Tazewell, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor. KU charged the defendants with conspiracy to destroy its business in Tazewell and asked the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system. Shortly before trial, the TVA Board of Directors determined that TVA was the primary source of power for Claiborne County on July 1, 1957, and that Claiborne County was the relevant area for the purposes of the act. The district court upheld the board’s decision, but the Sixth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed. Comparing the number of customers served by KU and TVA in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the Sixth Circuit held that the two towns and KU’s original county road corridor were an ‘area’ for the purposes of the act and that TVA was barred from extending its service to that area.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Umans v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/41

41

1967

Sam Umans

United States

<p>Sam Umans was a certified public accountant. Between 1959 and 1961, the Internal Revenue Service audited six couples represented by Umans. According to Louis R. Deitsch, an IRS employee, Umans approached Deitsch before each audit to “work something out together on it”. They agreed upon a disallowance for each audit and Umans gave Deitsch an envelope containing $50 for each case. Five other IRS employees described similar transactions between the years 1961 and 1963, wherein smaller disallowances were given during audits followed by cash payments to the auditing IRS employees.</p> <p>Umans and the six IRS employees, including Deitsch, were indicted in August 1964. Umans was charged with aiding and abetting IRS employees in receiving illegal fees. He was also charged with giving money to government officials. On March 25, 1965, Umans and the six IRS employees were re-indicted. The grand jury additionally charged Umans with giving money to government officials with the intent to influence their actions. The evidence before the grand jury consisted solely of an IRS agent summarizing statements made by witnesses who would later testify at Umans’ trial. At trial, Umans requested access to statements made by the IRS employees that they took bribes from persons other than Umans; the court denied this request and sealed the documents in question. The government’s case was based almost entirely on the testimonies of three of the IRS employees, including that of Deitsch.</p> <p>Judge Sterry R. Waterman, writing for a unanimous United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the intent element of Umans’ charge for aiding and abetting IRS employees, but that this instruction was not in plain error. He held that the instruction was not sufficiently prejudicial, noting that it was not objected to at trial. Judge Waterman did, however, reverse the sentence for giving money to officials, holding that this sentence could not be concurrent with the sentence for giving money to officials with intent to influence their actions. He noted that the charges were identical but for the higher requirement of proof in the latter charge. Looking to the statute itself, Judge Waterman determined that Congress intended to make the charge for giving money to officials a lesser, included offense.</p> <p>Judge Waterman held that the trial court properly excluded the IRS employees’ statements about taking bribes from other persons from the record. He reasoned that it would have been within the court’s discretion to prevent Umans from cross-examining the IRS employees on this subject for impeachment purposes, as the government did not broach the subject during the employees’ direct examination. Judge Waterman also held that the government properly indicted Umans with hearsay evidence, holding that this evidence was competent. He dismissed Umans’ concerns about inconsistencies between the evidence presented to the grand jury and evidence presented at trial. He noted that Umans had access to affadavits used by the government to indict him; thus, he could have objected to any inconsistencies at trial, but did not do so.</p>

per curiam

Judicial Power

Flast v. Cohen

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/416

416

1967

Flast

Cohen

<p>Florence Flast and a group of taxpayers challenged federal legislation that financed the purchase of secular textbooks for use in religious schools. Flast argued that such use of tax money violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A district court held that the federal courts should defer when confronted with taxpayer suits directed against federal spending programs.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Powell v. Texas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/405

405

1967

Leroy Powell

Texas

<p>Police arrested Leroy Powell for public intoxication. He was tried, convicted, and fined $20 in the Corporation Court of Austin Texas. On appeal, Powell argued that criminal punishment for public intoxication is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, because he had chronic alcoholism. Under this theory, he appeared in public drunk as a compulsive symptom of the disease, not his own choice. The County court of Travis County held that alcoholism is not a defense to the charge and affirmed the conviction.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Duncan v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/410

410

1967

Duncan

Louisiana

<p>Gary Duncan, a black teenager in Louisiana, was found guilty of assaulting a white youth by allegedly slapping him on the elbow. Duncan was sentenced to 60 days in prison and fined $150. Duncan's request for a jury trial was denied.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Ginsberg v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/47

47

1967

Ginsberg

New York

<p>Sam Ginsberg and his wife operated “Sam’s Stationary and Luncheonette” in Bellmore on Long Island in New York. They had a lunch counter that sold magazines, including some so-called “girlie” magazines. On October 18, 1965, a sixteen-year-old boy entered the store and purchased copies of “Sir” and “Mr. Annual”; the purchase was instigated by the boy’s parents to lay the grounds for Ginsberg’s prosecution. On October 26, 1965, Ginsberg sold the same minor copies of “Man to Man” and “Escapade” at the instigation of a police officer. All of the magazines in question contained pictures of nudes, and “Escapade” and “Mr. Annual” contained verbal descriptions and narrative accounts of sexual excitement and sexual conduct.</p> <p>Section 484-h of New York’s Penal Law prohibited the sale to persons under seventeen years of age of 1) pictures of nudity or sexual conduct or 2) literature containing narrative accounts or sexual excitement, if these materials were “harmful to minors.” It defined “harmful to minors” as that quality of any description or representation of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse that 1) predominantly appealed to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, 2) was patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what was suitable material for minors, and 3) was utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.</p> <p>Ginsberg was tried before a judge without a jury in Nassau County District Court and was found guilty on two counts of violating Section 484-h. The Appellate Term, Second Department of the New York Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Pickering v. Board of Education

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/510

510

1967

Marvin L. Pickering

Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County

<p>Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor at the Lockport Herald complaining about a recently defeated school board proposal to increase school taxes. The letter complained about the board’s handling of past proposals and allocation of funds favoring athletics over academics. The school board felt the letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools” and opted to terminate Pickering’s employment. Pickering sued in the Circuit Court of Will County alleging his letter was speech protected under the First Amendment. The court ruled in favor of the school board and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment