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2,800 | 62,165 | Green v. Brennan | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-613 | 14-613 | 2015 | Marvin Green | Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General | <p>Marvin Green began working for the United States Postal Service in 1973. In 2002, he became the postmaster at the Englewood, Colorado, post office. In 2008, a postmaster position opened in Boulder, and Green applied but did not receive the position. He filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) charge regarding the denial of his application, and the charge was settled. In 2009, Green filed an informal EEO charge and alleged that his supervisor and supervisor’s replacement had been retaliating against him for his prior EEO activity. Throughout that year, Green was subject to internal Postal Service investigations including a threat of criminal prosecution. He ultimately signed an agreement that he would immediately give up his position and either retire or accept a much lower paying position. Green chose to retire and filed subsequent charges with the EEO Office, which dismissed his claim. Green then sued in district court and alleged, among other claims, that he had been constructively discharged. The district court held that Green’s constructive discharge claim was barred because he did not contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of signing the agreement, which was the last allegedly discriminatory act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,300 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,801 | 62,168 | Evenwel v. Abbott | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-940 | 14-940 | 2015 | Sue Evenwel, et al. | Greg Abbott, Governor of Texas, et al. | <p>The Texas Constitution requires that the state legislature reapportion its senate districts during the first regular session after every federal census. After the 2010 census, the legislature created a redistricting plan that was signed into law. However, a three-judge panel of the federal district court found that there was a substantial claim that this redistricting plan violated the Voting Rights Act and issued an interim plan for the 2012 primary elections that was subsequently adopted and signed into law.</p>
<p>Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenniger are registered Texas voters who sued and claimed that the interim plan that was adopted and signed into law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They argued that the new districts do not adhere to the 'one person, one vote' principle, which the Supreme Court had previously held exists in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were apportioned based on total population rather than registered voter population, and while the new districts are relatively equal in terms of total population, they vary wildly in relation to total voter population. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim based on Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, which allows total population to be the basis for district apportionment. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on the appeal.</p>
| 1,478 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,802 | 62,174 | City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1042 | 86-1042 | 1987 | City of Lakewood | Plain Dealer Publishing Co. | <p>Plain Dealer Publishing challenged the constitutionality of a Lakewood city ordinance that authorized its mayor to grant or deny applications, made by publishers, seeking permission to place newsracks on public property. The ordinance merely required Lakewood's mayor to provide an explanation, in the event of a permit denial, while empowering him to subject all permit approvals to whatever "terms and conditions" which he "deemed necessary and reasonable." On appeal from a district court ruling that found the ordinance constitutional, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Lakewood's request for certiorari.</p>
| 639 | 4 | 3 | false | plurality opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | First Amendment |
2,803 | 62,178 | Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278 | 86-1278 | 1987 | Hustler Magazine, Inc. | Falwell | <p>A lead story in the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a "parody" of an advertisement, modeled after an actual ad campaign, claiming that Falwell, a Fundamentalist minister and political leader, had a drunken incestuous relationship with his mother in an outhouse. Falwell sued to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Falwell won a jury verdict on the emotional distress claim and was awarded a total of $150,000 in damages. Hustler Magazine appealed.</p>
| 534 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
2,804 | 62,189 | Michigan v. Chesternut | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1824 | 86-1824 | 1987 | Michigan | Michael Mose Chesternut | <p>On December 19, 1984, Michael Mose Chesternut saw a police car approach him while one a routine patrol, so he ran. After the police caught up with him and drove alongside him for a short distance, they observed him discarding a number of packets. Assuming the packets contained cocaine, the police arrested Chesternut and, after a search of his person, discovered heroin and a hypodermic needle. Chesternut was charged with possession of controlled substances in violation of Michigan law. The trial court dismissed the charge and concluded that Chesternut was unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and held that Chesternut’s freedom was restricted as soon as the officers began their pursuit. Michigan appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>
| 839 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,805 | 62,195 | Basic Inc. v. Levinson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-279 | 86-279 | 1987 | Basic, Incorporated, et al. | Max L. Levinson, et al. | <p>Basic, Inc. (Basic) was a publicly-traded company engaged in manufacturing related to the steel industry. Combustion, Inc. (Combustion), a similar company, had expressed interest in merging with Basic but had not done so because of antitrust concerns. Beginning in 1976, Combustion representatives had conversations with Basic representatives regarding the possibility of a merger. Throughout 1977 and 1978, Basic made several public statements denying rumors that these conversations were taking place. On December 18, 1978, Basic asked the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading of its stocks because it had been approached about a merger, and on December 19 Basic’s board approved the offer from Combustion.</p>
<p>The respondents in this case are former Basic stockholders who sold their stock after Basic’s first denial of merger conversations. They sued Basic and its director for making false or misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which has to do with material facts relating to the purchase or sale of stocks. The plaintiffs argued that these statements artificially depressed the market for Basic’s stock, which injured the sellers. The district court certified the plaintiffs as a class and granted summary judgment for the company. The court held that the statements were immaterial because the conversations were not necessarily destined to become a merger agreement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that a company cannot disclose misleading information and that the conversations, although they might not have been material on their own, became so because they made the company’s statements untrue.</p>
| 1,718 | 4 | 2 | false | plurality opinion | vacated/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,806 | 62,197 | Carpenter v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-422 | 86-422 | 1987 | David Carpenter | United States | <p>R. Foster Winans wrote a column for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) entitled <em>Heard on the Street</em> (<em>Heard</em>) in which he reported on up-and-coming stocks. In 1983, Winans entered into a scheme that entailed him sending information about the stocks to be featured in <em>Heard</em> to two friends who worked at a brokerage firm. When <em>Heard</em> featured a stock, it generally affected the actual price and quantity of the stock in the market. Over a four-month period, the brokers used Winans’ information regarding stocks yet to be featured in <em>Heard</em> to make trades that resulted in profits of around $690,000. When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began an investigation, Winans and his co-conspirator Carpenter confessed.</p>
<p>The district court found that Winans had breached the duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and found him and his co-conspirators guilty of mail and wire fraud as well as securities violations. The petitioners appealed and argued that, because the WSJ—the only alleged victim of the mail and wire fraud charges—had no interest in the stocks being traded, the conviction should be overturned. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the petitioners’ misappropriation of the upcoming publication schedule was sufficient to establish a case for mail and wire fraud. The Circuit court reasoned that the use of mail and wire services had a sufficient nexus to Winans' knowing breach of his duty of confidentiality he owed the WSJ and that this breach harmed the WSJ.</p>
| 1,557 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,807 | 62,212 | Boos v. Barry | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-803 | 86-803 | 1987 | Boos | Barry | <p>A provision in the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy which tended to "bring that government into public odium or public disrepute." Congregations of three or more persons within the 500 feet limit were prohibited as well. Boos and others were denied permission to display signs criticizing the Soviet Union in front of that country's embassy.</p>
| 411 | 5 | 3 | true | plurality opinion | reversed in-part | First Amendment |
2,808 | 62,209 | Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-7113 | 86-7113 | 1987 | Kadrmas | Dickinson Public Schools | <p>North Dakota was a sparsely populated state, and as late as the mid-20th century some children were educated in crowded one-room schools. Since 1947, the legislature encouraged thinly populated school districts to reorganize themselves into larger districts; once reorganized, districts could only charge for transportation provisions with voter approval. Dickinson Public Schools chose not to participate in the reorganization. In 1973, the district began charging a fee for door-to-door bus service; about thirteen percent of students rode the bus, and the district charged their parents ninety-seven dollars a year for one child or one hundred fifty dollars a year for two children. In 1979, North Dakota enacted legislation expressly indicating that non-reorganized school districts could charge fees for transporting students.</p>
<p>Sarita Kadrmas, her mother Paula, and the rest of her family lived about sixteen miles from Sarita’s school. In September 1985, the family’s annual income was at or near the poverty level. Until 1985, the Kadrmas family agreed each year to pay the busing fee for Sarita, but they refused to sign a contract for the 1985 school year and the bus no longer stopped for Sarita. The Kadrmas family then used private transportation, but the costs exceeded $1,000 per school year.</p>
<p>In September 1985, Paula Kadrmas and other parents in the district filed an action in state court seeking to enjoin the Dickinson Public Schools and various school district officials from collecting any bus service fees. The district court rejected their action on the merits. On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, rejected Kadrmas’ argument that the busing fee violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It characterized the statute as purely economic legislation, concluding that the charges authorized by the statute were rationally related to the legitimate government objective of allocating limited resources. In the spring of 1987, while her appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was pending, the Kadrmas family signed a busing contract for the remainder of the 1986 school year and paid part of the fee. They also signed a contract for the 1987 school year.</p>
| 2,237 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,809 | 62,222 | Frisby v. Schultz | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-168 | 87-168 | 1987 | Russell Frisby et al. | Sandra Schultz et al. | <p>Sandra Schultz and Robert Braun both strongly opposed abortion and gathered like-minded citizens together to picket in front of the home of a local doctor who performed abortions. In response, the city of Brookfield, Wisconsin passed a law against all picketing in front of residential homes except for labor disputes. Following the advice of the town attorney, the city amended the law to ban labor picketing as well. The stated purpose of the law was "the protection and preservation of the home." When enacted, Schultz and Braun stopped picketing and filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the law violated the First Amendment. The court declared it would issue a permanent injunction against the law unless it was narrowed in scope. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the law violated the First Amendment.</p>
| 867 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
2,810 | 62,221 | Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-16 | 87-16 | 1987 | Richard D. Shapero | Kentucky Bar Association | <p>Richard Shapero submitted a client solicitation letter to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval. Shapero directed the letter at individuals who were about to lose their houses to foreclosure. The Commission found nothing false or misleading with the letter, but denied approval under a Kentucky Supreme Court rule, which prohibited direct mail advertisements “precipitated by a specific event” such as foreclosure. Shapero then sought an advisory opinion from the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on Legal Ethics. The committee upheld the Advertising Commission’s ruling. On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.</p>
| 657 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Attorneys |
2,811 | 62,227 | Arizona v. Roberson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-354 | 87-354 | 1987 | Arizona | Ronald William Roberson | <p>On April 16, 1985, Ronald William Roberson was arrested at the scene of a burglary. The arresting officer read him his Miranda rights, and Roberson asked to see an attorney before answering any questions. On April 19, while Roberson was still in custody on the burglary charge, a different officer, who was unaware that Roberson had requested counsel, interrogated him regarding a robbery that happened on April 15. During this questioning, Roberson gave an incriminating statement. At trial, the trial court suppressed the statement and held that his interrogation without his attorney present after he had requested one violated his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review.</p>
| 777 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,812 | 62,229 | Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-399 | 87-399 | 1987 | Supreme Court of Virginia | Friedman | <p>Myrna Friedman, a resident of Maryland, was hired at a law firm located in the state of Virginia. Virginia law made permanent residency a requirement for admission to the Virginia bar without taking the bar examination. After Friedman's appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court was turned down, her claim was upheld in federal district court.</p>
| 346 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,813 | 62,237 | Clark v. Jeter | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-5565 | 87-5565 | 1987 | Clark | Jeter | <p>A Pennsylvania law required illegitimate children to prove paternity before seeking support from their fathers. The statute of limitations on suits seeking to establish paternity was six years from the birth of the illegitimate child. However, the state allowed legitimate children to seek support from their parents at any time. Cherlyn Clark sought child support from Gene Jeter, whom she claimed was the father of her daughter, Tiffany. Blood tests indicated that there was a 99.3% probability that Jeter indeed was Tiffany's father. A state court dismissed Clark's suit because it was initiated after the statute of limitations had expired.</p>
| 652 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,814 | 62,240 | Huddleston v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-6 | 87-6 | 1987 | Guy Rufus Huddleston | United States | <p>Between April 11 and April 15, 1985, a trailer containing 32,000 blank videocassette tapes was stolen from an Overnight Express yard in South Holland, Illinois. On April 17, 1985, Guy Rufus Huddleston contacted a business owner in Michigan and offered to sell her a large number of blank videocassette tapes for significantly under market value. Huddleston was later charged with possessing and selling stolen videocassette tapes across state lines. At trial, the government presented evidence that Huddleston had previously trafficked in stolen goods. In response, Huddleston argued that he had not known any of the goods were stolen. The district court then instructed the jury that the evidence of prior bad acts could only be used to establish Huddleston’s knowledge, not to prove his character. The jury convicted Huddleston for possession of stolen goods.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit initially reversed the conviction and held that the government failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the goods in the prior instances were in fact stolen. The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing and subsequently affirmed the conviction, holding that the government only needs to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.</p>
<p> </p>
| 1,276 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,815 | 62,243 | New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/87-654 | 87-654 | 1987 | New Energy Company of Indiana | Limbach | <p>An Indiana law gave a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel dealers, provided that the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state that grants similar tax advantages as the Ohio scheme.</p>
| 251 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
2,816 | 62,245 | South Carolina v. Baker | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1987/94_orig | 94-orig | 1987 | South Carolina | Baker | <p>In 1982, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA). The statute removed the federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term bonds issued by state and local governments unless they were issued in registered form. South Carolina declared that both bearer and registered bonds issued by states and municipalities had been free from taxation since Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co (1895). The federal government claimed that the Act did not eliminate the state's power to issue bonds free from taxation; rather it regulated the types of bonds to be exempt.</p>
| 623 | 7 | 1 | false | plurality opinion | none | null |
2,817 | 62,252 | Law v. Siegel | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-5196 | 12-5196 | 2013 | Stephen Law | Alfred Siegel | <p>On January 5, 2004, Stephen Law filed for bankruptcy. He claimed that there were two liens on his property consuming all of the property's value beyond a homestead exemption. A homestead exemption protects equity in a house when filing for bankruptcy. One of these liens turned out to be a fictional construction involving a woman in China. Alfred Siegel (the Trustee) claimed that, in exposing the false lien, he incurred $465,000 in attorney fees. Because these costs resulted from Law's misconduct and misrepresentation, the Bankruptcy Court added a surcharge equal to the full amount of Law's homestead exemption to offset the Trustee's costs.</p>
<p>Law appealed the decision to the Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit (BAP). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, federal appeals courts may create panels of judges to hear appeals from Bankruptcy Court. The BAP affirmed the order and held that the surcharge was necessary to protect the Bankruptcy Court's integrity. Law appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the BAP decision.</p>
| 1,076 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,818 | 62,257 | Robers v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-9012 | 12-9012 | 2013 | Benjamin Robers | United States | <p>Benjamin Robers was involved in a mortgage fraud scheme. His role was to pose as a legitimate buyer of houses, make fraudulent loan applications⎯by misrepresenting his income and his intention to live in the house and repay the mortgage⎯then allow the loan to default by not paying it. Eventually, the bank foreclosed on the houses and then sold them to pay back the lenders. Robers was able to secure two houses under this guise.</p>
<p>After government officials discovered the scheme but prior to indictment, Robers pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the funds for the fraudulent loans were disbursed electronically (wired) by lenders. A federal district court sentenced him to three years of probation and ordered him to pay restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) in the amount of $218,952.18 for both incidents. The amount was calculated by finding the difference between each loan and the resale amount of each house that was foreclosed (the offset value). Robers appealed the restitution award and argued that the wrong offset value was used in the calculation; instead, the fair market price at the time of foreclosure should have been used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding in part, vacated attorney fees and "other expenses" from the restitution sum, and remanded the case back to the district court to draw a new order with the corrected sum.</p>
| 1,479 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,819 | 62,254 | Pom Wonderful, LLC v. The Coca-Cola Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-761 | 12-761 | 2013 | Pom Wonderful, LLC | The Coca-Cola Company | <p>Pom Wonderful, LLC (Pom Wonderful), a California-based beverage company, sold various types of juice, including a pomegranate blueberry juice blend. In 2007, Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) announced its own version of a pomegranate blueberry juice. In 2008, Pom Wonderful sued Coca-Cola in federal district court and argued that Coca-Cola misled consumers into believing that Coca-Cola's product contained pomegranate and blueberry juices when it actually contained 99% apple and grape juices and only 0.5% pomegranate and blueberry juice. Specifically, Pom Wonderful claimed that Coca-Cola violated provisions of the Lanham Act, a federal law prohibiting false advertising, as well as California's false advertising and unfair competition laws. The lawsuit challenged the name, labeling, marketing, and advertising of Coca-Cola's product.</p>
<p>The district court held that Pom Wonderful's claims regarding the name and label of the juice were barred by a separate law, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA). The FDCA allows the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate the labels on, among other items, juices. Because the FDA has exclusive authority to file claims for violations of the FDCA, the court feared that a decision under the Lanham Act would undercut the FDA's authority to regulate juice labels. After both parties gathered evidence, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola on the name and label issues. Although the court gave Pom Wonderful the opportunity to proceed to trial on the remaining issues, Pom Wonderful conceded that it could not win without the name and label issues. Pom Wonderful appealed.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to bar Pom Wonderful's claim with respect to the name and labeling of Coca-Cola's juice. It vacated the lower court's ruling in favor of Coca-Cola, instead allowing Pom Wonderful's case to proceed on the remaining claims.</p>
| 1,967 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,820 | 62,255 | Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-786 | 12-786 | 2013 | Limelight Networks | Akamai Technologies | <p>In the late 1990s, two professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Tom Leighton and Daniel Lewin, began to research techniques to provide stable internet services during periods of high traffic. These men eventually founded Akamai Technologies, Inc. (Akamai) to capitalize on this research. Akamai is an internet content delivery company that owns and maintains thousands of servers around the United States and contracts with internet service providers. By contracting with these companies, Akamai can deliver stable, fast internet to far-reaching customers with less danger of internet slowdown or failure. On July 14, 1998, the two men filed a patent through MIT for a method designed to alleviate Internet congestion by delivering content from multiple available servers. MIT then licensed this patent to Akamai.</p>
<p>Shortly thereafter, several other internet companies filed patent applications for internet content delivery systems. This led to a series of litigations that spanned from the late 1990s to the mid-2000s. In 2004, in the midst of these court battles, Akamai entered into negotiations to purchase Limelight Networks, Inc. (Limelight). In 2006, however, Limelight informed Akamai that it no longer wished to be purchased. Akamai subsequently sued Limelight in district court for violating 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and § 271(b), federal laws prohibiting patent infringement. Specifically, § 271(a) prohibits general patent infringement and § 271(b) prohibits inducing patent infringement.</p>
<p>The case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded Akamai a $41.5 million verdict based on lost profit, lost royalties, interest, and price erosion damages. After a series of post-trial motions, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of Limelight and held that, although Akamai's patent was violated, much of the violation occurred when Limelight's customers took the key steps to violate the patent. Although Limelight allowed these steps to occur, it did not control its customers' actions and therefore was not liable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that an entity accused of patent infringement must either perform all of the steps of the claimed method, either personally or through its direct control.</p>
| 2,284 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,821 | 62,256 | Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-842 | 12-842 | 2013 | Republic of Argentina | NML Capital, Ltd. | <p>During an economic crisis in 2001, the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) failed to make payments on bonds owned by foreign investors. One such bondholder, NML Capital, Ltd. (NML), later prevailed in several actions it filed against Argentina in federal district court, which entered judgments totaling more than US$2 billion in NML's favor. In order to execute the judgments against Argentina, NML served subpoenas on two banks requesting information about Argentina's assets held worldwide. Argentina moved to quash the subpoenas and argued that they violate the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) by requiring the disclosure of assets that are immune from collection by NML. The district court ordered the banks to comply with the subpoena requests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the FSIA did not apply to the subpoena because it was a discovery order directed at commercial entities that did not have a claim to sovereign immunity.</p>
| 991 | 7 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Privacy |
2,822 | 62,258 | Riley v. California | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-132 | 13-132 | 2013 | David Leon Riley | State of California | <p>David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm.</p>
<p>Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed.</p>
| 1,765 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,823 | 62,259 | Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-193 | 13-193 | 2013 | Susan B. Anthony List | Steven Driehaus | <p>Prior to the 2010 general election, Susan B. Anthony List (SBA List), a nonprofit, pro-life organization, announced that it intended to put up a billboard in the district of then-Congressman Steven Driehaus. The planned billboard would have asserted that Driehaus's vote in favor of the Affordable Care Act amounted to a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion. Citing threats of legal action by Driehaus's counsel, the company that owned the billboard space refused to put up the ad. Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA List violated Ohio's campaign laws by making false statements about his voting record. SBA List filed an action in federal district court arguing that the Ohio statutes infringed upon its rights to free speech and association under the First Amendment. Driehaus withdrew his complaint upon losing his bid for re-election and subsequently moved to Swaziland for an assignment with the Peace Corps. The district court dismissed the suit by SBA List for lack of standing and ripeness. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,114 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,824 | 62,260 | Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-298 | 13-298 | 2013 | Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. | CLS Bank International, et al. | <p>Alice Corporation (Alice) is an Australian company that owns the '479, '510, '720, and '375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor.</p>
<p>On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '479, '510, and '720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the '375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,572 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,825 | 62,261 | Clark v. Rameker | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-299 | 13-299 | 2013 | Brandon C. Clark and Heidi Heffron-Clark | William J. Rameker, Trustee, et al. | <p>In 2001, Heidi Heffron-Clark inherited a $300,000 individual retirement account (IRA) from her mother's estate. The U.S. tax code provides special rules for IRAs that are inherited by someone other than the spouse of the deceased. These rules prohibit additional contributions to the inherited account and require the beneficiary to withdraw, and pay taxes on, a minimum amount from the account each year. Heidi and her husband (the "Clarks"), filed for bankruptcy in 2010 and claimed the inherited IRA was exempt from creditor claims. A bankruptcy judge ruled that retirement funds must be held for the current owner's retirement in order to qualify as an exempt retirement fund under Section 522 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Because the Clarks were required to withdraw money from the inherited IRA before their retirement, the judge held that the account was subject to creditor claims in the bankruptcy proceeding. The federal district court reversed and held that Heidi's inheritance of the IRA did not change its status as a protected retirement fund. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.</p>
| 1,125 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,826 | 62,262 | United States v. Clarke | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-301 | 13-301 | 2013 | United States | Michael Clarke, et al. | <p>The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) served five summonses to top officers of the Dynamo Holdings Limited Partnership (Dynamo) during its investigation into the company's tax liabilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted enforcement of the summonses. Dynamo opposed the summonses by arguing that it was entitled to a hearing to determine whether the summonses were proper. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the decision that allowed the summonses to be enforced and remanded the case back to the district court for a hearing on whether the investigation was launched under an improper purpose, which would render enforcement of the summonses unlawful.</p>
| 738 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Due Process |
2,827 | 62,267 | Martinez v. Illinois | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-5967 | 13-5967 | 2013 | Esteban Martinez | Illinois | <p>Esteban Martinez was indicted in August 2006 for aggravated battery and mob action against Avery Binion and Demarco Scott. Following several continuances due to the State's inability to locate Binion and Scott beginning in July 2009, trial was ultimately set for May 2010. At trial, the State informed the judge that Binion and Scott were still not present and asked for another continuance. The judge initially gave the State some additional time while the jury was selected but eventually denied the motion for continuance. The judge then swore in the jury and started the proceedings. The State did not participate in the case or present any evidence. Martinez moved for directed findings of not guilty on both counts, which the judge granted.</p>
<p>The State appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court and argued that the trial court should have granted its motion for continuance. Martinez argued that the State's appeal was improper under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the trial court had found him not guilty. The Appellate Court reversed and held that the action was appealable because no witnesses were sworn and no evidence was presented, and thus jeopardy had not attached. The Supreme Court of Illinois granted review and affirmed, though it noted that jeopardy generally attaches when a jury is sworn. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the relevant question is whether a defendant "was subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction" and that by this standard Martinez was never at risk of conviction.</p>
| 1,543 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
2,828 | 62,265 | ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-461 | 13-461 | 2013 | American Broadcasting Corporation, Inc., et al. | Aereo, Inc. | <p>Aereo, Inc. (Aereo) provides a service that allows its subscribers to watch programs that are currently airing on network television or record programs that will air in the future over the Internet. By allowing subscribers to watch live television as well as record and watch shows on Internet-enabled devices including mobile phones, Aereo serves three functions: that of a regular television antenna, a recording device, and an application that makes these services work on devices other than televisions and computers. Aereo is currently only available to subscribers in the New York City area and offers only New York City local channels. Aereo does not have a license from the copyright holders of the programs to record or transmit their programs.</p>
<p>Two groups of plaintiffs filed separate copyright infringement suits against Aereo and moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Aereo from transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs were still being broadcast. The plaintiffs claimed that the transmission of the programs violated their right to "publicly perform" their copyrighted works. The district court denied the motion and held that Aereo's system was not substantially different from another that had been determined non-violative of the rights of copyright holders and that, while the injunction might prevent harm for the plaintiffs' businesses, it would irreparably harm Aereo's. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling to deny the motion.</p>
| 1,534 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,829 | 62,266 | Tolan v. Cotton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-551 | 13-551 | 2013 | Robert R. Tolan | Jeffrey Wayne Cotton | <p>In the early morning hours of New Year's Eve 2008, Jeffrey Cotton, a police officer, fired three shots at Robert Tolan in front of Tolan's parents' home in Bellaire, Texas. Cotton mistakenly believed that Tolan and his cousin, Anthony Cooper, had stolen a black Nissan, because another officer had incorrectly entered the license plate number of Tolan's black Nissan Xterra. One bullet hit Tolan, collapsed his right lung, and pierced his liver. Tolan sued Cotton in district court and argued that he had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Cotton filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity, which protects government officials from litigation when their conduct has not violated a clearly established right. The district court ruled in favor of Cotton and found that Cotton's use of force was not unreasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed but declined to adopt the lower court's reasoning. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity regardless of whether he violated the Fourth Amendment because he did not violate a "clearly established" right. In support of its ruling, the Court of Appeals cited evidence that would lead a reasonable officer in Cotton's position to believe that Tolan presented an immediate threat to his safety.</p>
| 1,427 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,830 | 62,264 | Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-369 | 13-369 | 2013 | Nautilus, Inc. | Biosig Instruments, Inc. | <p>Biosig Instruments, Inc. (Biosig) holds the '753 Patent, which refers to a heart rate monitor associated with exercise equipment and procedures. Biosig sued Nautilus, Inc. (Nautilus) in federal district court and alleged that Nautilus infringed on several claims of the patent. Nautilus moved for summary judgment on two issues: whether there was infringement, and whether the patent was invalid due to its vagueness. The district court denied Nautilus' motion as far as the issue of infringement due to lack of discovery and granted the motion as it related to the patent's invalidity because of its vagueness. Biosig appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals held that a patent claim could only be considered legally indefinite when it is "insolubly ambiguous," or not possible for a person of ordinary skill in the area to understand and resolve.</p>
| 909 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,831 | 62,268 | Hinton v. Alabama | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-6440 | 13-6440 | 2013 | Anthony Ray Hinton | Alabama | <p>Between February and July of 1985, there were a series of restaurant robberies in Birmingham, Alabama. During the commission of the first two robberies, the manager of each restaurant was shot and killed by a .38 caliber bullet. The manager of the restaurant that was the target of the third robbery, however, survived and identified Anthony Ray Hinton in a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and found in his house a .38 caliber revolver. After Alabama's Department of Forensic Sciences analyzed the bullets and found that they had been fired from that revolver, Hinton was charged with two counts of capital murder for the killings during the first two robberies.</p>
<p>At trial, the prosecution's case rested on the connection between the bullets located at the scenes of the crimes and the gun located at Hinton's house; no other physical evidence was presented. Hinton's defense attorney filed a motion for funding to hire an expert witness to rebut the prosecution's experts, which the judge granted. Because the judge did not know how much funding he could grant, he invited the attorney to file additional requests for further funding if necessary. Hinton's attorney did not take the judge up on this invitation because he did not know that Alabama law allowed for funding in excess of what the judge had already granted. With this amount of money, the defense attorney was only able to find one expert who was willing to testify, and that expert was badly discredited during cross-examination. Hinton was convicted and sentenced to death.</p>
<p>In his post-conviction petition, Hinton argued that his trial attorney was ineffective because he did not seek additional funds to obtain more effective expert testimony. The circuit court denied the petition and held that the jury had not been prejudiced against Hinton due to the testimony. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and held that the trial court did not rule on whether or not Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify. On remand, the circuit court held that Hinton's trial expert was qualified to testify, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the case.</p>
| 2,254 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,832 | 62,263 | CTS Corp. v. Waldburger | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-339 | 13-339 | 2013 | CTS Corp. | Peter Waldberger, et al. | <p>In 1980, in response to concerns about the repercussions of toxic waste dumping, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which was designed to establish a comprehensive response mechanism and to shift the cost of the clean-up to the parties responsible. In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA by adding a section stating that, if a state statute of limitations allows the period in which action may be brought to begin before the plaintiff has knowledge of the harm, CERCLA preempts the state statute and allows the period to begin only from the point at which the plaintiff has knowledge.</p>
<p>CTS Corporation (CTS) manufactures and disposes of electronics and electronic parts. From 1959 to 1985, CTS operated the Mills Gap Road Facility (Facility) in Asheville, North Carolina, where notable quantities of carcinogenic solvents were stored. In 1987, CTS sold the Facility and promised the realtors that the property was environmentally safe and clean. Subsequently, the land was sold to David Bradley, Renee Richardson, and others (landowners), who learned that the land was contaminated and that their well water contained concentrated levels of carcinogenic solvents in 2009. The landowners sued CTS in federal district court and argued that CTS should be required to remove the toxic contaminants as well as pay monetary damages. CTS moved to dismiss the case by arguing that North Carolina's ten-year statute of limitations on real property actions resulting from physical damage to a claimant's property prevented the suit from going forward. Although the landowners argued that CERCLA preempted the limitation, the district court held that the ten-year limitation was actually a statute of repose, which limits legal action to a particular timeframe regardless of when the harm becomes apparent. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that CERCLA's preemption applied to both statutes of repose, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is not relevant to when the time period begins, as well as to statutes of limitation, in which a plaintiff's knowledge of the harm is relevant.</p>
| 2,235 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Federalism |
2,833 | 62,269 | Williams v. Johnson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-9085 | 13-9085 | 2013 | Tara Sheneva Williams | Deborah K. Johnson, Acting Warden | <p>In October 1993, Tara Williams drove two of her friends to a liquor store in Long Beach, California, with the intent to commit a robbery. Williams waited in the car to serve as the getaway driver while her friends stole the cash from the liquor store and fatally shot the store's owner. Five years later, Williams was apprehended and charged with first-degree murder. At trial, the judge discharged a juror for bias and replaced that juror with an alternate, after which the jury convicted Williams for first-degree murder. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. While Williams' petition to the California Supreme Court was pending, that court decided a case that held that a court abused its discretion when it dismissed a juror who seemed to disagree with the other jurors. Based on that decision, the California Supreme Court remanded Williams' case, and the California Court of Appeal issued a revised opinion holding that the lower court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the juror.</p>
<p>Williams filed a federal habeas corpus petition, but the district court denied relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which restricts federal habeas relief to cases that have already been adjudicated on their merits in state court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the California Court of Appeal had disregarded Williams' argument that dismissal of the juror in question violated the Sixth Amendment. In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the California court had adjudicated the case on the merits, even if the Sixth Amendment claim was not explicitly addressed. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of habeas relief.</p>
| 1,781 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,834 | 62,270 | Republican Party of Minnesota v. White | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-521 | 01-521 | 2001 | Republican Party of Minnesota | White | <p>Minnesota's Constitution provides for the selection of all state judges by popular election. The announcement clause of the Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct prohibits a candidate from announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues. While running for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, Gregory Wersal filed suit, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violates the First Amendment and an injunction against its enforcement. Wersal alleged that he was forced to refrain from announcing his views on disputed issues during the 1998 campaign, to the point where he declined response to questions put to him by the press and public, out of concern that he might run afoul of the announce clause. The District Court found that the announcement clause did not violate the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 881 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
2,835 | 62,272 | Waters v. Churchill | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1450 | 92-1450 | 1993 | Waters | Churchill | <p>A public hospital fired an obstetrics nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for insubordination after she allegedly complained about her superiors to a nurse trainee during a dinner break in the hospital's obstetrics unit. Churchill claimed that the hospital fired her because she opposed its policy of nurse cross-training and said it was leaving certain units understaffed.</p>
| 370 | 7 | 2 | true | plurality opinion | vacated/remanded | First Amendment |
2,836 | 62,275 | Franconia Associates v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2001/01-455 | 01-455 | 2001 | Franconia Associates | United States | <p>Under the Housing Act of 1949, the Farmers Home Administration makes direct loans to private, nonprofit entities to develop and/or construct rural housing for the elderly and low-or middle-income individuals and families. Franconia Associates is a property owner that entered into such loans before December 21, 1979. The promissory notes Franconia executed authorized "prepaymen[t] of scheduled installments, or any portion thereof...at any time at the option of Borrower." In 1988, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), which amended the Housing Act of 1949 to impose permanent restrictions upon prepayment of mortgages entered into before December 21, 1979. In 1997, Franconia filed suit, charging that ELIHPA abridged the absolute prepayment right set forth in their promissory notes and thereby effected a repudiation of their contracts. In dismissing Franconia's contract claims as untimely, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that the claims first accrued on the ELIHPA regulations' effective date. In affirming on statute of limitations grounds, the Federal Circuit ruled that, if the Government's continuing duty to allow Franconia to prepay their loans was breached, the breach occurred immediately upon ELIHPA's enactment date.</p>
| 1,296 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,837 | 62,274 | Kansas v. Colorado | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2004/105-orig | 105-orig | 2004 | Kansas | Colorado | <p>Kansas and Colorado disputed ownership of the Arkansas River. In 1949 Congress approved the Arkansas River Compact, which set out to resolve the states' dispute. In 1986 Kansas alleged Colorado violated the Compact. The U.S. Supreme Court appointed a Special Master to investigate the dispute and in 1994 the Special Master said Colorado violated the Compact. The Court agreed with the Special Master. Kansas later took issue with the Special Master's fourth set of recommendations. Kansas said it was entitled to interest from 1985 onward - before the Court's ruling against Colorado - for damages from Colorado's violations of the Compact from 1950 to 1985. Kansas also requested a "river master" to resolve a dispute over computer modeling of the river.</p>
| 764 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | none | null |
2,838 | 62,273 | Branch v. Smith | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2002/01-1437 | 01-1437 | 2002 | Smith | Branch | <p>After the 2000 census caused Mississippi to lose one congressional seat, the State legislature failed to pass a new redistricting plan. Subsequently, lawsuits were filed in both the Mississippi State Chancery Court and the Federal District Court, asking that each court issue its own redistricting plan. While the federal court stayed its hand, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Chancery Court had jurisdiction to issue a redistricting plan. The Chancery Court adopted such a plan, which was submitted for preclearance pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Meanwhile, the Federal District Court promulgated a plan that would fix the State's congressional districts for the 2002 elections should the state-court plan not be precleared by the state-law deadline. Ultimately, the District Court enjoined the State from using the state-court plan and ordered that its own plan be used in 2002 until the State produced a precleared, constitutional plan. The State did not appeal and no determination was made on the preclearance submission because the District Court's injunction rendered the state-court plan incapable of administration.</p>
| 1,157 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,839 | 62,286 | Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/2 | 2 | 1968 | Red Lion Broadcasting Co. | Federal Communications Commission | <p>The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged.</p>
| 715 | 7 | 0 | false | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
2,840 | 62,301 | Luis v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-419 | 14-419 | 2015 | Sila Luis | United States | <p>A federal grand jury indicted Sila Luis for her alleged role in a Medicare fraud scheme that involved giving kickbacks to patients who enrolled with her home healthcare companies. Because federal law allows the government to file a pretrial motion to restrain the assets of defendants accused of particular types of fraud, including substitute assets not directly related to the fraud, the government did so in this case. Luis objected to the motion and argued that she needed those funds in order to pay for her criminal defense lawyer, and therefore granting the motion would violate her right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 745 | 5 | 3 | true | plurality opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,841 | 62,306 | Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1496 | 13-1496 | 2015 | Dollar General Corporation, et al. | Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, et al. | <p>Dollar General Corporation (Dollar General) operates a store on land held in trust for the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians (Tribe). The store operates pursuant to a lease and business license agreement with the Tribe. In the spring of 2003, John Doe, a 13-year-old member of the Tribe alleged that he was sexually molested by the store manager, Dale Townsend, while he was working at the store as part of an internship program that the Tribe runs and in which the Townsend agreed to participate.</p>
<p>In 2005, Doe sued Townsend and Dollar General in tribal court. Both defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the tribal court denied the motions. The Choctaw Supreme Court upheld the denial of the motions by finding that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Montana v. United States</em>, which allowed a tribe to regulate the activities of nonmembers who enter into a consensual arrangement with the tribe, applied in this case. The defendants then sued the Tribe in federal district court and sought injunctions to stop the suit in tribal court. The district court granted the injunction for Townsend but not for Dollar General because the company had failed to carry its burden to show that the <em>Montana</em> decision did not apply in this case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,369 | 4 | 4 | false | equally divided | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,842 | 62,309 | Fisher v. University of Texas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981 | 14-981 | 2015 | Abigail Noel Fisher | University of Texas at Austin, et al. | <p>Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University’s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny.</p>
| 1,136 | 4 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,843 | 62,302 | Shapiro v. McManus | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-990 | 14-990 | 2015 | Stephen M. Shapiro, et al. | David J. McManus, Jr., et al. | <p>In 2011, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a redistricting plan based on the results of the 2010 census. Several of the districts consisted of de-facto non-contiguous segments—discrete segments that would be wholly unconnected but for one or two narrow strips connecting the two—often with largely inconsistent demographics between the two large segments. The plaintiffs were a group of citizens who sued the Chair of the Maryland State Board of Elections (Board) and the State Administrator of the Board and argued that the new districting plan violated their rights to political association and equal representation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to dismiss the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which requires that a complaint be plausible on its face and enable the court to draw a reasonable inference of misconduct. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and held that the complaint did no more than imply the mere possibility of misconduct. Therefore, the case did not go before a three-judge panel, as the Three-Judge Court Act requires for cases dealing with congressional districts unless the claim is determined to be insubstantial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.</p>
| 1,290 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,844 | 62,307 | Bruce v. Samuels | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-844 | 14-844 | 2015 | Antoine Bruce | Charles E. Samuels, Jr., et al. | <p>Several prisoners housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU) of the Federal Correctional Institution in Talladega, which is for gang-affiliated and other disruptive inmates, sued Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officials and claimed that SMUs violated the Eighth Amendment. Because SMUs housed gang-affiliated prisoners, the petitioners argued that the SMUs were unconstitutionally violent and dangerous because the BOP officials did not separate members of rival gangs. The prisoners moved to proceed <em>in forma pauperis</em>, which would allow them to waive filing fees. The parties then engaged in extensive back-and-forth filings regarding the collection of filing fees and the ability of other prisoners to join in the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prevented the prisoners from completely waiving filing fees, and that they instead must pay a percentage of their monthly income to cover filing fees.</p>
| 989 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,845 | 62,308 | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association, et al. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-840 | 14-840 | 2015 | Federal Energy Regulatory Commission | Electric Power Supply Association, et al. | <p>The Federal Power Act (FPA) grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) the authority to regulate the wholesale interstate transmission and sale of electric power. In 2011, FERC promulgated a rule that established uniform compensation levels for suppliers of demand-side resources that meet certain conditions, including cost-effectiveness as measured by a net benefits test. The rule’s stated purpose was to incentivize retail customers to reduce electricity consumption when it was economically efficient to do so. Various state regulatory agencies, trade associations, publicly owned utilities, transmission owners, and other industry groups requested a rehearing on the rule and argued that it conflicted with FERC’s efforts to promote a competitive market as well as FERC’s statutory mandate to avoid unjust and discriminatory rates. FERC confirmed the rule, and the industry groups petitioned for review in federal court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC did not have the statutory authority to directly regulate the retail market and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because FERC did not adequately consider and respond to the arguments made in opposition to the rule.</p>
| 1,249 | 6 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,846 | 62,310 | Foster v. Chatman | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8349 | 14-8349 | 2015 | Timothy Tyrone Foster | Bruce Chatman, Warden | <p>In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. At the trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes against all four of the qualified black jurors. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Batson v. Kentucky</em>, which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the defense objected to those strikes, and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that there were race-neutral explanation for the strikes. The prosecution provided reasons, and the trial court held that the reasons were sufficient. An all-white jury convicted Foster of murder and imposed the death penalty.</p>
<p>Foster filed a motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the prosecution’s notes during jury selection and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court and submitted a new <em>Batson</em> challenge based on the prosecutor's notes obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act. The court denied Foster's petition. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. </p>
| 1,322 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,847 | 62,314 | Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-915 | 14-915 | 2015 | Rebecca Friedrichs, et al. | California Teachers Association, et al. | <p>California law allows unions to become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of that district and therefore have a great deal of influence over a wide range of conditions of employment. Once a union is the exclusive bargaining representative for the school district, it may establish an “agency shop” arrangement, which means that a school district may require a public school employee to either join the union or pay the equivalent of dues to the union in the form of a “fair share service fee.” Because the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling nonmembers to support activities that are not exclusively devoted to negotiations, contract administration, and other duties as an exclusive bargaining representative, unions must send notices to all nonmembers laying out the breakdown of the chargeable and nonchargeable portions of the fee. To avoid paying for the nonchargeable portion of the fee, a nonmember must affirmatively opt out each year.</p>
<p>Petitioners are a group of public school employees who sued the California Teachers Association and other similar organizations as well as school districts and argued that the agency shop arrangement and the opt-out requirement violated the First Amendment. The district court held that precedent upholding those practices precluded its judgment on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,425 | 4 | 4 | false | equally divided | affirmed | Unions |
2,848 | 62,315 | Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-232 | 14-232 | 2015 | Wesley Harris, et al. | Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al. | <p>In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were under-populated in Democratic-leaning districts and over-populated in Republican-leaning ones, and therefore that the Commission had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission argued that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The district court found in favor of the Commission and held that the redrawn districts represented a good faith effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act.</p>
| 745 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,849 | 62,316 | Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-916 | 14-916 | 2015 | Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. | United States | <p>Various policies, regulations, and statutes of the federal government are intended to promote small businesses, especially those run by veterans. Although agencies generally have wide discretion to decide what method of contracting to use, a 2003 amendment to the Small Business Act established a goal of awarding three percent of government contracts to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses, and the Veterans Act of 2006 expanded the reach of the relevant provisions.</p>
<p>Kingdomware Technologies is a small business owned and controlled by a service-disabled veteran and has been certified as such by the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). In 2012, Kingdomware filed a bid for a project, but the VA awarded the contract to a company that was not a veteran-owned business. Kingdomware filed a bid protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and argued that the contract award was illegal. The GAO issued a recommendation that the VA cancel the contract and re-solicit bids. The VA refused to accept the recommendation, and Kingdomware sued in U.S. Court of Federal Claims, which held that there was sufficient ambiguity in the relevant statute and that the VA’s interpretation was reasonable, so therefore the contract award should stand. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,334 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,850 | 62,313 | Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-181 | 14-181 | 2015 | Alfred Gobeille, Chair of the Vermont Green Mountain Care Board | Liberty Mutual Insurance Company | <p>Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) operates a self-insured employee health plan through a third-party administrator. Vermont state law requires that all health plans, including self-insured plans, file reports containing claims data and other information with the state. The statute specifies what type of information is required and how it is transmitted. When Vermont subpoenaed claims data from the third-party administrator, Liberty Mutual sued the state and argued that the reporting requirements of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted the Vermont statute. The district court found in favor of the state and held that ERISA did not preempt the Vermont statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that ERISA preempted the state statute because the state statute’s requirements were connected to the ERISA requirements and therefore were preempted.</p>
| 942 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
2,851 | 62,317 | Lockhart v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8358 | 14-8358 | 2015 | Avondale Lockhart | United States | <p>In June 2010, undercover federal agents conducted an operation in which Avondale Lockhart ordered a number of videos containing child pornography. When the agents ostensibly delivered the ordered videos, they executed a search warrant and discovered over 15,000 images and at least nine videos depicting child pornography on Lockhart’s computer. Lockhart was subsequently charged with possession of child pornography, and he pled guilty. Lockhart had previously been convicted in state court of first-degree sexual abuse due to an incident involving his adult girlfriend. Based on this previous conviction, the pre-sentencing report for Lockhart’s child pornography sentencing recommended that Lockhart be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Lockhart argued that the mandatory minimum did not apply to him because the previous sexual offense did not involve a minor. The district court rejected Lockhart’s argument and held that the mandatory minimum sentence applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.</p>
| 1,067 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
2,852 | 62,318 | Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-510 | 14-510 | 2015 | Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin | United States, et al. | <p>Between 1995 and 2004, the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin (Menominee Tribe) provided healthcare services to members of the tribe pursuant to a self-determination contract with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). The self-determination contract states that the federal government will pay the participating tribe the amount that the government would have paid the Department of the Interior and HHS if those agencies were administering the program. The tribe and the government negotiate those costs in annual funding agreements.</p>
<p>In 2005, the Menominee Tribe filed administrative claims with the HHS’s Indian Health Service to recover contract support costs for the years 1995 through 2004. The claims were denied for the years 1996 through 1998 as untimely because the six-year statute of limitations had run. The Menominee Tribe challenged that decision in federal district court and argued that the statute of limitations should not have been running. The district court rejected the Menominee Tribe’s argument. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for further consideration, and the district court again held that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed and held that there were no extraordinary circumstances that should have prevented the statute of limitations from running.</p>
| 1,383 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
2,853 | 62,321 | Luna Torres v. Lynch | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1096 | 14-1096 | 2015 | Jorge Luna Torres | Loretta E. Lynch, Attorney General | <p>In 1999, Jorge Luna Torres, a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of violating a New York state arson statute. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a notice charging Luna Torres with inadmissibility because he was an “alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.” Luna Torres applied for a cancellation of the removal order and the immigration judge held that Luna Torres was both removable as charged and ineligible for a cancellation of the removal order because he was a permanent resident convicted of an aggravated felony; the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously held that a conviction under the New York state arson statute constituted an aggravated felony. Luna Torres appealed to the BIA and argued that the previous ruling should be reexamined. The BIA dismissed Luna Torres’ appeal, and Luna Torres petitioned for review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to the oral argument before the appellate court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s ruling and concluded that violation of the New York state arson statute did not constitute an aggravated felony because the state statute lacked the federal statute’s interstate commerce element. That decision conflicted with the interpretations of other circuit courts of appeals, and the appellate court in this case upheld the denial of Torres’ petition for cancellation of the removal order.</p>
| 1,525 | 5 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,854 | 62,319 | Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Manning | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1132 | 14-1132 | 2015 | Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., et al. | Greg Manning, et al. | <p>The plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. (Escala), and the defendants are a group of financial institutions that engage in equity trading. The plaintiffs sued the defendants in state court and alleged that the defendants participated in the short selling of Escala stock, which increased the pool of tradeable shares by electronically manufacturing counterfeit shares, thereby causing the plaintiffs’ shares to decline in value and dilute their voting rights. The plaintiffs’ claims were based on state law, but the Amended Complaint repeatedly mentioned a 2004 regulation that was adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and no parties dispute the fact that the claims included violations of federal law. The defendants sought to remove the case from state court to federal court based on the question of whether the federal court has jurisdiction over the state law issues. The plaintiffs sought to bring the case back to state court, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the plaintiffs’ motion. The district court disagreed, and the issue went to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court held that the case should properly be heard in state court.</p>
| 1,325 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
2,855 | 62,320 | Musacchio v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1095 | 14-1095 | 2015 | Michael Musacchio | United States | <p>Michael Musacchio was the president of Exel Transportation Services (ETS), a transportation brokerage company that arranges freight shipments for business clients, until his resignation in 2004. In 2005, Musacchio founded Total Transportation Services (TTS), a competing company, and several ETS agents moved to the new company with him. Around the same time, the new president of ETS became suspicious when potential new agents were unexpectedly familiar with the terms of ETS contracts. He discovered that Musacchio and other TTS agents had been accessing ETS servers, so ETS sued TTS and the parties settled for $10 million.</p>
<p>In 2010, the government indicted Musacchio and other TTS agents on counts of conspiracy and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. At trial, the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that the government had to prove more stringent elements than the statute actually requires, and the government did not object. After he was convicted, Musacchio appealed and argued that, by not objecting, the government acceded to the higher burden and failed to meet it. Musacchio also argued that one of the counts was barred by a statute of limitations, but he had not raised this defense at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court’s instructional error did not become the law of the case when the government failed to object and that Musacchio waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it at trial.</p>
| 1,511 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,856 | 62,322 | Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1146 | 14-1146 | 2015 | Tyson Foods, Inc. | Peg Bouaphakeo, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, et al. | <p>Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiff class are current and former employees of Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) at the company’s meat-processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa. The employees worked on a “gang-time” system, which means they were paid only for time they were at their working stations and the production line was moving. The employees sued Tyson and argued that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law by not paying appropriate compensation for the time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and lunch break. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages of several million dollars.</p>
<p>Tyson appealed and argued that the district court erred in certifying the plaintiff class because factual differences among the plaintiffs made class certification improper. Tyson also argued that the class should be decertified because evidence presented at trial showed that some members of the class were not injured by the company’s actions and therefore had no right to damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification of the plaintiff class.</p>
| 1,299 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
2,857 | 62,323 | OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1067 | 13-1067 | 2015 | OBB Personenverkehr AG | Carol P. Sachs | <p>OBB Personenverkehr AG (OBB) is owned by OBB Holding Group, a joint-stock company created by the Republic of Austria to operate rail service within Austria. OBB is a member of the Eurail Group, an association organized under Luxembourg law to provide rail pass to non-European residents.</p>
<p>In March 2007, Carol Sachs purchased a four-day Eurail Pass from the Rail Pass Experts (RPE) website for travel in Austria and the Czech Republic. RPE is located in Massachusetts, and the pass Sachs purchased listed a series of disclaimers, including that the “issuing office is merely an intermediary of the carriers in Europe and assumes no liability resulting from the transport.” In April 2007, Sachs used her Eurail Pass in Innsbruck, Austria. While boarding the train, Sachs fell between the tracks, and her legs were crushed by the moving train; they had to be amputated above the knee. Sachs sued OBB in district court in California. OBB moved to dismiss and argued that it was entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), or alternatively, that there was a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on foreign-sovereign-immunity grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit originally affirmed but, upon rehearing en banc, later reversed and held that the commercial-activity exception of FSIA applied in this case because OBB was a common carrier owned by a foreign state that acted through a domestic agent to sell tickets to U.S. citizens and residents. Therefore, the district court did have subject-matter jurisdiction.</p>
| 1,650 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
2,858 | 62,325 | Ocasio v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-361 | 14-361 | 2015 | Samuel Ocasio | United States | <p>Samuel Ocasio was a police officer of the Baltimore Police Department who was indicted in connection with a kickback scheme involving payments to police officers in exchange for referrals to Majestic Auto Repair Shop (Majestic). The indictment charged Ocasio with conspiring to violate the Hobbs Act by agreeing to unlawfully obtain money or property under color of right from Majestic. The jury convicted Ocasio, and he appealed by arguing that he cannot be guilty of conspiring to commit extortion with the owners of Majestic because they were also the victims of the conspiracy, and the victim of a Hobbes Act conspiracy must be a person outside of the alleged conspiracy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ocasio’s conviction.</p>
| 762 | 5 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,859 | 62,324 | Hawkins v. Community Bank of Raymore | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-520 | 14-520 | 2015 | Valerie J. Hawkins and Janice A. Patterson | Community Bank of Raymore | <p>Valerie Hawkins and Janice Patterson’s husbands are the two members of PHC Development, LLC (PHC). Between 2005 and 2008, Community Bank of Raymore (Community) made four loans totaling more than $2,000,000 to PHC for the development of a residential subdivision. The Hawkins and Pattersons each executed personal guaranties to secure the loans. In April 2012, PHC failed to make the payments due under the loan agreements, and Community declared the loans to be in default, accelerated the loans, and demanded payment.</p>
<p>Hawkins and Patterson sued Community seeking damages and an order declaring their guaranties void and unenforceable. They argued that they had only been required to execute their guaranties because they were married to their respective husbands, which constituted discrimination based on their marital status in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). Community moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion by holding that the wives, in joining their husbands’ loans, did not apply to a lender and therefore did not qualify as applicants that gain the protections of the ECOA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,208 | 4 | 4 | false | equally divided | affirmed | null |
2,860 | 62,331 | Marbury v. Madison | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/5us137 | 5us137 | 1789-1850 | William Marbury | James Madison, Secretary of State | <p>Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor, as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions were delivered by the Secretary of State. </p>
<p>William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the commissions. </p>
| 981 | 4 | 0 | true | majority opinion | none | null |
2,861 | 62,335 | Martin v. Hunter's Lessee | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/14us304 | null | 1789-1850 | Denny Martin | Hunter's Lessee | <p>During the American Revolution, Virginia created laws allowing the state to seize property of Loyalists. In 1781, Denny Martin, a British subject, inherited land from his uncle, a Loyalist. The following year, the Virginia legislature voided the land grant and transferred the land back to Virginia. Virginia granted a portion of this land to David Hunter. A federal treaty dictated that Lord Fairfax was entitled to the property. </p>
<p>The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Virginia's law permitting the confiscation of property, even though it conflicted with the federal treaty. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the treaty superseded state law under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. On remand, the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to follow the ruling and argued that the law granting the Supreme Court appellate review over state court decisions, section 25 of the Judiciary Act (the Act), was unconstitutional.</p>
| 952 | 6 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | null |
2,862 | 62,333 | Fletcher v. Peck | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/10us87 | null | 1789-1850 | Robert Fletcher | John Peck | <p>In 1795, the Georgia state legislature passed a land grant awarding territory to four companies. The following year, the legislature voided the law and declared all rights and claims under it to be invalid. In 1800, John Peck acquired land that was part of the original legislative grant. He then sold the land to Robert Fletcher three years later, claiming that the land sales had been legitimate. Fletcher argued that since the original sale of the land had been declared invalid, Peck had no legal right to sell the land and thus committed a breach of contract.</p>
| 572 | 5 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,863 | 62,337 | Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/17us518 | 17us518 | 1789-1850 | Trustees of Dartmouth College | William H. Woodward | <p>In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College-- a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees.</p>
| 434 | 5 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,864 | 62,336 | McCulloch v. Maryland | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/17us316 | 17us316 | 1789-1850 | McCulloch | Maryland | <p>In 1816, Congress chartered The Second Bank of the United States. In 1818, the state of Maryland passed legislation to impose taxes on the bank. James W. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to pay the tax. The state appeals court held that the Second Bank was unconstitutional because the Constitution did not provide a textual commitment for the federal government to charter a bank. </p>
| 425 | 6 | 0 | true | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,865 | 62,339 | Cohens v. Virginia | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/19us264 | null | 1789-1850 | Philip and Mendes Cohen | Virginia | <p>An act of Congress authorized the operation of a lottery in the District of Columbia. The Cohen brothers proceeded to sell D.C. lottery tickets in the state of Virginia, violating state law. State authorities tried and convicted the Cohens, and then declared themselves to be the final arbiters of disputes between the states and the national government.</p>
| 362 | 7 | 0 | false | dismissal - other | null | null |
2,866 | 62,341 | Gibbons v. Ogden | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/22us1 | 22us1 | 1789-1850 | Thomas Gibbons | Aaron Ogden | <p>A New York state law gave Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton a 20-year monopoly over navigation on waters within state jurisdiction. Aaron Ogden and other competitors tried to forestall the monopoly, but Livingston and Fulton largely succeeded in selling franchise or buying competitors’ boats. Thomas Gibbons -- a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey under a federal coastal license – formed a partnership with Ogden, which fell apart after three years when Gibbons operated another steamboat on a New York route belonging to Ogden. Ogden filed suit against Gibbons in New York state court, and received a permanent injunction. The New York state court rejected Gibbons’ argument asserting that U.S. Congress controlled interstate commerce. </p>
| 782 | 6 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,867 | 62,346 | Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/32us243 | null | 1789-1850 | John Barron ex rel. Tiernan | Mayor of Baltimore | <p>Baltimore wharf owner John Barron alleged that construction by the city had diverted water flow in the harbor area. He argued that sand accumulations in the harbor deprived Barron of deep waters, which reduced his profits. He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses. The trial court awarded him $4,500 in damages, which the state appellate court struck down. </p>
| 386 | 7 | 0 | false | dismissal - other | affirmed | null |
2,868 | 62,345 | Worcester v. Georgia | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/31us515 | null | 1789-1850 | Samuel A. Worcester | Georgia | <p>In September 1831, Samuel A. Worcester and others, all non-Native Americans, were indicted in the supreme court for the county of Gwinnett in the state of Georgia for "residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license" and "without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the state of Georgia." They were indicted under an 1830 act of the Georgia legislature entitled "an act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power by all persons, under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians." Among other things, Worcester argued that the state could not maintain the prosecution because the statute violated the Constitution, treaties between the United States and the Cherokee nation, and an act of Congress entitled "an act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes." Worcester was convicted and sentenced to "hard labour in the penitentiary for four years." The U.S. Supreme Court received the case on a writ of error.</p>
| 1,005 | 5 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | null |
2,869 | 62,349 | Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1789-1850/36us420 | 36us420 | 1789-1850 | Proprietors of Charles River Bridge | Proprietors of Warren Bridge | <p>In 1785, the Massachusetts legislature incorporated the Charles River Bridge Company to construct a bridge and collect tolls. In 1828, the legislature established the Warren Bridge Company to build a free bridge nearby. Unsurprisingly, the new bridge deprived the old one of traffic and tolls. The Charles River Bridge Company filed suit, claiming the legislature had defaulted on its initial contract.</p>
| 410 | 5 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,870 | 62,357 | Dred Scott v. Sandford | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/60us393 | null | 1850-1900 | Dred Scott | John F. A. Sanford | <p>Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott filed suit in Missouri court for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free man. After losing, Scott brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no “negro” or descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.</p>
| 535 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,871 | 62,362 | Ex parte Milligan | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/71us2 | null | 1850-1900 | Lambdin P. Milligan et al. | United States | <p>Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War for engaging in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.</p>
| 211 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,872 | 62,370 | Slaughter-House Cases | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/83us36 | null | 1850-1900 | - | - | <p>Louisiana passed a law that restricted slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans to a single corporation. Pursuant to the law, the Crescent City Live-stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company received a charter to run a slaughterhouse downstream from the city. No other areas around the city were permitted for slaughtering animals over the next 25 years, and existing slaughterhouses would be closed. A group of butchers argued that they would lose their right to practice their trade and earn a livelihood under the monopoly. Specifically, they argued the monopoly created involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and abridged privileges or immunities, denied equal protection of the laws, and deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. </p>
| 833 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,873 | 62,372 | Munn v. Illinois | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/94us113 | null | 1850-1900 | Munn and Scott | Illinois | <p>Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.</p>
| 106 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,874 | 62,373 | Reynolds v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/98us145 | null | 1850-1900 | George Reynolds | United States | <p>George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, was charged with bigamy under the federal Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act after marrying a woman while still married to his previous wife. Reynolds argued that the law was unconstitutional. He reasoned that his religion required him to marry multiple women and the law therefore violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. </p>
| 422 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,875 | 62,377 | The Civil Rights Cases | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/109us3 | null | 1850-1900 | The Civil Rights Cases | Various appellants | <p>The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act.</p>
| 478 | 8 | 1 | null | majority opinion | reversed in-part | null |
2,876 | 62,391 | United States v. E. C. Knight Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/156us1 | 675 | 1850-1900 | United States | E. C. Knight Company | <p>The Congress passed the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 as a response to the public concern in the growth of giant corporations controlling transportation, industry, and commerce. The Act aimed to stop the concentration of wealth and economic power in the hands of the few. It outlawed "every contract, combination...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" or interstate commerce, and it declared every attempt to monopolize any part of trade or commerce to be illegal. The E.C. Knight Company was such a combination controlling over 98 percent of the sugar-refining business in the United States.</p>
| 602 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,877 | 62,394 | Plessy v. Ferguson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/163us537 | 210 | 1850-1900 | Homer Adolph Plessy | John Ferguson | <p>Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Plessy – who was seven-eighths Caucasian – agreed to participate in a test to challenge the Act. He was solicited by the Comite des Citoyens (Committee of Citizens), a group of New Orleans residents who sought to repeal the Act. They asked Plessy, who was technically black under Louisiana law, to sit in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. </p>
<p>The railroad cooperated because it thought the Act imposed unnecessary costs via the purchase of additional railroad cars. When Plessy was told to vacate the whites-only car, he refused and was arrested. </p>
<p>At trial, Plessy’s lawyers argued that the Separate Car Act violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge found that Louisiana could enforce this law insofar as it affected railroads within its boundaries. Plessy was convicted.</p>
| 932 | 7 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,878 | 62,404 | Lochner v. New York | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/198us45 | 292 | 1900-1940 | Joseph Lochner | New York | <p>The state of New York enacted a statute known as the Bakeshop Act, which forbid bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day. Lochner was accused of permitting an employee to work more than 60 hours in one week. The first charge resulted in a fine of $25, and a second charge a few years later resulted in a fine of $50. While Lochner did not challenge his first conviction, he appealed the second, but was denied in state court. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the Fourteenth Amendment should have been interpreted to contain the freedom to contract among the rights encompassed by substantive due process. </p>
| 639 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,879 | 62,406 | Muller v. Oregon | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/208us412 | 107 | 1900-1940 | Curt Muller | Oregon | <p>Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries. The owner of a laundry business, Curt Muller, was fined $10 when he violated the law. Muller appealed the conviction. The state supreme court upheld the law’s constitutionality. </p>
| 275 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,880 | 62,414 | Weeks v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/232us383 | 461 | 1900-1940 | Fremont Weeks | United States | <p>Police entered the home of Fremont Weeks and seized papers which were used to convict him of transporting lottery tickets through the mail. This was done without a search warrant. Weeks took action against the police and petitioned for the return of his private possessions.</p>
| 282 | 9 | 0 | true | null | reversed | null |
2,881 | 62,420 | Hammer v. Dagenhart | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/247us251 | 704 | 1900-1940 | W. C. Hammer, United States Attorney | Roland H. Dagenhart et al. | <p>The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's father -- Roland -- had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.</p>
| 244 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,882 | 62,424 | Abrams v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/250us616 | 316 | 1900-1940 | Jacob Abrams et al. | United States | <p>In 1918, the United States participated in a military operation on Russian soil against Germany after the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsarist regime. Russian immigrants in the US circulated literature calling for a general strike in ammunition plants to undermine the US war effort. The defendants were convicted for two leaflets thrown from a New York City window. One denounced the sending of American troops to Russia, and the second denounced the war and advocated for the cessation of the production of weapons to be used against "Workers Soviets of Russia". They were sentenced to 20 years in prison.</p>
| 619 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,883 | 62,423 | Schenck v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/249us47 | 437 | 1900-1940 | Charles Schenck | United States | <p>During World War I, socialists Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer distributed leaflets declaring that the draft violated the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude. The leaflets urged the public to disobey the draft, but advised only peaceful action. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Schenck and Baer were convicted of violating this law and appealed on the grounds that the statute violated the First Amendment. </p>
| 569 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,884 | 62,435 | Pierce v. Society of Sisters | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us510 | 583 | 1900-1940 | Walter M. Pierce, Governor | Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary | <p>The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.</p>
| 414 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,885 | 62,436 | Gitlow v. New York | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/268us652 | 19 | 1900-1940 | Benjamin Gitlow | People of the State of New York | <p>Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested in 1919 for distributing a “Left Wing Manifesto" that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under New York’s Criminal Anarchy Law, which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterances without propensity to incitement of concrete action. The appellate division affirmed his conviction, as did the New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in that state.</p>
| 627 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,886 | 62,445 | Olmstead v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/277us438 | 493 | 1900-1940 | Roy Olmstead et al. | United States | <p>Roy Olmstead was a suspected bootlegger. Without judicial approval, federal agents installed wiretaps in the basement of Olmstead's building (where he maintained an office) and in the streets near his home. Olmstead was convicted with evidence obtained from the wiretaps. This case was decided along with Green v. United States, in which Green and several other defendants were similarly convicted, based on illegally obtained wire-tapped conversations, for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act by importing, possessing, and selling illegal liquors. This case was also decided with McInnis v. United States.</p>
| 629 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,887 | 62,449 | Powell v. Alabama | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/287us45 | 98 | 1900-1940 | Ozie Powell | Alabama | <p>Nine black youths -- described as, "young, ignorant, and illiterate" -- were accused of raping two white women. Alabama officials sprinted through the legal proceedings: a total of three trials took one day and all nine were sentenced to death. Alabama law required the appointment of counsel in capital cases, but the attorneys did not consult with their clients and had done little more than appear to represent them at the trial. This case was decided together with Patterson v. Alabama and Weems v. Alabama.</p>
| 519 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | null |
2,888 | 62,447 | Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/283us697 | 91 | 1900-1940 | Jay Near | Minnesota ex rel. Olson | <p>In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford accused local officials of being implicated with gangsters. Minnesota officials sought a permanent injunction against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and defamatory. The law provided that any person "engaged in the business" of regularly publishing or circulating an "obscene, lewd, and lascivious" or a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" newspaper or periodical was guilty of a nuisance, and could be enjoined from further committing or maintaining the nuisance. The state supreme court upheld both the temporary injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually issued from the trial court. </p>
| 775 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,889 | 62,459 | United States v. Butler | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/297us1 | 401 | 1900-1940 | United States | William M. Butler et al., Receivers of Hoosac Mills Corp. | <p>In the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, Congress implemented a processing tax on agricultural commodities, from which funds would be redistributed to farmers who promised to reduce their acreage. The Act intended to solve the crisis in agricultural commodity prices which was causing many farmers to go under. Authority to determine which crops would be affected was granted to the Secretary of Agriculture. He decided that one of the crops should be cotton, and Butler received a tax claim as a receivers of the Hoosal Mills Corp., a cotton processor. </p>
| 562 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,890 | 62,457 | A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/295us495 | 854 | 1900-1940 | A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation | United States | <p>Under the National Industrial Recovery Act, Congress allowed the President to regulate certain industries by distributing authority to develop codes of conduct among business groups and boards in those industries. The Act did not provide standards for the President or the business groups in implementing its objectives. When Schechter Poultry Corp. was indicted for violating a business code governing the poultry industry in New York City, it argued that the law was an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine. </p>
| 539 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,891 | 62,463 | United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/299us304 | 98 | 1900-1940 | United States | Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation | <p>The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, a weapons manufacturer, sold fighter planes and bombers to Bolivia during the Chaco War, during which Paraguay and Bolivia contested control of a semi-arid region. This violated a Joint Resolution of Congress and a proclamation issued by President Roosevelt, which banned U.S. weapons manufacturers from aiding either side of the war. Challenging its indictment, Curtiss-Wright argued that Congress had violated the non-delegation doctrine in allowing the executive branch to make decisions that were properly left to the legislature. </p>
| 582 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,892 | 62,466 | National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/301us1 | 419 | 1900-1940 | National Labor Relations Board | Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation | <p>With the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, Congress determined that labor-management disputes were directly related to the flow of interstate commerce and, thus, could be regulated by the national government. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) charged Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. the country’s fourth largest steel producer, with discriminating against employees who were union members.</p>
| 415 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,893 | 62,465 | West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/300us379 | 293 | 1900-1940 | West Coast Hotel Company | Ernest Parrish and Elsie Parrish, his wife | <p>Under Washington state law, the Industrial Welfare Committee and Supervisor of Women in Industry set a minimum wage of $14.50 for each work week of 48 hours. Elsie Parrish, an employee of the West Coast Hotel Company, received an amount less than this wage. Parrish brought a suit to recover the difference between the wages paid to her and the minimum wage fixed by state law. In ruling for the hotel, the lower court relied on <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/261us525"><em>Adkins v. Children's Hospital</em> (1923)</a>, in which the Court struck down a minimum wage law for working women. </p>
| 613 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,894 | 62,469 | Palko v. Connecticut | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/302us319 | 135 | 1900-1940 | Frank Palko | Connecticut | <p>Frank Palko had been charged with first-degree murder. He was convicted instead of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state of Connecticut appealed and won a new trial; this time the court found Palko guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.</p>
| 292 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,895 | 62,475 | United States v. Miller | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/307us174 | 696 | 1900-1940 | United States | Jack Miller and Frank Layton | <p>An Arkansas federal district court charged Jack Miller and Frank Layton with violating the National Firearms Act of 1934 ("NFA") when they transported a sawed-off double-barrel 12-gauge shotgun in interstate commerce. Miller and Layton argued that the NFA violated their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.</p>
| 375 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,896 | 62,483 | United States v. Darby | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/312us100 | 82 | 1940-1955 | United States | F. W. Darby Lumber Company and Fred W. Darby | <p>In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to regulate many aspects of employment, including minimum wages, maximum weekly hours, and child labor. When a lumber manufacturer, Darby, shipped lumber out of state, he was arrested for violating the FLSA. His charges were dismissed because the federal district court found that FLSA was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the FLSA’s potential effects on intrastate activities violated the Commerce Clause.</p>
| 484 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,897 | 62,481 | Minersville School District v. Gobitis | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us586 | 690 | 1940-1955 | Minersville School District | Walter Gobitis et al. | <p>In 1935, Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from Pennsylvania public schools for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses and believed that saluting the flag was forbidden by the Bible. They argued the expulsions violated their First Amendment rights. </p>
| 336 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,898 | 62,480 | Cantwell v. Connecticut | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us296 | 632 | 1940-1955 | Newton D. Cantwell, Jesse L. Cantwell, and Russell D. Cantwell | Connecticut | <p>Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message. Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-law breach of the peace.</p>
| 494 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | reversed | null |
2,899 | 62,489 | Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/315us568 | 255 | 1940-1955 | Walter Chaplinsky | New Hampshire | <p>On a public sidewalk in downtown Rochester, Walter Chaplinsky was distributing literature that supported his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness and attacked more conventional forms of religion. Chaplinsky called the town marshal "a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist." He was arrested and convicted under a state law that prohibited intentionally offensive, derisive, or annoying speech to any person who is lawfully in a street or public area. On appeal, Chaplinsky argued that the law violated the First Amendment on the grounds that it was overly vague. </p>
| 570 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | null |