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Goodyear Tire v. Haeger

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1406

15-1406

2016

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company

Leroy Haeger, et al.

<p dir="ltr">In 2003, Leroy, Donna, Barry, and Suzanne Haeger were injured when one of the tires on their motorhome failed while they were driving on the highway, which caused the motorhome to swerve off the road and overturn. The tire was manufactured by The Goodyear Tire &amp; Rubber Company (Goodyear). In 2005, the Haegers sued Goodyear, which was represented by Basil J. Musnuff on all cases involving that particular model of tire and by Graeme Hancock as local counsel. The parties reached a settlement without going to trial in 2010.</p> <p>Over a year later, the Haegers’ attorney saw an article that indicated that Goodyear had done testing on the tire in question that had not been provided to the Haegers during discovery. The attorney filed a motion for sanctions with the district court and argued that Goodyear had committed discovery fraud by knowingly concealing crucial tests. Goodyear opposed the motion and argued that it had never represented that it provided all the test records that had been conducted on the tire at issue. The district court determined that Goodyear and Musnuff had deliberately tried to frustrate attempts to resolve the case on its merits. The district court also determined that, while it could not impose sanctions because the matter was settled, it could award the plaintiffs attorney’s fees for all costs incurred after Goodyear’s responses to the first discovery request, which came to approximately $2.7 million. Musnuff and Goodyear were held jointly responsible for 80% of this figure, and Hancock for the other 20%. Musnuff and Goodyear appealed and argued that the district court could not impose such sanctions without the additional procedural protections required for the imposition of punitive sanctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in both appeals that the district court had not abused its discretion and affirmed the award of sanction fees.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1111

15-1111

2016

Bank of America Corporation, et al.

City of Miami, Florida

<p>The city of Miami sued Bank of America Corporation and similar defendants under the Federal Housing Act (FHA) and argued that the banks engaged in predatory lending practices that targeted minorities for higher-risk loans, which resulted in high rates of default and caused financial harm to the city. Miami also alleged that the banks unjustly enriched themselves by taking advantage of benefits conferred by the city, that their actions denied the city of expected property and tax revenues, and cost the city money that it would not have had to pay had the banks not engaged in these predatory lending practices. The district court dismissed the FHA claims and held that Miami did not fall within the “zone of interests” the statute was meant to protect, and therefore did not have standing to sue under the FHA. The district court also held that Miami had not adequately shown that the banks’ conduct was the proximate cause of the harm the city claimed to have suffered. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that, as long as the plaintiffs in an FHA case would have standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution, they can sue under the FHA; the statutory standing requirement is not more narrow than Article III. The appellate court also determined that Miami had sufficiently shown that the banks’ actions were the proximate cause of the harm because the harm was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the actions.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-827

15-827

2016

Endrew F.

Douglas County School District RE-1

<p>Endrew F. is an autistic fifth grade student who was placed in private school because his parents believed his public school education was inadequate. Endrew was placed in Firefly Autism House and his parents sued for reimbursement of Endrew’s private school tuition and related expenses pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). IDEA provides that if a free public school cannot meet the educational needs of a disabled student, the student’s parents may enroll their child in a private school and seek reimbursement for tuition and related expenses.</p> <p>This case first went to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for review. The ALJ rejected Endrew’s parent’s request for reimbursement concluding that Endrew’s public school had provided him with “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as required by the IDEA. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s ruling and held that Endrew’s parents failed to meet their burden to prove that Endrew was not provided with FAPE. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Sessions v. Dimaya

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1498

15-1498

2017

Jefferson B. Sessions III, Attorney General

James Garcia Dimaya

<p dir="ltr">James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed.</p> <p>While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held  that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

McLane Company, Inc. v. E.E.O.C

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1248

15-1248

2016

McLane Company, Inc.

Equal Opportunity Employment Commission

<p>Damiana Ochoa filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer, McLane Company (McLane), for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McLane required all new employees and employees returning work after a medical leave to take a physical capability strength test for positions that are classified as physically demanding. Ochoa failed the test three times, and therefore her employment was terminated. The EEOC opened up an investigation into McLane Co. During the investigation, the EEOC issued a subpoena for information McLane withheld, including either “pedigree information” for each test-taker or reasons the test-taker’s employment was terminated. McLane continued to refuse to provide that information, so the EEOC filed a subpoena enforcement action. The district court required McLane to disclose some of the information the EEOC subpoenaed, but it refused to require McLane to divulge the “pedigree information” or reasons for termination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part after reviewing the lower court’s decision “de novo,” or without giving deference to the lower court’s determination. </p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Bosse v. Oklahoma

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-9173

15-9173

2016

Shaun Michael Bosse

Oklahoma

<p dir="ltr">In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Booth v. Maryland that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentencing jury in a death penalty case from considering victim impact evidence that does not directly relate to the circumstances of the crime. In Payne v. Tennessee, four years later, the Supreme Court determined that the ban only applied to victim impact testimony. Because Payne did not deal with the victim’s family member’s characterizations of the defendant, the crime, or the sentence as Booth had, the Payne Court did not address these types of evidence.</p> <p>Shaun Michael Bosse was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder for killing Katrina Griffin and her two children. The prosecution sought the death penalty and, over Bosse’s objection, asked three of the victims’ family members to recommend a sentence to the jury. All three recommended the death penalty, and the jury sentenced Bosse to death. Bosse appealed and argued that the sentencing process had violated the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Booth. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence and held that Payne had “implicitly overruled” Booth as it related to characterizations of the defendant and opinions about the sentence. </p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1391

15-1391

2016

Expressions Hair Design, et al.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of New York, et al.

<p>The New York General Business Law prohibits surcharges on credit card transactions. Expressions Hair Design, along with four other New York businesses and their owners, sued Eric T. Schneiderman, the Attorney General of New York, as well as the District Attorneys of New York County and argued both that the statute violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the statute was unconstitutional under both theories. The district court found that the statute impermissibly distinguished between surcharges and discounts, which narrowed the form of commercial speech available to the plaintiffs and violated the First Amendment. Additionally, the statute was vague because its application depended entirely on the labels plaintiffs used. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the statute qualified as permissible regulation of economic activity. The appellate court determined  that prices were not inherently protected speech and that, because the surcharge provision had an easily understood meaning, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague.</p>

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Ziglar v. Abbasi

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1358

15-1358

2016

James W. Ziglar

Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi, et. al.

<p dir="ltr">The respondents in this case are a group of male, non-U.S. citizens, most of whom are Muslim of Middle Eastern origin who were detained after the September 11, 2001 attacks and treated as “of interest” in the government’s investigation of these events. In their original claims, the plaintiffs alleged that they were detained without notice of the charges against them or information about how they were determined to be “of interest,” that their access to counsel and the courts was interfered with, and that they were subjected to excessively harsh treatment during their detention. They also asserted that their race, ethnicity, and national origin played a determinative role in the decision to detain them. The plaintiffs sued a number of government officials and argued that the government used their status as non-citizens to detain them when the government’s real purpose was to investigate whether they were terrorists and that the conditions of their confinement violated their Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. After a series of motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed the claims regarding the length of confinement but allowed the Constitutional claims to proceed. Both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed various aspects of that ruling. </p> <p>While that appeal was pending, some of the plaintiffs settled their claims against the government and the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which held that a complaint must allege sufficient facts to be plausible on its face and to allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the claimed conduct. Based on these events, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the length of confinement claims but remanded the conditions of confinement claims and allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The appellate court again dismissed some of the claims and allowed others to proceed.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Matal v. Tam

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1293

15-1293

2016

Joseph Matal, Interim Director, USPTO

Simon Shiao Tam

<p>Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name  would likely be disparaging towards “persons of Asian descent.” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed the trademark officer’s decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Nelson v. Colorado

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1256

15-1256

2016

Shannon Nelson and Louis Alonzo Madden

Colorado

<p>The state of Colorado, like most states, imposes certain monetary penalties upon persons convicted of a crime. Shannon Nelson and Louis Madden were both separately arrested and charged with sexual assault crimes. Nelson was acquitted of all charges, and Madden was acquitted of one of two charges against him. Both requested refunds from the state for the penalties they had been charged, since their convictions were overturned. The trial court determined it lacked jurisdiction in Nelson’s case and only returned the funds taken from Madden in connection with the one charge on which he was acquitted. The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the state must refund the money Nelson and Madden had paid respective to their sexual assault charges that had been thrown out. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the decisions in both cases and held that,  under the state’s Exoneration Act, an individual may only recover monetary losses from an arrest if they can “prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that [they were] ‘actually innocent.’”</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Dean v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-9260

15-9260

2016

Levon Dean, Jr.

United States

<p dir="ltr">Levon Dean, Jr. and Jamal Dean were brothers who agreed to participate in a robbery of a local drug dealer known as J.R. with Jessica Cabbell and Sarah Berg. On April 15, 2013, Levon and Jamal accompanied Berg to the Palmer House Motel in Sioux City, Iowa, to confront J.R. Jamal pulled a gun on J.R. and hit him on the head with the firearm. Berg, Jamal, and Levon fled the scene with J.R.’s car, cell phone, and methamphetamines. Later that month, Levon and Jamal robbed another methamphetamine dealer, C.B., at gunpoint in his home. In a similar manner, Jamal hit C.B. with his gun and fled the scene in C.B.’s car with $300, methamphetamines, and other electronics. During this robbery, the Deans ordered Hope Marsh who was living at the residence to come with and live with them. The Deans were eventually arrested in May of 2013. </p> <p>The Deans were convicted of multiple crimes including robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act, which requires that a crime  “obstruct, delay, or affect commerce.” Levon Dean, Jr. was sentenced to 400 months, including a 360-month mandatory minimum consecutive sentence pursuant to the sentence for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under 18 U.S.C. §924(c).  Without the mandatory minimum, Levon’s sentence guideline would have been 84-105 months. On appeal, Levon Dean challenged the sufficiency the evidence to establish a nexus to interstate commerce as the Hobbs Act requires, the sufficiency of evidence for his firearm convictions, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to follow the precedent it established in United States v. Hatcher, which held that the district court did not have discretion to reconsider mandatory minimums in sentences. The appellate court held that the district court’s sentence of 40-months to be served consecutively with the 360-month sentence was “substantively reasonable and not an abuse of the district court’s discretion.”</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Hernandez v. Mesa

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-118

15-118

2016

Jesus C. Hernandez, et al.

Jesus Mesa, Jr.

<p>On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, was playing with friends on the cement culvert of the Rio Grande that separates El Paso, Texas from Juarez, Mexico. Hernandez and his friends took turns running up the incline of the culvert to touch the barbed-wire fence on the U.S. side of it and then running back down the incline to the Mexican side. Jesus Mesa, Jr., a U.S. Border Patrol Agent, arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernandez’s friends at the U.S. border, while Hernandez retreated to the Mexican side of the River and hid behind the pillars of the Paso del Norte bridge. Mesa, still standing on the U.S. side of the border, fired at least two shots at Hernandez, one of which struck him in the head and killed him.</p> <p>Six months after Hernandez’s death, his parents sued Mesa in federal district court in Texas and alleged that Mesa violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution through the use of deadly force and the failure to use of reasonable force when making arrests. Mesa moved to dismiss and argued that Hernandez lacked constitutional protection because he was an alien without voluntary attachments to the United States who was standing in Mexico when he was killed. Applying a formalist test, the district court concluded that the Constitution’s deadly-force protections stop at the border for non-citizens like Hernandez. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and held that the Fifth Amendment protections against deadly force applied but not the Fourth Amendment protections. The appellate court also held that Mesa was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rehearing the case en banc, the appellate declined to answer the Fifth Amendment question, but held that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hernandez could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment because he was a Mexican citizen without a significant voluntary connection to the United States who was on Mexican soil when he was shot and killed.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Lewis v. Clarke

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1500

15-1500

2016

Brian Lewis, et al.

William Clark

<p>On October 22, 2011, Brian Lewis was driving southbound on Interstate 95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when William Clarke crashed into him while driving a limousine owned by the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Lewis sued Clarke, claiming that he was injured as a result of Clarke’s negligent and careless driving. Clarke filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and argued that, because he was driving the limousine as an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion and held that it did not lack subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity because Lewis sought damages from Clarke personally, not from the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed and held that tribal sovereign immunity extended to Clarke as a member of the tribe acting within the scope of his employment as a limousine driver with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-32

16-32

2016

Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership, et al.

Janis E. Clark, et al.

<p dir="ltr">Olive Clark and Joe Wellner were both residents at the Fountain Circle Care and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home operated by Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership (Kindred Nursing) in Winchester, Kentucky. Prior to their admission to the facility, each had designated their relatives as attorneys-in-fact, which gave the relatives broad authority to enter into transactions and agreements on their behalf. Their relatives, Janis E. Clark and Beverly Wellner, used their status as attorneys-in-fact to sign an alternative dispute resolution agreements with the facility that stipulated that any disputes arising from the Olive’s and Joe’s stays at the facility would be resolved through arbitration. </p> <p>  </p><p>Olive and Joe both passed away in the spring of 2009, and Janis and Beverly each filed lawsuits against Kindred Nursing for personal injury and wrongful death on their behalf. Kindred Nursing moved to compel arbitration based on the agreements that Janis and Beverly had signed. The state trial court initially dismissed both judicial actions in favor of arbitration, but later reversed in accordance with the precedent the Supreme Court of Kentucky established in Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc. In that case, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the power of attorney that authorized an attorney-in-fact to manage the principal’s “financial affairs” and “health-care decisions” did not include the authority to bind the principal to an optional arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower court’s decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-54

16-54

2016

Juan Esquivel-Quintana

Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Attorney General

<p dir="ltr">Juan Esquivel-Quintana was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2009, he pled guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the relevant statute in California. In California, unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor is defined as an act of sexual intercourse with a person who is a minor and not the spouse of the perpetrator. The statute further provides that anyone who is convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger than the perpetrator is guilty of a misdemeanor or a felony. </p> <p>After 2009, Esquivel-Quintana moved to Michigan, which is where the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA states that a non-citizen may be removed from the United States if he is convicted of an aggravated felony such as sexual abuse of a minor. An Immigration Judge ruled that Esquivel-Quintana’s conviction under California law constituted sexual abuse of a minor and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and held that the term “sexual abuse of a minor” in the INA encompassed convictions under the relevant California statute without looking at the individual facts of the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA’s decision. The appellate court determined that the BIA’s decision was entitled to deference as a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Chevron, USA, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and that the rule of lenity--requiring that statutory ambiguity be resolved in the defendant’s favor--did not apply in a civil case.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Midland Funding v. Johnson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-348

16-348

2016

Midland Funding, LLC

Aleida Johnson

<p dir="ltr">In 2014, Aleida Johnson filed for bankruptcy in Alabama bankruptcy court under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In 2003 and years prior, Midland Funding had purchased a bundle of debt worth almost $2,000 from Johnson, so after she filed for bankruptcy, Midland Funding filed a proof of claim in the same court. Because the date of the last transaction in the account in question occurred in 2003 and the statute of limitations for collecting unpaid debt in Alabama is six years, Johnson sued Midland Funding in federal district court argued that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prevented bankruptcy actions that had passed their statutes of limitations.</p> <p>  </p><p>Midland Funding moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The district court determined determined that, while the FDCPA prohibited the filing of a proof of claim known to be barred by the statute of limitations, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allowed a creditor to file a proof of claim even after the statute of limitations has run. The district court resolved that conflict by holding that the creditors’ right to file a claim precluded debtors from challenging that practice under the FDCPA. Johnson appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that, although the Bankruptcy Code allowed creditors to file claims barred by the statute of limitations, that did not preclude them from liability under the FDCPA for filing the claim.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-149

16-149

2016

Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc.

Jodie Nevils

<p dir="ltr">Jodie Nevils was a federal employee with a Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) health insurance plan that was governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly preempts state laws and regulations governing health insurance and benefits plans. After Nevils was awarded a settlement in a personal injury case, Coventry enforced a claim to the settlement money. Nevils sued Coventry and argued that Missouri law prevented insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and held that the FEHBA preempted state law regarding insurance companies’ claims to the proceeds of personal injury settlement. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the FEHBA did not preempt state law in this case because an insurance company’s claim to a personal injury settlement does not clearly relate to “the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.”</p> <p>  </p><p>After the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, the Office of Personnel Management created a new formal rule. That rule stated that an insurance carrier’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the settlement of an individual covered by that insurance carrier’s plan “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” for the purpose of the FEHBA. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for this case and vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of this new rule. On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there is no precedent that establishes that a federal agency’s interpretation of a preemption clause receives judicial deference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri again determined that the FEHBA did not preempt Missouri state law.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federalism

Packingham v. North Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1194

15-1194

2016

Lester Gerard Packingham

North Carolina

<p dir="ltr">Lester Packingham was convicted of taking “indecent liberties” with a minor in 2002, as a 21-year-old college student. Per North Carolina law, he was sentenced to a standard 10-12 month imprisonment, followed by a 24-month supervised release. Aside from being told to “remain away from” the minor, his conviction entailed no special stipulations. Packingham was arrested in 2010 after authorities came across a post on his Facebook profile, thanking God for having a parking ticket dismissed. He was arrested for violating North Carolina’s laws regarding convicted sex offenders, which barred the offender’s access to social media websites. </p> <p>  </p><p>In his defense, Packingham argued that the law violated his First Amendment rights. He was convicted in trial court, which found that the state had a weighty interest in keeping sexual predators off of social media websites for the “protection of minors.” The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and held that the social media website provision of the law was unconstitutional. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed and held that the law was constitutional by finding that the law was a “limitation on conduct” and not a restriction of free speech. The court found that the state had a sufficient interest in “forestalling the illicit lurking and contact” of registered sex offenders and their potential future victims.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

County of Los Angeles v. Mendez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-369

16-369

2016

County of Los Angeles, et al.

Angel Mendez, et al.

<p dir="ltr">In October 2010, Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded to a tip from an informant that wanted parolee Ronnie O’Dell had been seen in front of the nearby residence of Paula Hughes. The officers were informed that Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia lived together in the backyard of the Hughes residence. Although they did not have a search warrant, other officers directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to search the backyard. After determining that O’Dell was not in any of the three storage sheds in Hughes’ backyard, the deputies proceeded to a wooden shed surrounded by an A/C unit, clothes locker, clothes, and other belongings. The deputies did not knock and announce their presence. Deputy Conley, upon opening the door, saw the silhouette of a person holding a rifle through a curtain in the shed. Conley yelled “Gun!” and both deputies proceeded to shoot Mendez and Garcia. Whether Mendez was merely moving the gun or was pointing it at the deputies was subject to conflicting testimony at trial. As a result, Mendez required amputation of his right leg below the knee, and Garcia was shot in the back. </p> <p dir="ltr"> </p> <p dir="ltr">Mendez and Garcia sued Conley and Pederson and alleged that the deputies, in their official capacity, deprived them of their Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unjustified warrantless search and that the deputies failed to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule, which requires that officers announce their presence before they enter a home. The district court found for the plaintiffs on both these allegations and also held that, although the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, they were liable for the shooting under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. That rule holds an officer liable for use of deadly force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation via a Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment but reversed the knock-and-announce rule holding that because there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on whether officers must announce themselves again at a separate residence on the same property.  The appellate court also held that the officers were liable under the provocation rule because their unjustified search of the occupied shed led to the shooting.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-254

16-254

2016

Water Splash, Inc.

Tara Menon

<p dir="ltr">Water Splash, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that makes aquatic playgrounds known as “splash pads” that are popular in urban areas. Tara Menon is a Canadian citizen who lives in Quebec, Canada, and at one point worked for Water Splash as a regional sales representative. Later, Menon began to work for South Pool, a Water Splash competitor. Sometime in 2012, Water Splash learned that South Pool had used some of its drawings and designs when it submitted a bid to the City of Galveston to construct splash pads at two of its city parks, and Water Splash subsequently sued Menon in Texas state court.  Water Splash served Menon by mail, as allowed by a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure. When Menon did not respond, the trial court award Water Splash a default judgment. </p> <p>Menon filed a motion for a new trial seeking to set aside the default judgment because service was not accomplished pursuant to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”), a treaty that governs service of process from one member state to another. Both the United States and Canada are signatories to the treaty. The trial court denied Menon’s motion for a new trial but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the Hague Service Convention did not authorize service by mail. The Texas Court of Appeals denied a motion for a rehearing en banc, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied review. </p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-74

16-74

2016

Advocate Health Care Network, et al.

Maria Stapleton, et al.

<p dir="ltr">The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) protects employees from unexpected losses in their retirement plans by putting in place required safeguards on plans that qualify for ERISA protections. Church plans are exempted from the Act and its protections to prevent excessive entanglement of the government with religion through regulation. </p> <p>Maria Stapleton and the other plaintiffs in this case are a group of employees who work for Advocate Health Care Network (Advocate), which operates hospitals, inpatient, and outpatient treatment centers through northern Illinois, and are members of Advocate’s retirement plan. Advocate formed in 1995 as the result of a merger between two religiously affiliated hospital systems (though neither system was owned or financially operated by the church with which it was affiliated). Advocate is also affiliated with a church, and though it is not owned or financially operated by the church, it maintains contracts with the church and “affirms [the church’s] ministry.” The plaintiffs in this case sued Advocate and argued that the Advocate retirement plan is subject to ERISA, and therefore Advocate has breached its fiduciary duty by failing to adhere to ERISA’s requirements. The defendants moved for summary judgment because the Advocate plan fell under the ERISA exemption for church plans. The district court denied the motion because it determined that a plan established and maintained by a church-affiliated organization was not a church plan within the meaning of the statutory language. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and this case was consolidated with two other ones presenting the same issue before the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1189

15-1189

2016

Impression Products, Inc.

Lexmark International, Inc.

<p dir="ltr">Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges. The customers who buy Lexmark’s cartridges may choose a cartridge subject to a “Return Program,” which is a combination single-use patent and contract license, and those who purchase the Return Program are given a discount on the cartridge in exchange for agreeing to use the cartridge once and then return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Otherwise, customers may choose  a cartridge free of restrictions on its use. Some of Lexmark’s cartridges sold abroad and all of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue were subject to both a discount and the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired the cartridges at issue after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable re-use in violation of the single-use Return Program. Then, Impression Products acquired the cartridges abroad and resold them in the United States. </p> <p>Lexmark sued Impression and alleged that Impression infringed on Lexmark’s patents because Impression Products acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, Impression’s resale of the cartridges is non-infringing because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges and held that the patent-holder’s rights were exhausted when the initial sale was authorized and unrestricted. The motion was denied as it related to the foreign-sold cartridges, however. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that Lexmark’s sale did not “confer authority” to Impression to resell without infringing on the patent. The appellate court also held that Lexmark’s foreign sales did not confer authority to import, sell, or use the cartridges, and it did not waive Lexmark’s rights to its patent.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Honeycutt v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-142

16-142

2016

Terry Michael Honeycutt

United States

<p dir="ltr">Terry Honeycutt was a salaried employee who worked at Brainerd Army Store, which was owned by his brother, Tony Honeycutt. In 2008, when Terry noticed an increase in the number of “edgy looking” people purchasing Polar Pure, an iodine-based water purification product, he called the local police station to find out if there was anything he should know about it. The police confirmed Terry’s suspicion that Polar Pure was being used to manufacture methamphetamine and that he shouldn’t sell it if he felt uncomfortable. Brainerd Army Store was the only place that sold Polar Pure locally, and the product was kept behind the counter, so only the Honeycutt brothers sold it. Over the course of the next year, the Honeycutt brothers sold increasing amounts of Polar Pure. The Drug Enforcement Administration began investigating the brothers and the store, which culminated in a search warrant in 2010. The search warrant revealed that Polar Pure was the store’s highest grossing item and that it generated $260,000 of profit. After the DEA agents seized the store’s inventory of Polar Pure, the number of area meth labs using the iodine method dropped to “insignificant” levels. A grand jury indicted both brothers. Tony pled guilty, and Terry went to trial, where he was convicted on 11 of the 14 counts with which he was charged. The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 60 months for each count, but the jury did not order any forfeiture of the proceeds of the sales, because it found that, as a salaried employee, Terry did not reap the proceeds of the conspiracy.</p> <p>On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that the doctrine of joint and several liability applied to co-conspirators for the purpose of forfeiture of the proceeds of drug sales. For the purposes of the forfeiture statute, a defendant may be jointly and severally liable for the proceeds of drug sales obtained by others with whom the defendant participated in the crime. Therefore, in this case, the district court erred in not ordering forfeiture of the proceeds.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Group LLC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-341

16-341

2016

TC Heartland LLC

Kraft Food Brands Group LLC

<p>TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is a company organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) is a company organized under Delaware law and with its principal place of business in Illinois. Heartland sold liquid water-enhancing products that it shipped to Delaware, pursuant to two of its contracts. Kraft sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware and argued that these products infringed on Kraft’s patents for similar products. Heartland moved to dismiss the claim and argued that the Delaware lacked personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit because Heartland is not registered to do business in Delaware, has no local presence in Delaware, and does not solicit business in Delaware. The district court held that, under U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit precedent, the subsection of the general venue statute that allows a defendant to reside in many jurisdictions for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction applies to the patent venue statute. However, this precedent runs counter the the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., which held that the definition of corporate residence is limited to the jurisdiction of incorporation and that the subsection of the general venue statute does not expand jurisdiction under the patent venue statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that Congress’ amendments to the general venue statute post-dated and therefore superseded the Fourco precedent. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Turner v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1503

15-1503

2016

Charles S. Turner, et al.

United States

<p dir="ltr">In 1984, the body of Catherine Fuller was discovered in an alley. She had clearly been badly beaten and raped. The police were unable to recover physical evidence that would identify the perpetrators, and the medical examiner was unable to determine how many people were involved. After investigating and conducting over 400 interviews, the police developed a theory that Fuller had been assaulted and killed by a large group of teens who had originally set out to rob her. A total of 13 teens were initially indicted and two of them, Harry Bennett and Calvin Alston, pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government. These two witnesses agreed on the outline of events but differed significantly on some of the details. Turner and several of the other defendants put forth alibi defenses, but some of their alibis conflicted with each other. The jury found Turner and nine of the other defendants guilty, and their convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.</p> <p>Nearly 25 years later, Turner and several of the other original defendants moved to have their sentences vacated and claimed that they had not received fair trials because the government had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, which established that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense that is material to either guilt or punishment. Additionally, Turner and the other defendants argued that newly discovered evidence, including the recantations of Bennett and Alston, established that they were actually innocent of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed because Turner and the other former defendants had not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of their trials would have been different had the government disclosed the evidence in question and that the new evidence established their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court consolidated this case with another suit by one of the other original defendants. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Lee v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-327

16-327

2016

Jae Lee

United States

<p>Jae Lee came to the United States from South Korea with his family in 1982 and has lived in the United States legally ever since, though he did not become a citizen. He eventually moved to Memphis, Tennessee, where he got involved in the drug trade. In 2009, after a successful sting operation, Lee was arrested and charged with possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute. The government’s case against Lee was very strong, and on the advice of his attorney, Lee pled guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence. Lee’s attorney had assured him that the guilty plea would not have immigration consequences; however, Lee’s guilty plea constituted a conviction of an aggravated felony, which is a deportable offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Lee subsequently appealed his conviction and argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, which provides for a two-pronged test: whether the attorney’s counsel was deficient and whether the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Lee’s conviction and determined that Lee could not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test because there was not sufficient evidence that the outcome of Lee’s case would have been substantially different had he known about the risk of deportation.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Howell v. Howell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1031

15-1031

2016

John Howell

Sandra Howell

<p dir="ltr">John Howell, a veteran, and his ex-wife Sandra Howell divorced in 1991. The Arizona Superior Court granted Sandra half of John’s Military Retirement Plan (MRP) funds when the payments were to begin. John retired from the Air Force in 1992 and began receiving his retirement funds soon after. In 2005, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs determined that John suffered from degenerative joint disease in his shoulder, that the cause of the disease was directly related to his service, and that it caused him a net loss of 20% in his earnings. Because of this, he was entitled to tax-exempt military disability payments. To receive the disability payments, John had to waive an equal portion of his MRP benefits, which he did in July of 2004.</p> <p>In 2013, Sandra sued John and claimed that she was still entitled to a full 50% of the MRP benefits John received, regardless of his waiver of a portion of his benefits due to disability. Both the Arizona Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in Sandra’s favor. John appealed and cited the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling in Mansell v. Mansell, which held that the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) preempted state courts from allowing the former spouses of veterans to claim interest in the waived portion of the veteran’s MRP. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and stated that, while the Mansell standard was applicable before divorce proceedings were finalized and during the proceedings, courts were split regarding the rules after a divorce had been granted. The Court found that, because the lower court did not grant Sandra an interest in the disability sum itself, but rather an interest in John’s overall assets in an equal sum, then Sandra was free to require payment from John to make up for the losses she would suffer due to his waiver of a portion of the benefits shared between them.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federalism

White v. Pauly

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-67

16-67

2016

Ray White, et al

Daniel T. Pauly, as personal representative of the estate of Samuel Pauly, et al.

<p dir="ltr">Officer Kevin Truesdale responded to a report of a drunk driver and interviewed the two women who called 911. They gave him the license plate of the car that they observed driving recklessly, and the officer ran a search that showed the car was registered to the address of Daniel and Samuel Pauly. Officer White and Officer Mariscal joined Officer Truesdale, and they determined that there was probable cause to arrest the driver and wanted to speak with him. Officer White stayed behind, and the other two officers proceeded to the address. They found two residences at the addresses and approached the one with lights and in which they saw people moving. They yelled to the occupants to open the door or they were coming in. The Pauly brothers heard people yelling but claimed that the voices never identified themselves as police officers. The Pauly brothers yelled back that they had guns, and Daniel Pauly fired out the door. Officer White arrived on the scene as this was happening. He took cover, then fired at Samuel, who was leaning out the door and pointing his gun in Officer White’s direction. Officer White’s shot killed Samuel.</p> <p>Daniel and Samuel’s estate sued the officers and argued that the officers violated the brothers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. The officers moved for summary judgment and argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. The district court denied the motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that reasonable officers should have known that their conduct would cause the Pauly brothers to defend their home in a manner that required the police to respond with deadly force. Especially in the case of Officer White, who arrived later to the scene, the court determined that a reasonable officer would have determined that a warning was required before firing. The appellate court also held that these rules were clearly established at the time of the incident.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-299

16-299

2017

National Association of Manufacturers

Department of Defense, et al.

<p>The Clean Water Act (CWA) provides for judicial review in instances where the Environmental Protection Agency’s action results in the issuance or denial of any permit or places restrictions on waste emissions or other activities related to the waters.On August 28, 2015, a final rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that defined the scope of “the waters of the United States” under the CWA came into effect. Numerous states and other organizations challenged the validity of the agencies’ rule and contended both that it did not conform with the CWA and was improperly adopted in violation of the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. Following consolidation of the claims before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the National Association of Manufacturers intervened to join the plaintiffs and moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that the CWA does not provide the federal circuit courts with jurisdiction over the agencies’ rule and that review is properly held in the district courts instead. The appellate court held that it had jurisdiction because, although the rule only defined the scope of U.S. waters, by defining its boundaries, the rule functionally placed restrictions on activity related to the waters. Therefore, the rule affected permitting requirements and thus had the practical effect of granting or denying permits. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Weaver v. Massachusetts

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-240

16-240

2016

Kentel Myrone Weave

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

<p>On August 10, 2003, Germaine Rucker was shot and killed. Kentel Myrone Weaver later admitted to shooting Rucker after the police questioned him. During jury selection for Weaver’s trial, the court officer closed the court to Weaver’s family and other members of the public due to overcrowding. Weaver was subsequently convicted of murder in the first degree. In 2011, Weaver filed a motion for a new trial and claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the closure of the courtroom in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.The trial court denied Weaver’s motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Weaver’s conviction. The court held that Weaver had not shown that he suffered prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object to the court closure. Although a Sixth Amendment violation typically constitutes a “structural error,” which is automatically presumed to be prejudicial, the court held that, when the structural error resulted from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-605

16-605

2016

Town of Chester, New York

Laroe Estates, Inc.

<p>Land developer Steve Sherman sued the Town of Chester (Chester) and alleged a regulatory taking of his property because Chester prevented him from developing his land by requiring unfair and repetitive procedures. While that case was pending, a real estate company, Laroe Estates, Inc. (Laroe), sought to intervene in the case and claimed that it currently owned the property in question based on an initial 2003 agreement and a subsequent one in 2013. In 2013, TD Bank, which held a superior mortgage on the property, initiated foreclosure proceedings. Laroe and Sherman then entered into a new sales agreement that took the foreclosure proceedings into account, but TD Bank took possession of the property. The district court denied Laroe’s motion to intervene because Laroe was not the owner of an interest in the property at the time of the alleged taking and therefore lacked independent standing in the takings claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, Laroe was not required to show it independently had standing to intervene. The appellate court reasoned that the Second Circuit case United States Postal Service v. Brennan, which held that there is no need to impose a standing requirement on an intervenor if there is an established valid case or controversy, applied in this case.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1039

15-1039

2016

Sandoz Inc.

Amgen Inc., et al.

<p>The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 established a process for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to license “biosimilar” products: products that are “highly similar” to already-approved biological products. Under the Act, biosimilar product applicants must provide notice to the seller of the original product at least 180 days prior to the first commercial marketing of the biosimilar product. The Act also requires the biosimilar seller to provide the original seller with the details of its application within 20 days of receiving notice of FDA review.</p> <p>In May 2014, Sandoz Inc. filed an application for FDA approval of its product Zarxio, which was highly similar to Amgen Inc.’s product Neupogen (both products are bone marrow stimulants). On July 7, 2014, the FDA notified Sandoz that its application was under review, and the next day, Sandoz notified Amgen of the application. Later that month, Sandoz informed Amgen that it would not disclose the details of its application as required by the Act. On March 6, 2015, the FDA approved Sandoz’s application; Sandoz then notified Amgen of the FDA’s approval.</p> <p>In October 2014, Amgen sued Sandoz and claimed that Sandoz violated the Act because it failed to disclose the details of its application and did not give proper notice of commercial marketing before the FDA’s approval of its biosimilar product. The district court held that failure to disclose application details under the Act does not authorize the original seller to receive damages from the biosimilar product seller or prevent the sale of the biosimilar product. The court also held that an applicant may give notice of commercial marketing before FDA approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and held that effective notice may only be given after the FDA has approved the application. Therefore, Sandoz’s notice was effective in March 2015 rather than July 2014, and Sandoz could not sell its biosimilar product until 180 days after the March 2015 notice. The court also held that, because the Act only permits remedies based on patent infringement claims, Sandoz’s failure to disclose the details of its application did not violate the Act. Both parties filed petitions for writs of certiorari which were granted and consolidated.</p>

majority opinion

Economic Activity

Kokesh v. SEC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-529

16-529

2016

Charles R. Kokesh

Securities and Exchange Commission

<p>The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued Charles Kokesh for violating federal securities law by misappropriating funds from four business development companies. The district court found in favor of the SEC and ordered that Kokesh pay $34.9 million for “the ill-gotten gains causally connected” to Kokesh’s violations. On appeal, Kokesh argued that this “disgorgement” order is barred by the five-year statute of limitations on this type of claim because the SEC brought its action more than five years after the claims accrued. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The appellate court held that the five-year statute of limitations did not apply to this case because the ordered payment was remedial rather than punitive in nature. The goal of disgorgement is not to punish a wrongdoer for illegal activity, but rather to return to the rightful owner whatever profits the wrongdoer gained in the course of the illegal activity. Therefore, a disgorgement payment may be ordered so long as the amount “reasonably approximates the ill-gotten gains causally connected to the Defendant’s violations.”</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Maslenjak v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-309

16-309

2016

Divna Maslenjak

United States

<p dir="ltr">In April 1998, Divna Maslenjak, an ethnic Serb from modern-day Bosnia, met with a U.S. immigration official to seek refugee status for her and her family at the close of the Bosnian civil war. Through a translator, Maslenjak told the immigration official that the family feared persecution in their home region of Bosnia based on their Serbian ethnicity. Maslenjak also told the immigration official that the family feared reprisal because her husband had evaded conscription into the Bosnian Serb militia during the war. Maslenjak and her family were granted refugee status in 1999 and immigrated to the United States in September 2000. Maslenjak was naturalized as a U.S. citizen on August 3, 2007. During the naturalization process, Maslenjak denied ever having given false or misleading information to a U.S. official in order to gain entry to the United states or to avoid removal. </p> <p>On October 7, 2007 Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, was convicted on two counts of making false statements on a government document for his failure to disclose that he had in fact served as an officer in a Serbian military unit. To avoid deportation, Ratko applied for asylum. Testifying on his behalf at the asylum hearing, Maslenjak admitted that Ratko had served in the Serbian militia and that she had lied to the immigration officer during the refugee application interview in 1998. Maslenjak was subsequently charged with two counts of naturalization fraud for denying having ever given false or misleading information to a U.S. official. At trial, the jury was instructed that, in order to find Maslenjak guilty of fraudulently obtaining her naturalization, it need not find that her false statements were material to the decision to approve her naturalization, merely that she made them knowing their falsehood. Maslenjak was convicted on both counts, sentenced to two years probation, and stripped of her citizenship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction and held that proof of a material false statement was not a required element of naturalization fraud.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-285

16-285

2017

Epic Systems Corporation

Jacob Lewis

<p>Epic Systems Corporation (Epic) is a Wisconsin-based healthcare data management software company. Epic has an arbitration agreement that requires its employees to resolve any employment-based disputes with Epic through individual arbitration and to waive their right to participate in or receive benefit from any class, collective, or representative proceedings. In February 2015, former Epic employee Jacob Lewis sued Epic in federal court individually and on behalf of similarly-situated employees and claimed that they had been denied overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Epic moved to dismiss the complaint and cited the waiver clause of its arbitration agreement. The district court denied Epic’s motion and held that the waiver was unenforceable because it violated the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities” under Section Seven of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and added that the waiver was also unenforceable under the savings clause of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). That clause provides that arbitration agreements are to be enforced unless there legal or equitable grounds that would render a contract unenforceable. Finding the waiver of collective proceedings illegal under the NLRA, the appellate court held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the FAA. This case was consolidated with Ernst &amp; Young v. Morris  and National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., both cases that dealt with the relationship between the FAA and the NLRA.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Unions

McWilliams v. Dunn

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-5294

16-5294

2016

James E. McWilliams

Jefferson S. Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Dept. of Corrections, et al.

<p dir="ltr">On December 30, 1984, James McWilliams raped and robbed Patricia Reynolds, who died in surgery later that night. McWilliams was arrested, tried, and convicted of murder during robbery in the first degree and murder during rape in the first degree. At the sentencing phase, defense counsel requested that the court order neuropsychological testing for McWilliams. The court did so and ordered that the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC) conduct the testing. The DOC doctor who conducted the testing recommended further testing from a doctor who was not affiliated with the DOC. The second doctor’s report was made available to both parties but did not arrive at the court until the day before the sentencing hearing, and the court did not allow a continuance for defense counsel to review the report with the assistance of an expert. At the sentencing hearing, the court concluded that there were aggravating factors but no mitigating factors and sentenced McWilliams to death by electrocution. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Alabama state courts.</p> <p dir="ltr"> </p> <p dir="ltr">In 2004, McWilliams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition without addressing all of the specific claims, one of which included a claim that he was denied his due process rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma because the court did not provide him with an independent psychiatric expert. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for the district court to address the specific claims in the petition. The district court again denied the petition, and the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that McWilliams’ due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a competent psychiatric expert, which met the requirement of Ake, and any harm that he might have suffered was not prejudicial to the outcome of the sentencing hearing. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-405

16-405

2016

BNSF Railway Co.

Kelli Tyrrell, Special Administrator for the Estate of Brent T. Tyrrell, Deceased, et al.

<p dir="ltr">In March 2011, Robert Nelson was employed by BNSF Railway Co. (BNSF) and sued the company for damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) based on knee injuries sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court granted the motion and Nelson appealed. Brent Tyrrell also worked for BNSF and was allegedly exposed to carcinogens that caused him to develop ultimately fatal kidney cancer. In May 2014, Kelli Tyrell, the administrator of Brent’s estate,  sued BNSF on Brent’s behalf under FELA for damages based on the injuries Brent sustained during the course of his employment. BNSF filed a motion to dismiss Tyrrell’s claim for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court denied the motion, and BNSF appealed. Both cases were filed in Montana state court because Supreme Court precedent for FELA decisions allows state courts jurisdiction to hear FELA cases solely due to the railroad doing business in the forum state. However, the injuries did not occur in Montana, and BNSF is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Texas.</p> <p dir="ltr"> </p> <p dir="ltr"> </p> <p dir="ltr">The Supreme Court of Montana consolidated both cases to decide whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under FELA and whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law. BNSF argued that, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, the state courts cannot exercise general jurisdiction. However, the Montana Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that, because BNSF does business in Montana, under FELA, Montana courts have personal jurisdiction. Montana’s Supreme Court also held that the state has general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law because BNSF “maintains substantial, continuous, and systematic” contacts with Montana.</p>

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Davila v. Davis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-6219

16-6219

2016

Erick Daniel Davila

Lorie Davie, Director, Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

<p>In February 2009, Erick Daniel Davila was found guilty of capital murder for the killings of Annette Stevenson and her granddaughter, Queshawn Stevenson. The jury sentenced Davila to death. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari, Davila pursued habeas relief in the state courts, which was denied at the trial and appellate levels. Davila then sought federal habeas relief and claimed, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and state habeas counsel. Because Davila did not raise the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in the state habeas proceedings, the federal district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted and denied habeas relief. Davila appealed and argued that Supreme Court precedent that ineffective state habeas counsel can overcome the procedural default of an ineffective assistance of trial claim should also apply to the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of relief.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

District of Columbia v. Wesby

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1485

15-1485

2017

District of Columbia, et al.

Theodore Wesby, et al.

<p>On March 16, 2008, Metropolitan Police Department officers responded to a noise complaint for a house party. Upon arrival, the officers heard loud music coming from the house. The officers then entered the house and observed party guests, including Theodore Wesby, drinking and watching “scantily clad women with money tucked into garter belts.” The partygoers claimed that a woman called “Peaches” was the host of the party, and that she had received permission from the owner, from whom Peaches was leasing the house. One partygoer called Peaches on the phone for an officer, since Peaches was not present. Peaches confirmed that she had permission from the owner, but when an officer called the owner, the owner claimed that the lease had not been executed and that he had not given permission for the party. The officers subsequently arrested the partygoers.</p> <p>Sixteen of the arrested partygoers sued the officers and the District of Columbia for false arrest. The district court ruled in favor of the partygoers. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed and held both that the officers did not have probable cause for entry and were not entitled to immunity from liability. Probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry under D.C. law exists where a reasonable officer concludes from information known at the time that the arrestee knew or should have known that they entered the house against the will of the owner. The court reasoned that, because the partygoers believed in good faith that the owner had given Peaches permission for the party, they could not have intended to enter unlawfully. The court also ruled that the officers were not entitled to immunity because it was unreasonable for them to believe that they were not violating the partygoers’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights against false arrest.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-399

16-399

2016

Anthony W. Perry

Merit Systems Protection Board

<p>In the mid-2000s, Anthony Perry began to develop osteoporosis, so in order to alleviate his pain and to ensure that he could continue working, he made an informal agreement with his supervisor at the U.S. Census Bureau. The deal allowed Perry to take breaks throughout the day to control the symptoms of his osteoporosis, and to make up any time lost during the workday after hours with no penalty. On June 7, 2011, Perry received a proposed removal notice that alleged that he had been paid for hours that he had not worked. He contested the charges and pointed to the informal agreement he and his supervisor had made and his unblemished performance record. In August 2011, Perry and the agency entered into an agreement that required him to serve a thirty-day suspension, to retire on or before September 4, 2012, and to forfeit any discrimination claims against the agency. After serving his suspension and retiring, Perry brought a pro se claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the federal board that is authorized the hear certain challenges by federal employees to adverse employment actions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) initially ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction because retirements are presumed to be voluntary, and the Board cannot review claims that resulted in settlement with the agency. Perry appealed to the Board, which remanded the case. Upon further review, the ALJ again denied that it had jurisdiction and held that Perry had not sufficiently shown that he was improperly coerced into settling his claims. Perry appealed to the Board again, which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Perry appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which transferred the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit based on a lack of proper jurisdiction.The appellate court docketed the case but granted Perry’s motion to suspend proceedings until the U.S. Supreme Court resolves the jurisdictional issue of which court system should hear the case.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-466

16-466

2016

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.

Superior Court of California for the County of San Francisco

<p>Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (BMS) is a global pharmaceutical company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York. BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug intended to prevent blood clotting, and markets and sells the drug nationwide, including in California. In addition, BMS maintains five offices in California, four research facilities, and one government affairs office, as well as 250 sales representatives. In eight amended complaints filed with the San Francisco Superior Court, 86 California residents and 575 non-California residents joined in suing BMS and McKesson Corporation, a California-based Plavix distributor, on individual product defect claims. Each alleged serious side effects from their use of Plavix, that BMS had misrepresented the drug’s safety and efficacy, and asserted numerous California product liability causes of action against BMS. BMS moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction in California. BMS argued that these claims had no link to its California activities, as the nonresident plaintiffs were not injured by Plavix in California, had not been prescribed Plavix in California, and had not received Plavix distributed by McKesson from California. Additionally, BMS did not research or manufacture Plavix at its facilities in California. The trial court denied BMS’s motion and held that the company was subject to the California court’s general jurisdiction because it had “wide-ranging, continuous, and systematic activities in California.” The California Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s assessment that BMS was subject to general jurisdiction in California, but held that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were sufficiently related to BMS’s California activities to support specific jurisdiction. The California Supreme Court affirmed and held that BMS’s nationwide marketing and distribution created a “substantial nexus” between the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims and BMS’s activities in California because the claims were based on the same allegedly defective product and misleading marketing that allegedly caused injury both in and outside of California. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-349

16-349

2016

Ricky Henson, et al.

Santander Consumer USA, Inc., et al.

<p>The petitioners are a group of individuals who all obtained car loans from CitiFinancial Auto. When they were unable to make payments on the vehicles, CitiFinancial repossessed them, sold them, and then informed the petitioners they owed a balance to cover the difference between the agreed purchase price and the amount of money for which CitiFinancial sold the debt. It later sold the defaulted loans to Santander Consumer, USA (Santander), which attempted to collect these alleged debts. In November 2012, the petitioners filed a putative class action lawsuit that alleged that Santander violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in its communications with them. Santander moved to dismiss the action and claimed that it was not a “debt collector” under the regulations of the FDCPA because Santander merely bought the debt from another institution and did not originate it. The district court agreed with Santander and dismissed the case.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision and declined to rehear the case en banc. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-373

16-373

2016

California Public Employees' Retirement System

ANZ Securities, Inc., et al.

<p>Before it went bankrupt in 2008, Lehman Brothers operated as a global investment bank, with stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Between July 2007 and January 2008, the company raised over $31 billion through debt offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CPERS), the largest pension fund in the country, purchased millions of dollars of these securities. In 2008, another retirement fund filed a putative class action suit against Lehman Brothers that claimed that Lehman Brothers was liable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for false and misleading statements. In February 2011, over three years after the initial proceedings were filed but before the district court had decided whether or not to certify the lawsuit as a class action, CPERS sued Lehman Brothers separately. The case was then merged with the other retirement fund’s lawsuit and transferred to the New York district court, where the first case was pending. Later in 2011, the parties involved in the initial suit settled. When CPERS received notice of the settlement agreement, it opted to pursue its own claims individually against Lehman Brothers. The district court dismissed the case as having been untimely filed because the filing of the initial putative class action suit did not constitute a timely filing for a later individual claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Artis v. District of Columbia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-460

16-460

2017

Stephanie C. Artis

District of Columbia

<p>In 2007, Stephanie Artis was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Health (DOH) as a code inspector. She alleges that she and her supervisor developed a contentious relationship and that he singled her out for unfair treatment in the workplace. On April 17, 2009, Artis took her first administrative step against DOH by filing a discrimination claim with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and while that claim was pending, DOH terminated Artis’s employment in November 2010.</p> <p>In December 2011, Artis filed a lawsuit against the District in federal court alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and invoked the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction to assert claims based on the District’s Whistleblower Act, False Claims Act, and common law. The district court granted the District’s motion on the pleadings and dismissed Artis’s sole federal claim, violation of Title VII, as facially deficient. It thus found it had no basis to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.</p> <p>Fifty-nine days after her claims were dismissed in federal court, Artis filed the remaining claims in a D.C. trial court. The District alleged that Artis’s claims were time barred based on the respective statutes of limitations, and the trial judge agreed, finding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) does not suspend state statutes of limitations at the time of the unsuccessful federal filing.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Class v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-424

16-424

2017

Rodney Class

United States of America

<p>In May 2013, Rodney Class was arrested in the District of Columbia for possession of three firearms on United States Capitol Grounds in violation of 40 U.S.C. §5104(e). Class, representing himself, pleaded guilty in the district court. He appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on grounds of constitutional error and statutory error. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court and found Class guilty due to his guilty plea. The appellate court explained that the its precedent in <em>United States v. Delgado-Garcia</em>—which held that, “[u]nconditional guilty pleas that are knowing and intelligent...waive the pleading defendant[‘s] claims of error on appeal, even constitutional claims”—is binding on this case. Delgado articulates two exceptions to this rule in which a defendant may appeal: (1) “the defendant’s claimed right to not be haled into court at all” and (2) “that the court below lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case…” However, the court held that neither exception applies here.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Rippo v. Baker

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-6316

16-6316

2016

Michael Damon Rippo

Renee Baker, Warden

<p dir="ltr">Michael Damon Rippo was charged with first-degree murder in Nevada state court. During his trial, Rippo obtained information that the judge was the subject of a federal bribery investigation and that the Clark County District Attorney’s Office prosecuting his case was a participant in the judge’s investigation. Rippo moved to disqualify the judge under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and argued that a judge could not impartially preside over a case in which one of the parties was investigating him. The judge declined to recuse himself, Rippo was convicted. After the initial judge was indicted on federal charges, another judge denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Rippo’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and held that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authorities were involved in the federal investigation. </p> <p>Rippo later applied for state post-conviction relief. He reasserted his bias claim, this time with evidence of state authorities’ involvement in the federal investigation of the trial judge. The state court denied post-conviction relief. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed and determined that Rippo was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allegations did not support an assertion that the trial judge was actually biased in his case. </p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Due Process

Wilson v. Sellers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-6855

16-6855

2017

Marion Wilson

Eric Sellers, Warden

<p>A Georgia jury convicted Marion Wilson of malice murder and several other felonies. At sentencing, Wilson’s attorney argued that Wilson was not the triggerman and presented evidence of his difficult childhood. The trial court sentenced Wilson to death, and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. Wilson filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County, Georgia, in which he argued ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in the sentencing phase of his trial. His argument rested on lay testimony that could have been used as evidence of his difficult childhood and expert testimony that could have explained his poor judgment skills. The superior court denied the petition in a written order. Wilson then filed an application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, which the Georgia Supreme Court summarily denied in a one-sentence order. </p> <p>Wilson then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court denied him relief on the grounds that the state trial court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. However, the district court granted Wilson a certificate of appealability on the issue of effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, reasoning that “the one-line decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia . . . is the relevant state-court decision for our review because it is the final decision on the merits.” In his petition for rehearing en banc, Wilson argued that the panel should have examined the last reasoned decision by a state court. Georgia originally argued a federal court should “look through” a summary order to see whether it was based on procedural grounds or merits, but then it changed its position and argued that the court should look to the reasoned opinion. The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, appointed an amicus curiae to argue Georgia’s original position on the matter. The Eleventh Circuit en banc ultimately concluded that federal courts do not need to “look through” a summary decision on the merits to review the reasoning of a lower court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-658

16-658

2017

Charmaine Hamer

Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago

<p>Charmaine Hamer, a former intake specialist for the Housing Services of Chicago (NHS) and Fannie Mae’s Mortgage Help Center, filed suit against her former employers, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae and NHS on September 14, 2015.</p> <p>Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), Hamer had until October 14, 2015 to appeal the judgment. On October 8, 2015, her attorney filed a motion to extend the appeal deadline to December 14, 2015, which the district court granted. Hamer filed her appeal on December 11, 2015.</p> <p>In a brief requested by the appellate court, Fannie Mae and NHS argued that Hamer’s appeal was untimely under Rule 4(a)(5)(C) and thus that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. That rule states that “[n]o extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 14 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.” Hamer argued that the rule is at odds with 28 U.S.C. Section 2107(a), which provides that “the district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause.” The appellate court found Hamer’s argument unpersuasive and dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-499

16-499

2017

Joseph Jesner, et al.

Arab Bank, PLC

<p>Several alien individuals were injured, kidnapped, or killed by terrorists in attacks against Israeli citizens overseas. The surviving aliens and the families of those who perished in the attacks accused Arab Bank, PLC (Arab Bank), a bank corporation headquartered in Jordan, of financing and facilitating various terrorist organizations involved in the attacks. The survivors sued Arab Bank in New York federal court under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides for federal district court jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens. Arab Bank moved to dismiss the ATS claims under the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. In that case, the appellate court held that the ATS does not authorize claims against foreign corporations. The district court acknowledged that, because the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Kiobel on other grounds and had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the court of appeals’ holding was still controlling precedent and therefore dismissed the ATS claims. On appeal, the appellate court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision did cast some doubt on the corporate liability holding in Kiobel. However, because the Supreme Court had not addressed the question of corporate liability, the appellate court  affirmed the lower court’s dismissal.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

U.S. Bank National Association v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1509

15-1509

2017

U.S. Bank National Association

Village at Lakeridge, LLC

<p>The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, (Lakeridge) filed for bankruptcy on June 16, 2011. At that time, MBP Equity Partners 1, LLC (MBP), a member of Lakeridge, decided to sell its claim on Lakeridge’s assets to Robert Rabkin. In a deposition, Rabkin testified that he had a close relationship with a member of MBP’s board. U.S. Bank National Association, which also held a claim to Lakeridge’s assets, offered to purchase Rabkin’s claim, but Rabkin decided not to accept it. U.S. Bank subsequently filed a motion to designate Rabkin as both a statutory and non-statutory insider, either of which would prevent Rabkin from voting on bankruptcy plan proceedings. The bankruptcy court held that Rabkin had become a statutory insider by purchasing a claim from MBP, which the court considered an insider because it was an affiliate of Lakeridge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that insider status is a question of fact that appellate courts review under the deferential standard of clear error. Under the clear error standard, an appellate court will only reverse a lower court’s finding if it is clear from the evidence that a mistake has been made. After reviewing the case under this standard, the appellate court reversed and held that a third party that is assigned a claim does not assume the insider status of the assigning party. The court also held that Rabkin was not a non-statutory insider because the evidence did not show that Rabkin had a close enough relationship with the member of MBP’s board to be considered an insider.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Ayestas v. Davis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-6795

16-6795

2017

Carlos Manuel Ayestas

Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Institutional Division)

<p dir="ltr">In July 1997, Carlos Manuel Ayestas, a Honduran national, was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Santiaga Paneque at her home in Houston, Texas. Ayestas appealed his conviction and filed for state habeas relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; he argued that his trial counsel failed to secure the testimony of family members who could have presented mitigating evidence. The state habeas court found that Ayestas’ trial attorney was not ineffective and denied his application for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the findings of the state habeas court and denied relief as well. </p> <p>In 2009, Ayestas, with a new attorney, filed a federal habeas petition and claimed that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation that would have uncovered “available and abundant” mitigating factors. However, the district court found that his claim was procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised in the state habeas proceeding and denied relief. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The US Supreme Court subsequently decided <em>Martinez v. Ryan</em>, which held that ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim may excuse a procedural default. The Supreme Court later extended the holding of <em>Martinez</em> to Texas’ habeas scheme in <em>Trevino v. Thaler</em>. In light of these decisions, Ayestas asked for a rehearing. On rehearing in the district court, Ayestas filed a motion for investigative assistance that was “reasonably necessary” to develop his broader ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). The district court denied the motion based on Fifth Circuit precedent that holds that investigative assistance is not “reasonably necessary” unless the habeas petitioner can carry the ultimate burden of proof on the underlying claim at the time of the request for investigative assistance. The district court determined that Ayestas could not meet his burden of proof on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and therefore denied the motion. The appellate court affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Patchak v. Zinke

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-498

16-498

2017

David Patchak

Ryan Zinke, Sec. of Interior

<p>The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the Gun Lake Tribe) is an Indian tribe in western Michigan that was first formally recognized by the U.S. Department of the Interior in 1999. In 2001, the Tribe petitioned for a tract of land called the Bradley Property to be put into trust for the Tribe’s use under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 465, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted the petition in 2005. The Tribe subsequently constructed and opened the Gun Lake Casino on the Bradley Property.</p> <p>David Patchak lives in a rural area near the Bradley Property and asserts that he moved there because of its unique rural setting and that the construction and operation of the casino caused him injury. Patchak filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Interior and other defendants, claiming that the Secretary lacked the authority to put the Bradley Property into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe. That lawsuit was argued up to the U.S. Supreme Court on a threshold issue of standing, and after the Supreme Court held that Patchak had standing to sue, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Act, which provided, among other things, that any legal action relating to the Bradley Property “shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.”</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Merit Management Group v. FTI Consulting, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-784

16-784

2017

Merit Management Group

FTI Consulting, Inc.

<p dir="ltr">Valley View Downs, LP, the owner of a Pennsylvania racetrack, acquired all shares of a competing racetrack, Bedford Downs, in exchange for $55 million. The exchange took place through Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, the escrow agent, and Valley View borrowed money from Credit Suisse and other lenders to pay for the shares. Shortly thereafter, Valley View filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.</p> <p dir="ltr"> </p> <p dir="ltr">FTI Consulting, Inc., as Trustee of the litigation trust that includes Valley View as one of the debtors, brought this lawsuit against Merit Management Group, a 30% shareholder in Bedford Downs. FTI seeks to avoid Bedford's $16.5 million transfer to Valley View under Bankruptcy Code sections 544, 548(a)(1)(b), and 550, which are safe harbor provisions for transfers "made by or to" certain enumerated entities. It is undisputed that Credit Suisse and Citizens Bank are financial institutions within the language of the statute, but at issue is whether the language “made by or to” includes institutions that act merely as a conduit for the transfer and do not benefit from it.</p> <p>The Seventh Circuit held that section 546(e) does not provide a safe harbor against avoidance of transfers between non-named entities where a named entity merely acts as a conduit for the transfer. The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the provision in the same way as the Seventh, while the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held to the contrary.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-969

16-969

2017

SAS Institute Inc.

Joseph MatalAndrei Iancu, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al.

<p>SAS Institute Inc. appealed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in which that court held that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) did not err in issuing a final written decision in an inter partes review that was petitioned by SAS Institute. While the PTAB contended that it need only have addressed certain challenged claims, rather than every challenged claim, SAS alleged that the PTAB in fact misconstrued a claim term, as well as erred by not addressing all the claims SAS challenged in its original petition.
</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-980

16-980

2017

Jon Husted

A. Philip Randolph Institute

<p>Ohio currently employs a process that clears the state’s voter rolls of individuals who have died or relocated. Under this process, voters who have not voted for two years are sent notices to confirm their registration. If the state receives no response and these individuals do not vote over the next four years, they are ultimately removed from the rolls.</p> <p>Plaintiffs are various civil rights groups that are challenging the process, claiming that it is not only inappropriate to remove individuals from the voter rolls as a consequence of failing to vote but also violates part of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993. The Act prohibits a program for voter-list maintenance for federal elections that involves “the removal of the name of any personal from the official list of voters . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.” Plaintiffs believe that the Supreme Court should involve itself and determine whether this process violates the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit previously struck down these rules, deeming them a violation of federal voting law because Ohio's process involves using an individual's failure to vote as a "trigger" for sending out a confirmation notice to that person. Plaintiffs consequently argue that there is no reason to disturb the appellate court decision. Defendants argue that Ohio is adhering to federal voter law, as set forth in the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

North Carolina v. Covington

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-1023

16-1023

2016

North Carolina, et al.

Sandra Little Covington, et al.

<p>In 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew state legislative districts in response to changes in population recorded in the 2010 Census. In May 2015, several North Carolina citizens sued North Carolina in federal district court and argued that 28 majority-black districts under the new districting plan were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs in August 2016 and held that race had been the predominant factor in redrawing the districts at issue. The court did not require changes to the districts in the short time before the November 2016 election but did order the General Assembly to redraw the map prior to holding any other elections. Three months later, the court put in place a remedial order that set a March 2017 deadline for the redrawing of the districts, required that any legislator elected in 2016 from a later-modified district serve only a one-year term, and ordered special elections take place in the fall of 2017. North Carolina appealed the remedial order to the U.S. Supreme Court. </p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Carpenter v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402

16-402

2017

Timothy Ivory Carpenter

United States of America

<p>In April 2011, police arrested four men in connection with a series of armed robberies. One of the men confessed to the crimes and gave the FBI his cell phone number and the numbers of the other participants. The FBI used this information to apply for three orders from magistrate judges to obtain "transactional records" for each of the phone numbers, which the judges granted under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(d). That Act provides that the government may require the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when "specific and articulable facts show[] that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." The transactional records obtained by the government include the date and time of calls, and the approximate location where calls began and ended based on their connections to cell towers—"cell site" location information (CSLI).</p> <p>Based on the cell-site evidence, the government charged Timothy Carpenter with, among other offenses, aiding and abetting robbery that affected interstate commerce, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Carpenter moved to suppress the government's cell-site evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, arguing that the FBI needed a warrant based on probable cause to obtain the records. The district court denied the motion to suppress, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Virginia v. LeBlanc

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-1177

16-1177

2016

Virginia, et al.

Dennis LeBlanc

<p dir="ltr">In 2003, Dennis LeBlanc was sentenced in Virginia state court to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for raping a woman when he was 16 years old. In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, which held that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses. The Court noted that Graham did not require states to guarantee eventual freedom to juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes, but they did have to allow for “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” LeBlanc subsequently filed a motion in state trial court seeking to vacate his sentence under Graham. The trial court denied the motion based on a Virginia Supreme Court decision that held that the state’s geriatric release program--that allows for conditional release for older inmates under some circumstances--satisfied the Graham requirements. Therefore, the state trial court held that LeBlanc’s sentence did not violate the rule established in Graham.</p> <p>In 2012, LeBlanc filed a federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge recommended that the petition be dismissed, but the district court disagreed and granted the petition because it determined that the state court’s decision was an unreasonable application of the law established in Graham. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. </p>

per curiam

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Oil States Energy Services LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-712

16-712

2017

Oil States Energy Services LLC

Greene’s Energy Group, LLC

<p>During hydraulic fracturing (known as “fracking”) procedures, fluid is pumped into oil and gas wells to stimulate production. However, the wellheads that sit on top of oil and gas wells are not designed to withstand continuous exposure to fracking fluids and can sustain significant damage as a result. In an attempt to address this issue, Stinger Wellhead Protection Inc., a subsidiary of Oil States Energy Services, first tried using a design described in Canadian Patent Application No. 2,195,118 (the ’118 Application) that relies on using hydraulic pressure first to push a “mandrel” into the wellhead through which the fracking fluid could be pumped without contacting the wellhead equipment. That method failed to sufficiently address the issue, so the Oil States subsidiary attempted a different method using a mechanical lockdown mechanism (described in Patent No. 6,179,053, or the ’053 Patent), rather than hydraulic pressure. In 2012, Oil States filed a patent infringement suit against Greene’s Energy Group, during the course of which litigation the district court found the ’053 Patent to be distinct from the ’118 Application using the “ordinary meaning” standard. Greene’s filed for inter partes review, which is a process used by the Patent and Trademark Office where one party asks the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board to reconsider the PTO’s issuance of an existing patent and invalidate it on the ground that it was anticipated by prior art or obvious. Oil States challenges the practice of inter partes review as violating the constitutional right of patent owners to a jury and an Article III forum before having their patent invalidated. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Pavan v. Smith

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-992

16-992

2016

Marisa N. Pavan

Nathaniel Smith

<p>Leigh and Jana Jacobs, and Terrah and Marisa Pavan—both same-sex couples—were married in Iowa in 2010, and in New Hampshire in 2011, respectively. Leigh and Terrah each gave birth to a child in Arkansas in 2015, and each couple completed the requisite paperwork for birth certificates for the newborns listing both spouses as parents—Leigh and Jana in one case, and Terrah and Marisa in the other. Citing a provision of Arkansas law, Ark. Code 20-18-401, the Arkansas Department of Health issue certificates bearing only the birth mother's name.</p> <p>The Jacobses and Pavans filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the director of the Arkansas Department of Health seeking a declaration that the State's birth-certificate law violates the constitution. The trial court agreed with the couples, holding that the state statute is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Due Process

Gill v. Whitford

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1161

16-1161

2017

Beverly R. Gill

William Whitford

<p>In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters elected a Republican majority in the state assembly and the senate, and a Republican governor. As a result, the Republican leadership developed a voting district map that its drafters calculated would allow Republicans to maintain a majority under any likely voting scenario. The redistricting plan was introduced in July 2011, and both the senate and the assembly passed the bill shortly thereafter. The governor signed the bill into law in August 2011. Even before it was enacted, the plan faced two legal challenges, on constitutional and statutory grounds. A federal court upheld the plan as not violating the “one person one vote” principle nor violating the Equal Protection Clause.</p> <p>Plaintiffs in this case challenge the plan as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. At issue is whether the plan systematically dilutes the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/15-1439

15-1439

2017

Cyan, Inc., et. al.

Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund, et. al.

<p>Since the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal law claims brought under that statute. Congress then passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which precluded certain state law securities class actions, and amended the 1933 Act to reflect that limitation on state court claims.</p> <p>Beaver County Employees' Retirement Fund filed a lawsuit in a California superior court asserting claims under the 1933 Act. Cyan Inc. moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the amended 1933 Act precluded state courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims entirely. The superior court rejected Cyan's objection to the exercise of jurisdiction. Federal district courts are split as to whether state courts have subject matter jurisdiction over covered class actions that allege only 1933 Act claims.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-476

16-476

2017

Philip D. Murphy, Governor of New Jersey, et al.

National Collegiate Athletic Association, et. al.

<p>In 1992, Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704, to prohibit state-sanctioned sports gambling. Included in PASPA are exceptions for state-sponsored sports wagering in Nevada and sports lotteries in Oregon and Delaware, as well as for New Jersey, provided that New Jersey also enact a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA's enactment, which it did not do. PASPA also permits any sports league whose games are or will be the subject of sports gambling to bring an action to enjoin the gambling.</p> <p>In 2011, the New Jersey Legislature held a referendum asking voters whether sports gambling should be permitted, and 64 percent voted in favor of a state constitutional amendment that would permit sports gambling. The legislature then drafted and received voter approval of a sports-wagering constitutional amendment, after which time, in 2012, it enacted the Sports Wagering Act ("2012 Act"), which authorized certain regulated sports wagering at New Jersey casinos and racetracks and implemented a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events.</p> <p>Five sports leagues sued under PASPA to enjoin the New Jersey law, which the state defended by arguing that PASPA was unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The district court held that PASPA was constitutional and enjoined the 2012 Act. The legislature passed a second law ("2014 Law") that purported to repeal the regulatory scheme for licensing casinos and sporting events, effectively providing tacit authorization of them. The leagues again sued to enjoin the 2014 Law, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the leagues and issued a permanent injunction against the governor and other state agencies. A divided panel of the Third Circuit affirmed, and upon rehearing, the Third Circuit en banc affirmed the majority opinion of the panel.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Federalism

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111

16-111

2017

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.; and Jack C. Phillips

Colorado Civil Rights Commission; Charlie Craig; and David Mullins

<p>In July 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins went to Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, CO, and requested that its owner, Jack C. Phillips, design and create a cake for their wedding. Phillips declined to do so on the grounds that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious beliefs. Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a form of art through which he can honor God and that it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.</p> <p>Craig and Mullins filed charges of discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), §§ 24-34-301 to -804, C.R.S. 2014. After the Division issued a notice of determination finding probable cause, Craig and Mullins filed a formal complaint with the Office of Administrative Courts alleging that Masterpiece discriminated against them in a place of public accommodation in violation of CADA.</p> <p>The Administrative Law Judge issued a written order finding in favor of Craig and Mullins, which was affirmed by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Commission's ruling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Marinello v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1144

16-1144

2017

Carlo J. Marinello, III

United States of America

<p>Carlo J. Marinello II owned and operated a freight service that couriered items to and from the United States and Canada. Between 1992 and 2010, Marinello did not keep an accounting of his business, nor did he file personal or corporate income tax returns. Indeed, he shredded bank statements and business records. After an investigation by the IRS, Marinello was indicted by a grand jury on nine counts of tax-related offenses, and a jury found him guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, one year of parole, and was ordered to pay over $350,000 to the IRS in restitution.</p> <p>One of the counts of which Marinello was charged and convicted was violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which imposes criminal liability on one who "in any . . . way corruptly . . . obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title." Marinello appealed his conviction on the grounds that the phrase "the due administration of this title" requires the defendant be aware of IRS action, and the government provided no evidence at trial that Marinello knew of a pending IRS investigation against him. Finding that knowledge of a pending investigation is not an element of the offense of which Marinello was convicted, the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-534

16-534

2017

Jenny Rubin, et. al.

Islamic Republic of Iran

<p>In September 1997, three Hamas suicide bombers blew themselves up in an a crowded area in Jerusalem. Among the injured were eight U.S. citizens, who consequently filed a lawsuit against the Islamic Republic of Iran for its role in providing material support to the attackers. In general, sovereign governments are immune from lawsuit, but the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") provides an exception to that immunity in cases of state-sponsored of terrorism. A district judge in D.C. entered a $71.5 million default judgment against Iran, which Iran did not pay. The plaintiffs then litigated numerous cases across the country in an attempt to attach and execute on Iranian assets to satisfy the judgment.</p> <p>The case at hand involves four collections of ancient Persian artifacts within the possession of the University of Chicago and Chicago's Field Museum of Natural History. With few exceptions, a foreign state's property in the United States is immune from attachment and execution. The plaintiffs argued before the district court that they should be able to attach and execute Iran's property under subsections (a) and (g) of 28 U.S.C. § 1610, as well as section 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"). The district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that while § 1610(a) permits execution on a foreign state's property "used for a commercial activity in the United States," that provision requires use by the foreign state itself, not a third party (such as a museum). The district court also held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 1610(g) permits attachment to property of a foreign state in aid of execution only in cases described elsewhere in § 1610, rendering that provision unavailable to the plaintiffs in this case. Finally, the district court held, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that § 201 of TRIA applies only to assets blocked by executive order, and in the absence of an executive order blocking the particular assets sought, plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of that provision either.</p> <p>The Seventh Circuit's holding thus conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's prior holding that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding attachment immunity exception that allows terrorism victims to attach and execute upon any assets of foreign state sponsors of terrorism, regardless of whether the assets are otherwise subject to execution under section 1610.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1276

16-1276

2017

Digital Realty Trust, Inc.

Paul Somers

<p>Paul Somers worked as Vice President of Digital Realty Trust from 2010 to 2014. According to his complaint, Somers filed several reports to senior management regarding possible securities law violations by the company, after which reports the company fired him. He did not report his concerns to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before he was terminated. Somers then sued Digital Realty, alleging violations of state and federal laws, including Section 21F of the Exchange Act, which includes the anti-retaliation protections created by the Dodd-Frank Act. Digital Realty sought to dismiss the Section 21F claim on the ground that, because Somers did not actually report the possible violations to the SEC, he was not a "whistleblower" as defined in the Act and thus not entitled to protection under its provisions.</p> <p>The Fifth Circuit in 2013 had strictly applied the Act's definition of "whistleblower" to the anti-retaliation provision, while the Second Circuit, finding the statute itself ambiguous and applying <em>Chevron</em> deference to the SEC's reasonable interpretation of it, had held in 2015 that the provision extends to all those who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless of whether the disclosures are made internally or to the SEC. The district court in this case followed the Second Circuit's approach and denied Digital Realty's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Murphy v. Smith

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1067

16-1067

2017

Charles Murphy

Robert Smith, et al.

<p>Charles Murphy was an inmate in the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois. In July 2011, correctional officers hit Murphy, fracturing his eye socket, and did not provide him proper medical attention. Murphy sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law theories. A jury returned a verdict in his favor and awarded him damages for some of his claims under state law, and the district court awarded him attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Two of the defendants appealed the judgment, arguing that the Illinois doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the state-law claims and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that 25 percent of the damages awarded be used to pay the attorney fee award.</p> <p>The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the state officials or employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity against state-law claims where the officials or employees violated statutory or constitutional law, which violations Murphy alleged and proved. The Seventh Circuit reversed on the attorney fee award, however, finding that the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) requires that the attorney fee award must first be satisfied from up to 25 percent of the damage award and that the district court does not have discretion to reduce that maximum percentage.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Attorneys

Byrd v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1371

16-1371

2017

Terrence Byrd

United States of America

<p>Terrence Byrd was driving on a divided four-lane highway near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was pulled over allegedly for violating a state law requiring drivers to use the left lane for passing only. Recognizing the car as a rental car, the officers asked Byrd for his license and rental agreement, which he had difficulty locating. Once he did locate them, the officers noted that the rental agreement did not list Byrd as an authorized driver, and when they ran his identification, they noted that he was using an alias and had an outstanding warrant in New Jersey. Despite the warrant’s indication that it did not request extradition from other jurisdictions, the officers attempted to contact authorities in New Jersey to confirm they did not seek Byrd’s arrest and extradition, allegedly following protocol for such situations. The officers experienced difficulty with their communications, however, and returned to Byrd’s car, where they asked him to exit the vehicle and about his warrant and alias.</p> <p>The officers asked whether Byrd had anything illegal in the car and then requested Byrd’s consent to search the car, noting that they did not actually need his consent because he was not listed on the rental agreement. The officers allege that Byrd gave his consent, but Byrd disputes this contention. The subsequent search turned up heroin and body armor in the trunk of the car.</p> <p>At trial, Byrd moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the initial stop, the extension of the stop, and the search. The district court determined that the violation of the traffic law justified the initial stop and that the extension of the stop was justified by the officers’ developing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Byrd maintains that he did not consent to the search, so the issue remains whether he needed to consent at all—that is, whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, despite not being listed on the rental agreement. If he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the officers’ search of the vehicle did not require his consent.</p> <p>There is a circuit split as to whether an unlisted driver of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental vehicle, and the Third Circuit (where the district court in this case sits) has held that such a driver does not. Thus, the district court denied Byrd’s motion to suppress, and the Third Circuit, reviewing the factual questions for clear error and the legal question de novo, affirmed the judgment of the district court.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1495

16-1495

2017

City of Hays, Kansas

Matthew Jack Dwight Vogt

<p>Matthew Vogt was employed as a police officer with the City of Hays, Kansas, when he applied for a position with the City of Haysville police department. During Vogt’s interview process with the City of Haysville, he disclosed that he had kept a knife obtained while working for the City of Hays.</p> <p>The City of Haysville made Vogt an offer of employment contingent on his reporting his acquisition of the knife to the City of Hays and returning it, which Vogt did. Upon this report, the City of Hays chief of police ordered Vogt to issue a statement regarding the knife, which Vogt submitted nominally, in addition to a letter of resignation due to his intent to accept the position with the Haysville Police Department.</p> <p>The Hays police chief began an internal investigation into Vogt and required him to issue a more detailed statement regarding the knife. This subsequent statement led to additional evidence, and Hays Police Department submitted both to the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, asking the Bureau to initiate a criminal investigation. As a result of the criminal investigation, the Haysville Police Department withdraw its offer of employment to Vogt.</p> <p>Vogt was charged in state court with two felony counts related to his possession of the knife. Following a probable cause hearing, the state district court determined that probable cause was lacking and dismissed the charges. Vogt brought a federal lawsuit alleging that the use of his compelled statements (1) to start an investigation leading to the discovery of additional evidence concerning the knife, (2) to initiate a criminal investigation, (3) to bring criminal charges, and (4) to support the prosecution during the probable cause hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.</p> <p>The district court dismissed his case for failure to state a claim, and, reviewing the claims de novo, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to the first three claims but reversed as to the fourth one, finding that the Fifth Amendment is violated when criminal defendants are compelled to incriminate themselves and the incriminating statement is used in a probable cause hearing.</p>

dismissal - improvidently granted

none

Criminal Procedure

Collins v. Virginia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1027

16-1027

2017

Ray Austin Collins

Commonwealth of Virginia

<p>On two occasions, a particular unique-looking motorcycle evaded Albemarle police officers after they observed the rider violating traffic laws. After some investigation, one of the officers located the house where the suspected driver of the motorcycle lived and observed what appeared to be the same motorcycle covered by a tarp in the driveway. The officer lifted the tarp and confirmed that it was the motorcycle (which was also stolen) that had eluded detainment on multiple occasions. The officer waited for the suspect to return home, at which point he went to the front door to inquire about the motorcycle. Initially the suspect denied knowing anything about it but eventually confessed that he had bought the motorcycle knowing that it had been stolen. The officer arrested the suspect for receipt of stolen property.</p> <p>At trial, the defendant sought to suppress the motorcycle as evidence on the grounds that the police officer conducted an illegal warrantless search (by lifting the tarp covering the motorcycle parked in the driveway) that led to its discovery. The trial court held that the search was based on probable cause and justified under the exigent circumstances automobile exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and convicted the defendant. The appeals court affirmed on the grounds of exigent circumstances, and the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed as well, but under the automobile exception only. The Virginia Supreme Court reasoned that the automobile exception applies even when the vehicle is not “immediately mobile” and applies to vehicles parked on private property.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1362

16-1362

2017

Encino Motorcars, LLC

Hector Navarro, et al.

<p>Encino Motorcars, LLC, which sells and services Mercedes-Benz cars, employed Hector Navarro and others as “service advisors.” Their role was to greet car owners upon arrival in the service area of the dealership, listen to customers’ concerns about their cars, evaluate the repair and maintenance needs of the cars, suggest services, write up estimates, and follow up with the customer while repair work was being done.</p> <p>Navarro and the other plaintiffs alleged in federal district court that Encino Motorcars violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them overtime wages. The district court dismissed the claim, finding that the FLSA exempts service advisors from its overtime compensation provisions. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, using the principle of Chevron deference to rely on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor in 2011 interpreting the statutory exemption as not encompassing service providers. The US Supreme Court vacated the panel’s decision, holding that the regulation lacked sufficient explanation and thus was not entitled to deference. On remand, the Ninth Circuit formulated its own interpretation of the applicable FLSA provision and concluded that the exemption does not encompass service advisors.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Unions

Dalmazzi v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-961

16-961

2017

Nicole A. Dalmazzi

United States of America

<p>Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a "civil office,” including positions that require "an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I US Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the US Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA). A judge convicted Nicole Dalmazzi of wrongfully using ecstasy, a Schedule I controlled substance and sentenced her to dismissal and confinement for one month. The AFCCA affirmed the findings and sentence. Dalmazzi moved the CCA to vacate its judgment because of the participation of Judge Mitchell on the panel. Before the CCA ruled on her motion, Dalmazzi filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), so the CCA dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The CAAF rejected as moot Dalmazzi’s challenge to Judge Mitchell's continued service on the AFCCA, because his CMCR commission had not been signed until after the AFCCA decided her case on the merits. Both of the other consolidated cases involve similar facts, where Judge Mitchell was on the CCA panel that affirmed the convictions of the petitioners.</p>

dismissal - improvidently granted

none

Civil Rights

Hall v. Hall

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1150

16-1150

2017

Elsa Hall, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ethlyn Louise Hall and as Successor Trustee of the Ethlyn Louise Hall Family Trust

Samuel H. Hall, Jr., et al.

<p>Ethlyn Hall, an elderly landowner in the Virgin Islands, filed suit against her son when she grew dissatisfied with his actions as her attorney. After Ethlyn passed away, one of her daughters, Elsa Hall, served as personal representative of the estate (the “Estate”) and continued to press Ethlyn’s claims against Samuel. Samuel brought claims of his own against Elsa in a separate proceeding. He argued that Elsa had poisoned his relationship with his mother, which caused him serious emotional distress. The Estate’s claims and Samuel’s claims were consolidated and tried together. A jury rejected the Estate’s claims and rendered a two million dollar verdict in Samuel’s favor. The District Court entered separate judgments on both aspects of the jury’s decision. </p> <p>The Estate appealed the judgment with respect to its claims, but did not appeal the judgment in favor of Samuel because the district court vacated the jury verdict and his claims were still awaiting retrial. Samuel argue that the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal while his claims were still pending in the district court, and the Third Circuit agreed.</p> <p>The Third Circuit relied on its binding precedent in <em>Bergman v. City of Atlantic City</em>, which held that when two cases have been consolidated for all purposes, a final decision on one set of claims is generally not appealable while the second set remains pending. The Estate argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp.</em> affirming the appealability of final judgment in a case that was part of a multi-district litigation should dictate the outcome of the case and permit the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims that have a final judgment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1466

16-1466

2017

Mark Janus

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et al.

<p>In 1977, the Supreme Court, in <em>Abood v. Detroit Board of Education</em>, upheld against a First Amendment challenge a Michigan law that allowed a public employer whose employees were represented by a union to require those of its employees who did not join the union nevertheless to pay fees to it because they benefited from the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the employer.</p> <p>Illinois has a law similar to that upheld in Michigan. The governor of Illinois brought a lawsuit challenging the law on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment by compelling employees who disapprove of the union to contribute money to it. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the governor lacked standing to sue because he did not stand to suffer injury from the law, but two public employees intervened in the action to seek that Abood be overturned. Given that Abood is binding on lower courts, the district court dismissed the claim, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal for the same reason.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Unions

McCoy v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-8255

16-8255

2017

Robert McCoy

State of Louisiana

<p>Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty.</p> <p>The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Microsoft Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-2

17-2

2017

United States of America

Microsoft Corporation

<p>Since 1997, Microsoft has operated a web-based email service available for public use without charge (most recently called Outlook.com). Much of the data associated with this service is saved on datacenters operated by Microsoft and its subsidiaries, which are located throughout the world.</p> <p>In 2013, Microsoft was served with a search and seizure warrant for the data pertaining to a particular user. That user's data was stored solely in Microsoft's datacenter in Dublin, Ireland. Microsoft disclosed all other responsive information requested in the warrant but moved the magistrate judge to quash the warrant with respect to the user data stored in Dublin. The magistrate judge denied Microsoft's motion to quash, finding that the Stored Communications Act (SCA) authorized the district court to issue a warrant for "information that is stored on servers abroad." The magistrate judge held that the place where the government would review the content (the United States), not the place where the content was stored (Ireland) was the relevant place of seizure.</p> <p>Microsoft appealed the magistrate judge's decision, and the district court affirmed after reviewing de novo. The district court also held Microsoft in civil contempt for refusing to comply fully with the warrant. The Second Circuit held that the SCA does not authorize courts to issue and enforce against US-based service providers warrants for the seizure of customer email content that is stored exclusively on foreign servers and thus reversed the district court's denial of the motion to quash, vacated the finding of contempt, and remanded the case to the district court.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Rosales-Mireles v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-9493

16-9493

2017

Florencio Rosales-Mireles

United States of America

<p>Florencio Rosales-Mireles pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). His total criminal-history score was calculated according to the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual, but when calculating the criminal-history score, the probation officer erroneously counted a 2009 Texas conviction of misdemeanor assault twice. His total criminal-history score, combined with other factors, led a sentence of 78 months of imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. Rosales-Mireles did not object to the sentence after it was imposed.</p> <p>The Fifth Circuit found that Rosales-Mireles met the three prongs necessary to meet the plain error standard. However, if all three prongs are met, the court has the discretion to remedy the plain error if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court declined to exercise its discretion in this case and therefore affirmed the judgment of sentence.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Dahda v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-43

17-43

2017

Los Rovell Dahda, et al.

United States of America

<p>Los and Roosevelt Dahda – twin brothers – were indicted on charges that they had conspired to acquire and distribute marijuana. Much of the evidence against the Dahdas was obtained through wiretaps of cell phones used by the co-conspirators, including the Dahdas. The wiretaps arose out of nine orders issued by a federal district court in Kansas. Prior to trial, the Dahdas brothers moved to suppress the information obtained from the wiretaps on the grounds that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction. The trial court rejected that argument, and both were found guilty and sentenced.</p> <p>The Tenth Circuit upheld the decision allowing evidence from the cellphones to be used against the brothers. Although the court of appeals agreed that the wiretap orders exceeded the district court's territorial jurisdiction, it held that such defect did not "directly and substantially affect a congressional intention to limit wiretapping. The court identified two “core concerns” of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—privacy and uniformity—that were not implicated by the Dahdas’ argument that the order exceeded the Kansas district court’s jurisdiction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Ohio v. American Express Co.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1454

16-1454

2017

State of Ohio, et al.

American Express Company, et al.

<p>In the credit-card industry, there is what is called a “two-sided market.” Cardholders benefit from holding a card only if that card is accepted by a wide range of merchants, and merchants benefit from accepting a card only if a sufficient number of cardholders use it. Thus, the cardholder and the merchant both depend on widespread acceptance of a card.</p> <p>In the United States, credit-card transaction volume is comprised primarily of four networks: Visa (45%), American Express (26.4%), MasterCard (23.3%), and Discover (5.3%). Because of the way Visa and MasterCard transactions are handled, they do not directly set certain fees, but merely influence these prices. In contrast, American Express is directly involved in the vast majority of transactions involving its cards. Thus, it maintains direct relationships with both its cardholders and merchants and directly sets the relevant fees.</p> <p>In the 1980s, Visa and MasterCard adopted exclusionary rules preventing member institutions from issuing card products on the Amex or Discover networks, and ran ad campaigns highlighting Amex’s smaller network and higher merchant fees. In response, Amex strengthened contractual restraints designed to control how merchants treat Amex cardholders at the point of sale, known as non-discriminatory provisions (NDPs).</p> <p>In 2010, the federal government and 17 states sued Amex, Visa, and MasterCard for unreasonably restraining trade in violation of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the credit card companies used anti-steering provisions to suppress competition and block competition from rival networks. In 2011, Visa and MasterCard entered into consent judgments and voluntarily rescinded their anti-steering provisions. Amex proceeded to trial, and the district court ruled that Amex’s NDPs violated US antitrust laws. Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the lower court should have weighed the NDPs’ net effect on both merchants and cardholders under the generally accepted “rule of reason.”</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/141-orig

141-orig

2017

State of Texas

State of New Mexico and State of Colorado

<p>The Rio Grande originates in Colorado, flows south into New Mexico, and flows into Texas near El Paso. The Rio Grande Compact apportions the water of the Rio Grande Basin among the states of Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. Among other things, the Compact provides that Colorado must deliver a specific quantity of water to the New Mexico state line, and that New Mexico must then deliver a specific quantity of water to Elephant Butte Reservoir, a federal Bureau of Reclamation project that distributes water to New Mexico and Texas.</p> <p>Texas alleges that New Mexico has depleted Texas's equitable apportionment of water under the Compact by allowing diversion of surface water and pumping of groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande below Elephant Butte. New Mexico contends that the Compact does not require it to deliver any specific amount of water to the Texas state line and thus that its actions do not violate the Compact.</p>

majority opinion

none

Florida v. Georgia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/142-orig

142-orig

2017

State of Florida

State of Georgia

<p>The Chattahoochee River starts in north Georgia, flows southwest past Atlanta, and then flows south along Georgia's border, first with Alabama, then with Florida. In the southwest corner of Georgia, the Chattahoochee joins the Flint River, to form the Apalachicola River, which flows south through northwest Florida and into the Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico. At issue is the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin (ACF Basin), which the US Army Corps of Engineers reports drains a total of 19,800 square miles in Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, which is distributed roughly into 74%, 15%, and 11%, respectively.</p> <p>Pursuant to congressional authorizations, the Corps operates a system of dams in the ACF Basin based on a Master Manual governing all the dams and a reservoir regulation manual for each individual dam. The Master Manual was completed in 1958 and has not been comprehensively revised since then. There have been several lawsuits among the states seeking update and clarify the apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin. The present action was filed by Florida, which alleges that the ecosystem and economy of the Apalachicola region "are suffering serious harm" because of Georgia's consumption and storage of water from the Basin. Florida invokes the US Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to ask that the Court equitably apportion the waters of the ACF Basin. For equitable relief to be granted, Florida must first show standing—that is, that it has suffered a wrong through the action of another state that can be corrected by the courts. Second, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence a "threatened invasion of rights . . . of serious magnitude." Third, the state must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of apportionment substantially outweigh the harm that could result. If a state meets this burden, the Court must craft an equitable-apportionment decree. After lengthy evidentiary hearings, the Special Master filed a report recommending that the Court deny Florida's request for relief on the ground that "Florida has not proven by clear and convincing evidence that its injury can be redressed by an order equitably apportioning the waters of the Basin."</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Kernan v. Cuero

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1468

16-1468

2017

Scott Kernan

Michael Daniel Cuero

<p>In 2005, the State of California charged Michael Cuero with two felonies and a misdemeanor. Cuero initially pleaded “not guilty” but subsequently changed to plead guilty to the two felony counts. Cuero admitted that he had previously served four separate prison terms, including a term for residential burglary, which counts toward California’s “three strikes” law. On his guilty-plea form, Cuero indicated that he understood that he “may receive this maximum punishment as as result of my plea: 14 years, 4 months in State Prison, $10,000 fine and 4 years parole.” After a hearing, the state trial court accepted the plea and granted the State’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charge. The court then scheduled a sentencing hearing.</p> <p>Before the sentencing hearing occurred, the prosecution determined that a second of Cuero’s prior convictions qualified as a “strike” and that the guilty-plea form erroneously listed only one strike. The fact that the present conviction would constitute his third “strike” under the law, Cuero faced instead a minimum sentence of 25 years. The State asked the trial court for permission to amend the criminal complaint accordingly, and over Cuero’s objection, the court granted the State’s motion. However, the court permitted Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea in light of the change. Cuero withdrew his initial guilty plea and entered a new guilty plea to the amended complaint, which charged Cuero with one felony.</p> <p>The trial court sentenced Cuero to 25 years to life, his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied a state habeas petition.</p> <p>Cuero then filed a petition for federal habeas relief in the US District Court for the Southern District of California, which denied his petition. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the state trial court had “acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court law” by refusing to enforce the original plea agreement.”</p> <p> </p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Dunn v. Madison

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-193

17-193

2017

Jefferson Dunn, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections

Vernon Madison

<p>Vernon Madison is a 66-year-old man on death row in Alabama for the murder of a police officer over thirty years ago. Madison has suffered strokes resulting in significant cognitive and physical impairments, and his lawyers argue that he is mentally incompetent to be executed under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in <em>Ford v. Wainwright</em> and <em>Panetti v. Quarterman</em>. At a competency hearing held by an Alabama trial court, Madison's lawyers presented testimony from a doctor that Madison's strokes caused him not to remember committing the murder and that he does not understand why the state is seeking to execute him. The State presented a different doctor's expert testimony that Madison was able to accurately discuss his legal appeals and legal theories with his attorneys and thus that he has a rational understanding of his sentence.</p> <p>The trial court decided that Madison was competent to be executed, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that facts in the record were insufficient to support the trial court's decision and that the trial court erroneously applied the test for competency established in Panetti.</p> <p> </p>

per curiam

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Currier v. Virginia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1348

16-1348

2017

Michael N. Currier

Commonwealth of Virginia

<p>Michael N. Currier was indicted by a single grand jury and charged with burglary, grand larceny, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, the defense and prosecution agreed to sever the firearm charge from the grand larceny and burglary charges. The case proceeded to trial on the burglary and grand larceny charges, and a jury acquitted Currier of both charges.</p> <p>When the Commonwealth of Virginia sought to try Currier on the remaining charge of felon in possession of a firearm, he objected that collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) protections embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his retrial. Notwithstanding his objections, Currier was tried, convicted, and sentenced. Currier filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict, and the trial court denied his motion. The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s conviction, as did the Supreme Court of Virginia.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1140

16-1140

2017

National Institute of Family and Life Advocates, et al.

Xavier Becerra, et al.

<p>The National Institute of Family and Life Advocates and two other religiously-affiliated pro-life entities engaged in providing pregnancy-related services in the state of California (collectively “NIFLA”) sought to enjoin the enforcement of the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the “Act”). The law’s stated purpose is to ensure access to reproductive health services for all California women, regardless of income. NIFLA argued that the Act’s requirements that (1) licensed clinics provide information to patients about free and low-cost publicly funded family planning services, including contraception and abortion, and that (2) unlicensed clinics inform patients of their unlicensed status violated their free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment.</p> <p>The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied NIFLA’s motion for preliminary injunction, concluding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), as to either their free speech or free exercise claims.</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit affirmed, ruling that the district court had not abused its discretion by denying the injunction. The Court rejected NIFLA’s argument that strict scrutiny should apply to the Act, because while the law compelled content-based speech by requiring NIFLA to disseminate information about low-cost family planning services, it did not discriminate based on viewpoint. Relying on its own precedent in the face of a circuit split regarding the level of scrutiny to apply in the abortion-related disclosure context, the Court reasoned that the type of speech at issue in this case was professional speech. It was therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny, which the family planning information disclosure requirement survived. </p> <p>The Court also affirmed that the requirement that unlicensed facilities disclose their unlicensed status survived any level of scrutiny.</p> <p>Finally, the Court agreed with the decision below that NIFLA was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on free exercise grounds, finding that the Act to be a facially neutral law of general applicability that survived rational basis review. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include this issue.</p>

reversed/remanded

Privacy

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-21

17-21

2017

Fane Lozman

The City of Riviera Beach, Florida

<p>Fane Lozman was a resident of the City of Riviera Beach (the “City”), where he was a vocal critic of the City’s plan to utilize eminent domain to redevelop the Riviera Beach Marina. After the redevelopment plan was approved, Lozman filed suit against the City under the Florida Sunshine Law, seeking to invalidate the City’s approval of the plan due to insufficient public notice for the emergency meeting during which the plan had been approved. The city council met in a closed session to discuss the lawsuit, and the meeting transcript seemed to reflect councilmembers suggesting that the City should employ intimidation tactics in fighting Lozman’s claim. </p> <p>On November 15, 2006, Lozman attended a regularly scheduled city council meeting and was granted permission to speak during the non-agenda public comment portion of the meeting. When it was his turn to speak, he attempted to begin discussing corruption in local government, and a councilmember instructed him to discontinue his comments on that topic. Lozman repeatedly ignored the councilmember’s instructions, and she ultimately instructed a City police officer to arrest Lozman. </p> <p>Lozman was charged with, inter alia, disturbing a lawful assembly. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was probable cause for the arrest, but dismissed the charges on the grounds that successful prosecution was unlikely. </p> <p>In February 2008, Lozman filed suit against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the City had arrested him at the city council meeting in retaliation for his opposition to the redevelopment plan. He alleged (1) retaliation by false arrest under the First Amendment, (2) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and (3) common law false arrest. The case went to trial in November 2014 with Lozman appearing pro se. The jury found in favor of the City on all claims. Lozman filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. </p> <p>On appeal, Lozman argued that the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury’s finding of probable cause on the charge of disturbing a lawful assembly was against the great weight of the evidence. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this contention in light of the evidence presented at trial. It further explained that under its own precedent, a finding of probable cause bars a claim for false arrest under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and state law. </p> <p>The Eleventh Circuit also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the district court’s instruction on retaliatory animus, stating that any error the instruction may have contained was harmless because the jury’s probable cause finding defeated Lozman’s retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law. The appeals court also rejected Lozman’s challenge to the lower court’s jury instructions regarding the City’s authority to limit public comment during city council meetings. The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari did not include these two issues.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Sveen v. Melin

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1432

16-1432

2017

Ashley Sveen, et al.

Kaye Melin, et al.

<p>Mark A. Sveen and Kaye L. Melin were married in 1997. Sveen purchased a life insurance policy that year, and the following year he named Melin the primary beneficiary, and his children the contingent beneficiaries. Sveen and Melin divorced in 2007, and Sveen died in 2011. </p> <p>Minnesota had changed its probate code in 2002 to apply a revocation-upon-divorce statute to life insurance beneficiary designations. Sveen had never changed the designation on his life insurance policy, and Melin was therefore still listed as the primary beneficiary at the time of his death. </p> <p>The insurance company filed an interpleader to establish whether the revocation-upon-divorce statute nullified this designation. Sveen’s children and Melin cross-claimed for the proceeds, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the children, rejecting Melin’s contention that retroactively applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution.</p> <p>The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that under its own precedent, the dispositive issue in this context was the right of the policyholder to have his wishes carried out in accordance with his intentions at the time he signed the contract. Applying the revocation-upon-divorce statute retroactively would deprive him of that right in violation of the Contract Clause.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1435

16-1435

2017

Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al.

Joe Mansky, et al.

<p>Minnesota Statute § 211B.II prohibits individuals from wearing political apparel at or around polling places on primary or election days. The text of the statute did not define “political”, so Minnesota election officials distributed policy materials to help identify which items fell within the scope of the law. Election officials received instructions to request that anyone wearing apparel which violated the guidelines laid out in the policy materials remove or cover it up. While officials were instructed to allow the person to vote regardless of their compliance, misdemeanor prosecution was a possible outcome, should an individual refuse the removal or cover-up request.</p> <p class="m_5420848131695921677m_-5970511599820556662m_3188443106529117331gmail-p1">This case arose when Andrew Cilek, executive director for Minnesota Voters Alliance, was temporarily prevented from voting at his local polling place in November 2010 because he was wearing a t-shirt with a Tea Party logo and a button that advocated for the requirement of a photo ID to vote.</p> <p class="m_5420848131695921677m_-5970511599820556662m_3188443106529117331gmail-p1">Minnesota Majority, Minnesota Voters Alliance, and Minnesota Northstar Tea Party Patriots, along with their association Election Integrity Watch (EIW), filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Secretary of State and various county election officials to enjoin enforcement of the statute as unconstitutional. The parties claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment, facially and as-applied, and was selectively enforced, which also violated their Equal Protection rights.</p> <p class="m_5420848131695921677m_-5970511599820556662m_3188443106529117331gmail-p1">Initially, the district court dismissed all claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed as to the claims regarding Equal Protection and facial First Amendment violations. It reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment against EIW, <em>et al.</em>, on the as-applied First Amendment claim. Reviewing de novo the grant of summary judgment against EIW, the Eighth Circuit considered EIW's claim that the Minnesota statute was not reasonable, as applied to Tea Party apparel, because the Tea Party is not a political party in Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit was unpersuaded and held that the district court was correct in its ruling, since EIW had failed to present specific facts that showed banning Tea Party apparel was not reasonable, given the Minnesota statute's purpose. The Eighth Circuit held that EIW's argument that voters in Tea Party apparel were affected by selective enforcement had also failed, as it offered nothing more than speculation that voters wearing other forms of political apparel avoided enforcement of the statute. EIW, <em>et al.</em>, then petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the lower courts’ ruling was correct. </p> <p class="m_5420848131695921677m_-5970511599820556662m_3188443106529117331gmail-p1">EIW indicates in their petition for a writ of certiorari that there is a circuit split on the issues presented, where the Eighth Circuit’s ruling aligns with the D.C. and Fifth Circuit, which both have held that the government has authority to ban forms of political speech near polling places. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits have held, by contrast, that a complete ban on all political speech, absent any limiting principle, is unconstitutional, regardless of the location in which such speech has been banned.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Hughes v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-155

17-155

2017

Erik Lindsey Hughes

United States of America

<p>Erik Hughes pleaded guilty to drug and firearm offenses and entered into a plea agreement with the government under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes accordingly. Hughes then sought a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which permits defendants who have been “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court relied on Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) in determining that Hughes was ineligible for a sentence reduction because he was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range,” but on a plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Sanchez-Gomez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-312

17-312

2017

United States of America

Rene Sanchez-Gomez, et al.

<p>Rene Sanchez-Gomez and defendants in three other criminal cases (collectively “Defendants”) objected to a policy (the “Policy”) of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California (the “District”) which required them to appear for pretrial non-jury proceedings in full physical restraints. The Policy, which applied to most in-custody defendants appearing in such proceedings, was proposed by the U.S. Marshals Service and accepted by the District’s judges.</p> <p>The magistrate judges in all four cases overruled the Defendants’ objections to the Policy. The Defendants appealed these denials to the district court, and also filed emergency motions challenging the Policy’s constitutionality. The district court denied all relief, and the four cases were consolidated before the 9th Circuit.</p> <p>The 9th Circuit, sitting <em>en banc</em>, construed the Defendants’ appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus under its supervisory authority, and found that it had jurisdiction to review the Policy’s constitutionality. It explained that while the individual Defendants’ claims may be moot by the time of review due to their criminal cases ending and the Policy having been changed, under the Supreme Court’s precedent in <em>Gerstein v. Pugh</em>, the Defendants represented a broader group of similarly situated people who could be injured should the Policy be reinstated. Thus, applying the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review mootness exception, the supervisory mandamus case was not moot. However, because the Policy was no longer in effect, the court withheld a formal writ of mandamus.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-387

17-387

2017

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe

Sharline Lundgren, et vir

<p>Sharline and Ray Lundgren and the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (the “Tribe”) own adjacent pieces of property in Skagit County, Washington. The space between a fence running across the width of the Tribe’s property and its southern border became a subject of dispute between the parties after the Tribe attempted to assert ownership of it in 2013.</p> <p>The Lundgrens’ property had been in their extended family since approximately 1947, during which time they had always treated the fence as the property line. In 2013 the Tribe purchased land to the north of the Lundgrens’ property, and were apparently not aware of the fence at that time. When they discovered it, they informed the Lundgrens of their intention to assert ownership rights over the disputed portion of land. </p> <p>In 2015, the Lundgrens filed suit to quiet title to the property, seeking summary judgment on the basis that they had acquired the disputed property by adverse possession or mutual acquiescence and recognition long before the Tribe bought its parcel. The Tribe moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and because the Lundgrens could not join them as a necessary and indispensable party. The trial court denied the Tribe’s motion, and the Tribe sought direct discretionary review. In the resulting ruling, the court granted the Lundgrens’ motion for summary judgment, finding that they had established legal ownership of the disputed property through adverse possession and mutual recognition and acquiescence.</p> <p>The Washington Supreme Court accepted the Tribe’s amended motion for discretionary review of both prior orders, and affirmed. The court rejected the argument that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, which neither the Tribe nor Congress had waived with regard to quiet title actions. The court found that because it had in rem jurisdiction, the Tribe’s sovereign immunity did not create a barrier to jurisdiction.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

China Agritech v. Resh

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-432

17-432

2017

China Agritech, Inc.

Michael H. Resh, et al.

<p>China Agritech is a holding company incorporated in Delaware, with a principal place of business in Beijing. The company represented that it manufactured and sold organic compound fertilizers and other agricultural products to farmers in over two dozen provinces throughout China. It listed its shares on NASDAQ in 2005, and in 2009 reported to the SEC a net revenue of triple the amount it had reported four years earlier. In 2011, company shareholders alleged fraudulent business practices by China Agritech. The company denied the allegations and announced that it would conduct an internal investigation, and subsequently dismissed its independent auditor. Later that year, NASDAQ halted trading in and initiated delisting proceedings against China Agritech’s stock, and in 2012 the SEC revoked the stock’s registration.</p> <p>Shareholders sued China Agritech in two successive putative class actions in 2011 and 2012, alleging various securities law violations against the company and several individual defendants. Class certification was denied in both cases.</p> <p>Shareholder Michael Resh brought a third putative class action against the company and individual defendants in 2014, alleging securities law violations arising from the same facts and circumstances as the first two cases. China Agritech moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it had been filed after the two year limitations period applicable under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Resh and the additional plaintiffs argued that under the <em>American Pipe &amp; Construction v. Utah</em> line of cases, the limitations period had been tolled on their claims during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The district court rejected this contention, finding that under <em>American Pipe</em> and its progeny, the limitations period was tolled as to individual class members, but that the Supreme Court had not decided whether an entirely new class action based on a substantially identical class was subject to the same rule. It ruled that the limitations period was therefore tolled as to the individual claims of the named plaintiffs in the instant case, but not as to the putative class.</p> <p>The Ninth Circuit reversed, with a three-judge panel finding that the plaintiffs’ class action would not be time-barred where: (1) the named plaintiffs had been unnamed in the two prior suits, which were against many of the same defendants and involved the same underlying events; (2) the two prior cases were timely; (3) class certification was denied in the earlier actions; and (4) pursuant to the <em>American Pipe</em> line of cases, the named plaintiffs’ individual claims were tolled during the pendency of the two prior class actions. The panel explained that permitting such claims to go forward was consistent with the policy goals of tolling in general. The panel further stated that in light of FRCP 23’s requirements, as well as principles of comity and preclusion, the existing legal system contains sufficient safeguards to prevent litigants from filing repetitious actions in light of this ruling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Koons v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-5716

17-5716

2017

Timothy D. Koons, Kenneth Jay Putensen, Randy Feauto, Esequiel Gutierrez, and Jose Manuel Gardea

United States of America

<p>Timothy D. Koons and four other defendants were convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy offenses. During the sentencing phase of each defendant’s trial, the government moved to reduce the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) for providing substantial assistance to the prosecution in the prosecution or investigation of another person. The district court in each case granted the government’s motion and reduced the defendant’s sentence to a term below the statutory mandatory minimum. All five defendants subsequently moved for further sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which allows a district court to reduce the sentence of “a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”</p> <p>The Eighth Circuit declined to follow the Fourth Circuit panel majority in holding that defendants are eligible for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) reductions. Rather, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the plain language of the statute to require the sentence be <em>based on</em> a range subsequently lowered by the Commission, and that in these five cases the sentence was based instead on the mandatory minimum and their substantial assistance. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of sentencing reductions, but for reasons different from those used by the district court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Tharpe v. Sellers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-6075

17-6075

2017

Keith Tharpe

Eric Sellers, Warden

<p>Keith Tharpe was convicted in Georgia state court of the September 25, 1990 murder of his sister-in-law, Jacqueline Freeman. A jury sentenced him to death, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, an affidavit came to light in which a white juror from Tharpe’s trial, Barney Gattie, made several highly discriminatory statements regarding African Americans. Tharpe, who is black, sought habeas relief from the Butts County Superior Court, claiming that improper racial animus had influenced the jury’s deliberations. His petition was denied on the basis that he had procedurally defaulted by failing to raise the racial bias issue in earlier proceedings, and because he did not adequately support his claim that ineffective assistance of counsel was to blame for the omission. Juror testimony was also deemed inadmissible to prove Tharpe’s racial animus claim. He then applied for a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the Georgia Supreme Court, and his application was denied. </p> <p>Tharpe next petitioned the US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that racial bias among the jury had rendered his conviction and sentence unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The district court found this claim to be procedurally defaulted, but granted him a certificate of appeal (COA) on an ineffective assistance claim. The 11th Circuit then affirmed the district court’s judgment.</p> <p>Following the US Supreme Court’s 2017 decisions in <em>Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado</em> and <em>Buck v. Davis</em>, Tharpe petitioned the district court under FRCP 60(b)(6) to reopen his § 2254 case. He argued that <em>Pena-Rodriguez</em> should apply retroactively, allowing him to present the juror testimony that had previously been deemed inadmissible, and ultimately overcome procedural default to prevail on his claim that improper racial animus had led to his conviction and sentence. The district court denied Tharpe’s motion, concluding, <em>inter alia</em>, that his claim was procedurally defaulted, and that he had failed to produce any clear evidence that Gattie’s statements had influenced the jury’s conclusions. The 11th Circuit affirmed, declining to issue a COA and stating that Tharpe had failed to show that the district court’s correctness was debatable with regard to its procedural ruling.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Benisek v. Lamone

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-333

17-333

2017

O. John Benisek, et al.

Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.

<p>In 2011, the State of Maryland engaged in a process of redistricting, which in that state entails two parallel procedures: a public-facing procedure led by the Governor’s Redistricting Advisory Committee and an internal procedure involving Maryland’s congressional delegation and a consulting firm called NCEC Services, Inc. NCEC developed sample maps using voter demographic data, a computer program, and a proprietary metric that predicts the likelihood of Democratic candidate success. In comparison to sample maps submitted by third parties, the NCEC-developed maps were assessed to be more likely to see Democratic candidate success. There is no evidence that the final map that was enacted to law was one of the ones developed by NCEC; rather, former Governor Martin O’Malley testified that the legislative director and staff from the Maryland Department of Planning likely created the final document. After the 2011 plan was implemented, the “Cook Partisan Voting Index” rated the Sixth District as a “likely” Democratic seat, whereas before the 2011 plan, the Sixth District was a “safe” Republican seat. In the 2012 congressional election, Democrat John Delaney defeated incumbent Republican congressman Roscoe Bartlett by a 20.9% margin. Subsequent elections saw other Democratic candidates succeeding over Republican candidates.</p> <p>The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction barring the State from enforcing the 2011 redistricting plan and requiring the State to implement a new map in advance of the 2018 midterm elections. A majority of the district court panel denied the motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of Gill v. Whitford, another gerrymandering case before the US Supreme Court.</p>

per curiam

affirmed

Judicial Power

Abbott v. Perez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/17-586

17-586

2017

Greg Abbott, et al.

Shannon Perez, et al.

<p>Individual voters in Texas, along with organizations representing Latinos and African Americans, filed a number of lawsuits in 2011, challenging the Texas legislature’s congressional and state house redistricting plans. The actions were consolidated and proceed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (“Texas District Court”). The plaintiffs alleged racial gerrymandering in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) as well as the 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution. At that time Texas was bound by the preclearance requirements under § 5 of the VRA, and therefore the State simultaneously filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (“D.C. District Court”) seeking preclearance of the redistricting plans. </p> <p>While trial proceedings were pending in both district courts, the 2012 primary elections were approaching. As a result, the Texas District Court assumed the task of implementing interim redistricting plans, which it did on an expedited basis, without access to all relevant facts, and with the understanding that most parties to the litigation alleged that those plans contained many of the same statutory and constitutional infirmities as the challenged plans. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the first iteration of the interim maps on the grounds that the court had not been sufficiently deferential to the legislature; the Texas District Court issued more deferential plans in February 2012. </p> <p>The D.C. District Court subsequently denied preclearance to the proposed redistricting plans on the basis that they were enacted with discriminatory intent and had the effect of abridging minority voting rights. Texas appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p> <p>After the Texas District Court’s interim maps were used for the 2012 elections, the Texas legislature failed to take any action on redistricting in the 2013 regular session. However, it convened a special session during which it adopted, among others, the Texas District Court’s congressional interim map (“Plan C235”) without any changes. The governor subsequently signed the legislation adopting this plan.</p> <p>In June 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided <em>Shelby County v. Holder</em>, which removed the § 5 preclearance requirements from the VRA. Texas was therefore no longer automatically subject to preclearance requirements, and the U.S. Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for further proceedings the D.C. District Court’s preclearance decision, which the lower court then dismissed as moot.</p> <p>The defendants subsequently sought to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims in the Texas District Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the case had become moot. In response, the plaintiffs expressed their desire to amend their complaints regarding the 2011 plans and to challenge the 2013 plans. The court granted them leave to amend, and denied the State’s motions to dismiss. The court explained that the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the 2011 plans were not moot because, <em>inter alia</em>, the plaintiffs continued to be harmed by them. The court also ordered that the 2013 plans, which included Plan C235, be used for the 2014 elections. The plaintiffs then filed their amended complaints, including claims related to both the 2011 and 2013 plans. Most plaintiffs included claims that Plan C235 violated § 2 of the VRA and the 14th and 15th Amendments.</p> <p>The Texas District Court held trials on the 2011 plans in 2014, and found that they violated certain aspects of § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. In the ongoing litigation, the plaintiffs contended that the 2013 plans, including Plan C235, included some of the same elements that the court determined were the result of discriminatory intent or statutory or constitutional violations as in the 2011 plans.</p> <p>In August 2017, the Texas District Court issued an interlocutory order regarding the plaintiffs’ C235 claims. It found that the racially discriminatory intent and effects identified in the 2011 plans carried through to the 2013 plans where the redistricting lines remained the same. It explained that the legislature had adopted the court’s interim plans (which included C235) as part of a litigation strategy that was designed to insulate the plans from any further challenge. The legislature had not engaged in any deliberative process to remove the discriminatory elements from the plans before adopting them, but instead intentionally furthered and continued the discrimination in the existing plans.</p> <p>The court also concluded that the configurations of CD 27 and CD 35 under Plan C235 violated § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. As to CD 27, though the court had found in 2012 that this district did not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose because it was not possible to create an additional Latino opportunity district in the region, the Texas legislature had still engaged in vote dilution. Regarding CD 35, the court stated that while C235 was enacted in 2013, the challenged district boundaries that it reflected were drawn in 2011 and found to violate § 2 of the VRA and the 14th Amendment. The court explained that the Texas legislature did not engage in any meaningful effort to cleanse the discriminatory elements from the 2013 plan before it was adopted, and in fact intended to maintain that discrimination in enacting the plan in substantially the same form. </p> <p>The court additionally found that the plaintiffs had proven a § 2 “results” violation as to CD 27, HD 32, and HD 34, and a racial gerrymandering claim as to HD 90.</p> <p>The court’s order directed the Texas Attorney General to issue a written advisory within three days as to whether the legislature would convene a special session to address the issue of redistricting. If the legislature did not plan to hold a special session, the parties were ordered to appear before the court to prepare remedial redistricting plans. </p> <p>In January 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the defendants’ appeal on the merits, at which time the Court would also consider the question of jurisdiction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Civil Rights

WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1011

16-1011

2017

WesternGeco LLC

ION Geophysical Corporation

<p>The US Supreme Court issued a 2016 order granting certiorari in this patent infringement case, vacating a 2015 ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and remanding the matter for further consideration in light of , 579 U.S. __ (2016). On remand, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment for enhanced damages for willful infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284, but reinstated its 2015 opinion in all other respects. </p> <p>The underlying dispute in the case related to patent-practicing devices sold by ION Geophysical Corporation (“ION”) which were combined and used in non-infringing streamer systems at sea, but that would infringe on patents belonging to WesternGeco LLC (“WesternGeco”) if used in that manner in the US. The jury found infringement by ION, found no invalidity as to any asserted claims, and awarded WesternGeco, among other amounts, $93.4 million in lost profits. </p> <p>In a subsequent appeal to the Federal Circuit, ION asked, among other things, that the lost profits award be reversed. In its 2015 opinion, the Federal Circuit agreed and reversed that award on the grounds that under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), WesternGeco was not entitled to lost profits arising from foreign uses of its patented invention. As stated above, the court then reinstated this portion of that opinion in 2016.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Lagos v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1519

16-1519

2017

Sergio Fernando Lagos

United States

<p>Sergio Fernando Lagos pled guilty in federal district court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and multiple counts of wire fraud. He admitted that for a period of two years, he and his co-conspirators misled General Electric Capital Corporation (GECC) regarding the value of their assets in order to increase their revolving loan amount and secure under-collateralized funds.</p> <p>Following his guilty plea, Lagos appealed the district court’s order of restitution to the 5th Circuit. He argued that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) did not allow restitution for the legal, expert, or consulting fees incurred by GECC in the course of investigating Lagos’ suspected fraud and the bankruptcy proceedings that followed.</p> <p>The 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s order  in light of its own precedent interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(4) under the MVRA to permit restitution for investigative and legal costs, even under circumstances where these costs were incurred outside of the government’s investigation. The appeals court noted that the D.C. Circuit has adopted a narrower reading of the statute in question, though multiple other circuits have not.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1215

16-1215

2017

Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP

R. Scott Appling

<p>R. Scott Appling hired the law firm of Lamar, Archer &amp; Cofrin, LLP (“Lamar”) to represent him in legal proceedings against the former owners of his business. Appling incurred significant legal fees, and verbally told Lamar that he would be able to pay them after he received a sizeable tax refund that he was expecting. In reliance upon this statement, the firm continued to represent him through the conclusion of the litigation. Appling received a tax refund, though it was smaller than what he had told Lamar he was anticipating, and he put it into his business rather than paying the debt he owed to Lamar. Lamar obtained a judgment against Appling, and Appling subsequently filed for bankruptcy. Lamar initiated an adversary proceeding to collect the debt, and the bankruptcy court ruled that the amount was not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) because Lamar had justifiably relied upon Appling’s fraudulent statements. The district court affirmed.</p> <p>The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded. Noting a circuit split on how to construe the statute at issue, the court explained that because Appling’s fraudulent statements about his tax refund were not in writing and qualified as statements “respecting [his] . . . financial condition” under § 523(a)(2)(B), the debt could be discharged.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity