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Schad v. Arizona

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-5551

90-5551

1990

Schad

Arizona

<p>An Arizona prosecutor brought a charge of first-degree murder against Schad after he was found with a murder victim's vehicle and other belongings. In Arizona, first-degree murder is murder committed with premeditation or murder committed in an attempt to rob. Schad maintained that circumstantial evidence established at most that he was a thief. The jury's instructions addressed first-and second-degree murder, not theft. The jury convicted Schad of first-degree murder. The judge sentenced Schad to death.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

Barnes v. Glen Theatre Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-26

90-26

1990

Barnes

Glen Theatre Inc.

<p>Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana, operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop enforcement of the statute.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1965

89-1965

1990

Cottage Savings Association

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

<p>For tax purposes, Cottage Savings Association exchanged its interests in the mortgages of 252 single family homes with several other savings and loan associations, receiving in return 305 mortgages that, taken together, had the same market value. The fair market value of the mortgages it gave away, however, were worth $2.5 million less than their original value. In accordance with the accounting procedures of the federal regulatory body of savings and loan corporations, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), Cottage Savings recorded the exchanged properties as "substantially identical" (because they had the same fair market value).</p> <p>When Cottage Savings filed its federal income tax return, however, it claimed a $2.5 million loss - the difference between the original value of the mortgages it gave away and the current value of the mortgages it received in return. The IRS refused to recognize the difference as a deductible loss, however, because under section 1001(a) of Title 26 of the tax code, the change in a property's value is only taken into consideration when it is realized through the "sale or disposition of [the] property." An exchange of property only constitutes a "disposition" if there is a "material difference" between the properties exchanged. Because Cottage Savings had reported the properties exchanged as "substantially identical," the IRS ruled, a "disposition" could not have taken place and the loss in value could not be deducted. Cottage savings took the issue to a federal Tax Court, which disagreed with the IRS and ruled the deduction permissible. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, siding with the IRS.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federal Taxation

Arizona v. Fulminante

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-839

89-839

1990

Arizona

Oreste Fulminante

<p>Arizona law officials suspected that Oreste Fulminante murdered his stepdaughter. He was later arrested in New York for an unrelated crime after the murder and incarcerated. While in prison he became friends with Anthony Sarivola, an inmate paid by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect information on other inmates while he served his term. Fulminante initially denied killing his stepdaughter to Sarivola, but admitted it when Sarivola offered him protection from other inmates in exchange for the truth. After his release, Fulminante also confessed to Donna Sarivola, Anthony's wife. Fulminante was indicted for murder in Arizona. Fulminante argued in trial court that his two confessions to the Sarivolas could not be used as evidence since the first was coerced and the second based on the first. The court admitted his confessions as evidence, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court ordered Fulminante to be retried without the use of the confessions.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Riverside County v. McLaughlin

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1817

89-1817

1990

Riverside County

McLaughlin

<p>McLaughlin was arrested without a warrant and argued that Riverside did not act promptly (within 48 hours) on judicial probable cause determinations and arraignment procedures in his case and others.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-1799

89-1799

1990

Masson

New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

<p>After Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position at the Sigmund Freud Archives, Janet Malcolm interviewed him for an article in the New Yorker magazine. Malcolm_s article included many long direct quotations from Masson. The article presented Masson as extremely arrogant and condescending; at one point, he was quoted as calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived." However, Malcolm fabricated many of the more distasteful quotations. Masson sued for libel. The District Court dismissed the case on First Amendment free speech grounds because Masson was a public figure.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Powers v. Ohio

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1990/89-5011

89-5011

1990

Powers

Ohio

<p>Larry Joe Powers, a white male, was indicted on the charges of two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder. He pleaded not guilty, and invoked his right to a jury trial. During the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecution excluded a black individual from the jury without explanation. The court denied the request for explanation. The prosecution struck nine more possible jurors, of which six were black. Powers objected each time, but the court overruled his objection. The jury convicted Powers on all charges. Powers appealed his conviction and argued that the prosecution’s discriminatory selection of jurors violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution, and that his own race was irrelevant to the right to object. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Lee v. Weisman

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1014

90-1014

1991

Lee

Weisman

<p>In keeping with the practice of several other public middle and high school principals in Providence, Rhode Island, Robert E. Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to speak at his school's graduation ceremony. Daniel Weisman's daughter, Deborah, was among the graduates. Hoping to stop the rabbi from speaking at his daughter's graduation, Weisman sought a temporary restaining order in District Court - but was denied. After the ceremony, where prayers were recited, Weisman filed for a permanent injunction barring Lee and other Providence public school officials from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at their schools' ceremonies. When the Court of Appeals affirmed a District Court ruling against the schools, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court and was granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Franklin v. Massachusetts

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-1502

91-1502

1991

Franklin

Massachusetts

<p>Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, a census must be conducted every ten years and the distribution of Representatives in Congress adjusted to provide proportional representation. The census is designed and carried out by the Secretary of Commerce before the results are forwarded to the President, who determines the number of Representatives each state will receive. In 1990, for only the second time since 1900, the census allocated employees of the Department of Defense who were stationed overseas to the states designated their "homes of record." Massachusetts claimed that this adjustment of the census shifted one Representative from Massachusetts to Washington state. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution, arguing that the allocation of overseas personnel to their "homes of record" was arbitrary and capricious under the APA standards and did not meet the constitutional requirement of counting the number of people "in each State."</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Nordlinger v. Hahn

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1912

90-1912

1991

Nordlinger

Hahn

<p>In a statewide ballot, California residents approved the addition of Article XIIIA to their State Constitution. Article XIIIA's "acquisition value" provision limited property assessment value increases to two percent, if caused by changes in ownership or new construction improvements. Article XIIIA exempted two types of transfers from this reassessment limit: first, if the principal seller is 55 or older and moved to a home of equal or lower value, and second, when a transfer occurred between parents and children. One of Article XIIIA's effects is that over time the taxes of new property owners, adjusted to reflect recent values, would be substantially higher than long-term property owner's taxes. A new property owner filed suit to challenge the state constitutional amendment.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-954

90-954

1991

Rufo, Sheriff Of Suffolk County, et al.

Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail et al.

<p>After the district court held that the conditions at the Suffolk County Jail were constitutionally deficient, the Suffolk County officials and the inmates of Suffolk County Jail entered into a consent decree for construction of a new jail. In the decree, the parties agreed single-occupancy cells would be provided for pretrial inmates. During the delay of the construction, the sheriff of Suffolk County moved to modify the decree to allow double bunking in certain cells to raise the jail’s occupancy. The sheriff argued that with the increasing number of pretrial detainees and a recent court decision, there was a change in fact and in law that was required to modify the decree. The district court refused the modification because the sheriff is required to show a grievous wrong by new and unforeseen circumstances to modify the decree and that the increase of pretrial detainees was neither new nor unforeseen. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Due Process

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1604

90-1604

1991

Morales, Attorney General of Texas

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

<p>The pre-emption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) prohibits states from enforcing any law relating to airline rates, route, or service. The ADA was enacted to ensure that states would not undo the anticipated benefits of federal deregulation of the airline industry. In 1987, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) adopted Air Travel Industry Enforcement Guidelines, which govern the content and format of airline advertising and award frequent flyers and payment to passengers who voluntarily gave up their seats on overbooked flights. The Attorney General of Texas sent letters to airlines, including Trans World Airlines, notifying them of the intent to sue if they did not follow the guidelines. Trans World Airlines sued and claimed that state regulation of fare advertisements is prohibited by the ADA. The district court found in favor of Trans World Airlines and held that states cannot take any enforcement action, which would restrict any aspect of the fare advertising or operations relating to rate, routes, or services. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part

Federalism

United States v. Fordice

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1205

90-1205

1991

United States

Fordice

<p>After 17 years of litigation, Mississippi's public university system remained racially divided. The state had operated legally segregated universities, but had since adopted race-neutral policies to dismantle its de jure segregated system. All students could choose which school to attend, though the choices produced nearly all white and all black institutions of higher learning. This case was decided together with that of Ayers v. Fordice.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-744

91-744

1991

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania

Robert P. Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania

<p>The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. A federal appeals court upheld all the provisions except for the husband notification requirement.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Privacy

Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-970

90-970

1991

Lechmere, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board

<p>Lechmere owned and operated a large retail store in a shopping plaza. Nonemployee union organizers campaigned to organize the store employees by entering the company's parking lot and placing handbills on car windshields. Lechmere prohibited solicitation and literature distribution on its property. The union organizers persisted in their leafleting campaign despite continued objections from Lechmere. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge against Lechmere. An NLRB judge ruled in the union's favor.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Unions

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1038

90-1038

1991

Cipollone

Liggett Group, Inc.

<p>Rose Cipollone died at 58 from lung cancer. She smoked for 42 years. Before her death, she and her husband sued several cigarette manufacturers in federal court for damages resulting from Mrs. Cipollone lung cancer. A trial court judgment of $400,000 was reserved in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Cipollone family appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Federalism

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1424

90-1424

1991

Lujan

Defenders of Wildlife

<p>The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (S7(a)(2)) required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that any authorized actions did not jeopardize endangered or threatened species or critically destroy natural habitats. A 1986 amendment to the act limited it scope to actions in the United States or on the high seas. Defenders of Wildlife and other organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the new amendment erred by providing for a geographic limit on the original law.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1596

90-1596

1991

Robertson, Chief, United States Forest Service, et al.

Seattle Audubon Society et al.

<p>Respondents -- the Seattle Audubon Society, the Portland Audubon Society, and several other environmental groups -- filed two separate suits in federal district court seeking to enjoin harvesting timber in forests managed by the United States Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. The suits challenged five federal statutes. In response, Congress enacted §318 of the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, which required harvesting in certain areas, while prohibiting it in others. §318 included the names of the lawsuits and specifically stated that it was enacted to address the challenges from the lawsuits. Respondents argued that §318 violated Article III of the Constitution because it directed the results of the two pending cases, a job for the judiciary, not the legislature. The district courts rejected that claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed, holding that Congress was directing the result in pending cases without repealing or amending the underlying litigation.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Riggins v. Nevada

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-8466

90-8466

1991

David Riggins

Nevada

<p>On November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his apartment with multiple stab wounds to his chest, head, and back. Forty-five hours later, David Riggins was arrested and charged with the murder. A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins complained to Dr. R. Edward Quass, the psychiatrist who treated patients in jail, that he was hearing voices. Dr. Quass prescribed the antipsychotic drug Mellaril and, when the voices did not stop, gradually increased the dosage. In January of 1988, Riggins successfully moved for determination of his competence to stand trial, and he was found to be competent. As the trial moved forward, Riggins moved to suspend his treatment with Mellaril because he planned to offer an insanity defense at trial and asserted that he had the right to show the jury his true mental state. The district court denied Riggins motion. Riggins was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Quill Corporation v. North Dakota

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-194

91-194

1991

Quill Corporation

North Dakota by and through its Tax Commissioner, Heitkamp

<p>Through its Tax Commissioner, the state of North Dakota filed an action in state court to force the Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail-order office equipment retailer, to charge a North Dakota use tax on Quill merchandise to be used within the state. The state court ruled in favor of Quill, grounding its decision on <em>Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753</em>. In this 1967 case, the United States Supreme Court found a similar Illinois statute to be in violation of both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on a rejection of <em>Bellas Hess</em> in light of the "tremendous social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations" since it had been decided.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-971

91-971

1991

Two Pesos, Inc.

Taco Cabana, Inc.

<p>Taco Cabana, a fast food Mexican restaurant chain in San Antonio, Texas, had a specifically-designed look or “trade dress”. Two Pesos, another similar restaurant chain based in Houston, Texas, opened a few years later with a remarkably similar look. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act. Two Pesos allegedly copied Taco Cabana’s distinctive trade dress. The judge instructed the jury that trade dress must be inherently distinctive of have acquired a secondary meaning. The jury found that Taco Cabana’s trade dress was inherently distinctive, but had not acquired a secondary meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court rejected Two Pesos argument that a finding of no secondary meaning necessarily means the trade dress is not inherently distinctive and is not protected under the Lanham Act.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

New York v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-543

91-543

1991

New York

United States

<p>The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Act Amendments of 1985 required states alone or in compacts with other states to dispose of such radioactive waste within their borders. New York State and Allegany and Cortland counties were frustrated in their compliance efforts by resistance from residents to proposed radioactive waste sites and a lack of cooperation from neighboring states. New York filed suit against the federal government, questioning the authority of Congress to regulate state waste management.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part

Federalism

Presley v. Etowah County Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-711

90-711

1991

Lawrence C. Presley et al.

Etowah County Commission et al.

<p>The principal focus of Alabama County Commission members is the construction and maintenance of roads. In 1987, Etowah County Commission passed the "Common Fund Resolution", combining all of the commission's funds into one county-wide budget and eliminating each commissioner's power over the distribution of funds allocated for his or her own road district. Newly elected black member, Commissioner Lawrence C. Presley, claimed that the changes in the distribution of authority were a form of racial discrimination and a violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which permits a state government to alter practices related to voting only after receiving judicial preclearance. The Etowah County Commission had not received this preclearance, and neither had the Russell County Commission when, in 1979, its members instituted the "Unit System." This system transferred full authority over Russell County roads, highways, bridges, and ferries from the commissioners to the appointed county engineer. When the first 2 black commissioners were elected in Russell County, they joined Presley in filing a suit against Etowah and Russell Counties in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The District Court determined that preclearance was unnecessary in both 2 instances, but Presley appealed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-155

91-155

1991

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

Lee

<p>New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals. Solicitation was permitted outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Burson v. Freeman

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1056

90-1056

1991

Burson

Freeman

<p>Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1419

90-1419

1991

National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Boston & Maine Corporation

<p>Under the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) may enter into "trackage rights" agreements to use tracks owned and used by freight railroads. Section 562(d) of the act also states that Amtrak may buy tracks from private railroads, and may ask the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to condemn tracks owned by those railroads if they cannot agree on sale terms, provided that the tracks in question are "required for intercity rail passenger service." Amtrak's need for the tracks is established unless the private railroad can show either that its ability to carry out its obligations as a common carrier (that is, a transporter of public goods) will be seriously hampered or that Amtrak's needs can be met by the purchase of alternative property.</p> <p>Amtrak had a "trackage rights" agreement with Boston and Maine Railroad (B &amp; M). Amtrak claimed that it was forced to discontinue this agreement because B &amp; M did not properly maintain its tracks. Amtrak then entered into an agreement with the Central Vermont Railroad (CV), under which it would acquire the B &amp; M track and sell it to CV, which would take over maintenance of the track but grant "trackage rights" to Amtrak and usage rights to B &amp; M. When B &amp; M declined Amtrak's offer to purchase the track, Amtrak asked the ICC to condemn the track (thus allowing Amtrak to seize it). The ICC granted Amtrak's request. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, however, sent the case back to the ICC for reconsideration, because Amtrak had not demonstrated the need for ownership, just for use (demonstrated by its intent to convey the property to CV). Amtrak petitioned the appeals court to rehear the case, and while the petition was pending Congress amended the RPSA to explicitly allow Amtrak to seize property with the ICC's permission and then convey it to another party if that would further its mission. The appeals court denied rehearing, however, holding that the condemnation had been invalid because it was not "required for intercity rail passenger service."</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Georgia v. McCollum

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-372

91-372

1991

Georgia

Thomas McCollum et al.

<p>In 1990, white respondents, Thomas McCollum, William Joseph McCollum, and Ella Hampton McCollum, were charged with assaulting two black individuals. Before the criminal trial, the prosecution moved to bar the defense from using its peremptory challenges to eliminate black people from the juror pool. The term "preemptory challenge" refers to the right to reject a potential juror during jury selection without giving a reason. The trial judge denied the prosecution's motion, and, when the prosecution appealed, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Suter v. Artist M.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1488

90-1488

1991

Suter

Artist M.

<p>The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACW) provides that, in order to be reimbursed for adoption and foster care services, a state must submit a plan for the administration of those services to the federal Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. In order to be approved, the plan must be "in effect in all" a state's political subdivisions and "be mandatory upon them," and must state that "reasonable efforts will be made" to prevent removal of children from their homes and to facilitate reunification of families where removal has occurred. Several children in the Illinois foster care program brought suit against the Director and the Guardianship Administrator of the Illinois program under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides private individuals a right to sue for "deprivation of any rights ... secured by [federal] laws." They charged that Illinois had failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunite families, and that it was required to do so by the AACW. The Director and Guardianship Administrator argued that the children had no standing to sue because the AACW did not create substantive rights that had to be reinforced, but merely stated what contents an administrative plan needed to have in order to receive approval. The federal District Court sided with the children, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Morgan v. Illinois

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-5118

91-5118

1991

Derrick Morgan

Illinois

<p>In the Illinois judicial system, the jury chosen to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence also sentenced the defendant. And, the trial court, not the attorneys, performed <em>voir dire</em>, which involves questioning potential jurors during jury selection to determine their ability to be impartial. Before Derrick Morgan's capital murder trial, he requested that the court ask the potential jurors whether they would automatically sentence him to the death penalty upon conviction. The trial court denied Morgan's request, and he was convicted and sentenced to death. When he appealed, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, Morgan's conviction, and his sentence.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Hudson v. McMillian

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-6531

90-6531

1991

Hudson

McMillian

<p>Keith Hudson, a Louisiana inmate, claimed that he was beaten by Marvin Woods and Jack McMillian, two prison guards, while their supervisor, Arthur Mezo, watched. Hudson sued the guards in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which allows individuals to bring suit for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." Hudson argued that they had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court ruled that the guards had used force when there was no need to do so, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that Hudson was therefore entitled to damages. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that an inmate must demonstrate "significant injury" when he claims that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated by the use of excessive force.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Jacobson v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1124

90-1124

1991

Keith Jacobson

United States

<p>Before the Child Protection Act of 1984 rendered it illegal, Keith Jacobson, the petitioner, purchased a magazine including photographs of nude minors. In 1985, government agencies began investigating Jacobson's interest in child pornography. Over the course of about 2 ½ years, they sent him mailings from 5 fictitious organizations and one non-existent pen pal all promoting sexual liberation and challenging government censorship. After Jacobson was somewhat responsive, a government agency attempted to sting him by selling him child pornography which he purchased, resulting in his arrest and conviction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-985

90-985

1991

Bray

Alexandria Women's Health Clinic

<p>Several abortion clinics sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from conducting demonstrations at clinics in Washington, D.C. The clinics claimed that the protesters had violated 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." The protesters had sought to deny women their "right to abortion" and their right to interstate travel, the clinics argued. The District Court agreed, holding that Bray and others, by blocking access to the clinics, had conspired to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The District Court also ruled for the clinics on state law trespassing and public nuisance claims, ordering the protesters to stop trespassing on or obstructing access to clinics. Finally, the District Court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics' attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-763

91-763

1991

Republic of Argentina

Weltover, Inc.

<p>In 1981, Argentina instituted a foreign exchange insurance contract program (FEIC), under which it effectively assumed the risk of currency depreciation in cross-border transactions. When Argentina could not cover the FEIC contracts, it issued "Bonods," which provided for repayment in U.S. dollars through transfer on the market in one of several locations. Subsequently, when Argentina concluded that it lacked sufficient foreign exchange to retire the Bonods, it unilaterally extended the time for payment and offered bondholders substitute instruments as a means of rescheduling the debts. Ultimately, two Panamanian corporations and a Swiss bank brought a breach-of-contract action in Federal District Court. The court denied Argentina's motion to dismiss. In affirming, the Court of Appeals ruled that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which subjects foreign states to suit in American courts for acts taken "in connection with a commercial activity" that have "a direct effect in the United States."</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

White v. Illinois

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-6113

90-6113

1991

Randall D. White

State of Illinois

<p>During Randall D. White’s trial on charges related to a sexual assault of a 4-year-old girl, Illinois state prosecutors twice-attempted to call the child, who was by then five years old, as a witness, but each time she experienced emotional difficulty and left the stand without testifying. The trial court then allowed the admission of testimony by the girl’s babysitter, mother, emergency room nurse, doctor and an investigating officer that recounted statements she made describing the crime. This testimony was allowed into evidence under state-law hearsay exceptions for spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of a medical examination. The jury subsequently convicted White. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected White’s claims that the introduction of the out-of-court statements violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review of the case.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

American National Red Cross v. S.G.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-594

91-594

1991

American National Red Cross

S.G.

<p>Plaintiffs filed two state-law tort actions in New Hampshire state courts, alleging that one of them had contracted AIDS from a transfusion of contaminated blood during surgery. The second action was brought against the Red Cross after plaintiffs discovered that it had supplied the tainted blood. Before the state court could decide a motion to consolidate the cases, the Red Cross invoked the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1441, to remove the second suit to federal court. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case to state court, holding that the Red Cross' charter provision allowing it to "sue and be sued in courts of law and equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States," 36 U.S.C. Section 2, conferred original jurisdiction on the federal district court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Lucas v. South Carolina Coast Council

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-453

91-453

1991

Lucas

South Carolina Coast Council

<p>In 1986, Lucas bought two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island. He intended to build single-family homes as on the adjacent lots. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law which barred Lucas from erecting permanent habitable structures on his land. The law aimed to protect erosion and destruction of barrier islands. Lucas sued and won a large monetary judgment. The state appealed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Freeman v. Pitts

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/89-1290

89-1290

1991

Robert R. Freeman et al.

Willie Eugene Pitts et al.

<p>In 1969, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ordered the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) to eliminate its previously legal racial segregation and its inequitable byproducts under judicial control. However, in 1986, DCSS officials filed a motion, intending for the District Court to declare the DCSS officially desegregated and withdraw supervision. <em>Green v. School Board of New Kent County</em>, outlines 6 categories in which a school district should achieve desegregation, and the District Court found that the DCSS was successful in 4 of these categories. Consequently, the court decided to relinquish control over the DCSS in these 4 areas, while it maintained control and mandated further improvements in the areas in which segregation still existed. Both the respondents, black schoolchildren and their parents, and the petitioners, the DCSS officials, appealed the District Court's decision, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed it. The Court of Appeals argued that the District Court should have authority over the DCSS until it is fully desegregated in all 6 categories for several years.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Lee v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-339

91-339

1991

Lee

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

<p>The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banned the distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets and other printed material at its airport terminals. Members of a religious group wanted to perform a ritual involving the distibution of literature at these airports. The group challenged the regulation on free expression and and free exercise grounds of the First Amendment.</p>

per curiam

affirmed

First Amendment

Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/-767

A-767

1991

James Gomez and Daniel Vasquez

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

<p>In 1979, a California state court convicted Robert Allen Harris of kidnapping and murdering two teenage boys in San Diego and sentenced him to death. On April 18, 1992, three days before his scheduled execution date, Harris and other death-row inmates filed a civil rights class action lawsuit in federal district court. The complaint alleged that execution by lethal gas constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Just hours before Harris was scheduled to be executed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an order to stay the execution, and the state appealed the stay to the Supreme Court.</p>

per curiam

vacated

Criminal Procedure

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-7675

90-7675

1991

R.A.V.

City of St. Paul

<p>Several teenagers allegedly burned a crudely fashioned cross on a black family's lawn. The police charged one of the teens under a local bias-motivated criminal ordinance which prohibits the display of a symbol which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." The trial court dismissed this charge. The state supreme court reversed. R.A.V. appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-1059

90-1059

1991

Simon & Schuster, Inc.

Members of New York State Crime Victims Board

<p>To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 "Son of Sam" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. In 1987 the Board ordered Henry Hill, a former gangster who sold his story to Simon &amp; Schuster, to turn over his payments from a book deal.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-918

90-918

1991

Christine Franklin

Gwinnett County Public Schools, William Prescott

<p>Andrew Hill, a teacher at North Gwinnett High School, sexually harassed Christine Franklin throughout her 10th grade year. Franklin reported the harassment to teachers and school district administrators, but the administration did nothing. They also encouraged Franklin to refrain from pressing charges. Hill resigned in 1988 on the condition that all matters pending against him were dropped. After Hill’s resignation the school closed its investigation.</p> <p>Franklin brought this action against the school district under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for failing to take action against Hill. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that Title IX did not authorize an award for damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/91-538

91-538

1991

Forsyth County

Nationalist Movement

<p>The Board of Commissioners for Forsyth County enacted an ordinance that permitted the county administrator to charge a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to hold a parade, assembly, or demonstration on public property in the county. The law allowed the administrator to adjust the fee to correspond with the estimated cost of maintaining public order during the activity. In January 1989, The Nationalist Movement (Movement) applied for a permit to hold a rally on the courthouse steps in Cumming, Georgia, to protest the federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, Jr. The county charged $100 for the permit, but that amount that did not include a calculation for expected law enforcement expenses during the rally. The Movement did not pay the fee and did not hold the rally; instead the Movement sued the county in federal district court and challenged its authority to interfere with the Movement’s free speech and assembly rights. The district court found that the county administrator did not unconstitutionally apply the ordinance to the Movement’s permit application because the fee was based solely on content-neutral criteria such as the costs of processing the application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that the permit fee of up to $1,000 a day exceeded the constitutional requirement that governments charge only a nominal fee for using public forums.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Doggett v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1991/90-857

90-857

1991

Marc Gilbert Doggett

United States

<p>In 1980, Marc Gilbert Doggett was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida on federal drug charges. When Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents went to his home to arrest him, they found he had left for Colombia four days earlier. The DEA later found out that Doggett was in custody in Panama on unrelated charges. While the Panamanian government promised to expel Doggett back to the United States after the proceedings in Panama were over, Doggett was allowed to continue on to Colombia. The DEA agent in charge did not follow up on the case and Doggett reentered the United States without issue in 1982 where he lived openly under his own name and in accordance with the law. No one looked into Doggett’s whereabouts, but in 1988 a random credit check of individuals with outstanding warrants revealed his place of residence.</p> <p>After being arrested, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government’s failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. A federal magistrate found that the length of time between indictment and arrest was presumptively prejudicial, but recommended dismissal of Doggett’s motion because he did not show actual prejudice. The district court followed the magistrate’s recommendation. Doggett then entered a conditional guilty plea, allowing him to appeal the subsequent conviction on the speedy trial claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1111

91-1111

1992

Hartford Fire Insurance Company

California

<p>Nineteen States and many private plaintiffs filed complaints alleging that the defendants -- domestic primary insurers, trade associations, and a reinsurance broker, along with London-based as well as domestic reinsurers -- violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1, by engaging in various conspiracies aimed at forcing certain other primary insurers to change the terms of their standard domestic commercial general liability insurance policies. After the actions were consolidated for litigation, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the conduct alleged fell within the grant of antitrust immunity contained in Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1012(b), and that none of the conduct amounted to a "boycott" within the meaning of the Section 3(b), 15 U.S.C. Section 1013(b), exemption to that grant of immunity. The court of appeals reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Economic Activity

Minnesota v. Dickerson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2019

91-2019

1992

Minnesota

Timothy Dickerson

<p>On November 9, 1989, while exiting an apartment building with a history of cocaine trafficking, Timothy Dickerson spotted police officers and turned to walk in the opposite direction. In response, the officers commanded Dickerson to stop and proceeded to frisk him. An officer discovered a lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket, and, upon further tactile investigation, formed the belief that it was cocaine. The officer reached into Dickerson's pocket and confirmed that the lump was in fact a small bag of cocaine. Consequently, Dickerson was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He requested that the cocaine be excluded from evidence, but the trial court denied his request and he was found guilty. Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Deal v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-8199

91-8199

1992

Deal

United States

<p>Between January and April 1990, Thomas Lee Deal committed six bank robberies. In each robbery, he used a gun. Subsequently, Deal was convicted, in a single proceeding, of six counts of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC section 924(c)(1). Section 924(c)(1) prescribes a 5-year prison term for the first such conviction, in addition to the punishment provided for the crime of violence, and requires a 20-year sentence "in the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction under this subsection." The District Court sentenced Deal to 5 years' imprisonment on the first section 924(c)(1) count and to 20 years on each of the five other counts, the terms to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2003

91-2003

1992

United States

California and California State Board of Equalization

<p>From 1975 to 1985, the United States Government contracted with Williams Brothers Engineering Company (WBEC) to conduct the federal oil drilling in Kern County, California. By 1981, WBEC had accrued a state tax deficit of $14 million. After the Board of Equalization rejected WBEC's claim that those taxes were invalid, the company paid its deficit, and, according to WBEC's contract, was subsequently reimbursed by the United States Government. In January of 1988, WBEC continued to challenge the taxes by filing an action in state court. This action concluded with an agreement between the state of California and WBEC that the company receive a $3 million refund. The Federal Government filed a suit in the Eastern District of California in May of 1988, arguing that the remaining state taxes totaling $11 million were also illegitimate. The District Court ruled in favor of the state of California, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1600

91-1600

1992

Hazen Paper Co., Robert Hazen, Thomas N. Hazen

Walter F. Biggins

<p>Hazen Paper Company fired Walter F. Biggins, a 62-year-old employee who worked for Hazen for just under 10 years. Biggins’ pension was set to vest at the completion of 10 years of service. Biggins sued Hazen and its owners, alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and several provisions of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Biggins, finding that Hazen violated ERISA and “willfully” violated the ADEA. The willful violation gave rise to liquidated damages. The district court judge granted Hazen’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversing the finding of willfulness which eliminated the liquidated damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the jury verdict and reversed the finding of willfulness, holding that Hazen knowingly violated the ADEA by showing a “reckless disregard” for the matter.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Heller v. Doe

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-351

92-351

1992

Heller, Secretary, Kentucky Cabinet For Human Resources

Doe, By His Mother And Next Friend, Doe, et al.

<p>A class of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons brought suit against Kentucky in a Kentucky federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state's involuntary commitment procedures. The district court agreed that the procedures were unconstitutional and prevented the enforcement of the applicable statute. After multiple appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit instructed the state to amend its procedures.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Due Process

Godinez v. Moran

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-725

92-725

1992

Salvador Godinez, Warden

Richard Allan Moran

<p>Richard Allen Moran allegedly shot three people and attempted to kill himself. He pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder in Nevada state court. After a court-ordered psychiatric examination, Moran was found competent to stand trial. Two and a half months later, Moran told the court he wanted to discharge his attorney and change his pleas to guilty. Moran said he wanted to prevent anyone from introducing any favorable evidence. After some questioning, the judge accepted Moran’s waiver of his right to counsel and the guilty pleas. The court sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed as to two of the murders.</p> <p>After sentencing, Moran claimed he was mentally incompetent to represent himself and sought post-conviction relief in state court. The court rejected Moran’s claim based on findings from the psychiatric evaluations. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed his appeal. Moran then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that there was enough doubt at the time Moran pleaded guilty that the trial court should have held a hearing to evaluate whether Moran could make a “reasoned choice” among the alternatives given. The record did not support a finding that Moran was capable of making a reasoned choice.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-94

92-94

1992

Zobrest

Catalina Foothills School District

<p>James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Graham v. Collins

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-7580

91-7580

1992

Gary Graham

James A. Collins, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

<p>On May 13, 1981, 17-year-old Gary Graham accosted Bobby Grant Lambert in the parking lot of a Safeway grocery store in Houston, Texas, and attempted to steal his wallet. When Lambert refused to hand it over, Graham shot and killed him. Graham was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.</p> <p>Graham petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus by arguing that the sentencing jury should have considered the mitigating circumstances of his youth and troubled family life. The district court denied the petition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, and a panel reversed the district court’s ruling. Upon an en banc review, the Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s decision</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Withrow v. Williams

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1030

91-1030

1992

Withrow

Williams

<p>During his murder case, Robert Williams argued that statements he had made to police should be excluded. Some of those statements had been made before he was given his Miranda warnings and others, while made after the Miranda warnings had been given, were the direct product of those earlier, un- Mirandized statements and should also be excluded, he argued. The state trial court (and subsequently the appeals court) disagreed, and Williams was convicted.</p> <p>Williams filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court, arguing only that the claims made before the Miranda warnings were given should have been excluded. The court agreed but went further, ruling that the statements made <em>after</em> the Miranda warnings were inadmissible as well because they were the products of the earlier, un-Mirandized statements. On appeal, the state argued that the Supreme Court's decision in <em>Stone v. Powell</em>, 428 U.S. 465, which barred federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claims when the state had already given defendants a fair chance to raise such claims in state court, should also apply to questions regarding Fifth Amendment claims stemming from a failure to give Miranda warnings in a timely manner. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's grant of the petition, however, rejecting the state's argument.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Shaw v. Reno

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-357

92-357

1992

Shaw

Reno

<p>The U.S. Attorney General rejected a North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan because the plan created only one black-majority district. North Carolina submitted a second plan creating two black-majority districts. One of these districts was, in parts, no wider than the interstate road along which it stretched. Five North Carolina residents challenged the constitutionality of this unusually shaped district, alleging that its only purpose was to secure the election of additional black representatives. After a three-judge District Court ruled that they failed to state a constitutional claim, the residents appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Moreau v. Klevenhagen

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-1

92-1

1992

Lynwood Moreau

Johnny Klevenhagen, Sheriff of Harris County, Texas

<p>The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) allows public employers to give employees compensatory time off instead of overtime pay in some situations. The employees of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department had a union representative who dealt with workers' compensation and filing grievances, but Texas law prohibited collective bargaining agreements. Each employee had an individual employment agreement with the Sheriff’s Department. These agreements provided that employees would receive 1 ½ hours of compensatory time for each hour of overtime work.</p> <p>Lynwood Moreau, president of the union, sued the Sheriff’s Department for giving compensatory time instead of overtime pay. He argued that where there is a designated union representative, the FLSA requires a collective bargaining agreement to authorize this kind of compensation. The Sheriff’s Department argued that, because Texas prohibited collective bargaining agreements, there was no properly designated union representative, and the individual employment agreements were effective. The district court ruled in favor of the Sheriff’s Office and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Unions

Wisconsin v. Mitchell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-515

92-515

1992

Wisconsin

Mitchell

<p>On October 7, 1989, Todd Mitchell, a young black man, instigated an attack against a young white boy. He was subsequently convicted of aggravated battery in the Circuit Court for Kenosha County. According to Wisconsin statute, Mitchell's sentence was increased, because the court found that he had selected his victim based on race. Mitchell challenged the constitutionality of the increase in his penalty, but the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claims. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-2024

91-2024

1992

Lamb's Chapel

Center Moriches Union Free School District

<p>A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Herrera v. Collins

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-7328

91-7328

1992

Leonel Torres Herrera

James A. Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division

<p>On September 29, 1981, Officers Enrique Carrisalez and David Rucker were shot within several minutes of each other in a rural part of Texas along the Mexico border known as “the Valley.” Enrique Hernandez, who was riding along in Officer Carrisalez’s squad car, was an eyewitness to Carrisalez’s shooting. The shootings led to a massive hunt for the killer across the Valley. The police arrested Leonel Herrera on October 4, 1981 near Edinburg and took him to the police station. During a heated exchange, Herrera struck a police officer and was restrained. When defense counsel arrived several hours later, Herrera was badly beaten, unconscious, and partly paralyzed; he was subsequently transported to a hospital emergency room. Officer Carrisalez died soon thereafter.</p> <p>The police discovered evidence at the scene of arrest implicating Herrera in both murders. The car pulled over by Carrisalez was registered in the name of Herrera’s live-in girlfriend, and Herrera had a set of keys to that car when he was arrested. The police found drops of Type A blood on jeans recovered from a laundry room and in Herrera’s wallet. They also found a letter in Herrera’s pocket with Herrera’s fingerprints; the letter contained apparent confessions to both murders. Hernandez could not specifically identify Herrera from an array of six photographs, but later identified him as the shooter when presented with a mug shot. Herrera was convicted of the murder of Officer Carrisalez, and pleaded guilty to the murder of Trooper Rucker.</p> <p>Herrera filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming actual innocence and alleging that various Valley police officials were involved in the drug trade and were working with the person actually responsible for the murders, Raul Herrera. The trial court denied relief. Herrera filed another petition, presenting the affidavit of Raul Herrera’s son that he witnessed the killings and that Herrera did not commit them. The district court dismissed most of Herrera’s claims, but granted a stay of execution as to his claim of innocence. The Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, vacated the stay of execution, agreeing with Texas that innocence was irrelevant to Herrera’s petition.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-10

91-10

1992

Spectrum Sports Inc. and Kenneth B. Leighton

Shirley and Larry McQuillan, dba Sorboturf Enterprises

<p>Shirley and Larry McQuillan were the southwest distributors for products made with sorbothane, a patented elastic polymer. They had an agreement with the manufacturer to be one of five regional distributors. Gradually, the manufacturer began to take away the McQuillan’s right to distribute certain types of products, eventually revoking their rights altogether. The manufacturer only allowed one national distributor, Spectrum Sports, Inc., which was co-owned by the president of the manufacturer’s son. When the McQuillan’s business failed, they sued Spectrum for violations of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act makes it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of the interstate commerce.</p> <p>The district court instructed the jury to infer specific intent and dangerous probability of monopolization if they found that Spectrum engaged in predatory conduct. The jury found Spectrum guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was enough evidence to show specific intent and a dangerous probability of monopolization even if the jury only considered Spectrum’s predatory conduct.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-948

91-948

1992

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.

City of Hialeah

<p>The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Brecht v. Abrahamson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-7358

91-7358

1992

Todd A. Brecht

Gordon A. Abrahamson, Superintendent, Dodge Correctional Institution

<p>Todd Brecht was charged with murder for shooting his brother-in-law. During his trial, he testified that the shooting was an accident. In addition to presenting other evidence, the prosecution pointed out his silence (both prior to his receiving the Miranda warnings and after) in an attempt to discredit his testimony. Brecht was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison.</p> <p>Brecht appealed, claiming that the prosecution's reference to his post-Miranda silence violated his right to due process according to <em>Doyle v. Ohio</em>. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned the conviction, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reinstated it. They found that the mention of post-Miranda silence was impermissible under <em>Doyle</em>, but was also harmless error according to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard from <em>Chapman v. California</em>.</p> <p>Brecht sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The District Court upheld his <em>Doyle</em> claim and found that the violation was not harmless error under <em>Chapman</em>. Brecht's conviction was thus overturned again, only to be reinstated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.</p> <p>The Seventh Circuit held that <em>Chapman</em> was not the appropriate standard under which to review <em>Doyle</em> error in federal habeas petitions. Rather than adhering to the <em>Chapman</em> standard, the court applied the <em>Kotteakos v. United States</em> test, which requires that the <em>Doyle</em> error have a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict. Brecht's <em>Doyle</em> claim did not meet this standard, and the Seventh Circuit denied the writ.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Helling v. McKinney

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1958

91-1958

1992

Helling

McKinney

<p>William McKinney, a Nevada state prisoner, sued his warden and several other prison officials for violating his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to unhealthy levels of second-hand smoke. McKinney shared a cell with a man who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. He claimed that his health - both current and future - was being harmed by the smoke, and that the prison officials were "deliberately indifferent" to the risk in violation of the Supreme Court's decision in <em>Wilson v. Seiter</em>, 501 U.S. 294. After a federal magistrate ruled that he did not have an Eighth Amendment right to a smoke-free environment and that he had failed to prove any "serious medical needs," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that he should have been given another opportunity to prove that the smoke levels were sufficient to constitute an unreasonable danger to his future health.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, Florida

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1721

91-1721

1992

Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America

City of Jacksonville, Florida, et al.

<p>In 1984, the Minority Business Enterprise Participation ordinance was passed in Jacksonville, Florida which set aside 10 percent of the budget for city contracts to hire minority-owned businesses. On April 4, 1989, the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, an association of individuals and companies that worked in construction in Jacksonville, filed an action against the city and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court ruled in favor of the association, but when the city appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The appellate court held that the association lacked standing to file the action because it did not demonstrate that one or more of its members would have received a reserved city contract but for the ordinance.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-603

92-603

1992

Federal Communications Commission

Beach Communications, Inc.

<p>Section 602(7)(B) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 provides that cable television systems be franchised by local governmental authorities, but exempts facilities serving "only subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such...facilities use any public right-of-way." When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ruled that satellite master antenna television (SMATV) systems, which typically receive a satellite signal through a rooftop dish and then retransmits the signal by wire to units within a building or a building complex, are subject to the franchise requirement if their transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way, Beach Communications, Inc. and other SMATV operators petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Among other things, the appellate court found that section 602(7) violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because there was no rational basis for distinguishing between those facilities exempted by the statute and SMATV systems linking separately owned and managed buildings.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Austin v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-6073

92-6073

1992

Richard Lyle Austin

United States

<p>Richard Lyle Austin was indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota’s drug laws. He pleaded guilty to one count of possession cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years in jail. The United States then filed an in rem action, seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop under federal statutes that provide for forfeiture of property that is used or intended for use to facilitate the transportation of controlled substances, or related materials. Austin argued that forfeiture of his property would violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court rejected Austin’s argument and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to civil in rem actions for forfeiture of property to the government.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Cardinal Chemical Company v. Morton International, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-114

92-114

1992

Cardinal Chemical Company

Morton International, Inc.

<p>Acting upon a belief that Cardinal Chemical ("Cardinal") violated two of its patents on chemical compounds used in polyvinyl chloride, Morton International ("Morton") challenged Cardinal's actions in a South Carolina District Court. Cardinal counterclaimed that Morton's patents were invalid. The District Court ruled that although none of Morton's patents were violated, they were both invalid. Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit Court which sustained the lower courts infringement finding but issued a per se reversal of its determination as to the validity of Morton's patents based on a practice dating back to 1987. Cardinal appealed the per se rejection of its validity counterclaim and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Smith v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-8674

91-8674

1992

Smith

United States

<p>John Angus Smith offered to trade an automatic weapon, a MAC-10, to an undercover officer for cocaine. Subsequently, he was charged with numerous firearm and drug trafficking offenses. Federal law imposes mandatory sentence enhancement penalties, specifically 30 years for a "machinegun", if a defendant "during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime[,] uses . . . a firearm." A jury convicted Smith on all counts, which triggered the sentence enhancement. On appeal, Smith argued that the federal penalty for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense covers only situations in which the firearm is used as a weapon, not as a medium of exchange. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the plain language of the penalty does not require that a firearm be used as a weapon, but that it applies to any use of a gun that facilitates, in any fashion, the perpetration of a drug offense.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Dixon

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1231

91-1231

1992

United States

Alvin J. Dixon and Michael Foster

<p>Alvin J. Dixon was arrested on second-degree murder charges and released on bond with an order not to commit any criminal offense. Violation of the order would result in prosecution for contempt of court. While awaiting trial, Dixon was arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia found Dixon guilty of contempt. Dixon moved to dismiss a subsequent indictment for cocaine possession, arguing that it violated the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. The Superior Court granted the motion.</p> <p>Michael Foster’s wife obtained a civil protection order requiring that he not “molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse” her, or he would face prosecution for contempt of court. Foster’s wife later moved to have him held in contempt for threatening her. Foster was found guilty of contempt on two occasions, but acquitted on three others. Foster was later indicted on several counts of assault arising out of those same threats. He moved to have the charges dismissed arguing that it violated double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated the two cases, holding that the subsequent prosecutions were barred by <i>Grady v. Corbin</i>, which held that subsequent prosecutions violate the double jeopardy clause if the two prosecutions require proof of the same “essential element.”</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Johnson v. Texas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-5653

92-5653

1992

Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr.

Texas

<p>On March 23, 1986, Dorsie Lee Johnson, Jr., who was 19, shot Jack Huddleston in the course of a convenience store robbery by telling Huddleston to get on the ground and then shooting Huddleston in the back of the neck. A few weeks later, Johnson was arrested for a subsequent robbery and attempted murder. At that time he confessed to the murder of Jack Huddleston. </p> <p>Johnson was tried and convicted of capital murder. After a jury determined that he was guilty, a separate proceeding was held to determine whether Johnson would be sentenced to death or to life in prison. Pursuant to the Texas capital sentencing statute, the court instructed the jury to determine two special issues, whether Johnson caused the death of Jack Huddleston intentionally and whether Johnson was likely to constitute a continuing threat to society. Under Texas law, if the jury answered yes to both questions Johnson would be sentenced to death. The court further instructed the jury that it may consider any aggravating or mitigating evidence. However, the jury was given no special instruction to consider Johnson's youth. A unanimous jury found that the answer to both special issues was yes, and the trial court sentenced Johnson to death. </p> <p>Johnson appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the conviction. Johnson later filed a motion for rehearing arguing that the special issues did not allow for adequate consideration of Johnson's youth. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's argument concluding that the jury was able to express a reasoned and moral response to Johnson's mitigating evidence. Johnson then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/92-344

92-344

1992

Chris Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration And Naturalization Service, et al.

Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et al.

<p>According to Executive Order No. 12807 signed by President George H. W. Bush in 1992, the Coast Guard was required to force the return of all passengers discovered illegally traveling by sea from Haiti to the United States before reaching its borders without determining whether they qualify as refugees. The Haitian Centers Council, Inc., a collection of organizations representing illegal Haitian aliens and Haitians detained at Guantanamo, requested that the District Court for the Eastern District of New York delay the implementation of the order. The council argued that the order violated section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which protect individuals escaping potential prosecution from forced repatriation. The District Court denied the council's request, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Alexander v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-1526

91-1526

1992

Ferris Alexander

United States

<p>Ferris Alexander was the owner of a chain of stores and theaters in Minnesota that distributed sexually explicit media. He was charged with violating federal obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal District Court in Minnesota found him guilty of both charges. The court ordered him to forfeit his businesses, sentenced him to a six-year prison term, and fined him $100,000.</p> <p>Alexander appealed, claiming that the confiscation of his stores for his dealings in obscene material amounted to 'prior restraint' on his subsequent distribution of adult materials, and therefore violated his First Amendment rights. He also claimed that the seizure of his business violated his Eighth Amendment protection against excessive fines. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment on the First Amendment claim, and declined to review the Eighth Amendment claim on the ground that no sentence less severe than life imprisonment without parole could justify an Eighth Amendment review.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Nixon v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1992/91-740

91-740

1992

Nixon

United States

<p>Walter Nixon, a Federal District Judge, was convicted of a felony, making false statements to a grand jury. The House of Representatives voted three articles of impeachment; impeachment in the Senate followed. In accordance with Senate Rule XI, a Senate committee heard the evidence and reported its findings. The full Senate convicted Nixon and sought to remove him from office. Nixon challenged Senate Rule XI in federal court on the ground that the rule violated the impeachment clause of the Constitution, which declares that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The lower courts deemed the issue nonjusticiable and declined to intervene in the dispute.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1292

92-1292

1993

Campbell

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.

<p>Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. sued 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty Woman" infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman." The District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made fair use of the original song. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Board of Education or Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-517

93-517

1993

Board of Education or Kiryas Joel Village School District

Grumet

<p>In 1989, the New York legislature passed a school districting law that intentionally drew its boundaries in accordance with the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel, a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim who practice a strict form of Judaism. Shortly before the new district commenced operations, the taxpayers and the association of state school boards embarked on a lawsuit claiming that the statute created a school district that limited access only to residents of Kiryas Joel.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Florence County School District Four v. Carter

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/91-1523

91-1523

1993

Florence County School District Four

Carter

<p>After Shannon Carter was classified as a learning disabled student, school officials met with her parents to formulate an individualized education program (IEP) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Unhappy with the IEP developed by the school district, Shannon's parents challenged its appropriateness and enrolled her in a private school while their challenge was pending.</p> <p>When state and local educational authorities concluded that the IEP was adequate, Shannon's parents sued in Federal District Court, claiming the school district had failed to provide a "free appropriate public education" as required by IDEA and demanding reimbursement for Shannon's education at the private school. The school district argued that the private school did not meet all the requirements of IDEA and therefore did not meet the "appropriate" standard. Because of it was not "appropriate," the school district argued, reimbursement was not required.</p> <p>The District Court and the Fourth Circuit of Appeals both ruled against the school district, requiring it to reimburse Shannon's parents.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-780

92-780

1993

National Organization for Women, Inc.

Scheidler

<p>The National Organization for Women (NOW) sued a coalition of anti-abortion groups called the Pro-Life Action Network (PLAN) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. N.O.W. alleged that Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters were members in a nationwide conspiracy to obstruct women's access to abortion clinics through a pattern of racketeering activity including the actual or implied threat of violence. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the voluntary contributions are not proceeds of racketeering and that a "racketeering enterprise" must have an economic motive, a fact that NOW could not demonstrate. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Privacy

Albright v. Oliver

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-833

92-833

1993

Albright

Oliver et al.

<p>Illinois police obtained a warrant to arrest Kevin Albright after he was seen selling a substance which look liked an illegal drug. Upon hearing of the warrant, Albright surrendered to police detective Roger Oliver. A trial court dismissed the charge because it did not state an offense under Illinois law.</p> <p>Albright claimed that Oliver violated his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right by prosecuting him without probable cause. He filed suit against Oliver under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which provides relief to those deprived of civil rights. The federal District Court dismissed the suit because it did not state a claim under Section 1983. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that relief provided by Section 1983 for prosecution without probable cause is valid only if the prosecution caused a consequence such as loss of employment or incarceration.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-70

93-70

1993

Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. et al.

Department of Environmental Quality of The State of Oregon et al.

<p>In 1989, Oregon Legislature imposed a surcharge on solid waste generated out-of-state and disposed of within the state. The Department of Environmental Quality, determined the amount of the surcharge to be $2.25 per ton, significantly higher than the $0.85 per ton fee charged for in-state waste. Two waste disposal companies —Waste Systems Inc. and Columbia Resource Company (CRC) — disposed of waste generated out-of-state in Oregon. Waste Systems Inc. managed and owned a landfill in Oregon, and CRC transported waste from Washington State to Oregon. The companies challenged the surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals, arguing that it breached the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. However, the appellate court upheld the surcharge, and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1956

92-1956

1993

Consolidated Rail Corporation

Gottshall

<p>Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) employee James Gottshall observed a fellow worker, Richard Johns, die of a heart attack while on duty. Gottshall's boss postponed seeking medical assistance during Johns' heart attack, insisted that the crew keep working, and left the body at the work site for the remainder of the work day. Shortly after Johns's death, Gottshall was admitted to a psychiatric institution. Gottshall sued Conrail under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for exposing him to distressing circumstances which he claimed caused his illness. A District Court rejected the suit.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and found that Gottshall's injuries were "genuine and severe." The Third Circuit contrasted the liberal injury recovery policy embodied in FELA over the more limited injury relief recovery policy embodied in common law standards, which often applied harsh tests to prove employee injury.</p> <p>Conrail employee Alan Carlisle also filed a FELA action against Conrail. He claimed that Conrail subjected him to unsafe working conditions, which caused him stress and lead to health problems. Because the stress related health problems were foreseeable to Conrail, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for Carlisle.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1402

92-1402

1993

C & A Carbone, Inc., et al.

Town of Clarkstown

<p>A New York town, Clarkstown, allowed a contractor to construct and operate a waste processing plant within town limits. The revenue from the plant would help compensate the contractor. Clarkstown promised that the plant would receive 120,000 tons of solid waste each year, and permitted the contractor to charge an $81 "tipping fee" for each ton received. To meet the 120,000 ton quota, Clarkstown adopted a "flow control ordinance." The ordinance required that all solid waste flowing into and out of the town pass through the new plant. C &amp; A Carbone, Inc. operated a similar plant within the town. To avoid paying the $81 fee, Carbone trucked processed waste directly to an Indiana landfill. In 1991, a Carbone truck carrying illegal waste crashed and police discovered that Carbone was violating the ordinance. Clarkstown sued Carbone in a New York Supreme Court. Carbone responded by suing Clarkstown in a federal District Court, claiming that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause by disrupting interstate commerce. The District Court agreed but dissolved its injunction against Clarkstown when the New York Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarkstown.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1168

92-1168

1993

Harris

Forklift Systems, Inc.

<p>Teresa Harris was sexually harassed by her employer. She filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the harassment created an "abusive work environment" in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employer countered that the harassment had not been severe enough to seriously affect her psychologically or impair her ability to work, and that it therefore did not create an abusive work environment under the meaning of Title VII. The district court agreed, stating that the decision was a "close case" but that the harassment had not been severe enough to create an abusive work environment in violation of the Act. A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals panel affirmed the district court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1812

92-1812

1993

United States

Alvarez-Sanchez

<p>Three days after his arrest by local police on state narcotics charges, Pedro Alvarez-Sanchez confessed to the Secret Service that federal reserve notes found in his home were counterfeit. When he was subsequently charged with the federal offense of possession of counterfeit currency, Alvarez defended himself by claiming that the delay between his arrest on state charges and his presentment on the federal charge rendered his confession inadmissible. Alvarez cited 18 U.S.C. Section 3501(c), which pronounced separate charge-based confessions inadmissible if obtained after the first six hours of detention. On appeal from a reversal of a district court's decision to uphold the confession, the Supreme Court granted the United States certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1370

92-1370

1993

Bfp

Resolution Trust Corporation, As Receiver Of Imperial Federal Savings Association, et al.

<p>BFP, a partnership formed by two private investors, bought a home in Newport Beach, CA in 1987. BFP secured the property by obtaining a deed of trust from Imperial Savings Association (Imperial). Imperial owned the property until BFP could pay off the amount borrowed. BFP defaulted on loan repayment and Imperial proceeded to sell the property for $433,000 to settle the loan (foreclosure). Before the title of ownership transferred to the buyer, BFP filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. BFP asked bankruptcy court to nullify the original foreclosure sale because the home was valued at over $725,000. BFP argued that the low sales price constituted a fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. Section 548(a)(2)(A), which guarantees that debtors receive "reasonably equivalent value" for property foreclosed. BFP claimed "reasonably equivalent value" was equal to the market value of the property in question. The bankruptcy court denied BFP's claim, and a District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Central Bank of Denver , N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , N. A.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-854

92-854

1993

Central Bank of Denver , N. A.

First Interstate Bank Of Denver, N. A., et al.

<p>In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued $26 million worth of bonds to fund public improvements and residential and commercial developments. The Central Bank of Denver served as a trustee on the bonds. In 1988, there was concern that the land was no longer worth 160% of the value of the bonds’ outstanding principals and interests as required by the bond covenant. Before a review was completed, the Public Building Authority defaulted on the bonds. </p> <p>First Interstate Bank of Denver and the other respondents had purchased $2.1 million of the bonds, and after the default, sued for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The respondents argued that Central Bank was also liable for aiding and abetting the violations. Central Bank petitioned the district court for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-397

93-397

1993

Associated Industries of Missouri

Lohman

<p>Following Missouri's imposition of a 1.5% statewide "use tax," the Associated Industries of Missouri - representing Missouri businesses that had to collect the tax and a manufacturing firm that had to pay it - filed suit alleging that the tax violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Such discrimination was said to result from the fact that the use tax exceeded many in-state localities' sales tax rate.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Beecham v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-445

93-445

1993

Lenard Ray Beecham

United States

<p>Lenard Ray Beecham was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which makes it illegal for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. Beecham argued that according to the statute's exemption clause ("Any conviction...for which a person...has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction...") he was no longer a convicted felon because Tennessee had restored his civil rights. Prosecutors pointed to the statute's "choice of law clause," which states that "What constitutes a conviction...shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held." They argued that because Beecham's prior conviction was under federal law, no state could restore his right to possess a firearm.</p> <p>The District Court ruled that a state could restore civil rights barred by a federal conviction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision. The Fourth Circuit's rule conflicted with those of the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which held that the since the exemption clause applied to "any conviction," it also permitted states to undo restrictions caused by federal convictions.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Farmer v. Brennan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-7247

92-7247

1993

Dee Farmer

Edward Brennan, Warden

<p>Dee Farmer, a biological male, underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants and underwent unsuccessful sex reassignment surgery. Farmer was convicted and sentenced to prison on federal criminal charges. Prison medical personnel diagnosed Farmer as a transsexual. Farmer was generally kept separate from the general male population, in part because of Farmer’s misconduct, but also because of safety concerns.</p> <p>Farmer was transferred to the U.S. Penitentiary Terre Haute and placed in the general male population in accordance with prison policy. Within two weeks, a cellmate allegedly beat and raped Farmer. Farmer sued in federal district court, alleging that prison officials deliberately and indifferently failed to protect a prisoner. This violated Farmer’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Farmer sought damages and an injunction against future incarceration in any prison. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prison officials, noting that Farmer never complained or expressed any safety concerns prior to the incident. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1750

92-1750

1993

Fogerty

Fantasy, Inc.

<p>After successfully defending against a copyright infringement suit filed against him by Fantasy Inc. (Fantasy), John Fogerty sought to recover the cost of his attorney's fees from Fantasy. Fogerty based his claim on 17 U.S.C. section 505 which states in part that: "the court may award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs." On appeal from an unfavorable district court ruling, the Court of Appeals affirmed as it found that Fogerty did not demonstrate that Fantasy's original suit was frivolous or brought in bad faith. Fogerty appealed again, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Attorneys

Digital Equipment Corporation v. Desktop Direct, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-405

93-405

1993

Digital Equipment Corporation

Desktop Direct, Inc.

<p>After Digital Equipment Corporation and Desktop Direct, Inc. arrived at a settlement agreement in a trademark infringement suit, the federal District Court dismissed the case. Several months later, after Desktop claimed that Digital had misrepresented important facts during the settlement negotiations, the Court reopened the case and cancelled the agreement. Digital appealed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hear the case, holding that it was not immediately appealable under the guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court in <em>Coopers &amp; Lybrand v. Livesay</em>, 437 U.S. 463. The court held that the "right not to go to trial" claimed by Digital under the settlement was not sufficiently important to merit an immediate appeal and was different from immunity rooted in an explicit statutory or constitutional provision or compelling public policy rationale, the denial of which had been held immediately appealable.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-639

93-639

1993

Ibanez

Florida Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy

<p>Silvia Safille Ibanez practiced law in White Haven, Florida, and had been a member of the Florida Bar since 1983. She was also a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed by the Florida Board of Accountancy (Board) and was authorized by the Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards—a private organization—to use the designation Certified Financial Planner (CFP). Ibanez used both of these titles in her advertising and on her law office's stationery. When the Board learned that Ibanez advertised these designations, she was charged with practicing public accounting at an unlicensed firm, which violated the Public Accountancy Act. The officer who heard the case recommended that the Board dismiss the charges due to a lack of proof. The Board refused and declared Ibanez guilty of "false, deceptive, and misleading" advertising. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First Circuit, affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Attorneys

Stansbury v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-5770

93-5770

1993

Robert Edward Stansbury

California

<p>Robert Edward Stansbury, an ice cream truck driver, was taken to the Pomona Police Department for questioning as a potential witness in the investigation of the death of a 10-year-old girl. Stansbury was not a suspect in the death, and did not receive Miranda warnings, but during questioning, made a statement that put him under suspicion. After further questioning, Stansbury admitted to prior convictions for rape, kidnapping and child molestation. At this point the interrogating officer advised Stansbury of his Miranda rights and Stansbury refused to make any further statements. Stansbury requested an attorney and was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. The trial court held that Stansbury was not truly in custody and therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings until suspicion focused on him. The court refused to suppress Stansbury’s statements made prior to the warning. Stansbury was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California affirmed.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Honda Motor Company, Ltd. v. Oberg

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-644

93-644

1993

Honda Motor Company, Ltd.

Oberg

<p>Karl Oberg was driving an all-terrain vehicle when it overturned, causing him severe, permanent injuries. The jury in his trial assessed almost $1 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $5 million in punitive damages. A 1910 amendment to the Oregon state constitution prohibited judicial review of jury awards.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

ABF Freight Systems, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1550

92-1550

1993

ABF Freight Systems, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board

<p>After employee Michael Manson gave a false excuse for being late to work, ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) fired him for tardiness. Manson repeated his false excuse while under oath at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, during which he argued that ABF had fired him in retaliation for his previous union activities. The National Labor Relations Board reversed the judge, ruling that ABF had used Manson's tardiness as a pretext to fire him. The Board reinstated him with backpay.</p> <p>ABF appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the Board could not reinstate an employee who lied under oath. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the Board could determine whether or not to pardon Manson for giving a false excuse.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

United States v. Granderson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1662

92-1662

1993

United States

Granderson

<p>Granderson, convicted for mail destruction, faced potential imprisonment of 0-6 months under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court sentenced him to five years of probation. When Granderson tested positive for cocaine, the court resentenced him under section 3565 of the U.S. Code. The section says that if a person serving a sentence of probation possesses illegal drugs, "the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one third of the original sentence." The district court interpreted the phrase "original sentence" to refer to the term of probation imposed (60 months), rather than the 0-6 month imprisonment range set by the Guidelines. The court resentenced Granderson to 20 months' imprisonment.</p> <p>The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Granderson's new sentence. Citing "lenity," the court agreed with Granderson that "original sentence" referred to the potential imprisonment range under the Guidelines, not to the actual probation sentence.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-141

93-141

1993

West Lynn Creamery, Inc.

Healy

<p>On January 28, 1992, in response to the serious financial hardships of Massachusetts dairy farmers, the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pricing order. The order required all dealers who sold milk to Massachusetts retailers to make a monthly premium payment to be distributed among in-state dairy farmers. Two Massachusetts milk dealers --West Lynn Creamery and LeComte's Dairy -- sell dairy products in Massachusetts. West Lynn Creamery relies on out-of-state producers; LeComte purchases all of its milk from West Lynn. The dealers filed an action in state court claiming that the order violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The state court rejected their claims; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Davis v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1949

92-1949

1993

Robert L. Davis

United States

<p>On the Charleston Naval Base, Keith Shackleton lost a game of pool and a $30 wager to Robert L. Davis. Shackelton refused to pay, and was later found behind the pool club beaten to death with a pool cue. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) questioned Davis after finding a bloodstain of one of the pool cues Davis owned. Before questioning, Davis waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into questioning, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” The interviewing agents attempted to clarify the statement and reminded Davis he could remain silent and/or speak to counsel, but Davis said, “No, I don’t want a lawyer.” Questioning continued for another hour before Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.” At this point questioning ceased.</p> <p>At trial, Davis was convicted on one count of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to confinement for life and dishonorable discharge. Davis appealed, arguing that the NIS investigators violated his right to counsel, as laid out in <i>Edwards v. Arizona</i>, when they continued questioning after Davis indicated he “maybe” should talk to a lawyer. The U.S. Court of Military Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that Davis’ statements were ambiguous and the NIS appropriately clarified Davis’ wishes before continuing questioning.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Simmons v. South Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-9059

92-9059

1993

Jonathan Dale Simmons

South Carolina

<p>In July 1990, Jonathan Dale Simmons beat an elderly woman to death in her home. The week before his trial for capital murder was scheduled to begin, Simmons pled guilty to first-degree robbery and two counts of criminal sexual conduct in connection with two previous assaults. These guilty pleas rendered him ineligible for parole if convicted of any other violent-crime offense. Prior to jury selection, the trial court judge granted the prosecution’s motion to bar any questions pertaining to parole during the jury selection process. Simmons was convicted of murder and brought forth mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. In closing arguments, the prosecution focused on the issue of the future danger the defendant presented to society as a reason to sentence him to death. The defense requested that the trial judge give a specific jury instruction clarifying the meaning of “life imprisonment” in this case, and the trial judge refused to do so. The jury sentenced Simmons to death. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach a decision on the merits and instead held that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury satisfied the substance of Simmons’ request.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-44

93-44

1993

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.

Federal Communications Commission

<p>In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The rules limit the cannels available for exclusive control by cable programmers and increase competition for the remaining channels.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Heck v. Humphrey

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-6188

93-6188

1993

Roy Heck

James Humphrey, Dearborn County Prosecutor, et al.

<p>Roy Heck was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the death of his wife in Indiana state court and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He filed an action in federal district court claiming that the prosecution engaged in an “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” before his arrest and knowingly destroyed favorable evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but did not seek a release from custody. The district court dismissed the action. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Heck’s petition for habeas corpus was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Heck’s damages action, stating that the action challenged the legality of the conviction, so Heck must exhaust all state remedies before seeking §1983 relief like he would under the habeas corpus statute.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights