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800 | 54,269 | Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-880 | 93-880 | 1993 | Madsen et al. | Women's Health Center, Inc., et al. | <p>Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.</p>
| 944 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part | Privacy |
801 | 54,273 | City of Ladue v. Gilleo | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1856 | 92-1856 | 1993 | City of Ladue | Gilleo | <p>Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.</p>
| 566 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
802 | 54,271 | Barclay's Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1384 | 92-1384 | 1993 | Barclay's Bank, PLC | Franchise Tax Bd. of California | <p>California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a "reasonable approximation" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.</p>
<p>The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the "worldwide combined reporting" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The "worldwide combined reporting" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with <em>Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California</em>.)</p>
| 2,036 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
803 | 54,279 | American Dredging Company v. Miller | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/91-1950 | 91-1950 | 1993 | American Dredging Company | Miller | <p>Robert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.</p>
<p>American Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of "forum non conveniens," which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.</p>
| 1,133 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
804 | 54,282 | Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a Great Oregon | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-859 | 94-859 | 1994 | Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, et al. | Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon et al. | <p>The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.</p>
<p>The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.</p>
| 774 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
805 | 54,280 | J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1239 | 92-1239 | 1993 | J.E.B. | Alabama ex rel T.B. | <p>Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.</p>
| 332 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
806 | 54,283 | Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1631 | 93-1631 | 1994 | Rubin | Coors Brewing Company | <p>Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol.</p>
<p>The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.</p>
| 1,025 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
807 | 54,285 | Ryder v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-431 | 94-431 | 1994 | Ryder | United States | <p>James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.</p>
| 809 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
808 | 54,289 | Metropolitan Stevedore Company v. Rambo | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-820 | 94-820 | 1994 | Metropolitan Stevedore Company | Rambo | <p>John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.</p>
| 827 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
809 | 54,288 | Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1121 | 93-1121 | 1994 | Ed Plaut et al. | Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al. | <p>In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in <em>Lampf v Gilbertson</em> (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in <em>Lampf</em>. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.</p>
| 1,065 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Miscellaneous |
810 | 54,290 | Asgrow Seed Company v. Winterboer | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/92-2038 | 92-2038 | 1994 | Asgrow Seed Company | Winterboer et al., Dba Deebees | <p>Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.</p>
| 1,128 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
811 | 54,297 | First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-560 | 94-560 | 1994 | First Options of Chicago, Inc. | Kaplan | <p>After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.</p>
| 1,294 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
812 | 54,299 | Miller v. Johnson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-631 | 94-631 | 1994 | Miller | Johnson | <p>Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community."</p>
| 817 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
813 | 54,302 | United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-723 | 93-723 | 1994 | United States | X-Citement Video, Inc. | <p>The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.</p>
| 623 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
814 | 54,306 | American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1286 | 93-1286 | 1994 | American Airlines, Inc. | Wolens | <p>In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.</p>
| 943 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Federalism |
815 | 54,307 | Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1841 | 93-1841 | 1994 | Adarand Constructors, Inc. | Peña | <p>Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.</p>
| 956 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Civil Rights |
816 | 54,315 | United States v. National Treasury Employees Union | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1170 | 93-1170 | 1994 | United States | National Treasury Employees Union | <p>The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 727 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | First Amendment |
817 | 54,317 | United States v. Aguilar | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-270 | 94-270 | 1994 | United States | Robert P. Aguilar | <p>In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.</p>
| 1,087 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
818 | 54,320 | Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-329 | 94-329 | 1994 | Rosenberger | Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia | <p>Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.</p>
| 449 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
819 | 54,324 | Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-749 | 94-749 | 1994 | Hurley | Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. | <p>In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.</p>
| 699 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
820 | 54,326 | Wilson v. Arkansas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-5707 | 94-5707 | 1994 | Wilson | Arkansas | <p>In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" before entering.</p>
| 619 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
821 | 54,328 | Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-762 | 93-762 | 1994 | Jerome B. Graubart Inc. | Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company | <p>The city of Chicago hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.</p>
| 873 | 7 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
822 | 54,331 | United States v. Lopez | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1260 | 93-1260 | 1994 | United States | Lopez | <p>Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.</p>
| 598 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
823 | 54,330 | Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1001 | 93-1001 | 1994 | Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. | Dobson | <p>In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.</p>
| 967 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
824 | 54,333 | Arizona v. Evans | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1660 | 93-1660 | 1994 | Arizona | Isaac Evans | <p>In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans’ arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion.</p>
<p>The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees.</p>
| 1,185 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
825 | 54,336 | City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-23 | 94-23 | 1994 | City of Edmonds | Oxford House, Inc. | <p>In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
| 1,034 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
826 | 54,343 | McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-986 | 93-986 | 1994 | McIntyre | Ohio Elections Commission | <p>On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.</p>
| 544 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
827 | 54,346 | Tome v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-6892 | 93-6892 | 1994 | Matthew Wayne Tome | United States | <p>Matthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child’s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness’ testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence of motive.” Tome was convicted. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose.</p>
| 1,297 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
828 | 54,353 | Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-590 | 94-590 | 1994 | Vernonia School District 47J | Acton | <p>An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.</p>
| 544 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Privacy |
829 | 54,354 | Shalala v. Whitecotton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-372 | 94-372 | 1994 | Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services | Margaret Whitecotton, et al. | <p>On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function. </p>
<p>In order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.</p>
| 1,053 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
830 | 54,355 | Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-780 | 94-780 | 1994 | Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. | Pinette | <p>In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.</p>
| 465 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
831 | 54,357 | Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-788 | 94-788 | 1994 | Milwaukee | Cement Div., National Gypsum Co. | <p>After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.</p>
| 1,084 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
832 | 54,359 | Reynoldsville Casket Company v. Hyde | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-3 | 94-3 | 1994 | Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al. | Hyde | <p>A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in <em>Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.</em>, 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied <em>Bendix</em> and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that <em>Bendix</em> could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.</p>
| 930 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Due Process |
833 | 54,360 | Johnson v. Jones | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-455 | 94-455 | 1994 | Johnson | Jones | <p>Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.</p>
| 1,051 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
834 | 54,362 | Kyles v. Whitley | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-7927 | 93-7927 | 1994 | Curtis Lee Kyles | John P. Whitley | <p>Curtis Lee Kyles was charged with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann’s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 805 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
835 | 54,366 | Wilton v. Seven Falls Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-562 | 94-562 | 1994 | Wilton | Seven Falls Company | <p>London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.</p>
| 953 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
836 | 54,369 | U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1456 | 93-1456 | 1994 | U. S. Term Limits, Inc. | Ray Thornton | <p>On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.</p>
| 623 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
837 | 54,371 | Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-226 | 94-226 | 1994 | Florida Bar | Went For It Inc. | <p>Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.</p>
| 343 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Attorneys |
838 | 54,373 | Brown v. Gardner | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1128 | 93-1128 | 1994 | Brown | Gardner | <p>Fred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.</p>
| 820 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
839 | 54,375 | North Star Steel Company v. Thomas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-834 | 94-834 | 1994 | North Star Steel Company | Thomas | <p>The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.</p>
| 1,155 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
840 | 54,378 | Lockheed Corporation v. Spink | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-809 | 95-809 | 1995 | Lockheed Corporation | Spink | <p>Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink.</p>
| 847 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
841 | 54,379 | O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-354 | 95-354 | 1995 | O'Connor | Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation | <p>James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old.</p>
| 548 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
842 | 54,380 | Jaffee v. Redmond | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-266 | 95-266 | 1995 | Jaffee | Redmond | <p>Mary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.</p>
| 950 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
843 | 54,383 | Carlisle v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9247 | 94-9247 | 1995 | Carlisle | United States | <p>At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.</p>
| 853 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
844 | 54,384 | United States v. Armstrong | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-157 | 95-157 | 1995 | United States | Armstrong | <p>Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of "conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same." The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.</p>
| 959 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
845 | 54,381 | Lewis v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6465 | 95-6465 | 1995 | Lewis | United States | <p>Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.</p>
| 1,177 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
846 | 54,382 | Shaw v. Hunt | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-923 | 94-923 | 1995 | Shaw | Hunt | <p>Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>
| 605 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
847 | 54,385 | Wisconsin v. City of New York | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1614 | 94-1614 | 1995 | Wisconsin | City of New York | <p>Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an "actual enumeration" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups.</p>
| 714 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
848 | 54,387 | United States v. International Business Machines Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-591 | 95-591 | 1995 | United States | International Business Machines Corporation | <p>Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The court agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 545 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federal Taxation |
849 | 54,388 | Neal v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9088 | 94-9088 | 1995 | Neal | United States | <p>A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.</p>
| 1,579 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
850 | 54,386 | Holly Farms Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-210 | 95-210 | 1995 | Holly Farms Corporation | National Labor Relations Board | <p>Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as "live-haul" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.</p>
| 1,066 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
851 | 54,390 | Lewis v. Casey | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1511 | 94-1511 | 1995 | Lewis | Casey | <p>Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.</p>
| 958 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Due Process |
852 | 54,391 | BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-896 | 94-896 | 1995 | BMW of North America, Inc. | Gore | <p>After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>
| 856 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
853 | 54,392 | Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1654 | 94-1654 | 1995 | Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas | Umbehr | <p>Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.</p>
| 654 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
854 | 54,395 | National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-947 | 94-947 | 1995 | National Labor Relations Board | Town & Country Electric, Inc., et al. | <p>Town & County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town & Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town & Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town & Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town & Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term "employee" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.</p>
| 1,139 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Unions |
855 | 54,393 | United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1893 | 94-1893 | 1995 | United States et al. | Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia et al. 516 U.S. 415 | <p>To prevent "local media monopolies," Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC- controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.</p>
<p>Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that "video programming" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a "content-neutral" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not "narrowly tailored" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open "ample alternative channels for communication" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with <em>National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp</em>.</p>
| 1,415 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Judicial Power |
856 | 54,394 | Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-559 | 95-559 | 1995 | Doctor's Associates Inc. | Casarotto | <p>Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.</p>
| 1,340 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
857 | 54,396 | Lane v. Peña | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-365 | 95-365 | 1995 | Lane | Peña | <p>The Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which barred "any program or activity under any executive agency" from discriminating on the basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.</p>
| 590 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
858 | 54,397 | Felker v. Turpin | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-8836 | 95-8836 | 1995 | Felker | Turpin | <p>Ellis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Act"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.</p>
| 610 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | null | Criminal Procedure |
859 | 54,399 | United States v. Ursery | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-345 | 95-345 | 1995 | United States | Ursery | <p>Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.</p>
| 507 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
860 | 54,403 | Tuggle v. Netherland | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6016 | 95-6016 | 1995 | Tuggle | Netherland | <p>Lem Tuggle was convicted of murder. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of his future dangerousness, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Tuggle to death. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, which held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but upheld the death sentence based on the vileness aggravator under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld based on one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid.</p>
| 1,013 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
861 | 54,405 | United States v. Noland | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-323 | 95-323 | 1995 | United States | Noland | <p>The IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.</p>
| 527 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federal Taxation |
862 | 54,408 | United States v. Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-325 | 95-325 | 1995 | United States | Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT | <p>The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&I Steel Corporation (CF&I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 million. CF&I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent "tax" on any "accumulated funding deficiency" of plans such as CF&I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an "excise tax" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later approved a reorganization plan for CF&I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,100 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Federal Taxation |
863 | 54,404 | Lonchar v. Thomas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5015 | 95-5015 | 1995 | Lonchar | Thomas | <p>Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed "next friend" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an "eleventh hour" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.</p>
| 1,162 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
864 | 54,407 | Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-12 | 94-12 | 1995 | Seminole Tribe of Florida | Florida | <p>The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.</p>
| 739 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
865 | 54,409 | Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-719 | 95-719 | 1995 | Gasperini | Center for Humanities Inc. | <p>William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted "industry standard" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict "materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation." The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000.</p>
| 1,349 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | null |
866 | 54,410 | Hercules Inc. v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-818 | 94-818 | 1995 | Hercules Inc. | United States | <p>During the 1960s, the United States government contracted with several chemical manufacturers, including Hercules Incorporated and Wm. T. Thompson Company, to manufacture the herbicide known as Agent Orange. After health problems arose, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against the manufactures. The manufacturers incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, the claims. The manufactures then filed suit under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on theories of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the government. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of implied warranty of specifications and the theory of implied promise to indemnify for liabilities incurred in performing the contracts. The appellate court also held that, by settling, the manufactures had voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible.</p>
| 951 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
867 | 54,411 | Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1530 | 94-1530 | 1995 | Things Remembered, Inc. | Petrarca | <p>Anthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.</p>
| 805 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
868 | 54,412 | Lawrence v. Chater | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9323 | 94-9323 | 1995 | Lawrence | Chater | <p>Kemmerlyn Lawrence asserted entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependant, unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. Under the Social Security Act, which requires paternity to be decided by state law, Lawrence acknowledged that her claim appeared defeated, but agued that the relevant North Carolina law's proof of paternity requirements are unconstitutional. After the Federal Government argued that a state paternity law's constitutionality need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Lawrence's benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security Administration reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. The Solicitor General thus invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) to the Court of Appeals to decide the case or remand it to the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration.</p>
| 1,050 | 7 | 2 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Judicial Power |
869 | 54,415 | Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-2003 | 94-2003 | 1995 | Lotus Development Corporation | Borland International, Inc. | <p>Lotus Development Corporation (Lotus) copyrighted a computer spreadsheet program called Lotus 1-2-3. The program's menu options were arranged in a specific menu command hierarchy. Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed users to write "macros," which designate a certain series of commands to be executed with a single keystroke. Competing software-company Borland International, Inc. (Borland) released a similar program called Quattro that contained a program called "Key Reader." Lotus claimed that Key Reader infringed on its copyright because it copied Lotus 1-2-3 macros and arranged them according to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. Borland explained that it did this to allow users already familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to also operate Quattro and argued that the Lotus menu command hierarchy did not constitute copyright-protected material.</p>
<p>After the District Court ruled in favor of Lotus, Borland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the command menu hierarchy was a "method of operation" - a category excluded from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.102(b).</p>
| 1,139 | 4 | 4 | false | equally divided | affirmed | Economic Activity |
870 | 54,414 | Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1175 | 94-1175 | 1995 | Bank One Chicago, N.A. | Midwest Bank & Trust Company | <p>The Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a "person other than [a] depository institution" sues a "depository institution," or when a depositor sues a bank.</p>
| 1,071 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
871 | 54,416 | Henderson v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-232 | 95-232 | 1995 | Henderson | United States | <p>Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint "forthwith," or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because "forthwith" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 928 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
872 | 54,418 | Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Hiles | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6 | 95-6 | 1995 | Norfolk & Western Railway Company | Hiles | <p>Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk & Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk & Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles." The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed.</p>
| 1,187 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
873 | 54,419 | Gray v. Netherland | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6510 | 95-6510 | 1995 | Gray | Netherland | <p>Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.</p>
| 1,355 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
874 | 54,421 | Pennsylvania v. Labron | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-1691 | 95-1691 | 1995 | Pennsylvania | Edwin Labron | <p>This is the consolidation of two cases involving the search and seizure of illicit drugs in automobiles. In Pennsylvania v. Labron 95-1691, the police observed Edwin Labron participating in a number of drug transactions out of his car on a street in Philadelphia. Without a warrant, but with probable cause, the police then found cocaine when they searched the trunk of Labron's car. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional, finding that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. In Pennsylvania v. Kilgore 95-1738, a search of Randy Kilgore's truck during a drug raid on his home turned up cocaine. Again, the police did not obtain a warrant, but probable cause existed. Again the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present.</p>
| 1,073 | 7 | 2 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
875 | 54,420 | Ornelas v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5257 | 95-5257 | 1995 | Ornelas | United States | <p>Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but for different reasons.</p>
| 497 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
876 | 54,422 | Leavitt v. Jane L. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-1242 | 95-1242 | 1995 | Leavitt, Governor of Utah | Jane L. | <p>A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early-term abortions was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable.</p>
| 664 | 5 | 4 | true | per curiam | reversed | Privacy |
877 | 54,424 | Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-26 | 95-26 | 1995 | Markman | Westview Instruments, Inc. | <p>Herbert Markman owns the patent to a system that tracks clothing through the dry-cleaning process using a keyboard and data processor to generate transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors. According to the patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights, Markman's product can "maintain an inventory total" and "detect and localize spurious additions to inventory." Westview Instruments, Inc.'s product also uses a keyboard and processor and lists dry-cleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical detectors. In an infringement suit, after hearing an expert witness testify about the meaning of the claim's language, a jury found that Westview's product had infringed Markman's patent. However, the District Court directed a verdict for Westview on the ground that its device is unable to track "inventory" as that term is used in the claim. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of the court and that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is consistent with that conclusion.</p>
| 1,144 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
878 | 54,423 | Rutledge v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-8769 | 94-8769 | 1995 | Rutledge | United States | <p>Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.</p>
| 477 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
879 | 54,426 | Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-668 | 95-668 | 1995 | Auciello Iron Works, Inc. | National Labor Relations Board | <p>The day after Auciello Iron Works' contract offer was accepted by its union employees' collective-bargaining representative, Auciello disavowed the agreement because of a good-faith doubt, based on knowledge acquired before the offer's acceptance, that a majority of employees supported the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Auciello's withdrawal was an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that the agreement be reduced to a formal written instrument. The Court of Appeals enforced the order as reasonable after the NLRB issued a supplemental opinion to justify its refusal to consider Auciello's defense of good-faith doubt about the Union's majority status.</p>
| 740 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
880 | 54,425 | Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-489 | 95-489 | 1995 | Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee | Federal Election Commission | <p>Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate." The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered judgment for the FEC.</p>
| 1,140 | 7 | 2 | true | plurality opinion | vacated/remanded | First Amendment |
881 | 54,427 | Romer v. Evans | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1039 | 94-1039 | 1995 | Romer | Evans | <p>Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.</p>
| 485 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Privacy |
882 | 54,429 | Bush v. Vera | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-805 | 94-805 | 1995 | Bush | Vera | <p>Following the 1990 census, Texas planned the creation of three additional congressional districts. Following the redistricting, registered voters challenged the plans as racial gerrymandering. A three-judge federal district court found the plans unconstitutional. The case moved to the Supreme Court on appeal.</p>
| 318 | 5 | 4 | false | plurality opinion | affirmed | Civil Rights |
883 | 54,431 | Robinson v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-7448 | 94-7448 | 1995 | Robinson | United States | <p>Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" both "during and in relation to" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting "use" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an "accessibility and proximity" test.</p>
| 904 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
884 | 54,432 | United States v. Winstar Corporation | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-865 | 95-865 | 1995 | United States | Winstar Corporation | <p>During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged thrifts in good standing and outside investors to take over ailing thrifts in supervisory mergers. The Board agreed to permit acquiring entities to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable assets as an intangible asset referred to as supervisory goodwill and to count such goodwill and certain capital credits toward the capital reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations. Subsequently, Congress's passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) forbade thrifts from counting goodwill and capital credits in computing the required reserves. Three thrifts, created through supervisory mergers who consequently ran into financial troubles, each filed suit against the United States for breach of contract. Agreeing with the thrifts, the District Court granted each summary judgment. The court rejected Government's arguments that surrenders of sovereign authority, such as the promise to refrain from regulatory changes, must appear in unmistakable terms in a contract in order to be enforceable and that a public and general sovereign act, such as FIRREA's alteration of capital reserve requirements, could not trigger contractual liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,364 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
885 | 54,433 | United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-340 | 95-340 | 1995 | United Food & Commercial Workers | Brown Group, Inc. | <p>The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof." Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing.</p>
| 1,278 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
886 | 54,434 | Brown v. Pro Football Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-388 | 95-388 | 1995 | Brown | Pro Football Inc. | <p>After their collective-bargaining agreement expired, the National Football League (NFL) -- a group of football clubs -- and the NFL Players Association -- a labor union -- began to negotiate a new contract. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a "developmental squad" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000 weekly salary. The union disagreed. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan. A number of squad players brought an antitrust suit, claiming that the employers' plan unfairly restrained trade. The District Court awarded damages to the players, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision.</p>
| 705 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
887 | 54,435 | 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1140 | 94-1140 | 1995 | 44 Liquormart Inc. | Rhode Island | <p>Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 554 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | First Amendment |
888 | 54,437 | Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-203 | 94-203 | 1995 | Morse | Republican Party of Virginia | <p>In 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the claims.</p>
| 878 | 5 | 4 | true | plurality opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
889 | 54,436 | Fulton Corporation v. Faulkner | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1239 | 94-1239 | 1995 | Fulton Corporation | Faulkner | <p>After North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.</p>
| 851 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
890 | 54,438 | Koon v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1664 | 94-1664 | 1995 | Koon | United States | <p>Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.</p>
| 1,242 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
891 | 54,440 | Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-244 | 95-244 | 1995 | Quackenbush | Allstate Insurance Company | <p>The California Insurance Commissioner filed a state court action against Allstate Insurance Co. seeking damages for Allstate's alleged breach of reinsurance agreements in an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission Insurance companies. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Commissioner sought to remand the case to state court, arguing that the court should abstain from hearing the case, under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of insurance insolvencies and liquidations. The District Court agreed, concluded that an abstention was appropriate, and remanded the case to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion. After determining the appealability of the District Court's remand order, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The court held that abstention was inappropriate in this damages action because a Burford abstention is limited to equitable actions.</p>
| 1,108 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
892 | 54,439 | Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Company | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1361 | 94-1361 | 1995 | Zicherman | Korean Air Lines Company | <p>In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Subsequently, Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother sued KAL under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs international air transportation. Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages. The Court of Appeals set aside the verdict, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The appellate court found that Mahalek had not established dependent status and remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a dependent of the decedent.</p>
| 954 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part | Economic Activity |
893 | 54,441 | Behrens v. Pelletier | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1244 | 94-1244 | 1995 | Behrens | Pelletier | <p>After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.</p>
| 1,167 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
894 | 54,442 | Peacock v. Thomas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1453 | 94-1453 | 1995 | Peacock | Thomas | <p>In 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru- Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in Thomas's favor, but found that Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit.</p>
| 851 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Economic Activity |
895 | 54,443 | Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-83 | 95-83 | 1995 | Meghrig | KFC Western, Inc. | <p>Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equitable restitution" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.</p>
| 986 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Judicial Power |
896 | 54,445 | Varity Corporation v. Howe | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1471 | 94-1471 | 1995 | Varity Corporation | Howe | <p>Charles Howe and others used to work for Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a farm equipment manufacturer, and a wholly owned subsidiary of the Varity Corporation. These employees all were participants in, and beneficiaries of, Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit plan, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA protected plan that Massey- Ferguson administered itself. When certain divisions in Massey-Ferguson stared losing money, Varity decided to transfer them to a separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey Combines. Varity also persuaded the employees of the failing divisions to change employers and benefit plans, conveying the message that employees' benefits would remain secure when they transferred. Ultimately, the employees lost their nonpension benefits. The employees filed an action under ERISA, claim that Varity, through trickery, had led them to withdraw from their old plan and forfeit their benefits. The District Court found that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, acting as ERISA fiduciaries, had harmed plan beneficiaries through deliberate deception, which gave the employees to right to relief, including the reinstatement to the old plan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
| 1,222 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
897 | 54,447 | Montana v. Egelhoff | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-566 | 95-566 | 1995 | Montana | Egelhoff | <p>James Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.</p>
| 592 | 5 | 4 | true | plurality opinion | reversed | Due Process |
898 | 54,448 | Whren v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5841 | 95-5841 | 1995 | Whren | United States | <p>Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
| 927 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
899 | 54,449 | United States v. Virginia | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1941 | 94-1941 | 1995 | United States | Virginia | <p>The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>
| 952 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |