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800
54,269
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/93-880
93-880
1993
Madsen et al.
Women's Health Center, Inc., et al.
<p>Women's Health Center Inc. operated several abortion clinics throughout central Florida, including the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida. In 1992, in response to anti-abortion protesters, a state court prohibited the protesters from physically abusing those entering or exiting the clinic, or otherwise interfering with access to the clinic. About 6 months later, Women's Health Center Inc. expressed a need to broaden the court order. The state court agreed, banning demonstrators from entering a 36-foot buffer-zone around the clinic, making excessive noise, using images visible to patients, approaching patients within a 300-foot radius of the clinic, and protesting within a 300-foot radius of staff residences. Petitioner Judy Madsen and her fellow protesters claimed that these restrictions violated their First Amendment right to free speech, but the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the court order.</p>
944
6
3
false
majority opinion
reversed in-part
Privacy
801
54,273
City of Ladue v. Gilleo
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1856
92-1856
1993
City of Ladue
Gilleo
<p>Margaret Gilleo placed a 24-by-36-inch sign calling for peace in the Persian Gulf on her front lawn. The original sign disappeared and a subsequent sign was knocked down. She reported these incidents to the police who advised her that such signs were prohibited in Ladue. She sued the city and the District Court ordered a preliminary injunction. Ladue repealed the law and replaced it with a new one which also banned window signs. Gilleo then placed another anti-war sign in her second-story window and amended her complaint to challenge the new ordinance.</p>
566
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
First Amendment
802
54,271
Barclay's Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1384
92-1384
1993
Barclay's Bank, PLC
Franchise Tax Bd. of California
<p>California used a "worldwide combined reporting" method to determine tax liability for multinational corporations operating inside the state. Under this method, the multinational's income was taxed in proportion to the average percentage of worldwide payroll, property, and sales located inside the state. Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) was wholly owned by a multinational corporation, Barclays Bank International Limited (BBI). Barcal did not include financial data for BBI in its 1977 tax filings. The California Franchise Tax Board (Tax Board) determined that Barcal misrepresented the proportion of income subject to taxation, causing a tax deficiency of over one hundred thousand dollars. Barcal and BBI paid, but then sued for the amount paid, complaining that the cost to provide BBI's worldwide financial data was disproportionately large considering that Barcal operated largely independently of BBI and BBI operated largely outside of California. Barcal and BBI contended that this violated the Commerce Clause-derived anti-discrimination requirement, which prevents States from imposing disproportionately large tax compliance burdens upon corporations. The Tax Board allowed BBI to make a "reasonable approximation" of financial data to minimize costs, but BBI claimed that this action violated Due Process by admitting financial data that was possibly inaccurate.</p> <p>The California Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and remanded the case to a California Court of Appeals, which also did not find the burden disproportionate. Barcal and BBI also contended that the "worldwide combined reporting" method risked double taxation by the state and the federal government. Additionally, The "worldwide combined reporting" method deviated from taxing methods employed by other states, thus transgressing the federal government's interest in providing uniform standards for taxing foreign commerce. (The case was consolidated with <em>Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Board Of California</em>.)</p>
2,036
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
803
54,279
American Dredging Company v. Miller
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/91-1950
91-1950
1993
American Dredging Company
Miller
<p>Robert Miller, a Mississippi resident who had moved north to find work, was injured while working as a seaman for American Dredging Company, a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Miller returned home to Mississippi, and filed a suit against the company in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. The suit was filed under the Jones Act, a federal law that allows a seaman to sue his employer in either federal or state court when he suffers personal injury.</p> <p>American Dredging moved to dismiss the case under the doctrine of "forum non conveniens," which allows a court to dismiss a case if it is filed in a place that is unnecessarily and significantly inconvenient to the defendant. The trial court agreed, holding that a Louisiana law making the doctrine of "forum non conveniens" inapplicable in Jones Act cases was superseded by federal maritime law (law that deals with oceanic commerce). An appeals court affirmed the decision, but the Louisiana Supreme Court overturned it, holding that the Louisiana law was not superseded by federal maritime law.</p>
1,133
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Federalism
804
54,282
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for a Great Oregon
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-859
94-859
1994
Babbitt, Secretary Of Interior, et al.
Sweet Home Chapter Of Communities For A Great Oregon et al.
<p>The Endangered Species Act requires that no person "take" an endangered or threatened species. The Act defines take as "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill." The Secretary of the Interior further characterizes "harm" as including "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Several persons within forestry industries sued the Secretary, asserting that Congress did not intend for the regulation to include changes in habitat. The District Court found for the Secretary of the Interior.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of noscitur a sociis, which means that the meaning of words is determined by the words around it. Thus, "harm" could only include actions applying direct force to the animal.</p>
774
6
3
true
majority opinion
reversed
Economic Activity
805
54,280
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1993/92-1239
92-1239
1993
J.E.B.
Alabama ex rel T.B.
<p>Alabama, acting on behalf of T.B. (the mother), sought paternity and child support from J.E.B.(the putative father). A jury found for T.B. In forming the jury, Alabama used its peremptory strikes to eliminate nine of the ten men who were in the jury pool; J.E.B. use a peremptory challenge to strike a tenth man in the pool.</p>
332
6
3
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Civil Rights
806
54,283
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1631
93-1631
1994
Rubin
Coors Brewing Company
<p>Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or advertisements. Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The government argued the regulation was necessary to prevent “strength wars” among brewers, which in this case, refers to breweries competing on the basis of the potency of their alcohol.</p> <p>The district court found in favor of Coors, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the district court. The district court subsequently upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars.</p>
1,025
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
First Amendment
807
54,285
Ryder v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-431
94-431
1994
Ryder
United States
<p>James Ryder, an enlisted member of the Coast Guard, was convicted of drug offenses by a court-martial. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review affirmed. On rehearing, the court rejected Ryder's claim that its composition violated the Appointments Clause because two of the judges on the three-judge panel were civilians appointed by the General Counsel of the Department of Transportation. The Court of Military Appeals agreed with Ryder that the appointments violated the Clause under its previous decision in United States v. Carpenter that appellate military judges are inferior officers who must be appointed by a President, a court of law, or a head of a department. The court nonetheless affirmed Ryder's conviction on the ground that the actions of the two civilian judges were valid de facto.</p>
809
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Civil Rights
808
54,289
Metropolitan Stevedore Company v. Rambo
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-820
94-820
1994
Metropolitan Stevedore Company
Rambo
<p>John Rambo received a disability award under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) for an injury he sustained while working for the Metropolitan Stevedore Company as a longshore frontman. Afterwards, Rambo acquired new skills and obtained longshore work as a crane operator, earning more than three times his preinjury earnings, though his disabled physical condition remained unchanged. Metropolitan filed to modify Rambo's disability award under the LHWCA on the ground that there had been a change in conditions such that Rambo was no longer disabled. An Administrative Law judge terminated Rambo's benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that the LHWCA authorizes modification only where there has been a change in an employee's physical condition.</p>
827
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Economic Activity
809
54,288
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1121
93-1121
1994
Ed Plaut et al.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., et al.
<p>In 1987, several Spendthrift Farm shareholders, including Ed Plaut, brought suit against the corporation claiming stock sales in 1983 and 1984 had violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court's ruling in <em>Lampf v Gilbertson</em> (1991) set a universal time limit of three years after an alleged violation for suits stemming from the relevant portion the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this ruling, a district court judge dismissed the shareholders' case on August 13, 1991. On December 19, 1991, Congress enacted the FDIC Improvement Act, which required courts to reinstate cases dismissed under the Supreme Court's limitation in <em>Lampf</em>. The shareholders filed a motion to reinstate. A district court judge agreed the act required the case be reinstated, but denied the request on the ground that Congress had violated separation of powers in requiring the courts to reopen settled matters. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's conclusion on the same ground.</p>
1,065
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Miscellaneous
810
54,290
Asgrow Seed Company v. Winterboer
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/92-2038
92-2038
1994
Asgrow Seed Company
Winterboer et al., Dba Deebees
<p>Asgrow Seed Company (Asgrow) held two Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) certificates protecting different varieties of soybean seed. These PVPA certificates act like patents in order to promote research on new varieties of plants and to protect the owners of seed varieties from unauthorized sales. However, there is an exemption for farmers who sell seed to other farmers whose primary occupation is growing crops for sale. In 1990, Winterboer planted and harvested 265 acres of land with two Asgrow soybean varieties. He then sold enough to plant 10,000 acres to other farmers for use as seed. Asgrow claimed that the PVPA prohibits anyone from selling for seed more than would be needed to replant his own fields - an amount greatly exceeded by Winterboer's sales. Winterboer argued that the exemptions in the statute protect sales of unlimited amounts of seed as long as both seller and buyer grow crops primarily for "other than reproductive purposes." The District Court ruled in favor of Asgrow, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and denied Asgrow's petition for rehearing.</p>
1,128
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed
Economic Activity
811
54,297
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-560
94-560
1994
First Options of Chicago, Inc.
Kaplan
<p>After the October 1987 stock market crash, First Options of Chicago, Inc., a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, demanded that Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI) immediately pay the entire MKI debt. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a panel of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange based on workout agreements, which governed the working out of debts owned by Kaplan, his wife, and MKI. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel. The Kaplans argued that their disagreement with First Options not was arbitrable. After deciding that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits, the arbitrators ruled in First Options' favor. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals reversed the award, finding that the dispute was not arbitrable. The appellate court concluded that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of a motion to vacate the arbitration award.</p>
1,294
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
812
54,299
Miller v. Johnson
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-631
94-631
1994
Miller
Johnson
<p>Between 1980 and 1990, only one of Georgia's ten congressional districts was majority-black. According to the 1990 decennial census, Georgia's black population of 27% entitled blacks to an additional eleventh congressional seat, prompting Georgia's General Assembly to re-draw the state's congressional districts. After the Justice Department refused pre-clearance of several of the Assembly's proposed new districts, the Assembly was finally successful in creating an additional majority-black district through the forming of an eleventh district. This district, however, was called a "geographic monstrosity" because it extended 6,784.2 square miles from Atlanta to the Atlantic Ocean. In short, "the social, political, and economic makeup of the Eleventh District tells a tale of disparity, not community."</p>
817
5
4
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Civil Rights
813
54,302
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-723
93-723
1994
United States
X-Citement Video, Inc.
<p>The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 prohibited the interstate transportation, shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual materials containing children engaged in sexually explicit acts. Richard Gottesman, owner and manager of X-Citement Video, sold forty-nine tapes to undercover officers. Gottesman shipped the videos, containing pornographic acts by industry legend Traci Lords before she turned eighteen, to Hawaii. Although he claimed he did not know the tapes contained underage pornographic acts, Gottesman was arrested for violating the sexual exploitation act.</p>
623
7
2
true
majority opinion
reversed
First Amendment
814
54,306
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1286
93-1286
1994
American Airlines, Inc.
Wolens
<p>In consolidated state-court class actions brought in Illinois, participants in American Airlines' frequent flyer program, AAdvantage, challenged American's retroactive changes in program terms and conditions. Specially, the participants alleged that American's imposition of capacity controls and blackout dates to mileage credits they had previously accumulated violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and constituted a breach of contract. American responded that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA) preempted the claim. The ADA prohibits States from "enacting or enforcing any law...relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services." The Illinois Supreme Court ruled to allow the breach of contract and Consumer Fraud Act monetary relief claims to survive. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, American petitioned for certiorari.</p>
943
5
3
true
majority opinion
reversed in-part/remanded
Federalism
815
54,307
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1841
93-1841
1994
Adarand Constructors, Inc.
Peña
<p>Adarand, a contractor specializing in highway guardrail work, submitted the lowest bid as a subcontractor for part of a project funded by the United States Department of Transportation. Under the terms of the federal contract, the prime contractor would receive additional compensation if it hired small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." [The clause declared that "the contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities...." Federal law requires such a subcontracting clause in most federal agency contracts]. Another subcontractor, Gonzales Construction Company, was awarded the work. It was certified as a minority business; Adarand was not. The prime contractor would have accepted Adarand's bid had it not been for the additional payment for hiring Gonzales.</p>
956
5
4
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Civil Rights
816
54,315
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1170
93-1170
1994
United States
National Treasury Employees Union
<p>The Ethics in Government Act of 1978, amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, prohibits members of Congress, federal officers, and other government employees from accepting an honorarium for making an appearance, speech, or writing an article. The prohibition applies even when neither the subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for it has any connection with the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging the honorarium ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of its freedom of speech. A District Court held the ban unconstitutional and enjoined the government from enforcing it against Executive Branch employees. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
727
6
3
false
majority opinion
reversed in-part/remanded
First Amendment
817
54,317
United States v. Aguilar
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-270
94-270
1994
United States
Robert P. Aguilar
<p>In 1986 and 1987, the FBI investigated Michael Rudy Tham and Abe Chapman as part of a nationwide investigation into healthcare provider fraud. The judge on the case authorized a wiretap of Tham and Chapman’s phones. He kept these wiretaps secret. Chapman was distantly related to U.S. District Court Judge Robert P. Aguilar. When Chapman asked Aguilar for help in the case, Aguilar talked to the judge on the case and learned about the wiretap. Though the wiretap order had expired, Aguilar told Chapman about it. When FBI agents questioned Aguilar on the matter, he lied about his knowledge and participation in the case. Aguilar was tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for disclosing a wiretap and endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of justice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that disclosing an expired wiretap does not violate the law, and Aguilar did not obstruct justice because the grand jury investigating the case did not order the FBI investigation.</p>
1,087
6
3
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
818
54,320
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-329
94-329
1994
Rosenberger
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
<p>Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by University guidelines.</p>
449
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed
First Amendment
819
54,324
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-749
94-749
1994
Hurley
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.
<p>In 1993, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council was authorized by the city of Boston to organize the St. Patrick's Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the event for the Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB). The group attempted to join to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals. The Massachusetts State Court ordered the Veterans' Council to include GLIB under a state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation in public accommodations. The Veterans' Council claimed that forced inclusion of GLIB members in their privately-organized parade violated their free speech.</p>
699
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
First Amendment
820
54,326
Wilson v. Arkansas
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-5707
94-5707
1994
Wilson
Arkansas
<p>In 1992, Sharlene Wilson sold illicit narcotics to undercover agents of the Arkansas state police. Police officers then applied for and obtained warrants to search Ms. Wilson's home and to arrest her. When the police arrived, they found the main door to Ms. Wilson's house open. The officers opened the unlocked screen door and walked in, identified themselves as police officers, and said that they had a warrant. Ms. Wilson's attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search, claiming it was invalid on the grounds that the officers had failed to "knock and announce" before entering.</p>
619
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
821
54,328
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-762
93-762
1994
Jerome B. Graubart Inc.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company
<p>The city of Chicago hired the Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company (Great Lakes) to perform work that would prevent ships from bumping into piers. To that end, Great Lakes used a crane to drive piles into the riverbed, which potentially weakened the structure of the freight tunnel that ran below the river. On April 13, 1992, water from the Chicago River poured into a freight tunnel, which subsequently flooded into the basements of several buildings. After the flood, many victims sued Great Lakes in state court and argued that the flood was the result of the weakening of the tunnel. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock removed the case to federal district court and argued federal admiralty court had jurisdiction of marine cases. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of admiralty jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.</p>
873
7
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Judicial Power
822
54,331
United States v. Lopez
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1260
93-1260
1994
United States
Lopez
<p>Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows...is a school zone." Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.</p>
598
5
4
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Federalism
823
54,330
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1001
93-1001
1994
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.
Dobson
<p>In 1987, Steven Gwin, a homeowner in Birmingham, Alabama, bought a lifetime "Termite Protection Plan" from a local office of Allied-Bruce Terminix Company. The termite prevention contract specified that any controversy would be settled exclusively by arbitration. After the Gwins sold their house and transferred their plan to the Dobsons, the Dobsons initiated suit against the Gwins, Allied-Bruce, and Terminix following a termite infestation. Allied- Bruce and Terminix asked for, but were denied, a stay to allow for arbitration under the contract and the Federal Arbitration Act. In affirming, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the denial of the stay on the basis of a state statute making written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable. The court also found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply because the parties entering the contract contemplated transactions that were primarily local and not substantially interstate.</p>
967
7
2
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Federalism
824
54,333
Arizona v. Evans
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1660
93-1660
1994
Arizona
Isaac Evans
<p>In January 1991, Phoenix police officer Bryan Sargent observed Isaac Evans driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Sargent directed Evans to pull over and asked to see his license. Evans informed Sargent that his license was suspended, and upon running the license, Sargent found that there was also an outstanding warrant for Evans’ arrest. During the arrest, Evans dropped a hand-rolled cigarette that smelled of marijuana, so officers searched his car and discovered a bag of marijuana. When Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, the police were informed that his arrest warrant had been quashed and only remained on the record due to a clerical error. Evans moved to exclude the marijuana evidence because it was discovered during the course of an illegal arrest. The trial court granted the motion.</p> <p>The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and held that the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter government employees who were not directly associated with the arrest. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and held there was no meaningful distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and those committed by court employees.</p>
1,185
7
2
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
825
54,336
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-23
94-23
1994
City of Edmonds
Oxford House, Inc.
<p>In Washington State, the City of Edmonds' zoning code provides that the occupants of single-family dwelling units must compose a family, defined as "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated] persons." Under the code, Oxford House, which operates a group home for 10-12 adults recovering from alcoholism and drug addiction in a neighborhood zoned for single-family residences, was issued a citation. Oxford House asserted that under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prohibits discrimination in housing against persons with handicaps, the city had failed to make reasonable accommodations permitting the maintenance of the group home in a single-family zone. Edmonds sought a declaration that the FHA did not apply to the city's zoning code. The District Court held that the city's zoning code rule defining family was exempt from the FHA under as a reasonable restriction regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling. The Court of Appeals reversed.</p>
1,034
6
3
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Civil Rights
826
54,343
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-986
93-986
1994
McIntyre
Ohio Elections Commission
<p>On April 27, 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.</p>
544
7
2
true
majority opinion
reversed
First Amendment
827
54,346
Tome v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-6892
93-6892
1994
Matthew Wayne Tome
United States
<p>Matthew Wayne Tome was charged with sexually abusing his daughter, who was four years old at the time of the alleged crime. Tome and the child’s mother were divorced and Tome had primary physical custody of the child, but the mother was awarded custody in 1990. The prosecution argued that the sexual abuse occurred while the child was with Tome, but was not discovered until the child spent vacation time with her mother. Tome argued that the allegations were fabricated to keep the child from being returned to him. The prosecution produced six witnesses who testified to verify the out of court statements made by the child. The out of court statements were all made after the motive to fabricate would have arisen. The district court admitted the statements into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which state that prior statements of a witness are not hearsay is they are consistent with the witness’ testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence of motive.” Tome was convicted. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, holding that the proper test was to weigh the probative value against their prejudicial effect, not whether statements were made before or after the motive to fabricate arose.</p>
1,297
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
828
54,353
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-590
94-590
1994
Vernonia School District 47J
Acton
<p>An official investigation led to the discovery that high school athletes in the Vernonia School District participated in illicit drug use. School officials were concerned that drug use increases the risk of sports-related injury. Consequently, the Vernonia School District of Oregon adopted the Student Athlete Drug Policy which authorizes random urinalysis drug testing of its student athletes. James Acton, a student, was denied participation in his school's football program when he and his parents refused to consent to the testing.</p>
544
6
3
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Privacy
829
54,354
Shalala v. Whitecotton
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-372
94-372
1994
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Margaret Whitecotton, et al.
<p>On August 18, 1975, Margaret Whitecotton received her vaccine against diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT vaccination) as a four-year old. That evening and the following morning, Margaret suffered seizures that were a symptom of encephalopathy. Her parents filed a claim on her behalf and alleged that the vaccine caused her encephalopathy, a condition that impairs brain function. </p> <p>In order to prove their claim under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, claimants must meet the requirements of the Vaccine Injury Table, which lists the conditions associated with each vaccine and the timeframe of their expected occurrence. The Special Master, empowered to hear such claims, determined that Margaret’s symptoms indicated encephalopathy, but that she exhibited symptoms of the condition prior to the vaccination, and therefore her symptoms did not fit within the timetable. The Master denied compensation and the Court of Federal Claims affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision.</p>
1,053
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Economic Activity
830
54,355
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-780
94-780
1994
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd.
Pinette
<p>In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds.</p>
465
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
First Amendment
831
54,357
Milwaukee v. Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-788
94-788
1994
Milwaukee
Cement Div., National Gypsum Co.
<p>After a ship owned by the Cement Division of National Gypsum Co. sank in a winter storm while berthed in a slip owned by Milwaukee, National Gypsum brought an admiralty suit for damages, alleging that the city had negligently breached its duty as a wharfinger. The city denied fault and filed a counterclaim for damage to its dock, alleging that National Gypsum was negligent in leaving the ship virtually unmanned. The District Court found that both parties were negligent, apportioned liability primarily to National Gypsum, and entered a partial judgment for the stipulated amount of National Gypsum's damages, excluding prejudgment interest. The court held that the fact that National Gypsum's loss was primarily attributable to its own negligence and the existence of a genuine dispute over the City's liability were special circumstances justifying a departure from the general rule that prejudgment interest should be awarded in maritime collision cases. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that mutual fault cannot provide a basis for denying prejudgment interest.</p>
1,084
8
0
false
majority opinion
reversed
Economic Activity
832
54,359
Reynoldsville Casket Company v. Hyde
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-3
94-3
1994
Reynoldsville Casket Co. et al.
Hyde
<p>A collision between a car and a truck occurred in Ohio. More than three years later, Carol Hyde, a passenger in the car, sued the truck driver and his employer for negligence in the Court of Common Pleas. Ohio had a two-year statute of limitations for such actions, but because the truck driver and his employer were from out of state, a special provision tolled the running of the statute of limitations. 10 months after this suit began, the Supreme Court decided in <em>Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc.</em>, 486 U.S. 888 (1988) that the tolling provision placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Common Pleas applied <em>Bendix</em> and dismissed Hyde's suit as untimely. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, but the Ohio Supreme Court reversed on the ground that <em>Bendix</em> could not be retroactively applied to claims that commenced prior to that decision.</p>
930
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed
Due Process
833
54,360
Johnson v. Jones
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-455
94-455
1994
Johnson
Jones
<p>Police officers found Houston Jones, a diabetic, on the street while he was having an insulin seizure. The officers arrested Jones because he appeared drunk. Later, Jones found himself with several broken ribs. Jones brought a constitutional tort action against the officers, claiming that they used excessive force when they arrested him and that they beat him at the police station. As government officials, the officers were entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. Three of the officers moved for summary judgment arguing that he could point to no evidence that these three had beaten him or had been present during beatings. Holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence supporting Jones's theory of the case, the District Court denied the motion. The officers sought an immediate appeal, arguing that the denial was wrong because the evidence in the pretrial record was not sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact for trial. The Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.</p>
1,051
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Judicial Power
834
54,362
Kyles v. Whitley
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-7927
93-7927
1994
Curtis Lee Kyles
John P. Whitley
<p>Curtis Lee Kyles was charged with murdering 60-year-old Delores Dye in a Schwegmann’s parking lot. After an initial trial with a hung jury, Kyles was tried again, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision on direct appeal. Then Kyles sought state collateral review, where he was unsuccessful, but he uncovered evidence favorable to him that the prosecution failed to disclose before or during trial. Kyles filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, citing <i>Brady v. Maryland</i>, which held that the prosecution violates due process if they fail to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant. The district court denied relief, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>
805
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
835
54,366
Wilton v. Seven Falls Company
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-562
94-562
1994
Wilton
Seven Falls Company
<p>London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group, which was involved in litigation over the ownership and operation of Texas oil and gas properties, under several commercial liability insurance policies. After a verdict was entered against the Hill Group, the underwriters sought a federal declaratory judgment that their policies did not cover the Hill Group's liability. The Hill Group filed a state court suit and moved to dismiss or to stay the underwriter's action. The District Court entered a stay on the ground that the state suit encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the federal action. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Noting that a district court has broad discretion to grant or decline to grant declaratory judgment, the appellate court did not require application of the exceptional circumstances test. The appellate court also reviewed the District Court's decision for abuse of discretion and found none.</p>
953
8
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Judicial Power
836
54,369
U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1456
93-1456
1994
U. S. Term Limits, Inc.
Ray Thornton
<p>On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters adopted Amendment 73 to their State Constitution. The "Term Limitation Amendment," in addition to limiting terms of elected officials within the Arkansas state government, also provided that any person who served three or more terms as a member of the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Representative from Arkansas. Similarly, the Amendment provided that any person who served two or more terms as a member of the United States Senate from Arkansas would be ineligible for re-election as a US Senator from Arkansas.</p>
623
5
4
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Federalism
837
54,371
Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-226
94-226
1994
Florida Bar
Went For It Inc.
<p>Went For It, Inc., (a lawyer referral service) and John T. Blakely (a Florida attorney) were sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives who had been injured in an accident. According to Florida Bar rules, such direct and targeted mailings are prohibited for thirty days following an accident or disaster.</p>
343
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed
Attorneys
838
54,373
Brown v. Gardner
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/93-1128
93-1128
1994
Brown
Gardner
<p>Fred P. Gardner was treated in a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility. Afterwards, he experienced weakness in his left leg, allegedly a result of the surgery. He claimed disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which requires the VA to pay disability compensation if an injury occurs as a result of or is worsened by treatment. The VA and the Board of Veterans Appeals denied the claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by VA regulation 38 CFR 3.358 (c)(3), requires that the claimant prove that the injury arose due to negligence or error by the VA facility. The Court of Veterans Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the fault-or-accident requirement in 38 CFR 3.358 was not warranted by Section 1151. The decision was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.</p>
820
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Civil Rights
839
54,375
North Star Steel Company v. Thomas
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1994/94-834
94-834
1994
North Star Steel Company
Thomas
<p>The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) authorizes a civil enforcement action by aggrieved employees or their union against a covered employer who fails to give 60 days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff, but provides no limitations period for such an action. In 94-835, the United Steelworkers of America filed a WARN claim, charging Crown Cork &amp; Seal Co., Inc. with laying off 85 employees without giving the required 60-day notice. In rejecting Crown Cork's contention that the statute of limitations had run, the District Court held that the source of the limitations period for WARN suits is state law and that the union's suit was timely under any of the arguably applicable Pennsylvania statutes. In 94-834, another District Court granted summary judgment for North Star Steel Company, holding the nonunion employees' suit barred under a limitations period borrowed from the National Labor Relations Act, which the court believed was more analogous to WARN than any state law. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and held that a WARN limitations period should be borrowed from state, not federal, law.</p>
1,155
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Criminal Procedure
840
54,378
Lockheed Corporation v. Spink
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-809
95-809
1995
Lockheed Corporation
Spink
<p>Lockheed Corporation hired Paul L. Spink when he was sixty-one. He was excluded from participation in Lockheed's retirement program. Later changes in federal law required Lockheed to add Spink to the retirement program. Lockheed added Spink, but refused accrued benefits for the years he had worked at Lockheed before federal law changed. Lockheed also offered an increased pension benefit to employees who would retire early in exchange for their waiver of any employment claims against the corporation. Spink refused to be added without earning the extra benefits for the previous years he had worked. Spink filed suit alleging he should receive full benefits. The District Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Spink. It held the law applied retroactively which would cover Spink.</p>
847
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Economic Activity
841
54,379
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-354
95-354
1995
O'Connor
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corporation
<p>James O'Connor, 56, was fired by Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. and replaced by a 40-year-old worker. O'Connor filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The District Court granted Consolidated's summary judgment motion. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that O'Connor failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination because he failed to show that he was replaced by someone outside the age group protected by the ADEA since his replacement was 40 years old.</p>
548
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Civil Rights
842
54,380
Jaffee v. Redmond
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-266
95-266
1995
Jaffee
Redmond
<p>Mary Lu Redmond, a former police officer, received extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker after she shot and killed Ricky Allen. Carrie Jaffee, special administrator for Allen, filed suit in federal District Court alleging that Redmond had violated Allen's constitutional rights by using excessive force in the encounter. During the trial, Jaffee sought access to the notes from Redmond's counseling. Redmond's counsel resisted asserting the conversations were protected against involuntary disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The District Court judge rejected the argument, but the notes were not released. The judge instructed the jury that they could presume that the contents could have been unfavorable to Redmond. The jury awarded monetary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. It found that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 prompted the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.</p>
950
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Judicial Power
843
54,383
Carlisle v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9247
94-9247
1995
Carlisle
United States
<p>At his trial on a federal marijuana charge, Charles Carlisle filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c) after the jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court granted the motion even though it was filed one day outside the time limit prescribed by Rule 29(c), which provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty..., a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period." In reversing and remanding for reinstatement of the verdict and for sentencing, the Court of Appeals held that under Rule 29(c) a district court has no jurisdiction to grant an untimely motion for judgment of acquittal, or to enter such a judgment after submission of the case to the jury.</p>
853
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Criminal Procedure
844
54,384
United States v. Armstrong
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-157
95-157
1995
United States
Armstrong
<p>Christopher Lee Armstrong and others were indicted on federal charges of "conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and conspiring to distribute the same." The Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms had monitored Armstrong and others prior to their indictment and arrest. Armstrong filed a motion for discovery or dismissal, alleging that he was selected for prosecution because he was black. The District Court granted the discovery order. It ordered the government to provide statistics on similar cases from the last three years. The government indicated it would not comply. Subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. It held that the proof requirements for a selective-prosecution claim do not require a defendant to demonstrate that the government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.</p>
959
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
845
54,381
Lewis v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6465
95-6465
1995
Lewis
United States
<p>Ray Lewis, a mail handler for the United States Postal Service, was observed opening several pieces of mail and pocketing the contents. Subsequently, Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, where each charge carries a maximum authorized prison sentence of six months. Lewis requested a jury trial. Denying his request, the Magistrate Judge ordered a bench trial, explaining that because she would not sentence him to more than six months' imprisonment, he was not entitled to a jury trial. The District Court affirmed. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that the Sixth Amendment jury trial right pertains only to those offenses for which the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty of over six months' imprisonment. The Court continued that, because each offense charged was petty in character, the fact that Lewis was facing more than six months' imprisonment in the aggregate did not entitle him to a jury trial. The court also reasoned that because the offense's characterization as petty or serious determined the right to a jury trial, a trial judge's self-imposed limitation on sentencing could not deprive a defendant of that right.</p>
1,177
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Criminal Procedure
846
54,382
Shaw v. Hunt
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-923
94-923
1995
Shaw
Hunt
<p>Residents of North Carolina challenged a plan to create two congressional districts on the ground that the proposed districts were racially gerrymandered. On initial review, a three-judge District Court panel dismissed the action only to have its decision reversed and remanded to it by the Supreme Court. However, the Court's standard for review left very little room for racial engineering of congressional voting districts. On remand, the District Court found the redistricting plans to be racially tailored and, therefore, unconstitutional. Again, the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>
605
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed
Civil Rights
847
54,385
Wisconsin v. City of New York
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1614
94-1614
1995
Wisconsin
City of New York
<p>Under the Constitution's Census Clause, Congress is vested with the responsibility of conducting an "actual enumeration" of the American public every ten years, primarily for the purpose of aportioning congressional representation among the states. Congress delegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce who, in the 1990 census, decided not to use a statistical correction, known as the post-enumeration survey (PES), to adjust an undercount in the initial population count. Acting on behalf of several citizens' groups, states, and cities, Wisconsin challenged the Secretary's decision not to use the PES; claiming that it resulted in an undercounting of certain identifiable minority groups.</p>
714
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed
Civil Rights
848
54,387
United States v. International Business Machines Corporation
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-591
95-591
1995
United States
International Business Machines Corporation
<p>Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) paid a tax on insurance premiums it paid to foreign insurers to insure exports from the U.S. to foreign countries. IBM sought a refund on the tax and filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims when its refund claim was denied by the IRS. IBM contended the tax violated the Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that "[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State." The court agreed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
545
6
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Federal Taxation
849
54,388
Neal v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9088
94-9088
1995
Neal
United States
<p>A federal District Court sentenced Meirl Gilbert Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute. The amount of LSD was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the U. S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper, or carrier medium, containing the drug. The combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams. Thus, the court ruled that Neal was subject to 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court held that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, an en banc Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights.</p>
1,579
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Criminal Procedure
850
54,386
Holly Farms Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-210
95-210
1995
Holly Farms Corporation
National Labor Relations Board
<p>Holly Farms Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc., is a vertically integrated poultry producer. In 1989, the Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board, seeking an election in a proposed unit that included live-haul employees working out of Holly Farms' Wilkesboro processing plant. The unit included workers described as "live-haul" crews, or teams of chicken catchers, forklift operators, and truckdrivers, who collect for slaughter chickens raised as broilers by independent contract growers, and transport the birds to the processing plant. Classifying the live-haul workers as employees protected by the National Labor Relations Act, rather than agricultural laborers excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board approved the bargaining unit. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order, holding that the Board's classification rested on a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was consistent with the Board's prior decisions.</p>
1,066
5
4
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Unions
851
54,390
Lewis v. Casey
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1511
94-1511
1995
Lewis
Casey
<p>Fletcher Casey, Jr. and other inmates of various prisons operated by the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), brought a class action against ADOC officials, alleging that the ADOC officials were furnishing them with inadequate legal research facilities and thereby depriving them of their right of access to the courts, in violation of Bounds v. Smith. Bounds held that "the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." The District Court found the ADOC officials in violation of Bounds and issued an injunction mandating detailed, systemwide changes in ADOC's prison law libraries and in its legal assistance programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed both the finding of a Bounds violation and the injunction's major terms.</p>
958
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Due Process
852
54,391
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-896
94-896
1995
BMW of North America, Inc.
Gore
<p>After purchasing a new vehicle from an authorized Alabama BMW dealership, Ira Gore, Jr. discovered that his new vehicle had been repainted. He sued BMW's American distributor (BMW), alleging that it committed fraud by failing to inform him that his car had been repainted. The Alabama Circuit Court entered judgment, following a jury verdict, awarding Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages. On appeal from the trial judge's denial of BMW's post-trial petition to set aside the punitive damages as 'grossly excessive,' the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damages were not so excessive as to violate BMW's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Due to a jury calculation error, however, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced Gore's punitive damage award to $2 million. BMW appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>
856
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Economic Activity
853
54,392
Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1654
94-1654
1995
Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas
Umbehr
<p>Umbehr was an independent trash-hauling contractor for Wabaunsee County, Kansas. He frequently criticized the County's Board of Commissioners (the Board). When the Board voted to terminate his contract, supposedly because the Board grew tired of his constant criticisms, Umbehr filed suit against two of the Board's members. Umbehr alleged that his termination resulted from his criticisms of the Board and, therefore, infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board, the Tenth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted Umbehr's petition for certiorari.</p>
654
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
First Amendment
854
54,395
National Labor Relations Board v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-947
94-947
1995
National Labor Relations Board
Town & Country Electric, Inc., et al.
<p>Town &amp; County Electric, Inc., a non-union company, sought to fill several positions for a construction job in Minnesota. Town &amp; Country received applications from union staff, but refused to interview any of the applicants except one, who was eventually hired and fired soon thereafter. These individuals applied with the intention to organize Town &amp; Country and were to remain on Union payroll during their time of employment. The union, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board claiming that Town &amp; Country had refused to interview and retain the workers because of their union affiliation, a violation of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board held that the 11 individuals met the definition of employees under the Act and rejected Town &amp; Country's claims that the individuals had been refused for other reasons.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that the term "employee" does not include those individuals who remain on Union payroll during their time of employment with another company.</p>
1,139
9
0
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Unions
855
54,393
United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1893
94-1893
1995
United States et al.
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company Of Virginia et al. 516 U.S. 415
<p>To prevent "local media monopolies," Section 533(b) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 barred local phone service providers (local exchange carriers or LECs) from directly providing video programming to their local phone service subscribers. The government claimed that because LEC- controlled phone lines could also transmit video signals, allowing LECs to provide video programming would hurt competing cable companies. First, LECs could deny competitors access to their data lines. Second, LECs could offer lower cable prices than competitors by raising the costs of telephone service and using the extra profits to subsidize the costs of cable service.</p> <p>Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia (Chesapeake) challenged the constitutionality of the statute, pointing out that "video programming" is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. The government argued that the statute's regulation of the cable market had a "content-neutral" objective. The District Court ruled that the statute's restrictions were not "narrowly tailored" to serve the statute's objective. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, adding that the statute did not leave open "ample alternative channels for communication" between LECs and local residents. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with <em>National Cable Television Assn., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Corp</em>.</p>
1,415
9
0
true
per curiam
vacated/remanded
Judicial Power
856
54,394
Doctor's Associates Inc. v. Casarotto
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-559
95-559
1995
Doctor's Associates Inc.
Casarotto
<p>Paul Casarotto, a Subway sandwich shop franchisee, sued franchisor Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its agent, Nick Lombardi, in a Montana state court when a dispute arose between the parties with regard to a standard form franchise agreement for the operation of the shop. The court stayed the lawsuit pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause set out in ordinary type on page nine of the franchise agreement. In reversing, the Montana Supreme Court held that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it did not meet the state-law requirement, 27-5-114(4), that "[n]otice that a contract is subject to arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract." DAI and Lombardi unsuccessfully argued that the state-law requirement was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which declares written provisions for arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." The Montana Supreme Court focused on the question of whether the application of 27-5-114(4)'s notice requirement would undermine the FAA's goals and policies. In the Montana court's judgment, the notice requirement did not undermine these goals and policies, for it did not preclude arbitration agreements altogether.</p>
1,340
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Federalism
857
54,396
Lane v. Peña
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-365
95-365
1995
Lane
Peña
<p>The Department of Transportation expelled Lane, a student, from the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy because he was diagnosed with diabetes. Lane sued the Department of Transportation alleging that his termination violated section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which barred "any program or activity under any executive agency" from discriminating on the basis of disability. The district court reinstated Lane, but refused to award damages because the federal government's sovereign immunity had not been waived by Congress. The appeals court affirmed the district court decision.</p>
590
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
858
54,397
Felker v. Turpin
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-8836
95-8836
1995
Felker
Turpin
<p>Ellis Felker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, appellate or certiorari review, and stay of execution after having his convictions for capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment affirmed on appeal. Felker's habeas petition challenged the constitutionality of Title I of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "Act"). Title I of the Act requires that all motions for filing a second or successive habeas appeal from a district court be reviewed by an appellate panel whose decision shall not be appealable by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.</p>
610
9
0
false
majority opinion
null
Criminal Procedure
859
54,399
United States v. Ursery
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-345
95-345
1995
United States
Ursery
<p>Alleging that Ursery manufactured marijuana on his property, the United States government initiated criminal proceedings against Ursery and began civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. On appeal from his conviction in District Court, the Court of Appeals reversed on double-jeopardy grounds. The government then initiated a second set of proceedings against Ursery's property, which was reversed on new double-jeopardy grounds. The government appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.</p>
507
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed
Criminal Procedure
860
54,403
Tuggle v. Netherland
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6016
95-6016
1995
Tuggle
Netherland
<p>Lem Tuggle was convicted of murder. After the Commonwealth presented unrebutted psychiatric testimony of his future dangerousness, the jury found two statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Tuggle to death. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, which held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence of an indigent defendant's future dangerousness in a capital sentencing proceeding, due process requires the State to provide the defendant with the assistance of an independent psychiatrist. On remand, the State Supreme Court invalidated the future dangerousness aggravating factor, but upheld the death sentence based on the vileness aggravator under Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals construed Zant as establishing a rule that in nonweighing States a death sentence may be upheld based on one valid aggravating circumstance, regardless of the reasons for finding another aggravating factor invalid.</p>
1,013
9
0
true
per curiam
vacated/remanded
Criminal Procedure
861
54,405
United States v. Noland
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-323
95-323
1995
United States
Noland
<p>The IRS filed claims in Bankruptcy Court for taxes, interest, and penalties that accrued when Thomas R. Noland, the trustee of the in-debt First Truck Lines, Inc., sought relief under federal Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court held that the claims for taxes and interest were the first priority in the case. Consequently, the court subordinated the penalties, to be adjudicated following the taxes and interest, because the penalties were not financial losses for the IRS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.</p>
527
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Federal Taxation
862
54,408
United States v. Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-325
95-325
1995
United States
Reorganized CF& I Fab. of UT
<p>The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 obligated CF&amp;I Steel Corporation (CF&amp;I) to make annual funding contributions to pension plans they sponsored. The required contribution for the 1989 plan totaled $12.4 million. CF&amp;I failed to make the payment and petitioned the Bankruptcy Court for Chapter 11 reorganization. The Government filed a proof of claim for tax liability arising under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971(a), which imposes a 10 percent "tax" on any "accumulated funding deficiency" of plans such as CF&amp;I's. The court allowed the claim, but rejected the Government's argument that the claim was entitled to priority as an "excise tax" under the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Court also subordinated the Section 4971 claim to those of all other general unsecured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code's provision for equitable subordination. The court later approved a reorganization plan for CF&amp;I giving lowest priority (and no money) to claims for non-compensatory penalties. The District Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
1,100
9
0
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Federal Taxation
863
54,404
Lonchar v. Thomas
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5015
95-5015
1995
Lonchar
Thomas
<p>Larry Grant Lonchar was sentenced to death for murder nine years ago. After the affirmance of Lonchar's conviction and sentence, his sister and brother filed "next friend" state habeas corpus petitions. Lonchar opposed both. Lonchar then filed a state habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed. Shortly before Lonchar's scheduled execution, he filed another state habeas corpus petition. When the petition was denied, Lonchar filed an "eleventh hour" federal petition, his first, on the day of his scheduled execution. The District Court held that Lonchar's conduct in waiting almost nine years to file his federal petition did not constitute an independent basis for rejecting the petition and granted a stay to permit time for consideration of other grounds for dismissal raised by the State. The court had reasoned that federal Habeas Corpus Rule 9, not some generalized equitable authority to dismiss, governed the case. The Court of Appeals vacated the stay. Setting aside the Rules and traditional habeas doctrine, the court held that equitable doctrines independent of Rule 9 applied and it concluded that Lonchar did not merit equitable relief.</p>
1,162
5
4
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Criminal Procedure
864
54,407
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-12
94-12
1995
Seminole Tribe of Florida
Florida
<p>The Seminole Tribe brought suit against the State of Florida for violating the good faith negotiations requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Under the IGRA, the Tribe may engage in gaming (i.e., casino gambling) activities subject to Florida's good faith regulations. Florida moved to dismiss the Tribe's action, alleging that the lawsuit violated Florida's sovereign immunity. On appeal from the District Court's denial of Florida's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment shielded Florida from federal suit and that under Ex Parte Young, the Tribe may not enforce its right to good faith negotiations by naming Florida's governor as a party to the suit.</p>
739
5
4
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Federalism
865
54,409
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-719
95-719
1995
Gasperini
Center for Humanities Inc.
<p>William Gasperini, a journalist and photographer, loaned 300 original slide transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. When the Center lost the transparencies, Gasperini commenced suit in the District Court. The Center conceded liability. A jury awarded Gasperini $1,500 per transparency, the asserted "industry standard" of compensation for a lost transparency. The Center moved for a new trial contending that the verdict was excessive. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals observed that New York law governed the controversy in this diversity case. Under New York law appellate courts are empowered to review the size of jury verdicts and to order new trials when the jury's award "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation." Contrarily, under the Seventh Amendment, "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." Guided by New York Appellate Division decisions reviewing damage awards for lost transparencies, the court held that the $450,000 verdict "materially deviates from what is reasonable compensation." The court vacated the judgment entered on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an award of $100,000.</p>
1,349
5
4
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
null
866
54,410
Hercules Inc. v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-818
94-818
1995
Hercules Inc.
United States
<p>During the 1960s, the United States government contracted with several chemical manufacturers, including Hercules Incorporated and Wm. T. Thompson Company, to manufacture the herbicide known as Agent Orange. After health problems arose, Vietnam veterans and their families began filing lawsuits against the manufactures. The manufacturers incurred substantial costs defending, and then settling, the claims. The manufactures then filed suit under the Tucker Act to recover such costs from the Government on theories of contractual indemnification and warranty of specifications provided by the government. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of implied warranty of specifications and the theory of implied promise to indemnify for liabilities incurred in performing the contracts. The appellate court also held that, by settling, the manufactures had voluntarily assumed liability for which the Government was not responsible.</p>
951
6
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
867
54,411
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1530
94-1530
1995
Things Remembered, Inc.
Petrarca
<p>Anthony Petrarca commenced an action in Ohio state court to collect rent allegedly owed by Child World, Inc. under two commercial leases and to enforce Cole National Corporation's guarantee of Child World's performance under the leases. After Child World filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, Cole's successor in interest, Things Remembered, Inc., removed the action to federal court under the bankruptcy removal statute and the general federal removal statute. The Bankruptcy Court held that the removal was timely and proper and that it had jurisdiction. The District Court reversed and remanded the case to state court, holding that the removal was untimely and that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed Things Remembered's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.</p>
805
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Judicial Power
868
54,412
Lawrence v. Chater
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-9323
94-9323
1995
Lawrence
Chater
<p>Kemmerlyn Lawrence asserted entitlement to Social Security benefits as the dependant, unmarried minor child of a deceased insured individual. Under the Social Security Act, which requires paternity to be decided by state law, Lawrence acknowledged that her claim appeared defeated, but agued that the relevant North Carolina law's proof of paternity requirements are unconstitutional. After the Federal Government argued that a state paternity law's constitutionality need not be considered before applying it to determine entitlement to Social Security benefits, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Lawrence's benefits. Subsequently, the Social Security Administration reexamined its position and concluded that the Act does require a determination whether a state intestacy statute is constitutional. The Solicitor General thus invited the Court to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the case (GVR) to the Court of Appeals to decide the case or remand it to the Social Security Commissioner for reconsideration.</p>
1,050
7
2
true
per curiam
vacated/remanded
Judicial Power
869
54,415
Lotus Development Corporation v. Borland International, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-2003
94-2003
1995
Lotus Development Corporation
Borland International, Inc.
<p>Lotus Development Corporation (Lotus) copyrighted a computer spreadsheet program called Lotus 1-2-3. The program's menu options were arranged in a specific menu command hierarchy. Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed users to write "macros," which designate a certain series of commands to be executed with a single keystroke. Competing software-company Borland International, Inc. (Borland) released a similar program called Quattro that contained a program called "Key Reader." Lotus claimed that Key Reader infringed on its copyright because it copied Lotus 1-2-3 macros and arranged them according to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy. Borland explained that it did this to allow users already familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 to also operate Quattro and argued that the Lotus menu command hierarchy did not constitute copyright-protected material.</p> <p>After the District Court ruled in favor of Lotus, Borland appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the command menu hierarchy was a "method of operation" - a category excluded from copyright protection under 17 U.S.C.102(b).</p>
1,139
4
4
false
equally divided
affirmed
Economic Activity
870
54,414
Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Company
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1175
94-1175
1995
Bank One Chicago, N.A.
Midwest Bank & Trust Company
<p>The Expedited Funds Availability Act requires banks to make deposited funds available for withdrawal within specified time periods. The act provides for administrative enforcement and civil liability. After a BankOne Chicago customer deposited a check drawn on a Midwest Bank and Trust account, the check was forwarded, but returned unpaid because BankOne's endorsement stamp was illegible. Subsequently, when the check was resubmitted, the account did not have sufficient funds to cover the withdrawal. Bank One then sued Midwest Bank for failing to meet its obligations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) pursuant to the act. The District Court entered summary judgment for BankOne. The Court of Appeals, vacating the lower court's decision, ordered the action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The appellate court held that the act authorizes original federal-court jurisdiction only when a "person other than [a] depository institution" sues a "depository institution," or when a depositor sues a bank.</p>
1,071
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Economic Activity
871
54,416
Henderson v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-232
95-232
1995
Henderson
United States
<p>Lloyd Henderson, a merchant mariner, was injured while working aboard a United States vessel. After exhausting administrative remedies, Henderson filed a seaman's personal injury action against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. Henderson's complaint was filed close to, but within, the two-year limit set on complaints by the Act. Henderson then followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the service of the summons and complaint, or service of process, to the proper authorities. The United States argued that Henderson failed to serve the complaint "forthwith," or without delay. This deprived the court of jurisdiction because "forthwith" service is a prerequisite for the government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. The government's argument prevailed and the federal District Court dismissed Henderson's suit. Henderson lost on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
928
6
3
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Judicial Power
872
54,418
Norfolk & Western Railway Company v. Hiles
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6
95-6
1995
Norfolk & Western Railway Company
Hiles
<p>Railroad cars are connected by couplers consisting of knuckles - clamps that lock with their mates - joined to the ends of drawbars, which are fastened to housing mechanisms on the cars. Cars automatically couple when they come together and one car's open knuckle engages the other car's closed knuckle. The drawbar pivots in its housing, allowing the knuckled end some lateral play to prevent moving cars from derailing on a curved track. As a consequence of this lateral movement, drawbars may remain off-center when cars are uncoupled and must be realigned manually to ensure proper coupling. William J. Hiles injured his back while attempting to realign an off-center drawbar on a car at one of Norfolk &amp; Western Rail Company's yards. Hiles sued in Illinois state court, alleging that Norfolk &amp; Western had violated Section 2 of the federal Safety Appliance Act (SAA), which requires that cars be equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles." The trial court granted Hiles a directed verdict on liability, and the state appellate court affirmed.</p>
1,187
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed
Economic Activity
873
54,419
Gray v. Netherland
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-6510
95-6510
1995
Gray
Netherland
<p>Coleman Wayne Gray was tried for the murder of Richard McClelland in Virginia. The prosecution acknowledged that if the trial reached the capital penalty phase they would introduce Gray's admissions to other inmates that he had previously murdered 2 other people. Gray's attorney moved to exclude the evidence because Gray had not been officially charged with such crimes. Gray also claimed such evidence was a surprise tactic and that he could not pose the proper defense immediately. The Virginia trial court denied the motion to exclude. Subsequently, Gray was sentenced to death. After exhausting state remedies, Gray sough federal habeas corpus relief. He claimed that inadequate notice of evidence prevented him from a fair defense in the penalty phase of his capital trial in violation of his right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court initially denied the petition because it found Gray had no constitutional right to notice of individual testimony. Later, the District Court amended its ruling, holding that Gray was denied due process when the state failed to provide notice of what murder evidence would be presented. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. It found that to grant the habeas corpus relief would be to recognize a new federal constitutional law regarding notice-of-evidence claims.</p>
1,355
5
4
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Criminal Procedure
874
54,421
Pennsylvania v. Labron
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-1691
95-1691
1995
Pennsylvania
Edwin Labron
<p>This is the consolidation of two cases involving the search and seizure of illicit drugs in automobiles. In Pennsylvania v. Labron 95-1691, the police observed Edwin Labron participating in a number of drug transactions out of his car on a street in Philadelphia. Without a warrant, but with probable cause, the police then found cocaine when they searched the trunk of Labron's car. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the search unconstitutional, finding that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement required both the existence of probable cause and the presence of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search. In Pennsylvania v. Kilgore 95-1738, a search of Randy Kilgore's truck during a drug raid on his home turned up cocaine. Again, the police did not obtain a warrant, but probable cause existed. Again the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suppressed the evidence seized, holding that Fourth Amendment requires police to obtain a warrant before searching an automobile unless exigent circumstances are present.</p>
1,073
7
2
true
per curiam
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
875
54,420
Ornelas v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5257
95-5257
1995
Ornelas
United States
<p>Saul Ornelas and Ismael Ornelas-Ledesma were arrested in Wisconsin after suspicious activity led to the discovery of cocaine in the defendants' car. In a motion to suppress the evidence, the defendants alleged that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in their detainment and in the police search of the car. The District Court denied the motion and the defendants pleaded guilty. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the District Court but for different reasons.</p>
497
8
1
true
majority opinion
vacated/remanded
Criminal Procedure
876
54,422
Leavitt v. Jane L.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-1242
95-1242
1995
Leavitt, Governor of Utah
Jane L.
<p>A Utah district court held that a state statutory provision regulating early-term abortions was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that a similar provision regulating later-term abortions should be invalidated along with the earlier-term provision. The Tenth Circuit held that the Utah Legislature would only have wanted to regulate later-term abortions if it could also regulate earlier-term abortions, and thus concluded that the provisions were not severable (i.e. separable). Utah governor Michael Leavitt appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Utah Legislature intended the two provisions to be severable.</p>
664
5
4
true
per curiam
reversed
Privacy
877
54,424
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-26
95-26
1995
Markman
Westview Instruments, Inc.
<p>Herbert Markman owns the patent to a system that tracks clothing through the dry-cleaning process using a keyboard and data processor to generate transaction records, including a bar code readable by optical detectors. According to the patent's claim, the portion of the patent document that defines the patentee's rights, Markman's product can "maintain an inventory total" and "detect and localize spurious additions to inventory." Westview Instruments, Inc.'s product also uses a keyboard and processor and lists dry-cleaning charges on bar-coded tickets that can be read by optical detectors. In an infringement suit, after hearing an expert witness testify about the meaning of the claim's language, a jury found that Westview's product had infringed Markman's patent. However, the District Court directed a verdict for Westview on the ground that its device is unable to track "inventory" as that term is used in the claim. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the interpretation of claim terms is the exclusive province of the court and that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is consistent with that conclusion.</p>
1,144
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Criminal Procedure
878
54,423
Rutledge v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-8769
94-8769
1995
Rutledge
United States
<p>Tommy L. Rutledge was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. The District Court convicted Rutledge on both counts. It sentenced him to life imprisonment without possible release on each count. The sentences were to be served concurrently. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected Rutledge's argument that his convictions and concurrent life sentences punished him twice for the same offense.</p>
477
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
879
54,426
Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-668
95-668
1995
Auciello Iron Works, Inc.
National Labor Relations Board
<p>The day after Auciello Iron Works' contract offer was accepted by its union employees' collective-bargaining representative, Auciello disavowed the agreement because of a good-faith doubt, based on knowledge acquired before the offer's acceptance, that a majority of employees supported the Union. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) ruled that Auciello's withdrawal was an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that the agreement be reduced to a formal written instrument. The Court of Appeals enforced the order as reasonable after the NLRB issued a supplemental opinion to justify its refusal to consider Auciello's defense of good-faith doubt about the Union's majority status.</p>
740
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Unions
880
54,425
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-489
95-489
1995
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
Federal Election Commission
<p>Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee had violated the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), which imposes dollar limits upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate." The Colorado Party defended itself by claiming that the FECA expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and it dismissed the counterclaim as moot. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Provision covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. Subsequently, the court ordered judgment for the FEC.</p>
1,140
7
2
true
plurality opinion
vacated/remanded
First Amendment
881
54,427
Romer v. Evans
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1039
94-1039
1995
Romer
Evans
<p>Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 to their State Constitution precluding any judicial, legislative, or executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Following a legal challenge by homosexual and other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining Amendment 2's enforcement. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on appeal.</p>
485
6
3
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Privacy
882
54,429
Bush v. Vera
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-805
94-805
1995
Bush
Vera
<p>Following the 1990 census, Texas planned the creation of three additional congressional districts. Following the redistricting, registered voters challenged the plans as racial gerrymandering. A three-judge federal district court found the plans unconstitutional. The case moved to the Supreme Court on appeal.</p>
318
5
4
false
plurality opinion
affirmed
Civil Rights
883
54,431
Robinson v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-7448
94-7448
1995
Robinson
United States
<p>Roland Bailey and Candisha Robinson were each convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1), which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" both "during and in relation to" a predicate offense. Bailey's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a loaded pistol which the police found inside a bag in the locked trunk of a car he was driving after they arrested him for possession of illegal drugs. Robinson's Section 924(c)(1) conviction was based on an unloaded, holstered firearm which the police, executing a search warrant, found locked in a trunk in her bedroom closet, along with drugs and money from an earlier controlled buy. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the Section 924(c)(1) convictions, interpreting "use" of a gun in violation of Section 924(c)(1) in accordance with an "accessibility and proximity" test.</p>
904
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Criminal Procedure
884
54,432
United States v. Winstar Corporation
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-865
95-865
1995
United States
Winstar Corporation
<p>During the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board encouraged thrifts in good standing and outside investors to take over ailing thrifts in supervisory mergers. The Board agreed to permit acquiring entities to designate the excess of the purchase price over the fair value of identifiable assets as an intangible asset referred to as supervisory goodwill and to count such goodwill and certain capital credits toward the capital reserve requirements imposed by federal regulations. Subsequently, Congress's passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) forbade thrifts from counting goodwill and capital credits in computing the required reserves. Three thrifts, created through supervisory mergers who consequently ran into financial troubles, each filed suit against the United States for breach of contract. Agreeing with the thrifts, the District Court granted each summary judgment. The court rejected Government's arguments that surrenders of sovereign authority, such as the promise to refrain from regulatory changes, must appear in unmistakable terms in a contract in order to be enforceable and that a public and general sovereign act, such as FIRREA's alteration of capital reserve requirements, could not trigger contractual liability. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
1,364
7
2
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
885
54,433
United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-340
95-340
1995
United Food & Commercial Workers
Brown Group, Inc.
<p>The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 filed suit alleging that Brown Group, Inc. began to lay off workers in connection with the closing of one of its plants, Brown Shoe Company, before giving the union the closing notice required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the WARN Act). The union sought backpay for each of its affected members. Under modern associational standing doctrine, an organization may sue to redress its members' injuries when: 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The District Court dismissed the compliant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that "[e]ach union member who wishes to recover WARN Act damages from Brown Shoe must participate in the suit so that his or her right to damages can be determined and the quantum of damages can be calculated by the court on the basis of particularized proof." Therefore, the court concluded that the suit was barred because the union failed to meet the third part of the test for asserting associational standing.</p>
1,278
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Judicial Power
886
54,434
Brown v. Pro Football Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-388
95-388
1995
Brown
Pro Football Inc.
<p>After their collective-bargaining agreement expired, the National Football League (NFL) -- a group of football clubs -- and the NFL Players Association -- a labor union -- began to negotiate a new contract. The NFL presented a plan that would permit each club to establish a "developmental squad" of substitute players, each of whom would be paid the same $1,000 weekly salary. The union disagreed. When the negotiations reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan. A number of squad players brought an antitrust suit, claiming that the employers' plan unfairly restrained trade. The District Court awarded damages to the players, but the Court of Appeals reversed that decision.</p>
705
8
1
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
887
54,435
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1140
94-1140
1995
44 Liquormart Inc.
Rhode Island
<p>Rhode Island passed a statute banning the advertisement of retail liquor prices in places where liquor is not sold. Petitioners filed suit claiming that the statute violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The District Court found the ban unconstitutional, noting that it did not serve any interest Rhode Island might have had in promoting temperance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that open competition for liquor pricing would be harmful insofar at it would increase consumption. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
554
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed
First Amendment
888
54,437
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-203
94-203
1995
Morse
Republican Party of Virginia
<p>In 1994, the Republican Party of Virginia held a state convention to nominate the Republican candidate for United States Senator. A local political committee could certify any voter as a delegate to the convention by paying a registration fee of $35 or $45. Fortis Morse, Kenneth Curtis Bartholomew, and Kimberly J. Enderson, registered voters in Virginia willing to declare their intent to support the Party's nominee, were eligible to participate. Bartholomew and Enderson refused to pay the fee and did not become delegates. Morse paid the fee with funds advanced by supporters of the eventual nominee. Moore and others then filed a complaint seeking an injunction preventing the Party from imposing the fee, alleging that that the imposition of the fee violated sections 5 and 10 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the District Court dismissed the claims.</p>
878
5
4
true
plurality opinion
reversed/remanded
Civil Rights
889
54,436
Fulton Corporation v. Faulkner
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1239
94-1239
1995
Fulton Corporation
Faulkner
<p>After North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by state residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax, the Fulton Corporation, a North Carolina company, filed a state-court action against the State Secretary of Revenue, seeking judgment that the tax violated the Federal Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for the Secretary, but North Carolina's Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the taxable percentage deduction violated the Commerce Clause. In reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that the State's scheme imposed a valid compensatory tax and that the intangibles tax imposed less of a burden on interstate commerce than the corporate income tax placed on intrastate commerce.</p>
851
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Economic Activity
890
54,438
Koon v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1664
94-1664
1995
Koon
United States
<p>Petitioners Stacey C. Koon and Laurence M. Powell, Los Angeles police officers, were acquitted on state charges of assault and excessive use of force in the beating of Rodney King during an arrest. They were convicted under 18 U. S. C. Section 242 of violating the victim's constitutional rights under color of law. Although the applicable U.S. Sentencing Guideline, 1992 USSG Section 2H1.4, indicated that they should be imprisoned for 70 to 87 months, the District Court granted them two downward departures from that range. The first was based on the victim's misconduct, which significantly contributed to provoking the offense. The second was based on a combination of four factors: (1) that the petitioners were unusually susceptible to abuse in prison; (2) that the petitioners would lose their jobs and be precluded from employment in law enforcement; (3) that the petitioners had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions; and (4) that the petitioners posed a low risk of recidivism. The sentencing range after the departures was 30 to 37 months, and the court sentenced each petitioner to 30 months. The Court of Appeals reviewed the departure decisions utilizing a de novo standard and rejected all of them.</p>
1,242
5
4
true
majority opinion
reversed in-part/remanded
Criminal Procedure
891
54,440
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Company
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-244
95-244
1995
Quackenbush
Allstate Insurance Company
<p>The California Insurance Commissioner filed a state court action against Allstate Insurance Co. seeking damages for Allstate's alleged breach of reinsurance agreements in an effort to gather the assets of the defunct Mission Insurance companies. Allstate removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds and filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The Commissioner sought to remand the case to state court, arguing that the court should abstain from hearing the case, under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., because its resolution might interfere with California's regulation of insurance insolvencies and liquidations. The District Court agreed, concluded that an abstention was appropriate, and remanded the case to state court without ruling on Allstate's arbitration motion. After determining the appealability of the District Court's remand order, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision and ordered the case sent to arbitration. The court held that abstention was inappropriate in this damages action because a Burford abstention is limited to equitable actions.</p>
1,108
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Judicial Power
892
54,439
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Company
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1361
94-1361
1995
Zicherman
Korean Air Lines Company
<p>In 1983, Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight KE007, en route from Alaska to South Korea entered the airspace of the former Soviet Union and was shot down. All 269 people on board were killed, including Muriel Kole. Subsequently, Marjorie Zicherman and Muriel Mahalek, Kole's sister and mother sued KAL under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which governs international air transportation. Zicherman and Mahalek were awarded loss-of-society damages. The Court of Appeals set aside the verdict, holding that general maritime law supplied the substantive compensatory damages law to be applied in an action under the Warsaw Convention and that, under such law, a plaintiff can recover for loss of society only if he was the decedent's dependent at the time of death. The appellate court found that Mahalek had not established dependent status and remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Zicherman was a dependent of the decedent.</p>
954
9
0
false
majority opinion
reversed in-part
Economic Activity
893
54,441
Behrens v. Pelletier
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1244
94-1244
1995
Behrens
Pelletier
<p>After the Federal Home Loan Bank Board recommended that Robert Pelletier be replaced because of he was under investigation for potential misconduct relating to the collapse of another financial institution, he was fired as the provisional managing officer of Pioneer Savings and Loan Association. Pelletier then filed suit, seeking damages. John Behrens, the agent responsible for the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's recommendation, asserted a statute-of-limitations defense and claimed qualified immunity from suit on the ground that his actions were taken in a governmental capacity. The District Court rejected Behrens' defense of qualified immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable "final" decision, that an official claiming qualified immunity is entitled to only one such pretrial appeal, and, ultimately, affirmed the District Court's rejection of Behrens' qualified immunity. On remand, the District Court denied Behrens' motion for summary judgment, which again claimed qualified immunity. On appeal from the latest denial, the Court of Appeals dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.</p>
1,167
7
2
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Judicial Power
894
54,442
Peacock v. Thomas
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1453
94-1453
1995
Peacock
Thomas
<p>In 1987, Jack L. Thomas filed an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) class action against his former employer Tru-Tech, Inc. and D. Grant Peacock, an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech. Thomas alleged that they had breached their fiduciary duties to the class in administering Tru- Tech's pension benefits plan and sought the benefits due under the plan. The District Court ruled in Thomas's favor, but found that Peacock was not a fiduciary. After the Court of Appeals affirmed and attempts to collect from Tru-Tech failed, Thomas sued Peacock. The District Court, agreeing with Thomas to pierce the corporate veil, entered judgment against Peacock in the amount of the judgment against Tru-Tech. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court properly exercised ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' suit.</p>
851
8
1
true
majority opinion
reversed
Economic Activity
895
54,443
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-83
95-83
1995
Meghrig
KFC Western, Inc.
<p>Three years after complying with a county order to clean up petroleum contamination discovered on its property, KFC Western, Inc. brought an action under the citizen suit provision -- Section 6972 -- of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) to recover its cleanup costs from the Meghrigs. KFC claimed that the contamination had previously posed an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the environment and that the Meghrigs were responsible for "equitable restitution" under the Act because, as prior owners of the property, they had contributed to the contaminated site. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 6972(a) does not permit recovery of past cleanup costs and that 6972 does not authorize a cause of action for the remediation of toxic waste that does not pose an "imminent and substantial endangerment" at the time suit is filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court on both issues.</p>
986
9
0
true
majority opinion
reversed
Judicial Power
896
54,445
Varity Corporation v. Howe
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1471
94-1471
1995
Varity Corporation
Howe
<p>Charles Howe and others used to work for Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a farm equipment manufacturer, and a wholly owned subsidiary of the Varity Corporation. These employees all were participants in, and beneficiaries of, Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit plan, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA protected plan that Massey- Ferguson administered itself. When certain divisions in Massey-Ferguson stared losing money, Varity decided to transfer them to a separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey Combines. Varity also persuaded the employees of the failing divisions to change employers and benefit plans, conveying the message that employees' benefits would remain secure when they transferred. Ultimately, the employees lost their nonpension benefits. The employees filed an action under ERISA, claim that Varity, through trickery, had led them to withdraw from their old plan and forfeit their benefits. The District Court found that Varity and Massey-Ferguson, acting as ERISA fiduciaries, had harmed plan beneficiaries through deliberate deception, which gave the employees to right to relief, including the reinstatement to the old plan. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>
1,222
6
3
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Economic Activity
897
54,447
Montana v. Egelhoff
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-566
95-566
1995
Montana
Egelhoff
<p>James Allen Egelhoff was tried in Montana courts for two counts of homicide. Egelhoff claimed that extreme intoxication rendered him physically incapable of committing or recalling the crimes. Montana law did not allow Egelhoff's intoxicated condition to be considered. Subsequently, Egelhoff was found guilty. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the decision. It held Egelhoff had a due process right to present all relevant evidence. Moreover, it held that Montana law's denial of such a presentation relieved the state from part of its burden of proof needed to convict Egelhoff.</p>
592
5
4
true
plurality opinion
reversed
Due Process
898
54,448
Whren v. United States
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/95-5841
95-5841
1995
Whren
United States
<p>Whren and Brown were driving in a 'high drug area.' Some plainclothes officers, while patrolling the neighborhood in an unmarked vehicle, noticed Whren and Brown sitting in a truck at an intersection stop-sign for an usually long time. Suddenly, without signaling, Whren turned his truck and sped away. Observing this traffic violation, the officers stopped the truck. When they approached the vehicle, the officers saw Whren holding plastic bags of crack cocaine. Whren and Brown were arrested on federal drug charges. Before trial, they moved to suppress the evidence contending that the officers used the traffic violation as a pretext for stopping the truck because they lacked either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop them on suspicion of drug dealing. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and convicted the petitioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>
927
9
0
false
majority opinion
affirmed
Criminal Procedure
899
54,449
United States v. Virginia
https://api.oyez.org/cases/1995/94-1941
94-1941
1995
United States
Virginia
<p>The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) boasted a long and proud tradition as Virginia's only exclusively male public undergraduate higher learning institution. The United States brought suit against Virginia and VMI alleging that the school's male-only admissions policy was unconstitutional insofar as it violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. On appeal from a District Court ruling favoring VMI, the Fourth Circuit reversed. It found VMI's admissions policy to be unconstitutional. Virginia, in response to the Fourth Circuit's reversal, proposed to create the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program for women. On appeal from the District Court's affirmation of the plan, the Fourth Circuit ruled that despite the difference in prestige between the VMI and VWIL, the two programs would offer "substantively comparable" educational benefits. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>
952
7
1
true
majority opinion
reversed/remanded
Civil Rights